I beg leave to present a Petition, signed by 747 workers in the motor-car trade, from East Renfrewshire, praying this honourable House for the abolition of the exemption of commercial motor vehicles from the payment of Import Tax.

I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

The sole object of this Bill is to give equality to the sexes in the matter of divorce, and it has no other purpose whatsover. It is practically a one-Clause Bill, and the main Clause reads as follows: that is looking very far ahead. I am quite aware of the long and tortuous and perilous paths that a Private Member has to tread before he can get any measure on the Statute Book of this realm. It is bad enough to contemplate the labyrinths of the House of Commons, and I hesitate even to contemplate the vagaries and uncertainties 'of the other place; nevertheless, I am sanguine enough—and I think it is not an unjustifiable hope—to think that this Measure has a very good chance of going through all its stages and becoming a portion of the Statute law of this country. Why do I say that? The first reason is because this is a simple matter of justice and equity, and I am sure it will appeal to every hon. Member on that ground alone; the second reason why I am sanguine is that I think this Measure commands a very general support in this House; and the third reason is that I think I can say it is practically universally demanded by the women of this country. I do not know whether hon. Members have had resolutions, but I think practically every women's society in this country is in favour of this Bill, and I think the experience of Members who have spoken to individual women on this subject is that, however little desire they have to put into practice the powers given by this Bill, at any rate they realise that this is a long standing grievance which ought to be removed from the law of this country.

I want to emphasise at the outset that I do not regard this Measure of mine as primarily one of divorce law reform. That subject is one which is far too wide and far too contentious to be brought forward in a Private Member's Bill. I regard this Measure more as a complement to the legislation which has proceeded in this House for some considerable time now towards recognising the equality of the sexes, and it is from that point of view that I regard this Bill, as an attempt to remove an anachronism, and an indefensible anomaly. We have had a continuous progress of legislation since, I think, 1882 towards granting equal status to women. It started with the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, which for the first time gave a married woman the right to own her separate property. Since then, we have had various Measures. I need only recall the Representation of the People Act, passed during the War, which gave women the vote for the first time, and the Sex Disqualification Removal Act, 1919, which also removed many disqualifications under which women suffered. Under that Act, I may say, a woman is now entitled to sit even on the bench as a Judge of His Majesty's High Court of Justice, so I think that if we have proceeded as far as that by legislation, nobody can doubt the right, on the grounds of equality and justice, for a woman to be placed on the same basis as a man in this all-important subject of the matrimonial tie. The days have gone by when a wife could be regarded as her husband's chattel and when marriage was regarded more as a matter of purchase. We have proceeded a long way from the time when such views prevailed, and, in fact, it is those views which are perpetuated in the present state of the marriage law, and I think it is high time that this House put an end to such anomalies and anachronisms.

It will be noticed that this Bill is to amend the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857. It is therefore obvious that the history of divorce law reform has been one of very slow progress and very great difficulty. Before the Act of 1857, a divorce could be obtained in this country only by private Act of Parliament, and that, of course, was limited purely to the very wealthy. Before that date, the jurisdiction in matrimonial matters rested in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and they used to grant what was called a divorce a mensâ et thoro, which finds its counterpart today in the decree of judicial separation, but it is very significant that the grounds on which the Ecclesiastical Courts granted a divorce a mensâ et thoro were the same for the husband and the wife, and that that applies to-day with regard to a decree of judicial separation, a wife being able to obtain a decree of judicial separation on the sole ground of her husband's adultery. Most hon. Members will agree that the punishment inflicted by the decree of judicial separation is greater than that involved in divorce, and if the wife can safely be entrusted with the right of obtaining such a decree on the ground of adultery, there is no danger whatsoever in granting her this right in the larger matter of divorce.

This subject is not a new one. As I have said, there has been practically no alteration in the law of divorce since 1857, but this subject of the equality of the wife's status was raised in debates when the Bill of 1857 was passing through this House, and an Amendment, moved by Lord John Manners in Committee of this House in 1857, to grant a wife the right to divorce her husband for adultery, which was limited to adultery which took place in the conjugal residence, was actually carried in this House, and was accepted by Lord Palmerston, who was in charge of the Government at the time. The only reason that Amendment was not finally incorporated in the Bill, was because when it went up to the House of Lords, the Lords rejected it on the ground of its uncertainty, and the difficulties which would be involved in the question of fact as to whether the act had taken place in the conjugal residence. During those debates, so great an opponent of divorce as Mr. Gladstone spoke strongly in favour of this Amendment which was to grant equality to the wife. Mr. Gladstone was against the Matrimonial Causes Bill of 1857, in so far as it extended the grounds of divorce, or granted divorce at all. But, on the particular Amendment of Lord Manners, which was to give a wife the same rights as her husband, he used these words: Report was actually signed by the Archbishop of York, and the Bill of Lord Gorell included this provision, which is the sole provision of my Bill, with regard to equality of the sexes, and also contained a great many other provisions with regard to Divorce Law Reform procedure which, for the reasons I have stated, are quite impossible for me to attempt in a Private Member's Bill. That Bill of Lord Gorell was actually supported by the Archbishop of York and the Archbishop of Canterbury. I do not think I need trouble the House with quotations of their words. The Archbishop voted for the Second Reading, and the Archbishop of Canterbury said that if he had been present he would also have supported and voted for the Second Reading of the Bill. Christianity stands for the broad principle of the equality of the sexes, the strongest ground on which I commend this measure to the House is that, where you have two standards of morality, the tendency is bound to be to accept the lower standard. We know very well that the argument is used, with regard to the fixing of wages by trade unions, that where a standard rate of wage is fixed, the tendency is for the minimum to become the maximum, and with the control of prices during the War we found that the maximum prices also became the minimum price.

However far-fetched these analogies may be, it is obvious, that where you have a differential standard, the tendency is for the lower to be accepted, and I am convinced that if a standard be equalised between the two sexes, the general tendency will be for the standard as regards men to be raised, and not for the standard of women to be lowered. That has been the experience in Scotland, which has this provision, as part of its common law, since 1560, and any dire results which may be anticipated from this Bill have certainly not resulted in Scotland. The Divorce Law Commission went very carefully into the evidence as regards the effects of this measure in Scotland, and that very distinguished personage, Lord Salvesen, stated quite confidently as his opinion that this provision had worked very well in Scotland, and that the tendency had not been there for women to take advantage, as is often said of a single act of adultery, because the number of petitions brought by wives is far less than those brought by husbands. Although it would be the generally accepted view of hon. Members that the opportunities of bringing a petition by the wife probably far exceeded those of the husband, yet the fact remains that in practice they were very much less. Lord Salvesen stated as his opinion that to give the wife this right would act as a deterrent to the husband's lapses from the conjugal tie, and that is very obvious. The present state of our law gives the husband complete licence to commit adultery with impunity, and that is a matter which is rather scandalous. There are many cases where a husband lives notoriously in continuous adultery with another woman, and the wife has no right under the law to obtain a divorce. It will be generally admitted that that is a state of affairs which should be brought to an end. We, almost alone of all the countries in the world, retain this anachronism on our Statute Book. The various countries which permit a wife equal rights with her husband are, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Roumania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland; most of our Colonies and the United States of America. Practically every civilised country, with the exception of Spain, recognises this equal right of the wife to divorce.

Before sitting down, I ought to deal with the kind of opposition, which, as far as I know, has been raised against this Bill. I am very sanguine of its passage. I have met with very little indication of opposition to this measure, so far as I have ascertained the general view of hon. Members during the last few days; but I understand that those who are in favour of a more general and comprehensive form of our divorce law view this Bill with apprehension because they think it will act as an obstacle to further reform at a distant date. They are afraid it will put back the clock of divorce law reform. I cannot see that argument at all. In any event, those who believe that this Measure in itself is a right and proper Measure ought not to hold up this act of justice because they think something else ought to be done; I am sure that is not a ground which will make a general appeal to hon. Members of this House. If they cannot rely generally upon sufficient support to obtain their proposals independently of this particular Measure being granted, then they ought to take the consequences of public opinion.

I need not say more than that this is the utmost that we are likely to achieve in a private Member's Bill. Even attempts to introduce matters of procedure such as obtained the support of the Minority Commission, or many matters on which nearly everyone is agreed about, would be fatal. To attempt these in such a Measure and in the course of a private Member's Bill would be a mistake. Every hon. Member knows the difficulties of securing sufficient time to get such a Measure through. My purpose is to try to get this Bill on the Statute Book. I am convinced that any attempt to add to its scope will simply jeopardise this much needed reform. On that ground I would appeal to those who are in favour of this principle, and who may desire something else, not to attempt any extension of the scope of the Bill. So far as I am concerned, I will say quite frankly that I will do my best to oppose any such attempt for the extension of this Measure on the one ground which I have endeavoured to state clearly.

We are told that this might block any great reform. We know very well the gigantic efforts which have been made in the other place to bring about a larger measure of reform. I have just referred to Lord Gorell's Bill. I do not know whether hon. Members remember the fate of that Bill. That Bill had the general assent of everyone in the House of Lords, and would probably have been brought by the then Government into the House of Commons, and passed into law, but for one fact. Lord Buckmaster in Committee added the ground of desertion to that Bill. He added that ground, he said, as a symbol, in order that when the Bill came to the House of Commons it would be possible that further grounds might be added. Lord Gorell, though he was in favour of that particular Amendment, opposed it, voted against it, and appealed to the Noble Lords not to jeopardise his Bill on that ground. The then Lord Chancellor (Lord Birkenhead) supported Lord Buckmaster, and went so far as to say that if the House of Lords accepted the Amendment to the Bill and the Bill went through in that form, that there was every hope it would procure the necessary facilities in the House of Com- mons. I would just like to mention what the Lord Chancellor said:

The only other ground of opposition which I have heard is that it would not be a very wise thing to grant a wife the right to divorce a husband for a single act of adultery, and that is what this Bill will do. There is no need to spend much time in answering that argument. It does not affect the broad question of justice and equality which is involved in this Measure. I have pointed out the significance of the fact that wives can to-day obtain a decree of judicial separation for one single act of adultery. The punishment which can be inflicted by that judicial separation which imposes a permanent life of celibacy on both parties will be generally agreed to be far worse than that involved in a divorce. But we have above those grounds which, after all, are matters of opinion the actual experience of Scotland. In that case the right which has been given there to a wife has not resulted in any abuse of the powers given. I only just propose to quote from the evidence of Lord Salvesen given before the Divorce Law Commission. He said:

I beg to second the Motion.

In view of the fact that the arguments have been so very well expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Hull (Major Entwistle), I shall not occupy the time of the House for more than a few minutes. I think the House would first of all like to congratulate the hon. Member who has just sat down upon the exercise of his discrimination in introducing a Bill which will have the effect of removing what is felt on the part of the women of this country to be a rankling injustice. That indebtedness to him is, I think, reinforced by the very able speech that he has made this morning in commending this Bill to the attention of the House. I only want in the little while I shall speak to give my own experience as a country lawyer in advising in these matters. Those of the same profession as myself will, I think, have gone through the same experience again and again.

Some unhappy woman has come to be advised as to the sufferings she is undergoing in her houshold because of her husband's offences, and she is amazed to find that whereas, if she had offended, her husband could have obtained a divorce against her there is no possibility of obtaining a divorce on the same grounds against her husband. The almost invariable comment that a woman makes is this: "That is the result of the law made by a House of Commons consisting of men." I think there is a bigger obligation upon us in view of the fact that there are so few women representatives in this House. Thus there is the heavier obligation upon us that we should do jus- tice as between one sex and the other. The power is in our hands, and the removal of this disqualification and the establishment of this equality will, I am sure, be welcomed generally throughout the country. I hope that none of those irrelevant considerations which have been so frequently suggested as being objections to this Measure will be urged to-day, and I trust that there will be a readiness, and even an eagerness, to support this Bill not only on the Second Reading, but in such a way as will secure for it a swift passage through Committee so that during this Session of Parliament we shall be able to say that we have wiped out one serious inequality. It is on these general grounds that I should give my support to this Bill.

I beg to move to leave out the word "now," and at the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."

I should like to clear the ground of one or two misconceptions as to the reasons which induce me to move the rejection of this Bill. In the first place, my opposition is in no sense ecclesiastical, or based upon any question of religious views. I hold very strongly that in a matter of this sort it is not right for the civil authorities to impose upon persons who are good citizens a religious code which would not be approved by those who do not believe in that religious code. Equally, my opposition is not based upon any general opposition to a 'reform of our present divorce laws, which I consider cry most urgently for reform. Not only are they full of anomalies, but they cause many injustices in their actual practice, and they are in some respects a fraud and a sham. I do not oppose this Bill from any idea of opposition to an equality of treatment of the sexes in the eyes of the law.

May I bring forward one assumption in which I think I shall have the general assent of the House, if not indeed of every single Member. I am going to assume that it is not a desirable thing that the marriage contract and the married state, after having been in existence for some time, should be determinable and dissolvable at the will of the parties, and by consent, by some ceremony very little more than that under which the contract was entered into. I think I shall obtain general assent to the proposition that it is not desirable that the married condition should be determinable between the parties at their will If that be so, I go one step further, and contend that it is undesirable to go something like 90 per cent. of the distance of bringing about that state of affairs. I go even further than that and say that it is not desirable to go even 50 per cent. of that way unless you can find some very strong argument in favour of the change.

What does this Bill propose to do? The hon. Member who moved the Second Reading of this Bill has stated correctly the effect of this Measure. It proposes to give a woman the right to a dissolution of her marriage as the result of one single act of adultery on the part of the husband. I said just now that I considered that our divorce laws at the present time were a fraud and a sham. Quite contrary to the intention of those who passed the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, we have under our laws in practice almost the right to end a marriage by consent or by agreement between the parties. It is well-known to almost every hon. Member of this House that if the parties to a marriage come to the conclusion that they would be best separated the thing can be done by the wife writing a letter to the husband asking him to come back, and then the husband writes a letter refusing and sends his wife the address of some hotel where she can obtain evidence sufficient to obtain a divorce. I believe that is a fraud and a sham, and it was not the intention of the law when it was passed, but it is the result of the law.

