House of Commons
Thursday, March 17, 1921
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
Private Business
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL. (By Order.)
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."
Arrangements have been made to withdraw the celluloid Clauses. If hon. Members object to those Clauses, perhaps they will not press their objection to the Second Reading. If they have objection to other Clauses, there is no point in what I am saying.
Question put, and agreed to.
Bill read a Second time, and committed.
Private Bills (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with).— Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bills, referred on the Second Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—
Swansea Gas Bill.
Cardiff Gas Bill.
Ordered, That the Bills be committed.
Private Bills [ Lords ] (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table eport from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—
Chatham and District Light Railways Company Bill [ Lords ]
Ordered, That the Bill be read a Second Time.
Durham County Transport Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next.
Metropolitan Water Board (Various Powers) Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till To-morrow.
Forth Conservancy Order Confirmation Bill [ Lords ] (by Order),
Consideration deferred till Wednesday next.
West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited
Copy ordered of Agreement, dated the 16th day of March, 1921, between His Majesty's Government and the West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited, supplemental to the Agreement, dated the 10th day of August, 1919, entered into between His Majesty's Government, the Government of the Dominion of Canada, the Crown Agents for the Colonies, and the West India and Panama Company, Limited (H.C. 447); together with copy of the Treasury Minute thereon.—[ Mr. Baldwin. ]
Oral Answers to Questions
Naval and Military Pensions and Grants
Royal Highlanders (Private H. Callaghan)
asked the Minister of Pensions whether his attention has been called to the case of the late Private Hugh Callaghan, Royal Highlanders, whose regimental number is given as 3/3396 and the number on the ring paper 3439; whether he is aware that the War Office intimated to his widow that he had died on 25th November, 1914; whether on the extract from the death certificate, furnished on request, the cause of death was given as suffocation; whether he is aware that the widow and children have not received any pension; whether this case was tried before the Pensions Appeal Tribunal for Scotland on 14th February, 1921, and the claim refused on the ground that death was due to the soldier's own misconduct; whether the extract of certificate produced at the appeal gave the cause of death as due to alcoholic poisoning; and whether, in view of the fact that two different regimental numbers have been given and two different extracts from the death certificate, he is prepared to cause inquiries to be made as to the real cause of this man's death so that his dependants will not be penalised if an error has been made?
From inquiries I have made I am satisfied that this soldier has been properly identified. The cause of death was found to be suffocation induced by alcoholism, and the refusal of pension was upheld by the Pensions Appeal Tribunal, whose verdict, as the hon. Member is aware, is by Statute declared to be final.
Has the right hon. Gentleman taken into account the fact that this case has been pending for over five years?
I have satisfied myself on the matter.
South Wales Borderers (Edward Edwards)
asked the Minister of Pensions whether Edward Edwards, No. 27760, South Wales Borderers, was in receipt of a pension of 8s. 3d. per week, and to what date; whether on 10th November, 1920, he was notified that, arising out of a medical board examination, he was granted from the 26th October, 1920, a 30 per cent. disablement weekly allowance for 12 months; and why it is that he has only received a payment of not more than 5s. 6d. per week?
The award of 8s. 3d. (increased to 12s. from 3rd September, 1919, under the new scale) ceased in January, 1920. The subsequent allowance of 5s. 6d: was awarded pending verification that a second disability, assessed by a board held in November last, was in fact due to service. After much inquiry, connection with service has now been established, and an award at the rate of 30 per cent. disablement has been authorised accordingly.
Temporary Grants
asked the Minister of Pensions whether he will consider the advisability of amending the regulations of the Ministry of Pensions, with a view to temporarily assisting the widows and families of deceased soldiers and sailors, pending the hearing of the dependants' appeal at the Pensions Appeal Tribunal?
If in any case of urgent need material evidence is produced which was not previously before the Ministry, the local committee may represent the facts to the Ministry, with a view to the issue of recoverable advances pending the hearing of the appeal. I do not consider that an extension of this practice is called for. I would remind my hon. Friend that claims to pension are only rejected by the Ministry after careful consideration of the available evidence.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many a widow with a large family suffers great disability by the hearing of these appeals being so long delayed?
I am afraid I have nothing to do with that.
Appeal Tribunals
asked the Minister of Pensions how many appeal tribunal courts have been set up in the London region; how many appeal cases there are still waiting for the tribunals to deal with; what is the approximate number of cases that are heard by the various tribunals in the London region each week; and what steps are to be taken in order that appellants' cases may in future be decided without their having to wait such a long period for their appeals to be heard as they have in the past?
The Pensions Appeal Tribunals are not under my control, but if my hon. and gallant Friend will put his question down again on Monday next I will see that he has an answer.
I beg to give notice that I will repeat it on Monday.
Surrey Yeomanry (Lance-Corporal Stamford)
asked the Minister of Pensions whether he is aware that Charles W. Stamford, late lance-corporal, No. 40089, joined the Surrey Yeomanry in November, 1912, was mobilised in August, 1914, and passed A 1; that this non-commissioned officer was sent to France in December, 1916, and was demobilised in February, 1919; that having experienced very indifferent health for some considerable time he consulted a doctor in June, 1919, and was found to be suffering from heart trouble in the form of a defective mitral valve; that in August, 1919, he made application to his local war pensions committee to claim a pension, and in November, 1919, attended a medical board at Cheltenham Terrace, Chelsea; that on the 11th December, 1919, Stamford was notified by the Director General of Awards, Burton Court, that he was not found to be suffering any disablement by reason of his disability; that he then contested the above decision, and on the 16th January, 1920, was notified by the Director-General of Awards that his case had again been submitted, and that it had been found that his disability was disorganised action of the heart, attributable to military service; that Stamford attended a medical appeal board at Cheltenham Terrace on the 5th July, 1920, and, after examination, was told that his heart was quite normal; that after production of the letter from the Director-General of Awards the board altered their decision, and told Stamford verbally that they assessed his disability at 20 per cent., but did not consider it attributable to service but rather to enlarged tonsils; whether this verdict coincided with the opinions expressed previously by various medical men; whether he is aware that a report was subsequently sent in by the medical appeal board that Stamford had no disability at all; that Stamford thereupon applied to his local war pensions committee and appeared before the Pensions Appeal Tribunal at Cadogan Gardens, Chelsea, on the 31st January, 1921; and that, after being questioned and examined, he was told that, although there was a slight murmur in the action of his heart, his disability was really nil, and he could not be recommended for a pension; and whether, in view of the widely different views expressed by the various medical boards, the case may be reopened and the whole of the circumstances reconsidered, so that there may be no possibility whatever of any miscarriage of justice with regard to Stamford's pension?
The decision of the Appeal Tribunal is final. I regret, therefore, that I am unable to re-open this case.
In view of the different decisions given by the medical officers, cannot the right hon. Gentleman agree to this case being reopened? Does he not recognise that it presses very hard on the applicant?
I have no power over the Appeal Tribunal. Therefore I cannot reopen the case.
Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise the fact that the Director-General's report suggests that the disability was attributable to military service, and that in the circumstances the Government should accept responsibility?
Yes; but when there is any doubt the case is referred to the Appeal Tribunal and, as I have often told the House, the jurisdiction over that tribunal is taken out of my hands.
Can it be placed in the hands of any other Government Department? I do not mean any disrespect to the right hon. Gentleman, but is it possible that it can be dealt with by any other Member of the Government?
Wound Pension
asked the Minister of Pensions whether, in the case of a man who was discharged from the Army in January, 1916, awarded a wound pension for 12 months, granted a medical board in 1920, and awarded a further pension, it is the practice to pay the second pension as from the date of the decision or whether it should be retrospective to the time when the first pension ceased; and, in the former event, whether, in. view of the fact that the second pension was awarded on the ground that the man was still suffering from the wound for which he was awarded the previous pension, he will lay down that in all such cases payment of pension shall be continuous?
The date from which the second pension would run in the circumstances stated would depend upon the merits of the individual case. If my hon. Friend has any such case in mind, and will give me particulars of it, I will gladly investigate it.
New and Expired Pensions
asked the Minister of Pensions the number of new pensions granted since 1st July, 1920, and the number of pensions terminated in that period; and when he expects the reduction to be evidenced in the decrease of administrative charges?
The number of new pensions and weekly allowances granted since 1st July, 1920, is approximately 99,000, and the number terminated 118,000. With regard to the latter part of the question, I may inform my hon. Friend that the staff of the Ministry (apart from that employed in hospitals and institutions) has been reduced since 1st July, 1920, by 1,712.
Ex-Service Men
Re-Settlement Grants
asked the Minister of Pensions the amount, if any, contributed by his Department out of State funds for the purpose of augmenting the £25,000 recommended by the Executive Committee of the National Relief Fund to create a fund out of which grants could be made for the purpose of reestablishing in business disabled officers and men; what steps have been taken to prevent overlapping of assistance and to ensure adequacy of aid; whether so far the results are regarded as satisfactory by his Department; whether he can inform the House of the extent to which any State grant for this purpose is contingent on any grant from the King's Fund, formerly the National Relief Fund, to the same end; and, if so, how his Department arrives at the estimate of the amount of such State grant in each year?
I have been asked to reply. My hon. Friend's reference to State contributions in the first part of the question is not quite clear. If, however, he has in mind the assistance given by the State towards the re-settlement of officers and men in their pre-enlistment busi- nesses, and the setting up of disabled officers and men in a business suited to their disability, the Civil Liabilities Department of the Ministry of Labour has expended on these and similar objects over £2,750,000 up to 31st January last. But before any grant is made to ah applicant, reference is made to the King's Fund to ascertain whether any application has been made to that Fund, and with what result.
Government Departments
asked the Prime Minister whether, with a view to finding employment for suitable men who served in the forces of the Crown for at least a year or were wounded or disabled, he will ascertain from every Government Department how many places are at present filled by women who are not dependent on their salary for their livelihood and whose places could be filled by ex-service men?
I have been asked to reply. I have no information as to the private means of permanent members of the staffs of Government Departments. As regards the temporary members of these staffs, who alone can be discharged in order that they may be replaced by ex-service men, inquiries have already been made, as suggested, and have shown that the number of women who are not dependent on their salaries, and who are still retained in employment, is very small. Every such case is carefully scrutinised to secure that retention is allowed, as recommended by Lord Lytton's Committee, in those cases only in which it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the head of the office that such retention is essential in the interests of the public service.
Would it not be possible to set up a Committee to deal with these cases, as the head of the office might have a prejudice in favour of the ladies?
May I ask that the same rule be applied to men, and that if they have private income they shall be put on the same footing as the women? A woman who has £30 a year is considered to have private income. Does the Prime Minister consider that any woman can live on 12s. a week? May I ask that men with £30 private income should be put on the same footing?
Is it not a fact that women and non-service men do stand exactly on the same footing?
No.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Irish Ex-Service Government Clerks' Union report, as lately as yesterday, that there is a temporary staff of 81–60 women and 21 non-service men—retained by the Department of Agriculture in Ireland?
Is not that a compliment to the women?
It is a violation of Lord Lytton's Interim Report.
Building Trade
asked the Prime Minister how matters now stand with reference to the employment of ex-service men in the building trade: and whether the Government intend to take any further steps in the matter?
I have been asked to reply. Since the building trade unions rejected the Government's proposal on this subject, the Government has been in communication with the National Federation of Building Trades' Employers. A scheme for the employment of ex-service men in the building trades has been recommended by the federation to its members for acceptance, and a ballot on the proposals is now being taken. It is expected that the result of the ballot will be reported early next week.
Will the right hon. Gentleman be able to explain this before the House rises for Easter?
If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will put down a question late next week, I will endeavour to give him a reply.
Will the right hon. Gentleman impress upon the trade unions concerned that if other similar industrial and professional organisations adopted the same line as these particular trade unions, it would be utterly impossible for ex-service men to regain their position in the civil life of this country?
Land Settlement (Ireland)
asked the Chief Secretary how many soldiers have been settled in Ireland under the Land for Irish Soldiers Act; if he will give the number according to provinces; whether a representative of the Estates Commission entered into negotiations with a number of ex-service men of Newmarket, county Cork; whether the ex-soldiers signed documents expressing their willingness to take up land from the Commission; if so, whether this has been followed by letters to the landowners stating that if they sell land for this purpose they will be shot; if similar letters have been sent to the ex-service men forbidding them to accept land from the Estates Commission on penalty of death; and whether negotiations for the settlement of these ex-soldiers are still proceeding.
The total numbers of ex-service men actually put in possession of holdings, or of cottages and allotments, are as follow:
Ireland
Murders and Outrages
asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether two armed members of the Royal Irish Constabulary entered the house of Mr. Robert Dixon, J.P., of Milltown, Dunlevin, Co. Wicklow, at 12.30 a.m. on 2nd February last, demanded money, killed him, and wounded his son, an ex-officer: whether one of these constables after- wards killed himself; whether the second has been arrested; whether he has been tried, and with what result; and whether these men were members of the Auxiliary Division?
rose, wearing in his buttonhole a sprig of shamrock.
Why is the right hon. Gentleman wearing shamrock?
Take out that shamrock! Do not be insulting to Ireland.
I hope that the beneficent influence of a great Christian national saint may permeate Ireland.
A constable has been arrested in connection with this crime and with the murder of Mr. Robert Dixon, and is at present awaiting trial on the capital charge. Another constable who is believed to have been implicated committed suicide on the day following the murder. Neither of these men was a member of the Auxiliary Division.
When will the court-martial take place?
In answer to that and similar questions, I may say that the courts-martial are set up by the Commander-in-Chief, and I must naturally await his decision in regard to these counts.
How long do you wait when it is an Irishman who is affected?
Is there any intention on the part of the Government to compensate the family of this murdered gentleman who have been to my knowledge reduced very greatly in circumstances by the death of their breadwinner?
I am aware of the most distressing circumstances which followed this brutal murder, and I have the matter under consideration. It is one of the matters of compensation in regard to which I have no funds, and I may have to come to the House.
Can the right hon. Gentleman not wait until the crime is proved?
It is the consequences of the crime I was dealing with. I mean the murder of the head of the family, whoever committed the murder.
asked the Chief Secretary whether he is now aware that John O'Connor, of Gloundaeagh, Farranfore, County Kerry, was arrested on 15th December last whilst on his way to church, and driven away in a motor lorry; that he was beaten while in the lorry, thrown from the lorry into the road, fired on, and wounded; that civilians then carried him into the house of Thomas Brosnan, Threegneves, Currow, Farranfore, where he was tended by the Rev. J. J. O'Sullivan, of Killentierna, Farranfore; that four officers returned from Farranfore, to which place the lorry had proceeded, in a motor car, and, on ascertaining from the Rev. J. J. O'Sullivan where O'Connor lay wounded, entered Brosnan's house and murdered O'Connor by firing three revolver bullets into his head; whether he is aware that the Rev J. J. O'Sullivan, Mr. Brosnan, and other eye-witnesses are prepared to testify to the foregoing farts on oath; whether an inquiry has been held: whether these witnesses were called; what was the finding; what action, if any, has been taken; and whether any compensation is to be paid to the widow and seven children of the murdered man?
I regret that I must ask the hon. and gallant Member to postpone, this question. The matter arose in a martial law area, and I must await the report of the Commander-in-Chief.
What is the cause of this terrible delay in the case of this very brutal murder? Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have been in correspondence with him for four months, and he always says that he is waiting for a reply, and does it not look as if there was deliberate baulking of justice in putting off this inquiry?
I can assure the hon. Member that there is no such sinister motive in this. The real reason for the delay in answering this and other questions is that there is a state of rebellion in this part of Ireland.
Is not that all the more reason why a delay of four months should not elapse between the murder of an Irish farmer and the taking of any steps by the right hon. Gentleman? Does not the existence of a state of rebellion make it all the more necessary that the law should be respected? It is disgraceful—four months' delay!
asked the Chief Secretary whether Alderman George Clancy, Mayor of Limerick, and Mr. Michael O'Callaghan, an ex-Mayor of that city, were murdered by Sinn Feiners on the 7th instant; and, in view of the fact that foreign money is being paid to those who commit murder and other crimes in Ireland, will he consider the question of deporting all persons who are not British subjects from Ireland except those who may be granted permission to remain in that country?
I am not yet in a position to make any statement with regard to this case except that no evidence has been forthcoming in support of the allegation that these men were murdered by members of the Crown Forces.
On a point of Order. I wish to ask whether it is not a well recognised rule in this House that an hon. Member who puts a question on the Paper should make himself responsible for the accuracy of the statements contained therein? I beg, Mr. Speaker, to call your attention to the fact that the hon. and gallant Member made a statement in this question for which he has no foundation and cannot possibly have any foundation, namely, that these two gentlemen were murdered by Sinn Feiners. The Chief Secretary has replied that he is not prepared to admit that the police committed these murders. Does he accept the suggsstion in this question that the murders were committed by Sinn Feiners? In any event—
Is the hon. Gentleman addressing me, or is he making a speech?
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman entitled to make a statement in this question for which he has not, and cannot possibly have, any foundation?
The hon. Member says there is no foundation for the statement. How does he know that?
Because I asked him.
An hon. Member puts a question down on his own responsibility and upon the knowledge he has acquired.
I am asking generally for information. I heard from Irishmen that these two men were murdered by Sinn Feiners. I am asking for definite, information, and am not expressing any opinion as to what happened. I think the British public have a right to know.
If they had been murdered by policemen, you would not want to know.
asked the Chief Secretary whether during curfew hours on 26th February the rooms of the Cork branch of the Irish Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Sailors and Soldiers were broken into by the military: whether much damage was done; whether £15 17s. l0d. was stolen; whether the secretary's drawer was forced open and another £10 stolen; whether on Monday, 28th February, the same premises were entered by the military and the men ordered out, all searched, and in some cases beaten; and what action he has taken or proposes to take in the circumstances?
On 26th February, 1921, after curfew hours, the offices of the Cork branch of the Federation of Discharged Soldiers and Sailors were searched by troops, but no money was taken. On Monday, 28th February, 1921, following the murder of unarmed soldiers in the streets of Cork on that date, a number of suspected persons were seen to enter these premises. In consequence, the place was surrounded and all the occupants were taken to St. Patrick's Bridge and searched. It is possible that the attitude of the search party on this occasion was influenced by natural exasperation at the cowardly murders which had taken place, and a thorough investigation will be made into the complaint of the beating of disabled men. Such persons as may be held responsible will certainly be dealt with.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that this money was stolen? It was in the premises of the branch of the discharged soldiers when the military entered, and it was not there when they left. In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman admits the other facts in this question, facts obtained direct from a branch of the federation which I myself started, is not the inference that the money was taken?
I cannot deal with inferences. I have given an answer prepared by the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, and I cannot add to it. If the hon. Gentleman would like me to make further inquiry into the matter, I shall be glad to do so.
My right hon. Friend has promised an inquiry into the beating of the discharged men. Will he inquire into the stealing of their funds?
I have said so. I will take the matter up again.
asked the Chief Secretary whether the constabulary who arrested John Lawlor, a clerical student in the streets of Listowel, county Kerry, on 1st January, and beat him to death, have yet been brought to trial for murder?
The circumstances attending the death of this man were investigated by a Military Court of Inquiry in lieu of inquest, which found that the cause of death was a blow inflicted by some person or persons unknown. No charge of complicity in his death was made against the police. The police deny that he was ever arrested or in their custody.
Why is it that this case, which only occurred on the 1st January, was investigated, whereas the case of John O'Connor, which happened on the 15th December, is still awaiting evidence?
asked the Chief Secretary whether he is now in a position to report the result of the Court of Inquiry into the case of John Moran, Drogheda, whose home was entered in the early hours of the morning by armed forces of the Crown, and who was marched from his residence to a place known as Weir Hope and shot; and that when his body was discovered in the morning it was found that practically the whole of his stomach had been blown away and his chest riddled with bullets?
The Military Court of Inquiry in lieu of inquest which investigated the circumstances attending the deaths of these men found that they were both murdered by some person or persons unknown. The court considered all the evidence available, but civilians declined to give evidence, with the exception of the doctors, who certified cause of death, and the relatives, who gave evidence of identification only.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether these was a legal member of this court, and if there ever is a legal member of these courts?
Is it not public knowledge in the district that these murders were committed by men who left the barracks in Government lorries?
I do not accept what the hon. Member calls "public knowledge." I must base my replies on the information I receive.
asked the Chief Secretary whether the auxiliary police who raided the La Salle monastery at Dunmanway, county Cork, on 20th January, attempted to assassinate the Rev. Brother Cormac, and succeeded in wounding him seriously, have yet been brought to trial?
Brother Cormac was wounded by auxiliary police on the 21st of January during an authorised search, in the course of which the residence of the Christian Brothers in Dunmanway was visited. According to the police report, which is fully confirmed by his own statement, he was in the act of running away when a shot was fired, which wounded him in the hands. The suggestion that an attempt was made to assassinate him is simply untrue.
asked the Chief Secretary whether an attempt was made on the 8th instant to murder two policemen who were on duty outside St. Columb's Church, Dublin; and, if so, whether any arrests have been made?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. One of the attackers is known to have been wounded by the police who returned the fire directed at them, but I regret that it has not been possible to make any arrests.
asked the Chief Secretary whether two ex-soldiers, named James Maher and P. Meara, were murdered in Co. Tipperary last week; whether a paper bearing the word "Spy" was pinned to Meara's coat; and whether any arrests have been made?
asked the Chief Secretary whether James Mahon, of Thurles, and Patrick Meare, who were shot dead at Ballytarsna on 9th March as spies by persons describing themselves as members of a Republican Army belonged to any combatant force; whether any reason is known for their murder except that they had served formerly in His Majesty's forces; and whether there is any indication that they bore arms at the time they were attacked or that they had any opportunity of defending themselves from their assassins?
According to the police report both these men, who were ex-soldiers, were found dead in a field near Ballinure, Co. Tipperary, on the 9th instant, their bodies being riddled with bullets. An envelope with the inscription "Spy" was found attached to each of the bodies. Nothing further is known of the circumstances of their deaths, and I regret to state that no arrests have yet been made.
Will the right hon. Gentleman explain how it is that he is able to give answers to questions by hon. Gentlemen opposite about an event that happened a week ago, and cannot answer questions by us about events which happened months ago?
In answer to that supplementary question of the hon. and learned Gentleman, I can say that, when a question is asked raising a matter in a martial law area, namely, the Province of Munster, it necessarily takes a longer time to secure an answer than it does in a comparatively quiet county close to Dublin.
Is the Chief Secretary aware that Tipperary is in Munster? If he does not know, I can tell him.
I am always glad to receive geographical information from the hon. and learned Gentleman.
asked the Chief Secretary whether he is aware that on the 9th instant Francis McPhillips, of Aghaboy, Co. Monaghan, was taken from his house by masked men and shot dead, and that his dead body was afterwards found with a card pinned to his clothing stating that he had been tried, convicted, and executed by the Irish Republican Army because he was an informer; and what steps the Government propose to take to prevent Sinn Fein murders, which are now a matter of daily occurrence?
I have not yet received the report of the Court of Inquiry in this case, but according to the police report the facts of this murder are as stated in the question. In regard to the latter part of the question, I can assure my hon. Friend that no effort is being spared to cope with the campaign of murder which has claimed as victims so many loyal servants of the Crown and innocent civilians.
asked the Chief Secretary whether any arrests have taken place in connection with the murder of Thomas Bradfield, a Protestant farmer, aged 57, of Knockmacool House, Desertserges, who was murdered on the 2nd February?
I regret to state that no arrests have yet been made in connection with this murder.
Does the right hon. Gentleman know that a large number of Protestants have recently been murdered in Co. Cork?
I regret the murder of anybody, and I am doing my best in every case to secure the murderers.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Lord Chief Justice at Cork deplored the hopelessness, futility, and helplessness of His Majesty's Government in preventing these murders?
I did not see that statement.
It is there all right.
I hope the Noble Lord will assist the Government in its struggle.
The best assistance for a better Government for Ireland would be for the right hon. Gentleman to retire.
On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. May I draw your attention to the fact that the Irish Questions go from 56 to 123, and could not the advisability be considered of taking a ballot for them?
asked the Chief Secretary whether any arrests have yet been made in connection with the murder of Patrick Lyons, an ex-soldier, aged 45 years, who was taken from his home at Ballintubber, Co. Roscommon, on the night of Saturday, 19th February, by masked and armed strangers, and who was found in a field on the Sunday morning unconscious, and who died in Castlerea hospital the following day?
I regret that no arrests have yet been made in connection with this brutal murder.
asked the Chief Secretary whether he can give any information respecting the condition of the five men of the Bedfordshire Regiment and the two policemen who were badly wounded in an ambush near Killclare village on the morning of 4th March last?
One officer and four other ranks of the Bedfordshire Regiment and one police constable were wounded on this occasion. The officer died from the effects of his wounds on the night of the 4th instant. The other wounded men are, I am glad to say, progressing favourably. No known casualties among the attacking party.
asked the Chief Secretary whether on Friday, the 4th instant, a train conveying jurors to Waterford Assizes was fired upon by armed Sinn Feiners near Durrow Junction; whether two soldiers were wounded on the occasion; whether a train carrying a detachment of the 1st Bedfordshire and Herts Regiment was also fired up as it left Kilfree Junction, Sligo; and whether any arrests in connection with these attacks have yet been made?
The answer to the first three parts of the question is in the affirmative and to the last part in the negative.
Special Constabulary, Ulster
asked the Chief Secretary whether the Newry corps of special constables has been disbanded; and whether, with a few exceptions, all of them have merely been transferred to other corps?
asked the Chief Secretary whether a police patrol was fired at in the town of Newry on the night of 8th March by Sinn Feiners; whether a quantity of ammunition was found at the spot where the crowd challenged by the police patrol had been standing; and whether any arrests in connection with the affair have been made?
asked the Chief Secretary whether he is now in a position to make a statement with regard to looting and robbry by special constables in Newry; whether an independent and public inquiry will be held at which evidence may be given on oath; whether he has now ascertained if Newry is classed as a first-class police station and Enniscorthy as a third-class station; whether it is intended to persist in the removal of District-Inspector Barrington from Newry to Enniscorthy; and, if so, for what reason?
asked the Chief Secretary whether his attention has been called to the fact that on the 8th instant, when the congregation was dispersing after service in the Newry Cathedral, the special constables opened fire on the people, with the result that four were wounded; whether he is aware that no provocation whatever was given and that scores of witnesses are prepared to testify to that fact at a sworn inquiry; and whether such an inquiry will now be held?
asked the Chief Secretary whether any cases of looting or robbery by special constables have taken place in Clones; whether his attention has been called to the statement that several special constables were killed and injured by members of the Royal Irish Constabulary who had surprised them in the act of robbery; whether he can state, from the identification of the wounded constables, the station from which they set out; what officers allowed them to use Government lorries and Government petrol on that expedition; and whether any of them have been brought to justice?
asked the Chief Secretary whether he is aware that 25 special constables in Newry entered the House of Mrs. Andrew Boyd, who was in a delicate state and under the care of a nurse; that these two ladies and a baby were the only occupants of the house; that the two ladies were compelled to stand for nearly two hours with their hands over their heads whilst two of the constables stood over them with pointed revolvers; whether the remainder of the raiding police meanwhile stole jewellery, clothing, tablecloths, and bedclothes, to the value of over £100; whether a constable, whom she identifies as one of the raiders, refused to admit her to the barracks next day to lodge a complaint; and what action has been taken in the matter?
asked the Chief Secretary whether he is aware that on 24th December a special constable in mufti entered Mr. John Quinn's shop in Newry and presented a revolver at a young man named Delaney, threatening to shoot him if he looked insubordinately at the constable and that the constable was followed by the Rev. Francis O'Hare, a Newry clergyman, who subsequently charged him with the offence; whether this constable has been put on trial; if so, whether the witnesses had any opportunity of giving evidence against him; what has been the result of the trial, if any; whether another special constable subsequently presented a revolver at Father O'Hare and threatened to shoot him; and whether any steps have been or will be taken to protect the lives and property of the citizens of Newry from policemen of this type?
As the answer to these questions is very lengthy, covering two typewritten foolscap pages, I would ask hon. Members to allow me to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
May I ask whether the Chief Secretary is entitled to take this method of burking inquiry. A large number of questions has appeared with regard to the conduct of the Government with regard to this Newry matter. When the matter is raised he endeavours to evade all questioning by grouping all the questions into one and then asking that the answer should be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I respectfully submit that the Chief Secretary should be required to answer the questions on the Paper without any further attempt to conceal the facts.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give the names of the special constables referred to in Question 100?
I have not the slightest objection to reading the answer.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman had perhaps better read it.
There is a number of questions on the Paper bearing on the Ulster Special Constabulary, and with the permission of the House I will, for the sake of economy of time, deal with them in a single reply. That certain acts of indiscipline and misconduct have occurred is, I regret to state, true, but with two exceptions these acts have been confined to a single district, the district of Newry, and as I shall show they have been very promptly and drastically dealt with. The two exceptions were the incident at Clones, County Monaghan, on the 22nd January last, referred to in the question by the hon. Member for the Holland-with-Boston Division, and a case of alleged larceny which occurred at Fivemiletown, County Tyrone, on the 19th January.
A full and searching official investigation was held into these incidents and the conclusion come to was that the same party of men were concerned in both cases. All the men against whom there is any reasonable suspicion of guilt have been arrested and are at present awaiting trial. As regards the various allegations of looting and robbery mentioned in the question of the hon. Member for the South Down Division, every one of these cases has been carefully enquired into. A full identification parade was held and every member of the special constabulary identified by one or other of the complainants or against whom any proof other than identification was available was at once arrested by the civil police and all the men arrested are now awaiting trial by court martial. A civilian suspected of complicity in these robberies has also been arrested and is awaiting trial. According to reports which I have obtained the allegations of threatening and robbery contained in the questions of the hon. Member for Seaham Division and the hon. Member for Morpeth Division respectively are entirely unfounded, but in the case brought forward by the hon. Member for the Seaham Division the constable in question was fined for unnecessarily subjecting one of the civilians named to indignity in public.
How much was he fined? Five shillings?
An official inquiry into the state of the Special Constabulary Force at Newry has since been held by the Divisional Commissioner of Police for Ulster and drastic action has been taken to prevent any recrudescence of indiscipline. The Newry Force has been entirely reconstructed, and two platoon officers have resigned. Neither of these officers was personally involved in any act of misconduct.
With regard to the question by the hon. Member for the Central Aberdeen Division, alleging that so recently as the 8th instant a party of special constabulary in Newry fired without cause or provocation on a body of men who were leaving the Cathedral, a police report which I have received puts a very different complexion on this affair. It appears that a patrol consisting of an officer and sixteen constables were proceeding along Hill Street about 10 p.m. on that night when they observed two bodies of men, one numbering about twenty and the other about fifty, on either side of an open square named the "Car Stand." Apprehending trouble the police called upon both crowds to halt and hold up their hands. Instead of complying the crowds attempted to disperse and a shot was fired from the party at the right side of the square. The police fired several shots in reply, and three men were wounded. One of the wounded men had his hand badly lacerated by a wound which was not a bullet wound and would appear to have been caused by an explosive thrown by some persons in the crowd. A quantity of revolver ammunition which had evidently-been discarded by some of the fugitives was found in the street. In the light of these facts I think the House will agree that the firing by the police was a justifiable act of necessary precaution and self-defence. In regard to the removal of District Inspector Barrington from Newry to Enniscorthy, I have nothing to add to what I said in reply to a question by the hon. Member for South Down on the 7th instant. Mr. Barrington retains his rank as a first-class District Inspector and has not suffered in any way by his transfer to another district:
Will the Chief Secretary answer the question which was put, whether he has now ascertained if Newry is a first-class police station and Enniscorthy is a third-class police station, and was District Inspector Barrington removed from a first to a third-class police station after he had brought these robbers and looters among the police to justice?
I have answered the question fully and I hope frankly.
Has the right hon. Gentleman now discovered, though he denied it on the last occasion, that Newry is a first-class police station and Enniscorthy is a third-class police station? Is there any answer to that question?
Surely after all the House is entitled to a plain answer to a plain question, and my right hon. Friend ought to know, is the one place a first-class and the other a third-class police station?
I cannot answer that offhand. I have answered all the questions asked.
It is on the Paper.
The answer was a carefully prepared answer to a series of questions dealing with Newry. My experience in this House warns me—
Not to tell the truth. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"]
On a point of Order. Is a Member of this House entitled to charge a Minister of the Crown with making a statement that is untrue?
I was unfortunately engaged in conversation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the moment the expression complained of was used, and I did not catch it, I am sorry to say. If it was such as the hon. Member describes, of course an hon. Member would not be entitled to use it.
Withdraw!
No, I will not. I stand by it.
Will the Chief Secretary answer another question which appears on the Paper, and which he has also evaded—whether part of the stolen property was found in the barracks of the police constables?
I can only repeat that I have given a very carefully prepared reply. If the hon. Member would like a special answer on this point I hope that he will put down a question and I will do my best.
Will the Chief Secretary give us the names of the special constables wounded in the Clones affair when the Royal Irish Constabulary caught these special constables red-handed in robbery and looting?
Obviously, I cannot give those names off hand. Perhaps the hon Member will put down a question.
Sinn Fein Propaganda
asked the Chief Secretary whether he will take steps to stop the Sinn Fein propaganda that is being pursued by not only a certain section of the English Press, but also by the Press in Ireland, in view of the fact that this propaganda is causing much unrest in that country and is the cause of much crime and unhappiness there, and that it is not in the best interests of the Empire or Ireland that this should continue?
I am in entire agreement with the hon. and gallant Member as to the mischievous nature of this propaganda, but I am convinced that the Government are taking the most effective means for counteracting it by keeping the public as fully informed as possible of the actual truth as regards events and conditions in Ireland.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give a definition of Sinn Fein propaganda?
If the right hon. Gentleman desires to keep us informed of events, when does he propose to publish the Strickland Report?
The hon. Member must give notice of that question.
Police Pensioners
asked the Chief Secretary whether he is aware of the number of former head-constables, sergeants, and constables of the Royal Irish Constabulary who acted as clerks while serving in the force and who are now unemployed through no fault of their own; and whether he will consider the desirability of recommending these poor pensioners for employment in the recruiting offices in Great Britain for the Royal Irish Constabulary and also in the Pensions Increase Branch at Dublin Castle, where a number of the rank and file of the Royal Irish Constabulary on the active list are now acting as temporary clerks?
No statistics are available as regards the first part of the question, but it is believed that the number of such pensioners now suitable for, and unable to obtain, clerical employment is, I believe, very small. Such pensioners are already employed, as far as practicable, in the Royal Irish Constabulary recruiting offices in. Great Britain. No active members of the Royal Irish Constabulary are employed in the Pensions (Increase) Office, which is staffed with ex-service men supplied by the Ministry of Labour.
Would the right hon. Gentleman see that these men are put on the same footing as ex-service men with regard to employment?
As far as I am concerned, in Ireland they are; but, as far as the Ministry of Labour is concerned, it is a matter for the Ministry of Labour.
asked the Chief Secretary whether, at a deputation of pensioners of the Irish police on 8th July, 1920, he was urged to introduce into the Pensions (Increase) Bill, then before the House, Amendments for abolishing the age limit of 60 years, for eliminating the provisions as to the limit of means, and for increasing the pensions of men who retired before 1st April, 1919, so as to correspond with those of men retiring after that date; whether he informed the deputation that they had proved their case up to the hilt to his satisfaction; that, owing to the ostracism to which they were subjected in Ireland as regards employment, their case stood on quite a different footing from that of men similarly circumstanced in England, and that he will urge on the Government the claims of the pensioners of the Irish police for special treatment; and whether he will state the result of his representations to the Government?
The deputation referred to made representations to the effect stated in the first part of the question. My promise to the deputation was that I would urge upon His Majesty's Government the claims of Irish police pensioners for special treatment; this I did, and the question of such special treatment was afterwards very fully considered in connection with the Pensions (Increase) Act of last year, but, as the hon. and learned Member is aware, it was not possible to establish a case in favour of it.
Would the right hon. Gentleman tell me whether his answer to the deputation is correctly stated in the question, namely, that he said that they had proved their case up to the hilt to his satisfaction, and that owing to the ostracism to which they were subjected they stood on quite a different footing from men similarly circumstanced in England?
My view was then and is now that the pensioner of the Royal Irish Constabulary does stand on a different footing in Ireland, because, having served loyally, he is looked upon in certain parts of Ireland, I regret so say, with antipathy, and his hope of employment is not the same as that of the discharged policeman in England.
Will the right hon. Gentleman once more urge upon the Treasury the absolute necessity of keeping these faithful servants of the Crown from starvation?
I would ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to raise that question himself and try to persuade the House of Commons to do what he suggests.
As it is the fact that these ex-members of the Royal Irish Constabulary cannot find employment, would the right hon. Gentleman not consider the raising of their pensions? Many of these men are facing starvation.
Martial Law Areas
asked the Chief Secretary whether all males have been paraded by the Crown forces in certain parts of the martial law areas and put to forced labour; whether they are also formed into so-called patrols and informed that they will be held responsible for any act of lawlessness committed in their respective areas; and whether this treatment of the citizens has driven many well-disposed persons into the republican army?
I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the replies given by my right hon. Friend the Attorney-General to questions on this subject by the hon. Member for the Falls Division on the 21st February.
Is there any reply to the last part of the question, as to whether peaceable men and well-disposed citizens have been driven into the republican army by this treatment?
I am not aware of that, and I do not believe it.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this practice is in direct violation of the rules of war as laid down by the Hague Convention?
Internment Camps, Prisoners' Health
asked the Chief Secretary whether he has received any report as to the health of the prisoners in internment camps: and whether he can state how many deaths have occurred, and from what causes?
Periodical medical reports on all internment camps are rendered to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and in addition a daily report is made as to the number of admissions to hospital. In addition to the two men who were shot at Ballykinlar by a sentry acting in the discharge of his duty, there has been one death at this camp from heart disease and two deaths at Galway from influenza. No other deaths have occurred.
Government of Ireland Act (Appointed Day)
asked the Prime Minister whether he can state the reason for the delay in fixing the appointed day for Northern Ireland; and whether he can now state when the Government intend to fix the appointed day?
Good progress has been made with the necessary preliminary work, and an Order in Council fixing the day from which certain provisions of the Act, including those relating to the establishment of the new Parliaments are to come into operation will be issued at a very early date.
Can the right hon. Gentleman state when the early date will be? "An early date" may mean any time within five years.
We will announce the date in a very short time.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will not explore the possibility of securing an immediate peace on the understanding that the elections to be held in June shall be for a Constituent Assembly, and not for the Parliaments, that Constituent Assembly to have the power of settling the whole constitution of Ireland?
They both have very large powers, and, as a matter of fact, if my Noble Friend will look at the Act itself, he will find they have the powers of a Constituent Assembly within limits, and no Constituent Assembly that anyone would set up in Ireland would be given the power of setting up any constitution without reference to the United Kingdom.
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the present provisions of the Act are hated and detested by every section of the community in Ireland?
That is probably because they have never been read.
Reprisals
asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to the resolution passed last week by the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches, condemning the practice of reprisals because it substitutes vengeance for justice, exasperates the animosities already existing, discredits the name of Great Britain throughout the world, and gravely prejudices all attempts to create a spirit of conciliation between our own and other countries; and whether he will put an end to these practices, which are abhorrent to the conscience of the country?
I can add nothing to what I have already said on this subject.
Is not the present unhappy condition of Ireland due entirely to the failure of statesmanship on the part of the right hon. Gentleman?
That is rather a big assumption.
Could the right hon. Gentleman define, for the benefit of the House, what is meant by an "official reprisal"?
I have never used the word. Let those who have used it give their own definition.
Does the right hon. Gentleman approve of official reprisals?
I never used the term.
Do you approve of them?
Questions
Emigration (Peru)
asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that the s. s. "Huallaga," which is only equipped for 120 passengers, sailed from Avonmouth to Peru on 12th December last, carrying 202 British emigrants, including a number of infants under two years of age; that no suitable food was procurable on the voyage for the infants on board; and whether, in view of the fact that the emigrants and their families had been induced by the representatives of the Peruvian Government to leave this country by assurances of employment which had not been realised, the Government will take steps to protect British emigrants from similar misrepresentations in future?
I have been asked to reply to this question. From the information at present available, it would appear that the facts regarding the voyage of the s. s. "Huallaga" are subsantially as stated by my hon. Friend. Further inquiries are, however, being made on the subject. As regards the last part of the question, His Majesty's Government have invited the attention of the International Emigration Commission to the unfortunate experiences of British emigrants who have recently been induced to proceed to Peru (as described in Section XIV of the Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee, Cmd. 1134), and they hope that the Commission may formulate proposals for preventing future abuses of this nature.
May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman whether, in view of the fact that many of these emigrants are now stranded with their families without resources, some provision may not be made for their passage to England—those of them, at any rate, who are desirous of returning to this country?
Yes. We have been drawing the attention of the Peruvian Government to their responsibility in the matter, and I hope we may be able to get some satisfaction from them.
Will the Prime Minister, in view of the fact that he has recommended emigration, provide better conditions for the emigrants?
