asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the fact that many articles manufactured abroad are still being imported into this country without any mark of origin of the country where they are manufactured being placed on the goods themselves, he will consider the advisability of introducing legislation that will require that all imported goods should be marked with the indication of the country of their origin?

The Government's proposals for the marking of imported

Mr. Davies—

Do I understand, Mr. Speaker, that you do not propose to call the first and second Amendments on the Order Paper, standing in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon), the Member for Greenock (Sir Godfrey Collins) and myself. The first is in page 1, line 6, at the beginning, to insert the words

"As from the dissolution of the present Parliament"

and the other in page 1, line 11 to leave out the words

"as from the passing of this Act."

The Amendment which I have now called, standing in the name of the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) is a better drafted one. It will make the Bill read better if it is accepted. That is my only reason for selecting it. I propose later to select the Amendment which has been put down to insert a new Sub-section (2).

I beg to move in page 1, line 11, to leave out the words "passing of this Act," and to insert instead thereof the words the special custodians of the British Constitution, desire to make such a drastic change in that constitution.

The arguments in favour of the change were brought before the House and fully debated in 1919, and, of course, are quite familiar to Members of this House who may be interested in the subject. My first objection to the Bill is that the Government of the day have no mandate for bringing in a Bill of this kind. The reply to that objection, obviously, is, that this is a private Member's Bill; but some of us have been long enough in the House of Commons to know that there are several ways of bringing Bills before Parliament. This has been brought in by the usual backdoor method. As soon as it was introduced, the Home Secretary took the infant very kindly in his arms, caressed and fondled it, and has been nursing it ever since. So much so, that we are entitled to be suspicious as to the reasons for the introduction of this Measure. In fact, some of us have been wondering whether the right hon. Gentleman who has nursed this Bill so assiduously is doing so from altruistic motives—but I must not press that point; it would be too personal.

Our complaint is that there was nothing in the 1924 election manifesto of the Tory Party to suggest that such a Bill would come before this Parliament. An important Measure of the kind, making so drastic a change in the constitution of the country, ought to have been put to the electorate; they could then have known something about it, and would have had a chance to decide upon the issue. But we have other objections even more important than that. The first attack upon the constitutional position was made by the Coalition Government. In fact, I regard this Measure as in the nature of a Coalition monstrosity.

The Monster lives, though the Coalition is dead, and I am literally surprised that the present Home Secretary, who detested the Coalition so much, and did all he could to destroy it, is now, as I have said, lovingly, fondling this Coalition infant, and trying to persuade the House of Commons to carry it into law. It is quite proper I think, to ask the right hon. Gentleman why the hurry to bring this Bill forward. There are other Bills before the House—Private Members' Bills—of considerable importance, some of which would affect the lives of thousands of our people—I could mention a few if necessary; and we are wondering why there should be this great hurry over this one. It is only a few weeks since this Bill passed Second Reading and went upstairs to Committee.

So far we have failed to get a definite answer from the Home Secretary to an important question put to him. I have read all the reports of the debates in Committee upstairs and he has failed to answer that question. I will therefore put it to him once again. This Bill may not become an Act of Parliament, because there are very independently-minded Gentlemen on the Tory side who are opposed to this great constitutional change. We are delighted, of course, to see that there is some independence left in a few Members of that party, and welcome their opposition to this Measure. If this Bill become an Act of Parliament, when will it become effective? Is it to operate at once? Are we likely to see some changes among the Ministry immediately following the passing of this Measure? I feel sure the Home Secretary, who knows all the secrets of this country, will know also the secrets of the mind of the Prime Minister on this important matter. I am not disputing for one moment that there ought not to be some changes in the present Ministry. I think there ought to be some drastic changes there at once. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name!"] No, that would be unfair; there are too many aspirants for posts to name them.

This brings me to another point in connection with this Bill. We are a little suspicious of those who are backing the Measure, even among back-benchers— some of whom, by the way, sit on the front bench although back benchers in every other respect. I think it is fair to ask, therefore, are any changes in the Government imminent on the passing of this Bill. All this hurry over the Measure indicates that there must be something which we have not yet been told, and the Home Secretary, who is usually very frank, will probably tell us this morning what is the real reason for galloping forward with this Measure. One would have thought this question of the re-election of Ministers was bound up with the whole problem of the franchise.

I think I must intervene here. The Amendment moved by the hon. Member proposes that the Bill, if passed, shall not operate in the present Parliament. He must reserve his general remarks on the subject for the Third Reading.

I was coming to that, Mr. Speaker, and, naturally, I obey your ruling. I will come, therefore, at once to what is the fundamental point of the Amendment. If it were carried, it would be impossible for the provisions of this Bill to operate until the issue of the next Proclamation summoning a new Parliament. It is a very sensible and reasonable Amendment. In fact, I have never stood at this Box to suggest any Amendment that was unreasonable, and this morning I feel sure that I can convince the right hon. Gentleman that it is not honourable for a Government to pass an Act of Parliament during its lifetime which affects the Members of the existing Ministry so very intimately and personally as this Bill will do. That is the whole point of our Amendment. I ought to say that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Consett (Mr. Dunnico), on the Second Reading, put very pertinently the reasons why Ministerial vacancies occur, and in arguing my case I feel sure the House will permit me to recall that they are. Vacancies may occur in this Government for similar causes. I do not know how long this Government will continue with their task. They are not very comfortable in their posts at the moment, and one cannot say whether we shall see several by-elections before this Parliament is dissolved.

Are you referring to us? We are quite comfortable.

You try your best to make it appear so. The reasons which necessitate fresh Ministerial appointments were stated on the Second Reading, and in order to enforce my point I would like to mention them. Vacancies in Ministerial posts are caused by death—but we do not wish to see that happen to any of our opponents—bankruptcy, insanity—and I feel sure nobody would wish to see that happening to any one of them—and changes made in the Ministry itself. What we contend is that in every case, from whatsoever cause it may arise, of a change of Ministers in this Government, the country would be more satisfied if they knew that this Bill would operate only from the beginning of the next Parliament, and that the status quo should prevail meantime. That is a very reasonable request, and this Amendment is, I think, the only substantial one on the Paper. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Of course, everyone thinks his own offspring is the best, and perhaps I may be allowed to think the same. Although we are opposing this Measure as a whole, we have put down this particular Amendment because we are doubtful of the tendencies in this House of Commons within the last year or so. I am very much disturbed to find that the tendency of the present Government, in almost every Bill they bring before the House, is to try to secure more power for themselves. We want to check that power, and, on the Third Reading, we shall offer some more substantial points of opposition to the Bill itself. I want to make that clear, in spite of all the humour that may be imported into the Debate—and some people are trying to create humour in order to cover up the aims of the Measure.

I have noticed that already.

In order to prove that there is a strong point in our Amendment, I need quote only one case. The argument has been used that the Prime Minister, the present Prime Minister, ought to be entitled to appoint the most capable man to a post without recourse to a by-election. If I may say so, I wish he had thought of that when he was appointing his present Ministers.

Humour!

There is no reason on earth why the Prime Minister, when he made his first appointments, should not have found the most capable men then. I feel sure that will appeal to some of the hon. Members on the back benches opposite. There was a case, however, where the Prime Minister of the day thought that in selecting a new Minister of Agriculture he was choosing the most capable man.

The electorate determined, however, that he was not the most capable, they rejected him at Dudley, and consequently he held no office under the Crown. All these arguments are very powerful against this measure and fully support my point of view. The Government is supporting this measure in spite of the fact that every Minister in it might be personally interested before the next General Election. It would be well, therefore, if the House accepted my Amendment in order that if the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament, the people of the country will know exactly what they are doing at the next General Election when they elect a Labour Government, as of course they will do. They will then know what the future Prime Minister is and is not entitled to do. I hope the Home Secretary will embrace my Amendment as vigorously as he has done this Bill. It is a very reasonable proposal; and I feel sure, if accepted, it will create a good impression throughout the country, and will once for all put this Government and the House above suspicion.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I am glad the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies), has moved this Amendment because he has done it very much better than I could, with his oratorical ability and because of the office he held in the last Government. While I agree with the object of this Amendment, on the Bill itself I spoke in its favour at a previous stage, and I shall vote for the Third Reading. This Amendment was proposed upstairs by the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon) who also supported the Bill on its Second Reading, and who intends to support it on the Third Reading. I wish to associate myself with what the Mover of this Amendment said in his strictures on the Bill. I agree that the present procedure is very much out of date, unnecessary and anomalous. With regard to the Amendment itself, I think a very strong case can be made out, and it has been put very temperately and with great force by the hon. Member for Westhoughton. I would like to ask is it fair for the present Government who are in office, with the support of an actual minority of the electors who cast their votes at the last election, and admittedly supported, as the Prime Minister has generously allowed, by a large measure of Liberal and Labour votes in the extraordinary circumstances of the last election to support a measure of this sort introduced by private Members without any mandate from the electors. It is true that the original Bill was brought in by the Coalition Government but that was an abnormal Government sitting at an abnormal time, elected at an abnormal election and it was even less representative of the mass of the people than the present Government. Even under those conditions nine months was allowed with that extraordinary Government who set about to undermine a great deal of our parliamentary safeguards and procedure. But even so, they only allowed nine months to elapse before a Minister taking an office of profit under the Crown had had to go again before the electors and receive their endorsement. A good deal could be said today against this Amendment if the Government had not such an abnormal majority. The proposals of this Bill might very well be necessary in the case of another Parliament where the parties were more evenly balanced. I myself have always quite plainly stated that it should be possible to change the Government frequently in this country without having an election every time.

I think a great deal can be said in favour of the system adopted in continental Parliaments where the Government can be changed without putting the country to the trouble and expense of a general election. There is, however, as things are, no possibility of a change of Government in this country without an election. I agree that there are hon. gentlemen opposite who are much better fitted to be Ministers than some of the holders of office in the present Government, and I think it is unfortunate that long political service instead of ability should give a title to office. Suppose some of the estimable gentlemen who now hold office should be so unfortunate as to come down at by-elections. That would not be a very great inconvenience to the present Government, because they have such a huge majority and a little thinning out would do them no harm at all. From the Government's point of view their record at by-elections has not been very satisfactory; they cannot look back on them with any satisfaction, and yet they carry on. I know the Home Secretary is unabashed and he is quite comfortable and does not mind. He still thinks that the Government has the support of a majority of the people.

Hear, hear.

I do not think anything I can say will alter the right hon. Gentleman's view on that point, and we shall have to wait till the next election comes. These by-election misfortunes have no effect upon the present Government. They can afford to lose every by-election, and no doubt they will, and they will sit until the end of their normal period. Therefore, undoubted arguments in favour of the Bill under ordinary conditions do not apply in this present Parliament. The Government do not need this Bill at the present time, whereas another Government, I do not say would need it, but might have a very good case for not being circumscribed in their choice of Ministers by the possibility of electoral misfortunes. I think the case for the application of the Bill only at the end of this Parliament is overwhelming.

A very good argument used by the Mover of this Amendment was that the people had not been consulted. I am sure hon. Gentlemen opposite who are in favour of the principle of this Bill, as I am, would agree that it would be much better from every point of view to limit its operation until the next Dissolution. I am sure they do not want to have the feeling that they have taken advantage of a big majority to pass this Bill for the benefit of some 12 or 15 of their colleagues. That is not a nice taunt, which could quite honestly be thrown at them if this Bill passes in its present form. I would like to think, however, that with or without this Amendment the Bill is going to lead to a reorganisation of the Government. Any change in the present Government would be an advantage to the country, and anything that I could do to bring a little fresh blood into the Government, even from my political opponents, I would gladly do. In spite of that, I think the case for the Amendment is very strong, and I press it upon the House as an avowed supporter of the principle of the Bill.

There is nobody who is seriously opposing this Bill, and the Amendment to my mind is a somewhat shabby one, because it is an attempt to defer the operation of the Bill until the next Parliament when those supporting it hope to get the benefit for themselves. As these possibilities appear on the horizon, that very narrow and invisible division which separates the hon. and gallant member for Central Hull (Lt.-Com. Kenworthy) from the hon. gentleman above the gangway, will tend to melt in the sunlight of power which it is hoped will come to the Labour Party in those days, and it will be very awkward for him to have to go to Hull and fight a new Election after he has achieved office. There is no real argument against the Bill. We have the principle of the Bill admitted; it is a very fair principle, and there is no reason why the present Parliament should not have the benefit of it. I will tell you one of the difficulties to-day. When a candidate for office is considered, you have to consider, not only his qualifications politically and his Parliamentary knowledge and whether he is persona gratia with his Party, but you have also to consider whether he represents a safe seat.