It may be said that, if this Bill were passed, it would not add very much to the power to put an end to a marriage at the will of the parties, but it will put an almost insuperable obstruction in the way of removing that fraud and that sham. I suggest that under the present circumstances of these days in which we live, if we are not to have marriages dissolvable at the will of the parties we must get rid altogether of the right to dissolve a marriage by reason of one single act of adultery. If our divorce laws are to be properly reformed, you can get that equality of the sexes pleaded for so eloquently by the hon. Member who moved the Second Reading of this Bill by saying that adultery shall only be a cause of divorce by itself if it be repeated or habitual. Then you would have a state of affairs in which the right to get a divorce would not be taken advantage of unless there were really good reasons for it, and it would not be open to people who merely change their mind to take advantage of the law to end the matrimonial contract.

I do not wish to base the slightest opposition to this Bill on any idea not to give equality to the sexes. The hon. Gentleman who moved the Second Reading made a suggestion that this was a measure of equal justice and equity, and was demanded almost universally by the women of this country. I know that among the women there is a very strong objection to the state of affairs which I am so opposed to in regard to divorce being made easy. There is a large mass of quiet women who are the strength of this country, and are now the strength of the electorate, and I am sure they would be very shocked if they found that they had been supporting this Bill merely as a matter of equality of the sexes, and then realised the result which I feel would come of increasing the existing state of affairs under which divorce can be so easily obtained, and putting obstacles in the way of putting an end to that particular fraud and sham under our divorce laws.

I suggest that in those circumstances the women of this country generally would be most loath to bring about that particular state of affairs merely for what I will describe as a certain theoretical equality between the sexes. That has been one of those catchwords which has been used thoughtlessly, ignorantly, and in ways in which it never applies, and I venture to suggest that this is one. You may have identity of treatment between man and man and you may have identity of treatment between woman and woman, but you can never make a man a woman and you can never make a woman a man. You can never get over the actual physical difference which comes in in this question of divorce. [ Interruption. ] I am very sorry, but, if half-a-dozen hon. Members will make their remarks all at the same time, it is impossible for me to hear them. May I just put this Question to Members of the House who are themselves fathers of families. Is there any man in this House who is the father of a son and of a daughter who would regard the sin of adultery on the part of his son as being as serious as the sin of adultery on the part of his daughter?

Why not?

Does the hon. Gentleman teach his children that?

I think, if hon. Members will carefully consider my words, they will realise that I am not attempting in the very slightest degree to advocate any low teaching of morality. I am not concerned to defend myself with regard to the teaching of my children. It is not necessary in this House, and no Member who knows me would venture to cast any slur upon my treatment of them or my teaching of them.

I desire to assure the hon. Member that I did not cast any slur upon him. I put a question to him based on his argument, a question to which, I believe, he can give only one answer by his own actual practice.

I accept the hon. Member's explanation. But it is quite unnecessary to discuss my teaching for this particular reason, that my only children are sons. I have no daughter. I would repeat once more my question to those Members of the House who did not give that particular answer. I will repeat it in a slightly different form: Is it not the case—regret it as much as you like—that throughout all ranks of society in this country to-day, from the highest to the lowest, the sin of adultery does not ruin the reputation of a man as it does of a woman? [HON. MEMBERS: "It should do."] Will hon. Members be good enough to follow what I am saying and not what I am not saying? I say, whatever should be, the fact is—and if hon. Members come here to legislate seriously they must deal with facts—that under the present condition of society, from the highest to the lowest, the sin of adultery does not ruin the reputation of a man in the way that it ruins the reputation of a woman. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I am not concerned with the question why; it is a fact. It is a fact which hon. Members opposite, I venture to think, will not deny. If the hon. Member who introduced this Bill and those who support him would—I do not know whether it is possible—amend or alter the Bill, or if they had introduced a Bill for the purpose which the hon. Mover expressed to be his purpose, to bring about equality of treatment between the sexes, and if they would bring forward a proposal that adultery, apart from any other offence, should not be a ground for divorce except it be habitual or repeated I would support them.

I do suggest that, if you make divorce so easy, as you will do by this particular proposal, you will be putting obstacles in the way of other divorce reforms. You will make divorce so easy to get by methods similar to those which I have described as a fraud and a sham that people will take advantage of those easy facilities to get a divorce for reasons which, comparatively speaking, do not matter, while the law will still remain in the anomalous condition of creating severe hardships, such as the case of a man or a woman being tied for life to an incurably insane partner. In that way, I suggest that the Bill, no matter what the object of the promoters may be, will put difficulties in the way of further reforms. Let me also suggest this argument. We desire an improvement in the moral standard generally, but the Bill under present circumstances will not tend in that direction. I have said—and hon. Members must, I know, admit it—that a single act of adultery on the part of a man does not cause him to be ostracised in society at the present time. There is a strong spirit of chivalry still existing in the men of this country, and the result will be that over and over again when a married couple are unhappy, perhaps temporarily —if they were bound together and went on for a year or two they might be happy again; that has happened in many a case—or if they come to a disagreement, the spirit of chivalry which exists in a man will lead him, at the request of his wife, to give her evidence of a single act of adultery in order to enable her to put an end to the marriage tie. You will thus be simply lowering more than ever the general moral censure which there will be upon loose living on the part of a man. Therefore, I do urgently appeal to Members of this House to consider very carefully whether I am not right in my suggestion that this Bill, if really under- stood, and if the effect of it were really explained to the women of this country, would probably be turned down by the vast majority of them. I go further than that and I say I have very little hesitation whatever in declaring that if such a reform as I have suggested, of adultery being a ground for divorce on either side only if habitual or repeated, then I think the Bill would receive far greater support from women throughout the country than it will in this-particular form.

12 N.

I should like to refer to an argument put forward by the hon. Gentleman who moved the Second Reading of the Bill. He gave as an illustration the ease of Scotland. The hon. Member will, I think, admit that an enormous number of undefended divorce cases are carried through in England in these days simply by orders for restitution with just sufficient proof of adultery in undefended cases. He will admit, I think, that these cases have multiplied a hundredfold within the last few years. What is now a common form of procedure was very rare less than 20 years ago. It was practically then unknown, possibly because the judges of those days were a little more inclined to be difficult in regard to divorce. This shows the tendency in recent times which has been leading this country more than Scotland to take advantage of that form of divorce. In Scotland, be it remembered, there has all the time been a very strong view held with regard to divorce. I do not think, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman's argument constitutes a very strong answer to the objections I have brought forward. The hon Gentleman also, as did his seconder, referred to there being very many cases at the present time of a husband living in regular adultery, and, because there was no other offence on his part, the wife being unable to secure a divorce. We all know of these cases, but I venture to suggest there are really not a very large number after all. When a husband is guilty of that course of conduct, it is ten to one that he is anxious for a divorce himself and in most cases I think it is very likely there is some other ground which would enable the wife to get a divorce. My whole case is based upon the anxiety to get rid of one of the worst attributes of our present divorce law. If it could be provided that a divorce for adultery should only be granted if such adultery were habitual, then, of course, the hard cases to which the hon. Member has referred to could be dealt with with complete satisfaction. I ask the House to realise and to believe that I am not in the slightest degree trying to obstruct the reform of the divorce laws regardless of consequences. I have over and over again expressed my wish to support many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. I am anxious to see that the family tie, which has been the basis of the strength of this country, should not be loosened more than it has been, but that we should try to preserve it, and I have ventured to put forward the lines upon which it could be preserved and yet at the same time every one of these hardships which have been quoted in the discussions on Lord Buckmaster's proposals could still be removed. If this Bill is understood by the women of the country it will, I am sure, meet with strong opposition. Equality of the sexes before the law may be obtained in a way which would not only give equality and justice, but which would preserve the family life of which the country has been so proud in the past and upon which its strength has been built up.

I beg to second the Amendment, and I propose to deal with the subject only in general terms. I speak for no Society; I have been approached by no organisation. I am merely standing on my own rights as a Member of this House to oppose what I think is an undesirable Bill and to endeavour to see that justice is done. I, myself, believe that desertion should be admitted as ground for divorce, and I am, therefore, afraid that if this Bill is allowed to pass into law a good deal of harm will be done and that it will go far to prevent all reform of the divorce laws for many years. I am interested as a Conservative to note that the Bill in the other House which is usually associated with the name of Lord Buckmaster has never been in this House. I notice that when his party has had an opportunity of introducing the Bill into this House it has failed to take advantage of it, but has chosen rather to put forward some alterna- tive measure If the opportunities had been seized by the Liberal party to really push such a Bill on the Floor of this House, even if it had not been carried into law, it would have secured such a publication of their views as might have assisted their cause very much indeed. The general public, when they consider that the opportunity was given of presenting that Bill on the Floor of this House, and that opportunity was not taken, but refused, will consider the Liberal party to be very half-hearted as regards these Measures of reform. By their failure to proceed now, when they have the chance, they will be disappointing a great number of people in the country, who will think of them in future as rather broken reeds.

I now want to turn to the point of view of those who oppose all divorce law reform. I was present in the last House when, on a private Member's Motion, this question was debated, and it was thrown out by those who opposed Lord Buckmaster's proposals, but it was constantly then stated that, if this present Measure were agreed to, obstacles would be removed and the matter could be squared. As it strikes me, it was understood at the time that, if those on the other side would accept this Measure, a deal would be done. It was said on the Floor of the House, if I remember aright, by a right hon. Member, that the matter could be squared. People who are keen on divorce reform will feel, therefore, that by the introduction of this Bill a deal has been done behind their backs, and that there would in future be no serious pressing forward of the proposals of Lord Buckmaster. I am a member of the Established Church, and take some interest in its proceedings, and I know that there are many of my persuasion who oppose very strongly, and perfectly honestly, all forms of extension of divorce. This suggestion of a deal having, as I have said, been made, if those who oppose all forms of extension do not now take this opportunity of rejecting this Bill, surely their conduct, if they allow it to pass without protest, will not be perfectly and strictly honest. Surely we who are connected with any Church, or any religious movement, ought to be perfectly certain that, even if our views are not exactly popular, we at all events put them forward with a perfectly clear-cut honesty and high-minded purpose, and if my Church, the Established Church, really allows—because there is no justification for it from their point of view—this Bill to go through without any protest or opposition, they leave themselves open to misrepresentation. People will say that they do not oppose a Bill in which they did not believe. I do hope they will not take that attitude, because to my mind it would be very unfortunate for the Church to which I belong. I beg to second, the Amendment.

I want to congratulate the Mover and Seconder of the Bill on the common-sense speeches that they have made. We have not heard any opposition to it yet. There is an old saying that what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. The treatment we mete out to men we ought to mete out to women. No one can combat that. I do not support this Measure because a woman is equal to a man, or because a man is equal to a woman; I support it because they are human beings. Women to-day are filling every post in the country. I should not be surprised if some day the position of Prime Minister were occupied by a woman. We have women magistrates, women doctors, women in the highest ranks of education, and no man in this House can say anything against it. We are all for the purity of the home. A man who commits adultery ought not to live in the same home as a pure woman, and vice versa. If we multiply the number of homes like that, where shall we get our Class A soldiers in the future? I signed 60,000 certificates in an Appeal Court, and they were all for miners. We never hear tell in my constituency of a divorce among working people, but when I pick up my London papers they contain column after column of divorce reports. Those marriages were not made in Heaven; they were made in Hell. Marriages that lead to the Divorce Court are made for money and for other reasons. All that we claim is that when a man commits adultery he ought to be placed on the same terms as a woman who commits adultery. I do not anticipate any real opposition; it is simply a heterogeneous amalgamation of sickening conceit and verbosity. We have had long quotations from what was said by Gladstone and others, but what matters it what they say? It is common sense to support this Measure. The law of the land is not common sense in many cases. What I claim for myself, I give to another. It is a biblical dictum, it is a philosophical dictum, it is logic, it is reasonable, and I think it ought to have the unanimous support of the House. I should like the Government to support the Measure or withdraw the Whips and go to a Division at once. Men and women ought to be equal before the law. They are not today, and I hope that to-day the House will decide that question.

The speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down was a notable specimen of that liberality of spirit so often found on the Benches opposite, which describes the views of all those who differ from them, not as common sense, but as a heterogeneous amalgamation of conceit and verbosity, and is prepared to hold that his own opinions comprise all common sense beyond the need of argument. I cannot follow the hon. Member in such an estimate of those who think differently from himself, but I hope I shall be able to extend rather more toleration, humbly as I do so, to those who disagree with my views. I have never taken any part in any of these discussions which in recent years have occupied the House on matters of the most delicate morality which form the basis of our social system. I have not taken part in them. I have not found it suited my taste very much. Sometimes they did not seem to be very savoury. But I have had this strange experience. There is an extraordinary inconsistency in some of the proposals of the most advanced of these ethical teachers who think they only are masters of what is real progress in ethical and on social questions. We have had Criminal Law Amendment Acts which impose severe penalties upon anything savouring in the least degree of illicit intercourse between the sexes. It has been discussed to my mind with a freedom which has been rather alarming. But on the other hand, while we wish to lay down the severest laws against any such illicit intercourse, it seems to be equally part of advanced political thought that we ought to reduce the marriage tie to something as near as possible to temporary and almost illicit connection. Under some advanced teachers I think that mutual consent would at most be considered suffi- cient, and it would be possible to form a temporary connection and then when it pleased you come to the conclusion that it should cease. I am old fashioned enough to remember the days when such connection would be called by its plain name of fornication. Now it is a rule of advanced social reform.

The question of the equality of the sexes is merely a catchword, and it is surprising how we seem nowadays to be governed by catchwords. I am positive that the pendulum will swing back and some day, not very many years hence, after I have disappeared from these benches, the cry will be the distinction between the sexes and the maintenance of mutual but clearly distinct obligations. There was a great moralist of the 18th Century—Dr. Johnson—who mixed morality with his common sense. Abhorring as he did violation of the marriage rule, he was none the less a weighty moralist, and he distinctly laid it down that the offence of adultery was different in a man and in a woman. If a man commits adultery he does not introduce a bastard into the household of his wife. If a woman commits adultery she makes her husband legally the father of a bastard. The difference is perfectly plain. It is a fact and you cannot get over it. Chastity in women is a star that has guided human nature since the world began, and that points far higher and teaches us of the other sex things which we could not otherwise know. We bow in humble reverence to that high star of chastity, and we celebrate it in song and poetry. But I do not think that any mere man would thank us for enshrining him in such a halo. This surely shows that there is a radical distinction. But after all is there not in all this working for the destruction of the marriage tie some sort of false idea that you are rising to some higher level and that somehow or other you will achieve emancipation if you make the tie less strong? There is this exceuse, that people rarely avail themselves to any large extent of facilities for the dissolution of the marriage tie. I think my fellow Scottish Members will confirm me when I say I am hardly aware of a single case where, upon the simple plea of isolated adultery on the part of the husband, divorce has been granted or has been sought. That maybe, of course, because Scottish, husbands are all Josephs for virtue, who would never yield to the ordinary frailties of the male sex unless they were prepared to add to it the more heinous crimes of desertion and cruelty.