Housing
Exchequer Charge
asked the Prime Minister if his attention has been called to the fact that about £200,000,000 sterling has been spent, or authorised to be spent, on housing schemes approved by the Government, and that while it is certain that the greater part of this sum will fall on the taxpayer, no estimate of the public charge has been made; and, seeing that the country cannot afford to spend money without even counting approximately the cost, can the position be reconsidered?
My right hon. Friend has asked me to answer this question. There is no foundation for the statement that the cost of the housing scheme is not even approximately known. For the reasons given in my reply to the hon. Member on the 10th March, it is not possible to make an estimate of the "present capital value of the ultimate exchequer liability," but it is, of course, possible to state the annual charge on the Exchequer at prevailing rates of interest and rent. It is calculated that the maximum immediate charge on the Exchequer so far as the £200,000,000 is concerned, is approximately £10,000,000 per annum. It is to be anticipated that in the future rents will increase. Moreover, should it become possible in respect of the many short term borrowings to re-borrow at a lower rate of interest, a fall of 1 per cent. in the rate of interest paid would represent a reduction of about 3s. per week per house in the Exchequer liability. My hon. Friend will be glad to know that a substantial reduction in the cost of housing has been effected during recent months. No contracts are being let except at a considerable reduction in the prices prevailing last year.
Business Premises
asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that recently a request was forwarded to him to receive a deputation of influential business men with regard to the approaching expiration of the provisions restricting the rents, of business premises; that those who made the request were referred to the Minister of Health; and that in turn the Minister of Health replied that he had no responsibility on this question; and whether he will state which Department or Minister will receive the deputation and give consideration to their views?
asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he is aware that, in anticipation of the expiration of the law restricting the rents of business premises, notices to quit are being issued to tenants with a view to the rents being substantially increased; that in one case, where the present rent is £68 per year, the owner has expressed his intention of demanding a rent of £250 as an alter native to eviction; and whether the Government will reconsider the decision to take no action to continue the operation of the provision in question?
asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he is aware that recently a large meeting of tenants of business premises in Manchester passed a resolution asking for the extension of the present protection for at least two years, as in the case of dwelling-houses, and also asking for legislation on the lines recommended by the Select Committee on business premises; and whether the Government will give this matter further consideration?
I regret that I am not in a position to add anything to the replies which have already been given on this subject.
Questions
Local Government Officers (Superannuation)
asked the Prime Minister how soon the Government will redeem the pledge given to the Local Government Officers' Associations last year that a Superannuation Bill for local government officers was then in course of preparation and would be introduced at an early date?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply I gave on Tuesday last to the question of the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. H. Morrison), of which I am sending him a copy.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in making that reply, he had in mind the statement he made to the deputation of municipal corporations on the 14th October that, with the consent of a Cabinet Committee, a Bill was then in draft and was shortly to be presented to the House?
I would like to have notice of that. The matter would involve under any circumstances substantial charges on the rates.
Egypt
asked the Prime Minister what reply has been received from His Highness the Sultan of Egypt to the telegram addressed to him informing him that the British Government is of opinion that the basis of a British Protectorate is no longer adhered to by the British Government and inviting him to nominate persons to confer with the British Government regarding a new basis for regulating the relations between Egypt and this country; who has been nominated; when the conferences are likely to begin; and who will conduct the negotiations on behalf of the British Government?
No reply has yet been received from the Sultan, and consequently I cannot give the names of the Egyptian representatives nor fix a definite date for the Conferences, which will probably take place in May. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will himself supervise the proceedings.
League of Nations
Court of International Justice
asked the Prime Minister whether the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague is still in existence; and whether the spheres of jurisdiction or influence of that body and of the Court of International Justice of the League of Nations have been, will be, or can be defined?
The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The spheres of the two Courts have not been expressly denned, but the Statute of the new Court provides that it shall be additional to the old. The absorption of the old Court by the new can only be a matter of slow development; joint working is, however provided for.
Is there any authority on earth that can decide between two Courts of such exalted status?
EmployéS
asked the Prime Minister what are the duties and hours of work of the 363 employés of the League of Nations; what proportion of their emoluments are paid as frais de représentation ; and whether such proportion is free of tax?
The answer to this question involves very careful inquiries, and for this reason it has had to be referred to the League of Nations. If the hon. and gallant Member will repeat his question after Easter, I hope to be in a position to reply to it.
May some of us, who have not much knowledge of French, know what is meant by " frais de représentation "?
Vilna (Arbitration)
asked the Prime Minister whether Poland has decided to oppose the League of Nations' proposal to submit the Vilna dispute to arbitration; whether the Council of the League has taken any steps to enforce the proposal upon Poland; and, if so, what these steps are?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative; the latter part does not therefore arise.
Poland (Sanitation)
asked the Prime Minister whether the League of Nations is empowered to commit this country to expenditure upon sanitating Poland or any part of Europe or to any expenditure to be covered eventually by a Supplementary Estimate and not met from its own resources?
The answer is in the negative. Expenditure of the nature which my hon. Friend has in mind forms the subject of special negotiation between the Council or the Assembly of the League and the Governments of States Members of the League, and is entirely on a voluntary basis.
Questions
Battle of Jutland
asked the Prime Minister what action, if any, has been recommended by the Director of Public Prosecutions to be taken against the editor and publisher of "Plain English" for the publication weekly since 25th December, 1920, of articles containing serious allegations against Cabinet Ministers?
I have been asked to reply to this question. I can add nothing to my right hon. Friend's reply of Thursday last, except that the matter is in the hands of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Can my hon. Friend tell the House why it is that a series of articles which have appeared since 25th December were only notified to the Home Secretary when I put down the question last week, and can he explain the difference between such delay in a matter of this kind, of serious allegations made against Cabinet Ministers, and the promptitude with which his Department acts against Socialist or Communist papers that print anything of a propaganda character?
As my right hon. Friend said, this particular article had not been brought to his notice until the hon. Gentleman brought it to his notice. I suppose there is a good deal of rubbish written throughout the country, and he really cannot be expected to read it all.
Is it not also the case that a great deal of rubbish is spoken from those Benches?
Government Establishments (Short Time)
asked the Prime Minister whether the present system of short time in Government establishments is being reviewed; whether he is aware that different systems are being practised by the various Departments; and whether it is proposed to continue any system of short time after 31st March?
The actual method of working short time, which differs slightly in each Department, has been carefully considered, and adapted to the needs of the individual establishments. I am afraid it will not be possible to discontinue the system of short time on 31st March.
Peace Treaties
Germany
asked the Prime Minister whether the Allies intend to take further steps in the event of the Germans disregarding the steps already taken to enforce the Treaty of Versailles and the decision of the Paris Conference; and if he can indicate what they will be?
As this question is hypothetical, I am not in a position to reply to it.
Russia
Trade Agreement
asked the Prime Minister whether he can now make any further statement as to the present position of the negotiations for the resumption of trade relations with Russia?
asked the Prime Minister whether the reported agreement arrived at between the President of the Board of Trade and the envoy of the Russian Communist Government will be brought before the House prior to the Easter adjournment?
asked the Prime Minister whether, before any trade agreement is finally arrived at with Russia, the final terms proposed can be circulated and debated in the House of Commons; whether the signing of a trade agreement would constitute recognition of the Soviet Government; and, if so, whether money or goods received in payment would be liable to attachment in British courts?
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether M. Krassin has returned from Moscow with suggested amendments to the proposed Anglo-Russian trade agreement; whether such agreement is now completed; and on what date it will be signed?
I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given yesterday by the Prime Minister in answer to questions on this subject. As hon. Members are aware the full text of the Agreement has been published.
Will the hon. Gentleman answer my question as to whether this agreement will be brought before the House and debated before Easter?
The Agreement has been laid on the Table, and there will be opportunity on the Consolidated Fund Bill and other suitable occasions for discussing the matter.
Will the hon. Gentleman define the other suitable occasions?
Yes. The Motion for the Adjournment of the House would be another suitable occasion.
Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the second part of my question—whether the signing of a trade agrement would constitute recognition of the Soviet Government; and, if so, whether money or goods received in payment would be liable to attachment in British courts?
The Trade Agreement was entered into between the Government of this country and the de facto Government in Russia. The terms of the Agreement are perfectly plain, I think.
In the event of there being no opportunity of debating the Trade Agreement in this House, will it come automatically into operation?
Certainly; it is in operation from the date of signature.
Why is the Trade Agreement not signed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs?
I suppose that, as the Trade Agreement has been negotiated by the Board of Trade, it is not unnaturally signed on behalf of the Government by the President of the Board of Trade.
Does that apply to the letter, which does not appear to have anything to do with trade?
Questions
Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic)
asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that the Nantyglo and Blaina Urban District Council have passed a Resolution urging the Government to remove the War-imposed restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages on Sunday in Monmouthshire, in view of his pledge to remove these restrictions after the close of the War; and if he will therefore grant this application?
I have not received a copy of the Resolution mentioned in the hon. Member's question, but I hope that the whole question of liquor control will be considered by the Government at an early date.
Royal Navy
New Construction
asked the Prime Minister whether he will consider the granting of a White Paper, giving the evidence given before the Committee set up to inquire into the question of new construction for the Royal Navy?
It would not be in the public interest to publish such evidence.
Questions
Unemployment, Germany
asked the Prime Minister if he can give the House his latest information as to the extent of unemployment in Germany?
I have been asked to reply. The latest information as to the extent of unemployment in Germany is contained in the Journal of the German Ministry of Labour, dated 28th February, 1921, and relates to the position at the beginning of that month. A summary of that, information has been prepared for the issue of the "Labour Gazette" which will appear to-morrow. Meanwhile, I will, if I may, circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a copy of that summary for the information of hon. Members.
Is it possible to state how many people are out of employment in Germany—roughly, I mean?
My hon. and gallant Friend had better see the summary, which gives the number of persons unemployed drawing unemployment donation, and so forth.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, in consequence of so much coal being sent away from Germany, a very large number of factories and workshops are being shut down in Germany?
The following is the summary referred to : —
Unemployment in Germany at the Beginning of February
As summarised from the Official German Ministry of Labour Gazette of 28th February, 1921.
A consideration of the various statistical indices for judging the state of the labour market as a whole in January still fails to suggest any improvement. On the contrary, the increasing numbers of persons in receipt of out-of-work donation, of unemployed trade union members, and of applicants for work at employment exchanges, continued to indicate a strongly marked tendency towards depression, in spite of a seasonal revival of industry helped forward in many districts by the mild weather.
The number of totally unemployed persons in receipt of out-of-work donation increased from 409,928 on 1st January to 432,318 on 1st February, or by 5·4 per cent.; among men the rise amounted to 6·6 per cent.; and among women to 0·2 per cent. only. These totals are exclusive of dependent members of families of unemployed workers, of whom 457,163 were in receipt of allowances on 1st January and 495,284 on 1st February.
The returns from trade unions indicate increased unemployment among their members during January as compared with December. According to reports received from 39 organisations, with a total membership of 5,707,717, the number out of work at the end of January was 252,658, or 4·4 per cent. of the total, as compared with 4·1 per cent. in the preceding month, and 3·4 per cent. in January, 1920.
Unions. Membership reported on at end of January, 1921. Percentage of Membership unemployed. Jan., 1921. Dec, 1920. Jan., 1920. All unions making returns 5,707,717 4·4 4·1 3·4 Principal Unions: Building trade operatives 470,602 12·0 10·1 5·9 Painters 52,602 15·4 13·1 — Glass workers 59,453 0·8 2·8 4·4 Metal workers (Soc. Dem.) 1,426,650 3·5 3·5 2·2 Engineers and metal workers (Hirsch-Duncker). 107,189 1·6 1·7 2·5 Metal workers (Christian) 215,929 1·1 1·0 1·7 Textile workers (Soc. Dem.) 531,785 4·3 3·3 6·4 Clothing trade workers 82,097 2·3 — — Boot and shoe makers 80,652 4·3 3·8 1·8 Transport workers 577,616 4·5 3·9 3·3 Printers (book and job) 68,234 1·9 3·2 3·6 Bookbinders 69,535 3·9 3·6 1·4 Saddlers and bagmakers 37,414 11·5 12·5 5·9 Wood workers (Soc. Dem.) 360,613 5·0 4·8 1·4 Wood workers (Christian) 37,545 0·1 0·5 — Porcelain workers 52,593 2·2 3·5 — Bakers 64,978 9·1 7·5 8·0 Brewery and corn-mill workers 72,743 2·2 2·0 2·1 Tobacco workers 59,542 1·0 1·3 2·2 Enginemen and stokers 51,599 2·5 2·1 2·0 Factory workers (irrespective of trade). 525,685 3·4 3·7 2·9 Factory and transport workers (Christian). 98,598 6·5 1·6 1·8 State and municipal workers 270,834 2·5 2·5 1·1
The greatest increase in the number of members unemployed occurred in the building, textile, and transport trades; the woodworkers also reported a slight increase. Factory workers, on the other hand, reported fewer members out of work at the end of January.
The Employment Exchanges reported a further increase during January in the number of men applying for situations. For every 100 situations registered as vacant there were 257 applications, on the average, as against 232 in December. The situation showed some slight improvement as regards women, the applications being 135 per 100 vacancies, as against 143 in December. For both sexes combined there were 210 applications for each 100 vacancies, as compared with 204 in December.
According to returns from 6,341 sickness insurance societies, with an aggregate membership of 12,781,958 (8,407,766 males and 4,374,192 females) the number of persons whose premiums for compulsory insurance against sickness were being
paid (and who were therefore assumed to be employed) showed no appreciable change between 1st January and 1st February; males increased by 0·3 per cent. and females decreased by 0·6 per cent.
Greece (Debt to Great Britain)
asked the Prime Minister whether any and, if so, what moneys or credits have been granted or confirmed or given to Greece since the fall of M. Venizelos; how much is owed to His Majesty's Government by Greece at the present time; and whether any offer has been made by the new government of Greece to pay back these sums or by His Majesty's Government to write off these debts in return for any evacuation of Thrace or Macedonia?
No further moneys or credits have been granted to Greece since the fall of M. Venizelos, but certain Greek Treasury Bills held by His Majesty's Government in respect of moneys advanced previously have been renewed since that date. The amount owed to His Majesty's Government by the Greek Government is now £16,750,384 10s. 9d. The reply to the last part of the question is in the negative.
Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the possibility of writing off this Greek debt in exchange for the retrocession of Thrace to the Turkish Empire?
Mr. Bonar Law's Health
Retirement from Leadership
Letter to Prime Minister
I should like to read to the House a letter which I have just received from the Leader of the House:—
17th March, 1921.
"MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
"I very much regret to have to inform you that I am no longer able to continue my political work. The strain of the last few years has pressed very heavily on me and, as indeed you know, I have for more than three years found it very difficult to do my work.
"Now I am quite worn out, and my medical advisers have warned me that my physical condition is such that, unless I have an immediate and long rest, an early and complete breakdown is inevitable. In these circumstances, I have no choice, and I can assure you that it will always be a pleasure to me to think that I have been of some help to you in the great work which, after you became Prime Minister, you were able to do for your country, and that it is necessity alone which compels me to abandon the hope of being of any assistance in the very difficult task which now confronts you.
"Yours very sincerely,
"A. BONAR LAW."
We had hoped that a short period of rest might have enabled my right hon. Friend to return to his duties. I am sorry, however, to say that the medical opinion I have had the opportunity of consulting has led me to the conclusion that my right hon. Friend will need a much more prolonged period of rest and freedom from worry.
Perhaps, by permission of the House, I may say a word or two on this most unexpected and painful announcement. For many years, with the exception of the brief time when we were colleagues together—and no one had a more loyal colleague—he and I have been constantly engaged across the Floor of the House in giving and receiving blows. His blows never left any rancour. This is not the occasion for many words, but the House will allow me to say, on behalf of those who have been for so many years his political antagonists, that we entertain for the right hon. Gentleman the most affectionate memories. We wish as sincerely as his political friends his complete restoration to health and his re-entry into the fighting ranks of politics.
This news comes to us in the nature of a shock—a shock that is so deeply felt that language is necessarily limited. I, therefore, rise only to associate those for whom I can speak on this side of the House with the words of real regret that have fallen from the right hon. Gentleman who preceded me, and to express the fervent hope of Members of the Labour party, as well, indeed, as all of us, for a speedy recovery to health of the Leader of the House, who has been uniformly courteous even to his strongest opponents. I say sincerely that we receive this news with a sense of the deep loss that the House is suffering from the absence of the right hon. Gentleman, and with the desire that there may be a much earlier recovery to health than is indicated in his letter.
Business of the House
May I ask what the business is for next week? May I also say that I am quite aware that that business must be of a very arduous character, but I think probably it will convey a note of sympathy to my right hon. Friend when I state that anything and everything we can do to expedite the business which is put before the House will be gladly done.
I need hardly say we appreciate very much the kind words which the right hon. Gentleman has just uttered with reference to the business of the House, and I will gladly convey them to my right hon. Friend.
The House knows that the business for to-morrow is to be the War Bonus Supplementary Estimate and the Report and Third Reading of the German Reparation (Recovery) Bill; also possibly the Cessation of Ministries Bill, although that may have to be taken on a later day. At any rate, the first Order will be the War Bonus Estimate, and the second the Report and Third Reading of the German Reparation (Recovery) Bill.
On Saturday we propose to take the Irish Supplementary Estimates, beginning with that for the Chief Secretary.
On Monday the Order will be the Cessation of Ministries Bill, the Report stage of outstanding Votes, and other Orders.
On Tuesday and Wednesday the Consolidated Fund Bill will be taken.
On Thursday we hope to take the Adjournment.
Message from the Lords
That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to make provision for the cessation of the Ministry of Munitions and the Ministry of Shipping." [Ministries of Munitions and Shipping (Cessation) Bill [ Lords. ]
And also, a Bill, intituled, "An Act to extend the time for the completion of the bridge over the River Thames between Blackfriars and Southwark Bridges." [Corporation of London (Bridge) Bill [ Lords. ]
CORPORATION OF LONDON (BRIDGE) BILL [Lords]
Read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
MINISTRIES OF MUNITIONS AND SHIPPING (CESSATION) BILL [Lords]
Read the First time; to be read a Second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 49.]
Portsmouth Water Bill. Herts and Essex Water Bill
Reported, with Amendments; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Orders of the Day
Supply
Navy Estimates, 1921–22
Sir J. Craig's Statement
Order for Committee read.
I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair"
I am sure the House will feel that the sad announcement of the Prime Minister somewhat adds to my difficulty in for the first time asking the House to consider the Navy Estimates. The news came to me, as to all other hon. Members, with the same suddenness and with the same deep regret. I can only hope that by using all the economy of time I can I may manage to compress within sufficiently narrow limits the necessary statement in connection with the Motion for moving Mr. Speaker out of the Chair. I feel, too, that the House, whilst feeling deep grief at the news which has been conveyed to us, would like me at the outset to refer also to the laying aside for very much the same reason—overwork on behalf of the State—of the right hon. Gentleman who has so long held the proud position of First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Long), and I am sure that if the return of these two right hon. Gentlemen could be assured by the good wishes of this House, they would both be in their places to-morrow. It would be quite wrong of me, I think, to refer in any way to the successor in office of the right hon. Member for St. George's, Hanover Square. Lord Lee is well known to all the Members of this House, and especially to those older Members who worked with him when he was a Member of this Chamber. I will only say this, that those of us who have watched his career are well aware of the deep interest he has always taken in naval matters, and I feel the utmost confidence that the affairs of the senior service will be quite safe in his hands. In presenting the Estimates to-day I think it would be advisable, and I believe it would be the desire of all Members, that we should as far as possible lay aside the criticism which more properly attaches to the discussion on a later date, when the several Votes come under anlysis. If I may in the first instance refer to the Votes as a whole, I would ask Members to be good enough within certain limits to refer only to pages 2 and 3 of the Estimates, because in those two pages one will find laid down a panoramic or bird's-eye view of the Votes into which the Estimates are properly divided. If they will look at those two pages they will observe that so far as the 15 sub-heads into which we divide them are concerned 10 of them show a very substantial decrease, and two of them remain practically the same. In the others it is quite obvious that necessary increases were involved. Take the Vote for Scientific Services. Even there, if Members will turn to page 66A of the buff Paper and the explanatory note affecting that particular item, they will observe there that a figure of £122,000 odd has been transferred from Vote 4, which will place the Vote for Scientific Service in the same category as the other Votes in which there is no change. With regard to the Vote for the Royal Naval Reserve, the reason for the increase this year is that last year, as must be obvious to those who have followed this question, we were unable to get to work. We had to prepare a new scheme, we had to refit various vessels on which training takes place, and otherwise make the very best disposition of the funds at our disposal, and it is only in the Estimates for 1921 that we are able to arrive at the scheme in its entirety. Therefore there was bound to be some increase.
4.0 P.M.
Vote 10 also shows an increase, which is to be explained, roughly, and I speak very broadly in all these matters, by repairs to buildings—if one looks at the coastguard stations, for instance, he will find a considerable sum appropriated for that purpose—and by the necessity of carrying out those oil reservoirs for which a large sum of money is required in consequence of the conversion of many of our first-class ships for the use of oil as against steam. Perhaps this would be the appropriate moment, when I am referring to the Estimates, to give credit where credit is due for the way in which they are this year presented. My right hon. Friend, the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) is the originator of the idea that as far as possible the Navy Estimates should be presented with some explana- tory note opposite the many involved figures, which hitherto it has been necessary to elucidate by a continuous stream of questions and cross questions over the Floor of the House. When I approached Sir Oswyn Murray, Secretary of the Admiralty, and Sir Charles Walker, our Accountant-General, with the request of the right hon. Gentleman, they met me most fully in the matter, with the result that to-day we have before us Estimates which I hope will be taken by the House as model Estimates from the point of view in which they are presented. The work entailed by this new system was considerable, but the Accountant-General's Department has been more than indefatigable in carrying out our desires, and I can only say that I believe the extra trouble and cost will be well repaid by the increased assistance which this system will afford to all Members in every quarter of the House. I may just add, to show the willingness with which the right hon. Gentleman's idea was accepted, that they tell me that, if there be any improvement that can be suggested, they will be only too delighted to carry it out.
It will be in the recollection of all quarters that last year, the then First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Long) foretold that the necessities of the post-War Fleet would be 127,500 men. Subsequently, on close investigation, with the desire for economy which runs through all the Departments, we have been able to decrease that number to 123,700 as a maximum on the 1st April, and it is hoped and expected that at an early date we shall be able to reduce the actual number borne on the Vote to 121,700. The Estimates to-day show a decrease on the gross amount of £14,000,000 and on the net amount of rather over £8,250,000. These decreases have taken place over practically all the Votes, and I can assure the House at this early stage that the naval staff, as well as those whose duty it is to scrutinise with the greatest care all expenditure in connection with the Navy, have most loyally helped us in the difficult task of bringing down the figures to what we consider reasonable having regard to the actual cost to the country and to the bounds of safety from the naval point of view, and I hope that they will commend themselves to the House. In the matter of policy, which it is customary to discuss on moving Mr. Speaker out of the Chair, I would call the attention of the House to part of the speech made by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Long) on St. Patrick's Day last year. He said:
This matter has been given the most careful consideration, and the Admiralty propose to close the dockyards at Haulbowline and Pembroke, these being the yards least adequately equipped to meet modern naval requirements. As far as possible the established officers and men will be gradually distributed among the other yards. It is expected that the closing of the dockyard at Haulbowline will be completed during the financial year 1921–22, and of Pembroke in 1922–23. No further naval work will be taken on at either of those yards, but the 10,000-ton oil carrier now under construction at Pembroke will be completed in that yard.
It will be recalled that a proposal to dispense with Pembroke was under consideration a year ago, and that, after the matter had been hanging in the balance for some weeks, it was decided that the yard could be retained, and an oil tanker put in hand there. By this expedient it has been found possible—and I desire to lay emphasis upon this—to postpone for a considerable period the taking of a step which the Board greatly regret, but which, in the interests of economy, they are now unable to avoid. The saving that will be effected in 1921––22 by the closing of these two yards will be reduced, naturally, to a great extent owing to the necessity of retaining men to pack and remove stores and other portable plant, and to other incidental work. It is estimated, however, that by the end of the next financial year we shall save, in the case of Haulbowline, about £50,000, and in the case of Pembroke about £80,000. Later on, when the full effect is felt of the policy of concentrating Naval work in a smaller number of yards, the ultimate saving effected will be, so far as Vote 8 is concerned alone, some £500,000 a year. It is regrettable that this important economy necessarily involves severing the dockyard connection with the two localities named, which quite legitimately counted on Admiralty employment as an important factor in their local conditions. It is one instance among many of a fact which must impress those who are closely analysing expenditure under Navy Votes, that this expenditure represents to a very large extent wages spent in this country, and that scarcely any important reduction can be made without at once diminishing employment. I hope it may be possible to dispose of Pembroke in such a way that the men there may be absorbed in some civil work analogous to that which they are at the present moment carrying on. I would point out to the House that Rosyth has taken the premier position now, which necessitates the closing down of these two yards, and in view of the profound necessity for economy in every direction, we are reluctantly compelled to take a step which the Board deeply regret, but they see no way of dealing with it other than that which I have indicated.
When the House gets into Committee and begins to discuss the Votes one by one, it will be observed that practically all along the line there is a consistent reduction tending towards economy With regard to War Liabilities, this is the last year in which they will appear on our Estimate. The total left to be cleared up before the end of the coming financial year only amounts to about £5,000,000, and that compares with some £18,000,000 in the current financial year, and £100,000,000 in the year 1919–20 That will give the House some idea of the rapidity with which the Department concerned has dealt with these vast sums of money, involving in some cases very large individual claims. This liquidation of War liabilities has consisted largely of the settlement of thousands of contracts for guns, shell, ships, and material of all kinds, which were in hand at the time of the Armistice, and were cancelled owing to that event. In the case of many of these contracts it had been impossible, owing to the conditions under which work had to be carried on by contractors during the War, and to the variations in wages and cost of material, to do more than fix provisional prices, the actual prices to be paid being left to be determined after examination by professional accountants of the actual cost of production. That the careful and scrupulous examination to which all War liabilities have been subjected has been fully justified, and that the staff necessary for the purpose is also fully justified, is evidenced by the fact that the actual deductions, as a result of investigation of books and accounts, have amounted, since the date of the Armistice, to more than £6,000,000, apart from consequential savings resulting from the application of the results of these investigations to the settlement of similar claims. This work has not yet been quite com- pleted, but it may be mentioned that the professional accountant staff, which at the date of the Armistice amounted to 327, will be reduced by the end of March this year to about half that number. It must not, of course, be assumed, because of this large reduction of £6,000,000 in the claims that were put in, that the Admiralty in any way suggest that those claims were improperly put forward. It is really that, on close investigation, many of them were considered to be liabilities which it was improper that the Admiralty should bear. We suggest nothing wrong; it is simply that by this vigilance and care we have been able to reduce the claims to that considerable extent. As the House is aware, a considerable staff has also been employed in the payment of War gratuities to the officers and men of the Fleet. In all, a sum of £13,500,000 has been paid to date, each award necessitating a careful investigation of the record of service of the individual concerned. This work also is approaching completion. There only remains some £166,000 to be dealt with, and that is entirely in respect of the claims of officers and men whose addresses we have not been able to obtain.
The return to their owners of the large number of hired vessels of all descriptions taken up for Naval service during the War is also almost complete. All these vessels had either to be restored to the condition in which they were when taken up, or lump sums had to be paid, arranged by individual negotiation with the owners. Considerable savings have accrued to the public as a result of the care taken in negotiating the settlements and in the arrangements for repairs. As against an expenditure of £17,000,000 on this service during 1919–20, and nearly £4,000,000 in the current year, the Estimate for next year provides for only £600,000. The arrangements for the disposal to the best advantage of the large number of vessels surplus to the requirements of the post-War fleet have continued without interruption since the Armistice, and have resulted in the return of many millions of pounds to the State. This work has been pushed on with all possible speed, but many vessels still remain to be disposed of and considerable receipts from this source will accrue during the coming financial year. The number of vessels which the market can absorb in a given time, whether for use or for breaking-up, is limited, and de- pends largely on general trade conditions, but I may say that this is a portion of the work in which I have personally interested myself during the past year, and one which I can assure the House has been carried out by the staff with as great rapidity and efficiency as could possibly be expected.
I come now to the closing of Osborne and the transfer of the junior cadets to Dartmouth. It was forecasted last year that there would be a considerable reduction in the number of cadets at the two naval colleges, and this enables the transfer to be made from Osborne to Dartmouth. Osborne College will then, of course, be closed, and I desire to make it quite clear how much we appreciate what has been done by the officers and staff of Osborne in the past, how much we are indebted to them, and how much those who have been associated with the college will feel the removal of this landmark in our naval system. At the same time, the Admiralty feel that at Dartmouth they will be able to carry on with increased efficiency, that they will be able to coordinate the courses, and that the results will be fully satisfactory as regards the supply of officers in the future. We desire to express to the staff how much the Admiralty have appreciated their services in the past, and also to emphasise what a success Osborne has been. I think that all Members in the House will agree to that as an accurate representation of the true facts of the case.
I explained to the House on the 14th December last the main provisions of the new scheme for the organisation and training of the Naval Reserves. The new Regulations for the two forces are in course of preparation, and in the meantime sufficient details have been promulgated for the information of men desiring to join. Recruiting for the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve has just been started, and recruiting for the Royal Naval Reserve will begin on the 1st April, as I announced to my Noble and gallant Friend (Viscount Curzon) in answer to a question a few days ago. The splendid record of these two Reserves throughout the War, and the increased opportunities provided under the new scheme, lead the Admiralty confidently to anticipate an ample supply of suitable candidates. To a limited extent recruiting for the Royal Naval Reserve has already begun, and we have at the present moment 321 seamen, 62 engine-room artificers, and 423 stokers already enrolled. We have no hesitation whatever in looking in the future to our numbers expanding rapidly after full recruiting begins on 1st April.
I now turn to welfare work, because I know how much dockyard members especially are interested in this matter. As the result of representations made by the Welfare Committee, which reported to the Admiralty a year ago, the Board have given special attention to the question of the improvement of the accommodation and amenities provided for the petty officers and men at the various barracks and shore establishments. If a careful analysis is made of the items dealt with under that Committee's recommendation it will be observed that we are committed in Vote 10 to a sum of some £300,000, £100,000 of which is specifically ear-marked in this year's Estimates. But over and above the £100,000, if anyone takes up the Admiralty monthly order for September last he will discover a schedule of many other undertakings as the result of recommendations by the Welfare Committee which absorbed large sums of money, including the permanent institution of marriage allowance, eventually costing £2,300,000 a year, increase of provision allowance, including long leave allowance, the immediate cost of which was £375,000, change of uniform for petty officers after four years, eventually costing £13,000 a year, and a concession to the old roll pensioners, the immediate cost of which is £272,000. Of course, A, D, E, and F, have been previously announced. But over and above that I have had made out for me a list of those improvements which have been carried out in ships as distinct from dockyards, and as distinct from these matters which are referred to in the Admiralty Monthly Order. The amount which is absorbed by that will come to something like £250,000 for the present year. It requires expert knowledge to be able, from the figures running right through this bulky book of Estimates, to come at the true figures, but I am led to believe by those who got it out for me that the amount is something like £250,000, and we may take it, roughly speaking, that during the past year a similar sum was spent in carrying out the recommendations on the Welfare Committee. These latter figures again are in addition to what I have mentioned in connection with Vote 10, which, of course, will be examined in more detail later on. The question of the Welfare Committee has caused considerable discussion outside as well as at the Board of Admiralty, and the position is, regarding the future, that if a general desire is expressed by the lower deck to revive the Welfare Committee at some future date the Board will be most receptive and sympathetic in considering the machinery which is necessary to re-establish it, perhaps on a rather different footing.
With regard to the naval staff, it is now on its permanent basis after close consideration and having been reduced from its largely augmented size during the War it has been brought down to the true dimensions which are considered necessary for post-War requirements. The eight divisions in which it has been divided, strengthened by special sections, superintended personally by the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, which deal with technical requirements, and air matters affecting the Navy, amount in all to a total of 86. That is to say, the personnel of the naval staff has been reduced to what I think the House will agree, in view of the great importance of having an efficient and up-to-date and live naval staff, is a model number to ask for of 86. Amongst the most important functions of the staff at present is, of course, the assimilation of all the experience gained in the great War, and special attention is being given to this aspect of the work. I think the Committee will not quibble at having the staff at its present strength, even though on close examination it may be found to be considerably larger than it was before the War, because there is no question that if we are to have a really efficient one-power standard Navy it is, above all, essential that our staff should be most up to date and capable.
With repard to naval air development, most hon. Members were present at the statement of the late Secretary for War when he made his speech dealing with this subject, and all I will say to-day is that the naval staff are working very closely with the air staff and the lessons of the War are being applied and numerous experiments carried out by both Services, the result of which has been distinct progress, particularly in the design of aircraft carriers. I class this as a very important subject. The critics of the policy of the Government may rest assured that so far as the Navy is concerned, it is watching most carefully all developments in connection with aircraft and taking a permanent part with the Air Force in all the experiments which are carried out.
I must say a word about scientific research because, I think, next to having an up-to-date and able staff, it is necessary for us to concentrate as much as possible on the scientific side of naval warfare, and so important do we consider scientific work that there we have one of the few increases in our Naval Estimates this year. It is indicated in the Estimates for 1920–21 that the experimental establishment at Shandon has now been closed, and the new premises at Teddington for the Naval Research establishment are approaching completion. It is hoped that scientific research work will commence there during next month. Research in many fields is meanwhile proceeding at the various Naval establishments and in the hands of private investigators. Progress can be reported in all these fields, and during the year the results of much research, which are of real importance from a navigational point of view, have been made public property. The organisation for co-ordinating research and preventing overlapping is being proved to be of the greatest value, and its work is proceeding smoothly. The methods which have been adopted for insuring a free exchange of scientific information, both between departments and individuals, are being more and more utilised as the value of such exchange is appreciated. The close liaison maintained between the Naval staff and the technical departments and the Director of Scientific Research has resulted in a scheme of priority for research work which will ensure the most urgent problems receiving the direct and concentrated attention of the scientific staff. By these means it is also ensured that items of research are undertaken only if necessary to the working of the whole scheme, and that they hold a definite and essential place in the chain of Naval development.
I come now to the question of the replacement of our obsolescent ships. The ships which we shall build to replace the four oldest of our capital ships now on the effective list will be an improvement on the "Hood" class embodying the lessons of the late War. We also propose to build a submarine and a minelayer, both of which will embody the latest developments in these craft, and will also include a number of experimental features. The views of the naval staff on the position and importance of the capital ship as the unit on which sea power is built up were expressed at some length in the notes on Naval Policy attached to the late First Lord's statement a year ago. The opinion there expressed, that the necessity for the capital ship has survived the test of the Great War, was endorsed at the time by the Board of Admiralty, and that opinion remains unchanged. It is common knowledge, from reports in the newspapers, that a similar investigation in the United States has led to the same conclusion.
How many capital ships do you propose to lay down?
It is proposed to replace the four vessels I have mentioned by these new vessels of the type to which I have referred, improved in accordance with the lessons learnt during the War.
When is it contemplated that those will be finished?
My right hon. Friend with his experience at the Admiralty will recognise that if the Committee, in accordance with the usual practice, sanctions this provision of £2,500,000 as from the passing of the Vote to-day it will be impossible really to get very far in the completion or even the beginning of the four vessels before early on in the autumn. The custom has been hitherto that on passing Vote A and I the necessary preliminary steps are taken and I hope the House accepts the principle which has been followed in the past that the provision of £2,500,000 for the replacement of obsolescent ships is approved by the House. The details of this expenditure can be discussed on Vote 8, Sub-section (3) and under the subheading LL when that Vote is reached. The White Paper explaining the distribution of the sum of to-day's Votes will be laid before the Committee prior to the taking of Vote 8. The sum is a maximum sum; in other words, there will be no Supplementary Estimates under this head. The £2,500,000 is the maximum that could be spent this year, and the maximum that will be spent unless something very unforeseen occurs, of which there is no sign at the moment. It may be said by some hon. Members that in voting this £2,500,000 to-day we are launching into a large sum for future years. But I am able to say that if the same care and prudence is exercised in the preparation of next year's Estimates it will be possible to carry on the building of these capital ships next year without making any appreciable increase on the Estimates which are laid before the House to-day. I think it is necessary to point out that there are in the Estimates, lines along which economy could be exercised in order to ensure that consummation. Amongst these, of course, the effect of the closing of the dockyards to which I have referred will be that a large saving will take place, and I believe that it will be possible with prudence and care not to exceed this year's Estimates next year, anticipating that there will be a fall in the price of material and also that wages will not carry on at the high level at which they are to-day.
Will all the four battleships be laid down during the next twelve months?
Yes, Sir; if the House sanctions this Vote to-day it is proposed to lay down the whole of the four ships this year.
In the Government dockyards?
I would rather not be drawn into stating where they will be laid down just at the moment.
They will have to be.
My hon. and persistent Friend behind me says they will have to be. I can assure the House that in the selection of where these vessels shall be built the Board will be guided entirely by the highest principles of where is the best place, and certainly Parliamentary pressure is the last thing in the world to affect that decision.
I do not think it would be reasonable to expect me here to-day, in presenting what I think are very reasonable Estimates, and asking for power to replace our obsolete ships in this way, to give my own opinion as to the merits of the large ship versus the small ship. I can only say that the Admiralty have naturally taken this matter into the gravest consideration, and have only come to their conclusions after consulting the wide experience which the naval side of the Board actually enjoyed themselves at sea during the War. But if hon. Members are really desirous of understanding another important question, that of the submarine versus the battleship, I would recommend them strongly to read the speech of Sir Eustave Tennyson-D'Eyncourt last night at the meeting of the Institute of Naval Architects. He there explained in very clear language, which will be readily understood by every Member of this House, at least one or two of the powerful arguments against abandoning our large ships. There may be some in the House who are captivated by the picturesque appearance of a vessel being bombed from the air that appeared in some of the Press at home, and a copy of which I have from the "New York Herald." The design shows the "Indiana," well peppered by aircraft, which is practising on purpose to elucidate that problem. I can only point out, as some hon. Members have pointed out already, that that also is a problem for experts, and I would only advance this argument, so far as the air is concerned, that aircraft are much more dangerous to the submarine type than they are to the battleship or cruiser or even to smaller surface craft. That is the experience of the War. I was told on good authority, for instance, that the "Goeben," which struck a mine and which was towed into Gallipoli, was for five days the subject of attack by the aircraft of the Allies, and although they came down to within very low range, and had five days in which to do it, they only managed to strike her twice, and the resultant damage was of a comparatively slight nature.
What was the date of that?
And the size of the bombs?
The total weight of the bombs was 15 tons.
What was the weight of the individual bombs?
They were 65 to 112 pounds. As I say, this is a matter for experts, but it has to be borne in mind further that the "Goeben" was a stationary target. I have here an extract from the report of a German naval officer who stated to our Committee of Control that the German destroyers on the Flanders coast were frequently bombed by Allied aircraft. Several destroyers were damaged, but not one was sunk by these means. The Germans consulted their records before making the above statement. Consequently, so far as I have been able to learn, the fear of the damage done to any of our capital ships from the air is much less than one might be led to suppose. I am told that, of course, our anti-aircraft preparations are keeping well ahead of the other experiments that are taking place. All this goes to prove that those of us who are merely laymen, who have to pick up scraps of information here and there, often of a divergent character, must in the end rely upon the Board of Admiralty to guide us as to the proper course with regard to all these important matters. The fact remains that it is they who are entrusted with the safety of our fleet and the guarding of our country. Let me quote the words of the gallant Admiral opposite (Rear-Admiral Adair), who stated the other night that he always had before him the fundamental facts that on the strength and efficiency of the Navy depended the safety, honour and welfare of this Empire. These words are almost a platitude, but at the same time I do not think they could be repeated too often. Consequently the House may with the utmost confidence rely upon the decision which will be taken by the Admiralty to hold out for a one-power standard, by which they mean a one-power standard in the literal sense, may be guided by them as to the replacement of our obsolescent ships, and will, I think, recognise that in the Estimates they have presented to this House they have taken the fullest possible view of what all Members are desirous of at the present moment—to couple efficiency with the greatest possible economy.
Capital Ships
I beg to move to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof the words
5.0 P.M.
Now the question comes to be considered as to whether the provision made in these Estimates is sufficient to keep up our establishment. In reference to that, although it is a fact, as the Parliamentary Secretary has quite rightly said, that we members of this House, being laymen in naval matters, must leave the actual decision as to what sort of ships are built to the experts and Admiralty, yet at the same time there are certain patent facts which are open to the criti- cism of the whole world and to which it is right to draw attention. The facts as we know them are that another great nation is building a fleet of capital ships which will be completed by the year 1925, amounting to 17 great vessels. One of them is already completed. As regards four of them the ships of the "Maryland" class are 85 per cent. completed, and are armed with heavier guns and are larger ships than any of the same class that we have. They have also 6 other battleships included in the 17 which are under construction and which are about 12 per cent. constructed at present. They are of 43,000 tons, each individually larger than any we have, and much more heavily armed. The remaining 6 out of the 17 are great battle-cruisers, larger than the "Hood," of 43,000 tons and 33¼ knots.
