House of Commons
Wednesday, December 14, 1927
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock.
The CLERK AT THE TABLE informed the House of the unavoidable absence of Mr. Speaker from this day's Sitting.
Whereupon Mr. JAMES HOPE, the Chairman of Ways and Means, proceeded to the Table, and, after Prayers, took the Chair as Deputy-Speaker, pursuant to the Standing Order.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
CHINA.
TARIFF REVISION COMMISSION.
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the purpose of the International Tariff Commission now sitting at Peking; at whose instance it was set up; and if he will give the names of the British delegates serving on it?
I presume the hon. Member refers to the Tariff Revision Commission which is, in accordance with Articles I and IV of the Washington Treaty relating to the Chinese Customs Tariff, engaged on the revision of the Customs schedule of duties on imports into China so that the rates of duty shall be equivalent to 5 per cent. effective, as provided in the several commercial treaties to which China is a party. This Commission was, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, convened at the instance of the Chinese authorities in Peking. It met at Shanghai in the autumn of last year, and the final stages of the work are being carried out in Peking. The Commercial Secretary at Shanghai was the British representative during the earlier stages; his place has now been taken by the Acting Commercial Secretary at Peking.
I suppose the Chinese authorities are also represented and taking part?
Oh, yes.
HANKOW.
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that the deadlock at Hankow still continues; that the Nanking Government has banned all exports to that area, and that none can tell who is in charge; and can he do anything that will have the effect of restoring to British residents the privileges and convenience that obtained when the British concession in Hankow existed?
I am fully aware of the divided authority at Hankow, of the friction between the rival militarists there, and of the general state of confusion. The area is nominally under the jurisdiction of the Nanking authorities, and I have no information showing that they are now imposing an embargo on exports to Hankow. The loss and inconvenience suffered by British residents have been due to the general state of disorder in the Yangtze Valley, and I can find no reason for assuming that they would have been any less had the concession continued to exist under purely British administration. His Majesty's Government are constantly engaged in doing all that is possible under most difficult conditions to safeguard the interests of British subjects there.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
DISARMAMENT (PREPARATORY COMMISSION).
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government have prepared a scheme for the limitation of naval armaments by agreement through the League of Nations for discussion at the forthcoming Preparatory Commission; whether such a scheme is in existence; and whether it will be published at the commencement of the sittings of the Preparatory Commission in the same way as the British scheme for disarmament was published at the beginning of the recent Tripartite Naval Conference at Geneva?
If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will refer to the answer which I gave him on the 7th instant, he will see that I stated that the British representative on the Preparatory Commission has discretion to bring forward our proposals whenever he thinks the occasion propitious, and that the occasion will probably be the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission.
I quite understood that answer, but my question is whether a scheme has actually been prepared for our representative to bring forward at the Preparatory Commission; whether such a scheme is in actual existence?
I think we must wait until the Preparatory Commission meets, and, when it meets, it will be the duty of the British representative to bring forward any proposals which he may have to make.
I am not asking for details of the scheme; I am asking whether it is in physical existence? Is there such a scheme?
I imagine there is a scheme, but it is impossible at the moment to say whether it is going to be the exact scheme which a few weeks hence will be presented.
It is not for the Under-Secretary to imagine. Does he know whether such a scheme exists?
The hon. and gallant Member should give notice of that question.
PORTUGAL (LOAN).
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, with reference to the application of the Portuguese Government to the League of Nations for a loan, it has signified its intention to apply any portion of this loan to Portuguese Africa?
No, Sir, but no details have yet been given.
MR. JOHN HARVEY (IMPRISONMENT, FRANCE).
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware that Mr. John Harvey, a native of Cardiff, is serving a sentence of eight years' penal servitude in France for deserting from the Foreign Legion; and if, in view of the services rendered by Harvey in the British Army during the Great War and subsequently with the Foreign Legion in North Africa, he will make representations to the French Government with a view to this man being released?
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the case of John Harvey, a British subject, now undergoing a long sentence of imprisonment for desertion from the French Foreign Legion; whether he is aware that an American named Doty, the leader of the five men who deserted, has been set at liberty by the clemency of the French Government; and whether, in view of the hardships which Harvey was called upon to endure in the campaign against the Druses in Syria, he can see his way to approach the French Government in the matter and to ask them to extend the same clemency to Harvey and give him his freedom?
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the case of the Englishman, John Harvey, and of the American, Bennett Doty, who were convicted in July last year of deserting from the French Foreign Legion; whether, seeing that the American was condemned to death and has subsequently been released on representations being made by the American Government, but the Englishman, who was sentenced to eight years' penal servitude, is still in prison, he has made any representations to the French authorities; and what action he intends to take to secure that this Englishman shall be released?
I am happy to be able to say that the French Government as soon as the matter was brought to their notice have given orders for the immediate release of Mr. John Harvey. I am sure that the House will much appreciate this graceful and generous act by the French Government?
Are we to understand that the release is a free release; that he is not to go back to his regiment?
I understand that it is a free pardon.
Can the Under-Secretary say how it is that the American Government at once made representations which effected the release of the man Doty, and why our Government did not take action at once?
Is it not the fact that this case has not previously been brought to the attention of the British Foreign Office; and that that is the reason why they did not interfere earlier?
I think that is the reason.
IMPERIAL CONFERENCE (OPTIONAL CLAUSE).
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if the question of signing the Optional Clause has been discussed with any of the Dominions since the last Imperial Conference; and, if so, with what result?
No, Sir.
ROYAL NAVY.
SHIPS (CONSTRUCTION).
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many ships are at present in course of building, either in the Royal Dockyards or in the yards of private shipbuilding firms; and can he give the estimated expenditure separately for hulls, machinery, and labour in both cases?
With regard to the first part of the question, I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply given to the question from the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) on the first of this month (OFFICIAL REPORT, cols. 732–4). I am not clear exactly what the hon. and gallant Member requires as regards the latter part of his question, since labour enters into the cost of hulls and machinery; but I would refer him to the programme appended to the Navy Estimates, 1927, which contains in considerable detail estimates of cost of ships under construction under a number of heads, including hulls, machinery, and dockyard labour.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is the fact that 23 ships have been laid down in private shipyards and only 10 in Royal Dockyards; and why more work is not given to the Royal Dockyards?
The second part of the hon. Member's question is profoundly different from anything in his main question, but, if he will do the Admiralty the honour to look at the answer, he will see where the ships are and be able to count up for himself.
CRUISER CONSTRUCTION.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the increase in the American shipbuilding programme and of the reversal of their disarmament policy, he will reconsider his decision with regard to the postponement of the two cruisers?
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has had under consideration the recent statement made by the President of the United States of America with reference to the naval programme of that country; and whether, in view of the contemplated expansion of the American navy, he will reconsider his decision to reduce the naval construction programme by two cruisers?
I have read the reports of President Coolidge's statement, but I find in it no grounds for departing from the decision of His Majesty's Government in regard to cruiser construction.
Has it not been the policy of His Majesty's Government to show their desire for disarmament by deeds and not by words, as opposed to the American policy of words and not deeds?
Can the right hon. Gentleman say why he did not abandon the two cruisers before the Conference instead of after; and does he not think that it creates a bad impression to do it now?
That question does not arise.
TUG MASTERS.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether any decision has been reached as a result of the representations made to him at an interview on 26th August, 1926, with the Association of First Class Masters of His Majesty's Tugs regarding increased pay and improved conditions of status and service for members of the association; and, if not, whether, seeing that the matter has been under consideration for so long, he can state when it may be expected that a definite reply will be given?
I am afraid that I am not yet in a position to add anything to my reply of the 20th July last (OFFICIAL REPORT, col. 386).
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that in the meantime these masters of tugs are serving under conditions which are inferior to those of the Trinity House pilots? Cannot he expedite a decision?
I am aware that the hon. Member gave me that information some little time ago.
Why not make use of it?
EX-APPRENTICES (ROYAL DOCKYARDS).
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if he can announce that ex-apprentices of His Majesty's dockyards are to count their service from 18 years of age for bonus and pension; and, if so, from what date will such a favour be granted?
I regret that I am unable to make the announcement that my hon. Friend suggests.
Does my hon. and gallant Friend mean that the suggestion is inaccurate or that he is not yet prepared to introduce it?
I can only give the answer which I have already given, that I am not yet in a position to make an announcement.
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that these ex-Government apprentices are in a worse position than outside apprentices with regard to the counting of time, and will he expedite a decision in the matter?
WAR FILMS (PRODUCTION AND ASSISTANCE).
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what sums of money, giving full details and percentages in each case, have been received by the Admiralty as their share of the profits derived from any films that have been made with the use of Admiralty property ships and naval ratings for exhibition to the public under contracts entered into between the Admiralty film-producing companies?
The amount actually received from film companies by the Admiralty up to date is £6,637. Further considerable sums are, however, expected to accrue from profits on films at present running. I am afraid I could not undertake to give the amounts in the detail asked for, as it is the invariable practice not to divulge contract prices.
Cannot the Parliamentary Secretary say the amount of money that has been received for each film?
I have given the hon. Member all the information that it is in my power to give.
May I ask whether the Parliamentary Secretary is aware that the services of naval ratings are used, as at Malta and Gibraltar, for commercial purposes, assisting in wireless telegraphy, and that these services are paid for? Why not make a business proposition of the use of naval ratings in the cinema-producing industry?
We are making it a business proposition, and that is one of the reasons why we are unable to disclose any of the details.
May I ask whether, in the case of this particular contract, the Parliamentary Secretary does not think it would be in the public interest to disclose what percentage the Admiralty are getting? It is a matter of public interest, and the British taxpayers are entitled to know.
We are looking after the interests of the British taxpayer.
Is it not the fact that a separate contract is made for each film, and is not the House of Commons entitled to know what profits are made out of these cinema contracts?
Is it true that a separate contract is made for each film?
We make our contracts and we make them in as satisfactory a manner as we can. I think the House should be satisfied with that.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what cost has been incurred to date by the loan of officers and ratings, ships, and materials, for the making of cinematograph films; and what is the estimated cost of the services to be rendered for the making of the films already arranged for which His Majesty's Navy and royal naval personnel will enact scenes?
So far as can be ascertained, the expenses involved to date in connection with naval material have been less than £350 and these costs are paid for by the firms making the films. As regards royal naval personnel no extra expenses to the Crown are incurred. I am unable to estimate the cost referred to in the last part of the question, but whatever it may be it will be repaid by the firms concerned.
Should I not be right in saying that fuel is used by ships for this purpose which otherwise would be used for legitimate exercises, and that therefore the actual cost is very considerable?
The actual cost of what?
Does the Parliamentary -Secretary expect me to suggest that you can send a squadron of ships to sea burning oil fuel for a cost of £350?
All these costs are considered when the contract is made.
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that enormous profits have been made by the film companies producing these films, and that for the hire of the Navy and personnel and everything else the Admiralty has received only £6,000 for twelve films?
Is not the whole object of these questions to prevent the production of British films?
Is it not a fact that the Navy are kept very tight for oil fuel, and that if they use it for film making they cannot use it for ordinary exercises?
The answer is that they do not use it.
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.
ADMIRALTY.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will state the number of officers on half pay plus civilian pay engaged at Admiralty head-quarters in October, 1913, and in October, 1927?
Four naval officers in October, 1913, and six in October, 1927, employed at Admiralty head-quarters were in receipt of naval half-pay in addition to the salary attaching to their Admiralty appointment.
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether his attention has been drawn to Cmd. 2983. which shows that his Department employs a lower percentage of disabled ex-service men and a lower total percentage of ex-service men than any other Government Department; the reason for this state of affairs; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy it?
The position has not materially altered since March last when, in reply to my hon. and gallant Friend, it was pointed out that, allowing for the fact that a large proportion of the Admiralty staffs belongs to the shipbuilding and engineering industries which were only allowed to volunteer for military service to a limited extent, the Admiralty percentage of ex-Service civil staff does not compare unfavourably with other departments.
Can my right hon. Friend assure me that he is making every possible effort to employ as many ex-service men as he can?
We are following the rules laid down for the Civil Service with regard to ex-service men in exactly the same way as every other department.
BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, as representing the First Commissioner of Works what progress has been made regarding the proposed new Embassy at Washington?
It is hoped that the contract for the building will be placed shortly. As hon. Members may be interested to see the design prepared by Sir Edwin Lutyens, my Noble Friend has arranged to exhibit the elevations In the Tea Room.
NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.
DISABILITY PENSION (WALTER BEWICK).
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that Walter Bewick, engine-room artificer, official number 7327, served 12 years from 25th February, 1914; that he was re-engaged in August, 1925, to complete time for pension; whether, on re-engagement, any medical examination took place; whether he is aware that he served on the China station from 1st January to November, 1926, and was in 1927 invalided with pulmonary tuberculosis; that during a period of 13 years no trace of this trouble was detected; and whether, seeing that medical opinion from the county sanatorium, Kent, attributes his complaint to service in China, he will reconsider this case with a view to augmentation of pension for such disability?
The particulars of this man's entry and re-engagement for service are as stated by the hon. Member. I will have further inquiries made into the medical aspects of the case and will inform the hon. Member of the result as soon as practicable.
If I send the hon. and gallant Gentleman a letter on the subject, will he consider it?
Yes, Sir.
WIDOW'S PENSION (MRS. MERRY ANDOVER).
asked the Minister of Pensions if he will reconsider the decision against the award of a pension to Mrs. Merry, of Vigo Road, Andover, the widow of a soldier who served in Salonika and there contracted malaria, for which he was treated both at Salonika and by the pensions tropical disease clinic, in co-operation with his own medical attendant, who holds the highest medical qualifications in medicine and who during the period of the war was in charge of malarial huts at Hawick; and whether, having regard to the divergence of opinion between the man's own medical attendant, who affirms that the man's death was occasioned by war service, and the Ministry's medical officers, he will, in view of the widow's present distress, grant her an award of pension from the date of her husband's death?
The opinion of the medical officer referred to by my hon. and gallant Friend has already been carefully considered in this case, but the medical advisers of the Ministry are unable to depart from their judgment, based on the evidence as a whole, including the results of observation in hospital, that the pernicious anæmia of which Mr. Merry died was not connected with the malaria for which he was pensioned, or with his war service generally. The decision of the Ministry was confirmed lay the independent appeal tribunal to which Mrs. Merry, appealed against the rejection of her claim. In these circumstances my right hon. Friend regrets he can find no ground justifying further action in the case.
Is it not the case that the private medical officer called attention to the progress of anæmia during the man's attendance at hospital?
I do not think so. Anyhow, the independent appeals tribunal confirmed the decision of the Minister.
UNEMPLOYMENT.
OIL MILLERS.
asked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that certain weekly workers, especially oil millers, who, by the nature of their employment, are frequently stood off for a week or weeks at a time, count their week for wages from Monday to Saturday noon, whereas the Employment Exchange week is counted from Wednesday to Wednesday; that, as a result of this, the men on extended benefit lose benefit for one week of their unemployed period, as the first three days count in one week at the Employment Exchange and the last three days in another; and whether it can be arranged differently, so that these workmen do not suffer this disability?
These men are subject to the general rule that, save in cases of hardship, extended benefit cannot be paid to a short-time worker when his earnings in respect of the current benefit week amount to at least half a full week's earnings. I think that the saving in respect of hardship is sufficient to deal with any exceptional case.
Will the right hon. Gentleman have this matter looked into, particularly in regard to this class of men, whose lot is very hard?
I have already looked into it, but if there are any fresh particulars perhaps the hon. and gallant Member will communicate with me.
W. TASKER AND SONS, LIMITED, ANDOVER.
asked the Minister of Labour whether his attention has been called to the fact that the late firm of W. Tasker and Sons, Limited, of Andover, now in liquidation, failed to stamp the insurance cards of their workmen although they deducted the money from the men weekly; that many of these men have in consequence been unable to obtain the relief to which they were entitled; and whether he will consider the adoption of some means to prevent such irregularities in future?
An inspection of this firm in 1926 disclosed that, whilst the great majority of the unemployment books of the firm's employés were properly stamped, a relatively small number were not fully stamped. So far as I am aware, however, no employé of the firm has suffered loss of unemployment benefit through failure on the firm's part to pay contributions. Every effort is made to ensure compliance with the Unemployment Insurance Acts by means of inspection and otherwise.
STATISTICS.
asked the Minister of Labour if, seeing that statistics of the number of persons who receive unemployment benefit in a particular month are not available, he will state on what figures the unemployed percentage of insured persons for the months of August, September, and October, given in the "Labour Gazette," are based?
The percentage rates of unemployment among insured persons published in the Ministry of Labour Gazette are based on a count of the numbers of unemployment books lodged at local offices, including those in the "two-months' file," irrespective of whether the persons to whom the books belong are drawing unemployment benefit. A separate count of those drawing benefit is not made for the purpose of these statistics.
asked the Minister of Labour how many of the 1,132,000 (approximate) persons registered as unemployed at Employment Exchanges at 31st October were in receipt of covenanted or standard benefit, uncovenanted or extended benefit, and those not in receipt of benefit, respectively?
I regret that statistics giving the information desired are not available.
IRON, STEEL AND WOOLLEN TRADES.
asked the Minister of Labour the number of persons at work on 1st July, 1914, 1924 and 1927, respectively, in the iron and steel trades and woollen trades, and the number unemployed?
As the reply includes a number of figures, I will, with the consent of my hon. and gallant Friend, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
Following is the reply:
The following table shows, for the iron and steel and woollen and worsted industries of Great Britain, the estimated number of persons insured under
BRISTOL EXCHANGE (ADMINISTRATION).
asked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that Bristol men, who have been out of work for a long period, complain that preference is given by the Bristol Employment Exchange to men who have been out of work for a month or less; that, after investigation among the unemployed, this complaint was ventilated at the meeting of the main committee of the Bristol Employment Exchange, held on the 7th instant, when it was admitted that there were good grounds for the complaint, as men who had been out of work for a long period were regarded by the officials as unemployable; and whether he will cause an investigation to take place into the local administration of the Exchange?
For ordinary industrial vacancies notified to the Exchange, applicants are submitted according to their industrial qualifications without reference to the length of time they have been unemployed. In regard to relief works, however, at the request of the authority responsible for the relief works preference may be given to those who by reason of a long period of unemployment or domestic circumstances may be suffering distress. I see no necessity for any special investigation as suggested.
the Unemployment Insurance Acts at July of 1924 and 1927, the numbers of such persons recorded as unemployed at the end of June in those two years and the differences between these figures.
How is it possible for a man to obtain work if his long period of unemployment is regarded as a penalty which will place him behind men who have recently had jobs?
I am not accepting the statement that a long period of unemployment is regarded as a penalty. The Exchange in every case, quite rightly, has to consider what are the industrial qualifications of the people. If they did not do that, then in filling the places we should not be able to exercise the proper functions of an Exchange.
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the Employment Exchange at Bristol has admitted that where the qualifications of two men are equal the person with the longer period of unemployment has to rank after the man who has recently been employed?
I shall make inquiries and see if it is the case or not, tout in any event what I have said really answers the case. They have to try to judge industrial qualifications in the ordinary event, and if it is a question of relief work, of course preference is given to the men who have had a long period of unemployment.
Is it not a fact that the practice at Bristol exists elsewhere, especially in Walworth?
Perhaps the hon. Member will tell me of instances in Walworth, or communicate with me regarding them.
CENTRAL EXCHANGE, GLASGOW.
asked the Minister of Labour if he has yet fixed a site for the new Central Exchange in Glasgow; where the site is situated; when the work of building is likely to commence; and if any time limit has been fixed as to when the building will be finished?
A site has been purchased for this purpose at the corner of Waterloo Street and Douglas Street, and, subject to the necessary financial provision, I hope that the erection of the building may start sometime in the next financial year. It is not proposed to fix a time-limit but there will be no avoidable delay.
EXCHANGES (ACCOMMODATION).
asked the Minister of Labour if he is taking steps to have the Employment Exchanges altered in construction to meet the requirements of the new Act in so far as the meetings of Courts of Referees are concerned, and to secure that no more waiting or overcrowding than is unavoidable will take place, particularly in the carry-over period?
I am endeavouring as far as possible to anticipate the requirements of the new Act in the direction indicated, and the position is being specially reviewed towards that end.
EMPIRE SETTLEMENT (TRAINING).
asked the Minister of Labour whether he has received the resolution passed by the Plymouth Council of Social Service urging the Government to provide facilities for training in agriculture and subsidiary occupations for suitable boys and girls who have just left school, in order to fit them for settlement within the Empire; and what action he proposes to take?
Yes, Sir, I have received the resolution and I shall be making some suggestions to the council whereby they may co-operate in a scheme for this purpose.
AIRSHIPS.
R101.
asked the Secretary of State for Air the reason for the estimated excess cost of airship R101 increasing from £100,000 on 16th November to £165,000 on 7th December?
The hon. Member appears to have misconstrued the replies in the House on 16th November and 7th December; there has been no such increase as that stated in the question. The £100,000 quoted in the earlier reply is the amount by which the original estimate (£300,000) is likely to be exceeded; the £165,000 quoted in the later reply is the amount which will probably be required in addition to that which has already been expended (£235,000). The total estimated cost is the same in either case, namely £400,000.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say if, as a graceful interlude in the process of airship development, he will train his expert staff at Cardington in the community singing of that beautiful old English ditty: That's the way the money goes; Pop goes the gas bag.
I must ask the hon. Member to give me notice of that very interesting question.
asked the Secretary of State for Air how many times since May 1924 he has revised the estimates of cost, quantity, lift capacity, and structure of airship R 101; and if he is confident that the present working designs are satisfactory and final?
As regards the first part of the question, R. 101 is an experimental type of aircraft designed on novel principles. This being the case, it was inevitable, as is the case in almost every new field of enterprise, that estimates made while many of the factors were still unknown should be provisional and a reasonable degree of elasticity allowed in the programme. It has followed that those originally made have had to be revised from time to time; but to state on how many occasions some item or other of expense has been varied would clearly be impossible. As regards the second part of the question, I would certainly not rule out the possibility that, as the work of assembly progresses, or as a result of trials, some further minor modifications may be found advisable— indeed in experimental development of this character excessive rigidity would obviously not be conducive to true economy or the production of an efficient article—but it is not expected that any major alterations will be necessary.
Will the Minister explain why up to the end of the present financial year he is spending over £40,000 in drawing office salaries alone; and if any sort of limit is going to be placed on this indefiniteness, since he did not know what he was doing in the first place and apparently, does not know now?
In the first place, a Socialist Government was in office, and I certainly was not responsible for that. In the second place, as to the actual figure, I would ask the hon. Member to give me notice of that question. The amount I am spending is strictly limited, and I hope it will not be greatly exceeded.
Would it not have been very injudicious, in the construction of an airship of this nature, to have had any fixed programme, in view of improvements which are bound to come along as the construction develops?
The right hon. Gentleman, for the third time, has suggested to me that this is a legacy to him from somewhere else.
"Order!"
It has often been laid down that this is not a time for speeches.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman then, if he is not conscious of the fact that a half truth is the meanest form of mendacity of which anyone can be guilty?
R.100.
asked the Secretary of State for Air approximately what sum in excess of the contract price (£350,000) the Airship Guarantee Company will require to complete the construction of Airship R100 now building at Howden?
No, Sir, the matter is one entirely for the Airship Guarantee Company, and I have no information on the subject.
AIRSHIP GUARANTEE COMPANY.
asked the Secretary of State for Air if the Airship Guarantee Company have asked for an extension of their contract prices; and, if so, is it proposed to grant one?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative; the second part does not, therefore, arise.
Since the right hon. Gentleman has said that this was a legacy from a previous Government, is it not true that the minutes prove that the previous Government, namely the Labour Government, rejected the original airship scheme, as submitted by their predecessors?
Does this matter arise out of the present question?
In answer to the right hon. Gentleman I would point out that the hon. Member behind him asked me a question about this programme, and I was not dealing with anything else.
SOUTH AMERICAN MEAT.
asked the Minister of Health the amount, if any, of South American meat which has been condemned in this country as unfit for human food during the last three years for which statistics are available, giving where possible the reasons for such condemnation?
I regret that the information for which my hon. Friend asks is not available in my Department.
Can the hon. Gentleman say whether any of this meat has been condemned on account of being contaminated with foot-and-mouth disease?
That is another matter. I should require notice of that question.
If I apply to the Ministry of Agriculture, will they be able to give the information?
I think the hon. Gentleman should put down a question.
COAL INDUSTRY.
MINE MANAGERS (QUALIFICATIONS).
asked the Secretary for Mines what action has been taken under Section 22 of the Mining Industry Act, 1926, with reference to the qualifications of mine managers?
Action under this Section involves, as the hon. Member knows, many important and difficult considerations. Considerable discussion with the various bodies and persons involved has taken place, but I am not in a position to make any announcement on the subject at present.
JOINT PIT COMMITTEES.
asked the Secretary for Mines how many joint pit committees have been set up under the provisions of Section 21 of the Mining Industry Act, 1926, since the passage of the Act; and where these committees have been established?
I would refer the hon. Member to the replies which I gave to the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. W. Paling) on 29th November, and to the hon. Member for Merioneth (Mr. Haydn Jones) on 15th June.
EXPLOSION (HAIG PIT, WHITEHAVEN).
( by Private Notice ) asked the Secretary for Mines whether he can give the House the latest information with regard to the explosion which occurred last night at the Haig Pit, Whitehaven?
I regret to inform the House that an explosion occurred in this pit last night in which, according to my information, the lives of four men have been lost. Three of the bodies have been recovered but a fire which is raging prevents further exploration for the recovery of the body of the fourth man who was killed. Operations are now in progress to seal the fire off. The Divisional Inspector left Newcastle immediately for the scene of the explosion and the Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines left London this morning to watch over the safety of these operations.
TRADE AND COMMERCE.
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES (GERMAN COMPETITION).
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that the Departmental Committee appointed by the Board of Trade on shipping and shipbuilding reported on the efficient forges that had been closed in England prior to the War, and stated that this dumping was deliberately arranged for under German selling agencies and the cartel system; and what steps he is taking against similar dumping by the European cartel?
I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer which the Prime Minister gave to a similar question by him on 12th December.
NAURU AND OCEAN ISLAND PHOSPHATE ROCK.
asked the Prime Minister if he has under consideration the bringing to this country of Nauru and Ocean Island phosphate rock, under the terms of the British Phosphate Commission agreement of 1920; and, if not, will he institute full inquiries as to its being made available to British phosphate manufacturers?
My right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture received a deputation on this subject yesterday, and the matter is now being considered.
SUGAR REFINING INDUSTRY.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he has yet come to any decision as to what aid, if any, he is prepared to give to the sugar refining industry?
I can at present add nothing to the answers given to previous questions on this subject.
When will the hon. Gentleman be prepared to give an answer? He stated, some time ago, that this question would he settled at an early date, and I would like to know if any date can be stated.
I cannot for the moment give a date, but I can say that the position is actually under examination, and obviously I am not in a position to say anything until the examination is concluded.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that to-day one of the Ministers is asking for £900,000 to subsidise sugar-beet?
SOUTHERN RHODESIA.
NATIVE CONTROL BILL.
asked the Prime Minister whether, in the correspondence with the Southern Rhodesian Government relating to the Native Control Bill, he will draw the attention of that Government to the importance of securing that offences shall not be tried nor penalties inflicted by those who have made the charge against the alleged offender?
It is presumed that the hon. Member refers to Section 17 of the Act. The Native Commissioners on whom the powers in question are conferred are judicial officers. In any event it is provided that the proceedings of all cases tried under this Section shall be reviewed by the Chief Native Commissioner, who is an officer of high standing and with wide experience of natives, and further, that all natives convicted under the Section shall be informed that they have the right of having their conviction brought by way of review or appeal before the High Court.
In view of the importance of this question, I propose to raise it to-morrow night on the Adjournment, or at the earliest opportunity.
JUVENILE EMPLOYMENT.
asked the Prime Minister whether, seeing that sanction was given to the legislation for the indenturing of native children in Rhodesia prior to the receipt by the Secretary of State for the Dominions of the last Report of the Chief Native Commissioner of Rhodesia, he will invite the Rhodesian Government to consider the advisability of submitting to His Majesty's Government periodic reports upon the working of the system of child labour in Rhodesia?
It is presumed that the hon. Member refers to the observations in the last report of the Chief Native Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia on the wages paid to native labourers in the mica fields. The report deals, however, with a period before the Native Juveniles Employment Act came into operation. Prior to the Act the employment of native juveniles was wholly unregulated, and the object of the legislation is to bring such employment under proper control and to enable the Native Commissioners to prohibit the employment of juveniles where it would be contrary to the interests of such juveniles. Information as to the working of the Act will no doubt be given in future reports of the Chief Native Commissioner.
WRECK OF STEAMSHIP "ELBERFELD" (CAPTAIN THOMAS).
asked the President of the Board of Trade if his attention has been called to the services rendered by Captain Pryce Thomas when in charge of the United Salvage Company's steamer "Rescue"; if he is aware that Captain Thomas picked up an S.O.S. from the German steamer "Elberfeld," whilst anchored at Gibraltar, and, notwithstanding the heavy weather, went to the assistance of the "Elberfeld," and, after strenuous efforts, the crew and one of the passengers, who had taken to lifeboats, were saved; and if the Board of Trade propose suitably to recognise Captain Thomas's services?
The attention of the Board of Trade had not previously been drawn to this case, and they will gladly obtain further particulars with regard to it. I should explain that in cases of this kind the question of recognition is usually left to the Government of the country to which the ship in distress belonged.
MINERAL TRANSPORT (STANDING COMMITTEE).
asked the Minister of Transport whether the Standing Committee on Mineral Transport, appointed in February, 1927, has made any Report; if so, what are its recommendations and what steps are being taken to give effect to them; and, if not, when may a Report be expected?
I understand that the Standing Committee on Mineral Transport are still engaged on the collection of data necessary to the consideration of the matters remitted to them. They have not yet presented a Report, and I am unable to state how soon they may be in a position to do so.
Can the Minister give an approximate idea whether the Committee will have finished its labours by the end of the year?
I am afraid that I can give no date.
Are we to understand that this problem is not quite so simple as the Samuel Commission thought it was?
It looks like that.
LIQUOR TRAFFIC (STATE CONTROL, CARLISLE).
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that the Carlisle and district State management has entered into competition with local manufacturers of temperance beverages, some of whom have already been forced out of business; whether he proposes to take any steps to prevent such competition; whether he is aware that the State management are competing with private interests in the general unlicensed catering trade; and whether such trade was considered in the State management scheme originally?
The Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) in 1916 acquired four licensed businesses in the city of Carlisle, which, in addition to the manufacture of beer and the blending and bottling of spirits, etc., carried on business as aerated-water manufacturers. These businesses were almost immediately concentrated in one building. There has been no change in the policy of supplying food and non-alcoholic refreshment in the same premises as intoxicating liquor in Carlisle, and it seems to my right hon. Friend that that policy is clearly right.
Is it not within the knowledge of the hon. and gallant Gentleman that they are tendering now for catering contracts, and is it not a fact that that was never contemplated when the original control over liquor was given to the State?
May we be assured that the Conservative Government are still in favour of the principle of competition?
Is it or is it not a fact that hon. Members opposite are constantly stating that every State undertaking is a failure, and does he not think the hon. and gallant Member who puts this question is justifying State enterprise?
