I should like to know what is the exact position of the House on this matter. Here we are on a Friday morning, only a few privileged select persons, and we are asked to consider these Amendments without knowing what they are and what their bearing is. It is a very important Bill—marriage goes to the whole root of family life—and it is not a matter that should be dealt within this way. The Bill has had very little discussion. It is not a contentious measure, but one which nearly everyone of us wants to see pased into law and here we are having thrown at us certain Amendments from another place. We have no proper means of knowing what they are, and we are asked to discuss them in the air, just having them read out to us. I should like to ask for some explanation. There must be someone in authority, whether the Parliamentary Secretary or one of the Law Officers. I think we ought to be told the exact position of the House before we enter into any discussion of the matter. It is quite common form for some explanation to be made why it is necessary to accept the Lords Amendments as a whole before we come to detailed consideration of them. As a humble private Member who does not take very much part in these Debates, I feel myself in a state of confusion, and I ask for this information if someone will give it to me.

I want to join for once with the hon. Member in this very important issue. I follow probably as much as most Members of the House the

In page 1, line 15, after "Act," insert:

"except in so far as it amends the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892."

When we raised a protest a moment or two ago and asked for some information from the Treasury Bench as to what these Amendments meant, we did not have a reply at all. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman representing the Minister of Health will not be so discourteous as not to explain to us what these Amendments actually mean. We cannot possibly understand them merely by having them read from Chair, and, therefore, the Attorney-General, or the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health, ought to explain to the House exactly what each of the Amendments implies. The Bill is, I think, a very reasonable measure, although we have never had it discussed on the Floor of the House of Commons. The Bill says that in future marriages shall be solemnized in this country between the hours of eight o'clock in the morning—

I would remind the hon. Member that this is not a Second Reading Debate.

We ought to have an explanation at any rate as to what the Amendment actually means. I do not want to offend the hon. Gentleman, but I doubt whether he himself knows what it means yet. When he has had time to study the Amendment, perhaps he will have the courtesy to tell the House what the Amendment actually means in relation to the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. B. Davies) is so frequently on his feet that I must apologise to him that I did not get the opportunity of explaining the Amendment before he had jumped up and had reached the Box. The Amendment is really a very simple one. It is a technical Amendment, and I am very much obliged to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health for his careful scrutiny of this Bill and for finding out that it might give offence to some parties if the Amendment were not accepted. The Bill itself does not apply to Scotland, but it was pointed out in another place that the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, provides a procedure under which British subjects may be validly married in foreign countries. It states in Section 8 of that Act that the marriages should be solemnized between eight in the forenoon and three in the afternoon. The present Bill substitutes 6 p.m. for the 3 p.m. contained in this Section, so that, assuming that the Bill becomes law, if a person domiciled in England wishes to be married in France, at, say, five o'clock, the marriage will be valid. And the framers of the Bill, of course, intend this to apply to all British subjects.

On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. You were good enough to call me to order for doing exactly what the hon. Gentleman is now doing.

I do not think that the hon. Member can find fault with me on that point. The hon. Member for Fairfield (Mr. Brocklebank) is trying to explain the actual Amendment before the House. He is not making a Second Reading speech.

With regard to the domicile of the man in England no question arises, but, if a man domiciled in Scotland or Northern Ireland asked to be married in, say, France, at five o'clock, some question might arise as to whether the marriage were legal or not. Therefore, I repeat that I am very much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Health for suggesting in another place these very simple words which make it quite certain that were that question to arise, a marriage in France, or Spain, or in any other foreign country would be valid up to six o'clock for all British subjects.

The position is remarkably awkward. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Fairfield (Mr. Brocklebank) has very carefully explained the position as far as he understands it, but he is not a Scottish Member nor is he a law officer. The Amendment, as far as I understand it, is to safeguard the provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, so that a Scotsman can get married in France up to six o'clock in the afternoon. That is the whole point of the Amendment as far as I am able to understand it. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about Northern Ireland?"] I wish to deal with Scotland first. I am not sure whether other Amendments may not deal with Northern Ireland. We do not know the position yet. It is wrong that we as English Members should abrogate to ourselves the laying down of Amendments of this kind on a Friday morning as far as Scotland is concerned.