It is a momentous fact that this nation has to take into consideration, that by 1925 this great nation overseas will have built a fleet which will practically make obsolete all the battleships of our Fleet at the present day with the exception of one, the "Hood," of over 41,000 tons, a battle-cruiser. To meet that situation the Government propose to lay down 4 ships only this year, and that means that these 4 ships, as the Parliamentary Secretary has said, cannot be commenced until next year. He said it will be late in the autumn this year before they will be commenced. It is common knowledge that it takes several months after the matter has passed this House for contracts to be signed, and again 6 months in all probability for the material to be collected after the contracts are signed before the ships are commenced. These ships, therefore, will not be commenced until the beginning of next year, and they may not possibly therefore be completed before 1925 at the earliest. It means that in 1925 we shall have constructed four modern ships, but the United States Navy will be in possession of more than four times the number of heavy ships.
There is one lesson which one would have thought had been driven home by the War more than anything else, and that was that ships of inferior speed and inferior gun power cannot live in battle against heavier armed ships. That was proved at Coronel, at the Falkland Islands and again at Jutland, where we won owing to the great superiority in the number of our ships; not so much in superiority, unfortunately, as was pointed out the other day by an hon. and gallant Member, in the construction of our ships, or in the shells, or even perhaps in the armour, but in the overwhelming superiority as regards the numbers of our capital ships. That being the case, is it a safe thing for this country to agree to this proposal when by 1925 another Power shall have a superior fleet to ours in these heavy capital ships? I, for one, will not be content to believe that four additional ships is sufficient provision for the safety not only of this country, but of the sea communications of the British Empire. It does not matter how friendly that other country is. After all, the United States indulged in the luxury of a civil war, a terrible war which lasted for four years, less than 70 years ago, and if that nation can have a civil war it might also have a foreign war, even with a nation with which for many years it has been on the very best terms.
When we are considering the strength of our Navy we ought to regard it as a naval insurance; we ought not to consider any sentimental question with reference to any other country, but merely, if we are to do our duty to our constituents and to our own country, to see that the naval insurance of this country is at any rate equivalent to that of any other nation in the world, and that is actually the policy which we are told the Admiralty is going to follow. The question is, how are they going to follow it if the only provision of ships they make is to lay down a number which are one-quarter the strength of what will be the greatest navy then?
There is another point in that connection. Ever since the Armada in 1588 we have maintained sea supremacy. It was upon that the British Navy was built; it is upon that we exist to-day, and it is seriously proposed now to the country that in 1925 we should take second place in naval power for the first time in our history for centuries. If nothing further is done than is proposed in these Estimates, that will be the situation in 1925. What I am urging is that all the Members of this House should urge the Government to make further provision, if not now, at any rate in the near future, to ensure that by 1925 we shall keep step at any rate with the United States.
In connection with the question of the United States Navy, it is right that we should say publicly in this House that there is not of course the slightest idea, and never has been so far as I know in this country, on the part of any person outside a lunatic asylum, either here or in the British Empire, to attack the United States, nor do I suppose it is possible that there are any persons in the United States who truly believe that the British Empire has any corresponding designs whatever upon the United States, but there are a lot of people in the United States, unfortunately, who, if they do not believe that, are trying to persuade the people of the United States that it is true, and the campaign, a raging and tearing propaganda, going on in the United States against this country at the present time is a very grave and serious danger.
It is the Irish Roman Catholics.
Yes, as the hon. Member says, it is the Irish Roman Catholics. I am a Roman Catholic of Irish descent, and I am sorry to say I have to agree with her. I regret that the Church to which I belong is one of the principal offenders in the United States. Led by Archbishop Hayes, New York, a malignant Anglophobe, the Church has done a great deal of harm. It is not only confined to the Church, but undoubtedly the German and Irish propaganda of the United States is most iniquitous. I do not think that the average Member of this House who has not lately been in the United States, as I have, or the country as a whole, realises the great danger to this country of that propaganda, nor do they realise the vitriolic virulence with which it has been waged or its malignant mendacity. It is almost impossible for a British citizen now to walk about the City of New York in certain parts without being insulted. The flag of every country in the world can be flown in the great cities of America with, perhaps, the exception of the German flag and one other flag, the Union Jack. Although that is true—I do not wish to exaggerate the situation—it is also true that, fortunately, probably 50 to 60 per cent. of the population of the United States are friendly to us, and a very large percentage of them are most friendly, and are doing their best to counteract this propaganda; but I wish to point out that we cannot afford to look too much on the sentimental side of this question, for these people who are carrying out this campaign are a powerful political party in that country. They dominate an enormous number of votes in the Senate, which, under the Constitution of the United States, has more power with reference to Foreign affairs than perhaps any other part of their legislative machinery. Therefore we have to be careful.
It has been admitted by many American papers, and notably by one of great standing in naval matters, the "Scientific American," that we in Great Britain are not the aggressors. They point out that in two years we have not laid down any ships and therefore that we have, although no one has wanted to follow it, gone along the lines of disarmament, or at any rate of limiting naval power by not building aggressively and in competition with other nations. But that invitation, that practical invitation, has not been followed. By all the signs and portents we can see that the United States intend to build these ships, the programme of which I have mentioned, and not only that, but we do not know that there is not a programme in the United States to make a two-power standard for the United States.
One might quote many things which have occurred lately in the United States, especially the Resolution of the United States Senate passed less than two years ago, which expressed its sympathy with Irish rebellion, and which was passed by 60 votes to 1. That was not paid any attention to in this country, and that is right, but when we are considering these matters what we have to look to is the honour and safety of the British Empire; and when we leave the sea communications in the hands of any other nation, then I suggest we are going along wrong lines. The only safe thing is to make our own provision for that safety. Only the other day we had an illustration from Senator McCormick, who has just been in England, and also in Europe, and who went back and spoke in the Senate to the effect that the reason why this big Navy was wanted was for the purpose, first of all, of maintaining the merchant fleet of the United States. We have no quarrel with that. Secondly, they wanted it with regard to their immigration policy. That was directed against the Japanese. Thirdly, he said their purpose was to establish by agreement if possible and otherwise if necessary, direct cable communication with Continental Asia and Central Europe, now denied them by France and Japan. He also said:—
We are faced with this situation, that by 1925 all our sea communications will be, to a certain extent, jeopardised, because another Navy will have taken first place in the world. There is no country in the world which is so dependent on sea communications as this country. There is no other country in the world which has 75 per cent. of its foodstuffs imported, and nearly all its raw material, and which is absolutely dependent for its life upon it. There is no other nation in the world which has such vast possessions all over the world, amounting to one quarter of the habitable globe, and comprising practically one fourth of the human race. Therefore, we could say without offence, without aggression, to any other nation that we intend to keep our Navy, at any rate, at a strength which shall ensure that at no time shall it be less than that of any other nation, no matter what steps they intend to take as regards the strength of their Navy.
I beg to second the Amendment, and I have much pleasure in doing so. It has been very ably moved. I do not propose to follow my hon. and gallant Friend in all the details which he has given, because I have not been able to study the matter closely. I rise to second the Amendment at his request because I feel that the matter is one of the most important that could be brought before this House. I am an economist, and I second the Amendment because I am an economist. If we have learned one lesson from the War it is that if we had had a sufficient Army and a sufficient Navy in August, 1914, it is very doubtful whether we should have had a war, and if we had had a war, it would have been brought to a close in a far shorter time and at far less expense. One of the factors which has led to the enormous increase in our national debt, which is imposing such a burden on the taxpayer, is that we were obliged to find all the shells, all the guns, all the additional ships for the Navy, and all the additional guns and men for the Army in a hurry, and had to pay for them at double or treble the cost which we should have had to pay for them if we had provided a basis, on which we could have extended, before the War broke out. I should like to make a quotation which, I think, will be appreciated by the right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Asquith) and which ought to be borne in mind, not only by every Member of this House, but by the country:
"Si vis pacem para bellum."
It has been a fact for the last 2,000 years that that doctrine has given to the nation which has acted upon its precept a very great advantage. Insurance against all risks is an absolute necessity. I hope I am not wrong, but I do not believe in the League of Nations. I do not believe that the League of Nations is going to alter human nature. Ever since there has been history there have been wars, and I believe that, notwithstanding the fact that there is a League of Nations, we shall—I hope it will not be for many years—as certain as I am standing in this place have to face the fact that unless we are very careful we shall be at war with another nation. My hon. and gallant Friend has referred to America. Every body in this House and in the country will agree with me when I say that there is not a single man or woman in the British Isles who has any desire or any thought of ever going to war with America. It is the last thing they would wish to do, and I sincerely hope and believe—I have not been to America, and therefore I do not pretend to know very much about the feelings of America—that the vast majority of Americans entertain the same feelings towards us that we entertain towards them. One does not forget, however, that there are in America, leaving out the compatriots of my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) —
Do not mix me up with it.
Leaving out the compatriots of the right hon. Gentleman, there are in America a large number of Germans, and we must not overlook that fact. There are not only a large number of blue-blooded Germans, but a largo number of people who have a German father and a German mother, although they may have been born in the United States, and therefore they are, to a very great extent, influenced by the feelings that influence the pure-bred Germans. We have to recognise that fact. So far as I know, very few countries have ever totally forgiven, at any rate not for a long time, a defeat such as was inflicted upon the Germans by the Allies, and we have to reckon with that feeling. If it is admitted that what I have said is correct, we are met with the fact that America has suddenly increased her Navy. They have in America what is called the Monroe doctrine. I am not sure I quite understand the meaning of the Monroe doctrine; but perhaps the hon. Member for Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) can explain it later on.
It was conceived by an Englishman.
I might even say that that is in its favour. I believe that doctrine means that America shall not interfere in the affairs of any country outside America. A very good doctrine; a little selfish, perhaps, but on the whole not a bad doctrine. One hon. Member suggests to me that that is not the doctrine. At any rate, what America says is, "If you will not interfere with us we will not interfere with you," and I am not sure that that was not a doctrine which we had in England many years ago. We had no interest in foreign affairs, and America said, "We have no interest in foreign countries so long as they do not interfere with America." If that is so, she does not want a great Navy, because there is nobody on this side of the water, even if they wish to do so, who could do anything against America. Germany is non-existent as a naval Power, France does not want another war. Therefore, there only remains this country. [An HON. MEMBER: "Japan."] That has nothing to do with us. Does anyone suggest that Japan is contemplating an attack upon America It is more likely that America is contemplating an attack upon Japan. That Japan is contemplating an attack upon America is unthinkable. If these are the facts, why is America suddenly going in for this large navy? I remember some years ago that I happened to have a certain amount of money in German 3 per cents. [An HON. MEMBER: "You got out in time."] Yes, Germany began to increase her navy, and we were told at that time that it was not directed against England, but that it was in order to protect her commerce. That is very much the same phrase which is now being used by America. I am of a rather disbelieving nature. I did not believe that Germany was doing this merely to protect her commerce. I thought that the Germans were very long-headed people, very cautious people, and that they would not spend money without reason, and I could not see that they were going to attack anybody with their fleet but England. Therefore, I sold my German 3 per cent., and as I got over 80 I did very well out of them. The reason I mention this personal story is that I am afraid something of the same sort is happening over again. America is suddenly building a large fleet. What for? Certainly there is Japan, but with the exception of Japan there is only one other country at which this large fleet can be aimed, and that is England. If that is so, for Heaven's sake do not let us be caught napping. Let us tell the United States that we have no desire to do anything against her, but that we must maintain the superiority of the English fleet at all hazards. How about the money? The expenditure for 1921–22 is for Civil Service to be £460,000,000, interest on debt £325,000,000, Army £106,000,000, Air £18,000,000 and Navy £82,000,000. Take it from the Civil Service, where it is being wasted, and use it for the purpose for which it will be useful, namely, the protection of our shores. My hon. and gallant Friend at the conclusion of his extremely able speech alluded to the question of food. Remember what happened in this House five years ago when we listened with trepidation, shall we say, to the statement from that front Bench as to the amount of food in the country. Are we going to run a risk like that again? Far better to take away from this £460,000,000, the great bulk of which can be saved and is useless expenditure, and spend it on something which will enable us to maintain that great Empire which has been handed down to us.
I listened with considerable regret to the speech which has just been made by the right hon. Member the Member for the City of London. His classics are better than his history, and I would like him to revise his recollection of what the Monroe doctrine really is before he addresses the House again on the subject. But though his history is bad his prophecies, predictions and apprehensions are, I think, even worse. For my part I have not the faintest apprehension of the intention or effect of what America is doing in the way of building up a Navy, or that it is directed or ever will be directed against this country. I may perhaps be allowed to congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend (Sir J. Craig) on the admirably lucid and comprehensive statement which he made at the beginning of our Debate. I am sure that the whole House will associate itself with his expression of regret that, well as he performed that duty, it could not have been discharged by the late First Lord of the Admiralty. Indeed, it is a sad and serious blow to this House that we should have to lament, as we have had to do this afternoon, the disability of two of our most distinguished and respected colleagues. The late First Lord is one of the oldest Members of this House. He was returned as far back as 40 or 41 years ago, and with very brief intermissions he has sat here ever since. I have been opposed to him in politics almost the whole of that time, but I shall always regard him—and I say this as he is absent with the more freedom—as the finest type of manly English Gentleman without any kind of personal interest, devoting himself, his assiduity, and his great ability to the service of the State. Such men are rare, and we ought to preserve, and as far as we can, to follow their example.
The Estimates which my hon. and gallant Friend introduced with so much dexterity and ability represent a substantial reduction on the Estimates of last year. That reduction, as the memorandum of the First Lord which accompanies the Estimate points out, claims to be a little over £8,000,000. But that figure is arrived at not by comparing the Estimates now introduced with the Estimates introduced a year ago, but by comparing them with the Estimates introduced a year ago, added to by the Supplementary Estimates produced in the later part of the year. To compare the original Estimate of last year with the Estimates submitted today, the saving works out at rather less than £2,000,000. I should be very glad to think that we had any guarantee that we were not going to have Supplementary Estimates during the current year. My hon. Friend nods his head. I am sure that his pious hope and sincere expectation are that that may be the case. But we have a large experience in these matters, and certainly during the last two or three years, so far as my knowledge and recollection go, there is hardly one of the great spending Departments which has not exceeded the original Estimates submitted in the spring to this House in the course of the financial year. The Admiralty, I agree, is not by any means so great an offender in that matter as the War Office, not perhaps because of the superior virtue of the Department, but because it is less liable to suffer from violent fluctuations and vicissitudes of political policy; but the figures, after credit has been given for every possible economy and reduction proposed by my hon. and gallant Friend, are of a very startling kind.
We are asked to spend—it is not irrelevant to say it—in the Estimates that are now submitted during the current year on fighting services, Army, Navy, and Air Service, a sum exceeding £200,000,000. For what has now become a mythical or an imaginative date in the political calendar, what is called the normal year, we have had various Estimates of what that expenditure will be. So far as I recollect the last figure put forward by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was £135,000,000. We are now, after two years, I will not say of peace, but, at any rate, of cessation from active widespread hostilities, asked to sanction an expenditure exceeding that of the normal year calculated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by no less than £70,000,000. That is a very serious state of things and makes it more than ever incumbent on this House to scrutinise with the most minute care the different Votes and items of which that large total is composed. That is the proper function of Committee of Supply as my hon. and gallant Friend truly said, and I am not going into these matters in detail at present. It would not be appropriate. But there are one or two questions which I would like to ask. One of the proposals which, not perhaps actually, but prospectively involves the country in the most serious increase in expenditure of the Navy is the proposal to lay down, in place of what are called obsolescent vessels, four new capital ships. I am not going into the merits of that proposal at the moment, but I think that the House would be glad to have from my hon. and gallant Friend an Estimate, so far as the Admiralty can at present form one, of what the total cost of those four ships is going to be. They have laid down, so far as I know, since the Battle of Jutland, only one capital ship, the "Hood." I think it was laid down while I was responsible for affairs in the autumn of 1916. I believe that I am right in saying that the "Hood" is now complete I do not know whether it is actually commissioned.
Yes.
If that is so, then the Government will be in a position to tell us what the exact cost of the "Hood" has been. I can only draw an inference from the figures which I have seen, but I suppose it is not short of £6,000,000. [HON. MEMBERS: "More."] That is what I would like to know. I would like to know precisely what it has cost.
The total estimate is £5,843,000.
I said not far short of £6,000,000. I think that the House would like to know when it is committing itself to the laying down of four new ships what is the total cost. In the figures before me for the actual construction of the ship it is stated that armaments and ordnance are excluded.
The heading which I have is including armaments.
The heading which I have is excluding armaments.
The designs were changed and all those changes add enormously to the cost.
Let us assume that the cost of the "Hood" is about £6,000,000. I would like to know whether these four new improved "Hoods"?—I do not know in what respect they are improved, whether the length, or displacement of the ship is to be greater or less, or whether armaments are to be the same or greater or less, but I would like to know, and the House is entitled to know, what is the estimate of the Admiralty when completely equipped with proper armaments for these four new vessels, the laying down of which we are now invited to sanction. I am not going to criticise the policy at the moment because I do not know precisely what vessels they are to replace. I am not one of those who think that the War has taught us that the navies of the future can safely dispense with capital ships. But the relative proportion of capital ships to the lighter forms of craft is a question undoubtedly of vital importance, as to which the House will expect the Government to give them the benefit, as soon and as fully and as explicitly as they can after the process of sifting and weighing which it has no doubt undergone, of the expert advice they have received.
I pass to say two or three things of a more general kind as to the lines on which our naval policy in these post-War days ought to proceed. The first thing, and in some ways the most important thing, to bear in mind when you are discussing that problem is that the pre-War standard, to which we had worked up in the year 1914, has little or no relevance to the facts of the situa- tion, actual and prospective, to-day. The War, I agree, has made no change—here I am in agreement with my right hon. Friend who has just spoken—in the fundamental fact that of all the great communities of the world, we are most dependent upon sea power. We are most dependent of all, not only because of our vulnerability to attack at so many points and in so many different quarters, but still more because, particularly here at the centre in this United Kingdom, we have to draw our main supply, both of food and raw material for our industries, from overseas. That is a fundamental fact in the geographical and political structure of the British Empire. No war can possibly alter it or minimise its importance. Though that is perfectly true, it is equally true that the War has changed, and, indeed, in many respects transformed, the perspective of what I might call the practical bearings, for the moment and for the years immediately in front of us, of that problem. Why do I say that? The years before the War, particularly the five or six years which preceded the War, may be described as an era of competitive shipbuilding. For many generations, for two or three generations, at any rate, no one, no Power outside, had ever challenged our naval supremacy. Germany deliberately entered the arena, and though there were certain disguises in the early stages of the transaction, it became, before many years were over, apparent and patent what her real purpose was.
It is a matter of history and not of controversy that we tried, and tried in vain, to call a halt. But the Government of that day, and the House of Commons of that day, as trustees for the national security, were compelled, as Germany proceeded on her rival path, to add year by year to their programme of construction and to their estimate of expenditure. You have only to look at the annual figures year by year for five or six years before the War to see what that involved. The Navy Estimates of the last year, 1914–15, amounted to over £50,000,000 sterling. It was an unheard of sum at that time. In the light of what has since happened no one can say that we were wrong. In fact, the right hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) said the provision was insufficient for the risk we took. I do not think it was, and the history of the War shows it. I am not going into that. It is a historical question. I am only pointing out that those were the conditions and those were the provocative and efficient causes which led to our relatively colossal programme of construction and corresponding expenditure in the years which immediately preceded the War. To revert, in view of the altered conditions which the War has produced, to that standard, either in personnel or still more in material, would be in the truest sense of the word an anachronism, and an anachronism of the most stupid and short-sighted kind. Just consider it. We had in 1914 38 capital ships in commission, and the number of men voted by this House in that year was over 150,000. I believe 151,000 was the exact figure.
Parenthetically, may I deprecate the habit that has now become the fashion of comparing expenditure in the present year or in the present conditions with the expenditure in the years before the War by the simple process of dividing it by 2½. We had an illustration of that in the case of the Army Estimates, and there was a suggestion of something of the same kind in connection with the statement of the First Lord. If you are going to divide by 2½ for that purpose you must consider in the same way, on the other side of the account, what are the resources of the taxpayer, measured in money, now as compared with the years before the War. The change which has taken place, produced by the War, was pointed out clearly by the late First Lord (Mr. Long) in his speech exactly a year ago, from which a quotation has already been made by the hon. and gallant Member (Sir J. Craig) in introducing the Estimates. He pointed out that the German Navy had disappeared completely, and he said there was no European navy, nor any combination of European navies, which need give us any anxiety, and the only navy approximating in strength to our own was that of the United States of America with whom—I commend these words to the right hon. Baronet who has just sat down— an expression as the One-power Standard. We used to speak of the Two-power Standard in the old days before the War. I can remember the introduction of the phrase 30 or 40 years ago. It is curious to remember that in those early days one of the two powers expressly or tacitly included in the views of our naval constructors was France. The second power varied from time to time. It might have been Russia. It was hardly ever Germany. It was never the United States of America. That never entered into the calculations of those who propounded and formulated and adopted and acted upon the Two-power Standard. That formula of the Two-power Standard was always a crude, unscientific rule of thumb. The only true and trustworthy principle to guide our action is that the Royal Navy, in conjunction, I am happy to say, with those of our Dominions—a growing factor in our Imperial panoply—our Royal Navy in conjunction with those of the Dominions should always be adequate to secure the safety of our sea-girt Empire and our sea-borne supplies against any reasonably, calculable risk. That, in my opinion, is a much better formula than these artificial rules of thumb, one-power or two-power or two-and-a-half-power, or whatever you like to call it. Do let us be on our guard against this curse of talk about competitive shipbuilding. I heartily re-echo the wish that is expressed in the concluding part of the memorandum of the First Lord—that we may have such a frank and friendly discussion with other Powers as—here again I quote the words of the late First Lord, admirable words which ought to be remembered—
That is the first and, I think, the most urgent, and certainly the most practicable, step towards that universal disarmament which is one of the avowed and fundamental objects of the Covenant of the League of Nations. You never had a more favourable opportunity than you have now, when the only two great naval Powers in the world—I am not ignoring the fact that our Allies, the Japanese, have got a powerful fleet— when the two supreme naval Powers of the world between them dominate the ocean actually or potentially, and they are these two great English-speaking peoples, between whom fratricidal strife is, we hope and believe still, an absolute impossibility. They are in this commanding position and nobody can say them "Nay," if they come to an agreement for such a reasonable reduction of naval armaments as will limit them to the absolute necessities of national security.
May I join in the congratulations so well expressed by my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Asquith) to my hon. and gallant Friend on the Front Bench (Sir J. Craig), who has so ably introduced the Estimates this year. I imagine that this is probably the most difficult and most critical year that the Navy has ever had to consider in its history. There is a cry everywhere for retrenchment and economy, and a very natural cry. I can well see on the one hand our naval advisers trying to do their duty to the country in the direction of the safety of the Empire, and at the same time trying to do something to relieve the taxpayer and meet the outcry which is so often reiterated against the spending Departments. I think this House ought to be careful, at all events as regards the Navy, if nothing else, that we are not led away to do something that we might extremely regret in the years to come, by allowing this cry for economy to affect our judgment in relation to our naval necessities as an Empire. You will not build a Navy in a hurry; you will not even train your personnel in a hurry. You must have personnel, and the only way you can have personnel is by having ships to train them in, and ships to train them in, do not forget, not of an obsolete character, but of an absolutely up-to-date character, ships which have originated from the lessons that we learned in the War. Something else also has to be remembered, and it is this, that the fewer the ships you put in commission, the more necessary it is that those ships should be absolutely, up-to-date. Therefore, as regards our building construction programme, there are many things that have to be kept in view.
I did not gather from my right hon. Friend (Mr. Asquith), who has just made a very eloquent and very instructive speech, whether he thought the programme was too great or not. I think we ought to be very explicit. You must lay down a policy first to your naval advisers, who cannot advise you without a policy; and as far as I am concerned, if I find the policy is right, and then I find that the naval advisers say, "What we propose will carry out that policy," that is the only way I have to judge. I read this Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty with some anxiety, not on the ground of expenditure, but on the question whether there is sufficient expenditure, and I will tell you why. I am judging nothing for myself in this, because I am not competent, but when I read first the policy which is to maintain a one-power standard, and that is that our Navy should not be inferior in strength to that of any other Power, I say that that is a policy which we are bound to maintain. I believe if it were explained to any audience in the country that for the first time in history the British Navy was going to be inferior in strength to that of any other one Power, you would have an agitation throughout this country which would compel you to take a very different view of the situation. I hope it is so, because if we are going to say we are satisfied to be the second naval Power in the world, tell it to the people, tell it to the Empire; tell them that there is another naval Power which may interrupt the great highways of the Empire, and let them, at all events, see what they can do to prevent what I believe would be the greatest catastrophe that has ever happened to this country.
Therefore I say that we are on the very limit of what is safe—and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith) laid down himself that the real question is as to what is safe—when we say that our policy is that our Navy should not be inferior in strength to that of any other Power, if we are on that narrow margin, as I call it, of safety, because, after all, do look at what is involved in the commerce of the country, in the food of the country, in the life of the country, and we cannot exaggerate it. Evidently that being put as the policy to the expert advisers, they say they have given and that would include what my right hon. Friend calls the disappearance of the menace of the German navy. They go on to say:
Then you turn to America, and I hope we shall be told something as to the programme of America by my hon. and gallant Friend the Parliamentary Secretary when he comes to speak again. In turning to the American programme, I cannot see how we are doing anything wrong in talking of American preparations, when America has no hesitation in talking of her own preparations, or in talking of our proposals. It is idle to say you are doing anything to promote hostility between countries simply because each of them refers to the increase or the difference in armaments of the other. I heard all this kind of thing long enough in this House before the War. I heard the very same thing said over and over again in this House—"Do you think for a moment Germany is building a navy against England?" That burns in my very soul, and we all know that that is always the argument. No, Sir; we have a right, until this policy is altered as laid down by the Government, to see and secure for the people that our Navy shall not be inferior in strength to that of any other Power, and as long as we tell the people that, we must examine the proposals of every other Power, or we are dishonestly acting towards the people of this country and the Empire.
What is the statement made as regards the United States of America? As I gathered from the very able speech of my hon. and gallant Friend who moved the Amendment (Lieut.-Colonel Archer-Shee) —and it corresponds with figures I have got myself—in 1925 the United States of America will have 18 capital ships of what may now be called the post-Jutland class, that is, ships built and constructed with every possible improvement which the lessons of the War have given. We shall have, assuming that the present proposals of His Majesty's Government be carried out, only 5. Does anybody think that is too much? But that is not all. You cannot leave out of consideration Japan. Japan will have, as I have the figures, in 1925, eleven of these great post-Jutland ships as against our five. That is, between those two countries there will be 29 as against our 5. If we are to go on, and have new ships at all, in my opinion the naval experts have advised, not the maximum of what we want, but the minimum. I earnestly hope that nothing will move the Government from the programme they have brought in, and that they will sternly resolve to watch the situation, so that next year they may bring forward a larger programme, if necessary, when probably shipbuilding will have returned to more normal conditions and the price of building may be less.
I earnestly wish the Government would see whether there are matters in the extension of our Empire since the War, and owing to the War, which might be got rid of—for instance, the costs we are paying for Mesopotamia. I am not at all sure it would not be better to put all that money into ships. But be that as it may, the one thing of which I am certain is that, whatever other economies you make, the country will not tolerate any economy which puts this country into danger with reference to her maritime position.
My right hon. Friend opposite said that the method of comparing Estimates with 1914, which was generally adopted by the Government, was fallacious. That may be—I am not competent to express an opinion upon the arithmetical sum, which is generally performed on these occasions—but I am perfectly certain that that is not nearly so fallacious as the other method adopted by certain right hon. and hon. Members opposite, and by a great section of the Press, of comparing what the Navy or other Service cost in 1914 with what it costs to-day, without taking into consideration the entirely different circumstances existing. Would anybody compare the condition of pay in the Navy as it exists to-day with what existed in 1914? I think we ought to be proud that, whatever else we have omitted to do, we have done a great deal to better the position, the emoluments and allowances which are made to our gallant sailors in the Navy, and which they have so well deserved. But it is idle to talk of these comparisons without going through the whole history of the six years.
There are one or two other points to which I would like to refer. The right hon. Gentleman opposite rightly said, I think, that it was very difficult, if not impossible, for laymen to express any very definite view upon this question of the big ship and the little ship. He, at all events, expressed no sympathy with those who imagine—and, in my opinion, most foolishly imagine—that you can do without the big ships, and allow yourselves to be outclassed in guns, and lose your personnel before you know where you are. He also said that there were other considerations, which is no doubt true. There is the question of the relative merits of the large ship and of the small ship and of the air, all taken together, having regard to the financial position in which you find yourselves.
Nothing could be more misleading than entering into controversy over the big ship against the little ship. It is really all one question—the big ship, with its proper and necessary complement of smaller ships. When I was at the Admiralty in the most difficult time of the War, I remember we could never let one of these capital ships out without, I think, at least four, five or six destroyers to screen them, and you cannot consider one ship without all its necessary complement. Therefore, what you want, and the only way you can do it, is to have expert advisers on whom you can rely, and those expert advisers must consider the matter as a whole.
I hope the Admiralty have considered whether it would not be well for them to get back again to their own naval air service. I believe that in the exigencies of the War it may have been right to make the change that was made, but, from the slight experience that I gained at the Admiralty, and from the views I heard expressed there by men who were expert in both services, you have to watch with the greatest possible care the progress of naval air service in conjunction with the naval service generally in relation to ships. I know the time I was there—I do not know how it is now—it certainly was looked forward to that, in the course of progress of seaplanes, in conjunction with small craft and wireless telegraphy, you would go far to solve the question of hunting the submarine. It is quite plain that the problem of the joint action of ships and airships is quite a different one from the relation of airships to troops moving in the field. I do hope my hon. and gallant Friend will be able to assure us that this is a question which is being carefully watched and carefully considered by the naval experts, and that, above all, no economy will prevent the Admiralty from carrying on research of all kinds in relation to the progress of ships in connection with the air, and also in reference to all the devices which have been in progress for the purpose of dealing with the submarine question.
All these are matters of vital importance, and I notice one matter in the statement of the First Lord which, I think, gives some anxiety, and that is where he says: I believe our gunnery was one of our great factors during the late War, and anything like a falling off in specialisation in gunnery would, I believe, be a great misfortune. Taking the matter on the whole, as it occurs to me, I think the Government have laid down the right policy. I have some doubt as to whether the Admiralty experts have not been persuaded to say that the present proposals put forward are sufficient for the purpose of carrying out that policy. But, at the same time, I think, if we are assured that our naval experts do say that that is sufficient, we are bound to take that advice, and to pass their proposals. It casts upon them, as it always must east upon them, the greatest responsibility that any part of bur war service ever has to incur, namely, the responsibility of upholding our supremacy at sea.
Reference has already been made to the manner in which the Parliamentary Secretary has presented the case for the Government this afternoon, and I return to the subject to say, on my own behalf, that having listened to a great many such speeches, I cannot recall one which exhibited greater brevity and clearness than the speech to which the House listened this afternoon, and we are indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for a very plain and effective statement. I cannot refer to the general question which is raised by the Amendment without expressing my disappointment at the tone and line followed by the right hon. Member for the Duncairn Division (Sir E. Carson). He speaks as though the events of the Great War had not really re-arranged the relations between nations, and as though those who had taken part in that great world encounter should learn nothing by its lessons. America represents our kinsfolk. She was our Ally. She is growing, it is true, in naval power, but if we pursue all that is implied in the term One-Power Standard, we are certain to provoke the very competition in naval armaments which I thought we were most anxious to avoid. If the standard becomes embedded in our minds, and we regard it as our duty to make ourselves equal to the standard of any other single Power, some other Power will follow our example. I am not, of course, thinking that if there is no alternative we should not seek to make ourselves as strong as any other single Power. But there is ar alternative.
If our principal object is defence—as I hope it is—we might seek, at all events, to arrange to fortify ourselves against attack. Can it be that already we feel that our kinsfolk and our Allies are not prepared to face this question of naval power in the spirit of arrangement, which will make economy a certainty, and which will be a big contribution towards that peace of mind to which I hoped we were all tending! The First Lord of the Admiralty addressed himself to this subject at a public gathering last night. I have read his speech with the greatest pleasure. In very distinct and very conciliatory language he virtually suggested to America to send us an invitation to talk this matter over. I hope that that suggestion of an invitation will not fall upon deaf ears across the water. But should no invitation come to us we might well consider whether, after all, as the older country, an invitation could not be extended from this side. I will not, however, pursue that theme now, but it certainly is an extremely helpful and valuable step in advance to have had the recent statement by President Harding on the one hand followed by such a rejoinder as that publicly uttered by the First Lord of the Admiralty.
Quite recently in this House, scorn was poured upon the idea of thinking of these questions in the terms of Christian doctrine. Even the Prime Minister was reproached for carrying in his head a copy of the Sermon on the Mount. I suggest to the House that we can trifle too lightly with even the doctrines of the Sermon on the Mount. These inspired our Army. They went far to fortify our fighting men in the Navy. Above all, this is surely now the time, having regard to the relationships between nations, when we should think of cementing those relationships in all that is implied by Christianity. Therefore it is no taunt to the Prime Minister; it is to his credit to have received such a taunt—whoever the Prime Minister be—that he is thinking of these great questions of international relationship in such terms. It is loathsome to my mind, and to many others I think, to have to consider questions of naval policy now from the standpoint of developing, extending, and expanding war-like instruments without pre- viously exhausting every possible opportunity for settling these matters on the basis of a peaceful arrangement. Though it is a matter of great regret to my mind that America is not within the League of Nations, or even in closer relationship than even she is to this country, it would be a matter of still greater regret if anything were either said or done that would tend to estrange these two great nations upon whose friendship, I believe, for a long time the amity and progress of the world must depend.
I therefore say there is an alternative to shipbuilding, an alternative that will cost us nothing, and which may save us money. If really we were exposed to more powerful or potential enemies than those to which we are exposed, I, and those for whom I speak, would be the last to say or do anything that would in the slightest degree enfeeble our Navy or make it less efficient for the protection of our shores. In the absence of arrangements, if really there be danger we can not overcome by conciliatory methods, by discussion, and the interchange of information; if these questions of armaments or other questions cannot be settled upon such a basis as I indicate, then it is the imperative duty of this nation to safeguard itself against any risk from outside attack. Having said that on the general question, I want very briefly to touch on two or three lesser points of detail. The Parliamentary Secretary announced to the House that Pembroke Dock and another one will very shortly be closed. I have no doubt the Admiralty have taken into account the position of that dockyard. The fact that it is perhaps more than other dock yards—
May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that we are now discussing the terms of the Amendment. When the Amendment has been disposed of, we will revert to the general discussion opened by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. For the moment the right hon. Gentleman must confine himself within the limits of the Amendment.
I am sorry, Mr. Speaker, if I have overlooked that fact. Therefore, seeing there are other hon. Members behind me and elsewhere who desire to speak, I will endeavour to raise some of these questions during a later stage of the Debate. Having covered the general question of policy so far as I desire to refer to it now, I will leave it there.
I understand, Mr. Speaker, from your ruling, that we must confine ourselves to the question of the shipbuilding programme. I have much to say on other points, such as the Air Service, etc., but I shall confine myself now to the question of the capital ship as we understand it to-day—that enormously costly ship. I heard the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) refer to the "Hood," saying that it cost £6,000,000. I fear that capital ships laid down now will cost vastly more than that. Not only does the ship itself cost more money, but if it is going to be used against nations such as Japan and the United States, we have to consider the cost of bases, docks, and so on, which are absolutely essential to the vessels operating in the waters surrounding these countries. I was speaking the other night on this subject, and I said:
The strength of the Navy does not depend only on battleships. As to losing our heritage, we must bear in mind the succession duties are very heavy, and some of us have had to sell our heritage on account of those succession duties. It behaves us to consider well whether our finances will stand the strain. To my mind, one of the great lessons which we learned from the War was this: that the German battleships, two-thirds only of the strength of ours—I speak, of course, in round figures—caused the whole of our battlefleet, with its enormous flotilla and an enormous number of skilled men, to be locked up in the North Sea for four years. A far weaker fleet absolutely "contained," as the expression goes, the stronger. Had Germany had as many cruisers, old second-class battleships, and so on, spread all over the world, and had she had bases from which to work those ships, could we have brought our overseas Army to Europe? Could we have brought the American Army to Europe? Could we have brought the essential foodstuffs, and raw material to this country? In fact, could we have won the War? Although we had this enormous preponderance of battleships, I say we could not have won the War. Though we had this preponderance we were absolutely afraid to detach any one of them to "mop up" what ships Germany might possibly have had over the whole of our trade routes, the smaller craft to which I have referred. That is why the other night, in addressing the House on this subject, with the hope of checking this appalling expenditure on armaments, not only by ourselves but by other countries, in the hope of preventing another great rivalry in battleship building, I said there was no occasion for us to lay down ships this year. I said this year only.
I did not say that lightly. I had the building programmes furnished to me by the Admiralty. I say, having regard to the international position in relation to the three navies, those of Japan, the United States, and ourselves, and considering carefully the five sets of circumstances which might arise as amongst these three navies, that with the ships we have at present we could, at least until the year 1925, contain an enemy battle fleet. In the meantime our enormous preponderance in every form of craft, cruisers, old battleships, and so on, with them we should be able to do what we liked all over the world. I say that with the 13 battleships armed with 15-inch guns and 15 battleships armed with 13½-inch guns as our battle fleet we need build none this year. There will be time next year to do what we want before 1925, when the American and Japanese navies will have to be seriously considered. We are talking about the effect of the Battle of Jutland. What occurred there does not waiter the ships themselves seriously. These 15-inch gun ships will last as efficient and formidable ships for many years to come, and those carrying 13½-inch guns are susceptible of enormous improvement consequent on the lessons we learnt at Jutland and during the last War. They can be enormously increased in offensive and defensive power. No nation wishes to go on spending millions on ships that may become obsolete in the course of perhaps ten years, as has been the case since we started the, to my mind, foolish policy of "Dreadnoughts."
We started this vast and mistaken policy of trying to best possible enemies in the size of our ships. I think that was a mistake. Let us try and stop this game of trying to best one another. Do not on any account let us be building ships with a view to besting the United States or Japan That will assuredly provoke them, and the United States, at any rate in point of riches, can best us whenever they like. Let us have no soft sawder or sentiment about this matter. We are building these ships to-day in view of the possibility of going to war with the United States or Japan. Let us have no nonsense on that point. Such a war may occur. I have not the least hesitation in saying it. Therefore, let us say plainly it may occur. Why should we be afraid to say it? But the situation to-day is entirely different from what it was when we were confronted with the German Navy. The German Navy was out to destroy our Empire and to seize it for Germany. It is ridiculous to suppose that the United States of America have any such intention, and Japan is fully occupied in penetrating and controlling the Chinese Empire. I see no reason whatever to anticipate for many years to come a war between ourselves and either the United States or Japan. I do not, however, lose sight of the fact that we have in the admirals on the Admiralty Board a body of advisers, expert and experienced, on whom the responsibility lies—a very grave responsibility it is—and although I deprecate, and I use the word in its best sense—I pray against the evil of building battleships this year, I trust them. It is their business and their responsibility. I trust them, and although I maintain my opinion that it is unnecessary for us to lay down ships this year, I waive my opinion in deference to theirs.
I listened to the speech of the hon. and gallant Admiral with great interest, and I differ from him on the question of policy with great diffidence. I cannot draw the same lessons as he drew from the composition of the battle fleets, and I would remind him that the fact that our battleships were superior to the German fleet gave us in the late War entire control of the ocean in every quarter of the globe, and our trade was passing backwards and forwards because our surface ships were able to cope with the enemy's submarines. The hon. and gallant Gentleman suggested that had the Germans had more obsolete ships they would have been able to reverse the position.
I said cruisers.
I venture with great deference to differ. The governing factor in the control of the surface is the battle fleet which can ultimately drive off any force the enemy can bring against it. I remember a very interesting opinion expressed by Lord Fisher, which impressed me very much. He said that the primary ship is the cruiser which controls the surface, and the primary object in every war is to control the sea roads. The cruiser controls the sea roads and in that sense is the primary ship, but behind it is the battleship, and the cruiser cannot get out and do her primary work unless she is protected by a superior battle fleet. I remember reading also Admiral Sims' book in which he described the antisubmarine warfare in which the American Navy took such a gallant and prominent part. The gallant Admiral there definitely states that it was the existence of the superior battle fleet which enabled the American Navy to carry on its antisubmarine operations in our waters. Therefore it is with great diffidence, after spending many years at the Admiralty and having heard naval opinion on these points, that I venture to suggest to the hon. and gallant Admiral that it was the actual superiority of our battle fleet which contained the German fleet. It is no answer to that to say that our fleet was also contained by the German fleet. That is purely a secondary point. The point was that our fleet being superior, we controlled the sea roads from one end of the world to the other, and the German fleet was unable to do so, because it dared not come out.
