House of Commons
Monday, February 19, 1923
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
Committee of Selection
Colonel Sir Charles Burn, Mr. Forestier-Walker, Colonel Sir Raymond Greene, Mr. Griffiths, Mr. Frederick Hall, Mr. Hinds, Sir Arthur Marshall, Colonel Nicholson, Mr. David Reid, Sir Samuel Roberts, and Mr. Robertson nominated members of the Committee.— [ Sir Samuel Roberts. ]
New Writ
For the Borough of Liverpool (Edge Hill Division), in the room of Sir WILLIAM WATSON RUTHERFORD (Chiltern Hundreds).—[ Colonel Leslie Wilson. ]
Trade and Navigation
Accounts ordered "relating to Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom for each month during the year 1923."—[ Viscount Wolmer. ]
Oral Answers to Questions
Coal Industry
Exports
asked the President of the Board of Trade what is the actual increase of coal exported from the United Kingdom as a result of the Ruhr invasion; and whether he can state the nationality of vessels which have been utilised for such exportation from the principal coaling ports since the beginning of this year?
The answer to this question has not yet reached me, and I could only give it roughly. So perhaps the hon. Member will postpone it?
Do I understand that the hon. and gallant Gentleman will reply later to my question? That I will be allowed to put it?
Yes.
The reply to the Question was as follows:
The coal exports from this country to France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands for the fortnight ended the 10th February (the latest period for which figures are available) show in the aggregate an increase of 52,000 tons over the fortnightly average in the last quarter of 1922. I cannot say to what extent this increase is due to the occupation of the Ruhr. I have no definite information as to the nationality of the vessels employed, but I am informed that the bulk of them are British.
asked the Secretary for Mines whether he has received any complaints from coal exporters in home ports at the delay in shipping British coal abroad, owing to the action of labour employed in shipping the coal which results in accumulation of stocks in coal ports; whether his Department has taken any action in the matter with a view of accelerating coal shipments; and can he make any statement on the subject?
As my hon. Friend is no doubt aware, negotiations between employers and employés at the docks are at present taking place on the question of the acceleration of coal shipments. It is most important, in the interest of the coal industry, that this object should be attained, but I think that a satisfactory issue is more likely to be secured by private negotiation than by pressure from the Government. Indeed, I understand that a provisional agreement has been arrived at in South Wales.
Does the hon. Gentleman accept the statement in the first part of the question?
There has undoubtedly been considerable delay in shipping coal, owing to the shortage of labour.
Persons Employed
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he can arrange to supplement the weekly statements of coal output in the Board of Trade Journal by a statement of the number of persons employed in or about the coal mines?
I have been asked to reply, and shall be glad to arrange for this information to be supplied.
Llanhilleth Colliery, Monmouthshire
asked the Secretary for Mines if his attention has been called to a meeting of the Western Valleys mines at which it was stated that a serious state of affairs exists at the Llanhilleth Colliery, Monmouthshire, where it is alleged that gas is very prevalent; if he is aware that on Saturday, 27th January, the workmen had to come out of 15 working places owing to the presence of gas; that the following Monday, 29th January, men went home from this colliery owing to gas and a shortage of timber; that on 1st February, 1923, men were unable to work in this colliery because they had no timber; and that they reported the matter to His Majesty's inspector when he passed through their places; if the inspector took samples of the air in the working places, roadways, and airways of this mine on 1st February, 1923; and, if so, will he state the percentage of gas found in the ventilation, and take steps to ensure that Section 29, Sub-section (3), and Section 51 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, are carried out at this colliery?
I am aware of the complaints that have been made about this colliery, and the matter is already receiving the close attention of the inspectors. Air samples taken by an inspector in two of the working faces in the West Dips district on 1st February contained respectively 1·7 per cent. and 2 per cent. of firedamp. At a further inspection of this district on 14th February the air current was found to be practically free of gas throughout the workings.
Subsidences
asked the Secretary for Mines if he is aware that upwards of two million tons of coal per annum are mined from the collieries in the Abertillery urban area; that in addition to this large amount of coal a very large proportion of rock, shale, and other débris are brought to the surface; that this continual excavation of mineral has caused very serious surface damage by subsidence and has seriously injured house property, public highways, sewers, water mains, waterworks, gas mains, gas-tanks, schools, railway arches, and embankments; and, in view of the devastation wrought to public and private property for which no compensation is paid by the owners and colliery companies exploiting these minerals, will he, at an early date, bring in a Bill to deal with this grievance that will enable public authorities and property owners to be compensated for this serious destruction of property?
asked the Secretary for Mines if it is the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill dealing with the question of subsidence in mining areas?
asked the Secretary for Mines if he is aware of the serious damage which is being caused by subsidence in the various coal-mining areas, and especially in South and West Yorks, and of the grave injury not only to property but to the health and general welfare of the inhabitants owing thereto; and whether he can state what steps the Government are prepared to take by providing legislation to safeguard the future of these large and important communities?
As regards the question of compensation, I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave on 27th November last to the hon. Member for Bedwelty. As regards the prevention of damage by subsidence, the Government hope shortly to introduce a Bill relating to the working of minerals, to contain provisions under which a right of support of works and buildings may be compulsorily acquired in certain circumstances where the public interest demands it.
Will the hon. Gentleman also take into consideration the hydraulic stowage of material that comes to the surface in order to support the buildings?
All these matters will be considered.
Inspectorate (West Cumberland and North Lancashire)
asked the Secretary for Mines when he proposes to appoint a man fully qualified in metalliferous mining in West Cumberland and North Lancashire in place of the senior inspector who resigned on the age limit two years ago?
It is not proposed at present to make any special appointment for this work. This could be done either by incurring increased expenditure or by sacrificing other inspectoral work, and neither course could at present be justified by the number of metalliferous mines working in the district in question or the number of persons employed there, both of which are considerably less than half the corresponding numbers two years ago.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the duties of the inspector of iron and ore mines and quarries in West Cumberland, North Lancashire and the Isle of Man performed by the senior inspector of metalliferous mines who recently resigned, have been tacked on to the junior inspector of coal mines and—
If the hon. Member has his question in writing, he had better hand in it at the Table.
Miners' Rents (South Wales)
39 and 40.
asked the Secretary for Mines (1) if he is aware that the Britannic Merthyr Coal Company, situated at Gilfach Goch, Glamorgan, is violating the Truck Acts, the Statement of Rates Act, 1919, and the Rents Act, 1920, by deducting out of the weekly wages of several hundred miners employed at their colliery from 10s. to 20s. per week as current rent and arrears of rent on behalf of building syndicates and clubs without the consent of the said tenants; and will he take steps to stop this practice without delay, as many of the families of the said miners are existing in a semi-starved condition in consequence;
(2) whether he is aware of the practice resorted to by certain colliery companies in South Wales in violation of the Truck Acts, of the Statement of Rates Act, 1919, and of the Rents Act, 1920, by which deductions for rent are made out of the weekly wages of the miners who are tenants of houses owned by the said colliery companies, or by building syndicates and clubs on behalf of whom the said deductions for rent are made; that the said deductions are made without the consent of the tenants; that these deductions include the weekly rent and 50 per cent. of same to pay off arrears of rent that have accrued since the lock-out of 1921; that these deductions for rent often leave less than 10s. per week in wages to meet the family needs of the household; and, in view of the suffering entailed to the many households affected, will he make inquiries into the matter forthwith with a view to putting a stop to this practice?
I am taking the matter up with the South Wales Coal Owners' Association, and will let the hon. Member know the result in due course.
Will the hon. Gentleman make inquiries into this special case, and will he see that the name of this place is properly spelt?
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman, in putting down his questions, will have a little compassion on the printers.
Unemployment
Mercantile Marine
asked the President of the Board of Trade what is the number of officers of the Mercantile Marine, including deck and engine departments, who are at present unemployed; and whether, in view of the disability of these men with regard to unemployment benefit, any steps will be taken to assist cases of distress?
I have no exact information as to the number of officers of the Mercantile Marine who are at present unemployed, but it is considerable, and for the most part they are outside the scope of the Unemployment Insurance Acts. The question of Government assistance to cases of distress which are outside these Acts is a general one which could not well be dealt with in connection with one particular class.
French Devastated Regions
asked the Prime Minister whether he can make any statement in reference to a scheme for the transfer of British unemployed to work in the devastated regions of France?
I have been asked to reply. Inquiries are being made in order to ascertain whether there are any opportunities for the employment of British workmen in France, but it is not yet possible to forecast the result of these inquiries.
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that a certain Government Department is spending a very large sum of money yearly in France just now, which could be paid to British unemployed to carry out the work?
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that men applying at the local Employment Exchanges in the Springburn Division are being asked by the officials whether they will take employment abroad, and that when they ask where it is they do not get any answer? Is it for France?
I am afraid I have not the slightest information on the question put by my hon. Friend, but I will make inquiries. With regard to the question of the hon. Member for Barrow (Mr. D. Somerville), I do not think that that comes within the purview of the question on the Paper.
Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman take steps to see that, wherever employment is offered, if we are satisfied that that employment is on sound lines, an opportunity shall be given to the unemployed of this country?
Yes, that is the exact reason why we are waiting for the results of further inquiries.
Questions
Grants Committees
asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the certain continuance of abnormal unemployment beyond the winter season, the Cabinet Committee have considered the desir- ability of extending the period of operations of the Unemployment Grants Committee; and whether their decision can be announced speedily, so as to enable local authorities to prepare forthwith their schemes of useful undertakings?
The question of the future action to be taken in the event of a continuance of abnormal unemployment is now being considered by a Sub-Committee of the Cabinet Committee. The relief works already before the Unemployment Grants Committee will in a number of instances continue for a considerable period.
Is it not desirable that local authorities should have the earliest possible notice, so that relief works may be undertaken at once?
In considering the extension of the Unemployment Grants Committee, will the right hon. Gentleman give further consideration to these necessitous areas?
Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Report of the Cabinet Commttee will be available for publication?
It is a committee for the benefit of the Cabinet, and there is no question of a Report.
Will the right hon. Gentleman inform the House whether and when it is intended to increase the amount available for this purpose?
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the very great dissatisfaction among the unemployed in regard to the actual sums with which the Government propose to supplement the local authorities, and that, instead of paying the trade union rate, the wages for the work are to be only 75 per cent.?
Trade and Commerce
Granite (Imports)
asked the President of the Board of Trade the quantity and value of foreign granite imported into Great Britain for the years ending 31st December, 1921, and 1922, respectively?
The quantity of granite (unmanufactured and manufactured) registered as imported into the United Kingdom from all sources amounted to 463,124 tons in 1921 and to 523,727 tons in 1922. The declared value of these imports was £740,577 in 1921 and £718,654 in 1922. In 1921, 60 per cent. of the total weight and 40 per cent. of the total value of granite imported was consigned from British Possessions. Corresponding figures for 1922 are not yet available.
Dyestuffs (Import Licences)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether there is a scale for licences on the importation of dyestuffs under the Dyestuffs Act; and, if so, is the licence per pound based upon the colour or its quality or is it purely arbitrary?
Section 2 (7) of the Dyestuffs (Import Regulation) Act, 1920, empowers the Board of Trade to charge in respect of each licence a fee not exceeding £5, to provide for the expenses of administration. The fees actually charged are on a sliding scale, based on the value of the consignment to which each licence relates, and range from 2s. 6d. on consignments of a value up to £100, to £5 on consignments exceeding £3,000 in value.
Is that scale on a geometrical progression? Is the Noble Lord aware that in a case I can mention, a consignment of double the quantity of dyes, at the same price per pound, was charged four times the duty?
I shall be obliged if the hon. Gentleman will bring that case to my notice.
Spanish Iron Ore (Importation)
asked the President of the Board of Trade the quantity of iron ore imported into West Cumberland during the year 1922 from Spain; if any inquiry can be made into the conditions of employment and the wages paid to iron-ore workers in Spain; and, if such inquiry can be made, will he place it upon the Table of the House?
The total quantity of iron ore, other than chrome iron ore and pyrites, imported into West Cumberland ports and registered as consigned from Spain during the year 1922 amounted to 51,698 tons. I am unable to state the quantity, if any, of Spanish ore imported into West Cumberland, though not consigned direct to West Cumberland ports. The answer to the latter part of the question is in the negative.
Have not these West Cumberland iron-ore workers as much right to protection as the gas-mantle workers of Wandsworth?
Statistics (Publication)
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he can arrange to publish quarterly in the Board of Trade Journal statements as to the distribution of British trade, showing the imports from and exports to British possessions, foreign countries in Europe, and foreign countries outside Europe?
The monthly Accounts of Trade and Navigation for January, April, July and October contain tables giving the values of the imports and exports from and to each British possession and foreign country during the preceding quarter. Accordingly, I think it will hardly be necessary to print quarterly statements in the Board of Trade Journal, as suggested.
British Shipping (New Tonnage)
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will state the total tonnage production of new British ships turned out in shipyards in Great Britain during the year 1922; and can he also give the comparative figure for the year 1913?
The tonnage of vessels of 100 tons gross and above which were built for British countries and launched during the year 1922 amounted to 706,896 tons gross. The corresponding total for 1913 was 1,415,525 tons gross. Particulars with regard to small vessels of less than 100 tons gross are not yet available for 1922.
Exports and Imports (India)
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he can state the volume of imports and exports from and to India during 1922?
During the year 1922 the imports into the United Kingdom, consigned from British India, amounted in value to £47,680,603. The exports, consigned to British India, of produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom amounted to £91,621,301, and of foreign and Colonial merchandise to £1,317,659. These figures are provisional and subject to some small revision on final examination of the returns.
Barytes Industry, Shropshire
asked the Secretary for Mines whether he is aware of the precarious condition of the barytes industry in Shropshire; whether he is in communication with the Minister of Transport on the subject of railway rates as affecting that industry; and whether any steps will be taken to try and prevent foreign competition destroying the British barytes trade?
I am aware generally of the circumstances of the barytes industry in Shropshire. As regards the second part of the question, the Ministry of Transport are making inquiries from the railway companies as to the position in regard to railway rates. As regards the last part of the question, I am not aware of any means within my power by which I can render effective assistance, but I am prepared to consider any proposals which the Noble Lord may desire to put forward.
Questions
Ships (Repair and Inspection)
asked the President of the Board of Trade the average number of days taken to repair ships previous to 1914, and the average number of days taken in 1922; and whether he is satisfied that proper inspection is made of ships to ensure them being in a satisfactory seagoing condition?
I have no information showing the average time taken to effect ship repairs in 1914 as compared with 1922. I have no reason to think that the present system of inspection is insufficient to prevent ships going to sea in an unseaworthy condition, and if the hon. Member has any special cases in mind I shall be glad if he will be good enough to send me particulars of them.
Plimsoll Line
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is prepared to consider the restoration of the Plimsoll line on ships?
The Plimsoll line has never been removed. The hon. Member is probably referring to the alterations made in the load line rules in 1906. This question was fully investigated by the Load Line Committee, to whose Report, Cd. 8204, I would refer the hon. Member.
Is it not the case that the alteration to the old load line would mean more ships would be required, and additional ships would have to be built?
It would mean largely increased expenditure to the ship-owning industry, and therefore increased revenue to the shipbuilding industry.
Is the Noble Lord aware that at the present moment an International Convention is sitting and considering the whole question of the load lines?
Yes, Sir, that is the case.
Is not that Convention largely dominated by shipowners?
No!
Marine War Risks Scheme
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his Department proposes to make any changes in the existing system of administering the mercantile marine war risks scheme; and, if so, what changes are proposed and when they will come into effect?
Careful attention has been given to the question of how the administration of this scheme, in which my hon. Friend has taken such a keen interest, could be improved. I am glad to be able to say that an invitation is being issued to the Seafarers' Joint Council to nominate two representatives on the Committee appointed to advise the Board on difficult cases. Also that officers and men whose disablement allowances are reduced may appeal, if dissatisfied, for a further examination by a specialist acting as medical referee. Also that proportionate children's allowances will be granted in partial disablement cases. These proposals take effect immediately, and as from 1st April next widows' pensions will be assessed on a final basis in cases where the payment from the money paid into the County Court under the Workmen's Compensation Act is £15 or under or where interest only is being paid.
Under the improved system would it be possible for any member of the Advisory Committee to call for a particular case which the Board of Trade officials have not seen fit to send them?
Yes.
Having regard to the fact that certain seamen's organisations are not included in the Seafarers' General Council, will the Noble Lord include them in the general invitation?
I am afraid that I cannot at present give that undertaking.
Has the Noble Lord had his attention called to the desirability of allowing certain organisations to be included having regard to their constituents; will he consider it?
That is part of the difficulty in the representation, giving it to some and not to others. In this case I am aware of the difficulty raised by the hon. Member, but if wider representation were granted it would tend to make the Committee so large that it would be difficult to get the work done.
Enemy Action Claims
asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps his Department is taking to secure prompt settlement of the 20,298 reparation claims already assessed, and the 8,719 not yet assessed on 5th January, and to ensure that payments on account are promptly made in all cases of urgent need?
The payments are being made as rapidly as possible. 12,899 payments have been made up to 15th February. Assessment of the 8,719 unassessed claims will be undertaken as soon as payment has been made in respect of the 20,000 assessed claims, and payment in respect of the former claims will follow as rapidly as possible.
asked the President of the Board of Trade when claims for compensation for damage done by enemy air raids in 1916 will be adjudicated on by the Reparation Claims Department?
The First Report of the Royal Commission has been published. It covers claims in respect of death and personal injury caused by air raids in 1916, and payment of the sums recommended is now being made. Claims in respect of damage to property are now being considered by the Royal Commission.
Is the Noble Lord aware that there has been considerable delay in this matter, six years having passed; and will he do something to accelerate the adjudication on these claims?
I can assure my hon. Friend that the matter is being accelerated as much as possible.
asked the President of the Board of Trade the number of claims which have been made to the Royal Commission on Compensation for Suffering and Damage by Enemy Action, the number of claims settled, the number of claims dismissed, and the total amount of compensation paid?
The number of claims registered in the Reparation Claims Department in respect of the different categories of damage is 73,463, but in some cases two or more claims have been lodged by the same claimant. The number of claimants to whom payment by the Royal Commission had been made on the evening of 15th February, is 12,889, involving a sum of about £1,000,000. No claims have so far been dismissed, but the work of the Royal Commission is not yet complete.
asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that many persons having claims which should properly be dealt with by the Reparation Claims Department of the Board of Trade have lodged applications with other departments, and that other persons have either not lodged or completed their claims yet, or have only recently done so; and can he state how it is proposed to deal with such cases?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As to the last part, the matter has been brought to the attention of the Royal Commission on Compensaion for Suffering and Damage by Enemy Action, which is the authority competent to deal with questions involved in the distribution of the £5,000,000 provided for the purpose of making ex gratia grants in respect of damage caused to civilians by enemy action, and I would refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 17 of the First Report of the Royal Commission which deals with the subject.
Is the Noble Lord aware that a large number of seamen did not send in their claims in the time stipulated by the Board, and will he consider any claims sent in by seamen who were not acquainted with the Regulations?
If the hon. Member refers to paragraph 17 of the Report, he will see that those cases are dealt with and the Royal Commission have stated that those special cases will be considered.
asked the President of the Board of Trade when the decisions respecting the claims submitted to the Reparation Claims Department arising out of the death and personal injuries caused by enemy aircraft will be finally announced?
The First Report of the Royal Commission dealing with claims in respect of loss of life, injury to health, maltreatment during internment and loss of personal effects at sea has been published and payment of the sums recommended by the Commission is being made as rapidly as the circumstances and the number of claims will permit.
I mean in this country.
Yes. That is covered by the Report of the Royal Commission.
Coal Gas (Carbon Monoxide)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has appointed a Committee to inquire into the condition of gas mains in the streets of London and elsewhere; if so, who are the members of the Committee and what are the exact terms of its reference; and whether, in view of the large number of deaths that have recently taken place due to gas poisoning, he will have a further inquiry made by impartial experts as to the need of limiting the percentage of carbon monoxide permitted to be supplied by gas undertakings?
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the large number of deaths recently caused by gas, he proposes to set up a Committee to investigate the composition of gas supplied by the various gas undertakings in the country?
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will co-operate with the Home Office in setting up an inquiry into the proportion of carbon monoxide and other deadly compounds now permitted in coal gas for domestic use; and whether he will introduce legislation to limit the proportion permitted of these compounds?
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the many cases of gas poisoning; whether some companies use as much as 18 per cent. of carbon monoxide; and whether, since this is a very high percentage, he will consider the desirability of fixing the amount of this deadly poison which should be in gas?
I have recently convened a conference between representatives of local authorities and gas providers to consider certain questions in connection with the repair of mains and other matters, and I am now awaiting the views of the bodies concerned upon the conclusions arrived at by the conference. I am having circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT a list of the bodies represented at the conference and the conclusions reached. With regard to the last part of the question, I would remind the hon. Members that a Committee presided over by Sir William Pearce, then a Member of this House, considered this question less than two years ago. Their Report was laid before the House, with the reference, Cmd. 1422. The recommendations of that Committee are being carried out, and I am having a special examination made of the available statistics as to fatalities due to gas poisoning over a number of years.
Is the Noble Lord aware that the Committee specially recommended that the situation should be watched; and that in the meantime, during the last two years, there has been an enormous increase in fatal accidents due to gas poisoning? Is he also aware that Professor Bone, one of the recognised authorities, and Dr. Haldane strongly recommended that the percentage of carbon monoxide permitted in gas should be limited?
The situation is being most carefully watched. I do not think it is accurate to say that there has been an enormous increase in fatalities during the last two years.
Will the Board of Trade direct special attention to the way in which gas mains are being laid under streets and roadways, in view of the increasing weights now being carried on the roads?
That is exactly one of the points which is being dealt with by the conference.
I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the Motion for the Adjournment next Wednesday.
The following is the information promised:
Conclusion arrived at by the Conference, presided over by the Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade, held at the offices of the Board on Thursday, 8th February, 1923, between representatives of the National Gas Council, the County Councils' Association, the Metropolitan Borough Councils' Standing Joint Committee, the Association of Municipal Corporations, the Urban District Councils' Association, the Convention of Royal Burghs in Scotland, the London County Council, the Corporation of the City of London, the Edinburgh Corporation and the Glasgow Corporation, together with representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transport and the Scottish Board of Health.
That the Conference is of opinion that the subjects which have been under the consideration of the Conference, viz.:—
(1) the best means of ensuring that gas mains shall be inspected and defects made good whenever the street in which the mains are laid is opened in close proximity to the mains;
(2) the steps to be taken to impress upon the public that all escapes of gas of uncertain origin should be immediately reported to the gas undertaking of the district, and to acquaint the public with the best means of making such reports promptly;
(3) the question of the inspection of gas fittings and the discouragement of the use of dangerous types of apparatus or apparatus fixed in a dangerous manner;
should be considered by the bodies represented at the Conference.
Further, the Conference recommends that in the course of this consideration special attention should be given to the following suggestions which have been adopted by the Conference, viz.:—
(1) That, in the interests of the public and of the undertakers, there should be as complete co-operation as possible between the Highway Authorities and the undertakers (including all bodies or persons having power to break up or open highways), and between undertakers themselves. With this object, procedure on the following lines is suggested for consideration:—
( a ) The Highway Authority should, as far as is practicable, before breaking up or opening any highway for renewal or reconstruction, give reasonable notice to all undertakers affected.
( b ) The undertakers should forthwith, upon receipt of such notice, notify the Highway Authority of the position of their works in the portion of the highway to be broken up or opened, and whether or not they propose to execute any work in relation thereto.
( c ) The Highway Authority should summarise the replies and send a copy of the summary to each of the undertakers.
( d ) Any undertakers who propose to break up or open any high way should, in addition to notifying the Highway Authority, also notify the other undertakers concerned.
( e ) The undertakers should, when highways are broken up or opened, take reasonable steps and be given reasonable facilities to ascertain, as far as possible, the condition of their respective works, with a view to executing such renewals and repairs as may appear to be necessary or expedient.
( f ) In cases of emergency, where it is not practicable to give previous notice, notice should be given as soon as practicable after the beginning of the work or the necessity for the same shall have arisen.
( g )Periodical conferences should be convened between the Highway Authority and the undertakers to discuss difficulties and arrange procedure.
(2) That we are of opinion that gas undertakers should consider what additional means they can adopt to bring effectively to the notice of consumers the danger arising from escapes of gas and the necessity of reporting at once the existence of leaks, and we suggest that this might be done by printed notices in red on the face of the gas account and affixed to the consumer's meter.
Further, we suggest that wherever practicable arrangements should be made by which notifications of leaks may be made immediately to the police or the nearest fire brigade station and thence passed on at once to the gas undertakers and that local authorities should be asked to instruct their employøs to report immediately any indications of escapes of gas that come to their notice.
(3) That it should be taken into consideration whether gas undertakers should be given powers that would enable them—
( a ) To prescribe the size and material of pipes for internal installation work on the lines of Section 33 of the Gas Light and Coke Company's Order, 1922.
( b ) To inspect the piping and gas consuming appliances and the fixing thereof in any consumer's premises and to refuse to give or continue to give a supply of gas to such premises if such piping, appliances or fixing be found dangerous and the consumer refuses or neglects after notice to make the necessary alterations.
Wreck (S.S. "War Knight")
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can state, in view of the offensive nature of the remainder of the cargo being constantly washed ashore after gales of wind and sea, if the Government propose to destroy or cause the owners to destroy the wreck of the "War Knight" that has lain off Freshwater Bay (Isle of Wight) fort for nearly five years?
The Board of Trade have no power to destroy this wreck or cause it to be destroyed, and Trinity House have not taken steps to remove it, as it is not a danger to general navigation. I will, however, have some further inquiries made in the matter and inform the hon. Member of the result.
Will the Noble Lord also consider changing the name of the bay?
Oil-Palm Industry, Sumatra
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether products of the oil-palm industry in Sumatra are now reaching this country; if he can state the quantity imported; and whether the oil and kernels arrive here in the crude form as from the West African Dependencies?
Separate records of the imports into the United Kingdom consigned from Sumatra are not available. Any such consignments would be recorded under the general heading of "Other Dutch Possessions in the Indian Seas." The imports of oil-palm products registered as consigned from these Possessions during the year 1922 were 1,199 tons of unrefined palm oil.
S.S. "Berrima" (Accommodation)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that on the 28th December last the s.s. "Berrima" left London carrying passengers for Fremantle; that the passenger certificate for this ship gives permission to carry 291, with a crew of 154, a total of 445; that the ship was cleared from London under an emigrant survey certificate sanctioning the carrying of 1,467 persons, the extra berths being rigged up in cargo space; that those berths are no bigger than boxes and have to accommodate about eight adults and several children in each, with the result that some of the passengers prefer to sleep on the deck; that the certificate shows 1,060 beds and there are 1,353 souls on board; that there has already been one case of measles; and that the passengers have to form in queues to obtain necessary supplies and for the use of the lavatory, bath, etc.; and whether he will have searching inquiry made into all the circumstances and ascertain how it was possible for a cargo boat of 11,000 tons, with accommodation ordinarily for 445 persons, to be certificated as an emigrant ship to carry 1,467?
The "Berrima" was thoroughly surveyed by Board of Trade surveyors before she left London at the end of December last, and complied fully with the Regulations as to space, accommodation and other matters. During the voyage there was an outbreak of measles, and complaints were made on the arrival of the vessel in Western Australia. These complaints have been investigated in Australia, and I am informed were found to be not well founded; but I will have further full inquiry made on the return of the vessel to this country, and will inform the hon. Member of the result.
Will a passenger on board, who is willing to give evidence, be permitted to do so?
Yes.
Does this ship belong to a foreign company?
No, Sir. It belongs to an English company.
Tea and Sugar (Retail Prices)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he proposes to institute an inquiry into the causes of the recent increases in the retail prices of tea and sugar to decide whether these increases are justified?
