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Commons Chamber

Volume 287: debated on Monday 12 March 1934

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House Of Commons

Monday, 12th March, 1934.

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

Private Business

South Metropolitan Gas (No 1) Bill

Read the Third time, and passed.

Somersham Rectory Bill Lords

Read a Second time, and committed.

Oral Answers To Questions

India

Fire, Rangoon Gaol

1.

asked the Secretary of State for India if he has any information as to the recent outbreak in the Rangoon Gaol, Burma?

There has been no outbreak in the Rangoon Gaol, but on the evening of the 2nd March a fire destroyed three old workshops entirely and partly destroyed another. The cause of the fire, which was brought under control in a very short time, is not known definitely, but incendiarism is not suspected. There was no loss of life or injury to anyone.

Civil Disobedience (Prisoners)

2.

asked the Secretary of State for India the number of political prisoners in India on 1st January, 1932 and 1st January, 1934, respectively?

The number of prisoners convicted of civil disobedience offences on various dates is as follows. I have included certain other dates so as to give an accurate picture. Up to the first date mentioned action had been confined to the North-West Frontier Province.

1st January, 1932761
1st February, 193212,960
1st April, 193232,458
1st January, 193314,919
1st January, 19342,778

Textile Mills (Strikes)

4.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether he can give the House information regarding the strikes which broke out recently among the textile workers in the Bombay presidency and other centres; in how many industrial towns in India the textile workers have resorted to strike action; whether he is aware that at Delhi the police were employed to force the textile workers to resume work; and whether he can state what are the demands of the workers on strike?

Between the 1st January and the 15th February six strikes in textile mills have been reported, three in Bombay City, one at Dhulia, one at Ahmedabad and one at Delhi. Four were due to cuts actual or anticipated in pay or allowances, one to delay in payment of wages and one to complaints about working conditions. In none of the reports received is there any confirmation of the suggestion made regarding the position at Delhi.

Is it the fact that in those cases where delay has occurred it has been a delay of several weeks?

I have not the details available, but I will make inquiries if the hon. Member desires.

British Navy (Contribution)

7.

asked the Secretary of State for India what contribution is paid annually by the Government of India towards the cost of the British Navy?

In view of a recent decision to pay a large sum to the Government of India for the privilege of exercising British troops on Indian soil, ought we not to pay for the privilege of exercising British ships in Indian waters?

Indian Army (Promotion)

8.

asked the Secretary of State for India whether in order to relieve the block in promotion, he has in view the introduction of a scheme of compulsory retirement of officers of the Indian Army?

As hon. Members are no doubt aware, the authorities in India are likely to be confronted with a serious congestion in the senior ranks of regimental officers in the Indian Army within the next few years, and are now considering how best to deal with the problem. The congestion is due to the large number of permanent commissions granted during the War years, taken in conjunction with the operation of the time-scale of promotion. No definite scheme has yet been placed before me, and I cannot say at the present stage what form such a scheme is likely to take.

Burma

3.

asked the Secretary of State for India the total cost, including the expenditure on military operations, of the suppression of the Burma rebellions of 1930 to 1932; how many persons were killed; how many executed and how many were imprisoned at the time of the rebellion; and how many of those imprisoned are still serving sentences?

I have asked for the information desired by the hon. Member, and will communicate with him when I receive it.

League Of Nations (Contributions)

11.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the approximate amount in sterling that has been contributed to date by this country to the expenses of the League of Nations and the approximate amount in sterling, at the current rate of exchange, of overdue subscriptions from other countries for the same purpose?

The approximate total of the contributions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the expenses of the League of Nations, including the International Labour Office, was, up to the end of 1933, £1,469,800. The contributions in arrear from other countries on the 31st January, 1934, amounted to gold francs 29,401,856.41, equivalent, at the current rate of exchange, to £1,872,700.

Will my hon. Friend on behalf of this country put forward the suggestion that those who make no contribution to the expenses of the League should take no part in the management and direction of its affairs?

Is there any limit to the number of years a country can be in default before we take an action?

There is no statutory limit, of which I am aware, but my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Lewis) is aware that this matter has been constantly before His Majesty's Government, and we are doing our best to secure the payment of arrears.

Can the hon. Member say whether the Chinese arrears have been paid up?

Is it not important that as many countries as possible should be represented at Geneva?

Russia

British Embassy (Supplies)

12.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether an assurance has now been obtained from the Soviet Government, in reply to the representations made by the British Government, that the restrictions imposed in the past on local purchases, and also on the importation, free of duty, of supplies by His Majesty's representatives in the Soviet Union, have now been withdrawn?

As my right hon. Friend stated on the 7th February, in reply to the hon. Member for Gower (Mr. D. Grenfell), His Majesty's Government considered it essential that necessary supplies should be available to His Majesty's representatives in the Soviet Union at reasonable prices, and that such supplies as those representatives found it necessary to import would not be subject to import duties. The arrangements now in force meet these two conditions.

British Subjects (Employment Contracts)

16.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been drawn to a notice in the Board of Trade Journal regarding the employment of British subjects in the Soviet Union; whether he is aware of the details of a case in which Soviet regulations for the export of foreign currency were interpreted in such a way as to deprive two British mechanics of a substantial part of their earnings; and what action he intends to take in the matter?

The notice in the Board of Trade Journal, to which my hon. Friend refers, was inserted with my right hon. Friend's concurrence. The facts of the case, which has been the subject of repeated representations to the Soviet Government, are as stated therein. The Soviet Government refused authority for the export of the sterling equivalent of the men's savings, without which the permit to exchange those savings into sterling contained in their contract was a valueless concession. It was therefore decided to give publicity to the matter, in order that other British subjects who may contemplate entering into similar contracts with Soviet organisations may not be under a misapprehension.

May I ask if this publicity was given officially by the Foreign Office?

It was given in the Board of Trade Journal with the concurrence of my right hon. Friend.

Manchuria (Mr E Lenox Simpson's Claim)

14.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Foreign Office, in consultation with His Majesty's Legation in China, have concluded their examination of Mr. E. Lenox Simpson's claim for compensation as a result of his having been forced by the Japanese Government to leave Harbin for Dairen?

The examination of Mr. Lenox Simpson's claim against the Manchurian authorities is not quite complete, but I hope that a decision will shortly be reached. It will be communicated to Mr. Simpson as soon as it has been taken.

Portugal (British Subject's Claim, Settlement)

15.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he can make any statement regarding the claim of Mr. Brewer against the Portuguese Government?

I am pleased to be able to inform my Noble Friend that this claim has now been satisfactorily settled by the award of £800 to Mr. Brewer by the Portuguese Government. I am glad to have this opportunity to express the appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the attitude adopted by the Portuguese Government both in making this award and in arranging the re-trial of the case against Mr. Brewer, as a result of which Mr. Brewer was eventually acquitted by the Supreme Court at Lisbon.

Spain

17.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information to give as to the situation in Spain?

As already reported in the Press, on account of serious labour complications affecting various trades, a decree was issued by the Spanish Government on the 7th March proclaiming "a state of alarm" throughout Spain. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware, no disturbances of a violent character have since then occurred.

May I ask whether His Majesty's Government are making any representations in Spain on this question or whether they view with indifference the possibility of Spain following Austria? May I have an answer?

Naval And Military Pensions And Grants

18.

asked the Minister of Pensions the number of ex-service men holding wounds or disability pensions who have disappeared and no longer draw their pensions, but of whom no actual death certificate has ever been received?

I regret that the records of the Ministry do not enable this information to be given, but it is believed that the number is very small.

In the event of such disappearance, have the relatives any claim on the pension accruing?

That depends on the relationship, and on the circumstances. Of course, if it were a wife we should know of her existence, and the matter would be taken up. But an unmarried pensioned man might get killed in an accident, and of his disappearance we should know nothing except that the pension had been discontinued.

Trade And Commerce

British Industries Fair

19.

asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department if he is in a position to give the House any information as to the results of the British Industries Fair in London and Birmingham?

20.

asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department if he can make any statement as to the results of the cotton textile section of the British Industries Fair?

I am glad to state that the results of the British Industries Fair have been very satisfactory. Reports from all sections of the Fair indicate that the orders obtained by exhibitors for the home market were in excess of those resulting from the 1933 Fair. The volume of orders and enquiries secured from overseas markets is stated to be higher than at any previous Fair, a statement which is borne out by an increase of over 20 per cent. in the attendances of overseas buyers at the London section.

The attendances at the London section were:
Overseas buyers12,008
Home buyers114,339
Public34,536
and the total attendances at Birmingham were 124,507.

Can the hon. and gallant Member say how the number of home buyers compared with that of last year?

The number of home buyers is slightly down in the London section, and in Birmingham they do not differentiate between home and overseas buyers. The grand total for all sections is slightly up.

Can the hon. and gallant Member give us any information about the cotton industry?

Balkans (Japanese Trade)

21.

asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department whether the attention of his representatives has been called to the latest Japanese commercial activity in the Balkans; and whether he will ascertain to what extent any form of barter or exchange of commodities rather than purchase is being adopted as the method of trading?

Reports have been received regarding Japanese commercial activity in certain Balkan States, but I have at present no information regarding the precise terms upon which Japanese goods have been sold. As regards the second part of the question, whenever instances occur of barter transactions or similar methods of trading by exporters of any country, our overseas officers report thereon without delay.

Manganese (Imports)

44.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what was the tonnage of imports of manganese from British West Africa and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively, in 1929 and 1933 or the latest year for which figures are available?

The total tonnage of manganese ore imported into the United Kingdom from British West Africa was 1,380 tons in 1929 and 22,689 tons in 1933; the corresponding figures of imports from the Soviet Union were 10,064 tons in 1929 and 220 tons in 1933.

British Herring (Russian Purchases)

46.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the question of price is preventing the Russian authorities buying herring from the British fishing industry; and, if so, can he say what the average difference is between the price asked and the price offered?

I am informed that about 8,000 barrels of existing stocks of cured herring were offered about a fortnight ago by the curers to the Soviet representative in this country at a price of 30s. per barrel. I understand that the immediate reply was an offer to consider a purchase at 25s. per barrel. I am not aware whether there have been any further negotiations in respect of the existing stocks of which only a small quantity now remains, unsold.

Textiles (Anglo-Japanese Negotiations)

47.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what is the present position of the negotiations between representatives of the Lancashire and Japanese textile industry; and whether, in case of failure, the Government propose to take action for the protection of our industry?

As regards the present position of the negotiations between the representatives of the Lancashire and Japanese cotton and rayon industries, I have nothing to add to the statement which appeared in the Press after the meetings last week. It would be premature and inappropriate at the present stage to discuss the eventuality suggested in the second part of the question.

Can my hon. Friend give the House any indication of when he is prepared to make such a statement?

I think that must be a matter for my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade to deal with himself, but, as the House knows perfectly well, there will be no delay in this matter, and it is most inadvisable to press further at the present moment.

Does my hon. Friend realise the position of Lancashire at present and the necessity of having some definite statement?

Can my hon. Friend say whether silk is included in these discussions?

As I was dealing with cotton and rayon, the answer, I think, is obvious.

Tithe Rentcharge

22.

asked the Minister of Agriculture if he has any further statement to make as to the possibility of the institution of a committee of inquiry into the working of the law relating to tithe?

Having regard to the widespread dissatisfaction with the present arrangements and the continued urgency of the problem, will my right hon. Friend undertake to make some statement on the subject before we rise for the Easter Recess?

Potatoes

25.

asked the Minister of Agriculture if he will state the average wholesale and retail price per cwt. of ware potatoes at the latest available date and comparable figures for 1933; and the estimated quantity still on hand?

The average wholesale price per cwt. of first and second quality King Edward VII and Majestic varieties (which are used for the calculation of the Ministry's index figure) for the week ended 1st February, 1934, was 3s. 11d., compared with 4s. 6d. for the corresponding week of 1933. The retail prices published by the Ministry of Labour show that the average retail price irrespective of variety on both 1st February, 1934, and 1st February, 1933, was 7s. per cwt. With regard to the quantity of potatoes on hand, I have no information later than 1st January, when it was estimated that 1,789,000 tons or 51 per cent. of the total crop in England and Wales still remained on farms. The next estimate will be made on the 1st April.

Do we understand that though the price to the grower has been lowered the price to the consumer remains the same?

Public Health

Milk Supplies (Schools)

26.

asked the Minister of Agriculture whether, before approving any proposals submitted by the Milk Marketing Boards for providing milk to schools at reduced rates, the Government will satisfy themselves that such milk will be free from the risk of tuberculosis or other infections?

I understand that under present voluntary schemes the source of milk supplied to schools has to be approved either by the school medical officer or by the local medical officer of health. I have no doubt that the Milk Marketing Boards will take note of existing procedure in framing the proposals which they will be submitting for approval, and I will certainly bear the point in mind myself.

Is it not a fact that the quantity of milk containing tubercle is infinitesimal and that questions such as this do a great deal of harm to the milk industry?

Water Supplies

36.

asked the Minister of Health if his attention has been called to the serious situation at Kirton, Lincolnshire, in consequence of the closing of the normal water supply of several hundred people, including school children, on the ground that the supply is polluted; and what action he proposes to take?

An engineering inspector of the Ministry has visited the locality to examine the position of the water supplies. At Kirton a private well on school premises was found to provide water below standard. Immediate steps are being taken to purify the water, and in the meantime other supplies are being used.

Is my hon. Friend aware that the only source of supply to the pump in question is what is known as soakage water and that there are no local springs available; and will he take steps to see that a pure water supply is provided?

And will he also take: steps to see that these matters are left in the hands of the Member of Parliament for that division?

As my hon. Friend knows Boston has already taken steps under a Private Bill to improve its water supply.

38.

asked the Minister of Health if it is proposed to give the regional advisory committees statutory powers to enable them to carry out schemes of regional water supply?

No, Sir. The committees have been formed for advisory purposes only, their functions being to survey the needs of their regions and resources and advise on measures to be taken. It is for the water undertakers in the region to decide how the recommendations of the Committee should be implemented.

Is my hon. Friend aware that at a recent meeting of the regional committee a resolution was passed declaring that further meetings were futile in the absence of some statutory power; and will he consider whether it is not advisable to provide them with some statutory authority, because this view is shared by other regional committees?

39.

asked the Minister of Health what replies have been received by him to his recent circular sent to rural district councils on shortage of water due to drought?

Four hundred and seventy-five rural district councils have so far replied to the Circular. Of these 315 report that their districts are not suffering from shortage; the remaining 160 report shortage of varying degree in parts of their districts, and indicate special measures which are being taken. As the details are somewhat long, I will with my hon. Friend's permission circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a summary of the replies.

Following is the summary:

Summary of replies received up to to-day in answer to Circular 1380 sent to all rural district councils in England and Wales on the 22nd February, 1934, referring to this subject:—

Three hundred and fifteen rural district councils report that their districts are not suffering from shortage, and 160 rural district councils report shortage of varying degree in parts of their districts. A total of 475 rural district councils reports.

Where shortage is reported, the replies indicate that, with few exceptions, special measures are being taken. The following summarises the information received

of principal measures taken in the rural districts in which shortage is reported:

Districts in which alternative supplies are available relatively near and being used24
Districts in which carrying and carting from more distant sources are necessary and being undertaken43
Districts in which shortage has been met by deepening of wells12
Districts in which shortage is met from neighbours' wells and private supplies42
Other measures5
126
Districts in which it is stated that no special action required beyond economy notices34
160

Where the replies suggest that further action is required, a visit is made by an engineering inspector of the Ministry of Health. Additional engineering staff has been engaged to enable this to be done. The inspector advises and assists the authority with emergency measures for the supply of water.

Tuberculosis

35.

asked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been drawn to a Report on Causal Factors in Tuberculosis, published by the National Association for the Prevention of Tuberculosis; and whether his expert advisers confirm the view that the incidence of tuberculosis varies with the consumption of raw milk, a shortage of which more than of any other foodstuff is a predisposing cause of tuberculosis?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regard the second part, the causal factors in tuberculosis are numerous and complex, including under-nourishment, but my right hon. Friend is advised that the nutritive value obtained by the consumption of raw milk might be accompanied by some increase in the risk of infection by bovine tubercle bacilli unless suitable precautions are taken to ensure the safety of the milk.

Post Office

Burglaries

27.

asked the Postmaster-General if he will state for each of the past five years the amount lost by the Post Office owing to burglaries?

The amounts for the years ending the 31st of March are as follow:

£
1928–292,200
1929–302,800
1930–312,100
1931–325,950
1932–3316,900

To what does my right hon. Friend attribute the great increase in recent years?

In the considerable increase last year the only appreciable amount was due to a burglary at one of the offices, where the loss was a very considerable one. Apart from that, I do not think there is any particular difference in the year. The losses are of very small sum having regard to the vast amount of money that is entrusted to the Post Office every year.

Cable Companies

28.

asked the Postmaster-General what are the conditions governing licences to American cable companies operating in this country; for what period these licences are granted; when do they expire; and, in view of the fact that the American Government does not grant licences to British cable companies operating in America, will he initiate negotiations for reciprocal facilities before renewing the licences of the American companies operating in England?

Cable landing licences which were granted to two American companies expired some years ago and have not yet been renewed. In the meantime arrangements have been made with the companies for the continuance of their services between this country and North America. The United States Government have in the past granted permission to British companies to land cables in the United States. So far as I am aware, no British cable company has recently applied for permission to land a transatlantic cable in that country, but I have no reason to suppose that if such an application were made it would be refused.

Is it a fact that American cable companies are now operating in this country without any licence at all?

That is another matter. My hon. Friend had better put the question on the Paper.

Geeatee London (Improved Facilities)

29.

asked the Postmaster-General what changes have been made recently in respect of postal facilities in the Great London area; if he can state the approximate cost of these changes; and whether any further improvements are contemplated?

Improvements have recently been made in the postal services at certain towns immediately adjoining the London postal area, the principal alterations being the provision of a later delivery of letters commencing at approximately 7 p.m., and a later evening collection from all letter boxes. An additional Sunday collection is also being made from letter boxes at certain Post Offices. It is intended to provide similar facilities at all towns similarly situated as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made. The provision of additional staff is dependent on many factors, and it is not practicable to state with any degree of accuracy the cost of the improved services, but the total expenditure on bringing the services up to date in the towns in question will be in the neighbourhood of £50,000.

Air Mails (Ceylon)

30.

asked the Postmaster-General whether the facilities for air-mail postage is available to Ceylon via India?

Air-mail correspondence for Ceylon may be prepaid for transmission by air either to Karachi or to Madras; the rates of air postage are the same as those for India.

British Broadcasting Corporation

31.

asked the Postmaster-General whether the annual report of the British Broadcasting Corporation is submitted to him for audit and approval before publication?

The annual report of the British Broadcasting Corporation, together with a statement of accounts certified by the Corporation's auditors, is submitted to me before publication in accordance with the terms of the Royal Charter of Incorporation, which also provides that the Corporation's auditors shall be a firm of chartered accountants approved by the Postmaster-General for the time being.

Is my right hon. Friend in possession of greater details of the expenditure than are contained in that report?

I must have notice of that question. I will communicate with my hon. Friend.

Is it not the case that under Clause 16 (4) of the Charter the Postmaster-General and all other persons nominated by him are given full opportunity to examine the accounts of the Corporation, which must furnish him with all the information and documents that he may require with regard to receipts and expenditure? Has that power been exercised by my right hon. Friend?

Regent's Park (St John's Lodge)

32.

asked the First Commissioner of Works whether he is aware that the future use of the main fabric of St. John's Lodge, in the Regent's Park, has been under discussion for at least seven years; will he come to a decision during 1934 as to whether the derelict main fabric is to be demolished or utilised; and will he state what was the obstacle to his arriving at a decision in 1933?

I am aware that the future use to which St. John's Lodge might be put, has been under consideration for some years, and, while several proposals have been discussed, the unsuitability of the building for official purposes, and the capital cost of any conversion being large, have so far proved obstacles in the way of a solution of the problem. It is possible that the building, which is not without some architectural interest, might be utilised for a museum, but failing this, I may have to contemplate its complete removal.

In view of the long delay that has occurred in this matter will my right hon. Friend take steps to see that it is now dealt with more promptly than in the past?

I am not excluding the possibility of some of our overcrowded museums using this as a dump or reserve. Failing that, I think it will have to come down.

Justices Of The Peace (Juvenile Courts)

33.

asked the Attorney-General whether, in the appointment of new magistrates, consideration will be given to the advisability of the appointment of school teachers of both sexes, with a view to their serving in juvenile courts where their special knowledge would be of value?

Careful consideration is given by my Noble Friend, the Lord Chancellor, to this matter and a number of teachers of both sexes have been included in appointments to the magisterial bench.

Housing

Slum Clearance

37.

asked the Minister of Health how many slum-clearance areas have been marked out and how many protests he has received from property owners, as distinct from site owners, against condemnation without compensation of property which is in good condition merely because it forms part of a slum-clearance area?

Up to 28th February 2,083 areas had been declared by local authorities to be clearance areas. As regards the second part of the question, my right hon. Friend has received representations in favour of an amendment of the law but its present effect is not accurately indicated by my hon. Friend. Objections by property owners to the inclusion of houses and other buildings in clearance areas are frequent at the local inquiries held by inspectors of the Ministry before clearance area orders are confirmed, and houses or buildings shown to have been improperly included in an area are excluded from the confirmed order.

While thanking my hon. Friend for his lucid reply, may I ask him to make it known very widely that proper compensation will be paid in respect of good houses which may unfortunately be included in a slum clearance scheme?

That, of course, is so. A clearance area is a legal, not a geographical area, and that means that if a house is structurally fit and happens to be situated in a clearance area, it can only be included at the market value. If it is wrongfully included at site value for the compensation basis, then when we are confirming the order we should exclude such house.

While again thanking my hon. Friend, may I ask him to make that fact widely known, in view of the misapprehension which exists all over the country?

Administration

45.

asked the Prime Minister if he can make any statement with regard to the desirability of setting up a Ministry of Housing?

Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the present Ministry of Health is doing all that can be done in connection with this question?

Unemployment

Public Assistance (Disability Pensions)

40.

asked the Minister of Health if, in view of the recent concession made by the Government in the Unemployment Bill whereby the first 20s. of a disability pension is to be left out of account in calculating means when determining grants, he will consider the advisability of recommending public assistance committees to adopt similar procedure when dealing with disability pensioners who have to apply for assistance?

Special legislation would be needed for the course suggested. Public assistance authorities have, however, power to ignore so much of a disability pension as is offset by the special needs of the case.

Foreign Musicians

41.

asked the Minister of Labour why, in view of the unemployment among musicians, a foreign band of negro musicians has been given a permit not only to perform at music halls but also at a restaurant; if he is aware that another foreign band, which received a permit during the summer of last year, had the permit limited to music halls and was not allowed to play in any restaurant; and what are the reasons for this change?

The permission which my hon. Friend has in mind covers an engagement for one night only and was conditional upon the retention of the band ordinarily employed. A concession on similar lines was granted to Duke Ellington's band last year. There has been no change in the general policy in this matter.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this band's performance is giving great offence to many people in this country, as it is nothing but a series of cat-calls?

Children's Allowances

42.

asked the Minister of Labour how many local authorities have sent resolutions to him, which they have carried, urging the Government to increase the allowance to children in the new Unemployment Bill from 2s. to 3s.; and will he say what the Government intend to do with the question?

My right hon. Friend has received resolutions on this subject from 24 local authorities. As regards the second part of the question there is nothing I can add to what was said by my right hon. Friend when the subject was debated in Committee.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction on this matter; and may I ask the Prime Minister what the Government intend to do about it?

How many of the local authorities in question proposed that their grants-in-aid should be reduced in order to assist the Government in financing the scheme?

Can the hon. Gentleman say whether all these local authorities suggested an increase?

I will send my hon. Friend a copy of the resolutions, if he would like to see them and to make inquiries himself.

Newfoundland

43.

asked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs what arrangements are being made under the Newfoundland Government in commission for auditing public expenditure, and particularly grants-in-aid made by this country?

The question of the arrangements to be made in future in Newfoundland for the local audit of the accounts of Government expenditure is at present under consideration. In view of the fact that Newfoundland will be assisted by grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom Exchequer, the audited accounts, with a report by the auditor, will in future be furnished to the Comptroller and Auditor General of the United Kingdom.

Does that mean that no payment of the Grants-in-Aid will be made until satisfactory arrangements have been reached?

I do not anticipate that more than a few days will be required to reach those satisfactory arrangements.

Even so, can we have an assurance that no payments will be made until the auditing arrangements are satisfactory?

I can give an assurance that the completed arrangements will be satisfactory both as regards the grants given and the auditing.

Does that mean that these accounts will be looked through by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons from time to time?

The practice will be exactly the same as in the case of all Colonies who obtain Grants-in-Aid from the United Kingdom Exchequer.

Royal Navy (Pensioners: Emergency Service)

48.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will take the necessary action to delete that portion of the King's Regulations which reserves to the Admiralty the right to call on long-service pensioners to serve though they have completed their contracts of service and have not chosen to be enrolled as members of the reserve, thus restoring them to full civilian status?

The liability of pensioners to service in emergency is statutory, and it is not proposed to ask Parliament to abrogate it.

British Army (Education Standard)

50.

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office if it is the general practice of Army education officers at recruiting depots to report to local education authorities all cases in which the educational attainments of recruits fall short of a reasonable standard; and in the cases of how many recruits has this been necessary in the past year?

If the educational standard of young soldiers is found to be noticeably low, the matter is taken up either by the command education officers or by the inspector of the Army Educational Corps who visits regimental depots and units and is in close liaison with the Board of Education. I am not in a position to give statistics.

Will my hon. Friend issue instructions to officers commanding depots and other units to bring notice of really serious cases of defective education to the command education officer, whose duty it would be to hand on the cases to the directors of education or to put them before the Board of Education?

I think all such cases are now brought to the notice of the Board of Education.

Methylated Spirit (Drunkenness)

51.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department the number of persons convicted in England and Wales, during each of the past five years, for drunkenness attributed to the drinking of methylated spirit, giving separate figures for London?

The following are the figures of convictions for each of the years 1928–1932:

England and Wales:
1928446
1929409
1930476
1931582
1932596
County of London:
192840
192939
193022
193124
193230
It will be appreciated that the figures include cases of persons who have been convicted on more than one occasion. Full particulars for the year 1933 are not yet available.

In view of the very great danger of this fact, are any special steps being taken by the right hon. Gentleman's Department to prevent it?

Transport

Motor Accidents (Police Reports)

52.

asked the Home Secretary whether Scotland Yard regulations preclude a statement of the facts being given to an injured person where a constable has witnessed an accident on the public highway without payment of a fee; whether there is any scale of charges in this regard; and in what circumstances are such charges levied?

53.

asked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that the police authorities charge a fee of 10s. for supplying to a person involved in a motor accident information in possession of the police as to the ownership of the vehicle or the names and addresses of other persons concerned in the accident; and whether he will recommend to the police authorities that such information shall be made available without charge to persons who have reasonable grounds for making inquiries?

Reports of road accidents are made by police to their superior officers for police purposes, the chief purpose being to enable the responsible officers to decide whether proceedings should be instituted by the police against one of the parties involved in the accident. The police have no duty to supply information so collected to other persons for their private purposes, but it is the practice to supply to applicants having a legitimate interest in a case an abstract of the salient facts ascertained by the police, for which a fee of 10s. is charged, or 2s. 6d. if the police are asked to furnish only certain limited particulars. These fees are waived in any case where any hardship would be involved in charging them. It should be remembered that these facilities cannot be furnished without the expenditure of considerable time and trouble on the part of the police; and when they are furnished for the private purposes of individuals who have been involved in accidents, It seems right and proper that the police fund should receive some reimbursement and my right hon. Friend sees no occasion for altering the existing practice.

Will my right hon. Friend explain why a payment has to be made to the police force, which is specially maintained for the protection of the public, and will he also say whether fees have to be paid in order that a person who has had his property burgled, if the burglar is apprehended, can obtain his name?

No. The police are paid for specific duties. They are paid out of public funds, and it seems unwise to advocate that public funds should be used to settle a dispute between two private individuals.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that previously 5s. was charged and full particulars were given, but that at present 10s. is charged and full particulars are not given, and that if more particulars are required, another 10s. is asked by the police?

I have said that if few particulars are required, the charge is only 2s. 6d. It is only when full particulars are provided that the charge is 10s.

Surely it is the duty of the police to give any assistance to the public that they can?

Cycles (Bear Reflectors)

58.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware that the red reflectors carried at the rear of bicycles are usually of a type which is either too small or constructed in such a manner as to be an inefficient reflector; and, in view of the resulting danger, both to cyclists and other road users, he will issue an order that only types of reflectors passed as efficient by his Department may be used on bicyles after a given date?

The Regulations made under the Road Transport Lighting Act, 1927, already lay down a specification with which red reflectors carried on pedal cycles in place of a red rear lamp must comply. Many representations have been made to my hon. Friend about failures to comply with the specification, and the matter is engaging his consideration.

Is my hon. and gallant Friend aware that a large number of manufacturers submit their reflectors to the National Physical Laboratory at Teddington to see whether they are efficient, and why cannot the hon. and gallant Gentleman's Department see that all reflectors are submitted to the National Physical Laboratory?

I can only repeat that this matter is receiving very close attention; and I am aware of the facts as stated.

Can my hon. and gallant Friend say when any definite answer will be given on this point?

Railway Facilities (East London)

59.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he has considered the resolutions sent from local authorities in the East-end of London urging the provision of an underground railway passing through Bethnal Green, that the electrification of the London and North Eastern Railway passing through Bethnal Green should be expedited, and that in connection therewith station facilities should be provided in the vicinity of the former Globe Road station; and what reply he has returned?

My hon. Friend has received the Resolution referred to and has brought it to the notice of the London Passenger Transport Board and the London and North Eastern Railway Company, upon whom the responsibility for providing any necessary facilities of this kind would rest.

Has the hon. and gallant Member received any reply to the communication sent a long time ago?

I understood the hon. and gallant Member to say that the terms of this Resolution had been sent to the chairman of the London Passenger Transport Board. I want to know whether he has received any reply.

In view of the fact that the Government sponsored this Transport Board, is it not time that they did something to put these changes into operation?

We have no power to order either the construction or the electrification of railways.

Sweepstakes, Lotteries, And Betting (Legislation)

54.

asked the Home Secretary when the Government Bill relating to sweepstakes, lotteries, and betting on greyhound tracks will be available to Members?

I hope it will be possible for a Bill to be introduced before the adjournment for Easter.

Can my right hon. Friend say whether the Measure will be introduced in the House of Commons or in another place?

Assault Charge (Magistrates' Decision)

55.

asked the Home Secretary if he has considered the communication sent to him by the hon. Member for Rothwell (Mr. Lunn) regarding the complaint of Mr. John Pattison, an organiser of the National Union of Textile Workers, who, when distributing handbills outside the Manor Mills, Ossett, of Messrs. Windsor and Firth, was assaulted by a member of that firm; and if he will cause inquiry to be made into the facts therein contained with a view to some amendment of the law relating to the right of appeal from decisions of magistrates?

:: The attention of my right hon. Friend was drawn by the Ossett and District Trade Council to this case, in which proceedings for assault were taken last December by Mr. Pattison against a member of the firm of Messrs. Windsor and Firth. According to the newspaper report which the hon. Member has sent, it appears that the case was fully heard, and the Justices, having found the charge proved, dealt with it in the exercise of their judicial discretion by an order for payment of costs. Such an amendment of the law as the hon. Member appears to contemplate would raise large issues going far beyond the considerations arising in this particular case.

As the facts in this case were admitted, though they were ignored by the magistrates—[HON. MBMBEES: "Order!"]—will the right hon. Gentleman advise the Home Secretary to order a re-trial of this case?

