I beg to move, at the end of Sub-section (1), to insert a new Sub-section— justification for my Amendment. The Bill treats them as identical. I suggest that there is a distinction, and that it should be preserved for three reasons. In the first place, there is the legal reason. For once in my life I regret that I am not a lawyer, because this legal point necessarily appeals much more to the legal mind than to the ordinary lay mind, and a lawyer would be far more capable of making it clear to the House than I can claim to be. The distinction I have mentioned has formed part of Roman law, which is the basis of much of the law of the world, ever since the Constitutions of Constantine, about the year 300 or 400. It appears to-day in the law of Scotland. The House should be somewhat chary of cutting itself adrift from the recognised Roman law on this point.

The second reason, I desire to see this distinction drawn is the moral reason. This is not simply a Bill for the benefit of the children, but also for the benefit of fathers and mothers. It is not in accordance with public morality that parents who are unfaithful to each other, and as the result of whose infidelity children are brought into the world, should be treated in the same way and should obtain the same privileges as parents who have been absolutely faithful to each other and whose children, although not actually born in wedlock, are born to one man and one woman who are living together and are faithful to each other. Therefore this Bill, which wipes out that distinction, tends to lower the standard of public morality, which regards the two cases as distinct, and does not, I believe, desire that they should be treated as if they were absolutely identical. I think the Bill tends to throw a cloak of respectability over the adulterous union to which I have referred. It must lower the standard of public morality and the idea of the home on which the country is built up.

Thirdly, and lastly, I come to the most difficult matter which I have to meet, and that is that the Bill is really concerned with the children, and that as far as the child is concerned it does not matter whether it is the result of a man and woman living together, who have been faithful, or the result of an adulterous union. So far as the child is concerned, it does not make very much difference, and we must do everything possible to abolish the handicap with which so many of them start life. I am not quite certain, how- ever, that this Bill is going to do so very-much for the benefit of the children. What will happen? A man and woman are married and they have children and the man has also children by a mistress. The wife dies or is divorced and the man marries the mistress. If the Bill stands as it does to-day, the children by the mistress will be legitimate; they will come-in as part of his recognised legitimate family. Perhaps some of them will be of the same age as the children born of the original union. I am not sure that a family composed in that way is likely to be a happy family or that the introduction of children of the same or similar ages to those already in the original family is likely to make for a peaceful or happy home.

If we can only do justice to the children at the expense of lowering the standard of public morality, I am not sure that it ought to be done. I am not sure that the maintenance of a high standard of public morality is not even of more importance than doing justice to the children of an adulterous union. My arguments are mainly based on the fact that the experience of civilisation is to maintain a distinction between the adulterous union and the union which is not adulterous, a faithful union which, perhaps, lasts throughout life. That distinction is maintained in all our other laws—in the pensions law and other laws, and it should be maintained in this Bill. I am not in any way hostile to the Bill itself. The proposal of Clause 1 to legitimatise children born out of wedlock whose parents could be married but have not been married has my approval. I am in favour of that reform. I only wish to limit the application of the Bill to that particular type of parent who could be married at the time the child was born, and to omit from the Bill the parents who could not have been married legally at the time the child was born. That will in no way injure the Bill but, on the contrary, I believe it will be a distinct improvement. It will bring us into consistence with the law of Scotland, and all those countries whose law is based on the Roman law. I have said nothing about the question whether the decisive factor should be the date of birth or the date of conception. That is a very complicated and difficult matter which has been discussed over and over again for centuries, and I desire to avoid complicating my Amendment with anything of that sort. I do not think it is material to the point I have raised, and I hope the House will be willing to accept my Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

The Bill makes no provision for securing that the children in such a legitimising marriage actually belong to the man. Where a man or woman get married, it is conceivable that the children have no relation whatever to the man. It is open to a man to go to a woman who has illegitimate children and for certain ulterior purposes to claim the children as his, although at the time those children were born the man may have been living in Peru and the woman may have been living in Siberia. There is nothing to prevent children being introduced into a family tree in that way. In a case like that, it is absolutely necessary to find out whether the claim is genuine, whether children are the sons or daughters of the supposed father. Where the man and woman have been living together for years and are well known, it is a different thing. But as the Bill stands, a man might go to the Registrar with a woman who has a train of children, who he has never seen before, and he could legitimate them by simply going through the ceremony of marriage. It may be said that this is not a very likely thing to happen; but I can prove that it is likely to happen, by events that have occurred.

There are two great evil motives which influence bad men, and which have led them to do this sort of thing in the past and will lead them to do it in the future, and this Bill will make that more scandalously possible. The first motive is the wish to defraud relatives, the wish to get out of the position of heirship in the family those upon whom property would have devolved in the event of the man in question dying without issue. There are many cases of that kind. The second motive is where a man is bribed to marry a woman and to legitimate children. In the first case, it means the introduction of absolute impostors into the family out of spite for other relatives. I could quote the case of Margaret of Burgundy, who brought forward Perkin Warbeck, and the case of the mother of the assassinated true Demetrius, who openly acknowledged the false Demetrius before the whole of the Russian people, although she knew that her son had been dead for years. There is also the well-known recent case where an elderly mother strove to introduce a hopeless impostor into the family. In that case the old lady owned an obese, illiterate butcher as her son, the drowned cornet of the Carabineers, in order to defraud her grandchild of the inheritance of the family. That was the famous Tichborne case, where an impostor was deliberately introduced into the family out of spite for relatives—a most disgusting motive.

This Bill would make it possible for any crabbed old man who hates his nearest relative, to fish out any woman with an illegitimate child and say that he knew her in Peru or in Kamskatka fifteen years before, where he had relations with her, and he could then foist her child upon the family. That is a possibility of a horrible fraud which has never been considered by the authors of this Bill. There is another disgusting possibility, and that is the case of the bribed, complaisant husband. In the old Court of France it was quite usual for some disgusting old nobleman to be bribed to marry the King's mistress in order that she might have a legitimate place at Court. We know of similar cases in England within our own memory, where the complaisant husband has been bought to father the children of somebody who makes it worth his while to take over his mistress. This Bill makes it possible for those children to be brought into a family great or humble, and for an absolute imposter to be brought in because money has been paid over for somebody's private profit.

Another point arises: It is, unfortunately, the fact that there are many impotent people in this country. I am sorry to have to talk about these subjects, but if people will bring in these Bills they must expect to have nasty subjects brought forward. It is well known that impotent people have been prepared to accept children who did not belong to them for the mere purpose of showing that they were potent—there was one very famous case many years ago, but I will not dwell upon it—and in such a case the man will now be able to marry anybody he wishes, perhaps a woman he has never seen before, and produce a string of children to support his reputation. That is perfectly possible and I think it is a scandalous possibility.

There is a third point about which the hon. Member behind spoke on which I wish to dwell a little more, which offers a terrible prospect for the wife of a bad man, who wants to marry and wants to get his illegitimate children acknowledged. That poor woman is a childless wife and her husband may bully her to divorce him. He will be physically cruel to her, and commit infidelities to force her to divorce him, to enable him to marry his mistress. That is a possible scandal, but there is worse than that. There are the patient wives, much enduring Christian wives who will not act on that provocation and sue for a divorce, and I should not like to say that this Measure would not lead ultimately to cases of murder to get rid of a childless wife, in cases where the wicked husband wants to marry his mistress and have his children legitimated. At present the children cannot be acknowledged as legitimate, and if he murders his wife it is to be hoped that he will get hanged, but even if he is not detected at present he can only marry the woman, but if you can also legitimatise the children the reasons for plunging into the crime of murder are increased.

The spirit of Henry VIII still survives. Read your papers. How many cases have you not got of husbands trying to poison their wives to marry their mistresses? There have been such cases lately and there have been convictions. I am talking to ordinary commonsense people who read their newspapers, and I am pointing out that the position of an ill-treated wife of a bad man is, by this Bill, made enormously worse than it has ever been before. There are many such cases as those to which I have referred. We all remember the horrible recent case in India of the attempted double murder of a husband by a wife and a wife by a husband—and they were not Indian, they were British—which shows that Henry VIII's spirit survives in modern times. This Bill will help towards the creation of modern Henry the Eighths.

The point concerning the prejudice to legitimate children has been touched on already. Imagine a family of brothers and sisters living together, holding an honourable name and an honourable position, it may be in the lower or higher walks of life, in some district. Their wretched father, after their mother's death, suddenly produces a woman from nowhere with a train of children, for reasons of his own, it may be family spite or there may be a question of money in it. What is the position of these poor children who find their name smirched, and themselves loaded with brothers and sisters from the gutter who were never heard of before? Think not only of the illegitimate children whose case we wish to examine, but think of the legitimate children, and the horrible smirch on the family. I am quite sure that those who drew up this Bill never dreamt of these possibilities, of the possibility of imposters, the tendency to cruelty and murder and the possibility of horrible pain, mental and moral, to numbers of hapless legitimate children. Therefore I hold that the evils which this Bill would cure are far less than the evils which it would produce. And remember it is only a limited number of illegitimate children who will be benefited, for you are only dealing with that comparatively small proportion of illegitimate children whose parents are in a position to marry. These are of whose parent is dead, or is still married to a legitimate spouse are not benefited. I have the greatest objection to the passing of a Bill which produces all this horrible result.

In my task of answering these very difficult and complicated Amendments I crave the. indulgence of the House, because, unlike a Minister of the Crown I have no Department to advise me.

You probably do better without their advice.

The hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir C. Oman) said that this Bill is such a dangerous Bill because it may tend to produce more Henry the Eighths to-day. The hon. Member was not seeking in that speech the rejection of the Bill. He was asking the House to insert in the Bill a Subsection. I ask him, would that Subsection stop one act of adultery? Of course not. His speech was on all fours with the general attitude taken up by the people of this and other countries on this question throughout the centuries until the 20th Century began. They said, "Here is a horrible distasteful sub- ject—illegitimacy, bastardy. We cannot talk of it. Therefore let us not speak about it; it is unpleasant." Take the recent speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North-East Leeds (Major Birchall). He gave three reasons why the Amendment should be inserted. He said truly that this Amendment was in the Bill in Committee. His first reason was a legal one, that every State, according to him, which has laws conferring legitimacy by subsequent marriage has always put in a provision like this.

I said every State whose basis of law was the old Roman law.

I have in my hand the Act of Parliament of South Australia. The words there are:

"Any child born before the marriage of his or her parents (whether before or after the passing of this Act) whose parents have been intermarried or shall hereafter intermarry, shall be deemed, on the registration of such child as hereinafter provided, to have been legitimated by such marriage from birth."

There are no limiting words there. But his first reason was that he wished to divide illegitimate children into two classes. What we are seeking to do is to pass an Act which will help all illegitimate children and will not divide them into classes.

Not all illegitimate children.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman went on to say that in his opinion, unless the Amendment is carried, the Bill would tend to lower public morality by throwing a cloak of respectability over adulterous intercourse. May I ask him whether, if the Amendment be accepted, there will be one less act of adultery? The purpose of this Bill is not to stop adultery; you cannot stop adultery by Act of Parliament. What we are doing is to legislate for the innocent result of the act of adultery. Has either of the two hon. Members who have spoken sought to penalise the parents? No. The parents, ex hypothesi, before they can benefit by the Bill must have intermarried. Therefore they have regularised their position. What do hon. Members say? They say, "We cannot hurt the parents and stop their marrying, because they have done it. What shall we do? We shall get at them through their children." "Will the child benefit?" asked my hon. and gallant Friend. The seconder of the Amendment said, "Is it not a terrible thing to think that you may have an illegitimate child legitimated and brought into an otherwise happy home of legitimate children?" It may be true—I do not think it will—that the home and the other children may not like it, but I know at least one child who will like it and be made happier, and that is the illegitimate child.