According to the most recent reports made to the Ministry of Labour, the retail price of tea is but fractionally different from that reported a year ago, and corresponds in this with the wholesale price together with the duty. Recently a very sharp advance has occurred in the wholesale prices of sugar. At present I think an official inquiry would be premature, but the course of the markets is being carefully watched by the Board of Trade.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is the case that this extraordinary rise in the wholesale price of sugar has taken place at a time when there are 3,500,000 cwts. more sugar in bond than there were a year ago?
I am afraid I cannot answer that question without notice.
Wool (Government Stocks)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the Government still hold stocks of wool in London and other home ports; can he state approximately what quantitites are still held in stock; if the wool all comes from British Dominions; what steps have been taken in order to dispose of the stocks; and whether it is being retained in order to obtain a high reserve price fixed by his Department?
The Government-owned stocks of wool in the United Kingdom amount approximately to 569,000 bales, all of Australasian origin. The disposal of these stocks is in the hands of the British Australian Wool Realisation Association, Limited, to which company this work was entrusted as from 1st January, 1921. During the two years that have since elapsed approximately 1,200,000 bales have been sold. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative. The stocks are being systematically disposed of concurrently with the supplies of new wool, and the quantities sold in 1922 in England were the largest on record. For a long time past every bale of Government wool displayed in the auctions has been sold to the best bidder, and if high reserve prices are being enforced it is on wool over which the Government has no control.
Peru (British Emigrants Compensation)
asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps are being taken to secure the payment of the balance of the compensation due to British emigrants returned from Peru?
His Majesty's representative at Lima is instructed to demand from the Peruvian Government the payment of the balance outstanding in this respect, a sum of £1,114.
Sea Defence Works
asked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the injustice that the burden of sea-defence works should be borne wholly by coastal towns, he is prepared to give facilities for the introduction of a Measure to make it a national charge?
This question was fully considered by the Royal Commission on Coast Erosion, who reported in 1911 that there was no justification for the assumption by the nation at large of financial responsibility in regard to works of sea-defence. I regret that I cannot hold out hopes of acceding to the suggestion of my hon. and gallant Friend.
Will the Noble Lord consider the desirability of another inquiry by a Committee? Is it not very-hard that these towns, in addition to their own burden of taxation, should be called upon to bear this extra burden?
I shall be glad to receive from my hon. and gallant Friend representations on the subject.
Russia
S.S. "St. Hubert."
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can state the result of the retrial of the case of the s.s. "St. Hubert," which was captured many months ago by the Russians off the Murman coast and condemned; and, if not, whether he will press the Russian Government with the view to securing the early retrial of the case and the return of the vessel?
From the most recent report from Moscow it appears that a retrial of this case has now taken place. The legal representative appointed by the owners has, however, lodged a petition, which has been accepted, demanding a further retrial at which he will be able to defend the case on behalf of his clients.
Can the hon. Gentleman tell me the result of the retrial, against which a petition has been lodged?
I cannot say more than that I presume, from the petition which has been put in, that it was unfavourable.
British Seamen (Arrests)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has received any information with regard to the fate of the five members of the crew of the s.s. "Itonian," who landed on the coast of Murmansk, Russian Lapland, on 21st January, and have not been heard of since; and, if not, whether, in view of the very great anxiety of the relatives of the men, he will take immediate steps to obtain the information from the Russian Government and to secure their release if they are prisoners?
As soon as news was received of the arrest of these men the British agent at Moscow was instructed by telegraph to endeavour to secure their prompt release and repatriation. Mr. Hodgson has replied that he hopes shortly to obtain full particulars, the only information at present available being that the men have been detained for landing without permission and for smuggling furs. Further instructions have now been sent to him to continue to press the matter strongly.
Questions
Greece and Turkey
asked the Prime Minister when the papers dealing with the events leading up to the Greek defeat in Asia Minor, and the circumstances of the Near Eastern crisis in the autumn of 1922, will be laid before Parliament?
There will be shortly laid before Parliament Papers containing a complete record of the recent Conference at Lausanne, which will be found to explain fully the present position in the Near East. It is still hoped that the negotiations conducted at that Conference will lead at an early date to a general pacification in the regions affected. Such prospects could only be affected adversely by the publication now of correspondence relating to the conflict, to which it is hoped to put an end by the conclusion of peace. His Majesty's Government are, therefore, not prepared at present to lay further papers as suggested.
Will the papers dealing with the Lausanne Conference also deal with these events in the autumn of last year, and will the papers dealing with the events of last autumn be laid before the Supplementary Estimate in connection with the despatch of troops is debated?
What I said was that, in my opinion, the publication of these papers before we made peace with Turkey would be bad for the Treaty, and we must wait till that is completed.
Will the right hon. Gentleman delay the submission of the Supplementary Estimate to this House until the papers are laid?
Will the papers include a full disclosure of the relations of Ministers with the Greek Government prior to the Greek defeat?
Mr. Churchill's Book
asked the Prime Minister whether he will in future make it a condition of acceptance of office that no ex-Minister, until he has been out of office for 15 years, shall be permitted, when writing articles or books for monetary consideration, to make use of information of a confidential character acquired during his period of office?
I am not prepared to adopt the hon. and gallant Member's suggestion.
If ex-Cabinet Ministers are to be allowed to make money by publishing confidential information, will the same privilege be extended to ex-civil servants?
I understand that it is clearly understood that secret documents of that kind should not be published, especially if they have any relation to the Cabinet, without the consent of His Majesty.
Does not the publication of official secrets make Ministers as well as civil servants liable to prosecution under the Official Secrets Act?
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the rule that he has just laid down has been observed recently?
Could not the book which is anticipated in this question give to the public the papers that were demanded in the preceding question?
Have any steps been taken to indicate to Mr. Winston Churchill the undesirability of this practice?
Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly answer the question that was put just now, as to whether an ordinary civil servant will get permission from his chief to publish private information, in order to write a book and make money?
Are the Government prepared to take action in cases where information of that nature is published without their sanction?
That, I think, has never been done. All that we are prepared to do is to repeat what the rule is in regard to these matters.
Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly answer my question, namely, seeing that the rule he has laid down is admittedly broken, what action do the Government propose to take?
I have already answered that in my last reply.
In view of the undesirability of leaving this matter to the discretion of His Majesty—
Oh, oh!
Yes, it is His Majesty in this case.
Through the Government.
May I put it in this way? Will the right hon. Gentleman give the House an opportunity of discussing this question on a Resolution laying down a rule?
asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the publication of Cabinet deliberations by ex-Ministers; and whether this is in accordance with the general custom?
I can add nothing to the answer which I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Reading on Thursday last, when I said: "It is of course an obligation upon Ministers and officials not to disclose confidential state or official papers or information without the previous approval of His Majesty's Government for the time being, or in the case of Cabinet information without the consent of His Majesty."
Are not revelations of this kind a breach of the Privy Councillor's oath? Has not the right hon. Gentleman taken that oath, and does he not therefore know?
I have taken the oath and personally I think I should consider it a breach.
Inter-Allied Debts
asked the Prime Minister whether the policy of the Balfour Note, in particular the sections of it dealing with the obligations of the Continental Powers to Great Britain, still holds as the policy of His Majesty's Government?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave to the hon. Members for St. George's (Mr. Erskine) and Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Linfield) on Thursday last.
Iraq
asked the Prime Minister whether he can make a statement at an early date explaining the strategic, tactical, or commercial reasons for the continued occupation of Iraq?
I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer which I gave on Thursday last, in reply to a question by the hon. Member for East Woolwich (Mr. Snell).
In view of the fact that the previous Government never gave a statement as to the real reason, can the country be enlightened on this subject at an early date, with a view to allaying similar misapprehensions?
I have no doubt that the subject will be discussed in full to-morrow.
Imperial Wireless Service
asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware of the disappointment felt in the Dominions at the delay in announcing the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to wire less communication; and whether he can now state what that policy is?
This question has been exhaustively considered by a Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and will now come before the Cabinet. I hope to be able to announce the decision of His Majesty's Government shortly.
Will it be convenient if I put down a question this day week?
I think that is too soon.
A fortnight?
Can the right hon. Gentleman name a date when we can put this question on the Paper?
Empire Settlement
asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the fact that the Overseas Settlement Office have stated that the workers mostly required in Australia are farm hands, and that as a consequence the £45,000,000 to be spent under the Empire Settlement Act will not have the desired effect of relieving the unemployed in our cities and industrial areas; and whether steps can be taken to devote a consider able proportion of the £45,000,000 towards maintaining the agricultural labourer on the land of this country, where there is no real surplus of land labour?
It is the case that the main object of the Overseas Settlement Committee in carrying out the provisions of the Empire Settlement Act is to assist and train men and women in this country who are anxious to seek opportunity overseas to settle in the British Dominions on the land. Persons adaptable to this work are in fact, and for many years have been, found in the city and industrial areas of this country. The hon. Member is mistaken if he thinks that the aim of the Empire Settlement Act is the immediate relief of unemployment here. Its main object is to ensure, as far as is humanly possible, that the intending migrant goes out under the best conditions to work which is available and offers the best chances of success, and to develop the vast undeveloped and under-populated parts of the Empire. His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to this policy, and have no intention of diverting the funds made available by the Act to other objects.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that about 9,000,000 acres in this country are officially admitted to be undeveloped and awaiting labour?
That is a question for the Ministry of Agriculture. There are many millions of square miles in Australia and Canada awaiting development, and those are integral parts of our Empire.
Peace Treaties
France and Ruhr District
asked the Prime Minister, seeing that the interpretation of Part 8 of the Treaty of Versailles must be decided unanimously by the Reparation Commission, whether the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr under paragraph 18 of Annex II has been so unanimously approved by the Commission; and what action the British representative has taken?
The question of the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr has not come before the Reparation Commission for decision. The second part of the question, therefore, does not arise.
What is the view of the British Government? Do they think it is legal or not? If they think it is not, why did not our representative raise it?
I think the hon. and gallant Gentleman is confusing two different things. The dissent of the British representative was on a question of fact and not of interpretation.
My question is, did the British representative ever agree to this interpretation of Part 8?
There is no question of interpretation at all, as far as I know.
If this action were taken in pursuance of Part 8, did the British representative assent?
As I have told the hon. and gallant Gentleman, the British representative dissented on the question of default. The French Government thereupon took action without any further reference to the Commission at all.
If the British representative had dissented from this interpretation of Part 8, it would have become illegal?
Has the British representative been instructed to raise the question of the interpretation of the Reparation Commission, and if he has not, deos not this imply that the British Government accept the legality of the French action?
Has the representative of His Majesty's Government on the Reparation Commission any authority, or is he the proper person to interpret the Treaty of Versailles?
I think my Noble Friend is right. I do not think he has. Of course, I can give no answer with regard to the inference which may be drawn, but as to the question of fact, speaking from recollection, I do not think any such instructions have been given.
asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that the Manchester Chamber of Commerce has informed Manchester merchants that goods forwarded to Germany will be confiscated by the French; if he has any information on the subject; and, if so, what action is the Government taking on this matter?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative, and I have no information to indicate that goods are being confiscated as suggested. Inquiries are, however, being made.
Is the right hon. Gentleman making any inquiries from the Manchester Chamber of Commerce?
No. We are inquiring on the spot.
Has the Government any information as to the intention of France to blockade Germany?
None whatever.
Have the Government received any notice from France that coal exported from Scotland is not to be allowed to be delivered at German ports?
The hon. Member must give notice of that question.
73 and 75.
asked the Prime Minister (1) whether he has assented to the transport of goods under French supervision across any part of British-occupied territory in Germany;
(2) what the proposals were which the French representatives laid before His Majesty's Government on Thursday and Friday last, and, in particular, was it urged by them that British troops should be withdrawn from Germany; and whether such a step by us did or did not end the Entente?
Certain proposals were discussed with the representatives of the French Government, but I would prefer not to make any statement about them until a later stage.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the report which has come from Paris to-day, and appears in our newspapers, regarding both the subjects discussed and the agreement come to in that regard is correct or incorrect?
The position is this. We made certain proposals to the French Government, but we have not yet received their reply. Until we do, we prefer not to discuss the matter.
Is it not a fact that the conference last week was supposed to be confidential? Now we have had a statement of one side, the French side, of the case, is it not right and proper that we should now have a statement of the British case?
I think the House will lose nothing by waiting.
German Reparation
asked the Prime Minister if any acceptance of his proposals for a reduction of reparation payments and Allied indebtedness has been received from the German Government; and has that Government at any time indicated its willingness to pay reparation considered by His Majesty's Government as reasonable?
The proposals were not addressed to the German Government, and they had reference, not to what Germany was willing to pay, but to the maximum sum which, after very full consideration, we estimated that Germany could pay.
Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly answer the last part of the question, namely, has the German Government indicated any willingness to pay a reasonable sum towards reparations? [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer!"] May I have an answer to the question which is on the Paper?
Is it a fact that two years ago the German Government offered as much as or more than we are now asking?
British Occupation (Germany)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the British occupation of Germany comes to an end under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles?
Articles 428–431 of the Treaty of Versailles provide for an occupation by Allied and Associated troops for 15 years from 10th January, 1920. This occupation is, however, to terminate before the lapse of the 15 years, and the occupying force withdrawn, if Germany has complied with all the undertakings resulting from the Treaty. If at the expiration of the 15 years the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees.
May I take it that in the events that have happened the occupation will in fact last 15 years?
I do not think I can quite accept the inference of my right hon. Friend. It would be rather premature to say what the result will be.
Questions
Navy and Army Air Forces
asked the Prime Minister whether a Committee has yet reported on the question of the full control by the Navy and Army of the Air Forces which work with them; and whether the Cabinet has come to any decision?
The question of co-operation between the Services is at present under consideration.
Can we have any indication when we shall have a decision on this subject?
I cannot say.
asked the Prime Minister if there is any other great naval or military Power in the world other than Great Britain which does not make its naval and military authorities completely responsible for their own naval and military requirements in air personnel and material?
Great Britain is, so far as I am aware, the only Power which at present maintains an Air Force as a separate Service, though the adoption of a similar course is, I understand, supported by a strong body of opinion in several other countries, notably France and the United States.
Working-Class Houses
asked the Prime Minister whether he will make provision in the proposed Bill to amend the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, so as to include all working-class dwellings built since the 1st April, 1919, and thereby remove the growing anomaly and injustice of the existing differentiation created by the Act?
No, Sir. The Government are not prepared to adopt a suggestion which, in their opinion, would effectually stop all building of working-class houses by private enterprise.
Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that about 220,000 new houses have been erected since April, 1919, and that the tenants of those houses expect the same protection against eviction and increased rents as tenants of existing houses?
That is an argument, not a question.
Honours Lists
asked the Prime Minister whether, seeing that the Select Committee on Honours confined their inquiry to the general principle of the conditions upon which honours were granted, whereas it was generally understood that this Select Committee would inquire into the granting of honours by previous Governments, in view of the failure of this Committee to give satisfaction in this respect, he is prepared to appoint another Select Committee to investigate the honours which have been distributed since 1914?
The answer is in the negative.
Can the right hon. Gentleman explain why it is in the negative?
That is metaphysics.
Chairmen of Boards of Guardians
asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the importance of the work done by the Poor Law authorities, he will consider the propriety of making the chairmen of boards of guardians throughout the country ex officio justices of the peace for the areas in which they operate?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given by the Home Secretary to a similar question last Thursday.
Public Assistance Administration
asked the Prime Minister whether the questions of old age and war pensions have been excluded from the terms of reference of the Departmental Committee appointed to consider the administration of public assistance; and, if so, for what reason?
I have been asked to reply. The terms of reference are fairly wide, and the Committee do not regard them as precluding them from considering the existing arrangements in connection with either of the forms of public grant referred to, so far as may be necessary for the co-ordination of administrative and executive action.
Will they include in the terms of reference public assistance granted to ex-Cabinet Ministers and other suchlike persons who receive heavy sums of money in the shape of public assistance? Why should not they inquire about the poverty the guinea pigs are suffering from?
The question really refers to gaps and to the inability of individuals to obtain assistance. From the very question the hon. Members puts he refers to those who are getting assistance.
You are asked here about old age pensioners. I want to know about these other pensioners who are in a position of affluence.
Does my hon. and gallant Friend consider war pensions should come under any reference such as is referred to in this Committee, namely, public assistance?
If my hon. Friend will read my answer, he will see that there is no question of war pensions concerned.
Is there no question of war pensions concerned? It has been understood that the substance of the inquiry was to inquire into war pensions.
The answer refers to old age pensions, and not specifically to war pensions.
Newspapers (Insurance Schemes)
asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to statements made by Judges in the Courts that the insurance business now being run by certain newspapers is fraudulent in that purchasers of the newspapers in question are being denied the benefits promised; and whether in the Industrial Assurance Bill foreshadowed in the King's Speech provision will be made to deal with this state of affairs?
I was not aware that such statements had been made by Judges in the Courts. As regards the second part of the question, I do not think it would be practicable to bring insurance by newspapers within the definition of industrial assurance.
Does not the right hon. Gentleman read the daily Press, and is he aware that there are hundreds of poor people being robbed of their benefits, not by the newspapers but by the insurance companies who are defrauding them, and they are too poor to fight the cases?
British Debt (United States)
asked the Prime Minister what were the precise terms and conditions on which the loan from the United States of America was made to this country; by whom and on what date the necessary bond was signed whether the terms of the same were ever ratified by Parliament; and when the House of Commons will have an opportunity of discussing the proposed terms of repayment and interest?
A series of advances were made by the United States Government at various dates from April, 1917, to June, 1919, against certificates of indebtedness signed on behalf of the British Treasury by His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington or other authorised persons. These advances, which were mostly at 5 per cent., were all repayable either at very short date or, in the great majority of cases, on demand, and were convertible at the option of the United States Treasury into long term bonds bearing interest at rates not less than the highest ratio borne by the bonds issued by the United States under the Liberty Bonds Acts. The Treasury had full Parliamentary authority under the War Loan Act to contract these loans, and no further Parliamentary authority is required for their conversion on the terms now proposed.
Is this arrangement to continue as a loan between Government and Government?
Were these loans contracted in the form of dollars or sterling?
As regards the first supplementary, I think we had better wait until we know exactly what are the terms of the legislation passed in the American Congress. With regard to the second question, the loans are repayable either in dollars or in gold or in bonds.
Is the Government in a position either to accept or reject the terms as laid down in the Act of Congress?
I do not think in honour we could reject them.
Street Trading
asked the Prime Minister when the Bill for the regulation of street trading, which was promised at an early date in the present Session, will be introduced?
I have been asked to reply. I hope to have the Bill ready in four or five weeks, but I cannot say at present whether it will then be possible to proceed with it immediately.
Before the Bill is introduced, would the right hon. Gentleman be willing to receive a deputation?
Yes.
All-In National Insurance
asked the Prime Minister whether, in the interest of economy and efficiency, he will consider the possibility of adopting an all-in method of insurance, so as to secure health, accident, hospital, unemployment, and additional old age benefits by one contribution?
An inclusive scheme of this character would present enormous difficulties, administrative, political and economic, and apart from an appearance of simplicity I am very doubtful whether it has much to commend it.
Near East (British Troops)
asked the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government have considered the advisability, in view of the military situation in the Near East, of bringing our troops from Constantinople to positions where they could offer a more secure opposition in case of a sudden attack; and whether General Harington has made any recommendations in this direction which have not yet been acted upon?
It would not be in the public interest to make any statement on this subject, but the hon. and gallant Member may rest assured that His Majesty's Government have the situation constantly under review.
Farmers (Credit Facilities)
asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the statement in the King's Speech regarding the provision of credit facilities for farmers, he has received the report from the Committee which has been considering the matter and whether legislation will be needed to carry out its suggestions?
I have been asked to reply. The answer to both parts of the question is in the affirmative.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say when this legislation will be introduced, as it is very pressing?
I cannot give a date for its introduction.
When is the report to be published?
Immediately.
Overseas Trade Department
asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that the Geddes Committee recommended substantial curtailment of the expenditure on the Overseas Trade Department; and if he will carry out these recommendations and consider the advisability of abolishing the Department altogether?
The expenditure on the Department of Overseas Trade and its overseas services has been substantially reduced. In view of the importance of promoting our overseas trade, and having regard to the representations received from the commercial community in favour of the maintenance of the Department, it is not intended to abolish it.
Malicious Injuries Commission (Ireland)
asked the Prime Minister whether, in conjunction with the Government of the Irish Free State, he has appointed a president of the Irish Compensation Claims Commission in succession to Lord Shaw?
I have been asked to reply to this question. I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply which I gave on the 15th instant to a similar question addressed to me by the Noble Lord the Member for Newark.
British Embassy, Washington (Alcoholic Liquors)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that the Treasury Department in Washington filed a complaint on 25th January with the State Department that the demands for alcoholic liquors by the various embassies and legations greatly exceeded the needs of the diplomatic personnel; and whether the British Embassy has received any representation from the State Department?
I have no knowledge of the United States interdepartmental correspondence to which the hon. and gallant Member refers. His Majesty's Embassy at Washington, in common with other diplomatic Missions there, was notified about a year or more ago that all applications for permission to import liquor should be signed by the head of the Mission. This request has been strictly complied with. I can say with complete confidence that the privilege has not been, and is not being, abused by the members of His Majesty's Embassy.
Private Member's Bills
Local Authorities (Enabling) Bill,
"to extend the powers of local authorities in matters of finance and municipal trading," presented by Mr. HAYDAY; supported by Mr. Frederick Jowett, Mr. Lansbury, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. Webb, and Mr. William Thorne; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 16th March, and to be printed. [Bill 31.]
Compensation For Subsidence Bill,
"to provide for the payment of compensation for damage to property as the result of subsidence due to underground mining,' presented by Mr. HIRST; supported by Mr. Grundy, Mr. Hartshorn, Mr. Tom Williams, Mr. Duncan Graham, and Mr. Stephen Walsh; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 13th April, and to be printed. [Bill 32.]
Business of the House
Ordered, That the Proceedings on the Address, in answer to His Majesty's Speech, shall, until concluded, have precedence of all other Orders of the Day, and of Notices of Motions, at all Sittings for which they are set down.—[ The Prime Minister. ]
Orders of the Day
King's Speech
Debate on the Address
[FIFTH DAY.]
Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [
"That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth:—
MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,
We, Your Majesty's moat dutiful and loyal subjects in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—[ Mr. Samuel Roberts. ]
Question again proposed.
On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker, I desire to call your attention to the terms of the Amendment to the Address, standing in the name of the right hon. Member for the Combined Universities (Mr. H. Fisher) and other hon. Members, which is to be moved to-day. The Amendment is, I submit, a repetition of the Amendment put down from these Benches on Thursday last. The House came to a decision on that Amendment on Friday. I, therefore, submit that the Amendment proposed to be moved to-day is out of order in accordance with the rule that the same question may not be twice submitted in the same Session. I have compared the two Amendments, and I find that the only point of difference between them is that the Amendment to be moved to-day refers specifically to action by the United States. The Amendment from these Benches contained general terms, which included the possibility of action by the United States. During the Debate on Thursday and Friday the action of the United States was continually referred to in discussion. I ask you to consider the question, and give your decision. There is no point that can be discussed under this Amendment to-day that could not equally well have been raised, and was, in fact, raised, under the Amendment discussed last week. I, therefore, submit, in accordance with the previous rulings from that Chair, that there is not sufficient difference in substance between the two Amendments to make it in order to discuss the Amendment down for to-day.
May I ask whether there is on record any case of an Opposition objecting to an Amendment to the Address being moved?
I do not know, but even if there were not, there would be nothing to prevent an hon. Member from raising objection. The point raised by the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Lees-Smith) naturally occurred to me at the time this Amendment was handed in, and I went into it carefully at that time. The hon. Member is quite right in saying that there was a great deal of what was discussed on two days last week which would be relevant to this Motion, but it seemed to me, on comparing the two Amendments, that, while they deal with the same trouble, this Amendment proposes a different remedy from that which was suggested in the one disposed of. That was the reason why I thought the House had the right to decide upon it.
Are we to understand that for the whole of the next four years, the whole of the life of this Parliament, hon. Members below the Gangway are entitled to wait for the official Amendment to be put down and then, to show that they are the friends of the working man—Codlin not Short—to duplicate the Amendment and have their own Division upon it, and is this to be perpetuated?
Before you reply to that, may I ask if for the next four or five years those objections are only to be raised by Liberals who have turned Labour?
It is impossible for me to answer that question.
With regard to Liberals turning Labour, will it also be applied to Liberals who have turned Conservative?
You explain your decision by saying that there is some difference between the Motion which is now put down and the Motion which was decided last Friday. Can you indicate what the difference is?
I had only the Order Paper when the question was put to me a few moments ago, but the points on which I think that there is a distinct difference between the Amendment which is put down for to-day and the Amendment already disposed of are, first, that the Amendment now on the Paper deals with taking securities against aggression by international guarantees under the League of Nations, which was not raised, by the Amendment last week, and, second, the Amendment last week dealt in very wide terms with the question of a World Conference, while this Amendment suggests a different remedy. Therefore it does seem to me that the House, having rejected the former Amendment to the Address, is entitled to express its views on the new suggestion which is now made.
I happen to have before me the Amendment which was discussed last week, and I would respectfully point out that your recollection is not accurate. The Amendment moved last week referred specifically to the League of Nations as the intermediary in these matters, and contained no words whatever about the World Conference.
As it has now become evident that it is the desire of the Labour party to save the time of the Government, will you now revise your decision that they should be regarded as the official Opposition?
I will not enter into motives.
German Reparations
I beg to move, at the end of the Question, to add the words
4.0 P.M.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith), in the course of a powerful speech, with every word of which I agree, declared himself a devoted friend of France. My right hon. Friend was the head of the Government which rendered to France at the most dangerous crisis of her history the greatest service that the Government of any country can render to the Government and people of any other, and it is not necessary for him, or for any British statesman who has been prominently concerned in the handling of our private affairs during the last nine difficult and anxious years, to protest their goodwill to France or their admiration for the brilliant qualities of the French people. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), indeed, has been recently enjoying—if "enjoying" is the word—a spell of vivid unpopularity in the French Press, grounded upon his steady, protracted, and, during his own administration, successful opposition to the recent development of French policy. But when the day of the present controversy has passed away and my right hon. Friend's record in relation to the French nation comes to be impartially examined, I have very little doubt that, quite apart from his services in the War, it will be found that he and his Government laboured steadily for a secure France in a peaceful Europe. There is great sentiment in this country for the people of France, but I hope that our French friends will not be misguided by the few organs of opinion in this country who support the Ruhr enterprise into the belief that that branch of French policy has the support of this country. I believe that the views of this House and the views of the country were accurately expressed last week by my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, being human, is, I suppose, sometimes liable to err, but he never errs on the side of overstatement or exaggeration, and that gives additional weight to the speech which he delivered last week.
What did the Prime Minister say? He said that the French were not going to derive, in so far as he could see, any of those considerable profits which they expected to derive from the occupation of the Ruhr. He told us that the occupation of the Ruhr would cut the jugular vein of German industry; that it would be harmful, if not disastrous to the industry of Europe; that it would lead to consequences, or might lead to consequences, dangerous to France itself; and that at any moment action on the part either of the French or of the Germans might render it necessary for us to withdraw our troops, and that would mean the end of the Entente. That is a very grave and sombre picture. I speak as one desirous, if possible, of preserving the good understanding between France and Great Britain. To me it is a lamentable and repugnant thought that our comradeship in arms should be broken up on the little rock of a debt-collecting expedition. What a sordid ending to a splendid tale! What a lamentable tragedy! What a squandering of a great historical opportunity!