I suppose the House could hardly be discussing a more important subject than we are discussing at this moment. In its essentials it is entirely unchanged from those discussions which we had on similar subjects before the War. After the speech of my right hon. Friend with whom I had the honour of serving at the Admiralty (Sir E. Carson), it seems to me there is very little more to say, but I would like to make one or two remarks in addition to what he said. I think that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who spoke as Leader of the Labour party (Mr. Clynes) was a speech of very great force and interest. Everybody will agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said, that agreement and international arrangement is far better than building one against another. Everybody will hold that. The practical question we have to consider on this Estimate is, can we afford, even when that is our opinion, even when the world knows it is our opinion, even when we wish the world to know it is our opinion, can we afford to allow any single Power, however friendly, however much we desire to maintain its friendship and even affection, even if it is of our own blood, can we afford to be in a position that another nation in the world will have a Navy definitely more powerful than our own Navy? Is there any hon. Member who will accept that position? That drives us to the one-Power standard, not in the sense of desiring to build against any other Power, or to select any single Navy and to say we are building to maintain one equal or greater than that, but simply from the purely defensive point of view. For reasons so eloquently stated in this House hundreds and thousands of times during the last two or three hundred years, we cannot afford to allow any country to have a Navy which could drive our trade and commerce from off the sea and control the sea roads by which the Empire is joined. Therefore no country can look upon our determination to maintain the one essential defence which this Empire has as in any sense aggressive. If the United States of America and the Government of this country can come to any arrangement by which competition in building can be avoided, it will not only be unopposed, but most heartily welcomed in every quarter of this House. But if such an arrangement is impossible, it is impossible for us to say, simply because we trust and believe in the continued friendship of the United States or any other country, that we can allow them to have a Navy to which our Navy would be manifestly inferior.
7.0 P.M.
Then as to the further question which arises on this, and that is the building of capital ships. I hold the view most strongly that as between the building of capital ships and submarines, or any other form of vessel, we must rely upon our naval advisers, and it would be, it seems to me, most dangerous for this House to attempt to assume a responsibility which it has placed on the Board of Admiralty. The Board of Admiralty relies for advice on its naval advisers and it must be held accountable by this House for telling the House what in its opinion is necessary to maintain the standard which this House has set. I cannot see how we can possibly depart from that principle. This time, as the right hon. Member for Dun-cairn has pointed out, is an extraordinarily difficult time to deal with problems of this character. I would suggest there are three factors which are all vitally important—one is the question of cost, another is the question of time, and the third is the question of scientific investigation into naval problems affecting different methods of offence and defence. These three factors are all interlocked and dependent on each other. The factors time and cost have both been profoundly affected by the War. Before the War when we were building under the threat of a supreme German Navy we could not afford to delay building not only one or more ships but homogeneous classes of vessels. Even the most expensive capital ships we could not delay from year to year. We had to build up to the latest information we possessed and delay would have been absolutely fatal. The present position is different. It is clear we are in no immediate danger, and it does give us a little more time. I do not draw the conclusion that the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite draws as regards this particular programme. I draw the conclusion that this programme gives full effect to those factors and that in laying down four ships now we have gone to the utmost limit in the matter of time. We could not safely have gone further, and these ships could not possibly have been delayed being laid down in the present year, having in view the very great length of time it must take to construct them. As to the question of cost, our position, of course, is very different from what it was. That is a truism which I need not labour, because it is in the mind of everyone in the House. I am sure that whatever other expenditure we may have to meet, the one which the taxpayer will least object to pay is that for the maintenance of our Navy. However much he may grumble at any other form of expenditure, he and the country would more resent a paring down of the Navy below the point which the Admiralty advised the Government was the point of national security than any extravagance which the Government might undertake. In considering the question of cost the House has a right to consider the relative cost of the Navy before the War and the Navy now, as compared with other forms of expenditure. The question as to the relation of pay, and so on, and the increased cost of all services compared with before the War has already been discussed. That applies to all services; it is not only the Navy which has increased. That factor should not and does not affect the relative cost of the Navy as compared with other parts of our national expenditure. It is interesting to see that in 1912–13, when our total naval expenditure was £44,000,000, that that was 29 per cent. of our total national expenditure. At the same time, the Civil Service expenditure was £33,000,000, which was 17 per cent. of our total national expenditure. Therefore, you had 17 per cent. of our national expenditure laid out on the Civil Service and 29 per cent. expended on our national insurance policy. In 1913–14 the figures were 19 per cent. on the Civil Service and 22·6 per cent. on the Navy. In the present year the proportion has been on the Civil Service 28 per cent. and on the Navy 8 per cent.
That does not include the cost of pensions. There is nothing for them.
That is so. I am indebted to my hon. and gallant Friend for these figures, which would otherwise have been used in his most interesting and able speech on this question. The cost of the Civil Service, quite apart from pensions, has gone up from 17 per cent. to 28 per cent., and that of the Navy has gone down from 29 per cent. to 8 per cent. I do not believe any hon. Member could go down to his constituency and defend those figures, not even the right hon. Gentleman who spoke as leader of the Labour party, unless he could also say that the House had had the assur- ance of the Board of Admiralty that the 8 per cent. to which the Navy had been cut down was really sufficient for a Naval insurance fund under present conditions. That is the only condition under which these proportions could possibly be accepted by this country. Most clearly, in that extraordinarily enormously increased percentage on the Civil Service, there is a fund from which, without increasing taxation, the House would be entitled and obliged if necessary to subtract money to add to our necessary naval expenditure.
I wish to touch on one point, as between the capital ship and the submarine. It is not a subject which I am competent to discuss in this Committee, and I am afraid very few hon. Members in this House are specially competent to do so. We can, however, all appreciate that it is quite true, as the hon. and gallant Admiral who last addressed the House said, that you can no longer really measure the relative strength of two navies by a simple counting of noses of capital ships. I agree with him. I dealt with that from another point of view in the first few sentences which I addressed to the House. From a different standpoint I agree with him, because nobody really knows to-day as clearly as they knew before the War what is the real value in war to-day of a capital ship. Nobody can really measure exactly what its value is.
indicated dissent.
I see my Noble Friend opposite shakes his head. If he or anybody else can tell me exactly the relative value of a capital ship to-day he will be going a long way towards solving a naval problem which I do not think the Admiralty can yet solve. To say, at the present stage, that the capital ship is knocked out, and that we can afford to assume that fact or to have greatly less capital ships than another nation, is a doctrine to which I cannot assent for a moment. That does not prevent me from saying that the really true value in war to-day of a capital ship is a changing value. Nobody can say exactly what that value is relatively to the small ship. The same applies to the submarine. It is very dangerous to use the argument put forward by the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith), who pointed out that the Goeben lay for five days as a stationary target, that she was missed, and was only hit twice by small bombs. I remember exactly the same arguments being used before the War with regard to torpedoes. It was pointed out, over and over again, how no damage whatever could be done by torpedoes. That was perfectly true in the then stage of development. The conclusion that, because at that stage of aerial development, the Goeben was stationary without being hit from the air, there would be no real danger from an aerial attack on a battleship to-day, is one which I cannot accept, and which, I think, would not be accepted by the Admiralty.
The same thing applies to submarine and even more to anti-submarine warfare. At the end of the War anti-submarine warfare was left in a most interesting stage. Most valuable lessons were being learned, and they were broken off at a most interesting point. We do not know what has been learned since. The Admiralty know, and it is for them to apply those lessons. In this matter all I can do is to put myself in the hands of the Admiralty. I heard with great satisfaction one statement in the able speech of my right hon. Friend who introduced these Estimates. He said that the naval staff was being maintained at a strength of 86 at the Admiralty. We have there what we had not before the War, a real Naval Staff, who are thinking out War problems and are not concerned in administration. The old system was that the same officer who had the daily and hourly administrative work cast on him, which monopolised the whole of his time, was supposed also to be able to decide, without expert, considered advice, the scientific naval problems on which the whole future of the country might depend. You have now a scientific staff, a real Naval Staff, which gives its whole time to thinking out war problems in the light of the lessons of the War, and of the scientific investigation which is going on under the Admiralty.
If I had any criticism to make of these Estimates, I should say that, if anything, too little money was being spent on research and too much on actual construction. Taking the factors of time and cost into consideration, I believe the country would be saved enormous sums of money in future if the decision of these great problems which arise on this Amendment could be deferred as long as possible until the Admiralty get the results of the scientific experiments which are being carried out to-day, and which will be carried out even on a larger scale in future. The problem of the future relative value in naval warfare of different kinds of ships is an important one. It is a question of surface ships, large and small, because it concerns, not only the submarine and the aircraft, but also very small vessels of extraordinary speed using torpedoes and weapons of offence. One of the great lessons of the War was that the smallest vessels, armed with modern weapons, might destroy the largest ships That was absolutely impossible when war was carried on under the conditions in which we fought many years ago.
Goliath and David.
They were not ships. I believe that so far as the laying down of these four capital ships is concerned, whatever they may cost, the Admiralty have certainly not exceeded the requirements of the country; and that, when completed, the House will most certainly be prepared to vote the money for them. The Admiralty could not have gone further than they did in the direction of economy. I hope they will devote the greatest measure of attention to possible scientific investigation, and I agree with the right hon. Member for Paisley, who asked that the results of that investigation, should, so far as possible, be laid before the House in next year's Estimates, so as to enable us to form a judgment as to what sum we may have to vote on that occasion.
It may be considered an impertinence on my part, but before I enter on the topic of discussion I should like to pay some humble tribute, not so much on behalf of myself as on behalf of a great many naval officers, to the right hon. Gentleman who was our late First Lord of the Admiralty. I have had letters from several people, and from one in particular who had the pleasure and distinction of serving under the right hon. Gentleman at the Admiralty. So far as I can remember them the words of his letter are these:
We must look round, as we have been doing this afternoon, at our resources. We have seen that a large number, in fact all, of our ships are rapidly becoming worn out. It has been mentioned in the explanatory statement that our ships are becoming obsolete. That is so, and they are also becoming worn out at the same time. I do not know whether the strain that has been put upon our Navy since the Armistice is generally recognised. We have had our First Battle Squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, very often steaming at high speeds, very often in action, with their guns, possibly, getting worn out. The Mediterranean Squadron is in much the same condition. Other ships, like the "Queen Elizabeth" class, have had to undergo their ordinary training in peace routine, and there are one or two others of the "King George" class also employed in the Mediterranean. Our light cruisers have had to do all their ordinary duties all over the world—naval training and showing the flag—and at the same time to keep going the blockade of the Baltic. All this must mean wear and tear. The Admiralty are right when they say that they are taking a risk. Our ships are getting obsolete and out of date every day, and, possibly, even worn out. Against that you have these two other great countries laying down ships which date from the year 1916. That was a landmark in naval construction; it was the date of the Battle of Jutland. Some hon. Members, and particularly the gallant Admiral who spoke from these Benches (Rear-Admiral Adair), seemed to think that it was quite possible for ships of the type which we have in our Navy to-day to go into action with a good chance of success against these ships of post-Jutland type. It may be that they would, but it really is asking a great deal of naval officers. If those ships are by any chance outclassed—and the proof can never come until they are called upon—no amount of gallantry on the part of officers and men will save them. They will just go down—or go up. The gallant Admiral said that there was no need to build, and he inferred that our ships were quite good and suggested that they could be improved in offensive and defensive powers. I do not know what he had in mind, but I am certain that it is not possible to reconstruct ships on the scale which he apparently contemplates. A great deal has been done with the 10 best ships in our Navy, since the Battle of Jutland, to give them increased protection to magazines and fit them with the various improved fittings for range-finding and so on. At the same time the design of those ships must be radically altered, their sub-division must be radically altered, to give them offensive and defensive qualities in accordance with the lessons of the Battle of Jutland. There are ships on the active list in our Navy to-day as to which the Admiralty themselves would have the gravest doubts and fears if they were to send them into action against such a ship even as the "Hood" herself.
We have let the time go as long as we possibly can, and we have arrived at a moment when the country must decide whether it is going in for fresh construction or not. Personally, I think that if the position is put fairly and squarely before the country, and if the country is given an opportunity of judging for itself without being misled, it will come to one conclusion and one conclusion only. When we talk about this question from the point of view of the country, I think we should also remember the Imperial nature of the question. A good deal has been said about Great Britain and America and Japan, but what about India, and what about our Dominions? They also are interested in this problem; it is vital to them as it is vital to us. There is, for instance, the question of a white Australia. Are we to turn round and say to Australia, "We are not prepared to guarantee you your place in the Empire, to guarantee your policy"? Think what our Dominions did for us during the War. They did not wait to know whether the outbreak of war was their quarrel or ours, or whose quarrel it was; they came in and helped us without stint. If they had not helped us in those early days of the War, it is doubtful whether we should even have been able to win it. We cannot, help Australia with large armies. The only possible way in which we can help any of our great Dominions is by means of an efficient and sufficient Navy—a Navy which will keep open the trade routes of the world, which will guarantee them from interruption, and will enable us to guarantee them their policy. I am certain that no one will challenge me when I say that it is only weakness and unpreparedness that invites attack. Australia to-day is an almost empty continent, and alongside of her are the teeming millions of the East and one of the most formidable naval powers of the world. This is an Imperial question, and one which must be brought before the Imperial Conference in order that they may decide.
A great deal has been said about the capital ship, and the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last (Mr. Pretyman) made some interesting remarks about it. One remark that particularly struck me was that we cannot tell the exact value of the capital ship. I do not know whether anyone can tell, but I think it is only fair to look upon the capital ship as fulfilling the same functions for the Navy that the big gun and heavy artillery fulfil for the Army. I have always heard it referred to in that way by naval officers competent to judge, and we can as little afford to economise in the heavy artillery of the Navy as we could afford in France to economise in artillery for the Army. I may be wrong, but I have always looked upon that as the value of the capital ship. Doubt has arisen in the minds of many people, especially at a time when considerations of economy are so important, as to whether we are justified in re-undertaking the construction of capital ships. Some people say that, owing to the development of submarines and mines—in fact, of underwater warfare generally—the capital ship is not justifiable It is true that submarines did achieve a certain measure of success in the recent War, but that success, mainly, at any rate, was against unarmed and defenceless merchant ships. Against warships the submarine proved almost valueless. When the Grand Fleet went to sea in the later stages of the War, it meant about 300 ships, and on not one occasion that I can remember was that enormous collection of ships ever prevented by submarines or mines from going to sea at all hours of the day or night whenever it was necessary. There were frequent attacks by submarines, but never with the smallest success, with the exception of the torpedoing of the light cruisers "Nottingham" and "Falmouth." The same submarines also endeavoured to attack the main Fleet, and were utterly unable to do so. They managed to fire torpedoes at one ship, but missed. To attack a large fleet with submarines is to do so under the heaviest possible odds. The submarine cannot keep her periscope up for a sufficient time to get a good clear shot, and with the enormous screen of destroyers it is very difficult indeed.
Towards the end of the War, surface craft had without doubt absolutely beaten the submarine. I do not know whether people realise the pitch of perfection that has been reached in the acoustic detection of submarines. I do not know whether the Admiralty would give any information as to that, but it would be a valuable lesson to the House and the country if they could give a little information to the public as to the methods available for dealing with submarines. In the case of merchant ships, submarines in the initial stages did achieve a certain amount of success, but by 1917 the position was very much altered. Surface patrols made it a matter almost of impossibility for a submarine to get to sea without being reported, and the convoy system had been started. If the Battle of Jutland had resulted in the annihilation of the German Fleet, the exit of the German submarines from the Heliogoland Bight would have been completely prevented, and very many officers and men and a large number of additional destroyers would have been available for patrols for hunting up submarines. If that had happened, the whole course of the War might have been different, and the submarine menace might never have materialised to the extent that it did. By those who say that submarines are a menace to the capital ship, it is urged that they did succeed in torpedoing some battleships in the Mediterranean. That is true, but they were all old ships, and on most occasions, if not actually hove to, were proceeding at very slow speeds. There are those who look to the development of the submersible battleship, but that means an enormous increase in the size of the submarine, and as the submarine increases in size so do the difficulties of handling it increase out of all proportion. In fact, I believe the definite limit to the size of the submarine has already been more than reached, and later developments will be a submarine of a smaller type. What I think the most valuable thing in connection with the menace of the submarine to the capital ship is the opinion of one or two of the officers in them, and I should like to read the opinion of a lieutenant who served in submarines during the whole course of the War. He sums it up by saying:
The other great menace that is urged against the capital ship is the question of aircraft. I think I should have been far better able to agree with the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last if he had said we do not know as yet the conditions surrounding the use of aircraft at sea with the Fleet. I do not think we do. I think aircraft are really the most serious menace with which the capital ship may have to deal in the future, but I think a good deal of harm is done by the enthusiastic advocates of the air, who claim rather too much for what they are able to do. It is said that the torpedo-carrying aircraft is a very great menace to the capital ship. I do not think these enthusiastic advocates of aircraft really realise the difficulty of running a torpedo, and I am not sure whether any of them have really ever tried to run a torpedo, or at any rate tried to discharge one, from aircraft or surface ships. I have seen experiments carried out, and this much is quite certain: First of all you have to get the mechanism of the torpedo, which is more or less reliable, carefully adjusted. Then you have to come down to a very definite height above the water, which must not be more, I believe, than about 20 feet. Then you have to correctly estimate the course and speed of the enemy. Then you have to make quite sure how you drop your torpedo, and to make sure you do not dip from the horizontal plane with the machine you are discharging from, for while if you fire a torpedo from a destroyer under helm, and it has a considerable list, all the calculation and adjustments of the torpedo may be correct, that alone is enough to make the torpedo miss. I wish to emphasise a fact which a great many people seem to lose sight of, that every torpedo fired does not necessarily hit its target. I think enthusiastic advocates of aircraft would do much more if they would claim a little less credit for their operations. It never seems to me that sufficient attention is paid to this point. In the existing Estimates we have provision for three aircraft carriers for the Fleet, and I think that fact alone should show that the question has not escaped the notice of the Board of Admiralty.
My hon. and gallant Friend (Admiral Adair) made a very interesting speech a short time ago, on the Adjournment, with reference to this question of the capital ship, and one of his chief points against the Admiralty was that the more capital ships you build the more naval bases you will have to provide them with. This is to a certain extent true, but he apparently contemplated the creation of large dockyards, such as Rosyth and places like that, all over the world. I differ from him. I spent nearly four years during the late War at Scapa Flow and I was able to see exactly what was done in creating a naval base there. You had those few islands, but there were no fortifications and no preparations for using it as a naval base whatever before the War. The whole of this place had to be created and what you have done at Scapa Flow you can reproduce anywhere all over the world. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to make it clear that the Admiralty have not lost sight of the possibility of creating a base such as Scapa Flow in the Pacific. Scapa Flow was absolutely submarine proof. No submarine ever succeeded in getting in, though a most gallant attempt was made by a German submarine within a very short time of the Armistice, and it only just ended in failure. At the same time no submarine has ever succeeded in getting inside, and I think that should not be lost sight of.
A good deal has been said about the difference in numbers of capital ships between the United States, Japan and this country, and several speakers have said that capital ships are not the only things that count. I quite agree. There is another question on which I should like to draw attention, to a comparison between this country and America. On 14th March I put a question to the Admiralty to get an idea of the comparative strength of this country and others in all classes of ships, and a most vital point comes out in this. Class A in this list refers to ships which, owing to their date, may be considered to embody the lessons of the War. We are only credited with 123 destroyers, whereas the United States is credited with no fewer than 232. I do not know whether this programme of new construction contemplates further additions to our destroyer flotillas, but I hope this point has not escaped the notice of the naval staff. It is a most serious question. It is true we can build destroyers much quicker than we can build capital ships, and we may be able to build them after a war has started, but for the United States to have nearly twice as many—certainly over 100 more than we have—is a very serious state of affairs indeed. I hope that point has not escaped the right hon. Gentleman's notice.
Another comparison I should like to bring out is this. I put a question on 16th March to find out a comparison of the numbers voted for each of the Navies concerned. The proposals for the United States, as far as the Admiralty knows them at present, provide for 150,800 officers and men. I believe this is just about the number required to keep every single ship of the United States Navy in active commission. I hope that point has not altogether escaped the attention of the Naval Staff. You may be able to build destroyers, but you certainly cannot build capital ships, and it certainly will take a very long time, if, indeed, you ever can train personnel in war time to be of real effective use to the Navy. The question of personnel is a most serious one. The numbers really speak for themselves.
I should like to refer to the agitation which has been got up in the Press to a certain extent, and outside in the country, by Sir Percy Scott. With parrot-like persistence he has gone on asking, "What is the use of a battleship?" I think this requires a little explanation. This officer was a very great personal friend of the late Lord Fisher. I do not know whether this is the cause of it, but I have noticed that the late Lord Fisher was very much against both the late and the present Board of Admiralty. He criticised them very severely and invited the country to "sack the lot." I do not know whether this inspiration comes from the late Lord Fisher or not, but when Admiral Sir Percy Scott criticises the policy of the Admiralty it should be remembered that he has never handled a capital ship of the big gun type during the War, and has had no opportunity of judging at first hand all the tactical problems involved, and at present you have the finest Board of Admiralty you could possible wish for—an absolutely ideal Board. All six officers whose names are on these Estimates came to the Admiralty young men, straight from the sea, fresh, with all the tactical problems involved at their finger tips, and if you are not prepared to trust them, backed, as they are, by the very finest Naval Staff the world could possibly get together, at any rate, that our Navy could show, whom will you trust? He has made every sort of charge against them. He has even charged them with self-interest. There may be hon. Members here who would not believe that, but on 4th February he wrote a letter to the "Times": and are not able to build more than is proposed, the position will be considered with the greatest care by the naval staff in the coming year.
I so entirely agree with the essence of the remarks of the Noble Lord that I am afraid I shall not provide that clash of naval opinion which is the usual feature of our naval Debates. With regard to the White Paper issued by the right hon. Member for St. Georges (Mr. Walter Long) last year, on that occasion, although I have been usually a hostile critic of the Admiralty, I said that I considered that it was one of the best statements of our naval policy and its development that I had ever read, and I think the late First Lord of the Admiralty can carry with him the conviction that he has by that Paper laid our naval policy on sound lines from which I doubt we shall ever diverge in future in regard to principle. He has brought the war staff on to a sound foundation, and we can trust all the recommendations now made by that war staff in this House. The hon. Member for Miles Platting (Mr. Clynes) advocated a conference with the United States of America and Japan to bring about a reduction of armaments. I do not think he is aware of it, but the Senate of the United States unanimously passed a resolution in favour of such a conference, and though we cannot, owing to congestion of financial business discuss it in this House, it would not be a bad thing if an expression of opinion, signed by Members of this House, were to go forward welcoming what the United States Senate has passed. During the Christmas holidays there was a Sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee including several Cabinet Ministers associated with Lord Beatty inquiring into our naval policy, and that committee was of great value, not merely because it instructed the members of the Cabinet, but it strengthened the position of the Board of Admiralty. It was presided over by the Lord Privy Seal and the Leader of the House and I feel certain that the Navy owes him a debt of great gratitude for the self-sacrifice with which he devoted his so-called holiday to that task, and it is possible that the overwork connected with it may have contributed to his illness, as to which the House has already ex- pressed its ardent desire that he may have a speedy recovery and be restored to its councils. The policy now is, as stated by the right hon. Member for Duncairn (Sir Edward Carson), that the Cabinet lays down policy; the Admiralty do not attempt to do so, but it does involve that when the Cabinet lay down the policy, the House has got to recognise, and the Cabinet itself has got to recognise that the war staff lay down the means to carry out that policy. The Cabinet are perfectly entitled to satisfy themselves that the war staff is efficient, that it is separated from the administrative body as is the case now, and that it makes its policy in consultation with the war staffs of the Air Department and the Army. That we can be quite sure is the case to-day.
I come to the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Finsbury (Lieut.-Colonel Archer-Shee). I differ from him entirely in his views regarding the United States of America. I do not think it would be necessary to mention the United States if he were not contending for an equality of standard, because if he were content to consider Japan alone and not contend for equality of standard, he would get all that he wants with regard to strengthening the Navy. It is impossible to wage war successfully with an equality of standard. You must have a margin of safety. We have always worked with a margin of safety, and if the hon. and gallant Member were to examine the programme of Japan alone, leaving out the United States, he would find that this House will have its work cut out in the way of expenditure in order to provide for that alone. I want now to devote my attention to the situation which the Admiralty have to face. It is a very extraordinary situation. The Admiralty have done everything they could possibly do in the way of setting an example of putting a limit to this expenditure on capital ships, which is probably costing Japan £10,000,000 for each ship. It is really six years since the Admiralty brought in a programme for a capital ship. The "Hood" belongs to the programme of 1915–16. She was already laid down before the Battle of Jutland, but the Admiralty were able to embody many lessons of that battle. They found themselves faced with a situation in which the United States were building 12 of these modern capital ships and had six more projected. Japan was building 8, and had 8 more projected. They also found that there was great uncertainty in regard to the completion of the Japanese ships. There are certain dates laid down, but the Japanese are working 24 hours in the 24 to build these ships as rapidly as possible. I say this in connection with the propaganda to which the hon. and gallant Member referred, because it is necessary to counteract that propaganda in the United States where our naval pretensions are exaggerated. We are now reducing the personnel of our Navy to 121,700. That is also the personnel which was voted in our 1901–2 programme, when we were first directing attention to the expansion of the German Navy. Japan's personnel is now equal to Germany's in 1914, just before the War. Our personnel, available for manning—the whole of that personnel is not available; the Noble Lord the Member for Battersea got some figures out of the Admiralty only yesterday to this effect—is 38,000 below that of the United States to-day. I ask that such figures should be considered by those who are carrying out this propaganda in the United States, because the propaganda, as the hon. and gallant Member for Finsbury pointed out, means mischief. We have got to remember that the conditions are very similar to when Chatham in 1760 issued a secret letter to all our ambassadors instructing them to avoid giving occasion for every hireling and ill-intentioned fellow to inveigh against the nava pretensions of England, already too much the common object of envy and calumny. What the Admiralty has done is that they have held their hand to the very last moment available, and they were bound to bring in the programme which they have brought in to-day. The hon. and gallant Member referred to Senator MacCormick. He is a well-known Senator, spoken of in the American papers as "the President's spokesman." He said he could not agree that limitation of armaments should be fixed on the basis of British sea power, more dominant than ever in modern history. The Admiralty are not asking for such a standard. They are very far from asking for it.
As I have read the history of this subject—and I have studied it pretty closely—there was a long period in which we asked for two to one against France. That period reached beyond the fifties of the last century. Then came the two-Power standard somewhere about the eighties. It meant a 10 per cent. margin over the two next strongest naval Powers, and in Cabinet councils it was always understood that these should be European Powers, and that the United States were not included. It meant, of course, a very much larger margin in small ships, cruisers, and torpedo craft. Then came the administration when the present Secretary of State for the Colonies was First Lord of the Admiralty. We had a 60 per cent. margin over Germany, and worked to that. Now I understand the Admiralty is having a standard which only involves equality with any other naval Power. I would rather rule the United States out and have a substantial margin over Japan. That is the standard to which the United States are bound now. They are considering England only to a small extent. If it is true that the United States are moving, or contemplating moving, their Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific, a course which I advocated in the discussion on the Naval Estimates last year, when I suggested a naval alliance, we to look after the Atlantic and the United State's to look after the Pacific—if they are doing that, no Power on earth could give a greater assurance of its confidence in this country than the United States are doing now. The hon. and gallant Member for Finsbury referred also to Admiral Huse, who, speaking at the George Washington celebration in New York on 22nd February, demanded a Navy big enough to fight the Anglo-Japanese alliance. There is no alliance so far as the United States are concerned It is true that the Senate rejected the Treaty of Arbitration of 1912, but when we negotiated the Treaty with Japan we notified them that we should regard the Peace Mission Treaty as a Treaty of Arbitration for the purposes of the alliance. That disposes of what Admiral Huse said. He also said that he had just returned from England, and that we were openly discussing the Navy required to fight the United States. I have not seen any of these discussions. It is true that the hon. Member for Finsbury and one or two other hon. Members spoke of the Navy in that sense, but I do not think any official person or anybody in high position has discussed that possibility at all. At any rate, I know of nobody who has ever discussed it as a probability. I would recommend Admiral Huse to read the First Lord's statement made in last year's Debate.
8.0 P.M.
I turn to Mr. Daniel's statement in which he wished to induce the American Senate to pass the Navy Votes. He spoke of equality of tonnage between Great Britain and America in 1925. He did not say that America would possess 18 of the post-Jutland ships for one of ours, or what will be 18 to 5 now. It was clearly misleading not to say so. At the same time as we ask America not to exaggerate what we are doing, do not let us exaggerate what America is doing. The American Estimates are invariably cut down by the Senate or by Congress. This year's programme was cut down by Congress—the programme, that is, which ends in June of this year, was cut down 220,000,000 dollars, or something like £60,000,000. Do not let us exaggerate these things on this side. I only make these comparisons because I want to counter the propaganda that is going on, but I do not believe for one moment in discussing rivalry with the United States. I say frankly I will take the glorious risk that Canada took of having a 3,000 miles frontier without a gun, and I would say there can be no frontier, no military front between the British Empire and the United States of America. I would ask the House if anyone were so foolish as to contemplate a naval rivalry with the United States if both put their hearts in it to remember the lines of James Russell Lowell written years ago:
Now I want to deal with the point by the hon. and gallant Admiral about the pre-War Dreadnoughts. I do not think you could put these ships into the line against post-Jutland ships in years to come, just as you could not put pre-War Dreadnoughts into line with the Jutland ships. I take the "Indiana" in preference to Japanese ships, because we do not know the details of the Japanese ships. Comparing the muzzle energy of the "Indiana" with the original "Dreadnought," it is almost exactly three to one, but, taking the latest of the pre-Jutland ships, the "Ramillies," completed two months after Jutland, the "Indiana's" muzzle-energy is to that of the "Ramillies" as 100 is to 55. That is a much greater change than was the "Dreadnought" as compared with the pre-Dreadnoughts, "Lord Nelson," "Agamemnon," or "King Edward VII." I do not deal with the Japanese ships because the Japanese ships are shrouded in secrecy. You must take into consideration that we can secure more hits, and that we can concentrate two or three ships on one without losing any hitting power, whereas at the beginning of the War each ship selected its target. We can now in a space of fifteen minutes hit nine times, where at the beginning of the War we could only hit twice. That greatly enhances the menaces of these big guns. I take another comparison between the "Indiana" and the "Queen Elizabeth." The "Queen Elizabeth" is a flagship of the Atlantic Fleet. The "Indiana" is armed with 12 new type 16-inch guns, as opposed to eight older 15-inch guns. She has 105-feet beam against a 90½-feet beam. That means that she is much more torpedo-proof than the "Queen Elizabeth." She has 15,000 tons more displacement, and that means that she is much better armoured. She has 18-inch modern armoured turrets, as compared with 10-inch older armoured turrets, and this means that the "Indiana" could sink the "Queen Elizabeth" by blowing up her magazine. The disparity is far greater between the post-Jutland ships and the pre-Jutland ships than between the Dreadnought and the pre-Dread-noughts.
I just want briefly to refer to Lord Jellicoe's proposed Pacific Fleet on which I asked a question yesterday. He asked for 8 battleships, 8 battle cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 40 destroyers, 30 submarines, and all necessary auxiliaries. If we take all our post-Jutland ships, the "Hood" and the four we are going to build now, and send them there by 1924 —I think we shall have completed them by 1924 in spite of what the hon. and gallant Member said that we could not complete them before 1925 —we shall then have five post-Jutland ships to send there against eight possessed by Japan. In 1925, unless we lay down more ships, we shall have five post-Jutland ships to send out there against 11 possessed by Japan, always assuming that Japan does not hasten her programme. In 1927 if we do not carry out a continuous programme, we shall have five post-Jutland ships to send there against 15 possessed by Japan. We shall have all our work cut out in order to provide for Japan alone, and in regard to what Lord Jellicoe stipulates, we shall be eclipsed by Japan in the smaller types of satellites of the post-Jutland ships. He asked for 10 light cruisers, and they will eventually be faced by 32. He asked for 40 destroyers; Japan will have 80. He asked for 30 submarines. Japan will have 80. "Jane's Fighting Ships" says that Japan will complete her ships earlier than the dates I have given. It says—and it is a very reliable publication and known throughout the world as reliable—that large Japanese companies have agreed to build capital ships in 20 months, light cruisers in 11 months, and destroyers in five months, or less, if they are given the material. I know they are working 24 hours in the 24, and I know as regards destroyers, that during the War the Bethlehem Steel Company completed their laying down of the keel to the completion of her trials of a destroyer in the short period of 58 days.
In conclusion, let me say that the system of reckoning the cost of these ships is wrong in taking the first cost. The real way of reckoning the cost of a ship is to take the interest on the first cost, the cost of the crew and the stores, and the depreciation, in regard to which the Japanese allow only eight years for the life of a post-Jutland ship. They say it will wear out in eight years, and will have to be replaced. Reckoning on that basis, each of these ships is going to cost the Japanese, exclusive of dockyards, in docking facilities, and all the auxiliaries that will have to be built, about £2,000,000 a year, or for the sixteen ships, a total of about £32,000,000 a year. I cannot get out of my mind the feeling of anxiety that a purely military nation, rather than face the cost of replacement, will bring on a war at her selected time. I think it is a grave danger for the future. I do not know how we are to stop it. We have either to face competition, or we have got to have this conference and try to bring about agreement by peaceful persuasion. If that fails, the only alternative that I can see is for the United States and the British Empire to say that it must stop. We will not adopt the alternative which Lord Fisher suggested in regard to Germany that we should bring on war. We do not want that, but we are quite entitled to say that, as the bulk of this Navy is being built with steel supplied by the British Empire and the United States of America, we shall ration Japan if she will not agree to this disarmament, so that she will only get rations of steel, steel castings, etc., for the purpose of peaceful commerce, and she will not be supplied with any steel at all for war purposes. Whatever happens, we can, at any rate, say of ourselves that we have held back the building of capital ships for six years since the "Hood," and that the responsibility for this race in armaments does not lie with British statesmen, or with the British Parliament, or with the British people.
The Noble Lord opposite (Viscount Curzon) said this is a most important Debate. I will go further and say it is a momentous day both for this country and the Empire, because we, the Members of the House of Commons, are called upon to give our consent to a change in our naval policy. Since the Armistice that policy has remained in abeyance. The War has taught us many lessons, none, I think, more important than the lessons affecting the Navy. These lessons required time for examination and time for study, consideration had also to be given to the changes, geographical and international, that followed the conclusion of peace. Admittedly with Germany out of the way, the old naval policy of the two-Power standard is no longer necessary. This fact, as we have heard more than once in the Debate to-night, was emphasised by the Member for St. George's last year when he foreshadowed what is now the declared Government policy — a one-Power standard for the Navy. What is a one-Power standard? The definition is this: A Navy to be maintained at a strength not inferior to that of any other Power. With the question of strength is closely interwoven that of the capital ship, and, seeing the importance of the issue involved, I do not think that the Government can be blamed for taking time to consider their judgment. With that judgment, namely, the continuance of the capital ship as the basis of our naval policy, I think I am right in saying that the Empire as a whole will be in accord. To carry out the policy laid down by the Government, economies must be effected. These economies are set out at length in the explanatory statement to which I have just alluded, and they include, among others, a reduction in the number of our capital ships to 30, of which 14 will be in reserve, giving us 16 ships in full commission, compared with 38 in March, 1914. Obviously, the older types are becoming obsolescent, if they are not already obsolescent, and must be replaced by modern ships embodying all the lessons of the War. In the Estimates to-day the Government have set aside £2,500,000 as a "first instalment" for "replacement" ships. No details are before us as to how this money is to be spent, but we have been told by the right hon. Gentleman to-night that the Government are laying down four capital ships this year, two immediately and two after the Imperial Conference meets in June. Nothing effective with regard to naval policy, especially in capital ships, can be done without the co-operation of our Dominions overseas, not only co-operation in a general sense, but financial co-operation. Financial cooperation is absolutely necessary, because these four new ships may cost anything from £6,000,000 to £8,000,000 each, representing a possible £32,000,000, which is more than half the amount of the total Navy Estimates before the War. The line upon which this co-operation is invited is the development of what are called local navies. I think, and I have had opportunities of discussing the matter with several overseas statesmen, that policy should commend itself to the overseas Governments. Australia had a local navy before the War; Canada was approaching a decision on the subject when war broke out. South Africa and New Zealand had been content to send subscriptions to the Royal Navy, but during the War they also sent contributions by way of ships, as also did the Federated Malay States, while India and the Colonies not possessing responsible governments made contributions in various ways. In the memorandum of the First Lord nothing is said as to the position of India and what are commonly known as the Crown Colonies, and I would ask the Parliamentary Secretary to say, if he possibly can, what part it is proposed that India and these other possessions are to play in the new imperial scheme of naval policy.
To return to the subject of the replacement of ships, I trust that the new ships will not be contract ships. I am afraid from what the Financial Secretary said to-day that there is some doubt on the subject. I do not want any doubt to exist. We do not want contract ships, that is ships laid down in private yards. I should be glad to have a little further information on that point, and I press him to give me the information. Next year the work in the naval yards will not be so extensive as it is now, and the work on the merchant ships now building in these yards is not unlikely to end of its own accord. If so, it is a matter of the utmost necessity that any new contract work in capital ships should be confined as far as possible—I put in these qualifying words to please the hon. Gentleman, although I do not want to do so—to the Royal yards. And I should like, as an addendum to this suggestion which I throw out for the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman, to have a promise from him that one of the two ships to be laid down immediately shall be laid down in the Devonport dockyard.
Good old Devonport!
What are other Powers doing in regard to capital ships? America and Japan alone are building navies that can compare with ours. Both these countries have settled their programme for the next few years. Most sincerely do I hope with the First Lord and with the hon. Gentlemen opposite who have spoken that it may be possible—and here I quote from the memorandum— undergo any diminution. Nothing that we can do or leave undone will affect them in any way. What are these programmes so far as they concern the capital ship? In 1924, when our four new ships are in commission, the United States will have 18 post-Jutland capital ships, 12 battleships and 6 battle cruisers. In the year following, Japan will have 11 ships of similar construction. Between now and 1924 we shall only possess one post-Jutland ship, the "Hood," and that does not embody all the lessons of the War Therefore we shall have no post-Jutland ship that does embody all the lessons of the War between now and 1924. I would remind the House that all the ships that are now being built by America and Japan are as superior to the pre-Jutland ship of the British Navy as the Dreadnought was superior to any warship of her day. That is a very important matter, and it is one which we must take very carefully into consideration.
In our pre-War Debates, and there are many hon. Members here to-night who took part in them, we used to reckon our naval strength in Dreadnoughts. We had many battles about it, but that was the agreed plan on which the strength of the Navy was reckoned. To-day I claim that for the sake of comparison we have a perfect right and indeed we ought to reckon our naval strength in post-War ships. If that right be conceded it is difficult to see how even by laying down four new capital ships this year we shall be maintaining the one-Power standard. Even the Government is doubtful on that point. The First Lord tells us in his Memorandum that in effecting these drastic economies, and they are drastic economies, "the Admiralty have assumed risks which in ordinary circumstances they would regard as difficult to reconcile with the full maintenance of the Government's declared policy." That is a statement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty himself. I do not mention this in any captious spirit, but merely to point out that on the present Estimates not only would the British Navy no longer be supreme, but there is considerable danger (of it dropping into the second place. Seeing that defence by sea is and must always remain the very condition of existence of the British Empire we should very seriously consider this matter. The Government are running a risk. They admit it and are apparently prepared to run that risk. I do not like it. I should like to have seen that risk avoided. We have always dealt with regard to the Navy in certainties. It is a great mistake to change that policy. Not that I desire to return to programmes. Nothing of the kind. Nor do I want to see building against any other Power; the day for that has passed; but I would remind the House of the statement made by a very important Australian statesman who recently visited this country: guard against any interruption of our trade. If the one-Power standard secures these ends then I, for one, am content, but it must not be a one-Power standard on paper. It must be a one-Power standard in being. The Government must not be contented with four capital ships of the post-Jutland type. They must continue laying down replacement ships until the British fleet like the fleets of the United States and Japan is no longer one of obsolete type, but a fleet up to date in type and of the highest efficiency.
We have heard something about economy. Members on the other side of the House have endeavoured to make it clear that economy is even more necessary than some of us on this side consider it to be with regard to the Navy. I do not think that we should economise in any way on the question of the Navy. At any rate, we ought to be very careful how we proceed. Our first consideration must be security. It is no use talking about economy without security, but having once satisfied ourselves on the question of security we should then apply our minds to the question of economy. I have heard it said, and said very often, that we must no longer have what is called a 03 population, and therefore we must go on spending a great deal of money in support of the Ministry of Health. I have heard it said we must do the same with our education because education is absolutely necessary for the people of this country. I agree with both these propositions, but what is the good of education or of an Al population if the population of the country has no existence at all? And that is what we shall come to if we do not maintain the Navy in a proper state of efficiency. With the changes in our naval standard, and the uncertainty of the continuance of merchant shipbuilding in the Royal dockyards to which I have already alluded, it is clear that we must anticipate some reduction in the number of men in the yards. But I do trust that the Government intend not only to continue the establishment on its present footing, but to carry out the promise made by the late First Lord of the Admiralty that the number of men employed in the Royal yards shall not fall below pre-War strength. If the Financial Secretary can give me this undertaking, then, I think, that so far as the Royal dockyards go they have solved the problem in a satisfactory manner.
