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Commons Chamber

Volume 171: debated on Tuesday 25 March 1924

House of Commons

Tuesday, March 25, 1924

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

Private Business

PRIVATE BILLS (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),

Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, referred on the Second Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—

London, Midland, and Scottish Railway (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill.

Bill committed.

Brighton Corporation Water Bill (by Order),

Read a Second time, and committed.

Oral Answers to Questions

Trade and Commerce

Railway Companies' Orders

(Foreign Competition)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has any information showing that the low quotations made by German manufacturers for railway wheels and axles for which orders have recently been placed in that country are attributable to the remission of the Reparations Recovery Duty?

As I informed the hon. Member for St. George's on the 11th March, I have no knowledge of the purchases of the railway companies. The answer to the present question is in the negative.

Has there not been a considerable increase of these contracts going abroad since the remission of this duty?

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the placing abroad recently by a railway company of a large order for wheels and axles owing to the lowest British price being 70 per cent. higher than the Continental price; and what steps the Government intend to take to prevent the continuance of a state of affairs under which home manufactures are being driven out of British markets by imported goods manufactured under sweated labour conditions?

As I have previously stated, I have no official knowledge of the contracts mentioned, or as to the precise reasons why some, out of the large number of contracts annually placed, are secured by foreign firms. I am unable to accept the assumption made in the second part of the question.

If the right hon. Gentleman has no official notification, will he make inquiries, which are not very difficult, and take all possible steps to preserve the industries of this country?

The Government are taking all the steps that are possible to preserve the industries of this country in the aggregate.

Is it not a fact that these alleged sweated labour conditions are taking place in Protectionist countries?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the wages paid in Germany at the present time are £1 per week, as against the trade union rate in this country of £2 14s.?

Gretna Works (Potato Spirit)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the large number of tons of last year's crop of potatoes that were ploughed into the ground because there was no demand for them, he will prepare for such eventuality by having prepared at Gretna Works plant to take from such supplies of potatoes potato spirit for industrial purposes?

I can only refer my hon. Friend to answers previously given on this subject. I am sure he will appreciate that, quite apart from other considerations involved in his proposal, an industry of this kind cannot be established with any hope of success if it has to depend on occasional surpluses of foodstuffs for its raw material.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that is no answer at all to my question? Is he aware that I have not raised this question before? The question I raised before was in regard to industrial alcohol, which is quite a different thing from potato spirit.

In view of the agitation in favour of State enterprise, will the right hon. Gentleman not consider whether he cannot utilise this factory for some kind of productive purpose instead of allowing it to be idle and wasting?

In view of the unsatisfactory answer to this and other questions, I beg to give notice that on the very first opportunity I will raise this question.

Italian Silk

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the fact that the Italian throwsters are offering thrown silk in this country at practically the same price as raw silk; and whether he has any evidence that the Italian Government are subsidising Italian silk throwsters?

Offers of the kind indicated in the first part of the question have been brought to my notice, but the answer to the second part of the question is in the negative.

German Dyestuffs

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that British traders can only make new purchases of German dyestuffs by paying the price ruling before the reduction in the Reparations Duty; and does he propose to take any steps to secure for British traders the advantage of the 21 per cent. remission of such duty?

I regret that I can do no more than refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave to the similar question that he put on the 20th March, a copy of which I am sending him.

Tobacco

asked the President of the Board of Trade what percentage of the total tobacco imports for the past year was Empire-grown; and whether he can state the total weight and value, respectively, of Empire- and foreign-grown tobacco imported during the past year?

The answer contains a number of figures, and the hon. Member will perhaps allow me to have it circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the answer:

About 71½ per cent. of the tobacco imported into the United Kingdom in 1923 was consigned from other countries of the Empire. The total weights and values of imports in 1923 of tobacco consigned from those countries and from foreign countries were as follows:

Quantity.

Declared value.

lbs.

£

Consignments from:

British countries overseas

13,267,491

873,079

Foreign countries

162,273,291

15,569,396

Total imports

175,540,782

£16,442,475

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can state the approximate cash value to the Dominions, based on last year's trade returns, of the existing preference on Empire-grown tobaccos and the increased preference on Empire-grown tobaccos recommended by the Imperial Economic Conference?

The preferential reduction of duty on clear- ances during the calendar year 1923 of leaf tobacco grown in, and imported from, the self-governing Dominions amounted to £40,600. Had the rate of preference recommended by the Imperial Economic Conference been in operation, that amount would have been increased to £61,000.

Mercantile Marine

Ramsgate Harbour (Tug-Boat)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has reconsidered the question of arranging for the tug-boat at Ramsgate harbour to be kept with full steam up at times of gales; and whether he is aware that such an arrangement would be particularly desirable during the winter months when east-north-east winds are blowing, and that such gales can be forecasted by the Meteorological Office?

I have been asked to answer this question. I have again examined the arrangements, and am satisfied that in all the circumstances they are as good as is practicable.

What information has the hon. Gentleman to back up his argument that the conditions are as good as they can be; and will he not reconsider the matter with a view to having the lifeboat as ready as possible to take out?

If the hon. Gentleman will come and talk it over with me, I will show him how the matter stands.

Home-Trade Vessels (Asiatics)

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can inform the House of the number of Asiatics at present employed on British home-trade vessels; and how many of these are British subjects?

The answer is rather long, and the hon. and gallant Member will, perhaps, not object to my having it circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Not in the least. Is the right hon. Gentleman taking any steps to prevent the employment in these British ships of non-British subjects, who are Asiatics?

I ought to have notice of that question.

Following is the answer promised:

The latest available figures of the numbers of Asiatic seamen employed in British home-trade ships are those obtained in the last census of seamen, and relate to the 19th June, 1921. On that date, out of a total number of 18,495 seamen employed on ordinary agreements in the home and coasting trades, 260 were Asiatics, and of these, 211 were stated to belong to India or Aden and were, probably, British subjects. In addition, 1,017 Lascars, engaged on agreements opened, and to be closed, in Asia, were serving in vessels which, on the census day, were employed in the home or coasting trade.

Questions

Enemy Action Claims

asked the President of the Board of Trade what conditions belated claimants have to satisfy in order to be entitled to compensation out of the £300,000 additional compensation fund?

9 and 11.

asked the President of the Board of Trade (1) upon what basis the Government arrived at the sum of £300,000 which they propose to allot as compensation for belated claims in respect of damage by enemy action: and what, divided approximately, this will permit upon belated claims;

(2) whether it is the intention of the Government to allow belated claimants for compensation for damage by enemy action the same proportion of their assessed claims as has been awarded to other claimants under the Reports of the Royal Commission?

The admission of belated claims will proceed upon the principles adopted by the Royal Commission, but the solatia payable to claimants must depend upon the number and total of the assessed values of the claims, as to which it is not possible to make a definite statement pending the examination of the claims.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what is the total number and aggregate value of the belated claims for compensation already received which the Government propose shall be allowed to rank for the extra £300,000 to be allotted as compensation?

The number of claims in the belated category received up to the present is 21,245. It is not possible to make any definite statement regarding the aggregate sum claimed pending investigation and assessment.

Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to investigate the conditions and give the figures to the House?

That will be done in due course when the investigation has been completed, and there will certainly be a Report in some form or other presented.

Is there any date fixed for the claims to be lodged or are they to be allowed to go on indefinitely?

We hope that the whole of the claims are already lodged; but some further time is to be allowed.

I can only say that the widest possible publicity has been given, in addition to what was done in previous years.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the hardship caused in many cases by the continued delay in the payment of the belated claims for compensation for damage by enemy action, he can now see his way to provide an increased staff for dealing with the same, and also increase the Government grant for distribution in such cases?

As to the first part of the question, owing to the technical nature of the work, I fear that to increase the staff of the Reparation Claims Department would tend to retard rather than to expedite the assessment of belated claims, and would not be justified. As to the last part of the question, I would refer to my answer to the hon. and gallant Member for the Central Division of Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) on 18th March, and that given yesterday by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to the hon. Member for Thanet (Mr. Harmsworth).

Arising out of the answer to the last part of my question, is the reply to which the right hon. Gentleman refers the last words of the Government on the question, and are the Government not prepared to take into consideration the necessities of these-unfortunate people?

I should like to remind the House that these unfortunate people have for the most part received various sums in the way of compensation, and that this is a final payment in the nature of a: solatium.

Will this matter come before the House in the form of Supplementary Estimates?

I assume not. As a matter of fact, no payments will be made before the 31st March.

Exactly what does the right hon. Gentleman mean when he says that these people have already received various sums, and that this is the final payment?

I was referring to the final settlement. I was referring to the seamen who form the larger part of these claimants—men who have been torpedoed and otherwise have suffered damage from War risks. I would remind the hon. Gentleman that a very large sum has already been paid: first of all in compensation for loss of effects; and secondly, for death and injuries, amounting probably to half a million a year.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what course of procedure was adopted in individual claims assessed and audited at certain definite sums of money after submission to the Royal Commission on Compensation for Suffering and Damage by Enemy Action; and whether claimants were notified of the amounts assessed and audited?

The course adopted has been to pay the exact sum awarded by the Royal Commission to the person concerned. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative.

Will these people have any kind of chance of appealing and of bringing their cases before the Separation Claims Department if they consider that they have been unjustly treated?

I am afraid not. According to the procedure adopted by the last Government, and the Government before that, that these claims were referred for assessment and decision to a Royal Commission or tribunal, over which neither the Board of Trade nor any other Department have any control.

Have these people any chance of putting their case before the members of the Royal Commission, or is that body a perfectly autocratic and arbitrary tribunal?

I presume any tribunal of that sort will be more or less autocratic; but it will be obvious to any hon. Member that, seeing there are 70,000 of these claims, the claimants will not be individually heard. They put their statements before the Royal Commission and they are carefully investigated. I am afraid it must be left there.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the statement made in the final Report of the Royal Commission on Compensation for Suffering and Damage by Enemy Action, that zones affected by air raids were carefully fixed, he will give figures showing the total amount of compensation represented by claims from East Kent; the total of such claims as assessed and audited; and the total amount which has been or will be paid out of the £5,000,000 compensation fund and will be paid out of the proposed grant of £300,000?

But the answer given by the right hon. Gentleman on 10th March did not take into consideration the fact that the last Report of the Royal Commission specifically stated that the county was divided up into geographical areas?

For the purposes of war risks insurance. It had no relation to the various claims, or the ordinary administration of the boundary. [HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."] I am informed that it is not possible to give these figures, or any others.

May I see the right hon. Gentleman with respect to some of these cases?

Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Enemy Debts)

asked The President of the Board of Trade whether steps are being taken during the present reparations investigation to arrange that Germany should fulfil her engagement to remit from time to time to the British clearing office for enemy debts sums necessary to balance payments due to British creditors whose unpaid claims have long ago been adjudicated upon in their favour by the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, or agreed between the British and German clearing houses?

The question of clearing office balances will be duly considered in the discussion of the general problem of reparation payments.

further asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the fact that the clearing office for enemy debts has £18,000,000 besides other assets in hand to meet the £12,000,000 due to British creditors, he will explain the reason for holding up the balance of 12s. 6d. in the £ still due to British creditors whose claims have been adjudicated upon in their favour by the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal; and will he give instructions for a further 7s. 6d. in the £ to be paid now, on account of the 12s. 6d. in the £ due, instead of compelling creditors to wait for distribution, as hitherto, at the rate of 2s. 6d. in the £ every six months?

The answer is somewhat long, and accordingly, if the hon. Member agrees, I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the answer:

The fund of £18,000,000 referred to in the first part of the question is charged, in the first place, with the payment of outstanding debts, and claims for the proceeds of liquidation of British property in Germany, which have prior rights over the fund. It is charged, in the second place, with the payment of the dividends of 7s. 6d. in the £ upon outstanding claims for compensation which will mature for payment upon awards being made by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. For this reason I am unable to adopt the suggestion contained in the second part of the question.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what the objections are to expediting the settlement of British claims before the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal by setting up additional divisions; and if he will state the number of officials employed in the enemy debt clearing office in this country, and the salaries of its 10 principal officials?

The answer is a long one, and the hon. Member will perhaps agree to it being circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Is it not a fact that the distinguished Swiss jurist who presides over this tribunal finds the work so great that he cannot give sufficient time to it owing to the calls on his time abroad?

I would remind the hon. Member that the second division was only started last November, and it has made considerable progress; but if he will refer to the answer which I am circulating, I think he will be satisfied with it.

Is it not a fact that the delay in the first division is still going on, owing to the fact that this distinguished Swiss jurist finds that he has much more work abroad than he can do in conjunction with this work in London?

I have nothing to add to my answer.

The answer is as follows:

It would, in my opinion, be premature to appoint additional divisions of the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal until it has been definitely ascertained that the assistance of the second division, which began its sittings last November, is inadequate to cope with the arrears which have accumulated. Since the appointment of this second division the position has considerably improved, and I am satisfied that it is making every effort to expedite the hearing of cases. I would remind the hon. Member that a moiety of the expenses of the tribunal is borne by Germany, and that it was only with considerable difficulty that the consent of the German Government to the establishment of a second division of the tribunal was secured.

As regards the latter part of the question, I would refer to Class 11, 9, P.2 ( a ,) of the Estimates which shortly be printed, and in which detailed particulars of the salaries of the Clearing Office officials will be given. To remove any misapprehensions which may exist, I should add that the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is an International Court of Arbitration. It is entirely independent of the Clearing Office and is subject to no control whatsoever by that Department, or by the Board of Trade.

Unemployment

Relief Works (Foreign Materials)

asked the Prime Minister if he can now make any statement as to the policy of his Government with regard to the restrictions placed by his predecessors on the rights of local authorities to purchase materials required for unemployment works from abroad, when rings and combines control the home supplies and the price demanded is much higher than that ruling in the open market?

The Government have decided that the Unemployment Grants Committee should adhere to their existing practice of insisting on the use of home materials in schemes assisted by them for the relief of unemployment, subject to the exercise of their discretion in abnormal circumstances.

Will the Government take into consideration making some grant to local authorities who have to pay this extra price in order to carry out the protective policy of His Majesty's Government?

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the proposal, made at a previous question time, that the question of limitation of profits on contracts relating to unemployment schemes might be considered as an alternative?

Innumerable replies have been given to questions on this subject, and to them I can only add that the Government does not regard buying in the cheapest market as being always, in all circumstances, necessarily a part of sound Free Trade doctrine.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of relaxing this restriction when there is evidence that there is a ring forcing up the price of the material?

Will the right hon. Gentleman carry out in other directions as well the sound doctrine which he has just enunciated?

Nottingham Lace Trade

asked the President of the Board of Trade what are the latest figures available in regard to unemployment in the Nottingham lace trade; and what are the figures for the corresponding dates in 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1923?

I have been asked to reply. As the answer is in statistical form, perhaps the hon. Member will permit me to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

The answer is as follows:

The number of persons in the lace trade registered at the Nottingham Employment Exchange as unemployed at 25th February, 1924, was 1,254, compared with 1,189 at 26th February, 1923, 1,339 at 21st February, 1922, and 814 at 25th February, 1921. In addition, 488 persons were working systematic short time and claiming benefit at 25th February, 1924, compared with 471 in 1923, 757 in 1922, and 3,150 in 1921. Figures for 1920 are not available.

What do the Government propose to do to relieve unemployment at Nottingham, which has now lasted for two or three years?

Questions

British Dyestuffs Corporation

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can now make a statement with regard to the negotiations proceeding between the British Dyestuffs Corporation and the Interessen Gemeinschaft?

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the anxiety created among manufacturers of dyestuffs and users of dyes in this country by the knowledge that negotiations are proceeding between the British Dyestuffs Corporation and the Interessen Gemeinschaft, he can give a definite assurance to this House that no arrangement between the British Dyestuffs Corporation and the Interessen Gemeinschaft will be sanctioned by the Government without the House having first had the opportunity of considering the terms of such arrangement?

I am not at present in a position to add anything to the answers I have previously given on this subject, copies of which I am sending to the hon. Members.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the answer he gave before was simply to the effect that he would consider the question and make a statement; and does he know that there is a good deal of uneasiness and a desire that no arrangement should be concluded before the matter has been raised in the House?

I am afraid that I am not in a position to make a statement on this subject. No arrangement has yet been concluded, negotiations are going on, and, as soon as I am in a position to make a statement, I shall certainly do so.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance, in view of the great importance of this matter, that no decision will be arrived at before an opportunity is given to this. House for a discussion upon this subject?

I do not think that the hon. Member need fear anything of that sort, but obviously I am unable to give any assurance now.

Housing

Building Materials (Prices)

asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will state the number of complaints in respect of the prices of building materials received and investigated by the Inter-Departmental Committee appointed to survey the prices of building materials; and what action has been taken with regard to these complaints?

I would draw the hon. Member's attention to third interim Report of the Committee, a copy of which I am sending him. I am considering the steps to be taken in connection with these complaints.

Is the right hon. Gentleman considering an increase of the powers of this Committee, and when can he make the statement on this matter which has long been promised?

I am considering every aspect of the question, and I will make a statement with all possible speed.

Will the right hon. Gentleman be able to make a statement on this and kindred matters before the House rises at Easter?

Elphinstone Barracks, Plymouth

asked the Secretary of State for War if he can now state whether Elphinstone Barracks, Plymouth, can be made available for the housing of civilian families?

The matter is still being actively pursued, but at present I cannot add any specific information to that which I gave the Noble Lady on 18th February.

Will the right hon. Gentleman, in pursuing this matter further, consider the arguments used by himself and other members of his party in regard to houses which were kept empty by private owners?

Questions

British Empire Exhibition

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his Department has reserved hotel or other accom- modation for visitors to London during the forthcoming British Empire Exhibition; if so, what special class of visitor is being catered for; whether he has taken any steps to prevent hotel companies and proprietors from profiteering at the expense of general visitors to London at this period; and whether he is aware that in several cases where accommodation has recently been applied for, excessive prices have been asked?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. I may refer my hon. Friend to replies which I have already given to questions on this subject, and also to the statement which was made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the course of the Debate on Wednesday last.

Would it not be very harmful if any rumours of this kind, which are entirely unfounded, were circulated around the Empire?

asked the Secretary of State for War the subjects of the War Office exhibit in the Imperial Government building at the British Empire Exhibition; and whether the Territorial Army will have a place in that exhibit?

The exhibit will illustrate, by models, panoramic displays, relics and other means, campaigns of the British Army for 800 years, up to and including the Great War. It will deal with the military history of the nation as a whole rather than with any specific portion of His Majesty's Forces, and there will, therefore, be no exhibit specially relating to the Territorial Army.

Government Departments

War Office

asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state the number of officers, previously pensioned and retired, who are now employed in the War Office?

There are 24 officers previously pensioned and retired, employed as retired officer clerks in the War Office, six of whom are employed in a temporary capacity. In addition certain ex-officers are serving in a temporary capacity as ex-soldier clerks, but I regret that I am unable to say without further inquiry whether any of them are in receipt of retired pay.

asked the Secretary of State for War if he is able definitely now to promise the establishment of a pension fund for War Department workmen?

As explained in Debate yesterday by my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary, the question is still under consideration, but the hon. Member will understand that, apart from other considerations, the actuarial bases of such a' scheme are of great importance and cannot be settled hastily.

asked the Secretary of State for War whether, with regard to non-service publicity officers retained in his Department, he will say what steps have been taken to ascertain whether any ex-service men possess the necessary qualifications which would enable substitution to be effected?

I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. and gallant Member for East Fulham (Colonel Vaughan-Morgan) on 29th ultimo. The qualifications of these officers consist largely in the departmental experience which they have acquired, and which, from the nature of the case, no one who has not been performing these duties could possess in a similar degree.

Substitution

asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will explain why appointments such as Colonel Cobb's should not come before the joint substitution board; did the South-borough Committee set any limits upon the class of cases to be considered by the board; whose province is it to decide what cases may be brought before them for adjudication; and whether he is aware that, on 31st July last, the Under Secretary of State for War deprecated questions in the House on this case because it was under the consideration of that Committee?

After full consideration it was decided, on the grounds explained in my reply to the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Mr. Hogge) on 26th February, that it was essential in the public interest to retain for one year the services of this officer to complete the work which he already had in hand. The recommendations both of the Lytton and the Southborough Committees leave the decision in such cases to the responsible Minister concerned.

On a point of Order. Has it not been your ruling, Mr. Speaker, that officers of the Services, whether naval or military, should be referred to in terms of their occupation rather than by name?

Permanent Civil Servants

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the total number of permanent civil servants in Government employ in 1914 and the total number of permanent civil servants in Government employ now?

I would refer to the answer which I gave on the 6th March to the hon. and learned Member for Norwood (Mr. Greaves-Lord).

Stationery Office Printing Works, Harrow

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, owing to the failure of the Government printing works at Harrow, he will recommend that they are sold and that future Government printing is placed with outside printers?

The hon. Member is rather premature in suggesting that the Government printing works at Harrow have failed. The whole question of the continued maintenance of Government printing establishments is at present being inquired into by a Committee.

The Committee has sat for some months now, and, I understand, has made considerable progress. I should think the report will be available at a comparatively early date.

Cornwall House

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps the Establishment Department of the Treasury has taken at Cornwall House, S.E., to save accommodation expenses by the closing of portions of the building commensurate with the reduction of the staff; and whether he will allow a special survey to be made now in order further to reduce occupation expenses in the various offices of the British clearing office?

Constant review is made of available accommodation for Government staffs at Cornwall House and elsewhere, and I do not think a special survey is necessary. The proper and economical course is not to close the unoccupied portions of the building but to house therein other Government staffs now accommodated in hired premises. Various schemes with this object in view are, I understand from the Office of Works, in an advanced state of preparation.

Junior Administrative Appointments

asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury if he is aware that, as a result of the examination for junior administrative appointments, over 100 qualified; and whether, in view of the fact that only three appointments have been made, it is proposed to offer executive posts to the other successful candidates?

The number of candidates at the recent limited competition for the administrative class who were declared fit for appointment, if and when vacancies were available, was eight. The number in the question is of those who passed the preliminary written test, which does not imply any qualification for appointment, but merely rendered the candidates eligible for interview by the selection board. As regards the suggested appointment of ex-service temporary employées to the executive class, I would refer to the answer which I gave on the 6th March to the hon. Member for Oxford.

Temporary Officers (Salaries)

asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether, in view of the increment just granted to permanent civil servants and temporary graded clerks on account of the rise in the cost of living, a corresponding increase of salary will be given to temporary officers above the rank of graded clerks, whose salaries were reduced a short time ago when the cost of living was on the down grade?

The increase referred to was equal in amount to a decrease which operated under a sliding scale in September last. Save in a few special cases, this decrease did not apply to temporary officers above the rank of graded clerks, whose rate of pay is settled Depart-mentally.

Pre-War Established Posts

asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how many pre-War established posts have been abolished owing to diminution of work or other causes; and whether he can give the Departments most affected?

Detailed information by Departments is not available and could not be obtained without disproportionate labour, but the total staffs in 1914 (permanent and temporary), excluding some 24,800 engaged on Irish Services, were approximately 254,000. The corresponding number on 1st January, 1924, was 299,000, of whom 244,000 were permanent.

Will not the hon. Gentleman consider the possibility of obtaining this information? It is very vital in considering the question of ex-service men and only needs a letter to be sent to every one of the Departments to get a reply.

The point, I am afraid, is not so simple as the right hon. Gentleman suggests. The truth is that in 1914 it was very difficult to distinguish, as we shall now distinguish, between temporary and permanent civil servants because there were many temporary men who had been in the Service for many years and were practically permanent.

I have made inquiries, but it is quite impossible to get information which would be worth anything at all to-day.

I think the reply covers the whole of the information the hon. Member asks for.

Temporary EmployéS

asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury what was the number of temporary civil servants on the 1st January, 1918; what was the number on the 1st January, 1924; whether any were placed on the established list during the years 1914–18, inclusive; if so, how many; and whether they were required to pass the usual Civil Service examination?

I regret that information as to the number of temporary employés of Government Departments on the 1st January, 1918, is not available. The number of such employés (other than industrial employés and the civilian staffs of War Office and Air Ministry outstations) was on the 1st July, 1919, 173,338, and on the 1st January, 1924, 55,020. With regard to the latter parts of the question, I would refer the reply given on the 24th March to the hon. Member for Bristol, East, of which I am sending the hon. and gallant Member a copy.

Does the reply to which the hon. Gentleman refers give an answer to the last part, whether they require to pass any Civil Service examination?

If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will refer to the reply, he will see that it gives in detail the exact conditions under which the men were passed in.

Is it possible now for these temporary ex-service civil servants to pass into the Civil Service without examination?

British Army

Shipkeeping and Separation Allowances

asked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that ship-keeping allowance to yardcraft ratings has been discontinued; that an order has been issued to Master-in-charge W. D. V. Gordon and "A. B. Seagull II.," dated Chatham, 26th February, 1924, intimating that these allowances are discontinued by War Office instruction; and will he take steps to have them restored?

My hon. Friend seems to be under the impression that a definite allowance had been agreed upon for "shipkeeping" apart and distinct from special duties performed. This is not the case. Payment, however, seems to have been made under a misapprehension to certain men performing merely ship-keeping duty. This has been discontinued on the ground that the conditions under which this payment was authorised had not been fulfilled. The revision of the Regulations governing night duty allowance is to be discussed at this week's meeting of the War Department Industrial Council, and I will communicate further with the hon. Member after that discussion has taken place.

asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will consider refunding the 6d. per day deducted from soldiers' pay towards separation allowances in the earlier days of the War so that these men shall have equal treatment with those who served later, and from whose pay no deduction for separation allowances was made?

This was one among various improvements in the soldier's emoluments introduced by the Royal Warrant published as Army Order of 1918. It would be impossible now to make that Warrant retrospective to August, 1914.

In view of the obvious injustice that has been done to these men who served out of patriotism, if it is a question of expense, will the right hon. Gentleman at least take into consideration their services and make up for it next year, and have some sort of inquiry into this subject?

I am quite sure my hon. Friend will see what an enormous amount of inquiries are involved. There are hundreds of thousands—one might say a million—of papers that would have to be examined relating to the period between September, 1917, and the outbreak of war in 1914. Many of these papers are not in existence, and they would introduce such confusion that I am quite sure this House would never agree to it, and therefore I cannot hold out any hope that this will be done.

Questions

Cadets (Fees)

asked the Secretary of State for War what fees are charged for military cadets or students under training for the officers' corps of the French, American and Japanese Armies, respectively, reduced to sterling?

As regards the French Army, I am informed that the normal charges at present made are, for outfit, 1,990 francs at St. Cyr, 2,400 francs at the Ecole Polytechnique; for annual maintenance, 1,400 francs at both schools. In Japan and the United States no fees are charged.

Is the right hon. Gentleman considering, therefore, abolishing these fees for the British Army also?

The conditions, really, are not comparable. The whole question of fees will be gone into as the circumstances develop.

Orkney and Shetland (Parliamentary Elections)

asked the Secretary, for Scotland whether, in view of the difficulties at present existing in the way of the electors registering their votes at Parliamentary elections in Orkney and Shetland, of the formally expressed desires by the councils of both counties for better facilities, and of the opinion of the sheriff on the matter, he is prepared to introduce a Bill to reduce the statutory period for polling from two days to one, so that the number of polling booths may be made adequate for the present electorate without unduly increasing the cost of an election to the Treasury?

I am aware of the difficulties to which the hon. Member refers, but, according to the information before me, the two county councils are not in agreement as to the lines which remedial legislation might take. I am considering the matter, but I cannot give any undertaking as to legislation.

Russia and China

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to the ultimatum presented by Mr. Karakhan to the Chinese Government, and to the fact that troop trains have been sent by the Russian Government from Chita, and that a concentration of Red troops is taking place on the Manchurian frontier; and whether he is taking any steps, either by means of the League of Nations or by diplomatic representations, to prevent an outbreak of war between Russia and China?

The answer to the first part is in the affirmative, but I do not think that the situation calls for the intervention of His Majesty's Government.

Industrial Assurance (Lapsed Policies)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the dissatisfaction felt in many parts of the country at the large number of insurance policies (industrial branch) which have lapsed during the last year; that a large number of Hull policy holders in the Prudential Assurance Company lost all that they had paid in last year; and whether he intends to take steps to see that particulars of the transactions of the leading insurance companies are published at an early date?

I have no information as to the number of policies which lapsed during 1923, either in Hull or elsewhere. The returns of the industrial assurance companies are due to be lodged within six months after the end of the period to which they relate, and those for 1923 will be published in due course after they have been received.

Can the hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance that his Government is watching this question very closely, with a view to avoiding injustice to these poor people?

Will he publish also in the Report the considerations given by these companies in most cases for lapsed policies?

I will consider that point. With regard to the first supplementary question, we are, of course, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows, governed by the legislation of last year, and we are, of course, watching the operation of that legislation.

National Debt (Committee)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is now in a position to state the terms of reference to the special Committee on the National Debt?

The hon. Member has evidently overlooked the fact that I announced the terms of reference to the House more than a month ago.

Treasury Bills

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the reason why the Treasury does not make greater efforts to induce holders of expiring Treasury bills to take renewal of a proportion of them in the form of Treasury securities running for various periods of not less than three years and not more than 10 years?

The hon. Member's suggestion involves considerations of general policy which can hardly be dealt with in the limits of question and answer, but I would remind him that 10-year Treasury Bonds have been continuously on offer to applicants since October last.

Is it not the case that bonds of a less length of time are not being taken up by the public, and that, if the terms were more attractive, the Treasury would be able to reduce the number of Treasury Bills by shifting money out of Treasury Bills into these Bonds?

The hon. Member is now raising those very intricate and technical questions which I said in my reply were not suitable for being dealt with by means of question and answer.

Scotland

Sheriff-Clerks' Salaries

asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury if he is aware that in April, 1922, the fees in all sheriff-clerks' offices in Scotland were practically doubled; that at that time all clerks in sheriff-clerks' offices were promised substantial increases in salary; that these promised increases have not yet been paid; that men filling important positions of trust in the offices of sheriff-clerks are paid, after over 20 years' service, a salary of £3 or thereabouts per week; and if it is the intention of the Treasury now to pay these officers the increases promised as from the date the sheriff-clerks' fees were increased?

I have been asked to reply. Without accepting all my hon. Friend's statements in detail, it is the case that, owing to the long negotiations which have taken place, the employés in question have not yet received the benefits of the reorganisation scheme. I hope that it may prove possible to obtain legislation to bring the new scheme into operation this year. The scheme includes provisions for benefits to accrue as from the date on which the fees were increased.

Can the right hon. Gentleman not give an assurance that a payment to account of the increases promised to those concerned can be immediately given?

An attempt is being made to reach an agreement with those interested, and if that is reached retrospective payment will be made as from the date of the increases in Court fees.

Education Grant

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether, while recognising that the grant for 1924–25 to the Education (Scotland) Fund cannot be ascertained until the close of the present financial year shows the educational expenditure in England, he will undertake, should this grant calculated in the statutory way prove to be smaller than in 1923–24, to find some way of making a special additional grant so that educational progress will not be hampered?

I am now quite satisfied that there is no likelihood that the amount of grant available for distribution to Scottish education authorities in 1924–25 will prove to be smaller than in 1923–24.