That puts the party in office in a handicapped position and seriously limits the selection of the Prime Minister of the day. Even if the Labour party be in office, it limits the Prime Minister's selection, because the most safe seats of the Labour party are held by the most fanatical and most extreme of them. Therefore, the Prime Minister in a Labour Government would be bound to select some colleagues whom he would much rather be without, and who would be likely to compromise his party. When you come to our party, you generally get the safe seats held by local magnates with whom the local people like to make friends, while the more clear thinking and more intelligent people are sent to fight forlorn hopes. They have all the fighting work to do. and they probably hold their seats by comparatively narrow margins. Con- sequently, very often there is a tendency to select somebody who has a soft seat. Therefore, there is a chance of having to select on the one side a kind of fireballs, and on the other those with very little chance of ignition in any shape or form. That is very undesirable, and I do not see why the Prime Minister even in this Parliament should not have a wider opportunity of selection. I cannot agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull in his estimate of the present Government. I do not think the country has seen a better Government for a long time. I have followed politics since 1881 and I recollect all the Cabinets since that date, and I do not think there has been any Cabinet which has enjoyed a greater measure of confidence among the masses of the people than the present one. The hon. and gallant Gentleman contended that a measure of this kind required the consent of the country. I would remind him what was done in 1917. The whole of the franchise was then altered by a Parliament that was already many years old. This is not a measure which affects so much the country as a whole; it is purely an inter-mural measure, but it will give a wider scope to the Prime Minister.

The hon. Member seems to be discussing the whole question. We have not come to that stage yet. We are dealing now only with the Amendments.

I bow to your ruling. I say that this Parliament should have the benefit here and now of this Measure. The hon. and gallant member for Central Hull has approved of it, the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon) has voted for the principle of the Bill, and we have as much right to the benefit of it in this Parliament as in the Parliament which will follow. This Government is certain to be in power for the full term for which the Act of Parliament allows it to sit, with the full approval of the people, and therefore it is right that Parliament, over this protracted period, should have the benefit of this measure. The party of the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull is breaking up into many component parts, and the future of the party above the Gangway opposite is somewhat uncertain, so that I think all the political prophets will agree that at the next Election the present Government are likely to be returned with practically undiminished strength. The matter, however, is really so far ahead that this Amendment is almost an academic subject, because they are never likely to see the Bill in operation as it affects themselves.

The hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull said that the Government was not representative, and twitted us with a by-election. I am not going into that, because I do not think it is relevant, but, as he has touched upon it, I should like him to refresh his memory in regard to the Buckrose election, where his party's candidate forfeited his deposit. The Government hold the confidence of the people in an unparalleled manner, and, therefore, the Prime Minister should be entitled to recruit the ranks of the Front Bench from time to time as he sees fit, without putting anyone whom in his wisdom he may select to the unparalleled strain and expense and trouble of facing a by-election, where as everybody knows, everything but the merits of the Government as a whole are discussed, where all sorts of small personal issues are brought up, and where, in many cases, the result does not represent the real feeling of the electors or the feeling of the country as a whole. I, therefore, think the right thing to do is to give this Parliament the benefit of this Measure, which really disposes of an ancient survival that ought to have been off the Statute Book half a century ago.

In rising to support this Amendment, I want to say that I have been unable to follow the reasoning of the hon. and learned Member who has just sat down. He told us in the earlier part of his speech of the confidence that is placed in this Government by the electors of the country. He pointed out that the present Government is not only likely to remain for the full term of the present Parliament, but is likely to be re-elected in a future Parliament; and then he went on to say that he did not think it was right that when a Member was elevated to a Ministerial office—an office of profit under the Crown—he should have to seek re-election. Is that because he is afraid to test the first part of his own reasoning? If he feels, and if the Government feel, that they have the confidence of the country to such a large extent and in such a magnificent manner as he says, why should they be afraid to allow any Member of this House who may be elevated to a Ministerial position to face the electorate of his constituency and see whether or not he has the confidence of the people in that constituency. There is all the more reason, to my mind, why a person who is put into one of these offices ought to seek the suffrage of his constituents to find out whether or not ho is approved by them as a Cabinet Minister, and whether the country approves of the choice or otherwise. I am not like my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy). He is opposing this Amendment while he supports the Bill.

No; I support the Amendment.

He is supporting the Amendment, and he supports the Bill. If the Bill is sound in principle, I cannot see how the hon. and gallant Member can support this Amendment, because, if it is a good Bill, there is no reason why it should not be given effect to at the earliest possible moment. I am supporting this Amendment because I am going to oppose the Bill. I am opposing the Bill because I am very apprehensive that our Parliamentary procedure is being undermined by the Government, and I imagine, after hearing the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull, that the Labour party is going to be the only party that is going to stand four square on the constitutional issue. Here is a Bill which is undermining one of the parts of our electoral law which has come under supervision and has been analysed on many occasions, in particular, in 1918, by a Committee presided over by Lord Ullswater. On that Committee's findings the system upon which our Parliaments are now working' is based. If it had been thought then, by a Committee of that standing, that there should be no re-election of Members elevated to ministerial office, it is a strange thing that the Committee did not recommend that at that time.

It was outside the terms of reference.

I accept that correction. That being so, I suggest that this Bill is outside the terms of reference as far as the Government are concerned. They have no mandate from the electorate for bringing this Bill forward. Therefore, without any mandate from the electorate of this country, there is being introduced into the electoral system of the country a new principle and a new idea. Another reason why I am supporting the Amendment is this: It is well known that every Member who comes to this House, while he may stand, and does stand, for some particular party, has also some pecularities that bring him to the notice of his constituents. He may have certain objects in view which meet with the support of his constituents. He comes here, notwithstanding the fact that he is allied to some party, with a certain amount of individuality about him. But once he is elevated to Cabinet rank, his individuality disappears; he is then absorbed in a Government, and that man cannot fairly represent the interests of his constituents, because he must represent the opinions of the Government, whether he is for or against them.

That seems to be an argument against the Bill as a whole. It would be a question for the Third Reading, but not for the limited scope of the present Amendment.

I admit that it is not easy to keep within four corners of this Amendment, and, not being an expert in Parliamentary procedure, I find it very difficult to do so. I hope that the House, at any rate, will accept this Amendment. My last point is this: Here you have in office a Government with the largest majority that we have known in modern times, so far as its membership is concerned, but a minority Government so far as the electors of the country are concerned. This Government must have some reason when it is asking that, if this Bill be passed, it shall immediately become law. I agree with my hon. Friends who have moved and seconded this Amendment, that it can be used, and we may be sure that it will be used, against the Government in all by-elections, that they have put this Measure through this House to become operative now because of their fear of facing the electorate at any by election.

I hope the House will reject this Amendment, because we have heard to-day from Members of the two branches of the Opposition that they believe and agree that there is a good deal to be said for the Bill itself. We heard on the Second Reading, both from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon), that they agreed that there was a necessity for an alteration in the law; but they both agreed that that alteration should not take place until the end of the present Parliament. Why did they think that? I would like to call attention to laws that have been recently passed affecting the position of Members of this House. There was the payment of salaries to Members.

That was put before the electors in a speech by the then Prime Minister prior to the election.

That I agree, but there was no necessity to put that into operation during the time of the Parliament which passed it. They did so, and it was introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) and supported by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley. The next alteration which affected individual Members was free passes on the railways. That was never put before the electorate. That was brought in by the Labour Government and introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Edinburgh (Mr. W. Graham), and it was brought in largely in the interests of the Labour party. It was said it was to the advantage of Labour Members that they should have these passes. I agreed with it and I voted for it, but that was brought in and put into operation during the Parliament which passed it. It was supported also by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley. Now we have this Amendment put down to a Bill which it is agreed on all sides is necessary. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] It is agreed at any rate by hon. Members opposite and by a large proportion, I think, on this side. The effect of the Amendment is that we are prepared to trust future Prime Ministers to make good use of this Bill, whereas we do not think the present Prime Minister, who has the confidence both of this House and the country, should have the privilege which will be given to future Prime Ministers of selecting suitable Members for the Ministry. I think the House will agree that that is hardly in agreement with the general opinion of the people of this country. They would prefer to trust the present Prime Minister to any future Prime Minister.

12 N.

the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. Clayton) who introduced the Bill, and who has made so able and reasonable a speech to-day, does not bring the discussion to the real point of the Amendment. I am opposed to the Bill, and I hope to have an opportunity of offering some remarks on the general question later, but the Amendment deals only with one small point, namely, whether we are entitled to alter the constitution in a small matter without consulting the electors. There is a great difference between making laws for the Government of the country, and making laws which alter the terms of the contract on which we ourselves are elected. That is really the essential difference. We are sent here on certain terms of contract. We are not entitled to change those terms of contract without consultation with the people with whom we make the contract. That seems to be the essential point covered in the Amendment. As to the two illustrations, the railway voucher case is certainly the stronger point, but the present Foreign Secretary had himself introduced such a proposal in an earlier Parliament, and although it was abandoned at that time it may be argued—though I always felt there was some doubt about bringing it in and using it at once—that it had been put before the electors. As regards payment of Members, that case has repeatedly been attempted to be made, but Lord Oxford definitely stated at a meeting at the Albert Hall before the election, after which payment of Members was instituted that if he secured a majority at the forthcoming election he would institute a reform which had been debated for many years. I think, therefore, the two points that were made by the hon. Member are shown to be points of no substance.

But may I ask him how far he is prepared to carry this. Will he be prepared to support the Government if they propose to alter the franchise and bring it into operation at once. There is the big issue of equality of franchise for men and women. Suppose the Government propose in this Parliament to prevent men under 25 from voting, would he think they were justified without reference to the electors? The fact is that although this is a small case it is a case that touches a vital issue, and I think if the Bill is passed without this Amendment it is susceptible to abuse, and it creates a new precedent. In the big issues touching the length of Parliament, Parliament has only, as far as I am aware, passed two Acts, one during the war for the prolongation of Parliament, which everyone will agree was a justifiable proceeding, and the Septennial Act, at the beginning of the 18th century, for the specific purpose of preventing a Stuart return. [ Interruption. ] As Scottish Members, we may both agree that that was a most undesirable Act of Parliament to put on the Statute Book. Just think of the abuse to which it is possible this Bill in this form might be put. The party opposite say they have the confidence of the country and are gaining ground. Some figures on that subject also touching the fortunes of the small party to which I belong will be in Order, no doubt, on the Third Reading. They certainly gain from time to time distinguished recruits. They recently had a great accession of strength, though not of fixity of purpose, by the secession from these benches of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carmarthen (Sir A. Mond). He received a very warm letter of welcome from the Prime Minister when he joined the Conservative party, but after all, a man cannot live on warm letters of welcome, and it is obvious that it is the universal desire on the back benches opposite that the right hon. Gentleman's talent should be recognised by a seat in the Government.

No.

Oh yes! See how this works. The right hon. Gentleman has had a difference with his constituents. He say he believes when a man is cultivating anything—I presume including a constituency—he should be regarded as a proprietor and not merely a tenant dur- ing good behaviour. He therefore sits in the House on the opposite side to that for which he was elected. If this Bill is passed it will be possible for the feelings of those who elected the right hon. Gentleman to be still further, I will not say outraged, but exacerbated by his being promoted to Cabinet rank without having a by-election. It is against the Standing Orders of the House to impute motives but it is possible to forecast events, and I have no doubt the Bill is receiving support from the back benches opposite on grounds of moral relief.

The Bill was introduced long before the event took place.

That does not touch the question. The House is asked to decide on this Amendment after the important change in the opinion of a distinguished man. No one really would desire that the opinion of a constituency should be flouted. Therefore, on high constitutional grounds and also because it may be applied in a way that would not command the assent of the people of this Country, it is highly desirable that if the Government desire to pass the Bill—I shall oppose it on the Third Reading—they should, at least, say that as they do not need it for the stability of their own Government, they will postpone the change until they have ceased to have any opportunity of having the benefit of it.

The hon. and gallant Member for Leith (Captain Benn) seemed to be thoroughly serious. The speeches hitherto have not been serious. The hon. Member who moved the Amendment was full of humour. Not so the hon. and gallant Member for Leith. He ascended from the "Comic Cuts" level to that of the "Spectator," and assumed an authoritative tone. But, apparently, he could not keep it up, and towards the end of his speech he descended to personalities and jokes about the position of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carmarthen (Sir A. Mond), who has seen light and left the party below the Gangway opposite. The hon. and Gallant Member has said certain hard things about his old friend and bosom companion, the right hon. Member for Carmarthen. The right hon. Member sat at the feet of the hon. and gallant Member for many years, and I am sure that he has imbibed many of his constitutional principles, and it was only because the right hon. Member felt-that those constitutional principles can be better expressed on this side of the House that he has come over.

In regard to the suggestion about this being a Mond Relief Bill I have nothing to say. I have no authority from the Prime Minister to make any announcement in regard to the future of the right hon. Member for Carmarthen. This Amendment is capable of being described as a Mond Disqualification Bill. I have something to say in regard to the important speech of the hon. Member who moved the Amendment. He was frankly cheerful and humorous about the Bill.

If the hon. Members opposite moved an Amendment that this Bill shall not apply to the right hon. Member for Carmarthen, would it be accepted?

I am afraid if we did that, we might have a sue cession of Amendments. It might be embarrassing not only to the Government but to the individuals concerned. The hon. Member who began the Debate was pleased to make fun of myself for embracing a fondling baby, a monstrous fondling I think he called it. I would point out that this baby received the support of the House of Commons on Second Reading and it has grown in favour, as babies should do, from week to week and month to month, and I think it will be found that the Bill will pass its Third Reading to-day by quite as good a majority as it passed its Second Reading a few months ago. The real object of the hon. Member was to force an answer from me to a question which he has already asked twice, and which has been answered once by myself and once by the Under-Secretary for the Home Department. He wanted to know when the Bill would come into operation. The answer to that question is that it will operate whenever occasion arises. Whenever a Member from the back benches is promoted by the Prime Minister to Cabinet rank the Bill will operate. If the hon. Member asks me, as I think he tried to do, whether there is to be a reconstruction of the Government, that is another matter. It seems to me that hon. Members opposite are thirsting for my blood in some way or other, and they want to reconstruct the unpopular Home Secretary out of the Government.