Is it not a fact that if this State management paid Income Tax, Corporation Profits Tax, and Super-tax—[ Interruption ].
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that large numbers of the supporters of the Government are bitterly opposed in any shape or form to the nationalisation of any trade?
May we take it that the support of this policy is an indication that the Government are assisting the Temperance party to blockade Prohibition?
BETTING DUTY.
asked the Home Secretary if he is aware of the existence, in London and elsewhere, of clubs, which have sprung up since the imposition of the Betting Tax, where illegal betting is taking place with consequent evasion of the tax; and whether he proposes to take any steps to ensure their suppression?
My right hon. Friend is aware that the number of registered clubs has increased of late years, and no doubt betting takes place in certain classes of club, but he is not in a position to say that clubs have been formed for the purpose of avoiding the Betting Duty. The detection of illegal betting in clubs is a matter of some difficulty, but the police are alive to the practice, and wherever possible proceedings are taken.
Has the Home Office received any submission from any other Departments in regard to these clubs?
I should like notice of that question.
Is it not a fact that at some of these clubs betting certificates are issued?
I am not aware of that, but, if the hon. Member has any facts to give me, I shall be glad to receive them.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that ready money betting is now taking place on licensed bookmakers' premises in respect of which an entry certificate has been issued; and will he explain why duty is collected on this form of illegal betting and not upon betting through a wholly illegal business such as street betting or solely ready money betting taking place upon unlicensed premises?
There have been several prosecutions by the police for illegal betting such as that described in the first part of the question. In reply to the second part, a bookmaker who conducts illegal betting renders himself liable, not only to police prosecution for contravention of the law relating to betting, but also, if he does not pay duty on the bets, to Revenue prosecution as well.
May I ask if the authorities are endeavouring to collect the duty upon all betting, whether it takes place in a legal or an illegal form?
Yes, that is so. All illegal betting, if discovered, is punished, and the Revenue tax imposed. The Finance Act provides that all betting, legal and illegal, shall be taxed, and the authorities try to enforce the law.
Can the hon. Gentleman give the House the number of prosecutions that have taken place?
No, Sir; not without notice.
IRAQ (RAIDS).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has received any further Reports from the Iraq Government of the impending attack or the movements of Sheikh Feisal-ed-Dowish; and can he give the particulars?
The Acting High Commissioner for Iraq reports the receipt of a message from the King of the Hejaz and Nejd to the effect that serious trouble has broken out in Nejd and that he has heard, to his regret, that a force of Akhwan is marching north contrary to his orders. He wished the Iraq authorities to have warning of this movement. The latest reports show that Akhwan raiding parties have recently been active in the neutral zone, which is between Iraq and Nejd territory. On the 9th December a British aeroplane reconnaissance was fired upon, one wireless operator being wounded. Later on, the same day, British aircraft located a strong raiding party in this area and attacked them with good effect. There is also a report of a raid by Akhwan further north in Iraq territory, but this is not yet confirmed.
Could we know whether the raiding parties are in very large numbers?
Not, I gather, very large, but it would seem that loot and marauding were the main objects of the raids.
ZAMBESI RIVER (BRIDGE).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any steps have been taken to construct a bridge over the Zambesi River?
I am not in a position to make any statement.
SINGAPORE (ARRESTS).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that two Javanese Communists, named Alimin and Moeso, who have been for some time past engaged in revolutionary movements in Dutch East India under the directions of the Moscow Communist Internationale, were recently arrested at Singapore and subsequently released; and whether these persons were prosecuted?
Before this question is answered, may I ask whether a question affecting some other Government which states an apparent fact is quite in order?
To what is the hon. Member referring?
I refer particularly to the phrase where it states that for some time past these persons have been engaged in revolutionary movements under the directions of the Moscow Communist Internationale.
In all these questions, the Member asking the question makes himself responsible.
I am responsible, and I accept the responsibility.
Yes, Sir, I am aware of the arrest and release of these men. They were arrested under the local Banishment Ordinance, but after full inquiry the Governor was advised that in the existing state of the law further proceedings against them were impossible, and they were accordingly released. As I informed the hon. Member for Blackpool (Sir W. de Frece) on 5th December, steps are now being taken to bring the local law into line with that of this country.
Are we to understand that these two persons did not break the law in the territory referred to?
As I understand it, they did not break the existing law in the Straits Settlements, and therefore, they were released.
Is it a fact that they were acting under the direction of the Moscow Communist Internationale?
I believe it is called the Third Internationale. I understand that that is the body to which they proclaimed themselves as being allied.
Are we to understand from the right hon. Gentleman's answer that at the present time there is greater liberty in the Straits Settlements than there is in this country?
There are defects in the local law there in dealing with revolutionaries which do not obtain in the local law in this country.
Is it not time that steps were taken to bring them into line with the common practice of the law in this country?
As I said last week, approval has been given to the introduction into the Straits Settlements Legislature of the necessary legislation.
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that, so far as the Third Internationale is concerned, it has nothing at all to do with the Soviet Government?
KENYA.
STOCK AND PRODUCE THEFT ORDINANCE.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware of the provisions of the Bill to amend the Stock and Produce Theft Ordinance, published in the official gazette of Kenya, 8th November, 1927; and whether the Bill has been submitted to the Secretary of State for his approval?
I am aware of the provisions of the Bill and I agreed to publication preparatory to its introduction into the Legislative Council.
Will the right hon. Gentleman undertake to keep a close watch on this proposed legislation, which contains ideas so contrary to our ideas?
I cannot quite agree with my hon. Friend in the latter part of his statement, but the terms of this Ordinance will be carefully examined. It follows, I understand, Ordinances applying to other crops; it applies not only to coconuts in Kenya, but to other crops.
Is it not a fact that a native is to be held guilty if he is in possession of produce, unless he proves himself innocent?
Yes; if he is in possession of certain categories of produce, he has to show how he got possession.
MUNICIPALITY OF NAIROBI (EXTENSION).
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can give particulars of the proposed extension of the municipality of Nairobi, in Kenya?
The population of the present municipality is 2,665 Europeans, 7,741 Indians, 76 Arabs and 1,382 others—a total of 11,864. The area which the Feetham Commission propose to add is approximately 15,107 acres of which 5,900 acres is under development for building purposes. The population of this area is 900 Europeans, 311 Indians, 6 Arabs and 64 others—a total of 1,281.
EX-ENEMY AIR RAIDS (CASUALTIES).
asked the Secretary of State for Air whether there is any record as to the civilian lives lost and as to the value of property destroyed in Great Britain by German aircraft during the War; and whether the information can be published?
In answer to the first part of the question, I understand that the number of civilians killed in Great Britain by German aircraft during the War was 1,117. As regards the second part, I am making inquiries and will communicate later with the hon. Member.
WIFE'S TORTS (HUSBAND'S LIABILITY).
asked the Home Secretary if, in view of the dissatisfaction at the state of the law respecting the liability
of the husband for the wife's torts, he will consider an alteration in the law with regard to the same?
A Bill for the purpose of altering the law on this matter was introduced by the Lord Chancellor in another place in 1925 and passed through all its stages there, but unfortunately it was impossible to find time for it in this House in that year, and the exigencies of Parliamentary business have prevented the Government since then from proceeding with the matter. My Noble Friend will give further consideration to the matter with a view to seeing whether it is possible to proceed with it in the Session of 1928.
BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
May I ask the Prime Minister what business he proposes to take on Friday?
The business will be the Second Readings of the following Bills: Indian Church [ Lords ], Statute Law Revision [ Lords ], Medical and Dentists Acts Amendment [ Lords ], Report and Third Reading of the Nursing Homes (Registration) Bill, and, if time permit, other Orders on the Paper.
May I ask whether, in order to enable Members to make holiday arrangements, the Prime Minister will announce when the House will meet next year?
That is Thursday's question.
Motion made, and Question put, That the Proceedings on Government Business be exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)."—[ The Prime Minister. ]
The House divided: Ayes, 195; Noes, 130.
LAW OF LIBEL AMENDMENT BILL [Lords].
Report and Special Report from the Joint Committee, in respect of the Law of Libel Amendment Bill [Lords] (pending in the Lords), brought up, and read.
Report and Special Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Minutes of Proceedings to be printed.
SUPPLY.
Considered in Committee.
[Captain FITZROY in the Chair.]
ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1927.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £3,090,000, be granted to His Majesty to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1928, for the excess cost involved in the employment of extra troops in China, not provided for in the Army Estimates of the year.
In presenting this Supplementary Estimate to the Committee, I want to emphasise the fact that it is to meet the excess cost of the extra troops which were sent to China. That means that this Estimate does not cover the cost of the ordinary garrison of three battalions stationed in China, nor does it take into consideration the normal cost of those extra troops which were sent out there. I would also add that where, owing to their move to China, any saving has been made in the ordinary or normal expenses of the troops, that saving has been credited to this Vote. In March of this year we asked for a Supplementary Estimate for £950,000 to meet the expenses of the Shanghai Defence Force up to the end of the last financial year, up to 31st March last. In presenting that Estimate I explained that only those expenses which could be paid in the last financial year were included in that Supplementary Estimate. In presenting the main Army Estimates of this year my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War made it quite clear that no sum whatever was being included in those main estimates for the extra cost of the Shanghai Defence Force, but that Supplementary Estimates would be laid to cover those expenses. That is the reason for the Supplementary Estimate which I now have to present to the Committee.
I think it may be of interest if I draw attention to some of the movements of troops which have taken place since March and those which took place before March. In the first place, before the end of March, that is, during the last financial year, two infantry brigades and one extra battalion, together with artillery, an armoured car company, and various ancillaries, had been sent from this country and from Gibraltar and from Malta. Part of the cost of that movement, but only part of it, was included in the Supplementary Estimate taken for last year. In addition to those troops there was also, of course, one infantry brigade, with artillery and various ancillaries, sent from India. After March, in April and May, one additional infantry brigade, with details of artillery, and various ancillaries, was sent from this country. The troops I have mentioned which were sent out to China formed the Shanghai Defence Force, and they were distributed between Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin and Wei-hai-wei, under the command of Major-General Duncan. The very presence of those troops had undoubtedly, a steadying effect in China.
In July it was decided that the strength of the force could be decreased, and the Indian brigade, which had been sent there in the first place, was returned to India between the months of July and November. It was later decided that five battalions of infantry and miscellaneous details might be withdrawn from China and sent to home and other stations. That means that it was decided that two brigades of infantry and one additional battalion should be withdrawn. I would like to refer to an answer which I gave to a question by the hon. Member for Stourbridge (Mr. Wellock) on Monday. He asked me the present strength of the additional troops in China, and I replied that the present strength was nine battalions, six of which were in Shanghai. I was then asked a supplementary question by, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker) as to whether any further reduction was contemplated. The figures I gave in reply to the original question were the actual troops in China at the present time, hut I had in mind that the five battalions which I have referred to, and which it had been decided to withdraw, had either been withdrawn or were in process of being withdrawn. Of the nine battalions which I gave as the present strength one is shortly being withdrawn, being one of the five battalions being taken away. That means that when that battalion has been taken away, and when these decreases have taken their full effect, the strength remaining additional to the garrison in China will be eight infantry battalions, of which five will be at Shanghai, in addition to supporting artillery and various ancillary troops. That is the force which will remain there for the present. It is impossible to forecast the future. The conditions are always being carefully watched, but I think that the Committee will agree that the whole force cannot be removed until a Government in China can assure us that it is able and willing to give adequate protection to our own nationals. The force which I have outlined as remaining there will, of course, be far less expensive than the larger force which has been there during the past year, and, assuming that no large expenditure for transport has to be provided for in the next year, the cost for the following year will be very much less than the figures now before the Committee.
I would like to refer to the position of the troops which have been out there. I think the Committee will realise that the position has been one of extreme difficulty, because, wherever the troops have been called in to assist at all, it has been in the case of riot or civil com-motion, and there are no more difficult situations with which troops have to deal. I think without doubt that the troops in China have acted with very great restraint; in fact, they have lived up to the very highest traditions of the British Army. The actual living conditions of the troops have been by no means perfect, and I think we shall sympathise with them in that respect. Their quarters have been in a confined space where they have had to live in improvised encampments. There have been very few facilities for training, and the opportunities for recreation have been very much restricted. Yet, in spite of all these disadvantages, the discipline of the troops has been excellent, and their conduct most exemplary. It may interest the Committee to know that, in view of all these circumstances, the health of the troops has been very satisfactory. In the earlier months of the occupation during the hot weather, there was a somewhat serious outbreak of pneumonia, but that was largely due to the climatic conditions, and also to the common but very unpleasant habit of the Chinese in spitting on the ground everywhere, in public carriages, and in all public places. To that habit was partly attributed the somewhat prevalent disease of pneumonia at the beginning of the occupation. On the whole, the health of the troops has been satisfactory.
Before turning to one or two of the items of the Supplementary Estimates, I should like to say a word with regard to the A Reservists. Questions have been put in the House with regard to the employment or re-employment of A Reservists when they return home. Some 3,000 of these men were recalled to the Colours to make up the numbers of the Shanghai Defence Force. Those men were within 12 months or two years of having left the Colours, and in the A Reserves they receive the sum of 1s. 6d. per day, which is 6d. more than the ordinary Reservists, on the sole condition that they place themselves at the disposal of the Government, and can be called up for service when necessary. They were called up, and some of them have already returned to civil life, and others are on their way back again. I would like to take this opportunity of appealing to the employers who employed these men before they were called up. Naturally, it is to those employers that these men will turn on their return home in the hope of being reinstated in their former employment. I know that a considerable number of them were unemployed before they went out to China.
Are we to understand that, where these men were in jobs when they joined up, the firms have not kept their posts open for them on their return?
I have heard of individual cases where the men have been refused reinstatement, but many of them have not yet returned, and when they do return they get one month's leave with full pay and allowances, and many of them enjoy that month's leave before seriously looking for employment. [An HON. MEMBER: "They have earned it!"] Certainly, they have earned it. That is one of the difficulties in dealing with A Reservists, because some of these men who have returned have not yet been seriously looking for employment. I think this is a good opportunity to make one more appeal to the employers of this country, not only the previous employers of these men but also to other employers to do what they can to provide employment for those who have given up their civil employment and have rendered such excellent service in China.
What is their position in regard to unemployment insurance?
That point has been dealt with before. Every one of these men has a certain amount of paid-up time for insurance benefit up to the time he leaves the Colours.
In view of the services which these men have rendered, surely the Government ought to be responsible for finding them employment, if their former employers refuse to do so.
No, Sir. It really is impossible for the Government to undertake to find employment for these men. Not only A Reservists but many others leave the Colours every year, and it is impossible for the War Office to undertake to find employment for one particular section. We do our best for them, and we are in constant touch with committees and other bodies who try to find employment for them. I am doing all that I can to get employers to re-engage these men. We have allowed them 28 days' leave with full pay and allowances, so that they may have an opportunity of finding employment.
If you wanted them for war again, you would soon employ them.
The War Office always does its best for those who have loyally served their country. [An HON. MEMBER: "You are running away from the point!"] I am not running away from the point, and I can say confidently that on any occasion that the record of the War Office with regard to help and assistance, and their interest generally in ex-service men, is examined it will be found to stand high in the opinion of those who have taken such a deep interest in ex-service men.[ Interruption. ]
It would be much better to allow the hon. and gallant Member to proceed with his speech.
4.0 p.m.
I only want to impress upon the Committee that we are doing our best, and will continue to do our best to find employment, and I merely mention this matter in the hope that, once again, it will come to the notice of employers, and that they will do what they possibly can to give employment to these men who have served their country so well. I have dealt quite shortly with one or two of the main causes of the introduction of this Supplementary Estimate. In the first place, perhaps, the item which jumps to the notice of people is the sum required for sea transport in excess of the normal trooping programme. The sum of £978,000, of course, seems rather large, but when hon. Members realise the conveyance overseas some 10,000 miles— the distance which these troops have to be carried—I think it will be realised that it involves a large item of expenditure. I have already explained how 17 battalions with ancillary troops, motor transport, vehicles, etc., had to be sent out to China. Some of these have already returned, and, in some cases, double transport has been incurred. But when ships have to be provided, as they had to be in the first place, at very short notice, hon. Members will realise that the cost is bound to be considerable.
Then, again, with regard to the cost of accommodation at Shanghai or Hongkong, and also reinstatement charges, hon. Members will understand that troops went out there to places where no accommodation was available. In some cases we were able to get buildings; in some cases we could only obtain land, and had to construct buildings and encampments upon those lands. We had no powers such as we might have under Emergency Regulations in this country in times of requisition, and, therefore, we had to go into the market and obtain accommodation on the very best terms which we could make. The cost certainly has been considerable, but some of this cost covers reinstatement of premises we are already giving up, so that the expenses in the future will not be so great. While I am dealing with the question of accommodation, I think it will interest the Committee to know that with regard to Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Council are paying the extra cost of billets, fuel, light and water due to the use of one of the battalions on internal security duties; also that the Shanghai Defence Force is exempt from the taxes on land and buildings, occupied and unoccupied, and that the land and buildings belonging to the Shanghai Municipal Council utilised by the troops are provided rent free. That is a contribution by the local municipal council towards the cost incurred by this country.
Could we have the total amount of the contribution from the Shanghai Municipal Council?
I am not sure whether I could give the hon. Member that information, because it is not in actual figures. They are remissions. Of course, I have not got them in my head, but I will inquire whether I can give the hon. Member any estimate or approximate figures. I think, obviously, it is a substantial concession for which we may be grateful. It is a saving of money, anyhow, on the Army Estimates, and, therefore, to the taxpayers of this country. Another item is for the full maintenance, pay, rations, etc., of the Indian Contingent. In introducing the Supplementary Estimate in March, there was some doubt at that time, as I explained, as to whether India would pay part of the expenses of that Contingent, or whether it would all fall on our Votes. The whole of the amount has fallen upon our Votes—their pay, rations, transport and everything else. They are all included in the various headings under the Supplementary Estimate now before the Committee.
Then, of course, there was the purchase of additional stores. Stores which were withdrawn from stock had to be replaced, and that amounted to considerable additional expenditure. There is one item to which critical members of the Committee may refer, and that is under Vote 5, L. It certainly looks rather peculiar to see "Add Appropriation-in-Aid (Deficiency)." I would like to explain, that that particular Appropriation-in-Aid, which is debited as a deficiency, is in respect of sea transport which would have taken place under normal conditions of relief to India. We obtained an Appropriation-in-Aid from India covering the cost of any normal transport for relief troops going to India, but, as the troops did not go to India, that Appropriation-in-Aid, of course, will not come to us, and therefore the amount is rightly added to this item as an additional charge to War Office funds. Of course, there are many items in the Supplementary Estimate which hon. Members may wish further explaining; I shall be glad to explain them if they are raised, but I do not think the Committee wish to be detained too long on details, as most of them are self-explanatory. Therefore, I hope we may get the Vote without much discussion.
We have had from the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken a lucid and businesslike statement such as we are beginning to be accustomed to have from him, but it was so businesslike that we have not succeeded in learning very much about what really matters greatly to the House, which is, why the soldiers are still there, and how long they are going to stay there? There is, moreover, a matter of detail on which I am never able to get any definite information from the hon. and gallant Gentleman. It is, how many of our soldiers are out there? We get units. We are not all military people here, and we do not know exactly to what an infantry battalion unit and all the ancillary troops may happen to amount, and the numbers that are out there are important in one respect. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has just said that the health of the troops is good; I do not know how many troops there are, but I will assume, for the sake of my argument, that there are 20,000, or shall I take the figure at 15,000?
It is a varying figure.
They are constantly varying within very small limits. There are a certain number of units being brought back, but the hon. and gallant Gentleman must know perfectly well how many there are within 100 or 200 at any moment, and he must have known it all along, but he will not tell us. I will, therefore, assume there has been an average of 20,000 during this year. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that the health of the troops has been good.
On the whole satisfactory.
These are the figures which the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself has given of the approximate average number in hospital during the various months. It began in March with 580. I am only going to read the "other ranks," although, of course, there is a proportion of officers. In April, the figure was 740; May, 370; June, 959; July, 1,309; August, 1,132; September, 1,191; October, 799; and November, 713. The Committee will observe that those figures are something like one in twenty always in hospital. I do not know whether that is a good average or a bad average. I should not think that it was a very good average, and that is one of the reasons I wish the Government would tell us how many soldiers we have had out there the whole time. The truth is, I do not think the Government want this defence force to be talked about too much. Recently the newspapers have not talked very much about it, and Ministers do not talk much about it. I think Ministers sometimes, perhaps, forget its existence. I do not know whether Lord Cushendun may have been been under the impression that these 20,000 men were disbanded, instead of being sent away to China, when he thrilled the astonished nations the other day with the announcement that Britain was disarming. Perhaps that was the impression he was under. But what we want to ask the Government in this Debate is not merely details such as those with which the hon. and gallant Member has been dealing, but how long this forgotten army is going to stay in Chinese territory. We want some statement of the Government's policy.
I am not going to waste the time of the Committee in reviewing the centre of our old controversy, that is to say, the question whether or not it was necessary for the safety of the British in January to send out troops to Shanghai. I am not going to repeat the arguments, because we all know perfectly well that we shall not agree. There are, however, other matters in connection with it. To us, of course, it will continue to remain an unhappy and a dangerous escapade on the part of the Government. No doubt those who support the Government will continue to say that it is a necessity, but we said that there were other results which were going to follow. We said that it would further embitter Chinese feeling which was already bitter enough towards us because of the Shanghai shootings and because of the bombardment of Wahnsien, and we said that whereas no doubt you would be able to say—and no doubt it is true—that behind the wire entanglements of Shanghai the British people would be safer if they had got 20,000 troops than if they had only 5,000, yet those outside Shanghai would be in greater danger because of the embittered feeling of the Chinese. So right were we about that, that no sooner had British troops been sent to Shanghai than the Government themselves issued invitations to Britishers in all other parts of China to go down to the coast and abandon their places of living. At any rate, the second thing which we said about the sending out of this force to Shanghai was perfectly correct, that is to say, that the British in the rest of China were in greater danger, and the Government themselves proved it by their own suggestion.
The next thing that we said was that British trade would suffer even more severely than it was suffering already. I think it is worth while that there should be a little, if possible, impartial consideration of what the effect on British trade is, by all parties in the House of Commons. The prosperity of one great county in this country, namely, Lancashire, is very deeply involved. During the last few years the exports from the United Kingdom to China have been falling steadily and rapidly. In 1922 they were worth £21,800,000. In 1923, they fell to £17,290,000; in 1924 they rose slightly, to £19,000,000; in 1925 they fell to £13,500,000. In the last year there has been a very serious drop indeed. The total value of United Kingdom produce and manufactures exported to China in the first-six months of 1926 was £9,259,000, and in the first six months of 1927 the figure had fallen to £5,194,000. This fall is the more serious because the exports of cotton piece goods have fallen by nearly 50 per cent., from a value of £4,000,000 to £2,300,000; and this process is still going on.
We maintain, and I think with some reason, that this is due to the fact that the policy of the Government is continually aggravating the Chinese people into greater hostility to ourselves; because let it be observed that, while our trade with China is steadily falling, it is not the case that the consuming capacity of the Chinese is declining. While we have been losing this trade, the Chinese, in spite of their civil war, in spite of all that has been going on in their country, have been importing just as large quantities of cotton piece goods as they were before; and not only so, but there has been an actual increase. Taking the last three years—I am not going to convert these taels into pounds, because I merely want to compare the three figures—in 1924 the import was 192,000,000 taels; in 1925 it was 196,000,000, and, in 1926, 205,000,000. That is to say, during the period when our trade was steadily falling, when our export of cotton goods was going down, even in these circumstances the Chinese people were consuming more. That is a very serious fact for us. The fact is that Lancashire is being blockaded at Shanghai, and, if the Government do not recognise this, at any rate those in Lancashire do. The General Council of the Amalgamated Weavers' Association said: We recognise that the civil war in China is detrimental to Lancashire trade, but we know that it will be a thousand times worse if the presence of armed forces results in hostilities. We warn the cotton workers of Lancashire that the danger of war is not past until the armed forces are withdrawn and the British Government recognise the full independence and sovereignty of China. It is also worth mentioning that this feeling in regard to the disaster which the policy of the Government is bringing upon them is not confined entirely to the working class. Mr. William Heaps, the Chairman of the Manchester Cotton Association, speaking of the long period of tribulation through which the cotton trade was passing, said that: the trade could not be again fully employed until there was a greater demand from the important market of China. The demand is there, but it is not coming to us, because of the policy which the Government imposes upon us. The question, surely, for this Committee to-day is, how long are we going to leave these troops there, and how are we going to get out of this morass in which our trading interests are in China?
I do not think that there is necessarily any great difference of opinion between us as to the ultimate way out. We on this side may put it a little more bluntly; perhaps that is the only difference; and we think it ought to be done more quickly. We say that the unequal treaties have got to go, that the Chinese have got to be treated as equals, and that as soon as possible the ports and cities of China ought to belong to the Chinese people again. The direction in which the Government want to go is the same; I presume that their policy has not changed, and that the Memorandum of last December still stands as the policy of the Government. But how can they get a step further in carrying out the ideas of that Memorandum as long as the army of occupation is there? It is that which makes it impossible for them to negotiate and to make any further advance. It is said, of course, that there is chaos in China. In the first place, I should like to say that China is a very big place—it is a continent, not a country. There are in it immense tracts which, even in the present troubled circumstances, are securely and peaceably governed, and have been for years past. If you are discussing whether you can come to terms which would enable you to withdraw your troops from Shanghai, the Government with which you have to deal is the Nanking Government. The Nanking Government is a Government which, as everybody knows, is one with which even now, according to the standards of the party opposite, you can deal. They have dealt with their Communists, and there is no perceptible reason for supposing that there would be any Communist reaction in Nanking. It is known, from the statements which have been made by those responsible for the Nanking Government, that they would be ready to meet us. Mr. Wu, the Foreign Secretary, recently issued an announcement in which he said that they had taken note of the statements emanating from authorised spokesmen of the foreign Governments as to the inapplicability of the existing treaties and their readiness to meet the wishes of the Chinese people, and that: With every confidence in the good intentions of the foreign Governments, this Government earnestly hopes that negotiations with a view to the conclusion of new treaties will immediately be opened. That could have been done, but our Government have not chosen to do it, and, as long as we keep our Army there, as long as our Army is there creating distrust, creating terrorism by the exhibition of overwhelming force which is incompatible with negotiations, clearly nothing can be done. I want to ask the Government to say, through a later speaker on their behalf in the Debate, whether they are going to consider a withdrawal of the troops in the course of the next few months. They have brought back one battalion after another, but they still keep the main force there. Or, on the other hand, are the British forces going to remain there indefinitely until the situation is perfect in China? How long is that going to be? If they are going to be left there, we shall get accustomed to leaving them there, and they will be more and more forgotten. The months will go by, and we shall go on into another year, paying, paying, paying. This year we have paid between £4,000,000 and £5,000,000 for keeping them there; are we going to pay £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 again next year? Is the economic Government, that is saving on unemployment and saving on education, going on paying out this £4,000,000 or £5,000,000? Then there is the question of the health of the troops. I have shown, by the figures I have read out, how, in the summer months at any rate, the number of the sick in hospital amounted to one in 15 or one in 20—I cannot give the exact figures because I do not know them. I presume that, if they continue to stay there, we shall have the same kind of sick list. We on this side consider, in the first place, that there never was an expenditure and there never was an expedition which was less justified than this to Shanghai, but we think it will be infinitely worse if this force is kept there indefinitely, ad infinitum. There is on the Paper a Motion in my name and those of other hon. Friends of mine, to reduce the Vote by £100, but I do not propose to move that reduction, because it does not adequately represent our views. We object to the whole of this expenditure as wanton, wasteful, hard on our people, and still harder on our soldiers who are kept out there, and we intend to invite the Committee to vote against the whole Estimate.
I had no intention of taking part in this Debate, but I feel that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Newcastle (Mr. Trevelyan) has made certain statements which it would be desirable to answer, even in the perhaps rather indifferent way in which I am able to answer them at a moment's notice. I think the Committee will have a certain amount of sympathy with the right hon. Gentleman, on account of the difficulty of the waters in which he was steering his barque, because it must be within the knowledge of all Members of the House that the attitude which his party took up on this question only a few months ago was one which results have shown was utterly wanting in statesmanship, showed an entire absence of any knowledge of China and Chinese conditions, and, indeed, if their advice had been followed, would have plunged, not only the British people, but a large section of the coast-living people of China, into great trouble and danger. The right hon. Gentleman said in effect that the fault lay upon the Government for sending these troops to China, and that the results which had come about in Shanghai had, to some extent at any rate, been caused by their despatch. On the contrary, I think it is within the knowledge of probably every Member of this Committee, and of most people in this country by this time, that, but for the despatch of these troops, not only would the lives of the British people in Shanghai have been in immense danger, but also a vast number of Chinese would have lost their lives who, as things have turned out, have been saved, while Shanghai has become, by the sending of these troops, the Mecca of the pilgrims who look to it as a place of safety and sanctuary from a great many neighbouring and troubled parts of China. As one listened to the right hon. Gentleman one could almost have believed that the civil war in China is entirely caused by the fact that the British Government sent out certain troops to protect our interests at Shanghai. As a matter of fact the real position is that there is no resentment in China, far from it, at our sending out these troops. On the contrary, it has been an action so statesmanlike and so vital that to-day Shanghai is probably the only really stable and secure city on the whole of that great coastline.
The right hon. Gentleman was also wandering far away from fact when he dealt with the situation at Shanghai as having anything to do with the falling off in the demand for Lancashire piece goods. It is extraordinarily true, as he says, that the demand for goods of all kinds continues to the extent it does, even in spite of the civil war, but the falling off of the exports of Lancashire goods is by no means entirely due to conditions in Shanghai or even to the civil war, but to totally different circumstances which to a large extent would have operated whether there had been a civil war or not. [HON. MEMBERS: "What are they?"] In the first place, the position regarding China as a market for Lancashire goods, as in the case of India, is one that has been changing steadily for a great many years past. The position is simply this. In the old days, Lancashire had a unique market in the East and was almost the sole supplier of cotton piece goods of all kinds. To-day in India, China and, indeed, all over the East, we are meeting competition, particularly in the coarser counts, which it is almost impossible for Lancashire to deal with, and there is no doubt that in normal times, in times of peace, that competition is likely to increase, based as it is upon longer working hours, cheaper labour and raw materials at hand. I do not wish to speak as an authority, but I fancy it would be generally agreed that the solution for us must be, in all these Eastern markets, the creation of the finer class of goods with which competition is not likely to be met from the East, or, at any rate, in which that competition will be at a later date than in the case of the lower quality goods. These circumstances have nothing whatever to do with the war in China or with conditions at Shanghai.
But there is the further statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the troops we have sent there have, in fact, set the Chinese people against us. I think that is a sort of statement which, if spread through the country and not contradicted, may do real harm. As far as my information goes, that statement is quite untrue. There is absolutely no foundation for it. On the contrary, the probabilities are that our action in sending troops to China was welcomed by many peace-loving Chinese. What the end of the civil war and the future of China may be, none of us can tell, but it is certain that the only statesmanlike action for the British Government is to follow the course already laid down. After the wonderfully generous declarations that were made only a year ago as to our intentions in China, in which we led all the Powers in the world in our clear statement of our desire to work amicably with China, to interfere as little as possible in Chinese affairs and to do everything we could to help to establish a stable Government, it seems to me the attitude of the British Government must remain as it is to-day, that we should keep our troops in Shanghai not to interfere in China, not to try to teach her her business, but merely to safeguard the lives and the interests of our British people there and incidentally to try to safeguard, to the extent that it is right and just for us to do so, the interests of the large numbers of workers in this country who, if the trade through Shanghai were stopped to-morrow, would immediately be thrown out of work.