I shall seek to submit three reasons for rejecting the Amendment. The first is that this Amendment would differentiate between classes of children and render some of them incapable of having their position regularised. I have dealt with that. Whereas the parents of the children can have regularised their position, if this Amendment be accepted the illegitimate children will still remain illegitimate, in spite of the marriage of their parents. The second reason is this: this Amendment is an effort directed at establishing degrees of culpability among parents. It says to some parents, "The result of your marriage shall be to legitimate: your children," and to others, "Because one or other of you was not able to marry on the date of the birth of the child you shall not have the power, although you have married, to legitimate your children." The third reason against the Amendment is that it will upset the whole working of the Bill. What is it that the Bill does? Automatically, as from the date of marriage, or the passing of the Act, whichever is later, it legitimates the children. If the Amendment is carried it will spoil the automatic effect of the Bill. Who is to prove that the parents were not, in fact, in a position to marry at the date of the birth of the child? Before whom is this to be proved? In many cases the parents are dead, or one parent is dead. The only thing I can say is that if the child is alive to-day, and if the parents have married, then on the passing of the Bill that child becomes automatically legitimated. We see enormous difficulties, because if the child is in the position that when it was born its parents were not able to marry, if, in other words, it is the result of adulterous intercourse, what will be the position of the child when the Bill is passed? It will never know whether or not some day someone will bring forward the case before some court and say: "Oh, no; you are not legitimate because your parents could not marry when you were born." Therefore, from the point of view of the child—and that is the point of view I want the House to keep in the forefront of their minds—this Amendment would ruin the automatic working of the Bill.

I am sorry that the last speaker cannot see his way to accept this Amendment. I hope that the Mover will press it to a Division. If the Amendment be not accepted, there will arise certain things which I do not think the promoters of the Bill intended. I have in my mind a case which, no doubt, the learned Solicitor-General will remember. It relates to a certain gentleman who holds a hereditary title. His children will be made legitimate and his eldest illegitimate child will succeed to the title unless this Amendment is inserted in the Bill. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Is not that so? At the time that the son was born the father had not divorced or been divorced from his wife.

Clause 6 bars the succession to titles—the one thing it does bar.

If that be so, I do not intend to press my point.

I am sorry that my hon. and gallant Friend who is in charge of the Bill has not agreed to accept the Amendment. He is the backer of a Bill which, as originally presented, contained the words of the Amendment. He says that if the Amendment is carried it will stop the working of the Bill. But the argument of my hon. and gallant Friend falls to the ground unless he is prepared to get up and say that when he put his name to the Bill he did not know what was in it.

My right hon. Friend knows, because he has far greater experience than I have, that no Bill is ever introduced into this House which, after further study is not found to contain certain provisions that are much better left out. That is the case here. When we went into the matter, which is of a very complicated nature, we discovered that this provision was not desirable and therefore we secured its omission.

The argument of my hon. and gallant Friend would have greater force if it applied to Bills of a more elaborate nature than this but this is a Bill of only nine Clauses. One would have thought that the Members whose names are on the Bill would have sufficiently studied it to have made up their minds as to what its effects would be. The hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir C. Oman) did not bring forward any argument to show that the acceptance of this Amendment would stop murder and no person could bring forward an argument to show that unless this provision was inserted murder might take place. What my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford University said was that this Bill as it stands gives another motive to induce a man to get rid of his wife and he brought forward a case which occurred a short time ago wherein a man in a good position in life was convicted. There is another case where the evidence was not sufficient to cause conviction in a court of law but in regard to which most people have drawn their own conclusions. Hon Members opposite seemed rather inclined to laugh at the hon. Member for Oxford University for his reference to character through the ages. In all ages people are animated by the same motives, and people now are animated by the same motives as those which animated men 200 or 300 years ago, or even longer. Human nature does not change and what the promoters of this Bill fail to recognise—and I am not speaking against the Bill but in favour of this Amendment—is that human nature has not changed and that you cannot change it by Act of Parliament.

If we were all angels, and I wish we were, no doubt that sort of thing would work, but we are not, and Bills of this kind give opportunities to the worst side of human nature. Let me point out something which will result if this Amendment is not passed. Only a few days ago we passed a matrimonial Causes Bill which allows a woman to obtain a divorce from her husband on the ground of a single act of adultery. We will presume that a man does not care for his wife, that he has married her perhaps for various reasons and that after marriage whatever attraction she had for him disappears and he desires to get rid of her. He happens to conceive an affection—I think the novels call it falling in love—for another woman who is a respectable woman. She likes the man and if he were not married would probably marry him but she is respectable and she refuses his advances. She says to him, "I do not like to commit an act of adultery. If I did, I should have a child and that child would have the stigma of illegitimacy, because you are married." The man says, "You can easily get over that. All I have got to do is to tell my wife that I have committed an act of adultery and I shall at once get a divorce and I shall be able to marry you and your children will then be legitimate." The effect of this is to make divorce easier. It lessens the force of the marriage tie, coupled with the Bill which we passed a few days ago, and it is a direct incitement to immorality.

Why penalise the child?

If the hon. Member reads the Bible, he will see that the faults of the parents descend to the children. However, I will not argue with the hon. Member upon matters of that sort. The introduction of this measure is another instance of hasty legislation got up by societies which are formed to do this, that or the other thing supported by people who are animated by genuine and sincere motives, but who do not know what they are doing. They have not really looked into these matters and they are carried away with ideas that something which may be an act of injustice can be remedied and they never consider that remedying that act of injustice is likely to create further acts of injustice and to make for considerable trouble. I trust the House will accept the Amendment by a large majority.

It is not very often I am in agreement with the right hon. Baronet, but I must confess, on this occasion, I think the views which he has expressed ought to receive careful consideration. I believe the original form of the Bill was the right form, and that the promoters make a mistake in taking out the Sub-section which it is now proposed to reinsert. I understand, both in this matter and in the matter of the reform of the divorce law, the promoters of the Bills in question have some regard for bringing the standard of English law a little closer to the standard of Scottish law. As a Scottish lawyer it is of interest to me to recognise that it is now proposed that England should enjoy for the first time what we have enjoyed for many centuries in Scotland. So far as the divorce law is concerned, that is being accomplished in the Bill which was considered quite recently.

I am afraid I do not quite follow my hon. and learned friend. I did not make any reference to Scottish law, because I was not certain what was the Scottish law. Do I understand that the provision we are seeking to introduce is in the Scottish law?

I want to make it quite clear that the Bill as introduced would have made the law of England the same as that of Scotland. The Committee have altered that, and it is now proposed to introduce again into this Bill the Subsection taken out in Committee, which would make the law the same in the two countries. We in Scotland have had experience of the law of legitimation by subsequent marriage for a very long period of time, excluding, as it has always been done from the very earliest times, under the Roman law and under the canon law also, the case of children born as a result of incestuous or adulterous connection. I suggest that, in the first place, it would be a very unwise thing to carry this reform further than has been the practice of Scotland during these many years. It would put the laws of the two countries on a different footing. In Scotland we have found nothing but advantage from the law as it at present exists, and we believe that it would be a mistaken policy to alter that law for either country. I suggest that the principal reason why objection should be taken to the Bill in its present form, and why the Amendment should receive support, is that it would result undoubtedly in the weakening of the marriage tie, which, after all, is a matter of primary importance. I agree also that it would be indirectly an incentive to divorce and that it would give rise to possible cases of even collusive divorce with a view to getting release and securing marriage with the party with whom the connection had taken place.

I hope this House will set its face resolutely against anything which would suggest the countenancing of adulterous intercourse. I believe a great deal of sentiment arises in connection with the case of the children themselves. A most eloquent appeal has been made by the hon. and gallant Member for Buckingham (Captain Bowyer) and others in regard to the position of the children, but after all we have to keep in view that these cases are not going to be very numerous, and in the second place that even the case of the child must be regarded in relation to a question of still greater importance, namely, the sanctity of the marriage tie, and I strongly urge upon hon. Members to consider that a system which has worked well for many centuries in Scotland and which has not given rise to any of the disadvantages which have been suggested during that period, ought not to be altered in this way. We in Scotland have founded our system not only on the principle of justice but on the principle of morality, and, accepting the doctrine of the Roman law and of the canon law, we have been able by practical experience to demonstrate the advantage of that law. I sincerely hope, therefore, that this House will hesitate before differentiating the laws of the two countries by carrying a reform to a point which is not justified and, in my opinion, cannot be justified.

12 N.

My name is on the back of this Bill, which is proposed in the interests of an unfortunate class, namely, illegitimate children, and I have listened with great interest to the speech made by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury). I am really quite unable to follow his argument. He puts it in this way: Has human nature changed since the time of Henry VIII? I say that undoubtedly human nature has changed in this respect, that we are endeavouring to-day to undo or to palliate some of the great injustices of old. Take, for instance, visiting the sins of the fathers on the children. We know they have been so visited from generation to generation, but, so far as we are concerned, we who are supporters of this Bill want to remove an injustice to the child so far as it can be done. I cannot see how this can promote adulterous intercourse. It does not in any way have reference to it. First of all, before there is an illegitimate child, there must be adulterous intercourse between the parties. That having occurred, how can it be said that anything here will add to the temptation of people to commit adultery?

Lawyers probably see the injustice caused to illegitimate children more clearly and more forcibly than anybody else. Here we see an unfortunate child who is branded through life as illegitimate, whose parents may afterwards have married, but still the shame attaches to that child for all his life, and we are attempting to get rid of that by passing this Bill. The child is no party to the adulterous intercourse, is no party to the shame that has been caused, and yet the child, under the present law, has to bear the shame right through its life. We hope to remove that injustice by this Bill. I should be opposed to the Bill if it could be said with any force at all, or with any shadow of reason, that anything in this Bill was to provide a motive for murder. I entirely disagree that it provides a motive for murder. The hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir C. Oman) said to the House there would be an incentive for one of the parents to commit murder in order that he might marry his mistress. I do not like to say more than this, that after a fairly long experience in the criminal law, I never knew yet that it was a motive for murder that children would become legitimate or anything of that sort. The motive for murder will exist if a man wants a woman, and another woman stands in his way, whether there are illegitimate children or not. The motive is there, and the idea that this Clause in the Bill will add to that motive is, if my hon. Friend will permit me to say so without offence, absurd.

I am reminded to say a word or two in regard to the Scottish law, with which I am not acquainted, but I am not at all sure that the Scottish law is as stated. In my opinion, as a lawyer, if the parents marry, the child becomes legitimate, whether or not the parents were married at the time when the illegitimate child was born. I believe that this Bill will bring the law into line with Scottish law on the subject. I did not intend to speak upon this matter. I have not given it the thought that it deserves, but I do say this most emphatically, that I hope this Amendment will be defeated in the interests of the one person we want to help, and that is the illegitimate child.

With regard to what the hon. and learned Member who has last spoken said, I think I am right in saying he is under a misapprehension as to the Scottish law. It is quite true that children born before their parents are legally married are, in certain cases, legitimatised, but the child of an adulterous union, born in adultery, is not legitimatised, and while there are many hardships in accepting the Bill as it stands at present, I would strongly appeal to the promoters of the Bill to re-introduce the provision. We have heard a great deal about the man and his mistress with strings of children, whom he wants to legitimatise, but I would rather take it, if you want a real case of hardship, from the woman's point of view. One can imagine a woman who has been very unhappily married, and who meets some man with whom she is really in sympathy. Her husband refuses any divorce, and she feels bound, for her own happiness, and, perhaps, for the view she takes of her own conscience, to live with the man she really loves. Children are born. It does seem to me a great hardship that on the death of her husband she should not then be able to have those children put in the position of being legitimate children, not, mark you, with any claim upon her husband now dead, or his property, but to make them have a proper claim upon the man who is actually their father, and to regularise the union from that point of view. That, I think, is the strongest case, and much stronger in favour of keeping the Bill as it stands now than anything else that has been put forward. But I submit that these cases are very rare, and I do not think, from the practical point of view, it is good enough to introduce this sort of thing into legislation for a few cases like that.