There is no Scottish Law Officer present representing the Scottish Office, and there is no Scottish Member in the House. There is, however, one representative of Scotland here, the Minister of Mines, but he comes from Torquay. He obviously knows the question inside out. With his great knowledge of procedure, his great knowledge of Scottish law and his great knowledge of marriage, he might explain to the House whether it is really the desire of Scottish people that they should be able to marry in France up to six o'clock in the evening. No Scotsman has ever approached me on the subject. I have had no letters on the point. On behalf of some of my friends in Scotland, I do not think it is right that we should deal with this matter purely on the experience of English Members. I think I approve of the Amendment, certainly I wish to approve of it, but I must have an explanation of it and not allow it to go through in any harum scarum way. We all appreciate what the hon. Member for the Fairfield Division of Liverpool (Mr. Brocklebank) has done in regard to the Bill, and we appreciate the clear statement that he has made, but we would like to understand the matter better. We know that the Minister of Mines is so generous that he always likes to draw on his great fund of knowledge. Perhaps he will help us in the matter. There in no other Scottish Liberal Member present, and no Scottish Socialist Member has come to the help of Scotland in this time of trouble.

We are in a difficulty in not having the Lords Amendments before us. There is one particular point in regard to the Amendment on which I should like some explanation, and I should like to know whether it has been considered. It has not yet been possible to fix summer time in this country the same as in other countries, and there may be a Scotsman who will find himself with more hours in France during two or three weeks in the year during which he could marry, as a result of the difference in summer time. It may be desirable that that should be so, but we ought to have some explanation either from the Parliamentary Secretary or from the hon. Member in charge of the Bill as to what the position would be in that case.

In page 1, line 18, at the end, insert:

"and this Act and the Marriage Acts, 1811 to 1932, may be cited together as the Marriage Acts, 1811 to 1934; and this Act and the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, may be cited together as the Foreign Marriage Acts, 1892 and 1934."

I hope the hon. Member will now stand up and explain exactly what all this means.

It is a purely drafting Amendment and is introduced merely for the convenience of citation. With that very full explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) will be satisfied.

I am not. I think that the hon. Member should be fair to the House. We have never had an explanation as to what all these Acts of Parliament, which are cited, mean. What does this Bill do, and in what way does it affect the law as it now stands?

I want to say a few words on what is called a citation Amendment. Like every one else, I have not a copy of the Lords Amendments, but I have had the privilege of looking at a copy of this Amendment. In the first place, it cites the Marriage Act of 1811. That is quite a long time ago, and during all the years since then all sorts of things have happened. We come down here to-day, find all these Acts cited, and are asked to pass a law based on citation. The hon. and learned Member for South Nottingham (Mr. Knight), who is usually bursting to explain things on a Friday afternoon, will check me if I am wrong—

You will find it in the Library.

I am very sorry, but I do not know what is the matter with me. That is the first thing we are asked to decide, but no one has given any explanation, and here we are citing an Act which is over 100 years old. As a small illustration, it is a perfect example of the way in which we ought not to do our business. We are citing a whole lot of Acts which go back for 100 years. You might as well cite Acts of Parliament which are much older, but in any case how is a Scotsman or an Englishman who wishes to get married to get hold of the Act of 1811 and be sure that he is all right.? It is very difficult. Then we wander on to an Act of 1832, also over 100 years old. Here are two Acts of Parliament, both over 100 years old, which are cited. Think of all the speeches which many hon. Members have made, brilliant speeches, about legislation by reference. Then you come a little nearer and you get an Act of 1834, and afterwards an Act of 1892. I am not quite sure, but at any rate there are six or seven old Statutes which are cited, and we are being asked this morning to insert them in this part of the Bill. The hon. Member as far as he could gave an explanation of the matter, and I am sure that the House will appreciate the immense trouble that he has taken. I do not ask him to read out all these Acts of Parliament on this occasion, but there is at least one which is vital to our argument. It is time some private Member should say that when a private Member's Bill is brought in it should be fairly clear what is meant to be done. It is indeed time that the legal authorities of the Government brought our laws into order, so that on an important question such as marriage—