Education (Intermediate Certificate)

asked the Secretary for Scotland if he is aware that several education authorities object to sections of Circular 60, issued by the Scottish Education Department, relating to the name of the new certificate; is he aware that many, if not all, education authorities, the E.I.S., and many employers of labour desire to retain the name of the certificate as intermediate certificate; and, if so, what action, if any, does he propose to take to accede to an almost unanimous demand to retain the inter mediate certificate?

I understand that the representations which have reached the Department on this point are very few in number. I shall be glad if my hon. Friend will give me an opportunity of discussing it with him personally.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman personally aware of the objections raised to this circular by education authorities and others interested, particularly as the intermediate certificate had acquired a recognised position as an award of merit in Scottish education?

I have already intimated that I shall be glad to discuss the point with my hon. Friend.

Am I to understand that, after he has discussed it, my right hon. Friend will give effect to my personal opinions?

Education Department (Circular 51)

asked the Secretary for Scotland what action he intends to take in regard to Circular 51 of the Scottish Education Department; and, if any action is contemplated, on what date does he propose taking such action?

The legal position will be re-stated in a new circular which will be issued very shortly. I regret that I cannot indicate a precise date.

Size of School Classes

asked the Secretary for Scotland if he can now state the number of classes in Scottish schools having on the roll from 50 to 60 pupils, and the number of classes of over 60 pupils?

Temperance Act

asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he has now completed the inquiry he promised to undertake into the operation of the Scottish Local Veto Act; and whether he is in a position to say when the result of that inquiry will be published?

I have received and considered a number of representations regarding the operation of the Temperance (Scotland) Act, 1913. I have not, however, undertaken to institute any inquiry into this matter, and I am not at present satisfied that such, an inquiry is necessary.

Did not the right hon. Gentleman, in reply to a question by the hon. Member for Dunfermline, state that he was having an inquiry into the operation of the Act?

Glasgow-Edinburgh Road

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, having regard to the fact that the Glasgow-Edinburgh road scheme was initiated mainly to relieve unemployment, and that it is proposed largely to employ upon its construction men who have no previous experience of road work, he will agree that the promised contribution by the Government, estimated at £1,500,000, shall be paid in part by the Exchequer and not wholly out of the Road Fund?

I have been asked to answer this question. It is proposed to put the work out to contract. There appears to be no justification, therefore, for any special contribution from the Exchequer.

Housing (Nitshill)

asked the Under-Secretary to the Scottish Board of Health, if he is aware that in the village of Nitshill, Upper Renfrewshire, about 40 per cent. of the houses are over 100 years of age, many originally being built as stables during the construction of the railway, and have been condemned as unfit for human habitation; that the only working class houses built in the last 40 years were four built by the local co-operative society; and what steps is he prepared to take to remedy the local housing conditions?

I am advised that no authentic information is available as to the precise age or original occupancy of the older houses in the village of Nitshill and that owing to lack of alternative accommodation none has yet been made the subject of a closing order. I am informed that 28 working class houses were erected in the village in 1902 by a co-operative society. The local authority are aware that housing conditions in the village are unsatisfactory and a Report is now being completed by the medical officer of health with a view to the local authority proceeding with a building scheme under the Housing, Etc., Act, 1923, in the areas of the district where housing needs are most pressing. Nitshill village is one of the areas which will require special consideration and I am hopeful that, as a result of the action taken and to be taken, the housing conditions there will be improved.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that two evictions have taken place within the last month by the sending of workmen to remove slates from two dwellings that had been condemned?

asked the Under-Secretary to the Scottish Board of Health if he will take into consideration, in the allocation of schemes for health improvement, the conditions in Nitshill, Renfrewshire, which possesses no proper method for the disposal of sewage and no scheme of public lighting?

In view of a representation that has been received, the Scottish Board of Health are in communication with the local authority in regard to the drainage and lighting of Nitshill, and I shall inform my hon. Friend of the result.

Questions

Pre-War Pensions Bill

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Bill for the increase of the pensions of pre-War pensioners will be introduced before Easter; and whether ex-Royal Irish Constabulary pensioners will be included within the scope of the Bill.

I would refer the hon. Member to the replies which the Prime Minister gave yesterday on this subject to questions by the hon. Member for Tottenham and the right hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty.

Can the hon. Gentleman give a reply to the second part of the question? The first part was answered by the Prime Minister yesterday.

I think if the right hon. Gentleman refers to the Prime Minister's reply he will see, in regard to the second part of this question, that it is to be considered.

Income Tax (Arrears)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can state the amount of arrears on 31st March, 1923, of Income Tax, Supertax, and Excess Profits Duty assessed and due but not paid, and the percentage of such arrears in each case which has since been paid?

As this answer is a long one I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

At the end of the financial year, will the hon. Gentleman circulate similar figures for the present year, so that we can see how our arrears of taxation are getting on?

I will consider the question.

Following is the answer:

The approximate amounts of Income Tax and Super-tax estimated to be due to be paid, but not paid, by the 31st March, 1923, were as follows:

Income Tax (excluding the instalment due on 1st July, 1923)

£73,000,000

Super-tax

£23,000,000

that has been collected, but the hon. Member may take it that only a comparatively small sum is now outstanding. The approximate amount of Super-tax outstanding at the 29th February, 1924, in respect of 1922–23 and previous years was, approximately, £7,000,000. This figure is not, however, strictly comparable with that given above, as the arrear at the later date includes considerable sums of duty assessed since the 31st March, 1923. As regards Excess Profits Duty, the approximate amount in assessment but unpaid (less sums shown due to be remitted) at the 31st March, 1923, was £203,000,000. As far as can be ascertained at present, the amount uncollected at the 29th February, 1924, was probably about £157,000,000. These arrears are, however, subject to adjustment on appeal or otherwise, and the duty to be ultimately received by the Exchequer is expected to fall far short of the amount stated.

Coal Industry

Retail Prices

asked the Secretary for Mines whether he is aware of the great differences in the prices of coal at the pithead as compared with the prices charged to the retail consumers; and whether the Government can take steps to protect the interests of the public in this matter?

Yes, Sir, I am going into this question. On Tuesday last I met representatives of the Coal Merchants' Federation and, after a preliminary discussion, put a series of questions to them to which they promised to give me full replies in due course. When I have received these I shall consider the matter further and shall probably meet them again.

Wages Dispute

asked the Secretary for Mines if he can make any statement with regard to the situation in the coal controversy; and if he is aware that there is much anxiety that every possible step should be taken to arrive at an early settlement?

As stated by the Prime Minister yesterday, in reply to the hon. Member for Newport, industrial negotiations between the parties have been renewed and a further meeting is taking place to-day. The Government are fully alive to the importance of a settlement being secured, and I am keeping in the closest touch with both parties with that end in view.

Will the hon. Member inform the House from time to time as to what progress has been made in this important matter?

Yes. If I can convey any useful information, I shall be very pleased to do so.

Will the Government consider the setting up of an inquiry before a strike take place, instead of afterwards?

Home Consumption and Export

asked the Secretary of Mines the number of tons of coal sold in Great Britain for domestic purposes, the number of tons sold for industrial purposes, and the number of tons exported for the year 1923; and the average amount per ton received for each class of coal?

One hundred million tons of coal were shipped abroad from Great Britain in 1923, as cargo or bunkers, and 177,000,000 tons were available for inland consumption. Of the latter it may be estimated that about 41,000,000 tons were domestic coal and about 136,000,000 tons were for industrial or other purposes. The average value of the coal exported as cargo was 25s. 2d. a ton f.o.b., and the average pithead price of all coal disposed of commercially (including exports) was 19s. 9½d. a ton. I have no information as to the average pithead prices of different classes of coal.

Does that include large as well as small coal exported?

Will the hon. Member give the separate prices of large and small?

I have great difficulty in regard to that, as I have said in reply to the question.

The Minister has given the price of coal per cargo exported. Can he tell us the price of coal per bunker?

Profits

asked the Secretary for Mines the number of collieries in the coal mining industry whose profits for the year 1923 were less than 6d. per ton; and the number with a profit of 6d., Is., 2s., 3s., 4s., or 5s. per ton for the same year?

I do not receive any returns showing the trading results of individual collieries; the figures published quarterly by my Department are based upon aggregations of the returns made to the Joint Accountants under the National Wages Agreement. I have not, therefore, the information necessary to enable me to make the computation for which my hon. Friend asks.

Having regard to the claims that the miners are making at the present time, does not the hon. Member think it is very desirable to get this information from the owners?

I may have such a desire, but, unfortunately, I have no means of obtaining the information.

Mine Regulations

asked the Secretary for Mines whether, having regard to the fact that there is no Regulation prohibiting petrol being taken down mines other than coal mines, he intends to bring all mines under the Regulation governing coal mines; and whether he will make it compulsory for some members of the staff of every mine to be trained in first-aid treatment and for for a first-aid outfit to be kept on the premises?

Regulations dealing with these matters on the lines indicated in the hon. Member's question are at present under consideration in my Department.

Royalties

asked the Secretary for Mines the amount of royalties of all coal mines in this country for each of the last 10 years; and if he will indicate how many persons there are who benefit by the receipt of such royalties?

I will circulate these figures in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following are the figures promised:

The amount of money paid as royalties in the coal-mining industry in each of the 10 years from 1914 to 1923 was, approximately, as follows:

£

1914

5,798,000

1915

5,643,000

1916

6,170,000

1917

5,821,000

1918

6,063,000

1919

6,321,000

1920

6,606,000

1921

5,297,000

1922

6,129,000 *

1923

6,317,000 *

* These figures relate to about 95 per cent. of the industry.These figures relate to about 95 per cent. of the industry.

Health and Unemployment Insurance

asked the Secretary for Mines whether he is aware that national health insurance and unemployment contributions payable by employers in the coal-mining industry are debited to costs of production other than wages, thus imposing an obligation upon workmen paying 83 per cent. of the employers' proportion; that 83 per cent. of legal litigation charges and medical cost incurred by employers in opposing compensation payments to injured workmen are borne by workmen instead of employers, such charges being debited as costs of production other than wages under the existing coal-mining agreement; and will he bear these facts in mind in drawing up the terms of any future wages settlement?

As my hon. Friend is aware, these matters have been settled by the industry itself through the National Board or its independent chairman, as part of the Agreement of 1921 and any revision of them in any new agreement which may result from the present negotiations would be a matter for the owners' and miners' representatives by whom these negotiations are being conducted.

Is the hon. Member aware that the existing agreement is enforced upon the workmen and that they have no alternative, and that, essentially, there is necessity for legislation?

As far as the agreement is concerned, it is entirely a matter for both sides to deal with. The question of legislation does not arise.

Are we expected to believe that a Labour Government is going to accept conditions forced upon workmen by Jew or violence?

Transport

Roads

asked the Minister of Transport whether he has received representations from the Manchester and District Joint Town-Planning Committee urging a minimum grant of 75 per cent. of the cost of constructing arterial roads; and whether, in view of the need for an improved system of main roads, and in order to give more employment, he is prepared to accede to this request?

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave on the 20th March to the hon. Member for the Royton Division, of which I am sending him a copy.

asked the Minister of Transport how much money has been granted to rural district councils in England and Wales towards the maintenance and reconstruction of third-class and unclassified roads during the years ending 1921, 1922, 1923, and 1924?

The answer contains a considerable number of figures, and, with the hon. Member's permission, I will circulate them in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following are the figures:

Apart from grants towards the maintenance and improvement of Class I and Class II roads, grants have been indicated from the Road Fund to rural district councils as follows:

£

1921–22

74,800

1922–23

112,000

1923–24 (to date)

1,658,600

The figures for the year 1923–24 include grants amounting to £452,200 from anticipated revenue for the year 1924–25.

It would not be possible to distinguish between grants to Class I and Class II roads and to "Other" roads for the years 1921–23 without a very laborious examination of the individual applications. The figures given for the year 1923–24 can, however, be dissected as follows:

£

Grants to Class I and Class II roads

826,200

Grants to "Other" roads

832,400

asked the Minister of Transport whether, seeing that rural district ratepayers have to pay their share towards the upkeep of first and second class roads, and also that third class and unclassified roads are largely used by general motor traffic, he can provide adequate grants to rural district councils to enable them to maintain their roads in a satisfactory state of repair?

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave on 6th March to the hon. Member for the Devizes Division, of which I am sending him a copy.

asked the Minister of Transport whether, in those districts where unemployment is increasing and local authorities submit schemes or main arterial roads which are approved by his Department, he will recommend the Government to make a special grant in excess of the usual 50 per cent. of the cost to those necessitous authorities?

The funds at my disposal will not permit of the adoption of a policy such as that suggested in the hon. Member's question.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that unless local authorities I can have a more substantial contribution from the State they will be unable to carry out the road work during the coming year?

Menai Straits (Barrage)

asked the Minister of Transport, in reconstructing the Menai Bridge, if he would consider building a barrage across the Menai Straits in order to produce hydro-electricity from the tidal race?

Any project such as that mentioned in the question would require lengthy investigation and affect several Departments besides the Ministry of Transport, but if a well-considered scheme is put forward by responsible bodies I will see that it is carefully examined.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the great possibilities in these tides for hydro-electricity, and can he say what he considers would be a responsible body to put forward the suggestions or propositions he mentioned?

St. Paul's Bridge

asked the Minister of Transport how much, if any, of the grant of £866,000, indicated to the cost of the road approaches to St. Paul's Bridge, will be available for the approaches on the south side of the river; what authority, if the scheme proceeds, will be responsible for the preparation of the plan and the execution of the work on the south side; whether any estimates of the total cost of the work on the south side are before the Department; and, if so, can he state the sum included in those estimates for land and compensation?

The estimate upon which the maximum grant of £866,000 was based is of a purely approximate character, and includes a provision for the southern approaches, but I am not in a position to dissect the figures. The work on the south side is covered in part by the powers conferred upon the City of London by the Corporation of London (Bridges) Act, 1911; other parts of the work would fall within the purview of the London County Council. No comprehensive estimates are at present before my Department.

London Traffic Bill

asked the Minister of Transport whether he is able to give a definite date for the introduction of the London Traffic Bill?

Notice of the introduction of the Bill appears in the Order Paper to-day.

May I congratulate the hon. Member on this unusual ministerial celerity?

Will the hon. Member try to arrange that prints of the Bill are available as early as possible this afternoon?

Will the hon. Member not try to have it ready to-day? If, as I understand, the intention is to proceed with further stages of the Bill this week, hon. Members who represent constituencies around London are very anxious to consult their local authorities.

Post Office

Mail Service, Lerwick

asked the Postmaster-General whether his attention has been drawn to recent irregularities in the mail service between Aberdeen and Lerwick; whether he can state why the mail which should have left Aberdeen on the 29th February did not leave till the 4th March; why it was not then sent direct to Shetland; and why the mail that should have left on the 7th March was not despatched until the 9th?

A storm of exceptional violence began on the 28th of February, and lasted, on and off, for about a week. The steamer scheduled to leave Aberdeen, on the 29th of February was held up by this storm at Kirkwall, whither she had been sent with grain and other cargo urgently required. By the exercise of much energy and goodwill on the part of the steamship company, the steamer was brought back from Kirkwall and got away from Aberdeen on the 4th of March, and she then called again at Kirkwall according to schedule. This call could not have been omitted without disturbing pas Sanger and cargo arrangements. The delay until the 9th of March of the next sailing from Aberdeen was the result of the late return of the steamer from the trip of the 4th of March.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that two steamers were sent to Kirkwall on the same day, and that, owing to that fact, one of them was delayed and could not get on to Lerwick, and will he take into consideration that the only way of getting these steamers to sail to schedule is to have a mail contract?

Parkhurst Prison Staff (Correspondence)

asked the Postmaster-General whether the Investigation Department, General Post Office, have any instructions to open letters addressed to certain members of the Parkhurst Prison staff; and, if so, will he state the reasons?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative; and the second part does not, therefore, arise.

Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire who is responsible for the opening of letters addressed to certain members of the prison staff?

Posting and Delivery (Schedules)

97 and 98.

asked the Postmaster-General (1) if he is now able to restore the tabulated schedule of London and suburban posting and delivery time indexes as contained in the pre-War Post Office Guide, in view of the prohibitive cost of telegraphing due to uncertainty of times of delivery;

(2) whether he is now able to restore the tabulated schedule of times of posting for provincial mails as contained in the pre-War Post Office Guide?

I will answer these two questions together, and would refer the hon. Member to my reply of the 20th February to a similar question asked by the hon. Member for Central Hackney, which applies to both schedules.

Printed Matter Regulations

asked the Post-master-General whether he will consider revising the regulations with regard to printed matter, which provides that where more than one similar printed form is enclosed the package must be treated as at letter rate; and whether it is possible for all printed matter to be stamped according to weight only?

I cannot agree to any general relaxation of the rule that supplies of blank printed forms intended to be filled up by the addressee cannot be sent by the printed paper post. Such forms are properly considered as stationery, and are not eligible for transmission at the cheap rate. The rate of postage on printed papers depends on their weight, being at the rate of ½d. per 2 oz.; but it is impracticable to admit everything which bears any printing for transmission at the reduced rate.

Sunday Delivery

asked the Postmaster-General whether he is in favour of, and can promise, an early resumption of the Sunday delivery of letters?

I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to my reply of the 6th of March to the hon. Member for Stockport.

Penny Postage

asked the Postmaster-General whether he is now able to make a statement as to the possibility of the restoration of 1d. postage?

asked the Postmaster-General if he will return to the 1d. post and so ensure more employment in the printing trade?

I am not yet in a position to make any announcement as to the restoration of 1d. postage.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is a fact that there is profiteering on every 1éd. stamp to the extent of 50 per cent.

Circulars (Postage Abroad)

asked the Post master-General whether he intends to introduce the Post Office Bill as presented by his predecessor in office, or whether he does not now intend to seek the powers sought in that Measure?

I assume that the hon. Member refers to the Bill dealing with the practice of arranging for circulars to be posted in countries abroad, instead of in this country, in order to obtain advantage from depreciated currency. I am glad to say that this practice has now been practically abandoned by British firms; and unless there is some indication of its revival, I do not think it necessary to take special powers in the matter.

Redcar (Hours of Collection)

asked the Postmaster-General whether he is prepared to restore the late pre-War collection in Redcar, in the North Biding of Yorkshire?

The latest hour of posting at Redcar is 8.20 p.m., which compares favourably with the time of the last collection at other similar towns. I regret, therefore, I am unable to restore the late pre-War collection.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the urban councils and the trade and labour councils are in favour of this collection and that the people who live in Redcar work a long way away on Teeside, and that they have no means of posting their letters in time in the absence of such a collection?

Questions

Rent Restrictions Bill

( by Private Notice ) asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he can now state the arrangements the Government are making to provide legal advice in the Standing Committee which is now considering the Bent Restrictions Bill?

The Government are anxious to do all in their power to assist the Committee in its work, and to this end I have approached the Chairman of the Committee of Selection and have informed him that the Government would be gratified if the Committee could see their way to add the name of Mr. Attorney-General to the Committee for the consideration of the Rent Restrictions Bill.

In view of what the right hon. Gentleman has said, will he explain why the Attorney-General was not on the Committee before.

Industrial Disputes

( by Private Notice ) asked the Minister of Labour if he is yet in a position to announce the name of the Chairman of the Committee which is to examine the questions of registration and a guaranteed week with a view to giving effect to the Shaw Report?

I am very glad to be able to inform the House that the right hon. Sir Donald Maclean has agreed to accept the Chairmanship of this Committee.

Business of the House

I beg to ask the Lord Privy Seal how far the Government propose to go to-night, in the event of the Eleven o'clock Rule being suspended? I would also like to know what business the Government propose to take on Friday?

The Motion to suspend the Eleven o'Clock Rule to-day was only placed on the Paper to insure that the House come to-day to a decision on Vote 10 of the Navy Estimates, should that not have been reached before 11 o'clock. The Government do not propose to take the Local Authorities (Emergency Provisions) Bill to-day, and the only business in addition to the Report of the Navy Estimates is the Report of the Resolution in Committee of Ways and Means, which is necessary in order that the Second Beading of the Consolidated Fund Bill may be taken tomorrow.

The Government propose to ask the House on Friday next to give a Second Beading to the London Traffic Bill, notice of the introduction of which was given last night.

Ordered,

"That the Proceedings on Consideration of Supply [20 th March ], Report be exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings, of the House)."—[ Mr. Clynes .]

Peeresses

I beg to move,

It is a fact that this House is responsible to women as electors. The other House, being a non-elected body, is out of touch with women, and it is all the more important that women should be there to help in the guidance of decisions on social questions and many other problems with which they are peculiarly fitted to deal. I imagine that there will be no opposition to my Motion. I ask the Government to give facilities for the Bill to pass. I believe that the Government is already pledged to such a Bill. Time after time I have heard members of the Labour party declare their affirmation of the principles of the Bill, and as it is obvious that there could be no Amendment to the Bill it should pass through Committee in half an hour. The Government, therefore, might still find time to give facilities for the Bill. Obviously the Government have no scruples on the ground of additions to the peerage, for they have already made peers. There is no reason why they should not continue that practice by adding a few women who, by long service, have deserved whatever honour can be given to them. It is a deplorable fact and a scandal that in the lists of honours so few women's names have ever appeared. I am sure that Labour Members will agree with me in that statement. I want to give them an opportunity of placing in the House of Lords those women who, by their services to the community, have deserved whatever honour a Government can give them. The passage of the Bill would give women an opportunity of exercising that influence and experience which have so long been theirs.

I wish to oppose the Motion, because I am a democrat. I hold that nobody has a right to legislate unless he or she has been elected by his or her fellow citizens. Every woman who sits in this House has been elected by her constituents. The principle underlying this Bill is that people should be sent to another place to legislate because somebody has selected them. I do not care who goes there, but I hope that our party will never sink to do such a thing, if we want the principle of democracy to be maintained. Why did we send a certain number of people to the House of Lords? Because it was essential, because we wanted someone in the House of Lords to defend the policy of the Government in the Commons. We could have done more; we could have packed the House of Lords as Mr. Gladstone predicted he would do if a certain policy was not proceeded with. [HON. MEMBERS: "Not Gladstone."] Long before the right hon. Gentleman below the Gangway was heard of, long before he became the wizard of Wales, and the blizzard of Britain, a threat was used in this House by a greater man than any now sitting here, with all due respect. He promised that if certain things were not done in another place he would make sufficient peers to control the destinies of Parliament. [An HON. MEM- BER: "His point of view."] His point of view and my point of view now. My point of view is that no man or woman ought to have the right to make laws for their fellows without they have been elected by their fellows. Therefore, the idea of transferring people to another House for the purpose of making laws to control the destinies of the nation is absolutely repugnant, and, on the broad democratic principle of the right of the people to elect their governors, I object to this Bill.

Division No. 31.]

AYES.

[4.1 p.m.

Ackroyd, T. R.

Dunn, J. Freeman

Hudson, J. H.

Adamson, Rt. Hon. William

Dunnico, H.

Huntingfield, Lord

Adamson, W. M. (Staff., Cannock)

Eden, Captain Anthony

Hutchison, W. (Kelvingrove)

Alexander, A. V. (Sheffield, Hillsbro')

Edmondson, Major A. J.

Iliffe, Sir Edward M.

Allen, R. Wilberforce (Leicester, S.)

Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty)

Isaacs, G. A.

Alstead, R.

Edwards, G. (Norfolk, Southern)

Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S.

Ammon, Charles George

Edwards, John H. (Accrington)

Jackson, R. F. (Ipswich)

Astor, Maj. Hn. John J. (Kent, Dover)

Egan, W. H.

Jenkins, W. (Glamorgan, Neath)

Astor, Viscountess

Emlyn-Jones, J. E. (Dorset, N.)

Jephcott, A. R.

Attlee, Major Clement R.

England, Colonel A.

Jewson, Dorothea

Ayles, W. H.

Erskine, James Malcolm Monteith

John, William (Rhondda, West)

Baird, Major Rt. Hon. Sir John L.

Eyres-Monsell, Com. Rt. Hon. B. M.

Johnston, Thomas (Stirling)

Baker, W. J.

Falconer, J.

Johnstone, Harcourt (Willesden, East)

Banton, G.

Ferguson, H.

Jones, C. Sydney (Liverpool, W. Derby)

Barclay, R. Noton

Finney, V. H.

Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)

Barnes, A.

Fisher, Rt. Hon. Herbert A. L.

Jones, Rt. Hon. Leif (Camborne)

Becker, Harry

Fletcher; Lieut.-Com. R. T. H.

Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)

Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W.

Foot, Isaac

Kedward, R. M.

Bentinck, Lord Henry Cavendish-

Franklin, L. B.

Keens, T.

Birchall, Major J. Dearman

Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.

Kennedy, T.

Bird, Sir R. B. (Wolverhampton, W.)

Gardner, J. P. (Hammersmith, North)

Kenworthy, Lt.-Com. Hon. Joseph M.

Black, J. W.

Gates, Percy

Kenyon, Barnet

Blundell, F. N.

Gaunt, Rear-Admiral Sir Guy R.

King, Captain Henry Douglas

Bondfield, Margaret

George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd

Lambert, Rt. Hon. George

Bonwick, A.

George, Major G. L. (Pembroke)

Lansbury, George

Bowater, Sir T. Vansittart

Gosling, Harry

Lawrence, Susan (East Ham, North)

Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W.

Gould, Frederick (Somerset, Frome)

Lawson, John James

Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive

Gould, James C. (Cardiff, Central)

Leach, W.

Briscoe, Captain Richard George

Graham, W. (Edinburgh, Central)

Linfield, F. C.

Brittain, Sir Harry

Gray, Frank (Oxford)

Livingstone, A. M.

Broad, F. A.

Greene, W. P. Crawford

Lloyd-Greame, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip

Brown, A. E. (Warwick, Rugby)

Greenwood, A. (Nelson and Colne)

Loverseed, J. F.

Brown, James (Ayr and Bute)

Grenfell, D. R. (Glamorgan)

Lumley, L. R.

Brunner, Sir J.

Grigg, Lieut.-Col. Sir Edward W. M.

Lunn, William

Buckingham, Sir H.

Grundy, T. W.

McCrae, Sir George

Buckle, J.

Guinness, Lieut.-Col. Rt. Hon. W. E.

MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Aberavon)

Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James

Gwynne, Rupert S.

M'Entee, V. L.

Burnie, Major J. (Bootle)

Hacking, Captain Douglas H.

Macfadyen, E.

Butler, Sir Geoffrey

Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton)

McLean, Major A.

Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R.

Hall, G. H. (Merthyr Tydvil)

Macnaghten, Hon. Sir Malcolm

Cayzer, Sir C. (Chester, City)

Hamilton, Sir R. (Orkney & Shetland)

Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

Cayzer, Maj. Sir Herbt. R. (Prtsmth. S.)

Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry

Macpherson Rt. Hon. James I.

Chapple, Dr. William A.

Harland, A.

Maden, H.

Church, Major A. G.

Harris, John (Hackney, North)

Makins, Brigadier-General E.

Churchman, Sir Arthur C.

Hartington, Marquess of

Marley, James

Cluse, W. S.

Hartshorn, Rt. Hon. Vernon

Martin, F. (Aberd'n & Kinc'dine, E.)

Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R.

Harvey, C.M.B.(Aberd'n & Kincardne)

Middleton, G.

Cobb, Sir Cyril

Harvey, T. E. (Dewsbury)

Mills, J. E.

Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips

Hastings, Somerville (Reading)

Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)

Cope, Major William

Hayes, John Henry

Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C.

Cove, W. G.

Hemmerde, E. G.

Morris, R. H.

Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities)

Henderson, A. (Cardiff, South)

Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.)

Cowan, Sir Wm. Henry (Islington, N.)

Henderson, W. W. (Middlesex, Enfield)

Morrison-Bell, Major Sir A. C. (Honiton)

Craig, Captain C. C. (Antrim, South)

Henn, Sir Sydney H.

Morse, W. E.

Crittall, V. G.

Hill-Wood, Major Sir Samuel

Mosley, Oswald

Davies, Ellis (Denbigh, Denbigh)

Hirst, G. H.

Moulton, Major Fletcher

Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale)

Hobhouse, A. L.

Muir, John W.

Davison, J. E. (Smethwick)

Hodge, Lieut.-Col. J. P. (Preston)

Muir, Ramsay (Rochdale)

Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.)

Hodges, Frank

Murray, Robert

Dawson, Sir Philip

Hoffman, P. C.

Nall, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Joseph

Dickson, T.

Hogbin, Henry Cairns

Naylor, T. E.

Dixey, A. C.

Hogg, Rt. Hon. Sir D. (St. Marylebone)

Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter)

Dodds, S. R.

Hope, Rt. Hon. J. F. (Sheffield, C.)

Newton, Sir D. G. C. (Cambridge)

Doyle, Sir N. Grattan

Horlick, Lieut.-Colonel J. N.

Nixon, H.

Dukes, C.

Howard, Hon. G. (Bedford, Luton)

O'Grady, Captain James

I certainly protest against the Measure.

Question put,

"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable Peeresses in their own right to sit and vote in the House of Lords."

The House divided: Ayes, 313; Noes 45.

Owen, Major G.

Shaw, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Preston)

Vaughan-Morgan, Col. K. P.

Paling, W.

Shepperson, E. W.

Viant, S. P.

Palmer, E. T.

Short, Alfred (Wednesbury)

Vivian, H.

Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan)

Simms, Dr. John M. (Co. Down)

Waddington, R.

Penny, Frederick George

Simon, E. D. (Manchester, Withington)

Ward, G. (Leicester, Bosworth)

Perry, S. F.

Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John

Ward, Lt.-Col. A. L.(Kingston-on-Hull)

Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.

Sinclair, Major Sir A. (Caithness)

Warrender, Sir Victor

Philipson, Mabel

Sitch, Charles H.

Watson, Sir F. (Pudsey and Otley)

Phillips, Vivian

Smillie, Robert

Watson, W. M. (Dunfermilne)

Pielou, D. P.

Smith, Ben (Bermondsey, Rotherhithe)

Watts-Morgan, Lt.-Col. D. (Rhondda)

Pilditch, Sir Philip

Snell, Harry

Webb, Rt. Hon. Sidney

Pilkington, R. R.

Somerville, Daniel (Barrow-in-Furness)

Wedgwood, Col. Rt. Hon. Josiah C.

Ponsonby, Arthur

Spencer, H. H. (Bradford, S.)

Wells, S. R.

Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton

Spero, Dr. G. E.

Weston, John Wakefield

Pringle, W. M. R.

Spoor, B. G.

Westwood, J.

Raffan, P. W.

Stanley, Lord

Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J.

Rathbone, Hugh R.

Starmer, Sir Charles

Wheler, Lieut.-Col. Granville C. H.

Rawson, Alfred Cooper

Steel, Samuel Strang

White, H. G. (Birkenhead, E.)

Raynes, W. R.

Stephen, Campbell

Whiteley, W.

Rea, W. Russell

Stewart, J. (St. Rollox)

Wignall, James

Rees, Capt. J. T. (Devon, Barnstaple)

Stewart, Maj. R. S. (Stockton-on-Tees)

Williams, David (Swansea, E.)

Remnant, Sir James

Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)

Williams, Dr. J. H. (Llanelly)

Rendall, A.

Sturrock, J. Leng

Williams, Col. p. (Middlesbrough, E.)

Rhys, Hon. C. A. U.

Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser

Williams, Lt.-Col. T. S. B. (Kennington)

Richards, R.

Sunlight, J.