The right hon. Gentleman is one of our greatest assets. He is the last person we want to go.

I did not quite catch the phrase used by the hon. and gallant Member. I heard something about being the greatest ass.

Asset.

I beg the hon. and gallant Gentleman's pardon. He is always polite to me. The reconstruction of the Government will take place if and when the Prime Minister thinks it is necessary, and not a moment before. As far as all the portents go, the Government is in quite good health. It does not feel that it needs any reconstruction, and it does not feel that the country demands any reconstruction. Hon. Members have taunted us about by-elections, they think there ought to be an opportunity for more by-elections. I have the figures. There have been 18 by-elections during the 18 months this Government has been in office. We have lost four, and we have won one, and we have had two valuable adherents who have come over from the Opposition. On a division we are one down in 18 months. There never has been such a record for any Government during the last 100 years. There never has been a Government which has lost so little in public favour in 18 months as this Government.

The object of the Amendment is to allow this Bill to be utilised for the benefit of the Opposition and not for the benefit of the present Government. It was admitted on the Second reading Debate by one of the leaders of the party below the Gangway opposite, the right hon. Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon) that the Bill is a good one. Perhaps the best speech in the Second reading Debate was made by the right hon. Member for Spen Valley in full accord with the principles of the Bill. He went so far as to say that the restrictions imposed by the Statute of Anne were no longer necessary. He said: That is from a Liberal leader. He also said:

If you get in next time, it will be all right for you.

I was going to say that those hon. Members opposite who are buoying themselves up with the idea that the Bill will work in their favour three years hence, when there is a General Election, are banking on a very unstable foundation. The hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull would be delighted to see fresh blood in the present Government. I do not know whether he is going to suggest transfusion. If so we shall have to think very carefully before we accept his kind offer. I am afraid the blood of the hon. and gallant Gentleman might be a little too red to mingle suitably with the blue blood on this side of the House.

The right hon. Gentleman is not the only distinguished Member of the House who apparently misunderstood my remark. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leith (Capt. Benn) expressed his surprise. When I spoke of "new blood," I did not mean from this side of the House at all. There has been some rich blood transferred already from this side of the House to the other, but I meant that I would like to see a chance given to distinguished Members on the back benches on the other side of the House.

I will report the hon. and gallant Member's views to the Prime Minister, and I have no doubt he will pay such attention to them as they deserve. Let me now deal with the matter quite seriously. One always gets a little flippant on Friday mornings. I do not know why; there must be something in the atmosphere. The hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment is responsible for it, for leading off with such a humorous speech. At other times he is as serious as I am. We believe this is a good Bill, and it is put forward in the interests of the country. It is not put forward in the interests of any Secretary of State or any other members of the Cabinet. It does not affect us. If I am moved I do not have to seek re election; but it does affect the rising talent of the party that may be in office. That is the real reason and the serious reason for this Bill. We believe it will be at least three years before there is another General Election and, therefore, it is not fair that the Prime Minister, in choosing those who should join his Government should be fettered and limited by any consideration as to whether the hon. Member who is fitted for a Government post has a safe seat. That is the real reason for the Bill. The Cabinet system is part and parcel of the Constitution of this Realm. It has worked well, and it is the best expression of democratic opinion that has yet been devised in this or in any other country. By this Bill we are endeavouring to improve the Cabinet system and make it easy for keen, energetic and valuable recruits to be elected to the Cabinet without being put to the disturbance, the anxiety and the expense of seeking re-election.

If this Bill is a good one, as we believe it is—and that is also the opinion of the right hon. and learned Member for the Spen Valley—I see no reason at all why hon. Members on this side of the House, friends and supporters of the Government, who may reasonably look forward to a Government position as the crown of their Parliamentary career, should oppose it. I speak as one who sat for 15 years on the back benches, and I am not ashamed to say that I realised that the opportunities of carrying out the ideas in my mind would be much greater if I was in the Cabinet. Hon. Members on this side of the House have the same ideas and the same ambitions. They have the same desire to serve their country, and as they can best serve the nation by attaining to a position of influence in the Government I cannot quite understand why those who are in agreement with the principle of the Measure should object to the Bill. I cannot understand why loyal Members of the Conservative party, who are desirous of giving relief to their colleagues who may be selected by the Prime Minister to join the Government, should seek to make it more difficult for their colleagues to join the Government of the day by opposing this Bill.

We oppose this Bill altogether. We do not take up the position that the Government of the day shall not have the advantage of these proposals, or that we shall have the advantage of them in the future; we are absolutely opposed to this Bill. The Home Secretary has not accurately reported on the early life of this child which he has adopted. When it was in the nursery upstairs, there were several occasions when its life hung by a thread. Its life was threatened not only by Members on this side of the House, but by a considerable number of Members on the Government side, and the attendance or non-attendance of one or two Members at the Committee upstairs saved the life of this child. The Home Secretary was not more accurate in the description he gave of the position of the present Government. I have never known such an example of complacency, except the complacency of the mine owners in regard to the welfare of the mining indusry. The Home Secretary ignored the real objection to this Bill, which is put forward in the Amendment, The principle of the Statute of Queen Anne was that persons who were brought into government position and pay should have to go before the electors, and the reason was to see whether these people in taking office were not violating the very principles on which they were elected. It might be true that the necessity for the Queen Anne Statute has passed, but the need for testing the honesty and good faith of Members of Parliament who are appointed to Government posts still remains.

The Debate seems to be developing into a general discussion on the Third Reading of the Bill. I must ask the House to confine itself to the particular Amendment.

I was pointing out the purpose of the Bill, in order to show exactly why it was particularly unfortunate that this Bill should be passed before a dissolution of Parliament. I was pointing out that the purpose of the Bill is to prevent persons suddenly changing their principles on attaining office, and I propose to deal with the question why it is very unfortunate to pass this Bill at this juncture. You have two parties in the State who are opposed to each other on principle, you have a third party which is in a state of disintegration, and it is very undesirable that a Member, who has been elected on certain principles and professions should be able to cross the floor of the House and take office without having to go before the electors. That applies, as has been mentioned, in the case of two right hon. Members who have recently crossed the floor of the House. But those are by no means the only possible cases. It may occur even to Members who are elected as supporters of the present Government. It has been said that there are two ways in which a back bench Member can attain the Front Bench. One is by being an extremely good boy, obeying the Whips very carefully and strictly, and perhaps acting as a private secretary. The other is by making himself such a nuisance that the Government, in order to shut his mouth, give him some position in the Government. That has happened more than once.

Suppose that a Member has taken up a particularly strong line on some question, has badgered the Government constantly on some point, and has even gone into the Lobby against his own Government. That has happened. Then suddenly he becomes promoted and is found on these points inclined to change all the views that he has held. It is quite clear that the electors should have something to say about that. The Home Secretary says that everything is perfectly safe with the Conservative Government, and that we can pass this Bill safely now. There are some fissures and rents in the fabric of the Conservative party, and it is quite possible there might be sooner or later, even in this Parliament, a palace revolution. The party opposite have absorbed two elements of discord from the benches below the Gangway. There are other well-known irritants. There are others who might conceivably cross the Floor, and make a coalition with certain sections of the party opposite, and conspire to overturn the Prime Minister. If that were so, it would be very desirable that before the present Prime Minister is executed by a palace revolution, headed by some of his late supporters, and some perhaps from the benches below the Gangway, the country should have something to say about it. If you pass this Bill, those changes may take place. The Government have an enormous majority. It is quite possible that one section may overturn the other, that you might have extensive changes in the Cabinet, and that the whole thing would lie entirely outside the purview of the electors. That is one very important reason why we put forward this Amendment.

There is a second reason. I do not imagine that if the Amendment were carried there would be quite the same enthusiasm for the Bill by Members on the other side. I do not think that the Bill is promoted because of any altruism in Members opposite, that would help them to take up this grave constitutional matter purely for the benefit of some future Government. They are in effect making a constitutional change for their own benefit. In spite of the protestations of the Home Secretary, we have not received any adequate explanation of why this Government is going to find it more difficult to carry on than any other Government under the restrictions of the law as it stands to-day.

We have had an interesting analysis of the Ministry from the hon. and learned Member for Argyll (Mr. Macquisten). He began by saying that all the stupider people tended to have safe seats and were therefore put into the Government, and then he declared that it was the best Government he had ever known. Surely the difficulties are not greater for the present Government than for any other Government. If this change is postponed until the next Election, there will be a chance for the people of this country to pronounce on this Bill, and any Government that comes in can then repeal it or not, as may appear good to them. Hon. Members have been elected to Parliament on certain definite conditions. A man standing for election says, "If I am elected to become a Member of the Government, it is part of the terms of my contract that I should come back to you and that you should again say whether you want me to be elected as a Minister instead of as a Private Member."

In this Bill you are definitely committing a breach of the contract made with the electors. We have heard a great deal about breaches of contract, particularly from the hon. and learned Member for Argyll, who said yesterday that society was held together by sacredness of contracts. Hon. Members opposite, or some of them, are now preparing to break the contract that they made with the electors when they were elected as rank and file Members of Parliament, that they were independent representatives of their constituencies, and that if and when they were called to office they would come before the electors again, The electors knew that perfectly well. But, whatever may be the constitutional position, we have to regard this from the point of view of things as they are. I see very serious objections to bringing forward this Bill now. There never was a time when it was more necsesary that the opinion of the people should be thoroughly canvassed, and that no opportunity should be lost of allowing people to say what they think of the Government of the day. You are passing this Bill through at a time of very grave industrial crisis. It is a time when the action, or the inaction, of the Government is the subject of universal comment. It is not a time when we should take away any opportunity of the electorate saying what they think of the Government as the electors of North Hammersmith did the other day.

I too support the Amendment, but I disagree entirely both with the hon. Gentleman who moved it, and with the hon. Member who seconded it. I cannot pretend to follow the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) in his subterranean delving into the mind of the present Cabinet. His suggestion is that this Bill is merely the prelude to a peaceful revolution and reconstruction of the Government. He does not seem to realise that we on this side have not adopted the principle of perpetual motion of leaders, which is gaining a good deal of ground on the other side. Our view of the function of Ministers is that, while their brains should be active, their seats in the Ministry should be quiet. I wish that the Home Secretary were present, so that we on this side who oppose the Bill could assure him that the respect and the affection which we have for him are only slightly impaired by what we consider the wrong attitude which he has adopted towards this Measure. The hon. Member for Westhoughton was not only subterranean; he was illogical. He impressed on the House the necessity for some reconstruction of the Ministry. He urged on the Home Secretary the necessity for new blood. Then he proceeded to say that he was going to move an Amendment which would make it impossible, or at any rate more difficult, for that reconstruction to take place.

As for the hon. and gallant Member for Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenwortny), I always have admired his eloquence and his persistency, but I never Eave admired his logic, and to-day his logic was conspicuous by its absence. I cannot understand how anyone who takes up the attitude which the hon. and gallant Member does towards this Bill could possibly support the Amendment. His attitude is that the Bill is unimportant; that it is not an alteration of the Constitution; that it is not, in fact, taking away something from the rights of the people, but is simply sweeping away an anachronism, and doing away with an unnecessary clog in the machinery of Government. If that were my view of the Bill I should unhesitatingly vote against the Amendment, because there would be no possible reason, in that case, for putting off the Bill. But that is not what those on this side who oppose the Bill think about it. We think it is a more important Measure. We think it would be a real alteration in the Constitution. Whether the effect be great or small, we shall be able to debate on the Third Reading, but that it makes some alteration we believe to be the case, and, therefore, we agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Leith (Captain Benn) that it is a disastrous precedent that an alteration in the Constitution, whether great or small, should be made without the electorate and the people whose rights are to be diminished having, first, an opportunity of saying whether or not they agree with it. It does no good to exaggerate and I do not pretend that if, at the next Election, this Bill were included in the programme of the Government, it would mean the gain or loss of a single seat. What we are doing now, however, establishes a precedent and a

far more vital occasion may arise. There may be a disastrous change of Government, and hon. Members whose constitutional zeal is flourishing to-day in the Friday atmosphere of the House of Commons may in future times find that plant less healthy. They may wish to make some vital change in the Constitution, some change, the importance of which will far overshadow any importance which this Measure otherwise might have, and they will then be able to point to this precedent which we the Conservative party have established as one which they may follow in order to force a change in the Constitution without consulting the electors.

rose in his place and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The House divided: Ayes, 162; Noes, 59.

Question put accordingly, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 166; Noes, 69.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 12, at the end, to insert

"(2) Notwithstanding anything in any Act, a Member of the Commons House of Parliament who accepts one of the offices of profit mentioned in the schedule to this Act shall vacate his seat.

Provided that more than nine months have elapsed since the issue of a proclamation, summoning a new Parliament."