With regard to the question of getting uniformity, as far as possible, between the laws of England and of Scotland, I know the Faculty of Advocates at the Scottish Bar, with their experience, and without any special interest in the matter, except in observing how the thing works, out in law and practice, are very much against extending this rather generous provision of Scottish law in this direction, and there is one thing certain, that if you go ahead beyond Scottish practice in English practice, you are going to have a discrepancy between the two laws which, I think, is very heartily to be deprecated. On the principle of the man who takes a little more butter to finish his bread, and then takes a little more bread to finish his butter, you may go on at this until no marriage law is left. I say, let us take the practice of centuries in Scotland, and in England let us come up—or, as some would say, down—to that standard, but, at least, as an experiment, do not let us go further than that just now. Let us secure a certain uniformity, and a broad justice to the children of an illegitimate union, but do not let us press this thing further, and enter into a sort of competition between the two countries, and get near to abolishing the marriage law altogether. If I may say so, I urge the promoters to do this, because I think this Bill, apart from this provision, is a very important measure of reform, and I am perfectly certain that if they will accept the re-introduction of this subsection they will get a large measure of support, whereas they will jeopardise the Bill if they do not do so.

I very much hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Betterton) will not accept this Amendment. I am entirely unconvinced by the arguments put forward by the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken. He based his case on two considerations. Let me deal with the latter first. He said that if this were conceded, it would equalise the law between this country and Scotland, as though there were a virtue in having the law between the two countries so equalised. He said there would be a discrepancy in future if this were not accepted, but the discrepancy exists at this moment. There is a legitimacy law in Scotland which does not exist in England, and I venture to say there is far less in that point of view than he sought to have us believe. Furthermore, what is the special virtue in equalising our law with what is, now-a-days, an obsolete law in Scotland? The legitimacy law in Scotland is of very old standing, and is based, as my hon. Friend said, on the old ecclesiastical, canon law. If we wish to link up our laws with existing legitimacy laws, surely the proper thing is to do that linking up with the modern laws, such as prevail in the Dominions. The principal in this Bill is no new thing in the Dominions, I believe it exists in practically the whole of the British Empire and in Sweden, Norway and America, and, indeed, a very large part of the civilised world. I should be very much surprised if anyone could tell the House that such a provision as is proposed to be introduced exists in any country except Scotland, and the reason why it exists in Scotland is, as my hon. Friend pointed out, that the Scottish law is of long standing, and is founded on the old ecclesiastical law, which attached, may I say, a greater importance to the necessity or penalising the adulterous issue than we in this House should wish to attach to it.

The second argument put forward by the hon. Gentleman on the front bench was with regard to the child. As to the child, I would like to ask him if he has considered this point? If this Amendment be carried, there will then only be one class of illegitimate child possible, and wherever a child is shown to be illegitimate, it will be branded as the outcome of adulterous intercourse. It will carry a stigma, because it will be known throughout the county that this House has drawn an invidious distinction, and, therefore, the effect of accepting the Amendment must inevitably be, still further to prejudice that unfortunate class of person. I am sure the House would be most unwilling to do that. I would like to say, with regard to the argument put forward by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury), it seems to me, that in adducing arguments with a view of clouding the issue, he showed less than his usual skill. I am sure no-one in this House is going to be in the faintest degree impressed by the nonsense talked about promoting adultery and murder. I am very much surprised that the right hon. Baronet should have risen in his place and seriously put that forth. It is most astonishing to me. He quoted the Bible with respect to visiting the sins of the fathers on the children. May I remind him that the prerogative which he seeks to usurp of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children is one which is laid down in the book to which he refers as one to be exercised by the Almighty. I hope the right hon. Baronet is not suggesting that the Almighty is in any need of assistance from the House of Commons in visiting the sins of the fathers on the children. I believe if the right hon. Baronet will search his heart and mind he will come to think, after careful reflection, that it is perhaps more a part of mankind to alleviate the sins and sorrows of mankind rather than to seek to do otherwise.

I am sorry that my right hon. and gallant Friend in charge of this Bill has not accepted this Amendment. As I understand it this matter has caused some considerable alarm in circles outside this House, and in bodies organised by women, of those representing women's opinion such as the Women's Joint Advisory Council and the Mothers' Union. The proposal to leave these words out, as my hon. and gallant Friend wishes to do, is in my view little short of a horrible idea. We talk about removing the stigma for the child, but really if those who speak are sincere, they must go the whole hog and legitimatise the illegitimate child during the lifetime of the legal wife.

But a man cannot have two legal wives.

No, but some hon. Members would seem to wish that a man should have two legal familiies.

I do not say that a man should have two families. But I say that in the case of a man having two families the child should be legitimatised.

Surely we ought to be consistent. A man has two families born during the lifetime of his legal wife. The second family will not be legitimate until after the death of his legal wife. My comment on that is that it is simply muddled sentimentally. That kind of thing, pursued to its logical sequence, means that these illegitimate children shall be regarded as legitimate from birth and if so the whole fabric of married life crumbles away! I hope that the hon. and gallant Gentleman in charge of this Bill will not prejudice the further passage of the Bill by refusing this Amendment. For my part I believe that many hon, Members are prepared to see this Bill passed into law, if amended as we propose, but if the Amendment be refused, or if it be defeated in the division lobby, then I hope that all hon. Members who have any regard for the marriage law at all will frustrate the further passage of the Bill.

I should be sorry to give a silent vote on this occasion, because there is nobody in this. House who holds stronger views upon the question of divorce than I do. But where I think the argument has gone wrong in this debate, if one may say so, is that there are some people who seem to think this Bill will give divorce a. moral sanction. If I had my way, I would repeal the whole of the divorce law from top to bottom. It is the beginning of all present evils, for once you admit the right to divorce, which I do not accept on moral grounds, and we must acknowledge that the law has been so far as divorce is concerned been broken into, then it seems to come down to one question, and one question only, and I cannot get away from it—that it is the question of the child! We have had a good many arguments during this Debate, historical and otherwise. I always listen with great interest to anything that is said by the hon. Gentleman who represents the University of Oxford (Sir C. Oman) upon matters of history. When, however, he referred to Henry VIII. it struck me that this case might more easily have been compared to a certain young king of whom we have heard. This king ascended the Throne very young, and as they could not chastise him when he did anything wrong, they got another boy, of whom he was fond, a lad about the same age, and chastised him whenever the king made a mistake. It seems to me that this is very much the case of the present Bill. We say that the parents have done wrong, because they have done wrong, and we cannot punish them, because, as has been pointed out, they have married and made themselves in the eyes of the law respectable, the children, the unfortunate victims of this wrong-doing of the parents, are to act the part of the whipping boy and bear the pains and penalties of their act. That seems to me to be a very wrong business. I therefore repudiate it as one who holds strongly against the divorce laws from beginning to end. I hold very strongly—I may be entirely wrong—but I think there is little difference between the fact, of, perhaps, a man and woman marrying and then separating, and then carrying on, if you like, an adulterous intercourse, so far as the children are concerned, and the fact that they go and marry as a matter of form and have a divorce, if as a result of either the children that are born afterwards are legitimatised. I know, of course, there are arguments condemning them as acting very wrongly and bringing about many evils and wrongdoing. I go back, may I say, to the beginning, and say that we must be very careful that so long as we have a divorce law this does not fall on the unfortunate child.

I trust the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not accept the Amendment, because as the Bill stands at present the tendency will be for this Amendment to act as an incentive to those people who have had illegitimate children born to them to condone their acts and to marry at the earliest possible moment. As the Bill now stands the feeling is to my mind that there is a great incentive to those people to marry, because they will not only regularise their own position but regularise the position of the children. If this Amendment be accepted I fear that these parties will not be so anxious to marry.

But one of the parties is already married.

I am afraid I cannot follow the argument of my right hon. Friend, but I hope very much that they will not accept the Amendment.

The difference of opinion expressed in the House shows how deep are the feelings excited by this Amendment, and I think everybody will feel that there are many important arguments that may be stated on both sides of the question. I do not think I ever knew a question upon which my own opinions have fluctuated so much as they have upon this question. I recognise what hon. Members have felt by their speeches and interruptions, but what we ought to consider primarily is the interests of the children. At the same time, I feel the full force of what has been said as to the complications that may ensue when you get two families and when the children of one of the families only come in at the date of the marriage. I do not express any opinion upon the question because it is essentially one for the House to decide and form its own opinion upon unassisted by the Government Whips.

If this Amendment be accepted and the words, which were removed in Committee, are put back into the Bill, substantially it will make the law as enacted by this Bill in regard to England what the law is in Scotland. I despair of explaining what complications may ensue if the Bill goes through in its present form in regard to succession to property, but I am bound to point out that at the present time so far as the Scottish law is concerned in England we do recognise the legitimation of a child of Scottish domiciled parents except for the purpose of succession to real property. We have recognised that so long as the parents were domiciled in Scotland. If this Bill goes through a child will be legitimated in England who would not be legitimated in Scotland. No doubt Scotland would recognise on the principle of the comity of nations that legitimation to a certain extent, but they might say that just as you in England have not recognised our law of legitimation, we do not propose to recognise yours in regard to succession to heritable property in Scotland. Therefore you would have the difference accentuated and increased.

Is that point not covered by Section 2 of the Act dealing with intestacies? Surely we could meet that point by saying that if a person has Scottish property the law of Scotland shall apply.

I have not given sufficient attention to this question to understand its full legal effect. I have had the advantage of discussing this matter with the Attorney-General, and it has also been discussed by the Law Officers for Scotland, and nobody would like to undertake to say what effect the Bill will have if it goes through in its present form. We are all agreed that in its present form, if passed, it will be absolutely essential, in order to avoid litigation in the future, to have some sort of consideration of the whole bearing of the Bill on this question, and make it plain what effect the Bill would have in England in regard to English legitimation and in Scotland as to Scottish legitimation. It might be that the Amendment may have the effect which is desired, but I think it will require very careful consideration.

We do not express any opinion on the merits of the Bill, but we say that if it goes through without the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Leeds (Major Birchall) being accepted reconsideration of the whole language of the Bill will be necessary. It may be that drastic amendments will be required in another place, and I do not know what effect that may have upon the chances of the Bill in this House. It may be that those who desire that a step forward shall be taken may think it better to take the Bill in the form in which it was introduced, and, if necessary, afterwards to have a further amendment of the law in another Session rather than risk the passage of the Bill now in a form which will be a really substantial advance upon our present law, and which will bring the English law substantially into conformity with the law of Scotland.

With regard to the future of this Bill, I am in this difficulty. The Solicitor-General has clearly pointed out the intricacies of the differences in Scottish and English law, and I have to remember that the future passage of this Bill to-day will be made more easy if I accept the Amendment. In these circumstances, and acting on the strength of what the Solicitor-General has said, I, on behalf of the promoters, feel that I must accept this Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1) after the words last inserted, to insert a new Subsection—

"(3) This section shall only apply in cases in which, it the date of the marriage the parents acknowledge the children as their own."