On a point of Order. Is it in order to reflect upon the decision of a court of law in this country in the way in which the hon. Gentleman did? I have always understood that it was out of order.

All these things are very difficult to deal with. The hon. Member did make what was, I thought, an improper remark.

I am sorry to have to press this matter, but I regard it as an important question. The hon. Member made a distinct charge against a court of law. He said that the magistrates had ignored the facts, and I ask if it is in order in this House so to criticise the decision of a court of law.

Education (Medical Service)

49.

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education the number of education authorities in England and Wales which employ school medical officers, dental surgeons, orthopaedic surgeons, and school nurses, giving the number of officers per thousand of children on the books, for 1920, 1925, 1930, 1932, and 1933, and giving figures for England and Wales separately?

I have been asked to reply. As the reply involves a tabular statement, I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the statement:

The following is the information asked for in so far as it is available:

I.—SCHOOL MEDICAL, DENTAL AND NURSING STAFF, IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
Year.School Medical Officers (including Assistant School Medical Officers).School Dentists.School Nurses.
Number of L.E.As.Number of Medical Officers.Ratio of Medical Officers to children in average attendance.Number of L.E.As.Number of Dentists.Ratio of Dentists to children in average attendance.Number of L.E.As.Number of Nurses.
Actual.Equivalent in whole-time Medical Officers.Actual.Equivalent in whole-time Dentists.Actual.Equivalent in whole-time Nurses (excluding District Nurses).
(Approx.)(Approx.)
1920–213168122354203161,941
1925–263171,1405891 to 8,5002895843541 to 14,0003174,5201,745
1930–313171,3016521 to 7,6003107415211 to 9,5003175,4852,178
1932–333161,3416591 to 7,6003127745551 to 9,0003165,6302,243

NOTES:—( a) Complete figures are not available for the year 1920–21.

( b) Precise information is not available as to the amount of work done for Local Education Authorities by District Nurses. It is therefore not possible to estimate the ratio of the number of School Nurses to the number of children in average attendance.

( c) Separate figures for England and Wales cannot be given without an undue expenditure of time and labour.

II.—ORTHOPAEDIC STAFF IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
1920–21.1925–26.1930–31.1932–33.
Number of Local Education Authorities having Orthopaedic Schemes (involving surgical treatment).Not available85216228
Number of Orthopaedic Surgeons directly employed by Local Education AuthoritiesNot available27121125

Orthopaedic Schemes are frequently operated by means of arrangements made between Local Education, Authorities and Orthopaedic Hospitals, and in these cases the Orthopaedic Surgeons are not directly employed by the Authorities.

Beet-Sugar Industry

24.

asked the Minister of Agriculture the market value of beet-sugar produced in Great Britain in 1933 without including in the computation the amount of duty paid thereon?

Deducting Excise Duty at the rate of 4s. 7d. per cwt. from the figure of £8,408,000 given in the reply to the hon. Member on Wednesday last, the net market value of beet-sugar produced in Great Britain in the 1933–34 campaign is estimated to be £6,320,000.

United States (British Debt)

56.

Division No. 153.]

AYES.

[3.33 p.m.

Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)Cross, R. H.Horsbrugh, Florence
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Dalkeith, Earl ofHowitt, Dr. Alfred B.
Allen, William (Stoke-on-Trent)Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M.S.Davison, Sir William HenryHudson, Robert Spear (Southport)
Anstruther-Gray, W. J.Denville, AlfredHunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)
Applin, Lieut.-Col. Reginald V. K.Doran, EdwardHunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer
Athoil, Duchess ofDower, Captain A. V. G.Hurd, Sir Percy
Baillie, Sir Adrian W. M.Drewe, CedricHurst, Sir Gerald B.
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyDuckworth, George A. V.Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)
Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)Dugdale, Captain Thomas LionelJohnston, J. W. (Clackmannan)
Barrie, Sir Charles CouparDuggan, Hubert JohnJohnstone, Harcourt (S. Shields)
Beaumont, Hon. R.E.B. (Portsm'th, C.)Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)Ker, J. Campbell
Belt, Sir Alfred L.Dunglass, LordKeyes, Admiral Sir Roger
Bernays, RobertEden, Robert AnthonyKnight, Holford
Birchall, Major Sir John DearmanElliot, Rt. Hon. WalterKnox, Sir Alfred
Blindell, JamesEllis, Sir R. GeoffreyLamb, Sir Joseph Quinton
Borodale, ViscountElmley, ViscountLambert, Rt. Hon. George
Boulton, W. W.Emrys-Evans, P. V.Latham, Sir Herbert Paul
Bower, Lieut.-Com. Robert TattonErskine-Bolst, Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)Leech, Dr. J. W.
Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.Evans, Capt. Arthur (Cardiff, S.)Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Boyce, H. LeslieEvans, David Owen (Cardigan)Levy, Thomas
Boyd-Carpenter, Sir ArchibaldFermoy, LordLewis, Oswald
Brass, Captain Sir WilliamFleming, Edward LasceilesLindsay, Kenneth Martin (Kilm'rnock)
Broadbent, Colonel JohnFox, Sir GiffordLindsay, Noel Ker
Brocklebank, C. E. R.Fraser, Captain IanLloyd, Geoffrey
Brown, Ernest (Leith)Fremantie, Sir FrancisLocker-Lampson, Rt. Hn. G. (Wd. G'n)
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Fuller, Captain A. G.Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.
Burgin, Dr. Edward LeslieGlyn, Major Sir Ralph G. C.Mabane, William
Burton, Colonel Henry WalterGoff, Sir ParkMacAndrew, Lt.-Col C. G. (Partick)
Butler, Richard AustenGoodman, Colonel Albert W.MacAndrew, Capt. J. O. (Ayr)
Cadogan, Hon. EdwardGraham, Sir F. Fergus (C'mb'rl'd, N.)MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham)
Campbell, Sir Edward Taswell (Brmly)Grattan-Doyle, Sir NicholasMacDonald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw)
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnMacdonald, Sir Murdoch (Inverness)
Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmGriffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro', W.)McKie, John Hamilton
Caporn, Arthur CecilGrimston, R. V.Maclay, Hon. Joseph Paton
Cayzer, Maj. Sir H. R. (P'rtsm'th, S.)Guinness, Thomas L. E. B.McLean, Dr. W. H. (Tradeston)
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)Gunston, Captain D. W.Macpherson, Rt. Hon. Sir Ian
Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.Maitland, Adam
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A. (Birm., W)Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)Makins, Brigadier-General Ernest
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Edgbaston)Hammersley, Samuel S.Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Chorlton, Alan Ernest LeotricHannon, Patrick Joseph HenryMarsden, Commander Arthur
Clarry, Reginald GeorgeHarris, Sir PercyMason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)
Clayton, Sir ChristopherHartland, George A.Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John
Cobb, Sir CyrilHarvey, George (Lambeth, Kenningt'n)Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)
Collins, Rt. Hon. Sir GodfreyHarvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)Mitchell, Harold P. (Br'tf'd & Chisw'k)
Colman, N. C. D.Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale
Conant, R. J. E.Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M.Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. Eyres
Cooke, DouglasHenderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsford)Moore, Lt.-Col. Thomas C. R. (Ayr)
Cooper, A. DuffHeneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.Morris, Owen Temple (Cardiff, E.)
Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H.Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John WallerMorris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)
Crooks, J. SmedleyHoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.
Crookshank, Col. C. de Windt (Bootle)Holdsworth, HerbertMunro, Patrick
Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)Hore-Belisha, LeslieNation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.

since, last year there has been any exchange of views of any sort on the subject of the American debt between this country and the United States of America?

Business Of The House

Motion made, and Question put, "That the Proceedings on Government Business be exempted at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)."—[ The Prime Minister.]

The House divided: Ayes, 241; Noes, 26.

Nicholson, Godfrey (Morpeth)Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)Tate, Mavis Constance
North, Edward T.Salmon, Sir IsidoreTaylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Nunn, WilliamSalt, Edward W.Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.Samuel, Sir Arthur Michael (F'nham)Thorp, Linton Theodore
Patrick, Colin M.Sandeman, Sir A. N. StewartTouche, Gordon Cosmo
Peake, Captain OsbertSavery, Samuel ServingtonTree, Ronald
Pearson, William G.Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Perkins, Walter R. D.Shaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Petherick, M.Shute, Colonel J. J.Turton, Robert Hugh
Peto, Geoffrey K. (W'verh'pt'n, Bilston)Simmonds, Oliver EdwinWallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Pownall, Sir AsshetonSkelton, Archibald NoelWard, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)
Ramsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)Smithers, WaldronWard, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)Somervell, Sir DonaldWard, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Ramsbotham, HerwaldSomerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)Waterhouse, Captain Charles
Rankin, RobertSomerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)Watt, Captain George Steven H.
Rathbone, EleanorSoper, RichardWhiteside, Borras Noel H.
Rawson, Sir CooperSotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Reid, Capt. A. Cunningham.Spender-Clay, Rt. Hon. Herbert H.Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Reid, David D. (County Down)Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)Wills, Wilfrid D.
Reid, James S. C. (Stirling)Stanley, Hon. O. F. G. (Westmorland)Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Remer, John R.Stewart, J. H. (Fife, E.)Wise, Alfred R.
Rickards, George WilliamStewart, William J. (Belfast, S.)Womersley, Walter James
Robinson, John RolandStourton, Hon. John J.Worthington, Dr. John V.
Ropner, Colonel L.Strauss, Edward A.
Ross, Ronald D.Stuart, Lord C. Crichton-TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.Sir George Penny and Sir Victor
Runge, Norah CecilSugden, Sir Wilfrid HartWarrender.
Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)Sutcliffe, Harold

NOES.

Attlee, Clement RichardGrundy, Thomas W.Thorne, William James
Batey, JosephHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Tinker, John Joseph
Cocks, Frederick SeymourJenkins, Sir WilliamWedgwood, Rt. Hon. Josiah
Cove, William G.John, WilliamWilliams, David (Swansea, East)
Cripps, Sir StaffordJones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Williams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Daggar, GeorgeLogan, David GilbertWilliams, Dr. John H. (Llanelly)
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Lunn, William
Dobbie, WilliamMcEntee, Valentine L.TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Edwards, CharlesPaling, WilfredMr. C. Macdonald and Mr. Groves.
George, Megan A. Lloyd (Anglesea)Smith, Tom (Normanton)

Selection (Standing Committees)

Standing Committee C

Mr. William Nicholson reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee C: Mr. Caporn; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Liddall.

Mr. William Nicholson further reported from the Committee; That they had discharged the following Members from Standing Committee C (added in respect of the Adoption of Children (Workmen's Compensation) Bill): Mrs. Copeland and Mr. George Harvey; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Grimston and Mr. Lewis Jones.

Reports to lie upon the Table.

Orders Of The Day

Supply

Navy Estimates, 1934

Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell's Statement

Order for Committee read.

3.42 p.m.

I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

In presenting the Navy Estimates for 1934, I think it must be my first task to attempt to remove some of the misconceptions about the London Naval Treaty. I do not blame people for making mistakes about this very complicated treaty. I myself was guilty last week of giving a wrong answer to a supplementary question about it. It has been apparent lately that a great many people are under the impression that the Admiralty this year are free, and that the Navy is no longer subject to the many restrictions which are placed upon it by the treaty. This is very far from being the truth, and I shall try to clarify the position, first with regard to the cruisers, as that is the type of vessel about which there is the most controversy. The only restriction from which we are free this year is the one that limits the tonnage laid down since the signing of the treaty, and completed before the end of 1936, to 91,000 tons. This limitation, of course, did apply to the last programme, to 1933, and when, as I explained to the House, it became necessary to increase the size of our larger 6-inch cruisers we had to reduce the number of cruisers in that programme from four to three. Otherwise, the total tonnage to be completed by the end of 1936 would have exceeded the figure allowed to us under the treaty.

That restriction has gone, but two most important restrictions remain. The first is the one that limits the total amount of cruiser tonnage, both under and over age, that we may have at the end of 1936 to 339,000 tons. The other restriction, and this is the one about which there is the most misunderstanding, limits the cruiser tonnage which may be laid down in 1934, 1935 and 1936, to the tonnage becoming over-age in 1937, 1938 and 1939, plus tonnage over-age by the end of 1936 and still in existence. This gives us, as the total tonnage to be laid down for 1934, 1935 and 1936, 86,350 tons. But it is also stipulated in the London Naval Treaty that replacement cruiser tonnage cannot be laid down more than three years before the year in which the tonnage to be replaced becomes over-age. The effect of those two restrictions, which sound rather complicated, is that in 1934, this year, we could lay down 67,350 tons. That is made up of 62,500 tons of tonnage remaining over-age and in existence at the end of 1936, plus one ship of 4,800 odd tons which becomes over-age in 1937. The total cruiser tonnage that we are proposing to lay down this year is about 32,000 tons. This, as the House will see, is a generous third of what we are allowed for the next three years, and this building programme is in accordance with the carefully considered Admiralty policy of replacement, a policy which is designed to pursue a steady annual programme.

A steady annual programme has very many advantages, and to depart from that steady programme would create many difficulties. The two chief difficulties would be the question of manning and the inability to take advantage of the latest development in any ship designed. If we laid down, as we are entitled to this year, 67,350 tons, we should have only 19,000 tons of cruisers for the two following years, 1935 and 1936, and, of course, this allowance would be quite inadequate to allow the Admiralty to pursue their steady replacement programme. Some people may contend that we should use all the replacements to which we are legitimately entitled this year, because they say the Naval Conference, which is to be called next year, in 1935, might break down and might end in disagreement. My answer to that is this: This country has made tremendous reductions in her armaments in trying to bring about a general limitation. People may argue whether that was done rightly or wrongly, but we have done it, and we are still pursuing that end. We have not given up hope, we are still trying, and I think the House will agree with me that it would be quite impossible greatly to extend our cruiser programme this year, on the eve of the Naval Conference, and on the assumption, and only on the assumption, that that Conference is going to break down.

Moreover, as the House well knows, this country has put forward proposals for qualitative disarmament. If those proposals should be successful, or other arrangements be agreed to at next year's Conference, we should be in a very unfavourable position if we had exhausted all the tonnage to which we are legitimately entitled this year, because we should have only 19,000 tons of cruiser tonnage for the next two years, and would be in a very bad position to take advantage of any scheme that may be arranged, and in a bad way to make any start on a new basis that may be adopted. I want to make it perfectly clear to the House that, by the end of 1936, we shall have the full cruiser tonnage that we can have by that date. Included therein will be the full amount of new tonnage which is allowed by the Treaty. As the House will know from my printed statement, our programme includes four cruisers, one of the "Arethusa" type of about 5,200 tons, and three of the "Minotaur" type of about 9,000 tons.

With regard to destroyers and submarines, the limitations in the London Naval Treaty affecting those two categories are in the main the same as those affecting the cruisers. Here, again, our programme has been based upon a deliberate policy of replacement. We are asking the House to authorise one flotilla leader and eight destroyers, and three submarines, one of which is of the mine-laying class and two of the "S" or patrol type. The numbers are the same as in previous years since the Treaty, and they represent the steady annual programme of replacement which best meets our requirements.

It is true that in destroyers we shall be short, by a little over 60,000 tons, of the under-age tonnage that we might have had under the treaty. In regard to submarines we shall only be short of about 4,000 tons of the under-age tonnage that we might have under the treaty. There is no deficiency in the total permitted tonnage in either category. To sum up: By the end of 1936, in all categories we shall have the full tonnage that we are allowed by the treaty.

In regard to aircraft carriers, it has long been recognised that the construction of a vessel of this type could not much longer be delayed. The House is aware that we in this country were the pioneers in this type of vessel. Of the six aircraft carriers that we possess today, three were experimental types and, according to modern requirements, no longer have the speed necessary for a craft of this sort. Neither have they power to operate the number of aircraft of the modern aircraft carrier. The tonnage of aircraft carriers was limited by the Washington Treaty to 135,000 tons. We have at the moment 115,350 tons, and when the new ship is finished we shall scrap one of the old ones. We shall then still be well within the tonnage allowed in the London Naval Treaty.

The House may be interested to know where the ships of the new programme are to be built. The "Arethusa" cruiser will be built at Portsmouth; one "Minotaur" and two sloops at Devonport; one "S" submarine at Chatham; Malta and Simonstown will have some small craft to build, and the remaining 20 ships and the rest of the small craft will be built by contract. The principal function, as the House well knows, of our dockyards is maintenance and repair. We have a big programme of repair work for the dockyards, and I can assure hon. Members who represent those most important seats that the men in the dockyards will be fully occupied for some time to come.

If I may revert for a moment to the question of submarines, I think that this is the appropriate occasion to inform the House and the Navy of a very important decision which we have come to with regard to saving life from a sunken submarine. After exhaustive and anxious consideration we have come to the conclusion that the raising of a submarine in time to save life by that means is not a feasible operation, and that the only practical as well as the most certain method of saving life is by the Davis Submerged Escape Apparatus which is now fitted to all submarines. For the future we propose to rely only on this for saving life. This conclusion was reached only after most careful investigation of all submarine disasters that have occurred in this country and other countries, in the light of the experience gained by the United States naval authorities, who have gone very deeply into the question and in the light of our own experience of the escapes made by means of the Davis gear from the "Poseidon" in 1931, and even from the negative results which we obtained from the attempted salvage of the M.2 in 1932.

We are fortified in the decision that we have taken because only recently the United Staes have come to exactly the same conclusion and have decided to adopt for the future exactly the same policy as we are going to adopt. Officers and men are all trained in the use of the Davis escape apparatus. There is a tank now at Gosport, one is being built at Hong Kong and a third will be built at Malta. The reason for our decision is that if it was thought by men imprisoned in a sunken submarine that salvage operations were going to be attempted, it might have the very grave effect that the men, although trained in the use of the Davis gear, might postpone using it until they saw the effect of those salvage operations. Waiting for hours, perhaps for days, under most intense strain, might so weaken their strength and their will that eventually they might not be able to make use of that escape gear at all. Escaping by the Davis escape gear is an act which requires great resolution and coolness. It must not be postponed too long if it is to be a success.

Accordingly, we are just about to issue orders to the Fleet that we do not intend for the future to retain a salvage organisation, as we have done in the past, with the object of salvaging submarines only. The existing organisation provides for cruisers and all surface craft available being sent as quickly as possible to the scene of the disaster. We are amplifying those orders by giving instructions that certain signals shall be made to the submarine when the surface craft have located it, and that when the submarine receives those signals the men have to make their escape by the Davis gear, when they can be picked up by the surface craft. The Admiralty have had to face facts in making this decision, and it is a fact that there is no hope of saving life by salvage. We have to make up our minds as to that, and we have come to our decision because we are convinced that it is in the best interests of the personnel of the submarine service.

To turn to a more cheerful subject: one of the most satisfactory features, to my mind, in these Estimates is the increase in Vote A, that is, in the number of the personnel of the Navy. Last year I explained from this Box that we had reached the nadir in the numbers of men, and that from that moment the numbers were going to increase. Doubts were cast upon my statement by various news papers—I do not blame them—because the method we have of computing Vote A apparently failed to bear it out, but it was true, and this year there is a further increase, the numbers having gone up by 2,057 men. So the curve of the numbers of men is now definitely ascending, and with that curve two other important curves must rise, representing the efficiency of the Service and the comfort of the men.

I should like to tell the House what we have been trying to do to improve the conditions and prospects of men of the lower deck. I have nothing at all spectacular to report, but I cannot help thinking that the cumulative effect of a number of small things we have been able to do in this direction is not inconsiderable. First of all, the increase in Vote A, which will increase what we call our margin, is going to make a great difference in the comfort of the men. It will mean, first of all, that they will not have to be moved about from ship to ship as much as they have been, and, besides that, there will be a better distribution of shore and sea service and foreign and home service. With regard to pay, we have done something in that direction. We came to a decision last year that men entered on the 1919 scale of pay should retain that pay when re-engaging for pension until they got a further rise on the 1925 scale, that is, they should retain their existing rate until they became entitled to a higher rate on the 1925 scale. The same with the pensions of the same men. A decision was also made whereby that part of the pension of such men which is in respect of their first engagement is to be calculated on the scale in operation when they joined the Service. In addition to that, we have recognised the very high qualifications necessary for what we call the communications department, that is, the signal and wireless branches. We have recognised that by giving these men non-substantive pay, and so putting them on the same footing as gunnery and torpedo ratings.

The victualling of the Fleet continues to be improved, general messing having been one of the greatest factors in this direction. Much more consideration than formerly is now given to the accommodation for the men on board ship. Shore station barracks are replacing hulks, and existing shore stations are being constantly improved and renovated. Steps have been taken to improve the selection and training of officers promoted from the lower deck, so as to put them on more level terms with ex-cadet officers in obtaining higher promotion. Every sort of facility to-day is given for games and recreation, and when the sailor comes to the end of his active service career, he finds that there are better facilities for vocational training and arrangements for re-settlement in civil life.

As I told the House, there is nothing sensational in any of these things which I have reported. Nevertheless, all of them touch aspects of life which most concern the sailor from the time he joins the Fleet to the time he leaves it, and they all help to ease what is, and should be recognised, as a hard life. I am quite sure that this House will never grudge any small concession that we are able to make to the sailor to ease his life. When he is afloat, the sailor is always on active service. He leads a crowded communal life. He has no barrack square in which to kick a football about during the dinner hour. If he is married, he is separated for a very long time from his wife, and has, in a sense, to maintain a dual establishment. He has to sleep in hammocks, sometimes so close as to touch each other, so that when a man turns the whole row feels it. What is worse than anything, it is almost impossible for the sailor to get any privacy, which at times all creatures want. For these reasons, I am sure the House will never grudge any small concession that we can make to improve his conditions.

I do not want the House to think, from what I have said, that the Navy is an unattractive service. Recruitment shows quite the opposite. Barely 80 years ago we were using the press gang to man our ships; to-day we are able to take only one in 14 of the men who want to join the Service. I think I ought to warn hon. Members who, later on, may wish to reduce my salary either for sins of omission or commission, that our right to use the press gang has never been abolished.

While we are getting over some of the difficulties of having too few men, we have still the difficulties in the Service of having too many officers in certain ranks. Owing to the large numbers of officers entered when the Navy was larger, and Treaty restrictions were unforeseen, there has been, and unhappily still is, a surplus of lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders. Several ill effects accrue from this surplus. It prevents a number of junior officers from taking command and exercising control which is so necessary to their future careers. It has meant that prospects are bad in the promotion of these officers. It has involved unemployment and early retirement, and I am afraid that some people outside may doubt very much whether the Royal Navy affords adequate prospects of a reasonably assured career for their sons.

Therefore, we are taking active measures to meet these several difficulties. Various ships in the Navy are now working on considerably reduced complements of officers, that is in addition to the reduction we made in lieutenant-commanders last year. In the light of the experience which we are gaining we shall adjust the numbers of lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders, and, at the same time, adjust the entries of cadets into the Service, so that we shall be able to offer definitely better prospects of promotion in the future. We have already considerably improved promotion from commander to captain, and I hope that in the future we shall have a considerably higher proportion of officers promoted from lieutenant-commander to commander. To those who may think of sending their sons into the Service, I have no hesitation whatever in saying that the prospects of a boy entering the Royal Navy to-day as a cadet have never been better since the War.

Last week my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air, at the end of his very admirable speech in introducing the Air Estimates, said:
"I am sure that the House as a whole realises that the Royal Air Force is now, alongside the Royal Navy, the first line of defence of these Islands and of the Empire."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1934; col. 2041, Vol. 286.]
I am sure that not only the majority of the House, but the whole House realises that, and I may say that the Navy has realised it for a very long time. I want to say here that I deplore very much a growing tendency to indulge in controversy on the respective merits of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for the protection of our Empire. I think that such controversy is wholly mischievous, and can only do harm to both Services and also to our country. Both these Services are vitally necessary for the defence of our Empire. In my opinion, the two Services are peculiarly complementary, and, if I see the future aright, I think that they will become more and more complementary as time progresses. The Fleet depends more and more upon our Naval Air Arm. We regard it as the spear-head of the Fleet, and we are prouder of it than of any other branch of our Naval Service.

It is equally true that the Air Force depends on the Navy. Without the Navy, the fuel which the Air Force uses, and indeed every other thing that is water-borne, would be in jeopardy. I am sure that the Air Force, as time goes on, will help more and more in the defence of our commerce in narrow waters. But the House must remember that to-day, at any moment, of the tremendously large number of British ships all over the world carrying our commerce, something like 85 per cent. are outside the scope of land-based aircraft, and I cannot help thinking that, until commerce flies altogether, you must have a Navy to defend it. It is perfectly true to say that the Navy can do nothing to protect London against an air attack, but a blow at the heart is not the only way of killing a country. A country can be killed, if more slowly, just as surely, by attacking its extremities, and sinking its merchandise and provender upon the high seas. Death by a thousand cuts is just as sure as death by a knock-out blow. It must be apparent that both of these great Services are required for our defence, and, in my opinion, they will work more and more closely together as time progresses. I am sure the House would like to know that, at those places where they come most closely in contact, that is to say, in the aircraft carriers and at the shore bases, there is the most perfect comradeship and co-operation between them.

If it is essential, as I think this country will always hold, for England to have a Fleet, I should like the House to realise and understand that it is just as essential for the Navy to have battleships. A dangerous heresy has appeared in certain naval circles which states that a battleship is an anachronism, and is unnecessary to-day. This question is even discussed as though there were two schools of thought in the Navy upon it, but I can assure the House that that is not so. I do not believe that it would be possible to find a Board of Admiralty who would not say that the battleship is, and must remain, the backbone of our Fleet. I see in his place my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes), and I should very much like to obtain his support for this thesis. I am sure I may take this opportunity of saying on behalf of the House how delighted we are to see among us a very distinguished Admiral of the Fleet who will bring great practical experience and knowledge to our Naval Debates.

This heresy about battleships has gained a good many adherents recently, because, in our up-to-date journalism, orthodoxy is no longer news value. It is only the hetrodox who obtain the headlines, as the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) well knows. Besides this, those who, like the First Sea Lord, have supreme responsibility for these things, are not supposed to take part in public debate, and cannot rebut theories that are put forward by people who have no responsibility whatsoever, and so it is left to me to try to make the case for the battleship, which I shall attempt to do. The argument is usually put in this way, that battleships should be reduced to 10,000 tons, and I propose to deal with the argument in that form.

The argument is advanced from three quite different points of view—by those who think that a reduction to 10,000 tons will mean economy for this country; by those who think that a 10,000-ton ship will be of a size sufficient strategically for the defence of this country; and by those who think that the 10,000-ton ship will make for peace, because it reduces the power of aggression. I think I should here state what the Admiralty consider to be the qualifications of a battleship. The first is that a battleship should be powerful enough to remain afloat for a reasonable time against any form of attack—from gunfire, from torpedoes, from mines, and from aerial bombs; and it would be technically impossible to incorporate the necessary protection against all these forms of attack in a ship of 10,000 tons. But there is an overriding consideration, and that is that a battleship should be overwhelmingly more powerful than the next type of ship with which it is likely to come in contact.

Taking first the economy argument, let me say that we at the Admiralty have every sympathy with the idea of economy; indeed, we have put forward plans for reducing the size of the capital ship very considerably, though I may remind the House that up to date those suggestions have not met with very much response. If the capital ship were reduced to 10,000 tons, or if the gap between the capital ship and the cruiser were unduly reduced, all the smaller Naval Powers which at present have not any ships bigger than cruisers would immediately be in a position to upset all the carefully calculated ratios and relative strengths of the other Powers, either by forming combinations among themselves or by re-inforcing one of the larger Powers; and it is only our possession of capital ships overwhelmingly more powerful than cruisers that enables us to accept so low a strength as is represented by a one-Power standard. Were our interests threatened in any distant part of the world, instead of sending, as we did in the War to the Falkland Islands, two ships of a far superior type against the concentration of enemy cruisers, we might, if we had not ships of that superior type, have to send perhaps double the number of ships of the same type. The result would be that we should want so many 10,000-ton ships that the Navy would be far more expensive than it is to-day.

As regards the strategical aspect, suppose that all nations were limited to ships of 10,000 tons, and that a country which had parity, or something like parity, wished to attack us. This country must always have a very large percentage of its cruisers on the trade routes, because our position with regard to the protection of trade is unique. That would mean that, at his selected moment, an enemy could concentrate the whole of his cruiser force against only a fraction of ours, either at home or anywhere else in the world. If it were at home, and he effected that concentration, he would have the whole converging traffic at the mouth of the Channel, and, indeed, the whole of this country, at his mercy. That would be making aggression easy; that would be making attack simple. But now suppose each of these countries to have a small battle fleet as well as cruisers. An attack on this country then would become a very much more difficult and hazardous enterprise, because the concentration of cruisers of which I have spoken could do nothing really effective while our battle fleet was in being, and it would be necessary for any enemy to move his battle fleet, working, perhaps, many miles from its base, before our battle fleet could be challenged.

The enthusiasts for the 10,000-ton capital ship are those who want to stop aggression in all its aspects. They think that by reducing the offensive power of a nation, and strengthening its defensive power, greater general security would be brought about. I agree absolutely with that, but one of the greatest difficulties has been to define what is an offensive and what is a defensive weapon. I think the only definition that finds universal agreement at Geneva is one that says a particular type of weapon is offensive if you are standing in front of it, and defensive if you are standing behind it. But, surely, this plan of reducing the capital ship to 10,000 tons would be deliberately playing into the hands of the aggressor, and dangerously reducing the defensive power of any country attacked. I will try to sum up these arguments by saying that neither technically, strategically, economically, politically, nor even pacifically, could we accept a 10,000-ton capital ship, and this is probably why all investigators who have studied the suggestion have unanimously turned it down.

Two years ago, when I first presented Navy Estimates to the House, I very regretfully explained that the Estimates of the Navy were at a very low ebb. The provision made in 1931 was lower than it had been for nearly 20 years, and, in spite of the very high hopes of general disarmament and general appeasement in the world that were held in those days, I realised that the money voted for the Navy was not sufficient properly to finance it. We were starved for stores and many other requirements; we were living on what was rapidly ceasing to be our own fat. It is true that the Navy Estimates in the last two years have risen by a little over £6,000,000, but, honestly, I do not believe, looking round at the general state of the world to-day, that anybody who had my job, who had the tremendous responsibility of answering for the efficiency of the British Navy to the British people, could possibly ask for a penny less.

4.28 p.m.

We on this side of the House regard the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty as the most dangerous occupant which that position has had for some time—dangerous from the point of view that he presents his case in such a manner that, if the statement of his case contained nothing other than that, he would disarm a considerable amount of criticism from this side. I know of no one who has been more businesslike in presenting the Navy Estimates than the right hon. Gentleman. He has raised a number of very important questions, the most important, I think, being that of the retention of the capital ship. Is that an indication that, high as the Navy Estimates are this year, there is the possibility of very much higher Estimates being presented, perhaps not in the near future, but at some time in the future? May I suggest that one of the first members of the Government whom he should convert regarding the need for the retention of the capital ship would be the Prime Minister himself? I understood that in the London Agreement, and in one of the memoranda issued while the London Conference was sitting, reasons were given why it was necessary to abolish the capital ship. I am speaking from memory and I do not want to do the right hon. Gentleman an injustice.

The injustice is not being done to me but to the hon. Gentleman himself. The basis of the negotiations with regard to capital ships at the London Conference was a reduction of the size but not the abolition of the ship itself.

A reduction in the size, I think, to the tonnage which is now being criticised.

