Can the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury announce the business proposed to be taken next week?

On Monday, we shall take the Finance Bill, completion of Committee stage

Tuesday: Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill, Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Bill [ Lords ] and Legitimacy Bill, Second Readings; Secretaries of State Bill [ Lords ] and Execution of Diligence (Scotland) Bill, Report and Third Reading; Post Office (Sites) Bill, Committee; Moneylenders Bill, Money Resolution in Committee; and other Orders.

Wednesday: Coal Mines Bill; Second Reading.

Thursday: Supply. The Vote to be taken will be announced later.

On Friday, as there seems to be a general desire in the House, the Government proposes to allot the day for a debate on Russia.

In regard to Wednesday's business, am I right in assuming that the Coal Mines Bill is the Eight Hours Bill?

That is so.

Can the Parliamentary Secretary say when we shall have the Coal Mines Bill and the accompanying Bill in our hands?

We propose to introduce the Bills together on Monday. The Coal Mines Bill is a short Bill, but the other Bill is a much more complicated Measure, and will require longer time to print. We hope that on Wednesday, when we ask the House to give a Second Reading to the Coal Mines Bill, the other Bill will be printed and ready for Members of the House, and we shall proceed with that Bill as quickly as may be, when the House has had time to digest it.

Do you expect to get it all through in one day?

On a point of Order. May I ask whether the Motion standing in the name of the Prime Minister—

"That the Proceedings [9th June] in relation to the Second Reading and Committal of the Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Bill [ Lords ] be null and void, and that the Bill be read a Second time upon Monday next "—

apart from its merits, has any precedence on Friday? The Rule as laid down by Erskine May on this point, says:

"The Orders of the Day set down for Fridays.… are usually.… the orders in the charge of unofficial Members, and on these days Orders of the Day are considered before Notices of Motion."

I, therefore, ask whether a Notice of Motion has precedence, especially a Notice of Motion by the Government, on a day which is specifically alloted by the practice of the House to private Members' Bills.

Before you reply, Mr. Speaker, may I say that this Motion was put down solely for the convenience of the House. There was a misunderstanding one night, and this Bill received a Second Reading when it was not intended. For the convenience of the House, we have taken what I thought was a fair course to render those proceedings null and void, so that the House will again have an opportunity of discussing the Second Reading of the Bill.

I have no doubt the Parliamentary Secretary, with his usual courtesy and consideration for hon. Members, has done what he thought best, but at the same time I submit, Mr. Speaker, that private Members have certain definite rights, and that it is a very dangerous infringement of those rights if time specifically allotted to private Members be to be taken up by Motions of the Government.

I do not rise to object to this Order being taken, if we pass it as an unopposed Order. It would be a serious infringement of the time allotted to private Members if an opposed Motion were taken and debated in private Members' time—the curtailed and exiguous time which the House now allows to private Members.

The business for Monday of next week includes the Second Reading of the Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Bill [ Lords ] and this Motion on the Paper says

"that the Bill be read a Second time upon Monday next."

Is that intended?

That is only the wording. It means that it shall be put down for Second Reading, but it does not mean that the Bill shall be taken.

On the points of Order raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Leith (Captain Benn) and the hon. and gallant Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton) I quite agree with them that if a Motion were put down which would raise considerable opposition, it ought not to be taken on a Private Members' day, in advance of business. That is the view I should hold, and I am sure the Government would hold the same view. This Motion, I understand, was put down because the Opposition did not intend to allow the Bill to go through. It went through inadvertently, and therefore it is purely a matter for the convenience of hon. Members that the Motion has been put on the Paper. I think the hon. and gallant Member for Leith will be satisfied in having maintained the privileges of the House by the intervention that he has made.

I need hardly say that I am very grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for your championship of the rights of Private Members. But may I suggest that if it be true that this Bill is unopposed, the Parliamentary Secretary should move it at the end of the day, in which case it could receive assent from all quarters, if so desired, without debate. I should not debate it. If, however, the course is to be adopted of taking the Motion in Private Members' time, we shall have to examine it, and see what it involves.

If the Motion were passed over now, it would not be possible to take it at a later stage to-day. Therefore, the Bill could not appear on the Order Paper on Monday. I think the hon. and gallant Member may rest satisfied with what I have said—that by his intervention he has maintained the position of Private Members, on a day allotted to Private Members.

I am satisfied to leave the rights of Private Members in your hands, Mr. Speaker.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That the Proceedings [9th June] in relation to the Second Reading and Committal of the Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Bill [ Lords ] he null and void, and that the Bill be read a Second time upon Monday next.—[ Commander Eyres Monsell. ]

I should like to say a few words on this Motion. If hon. Members will refer to the Votes and Proceedings of 9th June, they will find a record that this Bill was read a Second Time, and committed to a Standing Committee. It may be that there was some slip, and that hon. Members desire a fuller discussion. In that case, I should be the last to raise an objection. But we must understand what we are doing. If we are going to pass a Motion annulling an Order that has been passed by this House, we must understand exactly what may be the effect upon the fate of any Measures in which we are-interested. I was under the impression that it was an ancient Rule of this House that a Question once decided could not be re-submitted in the same Session. There is a special page devoted to this subject in Erskine May's book on "Parliamentary Practice."

On the merits of the Resolution, let us see where we are. We are only private Members, except the privileged Members on the Front Bench. We may have a Bill of very great public value in which we are interested. We put it down, as we did not get a place in the ballot, and after a great deal of interviewing of hon. Members who may have opposition to the Bill, we find that after eleven o'clock one night we can persuade the House to give it a Second Reading, without debate. In the old days that would advance one very little, because then one had to fight for time for the Committee stage in the House. But the House of Commons, realising that the rights of private Members should be a little bit extended, in the public interest, set up Standing Committees, and it is now one of the Rules of the House that when a Bill has received a Second Reading, it goes, without further Debate, to a Standing Committee, so that a Bill—Government Bill or private Bill—has a fair chance of being discussed.

Supposing that one has been fortunate enough to secure a Second Reading for his Bill—a Second Reading was given last night to a Bill moved by a Member from the Front Opposition Bench—and he is then faced by a Motion made by the Prime Minister, that the Second Reading that he has received is to be annulled, exactly what blow is being struck at the opportunities that have been afforded to private Members for passing legislation promoted by private Members?

Although this Motion may be desirable, it affects the rights of private Members in all parts of the House, and, as the Liberal party is the smallest party in the House, we should be most anxious with regard to any infringement of the rights of minorities. This, however, does affect the rights of every hon. Member of the House, wherever he may sit, and I think we should have some guarantee as to what its effect will be on the limited rights which still remain to the ordinary private Member.

I have already tried to explain that this Motion is put down in order to meet the convenience of Members of the House. When the hon. and gallant Member talks about the rights of private Members, I can assure him that they are perfectly safe in my hands, for it is my constant endeavour to see that they are not infringed in any way. So many Liberal leaders have, however, failed to satisfy the hon. and gallant Member that I cannot hope to do so. If I thought that this Motion would be objected to for one moment, or that it would be discussed, and thus take away a moment of the time which is given to private Members, I would not have it down for to-day. It is only to show the meticulous care with which we try to meet the wishes of the Opposition of this House, which includes the hon. and gallant Member himself, that the Motion is put down. I hope that will satisfy the hon. and gallant Member, and that he will show himself to be a champion of private Members' rights by not further objecting to the Motion.

Question put, and agreed to.

On a point of Order. Have we left the question of the business for next week, because I desire to raise a point on it?

The hon. Member is rather too late. We have already dealt with the business for next week.

I beg to move in page 1, line 6, after the word "indictment," to insert the words "otherwise than at quarter sessions."

The object of this Amendment is quite clear. It is to limit the powers which this Bill proposes to give to the Judges of the High Court. I do not propose to discuss at this stage the general merits of the Bill but the hon. and learned Member for Norwood (Mr. Greaves-Lord) will agree with me that this Bill does not alter the law at all. It is one of the anomalies of the situation that Judges now have the power to do everything which this Bill gives them, but there is no doubt that it will be regarded as an alternative method to the present possible system of giving a series of consecutive sentences of imprisonment. That being so, if the Bill be passed, it will be regarded as an indication that the legislature thinks the method proposed in the Bill is a proper method to be adopted; that is to substitute a term of penal servitude instead of giving consecutive sentences of imprisonment, a power, in fact, which is never exercised. The question does arise whether this increased power to inflict sentences beyond the two years of imprisonment, which is now normally given, is a power which should properly be entrusted to persons who have not the highest technical and legal qualifications.

I have pointed out before, and I shall point out again, that while no reflection is intended on Chairmen of Quarter Sessions, who in the counties are very deserving and conscientious gentlemen, but who frequently are not lawyers and have no technical training at all, it is dangerous in the extreme to give them powers greater than they possess to-day. Even under the last Act, Chairmen of Quarter Sessions are given considerable powers indeed, or rather Quarter Sessions are given considerable powers, although the chairmen of course exercise them, but it is rather another thing to say that the power of giving penal servitude up to the limit of seven years should be entrusted to Chairmen of Quarter Sessions. It is doubtful whether any real demand has even been made in the country for this measure at all. I will not discuss that at the moment because I can raise it on the general principle of the Bill, but if a demand has been made by any Judge, or any other responsible persons, that this Bill might be useful I cannot find any suggestion that this power should be entrusted to quarter sessions.

The most that can be said in favour of his Bill is that in certain cases Judges of the High Court can properly be trusted to exercise this increased power. But when you remember the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions are in no way selected by the Lord Chancellor or by any judicial authority at all, but are merely elected by their fellow lay magistrates, surely it is very dangerous to give them the considerable powers proposed by this Bill. There is no demand at all from any part of this House, or any part of the country, or from the Judiciary itself, that Chairmen of Quarter Sessions should have this power, and this, I think, is final and conclusive; there is no demand from the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions themselves. I do not believe any Quarter Session has ever sought for the powers which the hon. and learned Member seeks to impose on them. This is a gift unsought and un-desired, and for these reasons I move to omit the proposal that Quarter Sessions-should exercise these powers.

I certainly could not advise hon. Members to accept this Amendment. The hon. and learned Member who has proposed it is certainly under one misapprehension. He thinks the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions do not want these powers. As a matter of fact the Association of Chairmen of Quarter Sessions met during this week and considered this very question and decided unanimously that they wanted the Bill to pass. So far as the point is concerned that there is no demand for the Bill from Quarter Sessions, the hon. and learned member is under a misapprehension. Let me deal shortly with two points which have been raised with regard to the powers of Quarter Sessions to inflict punishment.

It is idle to say that you are conferring any fresh powers, or any serious fresh powers of Quarter Sessions other than those which they now possess. At the present time Quarter Sessions have the power to inflict penal servitude up to the limit of life. In these circumstances it is rather odd to say that they shall not be entrusted with the power to give seven years penal servitude.

What I am referring to is not the general power but the specific and new power to give penal servitude in substitution for imprisonment.

Then I withdraw that point. It is idle to say that a Court which can exercise its discretion to the extent of giving penal servitude for life shall not be entrusted in special cases—all of which are within the ordinary jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions—to discriminate between the more serious cases and the less serious cases put before them. This Amendment would strike at the root of a great deal of the utility of this Bill, because a very large number of the cases to which the Bill will refer are cases which are ordinarily tried at Quarter Sessions and nowhere else. The whole tendency to-day is to send cases of fraud and so forth to Quarter Sessions rather than to Assizes, and it is in just that class of case that there is so much necessity—in cases of bad fraud—for giving something other than a sentence of two years hard labour, which is the limit in practice. Such power is very necessary for such cases. If the Amendment were accepted the result would be to destroy the value of the Bill in a great many of the cases, other than sexual cases, to which the Bill relates. I hope that the House will not accept the Amendment.

I wish to support the Amendment. Those who remember the Second Reading Debate will remember that the Home Secretary suggested a different treatment of questions coming before Quarter Sessions from that of questions coming before a judge. He suggested that there should be a lower limit placed on the aggregate term which the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions might be empowered to give, as distinct from that which the judges might give. He suggested five years for Quarter Sessions, and suggested that the Committee might possibly consider a still shorter period. I feel that it is too wide an additional power to be entrusted to Chairmen of Quarter Sessions, and I hope the House will carry the Amendment.