I have had the advantage or disadvantage of seeing the old Norman law work. It is, of course, the basis of this particular law. It is the law of the Conqueror, and it was repudiated in the time of Henry III. I do not think that the people of this country at the present "moment want it, but whether they want it or not, it is quite certain that the majority of those in this unfortunate position wish to know what children they are acknowledging. If there are such children, the man should have the opportunity of saying, "These children are mine." There is nothing more easy to take in than a man, and there is no person in the world who can take him in more easily than a woman. I am speaking for the most part to men, and they know it, and the more honest they are the more easily they are taken in. Imagine to yourself that you have two children by a particular lady. She may be married or she may be unmarried. You believe her to be pure. You believe it, and you have the natural vanity of a man. There is nothing vainer on earth than a man, not even a peacock. The natural vanity of the man makes him believe that the child is his, and, if he be told it is, he believes it. The woman, once she has succumbed, may not be immune to the next attack, and probably will be still lees immune to the third, fourth and fifth attack. Therefore, when these two people come and propose to legitimatise certain children, the man at any rate should be able to acknowledge the children which he believes to be his by name. If not, the woman may have ten other children, unknown to him, and she may have two which the man honestly believes, and which she may believe, are his. He may wish, for reasons known to himself, not for the sake of the woman, but for the sake of the children, to legitimatise those two children. If he does, he must on the marriage legitimatise them and mention them by name: "I, John Brown, do hereby acknowledge little Jack and little Richard as my children." It is said that, better than that, we must see that justice is done to the children. If we are seeking to amend the law of God, then I certainly shall retire. The law of God punishes the children, as it is truly said, to the third, fourth and fifth generations. We know better than that. We are not going to punish the children of those who have committed sin. We are going to put a premium on vice.

I do not follow the rather wide ramifications of the hon. and gallant Member's speech as having any connection with this restricted Amendment. Perhaps he will succeed in connecting it, but I do not at present follow.

I will try, but perhaps I am a little out of order. I am opposed to the Bill, because I look upon it as a degradation of the woman, and anything that degrades the woman must in a short time degrade the race.

This Section says it shall apply only in cases where at the date of the marriage the parents acknowledge the children as their own. Surely that is a very much narrower point.

I bow to your ruling. My point that the woman might have ten children by other people, I thought, might weigh, because it shows that the man might be legitimatising a large number of children that were not his and which he might not even know existed. Probably he would not. Probably he would be simply taken in. I want to confine ourselves closely to the law as we know it to be carried out among the nations of the world. I want to provide that the father should acknowledge the children that he believes to be his at the date of the marriage and not allow a large number of children for whom he may have no paternity and in whom he may have no interest whatever to be fathered on him so that at his death they may come in and possibly succeed, not to his title, because that is barred at the present time, but to his estate.

I beg to second the Amendment. It will, so far as I understand it, prevent a situation arising which I am sure all the Members of the House will agree should not arise. We will presume that an unmarried woman lives with a man and has children by him. They disagree and part, and the woman becomes the mistress of another man who is a bachelor and she has children by him. Unless this Amendment is put in, presuming that the wife of the first marriage either divorces him or dies, then as the. law stands, if this man marries again the effect will be that the children of the first marriage will be legitimatised as the children of the second marriage.

That is not the case.

I shall be pleased to hear the arguments of my hon. and gallant Friend opposite if he can show I am wrong, but, as I understand it, that is the effect of the Amendment. All that is required is that when the parties are married they shall decide which of the children shall be legitimatised.

I am in considerable difficulty just now, because I really do not know the exact words of the Amendment, those which have been read out being totally different from the ones handed to me by the Mover.

Perhaps I can explain it. In consequence of the words last inserted, the Amendment had to be modified.

This Amendment is absolutely unnecessary. The House will clearly see, if they follow the first few words of Section I that the Bill only affects a child in so far as the actual parents of that child marry. If the actual' parents of the child do not marry there is never any question of the child being legitimatised.

Under the illustration which I gave, if the mother of the children of the first marriage says on the second marriage "Ichoose to do so and so and I will persuade my husband to do so," there is nothing under the Bill to prevent the children of other men becoming legitimatised.

There is everything to prevent it. The only criterion is this: Are the children in fact children of the parents who by reason of having married are thereby to be enabled by this Bill to legitimatise them. Take the case of a man A who eventually marries a woman B by whom he has had children. When the time comes that A makes up his mind he is going to marry B, surely one of the things that will enter into the proposition which he will turn over in his mind is what is the position of B with regard to the children. If B had children by him he will, of course, wish to do the honest thing by them and give them legitimacy. If the woman has children by another man he will know perfectly well that the children are not his. If he does not know of their existence, a fortiori they will not be involved. The only effect of passing this Amendment will be to give the father the right when he marries to choose between the children and say "I will legitimatise this one but not the others." That will be the only effect, and I submit to the House first that only the children of which he is the father come in under the Bill, and, secondly, that this Amendment will allow him to legitimatise some, but not others.

As I was responsible for the drafting of this Bill, I would like to say a word on the Amendment. My hon. Friend the Member for North Portsmouth (Sir B. Falle) says he dislikes the Bill. It appears to me that he is now attempting to engraft on to English law a French principle which hitherto ha-s had no part whatsoever in our law.

No.

My hon. Friend suggests it has no concern with the law of France, but I have here an authoritative "Encyclopaedia of Scots Law" which says:

"The French law gets rid of the necessity for such inquiry ( i.e., inquiries as to proof) by refusing—in this respect differing from the Roman Canon and Scots law—that the children shall be recognised by the married persons as their children before the marriage or at the time of its celebration. After the marriage any acknowledgment or recognition of the children is unavailing in France."

If I understand my hon. Friend's Amendment correctly, it does introduce into this Bill a principle of French law which is quite inconsistent with the Bill itself.

May I point out there are 39 different laws in France, including the laws of Normandy and Brittany? They were all included into one law when the law was codified. This is not a question of French law, it is a Normandy law.

My hon. Friend really strengthens my point. He is introducing a Normandy law or principle—a law which operates in France in this direction. I hope the House will not accept the Amendment, because we have no machinery for carrying out in this country the proposal of my hon. Friend. I have not the slightest doubt that the object of this Amendment is to destroy the Bill, which the hon. Member admits that he personally dislikes.

That is absolutely incorrect. It is not the fact that I desire to destroy the Bill; but, since it is obviously the wish of the House that the Bill should pass, it is at any rate my wish that it should be made as reasonable and workable as possible. It has been said that it is very easy for a man to know his own children, but I can only say that if that were so he would have to be a good deal cleverer than most people. In the case of a woman who would live with a man who is already married, if she has any children by other men, it is as certain as the sun shines that she will father those children on to him. The Norman law, to which my hon. Friend has referred, and which was brought into some parts of this country at the time of the Conquest, has nothing to do with France. Normandy and Brittany were then independent States, and those laws were only connected with the French law by the Code Napoleon, about which, as a graduate in French law of the University of Paris, I may claim to know something, while, as a Norman islander, and as an advocate of the Royal Court of Normandy, I also know something of the law of Normandy. That law is not due to any French source. The Normans were the conquering race. They conquered Neus-tria, and later won this country from the Saxon and the Celt, and in many cases they imposed their laws on the people of the countries that they conquered.

The only question before the House is whether or not there should be a declaration at the time of the marriage, and I must ask the hon. Baronet to keep to that question.

I am trying to meet the points which have been raised by my hon. Friend. I believe that, when a man marries a person with whom he has been living, he should know exactly, so far as the children are concerned, what he is doing, and if, besides children of his own, there are others of whom he may never have heard and whom he may never have seen, he should be able to prevent the real adoption by him of a number of children probably of different fathers.

We on these benches are quite unable to follow the reasoning of the hon. Baronet the Member for North Portsmouth (Sir B. Falle). The cases that have been cited are entirely beyond us. Norman law has been quoted, but I confess that I know nothing whatever about Norman law. I do happen, however, to know something about the law of this land, and as a magistrate I want to say, with regard to the hon. Baronet's suggestion as to men being so easily gulled to take on children that are not their own, that my difficulty has been that the man refuses to take on children that are actually his own. After all, is there not a law which is greater than Norman law or any other law—the law of humanity and Christianity; and may I remind the hon. Baronet—

The only point before the House is whether or not the declaration in question should be made, and these excursions into Norman law and the higher ethics are not relevant.

I was only attempting to reply to the hon. Baronet—

I am afraid that the hon. Member is following a bad example.

I do suggest that we ought not to accept this Amendment. It is only the children whom we are seeking to help, by means of this Bill, in the position in which they are to-day.

1.0 P.M.

While I am in full agreement with the hon. Baronet in regard to his Amendment, I think that, if we pass it, giving the father the power to choose his own children, we must, in the strict logicality of the case, give the children the power to protest against their father. It seems to me that, as a continuation of the proposal of the hon. Baronet, children who may be sworn by an unscrupulous woman on to an infamous person, and who, one may well believe, are not his children at all, should, in their own interests, and considering the horrible results that might follow from such an act, be given the power to repudiate the parentage, either immediately, if they are of age, or if they are not of age, on their arriving at the age of 21.

Amendment negatived.

CLAUSE 6.—Savings

(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the succession to any dignity or title of honour or render any person capable of succeeding to or transmitting a right to succeed to any such dignity or title.

I beg to move, in Subsection (1), after the word "title" ["any such dignity or title"], to insert the words

"but in the event of there being no heir to the title other than the person who is made legitimate under this Act, this Section shall not apply."

This Amendment would affect only a very small class of people, but it represents a measure of justice which we should give to the small number concerned. Subsection (1) of Clause 6 is a rather important Sub-section, and I maintain that, if there is no second son of a marriage, and if the eldest son of the marriage has been legitimatised under this Measure, that legitimatised son should be the Heir to the title, dignity or honour, as the case may be. It is a small Amendment, and I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman in charge of the Bill will accept it. As I have said, it will not affect a great many people, but it would be a great act of injustice that a title should be allowed to die out, or an old family be allowed to lapse, because there is no second son in the family, and the only descendant is this legitimatised eldest son; and in such exceptional circumstances I think the House will readily agree that this legitimatised son should succeed to the title. It is not suggested that he should be the heir to any moneys or entailed estates, but simply that he should carry on the title.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This Amendment is quite unnecessary, and in fact mischievous. Clause 6 says the Act shall not apply to any dignity or title of honour, and this is simply an attempt to get round that. It is very much better that as many hereditary honours should die out as possible, and I should be no party to doing anything towards hindering that process. Further more there are quite enough families who owe their high position to the artificial legitimatising of bastards and I shall be no party to doing anything to continue that process. It is a farce to talk of old families and that sort of thing, and this will make it more so. Of all the knights who rode at Poictiers not one now is-represented in another place, so it is no good shedding artificial tears about these alleged old families.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman is not confining, himself to the Amendment.

I am afraid I was a little out of order. This Amendment is calculated to make the whole Bill ridiculous and certainly to nullify Clause 6, which is an excellent Clause, and should be insisted upon. If the Amendment be accepted, I shall do my utmost to oppose the further passage of the Bill.

I cannot accept the Amendment, for this very good reason, that, right from the start of our efforts some three and a half years ago, we have always given a definite pledge to anyone who is opposing, or is interested in the Bill, that on no account would we seek to put such a provision in it. I am absolutely barred from accepting it, having given that pledge.

The argument brought forward by the hon. Member seems absolutely absurd. He began by saying there were certain cases of hardship. Cases of hardship make bad law, and if you are to make bad law, in order to meet one or two cases of hardship, you will cover the Statute Book with bad laws. I am glad the Amendment is refused, and I hope the hon. Member will not put the House to a Division.