Williams, Maj. A. S. (Kent. Sevenoaks)

Richardson, Lt.-Col. Sir P. (Chertsey)

Sutherland, Rt. Hon. Sir William

Williams, T. (York, Don Valley)

Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)

Tattersall, J. L.

Willison, H.

Robertson, J. (Lanark, Bothwell)

Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby)

Wilson, Sir C. H. (Leeds, Central)

Robertson, T. A.

Thomas, Sir Robert John (Anglesey)

Wilson, R. J. (Jarrow)

Romeril, H. G.

Thompson, Luke (Sunderland)

Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George

Rose, Frank H.

Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South)

Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl

Roundell, Colonel R. F.

Thomson, Trevelyan (Middlesbro, W.)

Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.)

Royce, William Stapleton

Thomson, Sir W. Mitchell-(Croydon,S.)

Woodwark, Lieut.-Colonel G. G.

Rudkin, Lieut.-Colonel C. M. C.

Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.)

Wragg, Herbert

Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)

Thornton, Maxwell R.

Wright, W.

Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)

Thurtle, E.

Yerburgh, Major Robert D. T.

Samuel, H. Walter (Swansea, West)

Tillett, Benjamin

Young, Andrew (Glasgow, Partick)

Sandeman, A. Stewart

Toole, J.

Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D.

Tout, W. J.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Scurr, John

Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. C. P.

Mr. Briant and Mrs. Wintringham.

Seely, H. M. (Norfolk, Eastern)

NOES.

Balfour, George (Hampstead)

Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich)

Seely, Rt. Hon. Maj.-Gen. J.E.B. (I. of W.)

Batey, Joseph

Hohler, Sir Gerald Fitzroy

Sherwood, George Henry

Beckett, Sir Gervase

Hughes, Collingwood

Stamford, T. W.

Bowyer, Capt. G. E. W.

James, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert

Tinker, John Joseph

Brassey, Sir Leonard

Leigh, Sir John (Clapham)

Wallhead, Richard C.

Buchanan, G.

Lowth, T.

Walsh, Rt. Hon. Stephen.

Burman, J. B.

Mackinder, W.

Ward, Col. J. (Stoke-upon-Trent)

Caine, Gordon Hall

Masterman, Rt. Hon. C. F. G.

Warne, G. H.

Cape, Thomas

Montague, Frederick

Windsor, Walter

Clarke, A.

Nicholson, O. (Westminster)

Wise, Sir Fredric

Climie, R.

Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

Wolmer, Viscount

Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William

Wood, Sir H. K. (Woolwich, West)

Davies, Sir Thomas (Cirencester)

Potts, John S.

Yate, Colonel Sir Charles Edward

Falle, Major Sir Bertram Godfray

Purcell, A. A.

Gardner, B. W. (West Ham, Upton)

Remer, J. R.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

Gavan-Duffy, Thomas

Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford)

Mr. J. Jones and Mr. Scrymgeour.

Guest, J. (York, Hemsworth)

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Briant, Viscountess Astor, Miss Jewson, Sir Robert Newman, Mr. Wignall, and Mrs. Wintringham.

Peeresses Bill,

"to enable Peeresses in their own right to sit and vote in the House of Lords," presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 85.]

New Member Sworn

Otho William Nicholson, esquire, Borough of Westminster (Abbey Division).

Notices of Motions

East African Colonies and Protectorates

On this day fortnight, to call attention to the Administration of our East African Colonies and Protectorates and Mandated Territories, and to move a Resolution.—[ Sir Sydney Henn .]

Over-Capitalisation of Industry

On this day fortnight, to call attention to the Over-capitalisation of Industry, and to move a Resolution.—[ Mr. Nichol, on behalf of Mr. Hardie. ]

Agricultural Labourers (Wages)

On this day fortnight, to call attention to the Wages of Agricultural Labourers, and to move a Resolution.—[ Lieut.-Commander Fletcher .]

London Traffic Bill,

"to make provision for the control and regulation of traffic in and near London, and for purposes connected therewith, presented by Mr. GOSLING; supported by Mr. Clynes, Mr. Henderson, and the Attorney-General; to be read a Second time upon Friday, and to be printed. [Bill 84.]

Message from the Lords

That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to make better provision for the health, local government, and finance of the borough of Haslingden; to consolidate the local rates leviable in the borough; and for other purposes." [Haslingden Corporation Bill [ Lords .]

HASLINGDEN CORPORATION BILL [Lords]

Read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

Selection (Chaimen's Panel)

Standing Committee A

Mr. William Nicholson reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Member from the Chairmen's Panel: Mr. Dennis Herbert.

Report to lie upon the Table.

Selection (Standing Committees)

Mr. William Nicholson reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee A: Mr. Groves; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Attorney General.

Mr. William Nicholson further reported from the Committee; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee A (added in respect of the Representation of the People Act (1918) Amendment Bill): Sir Leslie Scott; and had appointed in substitution; Mr. Waddington.

Standing Committee B

Mr. William Nicholson further reported from the Committee; That they had added the following Fifteen Members to Standing Committee B (in respect of the Legitimacy Bill and the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Bill): Viscountess Astor, Captain Bowyer, Captain Viscount Curzon, Mr. Foot, Mr. Hayes, Sir Gerald Hohler, Miss Lawrence, Sir Robert Newman, Mr. Rawlinson, Mr. Robert Richardson, Mr. Sexton, Lady Terrington, Mr. Tillett, Mr. Willison, and Mrs. Wintringham.

Mr. William Nicholson further reported from the Committee; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee B: Sir Leonard Lyle; and had appointed in substitution: Captain Brass.

Reports to lie upon the Table.

Southampton Harbour Bill

Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. *

Orders of the Day

Supply

[6TH ALLOTTED DAY.]

REPORT [20th March]

Navy Estimates, 1924–25

Order read for further Consideration of Eighth Resolution,

"That a sum, not exceeding £3,080,000, be granted to His Majesty to defray the Expense of Works, Buildings, and Repairs, at home and abroad, including the cost of Superintendence, Purchase of Sites, Grants-in-Aid, and other Charges connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1925."

Resolution further considered.

Singapore Naval Base

I beg to move to leave out "£3,080,000," and to insert instead thereof "£3,079,900."

The object with which I am moving this Amendment is to take exception to the policy which the Government have announced with regard to the island of Singapore. The subject is in itself one of sufficient importance to warrant another Debate, following that which took place last week, but in addition to the gravity of the decision which has been taken, there are circumstances making it specially necessary at the present time that the House of Commons should give very grave consideration to the views which have been urged. Hon. and right hon. Members are now in possession of certain communications which have taken place between His Majesty's Government and the representatives of our great Dominions. Their interest in this matter is very obvious. They themselves, or at least some of them, are much more concerned than, in the ordinary sense, we here might be regarded as being, and so much importance was attached to this great question that, at the last Imperial Conference, the representatives of the Dominions passed a Resolution stating in very explicit and definite terms their views in regard to the necessity of the fortification and extension of the docks at Singapore. These views expressed at the Imperial Conference have been greatly emphasised in the document now before the House of Commons.

Before I proceed to point out some of the opinions which have been expressed, I should like to refer to a matter which I confess somewhat startles me. We were informed that His Majesty's Government were consulting with the representatives of the Dominions upon this question, but I confess I have never seen consultation take a more discourteous form. What His Majesty's Government did was to announce to the Dominions that they had come to a decision, without communicating to them the view which they had arrived at, and so far from consulting them, having announced their view they proceeded to give the Dominions the opportunity only of making protests. No chance was afforded of doing anything to alter the judgment of His Majesty's Government before it had been finally formed. Now, when we get the result of the communications from the Dominions, what we find is this. The great Dominion of Canada does not feel she can pronounce any opinion at all. On the other hand, the oldest of our Colonies, Newfoundland, very strongly expresses its protest against the course which His Majesty's Government propose to take. The Government of South Africa indicate their view that this is a favourable opportunity to make the gesture of which the Prime Minister has spoken. On the other hand, the Dominions which are mainly concerned, New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia, have entered, not only a most emphatic protest against this policy, but have expressed their dismay that such a judgment should be arrived at by His Majesty's Government in the centre of the Empire. I do not stop at the moment to read the form in which these protests are expressed, but I should like, if I may, at this stage to read what Mr. Bruce, the Prime Minister of Australia, says: measures which are required to be taken at Singapore. New Zealand has already voted £100,000 for the purpose, and Mr. Bruce has expressed the intention of Australia to give a very substantial contribution. As he states in the document now before the House, theirs is a small community struggling at the present time to develop their country, and therefore not in the position to afford very large sums for armaments. He says:

Will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to indicate to the House the actual words used?

Yes, I can remember the phrase which my hon. Friend used. What he said was that they did it in the teeth of the opinion of the Board of Admiralty. I took a note of it, and I looked it up again only this morning, and I do not think my hon. Friend will have much comfort if he goes to the OFFICIAL REPORT. In fact, he was so anxious to prove to the House that they were a body of strong men, subservient to nobody, that he used that rather violent language in order to describe their attitude. As I say, the disclosure is a really significant thing, and if we are entitled to draw any inference at all from it I should imagine it reveals the extreme anxiety of the naval advisers of the Government not in any respect to be associated with such a policy. With this preliminary observation I should like now to deal with the merits of this question. The first point we have to consider is the importance of Singapore in the defence of the Empire? I do not propose to address the House at any length upon that question because the Government have entirely conceded the naval case. Perhaps it is right I should advert to the language which the Prime Minister used, but I am sorry to say I have not at hand the quotation from the Prime Minister's speech.

The right hon. Gentleman said more than is in the White Paper. What he did say to the House was that Singapore was the place for such a base. He used the phrase, "second to none in those waters for the purpose," and went on further to state his view that for all purposes, both of offence and defence, Singapore was a situation of the very highest importance in those seas. Accordingly I do not require to prove any case against the Government in that connection, and if the House will allow me for a moment I would like to say a word as to how the picture of the world situation strikes my mind at the present moment. We have a vast Empire but it is very widespread, and it is, if I may say so, a sprawling Empire. It cannot be an Empire at all unless you get an absolutely safe means of communication from one end of it to the other, and, in particular, it is of the first moment that you should be able to depend upon the great sea routes which unite the various parts of the Dominions. There is only one means of such communication and that is the British Navy. The British Navy is not merely the pride of all British citizens wherever they are on the face of the globe, but it is the real link which connects all our Dominions. You will find in what Mr. Massey says an eloquent statement as to the view which our people overseas take of the position of the British Navy and what a calamity they would regard it, if in any part of the great seas of the world it should be found impossible for the British Navy to operate. There is no doubt at all that if you once reach a position in which the British Navy is unable to guard your various peoples, you put a very severe strain on some of the links which bind some of our Colonies and Dominions to us.

How does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that the British Navy can guard the people of Canada except by good will?

It certainly can guard the people of Canada so far as sea power can do it. The hon. and gallant Member is really considering only one possible enemy to Canada, which is, after all, the least likely enemy in the world, but Canada may have other enemies which would attack upon the seas, and I think the hon. and gallant Member knows very well that suggestions have been made in the past of causes of irritation which would possibly bring about such an event. We hope they never will. The British Navy can only operate if you have places at which your ships can refuel, and refit, and repair, and two such examples you can readily find in Gibraltar and Malta. The third of the great trio which have acted as these points in the past has been Singapore, which occupies one of the most important places on the earth's surface, so far as we are concerned and so far as our interests go. It dominates seas on the perimeter of which you have Australia, and New Zealand, and India, territories which represent three-fourths of all the British territories in the world, and which carry three-fourths of all the population over which the King reigns. If you abandon Singapore, or if you make Singapore too weak to serve your purpose, it is perfectly plain that there is no means of defence whatsoever for the great countries to which I have referred. What is your next nearest naval base? It is Malta, which is 6,000 miles away from Singapore.

Has it ever been suggested by anybody that Australia and New Zealand could be defended from the Cape of Good Hope?

It may be nearer than Malta. Of that I am not quite certain, but it is certainly nothing like so near as Singapore. If you leave Singapore to get into a condition in which it becomes ineffective as a naval base, you are in effect saying to the Dominions: "We are no longer in a position to defend you should any action be taken against you," and it really means, to all intents and purposes, that you wash your hands of any possible defence so far as that portion of your Empire is concerned. That, in the military sense, but let me refer to another matter which perhaps in peace time appeals more to one's judgment. These seas in which Singapore is carry every year £1,000,000,000 worth of cargo to Great Britain. I do not suppose that that could be said of any other seas in the world. They carry practically all the rubber that comes to us, practically all the jute, all the hemp, all the wool, all the zinc ore, and many other commodities which are of the first essential to our ordinary manufacturing industries. At any day in the year there would be afloat upon that sea something over £150,000,000 worth of ships and cargoes belonging to Great Britain. I suggest to the House that that is a very sufficient reason for making efficient the naval base from which you propose to defend interests so immense and vital to your very existence.

The arguments that have been put up against us are various. I do not propose to deal at length with any except those which have guided the judgment of the Government in arriving at their conclusion, but in case I should be supposed to be ignorant of, or to ignore, other arguments, I should like to mention three which have been commonly stated against carrying out these operations at Singapore. The first to which I will refer is the question of expense. What we wish to have done at Singapore at the present time is nothing more than this: it is to bring it up into the efficient condition in which it was before the War, relatively to the vessels which then required the use of its harbours. As everyone knows, there has been a great increase in the size of ships in recent years, and what has happened is that a dock which previously was efficient for its purpose is now not nearly large enough to take any battle cruisers of the new type, and still less I those bulged capital ships which are I supposed to be thus protected against the submarine. The docks cannot even take in our ordinary aeroplane carriers, and the result is that none of our great vessels upon which a fleet depends could be repaired or refitted at Singapore so long as it is in its present condition. It cannot, in fact, take in anything larger than a light cruiser. I venture to suggest to the House that there is nothing very extreme in the suggestion that, having a base of that kind in these waters of such vast importance, you should at least make it efficient for your purposes, rather than have one which is totally inadequate for modern needs. But then we are told that it will cost expense. What is the expense? The capital cost of the whole operation is estimated at £11,000,000, spread over ten years—£11,000,000 as an insurance for a wealth of cargoes and ships representing £1,000,000,000 in the year. No one can say that that is an excessive insurance for the safety of our trade. It represents only one and a half times the value of a capital ship, and I am sure that it would prove to be very much more valuable, and save you perhaps in the long run the expense of many capital ships if only you would to-day make it efficient.

The second point which is often put is that the day of the great capital ship is over, and that by spending money upon, docks which are to accommodate these vast vessels, you are only wasting money, or at least spending money now which may prove in the immediate future not to be required. I had something to do with the question of capital ships. It happened that I was put upon a Committee appointed by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd-George), to investigate this whole matter, and at that time I was Chancellor of the Exchequer. I went on to the Committee fully prejudiced against the capital ship, because it was one of the great costs which the Exchequer had to bear, and if upon the evidence it had been possible for me to find that the day of the capital ship was over, I certainly would readily have voted for that decision. We had evidence from every quarter, we sought evidence from all who had written or spoken about it, but the Committee unanimously came to the conclusion—and at least three of us started in the same state of mind as I did—that it would be unsafe and would bring about a condition of insecurity such as we could not have defended if we were to decide to scrap the capital ship and go in for the smaller craft only. That is the opinion not merely of this country, but every great naval power has adopted the same point of view, and, accordingly, it would be rash madness if we were to take the view that we could dispense with capital ships in the future.

It is upon none of those points, however, that the Government have decided. The Government have accepted the view put before them by their naval advisers, and have formed the opinion that, upon quite other grounds, they should resist that advice. They make no mention of the expense, they take no account of the question of the size of the ships which are to use these docks, but they plume themselves upon a view much higher than that which they expect to appeal to the minds of ordinary men. They tell us that their attitude in international matters is one of peaceful co-operation, and that if they embark upon this expenditure at Singapore, they will give an impression of bad faith to those whom they are endeavouring to persuade at the present time to abandon armaments altogether. They say that this is a time to make a moral gesture to the world, and that if we go on with these works at Singapore we shall be doing something that is provocative. I confess that I entirely fail to understand the theory that any of the operations proposed at Singapore can be provocative to anybody. I suppose the Power which would be assumed to be provoked is Japan, but we all know what Japan's attitude was at the Washington Conference. Lf we did not know it before, we learned it the other day from a speech which Lord Balfour made in another place, when he disclosed the fact that it was well known to everybody at the Washington Conference that Singapore was not only excluded from the purview of the Washington arrangements, but that Britain intended to fortify Singapore and to make it efficient for all the purposes for which she required it. Therefore, it seems to me to be out of the question to say to-day that Japan is going to be provoked by anything that we do in this regard.

In the current year Japan is spending £2,000,000 sterling on making her docks more efficient. Are we provoked by Japan in that act? Are we taking any exception to Japan increasing the efficiency of her dockyards? And we must remember that Japan is just as near to Singapore as Singapore is to Japan. The theory that any provocation is going to take place by these works at a distance from each other of 3,000 miles, when the obvious necessity of our protecting our commerce is there, seems to me to be wild in the extreme. But then it is said that our good faith would be suspected. The Prime Minister puts it in this way: the air? There was a very significant passage in the Prime Minister's speech in the House, last Tuesday, in which he said:

To put this matter to a very slight test, what has been the effect up to now in the way of re-establishing the Prime Minister's good faith as a result of his announcement? I looked through the French papers hoping I would see there some indication that this self-denial on our part was going to influence their minds favourably towards us. What was the comment that was made almost universally? It was that it was a device on our part to bring all our ships back to the Mediterranean, in order to be ready for any action that we had to take there. The situation, indeed, to-day is, to my mind, almost grotesque. We are told we ought to make this moral gesture. We on this side of the House are as much in favour of bringing about peace in the world as anybody on the opposite side. No people who have gone through the War horrors, which all the civilised nations of the world have lately endured, will ever want in their time again to see anything in the shape of conflict as between the nations. We all desire to create the spirit of peace wherever possible throughout the world, but, after all, we still live in an imperfect world. That is not surprising, because we have only had two months of Socialist Government in this country. Most of us, although we would like to trust everybody, lock our doors at night. If we did not do it, the chances are that our resources would not put us in a position to help any cause or anybody very much in the future. The Prime Minister tells us that what he is pursuing is the absolute ideal. I hope we are all pursuing the absolute ideal, but I do not think he will expect to bring it to realisation even next week, or next month, or next year, and we shall have a long process to go through before we reach a condition in which we can begin to regard everybody in the world as trustworthy, and as unnecessary all precautions which ordinary wise men take. We are called sometimes by hon. Gentlement opposite, Militarists and Jingoes, because we seek to make the naval and military establishments of our country sufficient to meet our requirements. But you might as well say that a man who insures his life wants to die, or you might as well say that a man who insures himself against accidents really wants to be run over by a 'bus. [An HON. MEMBER: "Fire"!] In the case of fire, I believe there are some people who want a fire after they have insured against it, but they are not very numerous and not very reputable.

5.0 P.M.

These are the ordinary precautions which wise men take. You tell us to have faith, but the most idealistic religion I know in the world never left faith to stand alone as the maxim of mankind. Faith, as I understand it, was always associated with works. You were never to allow the exhaltation of faith to lead you to neglect the necessity of activity on your part, and I venture to think the activity of these works at Singapore would give you very much more justification for faith in the security of your Empire. If I may be permitted to recall it, I remember an old Scots lady who, in the days before the Forth Bridge was built, went down to the Queen's Ferry to cross to the Fife coast. When she reached the ferry it was a very stormy day, and she said to the ferryman, "Is there danger?" and he said, "Oh, yes, but we must always trust in Providence." Upon which the old woman said, "If that is all you are trusting to, I am gaun round by Alloa Brig." She was perfectly right. She was right even from the idealistic point of view. You are never entitled to run into danger, and then blame Providence for the consequences. You are not entitled to take risks, and then say you acted from high motives. What the Prime Minister, as it seems to me, ought to recollect, is that he is a trustee, and he is a trustee for the greatest heritage in the world. The subject of his trust is the British Empire, and whatever may be said of its blunders, its errors, and its follies, the fact still remains that it has been the greatest instrument for the advancement of civilisation and the welfare of mankind that has ever been constructed by the hand of man. If I might venture to use a legal phrase, I would say that he is not entitled to invest in projects which do not afford a trustee security. It is his business not to take any avoidable risks, but to keep the Empire safe. If our good faith has not already been made plain to the world in our desire for peace, then it is perfectly certain that to strip ourselves of some part of our defences at Singapore while we increase our Air Force and our Fleet is going to convince no one. The real fact is that nobody who has given any thought to this matter really believes in this defence on the part of the Government for their action. This message is not addressed to the Chancelleries of the world. They would make short work of it if it were. I cannot imagine many people giving it any credit. The Prime Minister must not believe that the more amiable atmosphere he finds in Europe to-day in connection with some of his negotiations has been created by his gesture. The inflexible march of events, financial and economic, are the potent influences which have created the change in Europe. This is not a large gesture to the world; it is a backward nod to the people who sit behind him. It is a sop to the pacifists who gave him their votes on the ground that he was going to scrap armaments, and who are now getting restless because they see the change of policy in his naval and air preparations. We, for our part, do not propose to support proposals which, while weakening the security of the Empire and estranging the loyal sentiments of our fellow-citizens overseas, serve only to make a surrender of the present responsibilities of Ministers to their profligate pledges in the past.

I have no cause of complaint whatsoever against the address which has just been delivered to the House. Before I come to the case I have to present, I want to deal with one or two points which were raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) and correct, if I may say so with all respect, some of the misapprehensions he seemed to feel. I want to make it clear, with regard to the point he tried to make against the Prime Minister and my hon. Friend the Civil Lord that they quoted in effect what was the opinion of the Sea Lords. It was made quite clear, and I think the right hon. Gentleman will admit it when I tell him, that the Sea Lords themselves felt it was due to them +hat some explanation of their point of view should be given. Whatever may be the facts with regard to the Government themselves, the Government thought it was their duty to leave no doubt, so far as their advisers are concerned, that they advised certain lines and that the Government accept responsibility wholly and absolutely for the position they have taken up. The right hon. Gentleman made reference to the fact that in certain seas in the neighbourhood of Singapore there are some million tons of cargo to be found every day, and he tried to point out that Singapore was vital for their protection. He knows, as well as anyone in this House, that that was the reason why the cruisers were replaced and that these cargoes are protected by our cruisers without any regard to Singapore as a Naval base. It has been done in the years gone by and it can be done in the future, without any regard to the docks out there. He also say that there is no accommodation whatever for the new cruisers and for the carriers in the docks at present. That is quite a mistake. The docks can take the 10,000-ton cruisers that are about to go on the stocks, and it can take all the aircraft carriers, with the exception of one.

That is the answer to the point that has been raised. The right hon. Gentleman went on further to point out that capital ships have been decreased, and that if you make larger ships why have you not a right to make larger docks? What does he mean by that? He knows that capital ships have been scrapped in accordance with the terms of the Washington Agreement and that we have acted precisely the same as other Powers who were signatories to the Agreement. There is nothing in that point. It is not a question of making larger docks for larger ships. The position is no different in that respect to what it was some years ago. He also said that we put ourselves on a plane which was higher than the man in the street could understand. We believe that our point of view will appeal to the man in the street when he appreciates and understands the point of view of the Government. The Government have not taken their stand and are not basing their policy on any quibbling or dialectical argument. We will give the right hon. Gentleman and his friends all the case that can be made from the point of view of naval strategy. That has not been challenged at all. We have given them that from the commencement. We do not dispute the distance between Japan and Singapore. That also has been taken into consideration. As the right hon. Gentleman says, we must learn from experience. It is true we should, but some people do not seem to have learned anything from experience. What does the right hon. Gentleman mean when he says that we should not run risks because we are actuated by high ideals? Was not that the thing for which we called the men to the Colours in 1914? Risks were to be run because of the high ideals which were put before them, and why should not we make an appeal on similar grounds?

I want briefly to put a point of view that has not yet been put by the right hon. Gentleman. I want to clear the decks right away from all the encumbrances of dialectical argument, in the hope that we shall be able to shift the question on to an entirely different plane to that advanced by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillhead. I have only dealt with what he said, in so far as it was courteous that I should meet the points which he made in his statement. The question of naval and military strategy is not challenged. The Government take the view that it is the duty of their naval advisers to advise as to what they think is correct from their point of view. In that respect one can understand and honour, as we must, those gallant and distinguished gentlemen who, viewing the matter from their point of view, are bound to give the best advice they can. It is then for the Government to decide what line of policy they intend to pursue, having regard to the advice given to them. It is precisely on that ground, after hearing all those points and endeavouring to make the position of the Sea Lords clear to this House, that the Government decided to take the action they have taken. Is it too much to hope that, in view of the reports that have appeared in the Press of the desire of the American people that they should take some steps to relieve the world from the burden of armaments, that we should make a gesture in the hope that there may be some cooperation from other countries? The Prime Minister himself indicated, in a speech he made a few days ago, that he is building large hopes on an International Conference on disarmament or limitation of armaments. Supposing these efforts fail? Is it not worth while to have made a moral gesture and to have failed to get a response rather than not to have attempted anything? We shall be in a very much stronger position if, after exploring all these possibilities, after having made an attempt to see if we cannot get a better point of view in regard to armaments, we have to say that we have been compelled by the mere force of circumstances to go on with our naval and armament policy. The point of view of the Government of Australia has been quoted to-night, and quite rightly, but it is only fair to remember that there is another point of view in Australia with regard to this matter. I find, from a speech made in the Commonwealth Parliament, that the Leader of the Opposition there, Mr. Matthew Charlton, discussing this subject said, in reply to the present Prime Minister of Australia: late War, also that the only country against whom we shall be protected is still suffering, although not quite so much now as was at the first thought, from the effect of a disastrous earthquake, and that they are not likely to go in for any competition in armaments—in fact they have given an earnest of their desire to carry out the whole terms of the Washington Convention, and they have fulfilled these terms to the letter and in the spirit—we should proceed with this project.

Why, then, if that be the case, should we not make any gesture of this sort? I do not quite gather whether the right hon. Gentleman suggested that the cruiser programme was contingent upon this policy of the docks at Singapore or not; if he did, then I am bound to ask does he seriously suggest that the last Government proposed to lay down a certain number of cruisers immediately in relation to docks that were to take nine years to complete from the date of commencement? These two things have no necessary connection. The one has a sole regard to our necessary equipment, and the defence of our trade routes; the other can only be built up as a naval armament, and as an increase of armaments; at a time, too, when everybody is hoping and praying that every action will be taken, and every effort expended, particularly to reduce armaments.

The Prime Minister has already indicated and—I am glad to say—expressed the views of the Government, that if, after having explored the situation, and done everything possible to see if there is any response in any quarter of the world, any desire for a lightening of armaments, and not to expend this unnecessary money, if after having made this gesture, it only leads to another race in armaments, we should probably have to consider what steps should be taken to equip ourselves in the way of armament. I submit this Vote to this House with every confidence. In the respect I have indicated, it is now presented. In declining to go forward with this scheme, upon which, after all, whatever may be the opinion of some hon. Members, there is a question of some, difference even between naval men and military men and military strategists and others who have expressed themselves from time to time that they think it is unnecessary and unwarranted, we do well. If there is a difference of opinion among the experts, then even laymen may have some case! Having regard to the whole of our commitments, all that is necessary, and more important work, and having regard also to the views expressed by some hon. Members in regard to the defence of the heart of the Empire, surely it is unnecessary to go to the ends of the earth and sink this money out there in equipping this dock for which we hope there will never be any need!

Again, there seems to be an impression in some quarters that there are no docks at Singapore, and that it is not possible for our ships to be fuelled at Singapore. That is not so. For many years there has been adequate accommodation, so far as fuelling of our ships is concerned, and other arrangements can be made in the eventuality of a future war. The future of this matter depends very much upon the conduct not only of our Government, but of other Governments throughout the world. If a policy is to be pursued along lines leading to the pacification of the world, in arranging that we shall strengthen and enlarge the prestige and authority of the League of Nations, well and good; and I am bound to say that already some steps have been taken. If we could only get the co-operation and good will of the Members of this House the matter would go forward much more rapidly than at the present time. That would be a great defence for our Empire and a greater defence for the peace of the world than armed force and new docks in any quarter of the world. It is with a desire to explore that to its fullest extent, that we proceed, and with the hope that we shall get, at any rate, a response from other Powers, and good will expressed by other nations. We trust that the good will expressed by the nation in the Pacific may still be continued, and so render it unnecessary to go forward any more with this project. We come to the House and ask in confidence that the Government shall have the support of the House in this policy they are bringing in, and by so doing make one great step forward, and show a large desire, and a determined effort, to do something; to leave no stone unturned to bring about a more peaceful time on the face of the earth.

According to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty the Prime Minister has built large hopes of future peace upon cruisers, and not upon docks! That is the gist of the speech to which we have listened. Cruisers may be all very well as a moral gesture; docks are not. I have witnessed unique spectacles in this House, but little did I think that I should see a thrifty Scotsman, who has been Chancellor of the Exchequer—and may I say to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) a very good Chancellor too, for he instituted the Geddes Committee which was so much favoured by the right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord of the Admiralty, who sits beside him—actually encouraging a Socialist Government to spend money! I would ask the right hon. Gentleman what is the matter with the Washington Conference. The Washington Conference was negotiated during his term of office. The Washington Conference is not to conclude until May, 1936. Why build these docks until some nation has given notice that it will conclude and abrogate the Washington Conference? I asked that question last year. I ask it again to-day. Why commence building these docks which the hon. Gentleman representing the Admiralty says may not be ready for nine years? That I do not believe is an accurate representation of the fact. I believe that if these docks are pushed on they can be built in much less than nine years. In fact, the right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord said he was going to pursue them in a leisurely fashion.

I look at the matter from a strategic point of view. I have the strongest possible objection to the programme of the late Government and Singapore. This is to be a battleship base. I observe that Earl Balfour, in another place, said it was to be a secondary base. Let us come back to the facts. What is the enemy? Where is the enemy? Is it Germany? The German fleet is at Scapa Flow. Is it France? Is it Italy? Is it America? Is it Siam? There is but one great naval Power in the Pacific. That is Japan which signed the Washington Treaty with the British Government. It is repugnant to me to be talking of war with the devastating experience of the time between 1914 and 1918. Japan kept faith during that War. Do let us—and I say it with great deference to the House of Commons, to the Sea Lords, and to everybody else—visualise what a war with Japan would mean in the Eastern Seas. You have to protect your Eastern Seas. My hon. Friend says you are going to spend £10,500,000. Is it certain it will only be £10,500,000? May it not be £20,000,000? What is the character of the naval establishment that you are going to establish there? It is not a small matter. One would have thought, listening to the right hon. Gentleman, that it was a very small matter—just merely bringing up-to-date a secondary base. You are going to spend £10,500,000, which is the estimate for the new docks, but what will it be later? We have, according to a reply which was given to me yesterday, the main items, with their cost, contained in the £10,000,000 estimate. I find it says: "Works common to all departments, namely, wharf walls, basin, railways, roads, water supply, drains, dredging berth for floating dock, etc., £5,100,000; graving dock another £1,000,000; officers, residence, etc., £420,000; workshops £700,000: magazines £610,000; storehouses £470,000." These figures, I say, were given me yesterday. There was a significant fact at the end of the answer which said: the fortifications? I would rather invite the attention of the House to this: What is to be the size of the fortifications to make this into a secure naval base, considering that the only possible enemy in these seas is Japan? What are the fortifications? There was a very illuminating letter from Sir Ian Hamilton in the "Times" this morning. Sir Ian Hamilton, it must be remembered, was Inspector-General, and went all over this area in 1912. In the letter he says:

Why should we require more troops there to protect Singapore merely because it is proposed to have bigger docks than we require at the present time?