The object of this Amendment, which stands in my name and the names of the hon. and gallant Member for the Waterloo Division of Lancaster (Captain Bullock) and the hon. Member for York (Sir J. Marriott), is anything but a wrecking one. It is a constructive proposal, which has been formulated in the hope of getting over some of the difficulties which have emerged in the course of the Debates on this Bill, both on Second reading and in the Committee stage. I should like to mention, in the first place, that this particular point which we are raising now has not had any adequate discussion on an earlier stage, because while it was raised in the Com- mittee, only two or three hon. Members spoke, the promoters of the Bill did not condescend to give us their views on the Amendment, the Undersecretary of State for the Home Department, who was there as an official observer, did not give his views on the Amendment, and, eventually, the Amendment in the Committee was lost by 18 votes to 11, making the total votes 29 out of 54 Members of the Committee. Therefore, I think, on that showing, I am entitled to claim that it is an Amendment worthy of consideration, and that it has not been rejected at all decisely at an earlier stage.

I would remind my hon. and gallant Friend that this is not the same Amendment as the one which was before the Committee, which was on the Schedule, and was quite an impossible one, and not thought worth discussing.

The difference in the Schedule is very trifling, and the principle of the Amendment is exactly the same. As the Home Secretary is here, I should like to demur very much from his appeal to what he called the loyal Members of the party to support the Bill. Our loyalty to the Conservative party does not come in question. It is not a Government Bill, and, indeed, the promoters of the Bill on Second Reading quite definitely stated it was in no way a party Measure. Therefore, I, for one, and my Conservative Friends who take the same view as I do, rightly object to the impugning of our loyal Conservative leanings. Perhaps it is our ultra-Conservative leanings that prompt us to take the line we are taking. On the Second Reading, we had it quite definitely from the Prime Minister, that

The trend of opinion which I see developing daily more and more, including the "Times" this morning, seems to be moving against this Bill. But I do not want to make a Third Reading speech now, and I come back to this specific Amendment. I expect I shall be told by the promoters of the Bill that this is widening the scope and changing the whole aspect of the Bill, and, to some extent, it is true, because if the Amendment were passed, we should have to pass a further Amendment to the Title of the Bill. On that point, I should like to mention that in the previous Bill of 1919, the Title was changed during its passage through the House, and whereas the Bill of that year first of all swept away all restrictions, when it emerged—and I will leave my hon. and gallant Friend to develop that point—there was a difference; it was changed very much in the same kind of way—not the same way exactly, but a similar kind of change was made. On that occasion it was a Government Measure; on this, it is not. The idea of the Schedule is that we should maintain and preserve the continuity of the present system. The present system is, in effect, that Ministers of the Crown holding offices of profit under the Crown must seek re-election. By sweeping away the anomalies of the minor offices—which, admittedly, do not affect the main situation—the Schedule would cover the major offices. That is, those who rightly call themselves when speaking in this House and elsewhere Ministers of the Crown, what you might call really those holding offices of profit under the Crown, would still have to be re-elected in accordance with the ancient constitutional practice which has existed for so long. In the case of the minor offices, to be quite frank, in view of the feeling of the House on the subject, we are quite prepared to see the existing practice swept away, and, in support of that particular line, may I quote something, again, which the Prime Minister, speaking unofficially on the Second Reading debate, as a private Member, as he went out of his way to tell us, observed: tion with regard to what may be called changes over in the Cabinet itself to that when a Minister is removed from one office to another, for one reason or another, he would not, because he was already in the Cabinet, have to seek reelection, if the Amendment were carried. It is a doubtful point now, and that, of course, could be gone into further.

Our Debates during this past week have been extraordinarily busy with the question of safeguarding industries, and in this Amendment we are trying to follow out the principle of safeguarding the present rights of the electorate. Reference was made to salaries and railway fares without direct consultation with the electorate. That has not at all the same kind of substance as a point of this kind, where it is a question of the elector having a say, in his own representation, as to whether his own Member should or should not become a Minister of the Crown. If you look back again to the previous Debates on this issue, in 1919, you will find there that even the Coalition Government, which brought in this Measure as its first Measure in that Parliament, with the whole of the backing of the Coalition itself, the Bill being brought in by the Leader of the House, the Deputy-Prime Minister—and, after all, the Coalition was bigger numerically in the House of Commons than even the Conservative party in this House—even the Coalition was unable to get this Bill through, and had to conform to the views expressed largely from these very benches from which I am speaking now.

It was Members of the back benches of the Conservative Opposition (some now on the front bench) which to a very large extent brought about the chang3 in regard to the 1919 Act, and caused the insertion of the nine months' period. I can only hope that the Government will be willing later to concede that point. I do not think we have put in a very adequate safeguard in relation to a point that has already been touched upon in the previous Amendment. As it was in order then, I imagine it will be just as much in order now to refer to the problem of crossing the Floor, so that a Member might be able to take office in two or three years' time without his constituents ever having had a say in the matter. I am sure it will interest the House to know that so long ago as 23rd February, 1869, this matter of the re-election of Ministers was raised in this House. On the occasion of leave to introduce A Vacating of Seats Bill Sir William Harcourt said—and he put the point far better than I can—and with the leave of the House I will quote what he said—

The hon. and gallant Gentleman is now going into the whole question of the Bill.

I am just trying to explain what I mean as to what the safeguards should be. If right hon. Gentlemen, in crossing the floor, were quite sure of office, then I think it is most important and absolutely essential that the present safeguard should be maintained. That is what we are trying to do by this Amendment. I am quite prepared to admit that the drafting of it may be imperfect, or the interpretation not quite clear. It is the first time I have tried my hand at this kind of thing, and I am not a lawyer, but if we could get the promoters of the Bill and the Home Secretary, to agree to the principle of the Amendment, then there ought to be no difficulty in arranging the actual details at a later stage.

The whole point at which we have found ourselves at issue is really a constitutional point. As the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken said, it may be a small constitutional point, but it is a point. In relation to it we must base ourselves not on the personal issue at all. It seems to me that during the whole of these Debates the tendency has been first to hilarity, and, secondly, to personal remarks as to the Home Secretary's position in relation to the Conservative party and so on. But while the constitutional issue may not be a very large point it is a point and, as such, ought to be given due weight. Let me give another quotation from Sir William Harcourt's speech. The case could not be put better. In the debate in 1869, Sir William quoted these words from "Hallam's Constitutional History": they will see no names of any of the Opposition parties. That tends rather to nullify the statement of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Widnes (Mr. Clayton). I appeal to the Home Secretary not to exercise any Governmental pressure, but to leave the matter to the free vote of the House. If he does that, I think he will see that the common-sense opinion, and it is always that that counts in this as in other matters, will agree with the principle of the Amendment, that there is a difference between Ministers of Cabinet rank and other Ministers, and that we are not prepared to do away with the practice now existing. It has been stated that this Bill is one brought in to meet existing needs. But what are existing needs? The principle to which I have alluded is just as valid to-day as it ever was. I do hope that the Government will not bring pressure to bear upon the Vote, but will leave it to the unfettered opinion of the House as to whether they do or do not wish to maintain the principle; and let the smaller points go. If the Government do this, I think they will find a far greater opinion behind the view I have been trying to express than, perhaps, they think at the present time.

I beg to second this Amendment.

I associate myself entirely with the words of the hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Capt. Crookshank). In supporting the Amendment and in opposing the Bill I am not acting in any spirit of disloyalty to my own party, or with any desire to criticise the Front Bench, but basing my action on two grouds—the historical ground and the need for looking to the future. When we have a Prime Minister such as our own, we are apt to think he will go on for ever. We think that because the present Prime Minister is incapable of political or personal intrigue the next Prime Minister will be equally incapable, and we are apt to think that past Prime Ministers have been equally incapable. I regard this Bill as a thoroughly bad Bill, and I rejoice that my point of view agrees with the view of those who were our prominent back benchers in 1919. I am glad to be able to quote extracts from speeches from my own side; it pleases me very much indeed that I need not go to Opposition speeches. I will give three short quotations from speeches made by Members who were then on the back benches and who are now adorning our very capable Front Bench. The Assistant Postmaster-General, whom I am glad to see in his place, said on 18th February, 1919:

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but I think he is making a speech what he ought to deliver on the Third Reading.

I submit that what the Under-Secretaries in certain offices which we have left out of our Schedule think does not matter nearly so much as what the great officers of State think. If I may be allowed to continue my quotations: He ends with this:

Although I oppose this Bill, I very much dislike the suggestion that it is being brought in with the object of putting the right Gentleman the Member for Carmarthen (Sir A. Mond) on the front Bench at once. Such a proceeding would, I think, meet with no strong opposition from a great number of back benchers that I cannot conceive there is any idea of it. As I have said, we have a very efficient Front Bench—I do not think there has been such a good Cabinet for many years. It has its humorous side occasionally, as we saw last week, but I think that is a great point in its favour that all parties can laugh when something funny happens, because even Hamlet had his grave-digger. In this Amendment we have left out the Law Officers, the Parliamentary Secretaries, and one or two of the others. I, like my hon. and gallant Friend cannot pretend to legal knowledge, although I passed my Bar examinations, and also took a very moderate degree in constitutional history, but I would like the House to remember that on this Friday afternoon we are about to take a decision of vast and far-reaching constitutional importance. I hold the view that this is a matter to be put in our election addresses, and not one to be dealt with on a Friday afternoon.

I think this had better be reserved for Third Reading.

I had a very strong feeling that I should not be able to get it on Third Reading. I hope the House will give us this Amendment, and that those young Members sitting on the back benches who are hoping to fly on to the Front Bench very soon will vote for this proposal. They will not go straight to the high offices of State, and these are not affected by this Amendment which will apply to those in humbler positions, who will not have to go through the responsibility, strain and horror of a by-election.

I hope this Amendment will receive the very careful consideration of the House, because it has the very great advantage, that it brings to a real and clean issue the constitutional question which, to some extent, was in danger of being confused in the Debates which have hitherto taken place on this Bill. The reason why it raises that constitutional issue in such an acute form is because the two arguments in favour of this Bill as a whole are that it removes a number of anomalies and prevents a number of younger Members from joining the Government because of the expense of by-elections. As a matter of fact, neither of those arguments can apply in the cases covered by this Amendment. The more important and vital constitutional question touched upon by this Bill has been, to a very large extent, overlooked, and the arguments really only support the cutting off of certain trimmings of the present position, and even these have been supported on grounds which cannot apply to this Amendment. Therefore, in this Amendment we have simply and nakedly before us, leaving out the question of the opportunities of these poor young men, and also leaving out the question of the anomalies in regard to certain subordinate offices being required to have by-elections whilst others do not require them, the question, "Do you wish the Cabinet, who are not young men who have suddenly come into the Cabinet without serving in subordinate offices, to be appointed as Ministers of the Crown without an opportunity being given, to the electorate to express their views upon the person appointed and upon the action of the Cabinet?"

The arguments which have up to now been adduced will not suffice in dealing with these particular offices, and some other reasons will have to be found. I feel a certain amount of diffidence in speaking upon this Amendment because, through no fault of my own, I happen to have held a certain office under the Crown for some time without having the advantage of having a seat in this House, and somebody might say that that anomaly was not strongly objected to by the Labour Government or myself. Very considerable precedents in this direction have existed in the past. In the case of the Irish Free State Constitution, it is specifically provided that no person may remain a member of the Government unless he is elected as a member of one of the two Legislatures within six months. We are here dealing with a different question. There are reasons, in my view, why we should preserve the constitutional tradition which has existed ever since the time of Queen Anne, and I think we should be even more reluctant to adopt another procedure. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon) seemed to indicate that some of the reasons which guided legislation in the time of Queen Anne and in the time of William III and Mary have now disappeared. I look upon the matter in quite the opposite direction.

I am afraid the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument is not very relevant to the Amendment.

I was dealing with the appointment of Cabinet Ministers, and was going to point out that recent legislation has endowed Cabinet Ministers with greater legislative and executive powers. Nearly all the Ministers named in this Schedule are far more powerful to-day, and less under the control of Parliament than they were in the reign of Queen Anne, but that does not apply to the subordinate Minister. There is not one of our Cabinet Ministers who could not by Regulation alter the law under powers which Parliament has given him. He could alter the whole structure of our legislation, the tendency of which has been to put more and more discretion in the hands of the executive Cabinet Ministers. To-day the normal Cabinet Minister is in his own person a legislator and executor, and exercises judicial functions. A Minister carries out his legislation through his own Department, and another section of his Department adjudicates upon it and declares whether he has acted correctly or not. Take, for an example, the Minister of Health—what I am going to say is not intended as a reflection on the present occupant of that office. He may legislate under the National Health Insurance Act, carry out his responsibility as an executive officer and, at the same time, through his referees and deputy umpires he adjudicates upon the validity of his own acts, and Parliament says that his decisions should be final for all purposes. That is the case whether we are dealing with a Liberal, Labour or a Conservative Government. But I am coming to the conclusion that the Conservative party at present sit on this side of the House, because I notice that the attacks on the Constitution have come while the right hon. Gentleman and his friends have been in office. Surely the argument that these things are less necessary now than in the time of Queen Anne, is quite wrong. The greater the power of the Minister, the less he is controlled by Parliament. Many of their acts never come before Parliament at all. The greater those powers are, the greater is the necessity that the electorate should be given an opportunity to say whether a particular person should be appointed as a Minister, and there is absolutely no sound argument in the fact that many years have passed since the reign of that estimable monarch Queen Anne.