I join the right hon. Gentleman and other Members of this House in paying my tribute to the hon. Member for St. Georges (Mr. Long). I have sat in this House for many years with him, and we have taken part together in many naval Debates. This is the first naval Debate since I came into the House in which he has not been here to take his part. The Member for St. Georges hits hard and hits fair and he never hit harder than when he was standing up for the Navy against those of his opponents who were endeavouring to cut it down. I would like to thank the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty for the very efficient way in which he has presented these Estimates. I do not know whether hon. Members are aware that this is the first time they have been interleaved. We now know beforehand what we are to talk about. Not only can Members who are well versed in naval matters, but Members of the House who are not so well versed, can by reading these notes take part in the Debate. I am sure Mr. Speaker will be only too glad if many more Members were to get up and talk. I think we ought to pay this tribute to the Financial Secretary. We ought not only to thank him for what he has done in presenting the Estimates but for all the work he has done in connection with the preparation of them. It must be remembered that the late First Lord was ill for a long time and that the greater part of the work in connection with the preparation of the Estimates and in the fighting with the Treasury that must have been necessary, has fallen upon the shoulders of the Financial Secretary. I am sure everyone regrets that this is the last time we shall see him in his place on the Front Bench and perhaps the last time we shall see him as a Member of this House.
The part of the speech of the last speaker with which I agreed most was his expression of regret that we are losing the Financial Secretary, after the very efficient service he has given to the Admiralty. The fact that we are also losing him from this House I am sure everyone who has had any dealings with him will deplore. The speech of the right hon. Member for Duncairn (Sir E. Carson) was an appalling speech. Mr. H. G. Wells, in one of his wonderful books of imagination, describes a time machine which would project a victim forward or backward in time. The speech of the right hon. Member for Duncairn reminded me very much of that machine. It really projected us back to 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914, to the days of the anxious Debates in this House vis-a-vis the German navy. I am sorry to see that the fact that there is no German navy to talk about and to frighten the people of this country with induced the right hon. Gentleman to turn to the next strongest navy, that of our friend the United States of America. Is it a definite part of the Constitution of this country that we must have some enemy? Is it absolutely necessary that we should always have some bogey to hold up before the democracy of this country. Is it always the last weapon of the reactionaries to get up a naval scare and to exploit the very natural feelings of a sea people about their Fleet. First it was Spain, then the Dutch, then the French, and then Germany. And now, who? According to the right hon. Gentleman it is the United States. Unfortunately, the great position he holds in this House will mean that his words will be reprinted in every anti-British paper in the United States—we have plenty of enemies over there, unfortunately—and they will be used against us. They will be received with the greatest delight by the Bethlehem Steel Works, by Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., and the other great armament firms over here and in America. They are the people who delight in speeches of that sort.
I noticed that the right hon. Gentleman, who supported the hon. Member for Fins-bury (Lieut.-Colonel Archer-Shee) in his Amendment, criticised the Admiralty somewhat mildly for not building enough ships. The Admiralty are laying down four hyper-super-Dreadnoughts, which will cost at least £8,000,000 each. Apparently that does not satisfy the right hon. Member for Duncairn. While he twitted the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) for not making any definite statement of policy—which it is not my hon. Friend's work to do—he himself did not state exactly what he wanted. Does he propose that, because the United States have 18 ships projected (which according to some pundits are the only ships which will count in our standard of strength in future) we have to lay down at least 18 also? That will mean an expenditure of £8,000,000 apiece on the capital ships and, with the destroyers, the aircraft carriers, the mine sweepers, the oil-carrying vessels, the light cruisers, and the auxiliaries generally, that these 18 Dreadnoughts must, have to be efficient, a capital cost of at least £200,000,000 straight away. That does not allow for the enormous upkeep of this new Armada. There will be extra bases required and extensions even of our dry-dock facilities in this country and abroad. I only hope the anti-waste party will get on the right hon. Member's track.
That will not hurt him.
The hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) in his speech pretty effectively destroyed the ridiculous bogey of the United States as a naval rival. The hon. and gallant Member drew attention to the position of Canada. I wish some hon. Gentlemen opposite, who try to raise this new naval scare, would consider the opinions of our fellow-subjects in Canada and Australia, where the feelings towards America are the friendliest. In fact I am told that in Australia, when the United States fleet made a great tour of the world before the War, the Americans had the greatest reception they received in any country they visited. I hope the speech of the hon. and gallant Member will be as well reported as that of the right hon. Member for Duncairn. I am trying to do something to counteract the mischievous effect abroad of the speech of the right hon. Member for Duncairn. I regret that the hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone made a remark about Japan which will be received with delight by the Ironworks at Osaka and the munition-making rings in that country. My hon. and gallant Friend quite rightly wiped out the idea of the United States navy as a bogey for the British Empire, but, I suppose in accordance with an extraordinary constitutional principle, he looked for the next strongest power in the Japanese fleet, and he held it up to us as the standard against which we must be prepared to build in the Pacific. I wonder if hon. Members really think what that will mean. If we are to look upon Japan as a possible rival it is no good building ships and having our dockyards and bases in the North Sea and the Mediterranean. You have to be pre- pared to fight her in the Pacific, and that means an enormous capital expenditure on bases, because if you are going to wage a campaign 15,000 miles away you cannot rely on temporary bases. They have to be fortified and defended and equipped in every possible way, and there is no knowing the expense we may get into. That is the prospect with which we are faced by those two speeches, which are not untypical.
The Financial Secretary, in his very lucid remarks, said that every party in this House has insisted on a Navy equal to that of any other naval Power, and he might have added that in the past we used to insist on a Navy equal to any possible combination of Powers. That has been true, and if I had been in Parliament before the War I would have supported that to the utmost, but have things really not changed? Is there no difference? Is all that has happened since then to count for nothing? Are we still to look upon anyone building a battleship with the greatest suspicion? Is there no other way out? I noticed that the ex-First Lord, speaking yesterday, used very courageous and very wise words, if I may be allowed to say so without impertinence, about a naval agreement with the United States. Last year the then First Lord, the right hon. Member for St. George's (Mr. Long) made another very admirable statement of that kind, but have we got no further than mere words? In the United States Senate there has been passed a unanimous resolution in favour of a naval conference. At present we are infinitely stronger than the United States on the water. We have 30 ships fit to lie in the line to-day, and the United States have 18 fit to lie in the line to-day, and this talk of only post-Jutland ships counting is very ill-advised. At the present moment we are in such a strong position that we can afford to make a really definite advance. Why has it not been possible for our Foreign Office to address a formal Diplomatic Note to the Government of the United States and to the Royal and Imperial Government of Japan inviting them to an immediate conference on this great question?
I hardly like to mention in this House the League of Nations, and I shall be met with the answer that the United States is not a member of that body, but the League of Nations, at any rate, have been considering this question. They came to what I think was an extraordinary decision, namely, to set distinguished Admirals and Generals to discuss the question of an all-round disarmament. You might just as well set cobblers to work to discuss the abolition of leather. Therefore, I hope, if we do have this discussion with these two great Powers, we shall not leave it entirely to the so-called experts; because without saying anything derogatory to the senior officers of my own service, you cannot expect human nature to cut down its own professional instruments. The day before yesterday we saw the indignation of hon. Members of this House who have served many happy years in the cavalry, at the very thought of cutting down the cavalry. They were not materially or selfishly interested, but it touched their professional pride, and in the same way, the keener, and more efficient, and the more senior in rank the naval officer is, the more bitterly does he feel anything that he considers to be an attack on his profession, and any proposal to cut down the Navy he would resent most bitterly. They are, therefore, the last persons who should consider this problem. I should like a meeting of the Chancellors of the Exchequers of the three countries to discuss the thing. Why have we not taken that initial step?
May I say a word on the question of the post-Jutland and pre-Jutland ships? I think I know what I am talking about here, as I was for some months at the Admiralty in a position to consider the designs of the ships that we had projected then, and I know a little of the designs of the pre-Jutland and post-Jutland ships, and really the lessons of Jutland were not so revolutionary or so far reaching. They were embodied in ships actually afloat. I am giving away no secret when I say that the principal thing we learned was that the magazines needed better protection, and we have been able in our later Dreadnoughts, ships armed with 15-inch and 13·5-inch guns, more adequately to protect the magazines. It has meant partial reconstruction, but it has been done. Then we learned lessons with regard to fire control and searchlights at night, important things, but not meaning a radical, revolutionary reconstruction of the ship at all. It has been quite possible in that case to put good new wine into good old bottles, and the later ships completed during the War, the "Revenges," and the "Queen Elizabeths," and all ships armed with 13·5-inch guns and over, are well fitted to lie in the line for at least three or four years to come. I was disappointed to hear the hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone simply talking about muzzle velocity, nearly the very last thing that counts in a battle. The real lessons we learned at Jutland were that we needed a new system of tactics, and secondly, perhaps, the tremendous importance of improved air scouting. Those were the two fundamental lessons of Jutland, and those are things that we can embody in our present magnificent fleet without building a new set of hyper-super-Dreadnoughts, which is a better word than talking about post-Jutland ships.
At the present moment we have thirty very efficient ships fit to lie in the line— I am not counting the 12-inch Dreadnought at all—and the Americans have eighteen. We are laying down four and the Americans another eighteen, which will give us thirty-four and them thirty-six. The people who get scared at any Navy except our own may say "Terrible! The Americans have two more super-Dreadnoughts than we have. Lay down a couple more ships immediately." But it must be remembered that at the present moment the Japanese have built in the Pacific ten ships of the line, six Dreadnoughts and four battle-cruisers, and I really do not think that in the event, the horrible event, of a war between the United States and Great Britain the attitude of Japan would be so certain and clear that the Americans could afford to concentrate the whole of their fleet against us. I apologise to the Committee for even discussing the question of war between the United States and ourselves, but nevertheless it is the thread that has run through the cloth of this discussion. After all, navies are built to fight; they are not built as a means of giving employment to young men with a taste for the sea; they are built for war, and we have got to consider who they are going to fight against. This Amendment discusses this very question of naval rivalry, and therefore we have to take these factors into consideration. Of light cruisers we have 51 most admirable ships. The Americans have 15 and the Japanese 17. I entirely disagree with the figures of the hon. and gallant Member for Battersea (Viscount Curzon) about destroyers. He seems to have left out the destroyer leaders, in which we have a very great predominance. Counting these two together, I make our figures 200 against 284 for the United States and 87 for Japan, and in submarines we have 96 against 103. In submarines, above all things, it is not mere numbers of submarines or torpedoes and so forth, but it is the men who man the submarines that count. If our submarine officers had been in their submarines, the Germans would have won the War and wiped out our merchant fleet. It is altogether inexplicable, after the experience of the last few years, for hon. Members merely to count tons and guns. It is not mere numbers, but the training, spirit, and personnel, and the knowledge that the cause for which one is fighting is right, which is more important than anything else.
If we are going to count ships, might I suggest to the hon. and gallant Gentleman that he addresses himself to the question of where the fleet is distributed? Some of our finest ships are in the Mediterranean. There may be political reasons for it, but I should have thought the work there could have been done by cruisers. The money spent on bases in the Mediterranean, if we are considering a Pacific war against Japan, or an Atlantic war against the United States, is absolutely wasted. You might just as well throw it into the sea, because those bases will be an embarrassment to us. Might I commend hon. Members who are getting alarmed at the fleet programmes in the Far East and on the other side of the Atlantic to look into the way our fleet is distributed? At the present time neither the distribution of the fleet nor the way our dockyards are being handled is on strategical principles. You are giving up one of the Atlantic dockyards, Haulbowline and Pembroke, which is the next best thing, and keeping on Rosyth, which is a North Sea dockyard. If you are considering strengths, you must consider the number of ships in commission and where they are distributed. We talk of navies being being built for war.
9.0 P.M.
I said just now there is a way out, and that is by agreement. As a matter of fact, either we are going to rely in the future on force, on our own right arm, in which case we have got to be strong and ready in every respect, or else we have got to rely on reason; and if we do that, we have not got to rely on navies at all, except for police purposes and to prevent smuggling. I do not think you can have a half-way house. You have either got to rely on force, in which case I will support the Government of the day which is relying on force, and I will do my best to help it to keep up the strength and efficiency of the Navy; or else you have got to rely on reason, and go the whole hog and disarm, except for police purposes. But I suppose we shall compromise. It is the way of Governments, and especially of British Governments. They adopt an unworthy compromise, and always run the risk of falling between two stools. If that is so, the question of the relative values of aircraft, Dreadnoughts, and submarines has been swept away very easily. It is not a chose jugée at all. The case against the great super-Dreadnought is a very strong one, and I would have liked to have seen a steady three years of careful, intensive research and experiment into the whole question of the weapons needed for fighting at sea. Until that has been done, until we have really thoroughly explored the subject, not by a committee of politicians, with one admiral, overworked people, as we know—unfortunately, one of the leading men has broken down from that cause—but a real expert committee that will sit for 24 months and make actual experiments at sea. Then you can begin to talk about building. We can always catch up again; we are perfectly safe for three or four years to come. In any case, we are much stronger than the United States to-day, and, even if the Naval Conference failed, I would be generous enough to let them catch up in actual numerical strength. We have got a big preponderance of ships. The present ships that fought in the late War, with the alterations made to them, have really embodied most of the lessons and, after all, it is not mere numbers that count. The Americans are finding great difficulty in manning their ships Although I have great admiration for many naval officers in the United States, they have difficulty in getting long service at sea, and in getting the best type of seamen. I hope they will get over that, for I want to see a strong American fleet. It will cost them a great deal, and then perhaps they will come to some arrangement. In the meantime, we can afford to let them get abreast. We have our hands full already. We are entangled on the continent and in the Near East, and are at loggerheads with half a dozen parts of the world. I do hope the country will not allow itself to be stampeded by speeches like that of the right hon. and learned Member for Duncairn into getting us into hot water on the other side of the Atlantic as well. We have enemies in Europe, the Middle East, and too many altogether. I do hope we shall not make a new enemy by this insane naval rivalry. After all, the War was fought to end war. I know that is jeered at now, although it was used on plenty of recruiting platforms in the dark days. Let us see if we cannot come to some agreement by diplomatic means before entering into this insane shipbuilding competition. I think we are ill-advised even to lay down these four ships. I will take an opportunity of voting against the laying down of these four ships, and I can justify it on any platform in this country.
I do hope we shall be allowed to speak on the Navy without people thinking we do not necessarily disagree with the idea of the League of Nations or mutual disarmament, as was suggested very early in the Debate. What it seems to me we are concerned about in a Debate of this sort is to get the most value out of the money we are prepared to spend on this particular service, and when we discuss a question like the Navy, the question of actual war must come into the consideration of the subject. First of all, to go to the heart of this matter—the Admiralty. If anybody were to go into the Admiralty and was then asked his opinion as to whether he thought it was a competent body to design ships, he would probably answer that, from the general appearance of the place, they were quite incompetent to design even a small craft. But they would be very, very much mistaken, because I do not think there is any doubt whatever that the designing staff of the Admiralty to-day is far and away the finest in the world. Just as we were capable of designing Dreadnoughts to put ourselves two years ahead of any other nation, so I think to-day there is no other country laying down ships which eighteen months ago we could not have laid down ships equal to in design. The ships we are laying down to-day are, again let me say, going to be ahead of any rival we have. Consequently I welcome the statement of the Financial Secretary that he does not intend in any way to reduce that technical staff at the Admiralty, because really in a matter like this it is not material that counts so much as brains. The thing is a technical struggle of one nation against another. When it comes to actual conflict and you get the crack of the whip you can get quick building by all sorts of firms, but you cannot get together a technical staff, which is the very heart of the Navy and the most valuable possession that we have.
There has been a great deal of discussion lately as to the merits of the big ship, and its potentialities, and the relative advance in airships. I appreciate perhaps more closely than most people how intimately wrapped up the Navy is with the Air. Some say that the power of the air is capable of knocking out the battleships. Others maintain that the capital ship of the future is going to be upon one vast aeroplane carrier. I think the thing is too empiric to lay down definite opinions of that type. Various people write to the papers about these things. But the thing is, are any of those who so write prepared to accept the responsibility of doing away altogether with the capital ship? That is the crux of the question. Very few people are prepared, when it comes to it, to do away with the capital ship. If post-War hatred has so far abated that one may quote a German proverb, may I remind the House of one which seems to me singularly appropriate, and that is, "Trees do not grow to the sky." That is to say, the powers of aircraft are limited in what they can do. We do ourselves and the things of the air enormous damage by writing about all sorts of impossible things in regard to the warfare of the present day. I want to draw attention to what aircraft can do at the present moment in naval warfare.
They can bomb, drop torpedoes, and scout—not very well, I think, any of the three. While I am on this subject I want to refer to something which was said by the hon. and gallant Gentleman in his opening speech which I thought was very unfair to the Air force, because he drew attention to what happened in the Dardanelles in 1915. He quoted those who reported as clearly saying or showing that the Royal Air Force of that date could not do any damage to the battleships by day. But the hon. and gallant Gentleman must remember the enormous development that took place in aircraft during the War, and to compare the aircraft of to-day with that of 1915 is perfectly ridiculous. The only things that could be sent down by an aeroplane in those days of 1915 were tiny little bombs that did as much damage as an orange. It was very different three years later. I should like to see the hon. and gallant Gentleman putting out a battleship now for a few days and seeing what damage could be done. It would be a very different thing.
To go back to what can be done by aircraft to help the fleet, there are, I say, these three things — bomb-dropping, torpedo-dropping, and scouting. These three functions are at present being carried out by the destroyer. It is along that line that development must take place in the air. We have got to build machines—there are already such in sight, though not visible for the moment, and machines will slowly become bigger—that will go to sea by themselves and cross the Atlantic on the water, or if need be in the air, which will be able to take two or three torpedoes and drop them—if they wish to—and they can carry bombs; and, of course, they can always do the scouting work for their main fleet. The principle that these particular types of machines are going on is to be self-supporting. They are going to be really the flying destroyers of the future, and they have got to look after themselves on the high sea. You may say: "Where does the aircraft carrier come in?" The answer of that is that nothing is going to knock out the flying destroyer but the little hornet—what I call the hornet — that is a very fast tiny type of aeroplane which we found at the end of the War was the only thing that dealt really with the big aircraft. Consequently, the Navy is bound to have, and always must have, ships that will carry small fast aircraft in order to knock out the aircraft which are built to deal with the capital ships.
If I may visualise the future naval captain he must take three classes of instruments of war—the big battleship, the flying destroyer, and the hornet aeroplane. I myself think that the flying destroyer will be too much against the battleship. The battleship dare not come out with flying destroyers about—at night particularly. They will always have the capital ships at their mercy. The person who gets control does not necessarily win the action but necessarily stops the other side from winning it, and once he has got control of the upper air he then lets out the flying destroyer; consequently the battleship goes, and with it the compelling terms. But it is doubtful who will win to such an extent as to compel terms. I therefore welcome very much the fact that the Admiralty, for the moment at any rate, are going to build capital ships, because I say that, anyhow, it is going to keep the eye of the Admiralty in building right up-to-date.
During the next five years, I think, great changes and great modifications will have to be made, it is scarcely possible to go so much ahead at the present time. Yet we have got to keep in mind the technical side of the Navy. The air is what we should be spending money on to-day. It is on the technical side that we are going to win out, because, remember, six years ahead is only the expression of our technical knowledge to-day. We do not see the result of technical knowledge for many years, and the technical side of the Admiralty and Air Ministry is responsible for what is in creation, and will be ready for use in six years' time. I appeal to the Admiralty, as I appeal to the other services, not to get that absurd snobism which does exist in the services between the officers and the technical officers. It is no use disguising the fact that it is there even in a service like my own. I was a technical officer during the War, consequently I was always looked down upon by any staff officer. It is perfectly ridiculous for anyone to take that line, for anyone who has a technical knowledge is a better man than the one who has not that technical knowledge. But there is the feeling about that, because a person has something to do with something technical he is necessarily an inferior being. The right hon. Member for Duncairn pleaded for the return to the Navy of its air side. I thought that we had heard the last of that, because, to say the least, it involves a very great waste of money. There is no use disguising the fact that for a long time there was a good deal of friction between the various services with regard to the supply of material from the Air Ministry. I thought that was all over. They are working very well together. The future of the Navy is so wrapt up with the Air Service that they must work together, and therefore I appeal to the Financial Secretary to continue as much as possible to keep these technical men and to co-operate with the Air side.
May I ask the House to allow us to come to a Division on the Amendment, as I fear that Members who are desirous of raising other questions, especially as regards the dockyards, will find the time rather curtailed unless we get Mr. Speaker out of the Chair.
There is one point which should be raised now.
Perhaps I may explain that there will be a wider field open for discussion in Committee than there is on this Amendment, and that is the only reason I suggest taking the Division now.
I have been sitting here since a quarter to four, and I am very anxious to deal with one point which, so far, as not been touched upon. I think a word should be said with regard to the claims of industry and commerce, and although it has been suggested that a wider field would be open in Committee, I very much prefer to raise it at this stage, for the reason that, while the Empire and the country have a right, and properly so, to first consideration in respect of the question whether capital ships or submarines shall be utilised for our defence and protection, yet no speaker to-night, in any part of the House, has dealt with our responsibilities as traders and also as one of the parties to the League of Nations. I want to know how and in what fashion our experts at the Admiralty are protecting our interests in respect of the policing of the seas, in which we shall, I presume, as the senior naval Power, have to take a part under the auspices of the League of Nations. As a plain business man I feel it is vitally important that we should have adequate protection on the high seas, and with great deference to the hon. and gallant Member for Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) in respect of the roseate views he entertains regarding the feelings of the nations one to another, bearing in mind that we as a nation are dependent on our export trade and on food which has to be brought to these shores, and I feel that, remembering the movement which is now going on among the yellow races, while much can be said in support of the Amendment we should, before we pass to the wider discussion, get a word from the Financial Secretary as to what is to be our protection and what are the arrangements between this country and the other Signatories to the League of Nations for protecting our interests and using the navies as international police. I do not want to keep the House from taking the Vote. I am quite willing to support all that has been said in regard to the splendid work done by the Admiralty and by the First Lord, but I do feel there is a risk whether with the four capital ships—I am speaking purely as a layman—with our great responsibility for "carrying on" and the tremendous uncertainty all the world over, we shall be adequately protected. Are the experts at the Admiralty fully clear in their minds on this, or are we to understand that they have been given a certain amount of money to spend and have merely done their best to provide what protection is possible at that price? I think we who are engaged in industry have a right to information as to whether we are to be adequately protected.
That question was raised by several other hon. and right hon. Members in the Debate, and I can assure them all that not a single Member of the Board would have put his signature to the Estimates unless he was satisfied they carried out exactly what hon. Members desire. My right hon. Friend the Member for Duncairn expressed fear whether any undue pressure had been brought to bear on any members of the board in order to get them to adopt the policy laid down in the Estimate. I have tried to indicate to the House that whilst, needless to say, the very strict economy desired by everyone at the present moment impressed itself on members of the Board of Admiralty in the same way as it has done on all others in the country, and it is quite true that certain words are used in the explanatory statement of the First Lord indicating that the Board went very far to meet the general demand for economy, yet so far as the actual carrying out of the policy is concerned, the whole Board are quite satisfied that the standard which we have set ourselves can be established and maintained, and the ideals suggested by the hon. Member fulfilled.
I am very sorry not to be able to fall in with the appeal of the right hon. Gentleman that a Division should be taken at once, but there is a point I want to bring out which has not yet been laid before the House, and it is a view held by many of the large shipbuilders of this country. I have heard various Members of this House express their views, and I gather that practically everyone in the House, including the Leader of the Opposition, is in favour of the proposals of the Admiralty, but they wonder where they are going to get the money, and what will be the actual cost. It reminds me of Raleigh's saying, "Fain would I climb but that I fear to fall." Hon. and right hon. Members would like the big ships, but dread having to find the money. It is, however, most important we should have these ships, and I will tell the House why. I want to call attention not so much to the Amendment, which I think is absolutely unnecessary, because it is practically on the same lines as the explanatory statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, I want to point out that this serious state of affairs exists. Thirty ships of the older type are becoming obsolete, and it must be remembered in this connection that no capital ships for the Royal Navy have been laid down and completed since 1916. Since 1916 no capital ship has been laid down and completed in this country. Does any hon. Member think, if you decided to-night you were going to build a capital ship, that you could get her next year? There are not in this country at the present time more than three or four shipbuilding yards that could build any of these big vessels which the Government intend to construct. The Financial Secretary to the Admiralty tells us that they are going to be improvements on the "Hood." What does that mean? The "Hood" is over 800 feet in length and about 100 feet in breadth. Where are the berths in which they are going to put down the "Hood," much less an improvement on the "Hood"? Can they do it in any of the Government yards? I very much doubt it. These improvements upon the "Hood" would probably bring the ships up to 900 and perhaps 1,000 feet in length. Where can you build them, supposing you decide that you are going to do so? I do not believe the Government yards can build them, and I know there are very few private yards that can.
Why not one at Portsmouth?
I very much doubt if you could put down a ship of 1,000 feet — a heavy battleship or an armoured cruiser—at Portsmouth. The Government ask for £2,500,000. That is not going to build the ship, but only to carry out the preliminaries. It will probably take twelve months to get out the plans. Then you have to prepare the berths for the ships if you can find them. If you cannot find them in existence you will have to pile three or four berths for a 900 or 1,000-feet ship. That will run away with £1,000,000 or £2,000,000. You have to look ahead, and if you ordered these ships to-day you would not get them for three or four years from now. When you remember that since 1916 not a single first-class ship has been laid down and completed it would mean that between 1916 and 1925 you are not going to get a first-class ship. That is a serious state of affairs, and the Government will be to blame if they do not take their courage in their hands and say, "We insist upon building at least four first-class ships; whether they shall be super-Dreadnoughts or battle cruisers is for us to say."
Other countries are building, and I am not one of those who believe all the sentiment that is talked about the brotherhood of nations. I have heard of that before. I was in this House in 1904–5, and I heard this speech delivered here: That was the expression of a right hon. Gentleman who has since been First Lord of the Admiralty. If there had been other Russian battleships lost, what would have happened if we had struck off so many of our ships? We should have been in a worse plight in 1914 when war broke out. I sat here in 1908–9, and, in conjunction with a little band, pointed out the danger menacing us from Germany, but we were laughed at. We pointed out how Germany was building ships—there is another country over the Atlantic that is building at the present time—and we were assured that it was not a menace to this country. We tried to call the attention of the House to the importance of providing dry docks on the East Coast for the docking of these warships. I even attempted to move the Adjournment of the House to call attention to a matter of urgent public importance, namely, the necessity for dry docks on the North Sea coast, but I did not succeed. I lived, however, to see battleships during the War towed into the Tyne sinking, and no dry dock in which to berth them. We do not want a repetition of that. There is another nation, we are friendly at the present time, but it contains within its borders many elements hostile to this country, and some day, perhaps—I hope not—we may be at war with that country. If we are, we shall not be fighting in the North Sea; we shall be fighting in the South Atlantic or the Pacific. Having decided on a one-Power standard—it is very low—let me implore the Government to take their courage in their hands and insist upon building sufficient ships to keep up to that standard. If they do, I say, "Do not fear, the country will back you up. The country has had a lesson; it does not want a second war." I hope in all their calculations with regard to the building of these ships the Government will not forget the important point that they should decide where they are going to build them, and how. We have in this country great manufactories for building ships and making guns, but now the swords are being turned into ploughshares and the machinery is being scrapped; and when you want the ships in an emergency perhaps you will not be able to get them.
I was at the Institute of Naval Architects yesterday, and I heard a gallant Admiral point out that during the War, when we were short of ships, Lord Fisher went to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and asked for permission to build cruisers and the necessary ships that we required. He was told, "Yes, you can build as many of them as you like." He went to the Admiralty and said, "We have got permission for these ships, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not say what size ships we might build." 'Then Lord Fisher said:
The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down referred to a question of the greatest possible importance. He has given the House the impression that we have no shipbuilding berths in this country to take ships over 1,000 feet. I was surprised that an hon. Member for Newcastle should make such a statement, because there are many berths in this country which can take ships 1,000 feet long.
I would call my hon. Friend's attention to the fact that there is a difference between ships and warships. A berth that would take a 1,000-foot mercantile ship cannot take a 1,000-foot battleship.
I am speaking now of berths capable of taking battleships 1,000 ft. in length.
There are only three or four.
I beg to differ, and I know what I am speaking about because I have been on those berths. There are not only berths that are piled, but concrete berths. My hon. Friend, perhaps, has forgotten that there were three "Hoods" laid down, in berths quite capable of taking battleships of even larger size than the "Hood." The building of two of those ships was ultimately discontinued. I, too, was at the meeting of the Institute of Naval Architects yesterday, and I think that my hon. Friend's quotation does a little injustice to Lord Fisher's attitude. He wanted big ships. He was told by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he could build light cruisers. He built what he called light cruisers, but he put into them 18-in. guns, and that is why they are in the Navy List to-day as light cruisers. They are light only in so far as their armour is not quite so thick. I think that Lord Fisher deserves the greatest credit for that little bit of policy, which gave us three very large light cruisers. I am sorry to differ from my hon. Friend, but I beg the House to believe that there is no need to make new battleship building berths to take ships 1,000 ft. long. This country is the greatest shipbuilding country in the world, and it would be a pity if it went forth from this House that we have no such berths. I should say we could lay down 12 ships. My hon. Friend could lay down three in his own constituency.
Amendment negatived.
Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
Considered in Committee.
[Sir E. CORNWALL in the Chair.]
Motion made, and Question put,
A. "That 123,700 officers, seamen, and boys, coastguard, and Royal Marines be employed for the sea and coastguard services borne on the books of His Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions for the year ending' on the 31st day of March, 1922."
We have been talking all the afternoon on the subject of ships, and I think, it will be opportune if we talk now about the personnel of the Navy. We are all very pleased to speak highly of the services rendered by our splendid seamen and marines of the Royal Navy. They certainly comprise some of the most highly trained and educated men to be found in any similar capacity in the world, and it follows that we would do the utmost that we possibly can to perfect their training, and, above all things, to make them contented. I should like first to speak on the subject of the lack of promotion amongst the members of the lower deck that has occurred since the Armistice. I have some facts here which will somewhat startle the Committee, because I am sure it will be agreed that the men of the lower deck have had nothing like their deserts. The Committee will probably be surprised when I tell them that since the Armistice not one chief petty officer or petty officer has been promoted to the warrant rank of gunner; not one member of the lower deck has been promoted to the rank of gunner (T)—that is to say, torpedo gunner; not one member of the lower deck has been promoted to the rank of boatswain, signal boatswain, warrant telegraphist, or warrant shipwright. I want to be very careful in my remarks, because these figures have been carefully provided for me, and there is one case about which I am somewhat uncertain. That is the case of the gunner (T). I cannot quite make up my mind, from the facts given to me, whether there has not been a case of promotion to that rank, but at any rate, if we exclude him, there has not been one promotion from the lower deck to any of the six classes to which I have referred. To the rank of warrant master-at-arms, only four men have been promoted; to the rank of warrant engineer, only ten; to the rank of warrant mechanician, one; warrant electrician, six; warrant ward-master, three; warrant writer, 15; warrant victualling officer, 19; and warrant cookery instructor, four. That means that from the whole of the lower deck of our Navy there have only been 62 promotions, or possibly 63, to the rank of warrant officer.
Let us turn to the number of commissioned officers who have been promoted during that time. There have been 61 captains, six engineer captains, and 12 surgeon captains, promoted to the rank of rear-admiral, making a total of 79. There have been 95 commanders, 25 engineer commanders, 20 surgeon commanders and 24 paymaster commanders, or a total of 164, promoted to the rank of captain. There have been 191 lieutenant-commanders, 62 engineer lieutenant-commanders, 38 surgeon lieutenant-commanders and 35 paymaster commanders—that is to say, a total of 326—promoted to the rank of commander. That makes a grant total of 569 promotions in the commissioned ranks commencing from a rank not lower than that of lieutenant-commander and going up to the rank of rear-admiral, during the 2¼ years that have elapsed since the Armistice. Against that, so far as the lower deck is concerned, the total is 62 only. I am not begrudging the promotions in these commissioned ranks, but you cannot get out of the mind of the lower deck the fact that these things occur, and you cannot help comment arising in connection with them. I can quite imagine that the hon. Baronet may say, "Yes, but commissioned officers are liable to be placed on half-pay." That was so, but it was altered in 1919, when a system was introduced, on the recommendation of the Halsey Committee, of unemployment time, which kept them employed on full pay for at least six months. On that point, therefore, there has been a slight amendment to the advantage of the commissioned ranks. In these circumstances you get discontent in the lower deck, because men holding the position of chief petty officer, petty officer, and lower ratings, find their chances cut off of getting to a higher position which they ought and which they expect to reach. There are cases, too, when, under these conditions, men pass the age limit. I hope the hon. Baronet will be good enough to look into this matter and give it the consideration which I think it deserves. I anticipate that he will ask, and he will be quite justified in asking, "How would you meet these cases?" because of the number of men who were demobilised and the number of men who are in the Service. In their desire for economy the Admiralty overstretched the boundary and got rid of men it was a pity they did get rid of, because they have been obliged to reenter them for the Navy.
As regards those cases of accelerated promotion, I would suggest two or three remedies. First, the Admiralty might consider the question of the promotion of warrant to commissioned rank in a few cases, which would accelerate promotion, because if you promote upwards you accelerate right from the lowest rank to the highest rank in the lower deck class. Then the Admiralty might consider facilities for retirement at an earlier age. The age for retirement of warrant officers now is 55, and I think it is quite feasible that the Admiralty should consider whether that age could not be lowered, and thus enable a number of warrant officers to retire, making room for those beneath them. Then you could make a number of warrant officers supernumerary to the establishment. That is done in connection with commissioned officers. I believe all commissioned officers are overborne. You might, so far as the lower deck is concerned, increase promotion and cause contentment by adding a few supernumeraries to the establishment. But there is another class that I think the Admiralty might consider. They established some time ago what is known as the mate class, that is, a commissioned class from the lower deck, and unfortunately they limited that to seamen and engineer artificers. It is generally thought in the lower deck that this class might very well be extended to all other ratings than the engine-room artificers, provided that candidates are selected by the Selection Committee and can pass the seamanship examination, and the higher educational test. I should be glad if the hon. Gentleman would consider whether something cannot be done for the promotion of the lower deck to the higher classes. I can assure him it is a crying question amongst the whole of the lower deck. Those of us who are attached to dockyard towns and naval ports know that they are continually coming to us to set forth their grievances, and almost always when you get to the rock bottom you will find the cause of it is that there is a stagnation of promotion, and something ought to be done to bring about contentment and satisfaction on this very important question.
I have spoken on several occasions on the subject of education in the Navy, and I cannot help taking advantage of this opportunity to refer to it again. There is a sad lack of qualified schoolmasters in the Navy. These are interesting figures, and I think the Committee would like me to give them. The number of battleships and battle cruisers in commission is 21. The complement of naval schoolmasters for these battle cruisers and battleships is 42. The actual number serving in these vessels is only 18. The number of light cruisers in commission approximates to 35, and the number of naval schoolmasters is 35. Would you believe that there is not one qualified schoolmaster in any of these light cruisers? From the figures that have been given me, I gather that of the number of battleships and battle cruisers and light cruisers iii commission, which amount to 56 altogether, there are only 18 qualified schoolmasters in the Navy afloat. This is without reference to any ships of the reserve, to which numbers of boys are to be drafted, and which, of course, have no schoolmasters. The effect of this is to lower the education in the lower deck. I will read two extracts from Admiralty Monthly Orders. The first is the Monthly Order of July, 1920: schoolmaster was, he said, "It is any rating which will take the job on," Why is it that the Admiralty cannot get these schoolmasters? The hon. Baronet will say there is a shortage of schoolmasters throughout the country. So there is, but you would think with the facilities which the Navy affords, the Admiralty ought to be able to get schoolmasters in proper numbers and with proper qualifications. Why do they not get them? Because they do not offer them proper and sufficient remuneration. The schoolmaster is the only officer in the Navy who does not get the pay of his rank. I have pointed that out to the hon. Gentleman on more than one occasion. Above all persons, the schoolmaster ought to receive that remuneration which would justify the Admiralty in receiving into the Navy sufficient numbers to be able to teach the boys.
10.0 P.M.
There are one or two other points, in the shape of inequalities in the Navy. One is the subject of provision allowances. Until 1919 officers and men have always had a sum allowed them for provisions when they were not victualled on the ship, and an officer and a man are supposed to require the same amount to sustain existence. I suppose it is not unfair to assume that an officer can live on the same rations as a seaman and vice versaâ. Until 1919 they both received the same allowance. Then it was altered, and the officers' allowance was raised to 5s. and the men's remained at 2s. Id. The men's allowance has since been increased to 3s. 6d., but the officers' allowance still remains at 5s. This will probably appear to the Committee to be a small point, but when a number of men have these unequal and unjust conditions brought to their notice, you will understand that it is a little pinprick which I think the Admiralty ought to adjust, and I hope my hon. Friend will be good enough-to do so. My hon. Friend referred earlier in the evening to the subject of the Welfare Committee. I am very grateful to him for referring to the fact that he knew I was interested in that question. I have personally seen and corresponded with him about it. I have been able to say to him that I had the privilege of representing most classes of the Navy at properly convened meetings, and I have put to him the views that they expressed on this point. He knows that, so far as Portsmouth is concerned, it is very much desired that this question of the Welfare Committee should be resuscitated, and I should be very glad if he could tell us something as to how far that has been advanced. I should like to know, in particular, whether the Admiralty could not agree to the establishment in each of the ports of a local Port Welfare Committee. The subject is too extensive to deal with at this hour, and I particularly do not want to embarrass my hon. Friend on this question, for on this as on all other questions upon which I have approached him and the Admiralty in connection with dockyard matters I have received the utmost courtesy and kindness from him, and I would be the last to wish to put him in any difficulty. But if he could tell the Committee the present position of the Welfare Committee, I am sure it would be very much appreciated. I think that I speak not only for the lower deck men in Portsmouth, but that these views are held by the whole of the Navy.
10.0 P.M
There is another little point, the question of the Resettlement Committees, consisting entirely of officers, which were formed in December last with the duty of drawing up schemes of settlement of naval men other than tradesmen when they leave the Service. The Chairman of that Committee is Captain Bennett, an officer very highly appreciated by the lower deck, and I congratulate the Admiralty upon the appointment. This is a subject which the lower deck have taken a deep interest in. The Committee can well understand why. These men think they ought to have established such a Committee as will enable them when they leave the Service to be adopted into new vocations of life. They have already in each port a bureau. Through the Grand Fleet Fund, which they themselves manage, they have taken a great interest in the school for motoring and similar things, and if the Admiralty can do this for the men it will be very much appreciated by them. What they want is to have some form of representation on that Committee, not, of course, equally with the officers, but that they might be consulted as to what may arise, so that they may assist the Committee upon right and proper lines. I believe my hon. Friend will find that it is to the advantage of that excellent Committee if they can call these ratings in by way of consultation. There is a little question which I want to raise in connection with the kit of seamen and stokers. I put a question down on the 17th February asking the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if his attention had been called to the fact that members of the seamen branch on re-entering the Navy are receiving a free kit, or £26 in lieu thereof, and independently of the time they re-enter, whereas members of the stoker branch were not so entitled, but had to pay for the kit required, and whether he could see his way clear to rectify this anomaly. My hon. Friend answered as follows: Friend's attention to these inequalities. There is one other point in which I am interested, and which I hope my hon. Friend will be able to put right—what is known in the service as the fore-and-aft rig, the uniform of petty officers of over four years' standing who have different reefer jackets from the ordinary blue-jacket's rig. They feel very keenly that this fore-and-aft rig should not be granted to men who have not been four years in the service. It makes an exception which they do not understand. I do not think it is my hon. Friend's fault. I know he would do a lot more if it were not for the fact that he, like a good many other Departments, has to get it from the Treasury. But if my hon. Friend can manage to impress the Treasury with the importance of conciliating a large body of men by making some of the few changes I am mentioning, I am sure they will all be deeply grateful.
I have listened to most of the speeches here this afternoon. After reading the First Lord's speech last night one was filled with hope, but after hearing the tone of the speeches of hon. Members this afternoon one was given a little to despair. I know that some people look with apprehension on America and its growing navy, but surely you cannot class America as you would class the Germany of before the War. After all it was the German mentality that we were fighting against, and though in America you may have an element of German mentality, the whole foundations of the country are Anglo-Saxon. It is uncomfortable to think of these two countries fighting one another. England is saying to America what she has never said to another country in the whole world. For over 200 years she has been the highest naval power, and she says to America, "I refuse to treat you as an enemy; I look upon you as a friend; I will not build against you." It fills one with despair when you hear of these great Anglo-Saxon countries even contemplating war; but I do say it is for the people of America to see the just intentions and wonderful spirit of England, who says to her "I refuse to treat you as an enemy Power." I am perfectly certain that will be understood throughout America. You cannot say anything about her more giddy politicians; they speak as politicians, and not for the great soul of America which is fundamentally Anglo-Saxon. That is all I want to say on that, and I did not mean to say it, but was compelled to do so after listening to the speeches this afternoon.