Here is the answer to that argument. General Sir Ian Hamilton asks why should you offer so terrible a temptation to the general staff of any great power as docks, for modern battleships without adequate land forces to protect them?

There is absolutely no necessity to keep a large land force on the spot, because you can bring it there in sufficient time.

Do let us consider this matter impartially. Why was the British garrison in South Africa not strengthened? Simply because it was thought that it would provoke the Boers to war. The very first thing, if you attempted to reinforce your garrison at Singapore, would irritate Japan, and probably produce war. I appeal to the House of Commons on this point. If you reinforce your base when you are experiencing strained relations you will make war certain. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Fareham (Sir J. Davidson) seems to forget that Singapore is 7,000 miles away.

I never suggested that you should send out these troops, because if you keep your garrison up to a maximum strength you do not require to do this.

If this base is to be kept ready for war, you must have everything ready for Japan's selected moment. That is the theory of war, and I have heard too much of this during the last few years. Let us assume that Japan is the enemy, and it is no use hiding the fact that Japan is supposed to be the enemy in this case. I have looked up in this publication the fleet of Japan at the present moment, and I find that the Japanese have 166 warships built and 75 building, making a total of 241. I ask the First Lord of the Admiralty what force do you propose to send to Singapore to cope with the Japanese fleet?

I assume you will say that 50 per cent. more than the Japanese fleet will be necessary, and that would mean that you would have to send to Singapore 360 warships. That is the basis of my argument. You would have to send your auxiliaries, mine-layers, sweepers, munition ships, colliers, store-ships, repair ships, hospital ships, aeroplane carriers and the rest. What is the length of 360 warships? I have made a little calculation. I am assuming that a warship is 300 feet long. [An HON. MEMBER: "They are more than that!"] I am always a very moderate person, and I will take the length as being 300 feet. Now 360 warships end to end would extend over a distance of 20 miles. Fancy 20 miles of warships going out to Singapore. Why, the whole thing is, a kind of naval comedy, and believe me that, unless you are going to send a fleet sufficiently strong, you had better not send any at all.

I feel sure that this question cannot have been thoroughly considered even at the Admiralty. I know the reason quite well. I have said previously in the House that in my opinion the Navy and the Admiralty have never been treated fairly. We have had eight First Lords of the Admiralty in nine years, and no First Lord has been able to make himself master of the situation in a little over a year. We were told by the right hon. Gentleman that we are doing £1,000,000,000 of trade per annum, and how are you going to protect our trade in the China Seas in case of a war with Japan? Just think it out for a moment. My right hon. Friend said the other day in a very powerful speech;

It is not a question of such a naval base at Singapore, because it would take half a dozen Portsmouths to fit out a fleet large enough to cope with the Japanese Fleet 7,000 miles away. I want to bring the House back to a sense of reality, and I want hon. Members to visualise what would happen in the case of a war with Japan. Let us get back to solid facts. Take the Japanese population. My hon. and gallant Friend has just spoken about the garrison at Singapore. The Japanese have a population all round Singapore, and is it not likely that in time of war there would be a good deal of sabotage, and, therefore, everything at that base would have to be protected?

We have been told that Australia desires to have this naval base at Singapore. I want to bring the House back to something which I regard as the most vital thing of all, and that is finance. We are spending about £130,000,000 on armaments, and that is about £3 per head of the population, whereas Australia is spending £3,426,000, and that works out at about 13s. per head of the population. New Zealand spends in this way 10s. per head of the population. I say to the House of Commons that we cannot go on extending indefinitely these military commitments. Believe me, you will come up against this expenditure some time, because it is unproductive expenditure. The right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment said that Mr. Bruce in his telegram stated: What about the old country? There is no country in the world suffering as we are suffering, nor any which is so highly taxed and has such an enormous army of unemployed as we have. I say with all sincerity that this naval base can be well postponed. I doubt if it ever can be built as a military asset to the Empire. Anyway, we have to consider our finance. We are paying to America the sum of £30,000,000 a year, and how long can we go on in this way? Hon. Gentlemen opposite are now egging on a Socialist Government to spend more money. This is a funny place.

What is the trend of public opinion which has to be combated? Apparently the idea prevalent in our democracy to-day is that public expenditure does not matter, but we have to show to the working men that unproductive expenditure or Government expenditure in almost every direction reacts most terribly on them. These are proposals which require some sacrifice on the part of the taxpayer. I am very strong about cruisers. I want to spend my own money, and I do not believe in the Chancellor of Exchequer or the late Chancellor of the Exchequer spending my money, because I believe I can spend it better myself. Therefore I want to keep it out of their maw. I want to keep the money of my constituents out of their maw, and we shall never get back to a sound system until we do, as Mr. Gladstone once said,

I have never had an opportunity as Civil Lord of the Admiralty of studying the strategy of this question, but it seems to me that if we follow the arguments used by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down to their logical conclusion our bounden duty would be to give up Singapore altogether. I do not desire, however, to follow the right hon. Gentleman because in the few minutes at my disposal I wish to put a certain proposition to the House. The Prime Minister, as I understand it, has decided to postpone the Singapore base for a sufficient period to allow him to investigate the possibilities of international disarmament. He definitely stated in his speech in this House on the 18th instant—and this has also been mentioned by the Parliamentary Secretary—that: confined to the Atlantic Ocean. It will not be able to operate in the Pacific Ocean.

The second policy is that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), and his policy is also destructive in a certain measure. It is a policy of spending additional money in order to provide an additional base. That is destructive in the sense that it destroys that sense of confidence which the Prime Minister wishes to create in order to carry out his policy. In the third place, we have the economic school represented by my hon. Friends below the Gangway opposite, and they say that the proposal of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook is destructive, because they say that any expenditure on armaments is unproductive expenditure. If armaments are not necessary everyone would agree with that premise. To the extent that it is necessary to spend money upon armaments it destroys the possibility of trade revival, and that destruction of trade revival prevents to some extent the absorption of our unemployed. I think, therefore, that the House will agree with me that each of these policies has within it a certain destructive element. There is also the political side. I quite agree that questions of high policy should always be divorced from party politics, but at the same time, from a practical point of view, any Prime Minister or any Government has to have some regard to what are practical politics. In that connection I was very much struck the other day by reading an article by a well known writer, in which he advocated the construction of the Singapore base for two whole columns of the paper, and then at the end suggested that it should be postponed for this reason:—

Those are merely the military and naval conditions, but it is the economic conditions that urge a country to take action in any special direction. The Japanese islands have a population of some 50,000,000, the density of population being 370 persons to the square mile. Of the land in Japan, a great deal is unproductive and uninhabitable, and so the extent to which the crop upon which they depend, namely rice, can be grown, is limited. Their annual increase of population is 700,000, and that is what causes Japan to turn her eyes to other countries. Let us consider where she can go. She necessarily wants to go to the South, where the climate is warm. The Philippines have a population of 87 to the square mile. In the Dutch East Indies the population is 20 to the square mile, and in French Indo-China it is 60 to the square mile; but when we come down to Australia and New Zealand, from which the Japanese are excluded, the density of population is only 1–8 per square mile. We have this further fact, that a great portion of the northern territory of Australia is not fitted for a white population, but the Japanese are precluded from emigrating there. We have a still more significant fact, so far as Japan is concerned, and that is that her demand for racial equality was denied her in the Treaty of Versailles, and she obviously will set about getting it in some other way. Her Government is in the hands of a determined militarist oligarchy. I would, therefore, recommend any statesman in the position of the Prime Minister to realise the fact that, with a country bound by these conditions, and having an active army of 4,500,000 trained men, he has no business to gamble with the safety of this Empire.

I would suggest to the Government that they are being misled by the impression which the horrors of war, and especially the horrors of aerial war, have produced upon their minds. It seems to me that there are two quite different conditions which we have to consider in regard to disarmament. One is the difference between highly civilised and contiguous countries, in which the new type of aerial warfare can be used, and those which are separated by great distances. It is quite possible that, under the ægis of the League of Nations, we may eventually arrive at a United States of Europe in which there will be disarmament; but those very conditions which impress upon the people, not only of this country, but of other countries, that they cannot afford to go to war, because, perhaps within 24 hours, they will be bombed out of existence—those very conditions do not impress themselves upon the people of Asia, owing to the fact that they are too far away to be frightened in that sense. That, I think, is a condition which the Prime Minister has to consider, and he should not be led away by his disarmament theories simply because he is meeting with a certain success in this House and in this country, and, perhaps, outside this country, so far as disarmament is concerned.

We have also to consider, so far as the East is concerned, the fact that we have a re-orientation of naval power, and our Eastern Empire must depend for the present on our naval power, and not upon our aerial power. We have had a reorientation of that kind before. In 1904, Lord Fisher, with the genius that was his, foresaw what was happening in Germany. He withdrew the China Fleet, reduced the Mediterranean Fleet, and concentrated them in Home waters; but at the same time—and this is important—he reduced Trincomalee and Hongkong, shut down Esquimault, and built Rosyth. That is to say, he had to carry out a re-orientation of naval ships coincidently with a reorientation of the bases upon which those ships depend. What is the position today? The position is exactly the same. We have a re-orientation of naval power, and I would say in passing that that reorientation of power is not at our behest, but is imposed upon us by other nations. We have to place our ships strategically in the position that is most suitable from a strategic point of view, and from a strategic point of view only. The Naval Staff cannot allow themselves to consider whether one country is friendly or not; they have to consider what may happen in the worst possible case, and the whole of our strategic dispositions have to be carried out on that basis.

6.0 P.M.

When we come to consider the position to-day, we come to a very curious fact, because if we compare the number of vessels in the Navy to-day with those in 1904—not 1913—there are to-day only 40 large vessels in commission as compared with 66. When we turn to what is spent on the dockyards, we find we are spending to-day £7,000,000, with 40 ships instead of 66, as compared with £3,000,000 in 1904. When we come to what is spent on construction, we find there was £10,200,000 per annum spent in 1904 as against £5,800,000 to-day, and that, of course, is an inflated figure. If it were put on a comparative basis with 1904 it would be approximately £3,000,000, that is to say, we are permanently over dockyarded at home. I do not want the Prime Minister to increase the dockyard accommodation. I do not want him to spend any more money whatever. I want him to continue with his policy of making it plain to the world that he is making this friendly gesture. Let us redistribute our bases in exactly the same way as we are redistributing our ships. Let us, in fact, send Chatham to Singapore. You cannot do that physically, but you can do it by a financial operation, and I do not believe it will cost the taxpayer any money. If Chatham is developed as a commercial base and as an extension of the Port of London Authority, we have this fact, that to-day it could accommodate 15 vessels.

By building a tunnel from Tilbury to Gravesend, which has been investigated and reported upon favourably by persons such as Sir Alexander Boss and others, Chatham could be made an extension of the Port of London Authority and a great port for commercial shipping. It could connect, not only with London but with the industrial areas of the North and could become a great adjunct to this country. When we consider the actual cost we are met with a rather remarkable coincidence. The King Edward Dock, with which I should like to compare it, cost £4,100,000 and had a quay space of 12,000 feet. Chatham has 12,500 feet of quayage, with a depth of 32 feet. With very small expenditure it could be increased to 26,000 feet, and on the same basis of capitalisation, it would put the value of Chatham at £9,000,000. The Navy would be saved £1,500,000 a year in the upkeep of Chatham. There would be many difficulties I know. There would be the permanent staff and you would have the vested interest of your dockyard members and great pressure would be put upon the Government. But the process of change, which could be carried out as a financial operation, must necessarily take a period of years. You are not going to spend £10,000,000 on Singapore next year. It is a slow process of financial manipulation. The total cost of the commercial manipulation would be something like £3,000,000 or £4,000,000. As to the tunnel between Tilbury and Gravesend, Sir Maurice FitzMaurice is carrying out the borings and they are to be completed this month. I understand there is no difficulty from the engineering point of view. I would ask the Prime Minister to consider this suggestion very seriously because I think he would be satisfied from his point of view. He has made his friendly gesture. He is not increasing the expenditure on armaments. He is not increasing the bases. He is merely changing one from one place to another. I think right hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway opposite should be satisfied, because there is no eventual added cost to the country, but probably an economy, in the suggestion. So far as my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) is concerned, he would get his base at Singapore. What I suggest to the Leader of the House is, that if he will give an undertaking to set up a Committee of business men to investigate this proposition, and if they report upon it favourably, he will promise to continue with Singapore, and, pending the result of the inquiry he will continue with the work. If he will do that, I would ask my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench to withdraw their Amendment. If he will not give that promise, I ask hon. Members opposite to support our Amendment.

The question before the House presents an embarrassing number of aspects, each of which might be discussed with a bewildering amount of detail. I will endeavour to confine myself to what seem to be the fundamental points at issue, and will first give the arguments which, from a purely naval point of view and under normal circumstances, would certainly induce me to support what is known as the Singapore scheme. I pointed out last week that the centre of gravity in naval matters has now swung to the Pacific Ocean. Let me state a fact which is sometimes in danger of being overlooked, that our defence policy now must be an Imperial defence policy, and we must be willing to go some way towards meeting Dominion views in questions or defence. Home and Dominion defence policy can no longer be separated. The time has gone by when we could think in terms of Great Britain or in terms of a Colonial Empire. We now have to think in terms of the Commonwealth, and the immediate problem of the future is the co-ordination of the problems of Imperial defence. I share in the hopes which are founded in the League of Nations, but I myself regard the Commonwealth as a miniature League of Nations in action, and the League of Nations itself contemplates the employment of force in making effective its decisions. The power of our Commonwealth to act for good in the world depends on our ability to put our defensive forces into operation. That is to say, it depends entirely on the mobility of our Fleet. We cannot now any longer hope to have decisive forces in every ocean, so more than ever the question of the mobility of the Fleet is of the first importance. The governing condition of naval policy must be the question of our ability to operate in Empire waters and the means of giving it the necessary mobility. I invite hon. Members not to let realisation of this fact be obscured by what is the fact, that the threat to this particular corner of the Commonwealth is the threat from the air. That is true. The visible threat to our security is the threat from the air, but the threat to the security of our Dominions is still from the sea.

In speaking of what I call the visible threat to us from the air, we must not overlook what I call the invisible threat to us, the threat to our trade, which comes to us from those Far Eastern waters, an invisible threat which began to materialise during the War when the enemy submarines reached their maximum point of activity and we had to begin to think about tightening our belts. The Dominions look to us to help them to achieve security from the sea, and in doing that we also achieve security for our trade in Far Eastern waters—that trade upon which our existence depends. If we think of that stream of shipping to and fro in Far Eastern waters coming home to us—our food, our wool, our dairy produce, all the necessities of our existence—the power to safeguard that trade depends upon our power to give our Fleet mobility to operate in those waters. It is recognised that the first problem in war is to bring decisively superior forces to the scene of action, but the corollary of that is that we must be in a position to maintain those forces in a condition of superiority over the enemy fleet, which has all the means it requires for support close at hand. To do that demands a base, and in point of fact the Navy is quite powerless for purposes of offence operating by itself. Unless the Navy has bases close up against the enemy's territory it is, practically speaking, powerless for any purposes of offence. If my point is proved that we require a base in those waters, all I can say is that, as far ad I know, naval opinion is absolutely unanimous in favouring Singapore for that purpose. As far as I know—and I only have the means of information available to any private Member of the House—there is not a single Flag Officer of war experience who does not agree that Singapore is the spot. May I also point out that the two parties who have had access to the papers on the question have also come to the same conclusion?

Singapore is the spot, because it is the concentration point for China, Australia, and India. It lies right on the flank of our trade route in the Far East. It also lies on the flank of any attack upon Australia coming from the North. Moreover, it is in the ideal position of guarding the Malay States, with all their vast possibilities. It governs the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, with all that involves to India and Africa, and it is the obvious spot for carrying on operations against super-submarine cruisers operating in the Indian Ocean—those submarine cruisers for which France fought so hard at the Washington Conference. If any hon. Member is inclined to doubt the force of these arguments I would only ask him to read them with a map open beside him and then to turn the question end for end and imagine to himself Singapore in the hands of a hostile force using it as a base for operations against the Dominions and against our trade. It would simply mean that all our security in those waters was gone. Who is prepared to guarantee the retention of Singapore if it is not developed? The Washington Conference precludes the development of Hong Kong, and forces us back on to Singapore. The retention of Hong Kong depends upon the ability to retain Singapore. If Singapore goes, Hong Kong goes, and then, I venture to think, everything goes.

Those are the main considerations, but they are by no means all. To take the matter a step further, I think it would be folly to ignore the satisfaction with which the decision to suspend the Singapore scheme has been received in one quarter, and that a quarter where I can only see a determination to assert equality with us, if not supremacy, in the Pacific Ocean. It is also folly to ignore the fact that America at the present time is going ahead with the development of Pearl Harbour. Let me take it a step further still. What is the march of events in China? As far as I can see, events in China may very well lead to the intervention of or negotiations by the Great Powers, and all our power to promote the welfare of China in such an eventuality must depend upon our power to speak with an equal voice with the other great Powers. That brings one back at once to the question of Singapore. At the present time I understand that China is glad to see our flag in her waters; in fact, she is inclined to ask more and more to see our flag on her rivers, knowing the security which it gives. But the ability of our small gun-boats to operate up the Chinese rivers depends in turn upon the operation of larger ships in deeper waters. There, again, we are brought back to the necessity of Singapore. In a word, our influence in Asia depends upon our ability to keep our word and to make good our word, and that depends upon our ability to operate in those waters.

What is it that one is talking of when one talks of the ability to operate in the oceans? There is no question whatever that the ability of our Fleet to operate all over the globe has been a godsend to the world. It has secured fairplay and an equal field for all comers. It is most significant to think of the various territorial expansions which have gone on side by side with the fact that we have enjoyed complete supremacy at sea. Germany built up her Empire overseas at the time, when she had practically no fleet upon which to base that expansion. She built it up at a time when our Fleet was supreme. Her mercantile marine was built up under the shadow of the British Fleet, and France and Italy have both accomplished territorial expansion whilst all the time our Fleet was supreme in all waters. These are the reasons which make me say that the ability of our Fleet to operate has been a godsend to the world and has given a fair field to all comers. Our ability to defend China's independence, if the necessity arises, our ability to guarantee the integrity of Chinese territory, and our ability to secure the open-door in China, will all depend upon the ability of our Fleet to operate in Far Eastern waters. I believe that to assist in the regeneration of China it may do more than anything else to prevent the outbreak of a struggle in the Pacific.

The Washington Conference was a compromise, and nothing else. It is no good looking upon it as much more than that. It was a compromise, and I am not at all sure that peace in the Pacific is not going to be better maintained by a strategical balance of power in those waters. The Conference did not assure peace. What it did was to give a breathing space to one of the parties concerned. I would ask the House to remember that Article 22 of the Treaty which was concluded at the Washington Conference lays it down that the provisions of the Treaty are, to all intents and purposes, to be abrogated in favour of any party which finds itself involved in hostilities. Broadly speaking, that is the effect of Article 22. If any good result came from that Conference I believe that it came because we went into the Conference strong. What is going to be the effect if we go into the 1931 Conference weak? In that case, I believe we shall come away with very little good accomplished. Suppose America had gone into the Washington Conference with her fleet half the strength of the Japanese fleet. I wonder how much would have been achieved.

The arguments of Sir Percy Scott have been mentioned, and certainly they deserve the respect due to an officer of most unusual intellectual activities and abilities, who may fairly be called the "Father of modern naval gunnery." The arguments which he has advanced in regard to Singapore are involved in the controversy known as that of the capital, ship. For the purpose of my argument I am perfectly prepared to make him a present of the capital ship argument. My argument is not based upon that. My argument is based upon the 10,000 ton ship in which the Washington Conference allows unrestricted competition, and it is also based upon the modern aircraft carrier of the future. Singapore is inadequate for craft of that description. It is inadequate for the 10,000 ton cruiser and for the aircraft carrier of the future. That being so, there is an end to Sir Percy Scott's argument as far as this question is concerned. There is one 10,000 ton dock at Singapore, but it is required for the purpose of the mercantile shipping passing through Singapore. In 1921. some 18,000,000 tons of shipping passed through Singapore. You cannot have it both ways; you cannot have that dock available both for mercantile shipping and for the purposes of a squadron of these 10,000 ton cruisers. The mercantile requirements in themselves are likely to require expansion at Singapore, and if that be the case what becomes of the theory about the provisions for mercantile shipping there having anything to lend to naval purposes? That is my reason for saying that Singapore is at present inadequate for this class of ship.

The further point has been brought out that floating docks might be employed in this respect. I believe I am right in saying that we have two floating docks and that one of them always formed part of the Singapore scheme. In any question of floating docks I do not know whether it is put forward on the ground of economy. If you take into consideration the expense that would be involved in dredging and the enormous expense that would be involved in towing, it will be seen that there will be very little economy effected by the employment of a floating dock in place of the construction of a graving dock.

I do not know whether it is necessary to go further into this question as regards the Washington Conference or Japan. It has been made perfectly clear that anything contemplated at Singapore is in no way opposed to the spirit of the Washington Conference. The discussion at Washington took place on the basis that we were going to go ahead with the Singapore scheme. With America knowing the vital importance of Panama to her, I do not think she was likely to quarrel with any decision of ours as to the development of Singapore. In any case, Singapore is, roughly, 400 miles away from what one might call the Washington Conference area, and 2,500 miles away from Japan. Southampton is 3,000 miles away from New. York. These figures make it perfectly clear that Singapore is a defence and not a threat.

I may be asked against what is it a defence? That is the sort of question that is often put in these discussions. We are asked, who is the enemy with which you are expecting to be at war? Who is the enemy against which Singapore is to be a defence? I ask the House to remember that there are factors now at work in the Pacific which in the past have almost invariably and inevitably made for war. It is no use not looking at facts because we do not happen to like them. Here are these forces at work in the Pacific which we have seen in history in the past making for war. Japan has an excess of population. She adds something-like 700,000 annually to her population. Another serious fact is that she cannot produce the food necessary to feed her population, she has to import it. She is faced with this problem of a rapidly increasing population and she feels that she has to do something here and now to provide for her children and grandchildren. Canada and America will not have them; Australia and New Zealand also say "No." Here you have what in the case of a virile race has almost inevitably made for war, and that is the absolute necessity for an outlet for surplus population and an ample provision of what the Prussians so genially call "cannon fodder" with which to fight for that outlet.

Another important factor which operates is steel and iron. Steel and iron are very fruitful causes of war and Japan cannot produce steel and iron. She has to import, and the Japanese manufacturers are fostering and stimulating a cry at this moment for Japan to become independent of foreign sources of supply for steel and iron. So you get a vicious circle—the need for iron and steel to get an outlet for her surplus population and the need for an outlet in order to get that iron and steel. Such is the case, as I see it, which can be advanced in support of the development of Singapore, and such is the case which would influence me if I were approaching the matter purely from the naval point of view or under normal circumstances.

I wish to give the reasons, as I see them, for supporting the Government in their decision to suspend the Singapore scheme. My reasons are found in the Prime Minister's words. Speaking last week he said: is as good as the security which Singapore would certainly give to our Dominions. That is why I ask hon. Members to keep an open mind upon the merits of this matter, and to remember that it has not been suspended either upon strategical or upon financial arguments, but because the Prime Minister says that he is engaged in trying new methods. But when he says that, he admits that the contingency of war remains, and he must accept the logical conclusion of his admission. In fact, I think that he is involved in certain inconsistency, because while the security of the Dominions is concerned in the Singapore scheme, he says that he is adopting other methods to achieve security, but when it is a question of security for these islands from the air, then his method is to build more aeroplanes, and when you come to the question of the security of the Dominions and security for our trade, then it seems to me that he compromises, because he says that he will adopt the old methods to the tune of five cruisers, which can, of course, in home matters be a substitute in international gesture for Singapore which will enable him to operate in Dominion matters. That is the inconsistency in which it seems to me he is involved. I agree that if that could be cleared up it would be well to have it done.

Turning to the question of responsibility. I have no intention of burning my fingers over that question. It is one which would be very difficult, and in any case it would be very inadvisable to lay down any hard and fast rule on the question of responsibility as between the Board of Admiralty and the Government. I think that for a nation which has been so obviously gifted by Providence with a perfect genius for governing by methods of rule of thumb, as we have been, it would be very unwise to try to lay down hard and fast rules in this matter. They are better not defined too closely. But on reading what has already been said, it seems to me that the Government accept responsibility for abandoning the Singapore scheme, but I do not see that they have accepted responsibility for the wider issue involved by that decision, because when their naval advisers recommended Singapore they were not recommending it as, if I may say so, a unit. They were recommending it as part of that general policy for guaranteeing the naval security of the Empire, and, so far as I can see, the Government so far have accepted responsibility only for ignoring the advice upon which the Singapore scheme is based, and I cannot see yet that they have accepted the responsibility for what is involved in that—namely, the inability of the Board of Admiralty to guarantee the naval defence of the Empire east of Suez. It seems to me to be only fair to the Board of Admiralty if that point is cleared up, and if it is made quite clear that in accepting responsibility for ignoring the advice about Singapore the Government are accepting responsibility for what follows from that advice—namely, the question of whether the naval security of the Empire can or cannot be guaranteed.

In addition to the question of responsibility I have heard things said about the Sea Lords and the question of resignations. I do not suppose that the Sea Lords are very much perturbed by what has been said, but it is also often said in that connection that it is very unfair to attack the Sea Lords in that way, because they are not in a position to defend themselves. I do not think that that is a very valid argument, because, after all, the Sea Lords always seem to enjoy the confidence of the Government, and if that is so they can rely fully on the Government to defend them, when these stories of threats of resignation spring up. I cannot myself claim that degree of familiarity with Sea Lords which would enable me to feel that contempt which some people without any acquaintance whatever with them seem to be able to feel, but my observation has led me to believe that there is very rarely any smoke about a Naval Lord of the Admiralty which is not followed by a raging conflagration. Therefore, with all this talk about resignations it is remarkable that there are so few resignations. Practically none ever take place. I remember that Lord Charles Beresford resigned on one occasion, but he was an Irishman of very mercurial temperament. Lord Fisher during the War also resigned, but with regard to that resignation we have to remember that he was serving under a very exceptional First Lord, and an exceptional man very often calls for exceptional methods.

What is the truth about this question of resignations? If you have a man of great ability, long experience, strong personality and great force of character then it is only natural that, when a policy in which he thoroughly believes is in dispute, he should perhaps grow a little restive, but if he does, and if resignation is ever talked of at the Admiralty, I am sure that it is upon this ground and that it is owing to a sense of duty. It is often very hard for a responsible officer to feel that he can go on doing his best work in support of a policy of which he disapproves, and if resignation is ever talked of I am sure that it is on those grounds and not on the ground of injured vanity or a wish to play the wrecker or to try to blackmail anybody into giving a decision in their favour. I believe that when there is any talk of resignations it springs from that sense of duty. After all, I dare say that it is not only professional advisers who become restive in their official positions, because at the present moment we have three ex-Prime Ministers in this House, and I dare say that they could all write interesting chapters headed "Resignations which I have received."

I hope I have made my position quite clear. Ah regards the strategical grounds in favour of Singapore I have said that in normal circumstances they would lead me to support the scheme, but I accept entirely the grounds upon which the Prime Minister has based his decision, and I earnestly trust that at a moment of such serious crisis as this, serious in regard to the state of affairs in Europe, this House will show a united front in supporting him.

I listened with great interest to the first part of the speech made by the hon. Member for the Basingstoke Division of Hampshire (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher), and I thought it extremely sane and sound, but when he got half way through there was a certain right about turn, and he left me absolutely amazed to think that he could espouse a cause which he knew was going to place our country in jeopardy, and put party before country. There is undoubtedly a feeling of great discontent in the country and in the Dominions at the decision of the Government. The Dominions feel that they have been absolutely betrayed by the decision that has been reached. They went to the Washington Conference, and they agreed to the disarmament proposals because they felt that a pledge had been given to them that the Singapore base would be constructed. Instead of fulfilling that pledge, the Prime Minister is to make a moral gesture, and is to make it at the expense of our friends and brothers so as to placate doubtful Allies in the future. Reference has been made to the communications which came from the Dominions, and to the statement of General Smuts, who welcomed the abandonment of the scheme. But General Smuts added these very significant words:

Hon. Members, who are turning down the scheme, said, when they were on this side of the House, that they wanted to see the dismemberment and disintegration of this great Empire of ours. Are they the people to go against expert opinion in a matter such as this? Not only that, but it is going back on our pledges, for we were practically pledged to the Dominions to continue the Singapore base scheme. If I might make the suggestion, I would at my own expense take five members of the Cabinet on a personally conducted tour to Singapore, so that they could have a look at the place. That must not be regarded as a bribe, but as a great responsibility. Someone might want their blood, but I would see that they were brought back safely to England. It would be another chapter in the "Pilgrim's Progress," if I conducted them there. A great point has been made that the completion of this scheme at Singapore would be an act of aggression. How can anyone conceive it to be that Singapore is 2,500 miles from Japan. Is it possible to be aggressive by building a dock? A dockyard cannot be aggressive. We agreed at the Washington Conference that we would give up Hong Kong, or not go on fortifying that place. For that reason it can be proved beyond doubt that our guarantees, as regards wanting peace, are good, and that we are not aggressive. The question of cost has been mentioned. It is said that the cost of the scheme will be £11,000,000, spread over 10 years. I regret to say that there has been in the Press and in the speeches of hon. Members opposite a lot of loose statements as to the cost. One hon. Member said that the cost would be £30,000,000. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who?"] He has been described by certain sections of the Press as an expert. I know him, and I know full well that he would not for a moment claim that he was an expert.

If the hon. Member refers to me, I never said it would cost £30,000,000.

I was referring to the hon. Member. I heard him say it would more probably cost from £20,000,000 to £30,000,000.

The hon. Member's friends have increased that to £30,000,000. They might as well say £50,000,000. Let us stick to the facts.

Let us stick to the facts. We hear about "making a moral gesture." I would like to know whether the Government have ascertained what would be the attitude of Japan in the event of our doing this. Ever since the Washington Conference Japan has continued strengthening her cruisers and her bases, and I have it on really good authority that she has strengthened Yokosuka and also the Bonin Islands south of Japan. I wonder whether the Government have made any inquiries as to Japan's position, and as to what she is doing there. The Liberal party at one time said that things have been retarded because of the earthquake in Japan. I maintain that the earthquake-has had very little effect on Japan's naval construction. Although it was said that there was no danger from Japan, it shows that they had at the back of their minds the idea that there was some menace there. We have to think of the policing and protecting of our trade routes. We import into this country annually £450,000,000 worth of food, and £400,000,000 worth of raw materials, and our mercantile marine must be protected.