Although I do not intend to withdraw for one moment from the position I took up last year, that our people at Shanghai were perfectly safe with our Fleet there and their very efficient volunteer force in being, I do not think at the present time it would be worth while debating with the hon. Member whether a year ago we or the Government were right. The fact is that we are faced with a situation which every Member of this House, and everyone interested in British trade, and I would add everyone interested in the Chinese people, have got to face afresh. We have at Shanghai an Army of occupation. I want to ask several questions in connection with the present situation. Has the Foreign Office envisaged the future to any extent, or is it simply carrying on the doctrine of "Wait and See"? China has now been undergoing these civil wars for the best part of 12 years. There is no more prospect of civil war coming to an end to-day than there was a year, five years, or 10 years ago. The situation is as bad as ever it was, without any sign of improvement. Are we going to continue under these circumstances the policy of "Wait and See," which was futile a year ago but which is now not merely futile but excessively expensive for the taxpayers of this country? It was, of course, possible to wash our hands of the question, to let the Chinese carry on, and protect our people there as best we could with our own right arm. We chose instead to send an Army costing this country between £4,000,000 and £5,000,000 a year. I suppose with the reduced Army now there it could carry on at an expense of £4,000,000 a year. We have had no estimate.
This Estimate is for the whole year, and is for just over £3,000,000—not £4,000,000 or £5,000,000.
Then the annual cost, we may take it, in future will be about £3,000,000 a year.
No, I have already-explained that.
I am sorry. I am not in a position, therefore, at present to ask the hon. Gentleman the exact additional cost to this country of the Army' and Navy at Shanghai, hut it must be several millions of money. There is a parallel for the situation in Egypt. In Egypt a much shorter civil war led to our sending an Army of occupation which went on from year to year indefinitely. The situation was not strictly similar to this, because that Army of occupation brought about a peaceful settlement, but the Army of occupation remained. In that case, the taxpayer of this country was not called upon to foot the Bill. If we are to have an occupation of China, or of Shanghai, we ought to come to some definite conclusion as to whether the taxpayers here or the people protected in China are to pay for the benefit of that protection.
There is another thing. It is clear to all of us who have been interested in the Chinese question that when the Expeditionary Force was sent to Shanghai it was the hope and intention of the people on the spot that the force would be used to bring about peace by carrying out military operations far outside Shanghai. That has never, I believe, for a moment been the intention of His Majesty's Government. They have always laid it down quite clearly that the Force was solely to protect Shanghai. But I believe the demand which came from the English people in China for that Force to be sent there, was not solely for the protection of Shanghai but to intervene in order in some way to secure peace by bringing the sword. I think now the people in Shanghai itself have given up any hope or anticipation of the British Force at Shanghai being used outside, as General Gordon's Force was used 70 years ago, to bring peace to China by pitting one set of Chinese against another set of Chinese. That is old history, but it cannot possibly be future history in China. The people in this country would not stand it and any such intervention is wholly out of the question. By now I think the English at Shanghai realise that that possibility is no longer practicable.
Has the right hon. and gallant Gentleman any sort of evidence or authority for what he is saying?
Yes. The letters appearing in the English Press in China have perpetually been urging that steps should be taken—of course, never military, but involving military measures —to bring peace about by force. That is quite out of the question and they know it. Is it not possible now to organise at Shanghai itself, from the foreigners there, an adequate defence or police force which would be quite as able to protect life and property as our present Army, the cost of which would fall far less upon the British taxpayer and yet would be sufficient for the primary purpose of protecting the people at Shanghai? It seems to me that is one question the Government ought really to be considering. Without any loss of prestige, without any loss of security, we might have organised there on the spot a body which could protect life and property and at the same time reduce our expenses and the undoubted hostility in the Chinese minds which our armed forces at Shanghai produce.
Can the right hon. and gallant Gentleman give us any figures of the Western population of Shanghai?
The Western population of Shanghai is undoubtedly far smaller than the Chinese population, but the hon. Member has lived long enough in the East to know that one Westerner is good enough to beat a considerable number of foreigners. It is impossible to give exact figures of the white population, but I should say the proportion is about the same as in the Bombay that he knows so well, and not only that, hut they are the richer part of the population and can afford to employ volunteer services.
If that is the figure, does the hon. and gallant Gentleman think that would constitute a population capable of producing an efficient police force without any military behind them in case of trouble?
Yes, I think so. If the population is 3,000, I presume 2,000 of them will be Englishmen—white men—every bit as capable of compulsory service as the white settlers in Kenya, and, if the danger is serious, I feel certain those people will take up arms, from 16 to 60, and give an adequate account of themselves. Englishmen abroad have to take certain risks and take them willingly, and when they are faced with trouble they generally give a good account of themselves, and I feel sure that the hon. Member's friends in Shanghai would look after themselves adequately. That is one way in which the Government might get out of the present situation. What is the alternative? Have the Government any alternative, or do they conceive of an indefinite continuance of this armed force of ours in Shanghai or Tientsin or elsewhere? Is it possible to organise Europeans on the spot sooner or later to take our place and to bear their own burden of defence?
The second question is whether the Government have formed any new plan for securing co-operation among the western nations interested in China and using that co-operation to call a conference of the various Chinese tuchuns, Governments and ruling powers with a view to eliminating bitterness between the westerners and the Chinese and, if possible, using the good influence of a joint body to bring some sort of peace into that country. Hitherto the jealousies of the different western Powers in China have been pronounced. The three principal interested parties in China are ourselves, the Americans and the Japanese. Co-operation between the three has seemed to be a dream quite impossible to realise. The Americans, we have always thought, have not seen Chinese affairs with our eyes. They look on them through the eye of the missionary and know but little of China except from the missionary angle. The Japanese, with territorial jealousies, and a special interest in Manchuria, have also been difficult to secure for any co-operation. I do think that as the months and years go on we ought to be in a position to make a fresh move.
At the present time I believe that America sees the Chinese matters far more through our eyes than they did a year ago. Mr. Strachan, who went to China about a year ago, has returned to America and he carries far more weight at Washington than probably any other American on Chinese matters. His speeches since he returned to America have been far more on all-fours with our Government's policy in China, and I should have thought that that would have been an admirable opportunity to get into touch with America, with American sentiment and with the American Government in order to see whether there really was any divergence of view which could perpetuate the dual policy of the two great nations in China. If England and America could agree there could be no doubt that Japan would come into line with us. The whole question as far as China is concerned is an agreement on policy between England and America. I know that the Americans are suspicious of our aims in China, and there are not absent from this House people who are suspicious of the aims of America. We have to discount these people. We have to assume that people of good mind in both countries can be made use of, and I am confident that if the Secretary of State would get personally into touch with the men who count in Washington on this question, we might lay the foundations of something which would redound enormously to the credit of both countries. We might lay the foundation of peace for the people of China.
I am bound to say that in this Chinese business I am thinking less of English trade than of the conditions of the Chinese people. There they are, butchered first by one party and then by another. Bandits are more numerous even than regular soldiers. People are held up to ransom and tortured until their relations provide the ransom. That is going on year after year, and the British and other nations stand around the cockpit offering sometimes well-meant advice but not intervening, because intervention involves war; sympathising, but doing nothing. [An HON. MEMBER: "Occupying Shanghai!"] Occupying Shanghai! Yes, but being very careful to see that no one is protected for one yard outside the barrier, only the Europeans. Here is an opportunity for England and America doing something which would be of more credit to our civilisation than anything that has happened since the War. If by merely getting together, explaining away the suspicions and the points of difference between us we could have full co-operation between the two peoples—it might be done by plenipotentiaries, by preference, who would be able to call together a conference of the Powers and the Chinese people—I believe that on these lines something might be done to end the business. Even if it failed, it would be a failure, but no harm would be done. If it succeeded, not merely would it save the Chinese people, but we might again employ the people of Lancashire in making the goods which the people of China want.
I wish to reply to a few of the observations made by the right hon. Member for Newcaetle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) before I proceed to my more general observations regarding the necessity for the defence force in Shanghai. The right hon. Member referred to the attitude of the Shanghai leaders which has been gathered by him from what he read in Shanghai newspapers. I would remind him that there is as great a variety of newspapers in Shanghai as in this country, and he is just as liable to read accounts which are remote from the truth in various newspapers in Shanghai as he is in many organs which are published daily in this country. There is not the slightest truth in the statement that the English community in Shanghai or any responsible body or organisation representing it ever demanded for a moment that this defence force should be used as a sort of expeditionary force for the subjugation of the Chinese. There is not a responsible agency there which for a moment would dream of suggesting a course which they know would not only involve this country in operations which might continue for an interminable time but in which it is very doubtful whether they could ever possibly achieve success. He also told us that the defence force was received, if I understood him rightly, with a great deal of hostility by the Chinese in Shanghai. That is as remote from the truth as a great deal else that has been said in connection with its despatch.
I did not say in Shanghai. I said Chinese sentiment was against it.
I will go further and say that the despatch of these troops has not been received with hostility of any description by any but the most subversive elements in China. There is not the slightest doubt that the great mass of the mercantile trading community, which exists not only in the coast ports but in the far interior, welcome any signs of order being brought into China either by us or by anybody else, so that there might be security and some opportunity of carrying on trade under orderly conditions. As far as the Chinese in Shanghai were concerned they were naturally apprehensive, at the outset, as to what was going to happen when a tremendous number of foreign soldiers were suddenly landed in their midst, but they soon learned to regard them with the utmost signs of friendliness, and you would get a bigger outcry from the Chinese in Shanghai if you removed the defence force than you would get from any other direction from which such an outcry would be likely to come.
The right hon. Gentleman also spoke about the creation of a Shanghai army and suggested that our proper course was to tell the community of Shanghai—who, I would remind him have gone out there for purely commercial purposes, to further the development of the trade of this country and to uphold the traditions and name of Englishmen and of the British Empire—that they should form themselves, or that they should be formed by some species of local conscription, into a standing army which would be quite sufficient for any period of disturbance in China, however long it might be, to provide the necessary protection in Shanghai. He must have forgotten that the British community out there are engaged all day in commercial pursuits. They have their business to attend to, and they are carrying on that enterprise which is so necessary if we are to increase our export trade. He seems to forget that if you are to have a force of a nature which would have any effect it must practically be on duty the whole of the day and the whole of the night. How could he expect the commercial community to undertake to act in the capacity of regular soldiers and to carry on their ordinary commercial work. I find that difficult to understand, and I do not think that anybody in Shanghai could understand it. I would recommend the right hon. Member to go out to Shanghai and to stay there for three or four months, and he will see the Chinese intimidator going round shooting responsible Chinese foremen, whose function it is to see that the wheels of Chinese industry are carried on, or inciting the populace to hostility against the European community. If he did that and he put himself in the forefront of the battle for a little time he would not come back and make in this House the remarks which he has made to-day.
5.0 p.m.
The Supplementary Estimate is a little larger than any of us thought it would be when the force was sent out. It is perhaps larger than we were led to suppose it would be, but I do not suppose for a moment that there is any citizen of this country who is not absolutely blinded by the fanaticism of political partisanship who grudges for a moment the money which has been spent. If ever the despatch of an expedition of this nature was justified by this country the despatch of that force has been justified. If ever money has been well spent in protecting British communities abroad who were unable to provide their own protection this money has been well spent. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Newcastle (Mr. Trevelyan) referred to the defence force as a forgotten army. I should say that it would be very much happier for his own political reputation if some of the speeches which he made in connection with the despatch of this defence force rapidly became forgotten speeches. That defence force, of course, saved Shanghai. It saved the municipal administration from the chaos into which the administration of Hankow has fallen, and it also helped to save Shanghai from any further trouble that may occur there. Further, it will be available while it is there for the purpose of protecting the British community at Tientsin if any chaos takes place there as the result of any giving up of the British Concession to a mixed Chinese administration which so far as we can gather at present is something which it is possible may occur. I can only hope that what has happened at Hankow will suffice to convince the Government that as regards the security of the British merchants in China one of the most fatal steps they could indulge in was an experiment of that nature. The hon. Gentlemen who have spoken in such strong terms about the despatch of the force have overlooked the fact that it evoked a spontaneous resolution of thanks to the British Government from foreigners of all nationalities in Shanghai, and that is largely unprecedented in our history. The events that are taking place now in Canton and about which we have been reading in the papers in the last few days afford an eloquent testimony to the necessity of this force in Shanghai for protecting the community there.
It is just as well that we should have the opportunity given to us by this Vote of again turning our attention to the situation that exists in China to-day; to our interests there, to what is at stake, to the fact that there are nine battalions of young British troops confined in Shanghai in comparative idleness, and that nobody can possibly say when we shall be able to withdraw them. My hon. and gallant Friend who presented this Estimate told us that the balance of this force will be left there until a stable Government exists in China, willing and able to create conditions of security. He could not tell us when we are going to find that Government. It is well that we should ask ourselves what is to be the outcome of the existence of these forces in Shanghai, how long they are going to be there, and what steps, if any, we can take to get them back. The conditions in China at the moment are no better than they were when the defence force went out. At that time there was a nationalist movement, which was at least a coherent organisation, sweeping the country, and which bade fair within a reasonable time to establish itself as the national Government at Peking. It was hoped that conditions would then be created which would enable the force to be withdrawn.
What is the position to-day? The Nationalist Government has disappeared. Mr. Eugene Chen, the then Foreign Minister, has disappeared too, and most people hoped the Hankow agreement had disappeared with him. There are now, instead of one united Government, three different Governments in South China, one in Canton, one at Nanking, and one at Hankow, all disputing which is to be the ultimate successor to the Government which disappeared, all fighting with one another, all endeavouring to see what they can do to forward their own projects and ambitions at the expense of their neighbours. Instead of any recognized authority, we find that there are new military commanders springing up every day. Each of them is in control of a certain number of troops, if you can call them troops. Most people call them brigands. They are intent on lining their own pockets as soon as they possibly can at the expense of their own country. Each of them is trying to get the better of the other, and not one of them is animated by any motive of bettering the conditions of his country or its people. The prize on which the eyes of these gentlemen are set is the flourishing port of Shanghai.
I would also remind the Committee that in Shanghai some 70 per cent of the Customs revenue of China is received. It is of great importance that these Customs revenues should be devoted to the purposes for which they are allocated by the obligations China has entered into and for the service of the various loans which have been made from time to time. Not one of these commanders appears to have any regard for China's obligations, but only for his own interests; and if any one of them were to secure possession of Shanghai it is very plain what would happen to these revenues. If they were sequestrated by any of these adventurers, the prosperity on which China depends would cease. I have no doubt that the conditions which prevail in that part are such as to make it more imperative than ever to see that sufficient forces are maintained at Shanghai in the interests of all nations, and particularly of China, and to preserve it from being absolutely devastated and wiped out. No one will deny that the presence of the defence force at Shanghai is as necessary now as it was when it was sent. No one can possibly tell how long the present conditions will continue, and nobody can say that the object for which we sent it there has ceased to exist.
The question which arises in view of this is, are we prepared to sit patiently down with folded hands in view of the prospect of that force being maintained there for an indefinite period, without lifting a finger to see if anything can be done? Is that our right course? Or is it to see whether there are no possible steps we can take which can create a state of affairs under which that force can he safely withdrawn or largely reduced? Are we not to make any effort to see if anything can be done? There can only be one answer to that question. We owe it to ourselves, to the men in Shanghai, to the British merchants, to the British taxpayers, and to the large Chinese community in that region with whom we have always been in a relationship of the greatest respect and esteem, to make an effort. In the name of common humanity we owe it to the vast, toiling, starving 'masses in China to see that assistance is rendered in some shape or form. What steps are the Government taking in this direction? What is the policy which they have in mind? [An HON. MEMBER: "What is your suggestion?"] They have announced a liberal policy towards Chinese aspirations but no policy to get the Defence Force out.
What is the next question that arises? What can we do? Any person with any knowledge of the situation there knows that there are other nations involved in this question. We are not the only ones concerned, and I submit that the first step we ought to take is to ascertain by first-hand contact if some common policy of co-operation between us and these nations cannot be pursued. I do not suggest a policy of aggression, of intervention or of force, but a policy designed and intended to create such conditions of comparative security as will not only enable us to withdraw the Defence Force, but to give assistance to China as well; a policy which would keep in check not only these military adventurers, but also tend to be of some help and assistance not only to the British community, but to the Chinese. Trade with China largely depends upon having certain sheltered places where business can be carried on, free from the distraction of these commanders.
We have to recognise that the Washington Agreement has become an obsolete document. It was a document brought into being in respect of a state of affairs which has now ceased to exist. We must ascertain what are the views of these other Powers interested in China, and see how far they can go with us and how far we can go with them. A great deal of preparatory work is necessary before we can ascertain exactly what the situation is, and I would submit that the right course for the Government to pursue is not to attempt to do this by means of the tortuous process of ordinary diplomatic conversations, which take a tremendous time, but to send out the biggest and best-known man of influence they can find in the country, somebody whose position and reputation are widely known and universally recognised, and charge him with the task of exploring the ground and ascertaining the possibilities by direct contact with responsible Ministers of the other nations concerned, the Foreign Ministers of America, Japan, France, Italy, and the other nations in the Washington Agreement, and who are still interested in China.
I know the Under-Secretary will raise objections to that course. There are objections to any course, and if we allow our policy to be paralysed by objections, we shall find that Defence Force sitting there year after year, and we shall never be able to get it out. But more than that, I suggest that steps should be taken to consult the great mass of moderate opinion in China which is only too aghast at what is taking place, which cannot understand why we permit our rights to be disregarded and our people endangered without making the slightest effort to check the marauders who are carrying out these acts, and who have come to regard us no longer as a strong Power capable of standing up for our rights, but, to use a characteristic Chinese expression, as a paper tiger which looks fierce and does nothing. We should take steps to see if they have not some suggestions which may be of assistance to themselves and to us, if, at the worst, they can suggest some policy we could adopt which would serve to keep alive the centres of trade until more settled conditions exist. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the big Chinese Guilds must surely have some views on this matter which will be worth while ascertaining. Why should we not ask what they are?
If we find that all efforts in this direction are hopeless, I suggest that we should consider laying the whole matter before the League of Nations. China has disregarded, or very largely disregarded, all the Treaties she has entered into. She has infringed their provisions almost every day. She is imperilling our subjects. She is a member of the League of Nations. Surely it is within the competence of the League, and well worth its attention, to turn its consideration to the large and great issues which are at stake in this part of the world. I ask my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State if there is anything in the constitution or in the rules or procedure of the League of Nations which prevents this matter being brought to their notice by himself or by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. If they fail there, what else can we do? I suggest that the next step is to see if we cannot obtain a common policy with Japan, with whom I would remind the Committee, we had the happiest alliance for many years. Japan is as much, interested in these questions as we are. She has, perhaps, a greater interest in China than we have. She is equally concerned with us, and she cannot afford to remain long aloof from what is happening in China. We have no right to assume that she would not be willing and even anxious to walk hand in hand with us in this matter. We are entitled to anticipate that she would be only too willing to co-operate with us in some common policy which would not only protect both our interests alike in the Far East, but would be calculated to bring some measure of peace and security to portions of that very unhappy land.
Finally, if everything else fails, if all these efforts are doomed to failure, there is one thing which stands out clearly as an instance of what we ought to do. We ought to ensure respect for ourselves, for our rights, for our interests and for our subjects, by insisting upon China's engagements with us being respected and fulfilled. We ought to permit no interference with, and no derogation from, these rights. We ought to make it clear that we shall maintain them by any means which we consider advisable, whatever the consequences may be. What is the lesson which has been learned through generations of contact with Oriental nations? It is that the less you stand up for your rights, the more you are under the necessity of standing up for them. The more we pursue the policy of offering the other cheek to the smiter, the more we shall have to put up with the exactions and the excesses of military leaders. If we do not take steps to stand up for ourselves, to see that our rights are not only insisted upon but respected, the more we shall be under the obligation to keep the Defence Force there. Our concessions, our settlements, the railways which have been built with our moneys, and which are run by our management, are outstanding instances of matters in-which we should see that our rights are maintained and preserved.
If we do that we shall at least have this advantage, that we shall maintain certain vital areas of trade in China where there are order and security, and where the Chinese as well as ourselves can carry on the business which they are only too anxious to carry on, if conditions permit. After all, the real question we have to ask ourselves is, Are we content to allow a quarter of the world which contains one-fourth of the whole population of the globe to lapse into devastation and misery without anyone making the slightest effort to see if something cannot be done? I can discover nowhere at the moment any movement or idea on the part of Great Britain or any other nation to take any steps which may be of assistance to the Chinese who are now suffering from the causes with which we have been familiar for some time; and upon the answer to this question depends the answer not only as to the outcome of the future events in China but as to how long we shall be obliged to keep the Defence Force there.
I desire to oppose this Vote, and I do so because I believe the policy we have pursued in China is entirely wrong. The situation in China when we sent out these troops was very difficult indeed. Involved in it were economic issues, the question of extra-territoriality, and the great national movement of China. The least we could have done in these circumstances was to make our attitude absolutely clear. We never attempted to do that in regard to the question of extraterritoriality, or with reference to our economic position as occupiers of factories and other works in Shanghai and other places. Instead of adopting an enlightened policy in regard to China, we sent our troops there, and there was, naturally, a good deal of antagonism through-nut the country, which has been main- tained to this day. We are suffering from it to-day, and have suffered from it all along. That antagonism need never have occurred, or, if it had, it might have been removed in the early stages if our policy had been open and enlightened.
There is a considerable number of Germans in China, in Shanghai and outside, and a certain number of Belgians, and in regard to both these sets of nationals there has never been any danger for the safety of their lives, property or business. As a matter of fact, I was reading in an American journal recently an article written by an American journalist, who said that he had witnessed very remarkable things in China. He had seen going down the Yangtse German boats which put on certain Chinese characters conveying tidings of goodwill to the Chinese people, and that a battle between two national parties was actually stopped in order to allow these German boats to proceed on their way. He further said that Germany was picking up a good deal of trade in parts of China where it was impossible for British people to go at the present moment. It must be emphasised that during the last 10 or 20 years very remarkable changes have taken place in the psychology of what are called backward races in reference to their dealing with those Powers who, according to their opinion, are oppressing them. These people are now realising that there are other methods of winning their freedom and maintaining their rights than the use of physical force. They are learning the method of the boycott, and we have been made to suffer as the result of our policy in China, which has led to the sending out of these troops.
I say quite frankly, that if we had been explicit, open and enlightened in our declaration regarding the economic situation in our attitude to the national struggle and to the question of extraterritoriality, we need not have sent a single soldier to Shanghai. That is my firm belief, and our people in Shanghai or in any other part of China would have been far safer than they are at the present moment. There are many items which should go to the debit side of this account which are not in the statement given to us. For example, take the question of trade. Every department of our trade has suffered since we sent our troops to Shanghai. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Ward- law-Milne) tried to make out that the statements of the right hon. Member for Central Newcastle (Mr. Trevelyan) were wrong, as there were other factors which were causing our trade to slump in China and other parts of the Far East. There is a modicum of truth in what the hon. Member says, but the fall in our trade in the present year compared with last year is very marked and sudden, and it took place immediately after our troops went to China.
Take the case of cotton, which is our biggest export trade as far as China is concerned. In January, 1926, we sent out to China, in piece goods, cotton to the value of £799,731. In January of the present year, the figure was £766,057, a drop of £33,000. But come to the month of February, three or four weeks after our new policy had been declared, and you find that there is a much more substantial fall. In February last year we exported to China cotton goods to the value of £985,000, and in February of this year we exported £678,000, a fall of something over 30 per cent. Come to March and you see that the figures fall still more. In March of last year we exported £771,000 worth of cotton goods, but in March of this year the figure fell to £400,000. In April of last year the figure was £598,000, and in April of the present year it was £122,000. I think the Committee will recognise that this fall is a phenomenal one and is the direct result of our policy of sending out troops to China. It means that we have lost something like £3,000,000 worth of trade during the last ten months, so far as the Lancashire cotton trade is concerned; that is the figure in the first ten months of this year compared with the first ten months of last year. The total yardage represented by that amount is 72,000,000 square yards. I wonder what our Lancashire friends would have to say if tomorrow morning orders could be put on the Manchester Exchange for 72,000,000 square yards of cotton cloth? That would be a prospect which I am sure the Lancashire people would welcome. It is one of the costs we have to pay, that the workers of this country have to pay, for sending out British troops to China—a definite cost of £3,000,000, and the workers of Lancashire have to pay another £3,000,000 in loss of trade.
The hon. Member has asked a question, and I will give an answer. He has asked, what would Lancashire say if a very large number of orders were to be placed with us in the cotton trade? Speaking on behalf of a cotton district of Lancashire that has suffered very severely from the loss of China trade, I can answer that if those orders involved the loss or the safety of a single Englishman or Englishwoman in China, we should repudiate the orders.
I have already dealt with that issue and I have declared my view that if this country had followed the lines that I have suggested there would not have been one Englishman in China who would have lost his life as a result of that policy. Furthermore there is another item in the account that is not mentioned very definitely. That is the question of the health of the troops. I observed that the Financial Secretary to the War Office stated that the chief disease or illness from which our troops have suffered in China is pneumonia. That statement does not correspond with an article that appeared in the "Lancet" on 18th June last. I quote from that article the following:— Since the arrival of the British troops there have been many cases of influenza and pneumonia, but the question of venereal disease has been the most clamant one, and in spite of every possible precaution the number of those affected has steadily increased. Further on in the article it is stated:— The high venereal rate has given the Command much concern and no stone is left unturned in the effort to lower it. I am not going to attempt to apportion any blame on an issue of that kind. I believe that the statement made here is correct, that everything has been done and everything would be done in order to put right a matter of this kind. What I am concerned with is the fact that when so many thousands of our men have to go out to a place like Shanghai, where you have such a conglomerate population from almost every part of the world, and where conditions of this kind exist, that condition of affairs has to be taken into account when you are settling the bill for such a movement as gave rise to the sending of the troops. I have raised this matter with the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and have been in corre- spondence with him upon it for several months. I expected a fuller report by this time. It has not come to hand, and, lacking that further information, I shall not go further into the issue at the moment. Nevertheless it is a very important matter and I would like the Committee to realise that this evil does not end when the troops come back to this country. Many tragedies will follow from what is stated to have taken place in this report by an eminent doctor who has been out to China.
I will say one further word with respect to our sending troops from India to China. That again is a very serious matter. Those troops were sent from one part of the East to another part of the East, and the people of India, neither democratically nor through their representatives, had any voice in regard to the sending of those troops. As a matter of fact there were many meetings of protest in India against that action. It is a matter that ought to give us very serious cause for concern, that we should send troops from one Eastern people against another Eastern people, thereby causing antagonism between those two sets of people. Further, I think that the action taken has tended to alienate the public opinion of India against this country. So from many points of view the action of the Government in sending troops to China, both from India and from this country, has been disastrous. I would beg the Government to review their entire policy. I recommend that they should even consider the suggestion made by the last speaker. We do need a more enlightened policy in regard to the Chinese situation. I hope that something will be done, that we shall declare our policy and be able to bring the troops home at the earliest possible date.
I will not detain the Committee for long, because upon this subject I know no more perhaps than the hon. Member who has just spoken. But in previous speeches there have been one or two points to which attention ought to be called. I wish first of all to congratulate the right hon Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) upon the concluding part of his speech, which put in very fine language indeed exactly what the policy of the Government has been in respect of China during the time that the pre- sent Government has been dealing with the situation. If the right hon. Gentleman reads his own speech in the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow, and compares it with those made from the Treasury Bench in the spring of this year, he will find that they tally in the most remarkable way. His suggestion about the formation of the defence force has been met by the arguments of the hon. Member for South-east Essex (Mr. Looker), who pointed out that the material is not really there. The right hon. Gentleman himself would admit, I think, that if he were in charge of the situation he would have very considerable doubts as to whether he could deal successfully with it with a force raised from not more than a couple of thousands of the European population.
It did come into my mind that one solution of the trouble would be to send out the right hon. Gentleman himself to settle China. Many Members of this House have probably forgotten that the right hon. Gentleman at one time was in charge of a district in Zululand. Subject to correction, I state that he introduced into his district such a degree of order and such an excess of discipline that even to this day Zulu mothers say to a refractory child, "If you do not shut up, you little blighter, I will give you to Josh." My real objection to what has come from the Labour benches is in respect of what underlay the speech of the right hon. Member for Central Newcastle (Mr. Trevelyan). On behalf of my own constituents, who are suffering terribly from the depression in the cotton trade of the East, I repudiate completely the suggestion that they, for the sake of their own wages and their own prosperity, would oppose the sending of an expeditionary force to preserve the lives of their fellow countrymen and fellow country-women in China.
Is the hon. Gentleman prepared to put that point of view to his constituents and to stand by it at the next election?
Certainly. To my constituents, those who are suffering worst, those engaged in coarse cotton spinning, I would put the question, "Would you prefer to have an additional day's wage or an additional week's work which costs the lives of your fellow citi- zens?" When this matter came up earlier in the year, I did discuss it with some of them. I said to them that in the opinion of the Government—the Government does know something about it, even as much as the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Hudson) knows—it was necessary to incur this expense and to send out this force. The conception, which apparently prevails in the minds of hon. Members opposite, that the Government of this country in our present financial condition sends out an expensive force to China for the fun of the thing, is too ludcrious to be worth consideration. The idea that any Government at the present time would incur such expense, unless they were convinced that it was absolutely unavoidable, is a preposterous idea. Therefore, my own constituents understand that any expense which has been incurred and any loss of trade, have been necessary to preserve the lives of the people in China. Unhappily hon. Members, like the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Newcastle, have very few opportunities of coming into contact with the workers of the country, but those of us who have lived among them; and have worked alongside them all our lives realise that they are very far from being such contemptible creatures as the right hon. Gentleman would have us imagine.
A lot of the trouble we have is that, as usual, the British taxpayer is shouldering the whole of the burden. I have just had put into my hands by the hon. Member for Stourbridge (Mr. Wellock), on whose speech I would offer him congratulations, the reply to a question which was given by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It refers to the ratepayers in the International Settlement at Shanghai. Perhaps the hon. Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker) will address himself to these figures. The whole of the bill apparently is being borne by us. It is true that other countries have had warships at Shanghai, but we are the only Power to send troops to Shanghai. The British ratepayers in the Settlement number 1,157, the Japanese 552, Americans 328, Germans 184, Russians 112, French 98, and so on. The total number of Europeans and Japanese in the Settlement is 2,742 and much less than half are British. Yet we are sending the whole of the troops and bearing by far the greater part of the cost.
Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman not aware that the Americans, Japanese, French and Italians have also sent units to protect Shanghai?
