I wish to ask a question regarding business. Have any alterations been made since the last announcement?

In accordance with the undertaking I gave on the day of the Adjournment, we have put down as second Order to-day the Mines Department Vote, and we propose, in view of the desire expressed by the Opposition in Debate on that subject, to take the second Vote as first Order— that is the Mines Department.

To-morrow, Wednesday, as first Order, we shall consider an Address to His Majesty in reply to the Most Gracious Message, and afterwards a Resolution to continue the Regulations made under the Emergency Powers Act, and other Orders on the Paper.

The business for Thursday will remain unaltered, as announced on the day of the Adjournment.

I am not yet in a position to announce the business for Friday.

On a point of Order. Before entering upon the Debate, may I put this point to you, Mr. Hope? Of course, we all know that on Supply days you rule very rigidly that no reference can be made to legislation, and our Debates on a day like this are apt to be kept within the very strictest limits of Order. To-day I think it would meet the convenience of all parties if there was a little elasticity in the Debate, so that the day may be used not merely for the purpose of counting as a Supply day, but also for the purpose of reviewing the present situation in the coal industry—the dispute, and so on. That cannot be done unless you allow us to refer to some of the points in the Royal Commission's Report which indicate that legislation is required. The Prime Minister, in frequent speeches that he has made, and in frequent obiter dicta, has indicated that he is prepared to accept, under conditions, that Report. If we are to have a full Debate such as the House and the country would expect to-day, it will be necessary for us to transgress your usual ruling, and I ask whether it would be possible for you to give us a little more latitude to-day than you would be inclined to do under ordinary circumstances?

I have anticipated some such question as the right hon. Gentleman has put to me. I feel that the Committee would be in some difficulty. On the one hand, it is an absolute Rule of the House that in Committee of Supply legislation may not be referred to. The importance of that is obvious, because the whole object of setting apart a day for Committee of Supply is that the various Departments, with their administration, should come under review and criticism, and if proposals for legislation could be discussed it is obvious that the Department would, to a great extent, escape that criticism. On the other hand, I cannot but recognise that the proposals of the Coal Commission, and perhaps other suggestions which would also require legislation, will be in the mind of every member of the Committee, and if we kept to the strict rules of Order there would be a truncated and unsatisfactory discussion. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that this is one of those- cases where I should ask the Committee to allow me to exercise a certain dispensing power. Therefore, if no objection be taken, I should not rule out references to possible legislation arising out of the Coal Commission Report, or other like suggestions for dealing with the present emergency. If no objection is raised I will act in that way.

I feel perfectly certain, Mr. Hope, in thanking you for the decision you have given, that I speak for once for the whole Committee and not merely for a section. We all wish to review a situation which is fraught with great national danger, and to review it in such a way as to enable us to make some practical contribution to its solution. Those of us who have been about the country during the Recess must have seen very considerable evidences of the paralysis which is creeping over our national industries. We have seen it in our railways; we have seen it in our coalfields, and I have seen it in one of those little secluded places that are so far remote from the centre of things that one hardly expects to find there any traces of the big events which happen here, namely, the little fishing villages, where men removed hundreds of miles away from the strike and millions of years away from the mentality of the strike, instead of being able to prosecute their calling on the West and North Coasts of Scotland, are idle at home, their boats laid up, and they themselves unable to do anything in order to make an honest living. That is the situation. The Government up to a week or two ago took up the position that, in accordance with its dignity and the responsibilities of its position, it could negotiate with nobody while the general strike was on. The general strike is off. What has the Government done? The Government must know perfectly well that this is not a time or a case for writing letters to a correspondent across the way and then waiting until the correspondent replies and then sending another letter in reply.

This is a time, and this is a case, when night and day men feeling the national responsibility and peril should use every minute actively in order to get a satisfactory solution. Negotiations are conducted not by men who have a conclusion already in their pockets. The negotiator, the Government, faced with a national crisis like this, an industrial crisis like this, does not merely fulfil its duty by expressing its views. It is bound to go to both sides and see that they do not get away from each other. No answer is a final answer; no answer is a hopeless answer. Personal influence, the influence of office and of position, the influence of the House of Commons, should be used every hour and every day in order to get the impossibilists, if there are any such, to become possible, and in order to get the possible views embodied in a lasting agreement. What has happened? I do not know that this is a moment to be reminiscent, but when the story of the whole crisis is told it will be one of the most melancholy stories of wasted time, wasted months, of opportunities mishandled and chances never taken. To-day we are still in the struggle, and as far as I am concerned, I am going to try to see what we can do to straighten it out.

4.0 P.M.

First of all, may I say that I was perfectly amazed at the reply given to my question about the subsidy by the Prime Minister. He seems to consider that every statement he makes is made subject to somebody doing something or other. I have never known such a living example of a believer in the relativity of truth. Was the subsidy a bribe? Was the subsidy a bargain? Was it like this; that in the mind of a sort of American Tammany Hall politician, owners and men were asked to come to peace, and, if they would agree to peace, then the Government would give them something, about £3,000,000, distributed in some way or another. Was that the idea? I am perfectly certain it never was. The Prime Minister is doing himself an injustice. My idea of the subsidy is this: it was necessary in the national interest. A situation had been created in the coal industry which had to be tided over. We were in a state of flux— in a state when normal internal economic laws could not be left to operate in that industry. The Government—much against its will, I suppose, and contrary to its principles— said: "In the circumstances we must temporarily put principle on one side, and in order to put this industry upon a sound economic footing again, we are prepared to spend public money" But now, apparently, not.