While I have no wish whatever to delay the passage of the Bill —on the contrary I wish to see it passed into law—yet I cannot help thinking that there is a great deal to be said from the point of view of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South-east Leeds (Sir H. Slesser). I have made my protest more than once, during the passage of this sort of Bill, against increased powers being given to Chairmen of Quarter Sessions so long as they are elected in the way in which they are elected. They are elected by their brother members, and that generally means that quite irrespective of what qualifications a gentleman may or may not have, he is often elected merely because he is the senior magistrate of the bench. I do not think that that is a proper qualification. We attempted to get put into an Act last year the qualification that the Cord Chancellor must approve of the election of any Chairman of Quarter Sessions, but unfortunately that proposal was resisted by the Government. It is quite true that Chairmen of Quarter Sessions can now inflict penal servitude, yet I agree with the statement that it is bad policy to extend the powers of Quarter Sessions so long as the present system exists.

I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just spoken. I doubt very much whether it is advisable to give further powers to the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions. My legal knowledge is very email, I am afraid, though I am a Member of the Quarter Sessions. From what I have seen of that body, I am by no means prepared to give them any further powers. They are not by any means as enlightened a body as we would wish to procure for this function. As to giving Chairmen of Quarter Sessions further powers, I am distinctly opposed to any such thing. The last speaker said that the position of Chairman of Quarter Sessions is often given to the gentleman with the longest qualifications on the bench. I am afraid that there is not always such a good reason to be found. The Chairman of Quarter Sessions is often the largest landowner in the country. The Chairman of the Quarter Sessions with which I am acquainted is a very great authority on horse racing and on fox hunting but his knowledge of the law is absolutely nil.

On the whole I am inclined to give some support to the Amendment. I think there is a great deal in what has been said in support of it. We know that the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions have certain powers, but when you lay it down definitely in the Bill that they can do certain things, we concentrate their minds on the subject, and they think that, as Parliament has passed the Bill, they ought to exercise the powers conferred on them. That is a point of view which has not been sufficiently discussed. It is not that I believe that Quarter Sessions would use the power wrongly, or anything of that kind, but I do think that when you put it down as clearly and definitely as you are doing in this Bill, there is a real danger that they might consider it to be their duty to exercise the power. I rather disagree with the statement of the Mover of the Amendment that Quarter Sessions would not necessarily be able to give the best opinion because they were not lawyers. I think that probably their judgment would be very much better, and, naturally, their discretion would be very much saner. But that is not my point. My point is that there is a very general opinion that, where very heavy sentences are given, there would be a feeling of greater safety if they were given only by the Judges whenever possible. The Judges are held in very high esteem by all sections of the community. I rather deprecate the effort which is being made in this Bill to make sentences heavier than hitherto.

I rise to clear up a misapprehension. I understood the hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) to indicate that the Home Secretary had spoken during the Second Reading Debate in favour of this Amendment.

No; what I said was that the Home Secretary had spoken in favour of a differentiation as between the Judges and the Quarter Sessions, in favour of allowing a shorter maximum for the Quarter Sessions.

Then I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman. It is quite true that the Home Secretary spoke on the Second Reading, and said that the Committee might consider five years penal servitude for offences tried at Quarter Sessions with a limit of ten years penal servitude. When this Bill went into Committee it will be recollected that an Amendment practically similar to this was moved. On that occasion the Home Secretary was present and he distinctly said he was not in favour of the Amendment and in fact he voted against it. I have the Division List in my hand. The Home Secretary cannot be accused of having changed his mind on this particular issue and he has definitely indicated that he does not approve of the Amendment now before the House. I understand there is no precedent whatever for conferring a lesser power of sentence on Quarter Sessions than on Assizes, for the same offences, and there is no valid reason why this Bill should discriminate between Quarter Sessions and Assizes.

It is not a question of discriminating in the matter of the sentences in this measure, but of giving certain powers to one body and not to another. I suggest that, for example, a Judge has a power to sentence a man to death and a Court of Quarter Sessions has not that power. It is not a question of discrimination inside the ambit of this Measure, but of differentiating between one power and another.

Surely it is discrimination if they are not allowed to try certain cases. I certainly would consider it discrimination if one were allowed to try certain cases which could not be tried by the other. I cannot speak from personal experience but I am informed that the Court of Quarter Sessions, as at present constituted, is a competent Court and one in which full confidence can properly be placed and I hope the House will resist the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 16, to leave out the word "seven," and to insert instead thereof the word "five."

It seems to me that the additional power which this Bill gives is very extensive and that the extension to five years is at least as much as should be given by this House. In the Second Reading Debate on this Bill the Home Secretary proposed that, so far as Quarter Sessions were concerned, five years should be the maximum term. The Under-Secretary for Home Affairs told us just now that the Home Secretary is now of opinion that there should be no differentiation between the powers of the Court and those of Quarter Sessions. If that be so, I suggest that the argument which in-

fluenced the right hon. Gentleman on the original occasion, in favour of five years for the Quarter Sessions, ought to apply both to Quarter Sessions and to the Court. The hon. and learned Member who is in charge of this Bill has told us that, in his view, the greater number of offences which are included would come before Quarter Sessions, and if we are to have one period for both kinds of Courts, I suggest that the shorter period should be that inserted in the Bill. It may be said that when it came to a vote on this question, the Home Secretary changed his mind, and in Committee voted against this Amendment, but I suggest that we should revert to the original view of the Home Secretary.

Question put, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 43; Noes, 74.

I would ask the House to consider what is the object of imprisonment. There are four objects for which imprisonment may be said to be given, and the first of these is the mere idea of punishment. I believe that that is rapidly disappearing from the minds of all people who really consider this question, and that to go back to the likelihood of increased sentences is a reactionary tendency away from the trend of thought of the times. The second reason for imprisonment is that it acts as a deterrent, and I would like hon. Members to realise exactly what this amounts to in this case. In order that the shorter period which I am proposing to substitute should come into effect at all, a man must have committed the offence at least twice. Now, is it seriously suggested that when a man has committed an offence twice already, he will be deterred from committing it a third time on the ground that he may get a sentence that may run for more than five years? The classic instance of a threat affecting the mind is the instance of our first forefather, who, at the suggestion of his wife, took a bite at the apple. Is it seriously suggested that if the punishment foreshadowed had been cumulative, and should not have been operative until he had taken three bites at the apple, he would have been deterred by the accumulation of the sentence when he had already yielded and taken two bites in advance? I do not think that anyone who seriously considers that illustration can imagine that the deterrent effect of this longer term can operate in this case.

Then we come to the reforming influence of prison. I am prepared to admit that under an entirely reformed system of detention it might be that a longer sentence might be more beneficial than it is at the present time, but I suggest that, in spite of the fact that prisons are very much better conducted than they were, we have still a very long way to travel before we can really claim that prisons are mainly a reforming influence. My own impression is that prisons in the main, so far from being a reforming influence, have the effect of making persons more likely to commit offences and go to prison. There is the prison mentality, which tends to produce in the mind of a prisoner a feeling that there is no real possibility of permanent life outside, and brings him back and back to prison, and we see that in the statistics of recidivism, with which we are familiar. Finally, in regard to the protection of society, the cases for which this Bill was originally proposed are in the main sexual cases. We have had reports made with regard to what should be done in these cases, and I feel that the whole method of dealing with them ought to be considered together, and that this is not the time, while public opinion and while the prisons are in a transition state from the old idea of punishment and vengeance to the new idea of detention in a different form, to increase by this large amount, up to seven years, the effective possibility of give imprisonment under the law. Therefore, I urge the Committee to reduce this long term of seven years to a maximum of five years.

I beg to second the Amendment.

It is extraordinary difficult I know to urge leniency in regard to cases such as are implied in this particular Bill, but, on the other hand, many of us feel that the mere effort to suppress such crime by inflicting heavy punishment is probably the worst of all ways in which to cure the evil. It does seem that there is a real case for complete examination as to what is to be done with such cases, which seem to be more pathological than criminal, and I, personally, think that the question of how this class of crime is to be dealt with and what should be done to the people who are guilty of it is one for proper scientific and careful consideration. What I am clear about in my own mind is that we ought to approach this matter on certain recognised principles, and not upon the old principle of merely adding punishment irrespective of whether it is going to cure the crime for which it is imposed. I suppose the whole trend of research in regard to modern criminology is that we ought to get away as far as we can from that old method of treating crime. We ought to aim at a reformatory treatment, rather than a mere blind punishment, because if you send a person to prison for seven years for a crime of this kind, it does not in the least follow that he will be a better citizen when he comes out. The whole tendency is that he will be a far worse citizen. There might be some case made, after proper inquiry, for the segregation of such people to prevent their having the opportunity of com- mitting that crime, but merely to thrust them into prison, and then, after a certain period, let them out again on to society, without reference to their particular mentality seems to me a blind and brutish way of dealing with this particular crime. Therefore, I think the Amendment ought to be accepted by the House.

12 N.

Having regard to the way in which the House dealt with the other Amendment, I think it would be rather idle to expect it to accept this. The hon. Members who moved and seconded this Amendment, seemed to speak as if this Bill were directed against one particular class of offence. There could be no greater misapprehension. This Bill is directed to remedying a defect in our present system, which, it is quite true, was made manifest in a case of a sexual character, but the effect applies equally in a number of other cases, and, in fact, with very much greater force. Hon. Members regard this as one of the arguments, apparently, in favour of their case. Let me give an illustration. At the present time, if a man be convicted on two charge of obtaining money by false pretences, he may be given 10 years' penal servitude, because he may have two sentences of five years' penal servitude which are consecutive. People talk about 10 years' penal servitude, but, of course, there are remissions, which, if a man behaved himself, would bring it probably, at the outside to 7 years. At the same time, the position today is that a man for two offences of obtaining money by false pretences can get, if the Court so choose, 10 years' penal servitude. As far as the right to give the maximum is concerned in this case, in a great many of the offences to which it applies the man would first have to be convicted of at least four distinct offences before he could get seven years' penal servitude under this Statute, and in some of the very worst cases with which this Bill will deal, the offence of obtaining money by fraud other than false pretences, or goods by fraud other than false pretences, a man would have to be convicted of no less than seven offences before the court could give him seven years' penal servitude. Is it not perfectly idle, when the Courts at present, for offences which very often are much less grave, can give 10 years, to say that the Court should not have the power, if it choose to exercise it, of giving seven years where there are seven distinct offences, indicating, of course, a real system of fraud, and one which ought not only to be punished severely, but from which society ought to be protected. Quite apart from that, hon. Members opposite suggest that by putting a maximum in the Act, you encourage the Court to give the maximum sentence under the Act. You do nothing of the kind, and those who talk about the trend of public opinion, talk as if that trend of public opinion were not influenced by sentences given to-day in the Court. Everybody knows that the whole trend of the courts to-day is to give as light sentences as are reasonable, having regard to public safety, and having regard to the administration of justice. The whole tendency is never to give a heavy sentence unless the circumstances are such that there is absolutely no other alternative. Quite apart from everything else, in order that the matter may be dealt with quite fully, and in order that there may be real effect given to the trend of public opinion, we have the Court of Criminal Appeal, which exercises a very careful supervision over sentences which are inflicted. But it is necessary that the Courts should have a reasonably wide discretion in the punishment which they can give. The very fact that they do not exercise their power to the maximum is very often a thing which adds to the deterrent effect, because it is known all the time that the maximum may be given. At the same time, as long as there are circumstances justifying the Court in taking another view, the Court will always exercise its discretion, and give a smaller sentence than the maximum.

In these circumstances, I venture to say these are not the days in which one should limit the discretion of those who have to deal with matters of this kind, but, giving them wide discretionary powers, subject, as they always are, to revision in the Court of Criminal Appeal, the House of Commons should leave it to the tribunal to carry out the system which they are carrying out at the present time, to try if possible to use their powers in the administration of justice for the reform of the criminal as well as the protection of society, but, using those powers in that way, to give them such a wide margin as will enable them to exercise their discretion.