The Attorney-General is present—

I am coming to him in a moment—we should have the fullest legal authority on the matter. The Attorney-General, as the hon. Member says, is present. His knowledge of the English law is undoubtedly very great, and I believe he has some knowledge of

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time".

This is a Clause which, I think, ought to be added to the Bill. It provides that no order may be made under the Act and that nothing in the Act shall affect the rights of any creditor or testator, or the rights of any person in relation to property of a testator which is not disposed of by the will of the testator and is not a subject of a donatio mortis causa. Hon. Members who are responsible for the Bill will realise that I submit this addition to their Bill in an earnest desire to put the Bill in as proper form as I can; but I also wish to make it plain that the Bill is not a Government Bill and is not my Bill. I have undertaken a great deal of work in connection with the Bill, work which it really was not my duty to do. The hon. Gentleman who is in charge of the Bill, I think, perhaps will say that it is not his real child but only his adopted child. The hon. Gentleman has been most helpful to me and most obliging. In fact, my only complaint is that he has taken almost too readily anything that I put before him, until I found myself in a somewhat ambiguous position. But I wish to make my position perfectly plain at the earliest moment.

Although I offer these technical Amendments to the House for their consideration, it must be made quite plain that I do not take the responsibility for seeing that every question that may be raised by the Bill has been provided for. I have moved this new Clause because this was something which seemed to me to stare one in the face when the Bill emerged from Committee. Everyone will agree that it would be quite improper for the rights of a creditor against an estate to be defeated by an order which might be made by the court after the death of the testator in pursuance of this Act. I do not suppose that the hon. Gentleman will object to that proposal.

I should say a few words in explanation of the second part of the new Clause. The way in which that will operate is this: A person might by his will dispose of half his property to a complete stranger and as to the other half make no disposition at all under the will. In accordance with the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, that property undisposed of under the will would go as Parliament has directed, to the next-of-kin—the widow or husband as the case might be or to the children if any. In other words that part of the property undisposed of would be distributed to the next-of-kin—the surviving spouse and the children if any—in the proportions settled by Parliament. The intention of this part of the Clause is to provide that no high court judge or county court judge shall have power, by an order made under this Measure, to interfere with the proportions which Parliament has thought proper to lay down in regard to the apportionment of the undisposed of part of the estate of a deceased person among the next-of-kin.

All those associated with the promotion of this Bill have every cause to be thankful, indeed deeply grateful, to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General for his help. While giving that help he has made it perfectly plain, as he did to the House this morning, that the Bill is not his Bill and that he is merely anxious, if it is to be passed at all, that it should be a workmanlike Measure. This proposed new Clause, is, I think, the result of an undertaking which he gave to the Committee upstairs that he would consider these points, and, if necesary, bring for-word a suitable form of words to deal with them. My right hon. and learned Friend has twitted me with being rather too amiable in the manner in which I have received his assistance. I think the House would only expect me to receive with gratitude the Attorney-General's assistance in a matter of this kind. This is a Bill dealing entirely with points of law and those in charge of it could not fail to appreciate the value of the assistance which has been given not only by my right hon. and learned Friend but by other hon. and learned Members. This New Clause and the New Clause which is to be moved later, as far as I can follow them, deal satisfactorily with the points which the Attorney-General undertook to consider and I shall be very glad to accept them.