That is not so. They have not sent troops; they have sent warships. We are the only Power to send soldiers. Not only have we to bear an immediate cost of several millions, but we shall bear odium in future among the Chinese, when I hope they have a central Government responsible to a Parliament elected by the whole of China—a federal Government—we shall have to bear the bad odour for our action. Other Powers have sent warships and so have we, but there are far more British than foreign warships. I sent certain questions to the hon. and gallant Member who opened the Debate, and I apologise to him for not being able to hear the whole of his speech but I had to attend a Committee. One of my hon. Friends, however, tells me that the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not fully answer my questions. Why have we not induced this very wealthy community in Shanghai to contribute something to this cost? There is a very large item here of £156,000 for the rent of buildings in addition to lodging allowances and so forth. I was in Shanghai two or three times during my service in China and even then, many years ago, it was one of the wealthiest cities in the world for its size. I suppose ground rents and values are as high inside the Settlement in Shanghai, as they are in London. For years, this wealthy community has lived without paying taxes apart from municipal taxes. They have not paid any taxes to the Chinese Government or to our Government. They are free of Income Tax, and I do not think they contributed any money to the cost of the War, though a great many of them served in the forces.
I should like to say that as much money was sent from Shanghai as a contribution to the cost of the War, as from any other place.
Did they pay Excess Profits Duty?
The hon. Member for South-East Essex is referring to a voluntary contribution. I give them great credit. They are very generous indeed when they have to put their hands in their pockets but I would rather put a tax on the whole community and let them contribute something in that way. I am reminded very much of what I remember to have happened in the days when I was just beginning to take an interest in politics. The late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain went to South Africa and told the British people that he was going to get something from the owners of the mines in the Rand for the cost of the South African War, but he never got one shilling.
If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will allow me, I wish to correct him on one point. He is speaking as though Shanghai were a British dependency. It is an international settlement, and it would have been impossible to have levied taxation on it for the purposes of the War.
I concede that point in reference to the cost of the past War, but we might do something towards getting them to help in paying for this veiled war in which we have engaged.
On a point of Order. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has made an assertion about a right hon. Member of this House who is now dead, and he says that that right hon. Gentleman said something to him. I myself do not believe the right hon. Gentleman ever did so, but if the hon. and gallant Gentleman says he did so, I should like to know on what occasion?
I do not think any point of Order arises.
I never had the honour of speech with Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.
I am sure he never said anything to the hon. and gallant Gentleman.
I am saying that I never had the honour of speech with Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. I did not say that he made this remark to me. I am only using it as an illustration. This international settlement should, I think, contribute to the cost of this British Army, and I believe a threat to withdraw the Army would make them put their hands in their pockets and pay very quickly. There is no difficulty about getting it. I am not speaking now about the cost of the late War, but about the cost of the present war in which the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite and the War Office are engaged.
I understand also that the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not answer my question about the occupation of territory outside the international settlement. There may be a case in international law for occupying the settlement. We have done it in the past, and I have always thought in certain circumstances it was quite legitimate. When Shanghai changed hands before, as it did several times when contending generals captured it or were driven out of it, ships have landed armed parties and, with the aid of volunteers—business men and so forth, the "Shanghai Highlanders" and other corps that are in being in the settlement —they managed to keep disorderly elements out of the settlement. I think that could have been done on this occasion. There is a case for that in international law, but I can see no justification for occupying territory outside the settlement. We have crossed the river and occupied certain factories and railway stations and gone a considerable way outside the settlement. China is a fellow-member of the League of Nations with this country, and we have committed an act of aggression. If the hon. Member for Wood Green (Mr. Locker-Lampson) is not able to define aggression, I advise him to address himself to this as a very good sample of an act of aggression. I have reason to believe that we have alienated a great many of the moderate elements in China who were prepared to excuse our landing an army, but who cannot excuse this invasion of Chinese soil.
Further, why is it necessary that our aeroplanes should continually fly over Chinese territory? If this force was a police force, I do not think it needed aeroplanes. Aeroplanes are quite useless for street fighting. I could understand tanks and armoured cars and even howitzers, but why aeroplanes, unless you intend, when the time comes, to bombard the interior of China? It is naturally irritating to the Chinese to have these machines flying over their territory and when machines are forced to land the Chinese arrest the occupants or remove the wings of the aeroplane. We then move part of the Chinese railway track —at a very convenient time for the Northern armies—until the release of the machine or the occupants, as the case may be. Perhaps the hon. Member for Wood Green will give us the Foreign Office justification for this violation of Chinese sovereignty. Might I also ask what is the position in regard to Wei-hai-wei? I understood that under the Washington Convention we were to evacuate it and return it to China. Are we in this case also waiting for the formation of an all-China Government. Wei-hai-wei is only of use to us as a health resort and I am sure the Chinese would allow us to continue using it as such. They were very good to us in the old days, allowing us to use Bias Bay and other places outside our territory at Hong Kong for Fleet exercises and for landing recreation parties, and all that sort of thing. Our restoration of Wei-hai-wei to Chinese sovereignty would have a very fine effect throughout China and would show that we wanted to make amends for the cavalier treatment which we have served out to China for the last 70 or 80 years.
I notice in the newspapers a very interesting account of a romantic Englishman known as General Sutton, who has been acting as Minister of Munitions for Chan Tso Lin, the Manchurian Dictator. The hon. Member for South East Essex said that the armies of the tuchans were mostly bandits. Chang Tso Lin is one of those people described by the hon. Member. He is one of the contending parties in China. Now, we have signed a convention not to allow arms to go to any of these contending factions in China, and if that convention had been honourably kept, the fighting would not have been so desperate or so long continued. It is notorious that, whereas our Government has tried to play its part in preventing illicit traffic in arms to China, other Governments have been very lax. But here we have a British ex-officer acting as Minister of Munitions in China to this Dictator in Peking and he is reported to have returned here with a fortune which is variously estimated at £50,000 and £500,000.
On a point of Order. May I ask what has the question of General Sutton to do with the Shanghai Defence Force?
Perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman was going rather far afield in his remarks, but I do not think he has yet gone out side the bounds of order.
I think I can relate this matter to the Estimate before us because part of the Estimate is for sending troops to Tientsin, which is near Peking, and that is the area where this General Sutton has been supplying munitions to Chang Tso Lin, and these munitions may, in certain circumstances, be used against our troops. Do not let us make any mistake about it. If Chang Tso Lin is poisoned one fine day, as happens occasionally to dictators in China, another man may take his place who is more hostile to us, and the very munitions which General Sutton has been supplying, may be used to kill British soldiers. It happened in Turkey. I would remind hon. Members that our troops were killed at Gallipoli with munitions which had been supplied by British firms just before the War. This General Sutton has been giving interviews to the newspapers. I have never met him and I know nothing about him, but he seems to be a romantic adventurer. What would happen, I wonder, if this ex-officer had been supplying munitions to the Nationalist armies in China? If he had been supplying them to the great army which has just taken Canton, would he be featured in the daily Press? I think the Home Office would have something to say about him in that case. I mention this case, not to attack this successful adventurer, who, apparently, has had a very good time and has come out with a large fortune, but to show that our Government is in favour of the dictators and is hostile to the parties who are contending in China for a constitution and for national freedom. If that is not sufficient, I would refer to what is, I think, a disgraceful episode in China for which the Foreign Office cannot escape responsibility—
Before the hon. and gallant Gentleman leaves the other point may I ask him whether General Sutton is a regular officer or not?
I do not know. He is an ex-officer and he is a British subject. That is my point.
The point of my question is of great importance. There are Members who sit behind the hon. and gallant Gentleman and who call themselves colonels who are not regular officers.
I presume that "General" is his local rank in China. I do not say that he is a general here.
May I say that this gentleman was never a regular officer. He served during the War and left with the rank of captain.
May I point out that I am not a colonel, though I am sitting behind the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Ken-worthy).
I do not base my case on his temporary or brevet rank in our Army or his rank in Chang Tso Lin's Army. I rest my case on the fact that he is a British subject and he has been allowed to go in and out of the international settlements in China and that he goes to Shanghai and "hob nobs" with the British community there, and nothing is done to him.
Is he in the same category as Comrade McManus of Petrograd?
6.0 p.m.
I do not know that Comrade McManus supplied any munitions to any of the contending factions in China. This ex-officer, this ex-temporary Captain, with local rank of General in China, who engaged in the supply of munitions against the Convention which our Government signed to prevent the supply of munitions to contending factions in China, is now a kind of hero, according to certain newspapers supporting the party opposite, and no steps are taken against him. What would have happened if he had been supplying the Bed Army in Canton? The Home Office would probably have paid some attention to him, and he would probably be in gaol by now. He is, however, as I say, a romantic adventurer, and I am attacking not him, but the Government. He could have been stopped very quickly in his activities in Peking-if our Minister there had been told to stop him.
I wish now to refer to another matter altogether, and this is a scandalous business. Some 14 students, members of the Kuomintang party—remember, we do not take sides in China at all, and the hon. Member for South-East Essex, who made a much better speech, if I may say so, than his own Foreign Secretary has yet made on China, looks for the day, and so do the Government, when there will be one party in control of the destinies of China, and one Government of whom he can approve. That is what we all hope for, and that will be the party of the Kuomintang, I hope— whether of the right or the left wing does not matter. My hon. Friends on this side might like to know that the people who win victories in China are always called Communists, but their doctrines are not Communistic at all. I am talking of the Kuomintang, and I think the Communist party will find that they are not necessarily friends of theirs.
As I say, 14 students of the Kuomintang party, this party that is struggling for a constitution for China, took refuge inside the British Concession at Tientsin, where British troops have been on guard, and they were handed over by the British police to the Government of Chang Tso-lin. They were, of course, plotting against the Government there. They were the Opposition, and they sought refuge in British territory in Tientsin, and so far have we forgotten the law of hospitality prevailing in the East that we turned over these young men to Chang Tso-lin's emissaries. Of course, they were called Communists after that incident, and this is what happened. I will quote from the "Times" of 30th April last. These are the people who, by an abuse of hospitality, a deliberate example of taking sides, were handed over to this ex-bandit Chang Tso-lin, and this is what happened, according to a correspondent of the "Times," writing from Peking on 29th April: The execution of 20 Communists by strangulation yesterday was carried out in circumstances of great brutality. It appears to have been a deliberately slow process, each case taking about 10 minutes. In order to increase the moral effect of the executions, 40 arrested Communists were paraded on the execution ground without warning, nor was any announcement made of their sentences. I am expecting momentarily an interruption from some hon. Member opposite to remind me what happened to opponents of the Communists in Russia, but I would again remind the Committee that anyone in China who is in favour of the Kuomintang is described as a Communist, though that is an abuse of words. They are not Communists at all. The "Times" correspondent goes on to criticise the horrible method of putting these men to death and the altogether unjust practices of the Chinese courts. He describes them as Byzantine, and mediæval, and so on, and we know that that sort of thing goes on in China, but in this case these were people who were handed over by the British police in the British Concession at Tientsin, which is guarded to-day by British soldiers, to their political adversaries to be treated in this way, and I say that it is a scandal and a disgrace to British practice in the East. I would remind the Committee of the fact that this sort of thing was not done in past years. These unfortunate political refugees in the past were allowed to take refuge in the International Settlements, and were never handed over to their enemies.
On a further point of Order. Is there any remotest connection between this matter and the Vote which we are discussing, even on a liberal interpretation of what may be discussed?
On that point of Order, may I submit that the hon. Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker), in his speech, introduced a large number of matters as remote from this Vote as Geneva and the League of Nations, and that he was not called to Order?
May I reply to that point by saying that I was discussing what policy we might pursue in order to get this force out of China, which was, I submit, quite a legitimate subject of discussion on this Vote?
I think this Vote deals with the maintenance of troops in Tientsin, and, therefore, the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) is in order in discussing that question. In regard to the point of Order raised by the hon. Member for Peckham (Mr. Dalton), I did not hear the speech of the hon. Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker), so that I am unable to rule on that.
To return to this incident at Tientsin, I think it is scandalous and that our Foreign Office is responsible; and this is not the first time that the Foreign Office has allowed that sort of thing to go on. If the hon. Member for Wood Green challenges me, I would remind him of a flagrant case, when he allowed the Chinese authorities to raid the Legation quarter in Peking in order to arrest people in the Russian compound, and that they were afterwards executed in the same brutal manner. That could not have been done without the permission of our Minister in Peking, and the Foreign Office must have known about it, otherwise they were flouted; and I say that the Foreign Office is very much to blame and that we shall pay dearly for this kind of thing in the future.
In Shanghai, under the very noses of our police—and, of course, we expect our troops to behave as British soldiers always do behave, and I readily accept all that has been said in that regard— the most appalling atrocities have been committed, always against Labour men and trade union officials. They are called Communists, and their heads are cut off without any trouble, and a great many are brutally tortured as well. Anyone in China who is aiming to raise the status of labour, to organise the labourers and factory workers, is liable, if reactionary generals are in local control, to be arrested and executed summarily; and this goes on in the area controlled by disciplined British troops, and I think it is very disgraceful. Also, in this city of Shanghai, where such peace and order have been preserved, the local irregular police, largely consisting of Russian refugees, anti-Communist Russians, were permitted to attack the Soviet Consulate and to break into it, and there was bloodshed and shooting on both sides. It was altogether a very disgraceful example of interference with the diplomatic privileges that every consulate may look to, right under the noses of our disciplined force of overwhelming strength in Shanghai; and to say that our policy in China has simply been one of safeguarding the lives of British men, women and children is nonsense. It has been partial, unfair, and very unjust.
With regard to these executions of trade union leaders that have taken place in the area controlled by our troops, China is going through a period of industrialism. Modern factories are being erected, and the Chinese are being trained as factory workers all over China; and they are being employed at a terribly low rate of wages and under horrible conditions of labour. That is admitted, and these low wage conditions are a menace to the workers of this country, of France, of America, of Germany, and of any other country that has a decent European standard for its workers. The only hope really in China, in the long run, is for labour to become organised and economically stronger, and that can only be through combination. China is going through the same stage that we went through in the early years of this century, when British workmen were deported, and in some cases killed, for attempting to organise their fellows in trade unions. In China the left wing of the Kuomintang are trying to organise labour into unions in order to improve the conditions of the workpeople.
I think the hon. and gallant Member is now going rather too far afield. This is a Debate on general policy, but to go into labour problems is, I think, going too far.
I beg your pardon, Sir. I was going to connect it up by saying that in Shanghai, and wherever, in fact, the British have control, I am sorry to say that these Labour organisers are suppressed, and I do not think that is what our troops were sent out to do. I have in my hand a letter from a soldier in Shanghai, and I will show it to the hon. and gallant Commodore representing the War Office if he would like to see it. Of course, it was sent to me under the seal of confidence. The writer, who is a member of a famous corps, says: There is no good purpose being served by the maintenance of the existing large and unwieldy force stationed in Shanghai, at a cost to the British taxpayer of some quarter of a million pounds a month, exclusive of overhead charges. I may add that this view is shared by the majority of the rank and file of the Army in Shanghai. 'Tommy' realises, of course, his obligation to serve in any part of the world, and in this respect his loyalty is unquestioned, but as a citizen with a vote he is also entitled to know that he is fulfilling some necessary task, and it appears that that cannot be said of the Shanghai Defence Force now, however much it might have been in March last. Why thousands of troops should be kept under active service conditions and restrictions in a place where there is no fighting to do is beyond our comprehension, especially when the place is far from being a health resort, as the hospital statistics show.
Would it not be rather hard on this man if the hon. and gallant Member sent this confidential letter to the War Office?
Oh, I will not send it to the War Office. What I said was that I would show it to the Parliamentary Secretary, whom I can trust implicitly, of course.
Will the hon. and gallant Member indicate what rank the writer holds?
I will show the letter to the hon. and gallant Member.
What rank was he?
He is not an officer, but a lance-corporal.
Then why does the hon. and gallant Gentleman call him an officer?
I did not say he was an officer. I said he was a member of the Army, but I will show the letter afterwards to the hon. and gallant Member. No names are attached to it, and he can see the letter with pleasure. It is very interesting, and it will do the hon. and gallant Member good to read it. There is a lot more of it, but I need not trouble the Committee with that. Here is this force, which apparently is to be in Shanghai, as the soldiers say, for "a full do." There is no prospect of this force being removed for the present, and we find ourselves in the position of being saddled with a permanent charge of six or seven millions a year for an indefinite number of years. That, I say, is the result of the muddling of successive British Governments, not only of this Government, but of its predecessors as well.
It would be out of order to go into past history, but for 16 years, ever since 1911, we have been backing—openly, in too many cases—the wrong horse in China. We backed the wrong horse in Russia and spent £100,000,000 of the taxpayers' money. I believe that in the long run the democratic forces in China, in spite of internal differences, will prevail, and that they will restore order in that distracted country. Every one is sorry for the great mass of the Chinese people, and I believe that their only final chance of salvation is in the same way in which we in the West have found salvation, and that is by democratic institutions. When that time comes, the best friend and the best patriot of this country will not be the hon. Member for South-East Essex and those for whom he speaks, but those on this side, who want a little sympathy and help shown to these people who are struggling with adversity and going through a very difficult time, and who protest against this unwarranted invasion of Chinese territory against imaginary perils.
My hon. and gallant Friend who has just spoken has wandered into a good deal of purely irrelevant matter. There is only one question a Member of this House has to decide on this Vote, and that is, whether he thinks that the Government were justified in sending an expeditionary force to Shanghai under the conditions which arose earlier in this year. I was firmly of opinion, after going into the matter very closely, that no Government could have shirked that responsibility; and I am perfectly certain that it does not matter in the least what Government was in power, whether a Conservative or a Labour or a Liberal Government, if they were confronted with the same conditions, I feel confident that they would not have taken any other course, and I do not think public opinion in this country would have tolerated a Government taking any other course. It is nothing whatever to do with the internal conditions of China. If the Government had been sending a force there to back up any of the rivals, whether they are bandits or generals, or what not, it would have been absolutely wrong. It would have been wrong in principle; it would have been utterly foolish. We would have committed ourselves to an entanglement of which we could not see the end without it costing us far more than £3,000,000 in the course of this year. The Foreign Secretary in his speech, and afterwards by specific replies to questions which I, among others, put to him, gave an undertaking on the part of the Government that there would be no interference among the rival forces, and that the force was to be sent there purely for the purpose of protecting the lives of British citizens there.
I do not know whether it is necessary to recall the conditions under which the force was sent. There was a real danger to British life at Hankow, and there was a repetition of the same sort of thing at Nanking. There are about 16,000 white people at Shanghai. I am unable to ascertain the exact number of the British subjects there, but I believe there are far more British citizens than there are citizens of any other individual nation. They number several thousands. Here was a prospect of a fight—such a fight as you got—in China between two or three rival armies. It was not even two. One or two of the armies are split into various forces. One general captures the command one day, and next day he is deposed. One of these gentlemen actually absconded with the army pay, and somebody else took charge of the concern. There was really no one in charge. It is idle to talk about the League of Nations. There was no one who could be held responsible to the League of Nations or by the League of Nations. The only representative of the League of Nations at the present moment is the representative of the Peking Government. The Peking Government have no authority at all in these areas, and I doubt very much if they had any authority with the nominal general who had Shanghai at that time, but they certainly had not any authority with the advancing army which ultimately captured Shanghai. Supposing we had said, "Let us recognise Mr. Chen." What happened to him? He soon vanished, and since then there have been four or five rival Governments, and even Kuomintang it- self, whose armies were advancing upon Shanghai, have been split into several contending forces. At one time, Nanking was fighting Hankow, and Hankow was fighting Nanking, and Shanghai was fighting the two. There was no one there whom the League of Nations could summon to discuss the situation.
The question was whether it was necessary or not to protect British lives, and I go to the extent of saying that even if somebody says now that nothing would have happened if we had not sent a force, that does not justify anybody voting against this. We have to consider what the position was at that moment. Even if the Government sent too large a force— that is very probable—I do not think even that is a ground for condemnation. It was a fault on the right side. At that moment the forces seemed to be much more formidable than they turned out to be. If the Government had sent too small a force, you might have had a disaster of the first magnitude which would have resounded throughout the whole world, and would have been detrimental to the repute of our country throughout Asia. In fact, we could not have taken the risk of sending too small a force; though I think it has turned out that it was a bigger force than was necessary.
I come to another question. I should like to hear from the Government what are the prospects of our extricating this force from Shanghai. It is quite clear you cannot keep permanently a big British garrison there, and we ought to hear what the Government mean to do. I should have preferred, as one who supported the Government in sending an expedition, if they had left the forces at Hong Kong. It would have been better from the point of view of the health of the troops. It is clear, when you look at the Estimates, that the health is pretty bad. Two substantial items seem to show that the health of the troops was really rather worse than it would have been if the troops had been in some area over which we had complete control. If these troops had been at Hong Kong, they would have been within two or three days' steaming of Shanghai and would have been quite near enough—
Seven or eight days.
That is longer than I thought. Even then, I should have thought that they were quite near enough to justify our leaving the main body of the troops in a place where we had complete municipal control over the health and sanitation of the area, and where, probably, they would have had very much better quarters than they have at Shanghai. There are three questions I would like to put to the Government. How long do they think it will be necessary to maintain the troops; whether it will be possible to reduce the numbers; and whether, if they feel there is no risk in not having a very large body of troops within reach, it would not be desirable that they should be quartered at Hong Kong rather than where they are now? I should like to say again, that I am very glad the Government have not interfered in the conflict between the parties, and the best proof of that is that there has been a change in the control at Shanghai. The Kuomintang forces captured Shanghai even while the British troops were there. There was no interference to keep the Shanghai forces out. There has been a change in the Chinese control of that city since we have occupied it, and that is the best proof that the Government have kept faith with the House of Commons in that respect by not interfering between the rival forces. It is true that there has been a split between the forces in Shanghai, but we cannot hold the Government responsible for that. I earnestly hope that the policy which they have adopted of non-interference will be preserved right to the end.
I will not traverse the ground that has been covered, but I would like to make a few references to some of the points that have been made by my friends on the opposite side of the House. They claim that it was quite unnecessary to send a defence force to Shanghai. I claim that I have some knowledge of China and its requirements, I come into contact with many whose interests are closely bound up with China, and I know that the action of the Government in sending a defence force to Shanghai has met with the very strong approval, not only of the residents in Shanghai, but also of the very large number of British interests in this country which are closely connected with the trade of China. There is no doubt that the expeditionary force was sent in the nick of time. Had they not arrived when they did, the loss of life would, I believe, have been enormous, and the destruction of property beyond description. Speaking for those who are interested in the China trade, I say that we owe much to the Government for taking this step, and for their foresight in acting at the moment they did; and if we have anything to complain about it is that the interests of the traders in China were not at the beginning of the trouble sufficiently protected, nor were the Treaties enforced as they might reasonably have been.
It has been pointed out in the course of the Debate that our trade with China has been interfered with owing to the presence of the Defence Force in Shanghai. As a director of one of the largest banks trading in Shanghai, I can say with absolute knowledge that it is nothing of the kind. That is not the reason why trade with China has fallen off. The reason is to be found in the action of the Bolsheviks, and the means they adopted to destroy our trade by instituting the boycott. It was pointed out by one hon. Member that while we could not trade Germany could do so, and that is the case, because the boycott was directed against this country and was carried out for a considerable time. It was Britain and British goods which were aimed at, and German trade was allowed to continue freely, the object of the Bolsheviks being to upset British interests in China.
It has been stated that the British taxpayer is shouldering the whole burden, but that is hardly correct. The banks which are associated with China, the large mercantile houses and the steamship companies trading with China, are all paying on this side' their share of taxation. Profits made in China are brought here. A bank's profits made by trading in China are transferred to this side, and Income Tax is paid upon them. Precisely the same thing occurs in the case of a merchant, who has his offices here and transfers his profits from China. He is a taxpayer and is paying his proportion of taxation. Therefore, it cannot be said that those associated with business in China are not paying their share of, or in any way contributing to, the cost of the Shanghai Defence Force. Another hon. Member referred to unequal treaties, saying the present posi- tion was largely due to the British Government trying to force the Chinese to recognise unequal treaties. There may be something in that contention, but those unequal treaties were thrust upon us by the Chinese themselves. When we sought to trade with them—this was a very long time ago—they refused to allow us to enter the interior of China and allotted to us certain small portions of land which they called settlements, places which, to them, were of little or no value—swamps, as Shanghai was. What they said was, "Make what you can of it, and you may trade there." Trade has been established in Shanghai, and Shanghai has become one of the largest and most prosperous cities in the Far East, and to-day undoubtedly the Chinese are casting envious eyes upon Shanghai, the British enterprise which has made it, and the enormous amount of British capital which is invested there, and also upon other places in China which have been similarly raised from mere swamps into wonderful commercial cities. They are casting envious eyes upon them, and would like to be in a position to taken them over.
When China is in a position to negotiate a new treaty with this country and with other Powers, I am quite certain that Great Britain will not be behindhand in meeting her aspirations, as far as it is reasonably possible to do so, but I do claim that in the meantime it is the duty of the Government to protect, as far as possible, the interest of traders in China. They have gone out there for no other purpose than that of trade. It is trade which has made this country what it is, and trade which will continue to add to the prosperity of the nation. China has been a very large contributor to that trade, and, on the other hand, we have been large purchasers of Chinese produce of one sort and another. The Treaties have not been one-sided. We have profited, and China has profited. The Government despatched the Shanghai Defence Force to China first of all in order that British lives should be protected and that British property should be protected, and in order that, as far as possible, the trade there, which is of great importance both to this country and to China, should be preserved.
I quite realise the difficulties of the Government with regard to removing the Defence Force. It is difficult to see when and how it may be done. I quite agree with my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker) when he says that probably the only means of arriving at an arrangement would be by sending some distinguished person to sound other Powers to ascertain whether we cannot come to an agreement with regard to action there, and the protection of the general trading interests and of life and property in China itself. As to the suggestion of the League of Nations doing this, I am afraid there is no body in China which could represent China in a satisfactory manner. If advances could be made through the League of Nations, and there were any possibility of coming to any satisfactory arrangement with China, I do not think we could possibly have a better channel through which to make some such attempt, but I fear there could be little hope of success to-day in view of the different factions in China. I hope the time may come, and come quickly, when it will be possible to remove the force from Shanghai; but until the Government are absolutely certain that the lives of our people are secure, that our properties are preserved and the obligation which the Chinese have undertaken under the Treaties already in existence are observed, I hope the Government will continue to retain that Force there.
At the beginning of this Debate I rather hoped that I should not have to make a speech at all, that the Debate would be restricted within rather narrower limits, but various questions have been put to the Foreign Office, and, therefore, I feel it is my duty to deal with them as shortly as possible. I am very glad the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) came into the House and contributed the few remarks he did, because the Government have been very glad to have the stamp of his weighty approval to the sending of the defence force to Shanghai. He certainly offered one or two minor criticisms, and also asked one or two questions; these my hon. and gallant Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office will deal with when he replies later, and I propose to deal with questions more or less solely concerning the Foreign Office. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for New-castle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) said that the unequal treaties must go. I entirely agree. The Government entirely agree that the unequal treaties have got to go, and we have already said so. In our Memorandum of December last, which was practically repeated in the following January, we made it perfectly clear that our policy was to negotiate, I will not say the complete abolition, but practically the abolition, of the so-called unequal treaties, and, as the right hon. Gentleman very properly said, we are merely waiting until we can get some body with whom to negotiate. At the moment there is no body with whom we possibly can negotiate on such a subject as that. The right hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme who, I am sorry to say, has left the House, suggested that we should call a meeting of the Chinese leaders, a sort of round table conference of Chang Tso Lin, Cheng Chien and various other rulers and generals who are in the South at the present moment. I cannot imagine any meeting which would be less likely to arrive at a common conclusion at the present moment. Very nearly all the leaders in China are fighting against one another, at the head of vast armies, and I am afraid there would be no likelihood whatsoever of coming to any agreement on any subject regarding China.
Rather like the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations.
My hon. Friend the Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker) made, I think, a very thoughtful and interesting speech. His first suggestion was that we should get into touch with the mass of moderate Chinese opinion. I wish we could do it, but I do not in the least know how it would be possible at the present moment. There is practically no Press in China. Where there is a Press you can get into touch with public opinion. We did our best in December last by publishing to the world our Memorandum, showing what we were prepared to do, so that all moderate people throughout China would understand our policy and, we hoped, be only too ready to co-operate with us. The unfortunate part of it is that a very large proportion of the Chinese popula- tion is illiterate and uneducated; it cannot read the Press, and, I am sure, there must be many millions of Chinese people who do not even know that a civil war is in progress.
May I point out that I referred to organisations like the large Chinese chambers of commerce which, more than anything else, reflect public opinion, and with whom we can easily get into touch?
We have been in touch with those organisations, but, after all, they have only a very limited sway. My hon. Friend also made a suggestion that we should co-operate more with the different Powers, if that were possible. We have always done our utmost to co-operate in the closest possible manner with all the Washington Powers, and during the last two years we have been in the closest relations with Japan, France, Italy and the United States. We have kept them fully informed on our policy, and we have done our best to bring our views into harmony with theirs, but, of course, this has meant that the slowest has set the pace. You cannot co-operate with a large number of Powers and expect to proceed very quickly. I can give instances in which we have co-operated on the occasion of the dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen from the Department of Customs. We were in the closest possible touch with Japan and it was owing to our co-operation that we were able to get this case more or less reviewed, and to ensure that he got proper treatment and payment at least for a year. We were also in very close co-operation with Japan over the Shanghai Customs Duties, and we were able to get them modified in the same way. We were in the closest possible co-operation over the Nanking outrages, and we sent an identic note in order to try to get an apology and reparation. At the present moment we are co-operating with the chief of the Powers in Peking with regard to the Bias Bay pirates, and we hope that we shall be able to do something to lessen the dangers of piracy in Southern China. If my hon. Friend means that we ought to have some special agreement with Japan to settle Chinese questions, I am afraid I do not agree with him because that would be going back on the Washington Four-Power Treaty, and if we had a special agreement with Japan the other Washington powers would have a very justifiable grievance.
Then my hon. Friend said that if these two things fail we ought to refer it to the League of Nations. After the right hon. Gentleman's demolition of that particular proposition I really do not think I need say any more. It is a most attractive proposition. I do not say for a moment that it is a foolish one, but I am afraid that at the present time it is quite impracticable, and even Lord Cecil who is so much devoted to the future of the League of Nations and its principles said the other day that it was quite impossible at the present moment to submit this question of China to the League. The other day Belgium attempted to do something very similar. The Peking authorities denounced the Belgian Treaty, and Belgium appealed to the International Court of Justice. What happened? The Chinese did not pay the slightest attention to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and it has only had the effect of rather impairing the authority of that Court without being of the slightest benefit to the Belgians themselves. I may say that we have already taken certain steps. Not so very long ago we wrote a letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, placing the whole of our policy before the League, and saying that directly we could get a proper opportunity of placing the subject before the League, we should not hesitate for one moment to invoke their good offices.
May I say that the Government are very disappointed indeed that there is no improvement in China. There is not only no improvement, but I think that the general condition throughout China is worse than it was a few months ago owing to the increase of the number of generals, tuchuns, and governors, who all seem to be out to fight against one another. Our policy is, as it always has been, one of peace and conciliation. We have published our proposals, and we were the first nation to publish them, saying that we were ready practically to abolish the unequal Treaties. We are prepared to sweep away some of our extra-territoriality straight away without waiting at all; in fact, we have already done so with regard to the Mixed Court of Shanghai. We are prepared to grant tariff autonomy to China. We have already granted her the Washington surtaxes, in face of the opposition of some of the Powers, and more especially Japan. We are prepared to modify the municipal administration in all British Concessions; in fact, we have already done this in one case. We have already handed over the Hankow municipal administration to a mixed body of British and Chinese with practically Chinese control, and we are prepared to surrender many other privileges in order to meet moden Chinese aspirations.