I will certainly look the point up. I am satisfied that there are reasons given in the memorandum then issued why there should be either the abolition or a reduction in the size of capital ships. But, at any rate, no increase in the number of capital ships can be made for some time owing to the agreements that are in existence, so there will be ample opportunity for the experts to discuss the question, whether it is necessary, or whether it is in the interest of all the canons of naval strategy, to retain the capital ship. It was most significant that the First Lord left the question of the actual increase in his Estimates until almost the last few sentences. He referred to the programme that was necessary for this increased amount of money, but the Estimates for the Fighting Services during the last two years have been increased by no less than £10,000,000. The Admiralty is taking the major portion of that increase, and that at a time when the Disarmament Conference is still sitting and when we are on the eve of a new Naval Conference if the Disarmament Conference fails, for the London Conference provided that in 1935 there should be a conference to decide what will be the position regarding the Fleets of the great naval Powers on the expiration of the period fixed by the London Conference. At this time the Admiralty and the Government are providing for an increase in the Fleet.

We recognise that the Estimates provide for ships which will be within the Treaty limits, but we deny the wisdom of building up to those limits at present. The Lord President of the Council last week expressed the hope that the endeavours of the Lord Privy Seal to save the Disarmament Conference will not be a failure. This is a period when the most rigorous economy has been enforced on all services which directly add to the well-being of the people, and, notwithstanding that fact, we are faced with this very large increase in the money asked for the Fighting Services. I do not know how far the First Lord and the Government have been influenced by the extremely significant campaign in the Press, on the platform, and even on the screen, for increased fighting forces, and this while the delegates are sitting at the Disarmament Conference working for a reduction in armaments. This propaganda was given a send-off by the Conservative Conference at Birmingham in October, which unanimously passed a resolution in these terms:
"That this conference desires to record its gravest anxiety in regard to the inadequacy of the provision made for Imperial defence."
Since that time the campaign has received active support from a number of politicians, from Admirals, Generals and other naval and military officers. There has been no more widespread demand for an increase in the armed forces of the country since pre-War days. The same arguments are used to-day as were used before the War, and the full forces of this propaganda have been mobilised to compel the Government to refrain from entering into agreements to limit armaments and to insist upon increases taking place. Alarming statistics from the naval correspondents of newspapers show that the sea peril is even more menacing than the air peril—Admirals letting themselves go one after the other at public meetings, banquets and the talkies, telling us that we are on the verge of collapse as a great naval Power and that our island security is threatened as never before. That has been going on for the last three or four months. It is most significant that the First Sea Lord himself should take sides in a controversy of this kind. Sir Ernie Chatfield responding to the toast of the "Imperial Services" said he had noticed in many quarters some apprehension as to the strength of the Navy.
"That apprehension, if it existed, was a sign of an awakening conscience. The nation must take stock of its defence position and consider whether, on its present naval expenditure, it was maintaining a naval strength in accordance with its policy."
He was followed by the hon. and gallant Gentleman whose presence in the House has been referred to by the First Lord. He will be able to bring his very expert knowledge to our Debates and, while perhaps we on this side shall not agree with everything that he says, we shall be very pleased to hear what he has to say concerning the position of the Navy. He is an advocate of a bigger fleet policy. Just before he became a Member of the House he said:
"Is Great Britain to be almost disarmed in a fully armed world? Is the very existence of an Empire to be decided by other nations or ourselves? Let us take off these hampering agreements with which we have been bound. They are not in the interests of economy, security or peace. Let us resume our right to build such ships as we consider necessary to safeguard our seas, assure peace and restore the prestige and prosperity of our Empire."
If that is the opinion of the experts, what prospect is there for any progress in disarmament, and what prospect is there likely to be for the success of the Naval Conference that is to be held next year? One would imagine from the propaganda of the last few months that the Navy had been starved, but during the last 12 years no less than £662,000,000 has been voted for naval purposes, and no less distinguished a journalist than Mr. Garvin has pointed out in the "Observer" that, since the War, this country, faced as it is with financial stringency, has spent no less than £2,000,000,000 on armaments and that half that money has gone to the Navy. We are told by the Press, by politicians, Admirals and the First Lord of the Admiralty that the Navy is, nevertheless, in such a condition that our safety is in jeopardy. I wonder what amount of money would have been required had there been no Naval Agreement? What Estimates would the First Lord have produced had there been no Washington Agreement? How much money would have been required in this year's Estimates had there been on London Agreement? The Prime Minister was the father of the London Agreement and, if criticism is levelled against it, he must take his fair share, as he is also entitled with Mr. Alexander, who was then the First Lord, to the credit that is due. My colleagues and I shudder to think what would have been the expenditure called for had it not been for the agreements which have been in existence during the last 12 years. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), in explaining the savings brought about as the result of the Washington Agreement, said that we had saved something like £400,000,000 as the result of the scrapping of certain capital ships and the reduction in size.

We hope the Government will not be influenced by the propaganda that has been going on. The hon. Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes) asked that there should be no agreements at all. He was preceded by a number of distinguished Admirals who claim that it is not 70 cruisers that we want, which was the minimum asked for in the Geneva Conference; they said that during the War we had 120 cruisers of all sorts, and they were not sufficient to safeguard our trade routes. Do they want a condition of that kind to exist in the future? I hope the Government and the Admiralty will endeavour at all times to control not only the size but the numbers of ships by agreements such as we entered into at Washington and at the London Conference.

I might ask where is the inferiority of the Fleet of this country at the present time. I do not think that the First Lord of the Admiralty would say for a moment that the Fleet is inferior to the Fleet of any other naval Power. We are not only building up to the full tonnage allowed under the London Treaty to the end of 1936, but, in the words of the First Lord himself, we are providing for overage ships until the end of 1939, and we want next year and the year after to have a programme similar to the programme which he has submitted this year, and then this nation will have built up to the full extent allowed under the London Agreement. I would repeat the question to those who have engaged in this propaganda during the lest few months as to where is the inferiority of the Fleet of this country?

The numerical summary which was issued by the First Lord a few weeks ago, points out that in cruisers alone we have built 50 to 21 built by the United States, and 31 built by Japan. We have a cruiser strength in this country as great as the combined cruiser strength of Japan and America. Not only that, but in the building we are in no way behindhand. I know that it can be suggested or inferred that America and Japan have vast naval votes for the spending of large sums of money. Whatever money is being spent in those countries in the building of warships, it is only to give them the amount of tonnage to which they are entitled under the London Naval Agreement. From the propaganda which has been directed in the Press one would imagine that they were exceeding by far what they were allowed to do. To look at the position at the present time, we are told, on page 371 of the present Estimates, that the number of ships to be completed, advanced, and commenced during the year 1934 will amount to 13 cruisers, one aircraft carrier, two flotilla leaders, 32 destroyers and other ships, making a total of 84 ships. One is inclined to ask, in view of the propaganda which has been conducted, who is the enemy which the bigger navy which is being asked for is to fight? There are five naval Powers. Germany is no longer a great naval Power. America and Japan are the two largest naval Powers which are signatories of the London Agreement. There is, of course, France and Italy, but, as I have already pointed out, the Fleet of this country is not in any way inferior to the Fleets of those countries.

I come to the question of the programme which we have before us at the present time, and I should like to refer to the alteration which took place in the programme of last year. In last year's programme there were three of the smaller type of cruisers and one "Leander." In November of last year the First Lord announced that the programme was to be so changed that, instead of having the three smaller type of cruisers, he was going to have two of the larger type, the new "Minotaur" type of 9,000-ton cruisers. We find that in this programme we are also providing for three 9,000-ton cruisers. I ask the First Lord what is the consideration that persuaded the Admiralty to build cruisers of this size. This sudden change is surprising, for it reverses the declared preference of the Admiralty for smaller ships and more of them. The Board of Admiralty appear to be in as changeable a mood concerning the type of cruiser as they have been during the last eight or 10 years concerning the size of battleships. I pointed out in the Debate on the Navy Estimates of last year that there was a changed opinion concerning the size of the battleship. At the Washington Conference of 1922 the size was fixed at 35,000 tons, which at the Geneva Conference was reduced to 30,000 tons. In 1930 a battleship of 25,000 tons was aimed at, and in 1932 it was further reduced to 22,000 tons. It was not so with cruisers. Here is an increase in the tonnage. In the Estimates which are now submitted we are asked for three of these large type and one of the smaller type. How long is it since the First Lord himself was converted to the larger type of cruiser which is now required? Speaking on the Estimates of 1932 he said:
"We want cruisers, not big cruisers, but light cruisers lightly armed, which are not a danger or a menace to anybody at all, but a, menace only to commerce destroyers. Although we want small cruisers, we want plenty of them."—[OFFICIAL REPOBT, 7th March, 1932; col. 1503, Vol. 262.]
He has sacrificed one small cruiser of his last year's programme for two of a very much larger type. I would ask the First Lord if he has seen the criticism of his predecessor Mr. Alexander concerning the building of the larger type of cruiser as compared with the smaller type? Mr. Alexander in a speech which he delivered last week said:
"They mean that the Government are going to build cruisers of a tonnage of 9,000 tons. Already they have 15 of 10,000 tons, and although they will be keeping within the total tonnage laid down by the London Agreement they will have the opportunity in 1935 of saying that they had not exceeded the limit. They will also be able to add that they are unable to build their 50 cruisers. Therefore they must have more tonnage."
Those were the words of Mr. Alexander who was the First Lord of the Admiralty during the time that the Labour Government was in office. It would be interesting to know whether the views of the Board of Admiralty have now changed, whether the 50 cruisers are not now required, and whether they think that a minimum less than 50 could really be accepted.

The First Lord, in his speech, referred to the fact that one of the most satisfactory features of the Estimates is the increase in the personnel. These Estimates provide for a further increase of 2,000, so that in two years he will have had an increase in Vote A of 2,600 as compared with 1932. This increase is not shown in Vote I, for there is only an increase of some £40,000 in the amount of money required. The cuts in pay, wages and pensions account for a reduction in Vote A of over £1,100,000 as compared with the 1932 Estimates. We on this side of the House would like to see the First Lord do all he possibly can to make the lot of the sailor much better than it is at the present time and as comfortable as it can be made. He said he was able to do some little towards this end. He could do one thing which would make him and the Government very much more popular than they are, and which would be very acceptable to all the ratings in the Navy. He could increase their pay. He is very careful about their accommodation and their food, but I think a little more pay would be acceptable to them. The restoration of the cuts would be very acceptable, in addition to the other improvements which he has been able to bring about.

I want to refer to the Estimates which were presented during the time that the present Prime Minister was Prime Minister of the Labour Government. At that time we were responsible for reducing the personnel of the Fleet. Mr. Alexander, in the Estimates which he presented to the House, indicated that a reduction was to take place and based the reasons on the fact that the operation of the London Agreement really meant the scrapping of five capital ships. These were responsible for the reduction of the personnel which took place at that time. I have satisfied my memory concerning that point.

May I ask the Prime Minister how he would describe the "Iron Duke," "Benbow," "Emperor of India," "Marlborough," and "Tiger"?

That is the position, and the reason given for the reduction in the personnel of 1931 was that it was owing to the scrapping of those five capital ships. We on this side of the House are somewhat alarmed at the increase that is taking place. When the reduction took place it was based on inquiries which disclosed that the Service was overmanned after allowing for the full complement both afloat and for shore establishments. The latter, it was said, were particularly swollen. I understand that the reductions which took place fell short of the suggestions then made, and met with the full concurrence of the Board of Admiralty. Comparing the estimated personnel with the tonnage which we have at the present time, I am of the opinion that there is no justification at all for this increase. The First Lord, speaking on the introduction of the Estimates of 1932, said that in the year 1931–32 we had to dispose of 74,000 tons of warships, and completed barely 26,000 tons. Seeing that in 1932 there was a reduction of 50,000 tons in warships, he is asking for a personnel which is equal to the personnel which existed before those 50,000 tons were scrapped. In comparing the personnel of the Fleet at the present time with the personnel and the size of the Fleet in 1913, I think that the First Lord of the Admiralty will admit that the size at the present time is just about 50 per cent.

Whatever may be the size of the reserve fleet the reduction of personnel is only 35 per cent. to-day, compared with 1913. It must be remembered that the change-over to oil fuel from coal has meant that the services of something like 20,000 stoker ratings can be dispensed with. That accounts for more than half the reduction in personnel that has taken place.

In the First Lord's statement no reference was made to the change in policy concerning Singapore. We find that in the Estimates, Vote 10, the total cost of Singapore is increased by about £1,000,000. The Naval Votes have already borne a portion of the expenditure and before the work at Singapore has been completed the Admiralty will have to meet an expenditure of nearly £9,000,000. I am not taking into consideration the grants-in-aid which have been paid towards the construction of the Singapore Base. That does not complete the story so far as Singapore is concerned, for in addition to the £9,000,000 which will fall upon the Naval Votes, £2,000,000 will fall upon the Army Vote and £600,000 upon the Air Service Vote. I should have thought that we could have had a statement from the First Lord dealing with this change—I will not say change of policy—and explaining why it is necessary that this increased sum should be placed in the Estimates this year. The Prime Minister knows the attitude which has always been taken by the Labour Opposition ever since the first day that the naval base at Singapore was mooted. In 1924 the present Prime Minister and his Government were responsible for stopping the work there and reversing the policy. In 1931 had it not been for the fact that contracts had been let and that the work had so far proceeded that it would have been very expensive to stop it, I have no doubt that there would have been a change of policy then. Now, nearly three years after the Labour Government went out of office, we find that the full programme of work at Singapore is to be carried out.

These are the criticisms which we offer to the Estimates. We view the greatly increased Estimates with considerable alarm. More ships, more personnel and more equipment are being provided for. More money, amounting to £6,000,000, is being asked for in the course of two years. I have already pointed out that we recognise that the Estimates provide for equipment of ships within our treaty rights, but we on this side of the House deny the wisdom of building up to those limits. The Disarmament Conference is still in being, and the Lord President of the Council said last Thursday that he did not admit that the tour of the Lord Privy Seal was a failure. Apart from the effect upon other nations, we must remember that this is a time for rapid developments, and the development of aircraft must to some extent determine our Naval policy. There is nothing in the Estimates or in the First Lord's statement to indicate that there has been any pooling of ideas in these important matters between the Admiralty and the other Services. The admirals have had their way, more ships are to be built and the Naval Estimates are up, at a time when the whole world is changing, when international relations are becoming revolutionised, when nations are living more on their nerves than they have ever done since pre-War days, and when steady and calm judgment and wise policies are more than ever requisite.

Tracing in my imagination as well as I can the probable course of events in a world steady on the run from disarmament towards so-called armed security, I am satisfied that unless the nations of the world strive in every way for greater disarmament, the great Powers of the world will in the coming months and years be arming to bursting point. The propaganda conducted in the country during the past few months, and the Estimates for the Services do not assist disarmament, and for these reasons we shall vote against them at every point.

5.5 p.m.

I appreciate the generous welcome which the First Lord of the Admiralty and the hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall) have given me, and from the reception which the House has accorded me I feel sure that it will extend to me that generous indulgence which is always given to a maiden speech. The hon. Member for Aberdare fired several broadsides, and, if I were to reply to him, as I should very much like to do, I am afraid that I should greatly exceed the time which I understand is allowed to a maiden speech. However, I will reply to him in regard to one or two things. I thank you, Sir, for allowing me to speak so early in the Debate, because, having listened with great interest to the Air Estimates, I hope to persuade the House to debate the Navy Estimates in relation to national defence in all its aspects. We who have seen something of war and know what war means have as great a desire for the preservation of peace as the most ardent supporter of the League of Nations Union, but we wish also to do all in our power to ensure the maintenance and the unity of the Empire.

I am sure that the House listened with intense relief to the brave words with which the Lord President of the Council concluded his speech on the Air Estimates on Thursday last. I think that many of us, coupled with our thanksgiving, offered up a fervent prayer that there might be a time-limit, definite and short, to the deliberations of the Disarmament Conference on Air. I do not believe that any other nation except Great Britain is going to surrender anything that affects its interests or jeopardises its security. It was with intense relief that we listened to title statement of the Lord President of the Council that:
"This Government will see to it that in air strength and in air power this country shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1934; col. 2078, Vol. 286.]
It was comforting to hear the shout of approval with which that statement was received in the House. The problem of national defence cannot be solved by raiding the Naval and Military Estimates to provide sufficient money to ensure that London and other places within reach of German aircraft shall not be bombed. There are other dangers. One hears so often nowadays that England is no longer an island, but the waters that surround our island are still the only route over which an army, complete with artillery, tanks, and transport can invade these shores. I never thought in the Great War that that was a serious danger. Then we had a great Fleet, but if our Fleet is allowed to fall below its proper strength that danger will be revived, and if we are ever threatened with invasion the three Services will have to co-operate to defeat it. But invasion is not the only danger. On the great ocean spaces over which our ships carry the food and raw material which is vital to the very life of these islands, aircraft, except those carried in ships, can neither attack nor defend our trade. Incidentally, aircraft carriers are the most vulnerable of all the ships we possess, and require fighting ships to protect them. On the other hand, the co-operation of aircraft is required when our ships approach these shores or pass through the narrow seas. Those who think that the Navy should be abolished and that the Air Force could undertake all our defence are surely labouring under a great and a dangerous delusion. I am sure that that view is not shared by those who are responsible for air defence. Whatever may be said to the contrary, the chief technical officers of the three great Services do work in accord for national defence.

I have been concerned with national defence for many years. I shared the responsibility for naval defence as deputy chief of naval staff on the Board of Admiralty for nearly four years during the early post-War period, when great decisions were taken in the interests of economy and disarmament. I hope the House will bear with me if I relate briefly the steps that were taken to provide security and at the same time to make great economies. I joined the Board of Admiralty on the eve of the negotiations for the Washington Treaty. My civil and naval chiefs, Lord Lee and Lord Beatty, accompanied the late Lord Balfour to Washington, and I remained behind and represented the Board of Admiralty on the Committee of Imperial Defence, under the chairmanship of my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). We were in close touch from day to day with what was going on at Washington, and it is no exaggeration to say that the co-operation of Lord Beatty and the naval staff, which included the present First Sea Lord, alone made it possible to translate America's gesture into a practical working treaty, the Treaty of Washington. This was a treaty which checked the construction of battleships for 15 years and called for great sacrifices on the part of Great Britain. I say quite definitely that the great economies and measures for naval disarmament after the War could not have been carried out but for the whole-hearted co-operation of the Board of Admiralty.

I would remind Socialist Members of the Opposition that when the first Socialist Administration was in office and was responsible for providing for naval defence, despite the strenuous opposition of the Liberal party of that day, but supported by the Conservatives, they provided a substantial building programme which enabled us to replace some obsolete worn-out cruisers and build cruisers fit to meet the cruisers which America, Japan, France and Italy had all been building. At that time they had the help and advice of the late Lord Haldane, a statesman, at one time much maligned, but to whom the Army and country owes an incalculable debt. He was to all intents and purposes their Minister for Defence, and, personally, I shall always be grateful to him for the wise guidance and help he gave in critical times.

I come to the next Administration. It was necessary to make some definite arrangements to replace our own worn-out and obsolete cruisers and destroyers. The Government appointed a Cabinet Committee which was presided over by the late Lord Birkenhead. On the one side the right hon. Member for Epping, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, defended the public purse, and on the other side Lord Beatty, and sometimes myself in his absence, endeavoured to extract sufficient for the needs of the Navy. In fact, an engagement was fought across the Table with a great lawyer and a jury of distinguished statesmen to decide the issue. When the Committee reported the Government decided that we should gradually replace our worn-out ships to the number of 70, the bare minimum required to carry out all the duties that our cruiser squadrons are called upon to perform all over the world, and may I add that it was less than half the number which had been found necessary in the Great War. This decision enabled us to keep in being the plant and power necessary to build war vessels, and to keep in employment gangs of skilled workmen who would otherwise have been thrown out of work and dispersed.

A vital link in the chain of Imperial defence was the construction of a battleship base at Singapore, without which it is impossible to go to the help of Australia or New Zealand, or to operate in Eastern waters. An efficient and complete base is absolutely necessary for us to carry out those services, and it was distressing to hear the hon. Member for Aberavon deprecate the building of this base. After all, Australia and New Zealand came to our aid in the Great War. Are we to leave them to depend on perhaps a wireless message of sympathy if they are in trouble, because it would be quite easy to cut the telegraph cables. After the Government's decision the then keeper of the National Purse, who had scrutinised every item of our programme, told me that he considered our policy a wise and statesmanlike measure. It will be generally agreed that the country owes Lord Beatty a debt for all that he did during the eight years in five successive Administrations in maintaining the Navy in a state of efficiency through such difficult times. In 1927, having as he thought secured the future of the Navy, he laid down his great office. The policy went on. The ships, however, were not built quite as quickly as we should have liked owing to financial difficulties and other causes, but the policy was clear and we were unhampered by treaty obligations except in regard to the building of capital ships.

In 1929 a dangerous change of policy came into being, and in 1930 the Treaty of London did away with all the safeguards which had been introduced at Washington. The 70 cruisers for which we had proved our case were reduced by 20. I must say this: If the technical advisers to the Government of that day bad sufficiently and strongly represented the dangers and far-reaching effects of that treaty the Government might well have taken advantage of the withdrawal of France and Italy and put a stop to the proceedings. The French Minister of Marine, M. Légues, who was responsible for the remarkable rebirth of the French Navy after the War, once declared:
"that sea power has been in the past and is now more than ever a measure of the greatness of a nation; and its increase or decrease is the surest symptom of progress or decadence."
It is not surprising that the French, accompanied by the Italians, should have withdrawn and declined thus to jeopardise their security within the terms of the Treaty of London. The Treaty of London not only limits our right to build ships and the type of ships we require, but it deprives us of the right of replacing a large proportion of those ships that are obsolete and worn out, and condemns us to send our people to sea in ships which are far inferior to those which other nations have been building.

There is one other great loss under that treaty; the hon. Member for Aberdare has mentioned it. We consented to scrap the "Tiger," one of the four ships in European waters which alone is capable of dealing with the pocket German battleship. We also consented to scrap the four "Iron Dukes." These five ships were good for many more years of valuable service. For instance, one of these with the assistance of a few light craft could have convoyed a merchant fleet of 40 or 50 vessels bringing food supplies from Australia. If we wish to build ships now we are compelled to build light cruisers with 6-inch guns, which in clear weather can only be a prey to the 8-inch gun ships which other nations are building unless they are accompanied by a superior force.

I should like to congratulate the First Lord on his admirable speech and on the clarity with which he has explained technical matters. The human note which he introduced will be greatly appreciated in the Service to which he and I are both devoted. I was head of the submarine service for four and a-half years, and I fully endorse all that he said about the salvage of a disabled submarine, and I fully appreciate his courage in making such a statement in this House. During the time I was head of the submarine service we lost several submarines, and that question came up over and over again. We felt that the same answer was needed but owing to sentimental reasons no one had the courage to give it. I congratulate the First Lord on his definite Statement which has cleared the air for ever. With regard to capital ships, I agree with everything that the First Lord has said.

I would take this opportunity of asking hon. Members to trust the naval experts at the Admiralty who are now responsible for the advice which is tendered to the Government on such matters and to disregard and to turn a deaf ear to those academic naval officers and others whose irresponsible criticisms add so greatly to the labours and the difficulties of those who bear the burden of responsibility. The First Lord has told us that we are building up to the full number of cruisers that we are allowed under the Treaty of London, but it is clear, I think, that we are not building up to the full number of destroyers allowed to us by the Treaty of London quota. I fully appreciate the great difficulties which the Government have had in restoring the finances of the country, and it is evident that there was not sufficient money available to build the destroyers. The Admiralty have had to decide where to make economies. But I would suggest that another flotailla should be built. The vessels are required.

Of the cost of their construction 80 per cent. goes into the wages of the people who build them in the shipyards, and of the remaining 20 per cent. no less than 15 per cent. goes into the wages of the workmen who work on the raw material. These figures are irrefutable, and I commend them to the notice of hon. Members who are all keenly anxious to reduce unemployment. This construction would give work to a great number of men for whom work cannot be found in any other way. The United States devoted £47,000,000, part of a great national programme, to alleviate unemployment. I cannot help thinking that here at least we might follow America's excellent example and build these ships.

I would like to go back for a moment to the capital ship. No submarine officer is under any illusion as to the limitations of his vessel when it is called upon to attack a well-screened battleship. Battleships are now provided with anti-air defence which renders them no more liable to destruction from the bombs and torpedoes of aircraft than from the torpedo of a submarine or from the guns of their equals. When the National Government took office, among its many liabilities it inherited a Navy tied up in Treaty bonds, short of stores, of fuel, and other essential reserves, with its overseas base in arrears, its personnel cut down far below its need, and its discipline to some extent impaired.

I hope I have not wearied the House with this retrospect. My only object was to show that up to 1930 naval defence has been very carefully considered by each successive Government, but that in 1930 an unfortunate step was taken. We were then committed to a most unfair and hampering treaty. Now that the National Government have made such great progress in restoring the finances of the country, have promised air parity, and have made a very definite advance in providing for the Navy, I trust that the Government will move forward resolutely and build all the ships that we are allowed under the terms of the treaty, and that at the first possible moment they will take steps to release the Navy from the toils of the London Treaty.

5.37 p.m.

I should like to begin by congratulating most warmly an old friend, an old colleague on the Board of Admiralty, and a new and welcome colleague in this House. The speech to which we have just listened must have impressed everyone by its survey, which gained enormously in weight by the authority of the speaker himself and by the moderation and fairness with which he stated his case. It was a case that must commend itself to all of us here, and I think it is bound to commend itself to the most serious consideration of the Government, especially those passages in which my hon. and gallant Friend pointed out the fatal injury done to our naval position by the Treaty of London, and the imperative need of releasing ourselves from the restrictions of that treaty.

Before turning to that issue, let me turn back for a moment to an earlier part of my hon. and gallant Friend's speech, and indeed to a part of the admirable and lucid speech of my right hon. Friend the First Lord, in which they dealt with the necessity of securing a right perspective in discussing the function of our complementary fighting services. We had an interesting and important Debate on Thursday last, and in that Debate, perhaps for the first time, the whole of the House without distinction of party faced up to the new and tremendous perils which confront the heart of the Empire from the development of the new air weapon. With everything that was said on the positive side as to that new development I agree. I agree equally that this new development demands a reconsideration not only of the allocation of our expenditure, but of the whole dovetailing of our forces to each other. But when that argument developed, as it did in more than one speech, on the negative line, and suggested that because a new peril had arisen all existing perils had gone, that the new factor in our defence had eliminated all existing factors, then I confess that I feel it necessary to enter a warning and a caveat.

I need not labour the point already made by my hon. and gallant Friend. While the heart of the Empire is open to a new and direct attack by air, this country is still as dependent as ever it was on the Navy for the protection of its supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs, and of its export trade, over 80,000 miles of sea routes, of which some 10,000 at most can be directly interfered with or defended by aircraft from land. As has been pointed out very truly, to protect your heart is not enough if your arteries are to be severed and you are to die from loss of blood. What consolation would it be to preserve London immune from bombing, or even to bomb Paris and Berlin, if we were strangled by the suspension of our shipping on the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans? In the Great War Germany for four years on end held her own on land and in the air, and in the end was undone by a blockade which at no point came within effective air reach from her shores or could have been interfered with by a German air force.

Moreover, it is not only a question of what is required to defend this country. In matters of defence it is no use talking in terms of England alone. As my hon. and gallant Friend has said, the Empire stands together, and it is only as an Empire that we can be a great Power. No scheme of defence is worth consideration which does not provide for our power to reinforce other parts of the Empire when they are in danger, or, for that matter, to enable them to reinforce us when we are in danger. For all I know, the problem of Imperial defence may dominate the next generation far more than the problem of our own local defence across the narrow seas. I can hardly imagine any Power on the Continent that would gratuitously wish to pick a quarrel with us. On the other hand, dangers may well develop on the Indian Frontier or in the Far East, dangers which we can only meet if the seas are free for the transfer of our land and air forces.

I would like to deal with this question of the complementary functions of sea and air in a somewhat different way. I ask the House to make a rather fantastic assumption, but one which I think will serve to illustrate the case that I want to make. Let us assume that aviation had been discovered a good long time ago, that we had developed its possibilities for civil and military purposes, that we were as air-minded as anyone wishes to be, but that it was only quite recently that it had been discovered how to build great structures of iron and steel, many thousands of tons in weight, which would float on the surface of the water. Should we not all be immensely impressed by the tremendous strategical implications and possibilities of such structures? Air-minded as we might be, we should at once realise that the force of our aircraft would be multiplied tenfold if, in addition to the ordinary fixed and vulnerable aerodromes in this country, we had a fleet of mobile aerodromes in the shape of aircraft carriers. They would carry our fighting strength, not only as the Navy has carried it in the past to the shore line of our enemies, but many hundreds of miles inland. We should realise at once that we had discovered an instrument of war of incalculable power, the domination of which would make us the strategical masters of the world.

The moment such an invention came to the front, obviously the first thought would be "What is the reply to it?" One reply might be more aircraft carriers of larger size carrying more aircraft. But there might be another reply to it, as my hon. and gallant Friend implied. The aircraft carrier is in many ways very vulnerable. The protection which its aeroplanes can give it is limited by the hours of daylight and conditions of wind and weather. It might be that the most effective and economical reply to this new weapon of the aircraft carrier would be a much smaller and swifter surface vessel or under-the-surface vessel, which could get home and sink it. A submarine or something in the nature of a destroyer might serve the purpose in the first instance. The moment, however, you embarked upon that reply, someone would find another reply and would say, "If this craft of 1,500 tons or whatever it might be is so formidable, why not build craft of 7,000 or 8,000 tons better armed, more powerfully gunned, speedier and with longer endurance on the water?" Every Power would then be compelled to follow suit. When you had done that you would come to the next stage and you would be automatically driven in the end to something not very different in essentials from the battleship of to-day.

I do not wish to enter into the technical details of the controversy about battleships. All these matters were considered with immense care over many months by the Board of Admiralty when I had the privilege of being one of its members, and the conclusions which were then reached certainly convinced me that you could not dispense with an ultimate centre of power at sea in the most powerfully-armed ship, offensively and defensively, that you could construct. The argument for not having any but small vessels is not very different from the argument once favoured among a certain school of gunners that the only gun of any use on land was the 15-pounder shrapnel-firing field-gun. It soon emerged in practice, however, that there was a place and a very important place for the heavier and more powerful gun. Every Power engaged in the Great War was driven to bigger and yet bigger guns. At any rate, the point which I am endeavouring to make is that if you had never had a naval service, if you had begun with an air service, once you moved that air service on to the water you might arrive, by automatic development, at something not altogether unlike the Navy of to-day.

That is as it may be. It is impossible for us in this House to be competent judges on the technical question of exactly how the Navy of the future is to be built—whether it is to be a Navy composed almost entirely of ships, which in one form or another are essentially aircraft carriers and which make aeroplanes their main projectiles, or whether it will be something between that and a Navy such as now exists. What I think stands beyond dispute is that at all times for this country, situated as it is and with an Empire the parts of which are separated from each other by great ocean spaces, the vitally essential element of our defence will be based on the water, whatever may be the actual form of the projectile through which it transmits action to any hostile quarter.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) on Thursday, in a very striking passage, pointed out how our very weakness as an island, our vulnerability to invasion, was used by us as an opportunity for becoming the greatest sea Power in the world. He appealed to us to use our present weakness in the air in order to achieve security in the air. I agree whole-heatedly with what he said, with this qualification. Let us, in aiming at security in the air, think of it not merely in slavish imitation of our landlocked neighbours. Let us think of it as the natural development of our whole history and as a means of making use not only of our position as an island, but of our position as the greatest of the world's sea Powers.