We cannot forget what happened in these waters during the last War when the "Emden" got loose, and was in the Bay of Bengal—how she sank in a week seven of our merchantmen, then went on to Rangoon and stopped all sea communication between India and Burma. Next she bombarded Madras, fired oil-tanks there, and caused many casualties. Shortly afterwards she was at Cochin and sank another five merchantmen. The cost of these vessels and their cargoes was estimated at about £2,500,000. After that she went to Penang, where she sank the Russian gunboat "Tchemchug," and I saw the dead bodies of the victims floating in the water. Then she went down to the Cocos Island and tried to stop our telegraphic communications there, and it was the Australian cruiser "Sydney" which brought her to book and destroyed her. Australia did that for us, and yet we are not prepared to help Australia in the hour of need, should it arise. It is a suicidal policy on the part of the Government if they want to establish friendship with our Dominions and want to secure that great bond of Empire which will be in future, as it has always been, the greatest safeguard of peace.

Reference has been made to the population of Japan. We know that Japan is a highly populated country, and that it must expand. The right hon. Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) said that Japan did her part in the War, which is correct, but I have heard from Japanese that they thought they backed the wrong horse at that time. There were times when it rather looked like it. The Japanese would have no difficulty in appropriating the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies, if they chose to do so. If they did that, where would Singapore be? If Singapore were to go the next outpost of Empire to go would be India. There are these significant words written by the Marquis Okuma, who was twice Prime Minister of Japan. They were addressed to the Indo-Japanese Association: to the War, and is due in great measure to the lack of foresight on the part of this country. Let us do all we can to prevent war in future. The amount that we would have to spend on this scheme would be one of the cheapest insurances for peace that we could have, apart from all other considerations. Until further evidence of the desire for peace is shown by other nations, let us do all we can to be prepared.

The hon. Gentleman who has just spoken did not tell us that when the Australian cruiser "Sydney" destroyed the "Emden" at the Cocos Islands she was able to leave the transport of Australian troops only because Japanese vessels were escorting those transports.

That makes my case all the stronger. Were we in conflict, there we might not have the assistance of the Japanese.

7.0 P.M.

I wish the hon. Member would allow me to complete my sentences. To the hon. Member and his friends the "Emden" has been a perfect godsend. She sinks seven ships here, and four or five ships there, "and bombards oil-tanks somewhere else. During the whole of the time the German fleet was swept off the seas. The vessels were either captured, or did not put to sea at all, or were interned in neutral ports. It comes with very bad grace from hon. Members to use these arguments against the Japanese. Later on we were very hard pressed by submarines, in the Mediterranean especially, and we sent out an appeal for help to the Japanese Navy. They had no obligation under their treaty with us to intervene in the Mediterranean at all, but they sent their destroyer flotillas to Malta immediately. Their admiral put himself at our disposal, and these destroyers were almost worked to death in protecting our convoys against the German submarines.

I do not want in any way to run down what the Japanese have done for us. I know that they were most loyal Allies to us during the War; but conditions change as time goes on, and I am only looking as to what might happen in the future. I am asking the Government to have vision ahead.

That is all very well, but the hon. Gentleman talked of the Japanese having the mentality of the Prussians, and I repeat that it comes with very ill grace from hon. Members opposite, after all that Japan did for us in the War, when she might have blackmailed us to any extent she liked if she had been so minded, to hold her up as the bogey against whom we must prepare and tax ourselves and put additional burdens on the shoulders of the unfortunate taxpayers. There is at the present moment in Japan a strong liberal movement. I am speaking in the broad sense of the word. There is an advanced progressive movement making itself felt in Japanese politics. The rule of the older statesmen is being seriously challenged by the democratic forces of Japan, and it should be the highest policy of the British Empire to play up to that new spirit of Japanese politics, and not to hold up Japan as our new enemy. It is an unfortunate fact that the Admiralty and successive Conservative Governments in this country have always felt it necessary to have a hypothetical enemy against whom we must arm. In one generation it was Russia; in the next it was France. When I first went to sea France was the enemy, and I have actually assisted in mobilisation against the French Navy. Then it was Germany. The German war resulted—I do not say because of that. Germany, having disappeared from naval power, it is necessary to manufacture a new bogey, and the new bogey is Japan.

The hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher), whom I am sorry to say has left the House, dealt with the strategic aspects of the Singapore base. I venture to question some of his arguments on this matter. He went on to say afterwards, of course, that he was going to support the Government. He laid down some extraordinary doctrines. One curious theory he put forward was that a Japanese fleet—an expedition—might sail south to Australia, and that Singapore would then be on the line of approach from Japan to Australia. That represented one of his arguments for this base. I wonder if he has worked out how many transports would be needed to carry at least two Army Corps—nothing less would have any chance against the fighting reserves of the Australian people— their tanks, heavy artillery, aeroplanes, and supplies? Has he worked out the figures of this operation about which he talks so glibly? Does he know the tonnage which was required to transport the small Australian Expeditionary Force to Samoa? It was enormous. The arrangements necessary for such an operation against Australia, in view of the British cruisers and submarines which would be operating, would be stupendous. To talk about Singapore as a preventive of this operation is quite absurd, because Singapore is 2,400 miles from the direct line of approach from Japan to Australia. As a matter of fact, the best answer to any attempt to invade Australia by sea is not Singapore at all. That is much too far away from the main line of approach from Japan to Australia. The correct answer to that is to have a base which can be utilised by our submarines and surface cruisers somewhere in New Guinea or in the North of Australia.

There is a growing body of opinion in Australia—I think it is growing because of a telegram which has been sent by the Australian Labour party to the Prime Minister supporting his view about Singapore—to the effect that they would rather see some of this money expended in fortifications and preparations at Port Darwin, or that a plan should be laid down for a defence base at New Guinea. [An HON. MEMBER: "Against whom?"] I am dealing with the argument that Singapore is on the line of approach from Japan to Australia, and I am pointing out that Singapore is quite useless as a base from which to hamper the sea communication of an army being taken from Japan to Australia. I repeat with confidence that it is quite useless, and anyone who looks at the map will see that it is. Singapore, for the purpose of preventing such an expedition, is much too far away.

Furthermore, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basingstoke might have led the House to believe that the existing dock at Singapore could not take anything greater than our present light cruisers. He said they could not take the new 10,000 cruisers. My information is that the existing dock at Singapore will take everything up to the "Hood." On strategic grounds there is quite a strong case to be made against Singapore.

I want to add one or two words on the international aspect. In the "Times" of 22nd March there is a Reuter telegram from Washington which contains the very significant information that the House of Representatives has sent up an amendment to the Naval Appropriation Bill, corresponding to our Naval Estimates, to the President calling upon him to take steps for the calling of an International Conference to consider the further limitation of competition in naval armaments. I should have thought the Government might have suggested retarding their own shipbuilding programme until they had seen whether this proposal of the House of Representatives would be adopted. In any case it is a very strong argument against this new expenditure on this new dockyard at Singapore.

There is another argument of great potency. I myself have pointed out in this House the strategic importance of Singapore, but that did not mean we should start a new great dockyard, some 15 miles away from the present town of Singapore, with its workshops and Admiralty Superintendent's house and hospitals and churches and all the rest of it. I wanted to see Singapore given the ordinary normal defences of an existing naval station of 30 years' standing. Since I used those arguments in this House an event of the greatest importance has occurred. There has been the Japanese earthquake. The Admiralty say—and I do not think they are likely to over-exaggerate from what I know of their propaganda—that this earthquake has caused damage to the dockyard establishments of Japan amounting to ten millions sterling. It has done more. I am informed that the Japanese earthquake has seriously injured the silk-producing districts of Japan, and has done great financial damage to the Japanese State. Silk is one of Japan's most valuable products, and one of their principal sources of revenue. We have helped the sufferers of this earthquake; we have raised a Lord Mayor's Fund; our money market took part in advancing a great loan to alleviate the damage; our Navy gave assistance. Surely this earthquake gives us the opportunity of postponing any fresh naval preparations which can be in any way represented as being made against Japan, or even for our defence in the case of a possible war with Japan. This earthquake has altered the whole situation. It has put the Japanese in the position of having to make good damage and loss before they in their turn can commence any new expansion. Do not simply count the few ships which have been damaged in the docks, or do not count the few ships which were building and which will have to be taken to pieces again. That is not the point. The finances of Japan are hard hit, and for that reason we have a breathing space, of which I am very glad to see the Prime Minister has taken advantage.

Furthermore, I do not believe capital ships will be needed at all in the Singapore Straits, even in the unhappy event of war. Our own Fleet, very rightly, did not penetrate into the Heligoland Bight because of the possible damage by enemy submarines, mines and, later on, aircraft. If we have a mobile defence of submarine or aircraft, and the preparations for mining, in the Singapore Straits, I do not believe it will be necessary to risk our very great and very costly capital ships in defending these Straits. The propaganda which has been, I am sorry to say, only two successful with our Dominion Statesmen in some cases, has led the public to suppose that we are leaving Singapore undefended altogether. I am sure no one on these benches suggests that for one moment. It has been a fortified port for two or three generations. All we have to do is to bring its defences up to date by means of mobile squadrons of submarines and efficient aircraft squadrons on the spot. That I can advocate, and until we get general disarmament I shall go on advocating it, but this brand new dockyard is provocative and its utility for the purposes for which we are told it is needed is very doubtful indeed. I hope, therefore, the Government will stick to their guns and remain firm by the promise which they have ennunciated in this House. I think hon. Gentlemen opposite are doing an extremely bad service in attacking the Government when they are, as on this occasion, trying to bring about a new international order which will make war, and all that war means, impossible or improbable in the future.

The hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) has made an interesting speech and I will not weary the House by bringing up against him his past speeches advocating Singapore. In the course of his speech he referred to the Japanese assistance given to us in the Mediterranean. I happen to know about that assistance. It was not prompt by any manner of means, and it is of great interest to consider that point, because it raises at once a question with which the Prime Minister is sure to be faced once he brings up the question of disarmament. The Japanese Government raised at once the question of Japanese emigration into Australia and that question I am confident will come up when the Prime Minister begins to negotiate with Japan. When General Smuts, who is at the comfortable distance of 7,666 miles—the distance from Yokohama to Durban—advocates in the cause of appeasement and conciliation, the policy of the Government, I wonder what answer General Smuts will give to the question of the immigration of the yellow races into South Africa, because it is bound to be raised. The hon. and gallant Member also raised the question of the invasion of Australia and said the route to Australia was over 4,000 miles away from the possible invaders. That is perfectly true, but it is quite enough to have a fleet on their flank at that distance to prevent the invasion, and besides that he must remember that a dockyard base is not necessarily the base of a British fleet. It is where they go for repairs and repairing facilities and docking once in the six months in order to keep up their speed. As the House knows, the speed of a ship falls off so much that after she is 12 months out she only goes 600 miles to 1,000 miles which she could go before. Therefore it is necessary to dock them once in six months because the speed of the fleet is the speed of the slowest ship, and if docks are not available the whole fleet is crippled. The hon. Member spoke about the finances of Japan. He mentioned that damage had been done to the dockyards to the extent of £10,000,000. That is £10,000,000 which the Japanese are spending at once on the re-habilitation of these two dockyards, and they are going to complete those dockyards within 12 months. They have got six other dockyards which are quite capable of taking care of the whole of their fleet. I think if it is a threat against Japan to develop Singapore 2,888 miles away, it is equally a threat on the part of the Japanese to develop those extra dockyards once more.

May I quote the Admiralty on that point? The Admiralty answer was that the damage to the dockyards was estimated at £10,000,000, which would be provided by Supplementary Estimates.

Yes, £10,000,000 is what they are going to spend as provided in those Supplementary Estimates. They are spending that money at once, and I think that fact, to a great extent, disposes of the hon. and gallant Member's case. I would point out that this very question of Japanese immigration, which I mentioned earlier, has been raised from the Government Benches. When the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was attacking naval expenditure last year he made a very long speech, and at the commencement of his speech he said: out to the House that when the hon. Member for Kingston-on-Thames (Mr. Penny) spoke of the Japanese as a warlike nation he was stating what is a common, known fact. Japan has gone to war five times since 1874 all for expansion. She has gone to war once in eight years. I do not blame her, and I am only stating facts. But you can have no guarantee that we will not require Singapore Dockyard nine years hence, and it will take nine years to complete the proposed extension. I had risen immediately after the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty spoke, hoping that I might be called in order to deal with two points which the hon. Gentleman made. I venture to say that for a Minister of the Crown he committed two serious errors, errors which no Minister of the Crown ought to commit. The hon. Gentleman represents the Admiralty at that Box, and he was expounding strategy, and he was saying that our cruisers, destroyers and submarines could function whether the Fleet was there or not. No Sea Lords and no war staff at the Board of Admiralty would make themselves responsible for the statement that our cruisers, destroyers and submarines could function in the protection of commerce out in the East or in the defence of Australia, without the Fleet being on the spot as their secure base. The second point was this. I have yet to know that a Minister of the Crown can get up and impugn the statement of a Dominion Government by quoting the Leader of the Opposition in that Dominion Parliament against the Dominion Government. Yet that is what the hon. Gentleman did. In his position as a Minister of the Crown he should have neither eyes nor ears for anything that is done or said representing Australian opinion, except as stated by the Government of Australia.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) was very certain of all he said. The right hon. Gentleman is always quite certain; he was quite certain as to what was to happen in the future. Therefore, he is a prophet and appears to bear out what Mahomet said, that prophets always come from the sheepfolds, because agriculture is his great subject. He is sure that Singapore will require great fortification. If there is no Fleet out there, the amount of fortification required is out of all proportion, but if the Fleet is there you only want minor fortifications to supplement the defence afforded by the Fleet being somewhere in the vicinity, because no great force will dare to go and expend its ammunition on bombardment, and no armada would dare to convoy troops in face of an undefeated Fleet. That is what the whole history of war proves. In the case of Dalny which Sir Ian Hamilton cites in the "Times" this morning, the Japanese had command of the sea. They were a very short distance off, and therefore as the Russian Fleet was effectually blockaded and did not threaten transports they had no difficulty in taking Dalny. If we do not send the Fleet out to the Far East the Japanese will have no difficulty whatever in taking Hong Kong and Singapore and you must have the Fleet there if you are to prevent the British Empire from falling generally. The hon. and gallant Member for Uxbridge (Lieut.-Commander Burney) made a very interesting speech and an interesting proposal, but he must excuse me if I say that the proposal is not a novel one. It has been discussed and proposed before that Chatham should be turned into a commercial dockyard. The Admiralty have attempted all they can possibly do to cut down our dockyards in this country, and it is the political pull alone which has prevented those dockyards from being cut down. The political pull is even greater now that there is a Socialist Government in power.

The hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher) also made a very interesting speech, and he gave to the Opposition—to the Conservative party—the whole of his mind, but announced that his body was going to follow his leader. I think we have on our side the more valuable product of the two in his mind. At the end of his speech he used the argument that the Prime Minister would be helped in bringing about European disarmament if we abandoned Singapore. Why, the whole tendency is the other way about. Europe, if it is anxious about the British Fleet, is anxious in regard to the Mediterranean. If we take the Fleet to Singapore we are taking it away from Europe, and therefore it cannot have the effect suggested, as far as Europe is concerned. The Singapore project, we have heard from the Government, will take nine years. You can, at a pinch, complete your cruiser programme and your air programme in two years. From the point of view of Europe, the cruiser programme and the air programme are real threats. The Singapore project only enables your Fleet to function in defence of eastern trade and in defence of India and Australasia, etc., and there is great inconsistency in adhering to armaments which can be quickly completed and abandoning a dockyard which takes time. It seems to me there are two points at issue. If you fail in your disarmament projects you are running grave risks should there be war nine years hence—appalling risks. There is the other point at issue which is raised by the Australian Government, namely, that we would be in a better position to negotiate if we had this Singapore project and could make it a counter, a thing that has been commenced and that is proceeding until we get disarmament. All the facts are on the side of the Australian Government.

We have three examples of disarmament in the years 1906, 1907 and 1908. We took off a capital ship in 1906 and 1907, and Germany responded by increasing her programme from two to three in both years. We took off another capital ship in 1908, and Germany proceeded to double her original programme by laying four to our two. We delayed Rosyth, and not one of these things had the slightest effect on Germany. Then you come to the Washington Conference, and you find that the whole success of that Conference depended on this one fact, that the Americans said, "We have 16 capital ships building, and we are ready to scrap them if you will agree to disarmament proposals in regard to capital ships." That was what carried the day. They carried the day by something which they had in hand and not by something which they had failed to commence as we are abandoning the extension of Singapore. They are proceeding on the same lines now. A question was asked in this House about the resolution of Congress, embodied in the Naval Appropriation Bill, requesting the President to negotiate for a Conference with the other Powers to bring about disarmament in cruisers, destroyers, submarines and aircraft. The Americans put forward this policy in 1923 as well, but at the same time they are going ahead with their Pacific bases all the time. They are carrying through schemes which involves spending £23,000,000 extra on their Pacific bases. The main expenditure is at Pearl Harbour, Honolulu, which is not a great distance away from Yokohama, nearly 3,400 miles, speaking from memory. Even when the Prime Minister has got his agreement and his disarmament, has he got rid of the factor that Japan has 10 capital ships and several aircraft carriers, because those are the very factors that have been limited already by the Washington Conference J If he has not got rid of them, there will still be the necessity for a counter to those ships in the Pacific,-and therefore there will be the necessity for the Singapore Dockyard base.

I would like to know whether he can tell us of any sort of agreement, in however vague outline, by which he can guarantee peace nine or 18 years hence, when we may require this Singapore dockyard. He says he is going to use a year or two for agreements while military affairs are kept down to a nucleus. We say that the smaller you make your nucleus, the greater the necessity for mobility, and therefore the greater the necessity that your Fleet should function in the Pacific through the Singapore dockyard. If you abandon it, your Fleet cannot function in two-thirds of the sea area of this world, where the bulk of the trade is, where the bulk of the world's populations are, and where the bulk of the British Empire is. I have pointed out before in this House that Great Britain, which, as the Prime Minister of Australia says, is eager enough to defend herself with aircraft and so on, lies on the northern fringe, and 99/100ths of the Empire lies outside a 2,000 mile radius from this country. I acknowledge to the full what the Prime Minister has said about the part that fear and suspicion play in world affairs. Nations are very like individuals, and of an individual it has been said when we do them are all wrong, but when foreigners do them they take no notice of them whatsoever? After all, the power of this country is based on British maritime power, and I defy anyone to show any misuse of that maritime power since the war with America. It cannot be shown, and when hon. Members make these speeches in this House, they are practically inviting the foreign Press to publish articles on the same lines. What would not Napoleon have given—Napoleon, who used the neutral Press to influence public opinion in England—to have had a Prime Minister such as we have to-day, and speeches made in this House such as are made on the opposite side to-day? It is not the fear and suspicion that are being sown in foreign countries that frighten me; it is the fear and suspicion that are being sown to-day in Australia and New Zealand owing to our abandonment of those great Dominions.

After all, there was one honourable obligation implied at the Washington Conference. We then said to the Dominions: "We agree to limit the British Empire quota to 20 capital ships. We propose that we shall hold the whole 20 capital ships, because we will defend these Dominions." That was what was implied, and, indeed, said. We said: "You will have only cruisers and destroyers." Now cruisers and destroyers are not enough to defend Australia against invasion. Having said that we were under an honourable, in fact, a treaty, obligation that those capital ships should function out in the Pacific, we now practically say to Australia and New Zealand that, by abandoning the Singapore project, we cannot function as a British Fleet out in the Pacific, and therefore we cannot defend them against aggression. When it is remembered that the policy of Australasia and New Zealand, like that of Canada, is mainly founded on a white Australasia and a white Canada—and they are in alignment with the United States of America on that question—our new policy, if persisted in, would be practically an indication to them to look to America for defence instead of to this country. When the Government attempt to justify this policy by saying that if we go on with Singapore we shall inevitably drift into a condition of mistrust and a competition in armaments in the Far East, what do they mean? Is not Japan's programme in full blast? Are they not spending £10,000,000 on rehabilitating two dockyards? Have they not got 70,000 men as their personnel, which they are expanding to 85,000, and are they not building up oil tank accommodation for 1,230,000 tons of oil for their ships, when their expenditure on their Fleet in peace time is only 150,000 tons?

I want to deal with one more point. The "Manchester Guardian," the leading Liberal paper in the provinces, in fact, in the whole country, told Italy the other day that we must defend the Mediterranean, because it is the road to our Empire, and added: Commons has refused the grant. This will be the first case on record, and I deplore it, because, also, it means the abandonment of our Dominions.

I was not fortunate enough to hear the whole of the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs), but that portion of it which I did hear made me feel that I would prefer to have heard him in the old days of 1906, when he was a young and active Naval Commander in full possession of his faculties. I have made it my business to turn up one or two of the Debates in connection with the Rosyth base in this House in 1906, and I find that the hon. and gallant Member, in talking of Rosyth and of the general advantages of naval bases, said he had always failed to see the necessity for any naval works at Gibraltar at all. In addressing the Committee then, he also referred to a speech which was made by Lord Selborne, who said that questions of policy must be influenced by financial as well as naval considerations, and the hon. and gallant Member commented that that was a point which it was necessary to rub well into the Committee. I do not gather that he has been rubbing that point well into the Committee this evening.

The whole point was that we had existing dockyards in this country, but we have no dockyard suitable in the Far East, and I was advocating the development of Chatham and Sheerness rather than Rosyth.

As I understand the charge against our party, it is that at about that time we did not proceed with the development of Rosyth, and I was only quoting the hon. and gallant Member to show that he agreed with us on that point. At that time he put a question to the Admiralty:

"Will the Admiralty postpone Rosyth until the financial condition of the country is in a more satisfactory condition?"

I feel that we are again—I think this is only the second time I have spoken in this House—flogging a dead horse, because this question is decided. So far as the vote this evening goes, there is no doubt to my mind that there will be an overwhelming vote against the expenditure of this money on Singapore—this £10,500,000. The hon. Member for Kings- ton-on-Thames (Mr. Penny), asserted that I had stated the expenditure as more likely to be £30,000,000. What I did say was that, from my experience of public works in Singapore, it was much more likely to be double the estimate than to pan out at about the figure of the estimate. I am not going to quote my own opinion, but I will quote a very good authority in Singapore, who has had a great deal of experience there in works of this kind. I refer to Sir John Nicholson, Chairman of the Harbour Board in Singapore, and one of the consulting engineers for the great undertakings which have been developed there. He was writing of the wet dock, which was a very considerable work, and I quote from his account of those works in the centenary history of Singapore which was published two or three years ago. He said:

"John Aird and Company raised difficulties as to their contract, alleging that it was a physical impossibility to carry out some of the walk in the trenches, and consequently stopped work on them."

That resulted in a law suit, and the contract had to be given to another engineering firm, T. J. and R., who eventually completed the work at a greatly increased cost. I can quote that, I think, in justification of my claim that estimates are not always reliable in Singapore. He was also referring to another work some miles away from this dock, the wharf at Telok Ayer, and he wrote:

"The wharf was originally to be 4,990 feet long, but as the work progressed it was found that near the centre the depth of mud was so great that there was difficulty in carrying out cylinder sinking, and 850 feet of wharf was left out."

That meant that the whole conception of the scheme had to be altered, and instead of having a wharf for a length of about a mile, they had to have a break in the wharf of 850 feet, and a sort of basin for light craft inside. The whole idea of the scheme was upset, and the value of the scheme was tremendously reduced.

Can the hon. Member tell us where were the dock and wharf actually? Were they on the south side of the island?

Yes, on the south side of the island. I suppose that what the Noble Lord the Member for South Battersea (Viscount Curzon) wishes to make is that the proposed new works are on the north side of the island. In that connection, I would like to quote a letter which the hon. Member for Kingston wrote to the "Morning Post" about a year ago, in which he questioned my "confidence" in saying that these works would be largely exceeded in cost, and implied that the engineers who had planned the new scheme— we did not make that clear, then the Japanese Government were led into this Treaty under an illusion.

Hon. Members on the opposite side express a desire for the extension and development of the Washington Treaty. What chance is there of its development if you are going to have naval bases springing up around Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and other places, with guns all pointing into this area? it seems to me you are going to have this area surrounded by armaments which will prevent any real development of the spirit of the Washington Treaty. We have heard a lot from the First Lord of the Admiralty about trade. I do not profess to be anything of an authority like the First Lord, or the right hon. Member for the Sparkbrook Division of Birmingham (Mr. Amery). He said we must regard this question as a matter of insurance, that it is only £10,000,000, and that we had £1,000,000,000 of trade involved. But that is not our total insurance to safeguard our foreign trade. Our total insurance for that purpose is surely the £130,000,000 we are now spending on armaments, and the £300,000,000 we are paying on National Debt due to past wars, so that we get up to a figure of something over £400,000,000, which we are spending today to safeguard a trade of £1,000,000,000. It is no use saying that £10,000,000 does not make much difference. It is the principle of the thing, whether it is the right way to safeguard our trade, and on that point I disagree entirely with those who sit opposite. As Colonel Repington pointed out in an article recently, Singapore is, of course, the centre of a transit trade in peace, but it would not be so in a war against Japan, for our trade with Japan and China would be closed down. The very fact that we had a naval base there would stop trade.

The right hon. Member for the Spark-brook Division told us in the picturesque speech he made the other night about the great trade route of the British Empire, but was it not a fact in the War, that with two of our strongest naval bases, I suppose, Gibraltar and Malta, the Mediterranean was practically closed to commerce? All the ships that came from the East during War time never went through the Mediterranean at all, so that from the point of view of security of trade, guaranteed by a naval base, it seems to me the other way about. The right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment this afternoon referred to the fact that Australia and New Zealand were in favour of the scheme, but Canada expressed no opinion, and South Africa was opposed to it. He emphasised the point that the Dominions mainly concerned were in favour of it. But all are concerned. If we are beaten, South Africa goes down just as much as Australia, New Zealand or Canada. If the British Empire is going to be destroyed, it does not matter whether the people are living in South Africa, Australia or New Zealand. Then he referred to the wishes of the Dominions who would contribute to the scheme. I only wish they would do more in proportion to what we spend on armaments, because, as has been pointed out already to-day, the Dominions have a tremendous preference in regard to the expenditure on defence as compared with the old country, and the right hon. Member pointed out that Australia was unable, owing to economic factors, to spend money on anything that was not productive. He did not go into what the economic factors are, or he would have pointed out that it was due to Protection that those Colonies were unable to develop their primary industry, because they were first trying to develop their secondary industry.

The Agricultural industry in America is in a deplorable condition, entirely owing to the high prices that farmers have to pay for the things they require.

The hon. and gallant Member is not comparing like with like. It is the sort of silly question one gets at an election from a silly old Tory elector. The question is, Who are our enemies? The right hon. Member for the Hillhead Division told us it was an impossible thing for it to be America. It must then be Japan. But if we are to have another war, surely the whole result depends on which side America is going to be—whether America is with us or against us. If America is with us, we win; if America is against us, we do not. I was rather surprised to hear the right hon. Member for the Hillhead Division give some quotations from the French Press, because when that was done from this side the other evening, we were told by hon. Members opposite to take no account of what was said by the French papers, because they were all inspired, and the various articles were written with an object. I do trust that this great gamble with Singapore, as the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) called it in the Debate last year, will not be permitted by this present House, and I have every confidence the Amendment Bill will be rejected by an enormous majority.

I have listened with the greatest possible interest to all the speeches made this afternoon. Therefore, I can claim to have taken considerable interest in the subject. We heard, first, the most astonishing speech from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. I say—and I challenge the Front Bench on this—that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty has given false information to the House this afternoon. He said that all our aircraft carriers, except one, could use the existing dock at Singapore. I challenge that statement. I am perfectly certain that the "Furious," the "Courageous" and the "Glorious," now being converted, and the "Eagle" cannot get into that dock, and I very much doubt whether the "Hermes" can.

I do not believe that statement. [HON. MEMBERS: "Order!"] The hon. Member may be quite right, but I am going to follow it up with a specific question to the Admiralty.

The information was given in the official answer to a question yesterday, and the Admiralty information is that the "Eagle" is the only one that cannot use that dock. The Noble Lord's statement is unwarranted.

[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"] I am not going to withdraw. I will give, and am entitled to give, my reason. I put a question to the Admiralty about this, and the answer I got was to the effect that no bulged ship can use the dock at Singapore. The "Furious" is a bulged ship, and all aircraft carriers are bulged ships. I am going to put a question to the hon. Member next week, and if the answer I then get confirm the statement just made by the hon. Gentleman, I shall certainly withdraw publicly, either in the Press or in this House, or both, if I can.

In the meantime, is it proper for the Noble Lord, having heard the facts on behalf of the Department through its representative in this House, to impute untruthfulness to my hon. Friend?

I did not take it that way. There is Very often a conflict of opinion in the House. The Noble Lord thinks his information is superior to that of the Sea Lords and of the Minister. We must just take it for what it is worth.

I will restate what I have already said. I have already had an answer from the Admiralty to the effect that no bulged ships can use the existing dock at Singapore. Now the hon. Gentleman has told us that every aircraft carrier except one can use this dock. I challenge that in the light of information already given, in view of the fact that the "Furious," one of our largest aircraft carriers, is a bulged ship. I say that the "Furious" cannot use it, and also that the "Glorious" and the "Courageous" will not be able to use that dock.

On a point of Order. The real point at issue, I submit, is this: The Noble Lord said, "I do not believe the Minister." That seems to me to impute an intentional untruth on the part of the Minister.

8.0 P.M.

I do not think so. It is a conflict of opinion, and I take it that the Noble Lord puts his opinion against the opinion tendered by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. It is in no sense a challenge. The Noble Lord said he had had an answer from the Government on an earlier occasion which conflicted with the information now given. The Noble Lord is quite entitled to make his statement to the House.

I think the position is that the two ships which are going to be converted as aircraft carriers will not be able to go into the dock when they have been converted. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty technically and momentarily is correct.

That rather confirms me in my view. An hon. Member who is speaking can put his own view of the facts.

I join issue with my hon. and gallant Friend. He forgets the "Furious," which is a sister ship to the "Glorious" and "Courageous," and he has not alluded to her at all. However, I will put a question to the Admiralty next week which will enable them to give a clear and specific answer on the point. I am not satisfied with the answer given this afternoon. Another astonishing statement which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty made was that you could protect the trade in the East by means of cruisers alone. I think his statement amounted to something to that effect. That is one of the points with which I wish to deal this evening. How could you possibly pit a cruiser of any description against a capital ship? How could you pit a cruiser carrying 6-inch or 8-inch guns against a battle-cruiser carrying 14-inch guns? It cannot be done. A light cruiser in such a situation would simply have to turn tail and clear out of it as fast as she could, if indeed she could get away, because everybody who knows anything about the sea is aware that, if there is anything like a heavy sea on, the lighter ship feels it far more than the heavier ship. To try to protect our trade by means of light cruisers is quite impossible. Therefore I maintain that it is wrong that the right hon. Gentleman should come and tell the House that you do not want a dock at Singapore because you do not want the capital ships. As a matter of fact, that information is quite incorrect. I would like, if I may, to make an appeal to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite in this matter of Singapore. I am afraid that they come here with their minds made up what they are to do. They are not considering the Debate or the questions raised in it; they come here in the light of pledges they gave during the Election. I would ask them to reflect before they lightly cast their votes in favour of the Government's policy in Singapore. The Government have stated that they have rejected Singapore, but they have not rejected it because it is expensive. Not a word has been said on the expense of the scheme, and there has been no speech on the Government Benches to prove that Singapore is not necessary. If I understood the Secretary to the Admiralty correctly this afternoon, he certainly gave us the whole case. I think the Prime Minister was quite clear about it the other day. He said:

"The strategical position of Singapore is second to none in the whole vast area of those waters. From the naval point of view in all its aspects, either from the point of view of defence, or from the point of view of offence, Singapore, I dare say, would be chosen as the place for a great dock to be built."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th March, 1924; col. 318, Vol. 171.]