I want now to ask the Admiralty if the whole of their policy in the dockyards is shown by the closing of two of the minor dockyards? The reason I ask this is because I represent part of a dockyard town. It is not only the question of the dockyard, of the future policy of the dockyards, but it is a question of the whole life of the town. Plymouth being a naval dockyard, the housing policy of the town depends very largely upon the permanent intentions of the Government. I suppose the Government cannot guarantee that they are going to keep up their pre-War standard, but we would like to know what it is going to be approximately. Naval dockyard towns are in a difficult position, because they have to lay down a housing policy. You cannot expect them to provide houses if there is a chance of a great reduction in the number employed in the dockyards. Then, also being a naval town, it has to provide for the naval men's wives. I deeply regret the Admiralty is far behind the War Office in not providing married quarters for its men. I, wish that had been provided for in the Estimates, and I wish very much to put in a strong recommendation for it.
Then we have on the White Paper the question of unemployment. They say there are 5,000 men specially taken on in dockyards on short time. I am surprised there are not more, because there must be 2,000 of them in Plymouth Naturally there is great uncertainty, and one is anxious to avoid unrest amongst the men. No Government can give an undertaking that these men will be kept on. You say you cannot keep them on with your shipbuilding programme. But the Admiralty must keep on certain dockyards, and, of course, Plymouth being the foremost dockyard in England and the most important—I suppose the rest of the dockyard Members will agree—if you cannot employ the men on shipbuilding, there is a great deal to be done in the dockyard, and I would suggest to the First Lord or to the Parliamentary Sec- retary that he should put these short time men on such employment rather than discharge them at these critical times. I am not asking that the Admiralty should let them do unnecessary work, but there is really necessary work to be done. There is the question of neglected buildings. Many of them are in a dilapidated condition. There are the roads of the yard and the railway track, which have been patched up during the War, and which need thorough repair. This would provide a chance of employing these men during this transition time, and would also help to put the dockyard in a state of efficiency. We understand from the First Lord and from the White Paper that we are going to have the most efficient and best Navy in the world, so it is very necessary that you should keep the dockyards efficient.
To get back to the men, which is always to me a more interesting topic than ships — I am particularly referring to the lower deck men—the Admiralty is too near the War not to know what the spirit of the men was. We remember that the Nelson spirit was still there, but I regret there are also some of the Nelson Regulations in the Navy which, in spite of the spirit of the men, are very irksome. The Nelson spirit is there, and we hope it will never go away, but the men expect a higher standard and a more progressive standard than they did in the Nelson time. During the War at Plymouth the men in the naval hospital were not allowed to smoke in the wards. I do not care about too much smoking anywhere, but that is one of the old Nelson restrictions. It was a most tiresome order. Another thing was that the men were not allowed to walk out, though the soldiers in the military hospital could go down to town in certain hours. That matter was brought before the Admiral, who changed the order. There is really a lot of that still in the Navy, things entirely out of date and very irksome, and I do hope that the Parliamentary Secretary, before he goes, will put all these little things right, because we know what a good heart he has. His work in the Ministry of Pensions shows that, and I am sure he is in desperate earnest when he says he wants to make the Navy one of the best places in England for the men.
There are one or two grievances I am certain he could put straight. One example is this: A man may be in the Navy nearly 25 years and if he dies before his pension is due, if, say, he unfortunately dies a week before his time expires, his wife gets no pension. After all these years' service, if he unfortunately dies before his complete pension is due, his wife gets nothing. It is very hard on these men and really tragic to their wives. Then again the Admiralty said two years ago that they were looking into the question of men invalided out of the Navy, but nothing has yet been done. There is a case just come up in Plymouth. Last July a man was found to be suffering from tuberculosis, but he is without pension. It is bad enough for the man, who has tuberculosis. It is even worse for his wife who has her husband and two children to look after. Both officers and men, I think, look upon their pension as deferred pay, so surely if they do not get the whole of it they should get part. I do hope that the hon. Gentleman will look well into this question before he goes. The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir T. Bramsdon) has dwelt a little on the question of education. Education does not seem to be a popular subject in the House at present, but they are short-sighted who do not pay regard to it. You ought to be very careful of the minds of the men, if you do not want discontented people in the Navy. The First Lord said last night that it would be a dereliction of duty on the part of the Admiralty to allow the efficiency, training or moral of the Royal Navy to deteriorate. He is perfectly right, and I hope he will be practical. Later on he said: moral of the Navy is to get the very best young men into it. If parents feel that their boys when they joined the Navy will be progressing, and getting a thorough education, they would be even keener than they are now to put them into the Navy. I beg the Parliamentary Secretary to keep that well in mind, and I do urge the House to take a great deal more interest in the question of education. If they took an equal interest in ships and in the moral of the men, in spite of having a one-power standard Navy we should have a most efficient Navy that could be put against any two-power standard Navy in the world. I have great faith in the spirit and the hereditary fighting power of the British Navy. I urge the First Lord and the Parliamentary Secretary not to economise in health, education, or welfare. We need not squander, but we must not take the short-sighted policy which mistakes stinginess for economy, nor must we take the so-called long-sighted policy which is on the look-out for enemies; but we do want to do our best to show our appreciation of the Navy by giving the men in it the very best chance, material, spiritual, and educational. I regret deeply that the Secretary is going, because I had great confidence in feeling that his outlook was the same as mine, and that our outlook was right.
I beg to move, that the Vote be reduced by 100.
The Debate has been conducted in a very good spirit, and I hope that the same remark will apply to the serious matter which I am about to bring forward. I move the reduction with the object of calling attention to the very serious proposals made in the First Lord's explanatory statement for the closing of Pembroke Dockyard. This is ostensibly done because the number of dockyards is now in excess of naval requirements, but after reading very carefully the paragraph which deals with this question, I see in it no suggestion that the reason for closing this dockyard is one of economy. Certainly the Financial Secretary in his opening statement to-day brought in the question of economy, but I think it was done very much as an afterthought. The real reason why the Admiralty have brought forward this astounding proposal is because they are landed after the War with the incubus of a huge dockyard at Rosyth, out of the way, which was designed and built entirely for the purpose of meeting the German menace, and which to-day is in the wrong place, but, having been constructed, it is now part of the Government's policy to maintain that dockyard and to abandon others which are much more suitable as regards position for meeting the needs of the Fleet. I desire, first, to say a word on the question of economy. The Financial Secre- tary suggested that by closing two dockyards there would eventually be a saving of something like £500,000 per annum. I cannot help feeling that the hon. Gentleman cannot have gone very closely into the foundations on which that statement was made. Economy is not obtained by closing dockyards. It can only be obtained by reducing the quantity of work which has to be done. The adaptation of the work of dockyards to the needs of the Fleet is the determining question in settling economy and not the closing of one or two or three dockyards. In closing a dockyard you do not reduce the number of men or the quantity of material that you require to do a certain amount of work. If you do not do it in one dockyard it must be done somewhere else. It is not a question of saving labour or material. It is a question of transferring labour and using material in one place which otherwise would have been used in some other place.
What saving can be anticipated by the closing, say, of Pembroke Dockyard? I am dealing for the moment only with that. There is no saving in labour, and there is no saving in material. The only saving that-can be claimed is some probable amount due to the reduction of overhead charges. Taking the Admiralty Estimates I find that what is properly classed as overhead charges—such as superintendence, rent, rates and taxes, water supply, etc.— amounts to something like 6 per cent. of the total wage bill. The wages in Pembroke Dockyard, on the pre-War basis of the number of men, would be to-day something like £460,000, and 6 per cent. of that is £27,600, which is a very small help towards the £500,000 which the Financial Secretary asks the Committee to believe would be saved by the closing of this dockyard. There is only one other item that will constitute a saving. That is the annual repairs and maintenance of the establishment. On the establishment at Pembroke Dockyard over an average of years that amounts to about £8,000 per annum. If you add the £8,000 per annum to £27,600, you have a probable saving—and it is only a probable saving—of about £35,600, or, say, £36,000. At what sacrifice is that possible saving to be obtained. Let us take, first, the question, What is the capital value of the establishment at Pembroke Dock- yard as an asset to the British Navy? I do not think I am far out in estimating, and if the up-to-date facilities, or such of the facilities as are up-to-date—that is much the greater part of them—had to be constructed anew to-day, they would not be built for anything under an amount of between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000. There are a graving dock, ten slipways, all the dockyard buildings and workshops, roads, and all the accompaniments of a considerable establishment. The proposal of the Admiralty is to scrap this capital value of something like £3,000,000. For what? To save £36,000 per annum in overhead charges. Let us take another example. It is proposed to close this dockyard, to scrap this asset. It is true that some of the machinery might be moved. The very Estimates which suggest this closing of the dockyard contain provisions for an expenditure of £5,600,000 for new work in connection with the other dockyards. Why? Is it to make up for what is scrapped at Pembroke Dock? Out of that £5,600,000 no less than about £1,600,000 is specifically devoted to new constructions and new machinery. So we have here, for the saving of probably £36,000 per annum, a proposal to scrap an establishment of an asset value of £3,000,000 and to expend in new works and machinery in other places something like £1,600,000. Surely, the ground of economy does not hold water?
There is another aspect of the question. I have already mentioned that I think the real reason for proposing to scrap this dockyard is that the Admiralty feel more or less bound to maintain Rosyth, which is a great modern yard, with great facilities if it was in the right place, but the reasons for building Rosyth are a limbo of the past. Will you keep a fleet to-day in the North Sea? If so, what for? This dockyard was designed to meet the demands of a fleet which had to be kept in the North Sea for the purpose of meeting the German menace. What do you propose doing? The late First Lord of the Admiralty, in his speech in this House just a year ago to-day, in introducing the Navy Estimates for 1920–21, told the Committee what the new disposition of the British fleet was, based on the Atlantic in con junction with the Mediterranean fleet, so that the two could join up when it became necessary. Let us take the Land's End as the guiding point instead of the north coast of Scotland. Your fleet and its accompaniments, to get to any dockyard whatever, would have to pass the Land's End, Rosyth is 800 miles away by sailing distance from the Land's End, and every ship that would have to go to Rosyth for repairs would have practically to pass Pembroke, Plymouth, Devonport, Portsmouth, and travel 800 miles there and 800 miles back to be repaired, when the facilities for doing the same work are at their very door. I can hardly think that the Admiralty can have considered this point of view. Pembroke dockyard is the only Government establishment for repairing or building ships on the whole of the west coast of Great Britain. On the whole of the great western seaboard of these islands there is only this one dockyard, and you suggest scrapping it. That is part of the sacrifice by which we are going to save a problematical £36,000 a year. I do not believe I am very far wrong in my figures. I have had some experience in these matters. It is part of my business now and again to sum up values, and I am never very far wrong. For a problematical saving of £36,000 a year, you are going to scrap a capital value of £3,000,000. You are going to expend money on building new facilities and erecting new machinery in other places to make up for it. 5fou are throwing away one of the most valuable assets of the British Navy by abandoning the only dockyard on the western seaboard of this country.
Let me ask the Committee to consider one other aspect of this question. It is all very well talking about closing a dockyard. Have you considered what the closing of a dockyard means? You not only close the dockyard. You break up a community, you destroy a town, you scatter a population, you rum thousands of people who are dependent upon this dockyard for all they possess. This dockyard is over 100 years old, not in facilities, but in time and tradition. During the whole of that period there has grown up round this dockyard a town, which is entirely dependent on it, of 16,000 inhabitants, a town which has spent its own money out of its own rates to provide the amenities necessary for a dockyard establishment. Most of the men own their own houses, having built them at their own expense. The men and the locality between them have provided the houses necessary and the public utilities necessary for maintaining a population which is entirely dependent upon the dockyard for its existence, and without which the dockyard could not have had an existence except by the Government themselves expending this money which has been spent for them. You not only destroy a town, scatter a community and destroy their property. You create a devastated area. There are a lot of devastated areas created by the War, and you propose to create a devastated area in the middle of this country in the second year of peace. I hope this Committee will not for a moment consent to such an unheard-of proposal. I am sure some of these aspects I have put before the Committee will be considered by the Admiralty. I feel confident that, on reconsideration, they will not think it wise or desirable to proceed with this. I feel strongly on the matter. I have no desire to press this Amendment to a Division, but I would urge the right hon. Gentleman, on behalf of the Government, to give an assurance to-night that, pending a full discussion of this matter on Vote 8, he will see that no action shall be taken in this matter before then which shall prejudice the position.
On a point of Order. Does the present position mean that we shall only discuss the question of Pembroke Dockyard until this discussion is got out of the way?
No, the scope of the discussion is not so limited.
Naturally I listened with interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Pembroke (Sir E. Jones), and I do indeed hope that the Admiralty will give the greatest consideration to it. In regard to these dockyard towns, like Pembroke and my own, I feel that, while there may be exceptions, substantially they consist of poor men. These have, by their steady industry and in virtue of their continuity of labour for His Majesty, invested their savings in house property, and they own their own houses. I put it: What could really be a greater injustice after serving His Majesty's Government, then not to receive some little consideration beyond what might be exected from a private employer? There is no question of bankruptcy before the Government. In cases like this work is closed down, men have to leave the neighbourhood, and to sell their homes for what they will fetch—it may be a nominal sum—and I venture to suggest that there are no communities in the country which can claim so great a consideration from the Government as the dockyard communities. I deeply sympathise with my hon. Friend with regard to the proposal made in relation to Pembroke Dockyard. It is, I submit, far too early yet to consider any such proposal as this. We really do not quite know how the world is setting. We hope events will make for peace, and we find ourselves largely on the League of Nations. But I doubt very much whether there is anything yet in the League of Nations that will relieve us of the liability; at any rate, for the protection of our own Empire and our highways on the sea. Under these circumstances surely it is premature to close any dockyard or to take any such drastic steps as these!
We have had it indicated in this House recently that the shipbuilding trade is in a very difficult situation. I ask myself where I, as a shipwright, or a fitter, or as one engaged in any of the trades affiliated to the shipbuilding industry could seek employment. Is it to be said that the Government which called this place into existence—and it has existed for a hundred years or more—is justified in closing it? It does seem to me that in this matter we are yielding to the clamour of the Northcliffe Press. We are afraid to do what is just and due to His Majesty's employés What would be said of a private firm if it closed down its works and scrapped its plant while there was much work to be done? I realise that the Parliamentary Secretary is suffering from very great difficulties in regard to finance, but is he cutting his finances wisely in this instance? The Colwyn Committee reported on this question of dockyards and made several suggestions. I know that the conditions have altered since those suggestions were made. It may be there is great difficulty in regard to obtaining orders for private shipping, but I will ask my right hon. Friend to consider whether he could not usefully employ even more labour, not only in Pembroke Dockyard, but in all dockyards in breaking up ships? I am informed—I believe the information is accurate—that never in the history of this country have we had so many ships to break up as we have at the present moment. I am told also—how far it is true I cannot say—that the caretaking of these vessels is costing us somewhere about £2,000,000 sterling a year. Are there not conditions at Pembroke which would enable the breaking up of ships to be done there at very little expense? Are there not mudbanks at Milford Haven on to which the ships could be run and broken up, and could not the dockyard be continued until we see how things develop? I have asked much the same thing with regard to the yard in the constituency which I have the honour to represent. What I deprecate very much is the discharge of labour. We hear a good deal about that from the Labour party which sometimes in that regard expresses very admirably my own views. My point is this. Our great difficulty at the moment is to tide over the difficulty of unemployment on the one hand, and the inconsistency of the situation is shown in my judgment in this way. We have the Minister for Labour coming down and obtaining from this House—and quite rightly, though the Prime Minister, and I agree with him, says it is inadequate in view of the increase in the cost of living—an enormous Vote for unemployment. He got 25s. for men in the Army and 18s. for civilians. If you discharge these men at any of the dockyards—I do not care which it may be—where are they going to find employment? What are you going to do with them? You will at once thrust them on the Ministry of Labour and on the Unemployment Vote, and we shall be paying money out and getting nothing back for it. You will absolutely demoralise the men by giving them money for nothing. Cannot we conceive some scheme for breaking up these vessels without great expense? It does not seem to me that it is necessary to have dry docks. I understand that they have acetylene burners, or something of that sort, to break up the ships. You could run the ships on to mud banks, where they would require nothing to hold them in position, and remove the material in lighters. Surely there is a demand for scrap iron? It is an idea of the Admiralty that the man who constructs ships should not be the ship breaker. I am quite willing to accept that, but have we ever had, within living memory, a period when there has been so many ships, costing such an enormous amount of money for caretakers, obstructing our seaways, and such a period of unemployment? Whatever your prejudices may be, you ought to give way in view of the unexampled conditions prevailing. You would save on unemployment pay, and you would be giving employment to the men, who would say, "We are earning, and we are worth what we earn." I would urge the consideration of this matter on the Admiralty, for its adoption would give a great deal of useful employment which would help to tide over the present difficulties. I heartily congratulate my hon. Friend and the Admiralty on what they have done for us in the past, particularly during the past winter. It is splendid, and I only hope they will try and extend the remedial measures which have been so effective in those towns with which I am concerned. The Colwyn Report was founded largely on the fact of the difficulty of the transportation of labour. If you give up a house in one place, no one, and certainly no lawyer, can find you another house in another place. It cannot be done, you cannot get rooms or anything. It is a hopeless position, and I ask my hon. Friend, in considering this, to see whether something cannot be done.
11.0 P.M.
If one reads the Admiralty statement, and compares it with that which was made last year by the right hon. Gentleman who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, one sees that last year we were told that, for the proper exercise of the Navy, four torpedo flotillas at least were necessary. We are now reduced to three. Why is that? Last year, too, it was pointed out how important the work, of the Air Ministry was in regard to the Navy. No doubt it was to some extent experimental, but they were to act in co-operation, and the Navy was to have its voice and be consulted in regard to air operations which concerned the sea. What is said on this subject in the statement to-day? It is simply a tale of lament. The Air Ministry have indicated that, owing to the restrictions placed upon them, they can do nothing for the Admiralty. What the country does require, whatever other expenditure you may reduce, is that at least the Navy should be safe. I venture to think that the Admiralty are running on too short a scale, and, further, that just consideration has not been given to the question of the dockyards. I reailse, of course, that they must be reduced, as and when the occasion arises, to the pre-War standard, but we have not yet passed through the times of War. Every one of our Estimates is eloquent of that. We have never yet got to to what was supposed to be a normal Budget. In this Estimate, looking at the sum demanded for the Admiralty office and its staff, one sees that it is pretty well £1,000,000 above what it was in pre-War times. No doubt some increase is necessary for increases in wages and for the settlement of a number of questions which have arisen out of the War, but really justice is not being done to the Navy itself or to the dockyards. I am very anxious with regard to the reduction in the number of men. There are so many young fellows who join the Navy as a profession in life, and they join it with this view. They know it is a long service and a continuous service, and they take on for 12 years with the idea of reengaging for the 22, and at the 22nd year going for a pension if they do not rise to the higher ranks. I see proposed in these Estimates a very considerable reduction of the personnel of the Navy. I ask myself what is the policy. Are they going to refuse re-engagement to these men who joined for the first 12 years, and have a real right, subject to good conduct, to re-engage for a pension? It would be a great injustice. You are throwing them out of employment, with the almost certain knowledge that they have no trade or occupation with which they are familiar and on which they can fall back. I ask the hon. Baronet to consider whether in his proposal for the reduction of personnel this is part of what he is doing. If so, it would be far better to postpone recruiting for a period, so as to enable these men to serve out until times improve. On the other hand, I notice in these Votes that there is a very large increase in regard to the recruiting establishment. Why is that? If you are only going to look for a reduction of personnel in the normal loss of men by accident or invaliding, or men expressing no wish to re-engage, I could understand it. I cannot believe that is the case, and I would press on the hon. Baronet the desirability, in the interest of the men now engaged, of never engaging a new man until he is satisfied that he cannot maintain his complement by re-engaging men now in the service of the Admiralty.
Just a word or two in support of the plea that has been put forth by the hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Jones). A stronger case could not be submitted, and there are only one or two additions to his admirable speech that I desire to advance. First of all, this is a district which, has been built up around the dockyard, and the dockyard and the shops attached to it are the only industry in the whole area. So that when you close up your dockyard there is no industry to which labour can be admitted. We have been told that the men who will be removed from the dockyard will be transferred to other yards. To me that is an absolute contradiction, because we hear of the rejection of men and the short-time system that has been adopted, and that all shows over-staffing, and if a yard or workshop is over-staffed you cannot take the surplus from any other district, so that the outcome will be that the whole of this part of Wales will be absolutely derelict. We are also informed that negotiations are proceeding for the sale of the dockyard to some private firm. If that materialises it will be some compensation, and I hope that the Government will not stop work until the transfer is absolutely secured. One other point. There are at least six hundred of these workmen who are ex-service men who have re-entered the service of the country after going through the great War, and having fought the War that was to end all war, they are rewarded by being unemployed and turned out of the homes they have created by their sobriety and industry. You may say that if these men are turned out they can sell their houses and turn them into money. Hon. Members are all business men. Try to sell a house in a district that is derelict and see what price you can get. You will soon see what price you get. You will find that prices have gone down. It will be impossible to sell property in a district from which industry is going and which is becoming desolate. These 600 odd men, men who have given their best in the country's interest, who have been fighting your battles for you and for me, are face to face with this big problem of unemployment or of being transferred into some other district, which means a serious matter indeed for them. Then you have got the trading community all round, estimated at about 600 businesses created by and dependent upon the work of the dockyard. Close down the yard and you close down the labour of all these businesses dependent upon it, and you are left with probably a few hundred pensioners receiving about 20s. per week. These will represent the community that is left in this splendid district of Pembroke. This is a poor return for the loyalty of Wales. Somebody laughed. If he lived in Pembroke and was one of the employés at the dockyard he would be weeping tears from his eyes at the present time. It is a tragic thing. It has created apprehension, almost panic, in the district. I hope the Admiralty for the Government will reconsider the position and relieve the feelings of the people that fought for us by letting them know that the yard will not be closed unless it is sold to some firm that will keep the machinery going.
I wish to say just one word about Pembroke. I have the greatest sympathy with these—
I think I shall be able to satisfy the hon. Member. First of all I must thank the Committee, and those hon. Members who were present when the House was sitting, for the way in which they have received the Estimates and assisted me by discussion and argument to-day. I can assure one and all that my colleagues on the Board, as well as myself, appreciate the kindness with which the Estimates have been received, and the friendliness which has been shown in the Debate. It would be very regrettable if practically my last action in this House were to refuse so reasonable a request as came from my hon. Friends who represent the dockyards, and of my hon. Friend, opposite, who spoke so strongly on behalf of the men. The Committee can believe me when I say that I look upon the discharge and throwing out of employment of any body of men who are connected with the dockyards as one of the most grievous things that could possibly occur, and I can thoroughly and most fully enter into the spirit of those who have notice to close served upon them either by the Admiralty or any other prominent institution, but at the same time we are face to face with the situation that I explained earlier in the afternoon. My hon. Friend has asked me today to postpone the closing to a future date, when the whole matter will again come before the Committee, and details will be presented to the House. Provided that hon. Members thoroughly understand that that will not interfere with the proportional reductions which take place in consequence of the necessity of closing down on account of the want of work, I am most willing to accede to the request of my hon. Friend. Therefore, nothing will be done in consequence of the decision of the Admiralty to close Pembroke Dockyard until this Committee has had an opportunity of discussing it more fully and of coming to a decision. I think that is the proper position. I know that my colleagues, whom I have had the opportunity of consulting, are most willing to meet the Committee's wishes, and I hope by the time the Estimates are considered in detail that it will be possible to convince the House and the Committee that some arrangement has been entered into with private firms to carry on the dockyard either for similar work or the breaking up of ships, and keep the men together and prevent suffering.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the statement he has made, and for the courteous way in which he has given it, and I am sure his statement will be read with as much pleasure as the original announcement was received with consternation. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Original Question again proposed.
There is a term in the White Paper to which I must take exception. It may seem a small matter, but it really is not, when it refers to executive or military officers. Throughout the Paper reference is made to deck officers, and if some of the older officers had heard this term used they would have had a fit, and quite rightly too. What is the meaning of the term? I have heard it used in the merchant service by engineer officers about the navigating branch, but I never heard it used in the Navy, except in quite recent years, and then it was looked upon as a slip of the tongue by persons who knew no better. I hope the Admiralty will drop such terms. The Admiralty ought to drop such a term. It is derogatory; it is totally misleading, and it is a matter of more importance than might appear.
I should like to mention these economies which the Government, I am sorry to say, have not seen their way to adopt. They would not affect the efficiency of the Navy, but would save a great deal of money. Why are we keeping up, in addition to the Royal yachts, of which I say nothing, three yachts, the Admiralty yacht, a yacht in China, and a yacht called "Surprise," which I think is used for the Atlantic fleet? Why do the Admiralty want a yacht, and why are the other two yachts kept? They are a great expense. They are no use for fighting, and they are a luxury which we cannot afford to-day. We want every penny that is spent on the Navy spent on its fighting efficiency and nothing else. I have brought forward this matter before, and I am disgusted that the Admiralty are still keeping these yachts going. Why are we still keeping as the flag ship of a most important station, the East Indies station, the obsolete cruiser "Highflyer"? She is 22 years old and of no fighting value. She could not run away and she could not stand up to a fight. She did good work in the War convoying, but at the present moment she is absolutely obsolete.
She is going to be replaced.
I think it is rather late in the day. She has a full complement of officers and men and is flying the Admiral's flag.
I was only informing the hon. and gallant Member.
I am very glad to hear that she is to be replaced, but I think the hon. Member might have mentioned it before. Why are we keeping on sloops in our foreign stations? They are not fitted for the work in wartime. They are slow; they are under-gunned; and they are not protected at all. If the Admiralty want to save money they should keep a few more light cruisers in commission and pay off more of these sloops. Why on earth are we spending £3,300,000 in turning a Dreadnought, the "Almirante Cochrane," into a seaplane carrier? Could the hon. Gentleman let me know whether a more suitable vessel, an ex-German liner, could not be used as a seaplane carrier? Here you have this enormous Dreadnought and you are to spend £3,300,000 on it. You could have built an efficient seaplane carrier for that. It means that she will be a bad compromise; she will have all the disadvantages of an enormous Dreadnought and she can never be a proper seaplane carrier. I hope these constructive suggestions will be considered.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
WAGES, &c., OF OFFICERS, SEAMEN, AND BOYS', COAST GUARD, AND ROYAL MARINES
Resolved,
"That a sum, not exceeding £18,314,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Wages, etc., of Officers, Seamen, and Boys, Coast Guard, and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1922."
Navy (Excesses), 1919–20
Resolved,
"That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to make good Excesses of Navy Expenditure beyond the Grants, for the year ended on the 31st day of March, 1920."
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.
Coal Mines (Decontrol) Bill
Not amended ( in the Standing Committee ), considered.
The first new Clause on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. Member for the Ogmore Division of Glamorgan (Mr. Hartshorn)—( Maintenance of wages for a temporary period )—challenges the whole principle of the Bill and is therefore out of order. The second and third new Clauses— ( Establishment of National Coal Board: and Powers and duties of National Coal Board and Regulations of wages and profits )—are both beyond the scope of the Bill.
Before any Amendment be taken, I appeal to the Government not to press the remaining stages of the Bill at this late hour. So much hinges upon the question of agreement between the mineowners and the men, and even between the Government and the representatives of the Miners' Federation, that no spirit of harmony between the parties can be expected if the Bill is forced upon the House at this late hour. We have previously on the Second Reading and in the Committee stage suggested that a settlement of this matter ought not to be sought by an instrument of force. The future welfare of industry in the country depends upon such a degree of harmony and goodwill as can be produced in the coal industry. If there is not peace and agreement in that trade we can scarcely expect it in any other. To force this measure through at this late hour when there is no adequate opportunity of dealing with the Amendments on the paper may be fatal to the chances of any workable understanding between the parties. Therefore I would appeal to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bridgeman) to give the House a better opportunity than it can have at this stage, and thus produce among the miners' representatives that better spirit of harmony, without which it is impossible to expect peace in this industry. If the measure is pressed now, it must be debated on conditions of the greatest physical exhaustion. The interests of the nation in this matter ought not to be overlooked by the Government, and therefore I appeal to them not to use the mere force of the great majority behind the Government, but to resort to what in the end will be the much more serviceable plan of securing harmonious relations between the Government and the representatives of the miners' interests.
I am sure I would very much regret anything that prevented harmonious relations between the Government and the miners, but the condition of public business is such that it is quite impossible to get this Bill passed into law in time unless we get it through the House to-night. All the points were debated at some length on Second Reading and in Committee, and I do not think it will require a very long time to discuss whatever remains to be discussed. I am afraid I cannot possibly accede to the request of the right hon. Gentleman.
I am very disappointed that the right hon. Gentleman cannot grant our request. It is perfectly true that the Bill has passed Second Heading and the Committee stages, but when one considers the importance and magnitude of the Bill I do not think it is unreasonable to ask that it should not be taken at this late hour. I know that there is a lot of public business to be done, but there is no part of the business that transcends in importance the Bill before us. The issues at stake in this Bill are of such an important character that we should have time to consider it in all its aspects under more advantageous conditions than are possible in the middle of the night. The Government would be well advised to accede to the request of my right hon. Friend and to adjourn further consideration of the Bill until the early part of next week, when it can be brought on at an earlier hour.
CLAUSE I.—(Curtailment of duration and Amendment of Act)
(1) The Coal Mines (Emergency) Act, 1920, as amended by any subsequent enactment, shall, so far as it is limited in duration, continue in force until the thirty first day of March nineteen hundred and twenty-one and no longer, and the expression "the period of the operation of this Act" wherever it occurs in the said Act shall be construed accordingly.
(2) For the purpose of the provisions of the said Act relating, to the pooling of profits, the period of the operation of the Act shall be divided into two periods, the one ending on the thirty-first day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty, and the other commencing on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-one, and the said provisions shall, in relation to each pooling period, have effect as if for references therein to the period of the operation of the Act there were substituted references to the pooling period in question.
(3) If, in either of the said pooling periods, the amount of the aggregate profits of all the undertakings, after such deduction or addition as is mentioned in subsection (2) of section one of the said Act exceeds the aggregate of the total standards of all the undertakings, no part of the profits in excess of such aggregate shall be distributable amongst the several undertakings; and, accordingly, proviso (i) of subsection (1) of section one of the said Act shall have effect as if the words "plus one-tenth part of such excess" were omitted therefrom.
(4) In relation to the second pooling period, coal levy and coal award shall be calculated with reference to nine-tenths of the standard instead of with reference to the standard as if in paragraph ( a ) of sub-section (1) of section two of the said Act for the words "the standard" wherever they occur in that paragraph there were substituted the words "nine-tenths of the standard."
(5) Paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the First Schedule to the Coal Mines (Emergency) Act, 1920, and as from the first day of April, nineteen hundred and twenty-one, section three of the Mining Industry Act, 1920, shall be repealed.
I beg to move in Sub-section (1) to leave out the words "thirty-first day of March," and to insert instead thereof the words "thirtieth day of June."
The Amendment and one which follows are designed to extend the period of control from 31st March to 30th June. The issue is a very simple, but a very important one. We have had a lot of talk on this Bill on Second Reading and in Committee, and I do not feel disposed to occupy a great deal of time in discussing it further. We are seeking what, we are convinced, is an essential modification of the Bill for a peaceful solution of the trouble at present existing in the mining industry. When I say a peaceful solution, I do not mean that without it the miners will go on strike. There is not, and there has not been, any talk in the Miners' Federation about a strike, and no such thought is in the mind of anyone. We say it is essential, because the time between now and the 31st March is not sufficient for putting into operation the machinery that must be moved before a settlement can be effected. We were told on the Second Reading and in Committee that the miners and the mineowners will have had five months by the end of this month in which to negotiate a settlement, and that seems rather a long time, but as a matter of fact what has been taking place during the whole of that period until within the last fortnight has been conversation between the parties, in the hope that they could agree upon broad principles upon which to build a wage system. It was only a fortnight ago, after a reference by the respective parties to their constituents, that the Miners' Federation and the Mining Association of Great Britain came to conclusions on broad principles. During the whole of the conversations which took place it was never once entertained by anyone conducting those negotiations that control would come to an end on 31st March. Had that been known there would probably have been less time in conversations and a more rapid conclusion on the broad principles, but it was not until after all these conversations had been gone through, the broad prin- ciples referred to the respective sides, and a decision reached on them that we got the first intimation of the intention of the Government to decontrol. At the present moment negotiations are still proceeding, with what hope of success I am not prepared to say. What everyone can say who knows anything about the industry, is that it is not possible to effect a settlement by the 31st March, and I do not think anyone would question that statement, because, even if the miners' representatives were prepared to agree to the principles which the owners have laid down and were prepared to recommend them, it would be necessary to have the national conference which is being held to-morrow; they would have, to refer it back to the districts, the districts to the lodges, and time would have to be allowed for lodge meetings to be held. Those lodge meetings would have to send delegates to coalfield conferences, which would have to come to decisions, and then there would have to be another national conference, and in all probability a further ballot, before agreement was possible on the part of the miners to any principles which could ultimately be put into an agreement.
Anyone who knows anything about the difficulties of negotiating an agreement of the kind now under discussion, must know that even if we have agreed upon broad principles, agreement on details in great schemes of this kind requires a considerable amount of time and several meetings, and often even after the principles have been accepted and the details negotiated, the ultimate tentative proposals have again to go through the same machinery before authority can be obtained from the respective parties to enable the negotiating committees to sign an agreement. All this will have to be gone through either while the mines are working or while they are stopped. If the Government adhere to 31st March the machinery I have referred to will be put into operation, and it cannot be operated before the 31st March. In that event, we shall be going through that process while the collieries are idle. We know that the owners have tendered 14 days' notice, and I am not surprised. The Government have destroyed all the contracts in existence between the workmen and the employers. Having taken from the coalowners the guarantee which they possessed up to now, I am not complaining of the coalowners taking the only course open to them to put themselves right, and I assume that at the end of March all the collieries in this country will come to a standstill. I may be wrong in that assumption, but I think I am, right. It is certain that, if not all the collieries, a very large proportion of them will be at a standstill, and all the procedure I have indicated will have to be gone through. I should imagine that hon. Members will realise that an issue of this description is of very great and serious national importance. We are not merely concerned about the miners' interests. Naturally we are very concerned about them, but I think we are entitled to claim that we are as much interested in the national welfare as any others Members of the House, and we think that very serious consequences must ensue if there is a general stoppage in the coal mines of this country. If we were merely renewing an agreement which had just terminated, and it was merely a matter of modifying some of the provisions of that agreement, we should be up against a very different problem from the one with which we are faced to-day.
What the House should keep in mind is that the miners are asking for one agreement—a National Wages Board. The coal-owners, on the other hand, say that they are not prepared to accept a National Wages Board, and that district agreements must be entered into applicable to the respective coalfields. There can be no further negotiations until the men have been consulted as to whether they are prepared to accept district agreements. If they decide in favour of that principle, it would be necessary for the districts separately to endeavour to fix agreements in the different coalfields, laying down an entirely new basis. There is bound to be considerable discussion, and considerable time devoted to it; and anybody who realises the facts of the situation, the difficulties of it and the work to be accomplished before a new set of agreements can be instituted in the mining industry, is bound to acknowledge what we say on this side, that a settlement during this month is an absolute impossibility. That being the case, we are urging the Government to give additional time for conducting these negotiations. If we are asked to give a guarantee to reach agreement with in a certain time, no one can give such a guarantee. What we can say is that there is as keen a desire on the part of the miners' representatives to reach agreement as there is on the part of the Government, the coal-owners, or the general community, and that real genuine efforts will be made to bring about such an agreement. Of that there can be no doubt. That being the case, we urge the House to agree to this Amendment. If the Government say "We cannot agree to that," well, I see that my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Derby (Mr. Holmes) has an Amendment for a six weeks' extension—that certainly would be cutting the time very, very short, and it would be extremely difficult to get through all the machinery in that time. If the Government cannot see their way to accept our Amendment, then accept the Amendment of my hon. Friend, for that would give us some opportunity of going on. We feel, however, that it is cutting it too fine to give us less than the end of June Notwithstanding the attitude which has been adopted by the Government, and the firm stand they have made, and their standing by 31st March, we hope, in the national interest as well as those of the miners and mineowners, that they will reconsider that decision and agree to this Amendment.
I beg to second the Amendment.
If one may judge from the opinions expressed on various sides, the general conclusion with regard to the Coalmining Industry appears to be that the coalowners are a body of men who have become rich beyond the dreams of avarice by exploiting the home consumer and by filching extortionate profits out of our Allies, and that the miners are the most wealthy, lazy, and independent set of workers in the country, who make huge incomes and then decline to pay Income Tax. Those who are in no way connected with the coal industry conclude that neither coal-owners nor miners are deserving of consideration or support, and that if decontrol would put both of them in a difficult position they may be jointly and justly left to stew in their own juice. As, however, this matter is one of great national importance, I venture to think that it would be well before the date of decontrol is actually decided by the House, either 31st March, 30th June, or 15th May—as I suggest—it would be as well for the House to recall the exact facts as to the manner in which Government action has affected the coal industry and the country during the last four years.
In 1916 a menacing dispute between the coalowners and the miners in South Wales caused the Government to decide to control that portion of the coal area. That was done as from 1stDecember, 1916. On 1st March, 1917, the Government decided that they would control the remainder of the coalfields of the country. The Coal Controller immediately met in conference the Mining Association of Great Britain and in July, 1917, an agreement was signed setting out the method by which the control should be exercised. That agreement was confirmed by a Bill passed here—the Coal Mines Control Agreement (Confirmation) Bill, 1918. The pertinent points in that agreement were that the collieries were to pay Excess Profits Duty in the ordinary way, but would only retain one-fourth of the remaining excess profits, and not in any case would the colliery retain a total amount of more than one-sixth of the profits, the remaining profits to go into the pool. If a colliery made no excess profit it was to receive from the pool such sum as would make up its profit to the approved standard, provided the pre-War output was maintained. This arrangement was necessary because directly control commenced the collieries had to send their coal to destinations decided upon by the Controller, and to sell it at the price fixed by him. They could not send it to their own customers. This coal control agreement remained in force until the 1st April, 1919, when it was repealed by the Coal Mines Emergency Act, 1920, which dated back to that date, and which provided this new plan, that the collieries were to be guaranteed nine-tenths of their pre-War standard, and if the aggregate profits made in the industry exceeded the aggregate of the standards then the collieries would receive the amount of the pre-War standard plus one-tenth of any of the remaining profits. That Act was to remain in force until the 31st August, 1920, but then we had the Mining Industry Act, 1920, which extended it for another year — until the 31st August, 1921. This Bill alters that Act, and says it shall only operate until the 31st March, 1921, and it takes away from the collieries their one-tenth part of the surplus profits above the standard and as from the 1st January this year it still further reduces the amount which the coalowners are to take.
From this narration the House will see that the coalowners have only retained in each of the past four years a sum hardly equal to the average profits of the prewar years, and the distribution they have been able to mote to their shareholders even where it has been at the same rate as in 1914 and before, has really been less, having regard to the increased cost of living and the consequent reduction in purchasing power. Let us realise the effect of this on the industry as a whole. The coal mine is a wasting asset, and the supply of coal can only be maintained by the regular development of new pits, the sinking of shafts, and the opening of fresh seams of coal. That requires far more capital than before the war. In the past the capital necessary for the opening of new pits in the coal industry—as in nearly all other industries—has been raised by setting aside a portion of each year's profits as a re-investment for the following year's capital. But the effect of control and the limitation of profits has been that for nearly four years little or no development work has taken place, and no capital has been set aside out of the profits of those years wherewith to sink new shafts, or to win fresh coal to replace the workings which are rapidly becoming exhausted. During the four years' control those members of the public who had money to invest in our industrial concerns did not regard the coal industry because of the Government action, and because of the limitation of profits, as one likely to yield large dividends or appreciation of capital values. To-day, with the demand for export coal gone, with the whole future of the industry in doubt, and with the financial conditions of the country such that it is difficult to get money for any concerns at all, it is almost impossible for colliery companies to appeal to the public for money for fresh development.