In any case, whatever may be the future structure of the Navy, we have at present to deal with our Navy and the navies of other countries as they exist. We cannot afford to let our vital defence perish while we run ahead in our imagination with schemes for modernising it into something very different from what it is. The obstacle to modernising the Navy and the Air Service is not, I may say in passing, to be found in any old-fashioned obscurantism on the part of the Board of Admiralty, and I am glad that the First Lord vindicated his colleagues in that respect. The obstacle lies much more in the new-fangled treaties with which we are tied up to-day. The Washington Treaty prevented us from having more than the equivalent of five 27,000 ton aircraft carriers above 10,000 tons, but, at any rate, it placed no limitation on smaller aircraft carriers. The London Treaty includes aircraft carriers below 10,000 tons in its limitation and expressly forbids us making them either for ourselves or for any other Power. The mere construction of an aircraft carrier in this country has been forbidden by the London Treaty. More than that, no battleship which was in existence in 1930 is allowed by the London Treaty to have a landing deck for aircraft, and only 25 per cent. of our cruisers are allowed to have landing decks for aircraft. One of the things which I would earnestly urge upon my right hon. Friend the First Lord is that he should give us an assurance that at the Naval Conference next year we shall liberate ourselves from these restrictions which prevent us developing our Navy on the lines of the greatest efficiency and, I believe, the greatest economy.

I propose for a moment to follow my hon. and gallant Friend in his story of the retrogression of our naval position in recent years. I, too, was one who thought that the Washington Treaty was a treaty which this country could accept because, while it placed limitations on our naval power, they were limitations which precluded us from doing things that were neither necessary to our security nor desired by us. They prevented us from carrying an aggressive war into the home waters of either the United States or Japan and they prevented those Powers from carrying an aggressive war into our home waters. That was a thing on which all three Powers could be agreed and by which none suffered. Throughout the negotiations which led to that treaty, however, Lord Balfour, Lord Lee and Lord Beatty were absolutely firm on one point, namely, that there should be no numerical limitation of our cruiser strength, because our cruiser strength is something which cannot be fixed with reference to the cruiser strength of others, but only with reference to our own needs in regard to patrolling the highways of the ocean. You can no more fix the number of our cruisers by the cruiser strength of other Powers, as the hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall) suggested, than you could fix the number of police by the number of burglars whom you estimated to exist in a great city. The number of police is fixed by the extent of the streets and also the value of the property to be defended. I imagine the hon. Member for Aberdare would not be happy if he as a special policeman were told off to protect the whole of Bond Street and assured that there was only one smash-and-grab burglar likely to come into that street.

I do not know what is the policy in London, but in most provincial areas the number of police is governed by population, and not by property.

It is the same thing. Population enters into it too. At any rate the number is not governed by an estimate of the number of burglars. It is the number of people who have to be defended. However that may be, I ask the House to have regard to the sacrifice which we made under the London Treaty when we came down from the minimum of 70 cruisers, which we believed necessary for our security, to a maximum of 50—a maximum fixed not by any consideration for our security but by consideration for America's convenience. America insisted on equality and did not want more than 50, and we were prepared for the sake of agreement—we are always making sacrifices for these agreements—to give up our own vital defence at sea, in order to suit the convenience of others. In addition to this limitation we accepted the curious and particularly indefensible limitation that during the years when we should have been entitled to build 157,000 tons of cruisers, in order even to get up to the 50 maximum, we should only be allowed to build 91,000 tons.

We have followed during many years a steady process of failing to live up to our naval responsibilities. Eleven years ago the present Prime Minister speaking in this House said it would be intolerable to allow the Navy to perish by wastage from the bottom. To a large extent by treaties, and outside treaties, that is what successive Governments have done—and I wish to give no party complexion to my argument—with one part or another of our naval defences throughout the last 10 years. Even now I do not feel happy that this well-balanced spreading of our requirements, in order to come up even to our treaty limits, is altogether wise. If we spend something more in the immediate future, we shall be economising from the national point of view in so far as we shall be saving in expenditure on unemployment. More than that, if, as all men know, the result of next year's Naval Conference is not to be a reduction but an increase in the naval forces of the world, then we shall only be in the position of securing a more even expenditure, instead of finding once more that we are seriously behindhand and with the possibility of having to pile very heavy Estimates on to a particular year immediately after 1935.

Whatever the position may be as regards that point, I do not wish to press my right hon. Friend too hard upon it. But, in general terms, I feel that the time has come to call a halt to gambling with our national security. We have done so year after year, at the outset with some justification, but a justification which has grown less and less, as the world has recovered from the Great War, and as the hope of any general scheme of disarmament has receded further and further into the mists of the future.

In conclusion, I should like to ask my right hon. Friend for three assurances. Will he assure us, first, that the Government will do everything in their power to bring us up to the very full limit of our treaty obligations at the earliest possible moment, keeping in mind the probability that our cruiser figures and our other naval figures will be higher after 1936 than they are now? The next assurance that I should like him to give us—and this I hold to be even more important—is to declare now that we mean to liberate ourselves at the Conference of 1935 from the arbitrary limits put upon our cruiser strength, and to demand a cruiser strength based upon our needs and not upon the convenience of any other Power. I think that declaration should be made now. The atmosphere should be prepared. If we have to make it in 1935, it is much better that the world should know it now. Japan has let the whole world know that she means to claim a revision of her ratio in 1935. Apart from Japan's action, we have a very strong technical ground for demanding revision in that escalator clause with regard to French and Italian construction of which we have never availed ourselves. The whole position, indeed, with regard to France and Italy clearly shows that it is not possible for us to limit ourselves in the matter of cruisers to an arbitrary figure like that. I might remind my right hon. Friend that even in 1932, in our Declaration of Disarmament Policy, we introduced a caveat preparing the world for reconsideration. On page 5 of that document will be found this sentence:
"And indeed cruiser numbers will require special consideration for the future."
So that I am only asking the Government to follow up a hint that has already been given, and to make a definite and clear statement here and now that at the Conference next year we mean to demand freedom for the construction of our cruisers, or for such aircraft carriers as may serve the function of cruisers, and get back to the position of the Washington Treaty in that respect. The third point on which I should like to ask my right hon. Friend to give us an equally clear and explicit assurance is that at that Conference we shall also press for such a complete revision of the present restrictions on modernising navies, in the sense of a fuller utilisation of the air weapon, as will enable us to make our Navy, if it is to be limited in quantity, at any rate as efficient and up-to-date as any Navy can be. I should like once again to congratulate my right hon. Friend on the admirable statement that he made, a statement that I think will give the greatest pleasure in the Navy, throughout the Services, and also in this House and in the country.

6.4 p.m.

As I agreed with very little of the speech of the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), I would like to join him in adding my tribute of congratulations to the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes) upon his maiden speech. I feel sure that his speeches will add distinction to our Debates on naval matters and on national defence, as well as upon other subjects in the future. The First Lord of the Admiralty last year attacked those with whom I am associated in the Labour party and accused us of being bloodthirsty pacifists, of advocating sanctions and at the same time refusing the Government the means by which sanctions could be imposed. That accusation, as far as I am concerned, was a blow in the air, because although I strongly believe in sanctions and hold that this country ought to go into a collective system for the maintenance of peace and international justice, yet I have never suggested that the forces by which those sanctions should be imposed should be weakened and made inefficient. I have never believed in unilateral disarmament, and pending the establishment of such a collective system, I feel that our defences should be maintained in an efficient state. Moreover, the Socialist state of the future, which I hope will come before long, will be a well defended State, because it will be a State even better worth defending than our present one, and the man-power in that State will be much more efficient, because our male population will not be starved to death by the means test as at present, when only one in every 14 who want to join the Navy has not to be rejected for physical reasons.

I cannot let that pass. The hon. Member knows that that is absolutely untrue. We have so many recruits that we cannot take more than one in 14. This is not due to physical defects, but because we do not want more than one in 14.

I will withdraw that remark as far as the Navy is concerned, but as far as the Army estimates just published are concerned it is stated that a large proportion of recruits have to be rejected for physical reasons. Moreover, we shall be able to keep our Navy efficient at a more reasonable price and cost, because we shall be able to get our materials at cost price instead of adding to the profits of armament makers.

As the hon. and gallant Member knows, the Government can produce armaments and munitions at a far cheaper rate than can private firms, as was shown in the last War. I agree with those Members of this House who hope that this is probably the last occasion on which we shall have to discuss the Service Estimates separately. Many of us hope that by next year we shall be able to discuss the subject of national defence in one Debate, and if we take the question as a whole in that way, I think the House will agree that if the Disarmament Conference fails, and if there is no hope of any conference establishing either disarmament or a collective system, then this country will be faced by a potential menace greater even than the menace which threatened Rome in the olden days. After all, when Rome was threatened by the barbarians, she was able to withdraw her legions to the centre to protect her heart, but we are unable to do that. We are unable to withdraw our forces from the far corners of the earth to protect London, because the heart of the Empire is not merely here, but in Australia, in New Zealand, in Delhi and Ottawa, and the possibility is that if a conflict occurred, and we were engaged in it without an international system at all, we should be engaged in a conflict not only here in Europe, but simultaneously in one far away, on the other side of the globe. Thus possibly we might be engaged on two fronts, and we might have to fight a certain nation, in Europe, on the North Sea, and one in the Far East at the same time. That would impose on us an impossible task from the point of view of cost.

That is why I think the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) was wrong the other night when he advocated a policy of armed neutrality, that we should make ourselves so strong that we should be able to choose our own course, independently of what might happen in other parts of the world and of the wishes or weaknesses of other nations. He said that we should be, as the Liberal Government in 1914 was, absolutely free and independent to take what course we liked. As a matter of fact, that was not a historically correct account of the case, because the Liberal Government in 1914 was not free to take what course it liked. Not only was it bound by obligations with regard to Belgium, but, as we know, it was bound by a secret understanding or arrangement between the British Government and France, arrangements which were not perhaps binding in a legal and Parliamentary sense, but which were morally binding on this nation; and we were not free at all. The only trouble about that was that those negotiations were not made known to the rest of the world; they were not published. If they had been, perhaps war might have been averted or at least postponed.

Such a policy of armed neutrality is impossible. We think the only security that this country can get is to go into a collective system, a system by which those in it would stand together to protect each other against an aggressor. The attitude of Pontius Pilate, washing his hands and of refusing any responsibility for what might be happening, say, across the Channel, is not an attitude which this country can adopt. We believe, that is to say, in a collective system, under which our forces would be organised and would be calculated, not as capable of fighting every possible combination, including the most difficult combination of Powers here and on the other side of the world, but organised in conjunction with other countries with a view to what it might be necessary for us to contribute in order to help to maintain, with others, the peace of the world and to repel an aggressor State.

Just as before the War we agreed with France to protect her Northern coast, so that the French were able to take their naval forces to the Mediterranean, so in the future we might have a similar arrangement by which the submarine forces of France might help us to protect the Channel against any inroads from Germany. That is my reply to the argument which I am sure my right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) proposes to bring forward later. However, while that system is not in existence and while we still belong to the League of Nations, I would ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will not consider a proposal which I suggested about two years ago, namely, that we should have joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean, say, with the French and Italian fleets, in order that we might be able to get experience in that association and common action which would be valuable in case we had to take action for police purposes later on against an aggressor.

When I leave the question of defence in general, and come to the question of naval difficulties, the problem is a little simpler, but still immensely difficult, and here I would like to say something about the vexed question of battleships. It would be absurd for me to speak as a strategist, or a tactician, or an expert on such a subject, and anybody who held the position of First Lord of the Admiralty, I quite agree, would have to take the advice of his experts. If the right hon. Gentleman says that the experts at the Admiralty are unanimously in favour of maintaining the battleship, that is certainly a consideration which should weigh very strongly with everybody interested in the subject. At the same time, the arguments which he gave did not entirely convince me, because, after all, we are not considering the nation in this connection as in an anarchic world, outside the collective system. We are speaking of navies which are limited all round by various treaties and arrangements. Everybody knows that a big gun is a more powerful weapon than a small one, and there is no need for the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook to tell us that. Everyone knows that the battleship is a more powerful instrument of war than the light cruiser. What we suggest is not a system by which we alone should abolish our battleships, but a system by which we should abolish them if all other nations abolish theirs as well. Considering the naval position of this country, it would put us in a stronger position relatively if the American battleships, the Japanese battleships and the German pocket battleships were destroyed.

We have to meet at the present time practically only two nations. There is the possibility of Germany constructing another Navy. Unfortunately, by some kind of agreement which we have made, it is suggested that Germany should have a right to equality, and, if she takes that view, she may construct submarines, battleships and every kind of vessel. I am sorry that that suggestion was ever made by this country to Germany. At the present time Germany has only these 10,000-ton pocket battleships, and they, of course, have to be dealt with. If they could be destroyed, together with ours, it would be possible for us to maintain our supremacy without the danger of these battleships operating so near to our shores. So far as the Pacific is concerned, what is the use of our battle fleet there? Does the right hon. Gentleman contemplate the possibility of our battle fleet going into the Pacific and operating thousands of miles away from the base? The Navy has to-day among other functions two important tasks. The first is to protect our commerce in time of war, and that would be better done by cruisers; the second is to maintain our defences in the Pacific, and to defend Australia and New Zealand. I do not know what the policy of the Government is on that matter, but surely we should be in la position to defend our possessions in that ocean more easily if the Japanese capital ships were not in existence, and if the whole fleets of the world were composed of smaller craft, the largest being the 8,000-ton cruiser with 8-inch guns.

One of the points which the First Lord mentioned in favour of the battleship was that it would be so much more powerful than the next in its class, but the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth told us that the 6-inch gun cruiser would simply be the prey of the 8-inch gun cruiser. If therefore we had by agreement the 8-inch cruiser as the most powerful naval vessel in any fleet, I should have thought that would have suited the Admiralty much better than its present policy of maintaining the battleship, which means not only a large expense but submarines as well. For unless we agree to the abolition of battleships other nations will not agree to the abolition of the submarine. At the Disarmament Conference one of our admirals declared that the battleship was as precious as rubies. Like precious stones, battleships have to be kept in a safe or at any rate in a safe place. In the War our battleships were a long way away at Scapa Flow and were guarded carefully by la number of smaller ships. It is possible that the Japanese would refuse to abolish their battleships. If they did, it would be clear to the world which nation was standing in the way of that form of disarmament.

I want to come to one or two other points connected with the Estimates, and to deal first with Dartmouth. This question was brought up last year by several hon. Members, including myself. Here is an institution which, after deducting the fees paid by the parents of cadets, is costing the country £40,000 a year. Each cadet passing through Dartmouth costs the country £50 a year, or £300 for the six years he is there. One of the effects of setting up an establishment such as Dartmouth is that it limits the class of boy who can go there, whereas the special entry system does not. Only a certain type of parent can afford to send his boy at the age of 12 or 13 to Dartmouth, and within certain limits the system rules out the boy who goes to the elementary school. With the special entry system, under which the boys enter at 17, you have not only the public school boy type, but the type of boy who, having started in the elementary school, has by his talents gone to the secondary school. It seems to me, too, that it is much better to take a boy at 17 than a boy at 12 or 13 into the Navy. You know better then what type of youth you are getting and the boy himself knows whether he is fitted for a naval career. There has been no criticism at all of the type of entry through the special entry system. It is said that the Admiralty could not get a sufficient number of cadets to enter in this way. I think that just as there is no difficulty of getting lads at 17 to enter Sandhurst so there will be no difficulty in getting them to join the "Frobisher."

Since 1913, I understand, about 11,000 have passed through as special entries, and 14 have become commanders. They have made good, and in a book by Admiral Richmond and speeches by the hon. and gallant Member for Burnley (Vice-Admiral Campbell) high tributes have been paid to the type of boy who comes in by special entry. Expense is saved, and it is very much better to get a boy in at 17 than at 13. Dartmouth is really a survival of the old Victorian days when people thought a good deal of exclusiveness, and when the Navy wanted to get certain types of person and did not want to get mixed up with people who came from the elementary schools. I do not want the British Navy to get like the Metropolitan Police, in which there is an officer class coming from the universities and the public schools. I think that the Navy of to-morrow, like the Navy of the past—not like that of the late Victorian age, but like that of Nelson's days and before—should be thrown open to boys of talent wherever they can be got.

Following on that, I want to say a word about lower deck promotions. Since 1913, 699 promotions have been given from the lower deck, including 467 in the Executive rank and 232 in the Engineering ranks, and they have risen to commanders and engineer-commanders. In case the House-may think that is a great number, I should like to point out that of these 699 commissions, 532 were given during the War. That means that during the last 15 years only 167 commissions have been given from the lower deck—96 on the Executive side, and 71 in the Engineering branch. That is an average of only 10 a year—six in the Executive and four in the Engineering branch. That is a very small number out of the whole number of officers who are in the Navy. When the Larkin Committee was appointed by the Labour Government in 1930 there was a great deal of talk about throwing open commissions to the lower deck. In the following year 12 able seamen were given promotions on the Executive side and there was a good deal of trumpet-blowing about the great new career that was to open up to those in the lower deck. In 1932, the last year of the old mate scheme, the number was reduced to eight. In 1933 it was only six, in spite of the fact that 12 were recommended by the Fleet Selection Board. On the Engineering side it was much the same; 15 were interviewed, nine were recommended, and only four were appointed. Last year, therefore, we got from the lower deck only six in the Executive and four in the Engineering branch.

I brought this matter up last year and did not get an answer. I would like to ask the First Lord now whether the Admiralty really intend to make this scheme of promotion from the lower deck a success, or is the intention gradually to reduce the numbers so that the scheme is dropped owing to the fact that in the opinion of some people men from the lower deck should not become officers in any great number because they come from humble homes and have limited incomes?

There is no foundation whatever for making a statement that men from the lower deck are not encouraged to become officers. I refute that as an old naval officer. It is a statement which should not be made.

The hon. and gallant Member misunderstands me. I am asking the First Lord what is the policy of the Admiralty, and whether they intend to make the scheme a success. I should like to say a further word about the Engineering branch of the Navy. I remember many years ago, when the engineers were fighting for Executive rank, that they wanted Executive curl and the power to sit on courts-martial and to discipline their own men. There was great opposition on the part of the old school of naval officer to the engineers getting Executive rank. I remember one old Admiral saying, "Keep them down in the pit." Now, owing to the energy and the originality of that great naval genius, the late Lord Fisher, who swept and garnished the cob-webbed rooms of the Admiralty, the engineers got their position recognised after years of agitation, and everybody in the Service recognises the great services done by that branch of the Navy. I would like to ask the First Lord whether he will not give a final crown to the Engineering branch as a reward for their work not only in the War but since then, and have a representative of the Engineering branch upon the Board of Admiralty itself.

I have one or two questions to put on the Estimates. Under Vote I, on page 35, I see that there is an increase of 248 in the writers and supply ratings, and I wonder whether we could be given any explanation of it. Another point concerns the question of the clothing of the apprentices at the Chatham Mechanical Training Establishment. It is suggested to me that these boys at Chatham, although they are able to get clothes from store, are also allowed to buy them from outside, and consequently many of them are getting into debt to tailors in London and elsewhere for their kit. When the time comes for them to pass out into the Navy, if they have not got quite the proper kit, they are deprived of leave until the requisite kit is bought. I am told that very often they have not bought clothes at all from the tailors but that the latter have lent them money. It has been suggested to me that it would be very much better if the boys were supplied with kit and uniforms, instead of being allowed to obtain them from outside people, with the result that sometimes they are in debt when they go into the Navy. Further, I would like to know why, in the case of Keyham College, we are given the cost in full but not given the cost in the case of the Mechanical Engineering Training Establishment at Chatham. The civilians employed there cost £21,700 and teachers for the apprentices £414. Why cannot the facts with regard to this establishment be brought out as they are in the case of Keyham College and other establishments?

To sum up. We on this side of the House do not want the Navy to become inefficient, but we feel that certain economies can be made without detriment to the efficiency of the Fleet. We know that when a vessel clears for action, a lot of superfluous material is cleared away, that a lot of the furniture, including the officers' piano, with its broken keys, is dumped into the sea, anything which may catch fire being got rid of. We want to see that our Navy is cleared for action in the same way. I am rather glad that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Portsmouth is not here, because I was going to ask why we should not have a reduction in the number of Admirals of the Fleet. Many people think that Admirals of the Fleet, like Field-Marshals, never die, and that they are very expensive; that it is rather an expensive and useless a rank, and ought to be cut down in times of peace, just as the rank of marshal in the French Army was abolished between the Franco-Prussian War and the late War. Going over Navy lists for the past 10 or 15 years, I note that some 40 or 50 per cent. of rear-admirals are unemployed at any given moment or, if not unemployed, are engaged on jobs which could very well be done by captains or commodores at less cost.

A further point which I have to raise is, I am afraid, rather a sore point with the Admiralty. It concerns the Admiralty yacht "Enchantress." It is laid up, at some cost to the nation. What is it kept for? Why cannot it be abolished? It has no fighting value. If the First Lord of the Admiralty wants to visit the Fleet, he can go in a light cruiser, and possibly would be happier there than in the yacht. It has been laid up for some time, and if it is ever brought into use again, a considerable sum will have to be spent on re-equipping it. I suggest that this yacht is a relic of the olden days, and ought to be eliminated. I have already suggested that Dartmouth should be abolished and a saving effected in that way, and that the special entry system should take its place. If battleships could be abandoned all round, there would be a considerable saving. Finally, as I said at the beginning, if this country joins the collective system for the maintenance of peace and justice throughout the world, we shall have the great saving of avoiding costly and destructive war.

6.36 p.m.

As a new Member and as one who has had actual, if now somewhat distant, naval experience, I felt that I should like to take this opportunity of making my maiden speech, and in doing so I would ask for that indulgence from the House which, I understand, it is the custom to grant on these occasions. May I first add my sincere congratulations to my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty for having struck a modest but nevertheless firm blow towards re-establishing the naval security of this country, in so far as security is possible within the limits of the London Naval Treaty? It has always been my belief that it was owing to sea power that the British Empire had its being, that it is by sea power that the British Empire will be maintained and that it will only be due to a lack of sea power if the British Empire should be lost. Therefore, it has been extremely painful to note the continual reductions which have been made in our Navy ever since the end of the War. We have made these reductions in the interests of peace and as a gesture and an inspiration to foreign navies to reduce their armaments, but is it realised that in this way we have, by gradual and successive stages, reduced ourselves to a relatively inferior position? Under this treaty, in accordance with which we have limited the replacements of our cruisers to 91,000 tons by 1936, we also note that by 1936 we shall have 61,500 tons of that cruiser tonnage obsolete, while the cruisers of France, Japan and America will be up-to-date.

I was very glad to see that we intend to pay regard to our anti-submarine forces and destroyers, because, as Lord Beatty said, against a preponderating force of submarines and cruisers and an overwhelming superiority in the air possessed by neighbouring foreign or Mediterranean Powers, what chance have we got of maintaining our supplies of foodstuffs and other vital commodities? In face of these considerations, unless there is agreement as regards disarmament, surely we shall have to reconsider our present policy of unilateral disarmament, which has placed us in our present position of inferiority. Therefore, it is very gratifying to see the new naval programme which has been outlined, especially at a moment when foreign Powers are expanding their navies, and also to note that the people of this country are beginning to realise that it is not in the best interests of peace that we should allow ourselves to fall into a position of such vulnerability as that to which we have come by allowing our Navy to fall so low. We are still one of the strongest influences in preserving peace in the world, and we have shown our sincerity by not taking advantage of that escalator clause by which we should be able to increase our naval armaments if we felt that our position was insecure.

We have nothing to gain by aggression and everything to gain by peace and tranquillity, but, as some of our finest naval experts have warned us, even 50 cruisers would be insufficient to do duty with the fleet as well as guarding and defending those 80,000 miles of trade routes which are the main arteries of the Empire and the mainstay of the life of this country. Will it help to maintain peace in the world if we allow ourselves to fall into an unnecessarily vulnerable position? Further, this naval programme will give employment to our own British working men because, as has already been said, 86 per cent. of the cost of this programme will go towards employing men in 20 other different industries, and surely we should undertake this work now, when there is this present depression, when work is scarce and prices are low. It will go a long way towards helping to overcome the present unemployment problem.

There is still one other point I should like to mention, and that is the gratification with which we see that some of our Dominions are contributing towards the Navy. India is contributing £100,000, New Zealand £72,000 and Gilbert and Ellis Islands £750. Australia, Canada and South Africa maintain their own vessels, but those vessels could only be used for more or less coastal protection. One hopes that the lifting of the cloud of depression will enable our Dominions to contribute more towards our Navy, on which they would depend for their very existence in a real emergency. One other suggestion which I should have liked to see put forward is that there should have been an Imperial Defence Conference before the next world Naval Conference, so that problems could have been discussed by representatives of the Dominions, and a minimum naval strength decided which would give the minimum necessary security to these islands and to the Empire, and which would help us to preserve the peace and unity of the world.

6.47 p.m.

May I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Cambridge (Lieut.-Commander Tufnell) on speaking upon a subject which he knows well, because we so often hear speeches in the House from hon. Members who know little about the subject upon which they are talking. It is always pleasant to hear someone who really understands his subject. The hon. and gallant Member for Cambridge, like his distinguished commander the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes), the Admiral of the Fleet, would probably have faced an enemy with less trepidation than that with which they addressed the House of Commons. That is a great compliment, of course, to us. The hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall) told us that whole nations were changing, and that Europe was in a state of nerves. If that be so, surely it is essential that this island should be secure. I have had some experience in this matter. I went right through the Debates before the War. I remember during the War coming up from Devonshire one Monday, and learning that at one large store—the Army and Navy Stores—no meat, cheese, margarine or butter could be obtained. That is a state of affairs that I would not like to see repeated in this country, and I am certain that the Labour party would not wish the towns to be in a state where no foodstuffs could be obtained. London is to be governed differently now, but I do not suppose that London will be fed entirely by manna from Heaven.

My impression is that it will be well if hon. Members of the Opposition will try to increase the food supplies to our own country instead of—as they are always doing—endeavouring to hamper us who try to increase those supplies. No one hates these discussions upon war and armaments more than I, but I am a believer in the security of our own country, and I do not propose for one moment to advocate or to vote that this nation shall be at the mercy of the passions of any foreign ruler. We were told about 15 years ago that never again would this country be so dependent upon foreign foodstuffs. We have forgotten that lesson now. There is an increase in the Navy Estimates. Personally, I would vote for anything in order to obtain security for our own country.

There are one or two questions which I wish to put to the Government and which have not been mentioned in the Debate. I hope that in doing so I will not offend the susceptibilities of hon. and gallant Members. We are told that there are 80,000 miles of trade routes. All right; but the focus of them is the English Channel. I received an answer from the First Lord of the Admiralty sometime ago that France since the Armistice have built and are building no fewer than 80 submarines. I asked that question, not with any view of disturbing our good relations, but because I thought that it was something into which we might inquire. I asked whether successive Governments had inquired of the French Government for what defensive purpose the French have those large forces of submarines. I do not wish to say a word which would in any way disturb harmonious relations, but we cannot get away from the fact that there are 80 submarines, built and building, since the Armistice. Against whom can they be used? Germany has none, so they cannot be used against Germany. Eighty submarines can, in certain eventualities, be a grave menace to the free flow of commerce in the English Channel; do not let us make any mistake about it. There are really more than 80 submarines, because there are some older ones, and on the north and west coasts of France they can be a menace to all the trade coming here. London can only be fed from the Port of London. There are 11,000,000 people to be fed from the Port of London, and those submarines could be, in certain eventualities, a great menace. The Government might well ask the French Government for what defensive purpose that enormous force of submarines exists.

We know that it was the submarine that nearly brought us down in the War. The Germans attacked us at the vulnerable spot. I have no love for saying what I am saying now. I do not like it, but the safety of our own country comes first, and no Englishman can tolerate existence upon the sufferance or forbearance of any foreign Power. Our French friends have, as I noticed in the Debate in this House last Thursday, 1,650 aircraft, which, with the great force of submarines, can paralyse all commerce in the Channel. France seems to be depending upon submarines, aeroplanes and the League of Nations, but she does not trust to the League of Nations if those great forces are maintained. I feel a great diffidence in speaking about this, but I think that it is necessary. Commerce in the Channel is dominated by another Power. That Power is friendly at the moment, but I remember the time when relations were very strained between ourselves and our French neighbours. Therefore, I would like the Government to give us some hint that they propose to ask for a reason why this formidable force of submarines is being maintained.

I want to go further. This point has not been mentioned in this Debate, and it concerns naval bases. We are to spend £56,000,000 upon the Navy this year, but the Navy depends upon naval bases. If the bases are not secure, the Navy is not secure and the money is largely wasted. I asked the Prime Minister the other day whether he was quite sure about the defence from aerial attack of Chatham, Sheerness, and Portsmouth. I might even have put in Plymouth. Those ports are on the South Coast, and are within striking distance of the Continent. Are they capable of being defended against foreign attack? If not, it is a very serious matter. I would like this question to be gone into other than by the Committee of Imperial Defence. I am sure that the Prime Minister and the Lord President of the Council give as much attention to it as they can, in addition to their other multifarious duties. I would ask that the question be thoroughly examined, because it is vitally important from the point of view of national safety.

I hope that the Admiralty will not regard the intervention of a civilian like myself as an infringement of their prerogative. I remember Lord Jellicoe putting to sea when there was no submarine-proof base for the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. I was a Member of the Board of Admiralty at the time, and have to accept all responsibility. I am now giving the Government the benefit of the experience which Lord Jellicoe had to learn, because of our neglect to furnish a submarine-proof base. I ask the Admiralty whether they are quite certain that the scrapping of Rosyth was a wise measure? Rosyth was built in the last 20 years and, as a port, is a great deal less vulnerable than Portsmouth, Sheerness or Chatham. It was one of the newest naval bases, equipped with every modern naval convenience. Would it not be wise to reconsider this question of naval bases? It is not for me to discuss now the question of Singapore, but I would far rather have seen the money that has been spent upon Singapore spent on a new naval base on the northern shores of this island, away from aerial attack.

I opposed the Singapore battleship base from the beginning. I do not believe that it is possible for Singapore to be defended. I believe that, as we are supreme in these western seas, Japan is supreme in those eastern seas. I do not think that anything can alter those facts. When we talk of trade routes between China and India and this country in the course of a war with Japan—which God forbid; one hates to talk about such things—we must realise that that trade must lapse.

I wish—and I have only this one special point—to draw the attention of the Admiralty to this air danger. My right hon. Friend the First Lord said that the Admiralty regarded the Air Force to-day as complementary to the Navy. Ten years ago I advocated in this House that the Air Ministry and the Admiralty should be amalgamated. The proposal was negatived then, but I asked then the Admiralty to consider that the air is a coming force. That force is here to-day. Aircraft can destroy commerce. No merchant ship can stand up against bombs from aircraft, and I am told also that aircraft have crippling power against a battleship; that a battleship, even His Majesty's Ship "Nelson" or His Majesty's Ship "Rodney," need not be struck in order to be disabled, and that the explosion of a bomb in the sea beside the ship will so damage the bottom or dislocate the machinery that she may be disabled for some time. My right hon. Friend rather smiled at that, but that is the information which I have on fairly good authority. Be that as it may, I ask that the Government shall consider this question of aerial attacks on our naval bases, and, if it be possible, that they shall find out from France why she requires this large force of submarines.

7.2 p.m.

I do not think that any statement made in this House has been of greater interest than the First Lord's speech on these Estimates. People of my point of view and thought of mind consider his statement to-day as satisfactory, with this reservation: that it is as satisfactory as he could make it under the conditions with which he is surrounded by the Treaty of London and the Treaty of Washington. We particularly asked that we should have a clear explanation of how we stood in regard to the Treaty of London, and perhaps, when I read the First Lord's speech to-morrow, I shall be a little clearer than I am now. He omitted one thing. I wish he had told us, having built up to these various tonnages which we are allowed, how many ships will be left on 1st January, 1937, that are over-age. I hope that we can get that figure; to many of us, that is the most important figure of all. In my calculation, which is probably wrong, I make it 14 cruisers out of date, obsolete, past their fighting age; and yet these very ships have to be out on our trade routes protecting our commerce against modern ships.