I cannot understand this contempt for the founders of our modern Constitution. Most of the safeguards controlling the Ministers mentioned in this Amendment were devised in the reign of Queen Anne or thereabouts, and since then Ministers have become more powerful; therefore we require more check upon the audacity of Ministers of the Crown. This is not in any sense a political question. The House ought to be most grateful to the hon. Member who moved this Amendment, because, if I may use so disrespectful a phrase of a Cabinet Minister, it has pinned the Home Secretary down to this one point, that no more can he or his supporters speak of the sentimental considerations about poor Members, or anomalies, or anything else. We are up against this question and this question only. Why does a so-called Conservative party want to throw away all the constitutional safeguards which the wisdom of the past has shown necessary to control the appointment and the action of Cabinet Ministers? Let them get up if they will and give us some Radical sentiments about the destruction of the Constitution, but, when they have done so and when they have, either with or without the aid of their Whips, destroyed these constitutional safeguards, I hope that they will no longer call themselves Conservatives.

When I first saw this Amendment on the Paper, I thought that it might well supply the solution of some of the very difficult questions which are in this Bill, but, on further consideration, I have come to the conclusion that really it introduces new considerations of a somewhat far-reaching kind. This Amendment really preserves the continuity of the present system, and at the same time sweeps away anomalies; and a very great deal can be said for it. That has been the claim which has been made by the Mover and also by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for South-East Leeds (Sir H. Slesser) who has just sat down. I would ask the House for a minute or two to consider whether this is really the case and whether they are not being led away by arguments more plausible than real. I do so in no spirit of revolutionary conservatism such as the hon. and learned Member appears to think animates those who support this Bill, but only because I see at least two very important developments which might arise if this Amendment were embodied in the Bill.

First of all, the effect of making the most important offices of the State subject to re-election and not others would seem to me to place the Prime Minister at a very distinct disadvantage in choosing his colleagues, and, if there be an important constitutional principle raised in this Bill, one would certainly be raised if the entire discretion of the Prime Minister in the choice of his colleagues were to be in any way Hampered. It seems to me that the effect of this Amendment, by making the most important offices of the State only subject to reelection would be in a sense, to ask that popular confirmation should be required of the Prime Minister's judgment in the selection of his colleagues. The hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down seemed to imply that that would be a good thing, but, after all, in the matter of selecting persons for the highest offices of the State, the judgment of the Prime Minister is of far greater consequence and value than the judgment of a constituency. Supposing that every time a Cabinet office had to be filled there were a by-election, would it not give that by-election a very much greater importance than any by-election which is now held, and would it not, in effect, be a question of confidence in the Government as to which way that election went? [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members appear to think that is a desirable thing, but surely it is a new development, and one of very far-reaching consequence, to place the whole fortunes of a Government on the throw of the dice at one by-election.

What happened in 1880?

It has happened from time to time, and no doubt may happen again, but there are plenty of opportunities of by-elections to show which way the opinion of the country is tending. After all, by-elections are well known to be unstable evidence of the state of feeling in the country as a whole. The conclusion to which I have come, for what it is worth—and I am afraid I cannot claim any legal or constitutional knowledge—is that if this Amendment were adopted the effect would be severely to restrict, much more than is done at present, the judgment of the Prime Minister in the selection of his colleagues and to place an importance on certain by-elections out of all propor- tion to that which ought to be put upon them; and, for those reasons, I would ask the House not to accept the Amendment, because I believe it would lead to much more serious constitutional alterations than anything which this Bill contemplates.

I agree with the hon. and learned Member for South-East Leeds (Sir H. Slesser) in saying that the House owes a debt of gratitude to the Mover of this Amendment for the clear way in which he has pointed out the real importance of the Debate. When the Bill relieved from the necessity of going to the country every person who obtains an Office of Profit under the Crown, there was a good deal to be said for it, because, quite apart from the fact that it might involve many Under-Secretaries and more subordinate persons in expense, there was also this to be said. In the time of Queen Anne, this law was brought into being because it was found that there was a tendency on the part of the Crown to corruption. That has completely gone in the sense in which it was applied at the time, and therefore it may quite fairly now that the necessity and the source which gave birth to this law has gone ask: why retain it? There is a great deal to be said for that view, but it is quite another matter when you come to exempt Members who have been appointed Cabinet Ministers. If the danger of corruption by the Crown has passed away, another danger has stepped in, a danger arising from the enlargement of the democratic Vote, from the complexity of Parliamentary Government, and from a hundred and one ways in which this machine in its very intricate and complicated structure can be made to work.

That has brought it about that the Executive has a very much greater authority and power than it ever had, and a growing power, and that, if the Executive has a strong majority behind it, it is capable, quite legitimately, and I am sure quite honestly, of doing things, to use a vulgarism, off its own bat, which it could never have done before. For that reason it is highly important not to diminish but to increase the channels by which we can tap into this House the views of the people of this country. Of course, we still have appeals to the country caused by death or resignation, which are two of those channels, but why cut out this one? Moreover, there is a vast difference in the appeal that arises when an ordinary Member loses his seat by the unfortunate event of death, or by resignation.

I would remind the hon. and learned Member that that is not the question which is now under discussion. The question now under discussion is whether certain officers should be exempted from the provisions of the proposed Act.

That, if I may say so, is exactly the point I want to make. Perhaps, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, you did not notice what I said in the first part of my remarks, to the effect that the smaller officers might well be relieved from an appeal to the country; but the Cabinet Ministers, who are the ones included in this Amendment, ought not to be relieved. That is the point that I want to make. I say that Cabinet Ministers ought not to be relieved for this reason. The Executive is given a great deal more power than it had, that power is increasing every day, and the country is more and more cut away from having a hand in the action of the Executive. Therefore, it is important, I maintain, not to cut out, but rather even to multiply, the channels by which the action of the Executive can be brought to the test of public opinion. Take, as an illustration in connection with Cabinet Ministers, what my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary remembers well, namely, the Mitcham election a couple of years ago. I remember that a Debate was going on in this House in a sporadic form—it had not become regularised, but was proceeding by question and answer—as to removing control over housing. There was a vacancy that had to be filled in the Cabinet, and the person put forward by the Government for that vacant position went to the country three times and was defeated. Then the Government said that they would not remove the control, and they did not. Had there not—

May I point out that that was after a General Election, when the Gentleman in question lost his seat?

I am aware of that, but it does not really touch the point I am making, which in this: Supposing that in that case there had been no compulsion on the Government to find a Cabinet Minister, the opinion then held on good information by the Government was that the country was in favour of the removal of control, and they would have removed it. Now we know that as a matter of fact the country was wholly opposed to the removal of control. How did we find that out? It was through the necessity that the person who was to fill a Cabinet office should go to the country. The instance I have quoted arose somewhat accidentally, but it still carries out my point. Therefore, it is good to keep open, of all things, this means of consulting the electorate when a person of great Parliamentary importance—because it is only such that will go to the country—is going to get such a position. It concentrates public opinion upon the issues of the hour, because he is a big man and because he is going into the forum that is going to determine those issues. Therefore, when a man is appointed to Cabinet rank, you have a public opinion that is 10 times more alert directed to what is going on than you will have at a by-election caused by resignation or death.

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman is aware that it is no use treating this as a trivial matter. It is a very important matter. It is really a constitutional matter. I know, myself, that in Australia the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and those of all the States also, have Clauses dealing with this matter. In some cases it is laid down that Cabinet Ministers must go to the country, and in others that certain officers must go to the country, but they all deal with the matter; and, moreover, each one of those Constitutions has also an express provision that any change made in the Articles of the Constitution requires an appeal to the country. Therefore, when we come to crystallise into print what really is created by implication among us, we see that the provision as to going to the country for which we are now asking is there made. It is a pretty casual way to treat a grave issue like that for a private Member to bring in a Bill on a Friday, and for the Government to come along and say they will treat it as their Bill, and will not take the Whips off, thus making an alteration in the Constitution that might lead to very serious consequences. If I wished to delay the House I could state many of them. One of them was pointed out in this Debate a few moments ago. Either a Tory Government or a Liberal Government or a Labour Government might get into office with one set of Ministers, make an entire change of policy that was never put before the country, and put in Ministers who were zealous in that policy and would carry it out. That might be a very serious matter, and that that should be made a constitutional practice in this country by a Private Member's Bill on a Friday in a desultory sort of Debate, is, I think, not worthy of the greatness of the change that is proposed.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 5, at the end, to insert the words

"Provided that where a Member holds an office mentioned in the Schedule the acceptance by him of another office so mentioned in lieu of or in addition to the office which he so holds and in immediate succession thereto shall not vacate his seat."

Under the Amendment of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank), Cabinet Ministers will not have the privilege that they have at present—

On a point of Order. I suppose the moving of this Amendment to the proposed Amendment will not put an end to the discussion on the main Amendment?

No; the discussion now will have to be confined to the new proposal. That can be either rejected or passed, and then the original Amendment, whether amended or not, will still hold the field.

Are we to understand that the Debate on the Main Question is practically over, now that we are discussing the Amendment to the proposed Amendment?

No; I do not wish to convey that for a moment. The Amendment to the proposed Amendment will be discussed, and sooner or later it will be disposed of. Whether it be accepted or rejected, after its acceptance or rejection the discussion will revert to the original proposal.

You will not accept the Closure on it?

At present Cabinet Ministers have the privilege of changing their office, or taking a second office, without again having to receive the acquiescence of the electors, but, in my hon. and gallant Friend's Amendment, that provision, I think through an oversight, was omitted. The proviso that I propose to insert gives that power, and, as has already been indicated, it is accepted by the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment. Therefore, I move my Amendment formally, and will reserve my further remarks for the Third Reading.

I beg to second the Amendment to the proposed Amendment. The advantage of this addition to the proposed Amendment is obvious, and it is unnecessary to dwell upon it. It closes a gap which was left by inadvertence in the Amendment of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank). No one can suggest that it would be to the advantage of the Government that if the Home Secretary were to remove to some other office of equal rank in the Cabinet it should be necessary for him to undergo a by-election.

On a point of Order. May I ask where we are on this? If we vote for this Amendment, and it is defeated, would that not prevent us afterwards discussing the other Amendment?

Not at all. That is what I have endeavoured to convey.

Amendment to proposed Amendment agreed to.

Question proposed, "That the proposed words, as amended, be there inserted in the Bill."

At the moment of this Amendment being moved, I was on the point of raising an objection to it because I preferred the Amendment as it was on the Paper before the Amendment to it was moved. My view is that when a man takes Cabinet rank, it is of the highest importance, from the national point of view, that he should seek re-election, and I am at a loss to understand the various arguments which have been raised on the Conservative side against this proposal. I would ask the Home Secretary to cast his mind back to the very important by-election at Manchester, where he opposed the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. I think he will agree with me that the personalities of the two candidates were a comparatively small thing compared with the issues involved, on which the whole mind of the country was centred. It was a very small majority, but my right hon. Friend was victorious, and the election had a considerable effect on the Executive. I would also ask him to cast his mind back to what happened in Ulster from 1910 to 1914. Mr. Masterman was appointed to the Cabinet of that day, fought three successive by-elections, at Bethnal Green, Ipswich and Reading, and lost them all.

The hon. Member seems to be debating the Main Question. The only question now is whether there should be a distinction between certain offices in the Schedule and certain other offices to which the rule now applies.

I was under the impression that you had passed the amending Amendment. Are we on the Amendment to the Amendment?

I read out at full length the Amendment we were on. The Question before the House is the Amendment, as amended.

The case I was putting was an illustration where Mr. Masterman was appointed to the Cabinet, and the country had an opportunity of expressing their opinion on the vital matter before the country at that time.

2.0 P.M.

Mr. Master-man had to seek re-election, not because he was appointed to the Cabinet, but because he accepted an office of profit. The whole question now is the distinction between certain offices of profit and others.

I was under the impression that Mr. Masterman was appointed a Member of the Cabinet. Coming to a later date, Sir Arthur Griffiths-Boscawen fought an election at Dudley in the Coalition days upon the very important matter of cattle coming from Canada. It is only this means of the country having a power over the Executive that gives that check that is necessary to any Government, whether Conservative, Liberal or Labour. It is a vital necessity that we should have this check on the appointment of a new man to the Cabinet. and that he should seek re-election and give the country an opportunity of expressing their opinion. It is a temptation to any party in their second, third, or perhaps fourth year to bring forward legislation which was not in issue at the election which appointed them to office. The only opportunity that can be given to the country to express an opinion is by means of Ministers seeking re-election on their appointment to Cabinet. There is a good deal of nonsense talked about the Prime Minister having difficulty in choosing his colleagues. Supposing the Prime Minister wants to choose a Member as his colleague in the Cabinet who has a small majority. Suppose it happens at the present stage of the life of this Parliament. That Member in two or three years' time will have to face the electorate. Surely it is just as serious for the Government to have a Minister defeated at a general election as at a by-election? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) had to fight a by-election after the general election that returned the Labour Government. I think he will admit that fighting as a Cabinet Minister was a considerable advantage to him compared with fighting as a private Member. The prestige of Cabinet Minister fighting a by-election must always be of very great advantage because constituencies like to be represented by prominent men.