Does the Prime Minister mean to tell me that the industry is better to-day than it was at 11 o'clock last night? Does he mean to tell me that the case for the subsidy which he could make out a fortnight ago, the last day on which we were meeting before the Adjournment, is weaker to-day than it was then? Of course he does not, and he cannot. The case for the subsidy he could have made out three weeks ago is stronger, unfortunately— there is no mistake about that—at this minute, than it was when the £3,000,000 subsidy was offered. All I say is, Governments may have dignities and so on, but to say something requires national help in order to put itself in a position to serve the nation, but if it is not good— using the language of the nursery—if it is not well-behaved, if it is naughty, what has been declared to be necessary for its sustenance from the point of view of national interest will be withdrawn from it, that is not in accordance either with Government dignity or Government wisdom. Whether we like subsidies or not, whether they are in accordance with our principles or not, I say that in dealing with the present situation, the situation we have to face on the first day of June, 1926, in the coal industry, we must begin with the assumption that money has got to be found to put that industry on its legs.

What is the general position of the Government in this case? The Government do not seem to know exactly where they stand. They will not keep out of negotiations, and they will not go into negotiations. I know, as a matter of fact—a good many others know too— that before the crisis came, both sides, remembering the experience of last year, assumed at the last moment that the Government would not come in, and that there was going to be no crisis. The Government did not come in. The Government made it perfectly plain last year, within an hour or two of granting the subsidy, and swearing to both owners and men that no subsidy would ever be granted. I admit after that experience, it is very difficult to get the confidence of either the owners or the men. Still, it might have been possible. But the Government must make up their mind whether they are going into the negotiations, or are going to stay outside. Up to now, on the whole they have stayed outside. On the whole they have been in favour of the reduction of the miners' wages. They may not have ranged themselves like a regiment behind the owners [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, yes."] I say they may not, but I do not mind whether it is so or not. The effect of their action and inaction has been to play the game of the owners. They are standing by while this fight is being fought to a finish.

Does the Prime Minister visualise what that means? Of course, he does. It is almost unfair of me to put the question. Is he quite satisfied in his own mind with that vision in contemplation that he is driving the situation hard enough? Is he quite certain that with the tremendous power he has, as the head of the State, he is using every minute as if it were a golden minute which he cannot afford to let slip wastefully? I frankly tell him that, as far as I am concerned, I do not believe he is sufficiently aware of that fact, and that he is allowing chance after chance to slip. Instead of being in it, fighting it all the time, instead of having the idea, that the Government is not the fifth wheel in this coach, but is the essential wheel in the coach, that the coal industry is a key industry, that the coal industry in a very peculiar way is a key industry not only for our internal strength, but in relation to our inter- national and external strength, and that, therefore, if this industry is being allowed to go to wrack and ruin by quarrels between owners and men, or by any reason whatever, the Government cannot afford to stand outside and behold all this change taking place as though they were beholding an earthquake playing havoc in a grocer's shop. The Government, seeing those cracks, seeing those signs of dissolution, are a partner, are interested, are not a spectator, and ought to be right in the negotiations, right in the active work that is being done all the time until peace comes.

I hoped, when the Prime Minister made his statement on Friday, the 14th May, that he was going to do this. I hoped the idea behind his words was that, "From now onwards I am going to come in. The owners can rebuff me, and the miners can rebuff me, but I am going to keep them together. I am going to keep them faced with their problems, and I am going to see to it that those problems do not get out of their minds. I am going to see to it that mere propaganda is not going to control the situation, the hard facts of the industry "What did he do? He said on that day: assumed that this declaration of the Prime Minister meant that the two parties, not being able to come to an agreement, the great third party, the country, represented by the Government, was going to come in and see that an agreement was come to.

What happened? A Memorandum was issued by the Government and sent to the Owners and the men. That Memorandum in its contents was much less than the pledges the Prime Minister had previously given, when he said that he was going to take the Report. There were two things left out of that Memorandum, first, the nationalisation of mineral rights; secondly, the coal- selling-organisation. It was a smaller Memorandum with a narrower pledge than the miners had been expecting the Prime Minister would have given them as a solution. But even then, what negotiator would have been content with drafting a dispatch of that sort, then sending it to one side and the other, then waiting till one side or the other sent in a letter of reply, and then saying: "If you do not agree with my Memorandum, I am going to withdraw my pledge to give your industry a subsidy"? To me, that is a most extraordinary proceeding. Nobody ever assumed that that Memorandum would be a peace Memorandum. Nobody on either side could ever have assumed that. A first Memorandum is never meant to be a peace Memorandum. A first Memorandum is always meant, at least in my experience, to be the basis of negotiations, and over and over again you keep things out of your first Memorandum, because you know you will have a pistol put at your head, asking you to deliver them, and you prefer to deliver them in negotiations rather than before the negotiations begin. It is a perfectly understood thing, but that is not what happened here. The whole thing was finished. Negotiations never took place at all, and that is the reason why to-day we are in the position in which we now are.

My first point is about the subsidy. My second point is, Begin negotiations now, but do begin negotiations with your minds made up as to what you are going to do. Now the major mistake which was made before the crisis came —I mean by the "crisis," the opening of the strike—was when the Government so handled the wages question that that problem was abstracted from other considerations for the reconstruction of the industry. That was the major mistake of tactics. They went to the men's representatives—Mr. Herbert Smith and the others—without any programme of reconstruction, without anything about reconstruction except the vague pledge that, "We are going to carry it out "Carry what out? Nobody knew. The Government themselves have shown they did not know. But beyond that, not a word, not a pledge of any substance of effectual value. They went to the men and said, "Will you accept a reduction of wages now?" The result of that was not only that they got a negative reply, but that they created a psychology on the part of the men which made them look at every subsequent proposal made to them from the point of view of whether it meant a reduction of wages. We have not got over that difficulty yet. The difficulty could quite easily have been avoided if the situation had been handled a little bit better than it was.