May I turn now to the other side of the picture, and look at the position of the miners? Before the war there was probably no industry in the country in which the remuneration of the worker was, from the public point of view, on a better basis than that of the coal industry. The miner had a minimum wage, but his actual weekly remuneration depended on the amount of work that he did, and was augmented according to the selling price of coal. In other words, he was paid by results and had an incentive to put his back into the job. Government control put an end to all that when prices were limited by Act of Parliament, and the miner found that his wages remained stationary while the cost of living went up by leaps and bounds. He, therefore, in 1917, appealed to the Government for a rise in wages to meet the increased cost of living, and the Government agreed, to the extent of 3s. per day. So the matter remained until this Parliament met in the beginning of 1919, when a very serious position had arisen in the coal industry. The Miners' Federation were then putting forward a demand for increased wages, decreased hours and the nationalisation of the whole industry. A Royal Commission, with Mr. Justice Sankey as Chairman, was appointed, and in its interim report it recommended an increase of 2s. a day in wages, which was intended, not to meet the increased cost of living, but to improve the social position of the miner's life. It also recommended a reduction of one hour a day in work. It is not necessary, and it would probably be out of order for me to deal with the final report on the subject of Nationalisation. The reduction of one hour per day took place in July, 1919, and the 2s. per day increase in wages dated back to January, 1919. In the Autumn of last year, the Miners' Federation applied for a further increase of wages in order to meet the further increased cost of living which had taken place since the Armistice. The strike which then took place was settled by the grant of an increase on terms which have resulted in the whole of that increase being lost to the miners, owing to the falling off in the coal exports during the present year. It is, I believe, generally thought that the miner earns, from £600 to £700 a year. That may be true in one or two isolated cases in South Wales, where individuals work very hard on the highest class of coal, but in England and Scotland it is an utter exaggeration to suggest that the average wage of the coal-winning miner exceeds £4 a week.
12 M.
Such is the position of the coalowner and the coalminer at the end of four years of control. The industry has experienced all the disadvantages of both private ownership and nationalisation without any of the advantages of either. The home consumer for a considerable time has obtained coal for his factory furnace and his home grate at less than cost price. The industry finds itself to-day with pits working themselves out, little development work in progress, and no reserves of capital with which to make up for the lost period—with its export markets closed owing to the impoverishment of the world, and little or no hope of maintaining either coalowners' profits or miners' wages. This is the moment which the Government choose for asking the House to decontrol the industry; and the House, being generally averse from Government control of any sort—a sentiment with which I heartily agree; being, perhaps, rather exasperated by the continued disputes between coal owners and miners, and being convinced from experience that the Government have made a thorough mess of their management of the coal industry, is only too ready to register its approval. But the duty and the privilege of the House of Commons in this matter is not to consider either the interest of the coal-owner or the interest of the miner, but to decide what is best in the interest of the nation. It is a matter for the most serious consideration whether the proposed decontrol of this industry on the 31st of this month is an act of the highest wisdom. Let me hasten to add that it is not in any way my desire that control should continue for an indefinite period. On several occasions in the House during the past two years I have attempted to show that coal control has caused extravagance, has checked development, and has diminished output; but the effect of the past four years has been that the industry has lost its self-control, and it must be given a proper opportunity of getting on its legs again. Since the Armistice, enormous profits have been made on the export of coal, but comparatively few collieries supplied this foreign demand. The greater portion of the profits which they earned went into the pool, and from that pool the majority of collieries have been maintained on a working basis. Suddenly the export trade in coal has disappeared, nearly every colliery in the country at the present time is being carried on at a loss, and the pool will probably be exhausted by the end of this month. The Bill suggests that on the last day of this month the pool shall cease. What will be the results? The first effect will be that, many collieries—I venture to say a third of the collieries in the country—will close; not temporarily, but for ever. Their output will be lost, their workers, and all those who gained their livelihood indirectly from such collieries and their workers, will be thrown out of work, and the nation will have to face a large increase of unemployment doles. The second effect will be that the closing of these collieries, and the consequent reduction of national output, will cause a shortage of home-produced coal with the result that the home consumer will either have to pay a higher price for his coal for industrial purposes or for home consumption, since the demand will exceed the supply, or, alternatively, we shall have to import coal from America or Germany in order to meet our needs. Having regard to the value of our coal exports in the past in paying for food imports, the possibility of our becoming a coal-importing nation is a matter of grave concern. None of us desires that these things should occur. On the other hand, we all realise that the coal industry cannot be subsidised out of national funds. It must be self-supporting on economic lines. Both the coal-owners and the miners realise this, and are endeavouring at the present time, to the best of their ability, having regard to their conflicting views as to what are collective interests, to arrive at an agreement; but the announcement of decontrol has been so sudden that, as the hon. Member for Ogmore (Mr. Hartshorn) has just said, it is impossible to make proper arrangements for the furture before the end of the month. It has been urged that negotiations have already been in progress for over four months and that nothing has resulted so far; but those negotiation started on an entirely different basis. The coal strike was settled on the basis that the remuneration of the miners; would be fixed in future on the selling price of export coal, and the negotiations that took place for a considerable time were devoted to making arrangements accordingly, but the slump in the export of coal caused a complete change, and negotiations had to be recommenced. The coal owners and the miners recognise that they cannot look to the national purse for a permanent subsidy, that the conditions in regard to the industry have changed, and that they must face the facts of the situation. With goodwill on both sides there should be agreement in due course; but, as the hon. Member has pointed out, speaking on behalf of the Miners' Federation, and I can say the same of the Mining Association of Great Britain, the negotiating bodies are cumbrous and time is needed in their negotiations so that they may consult those whom they represent and obtain their sanction for various proposals. I suggest, therefore, that it would be wise for the Government in the national interest not to extend control indefinitely "but to give a short extension of the period in order that the present negotiations may have a fair chance of being brought to a successful issue. So far as the House of Commons is concerned this is a matter of pounds, shillings and pence. The Board of Trade tell us that to postpone decontrol for six weeks would cost £7,000,000. Our experience does not give us much faith in Board of Trade estimates, but for the sake of argument I will accept the figure of £7,000,000. The £7,000,000 which they say it would cost to postpone decontrol for six weeks includes the guarantee of the owners' profits. If during the extended period of control the Government did not guarantee the owners' profits, but guaranteed the owners against loss, no coal-owner would close his pits during the further six weeks' negotiations if he was guaranteed against loss. That guarantee would reduce the possible Treasury loss to £3,000,000. By keeping all the pits open you would keep in work thousands of miners and others who are depending upon the mining industry, and who would otherwise come upon the State for unemployment grants. It is impossible to estimate, that liability, but I think we should find that the sum required would certainly be largely reduced and probably entirely wipe out the £3,000,000 which would be saved by decontrolling the industry on 31st March. From the anti-waste point of view, therefore, there is very little in it, but the extension of the date would certainly help the tone and temper of the negotiations which are being carried on. Let us remember that a settlement of this matter does not rest with the right hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Adamson) or with the hon. Member for Ince (Mr. Walsh), or the, hon. Member for Ogmore (Mr. Hartshorn), and their Parliamentary colleagues; it rests with over a million men who spend their working days underground, in darkness and dirt, and who have not the opportunity of studying economic and political problems that we have here. They know that as a result of the strike they received an increase of wages of 3s. 6d. a day, and that that increase has been taken off. It takes time to convince them that world conditions over which neither their representatives nor the coalowners are responsible make it necessary that the industry shall be placed on a new basis, and I venture to hope that the House, which is always ready to do the right thing, will assist the miners' representatives, whose position is one of the most serious difficulty, by agreeing to an extension of time for the successful outcome of the present negotiations.
I should like to make an appeal to the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill to give some heed to the request which has been made for extension of time. I can assure him that the demand we are making upon him is not made merely for the sake of prolonging this Debate. So far as we are concerned here, and so far as those who are immediately responsible for the workmen in the various districts are concerned, we are most anxious that nothing should be done to-night or during the next few months which will in any way lead to any serious difficulty in the coal trade. The case put by the hon Member for Ogmore supported by the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire cannot be answered from the point of view in which they put it. It is just possible that by attempting to rush this measure to-night and remaining adamantine so far as their position is concerned, the Government are not contributing to the best possible relationship between the workmen and the owners. If to-night this measure goes through and decontrol takes place on 31st March, it will have a very serious effect upon the mines. If on the other hand the right hon. Gentleman can accede in a measure, I do not exactly say to the full, to the request we make, the first effect of the concession would be that it would contribute very materially to the conciliatory spirit which is so essential in the settlement at which we hope to arrive. Those who are engaged in the very delicate and difficult negotiations which are going on are very anxious that nothing shall transpire which shall lead to rupture between the parties who are engaged therein. If the right hon. Gentleman could see his way to extend control for two months, or any such period as he thinks wise, so that adjustment can take place from the financial and commercial point of view, it will undoubtedly contribute not only to the well-being of the industry, but the well-being of trade in general. I do not know that the Government can be exonerated from all blame in regard to the present position in the coal industry, especially in regard to the export trade. The right hon. Gentleman remembers that very early this year he received a deputation from representatives of the coalowners and factors who were complaining very bitterly of the regulations of his office with regard to the export of coal. They are attributing a great deal of the decline in the export trade to the fact that the Government had misjudged the whole situation and maintained their regulations far beyond the time necessary; and that if large coal with slack had been allowed to go out of the country much earlier, the export trade would not have been so bad as it is to-day. If there is a measure of truth in that statement, then a great deal of the responsibility for the decline in the export trade must undoubtedly rest with those who have been conducting the business on behalf of the Government.
That leads me to say that if my right hon. Friend to-night could listen to the voices and pleadings on this side he would give time, notwithstanding the fact that they had in a measure contributed to the present condition, to the reorganisation of the industry and for adjustment of the mechanical side of the industry. What we are most anxious about is that there should be a settlement with regard to the general wages question. At the present time, as I have already indicated, negotiations are going on. What the outcome of those negotiations will be one does not exactly know. There is undoubtedly a conflict of opinion upon some very vital principle. Whether it will be possible to get round the difficult points or not I am unable to say; all I can say is that I am very hopeful indeed that if there is an extension of time these difficult points with regard to the negotiations will be overcome.
Let me assume to-night that the Government is adamant and are not going to accede to the request made from these benches for an extension of time. The first effect of that will be it will lead to the irritation of the minds of the men. The Government, I believe, at the present time have an opportunity of allaying unrest if they will accept the suggestions made, but if they are going to turn a deaf ear to our request, and are not going to consider in any degree the things that we put forward, then I feel certain the first effect of that position will be to contribute to the irritation of the minds of the men, and instead of contributing to that solution which is so essential just now, it will have the reverse effect, and it will more or less bring about a state of mentality which will be adverse to any possible settlement. I do not want to go further into that side of the question. It will undoubtedly also leave the industry in a very sad state. I do not know that I need elaborate that point. The hon. Member for North East Derbyshire in an able speech has indicated what the position of the industry is going to be. I myself happen to be in a district where we are very favourably situated. I do not think there will be many pits closed in the district to which I belong. I believe in the last financial report the district to which I belong is the only district which is paying. Therefore as far as that district is concerned the Bill will not have any sad effect. On the other hand, undoubtedly if decontrol takes place on the date set down in this Bill it is going to have the effect of stopping a good many pits in some of these localities. As has already been indicated, and as the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are told by the owners, who speak with authority so far as these districts are concerned, that in some cases once the mines are closed they will never be reopened. I do not think that is a state of affairs which even the Government wants to see take place, and if it is possible to avoid a situation of that character by extending the time for six or eight weeks, it will be to the eternal credit of the Government and of advantage not only to the coal trade, but to trade in general. If there is no such extension and no settlement, the very haste and rush of the Government will only be precipitating the possibility of a deadlock between the parties. That is what we desire to avoid, and we believe it can be avoided, and that if these negotiations are conducted in their present spirit a settlement will be reached. But without that it cannot be reached; and I hope that before the Government say the last word to-night and this measure passes from this House, they will be in a position to say to us, "We are able to accede to the demand for time with the specific purpose pf giving both sides a possibility of arriving at an amicable and honourable settlement so far as wages are concerned."
This question has been argued at considerable length upstairs, and I do not think it is necessary for me to say very much this evening, but I should like to notice one or two points in the speeches the hon. Members made. It is a very curious thing that everyone who speaks in support of the proposal for the continuance of control always begins his speech by abusing the system of control, and there has been nobody in this House more abusive of the system than the hon. Member for N.E. Derbyshire (Mr. Holmes) from the very moment that he took his seat here. I can remember a speech he made on the 28th November, 1919, in which he described control as "a mongrel policy."
He said: but the Motion he has moved is exactly contrary to the views he has expressed. [An HON. MEMBER: "It was so at that time."] On the contrary, the time he chose was when export prices were extremely high, and the effect of decontrol at the moment when he was prepared to do it would have been either to drive a great deal of coal out of the country or to raise the price for the home consumer. If he was prepared to do it then, I cannot understand how he can be opposed to decontrol now.
What I want to try to make clear is that it is not correct to say that this proposal has been sprung suddenly upon the country or the coal industry. It has been spoken of as a very sudden and precipitate measure. It began with the coal strike settlement in October last year. One of the first articles in that settlement was that both sides should meet forthwith to prepare a scheme for submission to the Government at the earliest possible moment and not later than the 31st of March, for the regulation of wages in the industry, having regard among other considerations to the profits of the industry and the principle on which any surplus profits should be dealt with. The latest moment by which that arrangement was to be reached was 31st March.
For the presentation of a scheme.
To regulate the industry. What is the use of presenting a scheme if it is not going to settle the troubles from which the industry has been suffering all this time? Intimation was given a considerable time ago to both the owners and the representatives of the miners that it was the intention of the Government to decontrol at the earliest possible moment. It was mentioned in the King's Speech. Letters were written by the President of the Board of Trade to Mr. Frank Hodges, Secretary to the Federation. On 31st January he said:
"An announcement will be made at once that decontrol of prices and distribution will take effect from 1st of March."
And he added:
"Moreover, it is the intention of the Government that all other forms of control of the industry should cease as soon as practicable."
Therefore, it is not correct to say that there has been any precipitancy about this action. It has been rendered necessary by the universal circumstances of the slump all over the country. What is essential now is to arrive at a scheme, to get a settlement in the trade, and get back to an economic basis of working. This Amendment, if carried, would mean a charge of about £15,000,000 on the taxpayer. Those who are prepared to vote for it would have to justify it to their constituents. It would mean charging the taxpayer more than £1,000,000 a week for the next three months. The argument that by fixing the date as the 31st of March we in some way damnify the amicable negotiations that have been going on between the owners and the miners' representatives is one that I find difficult to follow. We hear to-day that excellent progress is being made, and I see no reason why an agreement should not be reached. Hon. Gentlemen opposite know that as a rule agreements are not reached until the last moment that it is necessary to do so. Where a settlement is desired, as it is, by all those engaged in the industry, I am sure that it can be reached without that great expenditure of time and elaborate machinery that were mentioned by the hon. Member for the Ogmore Division. It has been done before. Settlements have been reached and become effective after strikes in a very short time and I do not think there is any reason why it should not be done again. Even if the final agreement were not actually reached it would be perfectly easy for the owners and the men to make a permanent arrangement far a few days, or whatever is necessary, until the final agreement is reached. It really is essential that this period of uncertainty in the trade should end. There is not any chance of a recovery until this uncertainty is at an end. If you prolong this period to 30th June you merely prolong a period of great anxiety for everybody. More pits, no doubt, will be closed, more people will go on short time; and you also would prevent those, who want to deal, the buyers, from starting and making the enquiries which they would make. The important thing is to get a settlement at an early date. Postponement can only mean postponing the difficulties which are at present very great. If you postpone them you will be up against exactly the same problem at the end of this period. You will have done no good, you will have wasted a great deal of time, you will have missed the opportunity of getting the industry on to right lines, and I cannot believe that the House will agree to accept the Amendment.
Certainly the members on this side of the House heard the statement with considerable disappointment. My right hon. Friend opened his statement by accusing the Member for North-East Derbyshire of inconsistency. As a matter of fact, everything quoted from the speech read by my right hon. Friend was recapitulated by him this evening.
What I said was inconsistent was the Amendment. The speech was the same on both occasions.
Not in the least He said then that he believed that Government control led to all the waste and abuse enumerated, but he did not say then, and he does not say this evening, that the Government should continue indefinitely control. What he does urge is that you, having made a muck of the whole situation, have no right to suddenly throw the coalowners and miners into this state of chaos. He says that all he asks in this matter is that the Government should take some steps to make amends for the difficulties they themselves have created. My right hon. Friend endeavours to prove that this is not a sudden scheme. He says in substance, that so far from this being sudden scheme, it was long anticipated, and he then actually quotes something, which I ask the House to follow for a moment, as the proof of our case. He says that, following the miners' strike, one of the provisions of the agreement was that a mutual scheme was to be submitted by the coalowners and the miners and the miners' representatives as early as possible, but not later than 31st March. I ask the House, no matter what their views on control may be, to follow that statement, which we submit is the best proof of the deliberate breach of faith. Would any lawyer interpreting that agreement suggest that if a scheme was to be submitted by the 31st March for the consideration of the Government, the Government had clearly in their minds that the period of control must of necessity follow some period after that? What earthly use is it to submit a scheme on 31st March if decontrol is to take place on that date? I ask my right hon. Friend to note the importance of it, namely, that if the Government themselves suggested 31st March as the day when a scheme must be submitted, the Government must clearly have had in their minds that it was after that date that decontrol should take place. Indeed, everyone knew and expected that. No one expected 31st March to be the date. I am amazed to hear—I wish it were only true—of these successful negotiations, and I am afraid that the public is being deliberately deceived in this matter as we are. We might as well talk quite plainly. Press statements are appearing that negotiations are progressing so satisfactorily that there is a possibility of an agreement, or of an arrangement being fixed up. My right hon. Friend practically says the same. All I can say is that to within a few moments ago the miners' leaders, who are negotiating, and the Triple Alliance who considered the matter this afternoon had no such information as he has given the House. On the contrary, the evidence is that unless there is some agreement it is as certain as we are here that a stoppage is bound to take place. That being so, is it not deceiving the House to pretend that there is some near agreement? Is it not deceiving the country? Is it not leading the people to believe that there is some negotiation on a basis of agreement taking place?
That is a very serious thing when all those concerned, and certainly every Member in this House connected with the mining industry, do not for a moment share the view of optimism on the matter. I wish we did, but the very plea we now make for some extension is to accomplish that, to endeavour to bring about some agreement. My right hon. Friend answers it by saying, "Yes, but let them go to their constituencies and justify it on the grounds of an expenditure of a million a week." Let those who oppose it go to their constituencies and first tell them that it is a breach of faith as far as the date is concerned, that as a consequence of that breach of faith not a million a week, but many millions a week will be lost to the trade, commerce and industry of this country and the Government will be paying very nearly as much in unemployed doles, and then let them go to their constituencies and justify it on the grounds of economy and follow it up by telling their constituents that the plea which was last made to the Government was not to continue to 31st August, but to continue at least for some short period after 31st March. I do hope this is not the last word of the Government. I can only repeat that I know not only among the miners' leaders, but among all sections of trade and trade unionists there is a genuine effort to effect a settlement. No one can guarantee anything, because no one knows better than my right hon. Friend that you cannot talk for a million men in this House. No one can pretend to do it. All you can say is that your influence will be directed to endeavouring to effect a settlement. That plea is made from this side of the House to-night to the Government with a genuine and sincere belief that if more time is given there is a possibility of bringing off a settlement. Surely having regard to all those facts the Government ought to say that what they contemplated in the settlement read out by my right hon. Friend was that before the 31st March a scheme should be submitted. We say: "Wait until the 31st March for the scheme to be submitted. Then after that date determine what is a legitimate time for decontrol to take place. You have no right to quote an agreement that said to the men, "Go on till 31st March," and then say "Our interpretation was not 31st March, but some date prior to that." For all these reasons I repeat that I hope the Government has not said the last word, but will seriously consider the plea we are now making for an extension.
I intervene for a few minutes, in order to support from this side of the House the renewed appeal made from the other side to the right hon. Gentleman for a reconsideration of his decision. Brief as this debate has been, it sufficed to prove that the policy of the Government as a policy has not been challenged in any way. There is no principle at stake. All that the miners' representatives have asked the Government is for an extension of time, and I fail to see why the Government cannot agree to that. The Bill stipulates that decontrol shall take place on 31st March. We have had it to-night on the authority of hon. Members qualified to speak for the miners that the time is insufficient. I take it that that is their plea, that the time is insufficient to effect the desired settlement. We have had it to-night also that the difficulty is complicated by the elabo- rate procedure necessary to secure the assent of the mine workers throughout the land and the position is further complicated, I understand, by fundamental differences that already exist between the coalowners and the miners in regard to a common denominator on this desired agreement. We have been told by the right hon. Gentleman that there was an understanding that decontrol should come off by 31st March. The right hon. Member for Derby (Mr. Thomas) charges the Government with breach of faith on that point. I will not say it is breach of faith, but it is very evident there has been a misunderstanding and that is all the more reason why the department should reconsider its decision. We have had it to-night from men in a position to speak that it is an absolute impossibility to secure a settlement on 31st March and the whole House will share their feeling that nothing can be gained by forcing the issue. I have been very disappointed by the reply of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for Mines. He refuses the request on three grounds. First of all on the ground of cost, and we are told that if the Amendment was adopted and the concession asked for were given it would lead to an expenditure of £15,000,000. It would be money well spent to secure goodwill. I quite agree with the right hon. Member for Derby that if on the other hand you force these men to an attitude of antagonism and opposition to the Government a much larger sum would be required to make good the damage. The right hon. Gentleman banked a good deal on a kind of deathbed repentance on the part of the miners and owners. Optimism is a very precarious thing in a matter of this kind. He seems to think that in the past agreement has been reached almost in the last few hours. The men who are qualified to speak have assured the House to-night that at present there is no sign of a settlement, and I think it is a very risky thing for the right hon. Gentleman, on the basis of what has taken place in the past to indulge in the hope that a settlement will take place in the last few moments. His third ground is that the prolongation of the period will lead to uncertainty in the industry. It is better to have uncertainty than chaos. There is something more at stake even than the interests of the miners, and that is the national interest. This is a matter that touches the whole nation, and if it be true, as was stated by the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire, that one-third of the collieries will be forthwith closed, and that the ranks of the unemployed will be considerably augmented, I think the right hon. Gentlemen who represent the Government will be well advised to make haste slowly in this matter, and to meet the miners by making some concession so that they may be able to bring about a settlement.
I have been a constant critic of the coal control for the last year or two, and I hold no brief either for the employers or the men in the coal trade, because I think the whole system lately has tended to inefficiency, and has not been in the national interest. I wish the industry had been decontrolled before, and I heartily support the motion for decontrol as soon as it possibly can be done, and for the removal of all hampering restrictions which prevent the masters and men coming to a proper understanding as regards working conditions and wages. But I do feel that the custom of this House has become too much one of legislation in a hurry. I cannot reconcile myself to the idea that a Bill of this magnitude, so far reaching in its effects, in the present state of unemployment and the state of trade generally, should be passed and come into force within seven days of receiving the Royal Assent. I have not risen as a supporter of the Amendment; I have risen to support the idea of some extension of time beyond, 31st March. It has quite truly been said by the Secretary for Mines that when the Bill was introduced there was as likely to be a settlement in three weeks as in three months. I agree that this House has no cause in the national interest to wait until a settlement has been achieved between employers and employed, but I do feel that the Government might reconsider the matter, if not here, at least in another place. The report of the Debate shows that reconsideration is desired, and that instead of 31st March, at any rate, 30th April, might be accepted. In deference to what has been said here and to the expressions of opinion upstairs last week, and in the interests of what I would, call a practical business settlement, at any rate, four or five weeks should be allowed after the passing of this measure into law before it should take effect.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will consult with his colleagues in the Government on this matter, find I am not speaking on behalf of the miners at all. We have got to remember that other industries are affected by this question. There are signs that the textile trade will within the next few months improve—I refer particularly to cotton manufactures—and we also have signs that the manufacturers of textile machinery will have an increase of orders. I put this point to the right hon. Gentleman: If there is any sign of the staple trades of Lancashire improving, is he going to run the risk of upsetting that improvement in trade by causing a dispute in the coal mining industry? Is he to run the risk of preventing an improvement in trade taking place in the cotton factories of Lancashire and Yorkshire, and in the engineering works in those two counties, by, I had almost said the stupidity of the Government in not conceding some extension of time in Connection with this Bill? If he does so, then, instead of economising, the Government will be guilty of extravagance. I will appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to give further consideration to this matter. If he cannot agree to the date June 30th, then let him take his courage in both hands and say that, with the object of improving trade, he will make the date May 31st. We must not allow any prejudice or feeling to stand in the way of effecting a satisfactory settlement of this matter. The industry is a basic one, a key industry, which reacts on a large number of people in the country. The Ministry of Mines has power to prevent a disaster in the industrial world, and the blame will lie on their shoulders if they do not succeed.
I do not wish to take up any attitude of hostility to the Government, and I would say at the start that I do not think the charges of breach of faith on the part of the Government are desirable in this debate. What I do say is that we have a definite statement that a scheme was to be prepared on March 31st. Now that the Government has had to deal with a very difficult situation and has had to interfere with the ordinary laws of supply and demand, and to evolve an artificial structure in order to deal with that, it is surely, as it took some time to make that alteration and as its effects became known in course of time, only right that, if responsibility is to be thrown on the coal trade—the miners and mineowners—to restore order and economic conditions, time should be given after the date for the presentation of the scheme for its elaboration. I quite agree that protracted negotiations in these cases are worse than useless; they only give cause for all sorts of new hares being started. On the other hand, men of goodwill on both sides must have some time to appeal to their constituents, the miners on one side and the Mineowners' Federation on the other. For that reason I strongly urge that, if not the period mentioned in the Amendment now before the House, at least a short period, perhaps as much as a month, should be given for continuing and carrying to a successful termination these intricate and delicate negotiations.
I urge the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill to listen to what has been said from all parts of the House. As the hon. Gentlemen, the Member for North-East Derbyshire (Mr. Holmes), has said, the coal industry is a wasting asset, and once some of the pits are closed down they can never be opened again. The country would find that it would be short of that commodity which is so essential to every industry. It would, in my opinion, be a disaster of the first magnitude not to give that little extension of time which is required to try and come to an amicable settlement. During the whole of my life I have lived among my own people, and have been in touch with the miners' leaders since I was a boy, and I have always tried to settle these matters, but I feel that the action of the Government will precipitate such confusion in the coal trade that the industry may be lost for ever. We cannot do with that. It has been said that the coal industry is a key industry, but I think it is the industry which keeps England going, and to ruin it would mean not only the ruin of coal, but it would ruin very many more industries besides, which would have to go consequent in the coal trade being ruined. May I plead with the right hon. Gentleman to remember the decision which he has announced to the House, and may I ask him, if he cannot agree to an Amendment, that an extension should be given for a short time, because the hon. Member for Ogmore (Mr. Hartshorn) has outlined what negotiations will have to take place before a settlement can be arrived at. The Secretary for Mines said that we often settled disputes in a very short time, but I would point out to him that negotiations were going on when the coal strike took place, and it took another two weeks to settle the dispute, and negotiations had been going on before the strike took place. We understood, as miners, that control was to remain until 31st August, but precipitate action has thrown us out of gear and has left us with little or nothing to choose between the owners themselves stopping us or a stoppage on that account. Let the right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for Mines, also remember that there are counties, whole counties, whose working industry will be entirely ruined because often the whole county depends on the coal trade. Take my own county of Durham. With very little exception the whole county is dependent on this industry and my hon. Friend, the Member for Workington (Mr. Cape), will bear me out that Cumberland is also dependent almost entirely on this industry. May I urge that we have not heard the last word in the matter and that some additional time should be given so that an honourable and amicable settlement may be arrived at.
I, too, rise to plead with the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for Mines to try and see his way to extend the time for the short period that has been asked for, as far as I can judge, from both sides of the House. I do so for one reason only, and it is that, at a time like the present, when unemployment is so great in our midst, we should do nothing that would in any way tend to an increase of unemployment. I was very glad to learn from the bon. Member for West Houghton (Mr. W. T. Wilson) that there was a chance of improvement in the cotton trade in the near future. I wish that those who are in it could see that as well as those who are
outside it, but there is certainly quite sufficient unemployment in that trade and other trades to make us exceedingly careful about adding to it by any precipitate action in regard to the coal industry. There are times when we argue that it would be far better for a time to continue a running industry at a loss rather than to allow that industry to break down altogether and to allow it perhaps entirely to stop, and I do beg the right hon. Gentleman, if he can possibly do so, to reconsider his decision.
I beg to move, "That the Debate be now adjourned."
1.0 A.M.
I cannot understand how it is that such silence should be maintained on the Front Bench, in view of the appeals that have been made from all sections of the House on this very important aspect of the case. Several of the speakers have suggested that if the Government cannot see their way to accept the Amendment now before the House, they might be prepared to offer some compromise in the way of a much more, limited extension of time. Very substantial arguments have been advanced why that should be so. The right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench have got their instructions, and those who would be entitled to make a concession are probably safely at home, where we as Members of the House would like to have been, but are denied the opportunity, and we have to remain here at the post of duty. It seems to me that we should not be wise in continuing in view of the unwillingness of the Front Bench, either because they are unwilling or because they are unable to respond to the universal appeal that has been made to them. Therefore, I beg leave to move that the Debate be adjourned in order that the Government might make some arrangement whereby the appeals from all sections of the House might receive proper consideration.
Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned."
The House divided: Ayes, 50; Noes, 109.
Division No. 42.] AYES. [1.1 a.m. Adamson, Rt. Hon. William Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) Ford, Patrick Johnston Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) Casey, T. W. Gillis, William Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.) Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe) Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton) Bromfield, William Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale) Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool) Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) Grundy, T. W. Cairns, John Edwards, Hugh (Glam., Neath) Guest, J. (York, W. R., Hemsworth) Cape, Thomas Finney, Samuel Hartshorn, Vernon Hayday, Arthur Parry, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Henry Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) Hirst, G. H. Raffan, Peter Wilson Waterson, A. E. Holmes, J. Stanley Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) Wignall, James John, William (Rhondda, West) Rose, Frank H. Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett) Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M. Shaw, Thomas (Preston) Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Stourbridge) Lawson, John J. Sitch, Charles H. Wilson, W. Tyson (Westhoughton) Lewis, T. A. (Glam., Pontypridd) Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough) Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton> Lunn, William Spencer, George A. Morgan, Major D. Watts Swan, J. E. TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— Myers, Thomas Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby) Mr. Arthur Henderson and Mr. Frederick Hall. Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.)
NOES. Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S. Forrest, Walter Morden, Lieut.-Col. W. Grant Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Morrison, Hugh Allen, Lieut.-Colonel William James Fraser, Major Sir Keith Murray, C. D. (Edinburgh) Amery, Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. M. S. Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E. Murray, John (Leeds, West) Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Ganzoni, Captain Sir F. J. C. Neal, Arthur Armitage, Robert Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham O'Neill, Major Hon. Robert W. H. Baird, Sir John Lawrence Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L. Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Glyn, Major Ralph Parker, James Balfour, George (Hampstead) Goff, Sir R. Park Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert Pike Barker, Major Robert H. Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.) Pratt, John William Barnett, Major R. W. Greene, Lt.-Col. Sir W. (Hack'y, N.) Raeburn, Sir William H. Barnston, Major Harry Greenwood, William (Stockport) Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes) Gregory, Holman Reid, D. D. Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. Hacking, Captain Douglas H. Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford) Bigland, Alfred Hamilton, Major C. G. C. Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor) Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry Roundell, Colonel R. F. Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert A. Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D. Briggs, Harold Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) Brown, Captain D. C. Hood, Joseph Steel, Major S. Strang Bruton, Sir James Hope, James F. (Sheffield, Central) Strauss, Edward Anthony Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Hopkins, John W. W. Sturrock, J. Leng Churchman, Sir Arthur Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere Sugden, w. H. Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender Johnson, Sir Stanley Sutherland, Sir William Coats, Sir Stuart Lane-Fox, G. R. Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Cope, Major Wm. Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) Townley, Maximilian G. Cory, Sir C. J. (Cornwall, St. Ives) Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales) White, Lieut.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. Lindsay, William Arthur Wills, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Gilbert Craig, Colonel Sir J. (Down, Mid) Lloyd-Greame, Sir P. Wilson, Daniel M. (Down, West) Davidson, J. C. C. (Hemel Hempstead) Lort-Williams, J. Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading) Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Loseby, Captain C. E. Wise, Frederick Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Lyle, C. E. Leonard Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L. Doyle, N. Grattan McLaren, Hon. H. D. (Leicester) Younger, Sir George Edgar, Clifford B. Macquisten, F. A. Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark) Manville, Edward TELLERS FOR THE NOES.— Eyres-Monsell, Commander B. M. Molson, Major John Elsdale Lord Edmund Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward. Falcon, Captain Michael Moore, Major-General Sir Newton J. Forestier-Walker, L. Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C.
Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."
rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."
Question put, "That the Question be now put."
The House divided: Ayes, 110; Noes, 49.
Division No. 43.] AYES. [1.9 a.m. Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S. Brown, Captain D. C. Forestier-Walker, L. Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Bruton, Sir James Forrest, Walter Allen, Lieut.-Colonel William James Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Amery, Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. M. S. Churchman, Sir Arthur Fraser, Major Sir Keith Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E. Armitage, Robert Coats, Sir Stuart Ganzoni, Captain Sir F. J. C. Baird, Sir John Lawrence Cope, Major Wm. Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Cory, Sir C. J. (Cornwall, St. Ives) Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Balfour, George (Hampstead) Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. Glyn, Major Ralph Barker, Major Robert H. Craig, Colonel Sir J. (Down, Mid) Goff, Sir R. Park Barnett, Major R. W. Davidson, J. C. C. (Hemel Hempstead) Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.) Barnston, Major Harry Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Greene, Lt.-Col. Sir W. (Hack'y, N.) Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes) Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Greenwood, William (Stockport) Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. Doyle, N. Grattan Gregory, Holman Bigland, Alfred Edgar, Clifford B. Hacking, Captain Douglas H. Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark) Hamilton, Major C. G. C. Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Eyres-Monsell, Commander B. M. Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive Falcon, Captain Michael Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank Briggs, Harold Ford, Patrick Johnston Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) Hood, Joseph Morden, Lieut.-Col. W. Grant Steel, Major S. Strang Hope, James F. (Sheffield, Central) Morrison, Hugh Strauss, Edward Anthony Hopkins, John W. W. Murray, C. D. (Edinburgh) Sturrock, J. Leng Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere Murray, John (Leeds, West) Sugden, W. H. Johnson, Sir Stanley Neal, Arthur Sutherland, Sir William Lane-Fox, G. R. O'Neill, Major Hon. Robert W. H. Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L. Townley, Maximilian G. Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales) Parker, James White, Lieut.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Lindsay, William Arthur Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert Pike Wills, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Gilbert Lloyd-Greame, Sir P. Pratt, John William Wilson, Daniel M. (Down, West) Lort-Williams, J. Raeburn, Sir William H. Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading) Loseby, Captain C. E. Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Wise, Frederick Lyle, C. E. Leonard Reid, D. D. Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L. McLaren, Hon. H. D. (Leicester) Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford) Younger, Sir George Macquisten, F. A. Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor) Manville, Edward Roundell, Colonel R. F. TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— Molson, Major John Elsdale Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert A. Lord Edmund Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward. Moore, Major-General Sir Newton J. Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D.
NOES. Adamson, Rt. Hon. William Guest, J. (York, W. R., Hemsworth) Sitch, Charles H. Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) Hartshorn, Vernon Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough) Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.) Hayday, Arthur Spencer, George A. Bromfield, William Hirst, G. H. Swan, J. E. Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Holmes, J. Stanley Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby) Cairns, John John, William (Rhondda, West) Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.) Cape, Thomas Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M. Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) Lawson, John J. Waterson, A. E. Casey, T. W. Lewis, T. A. (Glam., Pontypridd) Wignall, James Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe) Lunn, William Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett) Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale) Morgan, Major D. Watts Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Stourbridge) Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) Myers, Thomas Wilson, W. Tyson (Westhoughton) Edwards, Hugh (Glam., Neath) Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton) Finney, Samuel Parry, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Henry Gillis, William Raffan, Peter Wilson TELLERS FOR THE NOES.— Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton) Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) Mr. Arthur Henderson and Mr. Frederick Hall. Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool) Rose, Frank H. Grundy, T. W. Shaw, Thomas (Preston)
Question put accordingly "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."
The House divided: Ayes, 106; Noes, 53.
Division No. 44.] AYES. [1.17 a.m. Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S. Forestier-Walker, L. Morden, Lieut.-Col. W. Grant Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Morrison, Hugh Allen, Lieut.-Colonel William James Fraser, Major Sir Keith Murray, C. D. (Edinburgh) Amery, Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. M. S. Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E. Murray, John (Leeds, West) Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Ganzoni, Captain Sir F. J. C. Neal, Arthur Armitage, Robert Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham O'Neill, Major Hon. Robert W. H. Baird, Sir John Lawrence Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L. Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Glyn, Major Ralph Parker, James Balfour, George (Hampstead) Goff, Sir R. Park Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert Pike Barker, Major Robert H. Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.) Pratt, John William Barnett, Major R. W. Greene, Lt.-Col. Sir W. (Hack'y, N.) Raeburn, Sir William H. Barnston, Major Harry Greenwood, William (Stockport) Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Bell, Lieut.-Col. w c. H. (Devizes) Gregory, Holman Reid, D. D. Bellairs, Commander Carlvon W. Hacking, Captain Douglas H. Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford) Bigland, Alfred Hamilton, Major C. G. C. Roundell, Colonel R. F. Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert A. Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D. Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) Briggs, Harold Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard Steel, Major S. Strang Brown, Captain D. C. Hood, Joseph Strauss, Edward Anthony Bruton, Sir James Hope, James F. (Sheffield, Central) Sturrock, J. Leng Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Hopkins, John W. W. Sugden, W. H. Churchman, Sir Arthur Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere Sutherland, Sir William Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender Johnson, Sir Stanley Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Coats, Sir Stuart Lane-Fox, G. R. Townley, Maximilian G. Cope, Major Wm. Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) White, Lieut.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Cory, Sir C. J. (Cornwall, St. Ives) Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales) Wills, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Gilbert Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. Lindsay, William Arthur Wilson, Daniel M. (Down, West) Craig, Colonel Sir J. (Down, Mid) Lloyd-Greame, Sir P. Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading) Davidson, J. C. C. (Hemel Hempstead) Lort-Williams, J. Wise, Frederick Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Loseby, Captain C. E. Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L. Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Lyle, C. E. Leonard Younger, Sir George Doyle, N. Grattan Macquisten, F. A. Edgar, Clifford B. Manville, Edward TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark) Molson, Major John Elsdale Lord Edmund Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward. Eyres-Monsell, Commander B. M. Moore, Major-General Sir Newton J. Falcon, Captain Michael Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C.
NOES Adamson, Rt. Hon. William Grundy, T. W. Rose, Frank H. Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) Guest, J. (York, W. R., Hemsworth) Shaw, Thomas (Preston) Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.) Hartshorn, Vernon Sitch, Charles H. Bromfield, William Hayday, Arthur Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough) Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Hirst, G. H. Spencer, George A. Cairns, John Holmes, J. Stanley Swan, J. E. Cape, Thomas John, William (Rhondda, West) Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby) Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M. Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.) Casey, T. W. Lawson, John J. Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe) Lewis, T. A. (Glam., Pontypridd) Waterson, A. E. Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale) Lunn, William Wignall, James Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) McLaren, Hon. H. D. (Leicester) Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett) Edwards, Hugh (Glam., Neath) Morgan, Major D. Watts Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Stourbrdge) Finney, Samuel Myers, Thomas Wilson, W. Tyson (Westhoughton) Ford, Patrick Johnston Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton) Forrest, Walter Parry, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Henry Gillis, William Raffan, Peter Wilson TELLERS FOR THE NOES. —— Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton) Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) Mr. Arthur Henderson and Mr. Frederick Hall. Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool) Robinson, S (Brecon and Radnor)
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."
I beg to move to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months"
I move this Amendment because I believe that this Bill breaks the promise which the Government made to the miners during the time of control. During the Second Reading Debate, the Committee stage upstairs, and again to-night the Secretary for Mines tried to justify the action of the Government. He stated to-night that it has been known for some time that decontrol was likely to take place, and he referred to the settlement arrived at in October, 1920. I would also like to refer to that agreement. One of the salient points in the settlement of 1920 was that both sides—the representatives of the owners and the workmen—must get together and present to the Government a scheme for the settlement of wages on or before 31st March, 1921. Another point in the settlement was that a National Committee had to be set up for the regulation of the coal industry of the country. But when the two sides met, the first thing the miners' representatives found themselves up against was a unanimous protest against the principle of a National Committee and that necessitated the miners' officials getting a new mandate from their men, and the result of that mandate was that they were still to continue negotiations with a view to trying to present a scheme to the Government by the date mentioned, 31st March, 1921. But in the meantime the Government, instead of assisting the two parties in any way to bring about a settlement, came forward with a proposal to decontrol the industry, and really the first definite information that either this House or the miners had of decontrol was when the Bill was presented on 8th March to this House by the Secretary for Mines. The Secretary for Mines dissents. It is all right to read out an ambiguous statement from a letter which makes it difficult for any Member to say what the President of the Board of Trade meant. What I want to emphasise is the fact that before anyone seriously knew that decontrol was to take place we had to have the Bill which was presented on 8th March.