It is usual before the House goes to a division on an Amendment, to be told from the Front Bench the opinion of the Home Secretary. On this occasion, however, I am able to give the House the opinion of the Home Secretary on the Second Reading, before the Front Bench intervenes at all. The hon. Gentleman opposite somewhat in geniously, I thought, talked about the views expressed by the party on this side. As a matter of fact on the last Amendment, we had the majority of speeches against my hon. and learned Friend coming from the other side, and I have often in my time heard observations from this side in favour of longer imprisonment and segregation of the unfit, and other things, which I think very objectionable. I cannot see this is in any sense a party question, but this Amendment has a very curious history. My hon. and learned Friend on the Second Reading of this measure put no limit at all on the amount of penal servitude which might be conferred on the prisoner; it simply depended on the number of offences in the aggregate for which the prisoner could be given imprisonment, add them together and the sum would give you the penal servitude limit. I pressed this point on Second Reading, and my hon. and learned Friend gave way. The Home Secretary at the time addressed the Committee, and what he said on this point was this—

Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me? His interpretation is not quite correct. I indicated in Committee, and—if I remember rightly—in my speech on the Second Reading of the Bill that I thought it advisable that there should be a limit in regard to cases tried at Assizes of, say, seven or ten years penal servitude, and in regard to cases tried at Quarter Sessions of five years penal servitude; but I thought it well to have a maximum of ten years.

I withdraw what I said. Now let me call attention to what the Home Secretary said on the Second Reading of the Bill:

It may perhaps be said by the supporters of the more severe view: "Oh, but what about Assizes?" I would submit, however, that the fact that there is a reduction here from the maximum of ten years to seven years at the Assizes is no reason for increasing what the Home Secretary thought was the proper amount of five years at Quarter Session to seven years! Surely in this matter we ought not to bargain these maxima one against the other? Surely if the Home Secretary's advisers on the Second Reading thought that five years was enough for that class of case, it ought not to be brought forward as a reason for increasing the sentences at Quarter Sessions. Whatever the Under-Secretary may say by way of reply, I would ask the House to remember what the Home Secretary himself said on the Second Reading, and to follow that view. The House will not, I hope, forget the very significant words of the Home Secretary on the Second Reading.

If this Amendment be carried, it will mean a five years' Maximum in all cases. The hon. and learned Gentleman for South-East Leeds (Sir H. Slesser) has pointed out what the Home Secretary said on the Second Reading of the Bill. He said that the Home Secretary indicated that there should be less than ten years as a maximum in all cases. That is perfectly true. But I will repeat what the Home Secretary said on the Second Reading:

"I think the proper course for me to take would be for me to say that I would use my influence with the Committee not to make the term higher than ten years with five years for offences tried at Quarter Sessions, but if the Committee desire to make it less than that I quite agree that the Committee should have that power."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1926; col. 2323, Vol. 191.]

But the Committee possess that power without the grant of the concession from my right hon. Friend. My hon. and learned Friend asked me as to what was the opinion of the Home Secretary. Well, he himself gave the Home Secretary's opinion, but I would again remind the House that the Home Secretary on the Second Reading of the Bill said that he would give the matter full consideration between the Second Reading and the Committee Stage. Since the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants to know what my right hon. Friend's feeling is I think I should say that he has clearly laid it down first that the limit should be seven years in all cases. The Committee accepted the Home Secretary's opinion. The result of the division on the point was that 17 votes were cast in favour of the seven years, and only seven votes were cast in favour of the five years. I would suggest that it would be inadvisable for the House to reverse, not only the decision of the Committee, but the opinion of the Home Secretary.

I rise to support the Amendment submitted by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leicester. I gather that there is an increasing doubt as to the value of long sentences. There is very great doubt as to whether they are punitive or reformative.

I do not know whether I have misunderstood my hon. Friend's speech, but I gather that he specially refrained from claiming for his Bill that it will in any way diminish the Volume of crime or have any reformatory effect. On the contrary, there is overwhelming experience that the more humanitarian we become in our views the more we tend to diminish crime and to make our punishments of a reformatory character. I agree that society has a right to take further steps to protect itself against people whose minds are so abnormal that they commit outrages upon young people, but that seems to be another question altogether, and a very difficult question. I understood the Home Secretary, in his speech on Second Reading, to plead for further time for the consideration of this question. Committees are sitting upon it, and I think we have a right to expect that before long the Government will come forward with some proposal. There are already too many people in prison merely for some mental defect, and I cannot see that we are going to solve this problem by merely passing a Bill which will only have the effect of keeping in prison people who really ought never to have been sent to prison.

Question put, "That the word 'seven' stand part of the Bill."

The House divided; Ayes, 94; Noes, 52.

I beg to move in page 2, line 3, at the end to insert

"(3) In the application of sub-section (1) of this section to Scotland the expression 'the Court' shall mean the High Court of Justiciary, and the power to award penal servitude conferred by that sub-section shall be exerciseable in the case of a person remitted to the said High Court for sentence under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Acts, 1887 and 1921, as well as in the case of a person convicted before the said High Court."

This new Sub-section is being moved in order to clear up a doubt which might arise in the application of this Bill to Scotland. At present the only persons in Scotland competent to pronounce a sentence of penal servitude are Judges of the High Court, and I am sure nobody intended that under this Bill we should extend that power in Scotland to a Sheriff or one of the lower Judges. It is conceivable that the Clause might be construed as conferring those extended powers on a Sheriff in Scotland; and it is to make it quite clear that it is not intended by this Bill to confer any new powers, but only to give the powers given by this Bill to those Judges in Scotland who at the present time are competent to pronounce a sentence of penal servitude that this Amendment is put forward.

I am very glad now that for the first time Scotland has had some indication of the effects of the application of this Bill. It will be within your recollection, Mr. Speaker, that two or three months ago I felt it my duty to call attention to the procedure which had been adopted with regard to this Bill, and although I believe that what was done was technically within the rules of this House, the course adopted made it very difficult for Scottish Members to express their opinions with regard to the merits of this Bill. When this Bill was first introduced it was not to apply to Scotland. It was sent up to Standing Committee A and at the first meeting of that Committee we received notice of an Amendment applying the Bill to Scotland. We had no explanation whatever in the Committee of the effects this Bill would have in Scotland, and now, for the first time, the Lord Advocate has moved an Amendment showing that the power to impose this increased penalty will be restricted to the highest Court of the land. In so far as that Amendment goes it is an improvement because it is obviously very undesirable that an increased power of this sort should be exercised by any except the highest courts of the land. Personally, I am entirely opposed to this Bill. To my mind this Bill is an ad hoc Measure, and it is vindictive legislation. I regret very much that this House should be passing a Bill of this kind, but I will not say anything further on that point now. I have voted against the Bill at every stage and I intend to do so to the end.

I should also like to refer to the point which has been raised by the last speaker with reference to the procedure adopted in regard to this Bill in relation to its application to Scotland. Let me point out what a difficult position Scottish Members are put into if this procedure is to be pursued. A bill is brought to the Second Reading, and it clearly states that it shall not apply to Scotland. Consequently hon. Members representing Scottish constituencies vote under the impression that it does not affect Scotland. The Bill is then sent to a mixed Committee in which English Members predominate, and here an Amendment is moved that the Measure shall apply to Scotland. It is perfectly true that on Report it is open to us to move that a Bill shall not apply to Scotland and that we may vote against the Third Reading, but as Scottish Members, by the course adopted, we have been effectively deprived of two stages of this measure in which to express the Scottish point of view. Supposing a Bill was brought in applying to Scotland, the English Members naturally would say "We are not going down to the House because it is a Scottish day." Supposing when the Bill, having received a Second Reading as a Bill applying only to Scotland, was sent to the Scottish Grand Committee, where an Amendment was adopted applying the measure to England. I wonder what English Members would have said under those circumstances? I am sure they would say that they had been deprived of a proper opportunity of discussing the Bill because it was stated, in the first instance, that it would not apply to England at all. Because this Bill inflicts a serious handicap on Scottish Members I join with my hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland in protesting against it. I think Bills of this kind introduced under the pressure of a passing public opinion are unwise, and these changes should only be made after due consideration, and not in response to public feeling on a particular case which is not a sure guide in framing the legal code of this country.

Amendment agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That the Bill be now read the Third time."

I am sure hon. Members will not be deceived by the objects of this Measure. When the Bill was brought before the House hon. Members had a particular case in mind which occurred in the South of England, and upon which the Judge made very strong comments. As a matter of fact the Bill was introduced primarily because of that case. Now when we come to the Third Reading, and when the Bill has been through Committee, we find that this Measure deals with all manner of offences, with a few exceptions which are mentioned therein. In fact, the provisions of this Measure are very much wider than the Mover of this Bill and his supporters explained when the House gave it a Second Reading. Let me remind the hon. and gallant Gentleman once again that I feel sure that most Members of the House of Commons were of the opinion that this Measure was intended to deal with the Hayley Morriss type of case. We find now, however, its advocates riding off that case as it were, and dealing in this Bill with a very large number of other cases totally unconnected. The result will be, that instead of this Bill aiming definitely at dealing with men of the type I have referred to, of offenders against the person, we shall have Judges taking advantage of the first Clause of this Measure, and giving decisions far more severely than at the present time with offences against property.

It may be, therefore, that offences against property will come up for treatment under this measure even more than offences against the person; but my objection is even more than that. Whenever the. House of Commons is in doubt, or whenever the Government is in doubt as to punishment for offences either against persons or property, they generally appoint Committees to inquire into the question, because the subject is a very delicate one indeed when you are trying to impose new or fresh penalties or varying old penalties upon persons convicted of offences. For the last eighteen months I have been sitting on a Departmental Committee inquiring into the proper treatment of juvenile delinquents. So far as I know they will not be dealt with under this Bill. If it is thought proper that eighteen months and probably two years, ought to be taken up inquiring into the treatment of juvenile delinquents, then it cannot be right that a Bill of this magnitude should be sprung upon the House of Commons without any inquiry at all as to the consequences that may ensue. I think that consideration ought to weigh with members of this House.

Now I come to another point of objection which I want to make. This Bill I regard as a measure based upon the lust for vengeance, and I will endeavour to show why I think so. We never heard of this measure until the case occurred to which I have already referred. That man is not at all typical of our own people, because he lived, so I understand, most of his time in foreign lands. Surely a single case of that kind ought not to be sufficient to justify the introduction of a measure of this magnitude coming before the House of Commons. If passed it will give encouragement to some Judges who are always on the side of increased penalties; and they at any rate will be very delighted to satisfy this lust for vengeance. I want to make another point, which is more important than any I have yet made.

On a point of Order. Is it in order for an hon. Member to accuse officers of the Crown, namely, Judges and His Majesty's representatives, of being actuated by lust for vengeance and of gratifying it at their pleasure?

The observation was a very general one. Had it been directed to a particular Judge, I should have had to take notice of it, but I would point out that we are now on a Bill dealing with the administration of justice.

Might I point out to the hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir C. Oman) that I have yet to learn that Chairmen of Quarter Sessions are officers of the Crown.

The hon. Gentleman did not say "Chairmen of Quarter Sessions"; he said "Judges."

Well, they are in these cases Judges. I am not, of course, conversant with law, and I have not attempted to deal with any legal arguments in connection with the Bill. The chief objection, however, I have to the Bill is this. The criminal statistics of this and of all countries with which I have tried to make myself familiar prove conclusively that to increase the penalty upon the offender does not deter other people from committing similar offences. In fact, just as you decrease the severity of the penalty, so does crime decrease; and, if that holds good, as I think it does, not only in this country but in all the countries of the world, then, if Judges are going to use the provisions of this Act, we may see an increase of crime instead of what the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Norwood (Mr. Greaves-Lord) hopes to secure by the passing of this measure. I know that Judges, Chairmen of Quarter Sessions, and Recorders of Cities have their own point of view. Some of them have administered the law in a very merciful way, but others have not, and I wish that some of these gentlemen who administer the law were compelled to visit the places to which they send convicted persons. I would almost make it a rule that every Justice of the Peace should follow the boy whom he sends to a Borstal institution or to a Reformatory School. I wish all those who administer the law would see for themselves what is transpiring for illustration at Parkhurst, and in the Detention Camp close by. The men who actually deal with convicted persons in prisons are not of the same opinion as the hon. and learned Gentleman, and, if he himself were transferred to dealing with these men who are convicted, I would not be surprised if he changed his opinion as to the right method of dealing with prisoners.