Shortly after this election takes place that man will have to fight a general election and if it is a question of the Prime Minister choosing his colleagues, it is clear that he will have as great difficulty after the Bill has passed as he has at present. It makes no difference whatever to the position of the Prime Minister in choosing his colleagues. It is sometimes disappointing to a man who has been appointed to high Cabinet rank if he loses his seat, and we know numerous cases of people who have done that. But if we are going to look at the matter from the sentimental point of view we shall be having the position of people taking high Cabinet rank without seats in the House. The late Solicitor-General, the hon. and learned Member for South- East Leeds (Sir H. Slesser) made a statement of his own position when he was Solicitor-General in the Labour Government. I always held the view that that was a very great mistake. It will be remembered that there was a Bill upstairs which the Parliamentary-Secretary to the Ministry of Health did so much to obstruct, mainly on the grounds that the Solicitor-General of the Labour Government was not there to give a considered opinion upon it. I think he was justified in doing that. The House of Commons should hesitate a long time, particularly in a thin House on a Friday afternoon, when people are not thinking of this subject with the close attention that ought to be given to a subject of paramount importance, before they put on the Whips in order to force this Bill through, without giving notice.

The hon. Member is now debating a matter which will be more suitable for the Third Reading Debate.

This Amendment is a reasonable compromise as between the Government position and the position which we have taken up, and I have no hesitation in going into the Lobby in favour of the Amendment.

As the Home Secretary has not yet taken part in the discussion on this Amendment, it is in the hope that he may take the same point of view as has been expressed overwhelmingly this afternoon that I address the House. The Home Secretary is a lawyer and understands how serious a constitutional question we are discussing. He has the historical knowledge and historical instinct capable of appreciating the wisdom of the past, and he has no desire to make a mark upon the legislative history of the country by making changes for the sake of changes. I do not believe that we shall have the slightest difficulty in persuading the Home Secretary, as a man, that the change that is proposed to-day is undesirable, and that this Amendment, if we can carry it, would stabilise the constitutional practice and make for a better legislative and administrative future in this country. A predecessor of mine in the representation of Newcastle-under-Lyme, at the end of a large and Parliamentary experience, came to the conclusion that the principle which should underlie the action of private Members in this House should be to oppose all new legislation and vote for the repeal of all old legislation. I do not go quite so far as Mr. Carmichael in his magnificent conservatism, but I do think we might apply that principle far more than we do to Friday afternoon Bills.

When the Government introduce Bills they are subject to the constitutional check which has grown up, almost unnoticed, but which never operates in the case of Friday afternoon Bills. The Government have the Civil Service to check them and to teach their inexperience what the experience of the history of this country has been in the past, and to prevent the passing of a large number of such Bills as we are debating to-day, which, on the face of them, look attractive, but which, when they come to be studied in detail, show one after another the advantages of caution in fresh legislation. The speech of the hon. Member for South Leicester (Captain Water-house) showed exactly what are the issues of this Amendment. His has been the only voice so far opposed to this Amendment. His arguments were thoroughly sound from the point of view which I want the Home Secretary to consider to-day. This is merely one stage in that long effort of the Executive to free themselves from democratic control. I have known this Bill for 20 years. It used to be a hardy annual. Every Government resisted the temptation of it until the Coalition Government in 1919 fell a victim. That was one step. Now we have a further step. By accepting the Second Reading of the Bill we are wiping out the question of the re-election of minor members of the Administration; but by this Amendment we are Still attempting to keep some check upon the Executive. I do not say that it is a good check, but it is a check.

The whole British Constitution depends upon a nice balance of the powers of the Executive and the Judiciary. It is because we have maintained that balance in the past that we have avoided many of the violent revolutions of the Continent; but a nice balance between the power of the Executive and the criticisms of the democracy is as important, and in the future it may be more important. This check of a Cabinet Minister having to face an election on appointment is not much of a chance for democracy, but it is a chance, and it has been shown over and over again to be a very effective check upon the actions of the Government. I need not refer to the 1874 case, which led to Mr. Gladstone's resignation, nor to the by-election in 1880, which caused Disraeli to go to the country. Other instances have been mentioned, including Dudley and Masterman. All these by-elections have shown that when they are occasioned by appointment to the important post of Cabinet Minister, they do give the democracy of the country and not merely the electors of any particular district a check upon the Executive. It is inevitable that the Government should be in favour of legislation which gives the present Executive more power. When this question has been discussed previously we have found both Front Benches in favour of doing away with this check on the Executive, and I am glad that the Front Opposition Bench to-day has declared against strengthening the power of the Executive and in favour of the democracy. This is the first time we have found the existing Executive and the prospective Executive differing on this subject.

I am going to make an appeal to the Home Secretary. He may be a prospective Prime Minister; that is not at all unlikely, and I appeal to him not to look at this question from the point of view of the Executive or a Prime Minister who wants to enlarge the choice of his colleagues, but from the historical point of view, and preserve what can be preserved of the powers of the democracy. All over the world democracy is having an uphill fight against the Executive. In the greater parts of the world you find democracy going down before the Executive. We want to safeguard the free development of democracy as the wisdom of the individual increases, hoping for a real democracy some time, and I appeal to the Home Secretary to look at this question from the wider point of view of the interests of the English Constitution, rather than from the narrow point of view of the powers of the Prime Minister, and the possibility of choosing his candidates from a wider circle. He knows that the real danger which faces democracy is the risk of corruption. It is alleged that it has been the corruptness of the Legislatures of Spain and Italy, and Poland, which has given the dictator his chance. In America cities have been put into the hands of a Commission on account of corruption, and wherever corruption springs up and shows its head in a legislature, then the powers of the Executive are enlarged, and that enlargement is supported by the public opinion of the country.

We are by no means free from the risk of corruption. It is true there has been very little in Parliament in the past. In fact, our Parliamentary history is purer than the Parliamentary history of any country in Europe. In the old days there were places and jobs, and it was against these places and jobs that the legislation was originally introduced. To-day we are faced with a danger which is very subtle and which is perhaps not quite so personal, but Members of this House are very strongly tempted to look after special interests. It may be the special interests of their constituents, or it may be the special interests of some company in which they have a holding or are directors. In these days, when we have the Trade Facilities Act and the Export Credits Scheme, and subsidies to various industries, and the Safeguarding of Industries Act, there is a grave risk of corruption forming a visible part of our public life, and it would be specially dangerous at such a time to remove this last public check upon any appointment which might be the subject of unfavourable comment. It might put an end to such an appointment if it had to be the subject of a by-election.

On a point of Order. Is the hon. and gallant Member in order in dealing with any appointment?

Like a good many hon. Members, he is rather straying on to a Third Reading Debate.

The Amendment before the House seems to me to be almost another Bill. In the original Bill we discussed the abolition of election on appointment to office of profit under the Crown, and now we are discussing what might be a half-way house, and a very useful half-way house, between the system which is in operation and the suggestion made in the Bill itself. The Bill wipes out all by-elections for Ministerial purposes, and there are good grounds for that when you consider how arbitrary is the decision. But the Amendment we are considering is whether we should not go half-way and retain for the democracy just one more check; whether we could not all agree to pass this Bill as amended, understanding that Cabinet Ministers are to face an election, but that certain junior Ministers shall no longer have to do so. I do not think the appointment to junior posts matters in the least. Junior members of a Ministry have no power. A Cabinet Minister has tremendous power in these days, far greater than he had in the past, and we have a right to ask a Conservative Government to check its revolutionary career and allow us to have an agreed solution of this difficulty on the lines proposed by the Amendment.

Before the Home Secretary speaks on this Amendment, and probably seals its fate, I want to make an appeal to him, and at the same time to appeal to the hon. Member who has made himself responsible in the first place for this Bill, with a view to his accepting the Amendment. Those who listened to the very able statement of the Home Secretary against the last Amendment must recognise that his position on that Amendment has been completely destroyed by the proposal now before the House, and especially after the House has accepted the additional words. What was the case of the Home Secretary? His case was that it (was exceptionally hard upon the young men in the party, in any party, when appointed to office under the Crown, that they should have to seek re-election. We all know the anomalies that arise out of the working of the Constitution on that point, but the Amendment now before the House preserves everything he asked for when speaking against the previous proposal. The young men are all protected, and even the Ministerial members of the Executive still remain protected for nine months, and they will remain protected under this revised Amendment if they succeed once from one office to another in the Cabinet. Surely that ought to statisfy the Home Secretary and the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. Clayton). It seems to me that those who are in favour of this Bill should remain satisfied with the acceptance of the Amendment, as amended, and I ask the Home Secretary and the hon. Member to accept it.

The right hon. Gentleman has appealed to me. I think there is a misconception in the matter. I did not impute the slightest disloyalty to the hon. and gallant Members for Gainsborough (Captain Crook-shank) and Waterloo (Captain Bullock) in my last speech. Their desire is to help the other younger members of the party, and I admit that that help has been accorded by the last Amendment. The hon. and gallant Member for Waterloo rarely speaks in this House; I should be glad if he would speak more often. The real point in this matter has been misunderstood. We must go to the origin and reasons for this Bill. The Statute of Queen Anne was to protect the country against pressure or bribery by the Crown in the appointment of Ministers. That pressure could be exercised on an Undersecretary or Junior Whip as well as on a Cabinet Minister. That is the sole reason for the maintenance of this Statute of Queen Anne, which was passed for that reason. Now we are asked to maintain the Statute of Queen Anne as far as it affects the chief officers of the Cabinet, apparently not for that reason at all, not because there is any idea of pressure from the Crown, or bribery from the Crown in making a man a Cabinet Minister, but for some other reason, namely, that it is desirable that more frequent appeals should be made to the country in regard to the views of the Government on legislation.

Really, all the arguments that have been addressed to the House on this Amendment would more fittingly apply to a Bill in favour of shorter Parliaments. I have mentioned by-elections that I have fought, and other by-elections have been mentioned. It is a little hard, both on the Government and on the Member of Parliament or Undersecretary promoted to the Cabinet, that his vile body should be used for the purpose of discussing the legislation of the Cabinet. I do not see why it should be so experimented on. The principle of the Constitution is that for a period, first of seven years, and now of five years, the country entrusts the government to a majority of Parliament, with a Committee of that majority who are the Cabinet Ministers of the day. That is the theory of our Constitution. If you want to alter that, not on the ground of the Queen Anne Statute—that a man may be bribed in order to become a Cabinet Minister or for any other improper reason—if you want to say that you should have a General Election every two years or every three years, that is an arguable point.

On the average, you have in the course of a year perhaps two changes in Cabinet offices. That would be the extreme outside limit of the number of men imported into the Cabinet and not changing places within the Cabinet. Now you have certainly 12 and nearly always, as Parliament goes on, 18 by-elections in the course of a year. There is a legitimate opportunity—a by-election every month, and in the third and fourth years of Parliament a by-election every three weeks. It will be found that that statement is correct if hon. Members go through the list of Parliaments for the last 10 or 12 years. There is the legal and constitutional method of checking the policy of the Government. Every month during the first year of Parliament, and every three weeks during the third and fourth years of Parliament, there is opportunity for testing the policy of the Government. If you are going to say that 12 or 18 by-elections a year are not sufficient, and you want to add two more, not because there is any real reason for testing the appointment of a Cabinet Minister, but relying upon an old and obsolete Statute of Queen Anne, then I say that you are relying upon an obsolete Statute for a purpose for which it was never intended.

Is it not the case that in an ordinary by-election you have a new candidate, not the same candidate, and does not that vitiate the comparison?

The opportunity of testing the policy of the Government is rather fairer when you have two new candidates than when you have one of them a Cabinet Minister, who goes to a constituency with the full prestige of his appointment to Cabinet rank. In spite of what has been said, it is very rarely indeed that a Cabinet Minister is thrown out. Such an elec- tion does not provide a fair opportunity to that constituency for testing the policy of the Government because, I frankly say, the dice is loaded in favour of the Cabinet Minister.

Does the right hon. Gentleman not remember that the meat embargo was killed when the late Member for Dudley, then Minister of Agriculture, was rejected?

That has been referred to already. You must take the whole series of cases where Members have been appointed to Cabinets and have fought by-elections. On this Amendment the right hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) has appealed to me on the democratic basis, but I would be out of order if I replied to him on that point. I want to put this to the House: The Bill was passed with an open vote and no Government Whips were put on. The Prime Minister made a speech on it, and intimated that it would be left to the House of Commons. And when a Measure of this importance has been passed, after a full Debate in the House of Commons, by a vote of two to one, I think the Government's responsibility is to give facilities for passing the Bill through all its stages. In this particular case, we have here an Amendment which really cuts at the root of the Bill. You are by this Amendment merely allowing to escape from the provisions of the Queen Anne Statute, the Lord Privy Seal and the Lord President of the Council—I do not know why they are not included, because they are Cabinet Ministers, and it will be remembered that the Lord Privy Seal in the last Government sat on the Front Bench of this House. But they are allowed to escape from the meshes of the Queen Anne Act and also the Junior Whips. That is all that would happen, after all the labour which the House has gone through in connection with this Bill—that all the Under-Secretaries of State, the Secretary to the Admiralty, the Postmaster-General, the Secretary for Mines, the Secretary to the Treasury—are not brought under the Statute of Queen Anne. The only effect of the Bill, if this Amendment is carried, will be that the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord President of the Council, the Attorney-General—who is now a Member of the Cabinet—the Postmaster-General and half-a-dozen Junior Whips will escape from the provisions of the Queen Anne Act and those provisions will remain for the 14 Members of the Cabinet who are included in the Amendment. Having regard to the fact that the House of Commons by a fair majority, and after a full discussion, passed the Bill—

What was the size of the House which passed the Bill on that Friday afternoon? I think it was 217.