So much has been said by such experts as those who have preceded me that I must not overdo my remarks, but I should like to say a word or two about battleships. During the last two years or so battleships have been forgotten, but they have come to the fore again now. Battleships are the final word; in any fighting that takes place upon the sea, battleships have the last say. Their only duty is to checkmate the activities of the enemy's battleships. If the wish of the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) were carried out, if all battleships now afloat were done away with, it would merely create another race, and the heaviest ships afloat would then be the battleships. I wish to correct the impression that battleships cannot protect themselves. That story has always existed; yet the battleship has survived to this day. I took note of a speech made in this House in 1888 by Lord George Hamilton. They had just then constructed two battleships, the "Nile" and the "Trafalgar," and he said
"I had hoped some two years ago that the Nile and the Trafalgar would be the last battleships laid down in this country.…. It is therefore our duty, as we find other nations pushing forward this particular class of ship, to do the same."
He said that because at that time it was thought that the large number of fast-motor-boats which the Continental Powers were producing would be the end of the battleship. The battleship, however, survived that development. Then came the submarine, and the battleship did not, as had so often been foretold, seek refuge in harbour. When the submarines were about, she went into the open sea for safety. So it is well to remember that, if we take as an example of the battleship the modern dreadnought, during the last War no one single British battleship was hit by a torpedo fired from a submarine. That is how the battleship successfully protected herself from submarine attack.

Could the hon. and gallant Member tell us what hit the "Marlborough"?

I gather that it was a torpedo from a surface craft, and not from a submarine. Having been hit, she kept her place in the line and returned to port next day.

I asked that, because Lord Jellicoe, in his book, was very doubtful whether the torpedo had been fired from an under-water vessel or a surface vessel.

I do not know about that, but it has always been accepted, as far as I know, that the "Marlborough" was hit by a torpedo fired from a surface craft.

At all events, whatever hit her, she stayed in the line of battle. Then came the mines. Of course ships were hit by mines, but that was something which had to be learnt; methods had to be found to defeat the mines, and the results showed that the mines were practically defeated. Now it is the air. Naval officers speak about what air attacks can do on ships with great reservation, because they prefer to see the results before they make up their minds. With the resources of modern science, smoke-screens and smaller attacking craft, I have little doubt that when a battleship is attacked by aircraft in the battleship's field of battle—not choked up in the North Sea where attacking craft can get at her, but in the open ocean, which is her true battle-ground—she will survive this latest menace.

If I might again interrupt, would the hon. and gallant Member tell the House how he would use battleships 3,000 miles from their base?

There is no place in the world which is 3,000 miles from a base. When the Singapore base is completed we shall view these possibilities with even greater confidence than we do now.

May I come back to cruisers again? They are the ships that actually do the work, and when the First Lord was telling us of the necessity for them and proving so clearly the strength which the heavier ship has, I hoped that he had also heard the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes), who pointed out what an unhappy time a 6-inch gun cruiser would have against an 8-inch gun cruiser if she met her. As regards cruisers, there is not much that one can say, as so much has been said, but there is this. We can say with great confidence to the whole world that we have fulfilled not only the letter but also the spirit of the Treaty. I am not sure that every other country has done that. I do not say that countries have cheated, but they have taken every advantage of the rules. To come back to battleships again, countries are allowed money for modernising battleships. With a certain class of United States battleships, America spent more money in modernising than the ship originally cost. They did that on several occasions. Also when they have exhausted their quota of 8-inch gun cruisers and must build only 6-inch gun cruisers, they built a cruiser of 10,000 tons carrying 15 6-inch guns. What is the good of our smaller cruisers against a ship of that calibre? I have named the United States one or twice, and I think, as a naval officer, that I can do so. Having fought alongside the United States ships in action in the last War, I know perfectly well that, whatever the next war is, we shall find ourselves in the same position, and I desire to get these ships of the same type and species in order that, when we and the United States fight together, our squadrons shall be easier to handle because they are similar and homogeneous.

When I read these other Treaties, I reflected that people are still calling for more and more treaties, thinking that they will provide safety for this country. I have to remind some of my young friends that the Treaties made before the War were no less binding and no less sacred than the Treaties for which they are now asking, yet, when it suited the enemy to break them, the Treaties went one after the other. The safety of this country now rests partially upon treaties and partially upon our own strength, and I cannot help feeling that the people of this country would like to think that, if all else fails, the Navy still stands as their last line of defence.

As regards the other construction, the Admiralty have admittedly taken the point of view that the number of destroyers they are to build will be adequate. Presumably they will have a large number of obsolete destroyers. I would not criticise that policy too much, because there are to be 144 modern destroyers within the age limits, and it may be that the older types of destroyers, those that have survived their period of life and still remain efficient, may be put to many useful purposes. There is, however, another danger, and that is in the ship referred to as the "pocket battleship," the "Deutschland." The hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth rightly pointed out that in European waters there are only three ships that could seek her out and destroy her. But that ship is not in European waters, unless she has returned home during the last few days. She is in the Pacific, and it is just as well that this House and this country should remember that, whatever we may have at home, we have not a single ship east of Suez that could attack and defeat the "Deutschland"—not one. Hon. Members will remember how the "Emden" went out dealing destruction to our commerce and was afraid of almost any ship of ours that she might meet. Imagine the "Deutschland" going out in the full open day, fast enough to run away from anything more powerful than herself and powerful enough to defeat any ship of ours east of Suez that she might encounter. That is why we want battle cruisers. Yet, in the whole of our Fleet, there are only three ships which could look after the "Deutschland" if we happened to go to war with Germany.

I listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall). I have never pretended to understand the psychology of the Socialist party; they are always seeking to do a man out of a job if they can. Even Admirals of the Fleet suffer; they lose their jobs and have their wages reduced. The hon. Member told us definitely that he proposed to vote against this extra construction. I do not think that he realises what he is doing for the working man. I have here about three pages of all the smaller contracts that go with the building of one cruiser. Think of all the equipment in that ship—anchors and cables, steering gear, ventilation, pumping, ships' fittings for guns and torpedoes, timber, canvas, paint, ropes, and rigging; electrical cables, motors, generators, fuses, switchboards; scientific instruments; electrical steering gear; guns, mountings, armour—I will not read any more; much of that goes in different contracts all over the country. When that is multiplied by the number of all the various ships that are being built, it is difficult to see that there is any community in this country that would not suffer if the programme on the Paper were not carried through. Yet the hon. Member is perfectly prepared to vote against these men getting this work which they so ardently desire. That is the policy of his party, to take away the money from the Fighting Services and give it to the unemployed. They have achieved some recent success by adopting that policy, but I hope that our policy will remain as it is now, and that it always will be so: to produce work for the unemployed, which the building of these ships will give them.

I must refer again to the remarks of the hon. Member for Broxtowe, and ask him to realise this. I know that he takes a great interest in the promotion of the welfare of men from the lower deck, but not more than I do, or more than any other man who has served in His Majesty's ships, especially in command of them. The hon. Member asks: Will the Admiralty make a success of some scheme of promotion from the lower deck? But it is the men who are promoted that must make the success. If they were to prove themselves equally as good as other officers, then indeed the Admiralty might have to reorganise their methods, because, if, with all the money and experience and training given to a certain type of officer not from the lower deck, the lower deck officer were as good, the other scheme of training might as well disappear altogether. I am certain that the Admiralty will do all that they can to encourage such promotions—[Interruption.] Every one is qualified, but you cannot promote them all; that is the trouble. I think there was nothing in the Birthday Honours—not even excepting that conferred upon my Noble Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty—which the Navy observed with more pleasure than the promotion of a former lower deck rating to post-captain on the 1st January.

There is one thing on which I find myself very much in accord with the hon. Member for Broxtowe, and that is in his remarks about the engineering branch. The ancestors of these men started as engineers—simply engine drivers. They lived in a separate mess, wore a different uniform, and, instead of the brass button with the Royal Crown on it, they wore on their buttons a little steam engine. As their position and their duties increased, they went on to the wardroom mess, wore the same uniform, and eventually took executive rank. The First Lord made such play about the necessity of giving some inducement to executive officers to remain on for promotion, but what inducement is there to an engineer officer? He gets to a certain point, and there is practically nothing left. I do ask, with, I have no doubt, the same sympathy that other Members might extend, that there should be an appointment as a Junior Lord of the Admiralty for one of the senior officers of the engineering branch.

What happens to these men? They get very important jobs outside the Navy, but the Navy loses them; they have gone. Of course, as one in the Service, I know all the objections, or, at least, some of them. It is said that the constructors will object. Let the constructors object. It is said that, if that were done, all the doctors and paymasters would want seats on the Board. But all these are subsidiary services; they are not in the same position. I will not enlarge on the point, but will ask the First Lord to show himself big and strong enough to sweep aside all these small objections, and definitely to give to the engineers of the Navy such posts as admiral-superintendents of dockyards, and one of the Lords of the Admiralty, such as I think the whole Navy would wish them to have. In conclusion, I would like to quote one more word from what Lord George Hamilton said in 1889:
"We must either be content with a lower standard of precaution than in the past, or we must be prepared to face increased expenditure. Her Majesty's Government, in the present state of European politics, cannot recommend the former course."
I hope that the present Government are of the same opinion.

Coal Fuel

7.20 p.m.

I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:

"while in the interests of naval efficiency the fuelling of His Majesty's ships should be in accordance with the latest developments of modern engineering science, coal or fuel derived from coal should be used in all cases where it can be shown that, taking all relevant factors into account the efficiency of the Fleet is not thereby reduced."
I am afraid that the subject which I have to introduce in moving this Amendment is a rather dull subject compared with the questions of high policy which we have been discussing, but it is a subject which affects vitally the interests of a great number of people in this country, and that is my excuse for putting it before the House. I would like to congratulate the First Lord of the Admiralty on the introduction of his Estimates today. I remember very well that when I first came to this House, about 10 years ago, I used then to address my questions to him as the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty. We are glad that one who has had that earlier experience, and has served honourably in the Navy, has now the great responsibility of upholding the position of the Navy in this House.

I want to call the attention of the House to the very considerable change that has been effected in recent years consequent upon the substitution of coal by oil. I am not going to dwell upon the undoubted advantages that coal enjoys over oil. Undoubtedly oil has a higher calorific value; it has the convenience of low stowage; it increases the radius of action of the ship; it has the advantages of easy control of consumption, economy of staff, and ease of bunkering, especially at sea; and, finally, it has the advantage of cleanliness. I admit all this at the beginning, and I quite recognise that oil has advantages, ire- spective of any question of cost, which have very largely determined the policy of the Navy in recent years. But the effect upon the coal industry has been very marked. I will trouble the House with only a few figures to show what has been the reduction in the quantity of coal used by the Navy between the year 1913 and the present time.

In 1913, the Royal Navy used coal to the extent of 1,810,000 tons. That quantity had fallen by 1920 to just over 842,000 tons. In 1925, the figure had further fallen to 418,000 tons, in 1927 to 346,000 tons, and in 1930 to 244,000 tons; and I gather that during the present year tenders have been invited by the Admiralty from South Wales for 200,000 tons, representing the Admiralty's needs for this year. The fall which has taken place between 1920 and 1934, amounting to 640,000 tons, represents employment for 2,500 men. My Amendment admits at the beginning that the predominent consideration is the efficiency of the Navy—the absolute efficiency of the ship as a fighting unit. To that everyone must make obeisance. I remember that only a year or two ago there came from South Wales some representatives of a movement called the Back-to-Coal Movement, and they submitted their case, in the absence of the Prime Minister, to the Lord President of the Council. I had the opportunity of hearing the case put by that deputation, and the reply was then given that it was impossible to consider reversion to coal in the Navy, but that, short of that being done, the Admiralty would do all in its power to use coal and derivatives of coal where supplies were available and where the circumstances permitted.

I noticed that, in an answer to a question in this House only a few days ago, it was pointed out by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty that over 3,000 tons of fuel oil produced from coal had been used by the Admiralty in the year 1933; and, a day or two after that, the same hon. and gallant Gentleman gave a testimony which will be very welcome to those who are engaged in this industry. He said that the oil was a good bunker fuel, having a calorific value only slightly lower than that of petroleum fuel. That is testimony of very high value, and it will, I hope, have some effect upon the policy which we are now considering. Admitting all the claims for the supremacy of the Navy and the maintenance of its efficiency, I want to make a few suggestions as to what might be done within the limits of the terms of my Amendment. My Amendment is not intended to be admonitory, but suggestive of what can be done.

What can we do as regards the fuller use of home-produced liquid fuel? First of all, a great deal is being done in the way of experiment. I believe that the future of the coal industry is to be found very largely in what is done in the laboratory. I think there never was a more uninspiring slogan than "Back to coal." We live in such a hurrying world that we are not likely to go back to anything, and any industry that wants to hold its own must keep abreast of a hurrying world, and try to meet the demands of our own generation. The chemist, happily, has been at work, and the chemist is a very important factor in the coal industry. It is important that he should have every encouragement. I question if even the Admiralty understands the value that goes with its imprimatur after some discovery has been made or some product has been put on the market, if the chemist in the laboratory, and the industrial concern that is anxious to translate his discovery into a commercial proposition, can know that their activities are being watched with vigilant sympathy, that the fuel produced will be readily tested, and that in the event of a successful test there will be ample contracts for supplies. I believe that in that direction the Admiralty is in a better position than any other authority in this country to give encouragement to that work, upon which the future of the coal industry very largely depends. I said just now that in the year 1933 the Admiralty had used fuel produced from British coal to the extent of just over 3,000 tons. I am told that Low Temperature Carbonisation, Limited, has just installed two plants with a view to doubling its output, and I hope that, as a result of that activity, it may be possible for the Admiralty to increase the demand that existed in 1933.

Then I should like to mention a term which aroused a good deal of interest not long ago—the term "colloidal fuel." Some of my hon. Friends will remember that the famous journey which was made, during the time when I was on the other side of the House, by the Cunard steamship "Scythia" from Liverpool to New York, was watched with intense interest, and the papers had a great deal to say about it. I declined at the time to be lyrical on the subject, but we all expressed hopes as to what might result from that experiment. Hon. Members will know that "colloidal fuel" consists of 60 parts of oil and 40 parts of coal, and, from the combustion engineer's point of view, it is identical with oil. It has all the advantages of liquid fuel, and those who are in the best position to speak on the subject look upon it as a development offering a most promising prospect for the recovery of some of the position that has been lost by coal to oil in recent years. I should like the Civil Lord of the Admiralty later to let us know, if he can, about the Admiralty's observation of that experiment, and whether they would be ready to co-operate, as I have no doubt they would, with the Cunard or any other company concerned, and to take supplies as soon as that experiment has been marked as a pronounced success. The recent discussion on the Hydrogenation Bill was largely confined to the use of coal in producing motor spirit, but I think the Secretary for Mines pointed out that, besides the production of motor spirit by this process, there could also be produced fuel oil. If that is so, it will add to our home-produced supply, and I hope that that matter will also receive the watchful interest of the Admiralty and that steps will be taken in that direction to secure home supplies.

So far I have dealt with home-produced fuel. May I now say a word upon coal itself. I have admitted that, so far as the fighting ships are concerned, coal has had its day, but there are the auxiliary vessels attached to the Fleet where the requirements of steam are not so supreme. There are belonging to the Admiralty tugs and small craft in association with their work, which could very well do with coal, and I am told that in this respect great improvements have been made of late in the use of mechancial and chain grate stokers. Can the Civil Lord tell us anything about pulverised fuel, which has been making some progress of late, particularly in the industrial world. In 1929 we used pulverised fuel to the extent of 2,750,000 tons and in 1932 to the extent of 3,666,000 tons—a very marked progress. That progress, I know, has been made in industrial establishments, and some experiments have been made on board ship. It may be said, of course, that the use of pulverised coal is in its experimental stage as far as marine purposes are concerned, but, if anything can be told us about that, I am sure it will be welcome. I have also learnt that there are some mercantile vessels now equipped to take either coal or oil. They are able to make the change over, and they can make it speedily according to the circumstances of the supplies that may be available at any particular port. That is a recent improvement which may, I think, have some application to His Majesty's ships.

I know I shall be open to the reply that, even so far as these ships are concerned, there will be some loss of efficiency if coal is used instead of oil. But there are other considerations which may outweigh that argument. Have the Admiralty taken into consideration the reduction in the number of tankers which would be needed as escort in time of war, and the saving in the fuel consequent upon the reduction of these escort vessels? Have they taken into consideration the increased life of the reserves of oil at ports abroad by the lessening of the demand upon these auxiliary vessels to the extent that they can use coal instead of oil? Although I gave the figures just now in relation only to the British Navy, everyone knows that the example of the British Navy is very readily followed by the mercantile marine. Any step that is taken by the British Navy has a very swift reflex action and, if anything could be done on the lines that I have suggested, it would have its influence upon the mercantile marine. Of course, that is one respect in which the coal industry has lost very heavily, inasmuch as the mercantile marine to such an extent has turned to oil rather than coal.

I have so far not said a word about a subject which will be in the minds of many, and that is the argument that arises from strategy. Our dependence upon supplies which have to come from abroad must give concern and some apprehension to all who think upon the matter. Speed is important, but speed is not everything. It certainly is not the sole factor when we consider what may be our dependence in time of high danger and crisis for what is the very life blood of the Navy upon sources over which we have no control. When you consider the oil-producing stations in countries which in time of war might be friendly or might not, when you consider the hundreds of miles of pipe line open to vital attack and susceptible of interference at a hundred points, and then the convoy for hundreds or thousands of miles by steam, you see how great may be the danger in the time of utmost need. I have heard speeches to-day and last week upon the danger of being dependent upon other countries. Now that the Navy has turned to oil, that dependence is one of the integral facts of the situation. Whatever can be done to increase home supplies upon which we can depend to mitigate that dependence is a course which, I am sure, the Admiralty will be glad to take and, in taking it, they will have the support of the House and the British people.

May I say a word upon the claims of coal. The British Navy for a great number of years has been dependent upon coal and can never pay its debt to coal. Whatever have been our achievements upon the seas have been made possible by the men who have worked in the mines, and the building up of our Navy, and the building up of our position consequent upon the strength of the Navy, has been due as much to the collier as to the bluejackets, as much to the man who works at the coal face as to the man who serves behind the gun. That industry, to which the country owes so much, has of recent years passed through the most acute distress and, if anything can be done by the Navy, as representing the nation, to help it, it should gladly be done. I remember when I was a boy at school reading of a King who came over from Persia and invaded Greece and was driven back in humiliation. He knew that the predominance of Greece or Persia would be the deciding fact of the next generation or two, and he gave orders that every night, when he was at the banquet, a slave should enter and say in the time of high revel and entertainment, "Sire, remember the Athenian." I think it would be a very good thing if, in the British Cabinet and in the great Departments of State, whenever any arrangements have to be made, or Treaties effected or work given, or contracts placed in these big Departments, and particularly in the Admiralty, which owes so much to this industry, there should be the constant admonition. "Gentlemen, remember coal."

7.40 p.m.

I should like to follow in the footsteps of the hon. Member who has made such a splendid appeal on behalf of coal, though I do not know whether I can agree with him as to the slogan of "back to coal" as being something outside practical politics. I should like to ask what is the significance of this statement on the back page of the Memorandum:

"Steady progress has been made at the Admiralty Engineering Laboratory in the development of high-speed compression ignition engines."
I should like to know whether that statement involves a process of using coal direct. I believe we are on the eve of an extraordinary revolution and of the possibility of using coal direct from the pit to the engine. It has been the dream of the mechanical engineer for half a century that coal should not go through the process that it has been going through, but should be used straight away in the cylinder. In Germany big-scale experiments have been conducted for the last two and a half years and engines running on the same principle as the Diesel engine have been using pulverised fuel direct to the cylinder. The Germans are using a motor which takes up no more space in a ship than a Diesel engine and has the same propulsive capacity while the cost is enormously decreased.

I am anxious to know whether any effort has been made to adopt the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot) last year for the use of colloidal fuel. I am faced with an exceedingly difficult problem in my division. We have the slogan, "Back to coal," not only from the people interested in coal, but from people upon whom benefits are conferred resulting from their attachment to the Navy. We have a candidate who has written books and is accepted as an authority on naval arrangements. I think we are entitled, as laymen, to get direct from the First Lord what his real intentions are with regard to coal. It is not enough for me to be told that coal has reached the end of its tether when we have a gentleman of this kind, a retired naval officer enjoying the emoluments that that carries with it, saying that the Navy can go back to coal with as much efficiency and security as when it is dependent on oil.

Although I am only a layman, I believe that science must make progress, and that progress can be made in the Navy quite as efficiently by the use of pulverised fuel and colloidal fuel as with oil. I especially direct the attention of the First Lord to the prospects of exploring the possibilities, consistent with efficiency, of accepting the principle of coal direct to the cylinder, and ask him to make an examination of the experiments and the actual practical working of the Rupa motor in Germany at the moment. I anticipate, judging from that development, that enormous progress will be made in the building of ships which will probably outstrip our mercantile marine in the very near future. I do not think that it is fair that this country, with its tremendous resources of coal supply, and in view of the enormous depression resulting from unemployment in the mining areas, should neglect the possibility of utilising coal in the Navy in that efficient manner. If anything in that direction can be done, it will bring a boon and a blessing to the constituency which I represent.

7.47 p.m.

I have great pleasure in supporting the Amendment moved so admirably and eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot). His speech showed that he made very good use of his time when he was Secretary for Mines. I feel that I should apologise to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the House, being a mere layman, for intervening in this Debate, because as yet no such substance as coal or oil has been discovered below the fields of Norfolk. If such should be the case, I hope the people of Norfolk will get a greater benefit from it than has been the case where these substances have been discovered before. But I am encouraged in what I wish to say when I remember that the late Lord Nelson was a Norfolk man. He was educated at the famous Paston Grammar School situated in the division which I represent—the division of East Norfolk—close to the sea, and I think it is possible that for the first time in his life he saw the sea from that school, and that may have inspired him, or started the flame of inspiration through which he did such very great things for his country later in his life. I am sure that if he were alive to-day he would regard the problem which we are discussing as one of the very greatest importance. I do not think that anybody supports the proposition that the Navy should go back to coal entirely, but there is general support for the proposition that we should at any rate, make a move in that direction. We are the second greatest coal-producing country in the world, the greatest coal-producing country in Europe, and we are more or less entirely dependent upon foreign supplies for our oil to-day. Everybody will agree that, as far as possible, we should not be entirely dependent upon overseas supply for anything, unless circumstances make it absolutely necessary. I understand that the Navy consumes about 1,500,000 tons of coal less than it did in 1913, and that the figure has dropped from 1.8 million tons to 200,000 tons. For all those reasons I believe that we should make a move back towards coal.

There are two specific questions which I should like to ask His Majesty's Government and the Admiralty. Seeing that science is playing such a tremendous part in the development of new fuels, I would ask the Government to keep the experiments which are being made very closely under review, and, in particular, I ask the Admiralty to do everything they can towards giving a lead in the "back to coal" movement, not forgetting that we want to get back the very great economic advantage which we had in pre-War days when a large supply of outward coal was obtainable at every big port. In preparing my remarks to-night I had recourse to a most interesting paper which was read by Engineer-Captain Dunlop a few months ago to the Scottish Institute of Engineers, and if any hon. Member is interested in this subject, I recommend him to read this paper, because although it is rather a technical treatise, there is a very great deal of useful knowledge in it.

We have four possibilities in front of us at the present time. There is, firstly, that of the use of colloidal fuel which was mentioned by my hon. Friend and which, I understand, can be used in all ships except battle-cruisers and destroyers, where, apparently, the result is that too much soot gets deposited in the various tubes and other parts of the boilers. There are a great many ships which do not go at such tremendous speeds, and I think that colloidal fuel might very well be used in them. Secondly, there is the question of hydrogenation, experiments in regard to which are already in progress. I do not know whether it has been definitely laid down in the Act that heavy fuel oil should be produced, but even if it is not, I hope that it will be possible to persuade the Imperial Chemical Industries to do so, that the Admiralty may test it. Thirdly, there is the possibility of using pulverised coal, and the advantage of that seems to be that here you are using 100 per cent. coal, whereas with colloidal fuel you use only about 50 per cent.

When the hon. Member talks of using pulverised coal, does he mean that the ship has to bunker pulverised coal, or has to bunker with the ordinary Welsh steam coal which should be passed through a machine and thus become pulverised?

I was just coming to that point. The difficulty is that at present the pulverisation has to be done on board, and that means that you have to use space for pulverising machinery which you would be glad to use for other purposes. On the other hand, I understand that recently two Japanese boats have been built, that two cross-Channel ferries are being built for taking a train over between Dover and Dunkirk, and also a Great Western Railway boat for the service between Fishguard and Waterford all with pulverising plants. I am not clear whether these boats will have a pulverising plant on board or not, but if you can pulverise the coal somewhere else and store it on board, there would be a very great deal to be said for using pulverised coal. Lastly, there is the low temperature carbonisation process. Here production is already being carried out which, I understand, has been stimulated by the increased tax which the Chancellor of the Exchequer put upon oil last year. I believe that when the Budget comes out the figures will show that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has succeeded in killing two birds with one stone. He will have encouraged people to use more coal instead of oil, and, in the second place, it will be found that he has encouraged the low temperature carbonisation process.

The great point about the low temperature carbonisation process is that you can carry it out anywhere in this country, and if we had a time of emergency again, the process would be the best we could adopt for getting oil. That aspect of the matter most certainly ought not to be forgotten. I would not presume to say which of those four processes would be the best, but I think that there are distinct possibilities in all of them. It is for our scientists to go into each of them, and into any other scheme that there may be, very carefully, and to make a recommendation to the Government as to which they think is the best. I hope that the Civil Lord will do all he can to help this work along, because I believe it to be very vital and important to this country at the moment, not only from the point of view of helping the coal industry, but of helping the nation.

7.57 p.m.

The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot), who moved the Amendment so ably, skated over the advantages of oil fuel for the Navy very briefly. I may tell him that the naval constructor prefers oil to coal because he can design a very much better ship, with a higher speed and longer endurance when oil and not coal is to be the fuel. He can also design a safer ship, because he has not to cut the bulk hatch for bunker doors. The ship is very much safer in action, and also from damage by collision. He can design a much longer boiler when oil is used than he can in a coal-burning ship, and that means the saving of weight, which is everything in design. With oil, you do not need so many smaller units for your furnaces. There is also the purely engineering side. The engineers naturally prefer to use oil. They do not need as large a staff, which is reduced roughly by 50 per cent. Oil is much cleaner, and the staff is not so fatigued as when filling up with coal. Looking at the matter from the supply side of the question, it is much easier to fuel the ship with oil than with coal.

I was the first officer in this country to fuel a submarine from a gunboat. The gasoline was carried in tanks on His Majesty's Ship "Hazard," a gunboat, which we ran alongside. A flexible hose was thrown to us and we connected it up, turned on the cock, started the pump and filled the submarine very easily indeed. I was so impressed with the performance that whether it was a torpedo-boat, gunboat or battleship I have always favoured liquid fuel ever since. It gives a commander-in-chief a tremendous asset, because he can stop a tanker at sea and fuel his ships in moderate weather, in a moderate sea, when it would be impossible for a collier to come alongside. All these advantages are on the side of oil. Although I like to help the Welsh miner as much as I possibly can, the Navy cannot handicap itself for the purpose of helping the Welsh miner. We want speed in the Navy and we cannot afford to give up speed and endurance which our possible enemy may have.

The hon. Member for Bodmin did not seem to attach much importance to speed. I should like to give him an example where liquid fuel has helped speed. There was a Glasgow wine merchant who was very interested in the fact that one customer always ordered a most expensive sherry, which cost 9s. a bottle or so. The wine merchant was curious to know who it was that bought this expensive sherry, and he asked the carrier whether the purchaser was a connoisseur of sherry, "No" replied the carrier "he is not a connoisseur of sherry, but he is a dog racer. He gives a spoonful of the sherry every day to his dog"—he named a very famous racing dog—"and it has never lost a race since." The hon. Member for Bodmin is a great expert on wines, etc., but when he comes to the House and tells a naval man that he does not think much of speed, I say that he is out of his element.

I started by saying that speed was an element and therefore I recognise that for the fighting ship oil must be used. I think the desire of the hon. and gallant Member was not so much to answer my point as to bring in a good story.

It is within the knowledge of the House that the hon. Member did say that speed was not everything and that the Navy might think about using coal again.

The hon. Member assures me that the hon. Member for Bodmin did say that. I beg the Civil Lord of the Admiralty once and for all to say that the Navy is not going back to coal. It cannot sacrifice its efficiency. All the letters we get about coal for the Navy are from people who do not know a thing about the Service. We cannot sacrifice speed and endurance in naval ships. I do urge the Civil Lord to say that the Navy will not return to coal and that they are not going back on the great policy of the late Lord Bearsted and the late Admiral Sir John Fisher, just to satisfy the Welsh miners. Those two far-seeing men, with great wisdom, introduced oil into the naval service and the Navy has been satisfied ever since.

8.4 p.m.

I support the Amendment. When I read the Amendment first it carried my mind back to the title of a book, "Britain for the British." To-night this Amendment is enabling us to start a new slogan, "British coal or British oil for the British Navy." If the hon. and gallant Member objects to coal we reply "Then we are prepared to give you oil; British oil for the British Navy." No Department of the State in using public money is entitled to spend it just as it pleases. It must spend the money if possible for the good of the people in the State. The First Lord of the Admiralty has told us that there is a proposal to build more ships. Neither the First Lord nor the Civil Lord, nor any Member of the Government would suggest building those ships outside this country. The ships that are needed must be built in this country. If any attempt were made to give an order for one of those ships to a foreign country there would be a great outcry. We say that the Navy ought not to use foreign oil but British oil. The British Navy was built up on British coal. In 1913 they consumed nearly 2,000,000 tons, but in 1931 the consumption was less than a quarter of a million tons of coal. That has been a big blow to the coal industry, because the Navy was a large customer.

When we first heard that the Navy had begun to use oil extracted from British coal we were delighted, but our complaint is that they have not made as much progress in that direction as they might. In reply to a question the First Lord told us that in 1930 the Navy used 540 tons of oil extracted from British coal and in 1932, 572 tons, an increase of less than 40 tons in two years. In 1933, however, the consumption of oil from British coal had increased to 3,025 tons. This is an important matter to those of us who represent mining Divisions, and we are glad of the opportunity to-night, on this Amendment, to urge the Admiralty that instead of continuing to use foreign oil they ought to speed up and use British oil. We are in a different position to-day in discussing this matter than we were last year, because during the past 12 months it has been proved that oil can be extracted from coal and that it is a commercial proposition. Therefore we are entitled to say to the Civil Lord: "If it is not possible to use British coal in the Navy, it is possible to use oil extracted from British coal." If the Navy, the Army and the Air Force will face up to this question and use only oil extracted from British coal we shall be satisfied.

This is a golden opportunity for the Government. We are at a disadvantage in the three sets of Estimates of the Defence Services being presented separately. It would be much easier if the Estimates came forward together. However, to-night we can ask the Civil Lord to consult with the authorities of the Army and the Air Force, and we suggest that the three Services ought to have their own independent oil supply. We have heard a great deal about pulverisation, colloidal fuel and low-temperature carbonisation. Only recently it was stated in the House that a hydrogenation plant was about to be erected at an expenditure of £2,500,000, and that it would find employment for 12,000 men, in addition to 1,000 miners. If by spending £2,500,000 on a hydrogenation plant Imperial Chemical Industries can find employment for 12,000 men, then if the three Defence Departments would raise a capital sum of £30,000,000 and spend £1,000,000 a year as interest, that capital sum of £30,000,000, which is twelve times the amount that will be spent by Imperial Chemical Industries, would find employment for 144,000 men.