This is a retrograde step; it is against public policy. In fact, it has been proved over and over again as I have pointed out that you do not decrease crime by increasing the severity of the sentences. I am pleased to say that, so far as my limited knowledge goes, this country stands out almost supreme throughout the world for its humanitarian treatment of prisoners, apart of course from the question of capital punishment, and, because of the good name that we have gained in this matter, I regard this step that may be taken to-day as a very serious step indeed, and I trust therefore that the House will not give this Bill a Third Beading.

I would like to ask the Under-Secretary if he would give consideration between now and the Bill going to another place to one particular point. This Bill has been introduced partly to deal with sexual offences. A Committee has been sitting for some time with regard to such offences, and one of the recommendations of that Committee is that after conviction, but before sentence, the person accused should be remanded for medical examination. I wonder if in another place it would be possible to introduce an Amendment that all persons convicted of sexual offences should, after conviction, but before sentence, have a medical examination.

I suppose I cannot complain that the hon Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) who has opposed the Third Reading of this Bill, should have made certain suggestions with regard to the way in which it was introduced, beyond this that, having been present during the Debate on the Second Reading, and having also had the opportunity of re-reading the Report if he had chosen to do so, he should now make a statement which is entirely opposed to what took place on Second Reading. The hon. Gentleman said that this Bill was introduced to deal with one particular class of case.

No, what I did try to convey was that I felt sure that most Members of the House of Commons were under the impression that this Bill was intended to deal with that type of case.

The hon. gentleman went on to suggest that there was nothing in anything that I said that indicated anything else, but that when it came to the Third Reading we found that the Bill applied to a number of other cases. I have here the Report of what I said on Second Reading, and at the outset I said: sentences inflicted. I remember that on Second Reading I said that

If you are dealing with an offender who has not been before a court before, or with an offender as to whose crime there are circumstances which lead you to believe that it is not a determined attempt, or a determination to carry on a dishonest life, everyone who is administering justice in this country is extremely anxious to give that person every chance that can possibly be given him. I know of one case, of a man 65 years of age who had spent something like 40 years of his life in prison, and who, on the last occasion when he came before a Court of Justice, was bound over, although he was charged with several rather bad offences of house-breaking, to come up for judgment if called upon. That was over 12 months ago, and he is still in honest employment, and has been in honest employment ever since he was so bound over. That is a state of affairs which would have been almost impossible in this country 10 years ago, and yet that is the trend.

On the other hand, there is one type of punishment which undoubtedly has been discovered not to be of very much account, and that is the small sentence, sometimes for bad offences—the sort of idea that, when you get a confirmed criminal before you, you can give him a small sentence and by so doing encourage him to come out and lead an honest life. A small sentence upon a person who is not determined to be dishonest will lead that person into touch with prison life, will probably lead him astray, and will probably do a great deal of harm. In regard to that class of case I think a great many people to-day are of opinion that there should be no sentence at all if it can possibly be avoided, but that every chance should be given to put the man on his trust and lead him to come round to a proper and honest way of living. On the other hand, a small sentence is of no use in the case of the determined criminal, and in the case of the determined criminal there comes a time when society must vindicate its position, not merely by convicting, but also by showing that those who are determined to prey upon society shall at any rate be put in such a place that society is protected from them. I think that that is at any rate a general view with regard to these matters, but it is only in very few cases that one has to do that, and then one regrets it profoundly.

I am afraid that I have gone rather away from the general purpose of this Bill, because the general purpose of this Bill is not aimed at any particular offence. It is aimed, as I said a few moments back, at one defect in our system, which all those who have to administer the criminal law are aware of and desire should be remedied. It is true that what gave it its prominence was one particular case, which got into the public eye and evoked very strong expressions of public opinion, but that case, serious though it is, is a minor case in one sense as compared with many that have to be dealt with. Certainly, oases of fraud are far more important, and it is in cases of fraud that these powers are needed more than in any other class of case, because it is not a sudden temptation coming to a man which leads him fraudulently to take credit or something of that kind. The cases where this Bill would come into operation in connection with fraud are cases in which there are a large number of offences of a fraudulent character, which show ingenuity, which show deliberation, and which show determination to defraud the rest of the community on the slightest opportunity.

These are the strongest cases in connection with which this Bill will operate, and I venture to think they are cases in which, above everything else, the deterrent of punishment is most important. Anyone who has had anything to do with the administration of criminal law will know that the ingenious, deliberate, and heartless swindler is the person who grovels most when it comes to suffering punishment for the act he has committed. The more cold-blooded the fraud, the more cringing is the man who has to undergo punishment for it. There is very little manliness about those who commit fraud, but there is a very great deal of fear, and the power to deal with that type of offender will do more to deter people from committing that kind of offence than anything else, although it may not be necessary, and I hope it never will be necessary in this country, always to use that power to the utmost. I hope the House will give this Bill a Third Reading, and make available to those who have to administer justice a fitting alternative of which at present they are deprived.

I do not think it would be right to allow the questions raised on Report by two Scottish Members to go unanswered. I should have thought it was obvious to everyone that it is important to assimilate as far as possible the range of sentences under the criminal law in Scotland and in England, and that one way in which that can be done is by seeing that, at any rate in the first instance, the limits and powers that are conferred on the criminal judges in both countries should be the same. I think, therefore, that no excuse whatever is needed for maintaining that it is right that Scotland should come into this Bill as well. Equally, I cannot assent to the grounds which were suggested for protest against Scotland having been included in this Bill by reason of an Amendment in Committee. There are many precedents for that. It has been frequently done, not only by Amendments at the instigation of the Government on private Members' Bills, but by private Members as well.

The hon. Members to whom I have referred, or at any rate the hon. and gallant Member for Leith (Captain Benn), whom I do not see in his place at the moment, made a suggestion in support of the allegation that, if it were suggested in the Scottish Grand Committee to extend a Scottish Bill as it stood at that time to England, that would be a hardship on English Members. Subject to correction by you, Sir, I should have thought that the answer to that was very obvious— namely, that the Scottish Grand Committee is unique in our Parliamentary procedure, in that it deals solely with what is exclusively Scottish business; and I should doubt very much whether it would be competent or in order to propose an Amendment in the Scottish Grand Committee to extend to England a Bill committed to that Committee, because, if I remember aright, the reason for the allocation of a Bill to the Scottish Grand Committee is that the Bill exclusively relates to Scotland. That brings out the contrast between that Committee and the other Standing Committees. The other Standing Committees are representative of the whole of the Members in the House—not of English Members only, but Scottish Members as well; and this Bill would have gone to the same Committee whether on Second Reading it had been suggested that it should be extended to Scotland or not, or whether in fact it covered Scotland or not. It would have gone in the ordinary way to a Standing Committee representative, not merely of English Members, but of the whole of the Members of the House. Indeed, I may remind the House that, on occasion, Bills have been extended to Scotland after they had gone to the other House, and the only opportunity then to object has been when the Bill came back with the Lords Amendments to it.

I hope the Lord Advocate will forgive me for interrupting him, but does he approve of that procedure? I was not saying that the procedure was not in accordance with the Rules of the House, but that it was an undesirable procedure to follow.

Of course I agree with the hon. Member that it is advantageous to give notice as early as possible, and that is what was done here. You cannot, however, particularly in the case of a private Member's Bill, make up your mind very early whether it is going to be an advantage to extend the Bill to another country or not. I am sure I am within the knowledge of every Member in the House in saying that, after Second Reading, in the case of private Members' Bills, representations may be received from people in other parts of the country suggesting that the Bill should be extended to Scotland, or vice versa, and it is then, still in time for what is the first technical stage of the Bill, namely, the Committee stage, that the proposal is made. But I take no blame on myself whatever, or my Department, for not having been able to make up its mind on this not unimportant matter earlier. At the same time I agree at once, and I shall always hold that if one was able to form a definite opinion one should do it at the earliest stage. I have no objection to that whatever, but the protest in its terms has suggested something very much stronger than that, and it is only right that I should remind the House what the position is in the matter.

I am indeed sorry that the Government, to all intents and purposes have adopted this Bill and intend to see it passed into law. I am certain the Home Office itself would never have drafted it or put it before Parliament. The accident of securing a Second Reading on a Friday afternoon has put it into the hands of a small group of people with considerable energy and activity behind them to materially alter the law of England and to enable Judges to impose much heavier sentences in certain classes of cases. The hon. Member who is responsible for it is himself a member of the legal profession, and he must realise that Judges are, after all, merely human beings very like ourselves. They are not all of one mind nor do they see different classes of offences with a unanimous vision. Some have particular objection to certain classes of offences. Others have not those objections. If the hon. Member who is responsible for the Bill was himself to be the Judge in every case that came before the Courts where the sentences to be imposed are varied by the Bill, I am certain he would in every one of those cases do what he thought was right in the public interest, but if that Judge was myself or some of his colleagues who have particular objections, it may be to sexual offences, it may be to fraud, is it right that we should put this power of giving a very heavy sentence in the hands of every Judge? Is it not better rather to adopt the conservative course of trusting rather in the wisdom of our ancestors?

The Court of Criminal Appeal exists for the purpose of remedying inequalities which may arise sometimes from individual peculiarities.

How often can people, particularly poor people, appeal successfully?

Nearly every case that comes before the Court of Criminal Appeal is a poor person with unpaid assistance of counsel.

1.0 P.M.

It seems to me, in reading the papers, I have seen over and over again cases in which certain special Judges deal with certain special cases, and all the safeguards of the Court of Criminal Appeal do not seem to produce uniformity in the action of the Judges in all those cases. Moreover, I think the House should look at this sort of legislation in a more general spirit. The whole trend of the 19th century, and indeed of this century as well, has been towards mitigating sentences and curing offences by a more humane treatment, not merely in the prisons, but in the sentences inflicted. It has been the mark of criminal reform for the lats 150 years, and undoubtedly it has succeeded, for in spite of the offences referred to by the hon. Member the amount of crime in this country to-day is infinitesimal compared with what it was when the criminal code was indeed draconic in its severity. Over and over again, well-meaning people of the Friday-afternoon type have seized upon some particular offence which staggers their imagination and judgment and have brought forward some such scheme as this for specially penalising that offence, in order to save society. The result has never been successful. They meant well, but human nature worked out in different directions. I notice in the paper this morning that the Colonial Secretary, going one better than the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Norwood (Mr. Greaves-Lord), has authorised the death penalty for natives of Kenya for offences against white women, doing it with the best intentions of stamping out a particularly vile form of crime. Unfortunately, that sort of treatment of offences does not stamp it out. It advertises it instead of stamping it out, and I should have said the whole of our experience of the last century had shown that that was not the way to put an end to crime, and that more civilised treatment always has successful results where the savage treatment fails.

In the old days, we used to burn them at the stake or press them to death. In the old days we disembowelled people alive and quartered them. They even boiled coiners in the time of Henry VIII., and in every case the people who introduced that legislation were inspired by exactly the same noble motives as the hon. Member for Norwood. "Let us make the punishment so horrible that no one will dare to do it"—all in the interests of society and better education, better intelligence and perhaps even better feeling. Later generations have seen the futility of that sort of action and have done what all that sort of legislation failed to do. It is true they have not created uniformity of opinion. They have allowed us freedom of conscience, and in that way you have now not merely the legal attitude of mind of the hon. Member for Norwood, who sees through his legal spectacles, with a desire for controlling people according to law, but you have instead an enormous number of people criticising that point of view. This Third Reading will be carried, I suppose, with Government assistance by a considerable majority, but let them look at the press to-day and to-morrow and they will see that the public is far more critical than this House of this sort of legislation.