The New Clause states that nothing in this Act or any order made thereunder is to affect the rights of any creditor of a testator. What would be the position if the surviving spouse or child were a creditor of the testator? Would he or she have a double right first as a creditor and secondly under Clause 1 of the Bill, as not being mentioned in the will? There are cases, not only of ordinary debts but also of jointure charges, wherein a wife may be the creditor of her husband who is the testator. Because she is a creditor the testator takes particular care not to mention her in his will. In order to meet such a case as that, would the Attorney-General consider inserting after the word "creditor" in paragraph (a) the words "other than a spouse or child who is not benefiting under the will." I do not wish to delay the consideration of the new Clause but that appears to be a point of some substance and if there is any doubt about the matter it could be altered in another place. Everybody wants to see a surviving spouse or children not provided for under a will, receiving proper consideration according to the terms of the Bill but not if he or she is already entitled as an ordinary creditor or under a jointure.

There is one small point which arises on paragraph (b) of the proposed new Clause. The proposed new Clause provides that nothing in the Act is to affect the rights of any person in relation to the property of a testator which is undisposed of by his will. That of course means that if a testator has made a will disposing of part of his property but leaving another part undisposed of, then his next-of-kin will get a certain benefit. But Clause 1 of the Bill provides that, if a testator has not by his will made reasonable provision for the maintenance of a spouse or child the court can make such provision as it thinks reasonable for such spouse or child. I suppose that when the court considers whether or not a testator by his will has made reasonable provision, the court will probably take into account the fact that in an instance such as I have given, the spouse or child is already taking some part of the property under intestacy. That ought to be made perfectly plain.

With great deference I think both these points are answered by reference to Sub-section (2) of Clause 1 of the Bill which provides that the court shall on any application for any allowance consider

"any other matter or thing which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant or material in relation to the applicant."

I think the fact that the applicant was a creditor of the testator or the fact that the applicant was already taking some benefit in another way, are certainly relevant matters which the court would take into consideration.

The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) referred to the question of a jointure and we are told that that point is covered by Sub-section (2) of Clause 1. Here we have two lawyers, with considerable knowledge of the Bill, holding different opinions on this matter. I personally intend to vote for the proposed new Clause as it stands because I have confidence in the Attorney General—

Hear, hear.

I hope that my noble Friend the Member for the Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) will also be able to give it her support. While my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) has accepted the proposed New Clause we ought to be told whether the Government are going to vote for it. The original speech of the Attorney-General did not make that clear. Ordinary laymen are bound to accept the best legal advice and we have had it from the Attorney-General and I am prepared to support the new Clause, provided the Attorney-General himself intends to vote for it.

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time"

This second new Clause which I am offering to the House provides for the commencement of the Bill when it becomes law. At present there is nothing to say, or at any rate there is nothing clear to say, when precisely it will come into operation. It is dealt with in Clause 6 after a fashion, where the expression "testator" is defined in a particular way, but I do not think it is quite satisfactory in that form. It is much better that everybody should understand when the Bill is to come into operation. I am bound to say that I have had a great number of letters, as no doubt my hon. Friend opposite in charge of the Bill has, from people whose expectations have been raised very high indeed by this Bill. I have been asked to give directions that the Bill shall apply to estates which were subject to testamentary disposition as long ago as the nineties of the last century, but I have informed my correspondents that, although I have a great many powers, they are not so far-reaching as that, and I have told them that they had much better communicate with my hon. Friend opposite, who would perhaps put it into his Bill. Subject to any proposal of that sort, I suggest if only in order to give the House an opportunity of considering when the Bill should begin, that it should be made not to apply in the case of any testator who may have died before the Bill receives the Royal Assent. I do not know whether my hon. Friend agrees with me or not on that point.