No one could put it better. It has been turned down as a question of policy. The Prime Minister has told us that negotiations are going on at present. What negotiations are going on? When did they start? How long are they going to take? We know nothing regarding them. I venture to say that no negotiations are going on or have started. It is true there has been some sort of suggestion in America that something might be done, but there was a footnote to the American statement that no action is likely to be taken upon this till after the next Presidential election.

This was a vote of the House of Representatives at Washington calling for this Conference. It is very definite.

I agree, but I think it was clear that nothing was likely to happen till after the next Presidential election. If that is so, there is at least another year's delay, and it is admitted that we have not got more than about two or three years before we must come to a decision on the question of Singapore in view of the time it takes to construct it. I say the whole question has been decided from a point of view which is very unfair to the country and the Empire. Neither the country nor the Empire thoroughly understands this question. The Empire possibly understands it more than we do. Who have we against Singapore in this country?

The people who lined up against Singapore in this country were first of all the "Anti-Waste" Press. I think they started it, the "Daily Mail" and the "Daily Express."

No, not my supporters. They told everybody to vote against me. They were the first of the newspapers to take it up and I think we may leave it at that. I do not think they carry much more weight with hon. Gentlemen opposite than they do with hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty told us to-day that naval opinion was not united on this question. I have paid very careful attention to that expert naval opinion which says that we should not go on with Singapore, that it is waste, criminal lunacy, and so forth. But only two naval experts have used such words. One is Admiral Mark Kerr, and the other is Sir Percy Scott. When the Prime Minister held up Sir Percy Scott as an expert in this House the other day, he absolutely insulted the Royal Navy by doing so. Sir Percy Scott has left no stone unturned during the last year or two, ever since Admiral Lord Fisher died, to run down the Navy and belittle it on every possible occasion. He has been challenged. I have challenged him myself, not here but outside, to open debate before an expert audience, and what did he do? He ran away. I asked him to debate this question of Singapore. Admiral Mark Kerr came and debated it, but Sir Percy Scott ran away. He was invited to appear before Mr. Bonar Law's Committee on the capital ship, but he declined. In fact he ran away. He always runs away, and he will not substantiate his statements before any conference. These are the only naval experts and flag officers who have raised their voices against Singapore.

Another expert who has spoken is the hon. Gentleman for Westbury (Mr. Darbishire). He told us this afternoon that he did not believe the statement he had heard from the light hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery). He said it would not cost £11,000,000 but £20,000,000. He made a speech this evening pointing out the difficulty of securing a proper foundation on the south side of the island, but the new dock which is proposed at Singapore is to be on the north side of the island. Therefore I do not see that much importance can be placed upon what there is on the south side. Then there is the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy). He is another expert who has decided in favour of the Government's policy.

I am glad to hear that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is so modest. At any rate, I think his opinion has been quoted as one competent to form an opinion on these matters. The people against Singapore are, if I may say so, exactly the same people who almost in identical words, were saying that Rosyth was an act of madness or folly before the War. I refer to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the Liberal benches. I have not examined their speeches, but I am sure if one looked back through the annals of Parliament, and through the columns of the Press for the years before the War, it would be found that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen of the Liberal party, whom some of us knew then as the Little Navy Party, were making identically the same speeches against Rosyth as they are making against Singapore to-day. I would invite you to consider the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon-Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) in his weekly article in the "Daily Chronicle" which appeared last Saturday. He says:

"Liberalism practically lost England for 40 years. For reasons one need not enter into now, Englishmen were persuaded that it had no pride in British renown and no concern for British prestige. It allowed Conservatism to capture the flag. It disdained the patriotic appeal and left it to Tory platforms. This is a dangerous mistake. Patriotism is one of the deepest and most potent of all the emotions which move masses of men to action. Why treat it as if it were an offence to Liberal nostrils? As long as it is possible for the Tory Press and even Liberal papers to draw attention to the fact that an appeal from a Liberal Member in the House of Commons to stand up for British interests in Europe is 'received in grim silence on the Liberal Benches,' Englishmen will continue to suspect Liberalism of an anti-patriotic bias."

I put it to hon. Gentlemen not to past lightly over that article of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), because after all, he is a very good Liberal. But what about Singapore? You will see, if you study things, that every enemy of this country, and everybody who is a friend of the enemies of this country, is chucking his hat into the air. Everybody who is an enemy of this country—[HON. MEMBERS: "Who are the enemies of this country?"] I believe hon. Members on the benches opposite are able to study the Press just as well as I am, and I would ask them to remember that the British Navy—and I think everybody, and hon. Members would agree with this—is the one great link that binds the whole British Empire together; it has always, I suggest, been used not as an instrument of oppression but otherwise. I do not think I am putting it too much from a party point of view when I say that the British Navy, whatever party has been in power, Liberal, Tory, or whatever the party—the British Navy have always been used in the cause of peace. I maintain that you score, if you are strong, and able to speak with strength in the cause of peace, rather than going and begging for peace. With regard to our food supplies—

I submit to the hon. Gentleman that that is hardly a fair instance. I appeal to hon. Members opposite not to consider this from merely a party point of view, but to take a broad view of the matter. I do not think you can say that the British Navy has been used as an instrument of oppression. It may have been that operations were undertaken in the Baltic following the late War, but I think hon. Members will admit that the situation in Russia and in the Baltic was very confused. We found ourselves, at the end of the War, fighting side by side with people on whose side we had fought in the War. The fact that the country was going into a civil war rather left us in the lurch. I do not think we went into it with the idea of fighting against Russia. We got led into it through force of circumstances.

I am sure that, looking across to the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, and many of his friends, I realise that they come from Glasgow, and are here representing the poorest of the poor. I submit that there is one thing that the poorest of the poor are interested in, and that is in the maintenance of their food supplies. If you endanger them—surely that is a question in which they must take the greatest possible interest. There is one question which inevitably would have to be answered by this country if the Navy was overpowered, and that is: where are the people going to get their food from? I suggest to the hon. Gentleman opposite from Glasgow, that they should take a real live interest in this subject, because if ever our power is challenged—and it is all very well to say that there is no challenge in sight; there may be in a few years' time; you cannot say what is going to happen in a few years—if there is any challenge to our Navy, and the Navy is not able to meet that challenge, what will be the position of the poorest of the poor in the constituencies of hon. Gentlemen opposite?

I interrupted a moment or two ago, and the hon. Gentleman replied. I want further to say that it is not the protection of their food supplies against some enemy outside that the people that we represent need; it is protection against the landlords and the profiteers in this country that are represented on the benches opposite.

I would submit to the hon. Gentleman that the view he is taking is a party view, and is a somewhat parochial view of the situation. That is not what I mean. It may be true that he has a great dislike of hon. Members who sit on this side, perhaps even myself—I do not know; but I am asking him to look at this question of the Navy as an important one for his own constituents, and in case there should be any interruption in their food supplies. You may have the worst of landlords. You may even have the State as a landlord, but it will not be able to save your constituents if their food gives out and there is none for them. Hon. Gentlemen opposite should not forget what so nearly happened in the late War, that we were nearly brought to our knees by the German menace and blockade; and even in the Grand Fleet we had only seven days fuel oil left. That was what the submarine did for the Grand Fleet. If this was the case in the Fleet, it must have been pretty serious in the country.

We have the menace from the air. We have menace to the trade routes overseas. There is the European menace, and the increasing air forces. At once there is the threat at home, and overseas. There is the equal possibility of a danger to our great Dominions. Are we to turn round and say: "Yes, we know you are in danger, but we are not prepared to do anything: we are prepared to put up a moral gesture." What is a moral gesture to the Dominions? What is a moral gesture to the world? You say to them: "Oh, yes, we are going to make great moral gestures to show others how anxious we are for disarmament," and therefore we cannot take the obvious and necessary step in the case of Singapore. "We shall show others how much we are to be believed." We turn round to the Dominions with another moral gesture, but what does it mean to them? You had their help over here in the War, and now in peace time you say, "We are not going to do the obvious thing for you. I submit that that is the consideration which the hon. Gentleman wants altogether to leave out. If I mistake not, the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher) said something of the sort this afternoon.

A good deal has been said this afternoon about the possibility of the Fleet going East. I would submit to hon. Members opposite that unless they have a base East of Suez to be used in times of war the main battle fleet cannot possibly fight East of Suez. What is the effect of that? You hand over at least half—the hon. Gentleman the Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) said two-thirds of the sea—but at least you hand over power over half the world to a foreign Power. Supposing in that event that foreign Power decides to take action. Supposing that Power desires Singapore, look what inevitably happens! The battle fleet cannot move East of Suez, and everything, East Africa, India, Australia, New Zealand and our Dominions, must go. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty quoted from a Leader of the Opposition, I think it was in Australia, this afternoon. I wonder what that friend in Australia would say to the Japanese if they were to say: "Will you allow us to send in some Japanese emigrants?" Would he allow them to come in? If not, how is he going to keep them out? There is only one way; to show them that you are a country able to close the door and to say "No." I would really ask the hon. Gentleman to put it to his friend in Australia, what is the policy going to be if the Japanese put forward any request to be allowed to send Japanese emigrant" to Australia if you deny half the world to our Navy? Look at what you are spending on the Fleet at present—£55,800,000. That is only to be spent on defending half the world. Hon. Gentlemen and right hon. Gentlemen opposite are in favour of economy, but if the Fleet is to be used for only half the world surely that raises the cost of the Fleet.

You cannot send your Fleet to any part of the world unless you have a repairing base to which it can go in case of need. I ask hon. Members who are keen on economy not to forget that point. The figures have already been given in regard to the trade passing Singapore, and I need not give them again. Hon. Members know perfectly well the value of that trade to this country per annum. Here is a resolution passed at the Imperial Conference which the Government are prepared to go back upon. It is not the only resolution of the Imperial Conference which is in some danger from the present Government. Here you are violating the spirit of that Conference, and I attach just as much importance to the decisions of the Imperial Conference as I do to the decisions of the Washington Conference, and the resolutions of both Conferences should be carried out both in the letter and in the spirit. I should like to quote one or two opinions from the Dominions, and I will quote Mr. Hughes on the subject of Singapore. In the debate in the Australian House of Commons on the 30th July last year, Mr. Hughes said:

There were three lines of nets at the main entrance, and several lines of mines. There is no necessity to have much more than that in order to protect a dockyard at Singapore, if in the same place you have an efficient aerodrome. I should like to make an appeal to the Government. I am not satisfied with what the Parliamentary Secretary said this afternoon, and I am not exactly satisfied with what the Civil Lord said the other night; nor am I very satisfied with what the Prime Minister said in relation to the responsibility of the Government and the Board of Admiralty with respect to this question of Singapore. I should like to reinforce what was said by the hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke, to whose speech this afternoon I should like to pay a tribute, though I could not follow his conclusions exactly. The Government ought to make a full statement on the naval situation, omitting, of course, all confidential details. Such statement should be drawn up by the Naval Staff, and should show what the position is so far as our Navy is concerned to-day, and what it will be in 10 years' time if the present policy is pursued. I would ask the Government to put such a statement clearly before the country, so that, at least, we may understand what the position is likely to be, and whose responsi- bility it is. I would also ask the Parliamentary Secretary whether the Government could not, before this Debate concludes, say something about the standard of strength at which they propose to maintain the Navy. I have repeatedly pressed for such a statement during these naval Debates. Hitherto we have understood that we have a one-Power standard. It is no use the Prime Minister saying that he is maintaining the efficiency of the Navy while giving up Singapore, because the Navy will no longer be sufficient to protect our trade routes and maintain our sea communications in a time of trouble.

I submit that the Government are gambling on the maintenance of peace, and that the stake is the whole future, not only of this country alone, but of the entire Empire. This policy has been presented and supported by amateurs; no expert naval opinion supports it whatever. The Government have completely disregarded the advice of the Naval Staff. This is being done as a political move, and for no other reason. We know the old saying that morality varies with climate. It almost seems as though politics vary with climate, for, as you go East, you have a different policy from that which you have when it comes to the defence of this country. I say that the Government are quite reckless for the country and the Empire, and that they have deliberately flouted the opinion of the Dominions. I say that peace can be maintained if your policy is clear, and if you are strong enough to speak in the name of peace. Great Britain is one of the pillars of the League of Nations, and the reason for that is that we have the ability to speak with force in world affairs. If you allow foreign countries to think that pacifists in this country can speak for the Empire, you will involve us in war; you are asking for trouble. If you doubt it, I would only ask you to turn up what happened before the Crimea, what happened before the Boer War, and what happened before the late War. I hope hon. Members will keep as open a mind as they can till the end of this Debate, and not lightly cast any vote against this project of Singapore.

The Noble Lord has counselled hon. Members above the Gangway to take an interest in matters connected with naval defence. I want to say that, since I came into this House, I have been amazed at the amount of Parliamentary time that is devoted to questions dealing with the Navy, the Army, and the Air Forces. I have not taken he trouble to work out the amount of Parliamentary time that has been spent upon those forces, but I venture to say that a very considerable amount of time has bean used up in discussing what, I admit, is a very important part of the work of this House; but I always have at the back of my mind the thought that, while we are discussing a proposal to lay down a base at some spot thousands of miles away, and on which there seems to be a good deal of diversity of opinion, there are here at home a million and a quarter men who are unemployed, who are starving—

It has been said in the course of the Debate that we require to keep our trade routes open. One can realise that some of us here depend so much upon foreign trade that that is necessary, but, surely, more of the time of this House might be devoted to questions directly affecting the great mass of the population here at home. However, I suppose I should not be in order in this Debate in discussing the remedy for unemployment, and I will rather try to point out to hon. Gentlemen who have spoken that it seems to me that in the Debate they have not really faced the question of the Singapore base, or, at any rate, the attitude adopted by the Government as expounded by the Prime Minister in this House on the 18th March. I would remind hon. Members that that is the point which, if the policy of the Government is to be opposed, ought to be attacked. I listened with the greatest attention to a very fine speech by the hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher). From a certain point of view that speech was built up in a way that it would be very hard to defeat, but may I, in passing, point out that neither the Prime Minister nor any other member of the Government has put forward the plea that, from a strategic point of view, this base would not be a good thing. That is not the argument of the Prime Minister at all; it is not the argument of the Government. The argument of the Government is contained in the Prime Minister's statement that we have to consider the matter in a wider relationship, and come to the conclusion that we should not ask Parliament to proceed with this scheme. He pointed out that it is quite clear that, apart from other considerations, to continue the naval base at Singapore would hamper the establishment of this confidence and lay our good faith open to suspicion. The speeches which have been made in this Debate have never faced that question. They all argue it from some naval defence point of view and not from the wide policy that the Prime Minister is trying to develop. I would ask hon. Members who have insisted upon this money being spent to remember that when money is being demanded for unemployment it is very difficult to get it. When money is being demanded to increase old age pensions, or pensions for widows, no money can be found. It is said that to construct this base will only cost £10,000,000, but other authorities who are just as reliable tell you it is going to cost £30,000,000. I want to ask hon. Members if they believe that at a time like this, when the needs of the people are so great, it is wise that they should waste the time of the House by taking up a special day to discuss this question of Singapore, in view of the attitude adopted by the Prime Minister in his speech of 18th March.

Accepting the hon. Member's estimate, does he realise that that, after all, is only six days' cost of the Great War in 1918, and is that a very expensive insurance?

No, it is not very expensive if you look at it from the cost of the War during 1918, but it is very expensive when you look at it from the amount of money which is spent annually on behalf of the unemployed. I want to remind hon. Members also of the opinion of a gentleman who is held in very high esteem by all Members of the House and during the War I think was quoted oftener by hon. Members opposite than probably any other man in public life. I refer to the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa. I think his views on a matter of this kind should have at least some consideration. They are given in the Command Paper issued to-day. He says to the Prime Minister:

"Your proposed statement of policy meets with whole-hearted agreement. Purely on the ground of naval strategy Singapore may be a sound proposal."

Nearly all the speeches to-day have been on the ground that it would be a good strategical position, but no one has faced the position of the Prime Minister and the position put by General Smuts in his telegram of 7th March. He goes on to point out that, while technically outside the limits of the Pacific pact made at Washington, to go on with the base would be out of keeping with the spirit of the Washington Agreement.

I am quoting the opinion of General Smuts, whose opinion, I believe, is very highly valued by the other side, and I want them to give the weight that that opinion should get from the other side. But I want to approach this again from a point of view which has occurred to me but which I have not heard developed by anyone else. There is a difference of opinion with regard to naval shipbuilding in Japan. I have tried to get at the facts of the case, and, so far as I can find out, I believe there is a very great volume of naval shipbuilding going on there, particularly since the Washington Conference. I think we have to face that, but if we examine, the reason for it we might get at the cause of Japan's anxiety to go on with shipbuilding. Up till the statement of the Prime Minister on 18th March, undoubtedly the policy of this country—I think it is correct to put it in that way—was to construct the naval base at Singapore. I do not think it has been hidden by hon. Members who have spoken that that base was to be used against Japan. I think that is not unfair.

It was decided upon before the War, when Japan was a close ally of ours.

I do not dispute that statement at all, and I believe it is also true that at Washington Japan was cognisant of the fact that we intended going on with this Singapore base. Of course, even with our closest Ally we go on developing our naval or military policy. What I was trying to develop was that the fact that that was the policy of this country undoubtedly induced Japan to go on building so as to be able to meet our menace. There is a new policy, and I really think it should have a trial. It is a gesture. I think it is more than a gesture. I think it is a policy that is ultimately going to be of very great value to the whole world.

Had I come down to the House this afternoon with a completely open mind on this subject, after listening to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher) I should have been completely convinced that it was the right thing to do to vote for the continuance of the construction of the base at Singapore. His arguments from the start were in favour of the construction of that base; his strategical arguments certainly were, but when he came to the moral arguments upon which he based his opposition, he took great care to point out that the position taken up by the Prime Minister was absolutely logical. I doubt whether anybody could disagree with the principle enunciated by the Prime Minister in regard to his efforts to reduce armaments and to effect some general partial reduction in armaments. I, personally, give him my whole-hearted support in that effort, but I quarrel with him about the way, the method and the details for giving effect to that principle.

It always strikes me that the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole have regarded this problem of the Singapore base from a narrow point of view. They have regarded it as a water-tight compartment and have not looked upon it as a project of world-wide importance. I do not think it is impossible to exaggerate the magnitude of the issue. I propose, briefly, to look at the project from three different points of view. First, from the moral aspect, secondly, from the financial aspect, and, thirdly, from the strategical aspect. As far as the moral aspect is concerned, the Prime Minister is making certain moral gestures to the world as a whole. I think there is great value in those gestures, but at the same time I think that he ought to be extremely careful as to what those gestures are. He certainly ought to be logical. He ought not to make any gestures which may be dangerous. His gesture in regard to Singapore is both illogical and dangerous.

If the Prime Minister is going to cut off the Eastern Seas from operation by our main battle fleet, what is the object of maintaining that battle fleet in a central position in the Mediterranean? There can be no object. If that is the case, why does he have naval manœuvres in the Mediterranean? He showed how mixed he is in regard to the whole of this question when, in speaking on the subject recently, he said:

It would have been much more logical on his part if he had withheld the manœuvres in the Mediterranean, if he was going to discontinue the work of the Singapore Base. It is not logical to cut off the whole of the Eastern Seas from the operation of our Fleet and at the same time to have these manœuvres in the Mediterranean. It is only giving offence to France by having these manœuvres. This gesture regarding Singapore is dangerous. Let us suppose that the Prime Minister achieves some measure of success in the Conference on disarmament. Are we going to be prohibited by this gesture in regard to Singapore from constructing this base on modern lines? If so, it is highly dangerous, and it is a gesture which no Prime Minister should have made. I should like to know who has led the way, not in moral gestures, hut in practical acts of disarmament ever since the Armistice. It is this country that has led the way throughout, in every direction. I should like to know also, whether in the Prime Minister's opinion it is not the security of the British Empire which is really the main factor of safety in the conditions at the present time. I do not consider, and I believe that most people in this House in their heart of hearts agree with me, that this Singapore question is a weapon with which to bargain. Even with partial disarmament, we shall require a base at Singapore. Enough has been said already in regard to the question of giving offence to other countries by proceeding with the work at Singapore. Everybody admits that this work comes well within the terms of the Washington Conference, and that it is no offensive act towards Japan. Japan is the first to realise that.

I cannot help thinking, as the last speaker indicated, that it is not so much from the moral point of view as the financial point of view that the Government are regarding this question. In that matter I have again a certain degree of sympathy with the Government. I think the amount of money we are spending on defence at the present time—namely, £120,000,000, is exorbitant. The country cannot afford expenditure of that nature. I thoroughly agree with the Prime Minister when he said that there was no proper co-ordination between the Services. He said that the Committee of Imperial Defence is practically useless. On that point I am absolutely in agreement with him. Probably the best way to get effective co-ordination is to tell the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the new super-Chief of the General Staff, who has been established, as can be seen from the White Paper, that this sum of £120,000,000 has to be cut down by so many millions a year in the next four or five years, and certain definite items which are absolutely essential to Imperial defence, ought to be enunciated, such, for example, as a sufficient Air Force, the maintenance of our naval bases, and so on, and let them work out a scheme whereby they can reduce this expenditure year by year during the next four or five years. The Prime Minister said that he wished he could devise some machinery for the co-ordination of the Services. I believe that if he set a problem of that sort to the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the present Lord Chancellor at its head,—we all know what the Lord Chancellor did in days gone by, and that he has done more for defence than almost any other person since Cardwell—they could work out the machinery of co-ordination and could proceed with the cutting down of expenditure.

The main thing, however, is not the moral standpoint or the financial standpoint but the strategical standpoint. That is of the most vital importance to us. Various hon. Members this afternoon have described the position of Singapore and its value from the strategical point of view. The hon. Member for Basingstoke described it admirably when he pointed out that westward, Singapore provides a defence for the whole of the Indian Ocean, and the whole of the Dominions and Colonial possessions which surround that ocean, and eastward from Singapore it provides a defence against any enemy force advancing southward from the direction of China or Japan. There is no doubt that that is true. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) said that Singapore was of very little value unless you had it garrisoned in full war strength. I would like to ask him which other basis is kept at full war strength? Not one of them is. There is kept a sufficient garrison to ward off an unitial attack. One has only got to look at the map to realise how important Singapore is, when he sees the whole British possessions all around the Indian Ocean and the vast amount of trade carried across those waters.

The hon. Gentleman who spoke last referred to unemployment. The expenditure of this comparatively small amount of money on Singapore does insure that our trade shall be carried across those seas and does give employment to the people of this country. Without that trade there would be very serious unemployment and, indeed, starvation. Another strategical point of view is the question of the white Australia. Everybody understands that problem, but it has a serious reaction on the subject under discussion. Australia possesses a population which is lees than that of London in a continent which is practically the size of Europe. It is impossible for Australia to be defended from any point of view except the sea, and Australia has taken up the attitude, and it is a labour attitude which has been taken up by the Labour party, of excluding all coloured people from its soil. The reason is purely economic—in order to prevent any lowering of wages. Australia is in a very difficult position, especially in relation to the Empire. Look at South Africa and see how they object to coloured immigration, while India is pressing for coloured emigration to these places.

If you look at a map of the density of the population of the world, as I have often done, and see how the population is distributed it is most remarkable to notice that of the 1,600,000,000 people in the world some 900,000,000, or more than half the population of the world, are concentrated in a comparatively narrow belt facing Australia, in India, China. Japan and the Dutch East Indies. There is Australia with a population less than that of London opposite to 900,000,000 coloured people whom they wish to prevent from coming into their land. I think that that makes for trouble in the future, and in reference to this question of the vast numbers of coloured people near Australia in Japan there are potential difficulties looming in the future. I do not say anything against Japan's policy at the present moment, but in the pressure from the expansion of the population in her own islands, and the necessity of providing for this expanding population in the course of time, I agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher) that we get a cause of war.

There is a point in reference to China which nobody has mentioned. China is in a condition of chaos at present, but China is making rapid strides even in that chaotic condition. China is rapidly industrialising herself. The hon. Member for Northampton (Miss Bondfield) said the other day that it was the capitalists who were grinding the Chinese down in China. It is not British capitalists. It is the Chinese themselves who are doing it. The next day when I asked her a question as to how many British textile mills there were in China, and how many Japanese and Chinese, she told me that out of 120 mills in China five were British and the remainder were Chinese and Japanese. China is advancing very rapidly, and China and Japan are faced with this exclusion of their own people from a vast and important continent to which many of them would desire to go in the future. Look at the question now from the Indian point of view. Anyone who has had any connection with India will realise that a great many people in India, certainly those who are interested in politics, will look upon this action in regard to Singapore as a great act of weakness, and will press more and more their claims which will not be admitted by South Africa and will not be admitted by Australia, and are going still to raise further trouble, whereas if we took up a comparatively strong attitude by saying that we are going to establish an efficient base at Singapore probably this question would be relegated to the background.

Personally I hold a very strong view, that during the last century this country made tremendous strides owing to its industrial development, and owing to the advent of machinery and the advances in science, but that the feature of the present century is going to be Imperial development. I believe that it is the economic pressure in this country and the difficulty, which the Labour party themselves will not be able to solve, of unemployment that are going to drive our people, whether we like it or not, into the Dominions, and that will increase very rapidly as time goes on. As the Dominions increase in strength so it will be more and more important for us in this country to see that our communications with them are secured. What is the good of sending our people out to these other countries unless they are going to benefit from us and we from them? It is by the great ocean highways which are our trade routes that we are going to obtain these communications which are of vital importance both for our trade and our employment.

There are three things to which any Government should see, quite apart from any question of party politics. The first is to look after the Straits of Gibraltar, the second is to look after the Suez Canal, and the third is to look after the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. What is the object of having battleships at all if they cannot go out? It would be only reasonable, if the Government continue the attitude which they take now, for them to get rid of their Labour staff at the Admiralty altogether and get in a staff of people like Sir Percy Scott, who do not believe in these things. If there is disagreement something ought to be done in that way. If they think that capital ships are not necessary, then it must be that they are going to defend out trade routes in the Far East with light cruisers. That means that we shall have over again the state of affairs that we had at Coronel. I shall not deal with the question of the opinion of the various Dominions on this subject, as it has been dealt with fully by others. But I would put to the Government one question: Surely when they recognise the importance of keeping the British Empire together, strong, as a factor of safety, is it not just as valuable to make a moral gesture to our own Dominions as to make a moral gesture to foreign nations? I think it would be of far greater value, because every foreign nation knows that we are in earnest, and that we have given practical illustration of our intention to disarm to the utmost. It is a great mistake to follow the attitude which we seem always to be following, of considering other nations too much, to the detriment of our own nation and of the people overseas.

It is not my intention to detain the House more than a few minutes, as I have been here long enough to have learned that brevity is the soul of a maiden speech. I cannot claim the expert knowledge which is possessed by some hon. Members who have spoken. My sole excuse, if excuse be needed, for speaking, is that it was my privilege to hold His Majesty's commission during the War in the Naval reserve. The right hon. Gentleman who introduced the Amendment to-day remarked that the arguments used against this naval base would all, or nearly all, be applicable in support of a case for total disarmament. If I understood him aright, that was the point he was making in that particular connection. Having listened to the majority of the speeches to-day, it seems to me that nearly everything that has been said from the opposite benches might equally be used in support of the case for unlimited armaments. That is a contention which, I would respectfully submit, the House should take into consideration.

As far as my reading of our past procedure has gone, we have almost invariably pursued a policy of arming against some definite menace. I cannot discover anything in the speeches to-day which seems to indicate that this country is faced with a definite menace, at any rate in the the Far East. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken did, in very vague and general terms, hint at the possibilities of trouble in that quarter, and I do not think I am misinterpreting him by saying that that was as far as he carried it. It has been suggested that the party to which I belong is simply pursuing in this connection the policy which it pursued in pre-War days in regard to the German menace. I am not sure whether it is logically correct to assume that, because we might have been wrong in those days, we are necessarily wrong at this juncture. But I would point out that there is a very marked distinction between the situation which faced the country then and the situation which faces it to-day. There was, undoubtedly, a German menace in those days, a menace against which it was inevitable we should arm to the greatest extent possible. I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite will be good enough to enlighten us a little further as to the precise combination of circumstances that is going to constitute the menace against which we are asked to construct this base at Singapore. It seems to me that if trouble is to come in the Far East what we shall be faced with there is something more in the nature of a race war than anything of which we have had previous experience. If it is to be a race war, it means, surely, that not merely shall we be confronted by the yellow races, as we term them, but that other coloured races, those which, without offence, we might call the anti-white races of the globe, will almost certainly be arrayed against the white man in a struggle of that nature.

That being so, it seems that this is a policy which should cause us to halt, if only because, once we adopt it, it will land us we know not where. I want to point out what may be called the consequential expenses of this policy. They seem to me to be almost unlimited. We have had figures given us as to what the Singapore scheme will cost, but we have had no data or figures as to the expenses that would be involved in protecting Singapore by the Army. I notice that a distinguished officer has said that when we have carried out at Singapore the reforms which hon. Members opposite desire, we shall need three times as many armed forces to protect the place as we have now. I suggest that all along the line, not merely in regard to military forces but in other directions, once we embark upon the proposal involved in this venture, there is no end to the outlay which we shall inevitably incur before we justify the initial expense. This is one of the tasks which must be done thoroughly or not done at all. I understand that it will be necessary to have sufficient forces on the spot to withstand an attack for about a month until reinforcements arrive. That alone indicates the enormous extent of the commitments in which we would be involved.

Reference has been made to the Washington Agreement. Whatever our differ- ences may be on that subject, there is no suggestion that these proposals take us outside the letter of the Washington Agreement, though I suggest that we should seriously consider whether they would not carry us outside the spirit of that Agreement. I know that hon. Members opposite differ from us in that respect, but after all, the policy now adumbrated is tantamount to something in the nature of building fresh warships. It is true that we are not actually building them, but the net result is that we are, not deliberately, but inevitably, perhaps, getting round the restrictions of the Washington Agreement, and that we are adding to the mobility of the fleet of battleships which we are permitted to retain under that Agreement.

May I ask the hon. Gentleman if he will apply the same argument to Japan, who is spending two millions on extra naval bases?

Probably the same argument might be applied in that direction. I have only one word more to add, which I feel sums up all that needs to be said on this particular topic. I think there will be general agreement at least on this one point—that we have in this matter of armaments a breathing space. I do not think any hon. Member in this House will suggest that there is any reasonable likelihood of another great war at any rate for ten years, and probably for something like 15 or even 20 years. One need not be a pacifist—and the majority of us are very far from being that—to propound a proposition such as that. We are faced with a breathing space. It may very well be that it will be proved in the course of the next few years that mankind has learned nothing from the great struggle through which we passed between 1914 and 1918. It may very well be that we shall have to return to the old path—the path that leads to nowhere—of armaments and increased armaments. It may be that we shall have gained no wisdom from the experiences through which we have gone, but I do want to enter a word of protest against the idea, which it seems to me is at the back of some of the speeches to which we have listened to-day, that there is something inevitable about the constant recurrence of warfare. Such an idea is fatal to all the discussions and conferences in which we are engaged in these days. It may be we shall have to admit failure, but we have the opportunity of making an attempt to set humanity out upon a new path and in an entirely new direction. If we fail, it will be because the challenge has come from some quarter about which we are ignorant at the present moment. I only ask this—and on this ground alone we can entirely support the action of His Majesty's Government—that the challenge shall not even appear to be thrown out by this country, but that if it does become necessary for us again at some near or more distant time to take up or to resume the old race in armaments, we, at any rate, shall feel our record in the matter is unsullied, and that we have done nothing to provoke a return to the old regime.