Are you prepared to surrender Chinese political refugees?
We are prepared to surrender Wei-hei-wei directly we can get someone to negotiate with. The agreement has already been drawn up, and if it had not been for civil war, Wei-hei-wei would have been handed over long ago. We are simply waiting for some established authority in order to hand over Wei-hei-wei. In regard to General Sutton, we could not do anything at all in regard to him, because there was no case for legal action being taken against him. Since then I understand that he has returned. In regard to Tientsin, that was a case of the Chinese themselves imprisoning certain Communist agitators. The Chinese police produced proper warrants. We could not withhold these people from the Chinese authorities, and if they produce their warrants we have to hand over the men. I may say, however, that directly they were handed over, H.M. Consul-General made strong personal representations to the Chinese authorities saying that he hoped and believed they would have a proper trial.
Is the Under-Secretary not aware that ever since 1911, when the rebellion started, political refugees have taken refuge in our concession in Tientsin, and we have protected them? This is the first time that these young men have been surrendered for this brutal execution.
I do not think that is the case. When a proper Chinese warrant is presented by the head of police in what is, after all, a Chinese town, I do not see how we can refuse to give these people up.
In he past we did refuse to surrender these people, although the people temporarily in power demanded their surrender. Of course, we did this in the case of rich mandarins, but in this case they are only poor students.
If there is no proper authority to whom we can surrender Wei-hei-wei, why is there a proper authority to whom we can surrender these unfortunate students for execution?
That is a very different question. In this case we are dealing with the local Chinese police, and that is a very different thing from handing over a piece of territory, because in the latter case you must hand it over to a central power. Our difficulty is that there is no established Government with whom we can negotiate. China keeps on being a changing and shifting scene, and you may be negotiating with a general one day and the next morning he may have changed over with the whole of his army to the other side. Therefore, the only solution to-day is patience. Meanwhile, I would point out to hon. Gentlemen opposite that we cannot allow the rights of our fellow-subjects to be put in jeopardy in Shanghai. There they form a little island of British lives in the middle of an angry and stormy sea, and our troops are there merely in the character of a police force. They are not aggressive; they are merely defensive. We are as anxious as hon. Gentlemen opposite to withdraw our troops as soon as possible. Directly some kind of order is evolved, directly some kind of government is established which is able and willing to exercise some kind of control, we shall withdraw our troops at once. Meanwhile, it seems to me that it is our obvious and plain duty to the British citizens who have settled there with their families under treaties, relying on us, if necessary to defend them. It is obvious that we must keep those troops there so long as the lives and property of those British citizens are in danger. I hope hon. Members opposite, having made their speeches and having made their criticisms, may see their way to allow this Vote to go through silently without a Division.
What we are supposed to be doing on this occasion is making an examination of this Estimate. We are supposed to be passing a Bill for some work that has been done. I have been listening carefully all this afternoon, and up to the present I have heard nothing whatever about the Estimate itself. When the last Debate on this question took place, I was one of those who believed that 4,004 troops already in China would be quite sufficient to deal with any crisis there. I do not want at this juncture to discuss whether we were right or wrong in sending such a large number of troops to China, but I want to ask a question with regard to the figures which are published in the White Paper. I heard the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Newcastle (Mr. Trevelyan) make his opening statement, and he asked the Under-Secretary to state the number of extra troops which are considered necessary to make up the Expeditionary Force. No answer has yet been given to that question, although it has been asked several times during the last six months.
7.0 p.m.
I have always been in the habit when starting a job, to make sure that I have got all the right tools. I want to ask, as a Member of this Committee, how can I get to know whether these items in the Estimate are right or not if I do not know the number of men to whom they apply? Item C consists of £17,000 for marriage allowances. When I look at the Army Schedule of allowances, I find that it would take 18,000 men each with a wife and three children to reach that sum in 12 months. If you take the period that the Expeditionary Force have been there, it means about 25,000 men each with a wife and child. Are we to understand that there are 25,000 men in the Expeditionary Force? I would like the Under-Secretary to explain what that means. Then in Vote 5 (H) I find £978,000 for conveyance by sea. We have talked a good deal about the numbers, and I gathered from the Debates previously that it was the intention to send between 9,000 and 10,000 troops. If you take 9,000 troops, this transport by sea works out at £100 per man. If you double it, it works out at £50 each for 18,000 men. If you multiply it by four and bring it down to £25 each, it still takes some explaining.
For 10,000 miles?
Yes, in a troop ship. If you take the fare to Australia or the East in a first-class liner, it does not amount to anything like that. Apart from whether we did right or not, it is time that we went into the Estimate. Here is nearly £1,000,000 for conveyance by sea alone. Then there is an item of £22,000 for National Health and Unemployment Insurance. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said this afternoon that it was always the custom of the War Office to do the very best for the men. I want them to do the best they can for the men who have returned. The best that was ever done for returned soldiers from any war was done in 1918. I took part then in the deliberations at which the unemployment benefit was augmented by a very substantial donation amounting to £60,000,000. What was done for 4,000,000 men can surely be done for 10,000 or 20,000. I want to keep the Financial Secretary to his word. If he wants to do the best for the men, let him do the best. He made a very eloquent appeal to employers to re-employ these men. That is not enough. Many hundreds, perhaps a thousand or two, will be out of employment. They will be thrown on the bare unemployment benefit. If it is the intention of the hon. and gallant Gentleman to do the best for them, could not the War Office do what they did in 1919 and increase the unemployment benefit? I believe I have said enough to show that it is now time for the Committee to begin examining this White Paper. We are to-night passing a Vote. Last night we were discussing the Audit (Local Authorities) Bill, which makes drastic proposals for city councils and penalises members of them for passing estimates that afterwards prove exorbitant. Here is the House of Commons dealing with an Estimate for £3,000,000, and we have not yet started to discuss it. We ought to leave alone the merits of what we did six or 12 months ago, and we ought to discuss these items and thus get on with the job which we started at four o'clock this afternoon.
After the statement of the Under-Secretary and the convincing support which has been given to the policy of the Government in sending troops to Shanghai by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), there seems little need for anyone on this side of the House to say any more, but there are one or two matters to which I would like briefly to refer. The name of Captain Sutton has been brought up by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy). I know Captain Sutton, a gallant Englishman who did good voluntary service for the country during the War, and has since then had a romantic and adventurous career. It did seem to me a little unfair that the hon. and gallant Member should try to connect the name of Captain Sutton, who was manufacturing munitions, I believe, somewhere in the interior for some unknown Chinese general, with the possibility of those munitions being used against our forces.
I made no attack on Captain or General Sutton; I attacked our Government for permitting it. The point is that he is making munitions for Chang Tso Lin, the dictator of the Northern Government, whose army may change sides at any time and attack our people with these munitions.
I am very glad to hear that disclaimer, but I certainly thought that the hon. and gallant Member was blaming Captain Sutton for the possibility of these munitions being used against our forces. It would be more to the point if the hon. and gallant Member and his party would use their undoubted influence with Russia to prevent Russia from supplying certain forces in China with munitions that are undoubtedly used against our forces.
What does the hon. Member mean by our influence with Russia? We have no sort of influence with Russia, and we wish no one would supply munitions from either side to the Chinese.
The hon. and gallant Member disclaims any influence with Russia. At any rate, no one will deny that he and his party have a very peculiar interest in Russia. The hon. Mem- ber for Stourbridge (Mr. Wellock) laid great stress on the fact that Germans were unmolested in China and that the boycott was directed against our nationals and against British traders only. I think he left out one important factor, namely, the intensified Communist propaganda that has been carried on against this country. The right hon. Member for Central Newcastle (Mr. Trevelyan) who opened the discussion spoke of our forgotten army. There are a good many people in this country who do not forget that force in Shanghai. I had a daughter at Hankow, and I was thankful there were British bluejackets evacuating the British nationals at Hankow. I have a good many friends at Shanghai, and we know the large British interests at Shanghai. The friends and relatives in this country of those at Shanghai do not forget that force and are devoutly thankful that it exists. It is undoubted that the existence of that force at Shanghai produces one of the only stable elements on the East coast of China.
The right hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood), whose knowledge on this subject is very wide, referred to the annual expenditure as being a sum of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000. One of the items—and it was referred to also by the last speaker—is the cost of transit by sea, amounting to nearly £1,000,000. I suppose the troops will have to be brought back some time, but that £1,000,000 can hardly be referred to as an ordinary expenditure. Strictly speaking, therefore, the annual expenditure is about £2,000,000. We all regret this expenditure, but it is satisfactory to know that that £900,000 has gone mainly into the pockets of British shipping, which sorely needed it, and that a very large part of this expenditure has thus gone towards helping British interests, while some of the men who have taken part in this force were men out of employment, who have now got employment. To that extent, the country has benefited from all this expenditure. My hon. Friend the Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker) has made suggestions in regard to the future policy of the Government. Those suggestions have been dealt with by the Under-Secretary, and I cannot help agreeing with what the Under-Secretary has said. The Government's policy of non-intervention has been fully justified. Reference has been made to-night to the League of Nations. Who will represent China at the League of Nations? If we take a representative of the Peking Government, one can imagine what a protest will arise from the opposite side at our Government taking sides in China. It seems to me that the only course left is the course taken by the Government, and we can only hope that that course will lead to discovering some stable form of government which will produce greater prosperity, both in China and in this country.
The discussion on this Estimate has brought up two Ministers in defence of it, the Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office and the hon. and gallant Gentleman who represents the War Office. It is evident, therefore, that we have here a mixed question of foreign policy and of Army policy, and I will make a few remarks on both. As far as foreign policy is concerned, the Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office told us a number of things which the Government were doing by way of co-operation with various foreign Powers with a view to getting a better situation in China. All that co-operation is co-operation dealing with the symptoms of the trouble rather than with the deep-rooted causes of the trouble. He told us that they have been co-operating with Japan, France, the United States and other countries with regard to different matters, Customs duties, and so forth. But I would like to know whether there has been any co-operation with regard to the real cause of the struggle in China, which we all know is the civil war. The civil war could not go on unless the civil warriors had something to fight with. We know that arms are being poured into China from a great many different sources. That has gone on for the last 10 years. Had it not been for that continued flow of arms and armaments into China, the civil war would have come to an end long ago. I am informed that within the last month no less than 11 ships have been underwritten at Lloyd's carrying munitions to China from various Western European countries. It may or may not be true, but it is a statement that is made on fairly good authority by business people in the City. What I do submit is that if we are to get a satisfactory settlement of this whole matter we must endeavour to cut out the root of the trouble and co-operate with other Governments through our Foreign Office in order to stop this trade in armaments. We have had no assurance from the Under-Secretary that co-operation is proceeding along that line.
The hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. Somerville) has referred to the undoubted fact that Russia is in this arms traffic business along with others. I would like to know whether it is not possible, in view of the recent conversations that took place between the Foreign Secretary and M. Litvinoff, which appear to have been of a more friendly character than might have been anticipated, and in view of the tribute of the Foreign Secretary to M. Litvinoff's friendly and pacific influence in the dispute between Poland and Lithuania, whether discussions might not result in bringing in the Russians and in putting a stop to the whole of this trade in arms. If the flow of armaments could be stopped, the civil war itself could not continue, there would be no need for our troops to remain on any pretext whatever, and the country could be saved this large expenditure which is now being discussed.
The proposal of the hon. Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Looker), that the League of Nations should be brought into the matter, has had cold water poured on it by the Under-Secretary—sympathetic cold water, but none the less cold. I wonder whether that is the last word that can be said on that point? I wonder whether it would not be possible to do something further? The League of Nations has been sitting at Geneva under a Chinese Chairman. Either that Chinese Chairman stands for something real, or he does not. If he does not, he should not be allowed to take the Chair at a Council meeting of the League, but, on the other hand if he does stand for something real, the fact that he takes the Chair at a League Council meeting is, surely, a symbol of the possibility of some kind of discussion through League channels. It does not seem to me to be a possible position to say that there is no one to represent China while at the very moment our Foreign Secretary is sitting under a Chinese Chairman at Geneva.
The hon. Member for South-East Essex made other proposals also. He said that if we could not get a settlement through the League we ought—I took down his words—to make the Chinese respect our rights whatever the consequences may be. I do not know what he meant by that, but I felt that he was taking the Debate back on to military ground, and I am going back now on to military ground. I would like to make one or two observations on the military side of the matter. In regard to the finance of this Estimate, my hon. Friend the Member for East Newcastle (Mr. Connolly) has raised a very pertinent point which I hope will be answered. In fact, I have reason to think that the Under-Secretary is now making preparations to answer it by consultation, and it certainly needs answering. After some of the criticisms that have been made, I feel no kind of assurance—even if we agree that these troops should remain in Shanghai—that this business is being economically managed. There is considerable evidence of extravagance and wastefulness, even assuming that this body of troops ought to be there at all. We do not, however, assume that, and I am afraid I shall disappoint the Under-Secretary, who expressed the hope that, now that the Leader of the Liberal party supported the Government, we would do the same and allow the Vote to go through without a Division. We shall do no such thing, but shall divide the Committee against the whole sum, for reasons which I will proceed shortly to give.
While I am still on the question of finance, may I say that it appears to me that, if we could find out the number of British troops now at Shanghai, we should find that the total number was possibly even larger than the number of British people living in the Shanghai Settlement. We cannot quite settle that, because we cannot get the figures, but it looks as though every Shanghai-lander, man, woman or child, has at least one British soldier, and possibly two, to protect him. I submit that that is an extravagant and wasteful procedure. We have maintained, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) has said again this afternoon, that it should be quite possible, in view of the actual situation which has been shown to exist, for the British community in Shanghai to be adequately protected against any real danger—I do not mean nightmares which have no basis in reality, but against any real danger— by their own local police force plus the British Navy. We submit that it is most uneconomical to leave these people to be protected, each, as I have said, by more than one, and possibly more than two, British soldiers. British soldiers are too valuable to be used in that extravagant way.
I come now to some questions regarding the British troops in Shanghai. Of course, we were all delighted, though in no way surprised, when the Financial Secretary to the War Office told us that the British soldiers there have behaved with great restraint, and have lived up to the highest traditions of the British Army. We were delighted to hear it. We expected that, and we were in no way surprised at it, although we were delighted to hear it. We sympathise with them, and I would express here, if my voice should reach so far through any Press report, my appreciation of the conduct of our troops in Shanghai, and my regret that they are being subjected to such abominable conditions in respect of health, quarters, opportunities for recreation and other aspects of a reasonable military life. I say it is intolerable that these troops should be kept to protect a rich community, a pampered community, a community which makes no contribution to its own defence, but which profiteers at the expense of the British taxpayers. An account has been given of the manner in which we have had to pay through the nose for very second-rate accommodation for our troops at Shanghai. The British taxpayer is paying through the nose in order that British troops may be kept in wretched accommodation at enormous prices charged by these Shanghai-landers in whose interests these troops have been sent out and this money has been poured forth month after month. It is most discreditable that this community should thus take all and give nothing towards this expenditure.
We are told that our trade has made us what we are. That is a well-worn cliché. But our trade has been going down under this system. Figures have been quoted to show that during the first six months of this year it sank, as compared with the year before, from £9,250,000 to £5,000,000. Very soon we in this country will be paying more in respect of this defence force than the whole amount of British exports from this country to China, while these Shanghai-landers are making no contribution. The position is impossible and intolerable, whether from the financial, the military or the diplomatic point of view. It is high time that these people were told that, if they want this protection, they must help to pay for it. They pay no British Income Tax; they are, as I have said, a pampered community; and it is high time that a stop was put to this privileged position which they are enjoying at the expense of the British taxpayers and the health of British troops. For that reason we shall, as I have said, divide against the whole of this Vote. We have nothing to withdraw from what we have said on this matter on previous occasions, and we look forward to the time when it will be possible, by diplomatic or other means, to bring about a situation in which even His Majesty's Government will recognise the desirability of withdrawing this armed force.
I intervene to ask only one or two questions with regard to the figures of this Estimate. My hon. and gallant Friend knows that, so far as the policy of the Shanghai Defence Force is concerned, it has my whole-hearted support. I am not, however, quite sure whether this £3,000,000 is being spent in the best possible way. In the first place, I should like to call attention to Subhead M of Vote 6— Wages of Civilian Subordinates at R.A.S.C. Establishments, etc., £34,000. Could my hon. and gallant Friend, in his reply, indicate exactly whether that means civilian subordinates taken from this country, or whether it represents Chinese labour, or Chinese clerks, or what it represents? The equivalent of about £3,000 a month is clearly a very considerable amount. Then I should like to ask, with regard to Sub-head A of Vote 12— War Office—salaries, wages, etc., £12,000, whether the Committee are to understand that, as a direct outcome of the sending of the Shanghai Defence Force, we have an increase of staff in the War Office here, and whether that average extra charge of £12,000 a year will remain until these men are withdrawn from China? Again, I notice that Sub-head H of Vote 6 is— Mechanical Transport, £61,000, while Sub-head G of Vote 6 is— Hired Road Transport, £15,000. Could my hon. and gallant Friend indicate, in his reply, what is meant by "Hired Road Transport"? From the amount of Sub-head H, one would understand that mechanical transport units of some size are out there, and I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend will not mind my asking what exactly "Hired Road Transport" is, and why it should be necessary, if those units are there, to put down this large sum for hired road transport.
Finally, I think my hon. and gallant Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office will remember, although there is not a Treasury representative on the bench at the moment, that at the latter end of last summer the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed a hope that the cost of the Shanghai Defence Force would be found out of savings. Could my hon. and gallant Friend say whether that is likely to be the case? I am sure that the Committee generally, and particularly those of my colleagues who, with me, are anxiously regarding the question of expenditure generally, will welcome any explanation that my hon. and gallant Friend can give us.
I rise as one of the strongest objectors to the whole of this expeditionary force, as well as to this expenditure, not because I do not believe that British lives ought to be saved, but because I believe that British lives are endangered by the policy of Great Britain in sending an expeditionary force to save them, and also because I do not believe that, under that false pretence of saving British lives, the British nation had any right to send an expeditionary force to destroy Chinese property and take Chinese lives. I take an out-and-out working-class point of view. I am one of those sincere signatories of the letter which was presented to the Prime Minister the other day by the hon. Member for the Brightside Division of Sheffield (Mr. Ponsonby), stating that we will not support any warlike movement, any warlike preparations, or any warlike activities of any Government. When we take up such a fundamental position as that, we do it with a conscientious belief that there is nothing at stake belonging to this nation which can be or ought to be saved by military preparations and activities.
This expedition would not have been sent out, the pretence of British lives being in danger would never have been put forward, had it not been for the smashing victories of the Communist group in China at that period. The expeditionary force did not add to the safety of British lives; it has added very greatly to the danger to British lives—[HON. MEMBERS: "No!"]—and it has added to the danger that no peaceful settlement of British traders in China will be possible in the future unless this expeditionary force be kept there for all time. What this expeditionary force has done is quite certain. By its presence, by its indirect assistance, by its direct destruction of Chinese lives and Chinese property, it has achieved only one result, namely, the treacherous action of Chang Kai-chek against the Communist army which first enabled him to win his victories.
The sending of this expeditionary force was a political move; it was not an honest move based on any honest apprehension of danger to British lives at all. Moreover, we are not yet quite sure, even from the political point of view, whether this £3,000,000 has been wisely spent. With all the intrigue, with all the manipulation, with the wastage of £3,000,000, we cannot get an answer, but it is certain that the Communist elements have not been crushed, and cannot be crushed. Let me submit to this Committee, taking a purely working-class point of view, that the case of Russia has proved, the case of China has partly proved, and will prove it again, that in these large countries, when the peasants have begun to realise their rights and their freedom against foreign capitalists and foreign rulers, when they begin to organise themselves, when they begin to demand their complete freedom from all bosses and all rulers from foreign countries, there is not a force in existence that can crush them. If Sovietism is going to be introduced by the peasantry of China, this expeditionary force will not be able to crush it.
It is quite likely that you may for a time succeed in sowing dissension among the Chinese generals. It is quite likely that by the presence of your Expeditionary Force, by the ruinous expenditure of £3,000,000, you may create a feeling of safety, not in the British population but in the Chinese generals to turn traitor to their own people, and to the cause they once undertook. But all these would be only passing measures and passing consolations. You will not effect the permanent crushing out of the Communist movement in China by this expedition, or by many more of the same kind. All you will have done is to impose a penalty of £3,000,000 upon this nation. If I can approximately gauge it, instead of giving that false and unwanted protection to British citizens in Shanghai, it would have supplied much needed protection to the unemployed who have been deprived of their benefit on the argument that there is not sufficient money. It would have supplied about 4s. a week to each individual unemployed person when it was falsely and cunningly pretended to be for the protection for British lives in Shanghai. Apart from this loss of money, this expedition has been one of mischief. It has created mischief much greater than hon. Members opposite may be prepared to admit to-day. It has done a permanent harm, greater than the £3,000,000 lost, in the future relations between Great Britain and China, and Great Britain will well deserve to suffer this loss by their policy of sending out this expedition. Not only that, but the Government are trying to cover up the effects of this expedition besides creating political mischief and impairing friendly relations for all time and embittering the people of China against British citizens, they have furthermore been directly responsible for the destruction of Chinese lives and Chinese property, and when you try to put forward your claims in your future negotiations with China, for this and that debt and this and that investment, the people of China will present you with a bill for loss, damage and destruction inflicted upon them by your sending out this expedition.
I wish to offer a criticism of one item of expenditure, namely, the rents. The Expeditionary Force, we were told, was in response to a desire expressed by British citizens in China, as well, as we were also told to-day, as by the desire of those who had banking and property interests in China, and who were residing in this country. What is the rent exactly? People who had their property in China called upon you to send an armed force to protect it, and the property owners charged your troops rent for staying on their property for the purpose of protecting it. They have not the decency even to show hospitality to the Expeditionary Force that they invited, according to your version. There is another item of a very grave nature and that is the payment of the Indian troops included in this expedition. It creates a very dangerous precedent. It destroys what I am constantly told is the constitutional mode of governing countries and managing their affairs. The people of India are told point-blank that they have no control over the maintenance or movement of Indian troops. Who controls them? I hope the Committee will agree with me that it is a most dangerous position for any nation that there should be a very large body of men, well armed, and well equipped, who should be at the disposal of military authorities who move out from their own country and go to any other country with a military expedition without being in any control of the people of the country who own and maintain that Army. The people of India have to maintain an Indian Army.
Just as you say this expedition was for the protection of the lives of the British, that Army in India is supposed to be for the protection of Indian subjects in India, and to-day we discover that the military authorities can despatch an army, which is one of the best trained and best equipped in the world, to any part of the world for military purposes, and we are told the Indian taxpayers have to shut up and not have any voice in it—not only the Indian taxpayers but Indian citizens, whose moral relations are at stake when they send out their Army to butcher the working class and peasantry of China. British soldiers also belong to the British working class, and they were sent to attack and suppress the Chinese workers and peasantry. That is the meaning of the word "protection." Here are Asiatics going to fight Asiatics. It was done merely to serve a political purpose, and here is this great position of danger that the people of India are told they shall not have the slightest voice as to where the Indian Army shall be sent, and for what purpose. It has been mentioned that there are many meetings of protest in India. There were not only meetings of protest, there was a great constitutional issue. The elected representatives of the people of India in the Legislative Assembly demanded to discuss the whole policy of the Government of India agreeing to let Indian troops go out on a warlike expedition to any outside country. The objection was raised that they were interfering with the foreign policy of Great Britain. The President of the Assembly, who is the Speaker of the House, decided that constitutional question and said the Assembly had every right, without discussing the foreign policy of Great Britain, to discuss the question of Indian troops being sent out.
The British Viceroy himself, unconstitutionally, most arrogantly and outrageously interfered and sent an order to the elected Speaker of an elected House that he should not have the debate conducted in the Legislative Assembly. For that the other day I was chastised by the India Office for having raised constitutional issues in India, and having done something seditious. What is the meaning of it? It is this. That an Army can be despatched by some British military officers to create a position of war, and then months after that, this Parliament is asked to pay the expense because it was done for some purpose of Great Britain and not for some particularly Indian purpose. I consider that this is a very grave situation. It means that within the British Empire to-day you can have an armed force which, at the time of going out, is a military expedition not under the control of the elected representatives and taxpayers of the country that maintain that Army and that the Indian authorities can perpetually escape the censure and the control of the Indian taxpayers by making this House pay the cost of the expedition. It looks as if we were doing something morally right when it is something that is morally wrong, and very dangerous and a great menace to the peace of the world. Every country in Europe, practically all the countries in the world, are in constant danger when they find that the British authorities can send an Indian Army outside the control of the Indian taxpayer and a few months afterwards say, "We will pay the bill. We will not allow the Indian taxpayer to have any word in it." I cannot conceive of a greater danger and a more unconstitutional policy than this. I hope strong objection will be taken to the whole of the Estimates on this ground also.
We were told the lives of British citizens were in danger. Of course, there is a position of danger when there is a civil war or a civil strike going on. Once upon a time we heard there was a civil war in France. There was a civil commotion in Germany, and there may be another between Nationalists and Communists. There was a civil war in Italy after the Great War. There were British citizens living in all these countries. They take their own risk. If we want to help them we can do it by assisting them to evacuate and to come away. Would you dare to send a British Army for the protection of British citizens in Paris during a civil war in France? Did you do it during the revolutionary period in France? Did you dare to send a British Army to Rome, to Milan, or to Venice when there was revolution and counter-revolution going on in Italy, and there were British citizens there?
It is an insolent policy of Imperialist Britain to take advantage of the weakness of a shattered nation and to commit outrages against them which you dare not commit even with the smallest nation in Europe. There are British citizens everywhere. Britain is a nation of shopkeepers. You are shopkeeping all over the world. There is not a part of the world where you cannot find British interests, British rights, British property, British merchants, British men, women and children. You gave that as an excuse to send your Army, not because you were right in doing it, but because you had Imperialist aims and objects in China, because you want to take advantage of the position of civil war to extend your Imperialist power, to extend your opportunities of exploitation, and to degrade and enslave the working class and peasantry of China even more if possible, than you are doing now. On the face of it, I do not accept one shred of evidence that is advanced by the Government or by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) that this expedition was sent out with any honest motive, to serve any honest purpose, or that there was any real danger to British citizens which could not have been as well settled by friendly relations as by this expeditionary force. It is a cunning conspiracy of Imperialist Great Britain against the lives and liberties of the people of China, and this £3,000,000 is the cost of it. It will cost you still more if you do not stop at that and withdraw the troops.
May we have an assurance from the Government that if the Communist rising in Canton now succeeds further, and if the events of last January and February are repeated next January and February, they will refrain from sending their expeditionary force or from increasing the existing number of troops there? You were not afraid when Chang-kai-Shek was fighting against his former friends. There were more battles fought after the treachery of Chang-kai-Shek than when he was leading the Communist Army. There were more casualties in the country after the reversal of the Communist Army, and there was more destruction of property after the temporay defeat of the so-called Reds. You then were able to decrease the Expeditionary Force. If the Reds succeed again, are you going to increase the Expeditionary Force again, or are you now telling us that you are not concerned with what party wants China and you will withdraw the Expeditionary Force?
I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the War Office if he will give us some further light on one or two of the points in the Estimate. Under item C, there is the very large item of half a million for work and maintenance. Can he tell us how that very large amount comes to be expended? I gathered during the Debate that Members opposite thought the traders in Shanghai ought to supply buildings for the housing of troops. We should be grateful for a little further light. Then there is Vote 12, additional War Office staff. Is that a continuing expense as long as the force is maintained there? We should like to be assured that some reductions will be effected under this head if the Shanghai Force is to remain. All on this side of the Committee are agreed that the remaining money has been well and necessarily expended. Hon. Members opposite are inclined to grouse at this money being expended by taxpayers, but we do not at all hold with Members opposite who would prefer to see the money distributed in doles to the unemployed. We regard it as one of our duties to see that our people are protected in foreign countries, and I shall go into the Lobby in favour of this Vote.
I have no real reason for complaint as to the criticisms which have been made against the figures of the Supplementary Estimate. The main part of the Debate has been, of course, occupied by criticisms, not very strong, of the foreign policy of the Government. These have been already replied to by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I would like, first, to deal with the specific points raised in the Supplementary Estimate to which various Members have alluded. In the first place, the hon. Gentleman the Member for East Newcastle-on-Tyne (Mr. Connolly) raised the question with regard to marriage allowances, transport and unemployment. The marriage allowances amount to £17,000, and are in respect of men of the A Reserve sent out to China, and also for the other ranks of the British regiments from India which were sent out to China, and who come under this Estimate because they were entitled to be paid by us. Of the Indian Contingent, there were two battalions and about 3,000 men of the A Reserve. If the hon. Member looks at the Army Estimates for this year he will find that the rate of the marriage allowance is set out, and it varies, of course, with the number of members of the family, but the case he stated of a man with a wife and three children amounts to 19s. a week. That is an extreme case. I do not suppose that all of them get that, but even if you take it at 10s. to 20s. a week, I do not think if he works it out he will find £17,000 for two battalions of infantry, auxiliary and ancillary troops from India very heavy.
As regards transport, I dealt with that in my opening remarks, and I pointed out that some 17 battalions of infantry, regiments of artillery and also large numbers of transport and armoured car companies and other ancillary units have been sent out, and some of them have already returned, and their return passages are included in the amount. I also said in my opening statement that the whole of the return of the Indian infantry contingent was in this Vote, and that the whole cost of the transport of the battalions coming back to this country will be paid within this financial year. With regard to unemployment, I would like to tell the hon. Member that every man who leaves the forces leaves it in regard to unemployment and health insurance as a fully insured person, and entitled to all the benefits of an insured person. That accounts for the item of contributions for insurance. Then my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Sir F. Nelson) raised the question about Vote 6, (M), Item M, Wages of Civilians. These are wages to civilian subordinates replacing Royal Army Service Corps units sent to China, and also the wages of civilians engaged in China for Army Service Corps duty. Then he also asked me with regard to Items D and H. Hired Road Transport is the extra cost of hiring transport due to Royal Army Service Corps units being sent to China. We have to hire a greater amount in this country, and a certain amount out in China, and these are the road hairings referred to. The item for cost of vehicles under the Item for mechanised transport is extra transport we have had to provide for the troops going out to China. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Norwich (Captain Fairfax) raised one question in regard to Vote 10 (C). He raised the question of the amount of £462,000 on expenditure for construction and maintenance work. That is expenditure in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin and Wei-hai-wei, the cost of constructing temporary camps, the provision of a general hospital accommodation and provision for camp cookers and the cost of defences, maintenance of accommodation and the reinstatement of accommodation, not required for the reduced force. This is a large item, but it covers a considerable area and a considerable amount of work.
Are any of these buildings of permanent value?
I do not think we have actually secured any land.
Is there anything about rents?