My third contribution of a general character is this: The Government ought to make it perfectly clear that it accepts the Royal Commission Report in this respect. There was a little controversy on that Monday, on the day before the general strike, as to what the Report meant. I happened to be involved in it. I read the Report in one way and others read it in another way. I think both ways were possible. It is one of those unfortunate points which are not at all clear, and if hon. Members had to go into the details of that Royal Commission Report with the meticulous care that some of us have had to exercise during two or three weeks, they would discover that phrases which look all right when read carelessly, if read with a critical intelligence which says, "How am I going to apply them," are discovered to be very vague as a matter of fact. This is one of them. Now we have an interpretation. The Chairman of the Royal Commission has given an interpretation, and these are his words. He said in the fourth paragraph of that memorandum which he gave to the Trades Union Congress:

There is one other point to be considered. The Government must make up its mind as to its own plane. We want to know what it is going to do. It is not enough for the Government to say, "Provided the other two accept the Royal Commission Report we will do so." The owners never had such a present of a tactical situation as that statement. I am bound to say—I am a great admirer of the owners, though not a sympathiser with them—that they took the present with magnificent skill. If the Royal Commission's Report and recommendation is good, why not accept it? The coal industry has got into the situation that it cannot possibly be run on its present basis. Nobody claims that it can do so. When one studies the reconstruction that has taken place in the Ruhr within the last two years, when one sees the development—I have seen part of it with my own eyes—in the Pas de Calais, in the magnificently-equipped and up-to-date new mines, when one sees the development of the organisation of the Polish mines and the Silesian mines, then the situation of the British coal industry, one realises, has to be examined from a totally different angle.

If you leave it to the owners interested in this little property or the owners interested in another little property, and the miners interested in the standard of life of their own people, you have nothing but the elements of a fight; whereas if you want the element and the influence of reconstruction to come in, you must have some influence and some element which, mindful of both, and primarily the standard of life of our people, I candidly confess, and you must co-ordinate the industry in such a way that it will fulfil the function that the nation asks it to fulfil. If the Report has indicated how that is to be done, what is the use of saying, "We will do that if the miners and the owners agree to it"? The Prime Minister should say, "I will do that. If the miners and the owners both disagree with it, I will chance it." But the Intelligent men on both sides will so nothing of the kind; they will not disagree. I cannot imagine, or believe—Ir know sufficient of them both to know that there will be a small nucleus of men who will see that you do not get opposition to that.

You have to get your international settlement, but I will not proceed with that subject. It is a tremendous problem and one which, whoever is responsible for the Government of this country, will have to be faced. It will have to be faced in a totally different frame of mind from that which says, "If the two sides agree, I, as a third party, will also agree." The position of the Government should be this: "We believe that the industry has to be reconstructed on certain lines, and we will get men and owners to help-us to reconstruct it." If we were on the Government Benches we would do it ourselves. There is no doubt about it. I hope that that is no confession to hon. Members opposite. I am willing to go-step by step slowly, if I am compelled' by my companions, but quickly in the end. What this Committee will have to make up its mind to is that there must be co-ordination in the pits, and that the only complete form of co-ordination is nationalisation. I know that the present Government will not give us it, and I hope we are not going to make debating points about it.

My contention is that in the Royal Commission Report there is a definite proposal made, not a sort of pious proposal, but a business proposal, and a proposal made because the Royal Commission has come to the conclusion that unless there is co-ordination in the pits the industry is not going to recover. At any rate the Government has said, however much it may imagine it is opposed to nationalisation, "We accept that, subject of course to the others agreeing," which I consider absolutely superfluous. The Government has said, "We accept that, and we will do it" Why do you not do it? Why do you not co-ordinate your pits and produce your plan for doing it? Mining royalties—what are you going to do about them? If you made a declaration about them we should know where you stand. Miners do not accept words or vague terms, and quite rightly, for they have had too many. It is not because they have more original sin or suspicion in them than have hon. Members opposite. It is because they have accepted vague promises in the past, and they have been sold every time they have done so. They are not going to have any more. It is because of bitter experience that they are making their present stand.

Bring us your programme about mining royalties and about the nationalisation of mineral rights. What are you going to do about municipalities selling coal, and other selling organisations and agencies, which you have accepted, but only in words? Is your legislation ready; are your Bills ready? Above all, what is your idea about the combination of pits That is really the centre of the whole problem. So long as you leave the coalfields to be divided up into properties of varying value, you classify pits that could easily be made economical as uneconomical. You have not the samples, as it were, of pit working to enable you to strike the business average cost of production that is wanted. As a matter of fact you have it on paper now; you now strike wages averages upon averages returned of the actual selling prices of pits. But the average on which you now work does not exist at all except as figures on paper. What we want, and what the industry and the nation want, is that you take the next practical step and make your paper averages into business averages by actually grouping the pits for working pits that you group for financial and statistical purposes. What are you doing about that?

You cannot possibly face the figures presented by the Royal Commission about the varieties of rates and accounts in various districts—that enormous scale of variations, not applying to the nation but to the districts themselves—you cannot any longer face those pages of tables and refrain from compelling the unwilling owners to amalgamate, or from taking steps yourselves, to amalgamate under nationalisation, if you have the power to do so. What are you going to do about it? The subsidy I have already dealt with. I only say now that you have to pay; you cannot get out of it. Then there is this other point under this final head. What proposals do you make for some sort of long settlement in the coal industry? Are we really going to come out of this difficulty, as we have come out of other difficulties, to find in six months after a so-called peace that we are on the verge of war again? Are we going to finish this struggle, as we have finished others, and in 12 months from now find ourselves in new trouble about wages or hours or conditions or something of that kind? It is the duty and responsibility of the Government to produce an idea, a suggestion, a proposal, to safeguard us against a repetition of these endless disputes in the coal industry.