In my ignorance I should have thought the Clause to which my right hon. And learned Friend has referred, namely, Clause 6, made it perfectly clear that the Bill as an Act would not apply until the end of the present year. If he, however, with his very much greater knowledge, is in a position to tell the House that his Clause is necessary, I have nothing to say. To my lay mind it seems unnecessary, but I am prepared to accept it on the statement of the Attorney-General that it is necessary. I would only add that I am very pleased to hear that my right hon. and learned Friend has asked his correspondents to send their suggestions to me. I can tell him that the one suggestion to which he referred, with regard to the nineties, has not yet reached me, but I have had many requests to bring the Bill into operation, in such a way that it would deal with estates which were closed at least 20 years ago, so that my experience is very similar to that of my right hon. and learned Friend, and the amount of correspondence to which it has given rise is very great indeed.

It is very difficult for a layman to enter into a legal argument, but I always understood that no Act of Parliament could be made retrospective, and I think this Clause is reasonable from that angle. Having said that, I always thought the hon. Gentleman who is responsible for this Bill wanted a Measure of this kind to be passed into law in order to remove hardships that prevailed at the moment. Unless I am mistaken, this Bill was brought before Parliament because of certain hardships that exist now, and it seems to me, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman is once again too ready to accept the opinion of the learned Attorney-General. I do not mind the opinions of the right hon. and learned Gentleman on law, but on politics I do not think we should accept them.

I would ask the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill whether it is not a fact that the hardships which brought this Bill into being will still remain among us in spite of the passing of this Measure. I should have thought that at any rate the Bill might be made retrospective to a given date, say, for one or two years in order to clear up those cases. This is a private Member's Bill, and we are all entitled to give our opinions on it, but I do not know whether it is too late to ask the learned Attorney-General to consider whether it is possible not to make the Bill retrospective for 20 or 30 years. There are one or two cases on record which are really very terrible in this connection, and I should have thought the Government would have made the Bill retrospective just to include them.

I think the last speaker has not quite considered what he said, because the Bill deals with the distribution of estates, and although we lawyers are very slow, we have not held up the distribution of estates for five or six years if we could avoid it. What has happened is that such estates have already been divided up in accordance with the wishes of the testators. It would be very nice to make this retrospective, but in that case you would have to call in all these estates, and the executors would have to redistribute them according to the terms of this Measure.

Does the hon. Member mean to say that the estate of a rich man who died two months ago will have been cleared up already by the lawyers?

Not two months ago, but I understood the hon. Member to say some years ago. The Bill might be made to refer back, say, to the beginning of this year, but that is not the evil which I understood he wishes to cure. He wishes to cure some cases in which estates have been distributed already, unjustly as he thinks. It is not a practical suggestion that where an estate has already been distributed, you should call it back and redistribute it.

This Bill introduces an extraordinary principle into the jaw of this country. A man who leaves money has the right to the disposal of it, but the whole question only applies to a very small section of the community, because I regret to say that the majority of the population die without leaving any money behind them at all. My father used to say that the greatest endowment a father could give to his son was to throw him entirely on his own resources, and that he then always made good, whereas once he got a substantial portion it was another matter. As an hon. Member said the other day about great expectations, those who were waiting for dead men's shoes had great difficulty in making good. I remember a very distinguished professional secretary with a very large business, and I commented upon the capacity of a young man who was doing some work for him in which I was interested. He replied, "He has the advantage that he is the son of a gentleman, and he has not got a penny in the world. It is a rigid rule in this office that we never take a young man in whose father has any money, because you can never get any work out of such a young man." The fact has always impressed me that it is a very difficult thing for wealthy people to bring up their children.

The hon. and learned Member's remarks are very interesting, but they are not related to the Clause before the House.

I will come to the Bill.

May I say to the hon. and learned Gentleman that it is difficult but not impossible to bring up your children to work, even if they have a wealthy home.

I bow to the opinion which the noble lady has expressed. I agree that it is difficult; almost impossible is nearly the same thing as impossible, and when the noble Lady and I are in agreement on one of these occasions, it must make both of us doubt whether we can possibly be right. This Bill is for the purpose of altering a man's testimentary dispositions. We have had some experience of that in Scotland—

The hon. and learned Member is not speaking to the Clause, which deals with the case of a testator dying before the commencement of the Act.