I do not suppose that this law, when it is passed, will make much difference. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Is it any reason for passing legislation, that it will not make much difference? It has this result, that the people who pass these laws are changing the trend of legislation and the development of civilisation. The sentences may not be very different, but all over the world people will look at what the English punishment for certain offences can be, and the English model will spread, and instead of our penal reform continuing upon the lines which have inspired it for the last hundred years, we shall see this one small turning point in the wrong direction, which we owe to half-a-dozen Conservative Members of Parliament who want to be able to say that they have put an Act upon the Statute Book.

In reply to the hon. Member for Royton (Dr. V. Davis), I will consider the suggestion which he put forward. He cannot expect anything more than that assurance at this stage. I appeal to the House to proceed now to the Third Reading of the Bill in order that we may get on with the next Bill—The Adoption of Children Bill—in which I believe the whole House is in general agreement.

Question put, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

The House divided: Ayes, 88; Noes, 54.

Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

I beg to move "That the Clause be read a Second time."

My hon. friend the member for the Kirk dale Division of Liverpool (Sir J. Pennefather), who was to have moved this New Clause, is not able to be in the House this morning, and has asked me to take his place. The Amendment will not take long to dispose of, and I hope those in charge of the Bill will accept it. In the majority of cases, adopting parents will discharge the duties which the State places in their hands so far as the care of the adopted child is concerned, but occasionally the adopter may get into some dreadful criminal mess in middle age or perhaps take to strange and eccentric ways which may be hurtful to the child in his charge. May I give a grotesque instance of this. I know a person who served the Crown for many years with great credit, but in middle age he became, not only a vegetarian but an itinerant secularist lecturer. He was in charge of three boys aged 10 years, 12 years and 14 years, and he was bringing them up on grape nuts and without the Bible. It is obvious, in a case of that kind, that the unfortunate child, whose adopting parents take to strange courses, should be able to apply to the courts when they come of age and be able to cut themselves free from a bond which the State has forced upon them. They may be in the charge of freaks, and they should be able, when they are of a certain age, if they so desire, to be able to free themselves from a bond which has been forced upon them through no wish of their own. Any proper and conscientious adopter will never come under the operation of this new Clause, and I trust those in charge of the Bill will accept it.

I beg to second the Motion.

I think there is a great deal to be said for this proposal, but the hon. Member who moved it has left out one argument. As the Bill stands, there is no power to enable an adoption society, when it is found that a mistake has been made or that unexpected developments have arisen, to apply for a revocation of the order. I know the argument is that you must have stability, and that will be the case in 999 instances out of 1,000, but in the thousandth case some curious characteristics may develop and it is desirable that there should be some means of cancelling the adoption. In actual practice, the infant sues at the courts, I believe, in his own name, although actually a friend sues for him, but I think an adoption society, who I hope will continue to watch over the welfare of these children, should have the right to apply to the courts for a cancellation of the order where they think it is necessary. It is a safeguard which I think is required.

I must ask the House not to accept this Amendment. If I do not bring to the consideration of this matter the wealth of illustration which the hon. Member who moved it displayed, it is because the time at our disposal is so short. I hope we shall all keep our speeches as short as possible in order that this Measure, which to a great extent is agreed upon by all parties, shall be dealt with as quickly as possible. With all respect to the weighty observations which have fallen from the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy). I suggest that there is ample provision in the Bill for ensuring that the welfare of the infant is in every way safeguarded. Under Clause 6 the Court has power to make an interim order or not more than two years, so that the court will be able to see whether the adoption is likely to be successful or not.

You should protect a child for more than two years. People get queer long after two years.

Two years was considered a suitable period; and I think it is. If the Court cannot tell after two years whether adoption is likely to be successful I do not think any extended period would serve any useful purpose. This matter was considered by the Tomlin Committee, on whose Report the Bill is based, and they definitely reported against it. They said:

"Another matter of importance is the question whether adoption once sanctioned is to be capable of revocation. In our opinion revocation is inconsistent with adoption."

I recommend that view to the acceptance of the House.

I want to join with the hon. Member who has just spoken in asking the House to reject this new Clause. I will give one or two reasons why. There is something inconsistent with the provisions of the Bill and this Amendment, they would cancel each other. A case which has been brought to my notice leads me to the view that we should make a fundamental mistake if we accepted the Amendment. I will give the case. A man and his wife adopted a boy, and the boy is doing much better than he would have done with his natural parents. He is quite satisfied. He has just reached the age of 14 years and his natural father is anxious to get him back home in order that he might earn something for the family. Surely it is grossly unfair to the man and his wife, who adopted him when he was 18 months old, that he should be cut adrift from them simply because he is now of an earning capacity. If he remains in his present home he will receive a first-class education. That is the only case that has been brought to my notice, but I feel sure it can be multiplied over and over again.

The hon. Member will see that that is not a case which will come under the provisions of the new Clause at all, as the courts have to decide whether it is in the infant's interests or not.

The wording of the Amendment is:

"An adopted infant of the age of fourteen years or over shall have the right to apply to the court for a cancellation or variation of the adoption order."

Surely a boy of 14 would not dream of going to the Court unless instigated by his natural parents. I think the case is overwhelming.

The Court will take that into consideration, and will naturally decide against it.

The point is that the boy has been made dissatisfied by the instigation of his natural parents, who have not looked after him for 10 years. I was rather inclined to agree with the view of the hon. Member on this Amendment until he spoke, and then his speech turned me completely against the proposal.

Question, "That the Clause be read a Second time," put, and negatived.

CLAUSE 2.—(Restrictions on making adoption orders.)

I beg to move, in page 1, line 27, at the end, to insert:

"(c) Where the applicant is related to such infant by blood within the prohibited degrees of marriage, the provisions of Sub- section (1) (b) shall not apply, and an adoption order may be made subject to the discretion of the Court."

Sub-section (1, b ) says that an adoption Order shall not be made in any case where the applicant is less than 21 years older than the infant in respect of whom the application is made. Therefore, you cannot obtain an adoption order, except where the adopter is 21 years older than the infant. I want to insert in the Clause an exception, so as to allow an adoption order to be made where the applicant is related to such infant by blood within the prohibited degrees. The reason for the original restriction of adoption to a difference of 21 years is very well known. It is very well stated in the Report of the Committee presided over by my hon. friend the Member for the Combined Universities (Sir A. Hopkinson). The reason is that there should be a sort of parental relationship between the adopter and the infant, and you do not get that relationship unless you have a certain difference in age. The Report of my hon. friend's Committee puts that difference at 20 years, and the Bill at 21 years, but I submit that there is a class of exceptions to that sound rule, and that the exceptions ought to be provided for. The Bill is mandatory, and so no order can now be made in any case unless the adopter is 21 years older than the infant. No discretion whatever is given to the Court. Take the case of two brothers. Suppose that one dies and leaves a child of six years of age. Suppose there is a younger brother 25 years of age. No power can allow that brother to adopt his own nephew. That is a case that may occur, and certainly it ought to be provided for. In that opinion I am strengthened by the Report of my hon. Friend the Member for the Combined Universities. The Report states, in paragraph 37, that there may be rare cases in which the rigid application of the rule ought not to apply, and it proceeds:

"We would recommend, therefore, that the judge be given discretion to waive these requirements."

By my Amendment the order can only be made subject to the discretion of the Court. I cannot see that the Amendment will do any harm. It will certainly meet a case of omission from the Bill.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I will give an additional case which might arise. It is the case of the young aunt, the sister of the mother who has died and left an infant child. It is most natural for the aunt to bring up her nephew or niece. In many cases the aunt is a young woman who is not married. It would be rather hard to prevent an adoption in such a case because there is not a greater difference than 21 years between the aunt and the infant. The adoption cases where there is blood relationships are the very ones for which we should legislate most, and I would not like to see any artificial restriction put upon them. I am not so strongly in favour of non-related adopters. I am a little suspicious of making adoption too easy, for reasons which I have given previously, but in the case of blood relations I am strongly in favour of it.

The Mover of the Amendment put his case with great clarity, and I agree entirely with his point of view. If an adoption order were made in such a case as he has cited, and the brother were very young, there is still the safeguard that the discretion of the Court would operate.

I have an open mind about this Amendment. It is quite true that both Committees reported in favour of a difference of at least 20 years between the age of the adopter and that of the child, but a case has been made out for this special exception, which is safeguarded by the fact that the Court has discretion, and unless strong objection is raised on behalf of the Government I shall be prepared to accept the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 1, to leave out Sub-section (2).

This Sub-section is quite unnecessary. After all is said and done, members of the male sex may not be as good as they might be, but to assume in a Bill that the ordinary man who wants to adopt a child must necessarily do so for improper reasons, seems to me quite outrageous. The tendency at the present time, I am afraid is to legislate, not for the majority who are respectable, but for the minority who are not. It is quite proper that the Court should have the responsibility of considering each case on its merits. Why a man, because he happens to be a bachelor or widower, should be assumed to be an unfit person or not to have a proper reason for wishing to adopt a female child, I cannot understand. As the Bill stands, it creates rather an absurd position. A married couple may adopt a child and, perhaps, some years later the wife may die but the adopted child will remain in the custody of the widower. I am not supposing an unlikely or impossible thing and I suggest it indicates a ridiculous state of affairs. I ask that this reflection on the male sex should be removed and that we should not assume that because a widower or an unmarried man wishes to adopt a child it must be for some improper or undesirable reason.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I ask the House not to accept the Amendment. I think both the Committees which reported on this question came to the definite conclusion, after carefully considering the matter, that except in special circumstances female children ought not to be adopted by persons of the male sex. There are obvious reasons for that, but the Clause as it stands specially provides that the Court may, in its discretion, as an exceptional measure, make an adoption order in such a case.

I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: In page 2, line 10, after the first word "or," to insert the word "who."—[ The Solicitor-General. ]

I beg to move, in page 2, line 11, at the end, to insert the words who support the Bill, but after their reception of the first Amendment, I am not so hopeful. This Amendment is designed to defend the rights of the family against flighty parents. It provides that a parent shall not be able to alienate a child, that is, to send a child away so that it will be lost to the sight of the rest of the family. The Amendment aims at preventing such a parent from arranging an adoption which will cut off all communication between the child and the rest of the family, unless it is the case that the proper and suitable near relatives have refused to take charge of the child. That the relatives must be persons of weight and respectability is secured by the provision which I make in the Amendment that they shall be, in the opinion of the Court, fit and proper persons to assume responsibility for the child. I have in mind instances which have come to my own notice of flighty young widows or widowers, as the ease may be, who are left with children. They may have quarrelled with the grandparents of the child, probably on account of the unwisdom of the marriage. The widow or widower proposes to make a new start in life and to marry again, and meanwhile, in order to prevent friction, he or she is desirous of getting rid of the child of the first marriage.

I have known a case where a flighty young war widow got rid, by adoption, of the child of her first marriage, to the intense grief of the child's grandparents. The same thing may happen in the case of a young man who is left a widower with a child, who wishes to make a new match, and, perhaps, to go out to Australia or Canada and who wishes to get rid, at all costs, of the child of his first marriage when he has a second wife in contemplation. That such people should be able to go to an adoption society and rid themselves of the responsibility for the child left from the first marriage, without any previous attempt to place that child in the family, seems to be very wrong. I have provided that, in any case, if the grandparents, uncles or aunts of the child made application to the Court, at the time when the parent is proposing to alienate the child, the Court shall not permit the child to be transferred by-adoption unless it is held that the near relatives are wholly unsuitable to take charge of the child. It may be said that grandparents are taken out of the category of my Amendment by the provision in the Bill that the persons ultimately responsible for the children will have to be consulted. That does not, however, cover two cases which I have in mind. The first is where the uncles and aunts have not been consulted, and the second is the painful case which sometimes occurs, of tire grandparents of an illegitimate child who are quite ready to take charge of the child, though the father or mother wants to get rid of the child. I appeal for this Amendment on behalf of those relatives who have feelings in this matter, and who do not wish to see the children of their family alienated and put out of sight, perhaps never to be heard of again.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This Bill introduces a brand-new principle into the law of the country. I think, on the whole, it is a good principle but I would appeal to the promotors of the Bill to be very careful not to go beyond the accepted traditions of this country and to move very slowly. I ask them to remember that "blood is thicker than water" and that the general responsibility of members of a family for the other members of the family, is a very fine trait of the people of this country. If the hon. and learned Member in charge of the Bill respects that sentiment he will find that his Bill will meet with more general acceptance.