The coal industry has been an unfortunate one for centuries. To-day we are reaping what our fathers and grandfathers and great-grandfathers have sown. There is no industry in the whole country where the relations between owners and men have been worse. There is no industry in the whole country, not even the cotton industry in its early days, that ought to make us blush more than the inhuman conditions under which coal-owners made profits in the coal industry in the past. You meet women yet—and they are not extremely old—who can remember being harnessed to coal trucks, and leading the coal up from the coal pits to the open light of day. All this is your inheritance. This is the harvest which this unfortunate generation is reaping. I believe we have a great opportunity now, even though this time seems to be the very worst, of closing that chapter and opening a new one. It all depends upon the Government. It is for the Government now to produce their programme and tell us what they want, and cease to play with a reduction in the men's wages as they have been doing; it is for the Government to make it perfectly clear that they are out for reconstruction of the industry, and give the men and owners a sufficiently clear idea of what is in their mind. Above all, keep them negotiating; keep them fighting on proposals across a table, and not on platforms far removed from each other. Keep them facing each other with a Government representative, the Prime Minister himself if possible, as the Chairman, standing by the miners' standard of living, declining to allow that to go down, supplementing it by what assistance the nation has to give, and by this scheme for the reorganisation of the industry I believe the old, the bad, the black record of the getting of coal in our country would be finished for ever, and we would be facing a much more hopeful and brighter prospect for the miner in this nation.

I think after the speech to which we have just listened, the Government are now in a position, at once, to take steps to settle this long drawn out dispute. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has pointed out the failures of the Government up to the present. He has also told them what they can do, here and now, to settle the dispute. It remains for the Government to put into operation the proposals which the right hon. Gentleman has just made to them and thus, at last, peace and prosperity will reign throughout this industry. The proposals of the right hon. Gentleman boil down to this. We must not reduce the miners' wages; we must not increase the hours of labour; we must pay a subsidy in order that the hours of work may remain as they are at present and the wages as they were up to the end of April, and the other industries of the country are to bear the burden as they were bearing it previously. Surely, it i3 conceivable that the workers in other industries have some rights In this matter. [HON. MEMBERS: "So have the miners!"] Having paid over £50,000,000 out of their hard-earned wages during the last 10 years to the miners and the coal industry generally, their plea ought to be heard for once. We should listen to their complaint. They do not see any reason to contribute to subsidise, out of their pitiable wages, week by week, men who work shorter hours and receive higher wages. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] I think their bitter cry should arouse the sympathy of this Committee.

To show I am not speaking entirely from imagination, I may say that I have come across this question in the case of my own men. Perhaps I may be allowed to suggest to the representatives of the miners that other people have sacrificed something for their benefit. In March of last year, when the crisis became acute and the coal trade was, as it were, descending towards bankruptcy, I went down to my own men and said: "I shall be obliged to reduce your wages all round by 20s. a week," and they accepted that reduction cheerfully. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] They asked, "Why is a reduction necessary?" pointed out the condition of the coal industry, and I said: "The best we can. do for that unhappy industry is to keep prices down and make it as easy for that industry as we can," and, as I say, they accepted the reduction cheerfully.

Did they pass you a vote of thanks?

That is not the end of the matter. In July of last year I was forced, owing to the growing difficulties of the colliery industry, on which we depend, to go to the men again and say: "There is to be a further reduction of 20s. a week in the wages of every man in these works." [ Interruption .]

I must point out that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition was listened to without interruption, and when an hon. Member rises to state the case on the other side, he also should be listened to without interruption.

The hon. Member is not stating the case on the other side.

I ask hon. Members to give a fair hearing to the hon. Member who is addressing the Committee.

As I was saying I was obliged, in July of last year, to make the same unhappy announcement to my men and there was a further reduction on the wages of every man in the place of 20s a week—making a total of 40s. a week from every man in my works for the benefit of the miners and the mining industry.

Will the hon. Member tell the Committee what were the men's wages before the 40s. was taken off?

Their wages were more than 40s. above the district trade union rate, and I was obliged to reduce them to something very near the district rate. [HON. MEMBERS: "How much? "] About 15 per cent above the district rate. I only relate this incident to show the representatives of the miners that their troubles have been followed with sympathy by workers in other industries and that that sympathy has, in one case, taken a very practical form indeed. All through the autumn and winter my men put up with these conditions cheerfully until the publication of the Commission's Report, and then their views changed entirely. That Report, as the Committee knows, was widely circulated and widely read, and the view taken by the men in my works was this: "We have sacrificed ourselves all these months for the benefit of our colleagues in another industry, and we feel now we have sacrificed ourselves enough for men who are working shorter hours and drawing higher wages than we are." That being the case, can we be surprised that the general strike failed in a very short space of time?

The Leader of the Opposition blamed the Government for wasting time, and by implication he blamed one of the parties to the dispute, that is the Mining Association of Great Britain which, for the present at any rate, represents the coalowners of this 'country. Had the right hon. Gentleman borne in mind the programme of events since the publication of the Report, I think he would not blame the Government quite so severely for any delay in the matter.

I took the trouble this morning to make out a diary of events as they happened from day to day since the publication of the Report, and if the Committee will allow me I will go through them as rapidly as possible and leave it to the Committee to judge whether delay arose, and whose fault it was if delays did arise. The Report was published one night at nine o'clock. At five minutes past nine I was discussing it with representatives of the Mining Association. [ Laughter .] I do not see anything to laugh about. It seems to me it was the duty of the Mining Association, as soon as the Report was issued, to study it as quickly as possible. [HON. MEMBERS: "In five minutes?"] Yes, in five minutes inasmuch as I had made arrangements to have a messenger in attendance and to get hold of the first copy issued from the Vote Office, and it was brought straight away to where we were meeting. We discussed the Report up to a late hour that night, and on Sunday night, three nights later, I had ready a complete draft of a reply accepting that Report. That reply was discussed by the Association on the Monday and Tuesday following, and the general form of their reply to the Report was settled that very week. Having regard to the great dimensions of that Report, and the necessity for reading through it very carefully and comparing all the various ambiguities in one part of it with the ambiguities in other parts of it, that is to say comparing those proposals which said one thing against those proposals which said another thing—and there are plenty of them—it was not an excessive time to study that Report.

So far as the Government were concerned, they, perhaps, took a little longer. At the earliest possible moment, however, the Prime Minister sent for the representatives of the Federation and the Mining Association and advised them not to say anything until they had really studied the Report. That, in my opinion, was very sound advice. Both parties, I thought, would do well to take that advice.