Amongst the other arguments of those who wish, the loosening of the marriage tie is the argument that that tie is enforced by ecclesiastical rules, but I would ask those who hold this to think of this fact. Religion has its influence upon humanity only if it reflects that highest revelation of all, and that is the real truth of human nature, and I believe, apart from all ecclesiastical rules and from religious dogma, that there lies in human nature, and has lain from the earliest historical epochs, a feeling that the strongest tie in the world ought to be the tie between man and woman. That tie ought, as far as possible, to be made permanent. If that tie can be easily broken, if we are to break it according to a passing humour, or for occasional frailties, or the ebullition of our mere fractious tempers, then surely it is not the binding influence in our lives that it ought to be. To my mind, marriage is a tie that ought to be permanent through life; something that will raise life to the highest place upon a sacred pedestal. I am not disposed, sternly as I think there should be punishment for any infringement of the sacred bond, to introduce, from a mere isolated instance, a new possibility of divorce on grounds which would inflict one more serious wound upon that bond which legislation has made strong for the benefit of humanity. We have had the divorce law for 70 years. Look back to the annals of the divorce courts and see the picture of social life as it now exists. Do you think that the divorce law has raised our social life, and that it has made our home life pure and more hallowed? Do you think that it has not inflicted a stain upon our social annals which we would willingly expunge?

The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has put before the House, in very impressive terms, considerations which I have no doubt weigh strongly with him and with other hon. Members in resisting the Second Reading of this Bill. He quite rightly claimed that on both sides of the House we must make due allowance for the point of view of those with whom we do not happen to agree. Let me say at once, as I take a different view from the right hon. Gentleman, that I well understand that he and others who oppose the Second Reading of this Bill do not do so because they desire to encourage any laxity in the observance of the sacred obligations of marriage by a husband, just as much as by a wife. We thoroughly understand that. The Whole House is anxious in this matter to deal with this difficult and delicate subject, remembering that a difference of view among serious citizens is quite possible. Therefore, we must consider both sides before we come to a conclusion. I am bound to add, however, that the right hon. Member for the Scottish Universities (Sir H. Craik) has delivered a speech in very emphatic denunciation of the law of Scotland, a country from which he comes and of which he is so honoured a son, a country which for 350 years has lived under the law as this Bill would make it. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would be the very first to insist that respect for the marriage tie in Scotland and the standard of purity and good faith in Scottish homes are not in any degree below the standard in other parts of the world.

If we are going to consider, as we must consider, differences of opinion held in regard to this matter, it really is very material to observe how this matter has struck a large number of sincere and thoughtful men and women called together to constitute a Royal Commission, It is no good appointing a Royal Commission to gather opinions and to make recommendations, unless some attention is paid to what they say. I am very far from saying that the recommendations of a Royal Commission should control the free judgment of Parliament. Still, there is a tendency, and perhaps on a Friday afternoon the tendency is seen at its highest point, to discuss this kind of question without always bearing in mind the deliberate conclusions which have been arrived at by members of a Royal Commission representing all sorts of points of view on a subject of this sort. The Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes considered a great number of topics, some of them, I dare say, very disputable topics. There was a Majority Report which, among other things, recommended this particular change in the law.

What I think is very significant and extremely important is that there was a Minority Report signed by the present Archbishop of York, the late Sir William Anson—whom many of us remember so well as a Member of this House, and who will always be held in most affectionate memory by those who had the honour of his friendship—and Sir Lewis Dibdin, the Dean of Arches. If we were going to get the views of men of undoubted judgment and balance, men who at the same time might be expected to allow fully for some of the considerations which have just been put forward by the right hon. Gentleman, could we have selected three better qualified persons in order to say what was to be said on the other side? The Archbishop of York, the late Sir William Anson, and Sir Lewis Dibdin made a Minority Report, which is instructive, because on the particular matter dealt with in this Bill they entirely agree with the majority. They said: the southern part of this Island of Great Britain is one of the very few places in the world where a wife is not in this respect to be on an equality with her husband. I am willing to admit that there may be force in the contention that there is an injury done to the common home, that there is a possibility of permanent evil being introduced into the common home, in the case of the failure of a wife to observe her marriage vow, which may not in the same form arise in the case of a breach by the husband. That may be so. But what I am quite unable to see is how either reasonable observance of the promise which a man makes as the basis of marriage, or, indeed, the preservation of the sanctity of marriage itself is in the least degree preserved or promoted by the law refusing to regard a breach of the first obligation of a man in such a case to his wife as no reason why the wife should be able to obtain relief which he could obtain in the case of a similar breach by her. The hon. Gentleman who moved the rejection said that he would favour the remedy being available, I think he said, in the case of absolute infidelity.

Repeated infidelity.

Can anybody imagine a less practical distinction? I do not think the extreme importance of the subject which we are discussing, or, indeed, the delicacy of the matter, would make it at all seemly to go in for an interrogatory into how many, times, but at the same time, it must be plain to the House that a distinction of that sort, to say nothing of the merits of the distinction, would be quite impracticable. Not only so, but be it observed that the husband and wife do stand on a common level so far as judicial separation is concerned. That is a most astonishing state of affairs. I think that those who know most about the working of our marriage laws, and those whose social work leads them most closely to study the actual conditions of unhappy married life, are by no means satisfied with the situation which is created by the operation of our law of judicial separation. But judicial separation, whatever else it does, keeps a man and a woman in this respect on the same footing, and, as pointed out in the Report by the majority of the Royal Commission, when you analyse this case out you are driven, and the minority as well as the majority think themselves driven, to the view that, so far as this change in the law is concerned, no alternative change is practicable or justified. Reports of Royal Commissions, though available in the Library, are not generally looked on as light reading, and perhaps the House will forgive me if I read some passages from the Report of the Royal Commission on Matrimonial Causes. It is Command Paper 6478, and was presented to Parliament in the ordinary way in the year 1912. Without comment, I wish to read two or three passages to show the view of the majority, because nobody will dispute that the Commission was staffed by men and women of great judgment and good sense, upon whom some reliance must be placed, though that, of course, does not relieve the House of Commons in the least from making up its own mind. Paragraph 210 of the Report says:

"In principle there can be no adequate reason why two persons, who enter into matrimonial relationship, should have a different standard of morality applied to them, and, what is perhaps most remarkable about the difference in question is that it is not recognised as applicable to the right to judicial separation, for either man or woman who may obtain a decree of this nature for a single act of adultery. Those who maintain that judicial separation is a greater punishment than divorce are probably right, but the former may inflict life-long celibacy, and with no right of remarriage, and the latter does not. Thus the punishment which may be inflicted on a man for a single act of adultery may be greater than that which might be inflicted in the case of the greater offence of continuous adultery or cruelty or desertion, though the wife might, even in the latter case, choose to take a decree of separation and not of divorce. Apart from abstract justice the strongest reason for placing the sexes on an equality is that, where two standards exist, there is a tendency to accept the lower for both parties."

That is a profound truth and a very strong reason, indeed, for the Second Reading of the Bill. The Report goes on:

"The economic position of women has greatly changed during the last 100 and even the last 50 years. The Married Women's Property Act (1882), has given them a new status in regard to property. They engage freely in business, in the professions, and in municipal, educational and poor law administration, and claim equality of treatment with men. In our opinion it is impossible to maintain a different standard of morality in the marriage relation, without creating the impression that justice is denied to women, an impression that must tend to lower the respect in which the marriage law is held by women."

It goes on to deal with the matter from many other points of view. They arrive at this conclusion in paragraph 219:

"Our conclusion is that no satisfactory solution of the problem which is raised as to the personal relations between husband and wife, can be formed, except by placing them on an equal footing, and by declaring that, whatever grounds are permitted to a husband for obtaining a divorce from his wife, the same grounds shall be available for a wife in a suit against her husband. It may be safely left to a woman to consider whether she will exercise her rights, and it may reasonably be expected, as has been proved by actual experience in Scotland, that physical, social, pecuniary, and other considerations will have their natural effect, and lead to such rights not being exercised, at any rate in the great majority of cases without such good and sufficient reason as will meet with the approval of the relations and friends of the wife."

They never have been exercised.

I am glad to have the confirmation of the right hon. Gentleman that the law, as to whose extension he has such fears in the case of England, has not produced in Scotland the disastrous consequences which he forsees in this country. The hon. Member for Watford made some interesting remarks. He said—I think with a great deal of force—that there are cases in which the injustice and the injury done to the wife by holding her bound indefinitely to her husband may be regarded as at least equal to the injustice and the injury which might be alleged to arise under the present law as dealt with by this Bill. He said, for instance, take the wife who is married to a husband who is incurably insane. I understood my hon. Friend to say that he would be in favour of giving a wife the right to divorce from her husband in that position. In that respect he agrees with the Archbishop of York. But go a step further. What has the House to say of a wife whose husband is a convicted murderer, who will spend the rest of his days in a criminal lunatic asylum? There is a situation which surely shows that the present law in relation to marriage and divorce calls for some revision by the Legislature.

I am not quite sure whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman is suggesting that I should do otherwise, but I should approve of that particular form. I do not quite understand the point of the right hon. Gentle- man's reference. That would not be altered by this Bill.

My hon. Friend will see in a moment. I am told that I was mistaken in speaking of Sir Lewis Dibdin agreeing. The point is this. This Bill, of course, is a Bill which may, before Parliament has finally dealt with it, conceivably require some consideration by way of amendment, and, speaking for myself, I certainly should not take the view that the House of Commons or Parliament as a whole should bind itself in advance that no change can be made in the language of the Bill. I certainly do not wish to be understood as accepting that position at all.

Look at this Memorandum. Does that not limit it?

It is not for me to rule, of course. I wish to make it plain that, as far as I am concerned and as far as those who take my view are concerned, there are some provisions of Lord Buckmaster's Bill which ought to receive the consideration of Parliament. I do not think that the House of Commons ought in advance to tie its hands as to any and every Amendment, but it should be free to consider such Amendments as are consistent with the title of the Bill and would not lead to the loss of the Bill. It is right that that should be stated, because I am anxious that there should be no misapprehension as to the view which some, at any rate, would be disposed to take on this Bill at its future stages. I would most respectfully urge the House that the argument, whatever be its weight, that the actual character of the offence of unfaithfulness may be differentiated as between a man and a woman, with the idea of drawing some distinction between them, has nothing whatever to do with the importance of carrying this Bill. I do not believe that mankind, however much tempted in this matter, is really promoting the progress and happiness of the social life of our country or the world unless we set for one another the same standard that we set for our wives. Do not let anyone stand up in this House, because he is a man, and indulge in the mere language of cant. The point is that, whatever may be the temptation to breach of the marriage law to a man, he has entered into an obligation with his wife which is just the same as the obligation which his wife has entered into with him, and, if we do not give this Bill our support, it seems to me that we are in danger of creating an impression, which I am sure many Members of this House would be most anxious to dissipate, that we are actually setting up for ourselves a lower standard of faithfulness than that which we exact from women. I am sure that that is not the real spirit of various Members of this House. I conceive it to be the duty of the House, expressing as I believe the best judgment of the nation and following the unanimous recommendations of the Royal Commission on Divorce, to accept on behalf of mankind the responsibility and the obligation of strict observance of the marriage vow or of taking the consequence if they fail.

It is always a pleasure to hear the right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just spoken, even though one is opposed to him. Logical, keen, as an advocate he is simply unsurpassable. The hon. Member who moved the Second Reading of this Bill in an excellent speech, admitted that his object was not to carry a Divorce Bill. But this is a Divorce Bill. It extends the grounds of divorce and it goes far further than the mere purview of the Bill itself; it involves a principle far greater than the mere Bill. I would remind the House of what the last speaker rightly said, namely, that under the Bill as it is drawn there is nothing to prevent the House in Committee or on Report from extending the purview of this Bill very widely indeed. Any Amendment of the Act of 1857, under the title of this Bill, would be in order on this Bill, and you could introduce any further so-called reforms of the divorce laws which you show. I will be honest with the House and say that, so far as this literal Bill is concerned, I do not know that it meets a very large number of genuine cases that cannot be dealt with at the present time. One hon. Member drew a vivid picture of the terrible world of some lady client of his. I do not wish to suggest anything approaching dishonesty, but I cannot help feeling that where you get a very clear case of adultery against a husband, somehow or other evidence of cruelty is forthcoming, and, quite apart from the evidence, it is a fact that if a man has committed adultery he has treated his wife badly. I quite agree that logically you are perfectly right and that a man may commit adultery and never give evidence of any cruelty at all. I have had 40 years of experience practising in that Court, and I know that in real life the difficulties in those cases are not very numerous.

I will tell the House how this Bill will be used even in its present comparatively innocuous form. At the present time—I am not defending it—men in every rank of life, I am sorry to say, in many cases do not mind admitting that they have committed adultery. I refer to the collusive divorce suits which are the curse of Society to-day. You get a man in a good position in the country who will say "I have passed a night in a room in a hotel with a woman," and he leaves the Court to draw the inference of adultery. But that same man, such is his code of honour, if you choose to call it that, will hesitate before committing cruelty against his wife. I am speaking of what I know. You will get men to admit that they committed adultery or to pretend that they have committed adultery on any particular night, but those same men will shrink before they go into Court and have it proved that they have been cruel to their wives. That is the way in which this Bill will be used in practice. It will be used for these collusive cases of divorce, and that is the matter with which we have to deal here. There are two absolutely opposite views on this big question. There is the view which has been held for hundreds of years, though not so much in the present generation. It is the view that the contract of marriage is an indissoluble contract, that you take a woman for better or worse and that she takes you until death parts you both. That is the extreme view on the one side. The extreme view on the other side is that it is a mere matter of personal contract, like any other contract that you enter into, and that when both parties wish to put an end to it all that they have to do is to put an end to it and that it is no one's business but their own. Possibly the truth lies between the two extremes. The question is, have we already gone much too far towards the latter of these extremes.