Amendment negatived.

CLAUSE 9.—Short title and commencement

(3) The provisions of this Act, other than Section one thereof, shall extend only to England and Wales.

I beg to move, in Subsection (3), to leave out the words "other than Section one thereof."

This Amendment has for its purpose to exclude from the Bill in its present form any application to Scotland. As the acceptance of the first Amendment moved to-day would put the laws of the two countries on the same footing, I take it this Amendment will be accepted as a matter of course.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

I have no desire to oppose the Bill, but there is a type of Bill which has been introduced in the last few years which are attempts to make the nation more moral by Act of Parliament, or to palliate the immorality which obtains among certain sections of the community. You get the people who see something which appears to them, and very often is, a hard case. They endeavour to remedy it, and a Bill is presented to Parliament, but the only result of it is that it manufactures many more hard cases. You never know when you begin legislation, especially private Members' Bills, what the exact effect is going to be. When Bills are brought in by the Government a variety of people look into them beforehand, and the Opposition sees that they are discussed on the Floor of the House, and there are opportunities of hearing the arguments of those who bring them in and those who are opposed to them. In the case of private Members' Bills, especially if they be taken after 11 o'clock, there is no discussion on the Second Reading, and if they be taken on a Friday the discussion on the Second Reading is more or less of a perfunctory character. Out of over 600 Members there are not more than 200 who ever come down on Friday, and of those 200 only about 30 or 40 remain in the House. Therefore, private Members' Bills get very little discussion or criticism. Then the Bill goes to Standing Committee, and we all know what happens there. The numbers of Members on the Committee are limited, and at times there is even a difficulty in getting a quorum of 20. When the Bill leaves Standing Committee, it comes down to this House for Third Reading, so that really it is only on the Third Reading that there is any real chance of discussion.

I do not oppose the Bill, because the hon. Members have done their best to make it workable, and in recognition of that I shall not divide the House. I would point out, however, that this House consists of a very large number of new Members, who have only been here for a short time, and they do not understand what takes place. I would point out to those new Members that this Bill is an illustration of what may happen. There were 35 or 40 Members of the Standing Committee which considered this particular Bill, and a vital Subsection was struck out, which on Second Reading we all thought ought to be included in the Bill. It was only when the Bill came down for Report and Third Reading that, after a considerable number of speeches, the promoters of the Bill were obliged to replace the Sub-section in the Bill. Therefore, the Bill will not do the harm that it would have done if the Clause had been left out. This experience ought to serve as a warning to hon. Members that after a Bill has been to Standing Committee they must come down to the House and make themselves acquainted with what has happened in Committee. I thank the promoters of the Bill for having accepted the Amendment, and I shall not oppose the Third Reading.

Before the House part with the Bill, I should like to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance and help we have received from the right hon. Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury); but lest he should have aroused fears as to the drafting of the Bill I wish, as the one responsible for it, to quote what was said by the Attorney-General on the Second Reading:

"I should like for myself to say, both as a Member of Parliament and as a lawyer, that this Bill has my unqualified approval. … The Bill has been extremely well drafted. It has carefully avoided a number of difficulties and mistakes which were embodied in previous Measures, and in its present form the Bill is one which might well commend itself to the approval of almost every Member of the House."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1923; cols. 2429–2430, Vol. 160.]

Therefore, as far as the drafting of what is necessarily a very technical and very difficult Bill is concerned, I hope the House will rest satisfied that every possible precaution has been taken, and that the Bill is well drafted. As the Attorney-General said so much, it would not be right if I did not acknowledge the great assistance which I received in the drafting of this Bill from that most distinguished equity draftsman Sir Benjamin Cherry. Sir Benjamin was responsible for the drafting of that monumental piece of legislation the Law of Property Act, which we passed in the last Session of the last Parliament, and lest it be thought that by my silence I was appropriating some credit to myself which more rightly belongs to Sir Benjamin, I wish to acknowledge here and now the immense- assistance that I received from him.

I disagree with the right hon. Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) in one respect. He said he was afraid of new legislation in this respect, and that further legislation must be dangerous. The substance of this Bill is already in operation in certain parts of the Empire, and if the right hon. Baronet would study the laws of the Empire as he studies Debates in this House he would find that in Canada, especially in the province of Quebec, the old French law provides that where people marry and there are any illegitimate children, those children become legitimate on the marriage, and are entitled to all the privileges and all the succession as though they were legitimately born children of the marriage.

I believe in looking back upon the history of my own country, and I do not want to be taught by what other countries do.

I should have thought that the right hon. Baronet, with his great traditions, would have been very proud of the British Empire, and I am sorry that he repudiates one part of the Empire.

Canada should act with us, and not make laws for herself in this respect.

That is my reason for pointing it out, and having pointed it out, I should like to say that the law as it exists in Canada on this point is a very ancient law, and dates back for many centuries under the old Code Napoleon.

It cannot go back many centuries if it is under the Code Napoleon. The Quebec laws are founded on the Coutume de Bretagne and the Grand Coutumeri of Normandy. They are based on those two Coutumes with certain part's of the Code Napoleon added.

I am not going to prolong the discussion by entering into that matter, but perhaps I might tell the hon. and gallant Gentleman that the laws which they inherited were the original customs of Paris and not the customs under the Dukes of Normandy. On the general question I am very much in favour of the Bill. There is nothing dangerous in it in its present form, and I hope that the Third Reading will be carried without objection.

Question, "That the Bill be now read the Third time," put, and agreed to.

Bill read the Third time, and passed.

I beg to move to leave out the words "attend at the court," and to insert instead thereof the word "act."

The words which I desire to leave out were inserted in the Bill in the Committee stage. It has since been discovered that a magistrate can grant a summons, although he does not attend in the court, but can do it in his own house. Therefore the word "act" is better.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I do not wish to object to the Amendment, but I would like to have some little explanation as to what it means. I am glad to see the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department present, and I would like to have an explanation from him as to the effect of this Amendment, as I do not see the advantage of leaving out the words which are at present in and inserting the word "act."

Under Section 3 of the Bastardy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1872, the mother, in order to obtain an affiliation order, has to make a complaint to the magistrate within 12 months of the birth of the child. The magistrate on that information issues a summons which possibly, for some reason or other, cannot be served. They may not be able to find the putative father or for some other reason the summons cannot be served. In these cases the magistrate can issue the summons after the 12 months has elapsed. The summons has to be issued by the same magistrate. Suppose that the father cannot be found for the space of two years the magistrate meantime may have died or given up his duties. Therefore this Clause merely provides that in that case another magistrate may be able to issue the order. My hon. Friend's Amendment is a very slight alteration, practically merely a verbal alteration.

Amendment agreed to.

CLAUSE 2.—(Increase of maximum payments under orders.)

Section four of the Bastardy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1872 (which provides for the making of an Order on the putative father for the maintenance, etc., of a bastard child), shall, as amended by the Affiliation Orders (Increase of Maximum Payment) Act, 1918, have effect as well for the purpose of pending applications as for the purpose of future applications as though twenty shillings a week were therein substituted for ten shillings a week, and Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section one of the last-mentioned Act, which relate to the variation or Orders under the said Section four in force at the date of the commencement of that Act shall extend to the variation of Orders under the said Section four which are in force at the date of the commencement of this Act, with the substitution of references to this Act for references to that Act.

I beg to move, after the word "act" ["this act with"], to insert the words

"or which may be made subsequent to the commencement of this Act."

The main Act of 1872 made 5s. the limit that could be put upon the putative father and made no allowance for a variation of that sum. The amending Act of 1918 made it possible to alter that sum to 10s., but the variation which was then made could apply only to orders that were existing at the time of the passing of that Act, which means that it was open to anyone to go to the magistrates and ask that an order which had been made before the 1st January, 1919, might be varied, but there was no power for the mother in whose favour an order was made to go to the Court to ask for the variation of that order if it was made since the 1st January, 1919. The existing law is stated in Stone's Justices Manuel:

"Where an order for the payment of a weekly sum is in force on January 1st, 1919, either the Court which made the Order, or any other Court of summary jurisdiction for the same petty sessional division, or a Court of summary jurisdiction in the place where the person who was entitled under the Order to receive that payment resides, may, on the application of the person so entitled, by Order varying the existing Order he increasing the amount payable thereunder to such sum, not exceeding 10s. a week, as the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, may think proper."

The importance of that statement of the law is this, that there is no possibility of obtaining any variation of an order made since the 1st January, 1919, and the purpose of my Amendment is that power shall be given under this amending portion. I would like to give to the House, as an illustration, a case that very frequently arises. A young man is brought before the Court under an affiliation application. He may be 17, 18 or 19 years of age, and at the time he appears before the Court he is earning just an apprentice's wages—a few shillings a week. The magistrates are bound to have regard to his wages at the time. They may, therefore, impose upon him an order for only 2s. 6d. or 3s. a week, which is an amount altogether inadequate for the maintenance of the child. Later on the young man may become a journeyman with a substantial wage, or a young man who was living at home and earning nothing may succeed to substantial means. There is no power under the existing law for the mother to go to the Court and say, "When the order was made in my favour I was allowed only 2s. 6d. or 3s. a week, and the father is now in an immensely improved position. I ask for the order to be varied." The fact that the woman has no power to ask for a variation of the order is very often a grave injustice, I have come across cases in my own experience where an act of injustice has been inflicted on the mother. There is at present a power to vary, but that power applies only to orders that existed before 1st January, 1919, and probably it was an oversight that a general power of variation was not given. Power to vary is given in almost all other applications before the magistrates. Take the case of a woman receiving maintenance from her husband under a separation order. If the husband's circumstances improve she can go to the magistrates and say, "I am entitled to an increased amount." But that opportunity is not given to the-more unfortunate woman who is left as the mother of an illegitimate child. Seeing that the Amendment is favourable to the intention of the Bill, I Hope that the promoters will accept it.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This Amendment seems quite reasonable, and I hope that the Home Office will accept it.

I am most grateful to the hon. Member for moving the Amendment, subject always to this—that the terms of his Amendment carry out his wishes and what he has advocated so admirably. If the Home Office, who are able to call upon expert legal advice, find that other words carry out better the purpose of the Amendment, they could deal with the matter in another place.

Before the House accepts the Amendment I wish to hear something from the Home Office about it. It is a little difficult to follow manuscript Amendments. I admit that the Mover made a very clear speech in explanation of the Amendment, and I think I understand what he desires to do. I am very much in favour of extending the power of the magistrates to grant a larger sum than 10s. a week in certain cases, if they think it right so to do, but I am not at all sure that the effect of this Amendment is not to make this legislation retrospective, and I have always held that retrospective legislation is bad.

The existing power to make a variation of an order applies only to an order made before 1st January, 1919. The Amendment is not retrospective; there can be nothing retrospective in it.

I would like to hear what the Home Office representative has to say on the subject. After the explanation of the hon. Member who has just spoken I am inclined to think that there is no harm in the Amendment. I hope it is understood that if there is anything in the Amendment which it is not advisable to insert, it will be altered in another place.

I have no legal knowledge, and I have only just seen this Amendment. I understand that the hon. Member sent it to one of the Law Officers, and that he was not aware that the Home Office would be in charge.

I owe an apology to the House. I made a copy of my manuscript Amendment, and sent it to the learned Solicitor-General. I did not know that the Home Office would be in charge.

I think that the Mover of the Amendment has made a good case, and that the Amendment is quite reasonable. The Home Office are quite prepared to accept it, on the understanding that, if necessary, it can be altered in another place.

I shall be happy to agree to any such arrangement.