How are we to avoid the breaking up of this good understanding between the two peoples and the two Governments if the results of French policy—the tendencies of French policy—are such as the Prime Minister has described? I know that our French friends tell us that we do not understand their point of view. It is a very difficult thing for two nations, especially two nations so different in temperament, quality, and historical antecedents as the French and British nations, to enter into each other's mind, but I think there has been a very genuine effort on the part of England to understand the point of view of France. I think we all realise that the French Government is placed in a very considerable difficulty, both as respects its finances and with respect to the public opinion which it has to control and to manage. The French Government has budgeted on the basis of reparation payments which they have not received, and they are faced by an angry and impatient spirit in the devastated regions. We make allowance for that. One of the troubles in the situation is that the reparation question is an extremely complicated, difficult, and technical question, and yet every man and every woman both in France and in England think that they are qualified to give an opinion upon it. In France there is a general view that Germany is an immensely wealthy debtor shamming beggary, and that the only way that Germany can be induced to pay her debt is by the application of force.
One of the guiding considerations which weighs with Frenchmen, and which weighs also with this country, is the view that Germany has gained a great advantage over other countries by reason of the fact that she is now in a position, if she likes to do it, to wipe off her internal debt by a comparatively small payment in gold or in dollars. I notice, for instance, that the other day my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford (Mr. Wise), whose contributions to our financial Debates are always informing, referred to the necessity of putting a rope round Germany's neck because Germany had wiped off her internal debt. It is not quite accurate to say that Germany has wiped off her internal debt, but she is undoubtedly in a position to wipe off her internal debt by a comparatively small payment. While I am quite unable to gauge the extent of the advantage that confers upon Germany, I am able to gauge the extent of the loss which that process has inflicted upon Germany, and what I find is the case, both in France and in England, is that the other side of the shield is not generally presented to the public. What happens when a nation by a process of inflation wipes off its internal debt? It is equivalent to the imposition of 100 per cent. capital levy upon the savings of the people. Would my hon. Friend at any time in the last four years have gone to the City and proposed that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. A. Chamberlain), or the late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir R. Horne), should impose a 100 per cent. capital levy upon the savings of the British people? Such a proposition would have been received with horror. If we compare the financial policies which have been pursued respectively by France, by Great Britain, and by Germany in the last four years, there is very little doubt as to which of the three Governments has left most money to fructify in the pockets of the taxpayer. It has not been England, and it has not been Germany. So much for French public opinion.
Let me try to depict our public opinion upon this question. I have seen it stated in French newspapers that the principal apprehension of Great Britain with regard to this recent development of French policy is concern for the balance of power, and I notice that that note was struck by more than one Member on the Labour benches during the Debates of last week. I believe that is a note which awakens but a very faint echo in this country. I believe that if the population of the Ruhr district were a population of Frenchmen and not of Germans, there would be very few voices raised in this country against the occupation of the Ruhr district by the French to the crack of doom. It is quite true that we are to some extent influenced by the fact that we think that, from the French point of view, this policy will fail and that it will not bring in reparations. It will bring accumulations of paper marks, but it will not bring in anything substantial to the French Government which will compensate them for their expenditure and for the disturbance which has been created. That is one element in the public opinion of this country, but it is only a very inconsiderable element.
There is also a very deep concern as to the effect of the French action upon the industrial prosperity of the Continent and of the British Empire. You cannot cut the jugular vein of German industry without producing results disastrous to the whole economic fabric of the world, and we, depending as we do so largely upon our export trade, necessarily have a deep concern in this aspect of the question. But, beyond that, we feel that at a moment, when we all desire to see the convalescence of Europe this step is a movement not towards appeasement but away from it. This is a policy which has aroused the pride of Germany, which is recreating a military movement in Germany where there was none before; and it is fraught with great difficulties and dangers for Europe. I do not think that our apprehension has been in any way modified or diminished by the intelligence of the events which are now proceeding in the Ruhr district. The French occupation has been conducted with skill and, I believe, with a due measure of consideration for the population of that area. But you cannot have a military occupation without inflicting great hardship upon the poor in the area in which that occupation takes place. We learn disquieting rumours of children going without milk and being short of food.
There will, of course, inevitably be a number of disagreeable and painful incidents, which will be multiplied as time goes on and as the conflict of wills proceeds. What are we to do? It is obviously a situation which involves His Majesty's Government in very great difficulty and anxiety. They disapprove of the policy; they do not think of co-operation. They see endless difficulties arising from it. There are two policies. First of all, there is the policy of inaction—you may do nothing. You may wait upon French opinion. And French opinion is not altogether united on the subject. There are very powerful organs of opinion outside Paris opposed to the policy of M. Poincaré. But there is grave danger in a policy of pure passivity, because it is clear that if this contest of wills continues, the German Government and German people stiffly opposing the French, not only will the embitterment in Europe become deeper, and the prospect of European peace in future become over-clouded—not only will all those results happen, but at the same time great and continuous strain will be placed upon the friendship of Great Britain and France. Therefore, it is in the interests of the Entente it- self that I am desirous of seeing the Government take some action.
This Amendment proposes that the question of the amount of reparation which Germany shall be called upon to pay, and the mode in which the payment shall be made, should be referred to the League of Nations. My right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley put his finger upon the centre and source of our anxiety with respect to French policy when he said that in his view it seemed to constitute a hanging mortgage of an indefinite amount suspended over the whole future of Germany. We feel quite uncertain as to what the real intentions of M. Poincaré's Government are. I do not agree with some of my Friends on the Labour Benches in the view that this is a purely military move on the part of the French. I do not think so. I think its object is not military, but economic, and I fully accept the assurance of M. Poincaré in that regard. But what does give concern to British public opinion is the possibility that the Germans will be asked to pay a sum quite out of their reach, and that this amount, indefinite and impracticable, may be made the pretext for an occupation of indefinite duration. It is because we feel so profoundly these apprehensions that we are anxious to get the amount of the reparation payment settled by an impartial tribunal.
We propose that it should be remitted to the League of Nations, and we do this on two main grounds. In the first place, the League of Nations, the greatest association—it is composed of 51 States—of States known in history, has a moral authority which belongs to no other international organisation. In the second place, our Allies the French have no objection, so far as I can see, in principle to a reference to the League of Nations. The question was discussed very fully at a meeting of the League in Geneva last September. The Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) distinctly raised the question of reparations, and the French delegates concurred in a resolution to the effect that the question of reparations might, on the invitation of the interested Powers, be quite properly referred to the League, and, so far as I can ascertain, at that time there was a general inclination, a general disposition on the part of the French delegates at Geneva, to consider that it might be quite a proper and reasonable thing to do. I think that that is substantially agreed upon. But I admit that I have always had a considerable hesitation in asking the League of Nations to undertake the liquidation of the penal clauses in the Treaty of Versailles.
I do not mind owning that when my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs disagreed with M. Briand on the question of Silesia, and asked M. Briand to concur in referring the question to the League of Nations, I was a little apprehensive, because every arbitration makes enemies, and I was afraid that if the League of Nations attempted to intervene in that very thorny question, it must necessarily make an enemy either of France or of Germany. But I feel no such hesitations with regard to the present case. The position of Germany at present, in consequence of the French occupation of the Ruhr, is such that a settlement of the reparation question by the League, even if in many German minds the payments required were considered to be very stiff, would be regarded as a great relief. I cannot help feeling that the French themselves, now that they have experienced the difficulties of the task with which they are confronted, would not consider such a reference to be unwelcome. But it is an integral part of this Amendment that the Americans should be brought in. I consider that the co-operation of America in this matter is so important that if America should be unwilling to send delegates to serve upon the Commission appointed by the League, and were willing to take part in a conference independently of the League, we should accept the proposal of the Conference.
I think the prespects of American cooperation are not at all unpromising. I am encouraged in this view by a very remarkable speech made on 28th December of last year by Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of State for America. Speaking to the American Historical Association in New Haven, Mr. Hughes urged that if the forthcoming meeting in Paris should fail to find a solution of the reparation question, the Governments concerned should invite men of the highest authority in finance to report upon the limit of Ger- many's capacity to pay, and upon the best mode of effecting such payment. He added:
I have seen the proposals of this Amendment criticised on the ground that the Council of the League of Nations is not a very appropriate body to discuss so highly technical a question as the question of reparation. We do not propose that the Council should enter into the technical aspects of the question. I will agree that the Council, which is a political body representing 10 States, some of them not very greatly interested in the question, would not be qualified to give an expert opinion upon this subject. But the League of Nations is assisted by very skilled economic and financial advisers, as is shown in its recent handling of the Austrian financial question, which also demonstrates the impartiality with which the League addresses itself to this type of question. Therefore we think it would be quite possible for the League to nominate a highly trained expert and impartial Commission, reinforced from America, to give an impartial verdict upon this whole question of the amount and the mode of the reparation payments. Is it too much to suggest, if such a proposal were to be found acceptable by our Allies, the French, that at the same time, negotiations might be undertaken with a view to securing a détente in the Ruhr area? After all, both parties are suffering. The Germans, it is true, are suffering a great deal more than the French; still, both parties are suffering and neither party is getting an advantage. The atmosphere is becoming more and more difficult day by day and week by week, and it may become impossible a month hence. Surely it is a counsel of prudence to try, if we can, to arrange a détente in the Ruhr. There is the material for a settlement. The French are getting practically no coal, whereas, before they entered the Ruhr district, they were getting 1,600,000 tons a month. They are being obstructed in all their operations by the Germans. They are meeting with great embarrassments and, at the same time, Germany is suffering from the prohibition of the export of commodities from the Ruhr. Would it not be possible to arrange a détente on the lines of a resumption of the coal deliveries to France and of a resumption of the trade between the Ruhr and the rest of Germany, pending the report of an expert Commission on a reparation scheme? This may not be the best suggestion, but, at any rate, it is something.
Is it derogatory to France? We are told that the great difficulty which meets the Government, and it is a difficulty which I quite appreciate, is the difficulty of making a proposal which is not likely to be accepted. I quite realise the force of that objection. Is there, however, anything in the proposals contained in this Amendment derogatory to the dignity or the honour of France? There was a very acute difference between my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs and M. Briand over the question of Silesia, It was quite impossible to bring the British and French Governments into line upon that question. We wanted one thing and our allies, the French, wanted another. My right hon. Friend suggested that it should be referred to the League of Nations and it was so referred, and the League of Nations decided in a sense favourable to the French contention and unfavourable to our contention. We accepted that decision. Is it at all derogatory to the dignity of France to propose that the procedure which was followed then should be followed now, with the necessary modifications which I have already indicated? I see nothing derogatory in such a proposal, nor do I believe, if the proposal were made now in the sense in which I speak, and if the French found it impossible to accept it, that it would be any more difficult to make it at a subsequent conference. It appears to me the difficulties of the situation are bound to become greater and greater. French public opinion is bound to swing more and more against the course of action which is at present being pursued in the Ruhr district, and consequently the future prospect of the acceptance of such a plan will not be prejudiced by the offer of it at the earliest possible opportunity. In moving this Amendment, I am actuated by a very keen sense of the difficulties of the moment in the Ruhr district. I am not proposing anything which I think is likely to be repugnant to the French. The proposal I make is one which I believe to be practical, which I believe would not prejudice the future and which I think is compatible with a settlement honourable to French sentiments, satisfying to French claims and fair also to Germany. It is, I believe, compatible with the economic restoration of Germany and also with the growth by slow and gradual but certain degrees of a better feeling between the French and the German peoples.
I beg to second the Amendment.
The derisive cheers with which the opening sentences of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Mover of the Amendment were greeted in some quarters indicated that there was a suspicion widely entertained that the present Amendment is simply a party manœuvre. I indeed discern in the Amendment certain lineaments of my own, and I am told there are also to be seen in it the lineaments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). I can understand that there should be some suspicion as to the offspring of such an unusual union. The party aspect of this matter, however, interests me but little. I believe it to be an effort, a laudable effort at Liberal unity, but it signifies a great deal more. We on these benches regard it as modest but positive and constructive contribution to the cause of European peace. In dealing with a subject so thorny and so complicated as reparation, one must naturally touch to some extent upon the past. If I do so, it will be, I hope, without any tendency to those recriminations which, I think, unfortunately marred some of last week's Debates, and will be solely for the purpose of throwing light upon the present and of drawing lessons as to what we should avoid in the future. For two reasons this is no time for recrimination. In the first place, there is no party in this House which has a clean record in the matter of reparation. If all those who have erred and blundered in the matter of reparation were to appear in white sheets, it would mean a notable revival in the textile trade. There is the further reason that the situation is far too grave and the outlook far too dark for any such considerations. It is the duty of all of us, with a single mind as far as we may, to offer such counsel as we can, to guide this country and other countries aright, and to avert the dangers which beset us, and beset the rest of the world. The French occupation of the Ruhr is the gravest event which has happened since the Armistice. It has revived war conditions and renewed the war spirit. At present it is only being met by passive resistance, but there is the danger, even the probability, that that phase will pass into the phase of guerilla tactics, akin to those which our troops had to face in Ireland two years ago. That, again, may develop into regular hostilities which would plunge Europe into a disaster greater than any of us can imagine or conceive.
The present Government are placed in a difficult position and they have decided for the moment to do nothing. I do not think either this House or the country can be content with a passive attitude under these grave conditions. There was a tendency during the Debates of last week for speakers on either side to be pro-French or pro-German. We have no right to be either. It is our duty to be pro-British. This country should neither be the satellite of France nor the patron of Germany. Our concern in the first place should be to safeguard British interests and to discharge British obligations, and, in carrying out these tasks, at the same time to have scrupulous respect for the just claims of other nations. This is no easy matter. In order to do justice to others we require to understand their points of view, to sympathise with their amour-propre and to be capable of seeing ourselves as others see us. For that reason, I welcome the statement which my right hon. Friend the Mover of the Amendment has made in relation to the French attitude. I believe in this matter we should have regard both for French and German points of view, but in balancing their competing claims, France, in view of our long friendship, in view of the great common sacrifice made in the supreme ordeal of the War and in view, further, of our desire for her collaboration in the work of peace and reconstruction, has a preferential claim upon our consideration.
In the French view—and in this matter I think we have no right to make any distinction between the French Government and the French people; we may regret it or not, but the evidence that is available is that at the present moment, in the action which the French Government is taking, that Government has the support of the majority of the French people—the questions of security and reparations are interlocked. Their inter-dependence, indeed, was recognised in the Peace Treaty, for, as those hon. Members who are familiar with that document will remember, one of the sanctions in the event of default on reparations was to consist of the indefinite continuance of the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. There is further evidence of this attitude of mind in a speech of Monsieur Loucheur, delivered in the French Chamber on the 7th November, 1922. In that speech that French statesman, who was associated with my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs in the peace negotiations, and who, I think, would not be described as an extremist in France, said that, if it came to be a choice between reparation and security, he would prefer security. We must also remember the construction which he placed upon the word security and the means by which alone he believed that security could be achieved. In the sentences immediately following that which I have quoted, he spoke of the creation of a Rhine State, that being, in the French mind, the only method whereby effective guarantees could be obtained against the renewal of German aggression.
The French believe, rightly or wrongly, that we have not adequate sympathy with this desire for security. They point to the fact that at the end of the War the German fleet was destroyed, and that thereby we, as a sea Power, attained all the security which we could desire, and in their view the disarmament of Germany and the other steps taken under the Treaty do not correspond in effectiveness, for the purposes of their security, with the destruction of the German fleet. We, in putting down this Amendment, recognise that point of view, and we indicate our willingness to meet it. We know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs endeavoured to meet it in the course of the negotiations at Paris, and that it was for that purpose that the tri-partite Treaty was devised.
And again at Cannes.
And, as my right hon. Friend reminds me, that offer was renewed at Cannes, and, if my recollection serves me right, it gave rise to some controversy within the ranks of the Liberal party, but I think it is therefore important, recognising this French point of view, that an effort should be made to meet their case and to show that, in the settlement which we contemplate on reparation, we are anxious at the same time to satisfy them by way of special guarantees under the League of Nations, so that their security for the future may be adequately safeguarded.
On the question of reparation, I think it is also well that the French point of view should be considered. It certainly was grossly misrepresented in this House last week. We have to remember that the French Government has a liability amounting to £1,500,000,000 in respect of the devastated areas. We have to remember, also, that the French debts to the United States of America and to ourselves amount to £2,000,000,000, and they perfectly naturally inquire, if they have to meet these liabilities, how they are to consent to a scaling down of German reparation to a matter of £2,000,000,000 or £1,500,000,000. They sometimes ask, as M. Loucheur asks in this speech, to remind us that in the peace negotiations at Paris it was our representative who put forward the extreme claim of reparation, and they ask, if we have changed our mind, if we have come to believe that the payment of reparation on the scale contemplated in the Treaty is contrary to our interests, why should they suffer, and why should they alter an instrument to which both they and we are alike parties. I believe that that is a point of view which we must meet, and in relation to which we should be willing to make sacrifices.
There is the further question of the Ruhr, as to the legality of the French action. The position of His Majesty's Government, to say the least of it, is obscure on that matter. At the same time, I believe that the arguments, such as they were, which were put forward last week to show that France is committing an outrage and is in breach of the Treaty have no solid foundation. Let us take the French point of view. The Treaty lays down that default is to be determined by the Reparation Commission. The Reparation Commission has so determined. That is the first point, that there is default within the meaning of the Treaty. The next question is as to the sanctions which can be applied in case of default. The French are entitled to point out that when the ultimatum was sent to Germany in May, 1921, the Allies jointly threatened the occupation of the Ruhr as the sanction under the terms of this particular Clause. If, therefore, this was a competent sanction when the Allies acted jointly, it is obviously a competent sanction under the Clause. The sole question then remaining is, Is this sanction, which was competent to all the Allies, a sanction which is competent to any one of them or any group of them acting by themselves? They point to the fact that in the Clause the words "the respective Governments" are used, that in the second place in this matter there is no provision for unanimity, and in the third place I think they argue that we ourselves have acted severally and applied a sanction under this Clause—an economic sanction, it is true—in the form of the German Reparation (Recovery) Act, which is still, unhappily, in force. That is a separate action.
It was a sanction agreed by all the Allies.
I thought there was some obscurity as to the exact point, but in any event it was only applied in this country, and no other Ally took this method of obtaining a sanction in regard to the Treaty.
Any of the Allies might apply it.
To that extent, it is true, it was jointly agreed, but I am not putting forward this argument as my own. I believe it is a contention which has been used in France, and I am putting it for what it is worth. It is a contention that in fact we have, acting by ourselves, applied a sanction under this Clause, and they use that as a justification for their acting separately in respect of a different sanction under the same Clause. That is the French argument, and I say, in view of these arguments, that it is very difficult indeed to establish a case against the legality of their action. I have perfectly frankly stated the French point of view, and I have indicated therefore that in this House, and certainly on the Liberal benches in this House, there is the keenest possible desire to satisfy French demands and French needs. I think it is also important, though, that we should look at it from the point of view of Germany.
Germany, after all, has certain just claims, and there is no reason why the German attitude and the German point of view should be ignored, because it is now becoming clear that for any real settlement German assent must likewise be obtained, and that the weakness of the Versailles settlement was that in reality that was a settlement imposed by superior force. What is the German claim? The Germans object to the reparation provisions of the Treaty of Versailles on two grounds—first, that the demands are unjust and, secondly, that the demands are excessive. The strongest ground upon which they allege the injustice of the claims made upon them is their argument, an argument which, I believe, has never been adequately met from any Allied quarter, that the provisions of the Treaty in this matter are a breach of the pre-Armistice conditions. There are some people who believe that the Allies ought to have gone on to Berlin, and ought to have imposed there a settlement on terms of unconditional surrender, but we must remember that the Allies did not do that, that there was an Armistice, and therefore that the conditions which were laid down in the Armistice, on the faith of which Germany laid down her arms, ought to be scrupulously observed. I have never been able to find, in all the voluminous literature which has appeared on the Treaty on the Allied side, whether French, British, or American, any adequate answer to the contention that the provisions of the Reparation Section are at variance, in respect of the inclusion of pensions and allowances to soldiers, with the provision in the Armistice conditions which limited reparation to compensation for damage done to the civilian population and their property, and I believe that until that matter is settled there will be no real settlement in the matter of reparation.
5.0 P.M.
There is another matter in relation to their contention that the demands are excessive. I think it was in a communication which the Allies sent to Germany in June, 1919, that something in the nature of a pledge was given to Germany that in administering their provisions regard would be had to the restoration of the economic life of Germany. I think that the carrying out strictly, for example, of the schedule of payments of May, 1921, could not be done consistently with the maintenance of that economic life. I believe my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs has for long recognised that, and that his main efforts in the course of many conferences have been turned towards securing a careful adjustment of reparations in accordance with the maintenance of the economic life of Germany. Having, as it were, stated what are the French and German points of view, we have to consider what our interests and obligations are in this matter. The British interests in the present European situation can be considered under three heads—peace, security and trade. Our paramount interest at the present time is the maintenance of peace, not only on humanitarian grounds, but because it is essential to the restoration of the industrial prosperity of this country. We recognise, as my right hon. Friend the Member for the combined English Universities (Mr. H. Fisher) has described, that the continued occupation of the Ruhr, with its economic effects on Central Europe, is bound, whatever the temporary effects may be, to have a most disastrous influence on the trade and commerce of this country. It is, therefore, to our interest to bring that occupation, so far as it is possible for us to do so, to a conclusion. We believe also that if this continued occupation goes on, and War conditions arise, the disaster, the economic ruin, which will fall upon Europe will bring heavy sufferings upon ourselves. In the matter of security, I think we should remember the traditional policy of this country. The traditional policy of this country has been to regard our security as in danger whenever there was the unchallenged military domination of any other Power in Europe. We set out, I believe, in 1914, to prevent the military domination of Germany. I think, in the circumstances, it could not be satisfactory to this country if, after the end of the War, another military domination arose in its stead.
Therefore, from all these points of view, there are most urgent grounds for this Government not maintaining simply a passive attitude. I am not going to enlarge on the question of obligations. I will only touch upon the obligations first of all arising under the Treaty and the obligations antecedent to the Treaty. In respect of the obligations under the Treaty, I have pointed out what I believe is the strength of France's case, but this is no case for mere legal niceties. We have to look at the substance of the transactions, and when we look at the substance of the transactions, we find that the result of the Ruhr occupation is that the Reparation Section of the Treaty is really in ruins, that the Reparation Commission may, if it continues, be consigned to the scrap-heap, and, secondly, we have to consider how we are affected, as beneficiaries under the Treaty, by action which, to a large extent, sets the Treaty at nought. I believe, also, we have to set ourselves right in regard to the pre-Armistice conditions. I believe that, as the provisions of the Treaty stand, they represent a breach of faith, and, in my view, this country cannot rest content so long as it is under that reproach. Professions at the beginning of the War that we entered that War to vindicate the sanctity of international obligations are brought into contempt so long as it can be colourably said that we are parties to a breach of faith at the conclusion of the War. I believe that if the proposal in this Amendment be adopted, the result of the deliberations of the experts would reduce the amount payable in reparations to a sum which would have been paid had the claim not be inflated by the inclusion of pensions, but that includes a revision of the percentages as apportioned between the Allied Powers. I believe this country cannot avoid assenting to that claim on behalf of the French. If this be done, we shall have restored the good-will of this country, and it is in this respect mainly that I welcome this Amendment as a Liberal Amendment, because it is carrying out traditional Liberal policy. There is a tendency in these times, in certain quarters, to speak disparagingly of Mr. Gladstone and to suggest that he has nothing to tell the present age and the present generation, that there are new prophets and new oracles, but I wish to quote a few sentences written by Mr. Gladstone in 1870, in the course of the Franco-German War, in a situation not very different from that which confronts Europe to-day, and I quote it because I believe it contains the spirit of the present Amendment. described as a Little Englander, but I have never thought so ill of my country as to believe that she was not great enough both to pay and to forgive, and I believe it is on that line that we can find a solution. If we are willing to take the lead, as is now suggested, it may be that the present effort will fail, but that is no reason why it should not be made, nor is it any reason why we should be discouraged or dismayed. I believe that, if the effort be made, and the policy persisted, we shall have the honour of contributing towards a settlement of a weary and heavy-laden world; the imperishable honour thereby gained will be of more value than the crumbling laurels of the victor, and we shall receive a crown of glory that fadeth not away.
I do not imagine that anyone who had the advantage of listening to the two speeches that we have heard, will desire to offer any criticism either as to their tone or their temper. They showed a sense of responsibility in the very grave crisis in which we find ourselves, and I certainly do not envy any hon. Member who would be able to rise and take part in this Debate without a profound sense of that responsibility. At the close of the speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down, he urged in eloquent terms that we should take a certain course, even if it was not to be successful. I hope this House, whatever it does, will not adopt any policy merely because it is gratifying to its own feelings and sensations, and without regard to the practical result which may accrue from that policy. We have to consider here not only arguments, not only speeches. We have to make up our minds what vote we are going to give, what we desire to accomplish as the result of the discussion this afternoon. We cannot look only at the terms of the Amendment; we must look also at the effect of its adoption.
By an inveterate custom of this House an Amendment to the Address is treated as a Vote of Censure on the Government of the day. If it is adopted, it means a change of Government. It is quite obvious that no hon. Member can give a vote which will have that result unless he has a general want of confidence in the Government, and desires a change on general grounds, or, at any rate, on grounds connected with this subject, or unless he feels so strongly that the par- ticular course recommended in the Amendment ought to be adopted that he feels he must vote for it, even if the result may happen to be a change of the Government of the country. I certainly do not, on general grounds, desire a change of Government. Looking at it merely from the point of view of policy—I am not going, at least I hope not, to indulge in any controversial matter—but if there was a change of Government I presume it would be succeeded by a Government headed by the Leader of the Opposition to carry out the policy which he and his party have recommended to this House on this question. I cannot think that that policy would be a wise one. I am not going to argue it at length, because it was discussed last week, but what did it amount to? It was put mostly by the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Morel) I think. He said there is no solution to this question or other questions unless you call a world conference in order to re-write the Treaty from top to bottom. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] Well, that seems to me a perfectly impossible policy to suggest at the present time. Just consider what the hon. Member really recommends. It is that the Government of this country should announce to the world that they desire a general conference in order to re-write the Treaty. Every Power which was a signatory to that Treaty, and thinks that some part of it, at any rate, should remain, would be against the proposal. It is all very well to talk about re-writing treaties, but you cannot do it except by the agreement of everybody who signed the Treaty. Therefore, to suggest re-writing the Treaty from top to bottom at the present time would mean to expose yourself to certain rebuff.
Where are we? This is to be done at a world conference in which the United States would take part, and when all, including the League of Nations itself, is to be re-cast entirely. I took a very small part in the negotiations at Paris. I had nothing to do with the main part of the Treaty. I was only concerned with the League of Nations negotiations. I am perfectly sure of this: There is no one who took part in those negotiations but thinks it would be really madness to cast aside all thereby achieved in order to start again from the very foundation under conditions which would be far less favourable in practical results. With quite the greatest respect for the hon. Member, I should not feel disposed to give a vote which would make it probable that the policy of his party would become the policy of the country, or of this House. The hon. Member said: "Even so: if the policy suggested by this Amendment is so clearly right it ought to be adopted by the House of Commons, and one should vote for it." That means two things. It means, firstly, the adoption of the policy of the rejection of the Government's policy as we know it. What is the Government policy? [An HON. MEMBER: "Tell us."] It has been described by hon. Members opposite as a policy of "benevolent neutrality." I think that was the phrase used by the Leader of the Opposition. I may be wrong, and it may be possible to sustain that point by taking a phrase here and there from the speech of the Prime Minister referred to, but if you take the pronouncements of the Government as a whole I should not think that that would be an accurate way of describing their policy. I should have thought their policy was this: that they entirely disagreed with the action of France in the occupation of the Ruhr, that they thought that, as indeed the Prime Minister himself said, that the policy was dangerous and very unlikely to achieve the result that was desired, but they also thought—surely rightly—that it was very, very important to do anything that could reasonably be done in order to avoid a breach with France. Therefore, they say to the House of Commons—it seems to me: "Let us walk warily in this matter by all means, and when opportunity serves to put an end to this policy by all means let us put an end to it." You cannot say, at least it is dangerous for the House of Commons to say—so it seems to me—without all the knowledge to which they have access and all the information at the disposal of the Government—it is impossible for us seriously to say here and now: "You must take a particular course, and put an end to that policy." For very likely in doing so you will fail to secure what you desire, and you will bring about something like complete chaos in Europe. If I am right in that brief description of the situation, it seems to me the policy stated is reasonable, and one which is entitled to the support generally of hon. Members of this House.