I accept the hon. and gallant Member's figure of 217, but there was an opportunity for the other 400 Members to come here if they

objected to the Bill. If their feeling against it was as strong as the hon. and gallant Member would have us believe, why did they not attend to vote against it? We must take it that the House passed the Bill, and the desire of the House ought to be carried out. I think I am fairly entitled to ask the House to support its decision of two or three months ago, and to vote against the Amendment.

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The House divided: Ayes, 167; Noes, 82.

Question put accordingly, "That the proposed words, as amended, be there inserted in the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 94; Noes, 161.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

On a point of Order. I handed in a manuscript Amendment.

I did not select it.

I beg to move, to leave out the word "now," and, at the end of the Question, to add the words "upon this day three months."

I move this Amendment, in the first place, because, although we have debated this Bill on two Fridays I cannot think that, taking the House as a whole, any sufficient consideration has been given to it. This Measure seems to me, to be one of very considerable—I will not put it too high—constitutional significance. You have only got to look at the Schedule to this Bill to see how far-reaching it is, at any rate, in some of its effects, and I feel that the more closely this Bill is studied the less will it be approved. I am not going at this time of the afternoon into the questions of constitutional antiquities and black letter learning, which, to some extent, have figured in the Debate on this Bill. I want to ask the House to look at this problem from the severely practical point of view. But I am confronted with this difficulty. I frankly admit that all the obvious, all the specious, all the purely surface arguments are in favour of the Bill as it was originally drafted. Therefore, I feel myself very regretfully constrained to dive a little deeper into first principles than is customary in the Debates in this House, and I apologise beforehand for doing so.

3.0 P.M.

It will be admitted on all hands by all who are accustomed to make any serious study of these questions, that the whole of our constitution is in many respects peculiar, if not unique. It is certainly unique in its elusiveness. It is certainly unique in its extraordinary flexibility. What is the theory on which this unique constitution rests? I submit that the first foundation on which it rests is this, that ultimate political sovereignty in this country is vested in the electorate. I thought I saw the late Solicitor-General dissenting; but I was very careful to say nothing about the legal side. What I did say—perhaps he did not observe my emphasis—was that ultimate political sovereignty—and I lay stress on the word "political"—is vested in the electorate. On the other hand, the legal sovereignty in this country is vested in Parliament, and by that we mean King, Lords and Commons. As between the political sovereignty and the legal sovereignty of Parliament, as between the electors and Parliament, what is the position of the Executive? That is the real question raised by this Bill. May I call attention to the quite exceptional position of the Executive in the constitution of this country? The whole genius of our constitution is parliamentary. We are a parliamentary democracy. In saying that, I mean that, among the democracies of the world we are distinct from some other democracies by the fact that we are parliamentary. The democracy of the United States, for example, is not parliamentary, but presidential. We are similarly distinguished from the democracy of the Swiss Republic by the fact that they, again, are not parliamentary, but—if I may venture to use the term—referendal.

The very root and genius of our Constitution is its Parliamentary character, and it is Parliamentary in two special senses. On the one hand, because Parliament, as I have already defined it, is legislatively omnipotent. But, in relation to this Bill, there is a more important sense in which our democracy is a parliamentary democracy. Not only is Parliament Sovereign in respect of legislation; it also sustains and maintains the Executive. In the presidential democracy of the United States, the Executive, as the whole House is well aware, is entirely and most rigidly excluded from the Legislature. That is the genius of their constitution as contrasted with the genius of ours. On the other hand, in the Swiss Republic, the Executive is directly appointed by the Legislature, but, once appointed, it enjoys practically continuous and permanent office. The members of the Executive in Switzerland are virtually in the position of the permanent heads of our Civil Service. Our Executive—and this is the peculiarity, as I submit, of our Constitution—is not directly elected either by the electorate or by the Legislature, though it is in closest, if indirect, association with the electorate, and it is closely and indeed inseparably connected with Parliament. It is responsible to Parliament, and it is sustained by Parliament.

What does this Bill propose? It proposes a very important change, as I see it, in the relation of the Executive and the electorate, and so, indirectly, in the relation of Parliament and the electors. Down to the year 1919, for some 200 years-previous to that time, the electorate had possessed by law—I do not mind whether or not it was the original intention of the Statute so frequently referred to in. the course of this Debate, but the practical effect of the Statute to which reference has been made, was to give to the electorate a negative voice in the appointment of all the principal Ministers of the Crown. That ancient custom, that ancient rule was modified to, I think, perhaps, not an unreasonable extent in the year 1919. What this Bill proposes to do is to abolish that negative voice. I ask myself, in whose interests is this change proposed? I frankly admit that the change would be for the benefit of certain Ministers, especially of new young Ministers, though, if the Amendment proposed by my hon. Friend had been accepted, the younger Ministers, the junior Ministers, would alone be included under the operation of this Bill.

In the second place, this Bill is supposed, so I gathered from the speech of the Prime Minister in February, to make for the general efficiency of the Executive, and for freedom of choice by the Prime Minister in the choice of his colleagues. As I have already said, I do not for one moment dispute the validity of these considerations. I appreciate them to the full. But I do not think that the personal convenience of Ministers should in this, or, indeed, in any other matter, outweigh the nice equipoise, the very delicate equilibrium of the mechanism of the most flexible Constitution in the whole world.

I want to make only one further observation. I have a great many observations to make, but in deference to the House, and having regard to the hour, I do not wish to prolong my speech. I will, therefore, conclude with one further observation which I venture to press on the House with all the seriousness I can command, more particularly, if I may say so, on those of my hon. Friends who sit on this side of the House. I have always been a thick and thin Conservative—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"]—especially a thick Conservative, in the view of hon. Members opposite, but I have always endeavoured to be a cautious and constitutional Conservative. Let me say this, especially to hon. Members on this side. There is one position I do not at all like, and that is sitting on the safety valve, or even stopping the safety valve. I regard the present rules for the re-election of Ministers as one of the most valuable and indispensable of our constitutional safety valves. I venture, as a very humble individual, to prophesy—as one gets older this is perhaps a little safer, because there is less time for one's predictions to be verified or the reverse—I venture on a prediction, and it is this, that if to-day the Conservative party—because it will be the act of the Conservative party if this Bill is carried—if to-day the Conservative party, in what I regard as their shortsightedness, or their lightheartedness, should succeed in carrying this Bill, I believe they will have stopped a very important safety valve of the Constitution, and that they will run a very serious risk—the metaphor is mixed—of opening the flood-gates [ Laughter. ]—I admitted the mixture—to a very serious innovation. What do I mean by this? I mean that they will sooner or later open the way for the introduction into our constitution of the principle of the "Recall." I assume that hon. Members who are students of contemporary Politics will be acquainted with what I mean [ Laughter. ] I am told I must not presume it; but I should have thought that a good many Members of this House were familiar with the practice which has crept into the Constitution—not the Federal Constitution of the United States, but into many of the State Constitutions in the United States—the principle of the recall. The principle is this, that if there be a Member of the Legislature, or if there be even a Judge, who by his votes or by his judgments gives offence to the electorate, the electorate are entitled to call immediately for the resignation of that Member or that Judge. I regard that principle as one of the worst that you can introduce into administration, and it is still worse if it be introduced into the Judicature. In all seriousness I want to warn the House, and particularly my Friends on this side, that if they will persist, as I have said, in pitting on a safety valve they may open—I will not again mix the metaphor—they may open the way to Constitutional innovations which they will be the first to regret.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Very few words are required from me to state the position that we on these benches will take up on the Third Reading of this Bill. It is necessary that I should try to remove a misapprehension that was evident in the earlier stages of the discussion to-day, arising possibly out of the fact that my hon. Friend the Member, for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) put forward an Amendment. It seemed to be suggested in one of the speeches delivered by the Home Secretary, and also by the hon. Member who was responsible for introducing this Bill, the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. Clayton), that we on these benches were in favour of the Bill, but wished, for selfish reasons, that it should only apply in another Parliament, in the possibility that a change of Government might take place. That is altogether wrong. We opposed the Bill—I myself spoke on behalf of the Labour party—on Second Reading. I then gave the reasons why we opposed the Bill, and, if anything, they have been strengthened by the discussions that have taken place. It is a great mistake to suggest that, because we seek to make a bad Bill better, we have abandoned out position. First of all, we are opposed to the Bill because we believe it is disturbing a very satisfactory compromise arranged a very few years ago. Those of us who went through the discussions of this subject on previous occasions remember the very active part in securing that compromise which was taken by the late Mr. Bonar Law, and I think it cannot be said that that compromise has worked other than satisfactorily. As a compromise, I think it is a very great mistake for us to begin now to disturb it.

We are against this Bill because it is a further attempt to remove the Executive from direct touch with the electorate. I have had the privilege of being a Member of three Cabinets. I do not mind saying that I have never yet found a Cabinet that was anxious to do other than keep away from the electorate during the period it was in office by having the smallest number of by-elections possible. The fact that I have found Cabinets so indisposed to keep in touch with the electorate is the strongest reason why we ought to prevent the Executive, even although the Parliament is as short as five years, from getting away from the electorate, and we ought to try to keep them in touch with the electorate as much as possible.

The hon. Member for Widnes raised a point to which I should like to reply. He seemed to think that, on this point of our being willing to take the advantages of this Bill in the event of our coming into responsibility after the next election, we were departing from a position that has been taken up in previous Parliaments, and he cited the case of the payment of Members and the voucher system which operates in the case of the whole of the Members of this House. May I point out that there is a very fundamental difference between a change such as that which is included in the payment of Members and the granting of vouchers and the big constitutional change which we are making in the event of this Bill passing into law this afternoon. I think constitutional changes ought never to be made unless they have clearly been placed before the electors.

I remember, as I am bound to remember, that on more than one occasion we have made ourselves responsible for a Bill that would have made a constitutional change. Under the ballot we have more than once, in fact, on several occasions, introduced a Bill for the enfranchisement of women, changing the age from what it is to-day and placing it on an equality with men by making the age all round 21. We have been challenged that we ought not to make such a constitutional change as that by the very people who are the strongest supporters of that change to-day, and we have been told that we ought not to make that change on the initiative of a private Member. Here we find what is supposed to be the strongest constitutional party in the country, whose very name indicates that it will only make constitutional changes with the greatest prudence and the strictest regard to the dangers involved, establishing precedents for which there is no mandate.

I challenge any right hon. Gentleman on the Front Bench—the Government is now making itself responsible for the Bill—or any Member opposite to show me in the slightest degree that any mandate for this constitutional change was given at the last election or at any election in recent years when the party opposite has been returned to power. Yet we are not only, as I have said, disturbing a compromise, properly arranged for and accepted unanimously by a previous Parliament, but we are prepared to do that without having had the slightest instruction or mandate given to us from the electors of the country. I associate myself to the full with the warning given by the hon. Member for York (Sir J. Marriott). I think that to have to listen to warnings from a Member with his knowledge of history delivered to his own party is at any rate to me a very serious indication of the importance of the change which we are making to-day. We are so opposed to the Bill on the essential principle of loss of contact between the Executive and the electorate that we on these benches officially will, on the Third Reading, do what we did on the Second Reading, namely, give it our wholehearted opposition.

I would like to deal with this Bill, in the first place, from the historical and, in the second place, from the present-day point of view. Several Members this afternoon have referred to the Act of Queen Anne, and the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) gave me the impression that he believed that Act had been passed with the object of the electorate having some opportunity of expressing an opinion when a Member was appointed a Minister of the Crown. I have taken the opportunity of looking at the Act of Queen Anne, and the first thing I observe is that the Members in those days appear to have been constituted somewhat more powerfully than the Members of the present day. I was surprised to find— and other hon. Members perhaps may also be surprised to find if they delve into this question—that the Act of Settlement of 1700 was not an isolated Act, but was one of a series of Acts of Succession and Settlement. They also dealt with the powers of the Privy Council and the powers of this House. The reason for that was this. The Ministers who were in power in those days, in the immediately post-Revolution days, were of two minds. While they were busy creating the Cabinet, as we know it to-day, they were also extremely suspicious of the principle of Cabinet Government. Therefore, while on the one hand they did in the original Act of 1700 pass a provision prohibiting any Member sitting in this House who held an office of profit under the Crown, on the other hand they also were amending or repealing provisions of this kind to enable those self-same Members to sit in this House, because they realised that, if a certain number of the Ministers did not sit in this House, the House of Commons would probably lose more, than it would gain in its control over the Executive; as the Royal power was at that time able to effect its will by means of private Members. Therefore, the two things were continually working the one against the other.

If you look at these Statutes, you will find that, whereas in 1700 no Member was allowed to sit who held an office of profit under the Crown, in 1707 it was provided that no Member should sit who was appointed to an office created after October, 1705, and immediately following that provision is another one, to which every speaker has referred, saying that any Member who is appointed must immediately have his seat declared vacant, as if he was dead—those are the words used—and, on the other hand, he may fight a by-election as the result of his seat having been' declared vacant. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the intention of that provision was not to give the electorate of those days an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the question of the appointment of Ministers. As a matter of fact, we all know perfectly well that in those days the electorate was practically a negligible factor. A very large number of boroughs were pocket boroughs, and, if one takes the trouble to look up, as I did some months ago, the records of by-elections before 1832, and even just subsequently to 1832, one finds that almost invariably a Minister on appointment to office fought no by-election, but was returned unopposed, because it was regarded, as it is, now, by a constituency as a compliment, to a certain extent, that its Member had been preferred for office, and in those days it was a very much greater compliment than it is now. Therefore, the argument from that point of view is, historically, not quite sound.