Amendment agreed to.

CLAUSE 4.—(Obligations under orders.)

(1) Where a court of summary jurisdiction commits a defendant to prison for non-payment of any sum of money directed to be paid under the Bastardy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1872, or any Act amending that Act, including this Act, the court may direct that the imprisonment for the non-compliance with the order shall not extinguish the liability of the defendant to pay the said sum.

(2) Any person for the time being under an obligation to make payments, including payments of costs, to any person, under an order made under any of the said Acts shall give notice to such persons, if any, as may be specified in the order of any change of address, and any person failing to give such notice without reasonable excuse shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding two pounds.

I beg to move to leave out Sub-section (1).

I do not know if the right hon. Baronet will say that this is another instance of the disadvantage of private Members trying to legislate in a hurry, but I make him a present of that point. The questions dealt with in this and the previous Bill are notoriously complicated and the right hon. Baronet must forgive- us, if in trying to make our contribution towards reform, we have not in every case brought forward words which are, to start with, perfect. Our object in putting in this Sub-section was very obvious. It was to meet the case of a man who desired to shirk the responsibility of paying a sum of money under an order made by a Court and who said, "I will go to prison, my debt will be cancelled and I shall start afresh," while the woman whom he had wronged and to whom he should pay the money, had no alternative left but again to proceed against him after a certain lapse of time. What we wanted to do was to provide that his being sent to prison would not extinguish his debt. We find we cannot do so. I am informed by the Home Office and by legal experts that we cannot do so because of certain other Acts of Parliament in existence, which recognise that if a man goes to prison, it either wholly or to some extent pro tanto extinguishes the debt for which he was sent to prison. Section 3 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, says: oftener she causes him to be sent to prison, the less inclined the man will be, either then or eventually, to pay any money at all. He will say, "You can send me to prison, but money you shall not get." That will not help the woman to pay the cost of bringing up the child. On the other hand, if the man by going to prison can extinguish the arrears and the debt up to that time there is much to be said for the idea that, in the future, his common honesty may come to his aid and prompt him to say, "Well, I have served my sentence, and now I will pay the sum due sooner than have any further action brought against me." It is a complicated point, but it is impossible to allow this Sub-section to stand in the Bill, and in the absence of the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Rawlinson), who could have explained it much better than I have been able to do, I beg to move the Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

My hon. and gallant Friend the Mover of the Amendment suggests that this may be regarded as another case of mistakes in draftsmanship in Bills brought in by private Members.

The right hon. Baronet must not go on assuming that these are mistakes in draftmanship on my part. As a matter of fact, this Sub-section was not inserted by me at all—at least I do not think it was—but was inserted in Committee.

That does not alter the effect of my argument that we must be very careful in dealing with these Measures. In this particular case, however, I am inclined to think that if the Committee inserted this Sub-section they were right, and I am sorry that my hon. and gallant Friend has moved this Amendment. His first reason for the Amendment is that the Sub-section conflicts with other Acts of Parliament. I thought his object was to alter the law and not to maintain it. The fact that this provision is in conflict with other Acts of Parliament is an extraordinary reason to find advanced by the hon. and gallant Member, who is engaged in passing Bills which conflict in every way with our existing Acts of Parliament. The hon. and gallant Member went on to say that if a man has been committed to prison and his liability has been wholly or partly wiped out, common honesty is going to make him pay. I am a magistrate and I have some experience of the cases which would be dealt with under this Sub-section, and I never met this man whose common honesty is going to make him pay something which he has avoided paying by going to prison. On the other hand we have—not very often, but two or three times every year—cases before us in which the man openly says, "I am not going to pay anything." Then the question arises as to what we are to do with him.

There was a case of that kind not very long ago, and we retired to consider our decision. I said: "Send the man to prison. It is a hard case, the woman is not at all well off, it is necessary for her to have this money, and the man has made up his mind not to pay. Send him to prison, therefore." One of the other magistrates said: "He has been to prison once, and the only result of sending him again will be that his liability will be wiped out, and that is what he wants." We were in an extraordinarily difficult position, and did not know what to do. As far as my memory serves me, I think we made an order, but did not do anything more. As we have lady Members of Parliament now, if they desired to champion their own sex, I think they would get up with me, or rather, after me, and ask for my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Buckingham (Captain Bowyer) to withdraw his Amendment, and allow this Sub-section to remain in the Bill. It is no use increasing the penalty unless you give us magistrates some power to enforce the penalty. In many cases the father is a man who is not in regular employment, and to whom going to prison means very little. There is a certain class of men who say, "We do not care about going to prison. We are not going to pay her anything, and as we are out of work we might just as well be in prison as not." I feel strongly on this point, because I believe the fault in many cases is much more on the man than on the woman, and I never can see why the woman should have to bear all the trouble and expense and worry while the man gets off free. Therefore, if I can get anybody to tell with me against this Amendment, I shall certainly go to a Division.

2.0 P.M.

I should like to hear the views of the Home Office on this question before coming to a final opinion. But, as at present advised, I think this Sub-section is wrongly drafted, and is based on a misapprehension of the existing law. If I am right in my view, an order of imprisonment for non-payment of a sum awarded to a woman does not in any way wipe out the liability of the man to pay the debt. The only way in which that liability to pay the debt is interfered with by the imprisonment order is under Section 32, Sub-section (3) of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, to which the hon. and gallant Member for Buckingham (Captain Bowyer) referred, the effect of which is that while the man is in prison the sums which would otherwise become due from him to the girl during that time are not payable. If he is in prison, say, for two months, he is not liable to pay any of those sums for the two months, but his liability to comply with the order is not in the least affected by the order for imprisonment, except to the extent to which I have mentioned. That is the existing law. This Sub-section proposes that a court may direct that imprisonment shall not extinguish the liability of the defendant to pay the sum due from him. That Sub-section is drawn assuming something contrary to the law, assuming that the order does extinguish the liability of the defendant to pay the debt, whereas, in point of fact, the order does not extinguish the liability. Therefore, it seems to me that this Sub-section proceeds on a view of the law which is not correct, and in that case it is obvious that the Sub-section should come out, and the Amendment be carried.

I do not often find myself in agreement with the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury), but I am glad to say this morning that I am strongly in sympathy with the views he has just advocated. I think there are a good many hon. Members who would feel that this Bill would be considerably deprived of its value if this Sub-section went out. It seems to me that it should be within the power of a Parliamentary draftsman to get us a form of words which could be inserted here, or in another place, to secure the object we have in view. Instead of what the hon. and learned Member for York (Sir J. Butcher) has said, I can assure him that men go to prison under the assumption that they are going to escape liability to pay, and, in point of fact, they do escape. They may be lucky people who dodge the law through the ignorance of those who administer it, but they do escape. The hon. and gallant Member for Buckingham (Captain Bowyer) talked about the common honesty of these people, but they are the sort of men to whom the dictates of common honesty are not likely to appeal, and I hope the Home Office or the Law Officers of the Crown will be able to find us a form of words to accomplish what, I think, is a very desirable reform in the existing law, if this Sub-section be not, in point of fact, one that can be inserted in the Bill.

I think some confusion has arisen in regard to this Amendment. When a Court of Summary Jurisdiction makes an order in bastardy, if that order is not obeyed, and arrears accrue, the law provides a means by which those arrears shall be recovered, and having provided the means by which those arrears shall be recovered, no other remedy is open to the woman other than the means provided by Statute. The only remedy she has is to apply to the Justices for an order for the commitment of the man. She cannot do anything more. In my opinion, this Sub-section is very necessary, for this reason, that if the Justices have a man before them, he having got into arrears, and order him to pay the arrears, and in default of payment sentence him to so many days' imprisonment, that wipes off the remedy of the woman for that amount. I am quite sure of that. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for York (Sir J. Butcher) is right in his contention, technically, in this way. It may not wipe off the debt, but it wipes off the remedy for the debt, which is really the same thing. She cannot sue him in the County Court. She cannot make a claim on him in any other way than going before the Justices, and asking for an order, but, he having gone to prison, she cannot go again before the Justices in respect of the amount for which he has already gone to prison. So that, in effect, that really wipes it off.

I should like to have some authority for that, because I think the House ought to have guidance, if possible from the Law Officers. But I want to ask this question. I suppose the hon. and learned Gentleman is aware that orders are often made against trustees for sums of money, and sometimes they go to prison, or may go to prison, if they do not pay; but in no case of that sort is the debt wiped out by going to prison. I want to know by what authority the hon. and learned Gentleman says that the arrears for which the man is sent to prison are wiped out.

The case of trustees is a very different matter indeed. In the case of trustees, an order of attachment may be made, and, in default, they go to prison by reason of the attachment; but that does not alter their liability to pay out of any money that comes to their hands afterwards, and a man, by means of an execution, or any other means known to the law, may get the money, because no specific way is prescribed by Statute as to the way in which money shall be obtained from trustees. In this instance, however, when an order is made by Justices—as my hon and learned Friend will find, if he refers to the Bastardy Acts—upon a man to pay so much per week, the only remedy given to the woman to enforce that order is by applying to the Justices for an order for the man to be commited to prison for so many days. She cannot obtain a distraint. She cannot go to a County Court for sums due to her. She has one single remedy, and the Justices, having once exercised that remedy in sending him to prison for a certain number of days for a certain amount, when he comes out of prison, they cannot again send him to prison for the same amount. So that she has exhausted her remedies, and the man is free. I consider that this Sub-section is a very wise Sub-section, and I should like to see it carried further. I think it should be altered so as to give a woman all other remedies open to a creditor against a debtor, that is, by proceedings in the County Court, to enforce her rights against him in case he came into money. I will give an instance. A man may have allowed arrears to run on to quite a considerable sum, we will say £20. He goes to prison, and comes out, and is free with regard to any remedy as to that £20.

The Magistrates may divide that £20 into three or four portions, and give him a term of imprisonment for each.

No.

Yes; look at the Act.

No: I am quite sure of it. But my point is this: His arrears are £20; he goes to prison with regard to that, and having come out of prison, all the remedies of the woman against him for that £20 are exhausted. Supposing within the next six months that man came into £100, or obtained a lump sum of £100 from any other source, it is only just and right that that woman, to whom he owes £20 for arrears under a bastardy order, should have her remedy against him, the same as anybody else. As the law stands at present, she cannot have that remedy, and I am in favour of this Sub-section standing as it is, because, although I do not think it goes far enough, it shows that the liability is not extinguished, and I should like to see a further provision to the effect that nothing therein contained shall prejudice her right to proceed against him in the County Court for the balance due. That, of course, is not before the House. But I am in favour of the Clause standing as it is, for the reasons I have given.

I do not think there is any need for women to speak on this, as men have put it so much better than the women in the House could; but I do hope the House will not accept the Amendment, and will leave the Clause as it is. It seems to me most ordinary and common justice. I am perfectly certain there is not a Member in this House who would like a man to get off if there is any possible way of paying his just and legitimate debts.

I would appeal to the hon. and gallant Member to withdraw his Amendment, and allow this to go to another place, to be there considered.

There is nobody in the House keener than I am to see my own Bill in its own form. I only produce the Amendment because I am told by the Home Office that I have got to do so.

I am sure the hon. and gallant Gentleman has got a little independence. Never mind what he is told by the Home Office.