That would be a good investment for the State. Not only would the three Departments have their own independent oil supply but the saving to the State in another direction would be enormous. 100,000 men now receiving unemployment benefit, each with a wife and one child costs the fund £9,500,000. That would be an enormous saving resulting from the spending of £1,000,000 in interest on a capital of £30,000,000. Therefore I urge the Admiralty to get out of the habit of using foreign oil and to realise their duty to a depressed industry and to a huge mass of people who have little prospect of finding work, and take the necessary steps to get their own oil supply by the installation of the suggested plant. Men do not want the means test but they want work. Here is a way of setting men to work. Once we have started with the new slogan, the three Departments must set about their plans for getting a supply of oil extracted from British coal; otherwise, I am afraid we shall not be able to give them much peace. Let me say a word upon the Estimates.

The hon. Member cannot discuss the Estimates on this Amendment.

I will leave the matter by saying how pleased we are that we have had an opportunity of raising this matter to-night. I hope that the Department is going to treat this very seriously and do everything they can to own their oil supplies and help forward this new industry.

8.16 p.m.

The fuelling of the Navy depends primarily, almost entirely, however much you may wish to steer it one way or another, on the heat content of the fuel that is to be used. Therefore, the direct inference is that in using fuel with a larger heat content you use less of it, which means a smaller ship and that means less power. It is not, therefore, a direct comparison, it is a cumulative comparison, and, as is shown also in the air, the selection of the fuel is something which you cannot merely order according to your wish or in order to spend money in a particular district. You cannot do it; you are absolutely tied. So important is this that at one time or another other fuels have been considered, and it is interesting to see what they are and also to realise why we come back always to oil. Hydrogen has 34,000 heat units. If we could use hydrogen we should not use oil; obviously, we should use a fuel of that content. Acetylene has 21,000 heat units, alcohol 13,000, oil 19,000, and coal from 11,000 to 14,000. It is rather strange, and this may not be known to some hon. Members, that if you were to devise a motor which used an explosive compound, like some form of T.N.T., which is only 6,500 heat units, you would not get the same power out of the engine.

Let me answer some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Mr. D. Davies)—it may be presumptuous of me to do so, as it is not my duty, but perhaps hon. Members will allow me to give them my views. The use of coal direct in the engine is really a very important development. It is not by any means as far forward as the hon. Member imagines, but nevertheless, it has gone to a certain extent. There is the Rupa motor, which is the invention of a man called Pawelikovsky, and there is another engine which is running in Brünn, and I think there is a third engine. You may use coal dust, using it as fine as a face powder, fairly successfully in these engines at the present time, and there is every reason to believe that this process will be developed. I for one have been pressing on the Government for two years that we should carry out active experiments in this country, not because we could put these engines into our ships but because it is wrong that we, a coal country, should be behind any others in the use of coal. But we come back to the fact that it is the heat content in oil which you have to consider. If you compare an engine using oil direct in the cylinder as against a secondary engine, that is to say, an engine which burns oil in the boiler, in that case the burning of coal in the engine is rather more economical than the burning of oil under the boiler. I am sorry to be so technical, but I hope it clears up some of the points.

The Navy in the use of fuel have always adhered to steam, and they have made undoubtedly such progress with it that it may be said that our Navy is the leading one in the world in the use of the steam turbine. That is due, of course, primarily to the great invention of the late Sir Charles Parsons, and to the quick way in which the Navy took it up in its early days and developed it. No greater change has taken place in our industrial life or in naval efficiency than the change brought about by the late Sir Charles Parsons, and none of the old chiefs like Watt and Stephenson, in my opinion, made so great a change as Sir Charles Parsons with his turbine engine. Having due regard to the great work done with steam, and appreciating in every way what has been done, I still think that the engine itself, the primary engine, the use of the fuel direct in the cylinder, although developed to a certain extent has not been carried out to anything like the extent it has been carried out abroad. At present the fuel in the Navy is burnt under the boiler, but in the latest German battleship, the "Deutschland," it is burnt in the cylinder. The "Deutschland" is a remarkable ship. It was built probably for two reasons, one, essentially a naval reason; and, secondly, as active propaganda to illustrate technical developments in Germany. I believe she has been very successful in service. Two years ago I saw the engines of the "Deutschland" running on test, but this year, last week, when I went to Germany the door was shut; nothing more can be seen. In other words, they have been successful, and they are not going to let anybody else see what they have done.

May I ask whether they have overcome vibration, and also whether they have decreased the weight?

The vibration is greater than the steam turbine, but it is not objectionable. I learn, unofficially, that the extra weight of the "Deutschland" installation will be cut down by taking away the gearing, which I suppose will be a considerable gain. We have to remember that they are some years ahead of us with these engines and it will be very hard to catch them up. It is no good saying we can do as good as they can. They are there; and we have not anything similar at the moment. The door is shut by order of the German Government. Nevertheless, knowing the personnel of the Admiralty, I believe that we are fully able to develop engines as good if the wherewithal was provided, and there is no reason at all why some experimental work and development should not be carried on both for oil and coal separately, of course, because for coal it will have to be done in smaller engines. In all these matters, whether of coal or oil, it must be clear that we must be dependent upon sources of supply within our own control, and that is where one has great sympathy with oil derived from coal. Of course, to provide it in anything like quantities it is clear that a long time will be taken and that much experience will have to be gained. But at any rate during those years we must have proper and safe provision for our own supply of oil, and I suggest that it is one of the duties of those in authority to see that oil within the Empire is properly safeguarded and that it is developed to the maximum; and then our supplies of coal or oil will be under own own control. The importance of that I do not need to stress.

Finally, I wish to express my own personal appreciation of the excellent engineering staff of the Navy, with whom I am well acquainted. They are in touch with all that is going on, and they are open-minded to all that is going on. I have discussed all these matters with them and I always tell them what I learn. I think that if they were encouraged in the directions that have been indicated they would be only too eager to go ahead. I do not like to think that Germans should lead the world in the production of a ship, the pocket battleship, which had a large element of propaganda about it. The Navy of this country has been in the forefront with the mercantile marine in designing and development and in the sales arising therefrom. That has done more than anything to get our trade back for the production of vessels, and we want to look at matters in the same way with regard to the oil engine. We on this side have rather neglected to strike out in that direction. We must have paid hundreds of thousands of pounds in licence duties to the Continent, and now, when we are looking for employment for our own people, it is the duty of the Admiralty to do the maximum in encouraging the use of fuel directly to the engines themselves.

8.29 p.m.

I am sure the whole House will feel a little sympathy for a layman who has to reply to what is in the main an extremely technical Debate, and in particular that I have to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Platting (Mr. Chorlton), who is undoubtedly one of the foremost experts on this particular subject. The hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot) has taken advantage of his luck in the ballot to give very eloquent expression to the view that the Navy should, so far as circumstances will allow—that is without any loss of operational efficiency—draw its fuel from indigenous sources rather than depend upon a supply which has to come from overseas. I sincerely appreciated the tone of the hon. Member's speech and his declaration that it was not admonitory but suggestive; everyone is grateful to him for affording us this opportunity of discussing a subject which is of real interest. I hope that as a result of his action it may be possible for me, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty, to dissipate any doubts which exist in any quarter of the House in regard to our readiness, indeed our eagerness, to do precisely what the Amendment asks.

The bare idea that the supply of fuel for the Navy might at any time be liable to interruption is repugnant to everyone, and it is one which might in certain circumstances be very alarming. Perhaps the hon. Member for Bodmin will forgive me if I add that it is peculiarly gratifying that one of the followers of the right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) is such a very able sponsor of a measure of national economic self-sufficiency. I am sure that nobody in the House, not even the hon. Member for Spennymoor (Mr. Batey) will dispute the view that efficiency must be the paramount consideration. The first question therefore to which I am bound to address myself is whether a return to the use of raw coal in the Royal Navy is possible within the limitations which the Mover of the Amendment has laid down. It has been very eloquently urged to-night that such a course would help the coal mining industry at home. I have heard it urged outside the House that that would reduce our export of capital and thus improve our trade balance; and although the Amendment seems to me specifically to exclude considerations of that kind, it may be as well to deal with them very briefly in this Debate.

So far as the finding of work for miners is concerned, I do not for one moment under-estimate the vital importance of it, but even if the whole of our Fleet were to return to coal burning, it would only amount to an increase of one-third of 1 per cent. in peace time in the annual output of our mines, and if, as it may toe argued, the whole of that supply were drawn from the South Wales coalfield alone, it would only benefit South Wales to the extent of 3 per cent. We do obtain by far the greater part of our fuel oil from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a concern which is predominantly British and in which the Government is a large shareholder. We also get oil from Trinidad. I do not think, therefore, that our foreign financial commitments in this direction are very serious.

On the other side of the picture, as has been pointed out for me by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter), the positive technical advantages of liquid fuel are overwhelming. That that is so was admitted by the Mover of the Amendment. If we compare an oil-fired ship with a coal-burner of equal tonnage, we find that the oil-fired vessel has practically double the endurance, requires half the engine-room complement, takes much less time in harbour to replenish with fuel and stores, has greater flexibility of manoeuvre, can maintain full power until the whole of its fuel is exhausted, has the great tactical advantage of making no smoke except when it wants to do so, and finally that by pumping it can transfer its oil supply very easily from one portion of the ship to another, and in that way can correct heel or trim in a damaged vessel, and possibly prevent it sinking.

If the hon. Member will bear with me, I hope to deal with the case of pulverised coal later on. I ought to add that the considered opinion of the Board of Admiralty, with regard to the possibility of going back to coal, ought to carry much greater weight than that of any retired naval officer, however important or distinguished. [An HON. MEMBER: "Even Members of this House!"] Even Members of this House. The hon. Member for Pontypridd (Mr. D. Davies), who made a very interesting speech on this subject during the general Debate on the Estimates last year, asked me a specific question about the Rupa motor and the general principle of using coal fuel direct into the cylinders. The Admiralty are aware of the present state of development and the future possibilities of this motor, and it is interesting to observe this is the precise form of engine which was first worked to by the famous Dr. Diesel. It suffers, by using coal-dust, from somewhat the same defects as those which arise from the use of pulverised coal under boilers, but I can assure the hon. Member that the development of this motor will be closely watched.

There remains one very important question upon which several hon. Members in different parts of the House have directly or indirectly touched. It is a question as to which I believe considerable misapprehension exists, and that is the strategical aspect of the security of our fuel supply. It is perrfectly true that if the main Fleet were operating in the immediate neighbourhood of these islands, coal would have an advantage, but that advantage would completely disappear if the Fleet were engaged elsewhere. Oil fuel of a quality suitable for our battleships is obtainable almost anywhere in the world, but the supply of coal of a quality suitable for use under the boilers of our high-speed vessels is, as the hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall) knows, obtainable practically in South Wales alone. Contrary, therefore, to what appears to be a fairly general impression, our fuel supply is on the whole better assured by the use of oil than by being dependent on Welsh steam coal.

For all these reasons—and they could be considerably elaborated—it is not possible in the view of the Board of Admiralty to controvert the general statement that so long as foreign nations use liquid fuel for their warships the British Navy must do the same. That, I hope, will dispose effectively and once and for all of the contention that we can under modern conditions go back to the burning of raw coal. Among many interesting points made by the Mover of the Amendment he stated that the Navy consisted of a great deal more than battleships, cruisers, destroyers and the like and that we must have a large number of auxiliary vessels in which speed was not the predominant consideration. It is true that in the case of subsidiary vessels of low power and simple construction, such as trawlers and drifters, a lower speed or endurance ratio to displacement can safely be accepted. In those cases it is possible to use coal as fuel although, even here, the question of alternative supplies in distant waters gives us a certain amount of anxiety.

I am glad to be able to tell the horn Gentleman that we do use coal as far as we possibly can for those vessels. There are to-day no fewer than 214 of them using raw coal under their boilers. I want to make it clear, however, that they are auxiliary vessels and could not be expected to accompany the Fleet. I do not think it would be possible to adapt this kind of vessel as the hon. Member for Bodmin suggested so that they would be equipped for burning oil or coal, owing to the difficulty of the bunkering arrangements and the loss of space which we would have to suffer. It remains the fact that wherever we are able to do it, within the terms of the hon. Member's own proviso, we do use British coal.

Another suggestion which, I think, emanated from the same hon. Member was that if the Navy were to return to the use of raw coal the mercantile marine would immediately follow suit.

Hardly that. I made a number of suggestions, and I said that if those suggestions were adopted they would have a reflex action on the mercantile marine. I never suggested that the Navy should go back to coal.

I beg the hon. Member's pardon. It is, I think, true that there is the closest possible liaison between the Navy and our merchant fleet, and I have no doubt that any lead given from the Admiralty would be followed by the mercantile marine if it suited them to do so. But the House will recognise that the factors which govern the supply of the most suitable fuel are not necessarily common to the Navy and to the mercantile marine, and generally speaking, I think we are bound to assume that shipowners know their own business best and will fuel their ships in the way that best combines efficiency with economy.

If, therefore, the hard facts of the case force us to adopt the view that the burning of raw coal under the boilers of His Majesty's ships of war is out of the question, we have to look to the second alternative put forward by the hon. Member for Bodmin as indicating the beat chance of progress in the direction which everybody in the House desires.

The Mover and the Seconder of the Amendment and the other hon. Members who have contributed interesting and thoughtful speeches to this Debate have between them covered the ground and touched upon all the possibilities which we can see open to us at the present. It is, therefore, only necessary for me to say a few words upon each of the processes mentioned. There is, in the first place, creosote, the product of the high temperature distillation of coal. This is a welcome substitute for petroleum fuel in an emergency and the Admiralty used about 500,000 tons of it during and after the War. The quantity available is bound to be very small because it is dependent upon requirements for gas and coke in this country. Its calorific value is rather lower than that of petroleum oil, and it has one other technical disadvantage. It is necessary to mix it with at least twice its volume of petroleum oil, to avoid a very awkward naphthalene deposit.

Then we come to the low temperature carbonisation process. As has already been pointed out the Admiralty actually asked for 3,025 tons of this fuel from the Low Temperature Carbonisation Company last year and received 2,000 tons of it. They are to-day the only firm who are able to supply it, and it is, as I said in the House a few days ago, only very slightly inferior in calorific value to petroleum oil. I should like to say, with the greatest possible amount of emphasis, that we shall be glad to get as much more of this particular fuel as the Low Temperature Carbonisation Company or any similar concern can sell us at a reasonable price.

If the hon. Member will wait, I will come to that. He was incidentally suggesting that we should start a plant for hydrogenation, which is quite a different process. It must, however, be pointed out that this low temperature carbonisation fuel is merely a by-product from the production of that smokeless semi-coke which you can find in the fires in the Lobbies of this House. This semi-coke amounts to about 70 per cent. of the coal which is carbonised in the low temperature process, and for that reason hon. Members will understand that the possible supply of low temperature fuel oil is also extremely limited. I am advised that it is very improbable that we could get more than 10,000 tons a year of this for Naval purposes at the present time.

So far as hydrogenation is concerned, this process has the initial advantage of giving a very much higher yield of fuel for every ton of coal treated, as it only takes from 2½ to 3 tons of coal to produce a ton of liquid fuel. Against this, it needs a large plant and a highly skilled technical organisation. I agree that this in itself does not matter, but the difficulty is that, having put up the expensive plant and paid the highly skilled technical organisation, it is at present prices a very much sounder proposition to produce petrol and not Naval fuel oil. It is true, as the hon. Member for Spennymoor suggested, that a very slight adaptation of the plant which it is proposed to erect at Billingham would enable it to produce fuel oil instead of petrol, but this would result in a loss in present selling price of something like 80 per cent. There is, therefore, no immediate prospect of a supply of Naval fuel oil from this quarter, although the production of 100,000 tons of petrol, which is the estimated output of the Billingham factory, will be a very valuable factor in time of trouble in easing the tanker situation and leaving more available for the Fleet.

I have every sympathy with the hon. Member for Spennymoor in his £30,000,000 scheme. He said it would put 144,000 more people in work, and I am sure he will rejoice with me that during the last 12 months of the National Government 600,000 more people have got work. I am sure that he will also, with that caution which we Northerners share, agree that it would be just as well to wait until the plant at Billingham is put up and to see how it works and how much its production costs before we embark on any scheme of that kind.

My Noble Friend the Member for East Norfolk (Viscount Elmley) laid particular stress upon the use of colloidal fuel, also mentioned by the hon. Member for Pontypridd, a substance containing 40 per cent. of coal dust and 60 per cent. of oil. This fuel, of course, would have an immense advantage in not being a by-product, and the supply of colloidal fuel for the Navy would not be limited by the factors which at present operate in regard to the other liquid derivatives of coal. Various attempts have been made since 1918 to get a suitable coal oil mixture, but it was not until the recent trials in the "Scythia," under the auspices of the Cunard Company, that a mixture was produced commercially without some sort of fixing agent—"stabiliser," I believe, is the technical name—in order to hold the coal and oil together. All the fixing agents that we know of are soluble in water, and therefore the resultant fuel would be quite inadmissible for use in naval vessels. The Cunard Company have succeeded in doing without a fixing agent, and they used a cracked residue, which was successful in keeping the coal dust in suspension, and while, so far as we can make out, this particular form of fuel would be too viscous for naval purposes, I think that with the more rapid turnover of fuel, the less complicated pipe system and the lower rates of forcing which can be used in the mercantile marine, that this colloidal fuel holds out some promise of commercial development.

There is, finally, pulverised coal. Very little progress has been made with the use of pulverised coal afloat in the last few years, and I believe it is true to say that in the whole of the mercantile marine there are to-day only two ships which are on service thus fitted, but from our point of view the really important point—and that was very kindly pointed out for me by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor)—is that you cannot store pulverised coal on board a warship in bulk, because if you do, you run a very serious risk of spontaneous combustion. If, on the other hand, you are obliged to store your coal in lumps in bunkers, you will have to carry on board a pulverising plant, which would be extremely heavy and therefore inadmissible, and you would in addition suffer nearly all the disadvantages which have already, I believe, induced the House to reject raw coal as fuel at all.

Before I sit down I must say a word in regard to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Platting. I should like, first of all, to acknowledge on behalf of the engineering staff of the Admiralty, and to thank him sincerely for, the tribute which he has paid them, one which I myself very cordially endorse; and I think it might be applied all round to many of the extremely able technical staffs and civil servants who serve us so loyally and unobtrusively and with such remarkable efficiency. The hon. Gentleman suggests that we should go some way towards solving our fuel problem by making a more efficient use of the fuel we have got; in other words, by combusting it in the cylinder instead of burning it under the boiler. I should like to tell him that the development of the oil engine in all its aspects and bearings is being very closely and continually watched at the Admiralty. A large amount of work in research and development is going on at the engineering laboratory, and we have actually to-day reached the position that we have an experimental high-speed Diesel engine of a very novel and advanced type in an advanced stage of development at the Admiralty engineering laboratory. I am not inviting the hon. Gentleman or anybody else to come and see it at present. At the same time we must recognise that, while the Diesel engine has two qualities which give it an advantage over the steam plant, it has several disadvantages. Its really big advantage is the lesser consumption of fuel for a given distance, and its other advantage is reputed to be ease of manoeuvre. Against that, however, it is much heavier. I am sure that, keen exponent of the Diesel engine as the hon. Gentleman is, he will recognise with me that it is not possible to-day to produce any form of Diesel engine either here or in Germany which can equal the geared turbine.

That is hardly so. It is possible to-day to produce a Diesel engine considerably lighter than our steam plant. The 40 per cent. decrease of consumption must also be taken into account; that is why Germany has adopted oil engines in her latest warships instead of steam.

Does it take into account the whole weight of the installation? My information is that something like 50 to 54 lbs. per shaft horse-power is required for the Diesel engine, and we can do 40 lbs. per shaft horse-power in cruisers and 35 in destroyers. That is, shortly, why we do not use the Diesel engine at present. I should like to say again that every one of these processes, whether they be in the form of new means of utilising coal or any other method, are under constant and careful review by the Admiralty. We work in the closest possible touch with my hon. Friend the Minister of Mines and with the Fuel Research Board. We are willing, and indeed anxious, to give a fair trial to any home-produced fuel of whatever kind, provided it is suitable for our purpose and that the price is not prohibitive. The Board of Admiralty is fully alive to the strategical importance of assuring a home-produced supply of fuel for our Navy as well as to the economic aspect of the situation. It would be very wrong to suggest to the House that this happy state of affairs is at present in sight, but hon. Members may rest assured that no stone will be left unturned to bring it about. I appreciate the point made by the Mover of the Amendment as to the value given by the imprimatur of the Admiralty to any particular form of fuel which we are able to use successfully. The Amendment, therefore, accurately represents Admiralty policy and in ordinary circumstances we should gladly accept it. The hon. Member for Bodmin knows, however, that under the particular procedure of to-night if we are to proceed with the business and to get Mr. Speaker out of the Chair, the Amendment must either be negatived or withdrawn, and I hope that in the circumstances he will see fit to withdraw it.

I thank the hon. and gallant Member for his speech, and, in view of what he has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

9.0 p.m.

I should like to congratulate the First Lord of the Admiralty on the very clear statement that he made and for the way in which he expressed his great confidence in his naval advisers, a confidence which I personally and, I believe, the whole House share. That does not mean, however that we agree with all their proposals. What strikes me in the discussions on the Air and Navy Estimates is the fact that while we realise that the security and defence of this country lay in the air and on the sea and on our lines of communication which are by the sea, we have had two separate Debates, one on the Air Estimates and one on the Navy Estimates. In the Debate on the Air Estimates the Secretary of State made nice remarks about the Fleet Air Arm and the co-operation of the Air Force with the Admiralty. The First Lord of the Admiralty to-night made nice remarks about the Air Force and the splendid co-operation between the two services. I do not think that is sufficient. If we are to deal in a proper manner with the defence of this country we must sooner or later have one Ministry of Defence to deal with these matters which are interlocked, as was admitted by the Secretary of State for Air and the First Lord of the Admiralty. Yet we are dealing with them as if they were entirely different subjects, and that is impracticable and inefficient.

I should like to refer to a statement made by the First Lord on the question of battleships. I am glad that he raised this point because within a short time the question of the future of the battleship will have to be decided by this country. The First Lord stated that the present Board of Admiralty was Very much in favour of the capital ship. We ought to make it clear what the capital ship and the battleship are. He said that the present board is in favour of the maintenance of battleship and that he could not possibly find a Board of Admiralty which would be against it. I venture to say that the question whether this country should have battleships or not is one for the Government to decide and not for the Board of Admiralty. It is for the board to carry out the policy of the Government. The argument which the First Lord has brought in favour of the retention of battleships is well known, and, from his own point of view, to some extent unanswerable, but there are many who consider that if this country were to give a more definite lead than it has already given to reducing the size of ships to a limit, say, of 10,000 tons, we could get other nations to agree.

I agree with the First Lord that we must have a thing called, for the sake of argument, a capital ship. Why should it not be of 10,000 tons? As recently as 1900 the biggest ship this country had was 15,000 tons. The First Lord referred to the fact that if we scaled down to 10,000 tons the smaller nations would build up to that. They did not do that in 1900, for while our biggest ship was 15,000 tons, the biggest ships of the smaller nations like Holland, Austria-Hungary and Argentina were of 5,000 or 7,000 tons. I cannot see why we should not scale our tonnage down to the standard we had before we started building Dreadnoughts and super-Dreadnoughts, finishing up with a ship which we know unfortunately was unable to leave harbour for five days. If we built ships of 22,000 tons or some such size, they would be so valuable and so expensive to build, running into £5,000,0000 or £6,000,000, that they could not go to sea unless they were escorted by destroyers and aircraft to protect them against aircraft and submarines and all the other kinds of weapons which science has advanced. It is not a question of simply building battleships. It is a question of building destroyers and escorts to go to sea with them, so that the expense will be something enormous. We must realise what the cost of a future battleship would be plus the escort, and the country must think twice before they embark again on a new programme of building ships over 10,000 tons.

The First Lord said that a battleship could repel a torpedo attack or attack from the air, but it is often overlooked that one torpedo—I admit that it would have to be a lucky one, or perhaps I should say an unlucky one—might very well put the "Nelson" out of action. It might hit her side and do her no damage, but equally it might hit her propellers, so that she would not be able to steam. The Estimates show that we are spending hundreds of thousands of pounds upon refitting and repairing battleships which are out of date. On the "Warspite," which I think went to sea in 1914, we are to spend £500,000 this year, and that at a time when we do not even know whether battleships are going to be abolished or not. During the Debate on the Air Estimates the Lord President of the Council said that a decision on whether we built more aircraft to defend London would have to be delayed for the present, and that view was accepted by the House, and surely if such an important question in connection with the defence of this country has to be deferred while the Government are settling matters, the repair of these old and very nearly obsolete battleships might very well be delayed for a short time.

On the question of construction, a good deal has been said about battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines and destroyers, but no mention has been made of sloops. I see that we have built or building 38 sloops. During wartime sloops did very valuable service indeed. They helped to escort convoys through the submarine zones, and so on, but much of the late War was carried on round our own coasts, and that is not likely to be the case in another war, and in any event much of the work done by sloops could now be done by flying boats or aircraft. These sloops are ships which can neither fight nor run away, and I would like to have the opinion from the First Lord on whether it would not be better to build a flotilla of destroyers, which we could do under the Treaty of London, in place of some of these sloops. I realise that a certain number of sloops are required for the purpose of showing the flag in the Persian Gulf and in some of the rivers, and so on, but in peace time there is no work which a sloop can do which cannot be done by a destroyer, whereas in war time there is a lot which can be done by a destroyer which cannot be done by a sloop. We have to remember that in another war a submarine menace may appear in any part of the world, and even one destroyer off the West Coast of Africa, for example, would be far more valuable than a sloop for patrolling our trade routes.

Leaving the question of ships and turning to personnel I was rather surprised to read the following in page 11 of the First Lord's Memorandum:
"Trials are now"—
I emphasise the word "now"—
"being carried out in a battleship to ascertain the minimum number of lieutenant-commanders and lieutenants adequate to man the ship under peace conditions."
Sixteen years after the War we are carrying out an experiment to see how many officers are required to man one of His Majesty's ships. We seem to be rather behind the times. I hope things will be speeded up in other directions. I cannot leave the subject of personnel without referring to Dartmouth College. In presenting last year's Estimates the First Lord of the Admiralty brought forward some suggestion about Dartmouth College being turned into a public school. That is the first and last we heard of it. As frequently happens after a speech has been made, nothing more is heard of the proposal. I would like to know whether anything has been done in the direction indicated. I am one of those who are very much against Dartmouth College. I think it is entirely unnecessary. In these times, when the First Lord tells us he is not asking for a penny more than is required for the efficiency of the Navy, I cannot agree with the expenditure of £85,000 upon Dartmouth College. I cannot see why the Navy, unlike every other profession in the world, has to take in those who are to be officers at the age of 13½ years. I do not believe, from personal experience and the experience of others, that these officers who are taken into the Navy at the age of 13½ turn out to be any more efficient or capable than those who join at the more mature age of 17. It was said at a prize giving the other day that the art of seamanship is not yet dead, and I quite agree. An officer handling a destroyer at high speed, in darkness, in the middle of the night, still needs to know the art of seamanship, but what about the man in the air who crashes through fog at 400 miles an hour? Does he not need to know the art of airmanship? But he does not have to join the Air Force at the age of 13½.

The Dartmouth entry is an enclosed entry. I do not like to use the word "class," in this House or anywhere else, but there is only a certain type of boy who can enter Dartmouth, only a certain type of man who can afford to send his boys there. The parents of a boy who fails to get into Dartmouth College, either through being unable to pass the medical examination or the written examination, are generally able to send him to Eton or Harrow, or some other well known public school, and that being the case I do not see why Dartmouth College should be a burden on the State any more than any other public school. If parents can afford to send their boys to Dartmouth College I do not see why they should not pay the full expenses. From the point of view of expense there is no justification for Dartmouth College, and in the matter of the efficiency and production of young officers there is still less justification.

One hates to criticise the Admiralty, but in looking through the Estimates I could not help noticing that the expenses of the administration of the Admiralty have gone up this year. Seeing that the Navy is now so small compared with what it was in 1914, I have never been able to see, and I still cannot understand, the necessity for the enormous personnel retained at the Admiralty. This year, when we are having, I might almost say, to scrape together enough money to build ships for the security and defence of the country, we are still spending more money on Admiralty headquarters. I congratulate them on one economy. I see that we have reduced the number of store-women by one, and are saving her wages of 25s. a week. It is a step in the right direction, though I think we might do a little more than that. I am talking on a subject which interests me very deeply indeed, and there is much about which I would like to say a great deal, but I will not keep the House any longer seeing how time is getting on. I would, however, ask my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty to see that he and his advisers prepare well in advance for the Naval Conference which is to be held. It has been suggested in the House this afternoon that that conference is going to be a failure. That is a most hopeless spirit in which to enter on a conference. I trust that my right hon. Friend, with the very clever advisers whom he has at hand, will be able before the conference starts to prepare some concrete proposals, some reasonable proposals in the way of a limitation of armaments, which will be acceptable not only to us but to every other nation which has a sense of security and justice to sustain, as we have.

9.15 p.m.

I think the people of this country will have no real cause to complain of the increase which the Navy Estimates show for the second year in succession, because this increase cannot be regarded in any way as a change of policy and can only be described as the making up of a little of the leeway which has been lost in recent years. It would be impossible at the present stage to make any very great change in naval policy, because we are still governed by the terms of the Washington and London Naval Agreements. On the other hand, there must be grave doubts as to whether we are in fact building up even to our limits under those treaties, and it seems quite plain that we shall have to face the revision of those treaties with a considerable number of over-age ships, if not as regards cruisers, at any rate as regards destroyers. I do not wish to elaborate this point, because it is continually being put forward and stressed, and it has already been dealt with to-day, particularly by the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes) in the very valuable contribution which he made to this Debate. I can only add that our apprehensions are certainly not relieved by the determination on the part of Japan and the United States, which has become apparent during the past few months, to build right up to the very maximum allowed by the London Naval Treaty, while we seem content to remain well within those treaty limits.

Nevertheless, it is distinctly pleasing that there is to be a certain making up of leeway, and that 84 ships are to be begun, advanced or completed this year, as compared with 68 a year ago. Not only does the extra amount of money allocated to construction mean a slight speeding up of building, but it will bring an increase of employment to those districts where unemployment is so heavy, and a certain increase in the number of skilled shipwrights. This is an aspect which certainly should not be lost sight of. A skilled shipwright cannot be made in a short time, and if we are to allow our resources in that direction to dwindle, we might find ourselves, should we ever in the future need to build quickly, short of skilled shipwrights who could build those ships.

While the amount of money for construction shows an increase, the amount which has been allocated for this purpose to the Royal dockyards shows a slight reduction. But we who represent dockyard constituencies have no occasion for complaint on that score, because any reduction which has taken place in this form of work is more than counterbalanced by the extra amount which has been allocated for repair work. This has risen very considerably in amount and as the number of dockyard men also shows a rise, I think it can be said that the outlook for the Royal dockyards during the coming year is distinctly brighter. As far as one can see, the dockyards are going to be busier and their work is going to be steadier than it has been for some time past.