I am going to vote against any further extension of the facilities for divorce. Do not misunderstand me for a moment. I know the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley (Sir John Simon) does not think I am suggesting, that from the moral point of view there is any difference in the offence as between men and women. I am not dealing with that point. But this is not a question merely of personal morality and personal affairs as between husband and wife. A far graver matter is the question of the indissolubility of the marriage tie. You have the two views upon that which I have already stated. We have been told about other countries and what is done there. The right hon. Gentleman quoted America as an example. To me, personally, as far as social life is concerned the example is one for avoidance rather than one to be followed. The small influence which America has upon our social life in England I do not wish to see extended, and I say that quite frankly. President Roosevelt said upon this subject:

That was President Roosevelt's view of divorce as far as America is concerned. We have got to meet this Bill perfectly frankly and recognise that it is an extension of the divorce law, and I submit we have already gone too far in that direction. Anything which makes divorce easier is, in President Roosevelt's words, an evil thing and a curse on society. In the very able speeches which we have had from all sides of the House to-day, every single Member has confined his remarks to the question as between the husband and the wife—the rights of the husband and the rights of the wife. There is another very important consideration which has to be taken into account in dealing with the marriage contract. I agree with hon. Members in what has been said regarding personal rights and personal contracts in many matters; but when you come to the question of marriage there is one matter in which every civilised State interferes and in which they rightly interfere. This is not a question affecting the husband and wife alone. It also affects the State. We have to consider the evil effect upon the State of anything which tends in any way to weaken that great unit of the State, the family unit. There is one class which has not been mentioned here to-day. In saying this I speak not theoretically— not even logically—I merely speak as a man who has been dealing with divorce work in the Courts for a good many years, and I can only put before the House my ordinary experience. There are others besides the husband and wife of whom we hear in those Courts, and they are the children. This Bill does make divorce easier. [An. HON. MEMBER.: "No, but it makes it more just."] It may be just, but the fact remains that it makes divorce easier. If there is any question about that, I think the hon. Member for Watford (Mr. D. Herbert) has dealt with it. I am not for the moment dealing with the question of justice. The Bill may be fair and just; I attach very little weight to it in that aspect except as regards the question of collusive divorces. But you undoubtedly make divorce easier by the Bill. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] You must do so, and as I say, there may be justice in doing so, but I ask is it better for the children to make divorce easier? We have got to think of them. What I am pressing upon the House strongly is, that this is not merely a matter of justice and of equality between the sexes in regard to morality. I never did favour one law for men and another for women, but where two great principles come up against each other and where the question of the relaxation of the marriage tie comes up against the other comparatively small consideration we must be very careful before we extend divorce in any way. I have dealt with the social aspect of the question and with the children. It is with these considerations that we have got to be very careful. The right hon. and learned Gentleman read us the Report of the Royal Commission, to which of course we ought to attach great weight, and to which we should give every respect, but a great deal has happened since the Royal Commission reported in 1912. Those of us who go into the Courts know how much has happened in every class of society since then. It is not only rich people who come to the Divorce Court now. We have got now the advantage—as we are told—of poor persons' divorce and we have a very large number of people bringing divorce suits in that way. I might slightly transpose the dictum of one of our ablest judges who said: If I may apply that to the present case I would say:

I said that was not the feeling among the poor.

I am very glad to hear it and I am very glad to know that the feeling is not yet widespread. I go a step further and say that, although those who hold these views make a good deal of noise among the rich, it has not yet gone very far among the rich. I will illustrate that fact. Reference has been made to Lord Birkenhead in another place having said the Government was going to bring in a Bill. That Bill never came to anything. It will also be remembered that a Motion was put down in this House dealing with the question of divorce. Sometimes Motions are put down by private Members to test the feeling of the House and this was a Motion in favour of divorce. I am told that one Member who came down to speak in favour of it actually spoke against it, and though it was understood there were many promises in favour of that Motion, it was thrown out by the House of Commons. Is it possible that hon. Members had in the meantime gone among their constituents and changed their views when they faced the married women of 30 or 40 or 42—the married women of the poorer class? I know the poorer people in some parts of London and their views on cheap divorce? What are their views on the question of extending facilities for divorce to everyone? The logic and the brilliance of my right hon. Friend would be wasted, able though his speech might be, if he put his views before them. The married woman of that class knows her mind quite well. Her man is her man, and she is going to stick to him, right or wrong, to the end. She does not believe in cheap divorce, and that is the reason why the Government Bill to which I have referred never came before this House. It is a most important subject. Believe me, this is a vital matter; it goes to the bedrock of society. Look at history, or look at anything you like, once you get the family tie weakened in a race, once you get divorce made easy, it is a bad thing for that society and that State, and it is for that reason —not that I attach very much weight to this comparatively small and exceedingly logical Bill—and not for any reason of a desire to lay down one standard of morality for men and another standard for women, but because it is an extension of the divorce law, and for that reason alone, that I am speaking against this Bill. I believe you have gone too far at present in the direction of making divorce easier, and that any new step that we take ought to be in the other direction.

Those who are in favour of the rejection of this Bill have failed almost entirely to recognise the difficulty in which the woman is placed at the present time. We have heard a good deal about the loosening of family ties and so forth. In my opinion, this Bill would tend rather to the strengthening of those ties than to their loosening, but it is perfectly true that what we need more than anything else is to raise the whole moral standard of life. I am thankful here this morning to think and to know that I am the son of a mother and father—my father was in this House for 25 years—a great part of whose lives was spent in the attempt to remove the moral inequalities between the sexes, and in my very early training it was laid upon us that there was that absolute moral equality. We were early taught that there could be no fallen woman without there being a fallen man. It seems to me that there is no justification whatever for continuing to ostracise the woman, and that anything in the way of ostracism ought to be removed. The hon. Member who seconded the rejection of the Measure said he was a member of the Church of England. I am a member of a different Church, but I have always understood until this morning that all Christian Churches accepted the Ten Commandments, and this is the first occasion upon which I have heard, as I understood the hon. Member who moved the rejection of the Bill, that one of the Commandments is to be observed by one sex and not by the other.

The hon. Member will not misrepresent me, I know. I have never preached, and I did not preach today, a lower standard of morality for the man than for the woman, but, entirely apart from other qualifications, that has nothing whatever to do with the question of what may or may not be grounds for divorce. The divorce law is not a criminal law of punishment, and it does not apply to the standard of morality in the very slightest degree.

I understood the hon. Member to say that Members of this House should not regard their daughters in quite the same way as their sons, and I was dealing with that point.

I said that in fact, however wrong it might be, which I did not go into, the facts in society at the present time are that the sin is not regarded so seriously on the part of the man as on the part of the woman.

I accept what the hon. Member said, but at the same time we have no right to recognise a society which does draw these distinctions between morality on the part of the man and morality on the part of the woman, and it is because I believe that the passing of this Bill would raise the whole standard of morality, it is because this is a question not only of justice but of moral right, that I very heartily support the Bill.

If I say a few words on this Bill, I am induced to do so by the very interesting speech delivered by the right hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Rawlinson). We all recognise the sincerity of the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his knowledge of this subject, and if he did not convince me, and, I imagine, a good many other hon. Members of this House, that we should reject this Bill, I think it is apparent that the arguments against the Bill cannot be very strong. He, and others who have spoken against the Bill, admit frankly enough that you cannot have any civilised community with two standards of morals, one for men and another for women, but, having accepted that, they refuse to give to women the logical conclusion of this one standard of morality, and they say, "Oh, no; although a man may divorce his wife on the ground of adultery, we will not allow a woman to divorce her husband for the same cause, because it would make divorce easier." I cannot follow this extraordinary mental process. If you have come to the conclusion that the two processes are equally moral, if you have come to the conclusion that the husband can punish his wife—for divorce is punishment in most cases, and more serious punishment for the woman than for the man—for a breach of this law, you cannot then turn round and say, "I cannot allow the woman to have the same remedy for a breach of the same character, of the same contract, because it would produce more divorces." Of course, it may produce more divorces, but surely the question is not whether divorces ought or ought not to obtain. This is a very serious problem, and it is a question of whether, having a system of divorce, it should be unequal between the two sexes. That is a point which the right hon. and learned Gentleman never dealt with. On his line of argument, you ought to abolish all divorce. That, at any rate, would be equal for both sexes.

I should support a Bill which tightened up divorce, to make it equal in that way, but this is getting nearer to lowering it down.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman means that he would not allow a husband to divorce his wife if she committed adultery, and then everything would be all square. That would be going back against the whole traditions of the human race ever since it existed. Really, the right hon. and learned Gentleman cannot introduce his troglodyte doctrines at this time of day. The world has advanced, whether he likes it or not, in the direction of greater humanity, and greater humanity means that, however safe anyone may believe the marriage tie to be, however important it is for the race and for the children, there are still two human beings concerned in this grave matter, and that if two beings who have been together wish to be apart for very grave reasons, they should not be compelled to remain together. Let me analyse his statement a little further. He, of course, has a wide experience of the Divorce Courts, which some of us have not, but we read the papers, and we see there many cases in which a wife writes her husband a letter of the kind we know, drawn up in skilful language by somebody else, asking him to return and to supply her with a home, to which somebody else replies for the husband, saying it is impossible. There is then a proceeding for restitution of conjugal rights, which is disregarded, evidence is obtained of adultery, and you then proceed to a divorce, and this farce, which is enacted in our Law Courts, seems to satisfy the right hon. and learned Member. That is what he considers right and proper, but a clean case, which avoids all this hypocrisy, and enables a woman to bring a straight case of adultery, seems to him a terrible thing, because it makes divorce easier

He went on to intimate, which I am not surprised at, that after all the cruelty is easily inferred when adultery is proved. As a matter of fact, I think the judges, on the whole, have rather felt that the law was so grossly unfair that they have been inclined to look upon adultery as a form of cruelty, and it is a moral form of cruelty. It may be a greater form of cruelty than hitting a woman with a stick. The production of some sort of evidence that someone threw a hair-brush and so forth is camouflage. It is not, I think, at all dignified, or at all worthy of the subject, which is so important to the whole civic system. I can understand some of the arguments that there ought to be two codes in sexual matters between men and women, and although I do not agree, at all events it is an intelligible argument, and support, perhaps, may be found in history and tradition. But once you admit the equality of laws, how can you possibly go on to defend an inequality, and say that the inequality must remain for ever, perhaps, either because this Bill might be extended in Committee, which is a doubtful point—and, after all, the Committee and the House can deal with that—or because divorce ought to be made more difficult and not easier?

I do not think that line of argument is at all convincing. In fact, it is mutually destructive. The right hon. Gentleman said a great many things with which I very much agree. I do not know that divorce is a good thing for a country. We are not advocating it this afternoon. I think married life is a state of great importance to the individual, the State and the children, and very often to make divorce easy might lead people to separate who otherwise might come to live happily together. I think, even if this Bill be passed, many women would be prepared to forgive, as many must have forgiven, their husbands for a temporary lapse on their part, but to say a woman, because her husband lives in a state of continuous adultery with another woman, and refuses to continue to be a husband, shall be bound to him seems so monstrous a proposition, that I, for one, cannot subscribe to it. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that poor women are not so interested in the subject of divorce reform. I think he is entirely mistaken. I do not think he will find that supported by anyone who has really gone into this question. I think the women of the country as a whole expect—and rightly expect—that with equal citizenship and equal responsibilities, they should have equal rights in this matter, and I shall certainly heartily support the Second Reading of this Bill.

I did not intend to speak on this matter, but, as a lawyer, there are matters which, I feel, I ought to put before the House. First of all, with regard to the opinion of the country, I have been at times inundated with petitions from my division, which is a working-class mining division, in Warwickshire, to vote against any Measure which tended to make divorce easier. I come to the arguments put forward by the right hon. Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon), and may I say that a great deal of the difficulty in considering this subject, arises from what he intimated, in the course of his speech, was in the nature of a contract between the parties? Marriage looked upon as a civil contract one can understand, but it has another aspect and an entirely different one, namely, that of a religious sacrament. With regard to the civil contract, what is it? If it be the ordinary private contract between man and woman—"I will live with you, and you shall live with me. We will have children together, and I will support them," or something of that kind; if there be an implied condition that, "I will be faithful to you so long as you are faithful to me," we look upon that as lawyers merely as a civil contract, and damages would compensate for a breach. We cannot, however, look at this question in this House in that way. Eliminating the civil aspect—and it is in the civil aspect of the matter that we say there ought to be quality between the sexes—look at the religious aspect. For how long has the law of England been as it is with regard to divorce? For centuries and centuries. It was based upon the old ecclesiastical law. At one time they would not regard divorce as open to either party, and, as we know, the Roman Catholic Church to-day does not permit or recognise divorce. Whatever the law of Scotland may have been for three hundred years, the law of England has been for longer, and it was founded undoubtedly, as all our old laws are founded, on careful consideration, good sense and with regard to the welfare of the community.

Let us see if there are any reasons for altering it. The religious aspect of the ecclesiastical law was that when it was relaxed it was relaxed in favour of the husband. He could obtain a divorce on proving adultery, but the wife could only obtain a divorce if she could prove adultery, coupled with desertion, or cruelty, or various matters which I need not mention. Why was that distinction drawn? It was drawn by the old ecclesiastics, or monks, and was founded on human-nature and common sense. What is the foundation of it? To my mind—and I may be wrong, of course—the foundation for that distinction was this. Nobody can regard women as being on the lower plane on which man stands in sexual matters. Do not let us be hypocrites. Look at the things a man may do, apart from sexual matters, which a woman may not do. Who would think of throwing stones at a man because, after some convivial evening, he might stagger a little in his march towards his home? Who would throw a stone at him? [HON. MEMBERS: "Anybody."] Anybody on the other side might. Who would think the worse of him?

I would, for one.

I am not up to that high standard.

You ought to be.

Who would think the worse of a man for that?

I would.

Nobody but a hypocrite would.

On a point of Order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. The hon. Member in the course of his statement asked who would throw a stone at the man staggering home drunk after a convivial evening? I said I would. The hon. Gentleman went on to say that no one but a hypocrite would make such a suggestion. I think that that is an offensive remark, and requires to be withdrawn.

What I said, I repeat; but I did not suggest that a man was a bad character merely because he went home, as I have said, after a convivial evening.