I am not quite sure hon. Members opposite on the Labour Benches fully recognise the importance of friendship with France. The hon. Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Snowden)—if he will allow me to say so—made a very powerful and remarkable speech on Friday. I think he a little under-rated the importance of friendship with France. He and I agreed on one thing. We believe, as I understood his speech, in the same broad principles of international action. We desire international action based on international co-operation such as that designed by the Covenant of the League of Nations. Yes, but we desire co-operation not of this country with France only, but with all countries. It is not enough, either, to have co-operation with Germany if you thereby lose co-operation with France. I am one of those who have always desired the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. I still bitterly regret that the German Government has during the past years declined to make any application for admission into the League. I certainly should regard the League quite as incomplete if it did not contain France as if it did not contain Germany. Apart from this general idea, we must remember, as an inevitable result of the War, that there are a number of international questions in which we desire, and almost require, for their peaceful and adequate settlement, the co-operation of France. There are the questions of Vilna, of Memel, of East Galicia. You may say that France has not always been very helpful. Well, without her co-operation nothing can be done upon those questions. There is a whole bunch of questions in the Near East and in the Middle East, involving dangers and difficulties which I am sure the hon. Gentleman and his friends do not under-rate, and none of these questions can be dealt with and settled really satisfactorily unless we can maintain good relations, not only, I agree, with France, but with all countries, and with France amongst the others.
Therefore I could not help feeling that perhaps hon. Members under-rate that aspect of the question. I do think also that the indignation of the hon. Member for Colne Valley with France, which I entirely understand, was excessive. I do not think it was quite fair to France. The hon. Gentleman opposite referred to the very remarkable speech of M. Loucheur in November last in the Chamber of Deputies. He said, and said very truly, that M. Loucheur belongs to a moderate type of French opinion, and I think a great part of his speech, partly dealing with the financial and economic part of reparation, would be accepted by Members of this House.
How did that speech begin? It began, as the hon. Gentleman reminded the House, by recalling the scene at the Paris Conference at which representatives of France, Great Britain, and America were present. The Americans were pressing for a moderate system of reparation. The French were not taking a great part one way or the other. It was the British who insisted that the figure of £10,000,000,000 was a reasonable figure to require the Germans to pay. That was what we held out to the French as a reasonable figure which they might expect to get from the Germans, or their share of it. It is quite true, as the hon. Member for Colne Valley said, that £450,000,000 had been paid. That, however, is only a small sum compared with the £10,000,000,000. I think that the disappointment of the French is not unreasonable. You must remember, though they have got their share of the £450,000,000, unless my memory plays me false, they have a very small part of that in cash.
What is the financial position of France? The hon. Member referred to her great commercial and industrial prosperity. I have no doubt the hon. Member quoted accurately, at least I am prepared to accept it, and I have not verified the figures, but I think a corrective to his observations was supplied by the speech of the Leader of the Opposition when he pointed out that that might be true, but that France as a State was in a very difficult position indeed, and undoubtedly the French Budget had been framed time after time on the theory that they were going to obtain a large sum by way of reparation from the Germans. In the Budget itself it always figures as a sum which they are to receive. They may have been foolish. It is a little difficult, I am sure, for the British Member of Parliament, taking into consideration all that has happened in the last four years, to bring a railing accusation against France in believing they were going to receive that sum. I have always felt myself that con- siderations of that kind should always be borne in mind before we utter any vehement criticism. But I do not want to go further than that. It is enough for my argument to say that friendship with France ought to be one of the objects of our policy.
What is the alternative policy suggested by this Amendment? It really puts forward four separate propositions. It condemns the operations of the French and Belgian Governments in the Ruhr. It declares that it is necessary to seek effective securities against aggression by international guarantees under the League of Nations. It asks also for the appointment of a Commission under the League of Nations to settle the question of Germany's capacity to pay and the method of payment; and it proposes that America should be asked to give her co-operation and assistance to this end. As to the condemnation of the Ruhr policy, as far as this Debate has gone there is no dispute about that. I do not, however, pretend that every hon. Member of this House will agree in condemning it. On the contrary I know that some hon. and right hon. Gentlemen, whose opinion I have a profound respect for, do not condemn it. Nevertheless the leaders of all parties have condemned it, and I believe it to be true that a very considerable majority of this House is of that opinion. At any rate there is a somewhat striking concensus of opinion in that direction which at any rate may give some material consideration to those who advocate the wisdom of the policy adopted in the Ruhr.
In the second place, there is the question of the security given to France by effective guarantees under the League of Nations. There I could not be expected to disagree with that as a general proposition, because it is one for which I have fought vehemently for many months past. I believe profoundly that a guarantee of security, a genuine and real security by the League of Nations, one which would satisfy technical and military opinion, is a very desirable thing. Myself I believe it is practicable, and I believe such an opinion has very great support, not only in England, but amongst some of the best and most important opinions in France. I earnestly hope that my right hon. Friend will adopt that policy and press it forward by every means in his power. The right hon. Gentleman and myself were present together at the Assembly of the League of Nations last year when this matter was discussed at considerable length. I have no right to speak of the personal opinion of my right hon. Friend, but I do not think that he would say that the Government of which he then formed a part absolutely and without reserve accepted the policy that was then put forward, but I do not complain of that.
The Government of a country like this must, in dealing with an enormous subject of that kind, act with caution and circumspection. They cannot do things like a private individual like myself can do because, although they may individually be convinced of the wisdom of a particular course, they have to bear in mind the advice they receive and a number of other considerations. I do not complain of the Government still desiring more time to consider the advisability of taking that course, although I do think that the adoption by this country of a policy of that kind would show that we are really in earnest in desiring to get every reasonable guarantee for the security of France. However, I do not think that this can be more than of psychological assistance in the solution of this question, because the completion of that policy in detail must take a very considerable time, and far longer than we can afford in settling this question of the occupation of the Ruhr.
Before I come to the third proposition, as to the financial commission to be appointed, I want to say a word as to the suggestion that we should formally ask America to assist us in this respect. I must say on that point I have very profound doubts as to the wisdom of the suggestion. I do not doubt the great advantage it would be if America saw her way to assist us by her advice, influence and her point of view, and in other ways assist in the solution of this question. The question, however, as to whether a formal request from this country at this time to America to do that would really be a desirable course to take is different. The right hon. Gentleman rather watered down that suggestion in the Amendment when he came to speak on it. I understand that all he suggested in his speech was that America might be invited to send unofficially, or allow unofficially, American experts to serve on such a Com- mission as he contemplated, and that is a very different proposition and would be less objectionable. As the Amendment stands, I think it would be a very grave danger in driving back America from any such action as it was desired she should take. I am rather inclined to think America would repeat her view that when Europe has settled her quarrel and has an agreed proposal to make, she will be ready to consider it; but I do not think she will consider it is part of her duty to enter into a discussion of those controverisal matters. Therefore, I confess that this proposal as drafted seems to me the least acceptable of all the proposals made in this Amendment.
The fourth proposition is, after all, the most important, namely, that the League of Nations should be asked to appoint an expert Commission to advise on the technical aspects of the capacity of Germany to pay and the way in which she should pay. Here again I cannot object to that proposal in itself. I remember nearly two years ago on 18th March, 1921, a debate in this House in which I ventured to put forward that very proposal, and the Government of the day rejected it with something approaching contumely. I remember the former Attorney-General, when he was Sir Gordon Hewart, being put up to make one of his masterly speeches against this proposal, and he described it as an outrageous proposal, and he said, "We have got judgment against Germany, we are in the course of putting in an execution and the Noble Lord asks us to refer the whole matter to arbitration." I think it was an unfortunate thing that that proposal was then rejected, because I believe it might have led some way towards a settlement of this question. I remember an interview with Dr. Benes, the Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, one of the ablest continental statesmen of the present day, and when he was asked about some such proposal as this he said that he was afraid it was too late.
I am not so sure that the capacity of Germany to pay is a real matter in dispute. I read the recent proceedings at Paris, and the difference on that point seemed to me to be a small one—I am speaking of the difference between France and England, and that is the only thing we could submit usefully to the League of Nations. I understood the French view was that Germany should pay £2,500,000,000, and I do not think anyone suggested that she should pay less than £2,000,000,000. There were other proposals which brought the actual money value still lower. I should have thought the real difference was partly in regard to the Moratorium, though I thought that principle was common to both France and England. I think the main disagreement was on the point that it was essential to occupy some territory in Germany, or take some similar action as a guarantee for payment. Therefore, I am not sure that the Amendment as it stands really deals with the situation that exists, although, no doubt, it deals with a situation that did exist.
I have always recommended the policy which has been recommended in this respect. Indeed, I go much further. I am quite convinced that this question will have to be settled by the League of Nations or by some such world conference, and I do not think there is any other way. I think the League of Nations is the most convenient way because you have machinery already to your hands. I believe that a considerable section of French opinion is coming round to that view and, on this point, I do not speak altogether at random when I say that. I believe, however, that a week ago French opinion would have rejected absolutely a proposal to refer this matter to the League of Nations. That, however, is a matter which will certainly have to be considered. I also agree with my right hon. Friend that the League is fully qualified to deal with this question, and I believe it could deal with it admirably. I believe myself that if this question once got into the atmosphere of Geneva it would be settled without the slightest difficulty.
I do not accept the view put forward from the Labour benches that the action of the League shows that it is under the domination of England or France because that really is not so, and I beseech hon. Members who hold that view to examine the actual facts. It is true that when a question comes before the League in which France or England takes a strong view, it is treated with deference and respect, and it ought to be so treated. No international organisation can exist unless the views of powerful, important and highly-cultured countries are carefully considered, but to say that France or England, or France and England together can impose its will upon the Council of the League of Nations is simply to say what is not actually the case. My right hon. Friend will remember a striking incident in which Great Britain, France and Italy took one view, but were unable to induce the Assembly to accept it. They modified their view in order to meet the view of the Assembly. It was a question connected with events in the Near East. The settlement of Austria and Albania was not and indeed in no case was any settlement dictated by France or England. They were settlements arrived at and agreed to because they were supported by the general public opinion of the world, and they were given effect to by the Assembly of the League of Nations. Therefore I have very little doubt that the League will be able to settle this question. But when I am asked to vote and to say to the Government here and now, "You are to propose it," I must say I think it would be asking the House of Commons to take action which it would be very unwise to take. We must leave to the Government of the day purely administrative matters, unless there is general want of confidence in that Government, and as far as I am concerned, I see no grounds for saying there is a want of confidence in the Government in this matter. As I gather, they are willing to utilise the machinery of the League to the fullest extent, and by their action at Lausanne, by their suggestion of the entry of Turkey into the League, by their suggestion for the reference of the Straits question and the Mosul question to the machinery of the League, they have shown that they are prepared to utilise the League to the full, whenever it is possible so to do. I have been impressed by the tone adopted by the Front Bench throughout this discussion and by the tone which permeated the speech of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As far as I am concerned, I only ask the Government to go on fearlessly in the course they have begun. I ask them to reflect, as no doubt they have reflected, on two principles of international relations which are inconsistent one with the other. There is the old system that every country is the potential enemy of the other. There is the newer system which finds its latest exemplification in the Covenant of the League, and declares that all countries are friends unless they are proved to be enemies. One or other must be adopted. You cannot work foreign politics by a combination of the two. The old one leads inevitably to war and destruction. The new one leads to co-operation and safety, and I earnestly ask the Government to be strong and very courageous in adopting the new principle, and, in the words which are to be found in the introduction of every one of the Treaties signed at Paris, by international co-operation to achieve the peace and security of the world.
I confess that I am rather at a loss to appreciate the attitude of the Noble Lord who has just sat down. Two years ago he was in favour of referring reparations to the League of Nations. In fact, he urged it on the Government; the fact that it was an administrative question which was within their competence did not weigh with him at that time.
I did not divide against the Government.
Two years hence he may be in favour of it. He said so, but to-day and now he is not in favour of urging it on the Government. I think some of the audiences whom the Noble Lord moved to enthusiasm throughout the country for the principle of the League of Nations, for referring questions to the League of Nations, will be very bewildered when they read tomorrow morning that their champion has appeared in the House of Commons to address an ingenious argument to the House against referring to the League of Nations the one question above all others that disturbs the peace of Europe. The Noble Lord says, it is a Motion of want of confidence in the Government. There is in it not a word of condemnation of any action of the Government, not one. I never heard a word from the Government to say that they are opposed to it. May I also remind the Noble Lord and the House of Commons that in August last I proposed to the French Government, when we saw that we could not come to an agreement amongst ourselves, that this question should be referred to the League of Nations. Most of the right hon. Gentlemen now sitting on the front bench were members of the Government at that time. The Foreign Secretary was a member of the Government at that time, and I never heard a word of protest. It was proposed with the full agreement of most right hon. Gentlemen sitting on that bench, and why should it now be regarded as a vote of want of confidence in the Government that they are prepared, in February, 1923, to put into operation the very proposal which they sanctioned in August, 1922. However, I do not think it very profitable to pursue the question why the Noble Lord has changed his mind. There are many reasons for it which are not quite relevant to the discussion on the Amendment before the House.
But there is one statement he made I should like to be able to express my views upon, and that is that it is extremely desirable that France and Britain should march together. Every Member of this House who has expressed strong disapproval of France has accompanied that by a statement of his friendship for that country. But for that I should not have thought it necessary to repeat the same statement. In this House, on this very spot, I pleaded for friendship with France when the policy of this country was not friendly to France, when, on the whole, it was pro-German and antagonistic to the policy of France. I was a Member of the Committee of Members of this House, an original Member, who proposed the Entente with France. I have never departed from the principle that it is essential that the democracy of France and the democracy of England should walk together and act together as far as they can. I am not going to refer to the War. But friendship with France does not mean that you must approve of every act of every French Ministry which puts in jeopardy the peace of the world. On the contrary, I think that it is the truest friendship for France, the sincerest friendship for her people, that dominates those who now are entreating the Government to take some action to save France from disaster, disaster which is inevitable sooner or later, and the later the greater.
I believe the French Government are committing France day by day and week by week to a policy of irretrievable disaster. I think it is essential that the House of Commons should express an opinion; not in condemnation of the Government—I do not propose to use one word of criticism of the action taken by my right hon. Friends, because I know their difficulties, I have had experience of them. It is very easy to say this is the right course or this is the decision that ought to be taken, but you have always to reconcile so many conflicting appeals, conflicting motives and conflicting considerations. You have to keep the Allies together in so far as you possibly can, and therefore when I urge on the Government to put this Amendment into operation, to accept it in principle, I do so because I think it is to support them in taking that action. No one knows better than my right hon. Friend that it is very helpful to a Government when it is dealing with a complicated foreign situation to be able to point out opinion in your own country. It is a powerful argument to be able to say: "Did you notice the Debate in the House of Commons? I have the greatest difficulty there. The House of Commons wants to take such and such a course." My right hon. Friend knows perfectly well that the French Government used that argument, and so, too, did the Italian and Belgian Governments, and we have not been above using the argument ourselves. It is absolutely right, and I think the Noble Lord would have served the Government better if he had put them in a position to be able to say that opinion in this country was so overwhelming in favour of taking action to put an end to this impossible situation that the Government ought to take that course. [ Laughter. ] Well, hon. Gentlemen by their reception of that statement seem to think that that is very amusing. It is only those who really have no experience of negotiations who laugh at that appeal.
I agree also with the Noble Lord that when you come to the question of reparations itself the problem is not so difficult. That is what makes me suspect that it is not reparations, and that there is something beyond reparations. That is a disquieting feature. There was nothing in the reparations situation that demanded such a violent step as this. The difference in figures was not great. The Noble Lord is perfectly right in that. I have heard fantastic figures quoted here of claims put forward that have never been advanced. The figure which the hon. Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Snowden) quoted of £11,600,000,000 was probably an estimate of the damage on that date at the very inflated prices at that moment. I remember perfectly well that France brought in a claim for £7,000,000,000 or £8,000,000,000 for devastated areas. The sum required by Belgium was £2,000,000,000 or £3,000,000,000 and by Italy another £2,000,000,000 or £3,000,000,000, so that I should not have been surprised if the figures quoted by the hon. Member had been exceeded. It was a figure of damage upon the basis of repairing it in the state of prices at that date. That figure was never presented to Germany, and it is impossible for the House of Commons, or anyone else, to express an opinion which is of value upon the situation without realising exactly what the Treaty of Versailles actually provided.
6.0 P.M.
The Treaty of Versailles had no figure. It simply provided that damages should be paid on certain categories, which were to be adjudicated by a Commission set up by May, 1921—two years afterwards. That Commission was also to have the function of deciding, not merely what the amount of the damage was, but the capacity of Germany to pay. In 1921 the damage was assessed at £6,600,000,000. That figure was not the claim; it was the figure of the damage. Then came the question of capacity. The only claim that has been presented to Germany for payment is a claim in respect of £2,500,000,000, and my recollection is that there was to be deducted from that the amount which Germany had already paid. The remainder has never been claimed. There has been no serious contention that it ever can be claimed. It is true that it has not been wiped out, but if you went to France at the present moment and said to the French Government, "Will you give £10,000,000 sterling for the whole of that balance?" they would not do it. Why? Because they know perfectly well that that is a claim which will never be presented, and that the real figure is the figure of £2,500,000,000. I am putting that merely in order to show that this is approximately the figure in and upon which experts have agreed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) said in his speech the other day.
That is the position. What happened upon that figure? The Bankers' Committee appointed at the beginning of last year, which had been invited by all the Allied Governments to consider the situation, representing France, England, Italy, Belgium, reported that they were prepared to take the necessary steps to secure an advance for the purpose of reparation, provided the situation was cleared up and this contingent liability, in respect of which no claim has been put forward, should be wiped out. There was not a country that was not prepared to accept that situation, except, unfortunately, that M. Poincaré could not see his way. He refused. That was the first fatal step which has led towards this grave blunder in the Ruhr Valley. The next step was the proposal embodied in the Balfour Note—a very generous proposal, which offered to forego the whole of our reparations, provided that there was a clearing up of the debt situation. So long as no claim was put forward against us, we proposed to wipe out the indebtedness of France, Italy, all the Allied countries, and also our claim against Germany. That was refused in a Note by M. Poincaré. The next step was a proposal which was put forward by my right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, for the purpose of putting the finances of Germany into order. It involved a good deal of supervision; it involved the payment of customs under conditions which could be overlooked. Belgium and Italy, I think, were prepared to accept that; M. Poincaré again refused.
Then came a change of Government. The late Government had been in the position—they were left in that position because of the American refusal to come in—that they stood alone in taking the lead in resisting every drastic and extreme proposal put forward. We were always resisting; we were always cutting down; we were always pleading for moderation. The result was, undoubtedly, that French opinion blamed Britain, especially blamed me, and said, "This is an unsympathetic British Government"; and when the new Government came in they hailed it as a sympathetic Government, and said they would get more sympathetic treatment. My right hon. Friend had undoubtedly that preliminary psychological advantage at the Conference. In addition to that, he came forward with a very liberal proposal, a very generous proposal. Nobody can doubt that who read it. He found the present French Government just as intractable, just as implacable as—in fact even more so than—I had ever found them; and again came a refusal. And upon a default of 10 per cent. in coal deliveries—because default on general reparations had not been declared then—upon a default of 10 per cent. of coal deliveries, this serious step of invading Germany, occupying the Ruhr Valley—an operation which has already involved a great army from France—was undertaken. It is difficult to believe, having regard to all that, that reparation was the only purpose, and that is what adds to the gravity of the whole situation, in my judgment, and makes it necessary to clear it up.
Reparation is not beyond being settled. It is because I believe in the justice of reparation that I regret this. I believe it endangers reparation. If it fails, I believe reparations will be gone. If it succeeds, the cost will be so great that reparations will be irrecoverable. I believe in the justice of reparations; I believe in the wisdom of reparations. To allow a country wantonly to devastate another country, and never put forward claims for damage and repair, is in itself an encouragement to every invader, an encouragement to militarism in its worst form. It is a deterrent which has been incorporated in every law in the world. But any lawyer who has practised knows that there is nothing that requires more judgment than the extent to which you are to press your verdict for costs and damages against a defendant whose assets are not adequate to paying the whole. That is a very difficult matter upon which to advise. You know perfectly well that the defendant will minimise his assets, deliberately. When he comes to pay he takes a very pessimistic view of his capacity to pay. He is in no hurry to reveal his bank accounts, and he puts all his property down at something rather under its value. It is not an auction-room valuation. You have that on the one side. On the other hand, you know he cannot pay the whole. But you have a client, sore, angry, not believing a word the other fellow says, and suspicious of everyone; and if you go to him, and say to him, as a solicitor, "I have come to the conclusion, on the examination of the assets, that you cannot recover one-tenth of what you spent in costs—what you have paid counsel, especially, not to speak of the solicitor—and of the damages which have been inflicted," he suspects you on the spot. He will think that you are sympathising with the other side, and the chances are he will change his solicitor. In France they constantly change them. In these cases every adviser has to decide between cash and smash. France is trying both. She cannot. You have got to decide between the two, and the pity is that France has not an adviser who will tell her what England already knows, what she can recover—
You mean Britain?
I beg pardon. I accept that. I am the last man in the world who ought to have made that mistake. Britain already understands that, and the misfortune is that France has not been told. But I believe that France is understanding it. I do not accept the view taken by my hon. Friend that France is entirely behind this action. I am doubtful about that. Look at what has happened in France during the last few weeks, since the Ruhr policy developed. Someone told me they have had 17 bye-elections, and they have all gone against the Government and in favour of very extreme anti—I will not say anti-Treaty people—[HON. MEMBERS: "Pro-German!"] No, not pro-German, but an anti-extreme reparations view. That is the condition in France, and I believe that if it had been possible to put off the invasion of the Ruhr Valley for a few months, French opinion would have made it impossible for any Government to take this action. What has happened in the Ruhr Valley? The operation is developing far beyond what the Government revealed. I will go beyond that, and say it has developed beyond what the French Government ever conceived. What was their first statement? They said, "We are not going to occupy the Ruhr. We are going to send engineers there to control the mines. They must be protected, so we will send a few troops." I think the numbers were about 40,000. There are three or four times as many at the present moment. I am told there are very nearly four times.
There was a very remarkable statement in the "Petit Journal" last week, and I call the attention of the House of Commons to it, and especially the attention of those who think France has been acting wisely, and that they are likely to succeed in recovering reparations by this course:
The Germans thought in 1914 that terrorism was all that was needed. Fear is never the last word in human action. There is a national spirit, there is a sense of justice, there is a sense of outrage against anything in the nature of a wrong. That is deeper and it is fiercer when aroused. The national spirit of Germany, which for four years I saw humbled, broken, its great statesmen coming and saying, "What would you like us to do?"—that spirit which was humiliated is for the first time since the Armistice aroused by this action. It was a gross blunder to have come up against it. That is the trouble. France has committed herself, and it is very difficult for her to withdraw. Her pride is engaged and the pride of Germany is engaged—two brave nations, each of them capable of endurance, each of them capable of sacrifice—who can deny the sacrifices both have made, one for a good cause and one as we think for a bad cause, but each for its race and its land? The pride of two great peoples has been aroused and they stand in a position of gleaming defiance. That is the position at the present moment. It was a sad mistake. My right hon. Friend has no responsibility for it. He did his best as a faithful Ally to persuade France not to commit herself, and I am only entreating him now to show the same friendship by taking an additional step.
Who can tell what is going to happen? I would not like to say. My hon. Friend gave a gloomy picture of possible anarchy and bloodshed and of the kind of guerilla fighting that you have in Ireland. It has all been indicated in every newspaper reporting what happens in Germany. It has happened before. You may even break up Germany. Who gains by that?
We do.
My right hon. Friend is making the saddest mistake. If Germany breaks up, reparations at any rate go. You will be dealing with six capitals instead of one. Disarmament goes. You cannot control six different States, many of them hundreds of miles removed from the French frontier, and if you have revolution, revolution in Germany is a greater danger to France, a greater danger to Britain, and a greater danger to Europe than it is to Germany. You have troops in Germany. We have few, France has many. The German troops were infected in Russia. That did more to break up Germany even than armies. It broke up the nation behind them. They are pursuing a course of unutterable peril. I am all for security for France. I was the first to propose the pact, that the might of America, the might of Britain, and of the whole Empire should be behind France if she were attacked by an invading Germany. When America failed to ratify that pact I am proud to say that with the sanction of my colleagues I proposed that Britain alone should stand by France if she were attacked by belligerent Germany. It was accepted by M. Briand. It was rejected by M. Poincaré. I am all for security for France—security either from Britain or security from the League of Nations—but what security is there to seek in the Ruhr? The Ruhr is an open salient without any natural frontier. I do not believe that any military adviser of France has ever committed himself to the proposition that France ought to seize the Ruhr. I never saw any enthusiasm when the question was referred to in the presence of the military experts. It is a most dangerous position to put an army into. It is an absolutely untenable position for anyone to hold. They are giving hostages to a possible enemy. Security for France! It is peril for France. It may bring disaster in a military sense for France. I do not believe the military had anything to do with it. Their part of the work has been done, I understand, perfectly. The machinery is the admiration of everyone who has been there. I can believe it. Anything that Marshal Foch and Marshal Weigand had any part in directing, and scheming, and planning would be as perfect as anything of its kind could be. They are among the greatest military minds of the age. But it was ill-conceived and ill-thought out, there was a lack of vision in it, and if we are real friends of France—and I think we are—we will do our best to extricate France from this enterprise ere it becomes too late. Three weeks ago I saw the flaming headlines:
"GERMANY CLIMBS DOWN."
Nine or ten days afterwards I saw
"NEW PLAN FOR THE COERCION OF GERMANY,"
and some time ago,
"GERMANY CAPITULATES"
and
"GERMANY HARDENING,"
and the last thing I saw in an evening paper before I came in here,
"NEW ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY."
Four weeks have gone, and I beg the Government to take action, and take it now. I proposed the League of Nations in August, but there was no definite break, and therefore I could not formally propose it in a dispatch. M. Poincaré then said he could not accept it, and he took up this ground, that he could not refer any question under the Treaty of Versailles to the League of Nations. That is an amazing position. It is an absurd position. It is an untenable position. It is a position that France has never taken. The dispute between Poland and Germany was under the Treaty of Versailles. That was referred to the League of Nations with the assent of France, and to say that a Treaty which has parcelled out the whole of Western Europe, a Treaty upon the working of which, well or badly, the life of Europe will depend for the next generation or two, is to be excluded, and every question under it is to be excluded, from the operation of the League of Nations, is a perfectly ridiculous contention. I hope my right hon. Friend will not accept it. Under the Treaty of Versailles—and this is forgotten by the friends of the Treaty as well as by its opponents—the League of Nations is an essential part of the Treaty. It is the first part of it; it is the basis of it. Therefore, we are entitled to urge it upon M. Poincaré, who, above all others, has claimed the Treaty, the whole Treaty, and nothing but the Treaty. For that reason, I hope that we shall press it. My right hon. Friend the Member for the combined Universities (Mr. Fisher) has put the case of America. It is essential that America should come in. I am surprised at the attitude of the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin. He said he sincerely trusted that we would not go to America and ask her to come in. That is not the proposition. It is America herself who proposed to come in. America, four days before the Paris Convention, undoubtedly with the idea that the matter would be discussed on that occasion, proposed that experts should be appointed to examine anew the whole question of reparations, what Germany could pay, and how she should pay, and there was a very significant phrase which my right hon. Friend read, and which, I think, is worth reading again, as to what America would do in those circumstances. Mr. Hughes said: A most significant phrase! If I may so describe it, it is a most opulent phrase. Reparations and restoration cannot possibly succeed without the help of America. I do not agree with the Noble Lord that we can do it alone. We cannot. We must get the help of America. They have the gold of the world locked in their chests, and they are suffering from indigestion, from real surfeit. They have a moral responsibility, They helped to create the situation. They came in at least a year before the end of the war. They helped to break up Germany. They have a moral responsibility. Their President signed the Treaty with these Clauses, and although the Senate rejected the Treaty, it rejected it, not on the ground of the reparation Clauses, but because it could not accept the League of Nations. They morally accepted the position, and I am sure that Mr. Hughes recognised that when he made this very important offer. Was it discussed? Was it brought before the Conference? If it was, I should like to know what was the answer, because I think it is of the first importance that it should be pressed home.