I am sorry; I was late in coming in. I thought it was the question of the passing of the Bill. I hope that I shall have an opportunity of resuming my speech later.

Might I ask the learned Attorney-General to reconsider the Clause? So far as I understand what is intended, at a later point he is going to delete the interpretation at the beginning of Clause 6. As there is no other definition as to when this Bill comes into force, will not the effect be to make the Bill come into force earlier than my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) intended? Much as we like the provisions of the Bill, there are a great many administrative and legal difficulties involved. Is it a wise thing to make this Bill suddenly come into force, probably about Whitsuntide? Would it not be far wiser to make it operate from the beginning of January, 1935? I maintain that there is a parallel in my Bill, which was introduced last year—the Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals) Bill—which was passed at the same time of the year that this Bill is evidently going to be passed, and did not come into operation till January. Surely, the revolution in practice is much greater in this Bill than it was in that Bill. That is one consideration I would ask the learned Attorney-General to consider about this Clause.

There is another consideration. My hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster defines the word "testator" in the Bill. If we follow the suggestion of the learned Attorney-General to take out that definition there will be no definition in the Bill. The promoter had some very good reason for defining "testator," because he wishes to put something in as to an intestator. I think the word "testator" is rather a mistake in this Bill. For those reasons I would ask the House to consider carefully before they agree to this Clause, the very great difficulty in carrying it out, for I am sure my right hon. and learned Friend will agree with me that this Bill is not an easy Measure to carry out, and probably a most expensive one. Therefore, I think it most unwise for the House to accept this Clause unless we get some assurance that the Act will not come into force until 1st January, 1935, and I hope that there will be, either in this House or when the Bill goes to another place, an adequate definition of the word "testator" which will include all the conditions my hon. Friend the promoter included in his original Bill.

I am always interested, and I am sure the House is, when the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) intervenes in our Debates. He is amusing and entertaining Perhaps he is most effective when he is entertaining, but I hope that the House will not assume that this is a Bill in which only legal Members should take part. At least one or two hon. Members who, like myself, are not connected with the law, are taking an interest in this Measure, and I hope that other hon. Members will show interest and take part in the various matters which are raised. Of course, we always have a certain diffidence in attempting to intervene in debates which are couched in purely legal terms. I would like to refer to the suggestion of the hon. Member opposite first of all to make legislation retrospective. That is a dangerous principle.

Might I look at his suggestion from another point of view—that of an accountant. It is of course, well known that accountants have a great deal to do with the distribution of estates. My hon. Friend with, perhaps, some justification, referred to the reputation that members of the legal profession have that they are dilatory or wanting in the quality of acceleration. Speaking from an accountant's point of view, I hope that the same charge cannot be made with justification against accountants. I would point out that there are many cases where an estate is distributed within a very few months, and if the hon. Member's suggestion that there should be retrospective legislation were put into force, it would, in practice and in fact, create serious difficulties. In trying to cover one or two exceptional cases, he would also cover a large number of other estates, including smaller estates, which have been distributed, and where it would be utterly impossible for the assets to be followed. I, therefore, hope that he will not press his suggestion, although I appreciate the significance of it.

The suggestion of the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), that the date upon which the Bill should come into operation should be a later date than that suggested by the learned Attorney-General, is, I think, worthy of consideration. There are serious objections to certain parts of this Measure. There is an objection. to the fact that a small estate might be the subject of litigation which is entirely outside the scope and intention of the promoters of the Bill. It is therefore very important before any measure of this kind is put into operation that there should be a reasonable time in order that the public can be informed exactly what the Measure is intended to do. I therefore support with pleasure my hon. Friend and hope the date will be some date later than December, 1934, and certainly not before.