After hearing what has been said, I think the hon. Member's repetition is out of order.

May I say—

On a point of Order. May I submit that this is the first time that I have heard such a ruling during the long tenure of my seat in this House—to make a general attribution into a special one?

I think we must draw a distinction between a general and a particular statement. I do not think in the circumstances that the hon. Member for Nuneaton was within the rules of order in suggesting that another hon. Member was a hypocrite.

I had no intention whatever of attributing hypocrisy to any particular hon. Member. That was not in my mind. I was merely dealing with the general aspect of the case, and the view that one man would take of another man's conduct under the circumstances. I used the idea to illustrate my point, that a very different view would be taken if it were a woman who was seen walking home at night in that state. I was not drawing the distinction that the hon. Member suggests. That is one of the causes that lie at the very root of the distinction drawn by the old ecclesias- tics; the woman stands on a different plane altogether. It has been said that a good man, or the best men, are moulded out of faults, and are rather the better for being a little bad. You would not say that of a woman! We know what it is for a young man to be full of fire and energy. He has all the temptations to face which in that sense are not by the woman. These go into the world and they come in contact with situations and matters which are not the same in the case of a woman as of a man; so it puts the matter on an entirely different footing. In my view that was the reason why the ecclesiastical courts drew the distinction in days long ago, when they granted a man divorce on the ground of the adultery of his wife and refused the same relief to the woman, coupled, also, I may say, with what the right hon. Gentleman said, that there was always a danger in the case that the woman might bring into the family by an act of adultery a member who did not properly belong to it.

Let me turn to another aspect of the case for the moment, because it is one of which I know a considerable amount. I was a member of the Committee for discussing the Poor Persons Rules and their administration. For several years the number of applications made in connection with divorce were over 3,000 a year by persons worth not more than £50 in the world. What would it have been if adultery alone had been sufficient ground for obtaining divorce? agree entirely with my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Rawlinson)—

But what about Scotland?

I am not talking about Scotland. It is a question I know little about, and I would certainly not attempt to criticise affairs there, because I do not know; but I mention the facts, I do, because I thoroughly agree with the right hon. Gentleman sitting below me, that in this Bill you are making divorce easier, and I am determined, so far as I can, to oppose any Measure which makes divorce easier and cheaper.

I should like, as a Scottish Member, to take the opportunity of congratulating my hon. and gallant Friend (Major Entwistle) on having introduced a Bill which proposes to remove an intolerable slight upon the women of England and Wales, and to give them a right which the women of Scotland have exercised for nearly 400 years. Perhaps I might take the opportunity of reminding the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just spoken of the situation which exists in Scotland to-day, so that he and others who are opposing this Bill may realise that we, at any rate, have proved the case for the Bill in Scotland. We are not only satisfied with the law there, but we desire it to be extended to England and Wales. I was greatly surprised, I confess, at hearing the hon. Gentleman who represents the Scottish Universities (Sir H. Craik) opposing the Bill. I wonder if he has read the evidence before the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes given by the most distinguished Scottish jurists of the day, and whether he desires to dissociate himself from all the legal opinion in Scotland, including the Judges of the Court of Session, from Lord Guthrie's views given as a member of the Royal Commission, and from the evidence of Lord Salvesen and others who put the case for Scotland in a manner which was regarded by the Commission as altogether unanswerable. If the hon. Gentleman opposite will read the Reports he will find that there are large portions of evidence taken from Scotland—

I have read the Reports referred to by the hon. Gentleman.

The hon. Gentleman does not seem to have studied the subject very closely. I desire very briefly to address myself to the experience and practice in Scotland. I think the hon. Gentleman who moved the rejection of this Bill stated that there was a strong social view in Scotland on the subject of divorce. That is perfectly true. But I would suggest to him that he would find even amongst those whom he referred to as "the large mass of quiet women, who form the strength of electorate," also a very strong social view on the subject of divorce in England and Wales, and he may be surprised, probably, to find that the views of these women do not coincide with the view he has expressed in the House of Commons this afternoon.

The hon. Gentleman will understand my point, perhaps, if he answers this question: Does the number of undefended divorce cases in Scotland come anywhere near what it does in England and Wales?

I am dealing with the Scottish position and, while there are a number of undefended divorce cases in Scotland, I am not aware that things are so much different in England. I would remind hon. Members that in Scotland in 1560, after the Reformation, adultery was introduced as a cause for divorce without statute but on scriptural grounds, and as a consequence of the abolition of the Pope's jurisdiction in Scotland. Lord Stair attributes the origin of divorce for adultery to the determination of Reformers to conform to the precepts of our Saviour. Prior to the Reformation, marriage was looked upon in Scotland, as in other Roman Catholic countries as a sacrament. After the Reformation it was dealt with more in the form of a civil contract, but of a very peculiar and solemn and far-reaching nature, and divorce for adultery was at once introduced as a ground of action for either spouse. What is of great importance to keep in view is that the change in the law was supported most zealously by the new reformed clergy of the day.

I do not desire to go so much into the historical aspect of this question, but it is rather interesting to note that in Scotland the strong feeling on this subject was reflected in some of the old Scottish Statutes dealing with adultery as a crime and making it subject to indictment and prosecution. When I come to the practical application of the Scottish law may I remind the House that before the Act of 1857 the views of the Scottish Jurists had already been voiced before the Royal Commission of 1844, and the whole evidence from Scotland was strongly in support of the same right being given to either spouse in the case of adultery to regard it as a reason for divorce. Then following upon that came the Bill of 1857, and when it was in Committee in the House of Lords there was a very interesting review given by Lord Lyndhurst, who spoke of the experience in Scotland at that time, and he gave the evidence of some most distinguished individuals who, when asked if they wished a change in consequence of any inconvenience resulting, gave a decided answer in the negative and said:

In the main the question was found to involve this consideration, that a man who was liable to have a petition brought against him by his wife necessarily acted with more discretion and regard for his family than he might otherwise do. The figures are rather interesting because they show that there has been an almost constant figure in relation to population from the very early period, at any rate, in connection with divorce proceedings in Scotland. Lord Fraser, who was the highest authority on this subject, stated that during the whole of our history we have had the remedy of divorce for desertion and adultery, and that there were as many cases before the Commissaries at the time they were the only competent Court to entertain such actions as there were at the time he wrote, which was 40 or 50 years ago.

It is very striking, in reviewing the judicial statistics in Scotland, to find that there has been substantially, taking the figures presented to the Royal Commission on Divorce during the period 1898 to 1908, the same proportion and the same ratio with regard to population during that years' period. No doubt there was, at a later period after the War, in all countries a considerable increase in the number of actions for divorce, although the figures are now coming down. With regard to the figures for the 11 years taken by the Royal Commission on Divorce, it is interesting to point out that the annual average of actions for divorce during those 11 years was 184 and for adultery 102. When you come to actions instituted by the husband as pursuer the average number is 61 cases, and in the case of wives the number is 41, which shows that although it is generally recognised that in more cases the wife would have had the best grounds, she did not exercise her rights to the fullest extent. While there were cases in which she did so under circumstances which involved single acts of adultery on the part of her husband or in some cases with some slight aggravation, in many cases there was substantial aggravation as well.

I desire to urge against the arguments of the Mover of the rejection of this Bill this consideration, that the question which arises is whether the wife should not be in a position to be the judge herself as to whether it is a case to bring into the Court. I think she is entitled to have that remedy in her own hands, and if you say that she is not to have that remedy then we are applying to her a different moral standard to that which is being applied to the husband. Since 1908 there has been a substantial increase in the number of divorces according to population and there was also a much greater increase after the War which still appear in the 1921 figures.

Are these English or Scottish figures?

They are Scottish figures. The ratio in the cases of action for divorce on the ground of adultery show that in three-fifths of them the husband was the pursuer, and in two-fifths it was the wife. There is another point of importance, and it is that the largest proportion of divorces among the people in Scotland were amongst those who are in the more humble circumstances of life.

We are dealing here with a class of women who ought to have this remedy, women who will exercise as much consideration for the children as any other class, because they know perfectly well what family life means to them. It often means more to women in humbler circumstances than it does to those in better circumstances. Out of 202 divorces on all grounds in Scotland in 1908, only 22 related to persons in professions, merchants, or traders, and out of 510 cases in 1921, there were only 36 in professions, and 60 merchants, or traders. That shows that a very large proportion of those who came to the Courts belonged to the middle classes and the workers, who, I am glad to think, in Scotland have the advantage which has now been extended to England of suing in forma pauperis, and thus being able to get a divorce expeditiously at a very small cost. I maintain that the experience in Scotland in this matter is conclusive, and that really there has not been an argument advanced against this Bill which is not met by the experience in Scotland. Instead of injuring society and weakening family ties, it has all been the opposite way. It may be of interest to note that in the period which was taken before the Royal Commission on Divorce there was only one divorce for every 3,500 married couples in Scotland. That shows the very small proportion of divorce actions which were brought into Court.

I do not desire to go into the general question. It is almost an insult to the intelligence of the House of Commons that anyone should come forward and suggest in these times that we should refuse to apply equal moral standards to men and women alike. It would be the negation of our Christianity to suggest that any such method should be adopted. I am quite sure that hon Members opposite are all anxious as far as possible to secure that justice and fair play shall be given, but I desire to join issue with the hon. Member who moved the rejection of the Bill on the grounds which he put forward. His argument was that because the law might be evaded to-day, therefore no reform should take place at all.

I certainly never said anything of the kind.

I understood my hon. Friend to say that there were many cases where practically collusion took place under the present law, to which my answer is that the Court—I can at any rate speak for Scotland—is very strict in inquiring as to whether there is collusion.

The hon. Member suggested just now that I stated that I was opposed to any divorce reform for that reason. That was the statement which I denied.

My hon. Friend misunderstood me. I understood him to say that this alteration of the law might lead to further collusion. Am I right?

Yes, this alteration might do so, but I expressly said that I would approve of other alterations.

Much bigger ones.

Yes, much bigger ones.

Apparently my hon. Friend is opposed to this alteration of the law because it only goes a certain length. He is in favour of a much larger measure of reform. I also desire to join issue with the hon. Member who told us that he had been inundated with representations from his constituents against the weakening of the divorce law. I should like to know how many petitions he has received, and whether any other hon. Member has had the same experience.

Yes.

It may be that incompatibility of temper as a ground for divorce is one which all of us would resist. But in a matter of this kind, when we are dealing with a cause of action which has been regarded as a proper cause of action in practically all the highly civilised communities in the world, and which has been approved by the experience for many years past in Scotland, so closely adjoining England, I suggest that it is unthinkable for England to lag behind. For us to attach importance to the arguments which have been submitted to the House would be not only to weaken the influence of Parliament but also to hold us up as an example to the whole world of a country which refused to adopt this much needed reform. I therefore sincerely trust that the House of Commons will accede to what I believe is a great demand throughout the country to-day, that the women of England and Wales shall have this gross injustice removed from them, and that they shall have equal rights in matters of divorce with men.

Will the House allow me to explain a misunderstanding. The figures which the hon. Gentleman gave were to the effect that there were very few divorces—

The hon. Member is making a second speech.

Will the hon. Member listen to me for a moment. He inter- rupted me many times; perhaps he will allow me to give the explanation. This small number of divorces in Scotland shows that there are very few cases of collusion there, so that you cannot compare that state of affairs with the conditions in England where at the present time you have more than 10 times the number of divorces and more than 10 times the number of collusive divorces.

In spite of the protestations from the other side of the House, one gets the impression very definitely that the opposition to this Bill is similar to the opposition to granting women the right to vote, the right to enter the professions, and equal educational rights with men. It was very interesting to me to notice the very prominent part taken in those Debates by the right hon. Member for the Scottish Universities (Sir H. Craik) and the right hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Rawlinson). The Universities have always been in the forefront in the gallant fight to keep women out of their rightful place in society. I can understand the opposition of the right hon. Member for Cambridge University where I understand they still keep women on the inferior plane, but I cannot understand the opposition of the right hon. Member for the Scottish Universities.

He will get thrown out next time.

I am sure that so far as his constituents on this side of the House are concerned, we will all do our best. He does not in this matter voice the views of anyone on these benches. One feels also that the arguments which have been put forward have not been against this particular Measure, but have been rather against the whole idea of divorce. Many ingenious arguments, which I personally cannot understand, have been advanced to prove that in some way you preserve the sanctity of home and the moral life of our nation by declaring that a decent woman with her children should live in the same home with an adulterous and unfaithful husband. It seems to me that if a man has been unfaithful to his wife, if he has become an adulterer, the best thing that can happen from the point of view of the wife and children is that they should be enabled to have a decent and clean home as apart from that man.

2.0 P.M.

The right hon. Member for the Scottish Universities indicated that since the divorce laws were established, divorce has become more common. That would seem to be a very natural consequence. We cannot very well expect to have divorce before it is the established practice of the land, but that does not establish the fact that the moral standard of this country is to-day on a lower level than at any previous time. I may not perhaps have a very deep knowledge of British history or of English literature, but what I have leads me to believe that right back from the time of Henry VIII, during the Elizabethan period, and even further back, immorality and infidelity prevailed throughout this land, and so far from being regarded as a matter for regret, was regarded in our Courts and in the higher social classes as a subject for jest. The writers of those days seemed to regard matrimonial infidelity as a joke. We have now got beyond that. Nowadays while we may read a great many divorce cases in the newspapers—for greater publicity is now given to them—there are very few decent men who regard them as a subject for laughter. I had difficulty in following the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Maddocks), who indicated that he was a member of the legal profession and that he thought nothing of men staggering drunkenly about the streets or in this House. He made a very interesting suggestion which I should require more time to consider before I finally condemn or approve. He said that woman was on a much higher pedestal than man and that we must respect and worship her and keep her there, but because of that she must be on a lower plane in the eyes of the law. I do not suggest that that was what the hon. and learned Gentleman intended to say, but at any rate it is the impression he gave me. I think the House ought not to stop at this small step forward in putting women on to their rightful plane in our social and legal system. I hope the Bill will be passed by a great majority.