The provision to prevent Members from coming into this House if they held an office of profit under the Crown was simply and solely owing to the suspicion on the part of Ministers of those days, and Members of those days, of the power of the Crown, which still remained in their minds as the result of the Stuart Civil War, and that idea prevailed for very many years. On the other hand, although, as the Home Secretary said quite correctly, the Cabinet system is an adornment of our system of democratic government, it is really an absolute anomaly in any democratic system that we should have a Cabinet which meets in secret, which, until a few years ago, kept no minutes of any kind, and which practically does its work on the system of the Venetian Council of Ten, which was as absolutely undemocratic as any body possibly could be, though it may have been highly efficient. That our Cabinet system has been a success is simply due to the fact that in this country our ability to govern is such that we can practically turn any scheme into a success if we choose to do so. It has nothing to do with the system of democratic government; it is most undemocratic, and the fact that it is undemocratic is the reason why Members in those days were so highly suspicious of it, and so highly jealous of giving to newly formed Cabinets any power over the House of Commons, which had to some extent at that time obtained power to vote Supply. Therefore we must look at this matter from an historically accurate point of view, and the Statute of Queen Anne has absolutely nothing at all to do with the question of giving the electorate an opportunity of passing judgment on a Government on the appointment of Ministers. That is purely a modern idea, and when you come to look at it from a modern point of view it is a most unfair and unwise way of doing it.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) referred to several by-elections having been the cause of General Elections. I have not looked up this point, but I am almost certain that the point he referred to with regard to Disraeli's Government at the end of the 1874 Ministry was not a case that he should have quoted at all, because Disraeli went to the country because he won a by-election, and the by-election was, as a matter of fact, a most gross unreflection of the feeling of the country at that time, and it shows that by-elections, taken as a whole, in nine cases out of 10 cannot be relied on as giving a reflection of the feeling of the country. If you look up in the last few years the records of by-elections, and see what took place where a General Election followed, you will find that a seat won at a by-election is frequently lost at a General Election, and that shows that by-elections are no real test of what the feeling of the country is. Several hon. Members have pointed out that if you come to that point of view there are far more opportunities of testing the feeling of the country owing to by-elections taking place through deaths and resignations than there are ever likely to be through by-elections owing to the appointment of Ministers. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) said he was quite opposed to this Bill, and that he had taken up that attitude on the Second Reading. I find, on looking at his speech on the Second Reading, that he made this statement:

Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman do me the justice to quote my first sentence?

"I rise to advance one or two reasons why we, on these benches, cannot support the Second Reading of this Bill."

The right hon. Gentleman said there were one or two arguments with which he agreed. He then goes on to say one of the principal reasons why, apparently, he disagreed was because this Parliament was an exceptional Parliament. I think that is one of the most unsound arguments he could possibly use. Over and over again in our political history a party that loses an election invariably says the election was an exceptional one, and the party that succeeds invariably says the election was a normal one.

My object in making the statement was to show that this Parliament was a minority Parliament, and that is a very exceptional Parliament.

I do not agree that because a particular House of Commons has been returned with a particularly large majority of one party, therefore it is not desirable to carry out a particular Constitutional change. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leith (Captain Benn), who made one of those excellent speeches that he frequently makes on Constitutional questions, struck a different note with which I was at first rather impressed but subsequently did not quite agree with, and that was that we have no right to make any change in the Constitution without first putting it in front of the electors. In theory that is probably perfectly accurate, but in practice I do not attach a great deal of importance to it because I ask him, and I ask any Member of the House, does he really think at the next election he is at all likely to be asked a single question on this Bill, or would he have been likely to be asked a single question on it had the Amendment he was speaking to been accepted and the Bill been postponed until the calling together of the next Parliament. He knows as well as I do that it is extremely unlikely that any elector in his constituency would ask him a question, or that any elector in his constituency would know anything about the Bill at all.

The hon. and gallant Member should come to a Scottish industrial constituency. He would then find that they know a good deal.

I represented a Scottish industrial constituency for four years and I am well aware of the fact that the Scottish constituents are particularly keen on political questions, and so are the Lancashire people. But for all that I do not think that, with the enormous number of industrial and economic questions which come before the electorate at a General Election, an abstruse subject of this kind would greatly interest the man in the street. Therefore, to say that the coming into operation of the Bill should be postponed until the electorate has had an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon it, may in theory be sound but in practice it is not of the slightest value, because the electorate would not express an opinion upon it.

The hon. and gallant Member for Westmorland (Major Stanley) said that we were very unwise to deal with this question without referring it to the electorate, and that we were creating a precedent which might subsequently be used by the Opposition, if they ever achieve power, to carry out some great constitutional revolution. I do not agree with some hon. Members on this side that if and when the party opposite achieve office and power they are likely to carry out so great a constitutional revolution as some people believe. Even if they did, the hon. and gallant Member seems to forget that under the existing powers of the Parliament Act there is a safeguard, and there is no reason why we in this House should be limited in our legislative action by a principle of that kind. If we or the party opposite are in a majority in this House and we consider that a Bill is good, I do not agree that it is necessary to postpone it until the electorate has had an opportunity of discussing it and expressing an opinion upon it in every case.

The House of Commons cannot be bound hand and foot by everything that is said or done or not said and not done at a General Election. The House of Commons is elected for the purpose of governing the country in accordance with the views of the majority sitting in this House, and as long as it retains a majority in the House for a definite period of years, and I do not think the argument that it is necessary to refer this or that legislation to the electorate for their opinion is a sound argument. That might be carried too far. The position that faces us at the present time is that we in this House cannot give enough time to administrative questions, because we spend so much time on legislation. I am well aware that we are a legislative body, but we have the right as a legislative body to criticise the Executive. Any Member who, like myself, is a member of the Estimates Committee or of the Public Accounts Committee will agree with me when I say that the chief failure of this House at the present time is its lack of opportunity to discuss questions of administration and to criticise the Executive. This Bill goes a small way, but it does go a small way, towards helping that position, because it ensures that a Member of this House when he is first appointed to an important office, instead of having to go away to fight a by-election at a most difficult time shall be allowed to learn something about his office and not have to waste a month or six weeks in his constituency, when he ought to be in London. For that reason, if for no other, I heartily support the Bill and I hope it will receive its Third Reading.

I desire, in a few sentences only, to express the opinion which we on these benches feel towards this Bill. I am not concerned to dispute the very interesting historical argument that has been put forward by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. It may be true that in the reign of Queen Anne these safeguards were put in for a certain purpose, but it may be equally true that they are wisely retained to-day for another purpose. To-day we have to guard against the power of the Executive, and this is a special safeguard which we have over the power of the Executive. Many by-elections are due to the mortality amongst Members of the House, but a by-election due to death is in a different category to one due to promotion to office. The candidate who stands is a special representative and Member of the Government, and it is, therefore, a test of the opinions of that constituency on the policy of the Government. There are Members in the House who can remember that in the person of Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen the policy of the Government of the day was twice defeated on a reference to the electorate. That is a real ground of substance for objecting to this proposal. It may be altered in a scheme for a general reform, but the argument we advance is that this is not a wise moment to make an alteration which strengthens the power of the Executive without doing anything to remove the anomalies which weaken the power of this electorate.

The Home Secretary knows well that the Government at the last Election did not poll half the votes, and in the course of the by-election they have polled far fewer votes than at the General Election, whereas in the by-elections the Liberal party has polled 16,000 votes more, and when non-contested by-elections are taken into account, 4,000 or 5,000 votes more. A final argument which should alter the opinion of hon. Members between the Second and Third Reading of this Bill is that great events have happened in this country during the last few weeks—namely, that on the part of a few people, and only a few, there has been a challenge to the authority of Parliament. Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and hon. Members in all parts of the House, have been asking the poor people to trust Parliament, to trust the ballot box instead of attempting any alternative form of Government, and at such a moment it is a great mistake to make a change, however small, which appears to strengthen the authority of the Executive as against the authority of the electorate. It is because we wish in this respect to make the House of Commons a quick and responsible instrument of the people's will that we oppose this Bill this afternoon.

What troubles me is where democracy comes in? You have a Cabinet, but when the Cabinet door is shut, democracy is shut out. If the change which this Bill makes was a choice of all the Members who form the majority of this House, it would still bear no relation to the opinion of the electorate. When the choice is made by one man it becomes his own opinion and not the opinion of the people. Such a proposal takes you outside everything we know by demo- cracy. That is the position. What do you find? That here you have a man with great brains, but either with small means or a small majority. If any country had what is called a sane people, and had any idea about getting the best brains into the higher service of the State, would it allow a small majority or small means to prevent its getting the use of those brains? No. But you have been accustomed to going back to Queen Anne. You would go back to the Stone Age in order to keep up the dignity of this House.

If democracy is to have a voice in what is said on the Front Bench, every man promoted to the Front Bench ought to go back to the country for its opinion. If there were a secret ballot in this House on this Bill, I am sure that every member of the Front Bench would be voting against the Bill. They know that this Bill is held up in various lights as being required for this and that, but the fact is that it means the sack for a whole lot of people on the Front Bench. They do not want to take the risk of having to run by-elections on the fact that their chief Cabinet Minister was not capable of making a proper selection from the brains behind him. There is no essence of anything but what is anti-democratic in principle in this Bill. It is filtering down from the anti-democratic attitude of the Cabinet. The Cabinet system is anti-democratic. There is no democracy inside the door of the Cabinet, no relation with the electorate at any time, and decisions are taken that have no relation to what was fought for at the General Election.

My view is that it would be a great pity to pass this Bill, because it does admittedly remove a safeguard to the system which we have in operation to-day. It removes the safeguard that has been sitting on the safety valve or the sluice gate of the hon. Member for York (Sir J. Marriott), with whose speech I heartily agree. It seems to me rather strange that we should find the Government Front Bench all supporting the Bill, whereas a large number of backbenchers like myself are opposing it. One would have thought that in the natural course of events the situation would have been exactly reversed. We must realise that if this Bill were passed into law it would be much easier for changes to be made in the Cabinet and in Government appointments. At the present time, one of the reasons why such changes are sometimes delayed is the risk of a by-election. If you remove that risk, ipso facto, you will make it easier for re-shuffles and rearrangements of Government appointments to be made. Therefore, one would have imagined that the Front Bench would have opposed the Bill on that ground, whereas we on the back benches, all of us keen and hopeful aspirants to office in the future, would naturally be expected to support a Bill which would make it easier for these re-shuffles and rearrangements to be made. In spite of that, we find the exact opposite taking place.

One is compelled to ask oneself why this Bill has been brought forward in this way. As was said from the other side, nobody can claim that this Parliament or Government has any mandate from the electors for doing what they are doing. I go further, and say there is no demand or demonstrated need for taking this action at all. The present system appears to be working extremely satisfactorily and well. The only example of this practice in by-elections, which has taken place in the last year or two, was the triumphant vindication of the Conservative Government's policy at the by-election of Bury St. Edmunds. No one can urge that, from the point of view of the present Government, there can be any need or demand for it, but we must recognise that calamities may occur to this country. There is a remote possibility that the Conservative Party will not remain for ever in power. If that remote possibility ever becomes a fact then we may have the more unconstitutional elements of the Socialist party proposing changes in our extremely satisfactory Constitutional practices which we on this side would strongly deprecate.

As has been pointed out already if this somewhat minor change is passed into law by nominal Conservatives—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"]—a great precedent will be given to our opponents for carrying out any other changes which they may advocate but which we may greatly deprecate. I have used the expression "nominal Conservatives" which seems to have aroused some curiosity. I do so because, in a limited degree, I agree with what fell from the lips of the hon. and learned Gentleman who was lately Solicitor-General when he said that it was a strange commentary on political thought to-day that we should find the present Opposition, which does not set any great store by constitutional practice, supporting this Bill brought forward and backed by the official Conservative party. It is often a matter of wonder to me how on various subjects we find different political parties overstepping the boundaries and barriers which in actual fact divide different schools of political thought. We find that on some points the people who, one would imagine, would take what one might roughly describe as the left wing point of view really, when put to the test, reverse their views and take the right wing point of view. So, when we claim that we on this side who oppose this Bill are actuated by the real Conservative point of view, in spite of the fact that we unfortunately find ourselves supported by the official Socialists, that is no reason for assuming that hon. Members on this side, like the hon. Member for York and many others, are not really the true Conservatives.

Again, we have to ask ourselves why this Bill was brought forward in the way in which it was brought forward. It is obviously an important change in the Constitution. It does not do to exaggerate the importance of the change, but no one can deny that it is of considerable importance, and yet we find that it is brought forward by a private Member on a Friday, and we thought it was a private Member's Bill. Yet now on this, its final stage, we have discovered, somewhat to our surprise, that instead of it having been regarded as a private Member's Bill, the Government have taken it under their wing and have put on the Government Whips on this occasion. It is not for me to criticise the actions of the Government, but I cannot help feeling, if I may make so bold as to say so, that on this occasion it is a pity that such a course has been adopted, because—

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The House divided: Ayes, 190; Noes, 81.