The rents are a different Vote altogether. The rents of buildings amount to £156,000, on the Vote 5, Item C. The hon. Member did not raise that in his remarks, but as he asks me, I am pleased to tell him. The rent of buildings includes the rent of buildings at Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin and Wei-hei-wai necessary for the accommodation of troops, stores and offices. Where there have been buildings available we have hired them. With regard to the 12,000 under the head of War Office, I thought certain Members might inquire into it, but I should like to assure them that it is accounted for by the cost of financial staff at Shanghai. They are on the books of the War Office though they are out in China, and there are also others here to replace those sent out to Shanghai. They will be dispensed with as soon as possible. The main criciticism raised against the War Office has been really with regard to the number of troops and the fact that the right hon. Member for New-castle-on-Tyne (Mr. Trevelyan), who opened the Debate laid stress on the fact that I always refused to give the actual number. The difficulty in giving actual numbers is that they vary from day to day and week to week. Some men are sent home sick, some are sent home who are due for discharge, and the actual numbers are fluctuating. It is, therefore, very difficult indeed to give a definite figure, when somebody next week will criticise the figures because they are different. Therefore, I refused to give numbers, but I assure the hon. Gentleman they are nothing like 20,000 suggested by the right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood). When the present reduction is completed, when the five battalions and the ancillary troops are withdrawn, the numbers out there will not exceed 13,000. The 13,000 is, I suppose, the overwhelming British force to which the right hon. Member for Newcastle-on-Tyne referred.
Would the Minister tell us how many there were at maximum strength?
I cannot give any particular day, but in July there were four brigades and one battalion of infantry, making 17 battalions of infantry, various units of artillery and ancillary troops. I cannot give actual numbers.
Are those the troops in Shanghai or the whole of the Expeditionary Force in China?
8.0 p.m.
The eight battalions, five of which would be at Shanghai. The numbers which I have quoted are, apparently, the overwhelming British force to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred as terrorising and overawing the great Chinese nation. I can hardly think that a force of that description and size can terrorise some 1,500,000 men who are under arms in China at the present time. A small force such as that could not overawe or terrorise a nation like the Chinese. The right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme also raised a question with regard to the formation of a local defence force. There has been a local defence force composed of members of different nationalities in Shanghai, who banded themselves together for protection; but these are business men who have other vocations in life beyond the defence of their wives and children, and they could not devote the whole of their time to the protection of a city like Shanghai. It is absurd to think that 1,500 or 2,000 volunteers could adequately protect an area which has a boundary or perimeter of some 14 miles. A small force of volunteers would be utterly inadequate to give defence to an area such as is enclosed within the concession at Shanghai. That is why we had to send troops to help in the protection.
The hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), as he truly says, sent me several questions, to some of which I replied in my opening remarks. His question in regard to the contributions by Shanghai I dealt with in my opening remarks. The municipality are allowing us to have land tax free and are providing such buildings as belong to the municipal council rent free.
Are we paying taxes on the land?
No. It is tax free. If the hon. and gallant Member will look at the report of my opening remarks, he will see what has been done by the municipal council. He also asked me what land we are occupying outside the Settlement. The only land we have occupied outside has been in instances where the necessity for protection has arisen, and we have sent forces in order to give protection. In one or two instances, the Japanese and our own troops have gone outside to protect isolated property belonging to our nationals, and I understand that no objection to such forces being sent has been taken by the Chinese authorities.
With regard to the employment of Indian troops, which was raised by the hon. Member for Battersea North (Mr. Saklatvala) and another hon. Member, it was obvious that the need was urgent when the troops were despatched, and it was realised that the nearest place from which we could get troops was India. It is absurd to suggest that the British Government or the British War Office took these troops from India without the permission of the Indian Government. The Indian Government were asked whether the troops could go, and quite naturally they gave permission for the troops to be sent, with the immediate object of getting troops there in the quickest possible time. Had there been a demand upon the taxpayers of India it might well have been a matter of complaint, but it was pointed out that the British Government were paying the whole cost of the troops; therefore, the Indian taxpayer was not personally
affected by the Indian troops having been sent to China.
The Indian Government agreed, contrary to the wishes and without any control from the elected representatives of the Indian people.
If the hon. Member has any quarrel on that score it must be with the Indian Government and not with the War Office. We obtained the Indian troops at the earliest possible moment, and we were very grateful to the Indian Government for allowing the troops to be taken. We relieved them and sent them back to India at the earliest possible moment. I think I have covered all the points raised in Debate.
What about the aeroplanes?
That is a question for the Admiralty or the Air Ministry. It is only natural when aeroplanes are being used that they must go over territory other than the international settlement.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Ayes, 242; Noes, 103.
CIVIL ESTIMATES, SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1927.
CLASS VI.
BEET SUGAR SUBSIDY, GREAT BRITAIN.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £900,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1928, for a Subsidy on Sugar and Molasses manufactured from Beet grown in Great Britain.
According to the ruling which was given last year I should be out of order in arguing the case for a sugar subsidy or in detailing to the Committee the particular value and effect which this subsidy has had on arable cultivation. At the same time the Committee will no doubt expect an explanation of the increased production for which it will be necessary to provide a supplementary vote, the principle of which was accepted on the main Estimate. The increased sum is made necessary by the great development of sugar-beet cultivation in this country, which will enable the factories, according to the present estimate, to claim the payment of a subsidy on 239,000 tons of sugar and 69,000 tons of molasses during the current season.
Does that include any from last year?
Very little. I have not the exact figure. The Estimate which we present early in the year cannot possibly be accurate in this matter because we have to deal with three unknown quantities—the acreage on which sugar-beet will be grown, the yield per acre of the roots, and the sugar content of the roots which are produced. We have to decide the figure of the Estimate within the month of January, long before the crop has been grown. Last January, on the data which had been sent in by the factories, the maximum acreage in the south was 209,000, and that included a provision for two factories which were in contemplation, but which at that time, according to the information then in our possession, were not certain to be erected. In January, last year, the very favourable result of the 1926 sugar harvest was not known. That harvest produced nearly an extra yield of one ton per acre over the result of the previous year. The average yield per acre was 8.63 tons of beet, as against 7.67 tons for the previous season.
In the same way we had no information as to the great increase in sugar content, and that percentage reached 17.31 as against 16.36 per cent. for 1925–26. These improvements in yield and sugar content meant that the factory output for last season, expressed in terms of commercial sugar, reached 2,656 lbs. per acre as against 2,063 lbs. per acre for the previous season. In other words, there was an increase last season over the preceding season of nearly one third in the result, expressed in commercial sugar. The very satisfactory result to the growers and to the factories which was revealed in the final figures last year resulted in the erection not of two more factories, as we expected in January last year, but of four. It resulted in four of the existing factories doubling their plant and two other factories embarking on very large increases. In the current season contracts were signed for 222,500 acres of beet, but what was actually grown was nearly 230,000 acres, as a good many farmers grew beet without signing any contract.
Farmers grew beet without a contract?
A certain number of them grew beet without making contracts with the factories, knowing that some of the factories would be short of the maximum amount with which they could deal and would be glad to take supplies wherever they could get them. The Committee ought to realise the very large difference in the estimate which is caused by a comparatively small variation in the acreage yield and sugar content. If you take the present acreage, 230,000 in round figures, and assume 8½ tons to the acre, then an increase of 1 per cent. in the sugar extraction involves an extra subsidy of £380,000.
Shame!
If you take the other side of the problem, one half ton per acre increase in the yield means an increased demand on the Treasury, in the form of subsidy, of £335,000 last year. We had not one half a ton increase in the yield, but a one ton increase. We are still only half way through the season and it is impossible to foretell the final figure which the subsidy will reach. We can merely take the estimate of the factories, and these estimates fluctuate very considerably during the course of a few weeks. On 15th October the factories estimated that they would produce 210,000 cwts. more sugar than they estimated would be probable less than a month later, and as the expectations of the factories seem to be decreasing at the moment, I think it is quite certain that the £900,000, which we have provided in the Supplementary Estimate, is an outside figure and will prove to be more than what will be required. Undoubtedly, it is unsatisfactory to the Committee not to be able to tell in advance exactly what liability will have to be faced, but that is inevitable in connection with a subsidy such as that provided in the British Sugar (Subsidy) Act. In voting this large sum of £900,000, which will bring this subsidy up to £5,400,000 for the full season, the Committee can console itself because it is enabling a new and valuable industry to become firmly established and is giving financial relief to those arable districts which are most hit by the present agricultural depression.
I beg to move, to reduce the Vote by £5.
The right hon. Gentleman in his introductory words indicated that on a review of the Supplementary Estimate it was difficult, if not impossible, under the rules of the House, to explore the whole field of the subsidy. With that, of course, we on this side must agree. But in moving this reduction I trust we shall be in order in pressing for an inquiry into two or three points of importance which are raised very sharply by this Supplementary Estimate. I suggest that that course is justified by a good deal of the criticism which has emerged in recent months, and so far justified also by the White Paper— dealing with the nine or eleven factories —which I gather the right hon. Gentleman himself submitted to the House some weeks ago. The first point to which I would direct attention, in asking for this inquiry, is the conditions of labour in the factories to which this Supplementary amount, among others, applies. There is undeniable criticism regarding both the hours of work, the remuneration, and the recent refusals of the Minister of Agriculture to accede to investigation of or intervention in this problem. Information which has been lodged by several of the sugar beet factories in different parts of the country makes it perfectly plain that they are working shifts of 12 hours, that some quite young people in the factories are engaged for as much as 18 hours; and while we recognise that this is a short period industry, those conditions can hardly be defended any more than the remuneration which in many cases is offered.
I submit that before we proceed to vote any additional sum for the subsidy a problem of that kind deserves investigation. Accordingly we make that a part of the kind of inquiry which we recommend in moving this reduction. If I may I will refer for one moment to the general question. I wish to make it plain that there were certain hon. Members on this side of the Committee who never approved of this scheme; but the majority of our Members did approve of it, subject to the reservation that should be exercised by every hon. Member, that if circumstances developed in such a way as to indicate financial difficulty, that would be at any time proper material for review. That is the case which I am putting on this and other points to night. In the second place there cannot be any doubt at all that inquiry is urgently required into the general finance of the scheme. We must undertake that inquiry before the additional £900,000 is voted. During recent weeks the Minister of Agriculture issued a return covering 11 factories engaged in beet sugar manufacture, and that return indicates that of the 11, nine had a period of quite considerable prosperity. The aggregate profits in these cases appeared to amount in round figures to £425,000 or £450,000. It becomes a very important question for the taxpayers of this country, even assuming that there is a general desire to help this industry, whether a subsidy on such a scale is required if profits of that kind are to be earned by the factories. If the problem before us is one of encouragement of a new industry during its time of initial progress, is it true to suggest that we are going beyond that and with the assistance of the subsidy putting profits into the pockets of a comparatively limited number of people, which was certainly not the original intention of the promoters of this scheme? That is one consideration in pressing for inquiry. But of course there are many others.
We know that the subsidy was divided into three periods, the first covering the period of four years up to 1927–28; the next covering the three years succeeding —in other words we are now beginning the diminution of the subsidy—and the last period covering the final three of the 10 years. During that time the subsidy falls progressively from 19s. 6d. to 13s. and then to 6s. 6d. A very important question is arising as to whether these factories will be able to continue, with the fall of the subsidy, upon which period we are now beginning to enter, because just at the moment of this Supplementary Estimate we are, so to speak, at the turning point, at the beginning of the subsidy decline. Of course, if a broad view is taken of these beet-sugar factories, the argument would be, first of all, that they have done very well indeed; secondly, that they may be trusted to drive a good bargain with the farmers; and, thirdly, that if they had handled their finance aright they should have been able to build up such reserves and to make such other provision as will enable them with success to meet the declining period of the subsidy contribution. But against that there is the analysis of the Agriculture Institute at Oxford, and of certain other authorities, which many of us regard as of great importance as bearing on this special Vote of £900,000. That analysis suggests that it might be better if the larger part of the experience in building up this new industry had taken place when the subsidy was at its full height, and that that experience should have been acquired under those conditions, even if the subsidy later were more drastically or speedily reduced than is contemplated in the present scheme. That analysis goes on to point out that, so far from that being the case, the bulk of the experience is taken to fall probably now or in the second subsidy period when the decline is taking place, and that as far as future entrants to the field are concerned, their position presumably will be even more difficult when they are confronted not merely with the 13s. of the second period but the 6s. 6d. of the third.
What is the practical issue arising from all this analysis so far as the taxpayers of Great Britain are concerned? The idea was to stimulate a new industry which was to have an important influence on agriculture and to provide an alternative occupation in the agricultural areas. But at every stage of a subsidy of this kind—which up to the present has cost the taxpayers more than £10,000,000—there is a call for drastic inquiry, and if there is the slightest ground for suggesting that these factories will not be able to continue, when the subsidy is reduced, then quite plainly that is a matter which we must take into account not only on the main Estimate but on every Supplementary Estimate. Even at this time a claim is being staked out in certain quarters for the maintenance of the subsidy, and that is an issue which we must face, whether we are in favour of the scheme, or critical of it, or altogether against it. During the past few months in the "Sugar Manual," which is, I think, a representative publication in this matter, there has appeared an analysis of the position of a typical beet-sugar factory, turning out about 10,000 tons of beet sugar per annum, in the first, second and third subsidy periods. They envisage a capital of from £400,000 to £500,000, subject to fair conditions which would be generally accepted as a reasonable statement of the position of one of these factories.
The analysis shows that on that basis, and with that output, in the first subsidy period—that is taking 54s. to the grower—it ought to be possible to make a profit of about £147,000. In the second subsidy period, taking the new agreed rate at 46s., they estimate that that profit would fall to about £114,000, and, in the third period, that it would fall to £109,000. Finally, assuming the subsidy to be removed altogether—which is a consideration we must always have in our minds, because that is the broad plan of the scheme—they indicate that, making allowance for a greater efficiency on the part of the farmers in the cultivation of this crop, and for its offer at a much lower rate than is now or will be in force, that profit would fall to about £56,000. The Committee may say that even on that basis, which presumably is a fair test, the situation is perfectly safe; but that is not the view taken by other critics of this scheme, and particularly by that section of opinion which is now staking out a claim either for the maintenance of the subsidy or for an easier scale of modification. So in the light of all these facts in regard to what I will call the general finance of the operation of beet-sugar cultivation in Great Britain, I think a case has been established for an inquiry before a Supplementary Estimate is passed. In other words, what I have said covers the two points—first, the labour conditions applied to this form of cultivation, and the question of whether the workers on the land are getting any show at all in this case; and, second, the broad general question of the finance of the beet-sugar factories and the position of the subsidy at the end of the period.
That leaves only one other ground which I propose to notice in asking for this inquiry. That ground is the undeniable plight of the sugar refineries. I recognise that in a Supplementary Estimate, the whole broad problem cannot be surveyed, but during recent times, and certainly in the period that will be covered by this additional contribution the position of the refineries has become very much worse. Not so long ago, in Greenock there were 18 sugar refineries. There are now five, and of those, four are practically closed. Only one sugar refining factory in that important centre of the industry is in operation. Sugar refineries have been closed in other parts of the country, and, within recent times, a substantial difficulty has overtaken one of the largest firms—Messrs. Tate and Lyle—although, so far, that difficulty has been temporarily relieved. Is it unfair to suggest to the Government that, whatever view be taken of the proposals of the refiners for a remedy, they undoubtedly demand and require investigation of their position at the present time? Within recent weeks, the Corporation of Greenock, the refiners and others, have joined in an appeal to the Government for an inquiry, and, up to the present time, to the best of my knowledge, no favourable response has been made to that request.
We know that a section of the refiners are probably out for complete protection against the importation of what they call dumped Continental sugar at low prices. Another section do not go so far. They are content to say that we should alter the incidence of the Imperial Preference, and some of them couple with that a demand that we should disentangle the refining process at these beet-sugar factories from the other processes of beet cultivation and sugar manufacture. In other words, as I understand it, they would confine it to the raw material. In any case, they point out that when the subsidy is taken into account, and the contribution for molasses, together with the allowance in respect of the present scale of Imperial Preference, we are giving about 26s., and more, per cwt. Looking at the returns of these factories as included in the recent White Paper, it is fair to say that there is as much subsidy as sugar, because it runs to more than £1 per cwt. In other words, the subsidy is the larger part of the show on a cwt. basis in certain oases. If that be the argument of the refiners, and if these refiners are contending that they are penalised to some extent—that is as far as we can push the argument—by the beet-sugar subsidy, then, surely, it is a reasonable thing to aceede to their request for an inquiry.
Many of us on this side of the Committee are not prepared to go further than to say that beet-sugar cultivation is only a part, and not a large part, of the refiners' problem. In my view, by far the larger part of the refiners' problem is the dumping of Continental sugar at rates with which they find it difficult to compete, and in terms of a policy on the part of Czechoslovakia and other countries, of offering sugar here at a lower rate, and actually restricting supplies in order to keep up the price in their domestic market. Be that as it may, there is an undeniable case for an inquiry when we have regard to the plight which has overtaken Greenock and other centres. It is unfortunate, as regards Greenock, that this depression has coincided with a great dislocation in the shipbuilding and engineering trades. That is only an additional reason for making the fullest inquiry. In summary, I suggest that there are three points, namely, labour conditions, the general finance of beet-sugar cultivation, and the plight of the refineries, which constitute ample ground for this investigation. I shall be amazed if the Government take the extraordinary line of refusing what appears to be a very fair and reasonable request.
I rise to oppose this Supplementary Estimate, not altogether on the same grounds as my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Edinburgh (Mr. W. Graham), who has just spoken, but because of the vast size to which it has grown under the present arrangement and the necessity for the curtailing of national expenditure. In the first place, the total which appears on the Estimate is not a complete statement of the liability of the State; it is not a complete statement of what it has cost the Exchequer during the last year. To begin with, the calculation has added to it a footnote, which declares that: The Excise Duty at existing rates on sugar and molasses manufactured from beet grown in Great Britain is estimated to yield in 1927 £1,800,000. For the purpose of making this Estimate palatable to the House, that amount is deducted from the total amount of £5,400,000, so as to reach a total of a little over £3,500,000. That leaves out of account altogether the fact that, if there had been no subsidy, if we were feeding now on sugar imported from abroad and passing through British refineries, the extra amount of revenue which would have come to the State would have amounted to another £1,000,000. That has been lost under this scheme, so that actually the cost that we are now reaching is not a matter of £5,400,000; under the revised Estimate it is £5,400,000, not minus the amount of the Excise Duty, but plus the amount of the difference between the Excise Duty and the Customs Duty. In other words, the amount that we are now being asked to vote is not £5,400,000 in total, but it is a total which comes to £6,500,000.
The right hon. Gentleman is not buttressed by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and I am not at all surprised that the Treasury is shy of this Vote. It is one of the most expensive experiments that has been made since the present Government came into office. Already, we have spent £10,000,000 over it, with an addition of £2,000,000 lost by the Exchequer through the absence of Customs Duty, and the Minister himself has said—I am not sure that he was not even proud of it—that before we have done with this it is going to cost us £20,000,000. He would have been more accurate if he had said £20,000,000 plus £4,000,000 lost in Customs revenue—in other words, £24,000,000 for the 10 years scheme. These figures are really staggering. It is no use shutting our eyes to the fact that we cannot afford to pay subsidies on this scale, and, what is more than that, we cannot afford to pay them in this way.
The extra amount that we are asked to vote to-night of £900,000, plus whatever is lost by the Treasury, bringing us up to a very high total, is explained away by the Minister because of the difficulty which he had in estimating at the beginning of the season what would be the sugar content. Nobody knows what the sugar content will be. That is in the hands of God. If we have a very sunny summer, it is more than likely that the sugar content will be high; if we have a bad summer, the sugar content will be lower. We do not know what the yield may be; it depends entirely on the skill of our agriculturists. Whether or not they are able to produce a large yield depends largely on their method of manuring, which is not altogether the same in this country as it is in Germany and Holland. But one thing we can be sure of, and that is that the amount which passes through the factories is likely to go up from year to year as long as the subsidy remains at its present scale. When we go on the decline, I think there will be a smaller number of farmers ready to supply beet for the factories, and then there may be a crisis in the sugar beet industry.
Why should there be reluctance on their part to grow? The original reason given for the subsidy was that it was to aid agriculture; it was to open out a new branch of agriculture; it was to establish in this country a new industry which would enable our tillage farmers once more to establish themselves in a state of prosperity. How far has it done that? The right hon. Gentleman has heard from many farming associations, as I am sure he has heard from many individual farmers, that they are not satisfied with the factories making a profit of about £17 per ton of sugar, whereas they, the farmers, cannot make more than £4 to £5 per ton out of it. The distribution as between the factories and the farmers, they think, is unfair, and I heartily agree with them, for, if the benefit to agriculture was the reason for starting this subsidy, it is very easily shown, by calculations which can be checked by the Minister himself, that the lion's share of this subsidy is going to the factory owners and not to the farmers. Benefits, of course, have accrued to the farmers under it, quite naturally; of course they would. If you give a subsidy to a trade, naturally it benefits by it, and there are many farmers who believe that the subsidy should go on for ever. What they dislike about it is its declining scale, but there is no Minister who would think of coming down to this House and binding the Exchequer for ever to a subsidy of these enormous dimensions.
When we make a survey of the size of the subsidy, we begin to be able to get the material on which to form a judgment. In the first year, it was not very easy to see how far the thing was likely to go, but we can see now, with this Supplementary Estimate before us, what it is going to cost us, more or less. It is quite clear that under the scheme the factories, which are doing so well on the whole —there are only about two of them that did not make ends meet last year, and some of them made very much larger profits than they showed in their balance-sheets—are in the happy position of receiving their raw material free. That is what it amounts to—actually getting their raw material free.
Will the right hon. Gentleman develop his argument about profits being larger than shown in the balance-sheets?
Everybody who has drawn up a balance-sheet knows that you must have a good many secret reserves for contingencies, that you must have money to carry over in the following year. Any chartered accountant who has had anything to do with company concerns knows that; it is common form and quite justifiable. But do not let us deceive ourselves by imagining that the published profits which came out in the White Paper were the gross profits of these factories. They are not; they are the net profits; they are what, in the judgment of the directors, they think it wise and prudent to publish, and nothing more, and the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me that it is natural that they should have a good deal up their sleeves. They will go on doing that so long as the factories remain under the subsidy scheme, and I say, without any possibility of contradiction, that every one of these well-managed factories will repay the whole of their capital and leave a handsome profit over the 10 years' period. Indeed, if they do not do that, there is a danger of us losing some of the £2,200,000 capital which we have advanced, particularly to the Scottish factories.
Let me put to the Committee the size of the subsidy in various forms. I was saying, when the right hon. Gentleman, quite fairly, interrupted me, that the factories get their raw material free. What does that amount to? The subsidy comes to over £3 per ton of the beet which they receive; that is practically what it is equivalent to, for I think it is fair to say that the yield has been working out at something like 7.18 tons of beet for one ton of sugar produced. That would, therefore, make the amount which they receive per ton of the beet, the raw material, about £3. But now they buy from the farmer. Do they pay him £3 per ton? Not at all. They are paying him a great deal less than that. In other words, the factories are receiving their raw material absolutely as a gift from the State. You do not need to be either a Dutchman or a Scotsman to make a profit out of an industry of that sort.
Let us measure it in terms of acreage. This subsidy up to the level which it has now reached in the Supplementary Vote, actually works out, if you leave out of account the Customs revenue, on the basis of £23 per acre under cultivation. The farmer does not get it. The extra amount to be added for revenue lost brings it up to £28. That is; roughly the value of the freehold of farm land in this country. That is another way of showing to what enormous dimensions this subsidy has grown. The Minister, if he is going to justify going on on this scale, must, of course, believe that it has added to the employment of people in factories and on the land. It is very difficult to get out of him any estimate as to the extra number of persons employed on the land. His colleague from Scotland, with greater ingenuity in the answering of questions, produced yesterday a new formula. He says that the extra employment which has been given under this subsidy works out at one man for one and a-half weeks extra per acre. What on earth does that mean? I have been thinking of a great many ways of working it out, and the only sensible way is this. If you take a unit of 34 acres of beet and multiply one man by one and a-half weeks by 34 acres, it means that you might be employing one extra man for 52 weeks in the year. Is that what the right hon. Gentleman means? He said it is an estimate, and perhaps I had better leave it at that. I am increasingly distressed over the returns the Minister has produced of employment on the land. This subsidy is not checking the diminution in the employment of persons on the land. It is obvious to anybody who knows anything about farming that beet-growing must of necessity employ more men than the growing of some other crops, but not all. There are some crops in the southwest of England which employ more men than the growing of beet. There are others grown elsewhere that do not employ so much labour. I do not suppose, for instance, that we should want so much labour for the growing of turnips. But what is the figure?
9.0 p.m.
One of the reasons given for the subsidy was the employment that was going to be given. I will make a rough shot, if the Minister will not think me presumptuous. I say that on the total acreage this year it has not led to the employment of more than 7,000 people extra, and that for only a very short period of the farming year. Now, in addition to that, there have been 8,400 men employed in the factories for three months in the year. Let us measure the subsidy in terms of unemployment pay. Suppose we had had from the Exchequer to pay these men in lieu of giving them work, could we have done it on this generous scale without being open to criticism? Suppose my right hon. Friend who has just spoken, had come to the House when he was in power, and had said, "I believe in doing all that I can for the unemployed, and I have discovered a way of doing it on a generous scale. I am going to have 15,000 more men employed and under my scheme they will cost, for three months' employment, £380 each." Multiply that by four, and we get a nice little sum for the right hon. Gentleman with his great facility in mental arithmetic. That scale would have been regarded as an outrage, but that is what the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Agriculture is doing. What does it work out at? If you allow for the £1,100,000 lost in revenue—and you must allow for that, because it is an inherent part of the scheme—you will find that for the 8,400 men in the factories—a rough but a very generous estimate—and the 7,000 extra men employed in the beet fields, the cost works out for three months at £380 odd each. In other words, well over £1,000 for the year. They are the most expensive unemployed the country has ever had to support, and that is the only justification the right hon. Gentleman can have for putting through this scheme.
The right hon. Gentleman will now be able to supply a perfectly adequate explanation, and he will say that these are the most deserving of all the unemployed, and are well worth £380 each for three months. But we are bound to look at this question from a different point of view. Is this good expenditure of national money? The last illustration I give of the extent to which we are throwing away this money with both hands, without getting an adequate return, is to be found purely from the point of view of the nation, not of the farmers whom a subsidy can benefit, although they are not getting their fair share of it, not from the point of view of the factory owners, who are doing well out of it and sometimes upon our capital; but from the general point of view, it would actually pay us to use this money to buy our sugar in Rotterdam, to ship it across from Rotterdam, distribute it in this country free of cost, give every one of these men who would be thrown out of work £3 a week for the period they were out of work, and then there would be £1,500,000 left for the right hon. Gentleman to distribute among the farmers of the country. I have only one remark to make in conclusion. If that is the way we are going to squander our national money, no wonder the Chancellor is embarrassed. This is the worst example I have ever seen of crazy finance.
I should like in a few words to reinforce the plea so eloquently made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Edinburgh (Mr. W. Graham) for inquiring into the financing of this scheme. I was one of the few who was constrained on the Third Reading of the Subsidy Bill to vote against it. I voted against it, not because I was against the development of the beet sugar industry in this country, nor because I was against the stimulation of an alternative crop in agriculture, nor because I was opposed in principle to a subsidy for a munificent social good, but because I believed that this was going to be an extraordinarily wasteful and uneconomic way of applying a subsidy. In principle, we are all agreed about the necessity of the subsidy on certain things. We are agreed, for example, about the necessity for a subsidy on housing. [ Interruption. ] Most of us are, and I think there are very few hon. Members who would go into the Division Lobby to stop the housing subsidy. But be that as it may; we cannot argue now the merits of either the housing subsidy or the sugar beet subsidy, but we can ask the Government to institute an inquiry into the methods by which this subsidy is applied. The last speaker, in referring to the published accounts of these beet sugar factories— published by the right hon. Gentleman— said they did not disclose everything. I go further, and I say that in that White Paper we have no two accounts drawn up on the same basis. Some include a profit-and-loss account and others do not, and they are drawn up in different way, so that it is almost impossible to deduce common figures from them.
I have here the reports of the last annual meeting of three of these companies, held in June of this year. At the third annual meeting of the English Beet Sugar Corporation the chairman reported —I do not find this in the White Paper —that after providing for all charges, including depreciation and Income Tax, there was a balance of £246,168, of which £156,000 had been appropriated to general reserve. He proceeded to say that from the balance they were able to pay 20 per cent. to their shareholders, preference and ordinary, free of tax. This was the third annual meeting of this concern, and already they have 60 per cent. of their issued share capital in a reserve fund. They have already depreciated the original cost of their buildings and their plant by 30 per cent., and they are able to pay 20 per cent. to their shareholders free of Income Tax. In the case of the Ely beet sugar factory, again we find extraordinary profits. They made a profit of £307,000, compared with £83,000 in 1925. After debenture interest, depreciation and Income Tax had been allowed for, and £60,000 placed to general reserve, they were pleased to pay a tax free dividend of 12½ per cent. It is a most extraordinary story. The debentures are actually paid off in full, and a bank loan of £165,000 shown in the liabilities is wiped out. The Ipswich beet sugar factory paid 12½ per cent. free of tax. After three years of existence, it has already reserves equal to 23 per cent. of its issued capital, and has allowed 20 per cent. for depreciation. One daily paper with whose opinions I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not quarrel, the "Daily Telegraph," has made a reference to the gentleman who is the dominating figure in the three concerns which I have just mentioned. He seems to be the biggest figure in the sugar industry on the Continent at the moment, and he has come over here and has succeeded in securing the largest proportion of the British beet-sugar subsidy. I refer to Mr. Van Rossum, who is thus described in the "Daily Telegraph" under the heading "A Dutch Financier": Mr. Van Rossum has four factories, Kelham, Cantley, Ely and Ipswich, parcelling out some of the best land in the country. It was estimated that in October, 1925, these four factories would produce 40,000 tons, and as the cost of manufacture is £25 a ton and the net effective price with subsidy, is £42, the profit per ton is' on a conservative estimate, £17 per ton. That is to say, Mr. Van Rossum stands to make £680,000 per annum. [An HON. MEMBER: "Britain for the British!"] I say nothing about Mr. Van Rossum as a business man. He is a very smart business man. I happened to have an interview with him some time ago about jute bags. Before this subsidy was granted, the city which I represent was manufacturing jute bags for sugar for the British refineries. Now, if you please, these jute bags for Mr. Van Rossum and these other gentlemen are not being purchased in this country. That subsidy is not stimulating that British trade. The right hon. Gentleman informed me, in answer to a question, that a considerable proportion of these bags had this year been provided in this country. I failed to trace the order in this country, and I have a letter from Mr. Van Rossum in my possession stating that after inquiry—after I had induced him to make inquiry—he discovered that although he had given the order to a firm in London—a firm called Firmin and Son—Firmins had ordered the bags from Belgium. The right hon. Gentleman gets up at that Box and says that orders have been placed in this country. It is perfectly true they have been placed with a firm in Leaden-hall Street, but no British labour is engaged in the manufacture of the bags. I go further, and I say that nearly one half of the capital in this new British industry is foreign capital.