While the naval treaties have prevented the building of new capital ships, they certainly have not prevented the expenditure of enormous sums of money upon the reconditioning and modernising of those ships. It can hardly be pretended that the spending in this way of something like half title original cost of these battleships is a very economical form of expenditure, but if money is to be spent in this way it is very gratifying to know that a considerable portion of it is to be spent in the Royal dockyards. Not only are those dockyards more suitable and better equipped for repair work than any private yard, by reason of their great capacity as depots for naval stores of every kind, but probably this form of work provides the steadiest and most general employment. Naturally, we like to see the largest possible amount of work coming to Royal dockyards, whether in construction or in repair work, and in view of the fact that the Admiralty yards are unable to take outside work and have to depend entirely upon the Admiralty for their employment, it is to be hoped that first consideration will always be given to the Royal dockyards. It must be admitted that new construction by itself does not always benefit all the trades in the dockyard at the same time, and several branches, such as engineers, electricians and boiler-makers are apt to find themselves at a temporary disadvantage; whereas work in connection with large repairs and detailed refits provides steady work in all the departments in the dockyards.

There certainly are a number of causes for mild satisfaction in the Navy Estimates for 1934. The rise in the amount of money for construction purposes, the increase in the number of dockyard men and the increase in the personnel of the Navy, after the steady reduction which has gone on for so many years, are very welcome. On the other hand, the reduction in the amount allowed for fuel makes one fear that the activities of the Navy may be even more handicapped and naval exercises further limited. No one can possibly claim that our naval position is entirely satisfactory. Compared with the increase of just under £3,000,000 in our Naval Estimates is the United States' Navy Bill, under which the American Senate have agreed to provide something like 102 new ships at a cost of £125,000,000. While, of course, there is no need for us to view with any alarm the increase in the American Navy, it must be remembered that Japan will in all probability claim equality, and it certainly looks as if we shall have to face the revision of the Naval Treaties, with the alternatives of undertaking expensive building programmes or of accepting a position of definite naval inferiority. In the existing financial conditions, and under our treaty limitations, it is difficult to see how a larger rise in the Navy Estimates could be expected. The rise that we have actually got in construction, together with the very welcome increase in the personnel of the Navy, at least show that the Admiralty are fully alive to the seriousness of the position, and to the insecurity of our naval situation.

9.24 p.m.

First of all, let me congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes) on the very interesting speech which he delivered and which I think the House highly appreciated. I am not quite certain whether I understood him in one part, when he talked about the Board of Admiralty in 1930 at a time when the Treaty of London came into being. It occurred to me to be wrong to throw the onus of the London Treaty on to the Board of Admiralty. That surely is a matter of high policy and, whether for good or for bad, the Government alone are responsible for the treaty. But I am quite certain that the Board of Admiralty then would have pointed out to the Government any dangers that lay in the Treaty of London, and would have insisted that we should take full advantage of the Treaty and build up to the tonnage allowance under it. Up to this year—during the last two or three years—speaking on the Naval Estimates has been rather unsatisfactory because, whatever questions one put, whether as regards building more cruisers, battleships or anything else, the answer of the Government was invariably governed by the Treaty of London. To-night, a great many of us want to know whether we are building up to the Treaty.

With regard to the capital ships, I agree with the views expressed by the First Lord, and I think that for many years to come we shall still have to rely upon the capital ships. This year, for the first time, we are, to a certain extent, free of the obligations under the Treaty of London. As regards cruisers, destroyers and submarines, the 91,000 ton restriction has ceased to take effect and, as the First Lord pointed out, obsolete cruisers amount to 86,000 tons. As the 1934 programme this year amounts to 32,000 tons, we have 54,000 tons of cruisers which we could build under the Treaty of London. I do not know whether the First Lord intends to spread that tonnage over 1935 and 1936, but it largely depends on whether we are to go on deferring this year's programme for a year hence before we lay down the ships. I believe that plan was introduced by the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). In any case, as far as I can see, as regards cruisers we are bound to have to rely upon 14 obsolete ships in order to obtain our minimum. Fifty cruisers are a bare minimum to guard the trade routes of this Empire. It has always been considered in the past that we require at least 70 cruisers to perform the duties of battle fleets and to guard trade routes.

As regards destroyers, the First Lord seemed rather to indicate that he was not going to build up to the maximum allowed under the treaty. As regards flotilla leaders and destroyers, we have to-day a great many very old boats. There will be only 65 flotilla leaders and destroyers, amounting to 90,000 tons, within the age limit at the end of 1936. That figure, subtracted from the 150,000 tons that we are allowed under the treaty, leaves us 60,000 tons short. One flotilla leader and eight destroyers—or six destroyers—will not be sufficient to get us anything like up to what we are allowed under the treaty; we must double, or perhaps treble, what we lay down this year. As regards submarines, very much the same thing applies: I make out that at the end of 1939 we shall have 10 obsolete submarines; this year's programme allows for three, and that leaves eight submarines which we can build under the treaty.

I doubt very much whether this country is, even now, up to a one-Power standard. The United States are constructing 17 cruisers of 10,000 tons each—that is 170,000 tons; three aircraft carriers of 53,800 tons; eight flotilla leaders, 24 destroyers, besides submarines. Japan and the United States are building up to the limit of the treaty; we are not quite certain that they have not rather gone beyond it. Great Britain should do so as well. Italy and France are not tied by the treaty, but they are building a great number of fast cruisers, destroyers and submarines. We are, and have been for the last three years, dropping behind both the Oceanic and the European Powers as regards auxiliaries to the battle fleet. We should remember that at a crisis we are not in a position to expand our Fleet rapidly, as we were before the War. Owing to the very small orders placed with private armament firms, the reduction of plant they have had to put into force does not give them the chance of coping with sudden emergencies in a building crisis.

I was glad to see, from the First Lord's speech, that as regards personnel, we have at least stopped reducing. This country has been, year after year, decreasing its personnel. In 1914 we had 146,000; this year, while we have an increase, we have only 92,000. On the other hand, other countries, like America and Japan, have been largely increasing their personnel in the last few years. We have heard a great deal about parity in material, but what we want to do now, and it is very important, is to obtain parity in personnel. To do this we shall have to have a very large increase in personnel. I am glad to see that a larger proportion of short-service men are being entered; this is a good plan, and should be extended. I believe that the Fleets nearer home are manned on a reduced scale of complement. I should like to ask the First Lord whether the ratings are available to complete all the vessels to war complement as well as to man the auxiliary vessels necessary to mobilise the Fleet. It is essential that, with our small Fleet, all ships ready for service should have full active service crews. My colleague spoke just now about the Royal Dockyards. I ask the First Lord to bear in mind that, whereas private dockyards can undertake commercial work, Royal Dockyards such as Portsmouth and Chatham are practically barred from undertaking any such commercial work, and for their existence, and for that of the whole town, they depend upon work given them by the Navy. When he is placing orders, I am certain that he will bear that fact well in mind.

The other day Lord Beatty said that the annual value in sea-borne trade amounted to no less than £4,000 millions, and that on any average day at sea there were 2,000 ocean-going merchant ships and 1,000 coasting ships. The cargoes carried by these vessels were, he said, worth £100,000,000. It is the essential duty of the Navy to provide protection for our trade routes and sea-borne trade. For that we are asking the country for £56,500,000 for the Navy, and this is a very small insurance premium to safeguard our trade routes. The very existence of this country depends upon a merchant navy, not only for food supplies but also for every supply required for the life of this country. We have heard a great deal of the necessity of increasing the Air Force. I have every sympathy with that view; we have a great deal of leeway to make up as regards the Air Force, but, as the First Lord pointed out so truly, the Air Force and the Navy are complementary one to the other. All the same, I still maintain that the Navy is our first line of defence, and I am certain that the First Lord will do his utmost to see that we have an efficient Navy, with sufficient stores and equipment, in return for the money which the House votes.

The building of naval ships is desirable from two or three points of view. It is not only desirable from the point of view of the safety of this country, the guarding of our trade routes and the maintenance of our food supplies, but we have also to remember that 85, or perhaps 90 per cent., taking into account all the various things that come in, of the cost of building goes in wages. Surely it is better for us to build what we can up to the full complement of the London Treaty, giving protection to this country and its food supplies, and at the same time saving the payment of more unemployment benefit than is actually necessary. Very few works that could be put into force in this country would yield from 85 to 90 per cent. in wages, and for that reason alone, irrespective of the fact that it is a necessity of our existence, we should go to the fullest extent for a strong naval programme. In the past we have been gambling more than we were justified in doing on disarmament. Other countries are taking no risks, and their needs are nothing like as great as those of this country. It has always appeared to me to be an anomaly that foreign countries, while they were unable to pay the War debts which they owed to this country, could afford to spend millions on their armies, and also on their fleets, which in a great many cases are more or less a luxury. Why cannot Great Britain do this? We are told that it is because we have no money. It is true that we have had a financial crisis, but we have also to remember that we let off our Allies the larger part of the debts which they owed to us. We have been the poorer by that amount, but they have been the richer, and they have put it largely into armaments.

We have also to remember our social services, on which we spend hundreds of millions of pounds. There is no country in the world that can show social services equal to those of this country. Foreign countries prefer to spend less on them, but to protect themselves sufficiently by armed Services. We are apt to forget sometimes that all these wonderful social services would "go west" unless we are prepared to protect them, and the only way in which we can really protect them is by having a strong and efficient Navy. I am convinced that, unless we are prepared to do this, we are asking for the fate which has befallen many other Empires before ours. On the whole, considering the financial position and the difficulties which we know the Admiralty have had to face, the Estimates are satisfactory, because they show a commencement of the rebuilding of the Navy to an adequate strength for the forward foreign policy which our Government are pursuing. Our Fighting Services have been so far reduced that undoubtedly, in the last year or two, our power to make trade agreements and our influence in Europe and America has been greatly diminished. Our prestige depends on our ability to back up our opinions and our policy, and to-day, or at any rate in the last year or two, I question whether we have had that ability. I believe, however, that the prospects are brighter for the future, and that the First Lord is determined that, so far as lies within his power, we shall have a sufficient and efficient Navy adequately to protect this country.

9.41 p.m.

We have listened to the varying opinions of experts, ex-experts and ex-statesmen this afternoon. I am merely a humble student of the sea and sea power. I am merely an observer and not a pilot. I do not see any reason why the Air Force should get the whole of the lime-light, although I consider that, as has been said already, we should welcome the closest co-operation and co-ordination between the two Services. On last year's Estimates I ventured to draw attention to the difficulty that there was in finding men for foreign service without interfering with and drawing men from the Home Fleet in the middle of a commission. Unfortunately, that difficulty still exists to-day, and for some time the Home Fleet will suffer by periodically losing its men, with the result that it will have to be manned by young and untrained ratings, making it practically a training Fleet. Security of tenure is as essential for the men as it is for the ship or for the Fleet. I also ventured last year to draw the attention of the First Lord to the dangerous shortage of men. Now, I am glad to say, the "St. Vincent" and Shotley are full of seamen boys, and recruiting for the special service ordinary seamen class is in full swing at Chatham, Portsmouth and Devonport; but for some time, I fear, we must suffer from a lack of qualified men, as it takes about three years to make a fully trained naval seaman. This is a legacy which has been left to us by the last Government.

I am also glad to see that two other points which I raised have been very satisfactorily dealt with. The new conditions of advancement and the revised scale of pay for the signal and wireless branches is a very well deserved concession, in my humble opinion, to a most important section of the Service. The other point is that the shortening of the time for which men in the seamen branch now have to wait for advancement, after having qualified for higher rating, will undoubtedly produce very good results. Further, the new scheme of retirement and gratuities in the case of junior officers is a great improvement on all the other schemes. If I may say so as the representative of the senior dockyard, I welcome the First Lord's assurance that the repair work will keep the Royal Dockyards in full employment in the future. Last year mention was made of the "Frobisher." I would welcome another "Frobisher" for boys as well as for cadets, and, if possible, a training ship, so that they might fill in by a three months' cruise the interval between leaving the training establishment and joining the Fleet.

In 1936, and immediately after, we shall have to bring our Battle Fleet up to date. To-day, with the exception of the "Nelson" and "Rodney," all our battleships are old ships. In pre-war days a battleship was out of date in 10 years. To-day all except two are nearly 20 years old, and even if, by prolonging their lives under the London Naval Treaty, they are now brought up to date at very great expense, their serviceable lives are necessarily limited. But the battleship still remains, and must remain, the backbone of the fleet. By all means limit the size and armaments, provided always that there is a clear margin of superiority over any corresponding foreign ships. It is superiority that we must have, and not parity. I regard the battleship replacement programme as the most important naval factor to-day. Supremacy in any other class of ship will never make up for weakness in our capital ships. A new ship once built is far more economical in both fuel and upkeep than an old ship. It is also interesting to note that not one of our battleships was sunk by submarines during the whole War. Nelson said that a line-of-battleship was the best negotiator in the world. If it were known that Parliament would, if necessary, grant supplies for a battleship programme, it would prove an invaluable bargaining weapon at any future naval conference, just as powerful a factor as the tariff weapon is commercially.

We have suffered for 10 years in conferences. It is cruisers that we want, and not conferences. We are woefully short of cruisers, and the shortage is increasing, and not decreasing. A large proportion are worn out, and ought to have been replaced long ago. A squadron of cruisers is far more valuable to the Empire than any number of conferences, and, in the long run, a great deal cheaper. It is no good waiting until we are faced with the actual threat of war. We must either have cruisers adequate to our needs, or be prepared to climb down if any one cares to argue the point with us. A great many people have their wishbone where their backbone ought to be. On the 6th instant, the United States Senate passed a Bill for a naval programme of £150,000,000 covering a period of five years, consisting of six cruisers, 65 destroyers, 30 submarines and one aircraft-carrier. Senator Hales said:
"It is the duty of Congress to maintain an adequate Navy. If we make any mistake in our Estimates, it is better that the mistake should be one providing too large than too small a Navy."
It is maintained that they are only building up to treaty limits by which they cannot increase their armaments or the elevation of their guns. Be that as it may, the moral effect of such a large and rapid expansion is bound to create an adverse atmosphere for the reduction of armaments elsewhere in the world. If it is a matter of necessity and not of prestige to America, we can only assume that the menace is the Pacific, whereas to Great Britain with 80,000 miles of trade routes to protect, it is one of vital necessity. We cannot afford to take risks with our lives, and we cannot afford to gamble with our existence. No country since the world began was ever ruined by expenditure on armaments. It is not armaments. It is the mind behind the armaments that makes for racial antagonism. If we want peace, it is the causes of war and not the instruments of war that must be abolished. Aggression is always founded upon weakness. If one nation knows that she cannot face another's armaments, agreement will very soon be come to. If it is true that armaments are a cause of war, for 60 years, when the British Navy was twice as strong as any two other Powers, we ought to have been continually at war. Little Englanders and scaremongers say we have outlawed war, and, therefore we do not need a Navy and we ought to disarm. We might just as well say that, because we have made burglary illegal, we ought to abolish the police force. After all, the Navy is the police force of the sea. Our Navy does not exist for the protection of this country alone. The Dominions, the Colonies, and the Protectorates are equally dependent on it for their lives and their protection, and they should be encouraged to contribute their fair share.

The Pacific is now the focal point, and it is impossible to exaggerate the enormous importance of the Singapore Base. Singapore is not only the gateway to the Pacific, but it commands the Indian Ocean, round which are three-quarters of the land territory of the Empire, and three-quarters of the population of the Empire live in that territory. The volume of trade through Singapore is just as great as through Suez and Panama, and it is the only port from which a battle fleet could reach Australia and New Zealand, and give them the same assistance in time of crisis as they gave us during the Great War. An area of 3,000 acres was presented by the Government of the Straits Settlements and the cost is shared by New Zealand, Hong Kong and the Federated Malay States. I do not think there has ever been a greater harvest of achievement reaped at the price of so small a draft on the National Exchequer.

It has been frequently said by responsible and reliable people that we have disarmed to the edge of risk. We have disarmed far below the safety margin. We have reached an utterly unsafe limit. I pause to reflect upon the consequences of these statements in some quarters. In my many extensive journeys abroad I have been profoundly impressed by the effect that such statements have made upon certain foreign countries, which are inclined to consider that they can now afford to leave us out of their calculation. We ended the War as the greatest sea Power in the world. Now this one-sided disarmament has reduced us to a position totally unworthy of our great traditions. Dignified isolation is a two-edged weapon. Dignified isolation may be very well but to refuse to follow the example of other nations is to isolate ourselves from safety and common sense. It is not so much armaments qua armaments. It is prestige and dignity, and respect for the flag. Those of us who have travelled over the world know full well the confidence and respect which the White Ensign always inspires wherever it flies, and which always receives a great welcome by all our kith and kin in every part of the globe. That also applies to the Red Ensign and the Blue Ensign.

I would like to see more armed liners than we have at present. How often in far-off corners of the world have threatened risings and insurrections, which might have involved us in serious trouble and even international complications, been avoided by the presence of a cruiser, a gun-boat or a sloop. It did not matter which, for the presence of the ship and of the flag was to them a knowledge of the warning that behind that flag lay the authority and the great naval power of Great Britain. The British Ensign has always been regarded as the emblem and the symbol of freedom, justice and peace. The British Navy does not exist, and it never has existed, to attack, but to protect British lives, British territory and British trade. The British Empire is the British Fleet. If we are to preserve the one, it is essential that we must maintain the other.

9.57 p.m.

I rise to add a few words in support of the case which has been so admirably made out by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Battersea North (Commander Marsden). In short, I wish to refer to the status of the engineer officer in the Royal Navy. I feel most strongly that the time is long overdue when the position of this vital profession in the British Navy should be properly recognised, and the way to the highest positions in the Navy should lay open to its members. I feel that by tradition we are still clinging to the theory which was held at the time of the old ships of the line; the time when the ships of the line were equipped with an ancillary engine, much to the mistrust of the then rulers of the Navy. But anybody who has looked over one of our great battleships to-day must realise that it is indeed a complete engineering marvel, and no officer of those great ships is of more importance than the engineer. It is high time that the way should be open for the engineer in the Navy to occupy the highest positions on the Board of Admiralty and as Admiral in charge of dockyards. I have heard it urged that one reason why an engineer should not be put in control of a dockyard was that he might not know how to marshal ships or order the various naval operations connected with them, but for almost 50 years, in fact, navigating officers have been giving orders to engineers without the technical knowledge as to what those orders meant.

I feel that the matter is so important that it should be urged upon the First Lord that he should properly and at once recognise the position of the engineer officer. The modern battleship, as its design changes becomes more and more a matter solely for the engineer and constructor. If we are to secure in the service of the Royal Navy the best engineers available within these islands, we should put before them the possibility of rising to the highest positions in the Navy itself. I hope that after these few words the First Lord, with his broad view of naval matters, will definitely and finally tackle this problem, so that the whole of the engineering profession may realise that the engineer has a free franchise to rise to the highest positions in the Service. The last War, with its operations, naval and military, proved that the engineer is entitled to that status, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will mark his regime by a proper recognition—giving high dockyard command, or a position on the Board of Admiralty, for the engineer officer in the Royal Navy.

10.1 p.m.

In a club in Piccadilly there rests in lowly state an object of art depicting a nymph of the air kissing and caressing the spirit of the waves, symbolising very beautifully the intimate harmony between sea and air. It is the Schneider Trophy for which the nations contested for some 18 years. Now that this country, through the skill of our engineers and pilots, has won it for all time, it raises some difficulties as to its ultimate possession. I think my right hon. Friend the First Lord has solved the problem for us. The Trophy should go to him, I say that not because the Trophy itself depicts some ladies not too heavily robed and is regarded generally as having distinct educational value, but because he introduced into his speech this afternoon, I was about to say an olive branch, but I might more accurately describe it as an olive tree in full foliage.

I thought that he made a gracious gesture towards the Air Arm, and particularly the Fleet Air Arm of this country. Many hon. Members will recollect that there has not always been, even in recent days, this intimate understanding of the problems of sea and air. As we have had a statement by my right hon. Friend, I would like to say that the arrangement whereon the Fleet Air Arm operates is not by any means perfect. It works primarily because of the good understanding between the naval personnel and the Royal Air Force personnel in the Fleet Air Arm. I also cast my mind back—and I am sure all right hon. and hon. Members will do the same—to those naval officers whose careers during the last 20 years have been wrecked because they had the same faith in the air which my right hon. Friend has expounded this afternoon. I do not know whether admirals purr, but, if they do, I fancy that I heard, during the speech of my right hon. Friend, a purr from the hon. and gallant Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter). It will be within general knowledge that he was sacked by the Admiralty because he had too much faith in the air, and possibly it is not the least act of justice on the part of the National Government that in this year's honours His Majesty, for these very services, has dignified our hon. and gallant Friend with the honour of knighthood.

Coming now to these Estimates. Out of a total of £56,000,000 only £1,300,000 is spent on the air arm, or one-fortieth of the total Estimate. As I understand the position, we in Naval armaments are presumed to be on parity ratio with America, but America has over 1,000 Naval planes, unless I seriously misunderstand the true position. Can my right hon. Friend tell us, therefore, if in fact we are on Naval parity with America, why is it that the American Naval staff and our Naval staff take such entirely different views of the appropriate proportions between aircraft and surface vessels in a modern navy?

There is another point that should exercise my right hon. Friend as well as the Air Ministry, and it has been well brought out by the tragedies of the American Army Air Force operating the mails in the last few weeks. This is a question that I should like my right hon. Friend to answer, if he can. Is he satisfied that our training in the Fleet Air Arm is not of such a type as to make fair-weather aviators? Everybody in America thought that the American Army Air Force was as good as any commercial operators, but the fact remains, as the operation of the air mail service by the American Army Air Force has shown, that commercial air lines, operating in all weathers, become much more accustomed to blind flying and to flying in all types of meteorological conditions, which pilots will have to do in times of war. I appreciate that it is difficult for any staff in time of peace to cause unnecessary hazards to their personnel, but it is imperative that our pilots and observers should be competent to carry on even in the worst meteorological conditions.

My right hon. Friend expressed the hope that there would be few who still regarded the Air Arm as a possible replacement for the Navy. Let me assure him on behalf of hon. Members whose air views I know that there is not one who would take so foolish an attitude. Our concept of the Navy and the Air Arm is that they should be complementary of each other. When I use the word "complementary," I mean that the two together should make up the whole. I am sure my right hon. Friend would not wish to see the position left as it is, the Navy making up three-quarters of the whole and the Air Force only one-quarter. The hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir E. Keyes), to whose speech we all listened with interest, expressed the hope that if it was necessary, as the Lord President of the Council promised, to raise our Air Force to parity by vastly increasing it, there would be no paring of Navy Estimates for that purpose. If I may say so, without trespassing upon a matter which became somewhat delicate, I understood that in the declaration of the Lord President of the Council last Thursday he indicated quite specifically that we should come up to parity without interfering in any way with parity in any of the other services. I should feel greatly disappointed if the Navy were pared down and our protection on the sea reduced in order that our protection in the air might be more appropriate.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the fact that, although there is a danger in coming forward at this time with an increase in Estimates for the Services, he is not lacking courage in this respect, as indicated in connection with his decision on submarines. I was in Paris last week-end and sensed something of the atmosphere in France. I was able to understand a little of the difficulty that we have had in France recently in some of our diplomatic discussions when an eminent Frenchman uttered these words to me: "We cannot understand you. You are trying to persuade us to enfeeble ourselves, and yet you know that you depend upon us for air protection." These words might well give thought to the right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Members. We have the satisfaction of knowing that that position cannot long endure. For the time being we can appropriately salute my right hon. Friend for his courage in coming forward, as he thought necessary, with a not unsubstantial increase in the Estimates. I hope that he will give us some assurance that the parity of the Air Naval Force is not being overlooked.

10.13 p.m.

I wish to congratulate the First Lord of the Admiralty on his speech and also on the provision in the Estimates for strengthening and improving the position of the Navy. At the same time I feel very genuine concern at the position in which this country stands to-day due to the weakness of the Navy. I should like to quote to the House part of an article which appeared in the "Times" newspaper some months ago, to the effect that by our history, our Imperial commitments and our geographical position we are forced to play the part of a great Power in world affairs. Whether we like it or not, we cannot shirk our responsibilities in that matter. I am not suggesting for a moment that we wish to shirk that responsibility, but we can only play our part in the world by upholding and maintaining our strength at sea. There is no other way in which we can fulfill our part. Statesmen in the past fully realised the immense importance of sea power to this country, and our policy was directed all the time to strengthening and consolidating sea power. We built up our great Mercantile Marine and a Navy not only second to none but stronger than that of any other nation. We also acquired those vital connecting links throughout our vast line of communications, strategic bases throughout the world. It was those three factors which were the mainstay of our sea power and the defences of our Empire. It is quite true that our Imperial defence depends upon the closest co-operation between the three fighting services. That is undoubtedly true in the main, but our defence always has depended, and depends to-day, upon the strength and efficiency of His Majesty's Navy. Just in so far as we have been strong at sea have we been of real value as an ally to other nations. Behind our foreign policy has always been the strength of our position at sea, but owing to the decline in our strength at sea and in the air it is extremely doubtful whether to-day we can play our part as a great stabilising power for peace in the world.

We have reduced the Navy on the plea of economy, a very pressing claim, and one which has always come up after every great war. We have reduced the service on that account, but also because we hoped, a vain hope it was, that other nations of the world would follow our example. We have taken a great risk in reducing the Navy. We have sacrificed our security. We are not able to fulfil the obligations we have undertaken under the League of Nations or under the Locarno Pact. For instance, France is always clamouring, and rightly so, for security. The help that we can give to France is the power and might of the Navy, and when that power is reduced just so far as it is reduced is the security we can give to France also reduced. There is to be a conference next year and before we enter that conference it is necessary that the Government should make up their mind as to the policy they intend to pursue. Things have changed in the last two years. Our credit is restored, our financial position is better than it was, the need for economy, although still great, is not as great as it was, the disarmament which we have brought about in our naval forces and in our air forces has not been followed by other nations of the world, while the position of affairs on the Continent must fill us all with grave anxiety. When all these things are considered I think it is necessary that we should reconsider our position with regard to the strength of the Navy and go back again to our old policy of maintaining our sea power.

I should like to refer to the question of our cruiser strength. One of the main functions of the Navy is to maintain the security of our communications. To-day these communications are threatened in the narrow waters and in our ports and harbours by air attack. But that does not in any way lessen the responsibility of the Navy for providing security for 80,000 miles of sea route. A very important committee decided that the minimum number of cruisers which we require for our security is 70. Allusion has already been made to this point. A programme was agreed to which was to be put into operation, and over a period of 10 years there was to be a constructive programme so that at the end of the 10 years we should have in this country 70 effective cruisers. That was the minimum number which was required for our security. In 1930 that number of 70 was reduced to 50. I would very much like to know how the number of 50 was arrived at. If the naval experts informed the Government that 70 was the minimum required, what alteration has taken place which has enabled the Government to reduce the number to 50? Why not 40? Why not 20? Why 50. It is not economy to have a less force than is required for our security. It is a pure waste of public money. It may be a waste to have a greater force than we require, but at any rate with a greater force we get security, whereas with a force which is below our need we not only waste public money but we have no security. It would be very interesting to know whether to-day the First Lord is satisfied that security can be given to our all-important lines of communication with 50 cruisers. I hope we shall have some answer, because the country ought to know where we stand.

Let me take an example. I have a list of the number of British ships of 3,000 tons and over which were at sea on every day of the year on the great trade routes. Is the First Lord satisfied, or does he think, that the Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies, where there are three cruisers, can give reasonable security to the 215 British ships of 3,000 tons and over which are at sea in the Indian Ocean on every single day of the year? At the Cape there are two cruisers and in South America two cruisers. That is four together. Does the First Lord consider that with those four cruisers reasonable security can be given to the 215 ships which are in the South Atlantic on every single day of the year? If we go to the North Atlantic we find there are four cruisers on the North American station, and there are 320 British ships of 3,000 tons and over at sea on every day of the year. Is it possible for the Commanders-in-Chief to give reasonable security to our all-important trade with that number of cruisers at their disposal?

But that is not the whole of the story. Under the London Treaty, which has so hampered and restricted the First Lord in providing what is necessary for our defence, we shall have—I may be wrong, but I do not think I am far wrong—14 cruisers which are over age on 31st December, 1936. A part at any rate of those 14 cruisers must be on the trade routes. With a diminished number of cruisers to do this work one would imagine it was essential that every single ship in that force should be as efficient and up-to-date as possible. But we are not going to get that. We are to have only a proportion of the very meagre force of cruisers available because 25 out of the 50 are definitely "frozen in" with the battle fleet and do not leave it. That means that we shall only have 25 cruisers to cover the whole 80,000 miles of trade routes and some of those cruisers are over age, while at least 20 per cent. will be in harbour.

Thus we come down to a position in which not more than 20 cruisers can be at sea at any time and a severe additional strain is going to be placed on those cruisers. As I say, comprised in that number are ships which have lost their speed, the engines and boilers of which are becoming worn out, and these cannot be relied upon but are liable to break down at any time. Imagine the feelings of a commander-in-chief with cruisers of that sort when called upon to protect a valuable convoy. The security which ought to be provided by our ships may be taken away at any time. Not only will the ships themselves have to stand a greater strain than would be entailed if there was a larger number, but there is also a greater strain on the officers and men who may break down, with disastrous results.

When we come to the case of the destroyers we find that we are in even a worse case in that respect, because 50 out of the total of about 116, which we are to have on 31st December, 1936, are over age. It seems to me that the programme of eight destroyers and one leader to be built each year might well be increased to 16 destroyers and two leaders, so that we should have more up-to-date destroyers than those which will be available to us if we continue with a building programme of one and eight. Our cruiser force in which I include destroyers, is in a very serious position and I hope that this fact will be borne in mind at next year's conference. We have agreed to equality in cruisers where no equality properly speaking exists. It is recognised by every nation that we are in a special position, quite different from that of any other nation in that respect. We have far greater responsibilities and other nations are quite ready to accept the fact that we should have a larger cruiser force. Yet we have accepted this doctrine of equality, and up to the present our policy has been not only one of equality but one of reduction from the minimum of 70 laid down by the naval experts in this country, to a figure of 50. I hope that at the coming conference the figure will be made 70 instead of 50.

If we want security, if we want to be the great Power that we ought to be, and the great factor in maintaining the peace of the world that we ought to be, we must once more assert ourselves and bring this country back to the position which we always held in the past, a position of superiority in sea-power. We do not want any race in armaments, but we would do a good service to the cause of peace if we were to give to the world a programme of the ships we require for our security and build those ships. At the present time we are so hampered by the restrictions of the London Treaty that not only are we prohibited from building the number of ships we require, but we are even prohibited from building ships of the size we require. The present position is so unsatisfactory that I hope we shall go to the conference next year with the determination that this country is to have at her disposal such naval forces as she considers necessary for her security.

10.30 p.m.

I think my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty should feel very gratified with the reception that has been given to his Estimates and the compliments that have been paid to his speech. But that reflection has not made my task any easier. While we have had some extremely interesting speeches during this Debate, our Estimates have been so satisfactory and my right hon. Friend's speech has been so convincing that I have very few criticisms to answer. The hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall), on behalf of the Opposition, made an extremely affable and friendly attack, but I was under the impression the whole time that he was using blank ammunition and that his words were never meant to hurt. He dealt mainly with the new construction programme, and he made one very serious mistake when he spoke of the increase in armaments which we were projecting. Surely he ought to have talked of the replacement of armaments which we have carried out on a scale which had already been agreed to by the Labour party when they were in office. I think too he was on extremely weak ground when he was attacking us on our new construction policy. His attack should have been made against the Government of which he was himself a member. It is they who, at the London Conference, laid down the limits to which we could build, and if he, as he threatens, is going to vote against these Estimates, he is really recording a vote of censure against himself as a member of the Board of Admiralty which was responsible for the policy that the present board is carrying out.