I am sure I may congratulate the hon. Member who has just sat down upon the most excellent manner and substance of the speech he has just delivered. In the course of this Debate a very powerful case has been made on technical grounds for the building of this dockyard. The right hon. Member for Hillhead (Sir Robert Horne) advanced a very powerful case in a speech which, not unnaturally, excited elation in the hon. Members on the benches upon which he sits in view of their experience of the last few weeks. It must indeed have been inspiring to them to hear a fighting speech delivered from their Front Bench. Of course a powerful case has been made upon technical grounds. The experts are quite able to make a very powerful case indeed for holding every strong strategic position in the world. But I can imagine no more certain way of provoking war than by upholding all such strong strategic positions. The duty of Statesmen, in which duty hon. Members opposite, as I will show, have demonstrated themselves as conspicuously lacking, is to co-relate the advice of the experts, to take a general conspectus of the situation, to see in what sphere national weakness is shown, and to expend whatever money is available in remedying such weakness rather than in obtaining an overwhelming superiority in one sphere where security is already won.

In that respect this country has something to look at in the record of hon. Members opposite, and particularly of the right hon. Gentleman who will shortly speak for them. He throughout has gone in for over-insurance in the naval sphere at the expense of other defence spheres. The right hon. Gentleman throughout has adopted the policy of achieving an overwhelming naval superiority over Japan, while his Government was content to leave this country in an inferiority of ten to one in the air. That is not playing a statesmanlike part, or taking a general review of the situation. That is over-insurance in one sphere at the expense of other spheres, of which no ordinary business man in his business arrangements would ever by guilty To wish to secure an overwhelming superiority in one sphere and to demonstrate a state of inferiority in other regions is surely to display not only Jingoism, but inefficient Jingoism. Hon. Members ask for this overwhelming sum of money for Singapore while they are content to leave us in an inferiority of ten to one in the air. They agitate for this dockyard at Singapore which will give us an overwhelming superiority as against Japan. Can that be said to be an effective consideration of the whole sphere of national defence?

A lot has been said about Japan this evening—that small nation which helped us in the War, which has been rent and distraught by a great earthquake. We have heard arguments advanced from the other benches of the economic inspiration which that country derives from warfare against us and civilised mankind—arguments which would have gladdened the heart of Karl Marx if he had heard them. We have heard the emigration question urged as a likely cause of war. Hon. Members opposite have never considered that, if that question was ever the subject of war, the one Power which, more than any other, would have an incentive to ally itself with us in an overwhelming superiority against Japan would be the great American Fleet which dominates the Pacific. All these considerations have not been taken into account, and still, while in other spheres of defence we suffer a lamentable inferiority, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spark-brook (Mr. Amery) and his naval friends come here and want us to set up a yet more overwhelming superiority. I venture to say that while the right hon. Gentleman may be the busiest, he is not the most efficient, drummer boy in the Jingo brass band. They come to this House and say a terrible danger threatens the whole fabric of the Empire because we cannot have a dockyard at Singapore. Yet they say it is proposed to take ten years in building that dockyard. Is our fleet to be immobilised for ten years? Are we to be left defenceless during this troublous stage of the world's affairs? Why, if hon. Members took their own arguments seriously they would press for the completion of this dockyard in a year or two years, without allowing a delay to occur during which they confess upon their own calculation of events, this nation is to be left in an impotent condition. These brief considerations are put purely upon the ground of the philosophy of hon. Gentlemen opposite, but there is another and more serious consideration which, in my view, forbids this project. The Washington Conference took place not very long ago. It is true that, technically, the Singapore Dockyard is outside the sphere of that Conference, but at the same time it is only a few degrees outside the area laid down, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Sparkbrook Division admitted himself that the Japanese and American representatives who were our colleagues in that Conference were never informed of the project to build a dockyard at Singapore.

If my statement is challenged I will read the quotation. I quote from the OFFICIAL REPORT of the 16th July, 1923.

Mr. AMERY: … There was no kind of limitation of any of the Powers concerned as to the building of other types of ships, or dockyards in the Pacific or other waters, and no communication was made with each other in respect of those matters.

Mr. LAMBERT: This was not communicated at the Washington Conference?

Mr. AMERY: I have said so three times."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th July, 1923; col. 1871, Vol. 166.]

On a point of Order. I rise not to question the statement but to point out—

On a point of Order. Is it possible for the hon. Member to impugn the statement of Lord Balfour in another place that the matter was fully communicated?

I would gladly give way to the hon. Gentleman, as I often do, but I promised to sit down at a specified time in order to allow those on the Front Bench opposite to make a full reply to what I have to say. Now, as hon. Members opposite have interrupted me, I will take a minute or two longer. I have no concern with what Lord Balfour said in the other place. The statement referred to by the hon. and gallant Member opposite, if made, differs entirely from the OFFICIAL REPORT of what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Sparkbrook Division. We are concerned with what happens in this House, and not with what happens in the other place. I have quoted the words of the right hon. Gentleman from the OFFICIAL REPORT which he could have repudiated subsequently, if he found he was mistaken. In a subsequent speech, which I have here, the right hon. Gentleman said that our delegates throughout the Washington Conference had in mind the building of the base in Singapore. Let us take those two statements together. It was not communicated, and yet throughout the months of that Conference our representatives sat side by side with the Japanese and Americans, and never said one word of this project.

It is not reasonable that the hon. Member should continue misrepresenting the situation as he is doing. It is perfectly true that in a specific answer on the question of specific communication, I made it clear that no specific communication was made. I have not my speeches by me, but to the best of my recollection I also made it perfectly clear that it was fully understood by all the delegates at the time that the zone of self-denial was expressly so drawn as to enable us to modernise and develop the dockyard at Singapore, as we had abandoned the dockyard in Hong Kong.

The right hon. Gentleman in the answer which I have read said this was not communicated. It is quite true that in another speech he said our delegates had this in mind throughout and they specifically—[HON. MEMBERS: "Be honest."] Hon. Members are only taking up the time which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook could devote to replying to me.

The right hon. Gentleman here states that these facts were not communicated, but he stated in a subsequent speech that the line was specifically drawn by our delegates in order to leave the Singapore base outside. I submit it was not conduct worthy of a great nation to sit beside our American and Japanese colleagues throughout the discussion in Washington, having in mind the fact that we were going to build a dockyard at Singapore and never communicating that fact to them. Furtherfore, it was a direct breach of our obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, for the Covenant of the League states:

"The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programme."

The right hon. Gentleman here states that those facts were not communicated, and the line was drawn and the Washington Conference came to its conclusion in ignorance of those facts, because they cannot have known the facts if the facts were not communicated. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where is that from?"]

What does it matter where it comes from. Nobody pays the slightest attention to it.

My only complaint against hon. Gentlemen opposite is that they are paying too much attention. If they would allow me to get on with my speech it would not take nearly so long.

There may be other reasons for that. The net result of this transaction is to create an atmosphere of suspicion concerning the bona fides of this project to spend millions of money on the building of an entirely unnecessary and aggressive dockyard at Singapore. [ Laughter. ] Do hon. Members opposite ever read the speeches of their own leaders? If they read Lord Linlithgow's speech in another place, they will find that he argued that this dockyard would substantially increase the strength of our Fleet and consequently its power for aggressive or defensive purposes in that area Is it really wise, when our bona fides in this matter must be inevitably suspect, at a moment when we are trying to make the gesture which is so much derided by hon. Gentlemen opposite, for some measure of disarmament, for a new atmosphere in international affairs—to embark upon an undertaking of this kind which must entail the sacrifice of possibly essential defences in more vital spheres? Is it really wise to spend these millions of money in pursuit of a project which has been so inadequately defended?

The right hon. Gentleman opposite may say that, in going into international Conferences, it is well to build as much as you possibly can in order that, emerging from these Conferences, you may be permitted to keep as great armaments as you possibly can, although the object of those Conferences is to secure disarmament. I venture to disagree with the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the good result of the Washington Conference was due to laying down four super-"Hoods" in advance. I venture to think that the sentiment of the American people which granted that great measure of disarmament was not fear of a few extra super-"Hoods" being laid down in this country, but was a greater and a more magnificent gesture to the world and a nobler impulse in the direction of disarmament and peace upon earth. I believe that if we say that we are out for disarmament—we may have, though we cannot be compelled, to take wider and more defensive measures, but at first we will appeal to the world to co-operate with us in these great measures—then I believe this country can play a great and beneficent part in drawing mankind back to the paths of peace.

Before the House hears the speech of the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), and the reply from the Government Bench, I should like to intervene for a very short time in order to call the attention of the House to three aspects of this very important matter. There is the financial aspect, which every Member of this House is specially bound to consider, serving here on the Supply of the year; there is the strategic effect, as to which, for my own part, I shall occupy only a very few moments, because I recognise that that is a subject which calls for very special study and is one on which I note that the experts do not entirely agree; and there is the international aspect, which it is of the first importance that Members of this House should consider in the interests of the whole country. The curious thing is that while there may be some dispute as to the strategic result of this proposal, or as to the international consequences of carrying it out, the one result of this proposal which is quite certain and inevitable has hardly been referred to at all, and that is the financial result.

While I agree that we have to incur even the very gravest financial burdens if it is really proved that it is necessary in the national interest to do so, at the same time I think the House of Commons ought in these matters not to fail to observe what the financial consequences of the proposal really are. They are presented to us as though they meant nothing more, though this is serious enough, than spending in the course of the next 10 years a matter of £10,000,000, but very serious reasons have been given during the Debate to-day for thinking that by the time we were finished with a proposal of this sort the taxpayers of this country would have had a much greater burden than that to bear. My hon. Friend the Member for Westbury (Mr. Darbishire), who speaks with very special knowledge on this subject, for he knows Singapore and has served, I think, as a member of the harbour board there, told the House to-day how, in the experience of those who undertake works of that sort in Singapore, owing to the very special and peculiar character of the mud, estimates are almost invariably found to be exceeded, and if we were to rely on the experience of the harbour board of Singapore, we might safely multiply any figure now stated by two at once. But it does not stop there. It would be the height of folly for us to establish this enormously developed and most important base on an enlarged scale at Singapore if we were going then to run the smallest danger of losing it, and it is quite clear that the present suggestion of expenditure on the Navy Vote is a mere small fraction of the total burden which this scheme, if really put into operation, is bound to place upon the finances of the country.

I should like to know—perhaps the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook can tell us—Has an estimate been made, to his knowledge, and what is it, as to the probable charge which would come for the air defence, for the gunnery defence, for, it may be, an enlarged garrison defence, of this place, if it was indeed dealt with in this way? It is an expense which admittedly has to be incurred for years and years to come, and if once the House of Commons were to agree to it in principle, then year after year we should have the familiar explanation, perfunctorily given from the Treasury box, that, of course, all future expenditure on this head is merely in the nature of automatic repetitions or increases. Automatic increases in the Estimates of this House are nearly as elusive and unsatisfactory as anticipatory replacements. Hon. Members who have spoken in the Debate to-day were quite conscious that this is a point that ought to be met. No one has attempted to meet it more ingeniously than the hon. and gallant Member for Uxbridge (Lieut.-Commander Burney), who, observing that the hon. and gallant Member for Chatham (Lieut.-Colonel Moore-Brabazon) at the moment was not giving his full attention to the Debate, proposed, in relief of the British taxpayer, that we should sentence Chatham to transportation, and that we should save money by that simple process. The truth is, of course, that whatever, might be said for the argument that we in this country are, as the hon. and gallant Member said, permanently over-dockyarded, nothing is more certain than that it would be a work of the very greatest difficulty—of much greater difficulty than driving piles into the Singapore mud—to attempt to disestablish one of the dockyards of this country.

Therefore, first taking the purely financial aspect, this is how this matter appears to stand: We had some interesting answers given the other day by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who told us that in the last financial year, I think, the expenditure upon the shoulders of the taxpayer of this country in military, naval, and air defence and preparation was no less than £131,600,000, whereas the corresponding burden on Australia, according to a corrected figure which the right hon. Gentleman has since supplied, is £4,490,585, and the corresponding burden on New Zealand is a matter of £677,000. As I have said, I thoroughly accept the proposition that, of course, we have to accept these tremendous burdens as far as they are really established to be necessary, but I do claim that the House of Commons ought to consider, and ought to consider in the first instance, the financial results of this policy, for the financial results of this policy plainly mean this, that so far from our having succeeded in reducing our Naval Estimates, we should be adopting a new head of expenditure, which would, in fact, increase them. In so far as we here have a duty to scrutinise expenditure, in the interests not only of the taxpayer, not only of economy, but of the whole body of social causes which can only be served if we exercise proper economy about this other expenditure, I say that this proposal is one of the most serious import and moment.

The right hon. Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne), who started the Debate, spoke in his cheerful way of all this as though it were the paying of a premium on a policy of insurance. Let us just understand, from those who use that language, what it is we are insuring against. It is quite clear, I think, in the light of the recent experience of this country and some other countries, that, necessary as expenditure of this sort may be proved to be, it certainly is not an insurance against war. This country has paid a pretty handsome insurance premium for a good many years, and, for my part, I am perfectly prepared to justify it on good cause shown. But, whatever else it has done, it certainly has not saved this community from a burden of £8,000,000,000 of debt. Therefore, you have got to carry the argument a great deal further before you can ride off on the cheerful assurance that this is a policy of insurance.

I would point out, further, that there is an essential difference between insurance in business and insurance used in this metaphorical sense. You can get Lloyds to quote you a premium against some hypothetical, future, and, possibly, far-fetched risk, if you choose, but, generally speaking, you will find that a very modest figure of premium will cover a speculative and distant risk. But the argument about this being a premium of insurance is most cheerfully used here when the country is asked to undertake and authorise a very heavy payment indeed, without a serious and close examination of what really is the character of the risk. It is for these reasons that I invite the House, before voting to-night, not to forget that, besides being trustees, as we are, for the safety of this country and for the greatness of the Empire, we must also remember that we are trustees for the taxpayers of this country, and that we are trustees for a great range of social causes, all of which are clamouring for money, and have in this matter to judge these different demands according to their respective importance and urgency.

10.0 P.M.

Might I say one word on the strategic effect of this proposal? As I have said, I do not claim in the least to speak with any authority about it, although I do hold that it is the duty of every intelligent citizen, and certainly every hard-working Member of the House of Commons, to try and understand, at any rate, the elements and the objects on the side of strategy. We are all very much indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentlemen who have spoken to-day for much that they have said. I have certainly attended to it, and endeavoured to profit by it as much as I can. I should think that, from a strategical point of view, a proposal to spend this large sum in this leisurely fashion, spreading it over 10 years, if it is a thing that ought to be done, cannot be the way to promote the strategical needs of the Empire. The hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher) said that we had to look at Singapore from the point of view of Imperial strategy. I thoroughly agree with him, but allow me to say to him that there is nothing new in that. Certainly in the last 10 or 15 years, and certainly since the negotiations resulted in Australia having her own Navy in peace time, and as soon as the difficult negotiations were carried through which secured that the Fleets of the Dominions should combine with our own Fleet, and act in a common way and for a common purpose in time of war, strategical ques- tions in this House and in this island have been essentially regarded as Imperial questions, and they always ought to be. I must confess being admittedly quite an amateur about it, but I have the greatest difficulty in understanding how it can be assorted with confidence that in 10 years' time, when this dock is finished, the importance of accommodation for these enormous ships at this immense distance from our own shores can by any means be confidently asserted. I confess I should have thought it was extremely probable that, when the time came, complications nearer home, dangers threatening, or impending, in Europe, might very well make it quite impossible for methods of that sort, involving moving half across the world so immense an armament of our very big ships—I should have thought that events might very well have shown that that was a highly problematical solution, and I wish to hear from the right hon. Member for the Sparkbrook Division whether he has confidence that you really could base upon Singapore the enormous Fleet that would be necessary if you were going effectually to deal, by that method, with a hypothetical enemy in the Pacific, how really is it supposed that it would be supplied and reinforced, and how is it suggested that it could be spared from another part of the world.

May I be permitted to say a few words about the international aspect? It is by far the most important aspect, admittedly, and I thoroughly appreciate that hon. Members who are criticising the Government in this matter are just as anxious to see that we adopt a policy calculated to secure it as anybody can be in the House. It is not a question of object at all. It is a question, first of all, of method, and, secondly, if I may speak frankly, it is a question of how far the House of Commons really do believe in the alternative machinery of the League of Nations. I agree that there is involved in this proposal no breach whatever of the letter, at any rate, of the Washington Conference. I am bound to say, so far as the late First Lord is concerned, I have not understood him to give information to the House which would lead to the conclusion that there has been any deliberate concealment of the intention at all. But the point I am making is not that. Certainly, the House of Commons must not brush aside without thought the argument that, while there is no breach of the letter of the Washington Treaty, there none the less is here, or may be, a very serious evasion of its spirit. That is not merely my opinion, or the opinion of my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow. That is the view printed in the White Paper circulated this morning from the Prime Minister of South Africa. General Smuts says: mainland was reserved as being a thing they were doing inside their own island and upon their own soil. That really is a complete answer to the suggestion that there is some inconsistency between the two positions. It is said, and I think it is reasonably said, "Why should you regard this and denounce this as a menace to other nations?" I think, although the word "menace" is too strong a word to use, any sensible man will see that at any rate it is a stimulus to similar buildings and similar expenditure on the part of other nations. The simple philosophy that appeals to some people, that the more you spend the safer you are, is a philosophy which I believe to be entirely and absolutely exploded.

We are ultimately brought to this, which is the kernel of the position: the Admiralty have stated, I think by the mouth of the late First Lord, that the safety of our country does not require us to assume a war with a first-rate Power for another ten years. The late War at any rate has produced that. But the question comes to be, ought we not to shape our policy now so as to give other Powers every inducement to limit and reduce their warlike expenditure rather than to give them an excuse and reason for increasing it? At the League of Nations at Geneva a year after the Washington Conference a Resolution was passed that it was most desirable and important to promote the further limitation of armaments in other directions. Only within the last week or two we have had the news that in the United States proposals are being discussed and may be put forward for a conference on armaments. It really is of no use to meet the arguments against this proposed expenditure on Singapore, as the Member for Hill-head did, by saying that the Government is merely throwing a sop to the pacifists. Who are the pacifists? [HON. MEMBERS: "You are!"] Very much more important persons are involved in that than hon. Gentlemen seem to know. I do not know if they seriously regard the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) as a pacifist? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes, we do!"] Then I am very content to be classed as such in his company. I do not know whether they regard General Smuts as a pacifist? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes!"] Let me just point out that it is impossible to fling these cheap and easy condemnations at individuals in this House unless you are to deal with a man like General Smuts on the same terms. I do not want to say a word more than was said by General Smuts himself. He said: and by way of international agreement is useless and impossible. It is because I believe that the Government in this matter are boldly taking that proper course that for my part my friends and I are determined to support them to-night.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon) has not left us in any doubt as to the vote which he is going to cast to-night. Not that we had any doubt before he rose to speak. What would have been much more interesting and instructive would have been to hear from the Prime Minister who was first responsible for sanctioning the Singapore project, or from one of his colleagues in the Government responsible for the policy, what view they take of the question to-day, and—what is not of less importance—what vote they mean to cast, or abstain from casting, to-night. The right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just spoken, and others who have spoken to-night, have distinguished clearly between the two planes on which this matter is to be considered, the naval and technical plane, and the plane which the hon. Gentleman the Paliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty called the plane of political strategy. I will endeavour to keep those two planes so far as I can separate.

My task is greatly facilitated on the strategical side by the perfectly clear and explicit statement made by more than one representative of the Government. The stategical side of the question, as a Parliament Secretary said, is not challenged. There is no question about it. The Government, to use the language of the Civil Lord, have gone in the teeth of the advice of the Admiralty. The Prime Minister has also made it clear, so far as naval advice is concerned, that the Admiralty enjoy to-day the fullest confidence of His Majesty's Government. That can only mean one thing. It means that, so far as strategy is concerned, so far as the cost involved in that strategy is concerned, the Government do not share the view that this is a costly and wanton expenditure! They do on the strategical plane regard this measure as justified, and—if they have confidence in their naval advisers—more than justified—necessary, essential! They have overridden it on different considerations.

Singapore has been described by the Prime Minister as a position second to none from the point of view of defensive warfare. I am glad he put in the necessary words "defensive warfare." There is only one point in regard to which both he and the Parliamentary Secretary, and—if I may say so—the right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down—seem to be under a misunderstanding. It is that bringing Singapore up to date is only required for sending out great battle fleets. It is perfectly true that no battle fleet, great or small, can go out to the East unless you modernise Singapore. It is equally true that quite apart from fleet action, quite apart from the possibility of war with Japan, that in any war for the protection of our trade, we shall require something far more effective than the present commercial dock at Singapore. The Parliamentry Secretary said that we are building our cruisers, and that those cruisers could look after this trade, police the seas and the Indian Ocean without the help of Singapore. I would ask hon. Gentlemen opposite to visualise the actual situation. There is at Singapore in the commercial harbour one dock—one dock only—which can hold the larger size of light cruiser and for that matter the larger size of commercial ship, but cannot hold a large aircraft carrier, or a battleship, let alone a battle cruiser. Visualise that situation in a war. You have there a vast traffic, the natural flow in peace through the Straits of 18 million tons in the year. In time of war you will have all this traffic concentrating on this one great British harbour. You will have merchant ships in a sinking condition struggling home to Singapore, cruisers injured in action, and one dock only to accommodate them. There is no great harbour there, and so far from there being room for the re-fitting and repairing of cruisers there is not enough accommodation to deal even with the mercantile demands.

Again, a mercantile dock is not necessarily suitable for repairing a damaged cruiser because it has not the requisite machinery for dealing with naval repairs as distinct from commercial repairs. Even in dealing with commerce raiding and cruisers should we not be able to back up our cruisers with battle cruisers? It will be remembered that we had to send out battle cruisers to the Falkland Islands to deal with von Spee's cruisers. It is well known that in that one action our ships spent nearly all their ammunition, and therefore is it not necessary to have in that part of the world accommodation to supply the needs of both our battle cruisers and our cruisers. All these things have been left out of consideration in the reply which was given by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty.

This accommodation is required for the purposes of ordinary mobility not only of our batleships but of our cruisers, for such purposes, in fact, as were regarded as perfectly normal up to the last moment of the great concentration against Germany. We want to replace our dockyard position in the East to what it was before the Great War. There is just this difference, that as a result of the Washington Treaty, instead of replacing our dockyard capacity at Hong Kong, which might conceivably be regarded as being within such range of Japan as to be used for purposes of aggression, we have gone back another 1,400 miles to make it clear that our only purpose is defence.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley has referred to this question, and apparently suggested that there was something dishonest in not developing Hong Kong on modern lines and then doing so at Singapore. The whole essence of the Washington Treaty was the establishment of a neutral zone too wide for battle fleets to cross, and therefore any dockyard measures undertaken outside that zone could only be for defensive purposes. No one is complaining of what the United States are doing in this respect at Pearl Harbour, and no one has any right to complain of what we are doing in our own territory of Singapore. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert), and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley, seemed to think that we were meditating sending out a great fleet to fight the Japanese; and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton suggested that, if Japan had 240 ships of war, we should require to send out 360 at least. That argument is based on exactly the same misunderstanding on which almost every argument on this question is based, namely, forgetfulness of the fact that Singapore is nearly 3,000 miles away from Japan. If we intended to attack Japan in her own home waters, we should, indeed, want an Armada; but when our only object is defence, when any enemy that could attack us would have to come many thousand miles, then it is possible for a moderate fleet provision to deal with the defence of that spot. That also covers the question of land defences. It is no use comparing Singapore with Dalny and Port Arthur, in the immediate neighbourhood of Japan. You do not want a large force to defend your dockyard at Singapore. The dockyard can maintain a fleet which can defend it, and even a moderate fleet in being would prevent the advance of any invading army.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton drew a terrifying picture of the garrison that would have to be built up—white troops, with big guns emplaced, and all the rest of it. There has always been a garrison of white troops at Singapore. Singapore is defended to-day by the 9·2-inch guns for which the Government of the right hon. and learned Gentleman was responsible. There is no question of a large defensive armament on land at Singapore, as long as you have a Navy that can move in those waters. If you have no Navy, if you deprive the Navy of the power of working in those waters, then, if you want to keep Singapore, you would have to build great defences on land to enable it to hold out until it could be relieved. That is not what we contemplated.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman spoke of the question of cost, and he spoke very sarcastically, following the rather dangerous advice of the hon. Member for Westbury (Mr. Darbishire), about piles sunk in Singapore mud, and about the millions upon millions which would be squandered in trying to find foundations in that bottomless mud. It is perfectly true that the building of docks in Keppel Harbour at Singapore was found to be costly because of the mud; but the site which the Admiralty selected in the Old Strait is on granite. Again, the right hon. and learned Gentleman talked contemptuously of the suggestion of my right hon. Friend the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) that this was an insurance. He said it was impossible to insure against a war costing £8,000,000. I should think the proper answer to that was that we were sufficiently insured at sea, but that it was our insufficient insurance on land that caused that war to last so long and prove so costly. In any case, if we take insurance in the narrower sense, not of insurance against war, but of insurance against the risks to our floating cargoes, the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows quite well that before the War we had a Government covered insurance scheme for all our ships; but, if it had not been for the British Navy, that insurance scheme would have landed the Government in hopeless financial disaster in the first few weeks of the War. As a matter of fact, till the submarine menace became serious, very little was required in the way of insurance money from the scheme, because the insurance of the Navy covered our ships all over the world.

I do not wish to go further on that point except to say this: The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton said, "Where is this cost going to stop?" and in almost the same sentence he compared, as did the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the costs we incur for defence with the costs incurred by the Dominions. If we are to deal with the problem of Imperial Defence at a reasonable cost, it can only be by building up gradually full and adequate co-operation. This policy of Singapore was part of a policy of making it easy and natural for the Dominions to co-operate with us in the defence of the Empire. Without it there is no basis for Imperial co-operation. We hear a great deal of gesture in this discussion. Singapore, at any rate, was a gesture to the Dominions, which made it clear to them that we stood by them, and made it easier for their Governments to go to their Parliaments and ask them to stand by us. Mr. Massey, in the telegram be sent in answer to the Government's ultimatum, replied that every citizen and every country of the Empire is entitled to protection from the possibility of attack by a foreign foe. That precisely was the foundation on which we wished to build up a policy of Imperial co-operation. That is the policy the Government has thrown aside, and it says to-day that not only for the years which we may reasonably hope to be years of peace, but for an indefinite time three-quarters of the Empire and all the immense trade of the Empire in Southern waters are to be left absolutely defenceless. On the strategical side at any rate the situation is perfectly clear. The Government, in spite of the advice of those in whose advice they profess to have the fullest confidence, are prepared to leave three-quarters of the British Empire absolutely defenceless, and to let the British flag exist on sufferance in two of the greatest oceans of the world. That is a very grave responsibility.

I should like to pass now to the other aspect of the question—to the plane of political strategy—and if we are really in agreement on the strategical issue I can say equally that we are in agreement with them, all of us, as to the object they have in view. We all support a reduction of armaments consistent with security. We will all support any practical policy that is calculated to lead to that end. But we must know clearly what you are going to do and how you are going to do it. Your gesture must have a definite purpose behind it. It must not be a mere, vague fumbling in the air which leaves the whole world in doubt as to what the real motive of your action is. The other day I reminded the House of the past history of this matter. I will refer to it again in a sentence. From 1906 onwards the Government of this country made gestures for disarmament. It went back on our programme. It weakened itself deliberately. I am not blaming it for the object it had in view, but the weak, fumbling ineffective manner in which it was done only created the impression in Germany of want of purpose, and it is clear that the only thing that occurred to them was that we were unwilling to face the burden of armamants and to make sacrifices and that therefore Germany was justified in pushing ahead with redoubled vigour. The thing I want the House to realise is that that gesture, several times repeated, was not only a failure but directly contributed to make things worse. One of the chief causes, if not the chief cause, of the Great War, from which we are still suffering, was the fact that through all these years the Government of this country never contrived to make its real purpose or meaning clear to Germany.

May I turn from that unsuccessful gesture to the occasion where an effort for the limitation of armaments really succeeded? I refer to the Conference at Washington. It succeeded, let me remind the House, because we were dealing with a concrete, definite menace by a definite practical method, with a clear purpose as to what we intended and on a broad policy which was framed and supported by a united Empire. The right hon. Gentleman who is going to reply knows very well that the whole foundation of what was achieved at Washington was laid down at the Imperial Conference in 1921. Everyone knows that there was wide divergence in point of view between the various Dominions and this country, but at that Imperial Conference those divergences were hammered out into a single policy, and that was why it was successful when it was put to the test at Washington.

We went to Washington, in 1921, a united British delegation, with an agreed policy, not only as to how the relations of Japan with the United States and ourselves were to be harmonised, but also as to the maintenance of a one-Power standard, and, incidentally, I might add, as to the development of the Singapore base. That Conference succeeded not only in virtue of the persuasive power of Lord Balfour and the British delegates, but not less because they had at their side, in absolute harmony with them, men of great authority, like Sir Robert Borden, of Canada, and Senator Peace from Australia. The only Dominion representative who was not there was General Smuts, and that may possibly account for his misunderstanding of what is or is not in accordance with the spirit of the Washington Conference. That Conference succeeded because there was a united British Empire behind our proposals.

What is the position to-day? How are you going to enter upon another world conference? You came to a unanimous agreement with the Dominions as to what was essential for the defence of the Empire, and within a few weeks you reversed that decision without consultation. I repeat, without consultation. What the Government did was to send out to the Dominions the statement which they proposed to make in the House of Commons, making it perfectly clear that that was already decided upon, and that they had no intention to modify that statement. The statement was accompanied by no real ground for the reasons which had led the Government to re-open this question, and when the replies from the Dominions came in they were met with a curt reply "Your goodwill and sympathy have been taken into consideration." It is worth while that the House should realise what already has been the fruit of this remarkable decision of the Government. What are the answers which they have had from the Dominions? They have had an answer of enthusiastic approval from General Smuts. They are fully welcome to the encouragment which that gives them. But we want unanimity of Empire. The Empire can only work on the basis of unanimity. We have always arrived at unanimity by our conferences, but here we have revealed to the world a difference of opinion such as we never had before in the history of the Empire. I will read a sentence from the despatch of the Government of New Zealand, protesting earnestly on behalf of New Zealand against the abandonment of the proposal to make Singapore a safe and strong naval station: which is supposed to be the trustee of the policy of the whole Empire. I ask the House to consider what is to be the position in reference to the Empire at any future Conference. We have gone to previous conferences as a united Empire. In the next Conference you will have representatives of this country and of the great Dominions starting from the outset from opposite points of view. Our people will feel themselves in honour bound, if possible, to devise some scheme which will get them out of the necessity of acknowledging that they were wrong. The Dominions will be equally pledged, in consistency, to try to press through the cause of the maintenance of the base at Singapore. Not only have the hands of the right hon. Gentleman opposite been weakened by this action, but any concerted action of the Empire at a Conference is foredoomed to failure from the start. We are told that this is being done because of the need of co-operation. The action that the Government have taken towards their fellow-Governments of the Dominions shows that they are not within a thousand miles of understanding what co-operation means. They talk of their policy being based on confidence. They have shattered the confidence of the Empire. They talk of it being necessary that our good faith should not be open to suspicion. The Dominions have doubt and suspicion at this moment about the good faith of this country towards them.