The hon. Member who spoke last, and another hon. Member who preceded him, referred to Lord Weir. If Mr. Van Rossum is the directing genius in England, Lord Weir is the directing genius in Scotland. He and Lord Invernairn are running two concerns. I hold in my hand a typical instance of what might be expected from Lord Weir. The Secretary of State for Scotland will not be surprised at it. Lord Weir is employing British labour in his Cupar beet-sugar factory, the Second Anglo-Scottish Beet-Sugar Corporation, Prestonhall, Cupar. Here is a notice of employment of a man. I asked the right hon. Gentleman a question about this particular case a week ago. The notice is dated 8th October this year, and says: You have been appointed to a position in our factory as operator, and so on. Your wage will be £2 18s. per week"— listen to this— per day of 12 hours, but nothing extra will be paid for overtime or Sunday work. It is stated in print; he actually prints the postcard so that there will be no mistake about it—seven days per week, 12 hours per day and nothing extra for overtime or Sunday work. When I asked the Secretary of State for Scotland a question about these and similar conditions of employment, I was blandly informed that they had had no complaints put before them. I think it is high time that we had an inquiry into all this business. This suggestion has been made by the representatives of all parties. The Liberal party have issued a pamphlet in which that suggestion is made, and even members of the Conservative party have demanded an inquiry. It is quite true that there has been no addition to the employment of labour in this country by subsidising beet sugar refining. There might have been a different result if we only subsidised raw sugar. When I listened to the strictures upon this political party because they did not take proper care as to the method by which the subsidy should be paid, I was interested to discover that the Leader of the Liberal party, speaking on the 30th July, 1924, boasted that he was the first Chancellor of the Exchequer to give differential treatment in favour of beet sugar. Consequently, we are all in it, and we are all responsible for this waste. That is why I think we should have an inquiry to stop it.
Steps should be taken to safeguard the wage standards of the people of this country. The sugar refining industry pay wages varying from £2 18s. to £3 per week, but several factories are being worked on an agricultural wage basis, and their standard of living has been reduced in consequence. The Greenock standard is now being reduced to an agricultural standard. I think we ought to have some kind of Joint Industrial Council set up to deal with this problem. It was the Scottish refiners who broke up the last Industrial Council, and they declared that they would have no truck with the working classes at all. Now the time has come when such a Joint Industrial Council should be set up, and it is the duty of the Government to see that the working classes get a square deal. If an inquiry is set up, they ought to be able to see that whatever money is given by the State it should be given in the form of debenture stock and the State should own that stock. If we are not able to have such a system of ownership of the factories with the present constitution of this House, we ought at least to insist that whatever funds the State gives should be given, not by way of grants or as a gift to private enterprise or private profiteers, but in the form of debenture stock.
One hon. Member stated that when the Liberal party advanced £100,000 in the case of one of these factories, the money was not given as a subsidy or as a grant, but that it was to be held in trust for the Treasury and was to be returnable to the Treasury out of the profits. Surely, this new semi-subsidised State industry could be recreated on a public utility basis. There ought to be some limitation of profits, and whatever profits are made over 5 per cent., which is the percentage allowed in the case of gas companies, should be returned to the Treasury. I would go further and lay down that steps ought to be taken to secure that whatever increased value accrues to the land as a result of the expenditure of State money upon it, that increased value should accrue, not to private individuals, but to the British Treasury. When Sir Richard Winfrey was speaking in this House on the effect of the Corn Production Act, he declared that, from his own personal knowledge and experience, as a result of the subsidy under that Act, rents had been raised from £40 to between £70 and £80 per acre. We know already what has been the result of these subsidies in regard to the value of agricultural land. We know of many cases where the rent of the land has been raised considerably. For all these reasons, I think the Minister should grant a full and careful inquiry in order that the interests of the taxpayers may be safeguarded as well as the interests of those engaged in the refining of sugar. We should see that the profits created in a new industry subsidised by public funds should not accrue to a few private profiteers, but should become the property of the nation.
I wish that the Minister of Agriculture would come with me to Greenock during the next few weeks. The right hon. Gentleman must have met many farmers during the past six months, but if he will come with me to Greenock he will find that if the Committee passes this Estimate to-night, he will be throwing men and women out of employment in Greenock. By this expenditure the right hon. Gentleman is diverting work from the natural refineries which have been built up by private enterprise, and which were of undoubted assistance to Great Britain during the War; he is closing those factories and causing to be erected these spoon-fed factories throughout the length and breadth of England and Scotland. If the right hon. Gentleman will come to Greenock with me, he will find the quayside largely deserted, and the Secretary of State for Scotland knows that I am not exaggerating. The Minister of Agriculture and the Government of which he is a member, in their desire to assist the agricultural industry, are doing a grave wrong. They are carrying out a mischievous policy, and pouring out public money by millions to those engaged in this favoured industry. Those who, like myself, have been closely connected with a great industrial area for many years, will excuse me if I speak feelingly on this subject. The men engaged in these factories are feeling, not only the full blast of competition which in the past they have faced successfully, but they are now being stabbed in the back by their own friends. When there are these factories, financed by foreigners originally, who brought over to this country cheap second-hand machinery from Holland, and by favoured interests got some £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 out of the British Treasury to finance these factories, can you wonder that men come to me in Greenock and say, "What do you do for us? I am out of work. I have been employed and my people with me in this industry for generations back. We are now out of work, not through any fault of our own, but through the deliberate policy of His Majesty's Government."
I was glad to think that the right hon. Member for Central Edinburgh (Mr. W. Graham) pleaded for inquiry this evening, but he will excuse me when I say that this Debate might never have taken place to-night if this policy was not initiated by his party and by himself some two or three years ago. I am glad, however, that he is standing tonight for an inquiry, and I hope that hon. Members on the other side will realise the situation that has been created owing to the policy initiated by my hon. Friends above the Gangway and carried into effect and passed into legislation by His Majesty's Government. It is through that policy that this wrong has been done, and that these men are unemployed. I noticed that it is stated in the "Times" this morning that the result is that from 1,200 or 1,400 men directly employed and a much larger number indirectly employed are affected. Whatever the exact figure, it is a very considerable number. These men have been thrown out of work because of the tremendous output of bounty-fed, spoonfed sugar, melted in these factories which had been financed by the British Treasury, and which is to-day displac- ing the home-refined sugar. Between October and November—that is the principal time when sugar is made—in 1926 the imports of foreign refined sugar increased by 65,000 tons, the home-refined sugar decreased by 100,000 tons, but the spoon-fed, State-subsidised factories, which the Minister of Agriculture is so proud to see erected throughout the country, increased their output by some 90,000 tons. There has been a displacement of the refined sugar from the natural refineries in Great Britain by these artificially established, State-fed, bounty-fed, spoon-fed factories which are taking the place of the natural industry in this country.
Surely, that state of affairs should not continue. I know well that the late Chancellor of the Exchequer had no intention of seeing such a thing arise, but we are faced with a situation to-night which I have not in any sense exaggerated. Not only are there the ships which are not going to the quayside at Greenock, but there are the carters who are unable to find work through these ships not going to Greenock Harbour. There are vast numbers of tradesmen out of work because of these factories being closed. There are the multitudinous people who gather round a great industry in an old town who are affected. They say to me, "Surely, if the British House of Commons understood the position in which we have been placed, they would not allow this state of affairs to continue for more than a very few weeks." We cannot stand idly by and see this wrong, this economic wrong, this moral wrong committed by the Minister of Agriculture, favouring perhaps the agricultural industry but driving these men out of this old established industry.
I cannot help thinking that, if the Committee to-night would realise that this expenditure of money is not in the public interest and that there is no real economic gain to the country through this expenditure, we should see this Vote turned down and the Government of the day forced into the same position as the Coalition Government a few years ago when they repealed the Corn Production Act. The Corn Production Act was passed at a time when fear dominated the minds of the country and when it was thought wise to encourage the growth of certain cereals. It was passed for that specific object, but time passed, the bill became high and the cost great, and, when the pressure on the British Treasury became acute, the Government of the day turned back on their path and repealed the Act. The saving was of great value to the nation. It may have been hard on certain favoured interests who had cultivated more land hoping for this large sum under the Corn Production Act. It may be hard for certain interests in this new industry if the House of Commons refuses to-night to pass this sum, but the House of Commons has a perfect right to do so. Its hands have not been bound by the past, and, if it sees fit in its wisdom to vote down this Supplementary Estimate and make the Government of the day turn their back on their past policy, it has every right to do so.
Many references have been made to the large profits made by these new factories. I have here Command Paper 110, the balance sheet of the Cantley Factory. The ordinary capital is a sum of £450,000 and the general reserve is some £300,000. In other words, during this short period of time they have put to reserve out of revealed profit two-thirds of their capital by way of general reserve. The next item is really a most interesting one—Income Tax reserve of £71,000. A simple calculation shows that an Income Tax reserve of that figure at the rate of 4s. in the £ reveals a profit of £350,000. Profits of £350,000 on an ordinary capital of £450,000! That has happened under the subsidy proposals, while, on the other hand, the old-fashioned refineries are being driven out of business. This simple and not exaggerated statement of facts will, I hope, make the Minister of Agriculture revise his Estimates in the future and repeal this Act at the very earliest opportunity.
I have spoken solely with reference to the case of Greenock, but there is a much larger case, which has been put by several hon. Members to-night. I am not anxious to repeat what has been said, but I think it is quite clear that little economic gain to the nation will result from this policy. It is displacing certain groups by other groups; we are melting sugar in some new factories rather than in old factories; and some £5,500,000 is to be given this year to these favoured industries. The course of the Government in dealing with subsidies has been rather tragic. They endeavoured to stave off the coal dispute by the outpouring of some £24,000,000. They are trying to develop a new industry here, which has already cost £10,000,000, and which will cost £24,000,000 before they have finished with it. Have we any reason to think that this is not a wild gamble—that the nation is going to get any real, lasting benefit from it? I have spoken to many who have knowledge of this subject on agricultural side which I do not profess to have, and I think it is apparent, from certain words which have been quoted by other Members, that, so far as one can humanly see, at the moment when the subsidy ends—if it will end—the farmers will not be able to grow sugar beet to compete successfully at our ports against sugar grown in the natural places of the world. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] The hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir G. Courthope), speaking at Stur-minster Newton on the 10th November, 1927, said: But for the subsidy, the maximum price the factory can afford to pay the farmer is 16s. per ton. In the coming year the farmers are going to receive 46s. a ton from these spoon-fed factories, and these spoon-fed factories are going to receive, by way of subsidy, 40s. a ton. In other words, 40s. of the 46s. which the farmer is going to receive this year is being received by way of subsidy, and, when the subsidy has been withdrawn, unless the farmer is to be cut down to a very unfair figure by the new factories in the country, it is quite evident that it will not be possible to grow sugar successfully here. That, however, is a matter for more inquiry than I can give to it, but hon. Members with whom I have spoken on this subject have assured me that our climate and our soil are unsuitable to compete against the natural sugar grown in distant parts of the world. I hope, therefore, that the Minister of Agriculture will look this matter in the face. I wish he would come with me and see those closed factories, and meet those unemployed people, whom he himself, by inviting the Committee this evening to pass this Estimate, is throwing out of work in Greenock and elsewhere.
Before the Minister resumed his seat this evening, he threw out a suggestion based on the general allegation, when this scheme was launched, that it was going to give great employment to people who were unemployed in the countryside, and to regenerate agriculture. Many of the arguments used by previous speakers were in my mind when I came here this evening. I will not repeat them, but will take the point which has been put that something has happened to regenerate agricultural employment and development as the result of this policy. I have obtained some of the figures. I notice that the regular workers in agricultural districts in England and Wales amounted in 1925 to 639,353, and casual workers to 163,985, a total of 803,338. In 1926 the regular workers in agricultural districts in England and Wales amounted to 654,361, and the casual workers to 140,538, giving a total of 794,899, which is a reduction on the figure for the previous year.
Let me take the example of a district in which this rejuvenating industry is being paid for with the taxpayers' money. I am not blaming the present Minister. He is not responsible for this, but I think he will appreciate from this Debate that he has been left an inglorious heritage to carry on his back. If we take a case like that of Norfolk, where this industry is carried on, we find that the number of people employed in agricultural areas in 1925 was 42,616, whereas in 1926 the number had dropped to 42,238. On the top of that we have the statements made in the public Press with regard to the boomerang action of this artificial policy of growing sugar in this country; we have the appalling statements of Messrs. Tate and Lyle, to which reference has been made; we have the closing down of the Greenock factories; and I would recall to the memory of the Minister of Agriculture the statement of the "Morning Post" on the 11th October, 1927, to the effect that the closing of Messrs. Tate and Lyle's factories would mean the immediate disemployment of 6,000 men, and, on the top of that, the dislocation of the industry in Greenock. In addition, as the hon. Member for Greenock (Sir G. Collins) has just said, there is the dislocation in the docks and harbours, where the sugar has hitherto been handled on importation.
It seems futile to discuss this matter here to-night. Supposing that at this moment the vote were taken, what would happen? Hon. Members on the other side who form the Economy Committee, which is harassing and brow-beating the Government, will all pour into the Lobby without having heard one of the arguments that have been used, will all take their cue at the door, and will vote without knowing what they are voting for. [ Interruption. ] There is a larger ratio of Labour Members present than of Members of the party opposite. We have here one of the most appalling pieces of Governmental prodigality, of outrageous pilfering of the taxpayer's pocket, on record, and we have a half-empty House. I hope the people in the country will have some idea of the evidence of enthusiasm on the part of the "economy" administrators of this country when they hear how the benches opposite have been packed to-night. I know of no robbery equal to the robbery of this policy.
Let me come to the present Minister of Agriculture. He was very apprehensive on one occasion when agriculturists were foregathering in the background to ruin the present Prime Minister and his Government, and he hurriedly went down to the Isle of Ely county branch of the Farmers' Union to give them an assurance that all was well with agriculture if they would only have patience, and what did he say? Possibly he said this out of his inexperience, out of his lack of understanding of the manœuvre he had to deal with as a full fledged Minister. He said to these rebellious farmers, Peace be still. It was curious that the Government got so little recognition of that fact for the 10 years for which the sugar beet was guaranteed would amount to as much money as the total paid on coal. I say it will amount to more with these subsidiary Votes amounting to a few more odd millions. If this goes on as it is doing, it will be more than £20,000,000. It will be in the proximity of £26,000,000. The Minister, giving an assurance to these good people, said: Do not be rebellious. Give us credit for the fact that for a period of 10 years we are going to give in the beet subsidy a subsidy which is nearly the total given to coal. By this subsidy the farmers will get 54s. a ton for their wheat, whereas in countries like Holland, where there is no subsidy, the farmers only get 30s. The factories were sharing in the subsidy and that was the reason why they were able to carry on. No pressure"— This was rather ironical and cruel— No pressure from the Farmers' Union would have induced the factories to pay these terms to the farmers unless they had had the Government behind them to pay the money. No doubt that gave them a good deal of assurance and somewhat placated their recalcitrant disposition. No doubt, when they read the Debate that has taken place to-night they will become more solid behind the ranks of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. I would commend to their patriotism some of the names of the great Britishers who are profiteering most out of this handsome subsidy. Over a third of the share capital in the factories which received the subsidy last year was owned by gentlemen from other countries— £1,280,000. Among the directors concerned were Mr. Van Rossum from the highlands of Loch Lomond, Dr. Wijnberg —I wonder where he came from; I am sure he did not sing "Rule Britannia" all his lifetime—Dr. Van Loon (Ely factory), Dr. Hirsch, Dr. Aczel and Baron Korfeld of the United Sugar Company. All these are gentlemen who are the prime participants in the division of this spoil of the taxpayers' money. Large figures elude the grasp of the ordinary man and more especially when we are talking about subsidies, so in order to bring this thing within the comprehension of the man in the street, I will put it in this way. In manufacturing a hundredweight of sugar, sufficient molasses is produced to obtain a subsidy of about 2s. 6d., in addition to 19s. 6d. subsidy for the sugar—a total of about 22s. in subsidy. A hundredweight of sugar sells at 28s., but of this price 7s. 5d. represents Excise Duty, hence the actual value of the sugar is less than the amount of the subsidy paid to the factories that produce it. In other words, they could give the sugar away for nothing and still be in pocket by what they are receiving out of the taxpayers' pocket to-day.
I will not go over the arguments which have been already used. They were in my mind when I came down here to-day. If men really believe that by this form of subsidy they are doing something for agriculture there is some excuse for them, but the man who believes you can resusitate British agriculture by robbing the taxpayer by any form of subsidy of this kind knows nothing about economics at all. I am prepared to excuse him in his ignorance of these facts if he believes what he is saying when he advocates it. I have seldom listened to a Debate in which there has been a more intimidating indictment drawn up against any Government than has been used on this side to-night. There are many men on this side who may be apprehensive if they have these facts burning in their minds. It may be said, no amount of argument can stop a contract which has once been entered into by the country backed by the taxpayers' pocket; this must run on for its 10 long years; it must finally run up to the glorious figure of over £20,000,000 and we cannot stop it. I beg to differ. I think if this House, knowing the facts behind this performance, would take this thing seriously in its hands it could do something to recast the policy before the 10 years are up. We cannot complacently contemplate £20,000,000 of the taxpayers' money being used, not to resuscitate or keep an industry on its feet but practically to inflate profits which are going into the pockets of people who could give the sugar away and still be in pocket by virtue of the subsidy. I hope if the House will not seriously take the matter in hand as the result of this Debate and the publicity which may be given to it, people in the country will take the matter in hand, and long before the 10 years are up there may be a transformation in the political impression in the country and a new Government sitting on the other side, and this contract would not be fulfilled if I had anything to do with it. I would cut it now without any compunction.
I hope from what has been said here to-night, irrespective of party, and realising the distress in the country, and also realising that in the mining areas there are people coming home, as I saw them a few days ago, after paying their back rents and current rent with 7s. 6d. —[ Interruption. ] You need not sneer. It is no sneering matter. If you were sitting there with the prospect of keeping five children with 7s. 6d. for your wages next week you would not sit there and sneer complacently and then walk out if you knew that millions out of the taxpayers' pocket—
On a point of Order. Has this anything to do with the sugar-beet subsidy?
I do not think the hon. Member is far wrong. It is a very common thing in this House.
I am merely drawing a comparison, because when one goes down into these distressful areas and sees the condition of the working people, and then finds, I might almost say, a lethargic condition on the part of hon Members opposite, when millions out of taxpayers' pockets are being poured into a vested interest of this kind, it is time to rebel against these proposals. I am drawing the comparison to try to drive it home. It has been confessed to-night' that it is not merely one party that is involved in the sugar subsidy. Every party in the House has had something to do with this stupid policy, a policy to which I would never have assented. Therefore, if we are all in the trouble as parties, let us all, like men, face the issue. Let us have an open and frank inquiry as to the derivation of the money, the distribution of the money, and the final results to the country as a whole. The dominant argument when this proposal was put forward was that it would help agriculture and extend industry; but as I have proved from irrefutable figures from Government returns, and as has been shown by the glaring facts which have been mentioned by hon. Members who have spoken against the Supplementary Estimate, the vested interests are making a right royal fortune out of it, and it is time that we stopped it.
I suppose that I ought to rise with some considerable amount of shame, because I have had a great deal to do with this so-called iniquitous Measure, which has been described as robbery and pilfering. I have been considerably responsible for the Measure which we are now discussing. Many years ago, in the Eastern counties, I was one of the first growers of a crop of sugar-beet, and I realised very quickly the great value of such a crop to British agriculture. Realising that value, I have in the past done and I intend in the future to do as much as possible to establish the industry firmly in this country. I recognised many years ago that the industry could not carry on in the initial stages without some help from the State, and that the advantage to the State of this industry was entirely agricultural. I realised that in order to provide a satisfactory position it was essential to get at my back the agricultural industry, and I appealed to organised agriculture many times. At first, I was turned down and was told that it was impossible for the State to give assistance to the industry in the way that I required it. But I persisted in my appeal, and eventually succeeded in getting committees set up, with the result that at first we had a remission of Excise on sugar-beet grown in this country, and eventually the subsidy.
10.0 p.m.
I probably ought to feel ashamed for having been responsible for this robbery and pilfering, but I assure the Committee that I am not ashamed. The Minister is to be congratulated on what he has done. Great help has been given to agriculture in the Eastern counties and in the rest of the country, and I am very gratified at the result and congratulate the Minister upon it. It may have been that the figure given in the subsidy was larger than was necessary. On behalf of the growers I was responsible for the application of that figure. We got nearly as much as we asked for. Had I realised that we should have got as much as we asked for we might have asked for less, but on the other hand we might have asked for more. Who is to blame? We on this side of the House are the leaders in private enterprise. We consider that the captains of industry are better able to carry on their work than the State can carry on industry, but there are hon. Members on the other side of the House who do not believe that. They believe that the State, which means themselves, can carry on industries better than they are carried on under the Capitalist system. Hon. Members on the other side of the House were in office when the subsidy was granted. They looked into the figures and decided the figures. Unfortunately for themselves, they were not in office when the Bill became law. The Minister of Agriculture in the present Government brought forward the Bill. What was he to do? The question had been decided by Members of the House of Commons who thought that they understood industry and could manage industry, and they produced a figure and the present Minister of Agriculture had no option but to accept the figure that they had put down. Had he done otherwise it would have been an insult to the industrial knowledge of hon. Members opposite.
Certain criticisms have been made to-night. We have been told that this subsidy is throwing out of work many men in Greenock and elsewhere, but I would point out that for every man in the sugar-refining industry who is thrown out of work, that man is replaced by another man employed in the beet-sugar industry. I assure hon. Members above the Gangway opposite that if there is any diminution in the employment in the refining part of the industry whether carried on at Greenock, the Isle of Ely or elsewhere, there is an increase in, British labour in another direction, and that is upon the land.
The figures are against you.
Every acre of grass represents in employment something like 10s. to £1 in labour. Every acre of wheat represents in employment something like 50s. to £3. Every acre of sugar beet represents an employment figure of something like £10. Criticisms have been made that the sugar-beet industry is not financially good for the country. I will put a financial point. I recognise that I shall be criticised by the financers. I suffer somewhat considerably to-night because as a rule sitting on these benches is the hon. Member for Ilford (Sir F. Wise) who is always willing and able to give the best financial advice. The financial point I wish to make is this. It has been said that owing to the adverse balance of trade in this country we are on the road to national bankruptcy. It is admitted that our imports can only be paid for by our exports, including invisible exports. It is necessary for the financial stability of the country that the balance of trade should be in our favour. There are certain things which we must purchase, and they are the essential foodstuffs. A Noble Lord in another place assumed that it might be necessary for British agriculture to go more and more to grazing. I hope that will not be so. If I have one acre under grass, I am saving my country from having to purchase meat to the value of something like £3 to £4 imported into this country. If I plough up that acre of grass and sow it with wheat, giving me a yield of four bushels per quarter, I am saving my country the necessity of buying £3 in value. If, on the other hand, I grow one acre of sugar beet yielding 10 tons at 15 per cent. sugar, and 1¼ tons of sugar per acre at £20 per ton, that is a saving to this country of £25 worth of imported foodstuff. Therefore, I submit to the financial experts of this House that there is some value attached to the cultivation of sugar beet in this country.
In conclusion, I say that, in my opinion, it is the one thing that is giving, and has given, a definite help to British agriculture. It not only gives the farmer a profit to grow, but has necessitated such cultivation of the land that it has improved to the extent of four bushels if not more the succeeding wheat crops. The fact that £900,000 is being voted shows there has been a growth in the sugar beet industry of 40,000. This crop is doing the farmers good and the financial interests of the country good, in that it is not requiring to buy such a large import of sugar. It is also doing the agricultural labourer good. Instead of criticising the Minister, I should like to congratulate him on this great industry.
I rise to support the Amendment. We have all been interested in the speech of the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Shepperson). The figures he gave differ from those given by the Minister of Agriculture. I think I am right in saying the Minister of Agriculture stated that the root crop per acre was something like eight tons, whereas the hon. Gentleman says it is 10 tons. We have had one or two very interesting speeches from hon. Members who sit behind me and from hon. Members in front of me, and it seems to me that a very good case has been made out for an inquiry on account of the fluctuating evidence given during the Debate. The reason I have risen is because I represent a Division, the Plaistow Division of West Ham, where we have two sugar refineries adjacent. The hon. Member for Silvertown (Mr. J. Jones) sits for the Division where the two factories are situated, and it is rather strange that since the beet sugar subsidy was introduced there has been a diminution of employment from that day to this.
It is not pleasant to read figures in a Debate of this kind, but I think it is absolutely essential in view of what has been stated by the hon. Member opposite. Tate and Lyle have two factories in West Ham, the Thames Sugar Re-finery and the Plaistow Works. At the first there were engaged in the Thames factory, 2,261 men; in 1925, 2,122; in 1926, 1,893, and in 1927, 1,649. At the Plaistow works in 1924 there were 1,564; in 1925, 1,446; in 1926, 1,467, and in 1927, 1,180 So if you take the people of the two factories in 1924 there were 3,825; in 1925, 3,568; 1926, 3,360; and 1927, 2,829, or a reduction of about 1,000 employed people. If we refer to the sugar refinery controlled by the same firm in Liverpool, we find in 1926 there were 1,460; and in 1927, 1,288, showing a reduction. The reason we think we are entitled to this inquiry is that the Minister of Agriculture has neither to-night nor at any other time, as far as I know, during the course of this Debate, made it clear how this subsidy has been divided—what amount goes to the farmers and what amount to those who control the factories, or what amount has been expended either in new machinery, in the repair of machinery, new buildings or building operations. Not only should there be an inquiry into the actual alteration from A to Z as far as the growing of the roots is concerned, but in the manufacture of the sugar, and we are also entitled to an inquiry as to the amount of sugar imported from the Continent and where such sugar has come from.
I am more than convinced, though it is unpleasant to say so, that as far as the growing of sugar beet is concerned, it is not using the sugar refineries the same as imported sugar is. But we do know —and I happen to represent a very large organisation which eaters for all kinds of general labourers—the agreements we have made with some of the beet sugar factories in regard to wages and hours. In the sugar refineries there is a good deal of difference in wages and hours. There must be between 6d. and 7d. per hour, and I think there is a good deal of difference between the hours worked. I am between the hammer and the anvil, because a very large number of the men who work in the beet sugar factories are members of my own organisation, and, on the other hand, there are men who were working in the sugar refineries who are also members of the same organisation, and you can see that the men who work in the beet sugar factories do not want to be chastised because they work at lower pay, and men in the sugar refineries want to develop their interests because they want to get more employment. They do not care to be transferred from their homes in the borough of West Ham, where they had lived for many years, in order to go and work in these sugar factories.
But the conditions laid down by some employers are very harsh. It has been brought to my notice to-night that the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Johnston), who no doubt intended to have mentioned it in his speech but forgot it, has received a letter from the men working in the Cupar sugar factory, which I believe is situate in some part of Scotland. A deputation from the workers in this factory went to the management in regard to the hours they were working and the rates of pay, and to the great surprise of every man they were dismissed. That is the statement I have had given to me. I do not think any hon. Member on the other side will agree that when men go in the usual way to see the management of any factory, in order to put a justifiable grievance before them, that they should he treated in this manner. During the course of the discussion something has been said as to the amount of the subsidy. I suggest that we have not had the whole of the facts. You are not only granting this sum of £900,000; you are losing revenue from the Customs. There is a difference of 4s. 3d. per cwt. between the Excise Duty and the Customs Duty, and, therefore, on every cwt. of sugar which is made in the refineries and factories here you are losing 4s. 3d., that is assuming, of course, that the sugar is imported into this country. I hope hon. Member on both sides of the House will support the Amendment. Whatever the result may he we shall be perfectly satisfied. There is no doubt that the sugar refineries are meeting with very severe competition. They are handicapped by the subsidy and also by the dumping of sugar into this country.
The hon. Member for Burslem (Mr. MacLaren), who I regret to see is not now in his place, in the course of a scathing indictment of the beet-sugar subsidy, said that although very few Members on this side of the House were listening to the Debate, yet, when it came to a Division, the Lobbies would be filled by those who had not even listened to the arguments. I should like to point out that even if they had listened to the arguments they would have learned nothing, because they had not the smallest bearing on the subject that is really before the Committee this evening, that is to say, whether there should or should not be a Supplementary Estimate of £900,000 in connection with the beet-sugar subsidy. One would imagine, having listened to the Debate, that we were discussing whether there should or should not be a beet-sugar subsidy, and whether it had or had not had an adverse effect on the sugar refineries in the country. But I submit that neither of those questions has the remotest connection with the matter which we are considering. The policy of the Government has been already decided by the House, and indeed was laid down by hon. Members opposite when they were fortunate enough to be in office, though not, as they say, in power.
Having decided that principle, the question for us to decide now is whether or not a Supplementary Estimate of £900,000 is or is not essential. Whether or not one agrees with a subsidy and the principle behind it, the fact remains that the test of the success of a subsidy is the ultimate amount of the subsidy that has to be found by the taxpayer. That is inevitable in any form of subsidy. The whole point is to encourage the industry subsidised, and the more the industry expands the greater the price you must pay for that encouragement. Before you, Mr. Hope, took the Chair, the Debate ranged over an extraordinarily wide expanse of country. Therefore, I feel emboldened to touch upon one or two considerations which are really connected with the matter, though I wondered at one time how closely they were connected with this Supplementary Vote. The objections that have been voiced have been three-fold. The first is that the subsidy is too big; the second is that the farmer does not get a sufficient pro- portion of it; and the third is that it incidentally damages our existing sugar refining industry. I would submit this consideration. We have another big national undertaking which is subsidised and that is the building of houses.
Of course, the amount of subsidy and the way it has worked out are proper subjects for Debate, but the general question whether the sugar beet industry should be subsidised or any other industry not subsidised is not a subject that it would be in order to discuss.
I fully agree, but the question of whether or not a subsidy is desirable has been debated for the last two hours, and it seems a little hard that one should not be allowed to some extent to deal with a question that has been discussed at such length. However, if you rule that those narrow lines must be followed, I trust that hon. Members who follow will be regulated accordingly. Without touching on the parallel of the housing subsidy, I would submit this consideration. We were faced with the desirability of establishing as soon as possible a brand new industry, primarily in the interests of agriculture, that it could not be known what that was likely to cost, but that the important thing was to get it under way at once. Hind sight is easier than fore sight. It is easy to take the view that the price paid for the subsidy was unnecessarily large to achieve that object, but it is too late to talk about that now; it has been fixed in the Act. Whether the price was too big or not, the object sought was achieved. It is really a most remarkable thing that a brand new industry of such a complicated nature, not only an agricultural industry but a manufacturing industry and a very highly specialised chemical industry, should have been established on such a large scale in so brief a time in this country. Why have we achieved that object? Because we made it sufficiently attractive to the important key part of the industry, and that was the factories, there was immediately produced the necessary capital to put up the factories.
It is all very well for the hon. Member for Burslem to sneer at the foreign names of those who put up the factories. The country as a whole should be grate- ful to them. It does not matter where the capital came from so long as the factories were erected in the minimum of time. Beyond question that result has been achieved. The price paid may, on looking backwards, be considered unnecessarily high but it could not be known at the time. It has achieved its object; it has been eminently successful, and the indication of its success is the very fact that we are being asked to vote an additional £900,000. I do not welcome any additional expenditure which will fall upon the Exchequer, but, having once laid down the policy that we were to have a subsidised industry, then I say, when that industry is so successful that it has to ask for an additional subsidy, which means additional acreage, and a production of an additional amount of sugar-beet, under the beneficent aegis of the subsidy, it is a matter not for criticism but for congratulation.