The United States of America may say: "Well, we are a Republican Government that rejected the League of Nations. Therefore we cannot, consistently with the policy for which we came into power, accept an invitation to the League of Nations." What really matters is getting America in, within or without the League of Nations. If America says: "We will not come within the League; we will come without the League," then I say accept her offer. That is urgent; that is important. I hope the Government have sounded the American Government as to whether they are standing by the proposal they then made—made with a view of the contingency, as Mr. Hughes put it, of the failure of the Paris Conference. That contingency has arisen. Have advances been made to America? Have they been sounded whether they stand by that offer? I do not believe that whatever speeches are made, whatever articles are written, that France, obsessed as she must be with her difficulties now, would refuse an offer made by the two greatest Powers on earth that saved her from being in the position that Germany is in to-day. That seems to me to be the urgent matter for the moment. Get America in. If with the League of Nations all the better; if without, accept her.
The revision of the Treaty will create difficulties. I have either listened to or I have read the speeches made upon that subject. There is no proposal put forward from the benches above the Gangway that could not be carried within the four corners of the Treaty. Cutting down reparations; that could be done under the Treaty. The introduction of America; that could be done under the Treaty. Reference to the League of Nations; that could be done under the Treaty. Even the revision of boundaries, which my hon. Friend, with his anti-national sentiments, which I deplore so sadly, would like—even that could be done under the Treaty. It is true you must have the consent of France, but so you must as to revision. If you go to France and say, "Let us have a great World Conference"—I am referring to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Miles Platting (Mr. Clynes) said—"let us reopen the whole question; let us recast the Treaty upon new principles," how many of the Allies would attend that Conference? If we went we should be alone, absolutely alone. You simply there give the impression to all the Powers that every question which has been decided in their favour would be reopened. Alsace-Lorraine, the creation of an independent Poland, the concessions made to Belgium, the concessions made to Italy, the creation of Czecho-Slovakia as an independent Republic, Jugo-Slavia, Rumania—every one of these countries would say, "Once more we are to become an open question." That is not the way to settle the dispute in the Ruhr, or any other dispute.
I press the Government, and I urge them to approach America on the basis of Mr. Hughes' very important declaration, which, oddly enough, has not received much attention in this country. When I first read it, I was in the south of Spain. I thought it was one of the most momentous declarations that had been made since 1918. I certainly thought that England would be ringing with it—and Britain. I thought it was the one question that would dominate the Paris Conference. I was surprised to find that it attracted very little attention, coming from that great country, that very powerful country, that friendly country, and that country whose co-operation is essential to any settlemeent of a restored world. Above all, if this question is going to be entered into, we must have a new attitude and temper in the dealings with Germany. Sometimes you are forced to do business in life with men you dislike. In fact, if you do not, you never do any business at all. You cannot blacklist customers, except on financial grounds when they do not pay. A man comes into your shop. You do not think much of him. You dislike him, but you fix things up. You have agreed, and on the whole you have got rather a good bargain out of him. Alsace-Lorraine is not a bad bargain. Togoland and the Cameroons were not bad bargains. You destroyed their armies completely. You got a good deal. If every time that man comes to your shop and stands at your counter you scowl at him and snap his head off, it is bound to end in a rupture.
You cannot do business on pariah principles. Unfortunately, the dealing with Germany has been a series of sulky and snappish barks—notes, ultimatums, speeches and articles for four years. I do not believe that is the way to restore the peace of Central Europe or to recover reparations, and I trust that when there is a settlement of this question there will be a new method of dealing. M. Millerand agreed to meet the Germans, M. Briand too. At Cannes—here I invoke the testimony of my right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Robert Horne), I think it was this time last year, we were in a fair way to settling, by discussion with the Germans, the whole future of reparations. Then came the new policy—no more conferences; send them Notes. I hope that will come to an end. Above all, I entreat the Government to move, to take the initiative, to approach the United States of America. Having approached them, we can together approach France, and I believe these two great countries together, Great Britain and the United States of America, will be able to get rid of the difficulty which has been hanging like a cloud upon the fortunes of Europe.
We have listened to some remarkable speeches, speeches which at any rate indicate to the friends of the League of Nations what they have lost and what they have gained. If my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) will permit me to say so, in his position of less responsibility but greater freedom he has, in my opinion, delivered a speech in support of the League of Nations which for force and enthusiasm excelled any speech that I heard him deliver on this subject during the whole time he was occupying the position of Prime Minister. To that extent the Debate indicates what the friends of the League of Nations have gained. But we also listened to a speech from the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) which, especially in its concluding part, went to show the friends of the League of Nations what they have lost. I followed him very carefully as he analysed the four points contained in this Amendment. He did it with a great fairness and impartiality, and I was expecting that he would in his conclusion declare that he would accompany those of us, who have consistently supported on every occasion the League of Nations when we invariably had him with us, into the Division Lobby in support of the Amendment. Imagine our surprise and disappointment at the conclusion of his speech, which was that he could advise the Government to persist in its present policy, in a policy of benevolent neutrality that has been condemned freely in every quarter of the House since this Session opened.
The speech of the Noble Lord not only surprised Members of this House, but it will surprise and disappoint multitudes of friends of the League of Nations in the country, and that great organisation that he has done so much to bring into being will be the poorer for the deliverance which he has made to the House and to the country this afternoon. At the close of Questions my colleague the Member for Keighley (Mr. Lees-Smith) raised a question of Order and expressed the opinion that the similarity of this Amendment to that upon which we voted on Friday was so great as to make this Amendment out of order. I hold an entirely different opinion. I think that our Amendment was more comprehensive and probably, in the circumstances, was objected to by some Members of the House who would be prepared to support the less drastic and less comprehensive Amendment now under consideration, and for that reason alone I think it is well that we should have this discussion. At any rate, I have risen on behalf of the Labour party to support the Amendment. We recommended our Members to support it in the Division Lobby, and I hope to give reasons why they should do so.
The Amendment raises clear and definite issues. It rejects the policy which has been pursued by France and Belgium in the Ruhr. It declares, and I think rightly so, that the future peace of Europe cannot be safeguarded nor the recovery of reparations promoted by any such policy. It gives expression to the urgent necessity for effective security against aggression being sought through international guarantees through the League of Nations. Finally, it suggests that the United States of America should be invited to co-operate in finding a solution of the reparations problem. In a word, the Amendment directs the attention of this House to the main cause of Europe's inability to establish stable economic and political conditions, the futility and danger of the policy which is being pursued by our Allies in relation to Germany, and suggests that the whole problem ought to be referred for settlement by international co-operation. It cannot be disputed that the situation that has been created is positively desperate, and that it really demands a considered and comprehensive policy based on definite principles. This problem with which we are confronted is not merely an Allied problem, for its grave effects are not restricted to the Allies. It is a world problem, worldwide in its consequences, and one that will require the best of the world's statesmanship if any real solution is to be found.
In supporting this Amendment and in whole-heartedly endorsing the proposal that the question of reparations and of the occupied territory should be referred to the League of Nations I desire to make quite clear what is our policy towards France. This is necessary, I think, for speeches were delivered during the previous sittings of this Session which indicate that some Members are under a real misapprehension as to the position of the Labour party. It has been suggested for instance that we on these benches are more favourable to Germany than to France, that we are pro-German and anti-French and that we would free Germany entirely from making of reparations to the Allied peoples. These assertions are a complete misrepresentation. The Labour party is neither pro-German nor anti-French. Never has it taken any decision which can be interpreted to mean that Germany should be released from her obligation to make reparation for damage done by her armies during the War. I would remind the House that Labour has its international organisation, international ideals and an international following. This is why we reject the old system of diplomacy, the old conception of a policy, based upon the balance of power, which led to the great conflict of nations in 1914. We have repeatedly declared, through national and international conferences, our strong conviction that international competition and hatred must be limited by international co-operation and friendship. World peace is the bed-rock aim of Labour's policy. Not the peace that is merely the breathing space between mighty struggles, but the enduring and abiding peace that will permit of active and friendly co-operation among all the nations of the world.
7.0 P.M.
It is because we believe that the policy which is now pursued by France towards Germany is a danger to the peace of Europe, and because we are convinced that it will not achieve the end for which it was professedly conceived, that we are strongly and, may I say, unitedly opposed to it. To suggest that it is due to anti-French and pro-German feeling, to hint that we are indifferent to the well-being of the French people, is a flagrant misrepresentation. We do not believe that the French people are going to benefit by the policy of military occupation and control which their Government have established in the Ruhr. We believe that instead of this sort of action resulting in larger and more frequent payment of reparations being made by Germany, it will have the very opposite results, and will render reparation payments even more uncertain than they have been in the recent past. We hold these views very strongly, but that does not warrant any Member opposite suggesting that the Labour party is prepared to release Germany from its obligations. The time may come, and I believe that it will come, when all the nations engaged in the Great War, debtor and creditor nations, will be compelled by force of circumstances to come together and reconsider the whole question of war indebtedness in whatever category it may now be placed. The policy of the Labour party on this matter of reparations is clear and definite, and I want to quote from an official statement issued in December, 1921, when we declared: being ready to release Germany from obligations which the German Socialists have accepted and will honourably seek to meet. The main point, so far as Labour sees this very knotty problem, is to remove it from the limited conference of Allies, or of some of the Allies, and transfer it immediately to a genuine international tribunal.
The Amendment before the House proposes its reference to the League of Nations. With that we are in hearty agreement. It is difficult for some of us to understand why our own Government has not pressed that this policy in the Ruhr should be brought before the League of Nations. We know the explanation that has been given by the Noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, and I want to bring this to the notice of the House. Explaining why the effort to bring the matter of the Ruhr before the League failed at Paris, Lord Curzon said: League can act with comprehension and that it will act with speed and effectiveness. I say this, despite the fact that the League, as it is at present, in our judgment, falls far short of what the League of Nations really ought to be. Its membership, constitution, and procedure do not satisfy us. It is too much in the nature of an Allied instrument, instead of being a free and impartial international body. We want to see included in its members those nations which, up to the present have been excluded from membership. We are convinced that reference to the League, as at present constituted, would be far more acceptable than the present method of dealing with the problem under the policy of the French Government. Labour is strongly of the opinion, however, that the body which is called upon to handle the problem should be an international organisation in the fullest and widest sense, and, accordingly, should include both Germany and Russia.
For four years the Allies have persisted in regarding the problem of Separation as a purely Allied problem. The result is the very threatening situation that now exists. The British Government finds itself to-day in an almost intolerable position. The Prime Minister does not like the action of France in invading the Ruhr. He has declined to associate himself with M. Poincaré in this adventure. He realises only too well that it is creating a situation full of menace to the peace of Europe, and that the action of the French Government is overstraining the ties between this country and France. The present policy of France can never be, in our opinion, the policy of this country. No British Government can ever associate itself with a policy that aims at the dismemberment of Germany and is calculated to bring about her economic ruin, and that appears to us to be the aim of the French Prime Minister. He demands impossible reparation, applies one sanction after another on the ground of default, and is full of fear lest Germany should recover sufficiently economically as to be able to meet the Allied claims. I do not think he has any desire to see Germany recover her freedom. He would infinitely prefer to retain the strangle-hold over Germany which the Versailles Treaty gave to France. So long as this policy is pur- sued, in our judgment, the peace of Europe will be constantly menaced.
We on these benches, in spite of all that has been said to the contrary, desire to see friendly relations maintained with the French people, but we cannot support any French Government which chooses to act as the military dictator of Europe. To follow the French Government in this policy can only mean that there will be no security either for the French or for the rest of Europe. If France is influenced by fears that are well founded, of future suspected dangers of attack, she is entitled to security; but that security should be secured through an all-inclusive and more powerful League of Nations. What Labour cannot approve is that Germany should be isolated and ostracised, and kept in economic subjection and financial embarassment because the French Government is obsessed by fears which are largely the result of its own reactionary policy.
Finally, I desire to associate myself with my colleagues who have spoken earlier in the Debate, and have declared that this country cannot maintain its present attitude of so-called benevolent neutrality. Already complications have arisen between us and France, and they are likely to become aggravated as time passes. In our interests, as in the interests of France, it is imperative that steps should be taken to remove the settlement of the reparation issue from the field of force and sanctions to the chamber of negotiations. This can be done with less loss of dignity to France now than may be possible three months hence. Great Britain, as an Ally, can take the initiative and make the way easy for France to tread. The Charter of the League of Nations contains, as I have shown, a provision designed to meet just such a difficulty as that which is endangering the peace of Europe to-day.
I should like to address a word to the Chancellor of the Exchequer as the Prime Minister is not present at the moment. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) when he regretted that the Government should make the Vote on this Amendment a matter of confidence and regard it, if carried, as a Vote of Censure. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman when he said that if this Vote were properly used to-night it might be the finest indication to the French Government and the French people that there was a united Britain against the policy for which the French Government has made itself responsible. It would be a definite mandate to proceed along the only lines which offer a dignified escape to France from the growing complications in the Ruhr, and provide a promising alternative method for dealing with the thorny problem of reparation. I hope it will not be too late, when the Prime Minister speaks for the Amendment not to be made a Vote of Censure, but that the right hon. Gentleman will be prepared to leave it to a free House, and see whether he could not get such a Vote as would authorise him to go forward in the policy which we believe he himself has at heart, and therefore in that way be able to bring much greater moral influence upon the French Government and the French people than the Government are ever able to do by putting on their Whips and securing a majority against the Amendment.
The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken apparently does not understand that an Amendment to the Address must necessarily be a Vote of Censure. I can remember only one Amendment to the Address which was carried—an Amendment moved by Mr. Labouchere when Sir William Harcourt was leading the House. The result was that Sir William Harcourt withdrew the Address and brought in another Address. It is evident that an Amendment to an Address is taken as a Vote of Censure, because it means that that particular Amendment ought to have been in the Address, and that the Government did wrong in not including it in the Address. It would be absolutely impossible for any Government, even a Labour Government, to accept an Amendment to the Address. Before I say a word upon the Amendment, I would like to remind the last speaker that he was rather hard on my Noble Friend the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil). The right hon. Gentleman said it was very inconsistent of the Noble Lord, because about two years ago the Noble Lord was in favour of referring something of this sort to the League of Nations and now he had changed him mind.
I did not make that statement.
The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) said something of the sort, and I understood that the last speaker agreed. I am glad that I am wrong. The ex-Prime Minister has done exactly the same thing himself. Having put up his biggest gun to demolish my Noble Friend in March, 1921, he now turns round and takes exactly the opposite side. I am not surprised at that, because the ex-Prime Minister is never of the same opinion two years running or even six months running. He was hardly fair to my Noble Friend, with whom I do not always agree. My Noble Friend is certainly consistent in his actions in this House. The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken said that it would be a very great thing if we could induce the French Government to understand that this House and the country were strongly opposed to the occupation of the Ruhr Valley. But is that correct? I am only a humble Member, but I am strongly in favour of the occupation of the Ruhr Valley. I will give my reasons. Though I do not pretend to speak for the country, as far as my small circle of acquaintances goes I believe the great majority of them are of the same opinion as myself. I do not think it is at all correct to say that the majority of people are against the French in this matter. I support my friends and I oppose my enemies. It seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman and the ex-Prime Minister are doing exactly the opposite—they are supporting their enemies and opposing their friends.
I regret very much the speech of the ex-Prime Minister, because I believe that it will do a very great deal of harm in France. What did the right hon. Gentleman go out of his way to say? He first of all said that the occupation of the Ruhr was a mistake; secondly, that it would lead to disaster; thirdly, that it would not bring any reparation; and, fourthly, that the real object of the French was not to get reparation, but something else. There are four statements which will certainly not commend themselves to the French people or to the French Government. They are likely to make the situation worse, because they are likely to encourage the Germans in the attitude they have taken up. It is said that we should have another conference. For God's sake, do not let us have any more conferences. We have had enough of conferences. We have had nothing but conferences since the Versailles Treaty, and they have all resulted in nothing. Do not let us have any more.
Why should not France endeavour to obtain that which is her just due and do something of what Germany would have done to us and France if Germany had won the War? I am sorry that the hon. Member for the Colne Valley (Mr. Snowden) is not in the House at the moment. I disagree with every word he said, but from his point of view he made an extremely clever speech. I ventured to interrupt him and ask what Germany would have done if she had won the War. The hon. Member said he did not know. He ought to have known, because Germany told us over and over again what she would have done. She would have occupied the conquered countries until she had taken the last farthing which she thought necessary to repay the whole cost of the War. There is no question about that. Why should we suddenly turn round and become the generous supporters of the Germans, who, after all, brought about the War, inflicted unemployment on this country, behaved in a way in which few civilised nations have behaved during War, and murdered many of our prisoners. I cannot see why there should be this sudden change and why France should be told that she is to take, relatively speaking, a back seat, and that our desire is to re-establish Germany.
What took place before the War? Were we not told that Germany was dumping goods in England, and did we not have a Merchandise Marks Act to prevent German goods coming over here? Now, apparently, all that we desire to do is to assist Germany to send goods over here to compete with our own people. The idea that we are going to gain something commercially by re-establishing Germany is a great mistake. But there is something beyond that. I believe that if the Germans were given time to recover they would use that time in order again to commence a European war. What did the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) and the ex-Prime Minister say during the War? They said in effect, "We shall never make peace with Germany until we have taken such steps as will prevent her ever doing anything of the sort again." At that time I thought that that was rather a strong order, because I thought then, and think now, that you cannot crush a great nation like Germany. I was rather in favour of Lord Lansdowne's proposals, made about a year or more before the Armistice—I remember saying to the Unionist War Committee that unless we were very careful we should be bled white in endeavouring to crush a great nation. We have been bled white, and now, apparently, instead of endeavouring to crush the German nation, we are anxious to put that nation on its legs again and prevent our Allies, who suffered untold horrors at the hands of these people, getting the reparations to which they are justly entitled.
The Mover of the Amendment and the ex-Prime Minister said that there should be a Commission set up to ascertain what Germany can pay. There has been certainly one Commission set up already. I remember that the ex-Prime Minister, in the election of 1918, said that he was going to search the pockets of the Germans, and informed the electors that he had set up a Committee of bankers to report to him what Germany could pay, and, as far as I remember, the Committee reported that Germany could pay something like 10,000 millions or 11,000 millions. Now the right hon. Gentleman comes down and talks about £2,500,000,000 or even less. When the right hon. Gentleman alluded to the break-up of Germany, Members on this side of the House asked "Why not?" I am surprised that he was so indignant. After all, before the union of the various States which made up Germany we had peace, more or less, in the world. It was the union of those States which created a great and powerful nation, and when that nation was at the zenith of its prosperity it conceived the idea of conquering the world, and brought all this misery upon us. I sincerely hope that the French nation will note that the bulk of the English people have not forgotten the late War, and are prepared to stand by their freinds and oppose their enemies.
It is some years since I was in business. I then had relations with Germany. I never found that you could get anything out of a German unless he was quite certain that you were top dog and that he would be obliged to pay. My belief is that if, in conjunction with ourselves, the French had occupied the Ruhr Valley a year ago, they would have got what they wanted and they would have preserved the peace of the world for a long time to come. One speaker on the Address has suggested that Germany should be asked to join the League of Nations and to give an undertaking. What is the value of the undertaking? What about the scrap of paper? The value would not be worth a flick of the finger if Germany had a strong army and had recovered financially. How anyone with a knowledge of what has happened in the last eight years can suppose that it is any use whatever making a bargain with Germany by word of mouth, unless you have a strong force with fixed bayonets and loaded rifles behind you, passes my comprehension. It is all very well for the Mover of this Amendment. He is lost and immersed in all his great historical researches, in rooms that are surrounded by books and other authorities of that kind.
I wish I were.
The right hon. Gentleman thinks that everyone else is like himself; but he does not understand human nature or the nature of the Germans. Let me warn him. I ask the right hon. Gentleman never to trust in Germany again. Let him support the people for whom we have fought and suffered. I admit the French ought to be grateful to us for what we have done. We fought and bled and suffered, and do not let us be led away again as we were before. Remember the Liberal policy of 1912 and 1913. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen then said there was no fear of Germany. They said the idea of Germany attacking England was absurd. It will be admitted that they were wrong then, but they are like the Bourbons—they never learn, and they never forget. Therefore I say, let us not be led away again, but let us remember that what is much better than the League of Nations is:
"When a strong man armed, keepeth his palace."
I do not think anyone could venture to take part in this Debate, certainly not a new Member who must ask the customary indulgence of the House, without realising the extraordinary difficulty which faces the Government in this most complex of all possible situations. He must realise the obvious goodwill and candour which the Government has shown; and that they, as much as anybody else, are determined in the first instance to bring European peace, if they can, out of the present welter. At the same time, he must realise the disadvantage at which is he placed by the fact that he has not got the knowledge to which the Government alone can pretend. I do not share the suspicions suggested by some hon. Members of the machinations of the British Foreign Office. I believe the British Foreign Office more than any other takes an international as well as a national point of view in deciding its policy and its methods, and I am fully prepared to believe that the Foreign Office has tried, and is trying, all manner of means of bringing about a satisfactory settlement, and a more reasonable frame of mind, as we should consider it, on the part of France. I have no suspicions of the Foreign Office in that way. I only regret that they are so very modest. I believe that in the long, tangled history of the reparations question there have been various occasions on which a great deal of good would have resulted had the British Government been more willing to make known their policy, had they, after negotiations in which they took part with foreign countries, been willing to make more clear what efforts they had made, and had they been prepared to publish and be justified in various cases. Although it is perfectly obvious that indiscriminate publicity is impossible if diplomacy is to have any success at all, still I believe as against this risk of unwise publicity there is an equally strong, or possibly a greater, risk of unwise suppression. The foreign policy of this country and of other countries at the present time must depend upon public opinion. It is quite different from what it was 100 years ago, and the Foreign Office will never get that public opinion behind it unless it gives information and takes the lead which it has the right to take.
I am thinking in particular of one instance of the almost coy reluctance of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and that is in regard to allowing no inkling to come out as to the opinion of the Government on the legality of the French action. With the wisdom of that action I do not propose to concern myself. The right hon. Baronet who has just spoken will receive an answer from the Treasury Bench, which it would be presumptuous for anyone here to attempt to better. It may be said that it is pedantic to raise the question of legality in view of all the tragic happenings of the past few weeks and the tragic possibilities of the next few weeks. But I do not believe that is so. It is unworthy of a country like ours to ignore the question of legality. In 1914 we talked a great deal—and rightly so—about the public law of Europe. In 1919 we signed the Covenant of the League of Nations in which reference is made to the "scrupulous respect of Treaty obligations" as being one of those points on which we were determined to lay stress. It seems unworthy of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen to make light of the question of legality at the present time. It is not a question of friendship with France. It is not showing the truest friendship to make France believe that we take only a little interest in this matter. It is clearly stated in the Treaty of Versailles that the Reparations Commission "shall have authority to interpret the provisions" of the reparations part of the Treaty. It is further stated that unanimity is necessary on the question of the interpretation of these provisions. It is also laid down that ejusdem generis —that is to say, a general expression following a more limited expression is to be taken as being construed in the general scope and bearings of the words which have gone before. Paragraph 18 of Annex II to the reparations part of the Treaty enacts what the Treaty lays down with regard to the measures which the Allies shall have the right to take in the case of voluntary default by Germany and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war. These "may include financial and economic prohibitions and reprisals, and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances." There are therefore these two quite definite legal points. First, whether the respective Governments agreed to France taking separate action, and, secondly, whether "financial and economic prohibitions and reprisals and such other measures" can be taken as including what is, as a matter of fact, invasion and an act of war. The country has a right to know what position is taken up by the Government on that point, and I beg that the Government will let us know before the end of the Debate what view they take on this question of legality instead of hiding themselves behind a polite avoidance of it. What is the position supposing the question of legality is to be decided against the French Government? It was maintained in May, 1921, when a similar topic was being debated, that the right of Ourselves and the French to invade the Ruhr Valley did not rest on the Treaty provisions at all, but rested on the right of a party to a Treaty which was being violated to help itself by any means. If that be so, we ought to be told. If this action is not being taken under the Treaty then it amounts to an act of war and in that case it is a question upon which the League of Nations should be consulted. Whatever was the right of Governments as parties to Treaties which had been broken, before the signing of the Covenant, since the signing of the Covenant they have no right to take the law into their own hands, and invade a foreign country. They are bound to seek a possible solution either by conciliation or by arbitration through the League of Nations. It may well be asked, what is the difference between a real state of war and what has arisen in the Ruhr Valley? War need not only come like a thief in the night as it did in 1914. It may also come like a policeman or a bailiff in the daytime. That is what is arising at the present time.
The weakness of the Government's position is that it gives rise to a possible delay of weeks or months, and nobody can tell what will happen in these months. The issues are incalculable. It is there that the weakness of the policy of benevolent neutrality comes in. I do not know who first invented the phrase "benevolent neutrality," but it is not a very happy one, nor does it seem that the position in which we are placed is one that can be described as happy. Supposing you live in a crowded street and your friend sets fire to the house of his neighbour, is benevolent neutrality the part of friendship? That is what we are claiming at the present time. If, as the Government and a majority of the House believe, the action of France is thoroughly unwise, and bound to be disastrous, not only to Germany and Europe as a whole, but to France herself from the war of revenge which it seems bound to bring about—in that case surely the part of the true friend of France is not benevolent neutrality, but benevolent opposition. That it seems to me is the only policy on which we can embark if we are not to allow the weeks and months to drag on into inevitable chaos. By benevolent opposition I mean only diplomatic opposition, but it seems necessary that we should take a stronger line than we are taking at the present time. I doubt very much whether immediate reference of this problem to the League of Nations would bring about any immediate solution. I think possibly not, but I believe ultimately it is only in the League of Nations that a solution of the question can be found. Though that solution may not be immediate, an immediate reference to the League of Nations might be of the greatest advantage.
I urge the Government to lose no opportunity of bringing strong diplomatic pressure to bear, of mobilising the opinion and the moral force of all the European Governments and the American Government in order to make the pressure almost irresistible, when at last it is judged wise to impress on France the desirability of referring the matter to the League of Nations. I propose to vote for this Amendment, because I think it is of importance that it should be known that a great number of Members of this House are in favour of a reference to the League of Nations, believing that by mere benevolent neutrality at the present time we are running the appalling risks of delay. In the meantime, there are two actions which I think it would be disastrous for our Government to take. The first of them is to withdraw the British troops from Cologne and the bridge-head. From everything that I can hear of opinion in occupied Germany and elsewhere, it seems to me that such a gesture would be a mere empty gesture of disgust and annoyance, and would bring about no possible good at all. We have no quarrel, at any rater with the Germans of the occupied territory on the left bank of the Rhine. With them we have worked on excellent terms for the last few years, and nothing would be served by leaving this island in the raging ocean of madness prevailing there at the present time. Secondly, I deeply hope we shall not lend any colour or support to the French attitude such as we should lend if we determined to give them rights and facilities of making use of the British occupied territory themselves.
I am thoroughly in sympathy with the object which this Amendment is intended to obtain, but I cannot support the Amendment, because I believe that it is unworkable and is bound to be injurious to the future usefulness of the League of Nations. The League of Nations, to be successful, must have in it the great nations of the world. They must be determined with enthusiasm to put an end to war as the arbiter of disputes and to arrange that future disputes shall be settled by the League of Nations under rules based on equity and fair play. The League of to-day does not number amongst its members the United States of America, Germany, or Russia; it is not a League of all the nations of the world. No country like France, with her recollection of her awful sacrifices in the past, can dare to risk its future on any dictum of the League of Nations as constituted to-day, knowing that the League cannot enforce its decisions, either by the use of armed forces or by the pressure of world opinion. I hope the day will come when the League will represent all the great and small Powers and be in a position so to regulate international relations as to prevent conditions arising like those from which we are suffering to-day.