I ask the House not to accept the Amendment, which I think is unnecessary. The question which the court has to consider under the terms of the Bill, is the paramount interest of the infant and any court considering that question would always pay regard and due respect to the views of any of the relatives mentioned in this Amendment. If the Amendment were carried in its present form, it would add considerably to the expense of these applications and would probably cause a great deal of delay.

I think there is one obvious reason against the Amendment. If there were relatives willing to take over the care of the child in such cases, presumably they would arrange the matter with the parent or parents.

There are cases of quarrels between young and unwisely married people and their parents-in-law.

I cannot accept the view that necessarily the parents are always in the wrong, and the wise grandparents or uncles or aunts always in the right. By this Amendment you would be allowing a special claim on the children to the very people whom the parents do not want to have the children.

I support the Amendment and I think it is worth dividing upon it. The question of expense has been mentioned, but if the hon. and learned Member in charge of the Bill will accept an Amendment which will be found on the Paper later on in the name of the hon. and gallant Member, for Ripon (Major Hills) and myself, to allow the County Courts to deal with these cases, I think that objection would be removed.

That would dispose of the question of expense. I agree, for once in a way, with every word that has fallen from the hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir. C. Oman). One of the things that is being undermined, I think, to the detriment of the whole country at the present time is family life, the unity of the family, on the one hand by poverty and bad housing and on the other by the modern, mad desire for pleasure and luxury at all costs. Here we have a safeguard against this sort of thing. You may have the more serious, elder members of a family, taking the family in the larger sense of the clan, who do not want to see the children alienated, and unless these words are inserted they will be powerless in the matter. This is where I am meeting the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman who introduced the Bill, who said that this is left to the discretion of the Court and that if the grandparent or uncle objected, no doubt the Court would pay attention to it, but will the Court do that unless these words are inserted?

I am thinking of the case of a poor family who have the temptation, with a large number of children, to alienate certain of them to selfish but wealthy people. There is a sort of mistaken idea, which, to my amazement, was voiced by the late Under-Secretary for the Home Department, that because a child is getting a more expensive education than he would from his natural parents, that is a very good reason why these parents should not have any claim upon him. It is absolutely a wrong principle that because more money can be spent on the education of a child and it can be brought up in more luxury, it will be a more useful citizen than if it were brought up in straitened circumstances. I have the case in mind of a would-be wealthy adopter and of a poor family with a large number, of children, and I say that if, in the interests of the unity or, I will say, of the sanctity of family life, the grandparents object to the adoption of the child outside of the family, that objection should be upheld.

I hope the House will see that this Amendment cannot be accepted, for this very good reason. I think the hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir C. Oman) has perhaps not been able to read the Bill so carefully as he would have desired, because Clause 1 provides that an adoption order can only be made on the application of the person who proposes to adopt the child. Therefore the case he supposes, of a parent of a child wanting to get rid of it and making an application, can never arise.

Nobody can apply without having the adopter ready. The parent, in the case I have argued, has the adopter in hand, and, therefore, the objection of the Solicitor-General seems to me to be purely formal and trivial.

The objection is not trivial. I am trying to suppose a case where he wants to prevent a parent of a child making an application that it shall be adopted by a third person.

That is impossible legally. I am quite aware of that.

But that is the case that the hon. Member is supposing in his Amendment.

No.

If the hon. Member will follow his own Amendment, he will see that it provides that an adoption order shall not be made "on the application of the parent.' Does the hon. Member follow me? He assumes a case where a flighty parent makes an application—

The hon. and learned Gentleman has discovered me in a verbal error.

It is a great deal more than a verbal error, and my hon. Friend is too impetuous. He is supposing the case of the application of a flighty parent, who wants to get rid of a child. He then wants to provide that the Court shall not make an order on the application of the flighty parent where a grandparent or an uncle or aunt is prepared to take charge of the child. But the thing does not work like that. What my hon. Friend means, doubtless, is that a would-be adopting parent makes an application for an order that he may become the adopting parent. That order cannot be made without the consent of the parent of the child, that is to say, the flighty parent. Now let us suppose that an application to adopt the child has been made by a third person, with the consent of the flighty parent, and the grandparent, who wants to take charge of the child, comes forward and says: "No; I am the right person to take charge of this child." It is for the Court to say that it will not make an order in favour of the stranger when you have a benevolent and perfectly suitable guardian, in the person of the grandparent or aunt or uncle, prepared to take full responsibility, and I hold that in such a case the Bill is ample to meet the situation.

Am I in order in commenting on that reply?

The hon. Member can only speak by leave of the House.

If I have the leave of the House, I would say it is obviously impossible that in such a case the remote uncles or aunts should be notified. It is quite possible that they may not know anything about it, and unless there is an obligation to notify the relatives, the particular form of the objection that the learned Solicitor-General has raised does not count.

Amendment negatived.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 18, at the end, to insert the words

"or that it would be of advantage to the infant for the order to be made."

In the absence of the hon. and learned Member for the Park Division of Sheffield (Mr. Storry-Deans), I desire to move this Amendment. I understand that it is considered that it goes too far, and I am rather inclined to think it does, but the object of the Amendment really was to try to bring before the House the question of the position of the father of an illegitimate child. As the Bill stands, it would mean, I think, that a man who has to contribute, perhaps, a small sum of money towards the maintenance of a child under a bastardy order would be in the position of vetoing any application made for the adoption of the child. If the Solicitor-General will correct me and say that is not the case, it will relieve me of a great deal of anxiety, but my experience of magistrates is that very often cases come before a magistrates' Court and an order is made against the father of an illegitimate child when that father is desiring to shirk the responsibility, and then, perhaps, he never sees the child again. But under the Bill as it stands at the present time, before the mother of that child could allow it to be adopted by anybody else, the father would have to be communicated with, and he, as I say, might never have seen the child at all, but yet might veto the whole thing. It might, I know, be argued that he would not be likely to do so, but there are cases, as the learned Solicitor-General will know, in which the Court has to lower the contribution of the father on account of his inability to pay as much money as was allowed under the original order, and in that case the money received as maintenance by the mother might be a very small sum indeed. This would open out great possibilities of blackmail, which is always a danger in cases of this kind, and it might be possible for the father of the illegitimate child to withhold his consent to its adoption unless some consideration were paid to him for giving his consent.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I think this is a perfectly reasonable Amendment, and as long as the language is properly drafted so that it shall be confined only to the case which the hon. Member for Exeter (Sir R. Newman) has raised, so far as I am concerned, I am prepared to accept it. I understand that the Government are prepared, in another place, to see that proper language is inserted in order to meet the case raised by the hon. Member.

With that assurance, I will ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 25, at the end to insert the words

"or has been judicially separated for not less than fifteen years from his or her spouse."

The Amendment is in slightly different form from that in which it appears on the Order Paper, owing to the insertion of the words "for not less than fifteen years," having regard to certain representations which have been made to me by my hon. and learned Friend who introduced the Bill, and is intended by way of compromise. The main object of the Amendment, however, will be secured. Sub-section (4) imposes the necessity, in case of one of two spouses desiring to adopt, that both spouses must consent, except in such cases where one of the spouses cannot be found, or is incapable of giving such consent. The object of the Amendment is to enable one spouse to make application where he or she has been judicially separated for a period of not less than 15 years. It would be a great hardship if this Amendment were not accepted, because it might mean that in the case of a man or woman permanently separated from his or her spouse, a child could not be adopted.

The hon. and learned Gentleman does not include divorce, I suppose?

No, it deals with judicial separation. My point is that it is hard in a case of separation that an innocent spouse should be disabled from adopting a child. The point has been put to me that the adoption of a child might stand as a barrier to reconciliation, and, in order to meet that, I added the words "for not less than 15 years." I think at the end of 15 years, if no reconciliation has taken place, the chances of the husband and wife coming together again are remote, and can be neglected.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This Amendment, as now modified, in substance I am prepared to accept. I am told it may be the language will require some modification, but, as regards the substance, I quite agree it appears to be a perfectly reasonable Amendment.

Here, again, the Government will not object to the substance of the Amendment, although it may be necessary that the words in regard to the period of 15 years may have to be altered. Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman will allow the Government to put in fresh words if necessary, and, in those circumstances, I hope he will withdraw the Amendment.

On that understanding, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 26, after the word "not," to insert the words "save as hereinafter provided."

2.0 P.M.

This Amendment which, I think, raises a matter of considerable importance, is to enable blood relatives to adopt an orphan, where the relatives are resident in one part of the United Kingdom and the orphan happens to be resident in another. In my own constituency, I have a very large number of people who have migrated from Scotland, but all their relatives are from Scotland, and in the event of both husband and wife dying, and leaving an orphan, or several orphans, it is utterly impossible, under the Bill as drafted, for their Scottish relatives to adopt their children, and vice versa it is impossible for English relatives to adopt children who happen to be resident in Scotland. I understand there would be great difficulty in administering the Subsection as on the Order Paper, and I am really moving this to ask the Government whether they will consider this point, and, in another place, make this Bill apply to Scotland as well as to England. We have a great many people nowadays who move between the two countries, and I do feel, that because people move from one part of the Kingdom to another, the children should not be deprived of the benefits of this Bill.

I beg to second the Amendment.

If these words were accepted, we should be placing out of the jurisdiction of the Court the care of the adopted child the moment the order was made, because the order presumes that the child would be taken out of the jurisdiction of the Court. Although the object is very desirable, I do suggest that it could only be completely attained if the Bill were made to apply to Scotland.

This Bill is, of course, as hon. Members are aware, framed upon the principle that the applicant must be resident and domiciled in this country. There are obvious reasons for that, because if the applicant be domiciled and resident in this country, presumably the child would remain in this country, and the Court would retain jurisdiction over it. I agree with the Mover of the Amendment with regard to extending the Bill to Scotland. That is a matter entirely for the Government, and, of course, I should raise no objection to the Government considering whether to apply the Bill to Scotland or not.

The objection to the Amendment is that, in effect, it will extend the provisions of this Bill to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

I venture to suggest that this is not the proper time to make so radical a change in this Clause of the Bill. Up to this time the Bill has not been treated as applicable to Scotland, or to Northern Ireland, and I am not quite sure whether we have the power, having regard to the status of Northern Ireland, to deal with the matter so far as the children in Northern Ireland are concerned. The law in Scotland is quite different to that in England. It is quite impossible for me to give consideration to the matter in relation to Scotland seeing that this Amendment has come at a late moment, having only been put on the Paper yesterday. I hope, therefore, my hon. and gallant Friend will feel that his Amendment ought to be withdrawn, and although I hold out no promise whatever, no doubt, now that the point has been raised, it can be considered at the appropriate time, and something may be done. I am not holding out any hope that anything is likely to be done. I can only say to my hon. and gallant Friend that his Amendment may be considered at the proper time.

In view of the Solicitor-General's statement, I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 28, to leave out the word "not," and to insert instead thereof the words

"who is not a British subject and."

If this Amendment be adopted, no order will be made except in the case of the child who is first of all a British subject, and, secondly, is resident in England or Wales. The object of this Amendment is to prevent any conflict arising with the law of foreign countries which might arise if an order is made that might alter the status of the child, who may be a French subject, or the subject of some foreign Power. In that case the child would have one status in this country and another status in the other country, and hon. Members will see how undesirable that will be.

There are a certain number of children who are foundlings, and it may be difficult in some of these cases to say whether the parents are British subjects?

There is a presumption, of course, in the case of a foundling in this country that he or she has a British domicile, and, therefore, I think there will be no difficulty before any British Court as to the nationality.

Might I ask the Solicitor-General as to the case of a child born in France or another country whose parents were British. In Prance such a child is a Frenchman. Would there be any difficulty in that case?