Immediately after that, the Mining Association of Great Britain referred the Report to the various district associations in their respective areas, and during the next few days the districts were considering the Report with a view to advising the central authority. Next week, on Tuesday, the 16th March, the Association definitely made their first written draft. On the 17th, Wednesday, the Association met and invited the Miners' Federation to meet them on the following Tuesday morning to consider the Report. That invitation was sent in fulfilment of one of the recommendations of the Commission—a recommendation which says—perhaps it would be just as well if I read it! It says:

On that date, 24th March, the Prime Minister took his first step. He informed the Federation and the Association, who were present at the meeting, that the Government were perfectly prepared, although they did not like some of the proposals, to carry out the necessary legislation to put the proposals into effect. But, he added, "provided that those engaged in the industry agree to accept the Report and to carry on the industry on the basis of those recommendations." That condition seems to me a not unreasonable one for the Prime Minister to make. He was in this position: That certain recommendations, he knew perfectly well, were the merest eyewash and could not help the industry in the slightest degree. The Prime Minister knew also that certain of these recommendations were thoroughly unpopular with the bulk of his own supporters—and rightly and properly unpopular! Yet, in order that there might be peace in this unhappy industry, he was willing to use his influence with his own party— and it would have needed a very great pressure to get that party to pass legis- lation that was most distasteful to some at least of those supporters—and, in his own opinion—I have no doubt he will correct me if I am wrong there—could not possibly in the slightest degree help. I am certain—because the right hon. Gentleman himself said so—I will give his own words:

Did that include the nationalisation of royalties?

I venture to say, and I do not think I am asking hon. Members too much in this, that the nationalisation of royalties is not altogether popular with the Conservative party. And I think the result of a division on a Motion under the Ten Minutes Rule showed a while- ago that the municipal sale of coal also is not very popular. However, these interruptions do not help us. On 25th March, a fortnight after the publication of the Report —which I do not myself think is a very long period having regard to the complexity of the matter—the Mining Association and the Miners Federation of Great Britain had their first meeting. The President of the Mining Association referred to the offer of the Prime Minister, and pointed out the necessity for consulting the district associations because, as he said, the immediate question was what was going to happen on 1st May. The President at the meeting pointed out—and I think the House will agree that this is really the crux of the whole matter—that so far as the Association and the Federation were concerned, the main question was what was to happen on 1st May when the subsidy came to an end.

The policy of tackling that question and of leaving other proposals over for subsequent discussion seems to me not unreasonable. On the other hand, Mr. Richards, who took the place of Mr. Herbert Smith on many occasions, in opening the proceedings made a bitter complaint that at the previous meeting with the Prime Minister the owners had refused to back up the Federation in pressing the Government for an early settlement—that was the complaint made at that particular meeting. That complaint recurs at future meetings between the Federation and the Association. I need hardly mention that it did not occur at those meetings where the Prime Minister was, or any members of the Government. This scheme was that the owners and the men should join together and use their joint influence and joint powers of persuasion to squeeze a further subsidy out of the taxpayer. There was bitter disappointment shown by the president of the Miners' Federation when the owners refused to come into line with the miners on that scheme. [ Interruption .] If hon. Members will read the printed reports of these meetings, they will perhaps know a little bit more about what really happened.

The meeting to which I referred last adjourned until 31st March with practically nothing done, because there was this difference of opinion developing very strongly on the question that both parties should take the opportunity for squeezing the taxpayer. The Mining Association, therefore, was unable to discuss what was to happen on 1st May. The meeting adjourned till 31st March. Meanwhile the district associations of the owners were considering the reply that was to be given to the Commission's Report. The final replies were approved by the Association on 31st March.

On that date there took place the second meeting between the Miners' Federation of Great Birtain and the Mining Association. The President of the Mining Association pointed out that, as he had told the Commission, national agreements were impracticable. He said —but I will quote his words, the words, of the President of the Mining Association of Great Britain: was going to happen on 1st May. They side-tracked that at once and talked about the proposals for re-organisation. They met again, and as at the first meeting the miners' representatives criticised the owners for not joining them and in not squeezing the Government to continue the subsidy. Discussion then went on on the recommendations of the Commission and on the Commission's suggestions that the minimum should be referred to the districts. That question was debated at great length, not only at the meetings between the owners and the men, but in the Press and outside. It was said that there was a certain ambiguity in the recommendation of the Committee on' this point, but I venture to say that no unbiased person would say that there is any ambiguity whatsoever in the recommendation of the Commission. I have read it, and with the permission of the House I will read it again, in order that we may see whether there is any justification whatsoever for the suggestion that there is ambiguity in it: line with this recommendation. I ask, however, is it not the correct attitude to adopt in a matter of this sort to act in accordance with the specific recommendation at the end of the Report rather than act in accordance with some particular words of the Commission in the body of the Report? [An HON. MEMBER: "Read the first recommendation of the Report."] The first recommendation of the Report of the Commission is:

In other words the owners did accept this recommendation, and they were ready to carry it out. [An HON. MEMBER: "Did not the members of the Coal Commission agree to meet the Mining Association?"] Does the hon. Gentleman really imagine that the coalowners of Great Britain would have swallowed all that sloppy eyewash that the Commission calls its "Recommendations for re-organisation" for any other reason than that their undertaking to put into operation these silly obligations might, at any rate, preserve peace in the industry? This, I may say here and now, is the only reason which induced the coalowners to put their names to and to support some of those most foolish and ignorant recommendations.

That is the Royal Commission!