I had not intended to intervene in this Debate, but I have heard such curious statements on legal subjects since I came here that I thought that, although I was not conversant with the law of Scotland, I might be allowed to say a word or two about the way in which the law is at present administered in England. We have been told by the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Mad-docks) that the law of divorce has come down to us from the monks. What that has to do with this question I do not know. I certainly should not go to the monks or to bachelors generally for their views on this question. We have been told by the right hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Rawlinson) many curious things. I could not understand which of two horses he was riding. At one moment I thought he was telling us that he did not want an increase of the facilities for divorce, and at another moment he said woman had the facilities because when adultery was proved the law generally inferred cruelty. I do not know where the right hon. and learned Gentleman got his law from, but that certainly is not the fact, because judges have in recent years leaned very much against inferring cruelty from small acts of cruelty, and the result of the judges' attitude has been that to enable women to get some sort of equality with men there has been brought into our system what is nothing else than a piece of unmitigated humbug.

Let us consider what is the position of a woman who wants to get a divorce. A man can get a divorce if he can prove that his wife had been guilty of misconduct. The wife, on the other hand, has to add to the proof of misconduct proof of cruelty. Most men, as my right hon. Friend has told us, object to having it proved that they have been guilty of cruelty to their wives, but they are prepared to allow it to be suggested that they have deserted them, so, instead of the old law, under which the desertion of the wife had to be for two years, being relied upon at the present moment, the wife who wants to divorce her husband, as a preliminary step, has to bring against him proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights. It is not that she wants her husband to return, for she does not, but with the assistance of her lawyer she writes a letter asking him to return, and the husband, with the assistance of his lawyer, writes another letter saying he will not. Then the case goes to the Court, the letters are solemnly read be- fore the judge, who knows perfectly well the solemn humbug of the proceedings. This sort of collusion, which my right hon. Friend is so much against, and which our Courts are full of, is well known to every lawyer and every judge. Occasionally the parties muddle up the matter and I will tell the House what happens. I can give one or two instances of the experiences of my own unfortunate clients. The judge makes an order on the husband to return in 14 days. If he is a gentleman he does not return in 14 days, as he knows it is a part of the game, but if he is not a gentleman he does return within 14 days unless he can get some other terms for not returning. The unfortunate woman, who starts to divorce her husband, is entirely at his mercy whether he will allow the desertion to be completed by disobeying the judge's order or not. In one case in which I was interested, the husband, having been ordered to return in 14 days, took advice of a very distinguished solicitor and returned, and he turned up at his wife's house and said: "Well, you asked for me; here I am." As a matter of fact, the distinguished solicitor had made a mistake, and he returned on the 15th day. There was an idea that Sundays did not count. Now, see what happened. It might be imagined that the desertion was, therefore, non-existent, but the law said, "No, you were told to return in 14 days; you have returned on the 15th. At the end of 14 days your desertion was complete; get on with the divorce."

When courts of law condescend to tomfoolery of that sort, it is bad for the courts of law, and what is bad for the courts of law is bad for the judges who administer the law. Everyone knows, who chooses to face the facts, that the courts of law in this country are honeycombed with collusion, but that, if you are wealthy enough to employ lawyers to get you round it, then the thing is perfectly clear, and you will get your divorce. If you are not wealthy enough, or if you make any mistake, you may find yourself in the position that at present only poor people find themselves in, namely, that of being prosecuted for conspiracy to get round the law. If the present system is got rid of what happens? You get rid of the whole of the intolerable humbug of the restitution of conjugal rights, when wives ask for the return of their husbands knowing that they will not return, and not wanting them to return; and you get a perfectly simple system, where the wife has exactly the same rights as the husband, if she chooses to exercise them.

What conceivable reason is there against that? My right hon. Friend and learned Friend the Member for Cambridge University says in awestruck terms, being a bachelor, that no one has spoken of the children. What on earth have the children to do with the question whether a wife has equality or inequality? If you want to give divorce for misconduct, and you do in every civilised country under Heaven, and you are bound to do it, why do you give it to the man and not give it to the woman? I will tell you why. Because the laws were originally divised by monks and men, and not by women. We are asked why, if this has gone on for all these years, it should not continue? You might just as well say the same of married women's property. We have moved, and I hope we shall move a good deal further. We have heard from numerous speakers from Scotland in this Debate that as a matter of fact, owing to the greater freedom that the woman has in Scotland, and the greater freedom of divorce in Scotland, there is actually less divorce there; and I am not surprised, Jeremy Bentham said that many years ago, in writing upon jurisprudence. He always said that, if the parties to the contract of marriage knew perfectly well that it might be terminated, it was very likely that they would carry out that contract a great deal more faithfully. What has been the experience of Scotland is merely the experience that was foretold all that time ago by a great English jurist.

What is there left of this opposition to giving women this right? We are told—we have not been told so in this Debate, but we often are told, and it has been seriously argued—that for some reason or another a man is a person who is more frail and more liable to give way to temptation than a woman, and that there should be some difference between the sexes. The same writer to whom I referred just now also wrote that, of course, there was a great difference between men and women in this respect, because, if a woman was unfaithful to her husband, she might bear him a son or a daughter that he did not own, whereas that never happened in cases in which the man was unfaithful. I think, however, that we have passed a long way from that sort of thing, and at this time of day I cannot understand how, having given women all the rights that we have given them, we can possibly withhold from them for one moment this last right. I say that for the sake of women we ought to give them this right, that for the sake of our judicial system we ought to get rid of a system that leads to boundless collusion and fearful hypocrisy, and to have a simple system under which there would be none of this collusion necessarily existent. I believe that under such a system we should find in this country much the same results that follow, and have followed, in Scotland, and that, if you give to the man the responsibility by telling him that he will be treated in exactly the same way as a woman would be treated, he will be much less likely to get within the reach of the law than he is at the present time.

We hear constantly of various political parties and the consideration which should be shown to the views of minorities, but we have heard to-day, that, when we are considering legislation in regard to matters of divorce, we ought not to discuss questions of religion—that when we are considering differences of this kind, those questions of religion which are, probably, far more important in connection with the motives of human action, should be disregarded. Frankly, in what I am going to say now, I personally am largely influenced by my religious conceptions. I happen to be an English churchman, and I hold views with regard to marriage which are very pronounced. With much that has been said from the benches opposite I am in absolute agreement. I agree in thinking that sexual offence in the man is as culpable as in the woman, and, with regard to the question of equality of divorce for the two sexes, I cannot help feeling that a very strong case has been made out. But, coming here prepared to vote for this Bill, I have been seriously shaken in my conviction by many of the things that have been said by its advocates. I have not been convinced so much by what has been said on this side as shaken by the statements made on the other.

Hear, hear! The Dogs' Protection Bill.

I beg pardon?

I was merely suggesting that the hon. Member was shaken by the Dogs' Protection Bill.

That is an insult. That is the sort of thing I should have expected from the hon. Gentleman. I really must appeal to the Chair to ask him to withdraw.

If I have said anything which is out of order, I shall gladly withdraw, but if it is merely a matter of taste, I shall judge for myself.

We have been told by the Mover of this Bill that it means no extension of the causes for divorce. He did give assurances which, to a large extent, satisfied me, and I notice on the outside of the Bill a memorandum to the effect—that it is simply to apply to this one particular cause. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon) and other speakers have, however, claimed the right, during the Committee stage, vastly to extend the area which it covers. I am prepared to fight long and strenuously against any increase of the facilities for divorce, and if this Bill is going to be used for extending facilities for divorce, I shall feel compelled to vote against it. When I was up for election for a University I had a very large number of letters asking me to oppose all facilities for divorce. I only had one asking me to support increased facilities for divorce. It is only right that I should say that so as to bear out some remarks which other hon. Members have made.

If we are going to have an understanding that this Bill goes no further than to give equality of the sexes, I shall be prepared to support it. If, on the other hand, it is to be used to extend the grounds for divorce, I certainly shall vote against it. I do not know whether it is possible to give any such assurance. That is a thing which has made me extremely unhappy. A great deal has been said about the conception of marriage and the condition of affairs in England and in Scotland. There are two conceptions of marriage. You can look upon it as a civil contract, and from that point of view material considerations are the only ones that matter. Or one can look at it from the highest moral standpoint, where the religious question and things of that sort enter. I cannot help thinking many of those who have been speaking from the Labour Benches have been speaking from the highest moral standpoint. When we discuss it purely on the material side, no one can deny that there is a difference between man and woman. The addition of a child to the family that a man has to keep is a much greater hardship on him than a bastard outside the house is to the woman. I prefer to take the higher ground that a man and a woman are married for richer for poorer, for better for worse, in sickness and in health. I feel compelled to say what I have said because I feel myself in immense difficulties. If we are going to make divorce easier, I think it ought to be made harder, and I shall vote against it. If, however, I can get some form of assurance that, if it becomes a question of enlarging causes for divorce they will not allow the Bill to be made a means of bringing that about, I shall support it.

The remarks I am about to make are not based on the experience of many years spent in the Courts, but I think they represent the view of the average man in the street to-day. The hon. Member who moved the rejection of the Bill was of the opinion that it was very unfair that a man should be divorced because he happens to have sinned once.

indicated dissent.

I must have misunderstood the hon. Member. In any case for the life of me I cannot understand how it is possible that divorce should not be granted to a woman because her husband has committed misconduct when it would apply in the other extreme. After all, if we men cannot discipline ourselves in this matter—and it has been submitted I understand that temptation from the man's point of view is greater than from the woman's point of view—we do not deserve the love of the most beautiful creature that God has created. The hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Maddocks) said we as men of the world have been proposing to throw a stone at a man who had dined very well and on his way home had gone astray. I do not think that is the point. What would be the feelings of a Mem- ber of the House if his wife had had that same experience? He would not be prepared to view the position from such an abstract point of view. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Rawlinson) has stated that in conversing with married women between 30 and 40 years of age, he has found that that class of woman will do all in her power to keep what she terms her man. That is a very natural state of affairs, but at the same time the woman is not bound to take advantage of this Bill unless she is prepared to do so, and I do not think that is a very concrete argument. I think if the Bill were given effect, it would have a tendency to clear up a lot of unhappiness that prevails in our national life. I would not go so far as to recommend that the divorce laws should be extended on the same lines as they are at present in America, because it would be a very sad state of affairs from a national point of view if two people, perhaps young people, were allowed to get a divorce owing to the fact they lost their temper for a few moments. In America, where I have travelled extensively, I found that a lot of young married people lose their temper to-day and go for a divorce tomorrow. I do not think that benefits anyone, let alone the country. I heartily support the Bill and I hope hon. Members will take a broad view of the question.

Before the Division is taken, it is only right that I should explain the attitude of the Government in regard to this Measure. I am authorised by the Prime Minister to say that the Government will not oppose the Second Reading of the Bill, but I ought to make a reservation. I was satisfied with the declaration made by the hon. and gallant Member who introduced the Bill that it was not intended to go any further. On the other hand, I was a little disconcerted, as were hon. Friends behind me, when we heard from the right hon. Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon) that he thought the Bill did not go far enough, and that it was quite possible that he would try to add further weakening of the divorce laws to the Bill in Committee, or in the other House. That caused me some alarm. I do not mean to say that there are not possible additions such as those indicated in the Minority Report, signed by the Archbishop of York, Sir William Anson and Sir Lewis Dibdin, that might not be viewed with disapproval. But if the process suggested by the right hon. Member for the Spen Valley be taken, there is no reason that I can see why there should not be introduced into this Bill, by Amendment here or in another place, some of those abominable proposals, as they seem to me, which were contained in Lord Buckmaster's Bill of last year. If any extensions of this Bill beyond the most modest kind are attempted, I cannot answer for the Government not deciding to oppose it. Certainly, I should oppose it myself. Although I am quite sure that the hon. Member who moved the Bill does not intend to do that, I think it is only right that I should express this apprehension, and make the House understand our position.

Personally, I have never been in favour of what is called easy divorce. The hon. Member who spoke last said he was a newly-married man, and from his tone he is very happily married. I speak as an old married man of nearly 30 years' standing. I have had an extraordinarily happy married life, and I cannot wish my hon. Friend more than that he should enjoy a similarly happy married life, and that he should enjoy it for the same number of years that I have been privileged to enjoy my married life. Those who happen to be more fortunate than others in the matrimonial market may be inclined to take too hard a view of those who have been unfortunate. I do not want to argue the merits or demerits of the Bill. It appeals to me more as an obstacle to prevent some of the intentions of Lord Buckmaster and his friends than for any particular merits in itself. I hope it will satisfy a certain number of people who feel that the sex inequality in regard to this matter is unfair, but who do not want to go any further in the direction of making divorce easy.

An hon. Member who spoke for the Labour party asked, with some amount of fervour, what the question of divorce has to do with the children. The primary basis of marriage is the biological law under which, while the progeny of all other animals can feed and fend for themselves either at birth or shortly after, and are never succeeded by a second or subsequent issue, till the preceding one is beyond the need of parental care, human progeny is incapable of feeding and fending, for the first eight or ten years of life, and comes normally in such rapid succession in relation to the power of self-support, that a number borne by one woman and dependant on the care of others, may reach five or eight helpless children. Early in the evolutionary history of the race, before any religious sanction or ceremony was attached to marriage, these biological facts made it necessary for the human community to declare to a man, "All the children that that woman bears shall be deemed to be yours, and you shall, with her, be responsible for their support." This is the biological basis of marriage, and of the family which is the unit of the State. The interests of the children, the family, and the State, require that we should do nothing to weaken the sanctity of marriage or undermine the home. If it had not been for those biological facts, there would have been no marriage law and no divorce. The whole question is one of children and home. The hon. Member for London University (Sir S. Russell-Wells) based his views on the religious sanctity of marriage. That came later, and sanctified what early man had found a social necessity.

I am all against easy divorce without justification. If we deal with it from that point of view, we can easily see that the greatest enemy of the home is divorce. Divorce, as a rule, ruins two homes. We have to preserve the unity of the family, which is the unit of the State, and if we are to do that, we have to preserve ourselves as far as we possibly can against making divorce so easy that the home is

prematurely broken up. There are scores of families to-day living in perfect amity which, if divorce had been easier ten or twenty years ago, might have been dissolved. There is no doubt whatever that if we increase the facilities for divorce we shall often find that homes will be broken up, whereas if divorce is not too easy and too hastily sought time will assuage the cause of unhappiness and forgiveness will take the place of divorce. The right hon. Member for the Scottish Universities (Sir H. Craik) said that equality was a fetish. I believe we can measure the progress of civilisation by the growing respect and regard which men have shown for women, and by the plane of equality to which they have been raised. By that test the British race stands higher to-day than any race in the world. If we pass this Bill it is another step. The hon. and gallant Member who moved the Bill, and who spoke with such valid argument, and stated his facts so clearly, said that it was only one step, and that he had deliberately limited the Bill to one step. This House can maintain those limits. I think we can safely take this Bill as a payment on account in reform, and that we can pass it without extending its limits, because the House that has the power to pass it has the power to limit its scope. The House is to be congratulated on the high plane on which the Debate has been maintained. Sometimes these Debates lead to a certain amount of levity, but on this occasion the Debate has been kept high.