The second point relates to the contention that the farmer has not had a fair share of the subsidy. That again is a question of an agreement come to by the representatives of the two sides, the growers and the manufacturers. Each had a lever. The manufacturers were in a position to say "If you are not prepared to accept the figure we offer, it is not worth our while to put our capital into the erection of factories." The growers could say, "If you do not offer me an acceptable figure, I am not going to plant sugar beet." It seems to me, in view of the fact that the representatives of the parties agreed, that their joint point of view is a fair one. Hon. Members must bear in mind that this is a new industry. It is a gamble for everyone concerned. It has been a gamble for the Government, as we see by this Supplementary Estimate but the whole point was that unless capital could see that in the ten years it would be able to repay itself, the thing was not good enough for it. If we wanted the industry to be established we had to make it good enough for capital.
It is all very well to say that these foreign and home capitalists are getting such an enormous amount of subsidy out of the Government that they are going to pay back 20s. for every £ which they put in during the 10 years. But the industry itself will gain this advantage. At the end of 10 years, if all the capital has been repaid—by virtue, very largely, I agree, of the subsidy—and if the industry has been successful, then when we have to face the time when the sheltering umbrella of the subsidy is withdrawn, the factories which have been established will be in a position to operate with the minimum of overhead charges. It will have been possible for them to write off their bonded indebtedness, and their liens. If it were not for that fact, I for one would see no hope of the continuation of this industry at the end of the subsidy period. On the present outlook it seems to me that after 10 years of experience on the part of the farmers and the labourers, and those employed in the factories, it is at least to be hoped that we shall find this new industry so well established and financially so sound, that it will be in a position to offer farmers and growers better prices than would have been possible otherwise. There is a third point, and that is the question of the effect on existing industries. It seems to me that is very far afield from the question of whether or not we ought to vote this Supplementary Estimate. When the sugar-beet subsidy was established the question at issue was the question of agriculture and the growing of home-grown crop.
The hon. and gallant Member seems now to be going into a question of policy and the effect on other industries.
I entirely agree, but 50 per cent. of the previous two hours' discussion has been taken up with the question of the effect on our sugar-refining industry. However, having been ruled out of order I do not propose to pursue that point. I will conclude by re-echoing what has been said, that the very fact of this Estimate being brought forward is the measure of the success of the policy of subsidising the sugar-beet industry, and although it is regrettable that additional cost should fall upon the Exchequer, it is a matter for congratulation to the Minister of Agriculture and to the agricultural industry.
May I say, at the outset, that your predecessor in the Chair, Mr. Hope, when this Debate opened, allowed a fairly wide scope to the Debate for a reason which the hon. and gallant Member for Yeovil (Major G. Davies) did not seem to appreciate. If he had been here to hear the opening statement of my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Edinburgh (Mr. W. Graham), he would have heard my right hon. Friend move to decrease the Vote for the specific purpose of demanding from the Government an inquiry into the effect of the operation of the subsidy. It was because of the reasons then adduced by my right hon. Friend that the Debate was allowed to be rather wider than would usually have been allowed on a Supplementary Estimate, and I submit, with respect, that, having regard to the nature of the request made to the Government to-night for a general inquiry into the working of the financial scheme in respect of which this Vote is required, it is essential that we should state our case fully.
As a point of Order, the question of whether this industry should be subsidised, or whether any industry should or should not be subsidised, is a matter of original policy and would be out of order now, but it will be in order to say that a policy that works out at such large figures should, or might be, revised. The general question of a subsidy or no subsidy, however, is not in order.
That is the burden of the case of the Opposition to-night, and if the hon. and gallant Member for Yeovil had appreciated the case from the beginning, he would have understood the position better. The position in which I find myself is this, that the case brought to the Committee on this Supplementary Estimate is what I foreshadowed it would be. The hon. Member for Greenock (Sir G. Collins) cannot exempt the Liberal party from implication in this policy, for the statement of the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) in 1924 was quite explicit; it was that he was the first Chancellor of the Exchequer to subsidise the beet-sugar industry.
The hon. Member will recollect that on the Third Reading of the Beet Sugar Bill the House divided with the Opposition Whips on.
But the hon. Member cannot say that all three parties are not implicated, because the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, in 1924, stated that his party—
Has not this matter of controversy clearly to do with the original passing of the Act, and is it not, therefore, out of order?
I have not appreciated the argument fully enough to give a ruling.
The case I want to put is this, that if every party is implicated in the payment which we are asked to make to-night, at any rate there are some of us who have protested from the commencement against being called upon to vote this money, and I make no apology for not only supporting the request for an inquiry, but for saying that under any circumstances I could not conscientiously vote money from Parliament for this specific purpose. The hon. and gallant Member for Yeovil has said that the amount of money you are asked to vote from time to time for a subsidy depends on the success of the subsidy, and I think he is right. You never know how much you will have to pay, and there is never any safeguard for the taxpayer in the matter. The more you produce in a subsidised industry, the more you have to pay, and you never can have any final guarantee, as is now shown by this supplementary Estimate.
There is more production.
The more production there is in this spoon-fed industry, the more you will have to pay. I do not want to repeat some of the arguments that have been put to the Committee tonight, but I do want to impress upon the Minister that we have, in my judgment, put a complete case to him for a revision of the policy of the Government which has made it necessary to have this additional Estimate. We ask that at once, in view of the period yet remaining under the Beet Sugar Subsidy Act of 1925, there should be set up a committee which should be able to inquire into the whole of the circumstances, to review the present position of the effects of the subsidy on labour, on cultivation, on research in regard to sugar content, and on working cost; the effect when the subsidy period comes to an end in five years' time; and what the general effect will be on the industry in the country as a whole. I believe that on every one of these counts we have a complete case for an inquiry. What has further unsettled me is this. We have been discussing a very-heavy expenditure in regard to the subsidy on an Estimate which is signed, as usual, by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and during the whole of the discussions we have never had a representative of the Treasury upon the bench, although I think in regard to this request we are making officially on behalf of the Opposition that the Treasury ought to be intensely interested.
In his opening statement to-night the Minister of Agriculture, quite rightly, told us that even this Supplementary Estimate of £900,000 is by no means the limit to which he might ask the House to go during the present financial year. So, from that point of view we are entitled to ask for an inquiry. But the main point I want to put in support of the request for an inquiry is that this was a part of the original argument against a subsidy, and it is made very imperative in view of the Estimate which is brought in. We shall have voted with this Supplementary Estimate over £10,000,000 during the period of the subsidy. When you count the paid-up capital of the whole of the factories, you will find that we have paid in the total subsidy a great deal more than twice as much as the subscribed capital, so that already the capital involved in the industry has been paid by the State more than twice. The position from the accounts submitted is that already a large part of the capital is being written off, and on the arguments used by the hon. and gallant Member for Yeovil they will be able at the end of the 10 years to say, "We have had paid to us completely the whole of our capital out of subsidies; we have had made over to us the whole of the assets, the plant, machinery and land," and yet they will be able to say, and are likely to say upon the evidence we have, that they will, even in these circumstances be unable to pay a price for sugar beet which will enable them to keep cultivation by the farmer and to maintain the factories at a reasonable profit; and then this new industry, which the Minister of Agriculture said in introducing his Supplementary Vote was firmly established, will have gone completely out of business at the end of the 10 years' period. We shall have poured down the sink more than £20,000,000 of the taxpayers' money without obtaining any real and lasting advantage for the country. I submit that is a real case. Take the evidence of one of our sugar refiners, who is also interested in the British sugar-beet industry, Sir Ernest Tate, who says: I must repeat that our opinion, continually expressed, that beet sugar factories in Great Britain could not exist without the Government subsidy is still maintained. We agree with the view expressed by one of the ablest foreign participators in the industry that it would be a bad business proposition to enter the industry at the expiry of the third subsidy period unless contracts can be made with the farmers at a considerably lower price than the agreed figure for the second period of the subsidy. —which is 46s. What does the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir G. Courthope) say? I have always said that he has been disinterested in this matter, although closely connected with the sugar-beet industry. I believe he has worked conscientiously for the development of what he thought would be a good industry for the country. I make no reflection upon him. He has been talking in the country, and saying that when the subsidy comes to an end they cannot offer the farmer more than 16s. a ton, whereas they are now offering, in the second period of the subsidy, to pay 46s. a ton. On what grounds, then, can it be argued that at the end of the subsidy period, when he says they can offer only 16s. a ton, it will be an economic proposition to maintain the sugar-beet industry in this country? We shall he in the position of having subsidised foreign capital during the whole period, and those gentleman will be able to walk away with the whole of their invested capital intact, and with profits accumulated during the period, and will be able to sell what is remaining to them at any price as long as they can get out at a reasonable profit. The people who devoted their time and energy to the cultivation of this particular crop will be left high and dry, as though the industry had never started—except that they will have improved the quality of the land which has been under sugar beet; it would be wrong not to concede that particular point. My right hon. Friend has urged the necessity for an inquiry, first, on account of the labour conditions prevailing in the areas where the subsidy has been paid, secondly, on the ground that the amount is now so high that it ought to be revised, and, thirdly, because there is no guarantee that the present industry 'can be maintained at the end of the subsidy period laid down in the 1925 Act; and I wish to reinforce those reasons and to press upon the Government that they should recognise the need for a full and immediate inquiry.
I cannot claim to be an expert on finance or upon many of the questions affecting agriculture, because I left the countryside too soon to know much about agriculture. I think, however, we have a right to complain about the position in which the people who have hitherto been engaged in the sugar-refining industry find themselves. In this industry in Silvertown there are thousands less employed than there used to be some years ago. It is no consolation to say to these men and women who are unemployed in this industry, "It is all very nice now; we have a new industry, and if you cannot find employment making sugar at Silvertown, you can make it at Stoke Poges or some other place; and you may lay the flattering unction to your soul that while you are out of employment in Silvertown somebody else in another part of England is getting two or three months' work in the year in your trade." Up to a few years ago we had established in Silvertown decent conditions in the sugar industry. When this beet-sugar subsidy was first introduced we were led to understand from all parts of the House that it was going to be a great advantage to the worker, and that we were going to have more employment, particularly among the agricultural population. The figures which have been produced in this Debate show conclusively that there has been a decrease instead of an increase in the number of people employed in the sugar industry. At certain periods of the year, when the beet-sugar factories are busy, the farmers make a bargain with the owners of the factories that they shall not take their men away from the farms.
On a point of Order, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask if it is in order on this Vote to discuss the conditions of labour within the sugar factories?
I have not yet appreciated the hon. Member's argument. If the hon. Member is speaking about the conditions of labour within the factories, that would not be in order.
Is it not a fact that earlier in the Debate hon. Members sitting on the Front Bench occupied some time discussing the conditions within the factories?
I cannot see that the conditions within the factories are affected by this Vote. Of course, the hon. Member may criticise the basis on which the subsidy is framed.
We have been told from many quarters that this subsidy would mean better opportunities for the workers obtaining employment and better conditions of work. I was only giving the Committee an illustration, but probably I am not so clever in evading Standing Orders as other hon. Members who seem to get round them very easily. Who has to pay for all this? It is not the people who put their money into the industry, because the Government find nearly the whole of the money. I was trying to find out when I was interrupted by the hon. and clever Gentleman opposite how it came about that the farmer was able to enter into a bargain with the owners of these factories to ensure that the men should not be taken from their employment on the land during certain seasons of the year. We find that the subsidy is now being used to cut down wages.
In the past, the people of Silvertown were able to carry on in this industry under decent conditions of employment. There the men are fairly well organised, and conditions have been fairly well established now for over half a century. You find that their trade has been largely taken from them by people subsidised by the Government. I thought Protectionists always stood for the policy of treating everybody alike, and would not injure one section of the country for the benefit of somebody else, but this is a case of For he that hath, to him shall be given; and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath. That is how this works out. In a few years from now, supposing this industry has to stand on its own, I can see hon. Members getting up and demanding that the subsidy shall be continued. Why do they not be logical and ask for a subsidy for every industry? There is more right to have a subsidy for the Silver-town industries than there is for some of these other industries.
The hon. Member is now going into a matter of policy, the proper occasion for which is the main Estimate, and not this occasion.
All the things that I have said justify an inquiry. These facts show the kind of things which could be brought before such an inquiry. If you are going to talk about subsidising industry, you ought not to subsidise one industry at the expense of the rest. Nobody need be afraid of the facts—thousands of men thrown out of employment in the unsubsidised section of the same industry and not made up for by the number of extra people employed in the industry which is being subsidised. Therefore there are plenty of facts to support this reduction in the Vote.
I trust the Supplementary Estimate will be passed. I represent a constituency where many men and women are unemployed. I am referring to those men and women engaged in seasonal employment in the salmon fishing industry I hope to see a factory established in that constituency where many of the men and women are suffering. It may mean not only work for those engaged in the fishing industry— a splendid set of men—but also for agricultural workers.
When the Minister made his statement to-night I felt disappointed. As one who has has sat all through the Debate on this subject, I was sorry that the Minister could not give some valid reason for asking for this additional sum. If he had been able to show a real increase in the numbers of those employed, he would have been able to meet our arguments, but it is no use leaving out the central fact of the demand for money. The object of this was to help unemployed men in this country, and if he had been able to show that he had increased the number of men employed all the year round, and could show, for instance, the number of men absorbed, and the number displaced as a consequence of that absorption, he would then have had a basis for the whole case which he is seeking to put for this Supplementary Estimate.
The hon. and gallant Member for Yeovil (Major G. Davies) said, "The more we expand, the more we have to pay." I had expected that the Minister would have anticipated a statement like that by himself pointing out that the industry was so successful, the results of the experiment had been such that, while he was asking for £900,000 to-night, in a certain number of years this industry would be standing on its own feet. But when those who are engaged in the industry tell us that we have to encourage it by increasing the expenditure, it would seem to me that the industry is not paying so far as the nation is concerned, because, if it were, there would be no need to come to the House for a Supplementary Estimate of this kind. The hon. Member for Greenock (Sir G, Collins) has given figures showing the huge profits that have been made, and it would seem to me that, instead of asking for an additional subsidy, we should, if the industry had been so successful as some claim, be looking forward to a tremendous development. This Estimate which is placed before us to-night seems to me to be more an admission that, instead of being able to establish a new industry, we are only adding to the subsidy in order to fill the pockets of a few. Unless the Minister can say how many men have been absorbed, and how many have been displaced in refining, in bag-making, and in all the ancillary trades, he cannot give a real, clear case for the voting of a sum of £900,000.
On the Second Reading of the Bill a promise was made, in answer to a question, that very close scrutiny and attention would be given to the increased land values due to the application of the subsidy. Tonight the Minister gave no attention at all to that subject. What is taking place is quite patent. The whole of the improvement in the land, no matter whether the industry goes on or whether it closes down, due to the subsidy by the Government and the addition which is being asked for to-night, has been created by the subsidy from the taxpayers to this supposed industry that has been estab- lished. Surely, if we are creating a value outside the industry, it ought to belong to the people who have given the subsidy. [ Interruption. ] I know, of course, that if I had been someone else there would have been a greater amount of attention, but that is not going to worry me at all. I have been used to talking at street corners and places where there were bands playing. But it shows the great amount of manners that come from so-called superior quarters opposite.
11.0 p.m.
I want to make a reference to the Scottish side of this supposed industry. In Scotland things have been happening which really require some such definite form of investigation as we are asking for to-night. Things have been taking place there since the very start which have been growing each year, because no attention has been paid to them, and this additional amount which is being asked for is simply going to increase those defects unless the Minister is prepared to give us what we ask in the way of investigation and inquiry. Foreign names have been mentioned. I am going to mention a Scotch name—Lord Weir. It would seem from what has taken place that because Lord Weir has failed and is closing down his steel house business, he expects to make it up out of this £900,000. It is a tendency that is growing that, if some people can go on getting subsidy after subsidy and getting them increased by Supplementary Estimates, there is going to be a hantle of people dipping their hands into these subsidies, and if they fail on one, they will make it up on another. I hope the Minister will give us our inquiry.
The general object of the Debate on the opposite side has been in favour of an inquiry into the system of the beet sugar subsidy and the necessity for some alteration. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Edinburgh (Mr. W. Graham) put forward this suggestion, as he always does, in a very temperate form, but those who followed him made it clear that they would be glad to see the present statutory contracts under which the beet sugar industry has been established either cancelled or fundamentally varied. I think that would be a very serious breach of faith, to which the Government could certainly not lend themselves. The right hon. Gentleman based his demand for an inquiry, not on the suggestion that we should terminate the arrangement, but on three points where he considered the industry was not now being worked on a satisfactory basis. He wished that the conditions of labour should be explored, and he told us that the hours worked in the factories were in many cases excessive. We have had prepared statistics of the hours worked, and they come out at an average of 9.42. It is realised that this is a seasonal occupation lasting for about 100 days, and, after eight hours, overtime is earned. There is a Fair Wage Section in the Act, and a friendly reference in respect of the Cantley factory was taken under it to the Industrial Court, with the result that a system of payment was laid down which, as I understand, has proved satisfactory to both sides.
Does the right hon. Gentleman allege that there is a Fair Wage Clause dealing with conditions of labour operating in the Scottish factories?
Yes, in all factories. Under Section 3, if there is any doubt about the fairness of the conditions, an application can be made to the Minister of Labour, and the matter is referred to an Industrial Court for settlement.
That point has been raised by an earlier speaker. It really goes beyond the subject matter of the Debate. This is a Supplementary Estimate for £900,000, and not the full Vote for the year.
Is it not in order to refer to the part of the £900,000 that is going in subsidy to a factory, such as one in Lincolnshire, where the men are working 12 hour shifts? So much of the extra money is going to factories where men are working under improper conditions.
If they are not proper conditions no subsidy ought to be given to them, and the extra Vote makes no difference.
I do not wish to pursue the question of wages further. I was only answering the right hon. Gentleman. If there is any grievance the redress can be obtained under Section 3. The next point made by the right hon. Gentleman was that it was doubtful whether the industry would continue after the end of the subsidy period. We are very hopeful, because already in spite of the fact that next year the price for beet is reduced owing to the drop in the subsidy, the factories have obtained more than half of the contracts for which they are asking. Farmers are improving their methods so as to get a better yield and a better sugar content, and there is one factory in contemplation on a cooperative basis which is already offered contracts for over 6,000 acres on the basis of 41s. per ton of beet delivered. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where?"] At Chichester. The third point raised was that the sugar beet subsidy as now administered inflicts an injustice upon the refiners. I think the right hon. Gentleman has to a great extent answered his own case, because he admitted that the competition of the sugar beet industry was only part of the refiners' trouble, and that their difficulties were also due to the dumping of refined sugar from foreign countries and the restricting of supplies of sugar produced in Central Europe in the home market in order to increase the supply in our market. I am far from wishing to deny that the refiners have been going through a very difficult period, but their case has been fully put before the Customs Department. It is being considered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it is certainly not a case which ought to be remedied at the expense of this new sugar beet industry.
What we want in connection with the production of sugar beet in this country is confidence. There are five more factories in contemplation, and we are most anxious that they should be erected in this early period of the subsidy so that farmers should get an opportunity of producing this very valuable crop in certain arable areas which do not now enjoy that advantage. If we were to endorse the suggestion which has been put forward from the other side of the House that these contracts should be torn up; if we were to accept an inquiry, it is quite certain that these factories would not get their capital and that the sugar-beet industry would be stereotyped at its present stage of development.
Does the right hon. Gentleman assert that an inquiry being held would stop the industry from developing?
I think that an inquiry, held after the speeches made in criticism of the scheme and after the suggestion of the hon. Member for Greenock (Sir G. Collins) that we ought to follow the example of the Corn Production Act and repeal this Act, because we cannot afford the money, would inevitably create a great feeling of disquiet among the shareholders in these factories, and it would make certain that the five factories in contemplation would not be erected. The time for inquiry may come at the end of the period specified, but it would certainly be premature to hold it when only three of the 10 years have elapsed.
I had great sympathy with the hon. Member for Greenock in his account of the distress which exists in Greenock, but I do not agree with him in attributing this trouble to the growth of the sugar-beet industry. If be will examine the figures of annual production of refined sugar in this country he will see that it has increased as compared with the time before the War by 73,000 tons. Before the War, the United Kingdom was refining 730,000 tons of sugar a year. Last year it refined 803,000 tons. Before the War Greenock had 18 refineries at work. To-day, the hon. Member for Greenock told us that only one refinery survives. The Greenock refineries have dropped out of production, not because of the competition of this new beet sugar industry but because of internal readjustments within the sugar refining industry in this country, and that is a matter which really ought not to be considered merely in connection with the beet sugar subsidy. It is more suitable for examination in connection with the larger question put before the Treasury which is being given very careful consideration.
The right hon. Member for West Swansea (Mr. Runciman) made a very interesting speech as to the effect of the subsidy, but he was called away by an engagement and will not be able to hear the answer. But I think the House will probably have been concerned by the figures which he gave and will want to have some answer to the suggestion which he brought forward that very little extra labour is employed as a result of this subsidy. Our figures show that about 1,200 extra seasonal workers are employed on the agricultural side of production in connection with each factory which is in operation, and, in addition to that 1,200, another 500 are employed in the factory for three months in the winter. In fact, the right hon. Gentleman ignored the fact that, apart from the extra labour employed, we have to credit to the operation of the subsidy the keeping under cultivation of land in certain areas which are suffering from very serious depression and which without this cash resource would find it impossible to employ the labour they have employed in the past.
Would the right hon. Gentleman forgive me. He has given the figures of 1,200 men for each factory and 1,200 men on the agricultural side as well as 500 extra men. To how many factories does that figure of 1,200 apply?
There are 19 factories in operation this year, and that figure is the nearest estimate we can get as to the average for each factory. But the right hon. Gentleman omitted to refer to the indirect effect of this subsidy, to the 375,000 tons of coal which is consumed by this industry.
Has the right hon. Gentleman made any deduction of the amount of coal that is not being consumed in Greenock as the result of this policy?
My argument is that the subsidy is not responsible for the decrease in employment in Greenock, but that it is due to a readjustment in the refinery industry. It would be quite misleading, therefore, to deduct the decreased amount of coal consumed in Greenock from the total amount of coal consumed in the industry. But apart from coal these factories use 116,000 tons of lime stone and also provide a great deal of employment in the production of subsidy requirements which the factories demand. The right hon. Gentleman also suggested that the subsidy was unfairly divided between the factories and the farmers. It is a very difficult matter to arrive at how the money goes. It depends on the yield per acre and the sugar content, and all kinds of factors which constantly vary. I felt sure that this matter would be raised this evening and I answered yesterday an unstarred Question by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Sir D. Newton), which will be found in to-day's OFFICIAL REPORT, on page 2122. There I have given to the best of my ability calculations showing the receipts of the factories under the new arrangements which have recently been arrived at between them and the Farmers' Union. The receipts will be almost equally divided between the factories and the farmers, with a small balance in favour of the farmer. I cannot hope to explain the figures to the Committee now, but I trust hon. Members who are interested will look at them. The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Johnston) has stated that excessive profits were being made at factories, and singled out one which has been able to pay large dividends. These large dividends are inevitable under any system of uniform payments for beet sugar. Some factories are more efficient and have been established longer and if you have a uniform system of payments you will get an unequal return on capital.
And you encourage inefficiency in doing so.
The hon. Member will not find the National Farmers' Union agreeing with that opinion.
In the County of Durham where they have tried this experiment they are going to drop it because of the unfair division between factories and farmers.
That sounds as if the payments to the factories are not unduly high. In answer to the suggestion of the hon. Member for Springburn (Mr. Hardie) that it encourages inefficiency, I would ask the hon. Member how otherwise the industry could be organised? If farmers find that one factory offers a few shillings more per ton than another factory, is it not obvious that they will want to send the sugar beet from a large area into the factory that is in a position to give higher prices?
Is not that a reason why the subsidy should be reduced? What you are doing now is to pay to the inefficient man the same as to the efficient man, whereas if you paid the inefficient man only one-half what you paid to the efficient man, you might halve your subsidy.
It is not merely a matter of the inefficient man. All industries have to win their experience. Though one or two factories are now paying good dividends, many of them have had heavy losses in the first few years of their existence. I believe that the National Farmers' Union are entirely right in their opinion that the industry could not have been carried on in this country unless you had had one standard price fixed for the standard contract for a term of years. If you take the average profits you will find that they are by no means unreasonable considering the very speculative nature of a new industry of this kind. The total net profits for 14 factories for the season 1926–27 was £416,000. The total net losses amounted to £173,000, leaving a total net profit earned of £242,000, or 7½ per cent. on the issued share capital of £3,242,000.
Is that after reserves have been set aside?
It is after the allocation of the necessary reserves, but that is only in accordance with prudent finance.
Would the right hon. Gentleman say what he calls a prudent reserve? Would he say, for example, that 60 per cent. of reserves, acquired in three years, was more than prudent?
I certainly could not lay down any standard. Certain factories have made a generous allocation to reserve, but they are not numerous, and there are a good many of the factories which have made, as I think, an insufficient allocation to reserve. But I hope this will enable them to make a larger reserve in future in preparation for the more difficult times which they will have to face when the subsidy falls to a lower figure. The hon. Gentleman complained of the participation of Mr. Van Rossum in this industry.
Who is he?
I will tell the hon. Member how much we owe to Mr. Van Rossum. He was the pioneer of the sugar-beet industry in this country.
How about the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Shepperson)?
The hon. Member for Leominster told us that he was the pioneer of the growth of sugar-beet. The financial pioneer was Mr. Van Rossum, with other Dutch associates. In 1911 he put up a factory at Cantley. In the first four seasons they lost over £250,000. It was closed during the war. They reconstructed and lost a further £145,000 in 1920 and 1921. The first time they made any profit was after 10 years of discouraging results, when the State first gave them the advantage of a remission of the Excise Duty. They had no dividends on their share capital until their accumulated losses had been wiped out. Practically the whole of that capital and of other factories with which Mr. Van Rossum is associated had a Dutch origin, though in the case of the Ely and Ipswich factory blocks of shares have since been placed on the market. I cannot agree with hon. Members who suggest that it is to our disadvantage to have had the assistance of this foreign skilled experience in creating this industry, or that we should grudge the opportunity to foreign capital of giving us the advantage of creating this new industry. British capital has enjoyed many advantages in foreign countries, and our commercial development would not be what it is had foreign countries adopted a dog-in-the-manger policy such as has been suggested this evening.
That is the policy of the Films Bill.
The case for this subsidy is that it enables us to have an invaluable new industry in connection with British agriculture. Sugar beet is most important as a cleaning crop, in place of the root crop, which was too often grown at a loss. It gives the farmer a cash return, with no worry as to finding a market, or as to the price which he will be able to obtain when his crop has been won. It is a deep-rooted crop which compels the farmer to adopt methods of good cultivation and heavy manuring, and it rewards those methods by paying him directly, according to results. If his crop has a high sugar content it is evidence of his good methods of production. It is estimated on the Continent that a sugar-beet crop adds 10 to 15 per cent. to the yield of the following corn crop. This year is the last year of the high subsidy, and I believe that by means of this period of four years, during which this maximum subsidy has been paid, we have been able to establish this industry on a permanent foundation. It would be most unfortunate if the Committee were to show any hesitation as to carrying out the obligation into which Parliament entered when it passed the Act authorising the subsidy in 1925, or if it were to do anything by setting up a Committee of inquiry to cause a feeling of insecurity and deprive the agricultural industry of the full benefit of that policy which was adopted, I think, with the approval of all parties.
No.
The Minister said there would be great disquiet among the shareholders of the sugar beet factories if the subsidy came to an end. May I tell him there is great disquiet at present among the British taxpayers at the continuance of this tremendous subsidy to the sugar beet industry. If we have to divide our sympathy as between Mr. Van Rossum and his foreign friends, on the one hand, and the British taxpayers on the other, we come down on the side of the taxpayers every time. I hope industrialists in the Conservative party will give me a little attention, especially those who are concerned about national economy. How much value are we getting by way of increased labour from the subsidy? The Minister held out the prospect that we should get a great increase of agricultural labour and that for every 100 acres of cultivation there would be an additional 10 men employed in agriculture. I will confine myself to statements by the Minister and the Government. According to the reply to a question yesterday, for every 34 acres of beet sugar cultivated, there is one additional man employed for 12 months. If another root crop were grown, there would be one man less, so we have one increase for every 34 acres. The total acreage under cultivation is 230,000 acres, and 34 into 230,000 gives you roughly 7,000 additional men employed in agriculture. Now we will assume that these 7,000 are paid a wage of £3 per week—[An HON. MEMBER: "Thirty shillings!"]—I can afford to be generous, and to say £3 a week, or roughly £150 a year. The total expenditure, so far as agricultural labour is concerned, on that basis, is £1,092,000, and that leaves us, on the basis that the whole subsidy is now costing us £6,500,000 —a fact not disputed by the Minister— £5,408,000 to be divided among the workers in the beet factories.
According to the figures of the Board of Agriculture there are 8,400 workers employed in the sugar-beet factories for a period of three months. Another simple division sum will show that if you divide those 8,400 workers into the remaining amount of the subsidy, you get this astonishing result, that for each worker in these factories, employed for a period of three months, the State is granting a subsidy of £643. It is so grotesque as to sound fantastic. £643 at four to the year is at the rate of £2,572 a year, and these are the Ministry of Agriculture's own figures. You are therefore paying a subsidy which amounts to £2,572 a year for every man you are employing in the beet-sugar factories. If I took even the figures which the Minister gave me just now—and I do not believe they can be accurate in this sense, that I do not believe those factories have been fully working for 12 months of this year—and if I assume that they have been working for 12 months, then on his figures there are 22,800 additional agricultural workers and there are 9,500 factory workers. Even on those figures, by the same computation of £3 per week for the agricultural worker, I reach this astonishing result, that for every worker in the factories there is £327 being paid for the seasonal work of 12 weeks, which amounts to £1,308 per annum.
These are facts based on the Minister's own statements, and I submit that they cannot be controverted. Here is my hon. Friend below the Gangway telling me that the employment of these men has
displaced men employed in factories in Silvertown and Greenock who were getting about £3 6s. a week, and the average rate of pay in the beet factories is about £2 10s., so that the subsidy of £327 is being paid, and the worker in the beet factory is getting, at the rate of £2 10s. for 12 weeks, £30. Thirty pounds is being paid out in wages, and yet there is a subsidy of £327. I submit that it is an absolute scandal that this sort of thing should be going on. If there are any Members of the Conservative party who are really interested in economy and who want to see this ramp stopped, I invite them, not to take my word for it, although my word is based upon facts I have got from the Minister of Agriculture, but to go into these facts themselves; and I feel certain that they will come to the conclusion that this is a scandalous waste of public money. My conscience is absolutely clear on this subject. When this scheme was first introduced, I seconded a Motion to reject it, and I voted against the whole scheme. I said then, and I like to think now that I start in the position of a prophet who has been confirmed, that this was a particularly audacious and nefarious attempt to plunder the public purse for the benefit of a small section. I say the statement has been absolutely justified, and I would like to see the subsidy cut off without any further delay.
Question put, "That a sum, not exceeding £899,995, be granted for the said Service."
The Committee divieded: Ayes, 101; Noes, 192.
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
WAYS AND MEANS.
Considered in Committee.
[Captain FITZROY in the Chair.]
Resolved, That, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1928, a sum not exceeding £3,990,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.
Resolution to be reported To-morrow.
The remaining Government Orders were read, and postponed.
It being after half-past Eleven of the Clock, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Order of the House of 8th November.
House adjourned at Twelve Minutes before Twelve o'Clock.