A Royal Commission which made some very, very foolish suggestions. We are going to come to them later. In that meeting on 31st of March the Mining Association expressed its views on every single one of what are called "the fourteen points"—an unfortunate phrase, I admit. The Federation refused Doin't blank to state its views upon any single one of those points, and again no progress was made. The owners had told the Federation exactly what they felt about each point, and had given them a resume of what they were going to reply to the Commission's recommendations. At the end of their meeting the Federation had actually before them copies of the owners' reply to the recommendations contained in the Commission's Report. Again the President of the Miners' Federation asked the owners to join him in squeezing the taxpayer for a subsidy, and again this little plan was refused by the owners. The Federation then started a fight against that recommendation of the Report which suggested that the district minima should be referred in the first instance to the districts. They said quite openly that the miners' associations in the districts would refuse to discuss district minima and subsistence wages by districts. The owners, for their part, pointed out that the Mining Association of Great Britain has no power whatsoever to fix minimum rates of wages in the various districts, that its constitution actually forbids this, and that unless there is a specific demand from all districts that it should do so, it is utterly powerless to take any such steps. That did not impress the Miners' Federation in the least. The miners stuck to their point, although the owners again and again urged them to get down to business and to discuss what was to happen on 1st May. That night the copies of the owners' replies to the recommendations in the Report were sent to the Government and the Press, after they had been submitted to the Miners' Federation. [HON. MEMBERS: "What date?"] The date was 1st April. [ Laughter ] The hilarity of hon. Members does, at any rate, show me one thing which I have always suspected, that the sufferings which those employed in this industry are undergoing at present do not affect them in the slightest degree. I do not think that the present position of the miners of Great Britain, and of the whole industry, is a fit subject for foolish merriment. [ Interruption ] On 9th April was held the Miners' Federation Delegate Conference, delegates from all districts attending in London, and the following resolutions, to which we shall have cause to refer again and again, were passed:

Then the president of the Miners' Federation again initiated further debate—hours of it had gone on already— on the question of referring the minimum percentage to the districts. The owners, on their part, put forward their views as to the resolutions of the delegate conference which I have read out. They pointed out that in face of those resolutions it was not much use discussing any of the other points at issue. The president also said that the Mining Association was not in a position to frame proposals for district minima, nor, at that time, did the districts themselves know the minimum rates. Eventually that meeting broke down, and it broke down because this new element of the resolutions of the delegate conference had been brought into th discussion, that is to say, that there was to be no decrease in wages and no increase in hours, and no discussions involving either of those two points would be of any use whatever. A brilliant and statesmanlike position, in view of the fact that there is not a miner in Great Britain, or even a member of the executive of the Miners' Federation— and I have used that word "even" intentionally—who does not know, and who has not known for nearly a year past, that there is going to be a reduction of wages and that there is going to be an extension of hours. [HON. MBMBERS: "Is there?"]

About this date, 14th April, the Trades Union Congress began to appear. The Prime Minister met the Trades Union Congress General Council on 14th April, and they told him they were going to support the miners in opposition to district settlements of the minimum rates. No further meeting took place for some days, but on 15th April the Mining Association of Great Britain circulated its draft of the national agreement to the districts, and the districts were considering it in the next few days. I am cutting out all the non-essentials, and I come to 22nd April, when the adjourned meeting of the Miners' Federation and the Mining Association took place. A discussion started on the draft of the national agreement, which had been prepared by the Mining Association and handed to the Federation previously. Certain questions were asked on behalf of the miners and replies were given on behalf of the owners, and there was a very long argument on such points as the subsistence wage. The owners again pointed out the utter futility of all these discussions as long as the resolutions of the delegate conference remained in being, that it was utterly useless to continue the discussion when the Federation were bound by the resolutions of the delegate conference to say that they would have the same rate of wages, and no less, and would work the same hours, and no more.

Then the Federation reported to the Trades Union Congress, and the industrial Committee of that Congress saw the Prime Minister and asked him to intervene. I would like the Committee to note that up to this point the Prime Minister's only intervention had been immediately after the publication of the Royal Commission's Report in order to give the parties some very good advice, and, after the Report had been considered by all parties, to state that the Government were prepared, for the sake of peace, to pass the necessary legislation giving effect to the recommendations of the Commission provided that the other two parties would accept those recommendations.

On 23rd April the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Minister of Labour and the Secretary for Mines, met the Mining Association and the Miners' Federation at the Ministry of Labour. The Prime Minister asked both parties to state what, in their opinion, was the reason for the deadlock. The owners stated that, in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission, the Mining Association met the Miners' Federation with a view to a national agreement, whilst simultaneously the districts dealt with the question of the subsistence wage by districts and district minima, matters with which the Association was not empowered to deal. But that the Federation, in accordance with the resolution of their delegate conference, refused to discuss any change in the hours of work, or any decrease in wages, or anything but a uniform national minimum percentage, which was to be the same as 1924. The Association reported that it had made it clear to the Federation that the district minimum percentages should be submitted for approval to the national body, in accordance with the recommendations of the Royal Commission. The owners also put forward their draft of what a national agreement should be, but they also stated that no discussion of the latter was possible, because the Federation would discuss district percentages for a long time and then insisted on the uniform national percentage being the same as in 1924.

The Miners' Federation, when asked by the Prime Minister the reason of the deadlock, said that it would not discuss district percentages or an extension of hours. The Prime Minister, being, I suppose, already almost in despair, said. "These bodies are too large for any fruitful negotiations. Elect smaller negotiating bodies from amongst your selves, and I will deal with them." The next period is the period of what I may call the negotiating committees —the smaller bodies of the Federation and of the Association meeting the Prime Minister and not negotiating direct. The next few meetings are really confidential, and without per mission I could not give any consider able account of what took place. They were meetings between the Prime Minister and the Association on the one hand and the Prime Minister and the Federation on the other—private meetings at which the three parties—

What do you know about the confidential meetings?

The net result was [ Interruption ].

He is giving the show away.

This is no breach of confidence, although the public do not know what a prolonged process it was. But the Prime Minister eventually induced the coalowners to agree that they would put forward a national minimum percentage on a uniform basis throughout all districts. Up to that time the owners had followed meticulously the recommendations of the Commission, but the Prime Minister asked them, for the sake of peace, to go far beyond those recommendations, and eventually, although it took them some time to do it, they agreed that that was the right policy and was the only hope of peace.

On what date did the owners agree to that?