On a matter of such moment I say the Government should have called together another Conference, should have called the Dominions together, if not their Prime Ministers, at any rate, responsible Ministers, and again gone into this question by real consultation, not by an autocratic telegram telling them what we are going to do, and giving them no chance of a voice in the matter. Nothing would have suffered in the interval. It is not even as if any great expenditure could have taken place. The Prime Minister the other day seemed to think that £1,000,000 or more would be spent on the building of a dock if the decision were delayed. We are not within two years of the expensive work of building the dock. At this moment and for two years to come, the main work will be that of cutting down bushes, filling in holes, making roads and building huts, all the essential preliminary work, cost- ing us practically nothing at this moment. In the new financial year the expenditure to this country was to have been something like £50,000. The total expenditure was to have been £150,000, but the New Zealand contribution was to have been two-thirds of that. It is sometimes suggested that he who pays the piper should call the tune. At any rate, as regards the next year New Zealand might have been entitled to some consultation.

If this is the line which the Government are to take on what, I admit, is one of the most important issues of all in our policy, not only a defence issue, but an international issue, what becomes of all the advance in status of the Dominions since 1914? We thrust them right back into the position where we do not consult them. The Government pursue a policy to suit their own party exigencies at the moment, and pay no heed either to the Dominions' wishes or to the moral obligation incurred towards them. We hear a great deal in this House about the duty of honouring any agreements arrived at by the League of Nations. Is there not at least an equal obligation to honour those agreements which we arrive at within the more intimate League of the British Commonwealth? By this decision you have opened up a far greater problem than you realise. You have opened up the whole question whether the Government of the Empire can continue on its present basis, the basis of co-operation. We have no central Government of Empire, and we may never have one. The whole basis on which the Empire works is that of consultation and agreement. If those agreements which are arrived at by consultation, after the Prime Ministers of the Empire have given months of their time and imperilled their political positions to come here and discuss them, are thrust aside and flouted to suit mere party exigencies, it is the end of the present system in the Empire.

I hope I am not detaining the House too long, but I want to say something further about the Washington Conference. The Washington Conference succeeded because it dealt in a definite manner with a definite menace—the definite menace of building great fleets of warships enormously powerful and enormously costly. It dealt with that first of all by reducing the numbers of those ships in fixed relative proportions. I venture to say that we would never have succeeded in doing so if we had not made it clear ourselves by laying down four super-"Hoods" and being ready to lay down as many more as were necessary, that while we wanted peace we were equally prepared to defend our position in the world. The Prime Minister spoke of his method as being ten million times better from the point of view of moral sincerity. You have got to show your moral sincerity definitely in the whole of your policy. You have to make those with whom you are dealing understand that you are as sincere in your determination to preserve your position in the world as you are sincere in your determination to work for peace, and it was because there was no doubt of our sincerity in both aspects that we were able to bring about that beneficent agreement. The moment you let any doubt or suspicion spring up as to your real motive, or that you are acting from weakness or want of courage, or from some political exigency at home, your whole influence is thrown away. That is what I charge against the Government. The world will not believe—certainly our Dominions will not believe—that it is peace alone that has inspired the gesture in respect of Singapore when it has not inspired it in respect of aeroplanes or cruisers.

The other thing which we achieved at Washington, while limiting offensive armaments, was to create a zone of self-denial by interposing that great area over which battle fleets cannot move, and so make all arrangements outside that zone necessarily defensive in character. What we are doing at Singapore, I venture to say, is carrying out to the full and exactly the spirit and the intention of Washington. We are doing there exactly what the Japanese are doing in their own home waters, and what the Americans are doing in their own territory on the eastern side of that great zone. The policy of Washington was to limit the strength of the offensive while guarding the strength of the defensive. The policy now is to throw aside our defensive weapons while at the same time going on with weapons that at any rate can be used for offensive purposes.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty spoke about going to the ends of the earth to sink money in Singapore. That shows precisely that lack of Empire vision of which Mr. Bruce has complained. Has he not realised that the soldiers of Australia and New Zealand came to the very ends of the earth to aid us. But Singapore is not at the ends of the earth, but is in British home waters, in a part of the world which has been British for a century and between two of the greatest Dominions of the British Crown. And we are to take this decision with what object? What precisely is it the Government are going to secure? What is the menace to avert which they are giving up this base at Singapore? There is absolutely no reason given except the suggestion referred to by the Prime Minister in his statement, that it would

Again, I should like to ask what is the plan? What kind of conference do they propose to call together? Surely the House, when it throws away a great weapon of security, is entitled to know for what it is throwing it away. Is it to be a conference for the reduction of naval armaments only, or naval armaments in the Pacific only, or is it entirely connected with the European situation? We are entitled to know what the Government have in mind. A gesture must have some definite meaning and purpose, and as far as I can see the present gesture has neither. We are also entitled to know what the Government believe to be the prospects of the success of this gesture. We know how a similar gesture failed 20 years ago. What are going to be the consequences if this gesture fails? I venture to say if we make overtures to Japan or other Powers and begin with the suggestion that they should limit their programmes, whether of dock building or shipbuilding, and if they tell us, as they very well may, that it is their own affair—as Germany told us 18 years ago—we then will have to make a belated attempt to begin again at Singapore and hurry on the work feverishly because we see the strength of other Powers increasing. Surely the position then will be far worse. We shall not only have estranged a great and friendly foreign nation, but we shall have estranged our great Dominions. I repeat we should be prepared to support the Government in any definite and practical proposal made for reduction of armaments, but we see no evidence underlying the decision about Singapore that there is any definite purpose or proposal.

11.0 P.M.

All they are doing is to create, as they think, an atmosphere. It may well be the wrong atmosphere in international relations; it is assuredly the wrong atmosphere in our relations with the Dominions. The Colonial Secretary the other day talked of only cowards being afraid to face the facts. But the Government have been afraid to face the facts. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hillhead said we are not entitled, as trustees, to imperil the existence of the Empire for the sake even of high ideals. I fear the Government are imperilling the existence of the Empire, estranging the Dominions, preparing the way for misunderstanding and trouble with foreign countries, not for a great ideal, nor with any clear purpose, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of going back on the unwise things they said before the last election. I appeal to hon. Members, at any rate on this side of the House, with a clear conscience to go into the Lobby, and to do their best to register their protest against what I believe to be an act of wanton and disastrous folly.

The task of anyone at this late hour would be difficult, but accepting, for the purpose of argument, everything that my right hon. Friend has said as being the facts, I certainly am going to stick to the quotation he made and to show that I am not a coward and that I am not going to run away from them. What is the case as presented? We are accused of insulting the Dominions, of leaving them defenceless, in fact, of leaving three-quarters of the British Empire defenceless, of ignoring their advice, disrupting the Empire, striking a mortal blow at the unity of the Empire, and Tendering the possibility of any further Imperial Conference absolutely hopeless. And all that series of crimes, with all their consequences, are deliberately and wantonly undertaken by us in order to give a sop to the back benches. That is the charge. Let us see what all this disruption means. Three parts of the Empire are left defenceless, with all the dangers that follow, because the Government, in order to give this sop, refuse to cut down, in my right hon. Friend's words, a few bushes and to fill up a few dykes in the next two years.

This Empire is in danger. We were never in such a serious position. The whole world must look on with dismay, because all this happened during the last two months. What was my right hon. Friend doing? What was his Government doing if the position is as serious as he states it is? Let me examine some facts. We are accused, first, of insulting the Dominions, in that we merely sent them an intimation, without any consideration of their feelings, that we were going to do this, regardless of their views. That is the charge. Then my right hon. Friend said something which, I am sure, he will regret. I cannot conceive of his attempting to minimise the great services of General Smuts, or to set up one Dominion as being more attached to the-Empire than another.

I said that, as he was not himself present at Washington, his view as to the spirit of the Agreement could not carry quite the same authority as if he had been there. No one is better qualified than myself as an old friend to know of the great value of General Smuts' services to the Empire.

I said deliberately that I was certain that my right hon. Friend did not desire to do so. [ Interruption. ] I said I was quite sure he did not intend to do it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"] Of course, I am not going to withdraw. He will see in cold print to-morrow exactly what was said. [An HON. MEMBER: "What you said he said."] I say it for this reason. While it is true that General Smuts was not at Washington, my right hon. Friend knows perfectly well that General Smuts was at the Imperial Conference when this was discussed, and the whole situation at Washington was explained to him. It is perfectly true, and that is why I say an injustice, in my judgment, was unwittingly done to General Smuts. But what are the facts with regard to consultation? The day the Government decided to spend no more money on Singapore, they wired that decision to the Dominions. Let the House please observe that the Government already knew the Dominions' views. Not only was it on record, but certain Ministers, without mentioning names, were in this country when we came into power, and discussed Singapore with us. So do not be under any misunderstanding as to the Government not knowing the Dominions' views. Immediately they arrived at that decision, they communicated it, and that communication went on the 20th February. The Committee was then set up. On the day the Committee arrived at its decision, that communication, with a full explanation, was sent to the Dominions. When the reply was received, the Cabinet sat again to consider the reply, and, so that there should be no misapprehension, the Dominions were told quite clearly that the Government proposed to make this statement after considering their case. I want to put it to my right hon. Friend, does he seriously suggest that that is insulting to the Dominions? Can he tell me any other question discussed at any Imperial Conference where a different procedure was adopted by his Government? I will give him a chance to answer at once.

I do not know if I used the word insulting. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] The procedure of telling the Dominions what you are to do, and without considering their protests, making it perfectly clear that your minds are made up, was not a method of discussion in conference on which we proceeded. I cannot, from my recollection of the last three years, recall any instance where we simply informed the Dominions, against their protest, what we were to do.

The House will observe that my right hon. Friend could give no cases. I have looked up as well as him, and I did not make my statement without inquiry, and I repeat again that the procedure followed, whether it was right or wrong, so far as the Government was concerned, was precisely on the lines of that of previous Governments. Are we entitled, and is my right hon. Friend entitled, to assume that only certain Dominions' views are to be considered? Does he assume, when he talked about breaking Imperial unity, and the defence of the Empire, that Canada is not as much interested in this question as anyone else? You are to have Imperial defence, but the Dominions are only to consider the question from their own particular points of view. What becomes of Imperial unity? What becomes of Imperial defence? I, on behalf of Canada, repudiate the suggestion that Canada is indifferent to the defence of any other part of the Empire.

I never suggested that any part of the Empire was not interested in the common defence. What I did urge was that the right method was by conference to arrive at unanimity, and not proclaim to the whole world the existence of differences.

Then what was the object of my right hon. Friend quoting New Zealand and Australia? There could be no other object than to say, "This is a consideration that must be taken note of." I am quoting first Canada as saying quite distinctly, "So far as we are concerned we express no opinion." Then I quoted South Africa and said that they expressed very definite opinions. One would assume from what has been said in this Debate that in Australia and New Zealand the people were up in arms, that the Government and everybody else were united, and that a serious crisis had arisen. The present Government of Australia came into power by defeating the previous Labour Government. Does my right hon. Friend know that there is a fairly strong Labour opinion in Australia? I do not think I am overstepping the mark when I say that, just as they were the Government before, before very long they may be the Government again. Let us see the boiling indignation of these people. [HON. MEMBERS: "That is the minority!"] It is the minority. That is to say, they are precisely in the same position as right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite.

I am more considerate and tolerant to you than apparently you are desirous of being to them. At all events, here is a telegram received not by the Government, but by the Labour party—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] I am quite sure hon. Gentlemen opposite have no objection to the Labour party of Australia communicating with the Labour party here! No one on the Front bench would claim to be as representative in this House as the gentleman I will quote is in the particular House in Australia. He says:

It was realised immediately after the War by the Coalition Government when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) was Prime Minister and before.

It had become of paramount importance at the last Imperial Conference! Let us see what follows. Here is a question vital to the Empire—the only thing that really matters—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"]—I repeat, the only thing that really matters, so vital, so important, that whilst the Imperial Conference was practically sitting when they had arrived at this decision, the Government did not think it of sufficient importance to come down to the House and tell us, but risked a General Election on Tariff Reform; [ Interruption. ] I am sorry to detain the House, but I am going to submit three propositions. The first is that the Government did not consider this question from a strategical point of view. They listened and heard all the advice of the naval experts, and although I know that there are different views amongst naval opinion—[HON. MEMBERS: "No"]—Yes, very great experts differ. The Government came to their decision and the Navy experts accepted it on an entirely different basis to that of strategy. They may be wrong if you like, but the answer I give is that, whatever else the late War proved, it proved that armaments and military and naval preparations were no guarantee of peace. Whilst it is true that men came from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa long thousands of miles, which we all appreciate, we also believe that those men came, and many of them fought and hoped that they were fighting, to make war impossible.

There is no nation in the world that can bear the cost of armaments, even to-day. There is no nation in the world that could not apply the money they are spending on armaments to better use. Our answer on this point is that we are going to make a real and genuine effort in the direction of disarmament. We believe that peace can be obtained, and that a world peace can only be obtained by Japan and America being included. If we fail, then we are not to be condemned for making the effort. If we fail, we will frankly tell the House of the danger, and then the dykes can be filled up and the trees can be cut down. If a risk must be taken, there never was a time more appropriate to take it equal to the present. At any rate, we are prepared to do our best. We hope we shall succeed. We believe you wish us well. If we succeed, there will be no regrets; if we fail, we will stand by the consequences.

On a point of Order. I wish to ask whether it is quite courteous, and in accordance with the usual custom of this House, that when an hon. Member rises for one moment to reply to the right hon. Gentleman [ Interruption. ]

I rose at that time to put a question to you, Sir, on the interruption that was occurring while I was already on my feet.

The call, "Divide!" is a very old-established term. The House now always uses that call, "Divide!" which is recognised as a legitimate Parliamentary weapon of defence, and is at all times used with discretion.

Perhaps the hon. Member was not in his place at Question Time to-day, when I was asked a question on the suspension of the Eleven o'Clock Rule. In answer it was indicated that the Rule was being suspended in order that, if a speaker was addressing the House at the time, he should not be interrupted by reasons of the fact that it was Eleven o'clock; but

Division No. 32.]

AYES.

[11.35 p.m.

Ackroyd, T. R.

Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale)

Hayes, John Henry

Acland, Rt. Hon. Francis Dyke

Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)

Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Burnley)

Adamson, Rt. Hon. William

Davison, J. E. (Smethwick)

Henderson, A. (Cardiff, South)

Adamson, W. M. (Staff., Cannock)

Dickson, T.

Henderson, T. (Glasgow)

Alden, Percy

Dodds, S. R.

Henderson, W. W.(Middlesex, Enfield)

Alexander, A. V. (Sheffield, Hillsbro')

Dudgeon, Major C. R.

Hillary, A. E.

Allen, R. Wilberforce (Leicester, S.)

Dukes, C.

Hindle, F.

Alstead, R.

Duncan, C.

Hirst, G. H.

Ammon, Charles George

Dunn, J. Freeman

Hobhouse, A. L.

Aske, Sir Robert William

Dunnico, H.

Hodge, Lieut.-Col. J. p. (Preston)

Attlee, Major Clement R.

Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty)

Hodges, Frank

Ayles, W. H.

Edwards, G. (Norfolk, Southern)

Hoffman, P. C.

Baker, W. J.

Egan, W. H.

Hogge, James Myles

Banton, G.

Falconer, J.

Howard, Hon. G. (Bedford, Luton)

Barclay, R. Noton

Finney, V. H.

Hudson, J. H.

Barnes, A.

Fletcher, Lieut.-Com. R. T. H.

Isaacs, G. A.

Batey, Joseph

Foot, Isaac

Jackson, R. F. (Ipswich)

Berkeley, Captain Reginald

Franklin, L. B.

Jenkins, W. (Glamorgan, Neath)

Birkett, W. N.

Gardner, B. W. (West Ham, Upton)

Jewson, Dorothea

Black, J. W.

Gardner, J. P. (Hammersmith, North)

John, William (Rhondda, West)

Bondfield, Margaret

George, Major G. L. (Pembroke)

Johnston, Thomas (Stirling)

Bonwick, A.

Gillett, George M.

Johnstone, Harcourt (Willesden, East)

Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W.

Gorman, William

Jones, C. Sydney (Liverpool, W. Derby)

Bramsdon, Sir Thomas

Gosling, Harry

Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)

Broad, F. A.

Gould, Frederick (Somerset, Frome)

Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown)

Brown, A. E. (Warwick, Rugby)

Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)

Jones, Rt. Hon. Leif (Camborne)

Brown, James (Ayr and Bute)

Graham, W. (Edinburgh, Central)

Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)

Brunner, Sir J.

Gray, Frank (Oxford)

Jones, T. I. Mardy (Pontypridd)

Buchanan, G.

Greenall, T.

Jowett, Rt. Hon. F. W. (Bradford, E.)

Buckle, J.

Greenwood, A. (Nelson and Colne)

Jowitt, W. A. (The Hartlepools)

Burnie, Major J. (Bootle)

Grenfell, D. R. (Glamorgan)

Kay, Sir R. Newbald

Cape, Thomas

Griffith, Rt. Hon. Sir Ellis

Kedward, R. M.

Chapple, Dr. William A.

Groves, T.

Keens, T.

Charleton, H. C.

Grundy, T. W.

Kennedy, T.

Church, Major A. G.

Guest, J. (York, Hemsworth)

Kenworthy, Lt.-Com. Hon. Joseph M.

Clarke, A.

Guest, Dr. L. Haden (Southwark, N.)

Kirkwood, D.

Climie, R.

Hall, G. H. (Merthyr Tydvil)

Lambert, Rt. Hon. George

Cluse, W. S.

Hamilton, Sir R. (Orkney & Shetland)

Lansbury, George

Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R.

Hardie, George D.

Laverack, F. J.

Collins, Sir Godfrey (Greenock)

Harney, E. A.

Lawrence, Susan (East Ham, North)

Collins, Patrick (Walsall)

Harris, John (Hackney, North)

Lawson, John James

Compton, Joseph

Harris, Percy A.

Leach, W.

Costello, L. W. J.

Hartshorn, Rt. Hon. Vernon

Lessing, E.

Cove, W. G.

Harvey, T. E. (Dewsbury)

Lindley, F. W.

Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities)

Hastings, Sir Patrick

Linfield, F. C.

Darbishire, C. W.

Hastings, Somerville (Reading)

Livingstone, A. M.

Davies, David (Montgomery)

Haycock, A. W.

Loverseed, J. F.

Davies, Ellis (Denbigh, Denbigh)

Hayday, Arthur

Lowth, T.

it was clearly understood that the Debate was not to be continued longer after that than was unavoidable.

I think the House is prepared very shortly to come to a decision. I ask the House to give the hon. Member a hearing.

I thought, as the Eleven o'Clock Rule was suspended, it was not discourteous to address the House for two or three minutes, but, in view of the feeling which has been expressed on the other side, I will not make the remarks I intended to make in answer to the right hon. Gentleman.

Question put, "That £3,080,000' stand part of the Resolution."

The House divided: Ayes, 287; Noes, 211.

Lunn, William

Raffan, P. W.

Thomas, Sir Robert John (Anglesey)

McCrae, Sir George

Raffety, F. W.

Thompson, Piers G. (Torquay)

MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Aberavon)

Ramage, Captain Cecil Beresford

Thomson, Trevelyan (Middlesbro, W.)

M'Entee, V. L.

Rathbone, Hugh R.

Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.)

Macfadyen, E.

Raynes, W. R.

Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plaistow)

Mackinder, W.

Rea, W. Russell

Thornton, Maxwell R.

Maclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)

Rees, Capt. J. T. (Devon, Barnstaple)

Thurtle, E.

Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

Rendall, A.

Tillett, Benjamin

Maden, H.

Richards, R.

Tinker, John Joseph

Mansel, Sir Courtenay

Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)

Toole, J.

March, S.

Ritson, J.

Tout, W. J.

Marks, Sir George Croydon

Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O. (W. Bromwich)

Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. C. P.

Marley, James

Robertson. J. (Lanark, Bothwell)

Turner-Samuels, M.

Martin, F. (Aberd'n & Kinc'dine, E.)

Robertson, T. A.

Varley, Frank B.

Martin, W. H. (Dumbarton)

Robinson, W. E. (Burslem)

Viant, S. P.

Masterman, Rt. Hon. C. F. G.

Romeril, H. G.

Vivian, H.

Maxton, James

Rose, Frank H.

Wallhead, Richard C.

Middleton, G.

Royce, William Stapleton

Walsh, Rt. Hon. Stephen

Mills, J. E.

Royle, C.

Ward, G. (Leicester, Bosworth)

Mond, H.

Rudkin, Lieut.-Colonel C. M. C.

Warne, G. H.

Montague, Frederick

Samuel, H. Walter (Swansea, West)

Watson, W. M. (Dunfermline)

Morris, R. H.

Scrymgeour, E.

Watts-Morgan, Lt.-Col. D. (Rhondda)

Morrison, Herbert (Hackney, South)

Scurr, John

Webb, Lieut.-Col. Sir H. (Cardiff, E.)

Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.)

Seely, H. M. (Norfolk, Eastern)

Webb, Rt. Hon. Sidney

Morse, W. E.

Shaw, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Preston)

Wedgwood, Col. Rt. Hon. Josiah C.

Mosley, Oswald

Sherwood, George Henry

Weir, L. M.

Moulton, Major Fletcher

Short, Alfred (Wednesbury)

Welsh, J. C.

Muir, John W.

Simon, E. D. (Manchester, Withington)

Westwood, J.

Muir, Ramsay (Rochdale)

Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John

Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J.

Murray, Robert

Sitch, Charles H.

White, H. G. (Birkenhead, E.)

Murrell, Frank

Smillie, Robert

Whiteley, W.

Naylor, T. E.

Smith, Ben (Bermondsey, Rotherhithe)

Wignall, James

Nichol, Robert

Smith, W. R. (Norwich)

Williams, A. (York, W. R., Sowerby)

Nixon, H.

Snell, Harry

Williams, David (Swansea, E.)

O'Grady, Captain James

Snowden, Rt. Hon. Philip

Williams, Dr. J. H. (Llanelly)

Oliver, George Harold

Spears, Brig.-Gen. E. L.

Williams, Lt.-Col. T.S.B. (Kenningtn.)

Oliver, P. M. (Manchester, Blackley)

Spence, R.

Williams, Maj. A. S. (Kent, Sevenoaks)

Owen, Major G.

Spencer, H. H. (Bradford, S.)

Williams, T. (York, Don Valley)

Paling, W.

Spero, Dr. G. E.

Willison, H.

Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan)

Stamford, T. W.

Wilson, R. J. (Jarrow)

Parry, Thomas Henry

Starmer, Sir Charles

Windsor, Walter

Perry, S. F.

Stephen, Campbell

Wintringham, Margaret

Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.

Stewart, J. (St. Rollox)

Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.)

Phillips, Vivian

Stewart, Maj. R. S. (Stockton-on-Tees)

Woodwark, Lieut.-Colonel G. G.

Pilkington, R. R.

Stranger, Innes Harold

Young, Andrew (Glasgow, Partick)

Ponsonby, Arthur

Sturrock, J. Leng

Potts, John S.

Tattersall, J. L.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Pringle, W. M. R.

Terrington, Lady

Mr. Spoor and Mr. Frederick Hall.

Purcell, A. A.

Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby)

NOES.

Ainsworth, Captain Charles

Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R.

Edmondson, Major A. J.

Alexander, Brg.-Gen. Sir W.(Glas. C.)

Cassels, J. D.

Ednam, Viscount

Allen, Lieut.-Col. Sir William James

Cautley, Sir Henry S.

Edwards, John H. (Accrington)

Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.

Cayzer, Sir C. (Chester, City)

Elveden, viscount

Astor, Maj. Hn. John J. (Kent, Dover)

Cayzer, Maj. Sir Herbt. R. (Prtsmth. S.)

England, Colonel A.

Astor, Viscountess

Cecil, Rt. Hon. Sir Evelyn (Aston)

Erskine, James Malcolm Monteith

Baird, Major Rt. Hon. Sir John L.

Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.)

Falle, Major Sir Bertram Godfray

Balfour, George (Hampstead)

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Ladywood)

FitzRoy, Capt. Hon. Edward. A.

Banks, Reginald Mitchell

Churchman, Sir Arthur C.

Forestier-Walker, L.

Becker, Harry

Clarry, Reginald George

Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.

Beckett, Sir Gervase

Clayton, G. C.

Galbraith, J. F. W.

Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W.

Cobb, Sir Cyril

Gates, Percy

Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake)

Cockerill, Brigadier-General G. K.

Gaunt, Rear-Admiral Sir Guy R.

Berry, Sir George

Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips

Gould, James C. (Cardiff, Central)

Betterton, Henry B.

Conway, Sir W. Martin

Greene, W. P. Crawford

Birchall, Major J. Dearman

Cope, Major William

Greenwood, William (Stockport)

Bird, Sir R. B. (Wolverhampton, W.)

Courthope. Lieut.-Col. George L.

Grenfell, Edward C. (City of London)

Blades, Sir George Rowland

Cowan, Sir Wm. Henry (Islington, N.)

Gretton, Colonel John

Blundell, F. N.

Craig, Captain C. C. (Antrim, South)

Grigg, Lieut.-Col. Sir Edward W. M.

Bowater, Sir T. Vansittart

Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry

Guest, Capt. Hn. F.E. (Gloucstr., Stroud)

Bowyer, Captain G. E. W.

Croft, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Page

Gwynne, Rupert S.

Brassey, Sir Leonard

Curzon, Captain Viscount

Hacking, Captain Douglas H.

Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive

Dalkeith, Earl of

Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich)

Briscoe, Captain Richard George

Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H.

Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry

Brittain, Sir Harry

Davies, Alfred Thomas (Lincoln)

Harbord, Arthur

Buckingham, Sir H.

Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)

Harland, A.

Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James

Davies, Sir Thomas (Cirencester)

Hartington, Marquess of

Burman, J. B.

Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.)

Harvey, C.M.B. (Aberd'n & Kincardne)

Burney, Lieut.-Com. Charles D.

Dawson, Sir Philip

Henn, Sir Sydney H.

Butler, Sir Geoffrey

Deans, Richard Storry

Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford)

Butt, Sir Alfred

Dixey; A. C.

Hill-Wood, Major Sir Samuel

Caine, Gordon Hall

Eden, Captain Anthony

Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.

Hogbin, Henry Cairns

Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter)

Smith-Carington, Neville W.

Hogg, Rt. Hon. Sir D. (St. Marylebone)

Newton, Sir D. G. C. (Cambridge)

Somerville, A. A. (Windsor)

Hohler, Sir Gerald Fitzroy

Nicholson, O. (Westminster)

Somerville, Daniel (Barrow-in-Furness)

Hood, Sir Joseph

Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

Stanley, Lord

Hope, Rt. Hon. J. F. (Sheffield, C.)

Nield, Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert

Steel, Samuel Strang

Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley)

Oman, Sir Charles William C.

Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)

Horlick, Lieut.-Colonel J. N.

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William

Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser

Horne, Sir R. S. (Glasgow, Hillhead)

Pease, William Edwin

Sutcliffe, T.

Howard-Bury, Lieut.-Col. C. K.

Pennefather, Sir John

Sykes, Major-Gen. Sir Frederick H.

Hughes, Collingwood

Penny, Frederick George

Terrell, Captain R. (Oxford, Henley)

Huntingfield, Lord

Percy, Lord Eustace (Hastings)

Thompson, Luke (Sunderland)

Hutchison, W. (Kelvingrove)

Perkins, Colonel E. K.

Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South)

Iliffe, Sir Edward M.

Perring, William George

Thomson, Sir W. Mitchell-(Croydon, S.)

Inskip, Sir Thomas Walker H.

Philipson, Mabel

Titchfield, Major the Marquess of

Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S.

Pilditch, Sir Philip

Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement

James, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert

Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton

Turton, Edmund Russborough

Jephcott, A. R.

Raine, W.

Vaughan-Morgan, Col. K. P.

Johnson, Sir L. (Walthamstow, E.)

Rankin, James S.

Waddington, R.

Kindersley, Major G. M.

Rawson, Alfred Cooper

Ward, Col. J. (Stoke-upon-Trent)

King, Captain Henry Douglas

Rees, Sir Beddoe

Ward, Lt.-Col. A. L. (Kingston-on-Hull)

Lane-Fox, George R.

Reid, D. D. (County Down)

Warrender, Sir Victor

Leigh, Sir John (Clapham)

Remer, J. R.

Watson, Sir F. (Pudsey and Otley)

Lloyd, Cyril E. (Dudley)

Rentoul, G. S.

Wells, S. R

Lloyd-Greame, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip

Rhys, Hon. C. A. U.

Weston, John Wakefield

Lord, Walter Greaves-

Richardson, Lt.-Col. Sir P. (Chertsey)

Wheler, Lieut.-Col. Granville C. H.

Lowe, Sir Francis William

Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford)

Wilson, Sir C. H. (Leeds, Central)

Lumley, L. R.

Robinson, Sir T. (Lanes., Stretford)

Wilson, Col. M. J. (Richmond)

McLean, Major A.

Ropner, Major L.

Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George

Macnaghten, Hon. Sir Malcolm

Roundell, Colonel R. F.

Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl

Makins, Brigadier-General E.

Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)

Wise, Sir Fredric

Mason, Lieut.-Col. Glyn K.

Russell-Wells, Sir S. (London Univ.)

Wolmer, Viscount

Meller, R. J.

Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)

Wood, Major Rt. Hon. Edward F. L.

Milne, J. S. Wardlaw

Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney)

Wragg, Herbert

Mitchell, W. F. (Saffron Walden)

Sandeman, A. Stewart

Yate, Colonel Sir Charles Edward

Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)

Sassoon, sir Philip Albert Gustave D.

Yerburgh, Major Robert D. T.

Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C.

Savery, S. S.

Morden, Colonel Walter Grant

Scott, Sir Leslie (Liverp'l, Exchange)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

Morrison-Bell, Major Sir A. C. (Honiton)

Sheffield, Sir Berkeley

Commander B. Eyres-Monsell and

Nall, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Joseph

Shepperson, E. W.

Colonel G. A. Gibbs.

Nesbitt, Robert C.

Simms, Dr. John M. (Co. Down)

Resolutions agreed to.

WAYS AND MEANS [20th March]

Resolutions reported:

1. "That, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ended on the 31st day of March, 1923,the sum of £10 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."

2."That, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1924,the sum of £162,278,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."

3."That, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1925,the sum of £162,278,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."

Resolution agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolutions by the Chairman of Ways and Means, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. William Graham.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 2) BILL,

"to apply certain sums out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the years ending on the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-four, and one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five," presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time to-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 86.]

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

It being after half-past Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order .

Adjourned at Thirteen Minutes before Twelve o'Clock.