Upon the merits of the Sub-section, there are no two opinions in this House. If we allow it to remain, and go up to another place, it will go there as the considered opinion of this House, and if any technical readjustment is required, it can be made there. It is a new doctrine to me that we cannot amend the law as it exists. The fact that there is some other law inconsistent with this seems to me no objection to our passing this. It would be quite easy to say, "Notwithstanding the existence of any other Act, the following Sub-section shall apply." The Sub-section applies only to a specific case, so that other cases will not be affected. Somebody has said there are not many cases in which men go to prison in order to escape this particular liability, but we are increasing the liability, and we may therefore find an increase in the number of men who take advantage of the situation, go to prison, and thereby redeem the debt, at least to some extent. We are here defending the woman. We are trying not to take away from her the advantage which the Court gives her by granting a certain sum to her. We ought to allow this to stand. If we delete these words here it might be difficult to introduce them into another place.

I have listened very carefully to the arguments put forward, and think it would be better that the whole question should be considered by the Home Office, and then sent forward to another place.

Why not leave it there, and if it is necessary to give the Sub-section later, after consideration and consultation with the Law Officers, to let it go to the other House as the considered opinion of this House that it should be in the Bill?

I understand the present position of the law is that a committal to prison extinguishes the debt. If you allow this Sub-section to stand as it is, you are going to enable the man to be committed, very likely, to prison again for the same debt.

No. The hon. Gentleman will pardon me for interrupting. That is impossible. He may take it from me that you cannot send a man to prison twice for the same debt. The law does not allow it.

I agree that the present law does not allow it, but the position is that under this Sub-section, if you pass it, very likely it will be possible to send him to prison again for the same debt.

You cannot punish a man twice for the same offence.

Supposing the man comes out of prison, and has money and will not pay. Surely it is no hardship to send him to prison again?

It is clearly unfair to send him back again for the same offence. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Maddocks) appears to think that if you allow this Sub-section to go through you will alter the law.

No, it does not do anything of the kind. The man could not be sent to prison again: that is one remedy. But there are other remedies which are open to creditors, and I have argued that this Sub-section should stand because of the other remedies. Take, for instance, the case I put when I was addressing the House, where a man who has been in prison comes into money, say within a few months after coming out of prison. Is it not right that the woman should be able to sue him in the County Court for the money owing?

Why not put that into an Amendment.

I quite agree.

As far as my information goes, this suggestion goes infinitely further. I quite agree there is necessity for consideration of this matter, and, on behalf of the Home Office, I undertake that the point shall be considered very carefully.

I should like to make one observation as a magistrate of many years' standing. I strongly support this Sub-section, and shall vote against the Amendment.

I must confess that, when my hon. Friend who represents the Home Office says to me, "I follow the point that has been made on all sides of the House, and I will undertake to see

that the point is adequately dealt with in another place," I am perfectly satisfied with that undertaking, and when he asks me to withdraw the Amendment I feel, in the circumstances, that I must do it. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"]

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 12; Noes, 180.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (2), to leave out the words "any of the said Acts," and to insert instead thereof the words

"The Bastardy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1872, or any Act amending that Act, including this Act."

This is a purely drafting Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (2), after the word "shall" ["shall give notice"], to insert the words

"in any case in which Section four of the Affiliation Orders Act, 1914, does not apply."

This is another purely formal Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to insert a new Sub-section. think very much argument is necessary to press this Amendment upon the House. It is, of course, monstrously hard that a woman who may be a poor woman—and very often a woman in those circumstances is desperately poor—should not be able to claim anything against the estate of the father who might die a very rich man.

The matter has been dealt with by the Courts as far back as 1903 in the case of Wild v. Turner, in which a woman, who was placed in this unfortunate position, sought to make the estate of the father liable. The Court decided against her, and that, according to the wording of the existing Bastardy Acts, there was no possibility of her prosecuting her claim against his estate. I think that is the only case that bears upon the question. The hardship will be recognised. I have only drafted these words this morning, and I quite recognise that some further care may need to be exercised in introducing so important a provision into the Statutes of the Realm. I am quite prepared, therefore, if an assurance be given that this matter will be dealt with in another place, to rest upon that assurance, but I hope that it may be possible, although I do not press upon the Home Office to accept the words that I have suggested, for an arrangement to be made such as was made earlier in the day, and that any alteration thus decided upon may be agreed to. I think we are all agreed that this reform should be inserted in this Measure. It would be a great pity if this Bill left untouched this grievance, but I must leave myself in the hands of the hon. and gallant Member for Buckingham (Captain Bowyer), who is promoting the Bill, assisted by the Home Office. I am quite prepared to take either course as they may think more likely to bring about the result which I desire to achieve by my Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I hope that the House will accept the latter alternative, and will place this Amendment in the Bill and so to allow the assurance which the Home Office may give to be an assurance that they will reconsider the matter in another place. It is quite a mistake for this House to be content with assurances that things will be introduced in the other place. We should say what is our opinion and what we wish. If there be any scope for further amendment, then the change should be made in another place, but we should not allow a simple assurance to satisfy us. We should put in a provision expressing our opinion as well as words can express it, and, if any change be needed, that change can then be made in another place. I protest that on the last issue the House should have been content with an assurance which may not be realised. The other House may be ignorant of the view which we hold. The policy which we should always follow is to put the best that we can into the Bill in this House, and accept no assurance from the Government Bench except that they will in another place make any necessary change consistent with the spirit of the Amendment.

In this particular case, and in very many cases like it, there are two women involved. Unfortunately, in a very large number of cases a married man is the putative father of a single woman's child, and very often he misleads her as to his real position. I have known in my experience as a guardian individual cases of men who have been able to deceive single girls by telling them that they were single men. Supposing one of these men gets killed at the docks, or at his employment elsewhere, and that as a consequence his legitimate wife is entitled to a certain amount of compensation on behalf of herself and her children. I would like to know, when a paltry few hundreds are allowed under the control of the County Court, if somebody will be able to come along and take from the legitimate wife and children that to which they are entitled under the law.

The Amendment would not apply to money received under the Workmen's Compensation Act. That is not a part of the man's estate. It goes to the dependants, and is not a part of the estate of the deceased person. Further, if there be an illegitimate child who is partly or wholly dependent, the case of the illegitimate child is taken into consideration under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

That does not finish it. The man may be a contributing member of an insurance company or society for the benefit of his wife and family. He has committed the offence, but the penalty is not coming on him, but on the wife and family who are not responsible for his misconduct. We have a right to say there shall be some guarantee given that the wife and family who are the innocent victims of his offence shall not be made responsible for it financially. Really you can carry a principle too far. I want to give every possible service for the Bill, but there ought to be safeguards to protect the legal wife against the misdeeds of a man who may be dead. The child certainly ought to have some protection, but surely you are not going to reduce the legal wife and family to a state of destitution. Supposing an award of £1 is given in the case of an ordinary boilermaker or dock labourer. When that man is dead his earnings cease, and all that is coming in may be his insurance or compensation money. If the illegitimate child happened to be the latest born, that child would have the first and biggest claim.

I only want to be put right. I am not a lawyer. I want to know where the legitimate wife and children stand. It is all very well to talk about rich men; to deal with them is a comparatively easy job. It is not the same in the case of poor people. It means shoving them on to the board of guardians once more. They will have to pay the debt because the dead husband and father has committed an offence against the moral law, and they will have to pay it out of what little may be left for their own maintenance. It means that they will be driven to the Poor Law authorities for assistance. I want to secure some protection against that. I agree with the principle that where people can pay they should be made to pay. But there ought to be a protection against the case of great hardship that may arise under the circumstances I have described. We know by our own experience that such cases do arise.

The hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Foot), who moved the Amendment admitted that it was a very important one, and I think he will agree with me he can hardly expect the Government to accept off-hand an Amendment of this importance. The hon. Member for Dumfries (Dr. Chapple) said that this House ought to put the best possible into the Bill, but how can you do that when you have only three or four Members with copies of these Amendments in their hands. If it is desired to insert a very important Amendment like this in the Bill, it ought, in the first place to appear on the Order Paper. The hon. Member for Silvertown (Mr. J. Jones) has claimed that the Amendment requires further amendment. It is bad enough to have to argue a manuscript Amendment, but if that is to be amended, then the difficulty is increased and we are apt to get into a state of confusion. I am quite prepared, if my hon. and learned Friend will consult with me at the Home Office, to see if some form of words can be drafted for insertion in the Bill when it reaches another place, but I cannot at this juncture agree to the importation of a new principle into the Bill.

I am quite prepared to accept that offer. I appreciate fully the difficulty of my hon. Friend. If there is any blame at all in this matter it should fall upon my shoulders, for not having brought the Amendment up earlier, but it never occurred to me until I was studying the Bill this morning. What I want to secure is that words shall be inserted in another place which will adequately cover the point I have raised.

Will the point I have put forward be also taken into consideration?

I do not object to the hon. Member momentarily withdrawing his Amendment, seeing that it is a manuscript Amendment, but I would like to say that, if the House of Commons is only to act in every instance upon the individual knowledge of Members, very little work will be done in this House. The principle at stake here is fully understood. It is that the claim of the illegitimate child, or rather its mother, should not cease on the death of the father if he has left any estate. All I ask is that in seeking to give effect to the principle of this particular Amendment my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will bear in mind that the overwhelming opinion of this House, as manifested in the Debate, is in favour of the Amendment which is to be withdrawn now.

I only rise for a moment to support the point put forward by the hon. Member for Silvertown (Mr. J. Jones). Anyone who has had to deal with a large number of workpeople must be well aware of these cases of hardship. The Amendment as drawn would undoubtedly, in many cases, inflict great hardship on the widow and children of a man who leaves no substantial estate. I agree that in justice a substantial estate should support the burden, but it is important that in altering the law we should not inflict upon persons who are entirely innocent of any offence and were not parties to it, hardship and injustice such as might be entailed by dividing up a small estate in order to carry out the principle of this Amendment. I hope that the Under-Secretary for the Home Office will give careful attention to this point. It really shows the difficulty of altering the existing law in order to deal with a serious social problem. I think the hon. Member for Silvertown has made a substantial case, and I want to support him.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Motion made, and Question put, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

I am extremely sorry that the second good Clause in this Bill has been left out. The effect of the Bill is to give power to the Justices to increase the allowance in these cases from 10s. to £1. With that I am in entire accord, but unfortunately the only way in which the Justices could carry that out has been taken away from them by the omission of a Clause which was in the Bill as originally introduced. We have been told by the Under-Secretary to the Home Office that manuscript Amendments are difficult to deal with here, and that it is better to leave them to another place, but the hon. Member for Dumfries (Dr. Chapple) has pointed out to this House the danger of leaving these matters to another place. We have been told already that the first part of the Clause which has been omitted will be considered in another place, but I agree with the hon. Member opposite that we ought to have the courage of our own convictions. If the matter is right it should be put in, if it is wrong, it should be left out. We have nothing whatever to do with another place.

Further, I should like to put forward an argument which bears very much on the question at issue, and also on the attitude of some of us as to the Third Reading. It is all very well for my hon. Friend, for whom we all have the greatest respect, and who, I am sure, will do his best to carry out his undertaking, to say that in another place something will be done; but this is a private Member's Bill, and we do not know when it is going to get to another place, or who is going to take it up, and, when a Noble Lord in the other place has taken it up, it is quite possible—I have seen it occur over and over again in connection with undertakings given in Committee—that the whole thing may be, not intentionally, but quite accidentally, forgotten. What are we to do then? Or supposing that the Clause is inserted in a modified form, what are we to do? It will come down after eleven o'clock at night, it is a private Member's Bill, there will be no opportunity of discussing it, and we shall have to accept the Bill with what, I venture to believe, was really the best part of it entirely left out, on a vague assurance that something was going to be done in another place.