On 27th April. The Association explained to the Prime Minister that the uniform national minimum must of necessity be the minimum of the lowest-paid district. I think that is pretty obvious, and that is one of their reasons for objecting to a national uniform percentage, although many other districts might have paid a considerably higher percentage. At 12 noon on 29th April they promised to put forward a national minimum. Will hon. Members please note that up to this point not a single move of any sort or description has been made by the Miners' Federation and they simply sat there meeting after meeting chanting "not a cent off the pay; not a second on the day" The patience shown with the Miners' Federation is almost incredible and I only wish that hon. Members of this Committee could read the verbatim report of those meetings and see the constant taunts and insults that were used towards the owners, and the stupidity and insolence of one member of the Federation in particular.

Is the hon. Member entitled to insult the members of the Federation in this way?

Does the hon. Member for Mossley know that there are members of the Miners' Federation who believed that no one could equal the stupidity or audacity of the hon. Member himself?

I am giving my own opinion, and hon. Members are perfectly entitled to hold whatever opinion they like about myself. I suggest that anybody who does not agree with what I have just stated should get hold of the verbatim reports of these meetings and study them as carefully as I have done, and then I venture to say that no unbiased person can possibly fail to agree with the opinion I have just expressed.

Now I come to the final breakdown. The Association met the Prime Minister and laid before him 'their offer of a national uniform minimum percentage against which they had fought all the time, but which they decided to put forward simply for the sake of peace. The Association offered a 20 per cent, increase on the standard, with an eight-hour day instead of a seven-hour day. It was the 1921 wage, but based on an eight-hour day instead of a seven-hour day. That wage is very much bigger than was the case in 1921, taking into consideration the cost of living. I have only the figures for the month of April, and I should like hon. Members above the Gangway to note the fall went on after the month of April, 1921, and therefore the figures must be discounted. The actual figures for April, 1921, were 133, whereas for April this year the figures are 68. I want hon. Members to understand that after April, 1921, the fall in the cost of living went on for a long period.

That does not imply that the miners accept the 192.1 minimum as a reasonable standard of subsistence for the miners.

I do not know what they thought about that standard but they agreed to accept it. [HON. MEMBERS: "They did not."]

In 1921 when the minimum wage was established the wage was infinitely higher and it went up to 141 in my county. If we accept the 1921 scale now we shall go right to the minimum at once.

The hon. Member is quite right. I admit the conditions in 1921 were more favourable, but is that a true basis for the argument that the wages must now be higher than in 1921? On 30th April the Prime Minister sent a proposal to the Federation in which he contemplated a temporary modification of the Seven-hour Act, promising a return to it when the results of re-organisation in the trade made a return to it possible. I think that shows the open mindedness of the Prime Minister at that time. At 5.30 on the same day the Miners' Federation wrote flatly refusing those terms and put forward the suggestion of the Trades Union Congress Council for an extension of the subsidy and a withdrawal of the notices, a very useful contribution to the discussion in view of what happened the next day.

The Prime Minister then asked the Trades Union Council whether, if the subsidy were continued, the Federation would be prepared to negotiate on the basis of a reduction of wages, and they replied that they could do nothing of the kind since the Federation reiterated that they were not prepared to accept a reduction of wages as a preliminary to the re-organisation of the industry. But they said that they would give full consideration to all the difficulties when the schemes for re-organisation had been initiated. That reply contained a certain amount of ambiguity and its meaning depends on what is meant by "full consideration" and "initiated" I am afraid many hon. Members have forgotten completely the course of all these negotiations. The Federation when they were asked to define what they meant by the expression "full consideration" said that they meant that they would consider the report. In other words, they were quite willing to sit and look at the report again, but as regards what they meant by the initiation of re-organisation Mr. Herbert Smith made it perfectly clear that he would not accept any idea of any reduction at all in the interim period during which these remarkable proposals of the Samuel Commission were going to be carried out in order to restore peace to the industry.

In view of the terms in which the hon. Gentleman has spoken of the Royal Commission, I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, if it is not within the power of this House to afford some protection to the members of the Royal Commission?

These are criticisms relating to persons outside this House, and however injurious they may be, I cannot say they are out of order.

The hon. Member for Mossley (Mr. Hopkinson) has quoted from some notes, I want to make it clear that outside the Prime Minister and ourselves no one had those notes and I do not know where the hon. Member could have got them.

I will tell the right hon. Gentleman where I got them. I took them from a statement published by the Minister of Labour in the Press the same evening, and they were published in "The Times" and I copied them from the "Times" on Sunday last. I have detained the House on this question for rather a long time, but I have done so because I thought it very desirable that hon. Members should have their memory refreshed in regard to this subject. The negotiations from beginning to end were absolutely futile simply because the Federation had deliberately tied their own hands and had made themselves incapable of any useful negotiations. Not only this, but they had advised their delegate conference to tie their hands. They refused to have their hands untied and simply kept on repeating, "Not a cent off the pay, not a second on the day." It did not matter to them how many Royal Commissions reported or whether they reported that such a change is absolutely essential for the continued existence of the industry. It did not matter to them what was reported by the Royal Commission, they would still go on saying, "Not a cent off the pay, not a second on the day." The trouble with the Federation was that they refused flatly to consider any really definite specific recommendation in the Report and they spent their whole time discussing anything which in any way looked a little ambiguous. Now I come to the chief statement put forward by the Commission and it is a most definite statement. It says:

That being the case, and the coal-owners having warned the country more than a year before in regard to what was going to happen, surely they cannot be blamed when what they said would happen actually did happen. Further, I would like to ask hon. Members whether during the whole course of these negotiations there has been anything which the owners have done or anything they have omitted to do which was not done or left undone in order to maintain a strictly correct attitude and to serve in the national interest. The Prime Minister himself has repeatedly said that his requests to the owners have been met, sometimes after discussion and sometimes at once. But throughout the whole of these negotiations when the Government of this country has asked that certain concessions must be made by the Mining Association, those concessions have been made and what has been the result? When the general strike broke out, instead of the sympathy of the people of Great Britain being entirely on the side of the Trade Union Council and supporting the down-trodden miners, the sympathy of the whole country was on the side of the Government, and the price of putting the Government in that position was that the coalowners of Great Britain had to give way again and again on points which they knew were really of the utmost importance for the future welfare of their industry and of those employed in it.