I think my hon. and learned Friend will find, if he looks into the law, that a child of British parents who has had the misfortune to be born abroad is a British subject, though, subject to certain conditions, he may be the subject of a foreign Power at the same time.

Could not the Solicitor-General make the Clause negative; make the wording "not the subject of some other country" and, therefore, make it apply to people who are not domiciled?

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 29, at the end, to insert the words

"except in special circumstances where the applicant is resident and domiciled elsewhere within His Majesty's Dominions."

There are many cases where it is greatly to the advantage of the child to be adopted, possibly by a relative who lives outside England and Wales. Every day the child adoption societies and others arrange for the adoption of children under their charge by people in good circumstances who are able to offer the adopted child ample opportunities in Australia, Canada, and other parts of the Empire. It is quite conceivable that an orphan may be adopted and sent to Scotland, the North of Ireland, or to some other portion of His Majesty's Dominions under what may be termed exceptional circumstances. There seems to be no good reason for depriving the Courts of exceptional jurisdiction in these particular circumstances. It does not say that this jurisdiction would be often exercised, but it is certainly desirable in time to come that that jurisdiction should be exerciseable. It may be said that in Scotland and the North of Ireland the status of adoption has not been recognised. That does not apply to other portions of the Empire, where adoption has been recognised as a legal status for a considerable period already, so there is no fear of the child being neglected if so adopted in other portions of the Empire. So far as Scotland and Ireland are concerned, it is very easy for the Court to inquire into the circumstances of each particular application. Where a good case is made out, and where the Court is satisfied that the child will really be cared for in those countries, I submit to the House that there is no reason for imposing an absolute disability on applications of this sort.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Under the Bill no Court can make an order for the adoption of children outside England and Wales, but if it be satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom the child could with advantage be entrusted, why should it be debarred from making the order because the applicant happens to have the good fortune to be domiciled in Northern Ireland or Scotland? As the Solicitor-General has pointed out, everybody must have a domicile. Everybody is born with a domicile, and cannot get rid of it; he may possibly change it, but he cannot get rid of it till he dies. If one is born with a domicile in Northern Ireland, but is resident here, I do rot see why he should be debarred from adopting an infant in cases where the Court thinks it is to the advantage of the infant that it should be adopted by him.

I ask the House not to accept this Amendment which, they will see, widely extends the provisions of the Bill, a Bill which is an experiment. Under the Bill an applicant who wishes to adopt a child must be resident and domiciled in this country, and for an obvious reason. Where the applicant is domiciled and resident in this country the presumption is that he will continue to reside here, and that the infant will remain under the jurisdiction and protection of this Court. What this Amendment seeks to do is to enable adoption to take place in cases where the applicant is resident and domiciled outside the jurisdiction of this Court, and there the presumption is that the person is likely to go to reside in the place where he is ordinarily resident and domiciled, with the result that the infant will be taken outside the protection of the Court. That would be a very strong step, and would go far to nullify many of the provisions of the Bill. One of the provisions is that the Court, as one of the terms of the adoption, can require the adopter to enter into a bond or make other provision for the adopted child. If a person who is asked to make such provision is resident and domiciled outside the jurisdiction, that protection is rendered nugatory. This Bill being an experiment, I would ask the House to go cautiously, and not to accept this Amendment.

Amendment negatived.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 29, at the end to insert

"(6) Where a Roman Catholic child is in the actual custody of a public or local authority or body or in the guardianship of such authority or body an Adoption Order in respect of such child shall not be made in favour of any applicant other than an applicant who is a Roman Catholic."

The purpose of this Amendment is, I think, pretty clear. Obviously the Amendment may be of interest to other denominations besides Roman Catholics. I do not wish to take up the time of the House on this important Bill, and the only point I wish to put forward is this. It is probably true that there will be little or no risk in the case of an application to the High Court. In similar circumstances, under existing legislation, the High Court already takes account of the religion of the person principally concerned, but there does seem to be a risk that in the case of a lower court some local prejudice may lead to the disregard of the religion of the child or of the applicant. I hope those responsible will accept this Amendment, and, if not, that we may have an assurance that the point will be carefully considered, so that something may be done at a later stage—some Amendment inserted which is more acceptable to those responsible.

I do not think anyone could object to the substance of this Amendment, but it appears to me to be one-sided. Why should we not have reciprocity in this matter? If the principle of this Amendment is to be accepted by the Government, why should there not be some liberty for them to frame an Amendment which would be better balanced and would prevent a child of Protestant descent being committed to the care of a Roman Catholic adopted father or mother?

indicated assent.

I certainly appreciate the motive, the justice and the equity of what is proposed, but I think it should be possible to give it a wider balance, and so to deal justice all round.

It is quite impossible to accept the Amendment as at present drafted. On the Second Reading of this Bill the Home Secretary stated quite clearly that if representations were made to him in this connection they would receive consideration. Actually no representation was made to him, nothing was mentioned in Committee, and no Amendment on these lines was made in Committee, and my right hon. Friend naturally imagined that this case would not be pressed. The Hopkinson Committee alluded to this question in paragraph 45 of their Report, where they expressed the opinion that any Court—I think they really referred to the Judge, but now it would refer to any Court—

"should have regard to the religion of the parties,"

and said that as a rule the religion of the adopter ought to be that of the natural parent, or that in which the child had been brought up. That statement having been made by the Hopkinson Committee, I think it more than ever likely that any Court which was studying the interests of the child would take the question of religion into full consideration; it could not overlook a point of such importance. Thus I suggest that this question will be safeguarded quite satisfactorily by the Court, and that it is not necessary to complicate the Bill by the insertion of this Amendment, and I hope that my noble Friend will withdraw it.

There seem to be two entirely different questions to be considered. I do not think the hon. and gallant Member quite meets the point, as I understand it, which was put by the Noble Lord. One question is whether the Court is to be directed to consider the question of religious denomination. The point of the Amendment is that it is a specific instruction that this shall be done. I am not dealing here with the point that this particular Amendment is limited to Roman Catholics. I am assuming, and I rather thought the Noble Lord wished, us to assume, to treat it in a more general way, as the hon. Member for Motherwell (Mr. Barr) suggested. To insert a specific Clause in the Bill is quite another question. There is a further Amendment, but this Amendment is confined to children in the actual custody of a local authority. Therefore this Amendment does not deal with the case of an ordinary private person, but only with the case of a local authority. What the Noble Lord by his Amendment is asking is that where the child is taken from a local authority, that there the religion of the child shall be protected. I should like to have some assurance that the religion of the child will remain the same as it was when it was admitted to the custody of the local authority, even if this provision has to be extended beyond Roman Catholics to other denominations.

I ask the House not to accept this Amendment even if it be extended to other denominations. In these matters we have, first of all, to consider the welfare of the infants. I am not for a moment suggesting that the question of religious belief is not a most important thing, but it is not the only thing, and if we put in the Clause words which make it peremptory that the only person who can adopt a child must be of the same religious faith we may be doing something which m certain cases may be against the interests of the child. Of course, due regard will always be paid to this matter, but I ask the House to leave it to the discretion of the tribunal which will have all the facts before it, and which will see that full consideration is given to the paramout welfare of the infant.

Amendment negatived.

CLAUSE 3.—(Matters with respect to which Court to be satisfied.)

I beg to move, in page 2, line 34, after the word "to," to insert the words "either orally or by affidavit."

I move this Amendment in order to raise this particular point, and if I can be assured that the rules to be made by the Lord Chancellor will deal specifically with this question then there is no need for me to say much about this Amendment. I do not think it is desirable that the consent should necessarily be given orally in the presence of all the parties. I think it would prove a barrier to the popularity of adoption if the parent whose assent is required must necessarily be present in the Courts and consent orally to the adoption. The effect of requiring their physical presence is to bring the adopting parent and the natural parent face to face, and that is something which I am sure both sides would desire to avoid. I hope we shall have some assur- ance that the rules to be made under the section dealing with this question will deal with this point, but in the absence of such an assurance I must press for the insertion of these words.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I think my hon. and learned Friend will see that, generally speaking, it is desirable that all these persons should be seen by the Court. On the other hand, I agree it is not essential that the prospective parent should be seen and interrogated by those who are conducting the case. I am assured that Clause 8 lays this down, and that it is left open to the Court to consider the point which has been raised by my hon. and learned Friend without actually insisting on the presence of the parent.

I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 42, to leave out from the word "infant" to the end of the Clause, and to insert instead thereof the words we are dealing with a very important question affecting family life. I think before a boy or a girl is taken out of his or her family and adopted by another family they ought to have the same right as is now given with regard to apprenticeship. If this Bill is passed as it now stands the child is in this position. A parent may hand over his child to be adopted and at the same time he could not bind a brother of that child as apprentice without his consent. In this Amendment I have put the age at 12 years. I believe in apprenticeships to a seafaring life the age taken is 12 years. I take that as a test, but there are provisions that the Court should take full consideration, in the first place, of the advantages to the infant.

That, however, does not satisfy me. What I contend is that this is an experimental Bill and under the law of this land no child can be apprenticed without his consent and to suggest that that right should be taken away from him in my opinion is not fair. It may be that a boy of 12 might come to a wrong decision. That may be so, but when I was 12 I thought I was quite old enough to give an opinion as to whether I should or should not be handed over to another parent. As the law stands whether he likes it or not a boy may be handed over to another family, and I ask the House to give the same protection to these young people whom it is proposed to hand over to another family as is given in the case of an apprentice. Actually, as the Bill stands, a young man or woman of 18 might be handed over to another family without his or her consent.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I do not think that the words in the Bill are sufficiently strong to ensure the purpose which we all have at heart. I am quite sure that we all agree that the wishes of the infant ought to be considered. The only point is whether the words in the Bill are really strong enough. The words are infant if over 12 years of age shall be required, and that some stronger words shall be put in to cover the case of the infant who is under 12. The words of the Amendment are

I would ask the House not to accept this Amendment, because personally I am quite satisfied that the words in paragraph ( b ) amply carry out the purpose which the Mover and Seconder of it has in view and which we all have at heart. May I just trouble the House by reading the words as they stand in the Clause —

"The Court before making an Adoption Order shall be satisfied that the Order if made will be for the welfare of the infant, due consideration being for this purpose given to the wishes of the infant, having regard to the age and understanding of the infant."

What takes place in practice is this. Wherever it is necessary and wherever the infant is of an age to express a desire, the Judge sees the infant and has a talk with him or her, and in that way ascertains what the wishes of the infant are, and, by ascertaining what the wishes of the infant are, the Court is really in a better position to arrive at a decision whether the proposal is for the benefit of the infant than if merely a formal consent—it might be nothing more—were obtained. My submission is that these words, which have been carefully framed, framed as a matter of fact by a learned Judge experienced in these matters, ought to be amply sufficient to carry out the object which we all wish to attain.

I hope that the House will not accept this Amendment, because I fear it is likely to have an effect exactly opposite that intended by the Mover. I can imagine a case in which the Court might perhaps be a little doubtful as to whether the proposed adopters were suitable or not, but, if there were a definite consent by the infant, they might lose some of their sense of responsibility and agree to adoption taking place just where otherwise they might not agree. After all, there are many ways in which the consent of a young child might be obtained, and I do not think that the words of the Amendment, bearing in mind the safeguards already in the Bill, would be of any value.

I hope that this Amendment will not be passed. I am entirely in sympathy with the object of it, but I think that object can be far more effectively secured by the words in the Bill. I may mention the way in which this matter was dealt with in the original report of the Committee. That report states:

"The consent of the child should be required if over 14 years, but in all cases the Judge, or some suitable and responsible person acting on his behalf, should see the child, and, if it is of sufficient age and intelligence, ascertain its feelings, and consider its inclinations."

May I ask a question? It has been said that it will be at the discretion of the Judge. Am I right in saying that this matter will be decided by a bench of magistrates and will not necessarily go before a Judge at all?

If the Amendment were accepted and put into the Bill, it might be a High Court Judge or a County Court Judge or a magistrate of a Court of Summary Jurisdiction.