As the Bill stands, the only really vital portion is the provision that the allowance of 10s. shall be increased to 20s. That is a very good thing, in my opinion, but, speaking as a magistrate, I say that the provision is perfectly useless, because we cannot carry it out. What is the use of saying that there will be an allowance of 20s. if all that the man has got to do is to go to prison and the whole thing is wiped out? The only possible utility in increasing the penalty would be if we had powers to enforce the decision. After the Debate in this House, in which practically everyone who took part in it supported the inclusion of the Clause which has now been left out, only 12 Members had the courage of their convictions. I do not believe that, of the 170 Members who voted against the Clause, there were three who really understood it and wanted to vote against it. I really do think it is bringing Parliamentary institutions into ridicule when Members who hold contrary opinions on very important matters have not the courage to go into the Lobby in support of those opinions. Supposing that the Clause had been left in the Bill, what harm would have been done? It would have been found out in another place that it was impossible to make the Clause correspond with the existing Clauses, but to use that as an argument is absurd, because all you have to do is to say that Section so-and-so of the conflicting law is repealed so far as this Clause is concerned.

3.0 P.M.

If it is going to be held that a vague assurance that something will be done in another place is to replace our votes in this House, what is the use of this House? As the Bill stands, it is very nearly, if not quite, useless; but, in the hope that possibly something will be done in another place to enable the Bill to be carried out, I shall not oppose the Third Reading. Before, however, I sit down, I desire to express the hope that hon. Members will really consider what they have done this afternoon, and will remember that it is our duty in this House to pass as good a Measure as we can, and not to leave it to other people to do it for us. I hope that what we have seen this afternoon will not be repeated.

The right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) is always sound in diplomacy, and always wrong in policy, and that is how we sometimes find ourselves in agreement and sometimes opposed to one another. The right hon. Gentleman's diplomacy on this occasion was quite right, and I intended to vote with him, but I spent so much time in persuading all my colleagues on this side of the House to vote with him that I myself was locked out. This is a very good illustration of the way in which an assurance given by the Government is a disturbing factor. An assurance of that kind is all very well, and should be accepted if it is universally agreed to, but if it is not agreed to by the House the original issue immediately arises. I maintain that we should have voted in this case on the merits of the issue. The merit of the issue is that, under the Bill as it stands, imprisonment does not relieve an offender from his liability still to pay the woman whom he has wronged, and we all agree as to that. Nevertheless, Members on the Labour Benches actually voted against the woman and for the offender. [ Interruption. ] I am not complaining that hon. Members above the Gangway on this side voted against their convictions, but about the false position and about the lack of appreciation of a situation of this kind. It can always be said in future that those who voted in the "No" Lobby to-day on this issue voted for imprisonment wiping out the debt to a wronged woman. [AN HON. MEMBER: "You did not vote 'Aye.'"] I have already explained why I did not vote "Aye." I wish to emphasise this other point, that I think we should have retained the Clause, and allowed it to be revised in the other Chamber. That is the function of the other Chamber. It is not to initiate legislation, but to amend it, and to remove any defects that may exist in the legislation that we send to it. I hope that in future we shall bear that in mind.

I should like just to put on record what the actual facts are. The Whole House was agreed that Sub-section (1) of Clause 4 was really something perfectly admirable from the point of view of the Bill, the promoters of the Bill, and all who sympathised with it. In fact, however, we were told that the actual wording would cause great administrative difficulties, and the representative of the Home Office there and then, seeing the universal opinion of the House as to the merits of the Clause, said that he could not accept these words, but that, if the Clause were taken out, he would give a guarantee that words which fulfilled the object, but which would not entail administrative difficulty, were inserted in the Bill in another place. I accepted that assurance, and, therefore, declined to vote against the Amendment. I thank the House for giving the Bill a Third Reading.

Question, "That the Bill be now read the Third time," put, and agreed to.

Bill read the Third time, and passed.

I beg to move to leave out the words "two hundred," and to insert instead thereof the words "one hundred and twenty-five."

When the Bill was brought forward last year the reason given for increasing the sum from £100 to £200 was that the value of agricultural produce had doubled since the passing of the original Act. The hon. Member in charge of the Bill said the value of wheat had practically doubled. The seconder mentioned that wheat had risen by 112 per cent., barley by 81 per cent., and oats by 98 per cent. It would be impossible to be continually altering the Act as the value of produce increased or decreased, and consequently a particular sum was put in the original Act. Whether or not there was any reason for putting it in would, I presume, be better dealt with on the Third Reading than now, but it was a bad argument to bring forward for making the alteration that the value of crops has gone up because it opens the door to the railway companies saying: "If you put up the limit because the value of crops has gone up, you must in common fairness put it down when values decrease." The argument that values have doubled has disappeared. The value of crops has not now doubled since 1905. A letter appeared in the "Times" of 22nd March from a farmer named Good-child, who said:

What was the price of wheat in 1905?

I am told that it was 27s. 4d.

It is now 50s.

I was not aware of that. The hon. Member—

Is it in order for the right hon. Baronet to turn round, and address himself to the hon. Member for Kesteven and Rutland (Mr. Dixon)? We want to hear what he is saying.

I think the right hon. Baronet was addressing me, although his head was turned in another direction

I do not think that wheat is now at 50s. I think it is about 47s. The prices I am giving are taken from "Whitaker's Almanack," and they are average prices for the year. If the hon. Member will look at the average prices for 1922 he will find that they were not anything like 50s. The vast majority of the wheat crop of 1922 sold for about 40s. "Whitaker's Almanack" shows that in 1908 the price was 32s. and in 1912, 34s. 9d. You cannot be continually altering the amount of compensation under this Act. You must not change the price of wheat for one year. The average for the five years which I have mentioned was 33s. 4d. If you put in the figure of my hon. Friend you will find that the difference in the average would be of a slight description. The price would be probably 32s. 6d. as against an average at present of 40s.

Is it a fact that for the Amendment which you are now proposing you could not find a Seconder in Committee?

It was not necessary to find a Seconder. If the hon. Member looks at the excellent book issued by the Senior Clerk, he will find that in Committee it is not necessary to have a Seconder.

May I say that no Amendment can be put before the Committee without a Seconder.

The hon. Member is again wrong. May I explain the rule. In Committee an hon. Member can move an Amendment or a new Clause without a Seconder. When Mr. Speaker or Mr. Deputy-Speaker is in the Chair, then an Amendment or a new Clause requires a Seconder, except in the case of a Privy Councillor, and a Privy Councillor can always move an Amendment without a Seconder. This year English wheat was making from 9s. 8d. for the higher grades. That is equal to 42s. or 43s. Therefore, instead of wheat having doubled in October or November last, you could not get more than 40s. for it. Taking the present price at about 42s., the net is only somewhere about the figure which I propose. My Amendment is £125, the actual figure would be £129 or £130. I put in "one hundred and twenty-five" because that is an amount which is dealt with easily. I did not deal with the prices of the remaining produce, barley and oats, because it is well known to the House that the increase in barley and oats is rather less than the increase in the. price of wheat. Therefore, my figures are justified upon the present prices. The only argument brought forward last year was the increase in the value, and I have shown that that increase has disappeared. It might be argued, "Well, this is an exceptional period; you have picked out an exceptionally low period, and have put in exceptionally low prices which will not be maintained." Every Member of the House, and especially every agricultural Member, knows that the argument which has been used is that agriculture is in such a way, owing to foreign competition and a variety of other causes, that prices could not be maintained, and that assistance must be given to the farmer. If that argument is brought forward, it cannot be seriously maintained, because the contention of agriculturists, which is accepted by everyone, is that agricultural prices are more likely to fall than to rise, and that in any case the prices which obtained two or three years ago are exceptional, and are not likely to be seen again. What the Bill is endeavouring to do, unless amended, is to take a period of exceptional prices and to put those prices into the Bill. I want to take a period of more or less normal prices, prices which have a tendency to fall, and to put those prices into the Bill. I fail to see how anyone can maintain that my proposition is unreasonable.

I would like to ask the hon. Member in charge of the Bill whether he does not consider that the railway companies have a right to expect some consideration in this matter. They have met the farmers during the past two months, since the Second Reading of the Bill, in a very appreciable way and with considerable loss to themselves. Is there to be no reciprocity? Is the hon. Gentleman to maintain that, notwithstanding the fact that he has been met in a generous manner, he is going to put into the Clause a figure which cannot be justified because it is based on the false assumption that the prices of agricultural produce have doubled?

I regret I cannot accept the Amendment. The House will realise that it is in the interests of one who is putting forward this Bill to say as few words as possible, but before giving my reasons for not accepting the Amendment, I think the House will join with me in my desire to express the regret which I feel and which I know the House also feels, at the circumstance which places me in this position. The reason why I am in this position to-day is because of the lamented fact that the late hon. Member for the Tiverton Division, Mr. Sparkes, who was fathering the Bill, is no longer with us, to the great sorrow of hon. Members in all parts of the House. The Amendment before us seeks to reduce the sum of £200 to £125, and the only point before us is whether that sum should be reduced or not. We are not dealing with the general merits of the Bill, and in reply to the right hon. Baronet on this particular point, I will first refer to his statement that in the year 1905 the 10 year average price of wheat was 27s. 4d.

No. I had not the figures, but an hon. Member sitting beside me said in that particular year it was the price. [HON. MEMBERS: "The average!"]

I accept the statement that wheat was 27s. in 1904, the year previous to the passing of this Bill, but I should like to point out to the right hon. Baronet that the price of wheat is now from 48s. to 50s. and, if it has not doubled, it has very nearly doubled.

I pointed out that there was an exceptional price at the present moment, but that did not indicate the average price, and during the year 1922 wheat was far lower.

The fluctuations in the price of wheat in 1922 were, I admit, considerable but they started above 50s. They went below 50s. I admit, but they started above 50s., and now in 1923 the price stands at about 50s. I think we are justified in accepting the view that the probable average price just now is in the neighbourhood of 50s. It is not, however, to that point of view that I wish to direct the attention of the right hon. Baronet. The increase in the price which the growers seek for wheat may not be quite double but the increase in the cost of the production of that wheat is, in fact, double. I would also draw the right hon. Baronet's attention to the estimate of the damage which was done by the railway companies in 1905, and then I would direct his attention to the fact that since that time there has been considerable progress in the science of engineering. From 1905 to the present time we have had larger and larger engines coming upon our lines, and those engines are getting over the ground very much more quickly and are therefore emitting a far greater quantity of these sparks which cause these fires. I submit that the railway companies themselves who gain by these accelerated train services should bear the liability for the damage they do. We agriculturists desire that this compensation should be raised from £100 to £200, and I know that that is the opinion of the whole House. This proposed reduction from £200 to £125 was fought out in Committee, and it was there decided that £200 should remain. In the opinion of the House as a whole on the Second Reading of the Bill, the Measure was accepted nearly unanimously, and I am confident that the House will continue to accept it.

For the second time I find myself in agreement with the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury), and I need hardly say that because I am supporting him now is no question of making a good return for another good return. I support him for the following reasons: This is a proposal to increase the compensation by 100 per cent., and I ask hon. Members to view this matter dispassionately and not to be led away by the eloquence of the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Shepperson). Consider the position of agriculture to-day. Hardly a week passes in this House without the right hon. Gentleman the Parliamentary

Secretary to the Treasury bringing in another Bill to aid the farming industry in this country. First of all, we had the Agricultural Rates Bill, which is a great relief to the payments which the farmers make. Then we had the Agricultural Credits Bill, which—

On a point of Order. Has a review of the legislation before Parliament anything to do with the Amendment now before the House?

I am afraid I was occupied at the moment, but if the facts are as the hon. and gallant Member states, obviously not.

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The House divided: Ayes, 179; Noes, 40.