The Prime Minister has told us we should look to the future rather than to the past. If I may say so, I have been trying, in my very humble way, for many years past to do what he is telling us now to do, and that is to get, if it be possible to get—and I believe it is—an outlook upon industry by both employers and employed which will give some hope of better things in the future. If I may venture to differ just a little from the Prime Minister on this point, I would like to say this—that there is one essential preliminary to the reign of goodwill in industry which he advocates with such eloquence. It is no use constructing the pillars and vaulted roofs of your cathedral of goodwill unless, below the ground, unseen, but absolutely necessary, there is an economic foundation for the industry on which you are going to erect your superstructure. Our ancestors in the nineteenth century laid that foundation well and truly, and a cruel and a painful job it' was. There was nothing beautiful about their laying of the economic foundation of the industries of Great Britain. It was a case of working in mud and water, and sometimes in blood and tears, but they did lay those foundations, solid, broad, and firm, ready for a structure of goodwill in industry to be erected by our generation.

But from the beginning of this century there has been a force sapping away continually at the foundations, and that has been political interference, which, going absolutely contrary to those laws of nature which we call "economic laws," has been boring and blasting and working and mining below those foundations, until the whole of our industrial structure will soon be shaking and splitting and falling, unless we can get rid of this effect of politics upon our economic foundations. I do ask the Prime Minister, with all the power that I can command, and with the knowledge that he knows that, in my own humble way, I am trying to do what he wants us to do, I do ask him even at this hour to try to get rid of what is really the fundamental trouble in industry at the present time, namely, the fact that all our efforts to build up good will, and peace, and a better life, and a happier and more contented future for the workers of Great Britain are all the time being brought to nought by the interference of the politicians with the economic life of the nation.

In conclusion, I may say that there is one practical thing, and one only, that the Prime Minister and the Government can do for us at this juncture in the mining industry. We know—and there are unassailable figures to prove it—that it is impossible in certain coal-mining districts of Great Britain at the present time, on the basis of a seven-hours day— impossible, I say—to pay a living wag* to the lower-paid classes of the miners. We find that throughout the South Wales district the average minimum wage could only be some 5 per cent, on the 1915 basis, so long as that seven-hours day prevails as the law of the land, and we ask the Government, on behalf of the miners of Great Brita;n— I pledged myself to my own miners at home at the last General Election that I would endeavour to get rid of this bar to their future prosperity—to get rid now, at once, at the earliest possible moment, as they can, of the one bar to any possible settlement of the trouble in the coal mining industry of Great Britain. So long as the law of the land is maintained on that 1919 Act, so long as only under exceptional circumstances can any man be employed below ground for more than seven hours, plus one winding time, so long is it impossible in the exporting districts to pay a living wage. [An HON. MEMBER: "You go down and get the coal"!]. I have gone down and got a lot of coal. [An HON. MEMBER: "It would not boil an egg for your tea."] I have often holed about 150 yards in a shift before now— [ Interruption ] —with a machine, of course.

I must ask hon. Members to allow the hon. Member to finish his speech.

In spite of these interruptions, I am not going to continue more than a moment longer. I merely impress upon the Prime Minister and the Government the absolute necessity of getting rid of this bar to the prosperity of the coal mining industry of this country. There is no possibility of any general settlement until it is done, as the right hon. Gentleman knows only too well, for I have been impressing it upon him for weeks, indeed even before the publication of the Commission's Report. If he will do that for us, I guarantee this, that the miners of Great Britain will find that the offers that can be made, even in the poorer paid districts, will be such as, at any rate, will give them a higher standard of living than the skilled men in many other industries.

The hon. Member for Mossley (Mr. A. Hopkinson) has delivered, as he always does, a very interesting and a very earnest and eloquent speech, but on this occasion I am afraid it is also a very unhelpful speech. I earnestly trust that the Prime Minister will not listen to the appeal which was the whole point of the hon. Gentleman's speech, that is that the politicians should not intervene. If by "the politicians" he means the Government of the day, I can see no hope of a settlement of this dispute until and unless the Government intervenes, and intervenes very effectively. I will give my reasons in a moment or two for coming to that conclusion. I regret that the hon. Gentleman should have referred to the confidential communications which are taking place. He said he was not quoting them, but he gave impressions which were very unfavourable to one of the parties there. I do not think that is very fair. He suggests that offensive language was used by the mining leaders towards the mineowners. [ Interruption ] I have sat in the past on two or three occasions with miners and mineowners in the same room, and I have never heard offensive language addressed by the miners' leaders to the mineowners or by the mineowners to the men's leaders. Everybody knows that the President of the Miners' Federation uses very pungent language, and that he is just as blunt to his colleagues as he is to the mineowners. It is his way, and the mineowners always take it in very good part, but if it appears in a note, it looks as if it was very offensive, whereas everybody present knew that it was purely his way of taking part in a conversation. That is so; anybody would know that, and I very much regret that the hon. Gentleman should have said what he has said, where it has been so essential that these communications should be kept confidential. It is almost impossible to conduct negotiations unless you do so, and if impressions even are given, without any quotations, it is just as bad as and worse than if you gave the quotations themselves. I therefore very much regret that the hon. Gentleman should have gone as far as that.

Now I come to his point that the miners are to blame and that the mine-owners have done everything that could be done. That is not the general impression of the public, and I am talking not merely of hon. Members sitting above the Gangway and of those who are associated with them, but the general impression is that the mineowners have been exceedingly difficult throughout. I would ask the hon. Gentleman this: I do not know at the present moment whether the mine-owners have accepted the Report of the Commission. Have they?