Amendment negatived.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 5, to leave out the word "adopter," and to insert instead thereof the word "applicant."

This is really a drafting Amendment. In the opening words of the paragraph the word "applicant" is used, and it is thought better to use that word instead of the word "adopter" which now appears later in the paragraph.

Amendment agreed to.

CLAUSE 5. (Effect of Adoption Order.)

I beg to move, in page 3, line 19, to leave out from the word "marriage," to the word "shall," in line 21.

These words relate, to the position which will arise upon the intestacy of the adopted child. The question of succession to property is a difficult one. Broadly speaking, one can imagine three possible courses. One is to leave things exactly as they would be if the child had not been adopted; the second is to make things as they would have been if the child had in fact been the natural child of the adopting parents; and the third is to have some sort of intermediate arrangement by which the child gets the best or part of the best of both ways, retaining some of its rights in its capacity as a natural child and acquiring some new rights in its capacity as an adopted child. I venture to think that the House will agree that the third course is an inconvenient one, and that it is very desirable to have, either the position as it would have been if the child had never been adopted or the position as if the child had been the natural child of the adopting parents.

In Committee some words were inserted which adopted what I call the third course, namely, the intermediate course They provided in Sub-section (2), that a child should acquire some rights upon the intestacy of the adopter; in other words, that the child would succeed upon the intestacy of an adopter, under the common law, to part of his property. But they did not provide that an adopted child should acquire other rights which he would have had if he had been a natural child, that is to say, rights in respect of the intestacy of near relations of his adopting parents. I do not know if hon. Members follow what I have said; I do not want to elaborate it. The object of this Amendment, and of the other Amendments which will be moved subsequently, is to leave the position as regards property in exactly the same state as it is before the order is made providing for the adoption of the child; that is to say, that, if a child has prospects of some succession, either under a will or settlement, or upon an intestacy, in respect of property of its natural parent, the effect of the order made by the Court to provide for its adoption shall not deprive it of any of those rights.

Similarly, if my Amendments are accepted, the effect of the adopting Order will not be to confer upon the child any new rights in respect of succession. Of course, it will be open to the adopting parent to make a will, or disposition, or settlement, leaving, by the express operation of some disposition, property to the child; but my Amendments will not confer upon the child, apart from such express disposition, any right of succession to property. I venture to think it will be better to go back to the form in which the Bill was when it was passed on Second Reading, and to omit these words which have been added, which have the effect of creating an intermediate position. I would, therefore, respectfully ask the House to accept this Amendment.

I do not propose to resist this Amendment at any length, but I should like to express regret that the Amendment has been moved. The words which it is now proposed to delete from the Bill were inserted as the result of an Amendment moved by me in Committee. That Amendment was carried by a large majority, against the wishes of the promoter of the Bill and against the wishes of the representatives of the Home Office, so the House must not think that the Bill came to be in its present form by accident. It came to be in its present form as the result of long discussion on the merits of this question in Committee. The actual provision which my hon. and learned Friend is now moving to expunge is a provision extinguishing the rights of the natural parent to succeed to his child on that child's intestacy.

The effect of preserving, as this Amendment does, the right of the natural parent, is this: "Take the case of a child which the natural parent abandons in infancy. The child is brought up as a member of the new family, and care, attention, love and money are lavished upon it in the new family. The child reaches man's estate, comes into possession of certain property, and then dies. The effect of my hon. and learned Friend's Amendment is to give the natural parent, who has not seen his child for, perhaps, a quarter of a century, the right to succeed to that child upon an intestacy—

Not necessarily.

That, I think, is the effect. I think the effect of this Amendment is to eliminate also the right which the present language gives to the adopting parent of succeeding to his adopted child upon that child dying without a will. It seems to me that natural justice is very much more in favour of the adopting parent succeeding to the child upon such an intestacy, than of the claim of a natural parent who has abandoned his child in infancy. In view of the time, and of the general desire to get the Bill through, I do not propose to say anything more about the matter, but I should like to express my great regret that this Amendment has been moved, and also the expectation that, when this Bill comes to be amended later, the general consensus of opinion will be in favour of introducing mutual rights of succession on intestacy, in place of preserving the natural rights, as the Bill in its amended form will do.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Moss Side (Mr. G. Hurst) is not, perhaps, inclined to recognise that the rights of inheritance coming to parents adopting a child would probably come to that child from its natural parents. Such rights of the child as would derive through one of its natural parents, that are such natural ascendants, should have on the face of it better rights. Personally I much regret many of the recent changes in the common law of England as to succession to property, but I feel that it should now be realised that on the first day of this year there was such a radical change in the principles of succession to property in England, both real and personal, that there is little more change left to be made that is worth resisting in any direction. The redeeming feature of recent legislation is that settlements can be made which would readily meet any reasonable contingency. Property of importance is usually settled. Those who do not make settlements have only themselves to thank for what may happen in any direction contrary to their wishes. Accordingly, I hope the House will support my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General in his view of the Amendment before us.

I should like to register a brief protest against the action of the Government, which we are seeing repeated again and again, of reversing the decisions of Standing Committees. I think that when a Standing Committee, after full discussion, comes to a decision, it is not treating that Committee or the House with respect for the Government to attempt to reverse the decision on the Floor of the House, especially in the case of Private Members' Bills. I wish to protest against it.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 25, after the word "matters," to insert the words

"and in respect of the liability of a child to maintain its parents."

The object of this Amendment is that the adopted child should maintain its adopted parents, and not its natural parents, and vice versa. It is obvious that the Poor Law Acts are less likely to be put into operation after a child has been adopted than before, because in all probability the new parents of the adopted child would be wealthier than its natural parents.

I do not want to object to the Amendment as it stands, but I should like to raise a point with regard to something which is happening now in regard to the poorer children who come within the description of adopted children. The Government last year passed a Bill for pensions for widows, and we are having a good deal of trouble in cases where married couples have adopted children and the husband dies. Then the adopted child is not recognised by the Government as giving any rights to the widow for pension under the Act. If the Government, in this Amendment, want to make it legal for the adopted child to be called upon to maintain the adopting parents, it seems to me that the Government—I know they cannot do it in this Bill—should give some attention to making the position different in regard to the provision of a pension for the widow of a man who has adopted a child, and not rule out, as is at present the case, any claim of the widow to a pension because the child is not a natural child but an adopted child. As I have said, I know that that cannot be dealt with in this Bill, but, as this Amendment is being moved, I thought that this was the occasion on which to raise it.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 3, line 26, after the word "adopter," insert the word "exclusively."—[ Captain Hacking. ]

I beg to move, in page 3, line 39, after the word "under," to insert the words "any intestacy or under."

This is one of the series of Amendments which I moved just now to deal with the question of the succession of property.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 3, line 42, leave out the words "except upon the intestacy of the adopter."— [ The Solicitor-General. ]

I beg to move, in page 4, line 5, at the end, to insert

"(3) Where an adopted child or the spouse or issue of an adopted child takes any interest in real or personal property under a disposition by the adopter, or where an adopter takes any interest in real or personal property under a disposition by an adopted child or the spouse or issue of an adopted child, any succession, legacy, or other duty which becomes leviable in respect thereof shall be payable at the same rate as if the adopted child had been a child born to the adopter in lawful wedlock.

(4) For the purposes of this Section 'disposition,' means an assurance of any interest in property by any instrument whether inter vivos or by will including codicil."

There is an Amendment in this connection in the name of four Members but I think this will probably meet their desire. In Committee the hon. Member for Berwick (Mrs. Philipson) suggested that the Death Duties should be reduced on property passing from the adopter to the adopted child. This Amendment will reduce the duty from 10 to 1 per cent. on the proportion which is passing from the adopter to the adopted child. I think that will meet the wishes of the hon. Member and also the point put forward in the other Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

CLAUSE 8.—(Jurisdiction and Procedure.)

Amendment made: In page 4, line 29, leave out the word "and," and insert instead thereof the word "but".—[ The Solicitor-General. ]

I beg to move, in page 4, line 30, after the word "section," to insert the words "any county court or."

3.0 P.M.

I move this in order that we may have some assurance on behalf of the Government that these cases will be dealt with by the County Court and that the rules shall be so framed as to make it clear that the Court having jurisdiction to make adoption orders under the Bill shall be the High Court or at the option of the applicant, but subject to any rules under this Section, any County Court or Court of Summary Jurisdiction. I regard this as a very vital Amendment because the whole question of the law of adoption will depend on getting the right tribunal to sanction the adoption. We considered this very carefully and took the evidence of County Court Judges and a large number of people in all parts of the country who are interested in the subject. I believe nearly all the societies interested in child welfare are strongly in favour of recognising the County Court as an alternative. The jurisdiction of Courts of summary jurisdiction is very limited. For well-to-do people there could not be a better tribunal than the High Court, but it is perfectly ridiculous to imagine that to poor people in Newcastle or Carlisle the High Court is a possible tribunal. The only tribunal there is the County Court, sitting at their own doors. They do not want the associations of the Police Court in dealing with a civil matter. We have had the most definite evidence of two of the most distinguished County Court Judges, who made it clear that they have the machinery for dealing with these cases, their registrars have considerable experience of the district, and there is ample opportunity for hearing these cases in the Judge's private room. I believe it is now generally recognised that the County Court is the best tribunal outside London. One recognises the admirable work done by stipendiary magistrates in London, but outside London I am certain the County Court is the most effective and most free from all these objectionable associations.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This question was very fully debated in Committee, and the only two reasons why the County Court should not be used in these cases were, in the first place, that they were very busy at the moment and this would rather tend to congestion, and, secondly, that they would not have such full knowledge of the homes into which the children would be adopted. But there is very considerable feeling in the House that the County Court should deal with these cases, and we have no objection to the proposal. We should, however, like to have an opportunity of seeing whether this is the best place in which to insert these words, but, subject to any possible re-drafting, we see no objection to carrying out the principle.

Have we a definite assurance that if the Amendment is drawn in the form in which it is ultimately suggested, the rules shall be so framed as to make it possible for the County Court to act and that the other Courts should have jurisdiction?

Yes, certainly.

I take the view that the Magistrates' Court has much better machinery and much better means of knowing the circumstances of the poor people, and would be much better able to administer this Act with efficiency and economy. I also recognise the tendency to empower the Courts of Magistrates to hold Courts for children in all domestic matters. I would like to know from the Under-Secretary to the Home Office whether it is quite clear that there will be full alternative power to the Magistrates' Court to deal with these cases if the words "any County Court or" are inserted. I do not regard the County Courts as having the machinery or the knowledge to deal with these cases.

There will be full power to deal with these cases in the Magistrates' Court.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 4, line 41, leave out the words "to be," and insert, instead thereof, the word "being."—[ Captain Hacking. ]

CLAUSE 9.—(Restriction on payments or to adoption.)

I beg to move, in page 5, line 18, to leave out the word "parents," and to insert instead thereof the word "guardian."

The word "parents" is not necessary, because the word "parent" includes parents. We propose to substitute the word "guardian" because it gives fuller effect to the intention of the Clause.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 5, line 22, leave out the word "parents," and insert instead thereof the word "guardian."—[ Captain Hacking. ]

CLAUSE 11.—(Adopted Children Register.)

Amendment made: In page 5, line 42, leave out the word "Registry," and insert instead thereof the word "Register."—[ Captain Hacking. ]

CLAUSE 12—(Short title, commencement and extent.)

I beg to move, in page 7, line 36, to leave out the word "August," and to insert, instead thereof, the word "January."

The object of this Amendment is to give a little more time before the Bill comes into operation.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 7, line 36, leave out the word "twenty-six," and insert instead thereof the word "twenty-seven."—[ Captain Hacking. ]

I have an Amendment, in page 8, to leave out column 3, the object of which is to make it more difficult, for people who are evilly disposed, to trace the origin of an adopted child. I notice, however, that the Government have put down an Amendment in column 3 to leave out the words "and Surname," which I think meets my point satisfactorily. I should be prepared to withdraw my Amendment if the Government Amendment were accepted.

Does the hon. and gallant Member wish to move his Amendment?