The position in Europe was well described last week by the hon. Member for the Colne Valley (Mr. Snowden), but I go further than he does. I firmly believe that European civilisation is in immediate danger, and that, unless some prompt steps are taken for the settlement of Europe, famine, anarchy, and barbarism may gain a foothold that it may take years to remove. Why is Europe in this awful condition? Europe for centuries has led the world in the paths of civilisation, but she has seldom followed the maxims of peace and goodwill, and when disputes arise facile princeps amongst those who helped to make the Versailles Treaty, but the American Senate refused to confirm what its own President had helped to construct. America, being equally responsible with the other nations who drew up the Versailles Treaty, seems to me to be morally bound to help in the straightening out of the present tangle. It is, therefore, useless, in my opinion, to submit the question to the League of Nations, of which America is not a member.
No war is over until a settlement is reached that can be carried out. The Versailles Treaty is failing, and subsequent agreements arrived at under its terms cannot be carried out. France knows it, we know it, and Germany knows that we know it. Until a settlement is arrived at that is workable, the Allies who fought and won ought to work together just as closely as they did in the days of battle. The call to America today is as strong as it was in 1917. Liberty and civilisation are in danger, and when America realises that, I am confident that no distance from the danger zone nor fear of embroilment in future European wars will prevent her from coming over and lending her hand in trying to reach a settlement. America is often misunderstood. We must not forget that her population is drawn from the peoples of so many countries that there must be varied sympathies whenever Europe is concerned. It is when the interests of the American Republic itself are at stake that we can expect unanimity. America has a great future, but I am confident that she will not refrain from using her influence to secure a peaceful settlement in Europe. The matter is one that we all regard as so serious that I do not feel like following the lines of any particular reason for success not having been obtained so far. The hon. Member who preceded me (Mr. J. Butler) made what I presume was a maiden speech in this House, but it was one that showed it was not a maiden speech for him in other places, and I should like, with all due respect, to congratulate the House on having a man like he is, who ventures to deal, perhaps, with matters that some of us are not quite competent to follow. I refer to the legal matters of which he spoke.
I have ventured to intervene on this august occasion and at the same time to seek the indulgence of the House as a new and untried Member, because I feel very strongly that the Treasury Bench should be made aware that in these secluded quarters there are some of us who do not view the European situation with that tranquility which we thought we would get. In the first place, there is not a single word or idea in this Amendment to which I, as a Conservative, can take exception. This Amendment, moved in such felicitous terms by the late President of the Board of Education, whose scholastic attainments we all welcome and hope we shall have for some time in this House, invites the League of Nations to mediate. I am pledged to support the League of Nations by every means in my power, and I do feel that when this Amendment invites the League of Nations to mediate, certainly they ought to be given the privilege of mediation. I think that the situation warrants mediation. The word "mediate" has been used, not only by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but also by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I feel very strongly that the situation does warrant mediation, and the best proof of this is that quite recently there was a report from the French Government, in which we were asked not to countenance such an unchristian procedure. I do not want to dwell very much on the present state of the Ruhr or to go into details, but I would like to point out that at the present moment there are, I understand, ten French divisions engaged in dragooning an unarmed population. That, I feel, is simply setting up another Alsace-Lorraine, with all its legacy of hatred and revenge. Further, I have been given to understand quite recently that the French steel and iron trade has practically come to a standstill, and the House will agree with me that this repercussion will very shortly be felt in these islands.
I think the need of mediation is obvious. Who, then, is to mediate? It is very necessary here, I feel, to make a distinction. We can give, and have given, the benefit of our advice to France, and I may say I think it has been rather rudely received. We could employ a form of tactful pressure, and so could the United States of America, by pointing out to France how she owes us a goodly sum of money, but I do not think that would be mediation; it would be intimidation. I feel that this Government should certainly not forego any of their claims in the interests of the British taxpayer, but that such a weapon should not be employed, at any rate at this juncture, at first. However annoying it might be to us, we cannot help feeling a little puzzled at the consistency of the logic by which France has recently put forward a submarine building programme. I venture to ask this honourable House why this building programme was put in operation and whom it is directed against. I think it is extraordinary that such a building programme should be put forward when they are ignoring their just debts. There is only one body that can interfere to put an end to this tangle, and I refer to the League of Nations, with which I am proud to associate myself. I pledged myself over and over again at the recent fight which we have had to the League of Nations as the only possible remedy to put things right, and I feel very strongly on the matter, and that is one of the principal reasons why I am intervening to-night.
8.0 P.M.
It is rather remarkable, I may say, that the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) and his followers are now showing a very considerable devotion to the League of Nations. It is a trifle belated, I think, but, I trust, all the more sincere, and I hope they and their friends and colleagues on the Liberal Benches, and snipers, may I add, if at some future time they do occupy this side of the House, will not then be so much "Not at home" when the League of Nations calls. I feel that this attempt at mediation must be made. The League of Nations ought to be invited to mediate. Some failures, I think, are more honourable even than successes. The world's problems cannot be solved by twiddling one's thumbs and saying, "This nation does not need mediation, and, therefore, why should I bother it with my advice?" The Prime Minister might say that France would not sit down under any advice or dictation. I do not think France, perhaps, would, but I think the attempt should certainly be made, because France should be made to realise that this has the support of the greater part of the civilised world. Can France possibly stand up against the opinion of honourable men? I venture to say that if the hands of the League of Nations were strengthened in this respect, and France were challenged with the opinion of the world, there would be quite a different position. Sir John Bradbury is one of the representatives on the Reparation Commission, but I find on many occasions he has abstained from voting. Lord Kilmarnock, again, is on the Rhineland Commission. I find that he also pursues perfect tranquility. In fact, both of them abstain so far that they could stand in with the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Scrimgeour) as being total abstainers. When I think of the giants of the past who have pleaded many great causes in this august Chamber, I feel that if some of them could only come back and help to plead this great cause—the cause of humanity—I think we might possibly make some progress in this matter.
I would like to associate myself very strongly with the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs in inviting the cooperation of America. In that respect I do not agree entirely with the Noble Lord. I am convinced that if the great Republic of America were approached it would be only too glad to help us and co-operate with us in any way that would seem advisable, so that some settlement could be arrived at. I feel very much that this question is a question that has to be dealt with, and dealt with at once. I know we have a partnership with France, but this question is of such vital importance that I cannot help feeling that unless the League of Nations is to be made a living thing, it is no use for it to have any existence, and I submit that this Amendment should undoubtedly be supported. During my last two elections, when I had the honour to fight in the Conservative interest, I told my constituents that, with the advent of a strong Conservative Government, we should have a stable and strong foreign policy, and that that would undoubtedly tend to give greater tranquillity in the world. I think the time has arrived when we should certainly have a policy so that people should know what we want. For many years our foreign policy has been a sort of guiding star to the other nations of Europe, and to-day it seems more than ever necessary that we should have a strong foreign policy. I have much pleasure in supporting the Amendment that this matter should be referred to the League of Nations, and particularly the proposal that America should be invited to co-operate in this matter.
Those who were Members of the last Parliament, and recall how very difficult it was to deliver a maiden speech, will join with all the greater sincerity in the congratulations which we offer to the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. J. Butler) and also to the hon. and gallant Member for South Hackney (Captain Erskine-Bolst) on the addresses which they have just given. In the course of the two days' discussion last week, and also to a large extent in the discussion to-day, there has been naturally, and I think inevitably, a good deal of reference to the historical and sentimental side of this case, but I am perfectly sure hon. Members in all parts of the House will forgive me if very briefly to-night I try to direct my mind to what appears to me to be almost exclusively an economic problem. What we are discussing has certainly a very large economic bias, and I think, apart from any view we hold as to the rights or wrongs of the action of Germany or of France, or any other country, it is our duty to try to ascertain how best we are going to arrive at British economic recovery, and what contribution in this European situation we can make to that end. Alike, I think, with many hon. Members of this House, I take the view that, during the four years since the Armistice was signed, we in Great Britain have made very heavy sacrifices because of the definite effort, lat all events latterly, to put our financial house in order, and because of the steps we have taken to set an example to the world. There is a good deal of difference of opinion to-day as to the wisdom of our pursuing to such an extent what is commonly called the policy of deflation. There are people who think that if we had continued a certain amount of inflation, we should have escaped the violent unemployment which at one stage affected nearly 2,000,000 people, and still to-day affects very nearly 1,500,000, and made our situation generally easier. I will not attempt in any way to pronounce in a technical controversy of that kind, but I do say that there is a very distinct probability that, having regard to the steps which we have taken in deflation, and having regard to the undoubted improvement in our national finance, which up to a point we have brought about, we are in danger of being saddled with rather more of the burden of the recovery following the War than was perhaps strictly our due.
The situation here is very serious in every way, and I think it is not in any way a selfish argument to compare the rival conditions of France and of Germany, and to ask where our material interest as a British people lies. I feel as strongly as any other hon. Member the sufferings which France endured in the War, but, in considering the sufferings of France, do not let us forget that a fair portion of the devastated area has already been restored, that more would have been restored if another policy had been pursued by the French themselves, and that, in any case, the devastated area, while very important, is only a small section of the territory of France, and that France has great recuperative powers based on small scale industry over a large part of its territory which must be taken into account in estimating the possibility of its recovery as compared with that of other European people. My hon. Friend the Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Snowden) has been charged in numerous speeches with having made much too strong an attack upon France and with being unduly friendly to Germany, but I think, if one separates the sentimental from the economic argument, the indictment of France must be very considerable at the present day, and possibly it was due to the fact that his speech was so largely economic in character. Still, I think we have to face the cold facts, and, in the interest of France herself, say some plain and blunt things. It is true that France has a very considerable debt, but it is also true that there has been a conspicuous weakness in French finance within recent times in the extent to which France undoubtedly has relied upon payments from Germany, although any economic adviser would say to France, as he has said to other countries, that there is only a limited possibility in that direction. Strict finance would have done everything in its power to meet the situation without relying upon the reparation payments, at all events to the extent to which French financiers appear to have relied. It is also true that French trade in general is prosperous in many ways. There is a conspicuous absence of unemployment, while thrift and savings have been outstanding features in recent French experience. There is, taking the position of France at the present day, as compared with Germany, a strength which is based upon real economic effort, and not upon the highly artificial conditions which undoubtedly obtain in Germany.
Taking the case of Germany, it may be true that there has been some desire to go on depreciating the currency with the idea that that would ultimately be an evasion of a considerable part of an obligation. But we must remember that there are very definite limits to that steady currency depreciation. There has been within Germany an enormous rise in prices, and that has reacted on practically every department of German production, so that the artificial advantage that Germany enjoys, based upon that depreciated currency, with its consequent effect on the exchange, has to a material extent been modified, if it has not disappeared. That is one fact to which I think insufficient attention has been paid at the present day. There is another and a broad consideration which, I think, must almost settle the problem for Great Britain. Apart altogether from the question of reparation, and viewing the matter simply as a European problem, the experts have pointed out in every report which they have issued on the economic conditions in Europe that our recovery depends very largely upon the restoration of the German export trade. We must draw very clear distinction between the great measure of self-sufficiency in France—because I think that is altogether undeniable—and a very real desire which Germany, on the other hand, has to send goods to every corner of the world.
One cannot mention that consideration without alluding to the difficulty of the reparation settlement. There was the original extravagant estimates of £10,000,000,000 and, I think, an even larger sum. Subsequently this was modified to £6,600,000,000, this afterwards being boiled down to £2,500,000,000—by some experts to an even smaller sum. Whatever view we take of the sum which Germany must pay, one or two things are admitted. Having regard to existing conditions and the undoubted economic disease which has settled upon Germany the amount must be strictly limited in character, and, above all, it must at the earliest possible moment be fixed. The right hon. Gentleman who was Minister of Health in the declining days of the Coalition Government used a phrase on one occasion which is very appropriate to this Debate. He said: "We can fight tariffs, we can fight trade obstacles of all kinds, but there is one thing we cannot fight—that is uncertainty." It is that very large element of uncertainty in the total amount that Germany is to be called upon to pay which has had a profound Influence on the economic and financial policy which Germany has pursued—almost necessarily in some ways in recent times. It is hopeless to ask any country to set its internal finance in order while there remains hanging over its head an enormous obligation which is indeterminate in character. That must be settled without delay. I welcome bringing the matter under the League of Nations, if we can possibly secure that. But I am sure, if we cannot secure it, the experts will determine Germany's ability to pay, put it down as a plain, practical, economic proposition, and we should then ask the countries of Europe to assent to it for their own interest and prosperity.
I think that is of very great importance for this country. We may be ever so favourable to France. On that I have not a single thing to say one way or another, though I believe French policy to be hopelessly wrong. But it is quite clear, if we are going to take a million and a half of our unemployed off the streets of Great Britain we must do far more trade with a highly-industrialised country like Germany. The possibilities of Germany, to us, from the point of view of trade, are infinitely greater than the possibilities of France. That being the practical situation, the sooner we in Great Britain can make an effective contribution, first of all to the termination of Germany's problem, the better for ourselves. That is not in any way a selfish argument, because we must remember, at the present time, that we have entered into an obligation to the United States of America—quite properly —to pay an enormous debt. It means an addition of £33,000,000 annually to our Budget, with larger sums later. Surely it is a fair and relevant argument to point out that our power to meet that American obligation will be to some extent regulated by the strength we can draw from the recovering Continent of Europe, and Germany in particular, by the re-establishment of our trade in the Continental markets.
The whole thing hangs together. Much mischief in recent times has come from the tendency to regard countries as separate, and to view France here and another country there as being worthy of special treatment. In conclusion, that thought regarding the American debt and our power and ability to pay depending upon European recovery and our part in it leads me almost naturally to the invitation to America to take part in some expert or other Commission. The situation as regards America is full of odd contradictions. There is a great deal of political sentiment in the "United States which inclines to the view that, notwithstanding American tradition in the matter, the United States must take some active part, in the near future, in European affairs, if only on the purely material ground of seeing that American debts are paid. That tendency is, so far, in the right direction; but there is a good deal of economic contradiction. Payment must be made to the United States, I take it, largely in commodities or services. There is in existence the Fordney Tariff, which is the highest in American history. It includes principles of valuation affecting the entry of goods which exposes the trade of this country with America and from other countries to chaos and uncertainty. I am not forgetting that in practice the system of valuation has to a large extent broken down. Therefore we have the striking contradiction of a great country expecting payment from us and Europe, and at the same time keeping in existence an economic device which, whatever our view of Free Trade or Tariff Reform, is undoubtedly a serious hindrance to British and European enterprise as well. Is there any hope that if we get an American contribution on an expert Commission there might be indirectly some advantage in the general attitude of the United States in regard to that matter? Is it possible that a fearless and faithful examination of the European situation will convince America that, not only in sentiment and perhaps in some material provision, but also in the general policy of economic treatment that there is some chance of her making a real contribution at the present time? If the investigation brought about any such indirect but valuable result, I think it would be justified in every way.
That throws us back upon what Labour and other movements in this country have advocated during the whole course of the past four years. We have looked forward to the League of Nations, not only as a strong political organisation, but as a powerful economic organisation. We take the view that on an ordinary reading of the facts there are many countries which are economically weak, and there are numerous other countries which have surprising economic strength even now. Recovery will not be quickly effected unless they pool all their resources, and by that I mean that they will sit down together and try to frame some method or measure of genuine economic cooperation. That will involve consideration not only of the mark but also of the innumerable tariffs which have grown up out of the new-found nationalism in certain European countries since the War concluded. All these things, such as the payment and the cancellation of international indebtedness, will have to be taken into account, and it is on that broad ground that I, with others, welcome the proposal that this question should be sent to a commission of experts, and that we on our part should do our best to achieve a result which may build up the British recovery upon which we commonly depend.
If I may venture upon this occasion to tackle this difficult problem in spite of the fact that it is the first time I have addressed the House, it is because, although I am fully aware of the difficulties of the problem, I may claim to know something of the French point of view. For a long time I held an official position in France, and quite recently I had the opportunity while in Paris of consulting with many eminent Frenchmen of various shades of political opinion. I noted in previous Debates that there were two distinct opinions on the question of taking action. Hon. Members, especially those on the benches opposite, did not criticise French action principally on the ground that they felt that they ought not to do so out of loyalty to our Allies. Other hon. Members, above the Gangway especially, demanded that we should take strong action, that we should break with the French and impose our veto on the action that they were taking. It appeared to me, however, that the result of such action was not fully weighed, and that it was not carefully considered by those speakers what the result of such action would be.
What I think is so curious is that even now we are not aware why the French went into the Ruhr. The question has been debated in many ways, and many things have been said on this point, but the real French motives have not been discussed. We all know that the French mix up security and reparations. To the average Frenchman these two important questions are but one. Therefore we are prepared to excuse the fact that the French Government is apt to give way to the temptation of using the weapon at hand, of reparations, in order to obtain the necessary security for the future. We all believe that the French reparations policy is bad, but what we do not understand, and what has not been said, is that it was the British plan in Paris which impelled the French to take the action they did in the Ruhr. The House may be astonished to hear that there were many people in France, moderate men, who hesitated about making this advance into Germany, but they considered that such an advance was rendered inevitable by the British Note. We all know that the French Government represents the extreme and not the moderate section of French opinion, and the extremist section of public opinion in France was immensely strengthened by the publication of the British plan.
That gave the French Government the chance of playing the card of the Ruhr, which it had up its sleeve, and which otherwise might never have been played at all. There were several points in the British Note to the French Government which caused irritation in France, but the one which proved absolutely fatal was the suggestion made by the British Government that a financial council should be created in Berlin on which not only a neutral should sit, but which should sit under the presidency of the German Finance Minister. This suggestion was absolutely outrageous to the French, and it seemed to them that our point of view and theirs was so dissimilar that there was no further use in discussing the whole problem with us. I think that was a very grave error.
The Prime Minister, when he discussed this subject the other day, alluded to this particular point and said that it was perhaps an error in psychology. It was indeed an error that may cost Europe very dear indeed. Another point which caused a good deal of unnecessary irritation to France was the mention of the milliard of gold francs deposited in this country by the French some time back. We suggested that this money should be secured to us. French opinion was absolutely unenlightened on this point. To the French public it seemed as if we were suggesting that we should be allowed to use this money which had been placed in trust with us. If we had taken the trouble to study the French point of view this question would never have been raised. We might have found out that this sum of money, which has gone over to America long since, has been shown as an asset on the balance sheets of the Bank of France for many years.
I was told in France that the British Note was full of most valuable suggestions, and that it was most unfortunate it contained points which rendered its discussion impossible. Even the popularity of the Prime Minister when he was in Paris was quite unable to get over this difficulty. Our plan, as published, had the effect of consolidating opinion behind the extremist policy of the present French Government: otherwise, more moderate influences might have prevailed, and I believe an agreement might have been reached. It is a fact that before the Conference in Paris many Frenchmen feared an advance into the Ruhr. Many more believed it would be fruitless, but the mass of opinion in France became silent when our plan became known, and no man in France dared to back up a proposal containing suggestions which, from the French point of view, were really unpatriotic. I notice the Prime Minister stated that had we come to an agreement with the French as to the views to be forced upon Germany, the British Government would have been prepared to enforce those views even at the end of six months. This was not known in France. All they knew was that we were to take action at the end of four years If the average Frenchman is convinced of one thing more than another, it is that the Germans, who are paying little now, are far less likely to pay in four years' time, when they will be infinitely stronger than now.
There is another matter which went to make the Conference abortive. News was spread in high quarters in France that when the British Government Representatives arrived in Paris they would fall in with the French point of view. It was on that high expectation that the British Prime Minister was welcomed in Paris, and the disappointment was all the greater when it was found it was nothing of the sort. This was a mistake that ought to have been avoided. I respectfully submit it is quite wrong that our Note should have come as a surprise to the French, and I am forced to the conclusion that our present methods of communication are defective and inadequate, and need overhauling. Is it not extraordinary that, with these two great nations living, so to say, side by side, separated only by a narrow channel of water, yet our people are unaware of the French ideas and aspirations? Constant misunderstandings arise. I know our relations for some time past have been marked by a constant series of misunderstandings, and it is due more than anything else to the fact that all the messages we have to send to France have to pass through the bottle-neck of diplomatic relations, and thereby all the impulses are changed and stultified. We really ought to place the relations between these two countries on a broader basis.
I have been referring to what has happened in the past, but the question is, What ought we to do at the present time? What ought our attitude to be? I venture to submit to the House it would be a serious mistake to withdraw our troops from the Rhine. I was glad to hear the Prime Minister say that he had no intention of withdrawing those troops, unless the French Government or the German Government made it impossible for them to remain. I do not quite understand what the German Government have to do with it. We never sent our troops to the Rhine to please the Germans. We sent them there to enforce the Peace Treaty. The only considerations for retaining our troops there are to be found in our own interests and our own safety. I maintain that our troops ought to stay where they are, because they are the only moderating influence left in that part of the world, and if they go there is very little indeed to prevent the French and Germans from flying at each other's throats. There is another reason why they should not go, and that is that we have important commercial interests in that part of the world, and should we go those interests would fall into the hands of people who certainly would not look after them. A more important reason why we should not go is that if the French policy failed, as I believe it is bound to fail, it is absolutely certain that the French will blame us for such failure.
We ought to hesitate before we incur the responsibility of the whole of the French nation accusing us of the failure of this important step that they have taken. For one thing, it would prevent our ever being able to assume the role of arbitrator, which I hope we shall be able to take in the near future. French and Germans are bound, I believe, to come to a deadlock soon. The French are finding that they have been landed into a much bigger undertaking than they ever thought they would have to face. Germany has discovered that she can resist. What is going to be the result? Are the French going to advance more and more, until 39,000,000 Frenchmen spend their lives guarding 60,000,000 Germans? That is impossible, and both sides may be glad enough of intervention in the near future. I do not believe that, when the late Prime Minister said we ought to intervene at once, he meant that we should intervene this minute. He meant, I believe, that we should study the question, and be ready to intervene at the earliest possible moment. We cannot press upon the French and Germans at this actual minute our solution, because we have not the force to enforce it, and they certainly have not the will to accept it. I am glad, however, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us that the Government are envisaging the possibility of arbitrating at an early date. He told us that we ought to banish from our language a certain French derivative; I do not know whether he meant to prepare us at the same time for the disappearance of another word of more ancient lineage, but also of foreign origin—the word "tranquillity." I do hope that the Government is not only watching events, but is actually studying the form that our intervention is to take. I can only repeat the view expressed by previous speakers, that co-operation with the United States is extremely desirable.
Whatever plan is formulated must give the French security. Had we been in a position to fulfil our pledges, and had the United States and ourselves secured the French frontiers, as we undertook to do, the present situation would not have arisen. I submit that a solution might be found on the lines of a demilitarized Rhineland. I know that such a solution would be acceptable to many Frenchmen in very high authority. I suggest a Rhineland which would be under the League of Nations for the purpose of seeing that there were no fortifications erected there, no troops garrisoned there, and no recruiting taking place there. There would be no frontier between this area and Germany, whilst the ordinary Franco-German frontier would run along its present lines. To the French such a solution would present a good many advantages. It would mean that the great strategic railways of the Rhineland, which are absolutely necessary to an immediate mobilisation of the German army, would not be available to them; It would also mean that 8,000,000 Germane would not be available for recruitment. To the Germans it would not mean a dismemberment of their country. If it were a question of taking away the Rhineland from Germany, as Alsace-Lorraine was torn away from France, then, indeed, it would be a mistake; but I really do not believe that, to obtain the advantages which would be obtained at the same time by Germany, such as a general readjustment and final settlement of reparations, the Rhinelanders would really object to such a solution, for, after all, they would be saved from military service in the German army, and no man would go to war for the privilege of doing the goose-step in the ranks of the Prussian army. If I may add a single word more, there is one thing that I should like the Government to do, and that is to make it quite clear to the French that, should a revolution break out in Germany, as competent observers say it may, then we ought to state to the French that we hold them responsible, and that they must take the responsibility, including that of maintaining order. Opinion in this country will not tolerate that, having brought about this result, the French should be content to look on, themselves safe, while Central Europe collapses, satisfactory as it may be to some people in France to see their worst enemy eliminated by this means. There is nothing to be gained by not telling the French our real feelings. We constantly see interpretations of British policy in the French Press, and they are almost invariably wrong. France is most certainly in the dark as to the policy of our Government and the feeling of this country. Sufficient pains cannot be taken to make our attitude clear to the French nation.
I am in hearty sympathy with the lofty idea underlying the Amendment, as international arbitration under the League of Nations Tribunal seemed a practical remedy and a haven of rest for nations to aim at when we were encouraged by the victory won over the powers of militarism. But though our faith is strong, it received many rude shocks when these high principles came to be applied in practice, and I am one of those who still think and believe that no sacrifice is too great to be contemplated to bring about an understanding and friendship between nations. However, it is necessary for us to face facts as they are; it is quite as useless for us to lecture about the laws of supply and demand to the starving as it is fruitless for us to preach arbitration to those who are ill-disposed to listen to it, and that I regret to say is the position with which we are confronted at the present time. The question of reparations for all practical purposes is dead at the present time, and our Allies, by the occupation of the Ruhr, have killed it. Notwithstanding this, I would like to hazard a few remarks in the sincere and earnest hope that they may prove food for thought to others, and, in more able hands than my own, be shaped and moulded in such a manner that they may be helpful in dealing with the question of reparations when it re-imposes itself upon us, as it undoubtedly will in the future even more imperviously than it does now.
A great number of Members on both sides of this House agree and are entirely in accord with what His Majesty's Government has done so far as regards reparations, and I would like to add my congratulations to the praise which has been showered so deservingly upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer in bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the settlement of our debt to America, as it forms such an important link in this question. I think, myself, that the question of the debt will be reopened at a future date, and reopened on terms favourable to our- selves, for those who know the people of the United States and its Constitution realise that the feeling of the people will prevail, but it takes a long time in making itself felt. For the moment, the farmers and the population of the Middle West cannot grasp that it would pay them individually much better if they were not to be paid the debt, but I do not envy any Senator or Congressman who has to try and convince his audience that such is the case, any more than I would like to try and tell the good farmers of my own constituency that they would be better off if they were not to collect the debts to which they were entitled. Yet such is the intricacy of the modern commercial and financial structure that it would require patient propaganda in the United States of America, possibly for years, by thinking commercial men; but I am confident that day will shortly come, and it will be brought forward in the same noble and high spirit which actuated them in coming forward to our assistance in the War, when the will of the people prevailed. It is intolerable to think that, of all the warring nations, Great Britain alone should be the one to pay an indemnity.
9.0 P.M.
It is almost a truism to say that any nation situated as Germany is to-day cannot pay annually more to a creditor nation than the amount of the active trade balance of the debtor nation, or, in other words, the excess value of exports over imports. When Germany could sell the now practically worthless mark to ourselves, America, and other nations, she was able to pay reparations to France in gold, but in truth and in fact it is we and America who made this payment, and Germany only contributed to the extent to which we and other nations bought more of her products than we sold to her. This transaction found expression in the foreign exchanges, and in particular in the colossal drop in the value of the mark and the comparative strength of the franc. Germany's foreign securities and other international media for payments were early exhausted when we allowed the free export of these and other assets, which, from the date of the Armistice, should have been prohibited; in other words, we locked the stable door after the horse had bolted. The world position as it strikes me to-day is that we are faced with a recalcitrant debtor who has divested himself of all Ms assets, and has nothing left but his capacity to work; but his tools, which in this instance are the raw materials of the Ruhr, have been taken from him. There also seems to be agreement as regards the fixing of the maximum indemnity that Germany is capable of paying us, and Mr. Hughes has made a very useful suggestion as to how this method should be adopted and how the sum could be fixed; and when this is done, there is no doubt we must go on trading with Germany. But we must devise the necessary machinery whereby we can retain the yearly export surplus, which should be devoted to reparations, and also there should be additional taxation imposed upon her subjects, so that the Allies should be placed in a position to command a sum of money in Germany, so that she can pay thereby in goods and services. I feel sure that if this action were taken it would help very materially in coming to a solution of the problems which confront us at present. I thank the House very much for the kind indulgence which they have extended to me, as it is the first time I have addressed them, but I speak in all sincerity, and I earnestly pray that a solution may be found, not only to overcome the bitterness and stress of the present time, but that the reparation question will be solved and at the same time a feeling will be promoted among all nations bringing peace and goodwill throughout the world.