Question put: "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

The House divided: Ayes, 231; Noes, 27.

Bill read a Second time, and committed to a Standing Committee.

I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

I move this Motion with a feeling of great confidence, because I believe that it has the support of many Members in all parts of the House, irrespective of the party to which they belong, and because I know that it has the support of many men in all ranks of life in every part of the country. In the comparatively short time which remains for discussion of the Bill, I do not want to take up the time of the House by going into the history of the attempts which have been made hitherto to establish the principle which this Bill advocates. In the last Parliament alone there were four separate attempts, which emanated from three separate parties, to bring about the reform which I am now submitting to the House. There was the Bill introduced by the present Postmaster-General. There was the Bill introduced by the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean (Mr. Wignall). There was another Bill introduced by Mr. Shortt, then Home Secretary; and there was the Bill introduced by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Buckingham (Captain Bowyer), So I may say, with truth, that the principle contained in this Bill has received the Parliamentary approbation of every party and section in this House. The Bill of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Buckingham reached another place, and it was only the exigencies of Parliamentary time which prevented that Bill becoming law.

During the discussion of these Bills certain difficulties presented themselves, and were pointed out by the Law Lords in in another place and by hon. Members of this House. Having had the advantage of the experience of those Bills, I have, in drawing this Bill, attempted to meet those difficulties, and I hope I shall be able to satisfy, not merely this House but another place, that the difficulties have been surmounted. The scheme of this Bill, unlike the Bills to which I have referred, keeps the question of legitimation quite distinct from the question of the devolution of property. By that means I hope to attain the object I have in view. I will refer shortly to the Bill itself. The first Clause deals only with legitimation, and does not in any way affect the devolution of property. To my mind it is the most important Clause in the Bill. The first Sub-section says: That Sub-section contains the kernel of the whole proposal. Sub-section (2) says:

In Clause 2 we deal with the very difficult questions relating to property, particularly settled property, which met the promoters of former Bills. They are obviously Committee points and are highly technical. The Clause deals with the devolution of property on an intestacy. Hon. Members may be surprised to see that whereas in Sub-section (1) persona] property descends at once to the legitimate person, in Subsection (2) that period is deferred till 31st December, 1924. I will tell the House the reason. Last Session we passed a Law of Property Act, known as the Birkenhead Act. The effect of that Act was to abolish all those special customs of descent like gavelkind and borough English and the rest, as from the date of that Act coming into operation on 1st January, 1925. Therefore, I thought it unwise to complicate this Bill with an attempt to deal with the devolution of real property during the intervening two years. In the first case the number of cases affected is very small and the delay is for only two years.

Clause 3 is the only Clause which deals with property in any way. This, again, is highly technical, but to put it quite briefly and in a non-technical fashion, it provides that where, under a disposition, there is power of making an appointment among a certain class of persons, the class of appointees may include legitimated as well as legitimates. Clause 4 is confined to the future disposition of property and, speaking broadly, enacts that, except where otherwise provided, a legitimated person and his or her husband or wife, children or more remote issue may take any interest in real or personal property under a disposition in the same way as if he or she had been born legitimate, the only exception being that as regards the order which persons are to take, as regulated according to priority of birth or the descent of an estate, the legitimated person shall be treated as if he or she were the younger. Having regard to the short time available, I do not wish to become involved in technicalities and details, because they are obviously Committee points, and very difficult points too. All I need say on the actual Bill is to explain its broad and salient outlines. In so doing, I have purposely refrained from referring to what I may call the human side of the problem. I know that other speakers will do that. I conceive it to be my duty to explain in a general way the provisions of the Bill, and I venture to ask the House this afternoon to give a Second Reading to a Measure which will remove the stigma of bastardy from a great number of persons. I know from correspondence which I have received since I gave notice of the Bill, that its passing into law is looked forward to with hope and with anxiety by many people up and down the country who are tortured by remorse, having committed a great wrong, and who are anxious to do all in their power to make such reparation as they can. Having said so much, I leave it to other speakers to develop if they wish arguments in favour of this Bill. I am glad to see the Attorney-General in his place. I am not so vain as to imagine that a Bill of this highly technical character is not susceptible of great improvement from the legal point of view and I shall welcome any improvement which tends to make the Bill more water-tight and more acceptable. Without saying anything further I commend this Bill to the consideration of the House.

I beg to second the Motion.

3.0 P.M.

I propose to devote my remarks rather more to the human side of this problem and the need which exists for legislation of this kind. Ever since the year 1575, which was the year in which the Statute of Elizabeth was passed which started legislation on bastardy in this country, the question of the illegitimate child has been looked upon as, to a great degree—latterly, thank goodness! to a lesser degree—one about which nice people really would neither think nor talk. Ever since the days when law and religion instituted marriage as being one of the sure foundations of the State— from those early times, any child that was not born in marriage was looked upon as an outcast, and when private property and the rights of private property were instituted, the illegitimate child was not only deprived of any rights of property, but was stigmatised by the Church, by the State and by Society. If one looks at the opening words of the Statute of Elizabeth to which I have referred it will give one some indication of the feeling upon this matter in the year 1575 because the Statute begins like this: societies are necessary for ordinary children born in wedlock, how much more is it necessary to care for the unwanted child of the unmarried mother who has never had a chance. I shall give the House a few figures to show that the mortality among illegitimate children is rather more than twice as heavy as the mortality among children born in wedlock. I take the three years, 1915, 1916 and 1917 and comparing the mortality per thousand among children born in wedlock with the mortality per thousand among those born out of wedlock, I find in 1915 it was 105 as against 203, in 1916 87 as against 183, and in 1917 90 as against 201. No fewer than 201 children out of every 1,000 illegitimate children died in the year 1917. May I give a resumé of the position in which the illegitimate child finds itself to-day? In the first place it has no legal right to any name at all. In the second place by the common law of the land it has no relations. It has not even relationship with its mother or father. Thirdly it cannot succeed to its mother's property on an intestacy, and fourthly, the mother alone can apply for an affiliation order in order to seek help in her task of maintaining the child. If the mother dies soon after the birth, the child is left absolutely helpless because nobody on its behalf can seek for help from the Courts. Then hon. Members will remember that if the parents of the child do marry after the birth of the child, so far from doing any good, it may be said up till now to have proved an additional stumbling block in the way of ever making that child a legitimate child, because all the attempts that have been made up till this year have provided only that the parents of illegitimate children who marry after the passing of the Act shall have the right to legitimise their children.

Therefore, if one looks at it from the point of view of the child, one sees that, not only is the child penalised when it is utterly irresponsible for being brought into the world, but that it has no chance in the avenues of citizenship; if you look at it from the point of view of the mother, she bears not only all the physical burden, but, in most cases, the whole of the pecuniary burden as well; and if you look at it from the point of view of the State, you have got not only this infant mortality, which is double as great amongst illegitimate children as amongst those born in wedlock, but you have got the claims of childhood and the innocence of the children themselves. After three and a half centures of neglect, this problem is at last deeply engaging the attention of all thinking men and women in every grade of society and in every political party, because they recognise that, important as it is to improve the social conditions, which in the main are responsible for a good deal of illegitimacy, it is equally important to secure justice for those unfortunate children who are handicapped by the circumstances of their birth. Fortunately, there is this increasing tendency to exert every effort to preserve child life, and this results from the recognition of the obligation of society to ensure for all children a normal childhood or a childhood as nearly normal as possible, and as there are sceptical people and people still who think this is a subject which should not be mentioned or thought about, I say that to such people comes with ever-increasing force this answer: You may frown at the very thought that there site illegitimate children; you may be horrified at the immorality involved; but, at least, you cannot shut your eyes to the fact that 4 per cent, of the children that are born into the world to-day are illegitimate, and you cannot shut your eyes to the fact that those children themselves are absolutely blameless in the matter.

I am glad to be associated with my hon. Friends opposite in the presentation of this small Bill to-day, containing practically only one Clause of importance, and I want to say at once, if I have any regrets at all, they are that the Bill does not go far enough. It embraces, after all, such a small number when we come to realise, out of the 4 per cent, of illegitimate children, what proportion of the parents marry and thus come within the scope of the Bill, but I quite realise that to bring about any reform, especially reforms of this nature, you have to begin very slowly and very carefully. There is another serious defect from my point of view. I am not grumbling about it, or objecting to it; I am only pointing it out. It is that the Bill is not retrospective. It does not go back far enough. But, again, I realise that these are some of the features to which objection was taken to the Bills that have been before the House on previous occasions, and I accept the Bill as it is as the beginning of a reform that is imperative. Since I introduced Bills of this kind a Volume of correspondence has reached me from all parts of the country.

I do not want to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but I do not know whether he has observed the first three lines of Clause 1—

"Where the parents of an illegitimate person marry one another, whether before or after the commencement of this Act "—

the marriage will legitimatise the child.

I hope that the wording of the Clause is in accordance with the views expressed by the hon. Member, but I looked upon the wording of the Clause in another way, and although not pretending to be a lawyer, or to have any knowledge of the law, I know these are gentleman who look at it from opposite views, and take an entirely different view of the wording of an Act. However, that is not the point of debate with me now. I hope I am wrong, and I hope the wording of the Clause is far-reaching enough to embrace those who have been unfortunate enough to be brought into the world out of wedlock for at least some reasonable period of time. One principle underlying the whole thing is this. Whoever else has sinned, whoever else has committed a fault, whether it be the father or the mother, or both, or who was the greater at fault, the babe born has never committed any offence. The babe born was not responsible for the wrongdoing, which might have been the result of love, or lust, or both. Whatever it may be, the babe born into the world is an innocent result of other people's wrongdoing, and why that babe should bear the ban of illegitimacy throughout its life is one of the things that I at least cannot understand.

I have known cases, and I know of cases to-day, where a babe has been born out of wedlock through causes that we need not go into to-day, but the parents have married, and have legitimatised their lives before the world, but the babe born out of wedlock bears the stigma of illegitimacy all through its life, and carries it to the grave. That is where the injustice lies. I do not know whether there can possibly be any opponents of the Bill to-day. We have been following Scotland. Let us continue to follow Scotland. Scotland gave us a good lead on the first Bill; let us continue to follow Scotland on the second Bill, and at least allow it to go to Committee, so that we can have the time necessary for the examination of its details, and, if possible, deal with any defects, strengthen any weak points, or so alter it as to make things, perhaps, more safe than they may appear to be from a hurried reading of the Clause. I strongly support this Bill. I trust the House wil give it a Second Reading that we may be able further to inquire into its details.

I feel quite sure the Bill which does such obvious justice to a class of persons not in a position to assist themselves, and a Bill that has been so ably proposed, seconded, and supported will not find in this assembly criticism, or at any rate sufficient criticism, to put it in danger. My object in rising is to support the Bill and to make one or two observations that may even go so far as to persuade anybody who may be in doubt on moral or religious grounds on the question which we have to consider. The position of bastardy in England has gone through some peculiar changes. There was a time, as hon. Members will remember, when the stigma of bastardy was practically negligible. William the Conqueror openly boasted that he was known as William the Bastard, and there are State articles of that time to which his name is affixed in that way. There is, too, John of Gaunt, and various gentlemen who by the prefix of "Fitz" have announced to the world that their patrimony was not as it should be. But the most interesting point, if I may mention it, was the point of view that the Church took before the Council of Merton in 1264.

Up to that time the Church, which had a large part of the administration of the law, held the view that subsequent matrimony legalised a bastard. We find the two laws running together, the civil law, which said that on no condition must subsequent matrimony legalise the child, and the canon or ecclesiastical law, which said that on proof by the parents that they had subsequently married according to the laws of the Church the child became legitimate. The State had always been jealous of the amount of money the Church was getting by her practice of giving certificates of legitimacy, and at the Council of Merton it was made clear to all parties that they must no longer exercise a power which was not consistent with the laws of England. From that date forward we find that the King allowed the Bishops to grant certificates when it suited the King or his nobility. I can say without contradiction that from the accession of William the Conqueror right down to post-Reformation times, the Church took no exception whatever to the principle which is embodied in this Bill, but granted licences and certificates of legitimisation. What is the position of the law to-day? This Bill, in my judgment, does not go nearly far enough. We already have in the Common Law, apart from the Statute Law, a system, or the adoption of a principle which goes nearly as far. There is the case decided a few years ago. It was a case where the people entered into a marriage, and after being married seven weeks the wife presented her husband with a child, and it was held through all the Courts that, because they had married, that child was born in wedlock and was legitimate. It is quite clear that that child was conceived in sin. It is clear that there was no marriage or state of marriage in this case when the child was conceived. Therefore it is a very email way to travel to accept the principle of this Bill, and to say we will adopt the principle decided in that case, and we are merely carrying it a few years further. To-day it is still possible for an English child born before the marriage of its parents to get legitimised in the Court if the domicile of his father at the time he was married allowed it by the law of the land.

This is no new ecclesiastical doctrine, because the Church has approved it from the earliest period. It is no innovation in English law, and I hope this is going to be the first step in a very much wider source of relief being given to a long-suffering class of people. This Bill gives a name to a nameless piece of innocent babyhood. It gives restricted rights of property on intestacy, but it is quite obvious that the facility with which people can dispose of their property under the present law makes it easy to leave property to an illegitimate child.

This Bill does not say what the position of such a child is under the Fatal Accidents Act. I know that under Lord Campbell's Act an illegitimate child cannot bring an action if its father was killed in the course of his employment, although the present Compensation Act allows an illegitimate child to get relief. I should like to see in this Bill a paragraph which says quite clearly that for all purposes of the Acts that are already in existence the person so legitimatised shall from the passing of this Bill be for all purposes in the same position as a person born in legitimate wedlock. I hope the House will give this Bill a very ready acceptance and pass it to-day.