The Government, having had control of the industry for three or four years, and knowing that trade was declining, and beginning to feel that the industry was likely to get into a chaotic state, said to themselves "This is the time for us to clear out and leave these two people to fight their own battle the best way they can. Never mind the welfare of the country; never mind the mines. You served our purpose during the war. You tried to help us all you could. Now we, having got out of you all we can, will leave you to your own resources." The position now is that, while the two sides are at present negotiating with a view to arriving at a settlement in harmony with the settlement made in October, the Government will not even listen to a few weeks' postponement of the Bill to give everybody a chance to fulfil the promise made in October, 1920. Therefore, the only option left for us now is to move the rejection of this Bill, and I sincerely hope that members on the opposite side of the House will believe that we are sincere in our desire that the Bill should not become law at the present time, and I know there is a good deal of doubt in the minds of many members as to our sincerity, but we know the position of the coal industry and the temper of the men. We know that, whatever may be done, or however desirable it may be to keep the collieries working, it is an utter impossibility to do so, because a great many of the collieries will automatically close on 31st March of this year. As the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire has said, it does not mean only the closing of some of the collieries, but it means that all the subsidiary industries which are dependent on the coal supplies will automatically stop, and instead of having your unemployment minimised to any degree you will have it considerably intensified by the Government's method of putting into operation, with this Bill, the decontrol of mines. I appeal to hon. Members to look beyond the miners and the mineowners to the general public and to the community at large and, as far as they possibly can, to prevent disaster. It must be in the minds of every man who has studied economic problems in this country or in any other country that the more unemployed you have in a country the greater the danger to the welfare of the State. Unemployed men are generally hungry men and angry men, and that is at all times a menace to the welfare and well-being of a State or a community. Even if they have no sympathy with the miners or the mineowners, at any rate it is incumbent on hon. Members to have more than sympathy for the general community and to realise that it is a duty which they owe to the general public to try and legislate for their welfare and well-being. Therefore, in conclusion, we make this last appeal to hon. Members to help us to get the Third Reading of this Bill postponed for the period I have already named with the view of giving both sides of the mining industry a chance of arriving at a definite agreement as to wages and other matters connected with the industry.
I beg to second the Amendment.
I should like to crave the indulgence of the House while I attempt to address hon. and right hon. Gentlemen for the first time. Hon. Members will no doubt observe the traditions of this House and will listen to an hon. Member for the first time with every sympathy. It is rather difficult for an hon. Member to rise for the first time to speak on a subject of this character, feeling that he is breaking into what may be termed a frigid atmosphere, but I feel I cannot sit down and allow this Bill to become law without making my protest in some way or the other against the action of the Government. I want to state very definitely that the Government have been guilty of a breach of faith with the mining community of this country, and I can give the House sufficient evidence that not only have the Government been guilty of a breach of faith with the miners, but they have also been guilty of a breach of faith with the mineowners of this country. I come from a district where there are men at this moment, numbering about 12,000, walking about the streets looking at each other and wondering what is going to happen next. I assure right hon. and hon. Members who are supporting the Government and many of whom are far removed from these difficult circumstances of the situation, that the district from which I come cannot be accused in any way of the suggestion of not having been as patriotic as any people in this country during the war. They sent from that district 6,000 men for the Army; they have been working every day that it is possible for them to work, but during the beginning of February of this year, I think for the want of thought, for the want of the human touch in the Mines Department, a circular was sent out to the coalowners of this country, indicating to them that they were now to act as if the control of the mines had ended in December last year, seeing that export prices had fallen, and stop, if necessary, thousands of collieries that did not pay. We were up against a disastrous situation. I am as friendly, and can work as harmoniously, with employers as any man in this country. I am on friendly and intimate terms with the managing director of the Ebbw Vale company, and I was informed that owing to the fact that export prices had come down, owing to the circular being sent out from the Mines Department, the Ebbw Vale people were afraid that, if they kept their company going at a loss, they would be bearing the whole responsibility and burden themselves. The miners in Ebbw Vale have been working part time, and are idle in consequence of that circular having been sent out.
I do not understand exactly the tone and attitude adopted by the Secretary for Mines. He appears to be under the impression that it is possible to get a settlement of this great difficulty by 31st March. How is it possible to get that settlement? Already the miners have received a guinea a week reduction in their wages. Everybody who knows anything about the cost of living to-day knows that it is 151 per cent. above prewar rates. The miners' wages, I think, at this moment, stand at the point of 154 per cent., but in order to bring the industry at this moment back to a proper economic state of working and to get that harmonious agreement suggested by the right hon. Gentleman, the miners must be asked to get back to their pre-war level of wages, with 150 per cent. on the cost of living. It is an impossibility to expect that the men in the collieries are going to accept a situation of that kind. The miner wants to live, and I would remind hon. Members who do not come into touch with the miners so intimately as we do, that the miner is quite as intelligent as any other section of the community. He knows that he has a right to live, and that he has a standard of life to maintain. I want to give just one illustration of the feeling that exists at this moment. I came across a man in my own locality, as rational a being as any Member of this House, but unfortunately in this case he has to maintain 8 children and his wife. He said to me, "Do you think I am going to stand by and allow these children to starve while there is a possibility of doing something desperate in order to try to save the situation for them?" I want to remind the Government that that man is as patriotic as any man in this House, who has done his duty as far as he possibly could to help the nation in difficulties. But you are not going to have 100,000 miners out of employment, with another 100,000 in consequence of them being out without getting a social upheaval in this country. Taking it from the financial point of view you are going to create greater difficulties by paying unemployment doles than if you decide to maintain the industry for the moment until there may be greater progress in the cost of living and wages coming down to a proper level. The miners of the country do not desire to keep up the present rate of wages. They are prepared for wages to come down, but they want the cost of living to come down; they have a right to expect the cost of living to come down.
I want to refer to certain statements that have been made by hon. Members of this House during the course of these debates. I never feel very much annoyed when any statement is made that may be in opposition to what I think, but there has been one speech delivered during the course of these debates about which I feel personally very much annoyed. I think it was a piece of unblushing effrontery for the hon. Member for the City of Cardiff to come and tell the House of Commons that the present depression of trade in the country is due entirely and absolutely to the rapacity of the miners. I remember reading another speech that was delivered in this House by the right hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the House during the last Parliament. I remember reading that he was surprised—I do not know whether he said he was disgusted—at the amount of profiteering that was going on with the shipowners of this country. He admitted from the Front Bench that he was amazed at the amount of interest that was sent to him for the shares that he had in the shipping industry. I am sure we can feel nothing but surprise and indignation at hon. Members of this House to charge miners of having no consideration for the other classes of the community, especially from people, whom we do know, who had no consideration for the consumers of this country in the freights they were charging during the time the country was in great distress and necessity. It would be interesting if we could know the bank balances of certain people of the country in 1914 and what they are now in 1921. While the miners are only thinking in shillings there are hon. Members in this House engaged in industry who think in thousands—[An HON. MEMBER: "Millions"]—and while it is considered rapacity on the part of the miner to ask for an increase of wages it is considered keen business acumen on the part of the shipowners who can make thousands out of the distress and want of this country. There is somehow a different standard of morality when we come to think of these questions, especially when the working classes are attempting to up-lift themselves in some way or the other.
I want to make this appeal. I want hon. Members to think for the moment that I have some love and care for the men of my own locality. I want to do my best for them. I feel it is a tragedy not only to the locality but it is a tragedy to the nation that men are kept out of employment and are walking the streets looking at each other and starving in the process. The House objects by a majority to do anything. It appears that hon. Members are adamant and give no consideration to the appeals we are making which I think, and honestly believe, should be the proper attitude of the Government, seing that they have handled the industry for the last six years, and knowing that they have limited the operations of owners and men. When the limitation of prices came first into operation I know my right hon. Friend, the Member for the Ince Division, made a statement in this House when the Bill was going through that the miners wanted to get the price of coal down and welcomed the Act and every effort that would be made by the Government to prevent the exploiting of the consumer in the country. I do not understand which hon. Members make statements in this House that we were responsible for the prices going up. When we were attempting to get our Advisory Committee to act jointly with the Coal Controller in this matter they were told that they must keep away, that that was the privilege of the Coal Controller and the Federation had no voice at all. The miners have only asked, as every rational being has a right to ask, knowing we are passing through these extraordinary circumstances due to the war, that their wages should keep pace with the cost of living. One might go on for some time talking about the charge that has been levelled at the miners. I have myself repeatedly heard—there are the shorthand notes taken of the proceedings—in which statements were made by the Chairman and Directors of the Ebbw Vale Co., that the miners are not responsible for the declining output in any shape or form. The Government have been largely responsible for keeping material from the collieries, and prevented companies from getting the necessary facilities for men to work. In the end and the wind up of the whole argu- ment of all hon. Members and very largely the Press of the country is stated to be that the miners are ca'canny and shirking their work. I know there are hundreds of men in my own district that wanted to earn money, who while there was an opportunity of earning money, were prevented from doing so because they were not given proper facilities. I repudiate the charge that has been made wholesale that they have been acting on the ca'canny principle. You may have isolated cases. You may not get among the miners, I admit, any more morality than among other classes of the community, but you will get as high a standard of morality among the miners as in any other class, but hon. Members, somehow or other, have a prejudice against the miners because perhaps you may get an irresponsible person here and there throughout the coalfield preaching that doctrine and trying to create trouble. That is not the doctrine of the miners' movement. They want to get on and work properly and fairly. They have their ideal of nationalization, but that does not interfere with the men who are anxious to do a day's work if treated honestly by the owners and the Government. I believe the Government is making a fatal mistake with all these collieries idle on 31st March. It is impossible to adjust the situation without some help at this moment and I sincerely recommend the Government to enter into negotiations with the owners and workmen and fix up some arrangement by which there may be more gradual working down to the normal of pre-War days simultaneously with the cost of living. If that can be done there would be general satisfaction throughout the country and we would perhaps see the pre-War days coming again to us and not this anxiety and depression.
I am quite sure that every Member in this House must feel disappointed at the reply of the Minister of Mines to-night. I never heard a more brutal or callous indifference expressed on a great question like this because after all the question is one which is larger even than thin House of Commons. It is a question which affects millions of people and may have very far reaching consequences provided the Government proceeds in carrying forward their decontrol. We do not speak for ourselves alone in this House. We are all responsible leaders of the miners' movement, and who sit here as the miners' Members, and we all have a direct responsibility towards our own people. The callous disregard of the Government on a matter of so much importance leads us to think that if we had only ourselves to consult we should not be here opposing our pleading to the Government to extend control, but we should leave the whole question as it stands and allow the Government to take the responsibility without any pleading at all, because as sure as we stand here it will not be many weeks before we see the consequences of that act, and they will not be in the interests either of the House of Commons or of the community as a whole. The Government took over the control of the mines at a time of national difficulty. We must remember that during the period they have had control of the mines they have been quite a prosperous concern to the nation at a time when it was most essential that the industry should be controlled by the Government. Not only has it been a financial profit to the nation, but as a result cheap coal was provided to many of our vital industries, such as the railways and munitions works. Our Navy was provided for, our Allies were helped, and, after all, if an arithmetical calculation were made as to what were the substantial profits during the War or during control we should find they amounted to a pretty high figure.
Having taken over the industry and carried it through four years of very hard times from a national point of view we think the Government ought not to decontrol this great industry at such short notice. Immediately the prosperous times pass away and we have only just margins we find the Government suggesting both to the coalowners and to the Miners' Federation that decontrol should take place at an earlier date than that specified in the Mining Industry Act. We find it is taking place at a time when the Miners' Federation and the coal-owners of Great Britain ought to have been getting on with the agreement which the right hon. Gentleman has pointed out to-night has taken five months and is not yet complete.
2 A.M.
It is only fair to point out that in the middle of the process of trying to negotiate between the owners and the workmen the President of the Board of Trade on several occasions interviewed these bodies and suggested that decontrol ought to take place earlier than 31st August. As a consequence the negotiations have been delayed and we are not as fully advanced as we hoped we would have been, but that is no argument for decontrolling the mines five months earlier than was expected, and it is no justification for that action being taken. It has been said it was a breach of faith to the whole community I agree with that expression. It is a breach of faith both to the coalowner, the miner, and to the nation as a whole. The Government are intending to decontrol apparently irrespective of consequences, and they are selecting the time for decontrol when we are in the depths of depression and a trade slump, when we have scores of thousands of workers unemployed to-day. Only this morning I received a letter in response to an appeal to a certain coal-owner in my district to postpone the notices given to a certain number of men to terminate to-morrow—135 men are concerned here. The letter states it is impossible to continue any longer and the mines must be closed down. That is only one small incident, because at the moment we have practically speaking the whole of the miners of Great Britain under fourteen days' notice. Their contracts are to terminate at the time when we are decontrolling the mines on 31st March. To decontrol and to have the men terminating notices at one and the same time is a very dangerous proposal. It is not only a danger to the industry, but it is a great danger to the State, and I think the Government ought to look at it from that point of view. To swell the ranks of the unemployed at a time like this is no sound measure even for a Government, and they would be wise to reconsider the decision more than they have done. It has been said to-night that when decontrol takes place one-third of the mines of the country will be closed down. If that is so, I wonder if the Government have considered the consequences of that. We have been told that one-third of the mines of the country will be closed down. Have the Government considered that there will be 250,000 of the workers in the mines added to the total of the unemployed in other industries, and the great national danger that will arise from that fact? I ask you to cast your view on the industrial chaos which will be rampant right through the whole country, and to visualise the great number of people unemployed and their families starving. Then you will not wonder how anarchists and revolutionists are bred. There is no person in the world who would stand by and see his children starving. There is nothing that makes the iron enter so much into a man's soul as to see his wife and children starving in a land of plenty. It may be said that this is speaking rather too early. But it is no use speaking too late. We had better visualise things as we see them at the moment. If the Government will do that, they will see that the human touch spoken of by the last speaker is one of the things that ought to enter into their calculations. Decontrol will relieve the Government of financial responsibility, but that financial responsibility will be thrown on the owners and workmen and the public generally. Is it possible to impose any more hardships on the people of this country? To-day the standard of living of the miners is no higher than it was in 1914. As a matter of fact, when their wages were fixed at the present rate the cost of living was lower than it is to-day. That means that the miners are living on a lower standard than in 1914.
This is a deliberate breach of faith on the part of the Government. Will decontrol help to stabilise the industry of the country, or help to restore our commercial prosperity? Will it bring back our export trade, or give greater commercial prosperity and happiness to the whole of the people of this country? I suggest it will do nothing of the kind. It is absolutely against every one of these points. If the Government persist in decontrol, I hope they will not try a fortnight hence to shelter themselves behind any other class of persons, but will accept full responsibility for the action which they are deliberately taking. We who hold responsible positions in our industries can visualise the unemployment, poverty, and starvation that are sure to occur, with the possibilities of passion, hatred, and in many cases crime. We may have a growing clashing of the classes of the country. When the miners were fighting in the War they were held up as exemplary characters. Now the War is over and victory won and we find hun- dreds of thousands walking the streets. We were told that hatred between the classes was passing away. We hoped that the relationship between the working classes and the propertied class would be better in the future. It will not be denied that the workers in all our industries have won their right to a higher standard of living, and should have a shorter working day, and a share in the control of their particular industries. But decontrol at this moment, carrying with it a very great reduction in the wages of the miners, will place them in a worse position than in 1914. Decontrol will do nothing to help the country. It will intensify the present industrial chaos, and I appeal to the House to reconsider its decision. We do not ask that the subsidy should remain as a permanent institution, but we ask that it should remain until a change in the industrial conditions has taken place; until we find that amicable relations exist between employers and employed, and until we find a permanent agreement upon which we can once more build the prosperity of our industry. We want to find a means by which the industry can get out of the muddle for which the Government is alone responsible. If the Government will look at this from the point of view of what is likely to happen and give to their consideration some of the human touch so necessary to reach a just conclusion, they will at least post-pone the operation of the Act until an amicable arrangement has been arrived at between employers and workmen.
When Members of the Government sit and listen to speech after speech and make no reply, I suppose we may take it that they think the less said about their Bill the better. I am inclined to think that from one point of view that is perfectly sound. Nevertheless, there is another point of view from which it is necessary to say something about this Bill, and I want to say a very few words from my own point of view, which is not perhaps quite the same as that which I have heard from several speakers already during this Debate. I have been connected with iron and coal all my life. I was born in the very midst of it, and at the present moment I represent a constituency one-half of whom are engaged in producing coal, and whose financial interest may be supposed to be in getting a good price for coal. The other half are consumers of coal— partly for ordinary use, and partly as manufacturers of steel and iron. Therefore, perhaps I may be permitted to speak somewhat impartially in the matter. When I look round that constituency and when I look round the whole of the North-East of England at the present time, I cannot but feel indignant with the Government which has got that part of the country into such a disastrous state and which then strives to shuffle out of its obligations and to leave the difficult and unpleasant task to other people. You have the coal mines working three days a week perhaps, perhaps less, and you have blast furnaces standing idle, and the steel works standing idle a great deal of their time. Why is that? It is very largely because the Government have made such a muddle and mess of their control of the mining industry and of their management of the affairs of the country generally. I do not profess to think that control could ever be a very good system or that it could endure very long in this country. I can understand nationalisation, I can understand private enterprise, but I cannot understand private enterprise with its hands tied and the initiative cut out of it. That is what control has done as we have known it in this country. As a result we find this position, that there is no work for the coalminers, and there is not enough work for those who desire coal for their industries because, as they constantly tell us, the coal is so expensive that they cannot produce the goods to meet their market.
I hope I may be allowed very sincerely to congratulate one of the leaders of the coal miners on his maiden speech, because I am sure every hon. Member will agree that it was a most able and valuable contribution to the Debate. The hon. Member said that the miners did not object to a reduction in the price of coal provided there was a corresponding reduction in the cost of living. That is what all the consumers of coal, all the manufacturers who use coal, are asking for, but, as the hon. Member said, there is one thing that stands in the way, and that is the cost of living. The problem is, how are these two things to be reconciled? We know that the Government are very largely responsible for the wages and the conditions in the coal trade because they have had control for so many years. I believe they are also responsible largely for the high prices, owing to their system of finance. Having got things into this monstrous and lamentable position, what do they do? They suddenly discover that the dates they mentioned are too far off, that when they talked about control coming to an end in August they did not mean it, or that they have thought differently since, and that when they said a scheme was to be presented by the owners and workmen on 31st March they meant that it was to come into operation on 31st March. It would be ridiculous if it were not so tragic in its consequences. Therefore, I for one, am bound to vote against the Third Beading of this Bill as a protest against the Government, when they have got everything into this lamentable and disastrous position, shuffling off the responsibility on to other people and calling on employers and employed to take over the burden and the difficulties and to make, at short notice, whatever settlement of it they can. Employers and employed in my part of the country, at any rate, when they had the responsibility for years and years managed their affairs amicably. They met the conditions of the market at the time, and as these changed they carried on under the new conditions. No doubt there was much that needed altering, but at any rate they did make a working system by which they moved and carried on their industry. Now the Government have failed utterly to establish any system which can be compared with the old system; they have landed us in this disastrous position, and they shuffle off their responsibility on to other people.
In the last strike I was one of those in this House who urged a settlement mainly on the lines of the National Wages Board. I also urged those with whom I had any influence in the mining areas of the country to accept it because of the fact that we should have a National Wages Board, which is so necessary and which I think is inevitable in the mining affairs of this country. Anyone who knows anything about the chaotic state of prices and the differences of wages throughout the British coalfields before the War, anyone who knows the situation as it is now, must agree that there must be a different system of wages altogether and a more unified system than there has been in the past. Yet, although the Government itself lay very great stress on that point, although I remember that both the Prime Minister and the President of the Board of Trade laid emphasis on the fact that one of the gains that would come to the miners would be a National Wages Board, the Government have taken a step, in precipitating the decontrol of the mining industry, that is going to make a National Wages Board almost impossible. One gathers from the moment that decontrol was suggested the attitude of the coalowners has been altogether different, for in this matter the Government and the coalowners seem to be one.
They are going back to the old 1914 system irrespective of miners or of anyone else. That shows in every respect lack of appreciation of what the present situation is in the mining industry of this country and the world. The Government and the coal-owners alike in this matter seem to have learned nothing from the experience of the last six or seven years. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Evan Davies) who has just delivered a speech with spirit and ability and one which shows that in the future he will contribute to the debates of this House considerable thought to the solution of its problems, said there were members of his own union—I think 12,000—who are at the present time thrown out of work. I come from a district which has something like the same experience. Immediately the suggestion of decontrol was made, there were certain coalowners who began to lay certain pits in. They said this pit does not pay, therefore it is at an end. I have in my mind's eye two or three pits with great possibilities although they have been going a considerable time, where sons and fathers and sometimes more than that have worked for generation after generation. They are small, compact places and they have been suddenly shut down. The mines in the same company may be paying, the company as a whole may be paying, yet the company has the power of life and almost death over these people and can simply shut them down and rob them of life and all its possibilities. That kind of thing cannot continue indefinitely. As you have a company, so you have a coal area, and unless it is realised by the Government that the coal trade is one, that mine and company, company and district, district added to district throughout the coal area in the United Kingdom, is one from the business as well as from the social point of view, the mining industry of this country has not a single chance to get back to where it was and to regain its former position. There is only one possibility. The Government ought to use every means in its power; the Government ought to postpone the control for this single reason alone: We cannot face world markets in the future on the system of 1914. Whether it is nationalisation, whether it is trusteefication, or whether it is by some sort of control, the fact remains that unless the industry as a whole faces world markets then I say that our chance of regaining what we have lost is very poor indeed. To think of going back to the 1914 system, the world being as it is, is simply industrial suicide as well as social retrogression in its very worse sense.
If, as seems to be suggested, we come back to the old wages system, it means that each district has its own system. It means that each district has to fight out its own method. Decontrol means almost inevitably, in face of the present attitude of the owners, that each district has to go back to the old system. If that is going to be the case there is going to be chaos and confusion; there is going to be bitterness and strife in this country on a very great scale. No one certainly wants to see that. There is not a miners' leader of whom I know there is not a man holding some local position of influence in the coalfield, who wants to see that kind of thing, who wants to see a spirit of bitterness, of strife, and of strike. In the coalfield at the present moment, and there has been for a considerable time, there is a spirit of conciliation, a spirit of willingness to talk business, to free the industry in a businesslike way; there has been a spirit almost of sometimes putting themselves in the background if only they could make sure of the future of the industry and of helping to tide over this period of confusion and chaos. I have noticed among these men—and among their women too—men who played a great part during the War in facing the national crisis, who went out in their thousands and in their tens of thousands—that there is just the tendency towards a spirit of sourness on the part of these men who are thrown out of employment. What can you expect?
I agree with the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale that the coalowners have had a tip, that they can do pretty much what they like even before control is ended. I suspected that myself, because I see evidence of it. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale gave us a clear indication of the circular that has been sent out by the right hon. Gentleman's Department. But I say when you find men getting into the position that their livelihood is taken away from them, when they see that one man or a few men have the power of taking away their opportunity of a livelihood simply at their own will, one cannot wonder that you have a spirit of soreness prevailing in the minds of men under these conditions. We have been constantly told throughout these Debates that the miners are to blame for the position as it is at the present time. I must say that I am surprised that any hon. Gentleman or right hon. Gentleman has the temerity to make an insinuation of that kind. When you talk about the cost of production I want hon. Members to understand, as we understand, that there is more than wages that go to make up the cost of producing a ton of coal. There is the question of management, there is the question of organisation, and there is the question of the burden of various types of people who are sometimes unnecessary to the industry. I want to say to the Government and to right hon. Gentlemen interested in the coal trade of this country, that we understand that directors are necessary in the mining industry as in other industries; but we also understand that those are well-paid directors who seldom direct and are a first charge upon the industry in increasing the cost of production. There are other sets of factors which go towards the increased cost of production, for which credit is never given in public statements. When there is to be an explanation of the situation as it is, then we are simply told that it is because of the increased wages. It ought to be acknowledged also that the payment of the coal indemnity to the French has had a vital effect upon the present position of the coal trade, and a fact like that ought not to be blurred over. We were inevitably going towards a slump, but that indemnity has had a powerful effect in bringing about something like a collapse of the coal trade, as it presents itself in this country at the present time. From the point of view of wages of the workers in the industry, the Mines Department ought to have postponed this Bill in order that they might have given an opportunity for a settlement of the wages scheme on a national scale. During the great crisis nearly 30 years ago there was a very keen-sighted coalowner in this country who saw the necessity of organising the industry as one great unit. The right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Cardiff, will remember the redoubtable Sir George Elliott, who first suggested to the mineowners of this country and laid down a practical scheme for the unification and organising of the industry throughout the country for the purpose of efficient production at a minimum of cost. What the owners of this country are doing is trying to evade the inevitable in face of the world position, and the Government in taking this step and helping the owners to retain this industry are damaging the nation of which this industry is a part.
There are other factors as well as the Government and as well as the coal-owners. There is also what my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale calls the human factor. These men and women with whom we come in contact every day, who have had their livelihood taken away, who are not so much in fear of the known as the unknown, ask "What is coming next?" As a result of this Decontrol Bill there is a prospect of other mines being closed down in those coal areas. Those people are not going to take a matter like this lying down. It would be regrettable if there was any trouble in a crisis like this. It would be regretable to see anything taking place of an industrial nature which would make bad worse, but one can understand the bitter spirit that will sweep through the mass of the people of this country, especially through the mining areas, if this Decontrol Bill becomes a fact as seems likely at the present time. So I want to add my protest to those of the Members from this side of the House. The Government is robbing the mining industry of the only chance it has of facing the facts and facing the position both nationally and from the world market point of view. They are simply leading the owners to believe that they can run this great industry on the petty 1914 principles and go back to the old system of wage paying. The inevitable result of that would be that it would bring about closing of mines on a big scale, mines which—as the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire said—might never be opened again. If the Government had been wise, it would have welcomed the words of the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire when he pointed out that though it might cost £7,000,000, in the long run it would cost the nation and the mining industry seventy times seven millions as a result of the chaos and confusion that will be created by this Bill. So I enter my protest against the methods by which the Government have brought this matter to an end, and at the same time against the Decontrol Bill because I believe it is going to have a very serious effect upon the nation and the community generally.
I only want to answer one or two points that have been raised in this Debate because I do not think it would be right to allow the charge of a breach of faith which has been brought against the Government to go through without intervention on my part. I proved on the Second Reading that there was no breach of faith. The mining representatives in this House refused to have anything to do with the Mining Industry Act except the hon. Gentleman who last spoke. They would not give any assistance, and there has certainly been no breach of faith because there was no bargain with them, but it is inherent in the Act itself that it must be brought to an end by 31st August. Under the Act it may be terminated at any time. It was said again and again that control would only go on while the export price was so very much higher than the cost of production. It was said in the Debate in this House and in the other House on that Bill. It has been said frequently. Reference has been made to the strike settlement arrangement by which a Committee was set up to try and arrive at a settlement at the earliest possible moment, and at any rate not later than 31st March. Supposing they had reached it a month ago would it have been a breach of faith to put it into operation now? Of course not. The charge of breach of faith has not been proved. Hon. Gentlemen opposite contend, too, that the passing of this Act will lead to an immense amount of unemployment in the country. They have not tried to prove it. On the contrary there is a great deal of unemployment in the coal trade at the moment, not in the coal industry only, but in the other industries, and one must think of them as well as of the coal industry. The hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Allen Parkinson) accused me of speaking with a callous and brutal indifference in this matter. I am sorry that I should give that appearance. It certainly is not my intention, and anyone who knows what I have done during the last six months will not think that I am indifferent to the importance of this question. I am advocating this because I think it is going to do away with unemployment and not to cause it. I do not believe you can get this country back on Sound lines until you have faced the difficulties before you in the coal trade and other trades. It is because I believe it is essential that these difficulties should be faced at once that I am advocating this measure, and my honest belief is that it will be best for the industry of the country, best for the owners and workers, to have this question settled at the earliest possible moment. For that reason I hope the House will now agree to give this Bill a Third Reading.
rose in his place and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put," but Mr. Speaker withheld his assent, and declined then to put the Question.
The Secretray for Mines states that our complaint on this side is that the Bill will cause a great deal of unemployment, and he goes on to state that not a single one of us has given any reason. Certain facts are very well known to the right hon. Gentleman, and indeed, most of the Members of this House, but one outstanding fact is that with the single exception of the county of Derby, every mining area in the whole Kingdom made serious losses, some as much as 17s. a ton, in January last. Even taking into account the reduction of 3s. 6d. that has taken place in miners' wages there is probably a growing loss in every mining district in the country at the present moment, because, of course, the standing charges in the main hold good although large bodies of men may have gone out of employment. It is perfectly true to say that not one coal mining district in the Kingdom is at this moment showing a profit. When control is taken away and the ordinary conditions of private enterprise once more come into force the employer will not keep on his pits at a loss; no person would ask him to do it. Therefore, if the industry is to be maintained, it can only be maintained through a large increase in the selling price to the public, which everybody says the public will not stand, or by reducing wages. If an owner is losing shillings per ton, he is bound to come to the men and say: "I must reduce your wages if this enterprise is to continue."
That is not an unfair statement of the case, and the right hon. Gentleman knows that my statement of the actual facts is correct in every detail. Indeed, he him self says that. On the previous occasion he said: "After all, there must be a reduction of wages, the workman must submit to a reduction of wages and the employers must submit to a reduction in profit." It is not unfair to say that although for the last three months you are making them up to the 90 per cent. of their pre-control standard at the end of the three months there will be no profits at all. The employers, therefore, being unable to raise prices to the public, must turn round upon the workmen and appeal to them to accept a huge reduction in wages if the enterprise is to continue at all. In these circumstances the right hon. Gentleman says none of us has endeavoured to prove that there will be unemployment in the industry. These are conditions that must convince him not only that there will be unemployment, but that when dealing with a vast industry like this there is going to be a real risk of the greatest social disaster I have known in my life. I wonder really that the Government could not have acted as they did during the war. Then, when they were in a difficulty, they appealed to men who had the confidence of the trade unionists. The Prime Minister himself went all over the country and took counsel with all the prominent trade unionists. He appealed to us and we helped him. Surely if we, were deserving of confidence at that time we have not by later action forfeited the right to a continuance of that confidence. We really are asking you to give us a little time to build up an atmosphere necessary to bring the colliery owners and the work- men together. We have never said that you are not entitled to cease control. We have only said, "Do, for the good of the whole nation, give us some time to be able to get the necessary atmosphere which alone can make the negotiations successful." The right hon. Gentleman says: "I have known negotiations to go on and on almost indefinitely until the very last moment, when there seemed to be a chance of a strike, and the negotiations have been ended and everything happy." This is not a strike at all. This will not be a strike; it will simply be a closing down of the collieries by people being unable to continue.
It is true to say that in the coal mining industry, which I have known all my life, there has not been a period during the last quarter of a century in which there has been such a good feeling between the owners and workmen as to-day. The whole world has suffered through the most dreadful convulsion of which human history has record. The whole conditions of the coal industry have been thrown into convulsion, and we cannot get back to the old lines. It takes a great deal of patient endeavour to get the men and the employers together. We say that you are not giving us time. It is not that we are not willing to help in every possible way, but you really are killing the only means by which this great industry can be maintained and the nation's well-being also preserved. We say to you, "Give us a chance to preserve peace and good will in the industry." The first consideration is the well-being of this State. Hon. Members seem to think that we are joking when we try to show to them what grave consequences will ensue from the Government's action. We are not. I do not think there is a man in this House but desires the well-being of the nation which we all love so well, but those of us who have been bound up with the mining industry all our lives know how difficult it is to foresee the consequences of such a step. Believe me, we are speaking with a high sense of responsibility and we wish you would all think that we take the matter seriously. Now what will happen? The coalmining industry will be practically destroyed. When once mines close down they do so under conditions which make it difficult and sometimes impossible to reopen them. What must follow? The Government may for the moment achieve—the Government of this nation is strong enough to crush us and to overcome any section of society—and the nation may feel some pleasure in achieving a victory over a body of men like the miners, but let the pits close down and go out of existence, let one-third or one-half of them close down, and as sure as tomorrow's sun will rise, up will go the price of coal and the last stage of the public complaint will be worse than the first. On every broad consideration of the safety of the State and its well-being now, the desire, the sincere desire, of all of us is to set time to enable us to build up that atmosphere of goodwill and mutual conciliation which may make the coming together again of the industry on old-established lines. From every point of view it is desirable that the Government should say, "Well, we will re-consider this."
If the Government could only say that they would consider this in another place, it would give some hope to those of us who have a great responsibility, and here and outside we would do our very best We should not take any overtures or offers made from the Government in any spirit except that of the highest goodwill, but surely we have established the right to be treated with greater consideration, and surely the industry has established the right to be treated with greater consideration. The miners have over and over again shown to the State how willing they were to subordinate themselves on every occasion to the well-being of the whole nation. We claim that we have established the right to better treatment than this. If the mineowners cut down the miners' standard of living, if it is substantially lessened, does anybody believe it can stop there? It is not very long ago that we were told to be audacious and to pitch our claims high. We were told that the miners had sunk below the social level of other classes of labour in the community, and we were told that a particular amount of money was necessary to raise the miners to a proper standard of living commensurate with that occupied by all other classes of labour. But by this action the miners are to be brought down to a subsistence level very much lower than that which was represented by the pact of 1914 On all these grave considerations we would appeal. We are bound to vote against the Third Reading of this Bill. The Government will certainly carry very large numbers into the Division Lobby, but they will do so not because the merits of the case are on their side. There is hardly an hon. Member on the Government Benches who has taken up the attitude of at any rate a convinced advocate of the Government policy; in fact, I am not sure that a single one has risen to-night. I am sure that if the large body of hon. Members had really thought of the case as the facts are known to the right hon. Gentleman himself, if they did really recognise the grave issues involved and the serious injustice that is being committed at the same time on the miners, they would not willingly troop into the Lobby, as I am afraid they will in a few minutes' time. However, we are convinced that we are in the right, and we are convinced that, at a little later date, the nation itself will certainly see that we are in the right, and because of that deep conviction we shall certainly do our best to destroy this Bill on this Third Reading. We shall certainly do our best to convey to the nation a true sense of the grave injustice which the Government has committed. Having said so much, I may as well sit down. The Government will beat us, I know, by many votes, but they will not beat us on the strength of their case or on the merits. They will simply use the serried ranks of votes, exactly as the Germans did in the late days of the War; they will beat us, not on the merits of the case, not as the national need, but by Prussianism pure and simple. There is hardly a man that can get up and advocate the case of the Government; is there a speaker who dare? That is the whole case. The Government can always vote us down; they have done so before and they will do so again this time. I had only hoped that the Government would have had a case founded on a greater sense of equality than is found in this Bill.
rose in his place and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."
Question put, "That the Question be now put."
The House divided: Ayes, 108; Noes, 41.
Division No. 45.] AYES. [3.0 a.m. Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S. Forestier-Walker, L. Moore, Major-General Sir Newton J. Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Forrest, Walter Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. Allen, Lieut.-Colonel William James Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Morden, Lieut.-Col. W. Grant Amery, Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. M. S. Fraser, Major Sir Keith Morrison, Hugh Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E. Murray, C. D. (Edinburgh) Armitage, Robert Ganzoni, Captain Sir F. J. C. Neal, Arthur Baird, Sir John Lawrence Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham O'Neill, Major Hon. Robert W. H. Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L. Balfour, George (Hampstead) Glyn, Major Ralph Parker, James Barker, Major Robert H. Goff, Sir R. Park Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert Pike Barnett, Major R. W. Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.) Raeburn, Sir William H. Barnston, Major Harry Greene, Lt.-Col. Sir W. (Hack'y N.) Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes) Greenwood, William (Stockport) Reid, D. D. Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. Gregory, Holman Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford) Bigland, Alfred Hacking, Captain Douglas H. Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor) Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Hamilton, Major C. G. C. Roundell, Colonel R. F. Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert A. Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D. Briggs, Harold Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) Brown, Captain D. C. Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard Steel, Major S. Strang Bruton, Sir James Hood, Joseph Strauss, Edward Anthony Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Hope, James F. (Sheffield, Central) Sturrock, J. Leng Casey, T. W. Hopkins, John W. W. Sugden, W. H. Churchman, Sir Arthur Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere Sutherland, Sir William Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender Johnson, Sir Stanley Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Coats, Sir Stuart Lane-Fox, G. R. Townley, Maximilian G. Cope, Major Wm. Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) White, Lieut.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Cory, Sir C. J. (Cornwall, St. Ives) Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales) Wills, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Gilbert Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. Lindsay, William Arthur Wilson, Daniel M. (Down, West) Craig, Colonel Sir J. (Down, Mid) Lloyd-Greame, Sir P. Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading) Davidson, J.C.C.(Hemel Hempstead) Lort-Williams, J. Wise, Frederick Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Loseby, Captain C. E. Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L. Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Lyle, C. E. Leonard Younger, Sir George Edgar, Clifford B. McLaren, Hon. H. D. (Leicester) Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark) Macquisten, F. A. TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— Eyres-Monsell, Commander B. M. Manville, Edward Lord Edmund Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward. Falcon, Captain Michael Molson, Major John Elsdale Ford, Patrick Johnston
NOES. Adamson, Rt. Hon. William Guest, J. (York, W. R., Hemsworth) Sitch, Charles H. Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) Hartshorn, Vernon Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough) Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.) Hayday, Arthur Spencer, George A. Bromfield, William Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Widnes) Swan, J. E. Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Hirst, G. H. Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby) Cairns, John Holmes, J. Stanley Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) Cape, Thomas John, William (Rhondda, West) Waterson, A. E. Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M. Wignall, James Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe) Lawson, John J. Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett) Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale) Lunn, William Wilson, W. Tyson (Westhoughton) Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) Morgan, Major D. Watts Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton) Finney, Samuel Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) Gillis, William Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) TELLERS FOR THE NOES.— Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton) Rose, Frank H. Mr. Thomas Griffiths and Mr. Frederick Hall. Grundy, T. W. Shaw, Thomas (Preston)
Question put accordingly, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
The House divided: Ayes, 107; Noes, 42.
Division No. 46.] AYES. [3.7 a.m. Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S. Brown, Captain D. C. Forestier-Walker, L. Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Bruton, Sir James Forrest, Walter Allen, Lieut.-Colonel William James Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Amery, Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. M. S. Casey, T. W. Fraser, Major Sir Keith Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Churchman, Sir Arthur Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E. Armitage, Robert Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender Ganzoni, Captain Sir F. J. C. Baird, Sir John Lawrence Coats, Sir Stuart Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Cope, Major Wm. Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Balfour, George (Hampstead) Cory, Sir C. J. (Cornwall, St. Ives) Glyn, Major Ralph Barker, Major Robert H. Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. Goff, Sir R. Park Barnett, Major R. W Craig, Colonel Sir J. (Down, Mid) Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.) Barnston, Major Harry Davidson, J.C. C. (Hemel Hempstead) Greene, Lt.-Col. Sir W. (Hack'y, N.) Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes) Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Greenwood, William (Stockport) Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Gregory, Holman Bigland, Alfred Edgar, Clifford B. Hacking, Captain Douglas H. Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark) Hamilton, Major C. G. C. Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Eyres-Monsell, Commander B. M. Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive Falcon, Captain Michael Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank Briggs, Harold Ford, Patrick Johnston Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. Steel, Major S. Strang Hood, Joseph Morden, Lieut.-Col. W. Grant Strauss, Edward Anthony Mope, James F. (Sheffield, Central) Morrison, Hugh Sturrock, J. Leng Hopkins, John W. W. Murray, C. D. (Edinburgh) Sugden, W. H. Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere Neal, Arthur Sutherland, Sir William Johnson, Sir Stanley O'Neill, Major Hon. Robert W. H. Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Lane-Fox, G. R. Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L. Townley, Maximilian G. Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) Parker, James White, Lieut.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales) Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert Pike Wills, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Gilbert Lindsay, William Arthur Raeburn, Sir William H. Wilson, Daniel M. (Down, West) Lloyd-Greame, Sir P. Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading) Lort-Williams, J. Reid, D. D. Wise, Frederick Loseby, Captain C. E. Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford) Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L. Lyle, C. E. Leonard Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor) Younger, Sir George Macquisten, F. A. Roundell, Colonel R. F. Manville, Edward Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert A. TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— Molson, Major John Elsdale Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D. Lord Edmund Talbot and Mr. Dudley Ward. Moore, Major-General Sir Newton J. Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston)
NOES. Adamson, Rt. Hon. William Guest, J. (York, W.R., Hemsworth) Shaw, Thomas (Preston) Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) Hartshorn, Vernon Sitch, Charles H. Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.) Hayday, Arthur Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough) Bromfield, William Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Widnes) Spencer, George A. Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Hirst, G. H. Swan, J. E. Cairns, John Holmes, J. Stanley Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby) Cape, Thomas John, William (Rhondda, West) Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M. Waterson, A. E. Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe) Lawson, John J. Wignall, James Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale) Lunn, William Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett) Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) McLaren, Hon. H. D. (Leicester) Wilson, W. Tyson (Westhoughton) Finney, Samuel Morgan, Major D. Watts Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton) Gillis, William Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton) Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) TELLERS FOR THE NOES.— Grundy, T. W. Rose, Frank H. Mr. Thomas Griffiths and Mr. Frederick Hall.
Bill read the Third time, and passed.
The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
It being after half-past Eleven of the clock, upon Thursday evening, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at a Three o'clock a.m.