I feel it is a great privilege to have an opportunity of speaking at all in this important Debate. We have had a number of really remarkable maiden speeches, among which I should like to be allowed to single out that of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Butler), if I may compliment him upon the brilliance of the reasoning he displayed. We have also bad a speech remarkable for its sincerity of purpose from the hon. Member for South Hackney (Captain Erskine-Bolst). I am sure it must have been enormously gratifying to us on this side to hear those views put forward so fearlessly from the Benches opposite. I should like to deal with a point made by the last speaker upon the general effect of whose maiden speech I should like to compliment him. He referred to the question of the farmers collecting their debts. The situation really is not at all a parallel. In the case of debts owing to farmers they invoke the machinery of the law.
In referring to the farmers in the United States, I was referring to a large part of the population. It was the public feeling that I was really referring to, and not particularly that of the farmers.
I beg my hon. Friend's pardon. I misunderstood him. I wish to draw attention, if it is in order, to a speech made in another place by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a few days ago. In that speech, in which he was reviewing the negotiations which had recently taken place, he made reference to a suggestion that had been put forward by the Noble Lord who leads the Opposition there, and he gave an explanation why this particular problem had not been dealt with in a manner in which we on this side of the House would like to see it dealt. He said that an attempt had actually been made to lay this question before the League of Nations, an attempt which failed because, under the terms of the Pact, a question of that sort could only be brought to the attention of the League by those Governments or States who were directly interested, and as the suggestion emanated from an outside quarter, it was ruled out. Far be it from me to hint that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is making a mistake in an assertion of that kind, but we have every reason to believe that, although there was no publication of the matter, some attempt was made to bring the Reparation problem before the Council of the League of Nations at the meeting on 25th January last. At least, it is true to say that some informal conference on the subject took place, and I cannot help thinking that the Noble Marquess when he made that statement must have had in his mind the resolution which was passed at the third Assembly as long ago as last September. At that time, it was suggested in the course of debate that whilst in general terms it was desirable that the League of Nations should have the handling of this problem, it would probably be better that it should be brought forward by one of the interested parties. This country is an interested party. With all deference, when the Noble Marquess makes a statement that such a question can only be brought 10 the attention of the League by those Governments directly interested, I say that, in the first place it would be perfectly competent for this Government to bring it before the notice of the Council of the League, in view of the fact that it is interested, and in the second place, even if this Government did not desire to bring it forward, the case would obviously be covered by the provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant, which lay it down most clearly that
I was a little astonished that the right hon. Member for the Combined Universities (Mr. Fisher) in moving the Motion accepted so entirely the statement of the French Prime Minister that this was only an economic movement. I find it very hard to understand his ground for that belief. Of course, we must in this House be most careful to give the greatest weight to anything which any foreign statesman says, but we must take into consideration the material evidence upon such a point. A great part of the Paris press, ever since the occupation began, has been ringing with plans for the creation of an independent Rhineland republic, of which the Ruhr State was to form a part. The evidence does not stop there. During the progress of this Debate I have taken the opportunity of reading the telegrams that are coming through, and if the telegraphic agencies are to be believed, and there is no reason why they should be less accurate on this occasion than on any other, a Rhineland revolt is at this moment in progress. As I read the telegrams that are coming through this evening, the German officials in the area occupied by ourselves and the French are at this moment in a state of passive revolt. The Rhineland Commission has gone so far as to issue what is described as an ultimatum. I should like to know whether the Government have any information on that point, and whether the British representative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission has concurred in this ultimatum directed to these officials, requiring them to vacate their offices or to agree to serve under the French. That is the information which reaches us over the wires, and it is quite evident that there is something seriously wrong there.
There was another point on which I should like, not to join issue, but upon which I should like to go further than the right hon. Gentleman who moved the Motion. He put it that it was an essential corollary of this matter being brought before the League that the French should, in advance, agree to our raising the question in the League. I should be the last to deny the desirability of that. If the French could agree, so much the better. If the French refuse to agree to what would virtually mean the raising of the question, I do not think we ought to allow the matter to stop there. It seems to me it is an occasion for courageous action on the part of our own Government. If the situation is as serious as it has been painted, not only on this side of the House, but on the other side, if it is really true that this action by the French in invading the Ruhr is sowing the seeds of further war, is the first spark which is going to set Europe in a blaze again, if it is true, as the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Pringle) pointed out, that this dreadful guerilla warfare which has so horrified and shocked all in Ireland is about to be repeated in the heart of civilised Europe, should we be justified in maintaining silence, in doing nothing, if the party which appears, on the face of things, to be the aggressor in the matter refuses to consent to the question being raised in the League Council?
I do not want to say anything which may seem indiscreet or to urge on the Government a policy which is improper, but if all these things are true, if the French are not prepared to agree to the reference to the League of Nations, we should exercise what is expressly provided to be a friendly right and should raise the matter of our own accord in the Council of the League, and, if necessary, we should demand, as we are entitled to do, a special meeting of the Council of the League to consider the matter. [ Laughter. ] I notice that this proposal gives rise to some mirth on the other side of the House. I assure hon. Gentlemen who are smiling that I am making the proposal in all seriousness, and that I have thought it out as carefully as I am capable of doing. I would say the same thing with regard to the question of America. The Eight Hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) was very insistent, and rightly insistent, on the importance of the co-operation of America, and both he and the Mover of the Motion seem to have little doubt in their minds that in view of Mr. Secretary Hughes' speech there would probably be no difficulty in persuading America to participate in a conference on the subject. At least it was not a question of our persuading America to participate in a conference. The offer had emanated from America.
But we had had offers on other occasions, and it has not always been possible to have them carried out in their entirety, and what I would urge is this. Suppose the Government agreed to accept the policy which we would put forward, and America then withdrew her proposal, or would be reluctant to participate in a conference, urging, as the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord R, Cecil) feared she might urge, that Europe should settle her differences before America came in, then in that case I do sincerely hope that the Government will not make the abstention of America an excuse for doing nothing. Again, I would say as with France so with America. If those States are not prepared to agree to take the initiative in raising the matter under the League of Nations, and to participate in a conference, then let us go on with the remainder of the world and raise the question and settle it.
There was a point of considerable importance referred to both by the hon. Member for Penistone and the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. J Butler), and as they took divergent views I make no apology for referring to it again. As I understood, the hon. Member for Penistone considered that the argument that the French action was illegal was of questionable validity. He referred to the relevant Articles, and made out quite a strong case in favour of the validity of the French action. Precisely the opposite view was put forward by the hon. Member for Cambridge University, and that brings me to a very important suggestion as I think. It is precisely because there are these two> schools, if I may so term them, of juristic opinion, these conflicting views, that no agreement has been possible up to the present. We have created out of the League of Nations a Permanent Court of International Justice, one of the express functions of which is the interpretation of Treaties. Somebody in the course of the Debate said that the interpretation of this particular Clause was the work of the Reparation Commission. Strictly speaking, perhaps it may be under the terms of the Treaty, but where two Governments, the British and France, are at variance, the Reparation Commission is hardly the body to give a judicial decision as to which of them has the correct interpretation.
On the other hand, the permanent Court of International Justice is precisely the body to perform that function. Indeed, it has already performed it with regard to several important questions of difference between the two Governments. What is particularly important in this connection, in view of the oft-advanced French argument that the action of the League of Nations ought to be brought into play to deal with questions arising out of the Peace Treaty, is that the French themselves recently invoked the Permanent Court of International Justice to obtain an interpretation of certain of the Labour Clauses in this very Treaty of Versailles. If a Permanent Court is appropriate to interpret a question of that kind, obviously it is equally appropriate to interpret a question of this kind, and one of the things which, if it were not too late to do so, might well be done would be to refer this much vexed question to the Permanent Court for its interpretation. The Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord E. Cecil) began by pointing out that this Amendment is equivalent to a vote of censure upon the Government. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] If the Government, by its cheering, mean to intimate that the policy put forward in the Amendment is a wrong policy, I can only say that they are deserving of censure.
This is a question which I hardly think is intended to take the form of a Vote of Censure. The right hon. Member for the Carnarvon Boroughs made it perfectly plain that we were not condemning the Government but that, however ill-timed they might think our assistance, we were endeavouring to help them. It is all very well for supporters of the League of Nations on that side of the House—I am quite aware that there are just as many supporters of the League of Nations over there as there are on this side, and I am equally aware that they are just as sincere as we are—to say that this Amendment is a Vote of Censure and that therefore they must divide against it. I have not observed that the Government has given any indication that it intends to carry out the policy put forward in this Amendment. The Prime Minister made a speech at the opening of the Session, in which he spoke benevolently of a reference to the League. Except for one or two notable instances, I have not heard a word from that side to intimate that a reference to the League is not the correct solution of the matter. Might it not be possible for the Government to accept this policy? [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] I will say no more. If it is not possible for the Government to accept this policy, we must obviously agree to differ, and hon. Members on that side of the House must vote against their consciences.
The second point in the Noble Lord's speech, to which I would like to refer, is this. Answering something that had been said on a previous day from the Labour Benches, with regard to the importance of the inclusion of Germany in the League —I know there is no one in the House more anxious to have Germany in the League than the Noble Lord, I do not wish to misrepresent him—he reminded my hon. Friends above the Gangway that it was just as important to have France in the League as Germany. That is perfectly true, and it is obviously true; but why assume, because you suggest to France that this problem should go before the League of Nations, or even because you go further than that, and raise the question with the Council of the League of Nations, that the French will leave the League? I am well aware that the French Government has on many occasions made what I would, without offence, describe as rash and unguarded statements as to the possibility of its action if the German admission to the League were raised in the Assembly. I see that the same recollection has occurred to the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy). That was at the time of the first Assembly, and that was a threat, not made by the French Government, but which appeared in an organ of the French Press which is reputed to support the French Government.
I do not think we have any reason whatever for assuming that a reference of this subject to the League of Nations would be followed by a withdrawal of the French from the League. Even if they threatened to withdraw from the League, yet with the League in its present state of prestige, with its power, and with the work it has done, I cannot believe, and I shall never believe until I see it happen, that any nation would withdraw from it because a dispute, to which that nation was a party, was brought before the League which, under the Covenant, is the proper body before which it should be brought. I feel that I have almost exhausted the time within which I had set myself to speak. I desire, if I may, to thank the House most warmly for the attention it has given to my few arguments. I sincerely hope that hon. Members opposite will be actuated in their voting to-night by the reply which comes from the Treasury Bench. If that reply be favourable to the adoption of this, policy then they, of course, will vote for the Government. If the Government give no undertaking to deal with this matter as they know perfectly well it should be dealt with, I beg that hon. Members will let their consciences and not their party rule their actions.
I am afraid that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken, and some other hon. Members who have spoken from that side of the House, are in this difficulty, that they would like the Government to treat this Amendment as though it were not a Vote of Censure. I think I am right in saying, however, that it is a very long-established Parliamentary practice that any Amendment to the Address must be taken as a Vote of Censure. I quite recognise that in some respects there are many points with regard to which there is no great divergence of view between hon. Members on that side and on this. At the same time, there is a difference—a very great difference—of principle to constitute this a Vote of Censure on the Government. It has always seemed to me that our Prime Minister, at the Conference in Paris, was faced with a situation of unexampled difficulty and complexity. He had just succeeded to office. His predecessor had resigned. He had been forced to resign because of the attitude he had adopted in the Græco-Turkish dispute, an attitude which was hostile to the French attitude in the Near East, and because, as definitely evinced in the subsequent Election, the country desired, above all else, friendly co-operation with France. In these circumstances, the Prime Minister had to take a decision of extraordinary difficulty, but I think it is undoubtedly the opinion of a great majority of this House that the decision which he took was the right one.
Two points stand out as the result of the Debate this afternoon. The first is that by this adventure into the Ruhr France will not get the reparation which she hopes to obtain. The second is that even if she did, the continued occupation of the Ruhr by France must be a standing menace to the future peace of Europe, and must continue to increase and intensify the hostility of Germany to France. In that state of affairs what should our Government do? The policy which was announced in the King's Speech is practically a policy of drift. A policy of drift in the present circumstances is a policy of danger. It should, therefore, be the object of British policy to try and put an end to the present state of affairs by some definite move, either one way or another. What should be done? It is very easy to criticise. This joint Amendment of the two sections of the Liberal party proposes that the whole question should be referred to a Commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. Surely that is impracticable at the present moment, for many reasons, with all due respect to those who have the League of Nations very much at heart. The League of Nations to-day is not what, at the time of the Versailles Treaty, it was thought it would be four years later. The United States of America, unfortunately, has not come in. Germany is not a member of the League; Russia is not a member of the League; Turkey is not a member of the League. How can you have an effective League of Nations with great nations like Germany and the United States still standing out? What happened at Washington? Great though I hope the results of that Conference will be, what happened was really a slap in the face for the League of Nations, because the proceedings showed that it was possible to carry out a great conference of the nations of the world and to discuss the question of disarmament outside the League—a body which, under the Treaty, was the body by which such questions should be discussed.
It still remains the fact that force is the greatest power in the world to-day. Consequently, I think there is very little doubt but that France would not to-day accept or even favourably consider a reference of this matter to the League of Nations. The Prime Minister told us the other day—I think it now practically admitted in all quarters of the House —that what France wants is security, and it was in order primarily to get security that she went into the Ruhr and adopted the policy she is carrying out now. I think that in the main that is true. Ever since the Treaty of Versailles was in the making, France has shown time and again her fear that her Eastern frontier would be insecure. I remember a speech by M. Franklin-Bouillon in the French Chamber during the conduct of the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Versailles, in which he made it clear that security and reparation at that early date were the two great objectives of French policy at the Conference. I do not believe, the Prime Minister does not believe, and the majority of this House do not believe that the French policy in the Ruhr will give her that security. Can she have any other? Can we offer her any other security? I believe that we can.
The matter has been referred to by the late Prime Minister and by other speakers this evening. It seems to me that as a basis of negotiations with France, we should here and now approach her with a definite offer of a renewal of the Treaty which we signed with her at the time of the Versailles Treaty, when a similar Treaty was also reached between her and the United States. That arrangement fell through because our part of it depended upon ratification by the United States, which never came. The late Prime Minister told us this afternoon that when he was Prime Minister—he was, he said, very proud to be able to state it—he offered to France that Britain alone would undertake the responsibility of guaranteeing the French frontiers against German aggression, and he said that although M. Briand was prepared to accept it M. Poincaré refused it. I cannot believe that if the Government of the British Empire came forward and offered France once again the absolute pledge and guarantee of this country that in case of German aggression against the French frontiers the British power, the British people, would be ready to come to the help of France, she would turn down such an offer. I most sincerely believe that if the Government were to make that offer again to-day they might obtain from France very many concessions with regard to her Ruhr policy which would be of such a kind as to make an arrangement possible.
Some people may say that this country could not undertake so great an obligation apart from the United States. It seems to me that we cannot for ever wait upon the people and the Government of the United States. The United States is very remote from Europe. It is true that in the last resort she may be drawn into European struggles, but, in considering whether or not the United States is likely to come into the centre of European politics, we ought not to forget that she undertakes a vast obligation in the Western hemisphere by reason of the Monroe Doctrine. President Monroe's Address to Congress, which is the foundation of the Monroe Doctrine, was given in December, 1823, and for 100 years, by reason of that doctrine, the United States has succeeded in keeping all aggression away from the many countries and republics of the West. She has that obligation, and it is no insignificant one. We ought to offer France this guarantee alone. I cannot believe that if we did so the French would be so mad as to refuse the offer.
It would not be even inconsistent with the League of Nations, because if the Tripartite Treaty, so far as Great Britain and France are concerned, were to be renewed there is an article in that Treaty under which the guarantee of the British Empire would have to be passed by the Council of the League of Nations as not inconsistent with the League. Further, under Article 3 of the Treaty, the guarantee of the British Empire would be subject to withdrawal, so soon as the Council of the League of Nations by a majority considered that the League itself was a sufficient guarantee. Therefore, the matter would remain really with the League of Nations, even though we did give this definite alliance to France. Surely, there could be no finer or higher objective of British foreign policy than an effort to furnish the League of Nations with that power and force, without which its decrees in future will be so much waste paper. If we could fashion the League of Nations into a body with power to enforce its decrees, if British foreign policy were aimed at producing something real, tangible and strong out of the League of Nations, we might have some hope that the League would become the great power for peace which those responsible for its creation believed it would be. If we cannot make the League of Nations into a, real power for peace, then it seems to me that Signor Nitti, in his last work—a rather remarkable book —was right in saying that Europe is decadent, and that there is a real danger that the whole of Western civilisation will crumble into dust and ruins.
Whatever else may be said about our Debate to-day it will be, on all hands, regarded as a satisfaction that in every quarter of the House there is the plainest indication of a deep and sincere sympathy with the French people. Disputes as to the best course to follow do not in the least involve a failure to understand both the disappointment of the French people at not receiving the reparation they expected, and the anxiety of the French people that they may be really secure against future invasion. It is further to be noted about the Debate that more than one speech has been made, such, for example, as that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Antrim (Mr. O'Neill), in which strong approval has been expressed of some, at any rate, of the proposals contained in this Amendment, though the right hon. Gentleman does not feel he is able on this occasion to support us by his vote. The Amendment begins with the assertion that neither the recovery of reparations nor real security for future peace is promoted by the advance of the French into the Ruhr, and though there may be here and there in this House some who hold a different view, it is quite plain to see, and perhaps it may be thought significant by our friends across the Channel, that in every quarter of the House that view is very firmly held. We know it is the view of the Prime Minister, and it was the very fact that he and his Government held this view that the French advance was not calculated to gather in reparations or promote the peace of the world which caused him to take this step of dissociating our country from the action of France.
So far, at any rate, there is a very wide measure of agreement. There is another thing about this Amendment which is worth noting, and it is that it couples together the subject of reparation and the subject of security. It is very important to do so. The failure which has attended many efforts of the Supreme Council to find a satisfactory settlement of the question of reparations is, I think, very largely due to the fact that reparations have sometimes been discussed as though they were in a compartment by themselves. It is not true. The true way in which to regard the subject of reparations is to regard it in close connection with the subject of the security of France. As I will point out presently, recent developments have made that more important than ever. If I take first the reparations side of the matter, it is necessary, as the ex-Prime Minister pointed out earlier in the Debate, to go back. My right hon. Friend pointed out that it was a mistake to speak, as people sometimes do, as though a figure of reparation were named in the Treaty of Versailles. I go further, and say it is the initial misfortune of the Treaty of Versailles that it did not fix any total sum for reparation. Instead of fixing a figure it invented a formula, and it left the Reparation Commission to apply that formula, and gave them two years in which to do it, for the Reparation Commission were not required to ascertain, until 1st May, 1921, what this formula really involved. That was the initial misfortune connected with the Treaty. No doubt it was a convenient course for some people, for it was a way in which to avoid exposing forthwith the contrast between extravagant electioneering hopes and cooler second thoughts. Nobody knows better than the late Prime Minister that the barest hint of a more reasonable view provoked at once violent protest from those who demanded that the enemy should pay the whole bill.
As the right hon. Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) said earlier in the Debate, there are some people in this House, like the Bourbons, who, learn nothing, but though it was a convenient course, it was a disastrous course, and it was a disastrous course for two reasons. The failure to fix a figure in the Treaty of Versailles for reparation was disastrous, first of all, because it was a premium on evasion of the payment of reparation. Germany was not the least likely to make prompt and vigorous efforts to pay all she could as long as the amount that she ultimately had to pay was left vague and indeterminate. Reference has often been made in the Debates on this subject to what happened after the Franco-German War. What did happen in this connection? There was fixed a. figure which victorious Germany called upon defeated France to pay, and inasmuch as the figure was fixed, France knew forthwith what she had to do to get rid of the enemy that was occupying her country, and she set to work with remarkable success to pay off those reparations, and actually paid them off in less time than the time fixed. That course of conduct is only possible if you define the amount of payment and give clear notice that, once that sum which is fixed is paid, then there will be nothing more to pay, but as things were, with the figure of reparations left vague and indeterminate, Germany was, in fact, in this position. She was put in a position where she had every temptation to make arrangements to get rid of these means of payment and where, if she had, in fact, begun by paying larger sums than many people estimated were possible, the only result would have been that she would have been told that now she had proved that the correct total of her reparations was bigger than had been thought before.
10.0 P.M.
That is not the only reason why it was, as I believe, a great disaster that the figure of reparations was not fixed in the Treaty. The second reason is this—and here I think the Prime Minister may perhaps be disposed to agree. The structure of the whole Treaty really depends on reparation payments being within Germany's capacity to pay. Terms were to be put on Germany which Germany could fulfil, and upon their fulfilment, at the end of 15 years, the occupation of the Rhine provinces was to cease. What happened? What is happening is that, owing to this long-drawn-out dispute as to the amount of reparations, the whole operation of the Treaty is being perverted, and we now find that the French Government is relying upon these provisions in the Treaty for the purpose of justifying an indefinite occupation of German territory. Nothing struck me more—nothing, I think, was more striking to the House and to the country—than the explanation which the Prime Minister gave, with such frankness and openness, on the first day of this Session as to what was the reason why he realised, even when he met M. Poincaré here in London, before ever he went to Paris, that agreement between them was hopeless. The Prime Minister said:
There has been a reference made to-day to the remarkable speech that was made last November in the French Chamber by M. Loucheur. I happen to have here the French Official Report. It is, perhaps I may be allowed to observe, a much more entertaining document than our own, and contains human touches singularly absent from the stately record which we get every morning, for I see that when M. Loucheur finished his remarks the Official Reporter informs readers that
May I ask how much we are paying America now?
I was saying that as long as that statement is made there is the most considerable reason for saying that the revision of the question of what can be paid by way of reparation is one of the most urgent importance for Europe. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) said very truly, earlier in the Debate, that there bad been an immense change in the opinion of this country as to what Germany could pay, and in this very speech of M. Loucheur he refers, in the most interesting way, to a discussion which he says took place at the Hotel Crillon in the spring of 1919, when he met one of the skilled advisers of the then Prime Minister, and heard the estimate put forward by the then Prime Minister's adviser of £10,000,000,000 as the figure which Germany might pay. For my part, I do not think the criticism is a fair criticism of the late Prime Minister which attributes to him the suggestion of these enormous figures. How could anybody deal with such figures except on the advice of skilled advisers? But the truth is that these immense estimates, which were then the common currency of political discussion, have turned out to be wholly fallacious, for this reason. We see now what I think very few of any party saw then. We see now that the problem of the extent to which a defeated community can be made to transfer wealth across its borders by way of tribute has very little relation to the ordinary commercial question of the extent of trade between one country and another.
The truth is that there is all the difference in the world between trade and tribute. Trade is an operation between individuals, who may be of different communities, entered into voluntarily on both sides on a calculation of profit to each side, and if the calculation is just, the result of the transaction is to make both sides stronger and better able to repeat the operation. That is the essential character of the trading operation, but with tribute—the transfer of wealth from a defeated community across its borders to a victorious community—the conditions which measure how much can be paid in those circumstances are entirely distinct, and it is the plain truth that that was a class of problem in which the world had practically no experience. It was a mistake to suppose that business people had special knowledge in this matter, and since the discussions in Paris it became very plain to the mass of people in this country that a great miscalculation was made, for which it would be quite unjust to blame any individual or section of opinion. When I see that M. Poincaré says that until the Treaty is scrupulously executed (which means, among other things, until this figure of reparation is paid), France will not abandon the left bank of the Rhine, I confess that I think we are well founded when we urge in this Amendment the great importance of referring the question of how much Germany can pay, and when and how she is to pay it, to an expert tribunal. I do not think it is quite true that even in this country there is general agreement about this sort of thing. There is a very widespread opinion, held by people in different quarters here, that there is available some secret source of payment in the form of credits which German merchants, speculators or financiers have abroad. There is a very considerable body of opinion in business circles that something considerable could be done to get hold of these credits. Whether or not business circles would be quite so keen to get hold of them if they turned out to be the means by which business purchases in this country are being financed is, I think, quite another thing; but, at any rate, that is one reason the more for saying, do let us without further delay have the question of what Germany really can pay and how she can pay it investigated and reported upon by an independent and expert tribunal.
There are some people in this House who are under the impression that up to the present Germany has paid next to nothing, that she is a fraudulent bankrupt who hitherto has avoided making any contribution. It is just as well to face one or two ascertained facts. It is an ascertained fact—you can get it from this very French Debate—that up to the present, whatever her deficiencies, Germany has paid twice, or even, according to some estimates, three times the amount which France paid to Germany in 1871. I hear a right hon. Gentleman opposite say it is not so. That is one of the things upon which he will be able to give evidence at the proposed inquiry. That is a very different figure from 30 times that amount, which is the figure which at present is regarded in some quarters as being a proper figure, and it is of all things important that we should insist that, in referring this question, we are not in the least prejudging, and have no desire to prejudge, the question as to whether Germany cannot make great payments further and beyond anything she has already done. I do not believe that in any quarter of this House there is the slightest desire to let Germany off what it can be shown she is capable of paying by impartial inquiry. I might point out this difference. It has been suggested by one or two speakers to-day that you cannot refer to any League of Nations, or to any expert body appointed by the League of Nations, such a question as the revision of reparations. Indeed, I think someone to-day quoted M. Poincaré as asserting that it is impossible to refer to the League of Nations anything that is within the four corners of the Treaty of Versailles. Let us see. The Treaty of Versailles was sent to the German Government when its terms had been finally agreed. Yes, but it was sent to the German Government after the German Government had protested that those terms were too severe, and it was sent with a covering letter. It was sent with a covering letter by the French Prime Minister, M. Clemenceau, writing on behalf of all the great Allied Powers, and this is what he wrote when the Treaty was sent to the German Government with an intimation that this was what the Allies had resolved upon. The then Prime Minister of France said: Petit Parisien, which reported M. Clemenceau as saying this:
No. The right hon. and learned Gentleman does not desire to misrepresent me, I am sure. I never said that. I never thought it. I said it it seemed to me to be a matter for the executive Government to decide when this course, which I thought very desirable, could be hopefully pressed through.
The Noble Lord is in the position of
"Jam yesterday, and jam to-morrow, but never jam to-day,"
unless Governments give it to you. The only reason I know, and of course the only reason he disclosed, for saying that was that he thought it was a Vote of Censure on the Government.
And that it would bring in the Labour party!
I will not take long to deal with the remaining questions involved in this Amendment. I venture very respectfully to put this before the consideration of the Prime Minister: What was the real object of France in her advance into the Ruhr? A great many people in France, and a great many people in this country, believed that the object was simply to collect reparations. M. Poincaré has described it as
Regarded as a debt collecting operation it is a lamentable failure. You cannot search pockets with bayonets. The Reparation Commission on the very eve of the French going in found that Germany had made default in the delivery of coal. It was a trumpery default—[An HON. MEMBER: "No!"]— wholly out of scale with what has taken place since. I would add this: Sir John Bradbury, who, so far as I know, has the confidence of Englishmen and of the Government, and who is probably in a better position to know than anybody, has said that while agree- ing that there had been this trumpery default he desired to put on record his view that the default was involuntary and unavoidable. He added that for his part he was surprised to discover by what tour de force Germany had been able to deliver the coal during 1922. In those circumstances is it really likely that the object was to collect a little coal. If the object was to collect reparations, then it has signally failed. Will the House observe that General Degoutte declared that France was confident of the success of the French plan. I would like to put this question to the Prime Minister. What has he ascertained are the French plans? Has our Government asked France in plain terms to state what her objects are in going into the Ruhr? Have we asked France what it is which France expects Germany to do as the condition of French withdrawal from the Ruhr. I think we are entitled to ask that question because we are very much concerned ourselves, because French policy is reducing to vanishing point the prospects of reparations in which we are interested as well.