Rising as I do for the first time, I claim the indulgence which is always extended to a Member making his maiden speech. I rejoice that on the first occasion I speak in this House it is in support of a Bill which will remedy a very serious blot in the law of this country. At the same time I have to express my regret at any rate that the exigencies of debate on former Bills have led to a Bill being produced which certainly contains within its own boundaries very serious blots. Although these are matters which may be remedied in Committee there is certainly one to which I should like to draw attention, and that is Clause 4. Here we are trying to remove from those who through no fault of their own have borne a stigma of a very serious character, and yet we are inserting in the Bill, for no apparent reason which I earn see, something which will intensify that stigma.

For some purpose, in Sub-section (3) of Clause 4, you are inventing an entirely new class at a time when, as a result of a Bill passed in the last Parliament, we are abolishing primo geniture, we are by this Bill introducing an entirely new class, namely, the presumed younger child. One could understand if this Bill were a Bill to supplant a child born in wedlock that some provision as that might be a necessity, but where you are endeavouring to remove entirely the stigma from an illegitimate child, you are putting that child, so far as its status is concerned, on precisely the same basis as the subsequent children of the same parents who happened to be born later. Why should you introduce into this Bill a Clause which says that those who were born earlier shall be presumed to have been born later? I say nothing about the almost equal stigma which is contained in Clause 5. I recognise that those Clauses have been inserted as the result of opposition to similar Bills in the past, but may I express the hope that when this Bill gets into Committee, it may be found possible to adjust the differencies that have existed in the past and to remove from the confines of the Bill those Clauses which derogate, and derogate seriously, from the general principle of it. We are on the whole a nation of generous instincts. Sometimes it takes us a long time to rise to the best part of those instincts. When we have at last risen to what is, after all, a great occasion in our history, and when we are removing a very serious blemish from our legislation, do not you think that is a time when we should avoid allowing the exercise of our generous instincts to be belied by putting in petty Clauses of this kind that tend to make this a mean Bill instead of one which is to exercise a proper if somewhat belated generosity.

I did not intend to speak upon this Bill and I should not have spoken if it had not been for the speech of the hon. and learned Member who has just sat down. Many of us were prepared not to object to this Bill but to give it every assistance in our power on the understanding that it was not to be amended in the way that the hon. and learned Gentleman suggests. I can stop this Bill if I choose. [HON. MEMBERS:"Oh!"] That is perfectly clear, and it was only on the understanding that it was not to be taken advantage of in order to introduce Clauses which would have the effect of dealing with property and title that we agreed to let the Bill go through. The hon. and learned Gentleman talks beautifully about removing stigmas. What is the origin and reason of these Clauses being introduced? It is perfectly clear what would happen if Clauses of this sort were introduced. Supposing a man had been living with a woman for many years and had not the slightest intention of marrying her, he could, because of some death, by marrying the women put his child in front of somebody else who had lived an honest and decent life and whom he did not like and put that child in possession of a property and a title to which he had no right and no claim. What do we want to do, or at any rate the great majority of us? We want, as far as we possibly can to preserve in the future a good race of people, and, where there are families who have lived great lives, worked very hard, and become honoured people in this country—there are many such families, the Duke of Devonshire for one—we want to preserve their lives to this country. We do not want for mere sentimental reasons, for the reason for instance that someone may have removed a stigma which would have remained with him if it had not been that his father for spiteful reasons decided to marry—we are supposed to be a sentimental race, and we do not desire to visit the sins of the parents on the children— we do not wish for foolish or sentimental reasons to introduce into this Bill Clauses which may materially affect life and property in this country. If you do that all I can say is the Bill will not go very far. It is right I should say that at this moment in order that the House may understand there is no factious opposition to the Measure. Our desire, in supporting my hon. and learned Friend, is based on the fact that we understand him to have seen the good arguments brought before him, and to have consequently drawn his Bill so as to ensure that it meets with the approval of all parties in the House.

I should like to be allowed to say one or two words on this Bill, because it deals with a subject in which I have interested myself to a very considerable extent. I do not think anyone who has examined the question will feel that this Bill deals with any completeness with the problem we have to solve. From a material point of view it will do very little to improve the position of the illegitimate child. It will do nothing to remedy the fact that infantile mortality amongst illegitimate children is twice as large as it is amongst legitimate children. It will not be of any assistance to the mother in obtaining an affiliation order, and I may remark, in passing, that rather less than one-fifth of the total number of illegitimate births become the subject of affiliation orders, thus showing what difficulty there is in obtaining such orders. Again, it does not distribute equally as between the father and the mother the responsibility for the child; indeed, the Bill will do very little to advance matters. Still, it would be a mistake to underrate the benefit which it will confer from a moral point of view. It does mark a definite step forward in our recognition of the position of the illegitimate child, and it will do something to put us once more upon a level with other civilised countries in that respect. It does seem to me to be an extraordinary and scandalous thing that in this country alone among all civilised nations there should be no such provision as is here made for the legitimation of children by the subsequent marriage of their parents.

The promoters of the Bill have confined themselves solely to the one point, and have made, as I think, the most careful and thorough attempt to deal with the difficulties which arise in connection with it that has been made in any Bill that has yet been before this House. It really is largely a matter for lawyers to decide how far they have met those difficulties. I do not feel competent to pronounce upon them myself, but there are just one or two points that I should like to put before the House. First of all, I regret Sub-section (2) of Clause 1, the effect of which is to say that, where the parents could not have lawfully married, the child is not to be legitimate. Of course I quite recognise that the wrong done when one of the parties is married is greater than when neither is married, but I do not see that that is any reason why the child should be punished. I hope it may be possible to excise that Sub-section—put in to meet certain, perhaps, doctrinal objections which are really contrary to the common sense and the humanity of the country at large— when the Bill goes before a Committee.

With regard to Clause 4, I confess I was glad to hear that there were any terms upon which my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) would allow legislation of this kind to go forward. He has been a very determined opponent of it on previous occasions. I really think, however, while I agree we must have some protection of the kind, that Clause 4 is open to certain objections. Supposing that a man has had a child out of wedlock, and subsequently marries the mother of that child, and he then has more children by her in lawful wedlock, is there any reason why the child which was illegitimate and has been legitimated should be put behind the children born of the same father and mother but in lawful wedlock? That seems to me to be a fault in the Clause as it is drawn. If you take the other case, that of a man who, having had a child out of wedlock, subsequently marries some other woman, has lawful children, and, after her death, marries the mother of his first child, then it does not seem to me that that child should be placed in a position of advantage and throw out the lawful children from their natural and proper inheritance. These are all the points that I wish to touch upon. I am speaking entirely for myself, and not as a member of the Government, but I hope the House will give the Bill a Second Reading, and that it may then go to a Committee to be amended in such small details as may be found necessary.

I cannot help fearing that our feelings of sympathy for the hardship inflicted upon children born out of wedlock—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up! We cannot hear."]—may lead us not to look sufficiently widely at the result of such legislation as this. I expect that most Members of the House have studied, at some time or other, the Report of the Poor Law Commission in 1834, and will have noticed that that Commission drew attention to the effect of the then existing conditions in promoting illegitimacy. I have been interested in getting out the results of legitimisation of children born out of wedlock, and I find that a question was addressed to the Minister of Labour asking for statistics of illegitimacy in Scotland, the United States, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. In Scotland and in most of the countries of Europe, subsequent marriage of the parents legitimises a child born out of wedlock. The Commissioners of 1834 were convinced that pressure was brought to bear upon the father who married the mother of an illegitimate child. They gave very elaborate evidence in favour of this contention, and the chapters in question are well worth anyone's perusal. One can easily understand that if a woman who becomes a man's mistress knows that no harm will be done to her offspring, who will be legitimised if the father subsequently marries her, that is a condition which may very well induce consent. It is a very interesting figure that no country in Europe has a lower proportion of illegitimacy than England and Wales, with the exception of Holland and Ireland, where, of course, the influence of the Roman Church is very strong. In England and Wales the proportion of illegitimate births per 10,000 is 455. In Scotland the proportion is 711, in France 879, in Belgium 644, and in Sweden and Denmark the enormous figures of 1,494 and 1,043, respectively. Those figures, to my mind, are well worth considering. One recognises the slur, and therefore one does not want to see more illegitimate children brought into the world. The very reason why I felt disposed to give support to the first Measure to-day makes me feel that I must not give a vote for this Bill, because I cannot help feeling we are offering an inducement to irregular alliances. It is very easy to be sorry for the product of illicit intercourse without doing anything to promote the social ills we are trying to avoid.

I will not detain the House because I recognise that the bulk of the feeling is all one way; but I understand it is usual for the Government to explain its position on any Bill that is brought before the House. On behalf of the Government I want to say that, while we are in no sort of way hostile to the Bill, and while we do not regard it is a party Measure—the speeches on both sides of the House have shown that—we leave it absolutely to the House. Having said that on behalf of the Government, I should like for myself to say, both as a Member of Parliament and as a lawyer, that this Bill has my unqualified approval. I think that so far from agreeing with the hon. and learned Member for Norwood (Mr. Greaves-Lord) who made an interesting maiden speech, the Bill has been extremely well drafted. It has carefully avoided a number of difficulties and mistakes which were embodied in previous Measures, and in its present form the Bill is one which might well commend itself to the approval of almost every Member of the House. I cannot think that the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir S. Russell-Wells) is right when he holds out, as an argument against the Bill, the suggestion that it will tend to encourage illicit intercourse. If there be a woman who is able to resist temptation without the promise of marriage, but who will yield on the promise of marriage, the man who is tempting her will give the promise, even if he does not mean to carry it out. It is not true, in my opinion, that the effect of this Bill would be in any way to increase illegitimate intercourse. What it would do would be this, that where a man has given a promise and not been man enough to carry it out at the time, afterwards, if he is anxious to repair the wrong that he has done, the Bill would give him the opportunity of doing it.

Let me say a few words on legal topics which have been raised. One point to which I drew the attention of the hon. Member who moved the Second Reading is where, in Clause 1, the Bill purposes to legitimate children whose father was domiciled in, England or Wales or elsewhere. From the legal point of view that is a mistake, because by the law of every country the legitimacy of every child depends upon the law of the domicile of its parents If we were to pass the Bill in this form, we should have this difficulty, that the children of foreign parents might be legitimate in this country and illegitimate in their own country. We should have a conflict of law which would not be desirable and which is not intended. The second small point is this: the Mover of the Second Reading called attention to Sub-section (2) of Clause 1, and pointed out that the reason for that was to bring the law of England into harmony with the law of Scotland. If that be the only reason for the Clause I doubt very much whether it effects its object, because I am told by Scottish lawyers that by the law of Scotland it is necessary, in order that the child may become legitimate, that the parents should be free to marry, both at the date of conception and at the date of birth. This Clause does not carry that out. A child conceived in adultery and born after divorce would be legitimatised by the law of England but not by the law of Scotland. If the only argu- ment for that Clause is that we want to bring the law of England and Scotland into harmony the Clause must be left out. That is a point which no doubt will be considered in Committee.

There is also a question on Clause 4, to which the Postmaster-General has called attention, as to a certain unintended effect of the postponement provisions of the Clause. I think that there again, an improvement might easily be effected in Committee. But these are minor matters, and I submit that in the name of humanity and fair play it is only right that where a man and a woman, perhaps in a moment of temptation, have given way to sin and have offended, as the old Statute says, "against God's law and man's law," if, later on, they wish to repair the damage they have done so far as in them lies, we, as the legislative authority of this country, should not lag behind other nations in giving them the power to remedy their fault and to put right their wrong. I do hope that this House will give a Second Reading to the Bill.

Question, "That the Bill be now read a Second time," put, and agreed to.

Bill read a Second time, and committed to a Standing Committee.

I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

This Bill has three times received a Second Reading in this House, twice without opposition and once by a majority, and on one occasion it passed the Committee and Report stages and it was only on Third Reading that it was rejected. The only argument advanced against it is that it would do harm to medical research. Practically its only opponents are doctors. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] The majority are doctors. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Well I will not argue that now. But I may quote a short passage from the "Lancet" of 31st May, 1919, in reference to this question, which says:

I desire to second the Motion of my right hon. and dogmatic Friend. My only regret is that we cannot always get as much sympathy for humanity as we get for dogs. I am in favour of protecting animals against unnecessary experiments, and to that extent I support the right hon. Baronet. I know that the argument against us is that science demands it; but, after all, if we want to experiment let those who are capable of giving free expression to their opinion submit themselves. I am willing to be experimented on if necessary. My particular objection to vivisection is that animals which cannot speak for themselves are made the victims of these experiments. If my life is to be saved only by cruelty to an animal, let me go. I do not think my life is worth the sacrifice. Unfortunately, the idea seems to be that animals are simply something that we are to experiment upon and use for our own purposes. You love your dog and want to experiment on mine. It is not the dogs of war on which we want to experiment; we made heroes of them. It is the dogs of peace that are to be experimented on, and so far as we on the Labour Benches are concerned—I hope I speak for all—we believe that there are other means of research and other means whereby remedies can be found for the illnesses of mankind, without torturing animals, and doing some of the things that I have had an opportunity of witnessing in my short experience of this terrestrial globe.

There is not time to advance a tithe of the arguments which rise to one's lips in speaking against this Bill. It is only possible to deal with the two arguments which have already been raised this afternoon. First, the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) with his usual acumen seeks to prove his point by a quotation from his enemies. He quotes, but at the same time misreads a passage from "The Lancet." "The Lancet" does not say that such, results as have been achieved from experiments on dogs, could have been achieved in other ways. "The Lancet" was unable to say that these results could not have been achieved in other ways—which is an entirely different thing. The right hon. Baronet, like myself, is not a Scotchman and therefore his logic, like mine, is not complete, but even we Englishmen can recognise the difference between those two statements. "The Lancet" as a matter of fact says what we all agree upon, and very often you may find experiments on other animals will give similar results in the long run, but the great point of our research work is that when you start it in the laboratory you cannot go directly to your end by the particular route you think best. You have to spread your net as widely as possible in the hope that science will reveal herself to you with results that you cannot anticipate. Among things that must be so revealed are different points which can only be revealed through experiments on dogs. That is a matter which on a future occasion I hope I shall have the opportunity of dealing with.

It being Four of the Clock, the Debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed upon Wednesday, 14th March.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 3.

Adjourned at One Minute after Four O'clock till Monday (5th March).