He asked me two specific questions. One was, Who are the enemy? That is just the sort of question we expect from one of these bloodthirsty pacifists. They are always asking, Who are the enemy? They are always trying to point out the country against which we are preparing and trying to find somebody whom we are to fight. On the other hand, we who are responsible for the administration of the Admiralty are not looking for potential enemies. We are only seeking to ensure that we shall be able to secure the defence of our country and carry out the responsibilities which are laid upon us. He also asked the reason for the alteration in the programme from four cruisers to three. It is a very simple reason. We have not altered one iota from the view which the Admiralty have always expressed, that we want small cruisers, but we want a great many of them, and that is the view that we have always been trying to impress upon other rival Powers. We hoped that by giving a lead in the direction of small cruisers, we should persuade other countries to follow our example, but unfortunately that hope has not been fulfilled. The two other big naval countries have built several 10,000-ton cruisers, much more heavily armed than our "Leander" class, and we have felt constrained on this occasion to follow their example. That is the reason for the appearance of a new class of cruisers, the "Minotaurs," of 9,000 tons and of an armament comparable to that of the new cruisers of the other Powers.

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Battersea (Commander Marsden) asked how many over-age ships we shall have in various categories at the end of the treaty period. We shall have 14 over-age cruisers and 44 over-age destroyers. Several specific questions were put to me by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery). He asked if we were prepared to build up to the full limit of our treaty strength. So far as our cruisers are concerned, most certainly so; the new tonnage which we are allowed to build will be built by the end of the treaty period. The First Lord told us exactly how far he was proposing to go with regard to destroyers and submarines. My right hon. Friend further asked whether we were satisfied with the number of cruisers that we are allowed at the present moment, and he asked us to give a definite assurance that at the next conference we shall ask for more, and also get greater freedom in the type of ships which we were to build. I do not think my right hon. Friend could blame me if I said that this question should really be left for the conference to decide. They are the basic questions for discussion at that time, and I do not think this is the moment when one can anticipate the 1935 conference. They will, of course, be given the very fullest consideration.

The hon. Member for Aberdare raised two other points of substance in his speech. He asked why we were spending more money on Singapore. That is a very easy question for me to answer. The Labour party have always been accused of digging a hole just to have the pleasure of filling it up again, but in this case they were doing something even worse. They were, by adopting the truncated scheme, merely digging a hole and leaving it there for no purpose whatever. Under their truncated scheme the dock at Singapore would have been quite useless. All we have done is to add a caisson, a pumping plant and a generating station, thereby assuring that the dock can be of benefit and of utility. I do not think that the strictest economist would object to our spending £8,750,000 on a dock from which we can get some value rather than spend £7,750,000 to get a grave which is useless except as a memorial to Mr. Alexander's term of office.

May I ask whether workshops are being put up to carry out the repair of ships that go into the dock?

A certain number are being put up, and also some transit sheds. The main purpose of the increase in this scheme is to enable the dock itself to be used. The hon. Member also raised an interesting point in drawing attention to the increase in Vote A and asking why that was necessary. Unfortunately, it has been necessitated by hard facts, and by the experience which we have gained in the difficulties of drafting during the past year or two. We had a discussion on this subject when the Navy Estimates were presented last year, and I think he may remember that I told the House then that during the previous years we had been on a falling Vote as far as the numbers were concerned, and that therefore there was always a surplus which we could use for drafting purposes. But the moment we got to rock bottom, to the lowest datum line, that surplus disappeared, and we found we had underestimated the number of men that were required for the service of the Fleet. In addition to that, both "Leanders" and "Minotaurs" require more men than the other cruisers, and that also necessitated a small increase. He also asked why the increase of 2,000 in Vote A was not reflected in Vote 1, or only to a limited degree. The answer is that 6,000 men have gone off the top of the list—they are all the more highly paid and senior ratings—and 8,000 men have been entered at the bottom of the list at, of course, the lowest rates of pay, and therefore it is obvious that we shall not get a true relation between Vote A and Vote 1.

I am sure the House will agree that this Debate has been enriched by two maiden speeches of great merit. My right hon. Friend the First Lord had the opportunity of congratulating my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Sir K. Keyes) on his victory and his entry into this House, and I have the pleasure of congratulating him on the result of his first engagement, which we all agree has revealed him as an amphibian of no mean order, equally at home on land and sea. We also all very much enjoyed the extremely thoughtful and interesting speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the new Member for Cambridge (Lieut.-Commander Tufnell). I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth North that no words spoken during this Debate have given greater pleasure to those of us on this bench than the graceful tribute which he paid to our naval colleagues of the Board and in the Admiralty. I was glad to hear him suggest that we should not take the critics at their own valuation. The critics generally have a very easy time, and if they do not like the answers to their criticisms they never need publish them. I am glad that we are able to tell the House, which I am sure it knows already, that in our naval advisers at the Admiralty we have the pick of the brains of the whole Service, with the additional advantage of being completely up to date.

A good number of speakers, both during this Debate and the Debate on the Air Estimates, have stressed the relationship between the Navy and the Air Force, and I can do nothing but reiterate the assurance given in the speech of the First Lord that there is the closest co-operation between all the Forces. I am grateful, and so I am sure is my right hon. Friend, that my hon. Friend the Member for Duddeston (Mr. Simmonds) has taken the tribute to this co-operation as a tribute to the Air Force and the Fleet Air arm in the spirit in which it was made. In the Navy we are always ready to give to the Air Force all the assistance which they require or for which they ask. We have helped them, I hope to a considerable extent, during the exercises in the past year. We have gone so far as to give special facilities to air-minded Members of Parliament to visit our aircraft carriers.

It is not out of place that many speakers during the Debate have stressed the fact that more publicity, or perhaps undue publicity, may at this moment be given to the dangers of air attack upon London, but the Navy is by no means obsolete, and many of the essential functions which the Navy has carried out during the centuries past must still be carried out by the Navy and by the Navy alone. My hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook recalls the fact that during the darkest days of the War we were far more worried by the possibility of starvation than we were by the possibility of increasing damage to London by air bombardment. For a generation at least the Navy and the Navy alone will have to be responsible for the maintenance of the food supply in time of war, for the shipment of an expeditionary force to any part of the globe and the necessary defence of our Empire and our communications.

A certain number of points have been raised during the Debate. I will try and answer as many of them as possible, but, if I do not answer them all, either because I may have missed them or because I may not at the moment know the answer, I am sure that the House will understand. The hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) was a regular machine gun in his desire for information. The Admiralty would very much welcome a Debate on defence as a whole in addition to the usual Debates on our own Estimates, but that is a question that should be addressed to the Lord President of the Council and not to us. The hon. Member also made the interesting and perhaps rather dangerous suggestion that we should carry out joint naval exercises with France and Italy. Perhaps he did not consider the effect which that might have on those partners who were not lucky enough to be selected. It is more than likely that it would make our position extremely invidious and the unlucky ones extremely jealous. With regard to lower-deck promotion, I can assure him that it is the earnest desire of the Admiralty to make the new scheme a success. As he knows, the failure of the old scheme was due to the fact that the men from the lower deck came in too late. They were older than cadets of the same entry, and that meant that their chance of promotion to the higher ranks was very doubtful. By the new scheme we equalise, or very nearly equalise, the ages of those selected, both of cadets and of those from the lower deck. I hope that the demerits of the old scheme will not be found in this one, and that many of those who have been selected during the past two years or may be selected in future, will have a highly successful career and get to the highest positions in the Navy.

The hon. Member for Broxtowe, as well as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Burnley (Vice-Admiral Campbell), raised the question of Dartmouth. This has been discussed in the last two years, and was thoroughly thrashed out last year; I do not think that the hon. Member will expect me to go into details again. I do not wish to draw any comparison between the quality of entry that we get from Dartmouth and the special entry; all I can say is that we are fully satisfied with both. I feel, however, and so does the Board of Admiralty, that Dartmouth is fulfilling an indispensable function at the present moment, and that we are not prepared to make any change in the policy which was announced last year.

My right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) asked whether we would ask the French why they were building so many submarines. I believe that the question has been hinted to them on several occasions, and I only regret that they were not able to come into the London Naval Treaty, which limits the amount of submarines which any of the signatories may have to 52,000 tons. He also asked about the safety of the naval bases, but, as the Prime Minister said in answer to a question on Tuesday last, the matter has been carefully considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and I am sure that he will not expect me to rush in where even the Prime Minister feared to tread. Rosyth is on a care and maintenance basis, and if its use were ever required again we could use it at fairly short notice.

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Burnley started off by saying that the First Lord's arguments in favour of battleships were unanswerable, and he then went on to tell us how very undesirable he thought battleships were. If my right hon. Friend's arguments were unanswerable, I can add very little to them. My hon. and gallant Friend was rather optimistic when he thought that other countries would consent to a reduction in the size of a battleship to 10,000 tons, when they will not even agree to the reduction of a cruiser to 7,000 tons. He also asked why we were building so many sloops. He must know how useful these sloops are, particularly in Eastern waters. They are maids-of-all-work, and they are also taking to a very large extent and in many directions the place of destroyers, at a greatly reduced cost.

The hon. Member for the Central Division of Portsmouth (Mr. R. Beaumont) drew attention to a reduction in the Vote for fuel in this year's Estimates. I am happy to be able to tell him that the allowance has not been reduced, but that fortunately we can get it at a cheaper rate; this accounts for the reduction in the Vote.

My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich (Sir J. Pybus) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Battersea raised the question of the status of engineers. My right hon. Friend the First Lord wishes me to say what I am sure that everyone connected with the Navy knows already, namely, that he

Division No. 154.]

AYES.

[10.57 p.m.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelCook, Thomas A.Guinness, Thomas L. E. B.
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.Gunston, Captain D. W.
Albery, Irving JamesCraddock, Sir Reginald HenryHacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.Crooke, J. SmedleyHamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Anstruther-Gray, W. J.Crookshank, Col. C. de Windt (Bootle)Hanbury, Cecil
Applin, Lieut.-Col. Reginald V. K.Cross, R. H.Hanley, Dennis A.
Aske, Sir Robert WilliamCruddas, Lieut.-Colonel BernardHarvey, George (Lambeth, Kenningt'n)
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyDavidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Balfour, George (Hampstead)Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)
Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M.
Banks, Sir Reginald MitchellDenman, Hon. R D.Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.
Barrie, Sir Charles CouparDanville, AlfredHenderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsferd)
Beauchamp, Sir Brograve CampbellDrewe, CedricHeneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.
Beaumont, Hn. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)Duckworth, George A. V.Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)
Bernays, RobertDuggan, Hubert JohnHopkinson, Austin
Boothby, Robert John GrahamDuncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)Hornby, Frank
Borodale, ViscountEden, Robert AnthonyHorsbrugh, Florence
Bossom, A. C.Edmondson, Major A. J.Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.
Boulton, W. W.Elliot, Rt. Hon. WalterHudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Boyce, H. LeslieEllis, Sir R. GeoffreyHume, Sir George Hopwood
Boyd-Carpenter, Sir ArchibaldElliston, Captain George SampsonHunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)
Bracken, BrendanElmley, ViscountHunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)
Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)Emrys-Evans, P. V.Hunter-Weston, Lt. Gen. Sir Aylmer
Broadbent, Colonel JohnEntwistle, Cyril FullardJames, Wing-Com. A. W. H.
Brocklebank, C. E. R.Erskine-Boist, Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)Jesson, Major Thomas E.
Brown, Col. D. C. (N'th'l'd., Hexham)Evans, David Owen (Cardigan)Joel, Dudley J. Barnato
Brown, Ernest (Leith)Evans, R. T. (Carmarthen)Johnston, J. W. (Clackmannan)
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Fleming, Edward LascellesJohnstone, Harcourt (S. Shields)
Burghley, LordFoot, Dingle (Dundee)Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)
Burgin, Dr. Edward LeslieFord, Sir Patrick J.Kerr, Hamilton W.
Cadogan, Hon. EdwardFox, Sir GiffordKeyes, Admiral Sir Roger
Campbell, Sir Edward Taswell (Brmly)Fuller, Captain A. G.Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)Gibson, Charles GranvilleLambert, Rt. Hon. George
Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmGillett, Sir George MastermanLatham, Sir Herbert Paul
Caporn, Arthur CecilGilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir JohnLaw, Sir Alfred
Carver, Major William H.Glossop, C. W. H.Leckie, J. A.
Castlereagh, ViscountGluckstein, Louis HalleLeech, Dr. J. W.
Cayzer, Maj. Sir H. R. (Prtsmth., S.)Goff, Sir ParkLees-Jones, John
Chapman, Col. R. (Houghton-le-Spring)Goodman, Colonel Albert W.Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Choriton, Alan Ernest LeofricGower, Sir RobertLevy, Thomas
Clayton, Sir ChristopherGreene, William P. C.Liddall, Walter S.
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnLindsay, Kenneth Martin (Kilm'rnock)
Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.Grimston, R. V.Lindsay, Noel Ker
Conant, R. J. E.Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.Lloyd, Geoffrey

fully recognises the fine qualities and the invaluable services of the engineering branch of the Navy, and will certainly give most serious consideration to the points that have been raised by my two hon. Friends. I think I have now answered the majority of the questions of substance which have been put during the Debate. I would say that the general tone and trend of the discussion this afternoon and the speeches which have been delivered show a desire to avoid the expression of any warlike tendencies and a hope that the peace of the world will long be maintained, but a determination to ensure the security of our own defences. On these grounds I recommend to the House Estimates which should be a provocation to no foreign country, but which contain a very real instalment of security for our own.

Question put, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

The House divided: Ayes, 254; Noes, 35.

Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)Pearson, William G.Soper, Richard
Loder, Captain J. de VerePeat, Charles U.Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.
Lovat-Fraser, James AlexanderPenny, Sir GeorgeSouthby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.Peto, Geoffrey K. (W'verh'pt'n, Bilston)Spens, William Patrick
Lyons, Abraham MontaguPickering, Ernest H.Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Mabane, WilliamPowell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.Stanley, Hon. O. F. G. (Westmorland)
MacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. C. G. (Partick)Pybus, Sir Percy JohnStevenson, James
MacAndrew, Capt. J. O. (Ayr)Raikes, Henry V. A. M.Stewart, J. H. (Fife, E.)
MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham)Ramsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)Stones, James
MacDonald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw)Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)Storey, Samuel
McEwen, Captain J. H. F.Rankin, RobertStourton, Hon. John J.
McKie, John HamiltonRea, Walter RussellStrauss, Edward A.
Maclay, Hon. Joseph PatonReed, Arthur C. (Exeter)Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.
Macquisten, Frederick AlexanderReid, David D. (County Down)Sugden, sir Wilfrid Hart
Maitland, AdamRemer, John R.Tate, Mavis Constance
Makins, Brigadier-General ErnestRenwick, Major Gustav A.Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.Rhys, Hon. Charles Arthur U.Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Marsden, Commander ArthurRickards, George WilliamThompson, Sir Luke
Mason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)Robinson, John RolandThomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel JohnRopner, Colonel L.Todd, Lt.-Col. A. J. K. (B'wick-on-T.)
Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)Ross, Ronald D.Touche, Gordon Cosmo
Milne, CharlesRoss Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)Tree, Ronald
Mitchell, Harold P. (Br'tf'd & Chisw'k)Rothschild, James A. deTryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Mitcheson, G. G.Ruggles-Brise, Colonel E. A.Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Morton, A. Hugh ElsdaleRunge, Norah CecilWallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. EyresRussell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)
Morris, John Patrick (Salford, N.)Russell, Hamer Field (Shef'ld, B'tside)Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Morrison, William ShepherdSalmon, Sir IsidoreWarrender, Sir Victor A. G.
Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.Salt, Edward W.Watt, Captain George Steven H.
Munro, PatrickSamuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney)Wells, Sydney Richard
Nall-Cain, Hon. RonaldSandeman, Sir A. N. StewartWhiteside, Borras Noel H.
Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
North, Edward T.Savery, Samuel ServingtonWilliams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Nunn, WilliamSelley, Harry R.Wills, Wilfrid D.
O'Connor, Terence JamesShaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)Wilson, G. H. A. (Cambridge U.)
O'Donovan, Dr. William JamesShaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir HughSimmonds, Oliver EdwinWorthington, Dr. John V.
Ormiston, ThomasSmiles, Lieut.-Col. Sir Walter D.
Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.Smith, Bracewell (Dulwich)TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Patrick, Colin M.Somervell, Sir DonaldCaptain Sir George Bowyer and
Peake, Captain OsbertSomerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)Mr. Womersley.

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)Milner, Major James
Attlee, Clement RichardGrundy, Thomas W.Nathan, Major H. L.
Batey, JosephHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Paling, Wilfred
Bevan, Aneurin (Ebbw Vale)Jenkins, Sir WilliamParkinson, John Allen
Buchanan, GeorgeJones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Cocks, Frederick SeymourKirkwood, DavidTinker, John Joseph
Cove, William G.Lawson, John JamesWilliams, David (Swansea, East)
Cripps, Sir StaffordLogan, David GilbertWilliams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Daggar, GeorgeLunn, WilliamWilmot, John
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Macdonald, Gordon (Ince)
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)McEntee, Valentine L.TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Edwards, CharlesMaclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)Mr. John and Mr. Groves.
Greenwood, Rt. Hon. ArthurMaxton, James

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Captain BOURNE in the Chair.]

Personnel

Motion made, and Question put,

"That 92,338 Officers, Seamen, Boys, and Royal Marines be employed for the Sea Service,

Division No. 155.]

AYES.

[11.7 p.m.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelBarrie, Sir Charles CouparBracken, Brendan
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Beauchamp, Sir Brograve CampbellBraithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)
Albery, Irving JamesBeaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)Broadbent, Colonel John
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.Bernays, RobertBrocklebank, C. E. R.
Anstruther-Gray, W. J.Boothby, Robert John GrahamBrown, Col. D. C. (N'th'l'd., Hexham)
Applin, Lieut.-Col. Reginald V. K.Borodale, ViscountBrown, Ernest (Leith)
Aske, Sir Robert WilliamBossom, A. C.Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyBoulton, W. W.Burghley, Lord
Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)Boyce, H. LeslieBurgin, Dr. Edward Leslie
Banks, Sir Reginald MitchellBoyd-Carpenter, Sir ArchibaldCadogan, Hon. Edward

together with 884 for the Royal Marine Police, borne on the books of His Majesty's Ships, at the Royal Marine Divisions, and at Royal Air Force Establishments, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1935."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 250; Noes, 34.

Campbell, Sir Edward Taswell (Brmly)Hume, Sir George HopwoodRamsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)Hunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)
Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmHunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)Rankin, Robert
Caporn, Arthur CecilHunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir AylmerRea, Walter Russell
Carver, Major William H.James, Wing.-Com. A. W. H.Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)
Castlereagh, ViscountJesson, Major Thomas E.Reid, David D. (County Down)
Cayzer, Maj. Sir H. R. (Prtsmth., S.)Joel, Dudley J. BarnatoRemer, John R.
Chapman, Col. R. (Houghton-le-Spring)Johnston, J. W. (Clackmannan)Renwick, Major Gustav A.
Chorlton, Alan Ernest LeofricJohnstone, Harcourt (S. Shields)Rhys, Hon. Charles Arthur U.
Clayton, Sir ChristopherJones, Lewis (Swansea, West)Rickards, George William
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.Kerr, Hamilton W.Robinson, John Roland
Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.Keyes, Admiral Sir RogerRopner, Colonel L.
Conant, R. J. E.Lamb, Sir Joseph QuintonRoss, Ronald D.
Cook, Thomas A.Lambert, Rt. Hon. GeorgeRoss Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)
Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.Latham, Sir Herbert PaulRuggles-Brise, Colonel E. A.
Craddock, Sir Reginald HenryLaw, Sir AlfredRunge, Norah Cecil
Crooke, J. SmedleyLeckie, J. A.Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)
Cross, R. H.Leech, Dr. J. W.Russell, Hamer Field (Shef'ld, B'tside)
Cruddas, Lieut.-Colonel BernardLees-Jones, JohnRutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)
Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)Leighton, Major B. E. P.Salmon, Sir Isidore
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Levy, ThomasSalt, Edward W.
Denman, Hon. R. D.Liddall, Walter S.Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney)
Denville, AlfredLindsay, Kenneth Martin (Kilm'rnock)Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart
Drewe, CedricLindsay, Noel KerSassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Duckworth, George A. V.Lloyd, GeoffreySavery, Samuel Servington
Duggan, Hubert JohnLockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)Selley, Harry R.
Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)Loder, Captain J. de VereShaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)
Eastwood, John FrancisLovat-Fraser, James AlexanderShaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)
Eden, Robert AnthonyLumley, Captain Lawrence R.Simmonds, Oliver Edwin
Edmondson, Major A. J.Lyons, Abraham MontaguSmiles, Lieut.-Col. Sir Walter D.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. WalterMabane, WilliamSmith, Bracewell (Dulwich)
Ellis, Sir R. GeoffreyMacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. C. G. (Partick)Somervell, Sir Donald
Elliston, Captain George SampsonMacAndrew, Capt. J. O. (Ayr)Somerville, Annesley A (Windsor)
Elmley, ViscountMacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham)Soper, Richard
Emrys-Evans, P. V.MacDonald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw)Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.
Entwistle, Cyril FullardMcEwen, Captain J. H. F.Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Erskine-Bolst, Capt. C. C. (Blk'pool)McKie, John HamiltonSpens, William Patrick
Evans, David Owen (Cardigan)Maclay, Hon. Joseph PatonStanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Evans, R. T. (Carmarthen)Macquisten, Frederick AlexanderStanley Hon. O. F. G. (Westmorland)
Fleming, Edward LatcellesMaitland, AdamStevenson, James
Foot, Dingle (Dundee)Makins, Brigadier-General ErnestStewart, J. H. (Fife, E.)
Ford, Sir Patrick J.Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.Stones, James
Fox, Sir GiffordMarsden, Commander ArthurStorey, Samuel
Fuller, Captain A. G.Mason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)Stourton, Hon. John J.
Gibson, Charles GranvilleMayhew, Lieut.-Colonel JohnStrauss, Edward A.
Gillett, Sir George MastermanMills, Major J. D. (New Forest)Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.
Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir JohnMilne, CharlesSugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Glossop, C. W. H.Mitchell, Harold P. (Br'tf'd & Chisw'k)Tate, Mavis Constance
Gluckstein, Louis HalleMitcheson, G. G.Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Goff, Sir ParkMolson, A. Hugh ElsdaleThomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Goodman, Colonel Albert W.Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. EyresThompson, Sir Luke
Gower, Sir RobertMorris, John Patrick (Salford, N.)Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Greene, William P. C.Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)Touche, Gordon Cosmo
Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnMorrison, William ShephardTree, Ronald
Grimston, R. V.Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.Munro, PatrickTufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Guinness, Thomas L. E. B.Nall-Cain, Hon. RonaldWallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Gunston, Captain D. W.Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.North, Edward T.Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)Nunn, WilliamWarrender, Sir Victor A. G.
Hanbury, CecilO'Connor, Terence JamesWatt, Captain George Steven H.
Hanley, Dennis A.O'Donovan, Dr. William JamesWells, Sydney Richard
Harvey, George (Lambeth, Kenningt'n)O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir HughWhiteside, Borras Noel H.
Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)Ormiston, ThomasWilliams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M.Patrick, Colin M.Wills, Wilfrid D.
Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.Peake, Captain OsbertWilson, G. H. A. (Cambridge U.)
Henderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsford)Pearson, William G.Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.Peat, Charles U.Womersley, Walter James
Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)Penny, Sir GeorgeWorthington, Dr. John V.
Hopkinson, AustinPeto, Geoffrey K. (W'verh'pt'n, Bllst'n)
Hornby, FrankPickering, Ernest H.TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Horsbrugh, FlorencePowell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.Captain Sir George Bowyer and
Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.Pybus, Sir Percy JohnLieut.-Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward.
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)Raikes, Henry V. A. M.

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)Cripps, Sir StaffordGrundy, Thomas W.
Attlee, Clement RichardDaggar, GeorgeHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)
Batey, JosephDavies, David L. (Pontypridd)Jenkins, Sir William
Bevan, Aneurin (Ebbw Vale)Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
Buchanan, GeorgeEdwards, CharlesKirkwood, David
Cocks, Frederick SeymourGreenwood, Rt. Hon. ArthurLawson, John James
Cove, William G.Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)Logan, David Gilbert

Lunn, WilliamNathan, Major H. L.Tinker, John Joseph
McEntee, Valentine L.Paling, WilfredWilliams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Maclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)Parkinson, John AllenWilmot, John
Maxton, James.Rathbone, Eleanor
Milner, Major JamesSmith, Tom (Normanton)TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Mr. Groves and Mr. John.

Wages, Etc, Of Officers And Men Of The Royal Navy And Royal Marines, And Civilians Employed On Fleet Services

Resolved,

"That a sum, not exceeding £12,633,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Wages, etc., of Officers and Men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, and Civilians employed on Fleet Services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1935."

Division No. 156.]

AYES.

[11.18 p.m.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelEdmondson, Major A. J.Latham, Sir Herbert Paul
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Ellis, Sir R. GeoffreyLaw, Sir Alfred
Albery, Irving JamesElliston, Captain George SampsonLeckie, J. A.
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.Elmley, ViscountLeech, Dr. J. W.
Anstruther-Gray, W. J.Emrys-Evans, P. V.Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Aske, Sir Robert WilliamEntwistle, Cyril FullardLevy, Thomas
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyErskine-Bolst, Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)Liddall, Walter S.
Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)Evans, David Owen (Cardigan)Lindsay, Kenneth Martin (Kilm'rnock)
Barrie, Sir Charles CouparEvans, R. T. (Carmarthen)Lindsay, Noel Ker
Beauchamp, sir Brograve CampbellFleming, Edward LascellesLloyd, Geoffrey
Beaumont, Hon. R.E.B. (Portsm'th, C.)Ford, Sir Patrick J.Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)
Boothby, Robert John GrahamFox, Sir GiffordLoder, Captain J. de Vere
Borodale, ViscountGibson, Charles GranvilleLovat-Fraser, James Alexander
Bossom, A. C.Gillett, Sir George MastermanLumley, Captain Lawrence R.
Boulton, W. W.Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir JohnLyons, Abraham Montagu
Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.Glossop, C. W. H.Mabane, William
Boyce, H. LeslieGluckstein, Louis HalleMacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. C. G. (Partick)
Bracken, BrendanGoff, Sir ParkMacAndrew, Capt. J. O. (Ayr)
Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)Goodman, Colonel Albert W.MacDonald, Rt. Hn. J. R. (Seaham)
Broadbent, Colonel JohnGower, Sir RobertMacDonald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw)
Brocklebank, C. E. R.Greene, William P. C.McEwen, Captain J. H. F.
Brown, Col. D. C. (N'th'l'd., Hexham)Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnMcKie, John Hamilton
Brown, Ernest (Leith)Grimston, R. V.Maclay, Hon. Joseph Paton
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.Macquisten, Frederick Alexander
Burghley, LordGuinness, Thomas L. E. B.Maitland, Adam
Burgin, Dr. Edward LeslieGunston, Captain D. W.Makins, Brigadier-General Ernest
Cadogan, Hon. EdwardHacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Campbell, Sir Edward Taswell (Brmly)Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)Marsden, Commander Arthur
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)Hanbury, CecilMason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)
Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmHanley, Dennis A.Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John
Caporn, Arthur CecilHarvey, George (Lambeth, Kenningt'n)Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)
Carver, Major William H.Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)Milne, Charles
Castlereagh, ViscountHaslam, Sir John (Bolton)Mitchell, Harold P. (Br'tf'd & Chisw'k)
Cayzer, Maj. Sir H. R. (Prtsmth., S.)Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M.Mitcheson, G. G.
Chapman, Col. R. (Houghton-le-Spring)Heilgers, Captain F. F. A.Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale
Chorlton, Alan Ernest LeofricHenderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsford)Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. Eyres
Clayton, Sir ChristopherHeneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur p.Morris, John Patrick (Salford, N.)
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)
Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.Hornby, FrankMorrison, William Shepherd
Conant, R. J. E.Horsbrugh, FlorenceMuirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.
Cook, Thomas A.Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.Munro, Patrick
Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.
Craddock, Sir Reginald HenryHume, Sir George HopwoodNorth, Edward T.
Crooke, J. SmedleyHunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)Nunn, William
Cross, R. H.Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)O'Connor, Terence James
Cruddas, Lieut.-Colonel BernardHunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir AylmerO'Donovan, Dr. William James
Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh
Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)Jesson, Major Thomas E.Ormiston, Thomas
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Joel, Dudley J. BarnatoOrmsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.
Denville, AlfredJohnston, J. W. (Clackmannan)Patrick, Colin M.
Drewe, CedricJones, Lewis (Swansea, West)Peake, Captain Osbert
Duckworth, George A. V.Kerr, Hamilton W.Pearson, William G.
Duggan, Hubert JohnKeyes, Admiral Sir RogerPeat, Charles U.
Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N)Lamb, Sir Joseph QuintonPeto, Geoffrey K. (W'verh'pt'n, Bllston)
Eastwood, John FrancisLambert, Rt. Hon. GeorgePickering, Ernest H.

Works, Buildings, And Repaies At Home And Abroad

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That a sum, not exceeding £2,277,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Works, Buildings and Repairs at Home and Abroad, including the cost of Superintendence, Purchase of Sites, Grants and other Charges connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1935."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 236; Noes, 32.

Powell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.Selley, Harry R.Thompson, Sir Luke
Pybus, Sir Percy JohnShaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Raikes, Henry V. A. M.Shaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)Todd, Lt.-Col. A. J. K. (B'wick-on-T.)
Ramsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)Simmonds, Oliver EdwinTouche, Gordon Cosmo
Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western lsles)Smiles, Lieut.-Col. Sir Walter D.Tree, Ronald
Rankin, RobertSmith, Bracewell (Dulwich)Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)Somervell, Sir DonaldTufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Remer, John R.Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)Wallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Renwick, Major Gustav A.Soper, RichardWard, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Rhys, Hon. Charles Arthur U.Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Rickards, George WilliamSouthby, Commander Archibald R. J.Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.
Robinson, John RolandSpens, William PatrickWatt, Captain George Steven H.
Ropner, Colonel L.Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)Wells, Sydney Richard
Rose, Ronald D.Stanley, Hon. O. F. G. (Westmorland)Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Rote Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)Stevenson, JamesWilliams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Ruggles-Brise, Colonel E. A.Stewart, J. H. (File, E.)Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Runge, Norah CecilStones, JamesWills, Wilfrid D.
Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)Storey, SamuelWilson, G. H. A. (Cambridge U.)
Russell, Hamer Field (Sheffield, B'tside)Stourton, Hon. John J.Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)Strauss, Edward A.Womersley, Walter James
Salmon, Sir IsidoreSueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.Worthington, Dr. John V.
Salt, Edward W.Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney)Tate, Mavis ConstanceTELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Sandeman, Sir A. N. StewartTaylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)Sir George Penny and Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Lambert-Ward.
Savery, Samuel ServingtonThomas, James P. L. (Hereford)

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)Nathan, Major H. L.
Attlee, Clement RichardGrundy, Thomas W.Paling, Wilfred
Batey, JosephHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Parkinson, John Allen
Bevan, Aneurin (Ebbw Vale)Jenkins, Sir WilliamRathbone, Eleanor
Buchanan, GeorgeJones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Cocks, Frederick SeymourKirkwood, DavidTinker, John Joseph
Cripps, Sir StaffordLawson, John JamesWilliams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Daggar, GeorgeLogan, David GilbertWilmot, John
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Lunn, William
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)McEntee, Valentine L.TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Edwards, CharlesMaclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)Mr. John and Mr. Groves.
Greenwood, Rt. Hon. ArthurMaxton, James

Victualling And Clothing For The Navy

Resolved,

"That a sum, not exceeding £3,165,700, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Victualling and Clothing for the Navy, including the cost of Victualling Establishments at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1935."

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.

Post Office (Sites) Bill

Mr. Brocklebank, Commander Cochrane, Mr. Griffiths, and Mr. Lewis Jones

nominated Members of the Select Committee on the Post Office (Sites) Bill.—[ Sir F. Thomson.]

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

Adjournment

Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Captain Margesson.]

Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-nine Minutes after Eleven o'Clock.