But we are entitled to ask for another reason, because France is spending immense sums in military occupation and preparations, whereas she fails to pay either interest on or the principal of her debt to us. Instead of collecting reparations, instead of gathering in these payments, the really serious thing about the French action is that it indicates a military occupation to which no bounds can be set. What is there in the present action of France which really suggests that her proceeding is merely temporary and financial? France is establishing herself in the Ruhr with all the precautions against eviction which might be adopted by an ancient Pharaoh barricading himself in his tomb.
The question, therefore, seems to me to be a legitimate one. I think it is an important question and one which I press upon the Prime Minister. Does the Government know what, in the French view, Germany has to do in order to get the French out? France will not accept any promise and promises will not do. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members opposite cheer that statement, but will they cheer when I say that the promise to pay £6,500,000,000 sterling would be worthless? What has Germany to do? [An HON. MEMBER: "Pay up!"] I might have added that "pay up" is the advice of the thoughtless enthusiast who thinks that the most complicated and difficult international problem of our time can be solved by shouting, "Good luck to France." We want to know how much is Germany to pay, when she is to pay and how she is to do it. We want to know, and I think we are entitled to know, whether or not our Government have ascertained from France what France is going to do. There was an expression used to-day by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) in which he repeated an interruption which he made to the speech of the hon. Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Snowden) last week. He asked this question: "What would Germany have done if she had won the War?" If I may say so, I do not think the answer which was given by the hon. Member for the Colne Valley at all exhausted that question. The hon. Member said he did not know. I think there is a further answer and one much more to the point. If it had been in the power of the military clique which controlled German methods during the War to have dictated terms of peace, we might well have expected fearful and oppressive terms. The British people are not in the least likely to forget some of the things Germany did in the War. The right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment today, served on a Commission of historians which investigated and reported on the action of Germany in Belgium during the War. What I want to know is this. Are these examples of things recommended by the right hon. Gentleman for our imitation? I put this further question. Does he think that violence and aggression such as he fears Germany would have exhibited had she had the power would have brought peace to Europe?
It was said by the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Harney) the other day that this method of trying to provide for the future of Europe by alternating reciprocal vengeance is threatening the destruction of Western civilisation. It would be quite untrue to say that the attitude we have taken up betokens a want of sympathy with the French people. It is quite untrue to say that the French people are militarists who want war. No people want war. Our difficulty is that the French Government is proceeding along a line which, if you take a long view, is certain to lead to a renewal of strife. The position we take up does not mean that instead of being pro-French we have become anti-French. No one is going to promote the peace of Europe by changing enemies. The conception that the future of Western Europe is to be nothing but alternating fears and hates between Frenchmen and Germans is a conception we resist with all our might. Therefore, the policy which is outlined in this Amendment—outlined in a spirit by no means unfriendly to those who have the responsibility of government—is a policy which we urge His Majesty's Government to consider and which we press upon the House.
The last part of my right hon. Friend's speech was instructive. This is an Amendment to an Address, which is moved in no unfriendly spirit to the Government of the day. That is unusual, for the successful carrying of it would put an end to that Government, which is not supposed to be the desire of any Government. There has been this pecularity in the Debate to-day all through, that hon. Gentlemen who have spoken in favour of the Amendment have dwelt upon the view that the French action in the Ruhr is bad, and can have nothing but bad results. As a matter of fact, that is the view of His Majesty's Government also. That has been made perfectly plain. The point of difference between those who have spoken in favour of the Amendment and ourselves is that, though we differed from the French, we did not think that either our own interests or the interests of the world would be helped by taking up an attitude antagonistic to France. That was our view, and we acted upon it.
While I say that we, as well as hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken in favour of the Amendment, do not approve of what the French have done, I am bound to say that I am very much out of sympathy with many of the arguments which have been used in support of that thesis. My right hon. Friend the late Prime Minister delivered a very able speech on the subject this afternoon, but the gist of it undoubtedly was that France was so wrong that it was our duty, not merely to stand aside and allow her to try the experiment which she wished to try, but to take active steps to prevent her doing it. I do not see that that would have helped matters. I am not in the least pretending that we like the situation which has arisen. On the contrary, I have made it plain that we dislike it. But in what way would the position be made better if, in addition to the other dangers which threaten Europe, there had been the knowledge that this country was definitely hostile to France in this matter? I do not think that that would have helped. My right hon. Friend, in the course of his speech, pointed out quite truly that for four years the German nation was without the spirit of nationhood, that, whatever question was put to them, they gave the reply, "What would the Allies wish done?" That was precisely the case which was put by the French to us at Paris. They said, "You asked anything, they promised it; but they gave nothing in return"; that all through those four years they had not received any of the reparations to which they were entitled; and they said, "We are tired of that; we are going to take steps to secure the receipt of reparations." My right hon. Friend dwelt very largely on the wickedness, I might almost say, of the invasion of the Ruhr. It is rather difficult to follow exactly the line of argument which was in his mind. The Ruhr, he tells us, occupies already something like, I think he indicated, 160,000 troops, and would take 400,000 before it was done. That is not our information.
I did not say that. I am sorry to interrupt, but I said that the "Petit Journal" stated that, if they pursued the policy of exploiting the mines, it would take three times as many bayonets, and that would have meant 400,000 men; and they abandoned it for that reason. I quoted from the "Petit Journal."
I do not follow that, because originally his statement was 40,000—
I meant 150,000, and it would be three times that.
As a matter of fact, whether the idea came from the "Petit Journal" or from my right hon. Friend, it is not a sound one, because the Ruhr is not large enough to contain anything like that number of troops. I do not profess to the military knowledge of my right hon. Friend, but I know that before the War no German troops were kept there. There are no barracks, and my information is that anything like that number would be impossible. But my right hon. Friend is against the occupation of the Ruhr. So am I at this moment. But on what ground is he against it on its merits? Less than two years ago he himself proposed in an ultimatum to Germany that the Ruhr should be occupied. Apparently in making that proposition to Germany he either foresaw all these calamities which have happened and was preparing for them, or he was making a proposal which he knew Germany could not accept.
Bluff.
I rather hinted at that in what I said, but I did not like to express it, because I think in these international questions it is rather a dangerous game to play. At all events, he was preparing to' adopt it two years ago, and on what grounds? Because Germany then had made default in the same way that the French say she has made it now. Therefore, his contention amounts to this. In either case, it is a weapon in the hands of the French against us. It either means that these evils would not have happened if we had joined with the French and then the Germans would have submitted and accepted the situation, or it means that the interval during which they have been allowed to pay practically nothing has so strengthened them that they are now in a position to defy the Allies and to refuse to pay, and my right hon. Friend rather suggested that. He spoke of this as a possible beginning of war. I do not think that is the right view. That was not the view I held in Paris. I thought, and think still, that the Germans would not have accepted even if we had joined with the French, though it would have been as a matter of fact impossible to do it, because we believe they were using sanctions to make demands which could not be fulfilled; but the view, as expressed by the late Prime Minister, amounts to this, that if we had gone with them the Germans would have accepted, and there would not have been this struggle.
In reality I do not believe that is the case. I believe the Germans have taken up their attitude of resistance, because they, too, realise that the sanctions are being imposed for the sake of demands which cannot be met, and it is despair which is making them take up this attitude. My right hon. Friend says, indeed he seemed to me to be influenced by what is more or less an obsession, that it is all the fault of M. Poincaré. Undoubtedly the present head of the French Government has made his views on this question perfectly clear from the start. So far as I can judge in this matter, he was reflecting correctly the opinion of the two Chambers with which he had to deal. What happened shows that that view was correct, because, in spite of our opposition, he received the almost unanimous support of the Chambers. That makes, to my mind, a very great difference. If it had been only a question of one man's view, one could have hoped that there would have been a change of Government. It was not one man's view. It was certainly the view of the French Chambers at that time. When my right hon. Friend told us to-day that there had been 17 bye-elections, all that I can say is that I am not aware of them; it seems to me a large number. At all events, it is certain that the elections will not come for more than a year from now, and therefore the French Chambers as they exist to-day are the Chambers which must have settled this question.
I should like to point out that the real difference of view on this question, the real break with France, did not begin either in Paris or in London. It began in August of last year, when the two Governments failed to come to an agreement. What has happened since seems almost to be the inevitable result of that disagreement. My right hon. Friend says that in August he proposed to the French Government that the question should be referred to the League of Nations, and he, told us the answer that he got. They would not listen to it. If they would not listen to it then, before they were committed to the measures which they have taken before French pride was involved, is it the least likely that they would listen to it now?
On this question the real point that the House must keep before its mind, and on which it has to take a decision, is whether or not intervention would be useful or would not be useful. That seems to me the sole question. It is said that we as a Government are drifting in this matter. What does that mean? If it means that at this moment we have no policy in regard to this matter, and that we have no policy which we can put into effect, then we are drifting. In our view it is as certain as anything in this world can be that a proposal of this kind would be turned down at once by the French Government. Then what object is there in trying? Does anyone suggest that if you try and fail, you have not made the position worse than it was before? We know not as a matter of guesswork, but as a matter of fact, that it would be considered by our French friends as an utterly hostile act. If we do that, what do we gain? We shall have definitely taken up an attitude which seems to the French an attitude of hostility, and the whole difference, with all these calamities, for they are calamities, happening in Europe would be that instead of being friendly to France we shall be regarded as hostile.
I have said that that would be the effect of our intervention. There is not any doubt about it. The French Government have made it plain that it would be so. Does anyone in the House who is in favour of this Amendment calculate what that would mean? It is not a question of referring it to the League of Nations to deal with. It is not possible. Nothing can be done without the consent of France. The whole object therefore would be to use the League of Nations as a means of mobilising the public opinion of the world against France. That would be the sole effect so far as this is concerned. Who would gain by that? It is quite true that if France were willing to accept that intervention it might be useful, but surely there is little ground for the criticism of my Noble Friend the Member for Hitchin, because he told us that the time for attempting anything of that kind must be left to the Government of the day. If you attempted to do anything when France was hostile, what would be the effect on the League of Nations?
I would ask the House to consider that the League of Nations is all that is left to us as the result of the War as a means of settling disputes otherwise than by force. I have always felt, and the Government, so far as it has been able, has acted up to it, the desire to make the League of Nations strong, and to give it greater power. But we all know, as was said by my right hon. Friend, that a League of that kind with the United States, with Germany, with Russia out of it is a very weak instrument compared with what we should like to see it. But we know that if this step were taken, and were taken effectively, we should have at once the hostility of France to the League of Nations, probably of Belgium, probably of Italy, and what would become of the League of Nations? One thing which surprised me in the Amendment was the reference to America: Then comes a sentence which made my right hon. Friend almost lyrical,
What does all this amount to? Let right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who propose to vote for this Amendment count what the consequences are. They will not alter to-day the French attitude. The action on the Ruhr will still go on; the only difference will be that in the eyes of all Frenchmen England, instead of being friendly, will have become hostile. That is the only difference, and I would ask hon. Gentlemen who mean to vote for this Amendment to put to themselves the question: What would be the good of it, supposing it were carried? In the eyes of France, England becomes hostile. Do they wish that? Do they wish that our attitude should be a declaration of hostility? Surely, with all the trouble that lies in front of us—and I for one, as I said the other day, do not see when the moment will come for intervention, but I am sure of this, that the moment has not come yet —to wait, though it is very much the reverse of a heroic policy, in the hope that some opportunity of intervention may come, is a better policy than to intervene when there is a certainty that the intervention will be harmful.
All this had to be settled by us in Paris. The late Prime Minister was under the impression that it was M. Poincaré's fault.
indicated dissent.
That is not so. Nothing we could have done, in my opinion, could possibly have prevented this action on the part of the French. The only choice left to us was to decide whether that action should be taken with us as friends, or with us as enemies. We chose that it should be taken with us as friends. That is still our view. I said on the first day of the Session that it was a difficult course to carry out. It was obvious in Paris, and it is obvious to-day, that to keep our troops in Germany at all, with this action, of which we disapprove, going on, is difficult. There is no logical basis for it. But we did come to the conclusion that it was in the interests of the Entente—which we hope will still continue, in spite of all that is happening—that they should remain as long as possible. That is our policy. I
said the other day, perhaps with an exaggeration, that to take them away would be an end of the Entente. That was exaggeration perhaps, but it was my feeling at the time, and everyone will realise that it would be a serious step to take and would make the continuance of the Entente more difficult than it would be otherwise. For that reason we desire to continue. I would again press on the House, if I may, that there is no use in making these pious resolutions. There is no use in appealing to the League of Nations against France when we know that nothing effective can come, and that all it will do will be to irritate our Ally.
Question put, "That those words be there added."
The House divided: Ayes, 196; Noes, 305.
Division No. 2.] AYES. [10.57 p.m. Adamson, W. M. (Staff., Cannock) Falconer, J. Lee, F. Adkins, Sir William Ryland Dent Fisher, Rt. Hon. Herbert A. L. Lees-Smith, H. B. (Keighley) Alexander, A. V. (Sheffield, Hillsbro') Foot, Isaac Lewis, Thomas A. Ammon, Charles George George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd Linfield, F. C. Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry George, Major G. L. (Pembroke) Lowth, T. Attlee, C. R. Gilbert, James Daniel Lunn, William Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) Gosling, Harry McCurdy, Rt. Hon. Charles A. Barnes, A. Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton) MacDonald, J. R. (Aberavon) Barrie, Sir Charles Coupar (Banff) Graham, W. (Edinburgh, Central) Macdonald, Sir Murdoch (Inverness) Batey, Joseph Gray, Frank (Oxford) M'Entee, V. L. Benn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith) Greenall, T. McLaren, Andrew Berkeley, Captain Reginald Greenwood, A. (Nelson and Colne) Maclean, Nell (Glasgow, Govan) Bonwick, A. Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool) Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J. Bowdler, W. A. Groves, T. March, S. Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W. Grundy, T. W. Marks, Sir George Croydon Briant, Frank Guthrie, Thomas Maule Marshall, Sir Arthur H. Broad, F. A. Hall, G. H. (Merthyr Tydvil) Martin, F. (Aberd'n & Kinc'dine, E.) Middleton, G. Brotherton, J. Hamilton, Sir R. (Orkney & Shetland) Millar, J. D. Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) Hancock, John George Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Moritz Buckle, J. Harbord, Arthur Moreing, Captain Algernon H. Burgess, S. Harney, E. A. Morel, E. D. Burnie, Major J. (Bootle) Harris, Percy A. Morris, Harold Butler, J. R. M. (Cambridge Univ.) Hastings, Patrick Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.) Buxton, Charles (Accrington) Hayday, Arthur Murray, Hon. A. C. (Aberdeen) Buxton, Noel (Norfolk, North) Hemmerde, E. G. Murray, John (Leeds, West) Cairns, John Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (N'castle, E.) Paling, W. Chapple, W. A. Henderson, Sir T. (Roxburgh) Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) Clarke, Sir E. C. Henderson, T. (Glasgow) Parry, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Henry Collie, Sir John Herriotts, J. Pattinson, S. (Horncastle) Collins, Sir Godfrey (Greenock) Hill, A. Philipson, H. H. Collins, Pat (Walsall) Hillary, A. E. Ponsonby, Arthur Collison, Levi Hinds, John Price, E. G. Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities) Hirst, G. H. Pringle, W. M. R. Darbishire, C. W. Hodge, Lieut.-Col. J. P. (Preston) Rees, Sir Beddoe Davies, David (Montgomery) Hogge, James Myles Richards, R. Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale) Hutchison, Sir R. (Kirkcaldy) Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) Davies, J. C. (Denbigh, Denbigh) Jarrett, G. W. S. Riley, Ben Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton) Jenkins, W. (Glamorgan, Neath) Ritson, J. Dudgeon, Major C. R. John, William (Rhondda, West) Roberts, C. H. (Derby) Duffy, T. Gavan Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth) Robertson, J. (Lanark, Bothwell) Duncan, C. Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown) Robinson, W. C. (York, Elland) Dunnico, H. Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly) Rose, Frank H. Edge, Captain Sir William Jones, R. T. (Carnarvon) Royce, William Stapleton Edmonds, G. Jones, T. I. Mardy (Pontypridd) Salter, Dr. A. Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) Jowett, F. W. (Bradford, East) Scrymgeour, E. Emlyn-Jones, J. E. (Dorset, N.) Jovtitt, W. A. (The Hartlepools) Sexton, James Entwistle, Major C. F. Kenyon, Barnet Shakespeare, G. H. Evans, Capt. H. Arthur (Leicester, E.) Lambert, Rt. Hon. George Shaw, Hon. Alex. (Kilmarnock) Evans, Ernest (Cardigan) Lansbury, George Shaw, Thomas (Preston) Fairbairn, R. R. Leach, W. Short, Alfred (Wednesbury) Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby) Westwood, J. Simpson, J. Hope Thomson, T. (Middlesbrough, West) White, Charles F. (Derby, Western) Sinclair, Sir A. Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.) White, H. G. (Birkenhead, E.) Sitch, Charles H. Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plaistow) Whiteley, W. Smith, Sir Allan M. (Croydon, South) Thornton, M. Williams, David (Swansea, E.) Smith, T. (Pontefract) Tillett, Benjamin Williams, Dr. J. H. (Llanelly) Snell, Harry Trevelyan, C. P. Williams, T. (York, Don Valley) Snowden, Philip Turner, Ben Wilson, C. H. (Sheffield, Attercliffe) Spears, Brig.-Gen. E. L. Twist, H. Wilson, R. J. (Jarrow) Spencer, George A. (Broxtowe) Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) Winfrey, Sir Richard Spencer, H. H. (Bradford, S.) Warne, G. H. Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.) Stephenson, Lieut.-Colonel H. K. Watson, W. M. (Dunfermline) Wright, W. Stewart, J. (St. Rollox) Watts-Morgan, Lt.-Col. D. (Rhondda) Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton) Strauss, Edward Anthony Webb, Sidney Sturrock, J. Leng Wedgwood, Colonel Josiah C. TELLERS FOR THE AYES. —— Sullivan, J. Welsh, J. C. Mr. Phillips and Mr. Hilton Young.
NOES. Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte Cockerill, Brigadier-General G. K. Harvey, Major S. E. Ainsworth, Captain Charles Colfox, Major Win. Phillips Hawke, John Anthony Alexander, E. E. (Leyton, East) Colvin, Brig.-General Richard Beale Hay, Major T. W. (Norfolk, South) Allen, Lieut.-Col. Sir William James Cope, Major William Hennessy, Major J. R. G. Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S. Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford) Apsley, Lord Craig, Captain C. C. (Antrim, South) Herbert, S. (Scarborough) Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hewett, Sir J. P. Ashley, Lt.-Col. Wilfrid W. Croft, Lieut.-Colonel Henry Page Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank Astbury, Lieut.-Com. Frederick W. Crook, C. W. (East Ham, North) Hiley, Sir Ernest Astor, J. J. (Kent, Dover) Crooke, J. S. (Deritend) Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G. Astor, Viscountess Curzon, Captain Viscount Hogg, Rt. Hon. Sir D.(St. Marylebone) Baird, Rt. Hon. Sir John Lawrence Dalziel, Sir D. (Lambeth, Brixton) Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Davidson, J. C. C. (Hemel Hempstead) Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard Balfour, George (Hampstead) Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Hood, Sir Joseph Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G. Davies, Alfred Thomas (Lincoln) Hopkins, John W. W. Banks, Mitchell Davies, Thomas (Cirencester) Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley) Banner, Sir John S. Harmood Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.) Horne, Sir R. S. (Glasgow, Hillhead) Barlow, Rt. Hon. Sir Montague Dawson, Sir Philip Houlton, John Plowright Barnett, Major Richard W. Dixon, C. H. (Rutland) Howard, Capt. D. (Cumberland, N.) Barnston, Major Harry Dixon, Capt. H. (Belfast, E.) Howard-Bury, Lieut.-Col. C. K. Becker, Harry Doyle, N. Grattan Hudson, Capt. A. Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes) Du Pre, Colonel William Baring Hughes, Collingwood Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake) Edmondson, Major A. J. Hume, G. H. Bentinck, Lord Henry Cavendish- Ednam, Viscount Hume-Williams, Sir W. Ellis Berry, Sir George Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark) Hunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer Betterton, Henry B. Ellis, R. G. Hurd, Percy A. Birchall, Major J. Dearman Erskine, James Malcolm Monteith Hurst, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald B. Blundell, F. N. Erskine, Lord (Weston-super-Mare) Hutchison, W. (Kelvingrove) Bowyer, Capt. G. E. W. Erskine-Bolst, Captain C. Inskip, Sir Thomas Walker H. Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. Eyres-Monsell, Com. Bolton M. Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S. Brass, Captain W. Falcon, Captain Michael James, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert Brassey, Sir Leonard Falle, Major Sir Bertram Godfray Jephcott, A. R. Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive Fawkes, Major F. H. Jodrell, Sir Neville Paul Briggs, Harold Fermor-Hesketh, Major T. Johnson, Sir L. (Walthamstow, E.) Brittain, Sir Harry Ford, Patrick Johnston Jones, G. W. H. (Stoke Newington) Brown, Major D. C. (Hexham) Foreman, Sir Henry Kennedy, Captain M. S. Nigel Brown, Brig.-Gen. Clifton (Newbury) Forestier-Walker, L. King, Captain Henry Douglas Bruford, R. Foxcroft, Captain Charles Talbot Lamb, J. Q. Bruton, Sir James Fraser, Major Sir Keith Lane-Fox, Lieut.-Colonel G. R. Buckingham, Sir H. Frece, Sir Walter de Law, Rt. Hon. A. B. (Glasgow, C.) Buckley, Lieut.-Colonel A. Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E Leigh, Sir John (Clapham) Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James Furness, G. J. Lloyd-Greame, Rt. Hon. Sir P. Burn, Colonel Sir Charles Rosdew Galbraith, J. F. W. Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green) Burney, Com. (Middx., Uxbridge) Ganzoni, Sir John Lorden, John William Butcher, Sir John George Garland, C. S. Lorimer, H. D. Butler, H. M. (Leeds, North) Gates, Percy Lort-Williams, J. Butt, Sir Alfred Gaunt, Rear-Admiral Sir Guy R. Lougher, L. Button, H. S. Goff, Sir R. Park Lowe, Sir Francis William Cadogan, Major Edward Gould, James C. Loyd, Arthur Thomas (Abingdon) Caine, Gordon Hall Gray, Harold (Cambridge) Lumley, L. R. Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Greaves-Lord, Walter Lynn, R. J. Cassels, J. D. Greene, Lt.-Col. Sir W. (Hack'y, N.) Macnaghten, Hon. Sir Malcolm Cautley, Henry Strother Greenwood, William (Stockport) McNeill, Ronald (Kent, Canterbury) Cayzer, Sir C. (Chester, City) Grenfell, Edward C. (City of London; Makins, Brigadier-General E. Cecil, Rt. Hon. Sir Evelyn (Aston) Gretton, Colonel John Malone, Major P. B. (Tottenham, S.) Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox, Univ.) Guinness, Lieut.-Col. Hon. W. E. Manville, Edward Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord R. (Hitchin) Gwynne, Rupert S. Margesson, H. D. R. Chadwick, Sir Robert Burton Hacking, Captain Douglas H. Mason, Lieut.-Col. C. K. Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Birm., W.) Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich) Mercer, Colonel H. Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Ladywood) Hall, Rr-Adml Sir W.(Liv'p'l, W. D'by Milne, J. S. Wardlaw Churchman, Sir Arthur Halstead, Major D. Mitchell, W. F. (Saffron Walden) Clarry, Reginald George Hamilton, Sir George C. (Altrincham) Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham) Clayton, G. C. Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry Moles, Thomas Coates, Lt.-Col. Norman Harmsworth, Hon. E. C. (Kent) Molloy, Major L. G. S. Cobb, Sir Cyril Harrison, F. C. Molson, Major John Elsdale Moore, Major-General Sir Newton J. Reid, D. D. (County Down) Stuart, Lord C. Crichton Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. Remer, J. R. Sugden, Sir Wilfrid H. Morrison, Hugh (Wilts, Salisbury) Rentoul, G. S. Sutcliffe, T. Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. (Honiton) Reynolds, W. G. W. Sykes, Major-Gen. Sir Frederick H. Murchison, C. K. Richardson, Lt.-Col. Sir P. (Chertsey) Terrell, Captain R. (Oxford, Henley) Nail, Major Joseph Roberts, Rt. Hon. G. H. (Norwich) Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) Nesbitt, J. C. Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford) Thorpe, Captain John Henry Newman, Colonel J. R. P. (Finchley) Roberts, Rt. Hon. Sir S. (Ecclesall) Titchfield, Marquess of Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter) Robertson, J. D. (Islington, W.) Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement Newson, Sir Percy Wilson Rothschild, Lionel de Tubbs, S. W. Newton, Sir D. G. C. (Cambridge) Roundell, Colonel R. F. Turton, Edmund Russborough Nicholson, Brig.-Gen. J. (Westminster) Ruggles-Brise, Major E. Vaughan-Morgan, Col. K. P. Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth) Wallace, Captain E. Nield, Sir Herbert Russell, William (Bolton) Ward, Col. L. (Kingston-upon-Hull) Norman, Major Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Russell-Wells, Sir Sydney Warner, Sir T. Courtenay T. Norton-Griffiths, Lieut.-Col. Sir John Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham) Watson, Capt. J. (Stockton-on-Tees) Oman, Sir Charles William C. Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney) Watts, Dr. T. (Man., Withington) O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Hugh Sanders, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert A. Wells, S. R. Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William Sanderson, Sir Frank B. Weston, Colonel John Wakefield Paget, T. G. Sandon, Lord Wheler, Col. Granville C. H. Parker, Owen (Kettering) Scott, Sir Leslie (Liverp'l, Exchange) White, Lt.-Col. G. D. (Southport) Pennefather, De Fonblanque Sheffield, Sir Berkeley Whitla, Sir William Penny, Frederick George Shepperson, E. W. Willey, Arthur Percy, Lord Eustace (Hastings) Shipwright, Captain D. Wilson, Col. M. J. (Richmond) Perkins, Colonel E. K. Simms, Dr. John M. (Co. Down) Windsor, Viscount Peto, Basil E. Simpson-Hinchcliffe, W. A. Winterton, Earl Pielou, D. P. Singleton, J. E. Wise, Frederick Pilditch, Sir Philip Skelton, A. N. Wolmer, Viscount Pollock, Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Murray Smith, Sir Harold (Wavertree) Wood, Rt. Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon) Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton Somerville, A. A. (Windsor) Wood, Sir H. K. (Woolwich, West) Pretyman, Rt. Hon. Ernest G. Somerville, Daniel (Barrow-in-Furness) Wood, Major Sir S. Hill (High Peak) Privett, F. J. Sparkes, H. W. Woodcock, Colonel H. C. Raeburn, Sir William H. Spender-Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Yate, Colonel Sir Charles Edward Raine, W. Stanley, Lord Yerburgh, R. D. T. Rankin, Captain James Stuart Steel, Major S. Strang Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. John Fredk. Peel Stewart, Gershom (Wirral) TELLERS FOR THE NOES. —— Rawson, Lieut.-Com. A. C. Stockton, Sir Edwin Forsyth Colonel Leslie Wilson and Colonel Gibbs. Reid, Capt. A. S. C. (Warrington) Stott, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Main Question again proposed.
It being after Eleven of the Clock, the Debate stood adjourned.
Debate to be resumed To-morrow.
The remaining Order was read, and postponed.
Adjournment
Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Colonel Leslie Wilson. ]
Adjourned accordingly at Ten Minutes after Eleven O'clock.