I rise to ask the Attorney-General to make clear what will be the effect of paragraph (b)of the new Clause which has been accepted on this proposed new Clause. As I understand, it means that in cases where a man dies intestate this Bill will have no operation and that, if he leaves a will in which he disposes of some portion of his estate and the rest is intestate, that will go to the next of kin and that in that case also the matter will not arise. I hope my right hon. and learned Friend will make that clear, because I thought that under the new Clause which we have accepted the Bill would have no application in cases of intestature.

I hope we may have a definition from the Front Bench on this matter of "testator" in order to clear up the confusion in the minds of one or two people as to the difference between testators and intestators. When we have two or three lawyers speaking on these Bills I feel that other hon. Members must act as a jury. They explain something which is often done so much better by a layman, except in the case of the learned Attorney-General. I would like to comment on the very dangerous speech of the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies). He said he wanted to make the Bill retrospective. We do not as a general rule make Bills retrospective. He wanted it to be made retrospective in regard to certain cases for a few years. Has he any authority from the leaders of his party for making a statement of that kind? Has he consulted his hon. and learned Friend the Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) as to what happens when we begins to make Bills retrospective?

If the hon. Gentleman listened attentively to what I said he would know that I made it clear that this is a private Member's Bill and that we all speak our own minds on it.

I understand that position, for I was listening as I always do to his speeches when I stay here. Although he spoke with the voice of a Private Member, he is sitting on the Front Bench, and I have always held that there should be a difference between the authority to be attached to a Front Bench speech and that of a Back bench speech. The House should have its attention drawn to the fact that the hon. Member who is acting as leader of the Opposition to-day wishes, with no contradiction from his Party behind him, to make this legislation retrospective. It is essential in these matters to have a definite date for the Bill. I do not like this proposed new Clause, for I think it would be much better if the Bill were kept as it is, and it came into operation at the end of the year. I do not like the wobbling attitude of my hon. Friend who is in charge of the Bill. The Measure interferes with the right of people making wills. If it passes, as I hope it will, we should give the ordinary person who wishes to adjust any error that has been made in the will a chance to do so. He should be given reasonable time—five or six months—to do it. This Bill will affect a great number of people, and they should be able to receive the advice of their legal advisers as to any changes that should be made in order to make their wills in accordance with the Bill. Six months is not too long a time for that to be done. My hon. Friend was wise in his original intention, because it gave time for any changes to be made. If the Bill is put into operation too quickly, it will lead to cases of legal dispute.

My hon. Friend suggests that I have wobbled a little in connection with this particular Clause. I have not yet dealt with the conditions of Clause 6. We have not yet reached that point. There are two matters raised in that Clause.

I never for a moment thought that with regard to Clause 6, and it would not have been in order if I had brought it in. I feel inclined to vote against the new Clause. I like to feel that anything that comes from the Government is good, but on this occasion I feel, with great regret, obliged to ask my hon. Friend to stand firm on his original position. There is a further point as to whether the Home Office comes in under this particular provision. It would be awkward if this Bill led to some trouble which might affect that Department.

My hon. Friend opposite, I am afraid, will have to make up his mind whether he agrees with the new Clause now proposed or whether he prefers Clause 6 as it stands in its present form. He led me to think that he proposed to make the best of both Clauses.

The point about Clause 6 is that it contains a definition which is not covered by the new Clause. It will have to be considered when Clause 6 is reached. That is a different thing from the point in regard to the date on which the Bill should come into operation

Really my hon. Friend is under a misapprehension when he says the Amendment to leave out the definition in Clause 6 will have to be considered. If he means that when it comes to be considered the House can leave the so-called definition in the Bill after it has accepted this new Clause, that would be to make sheer nonsense of the thing.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has put down an Amendment to Clause 6 which proposes to leave out the definition regarding such portions of an estate as come within the meaning of "intestate" and that will be dealt with. I have accepted my hon. Friend's Amendment regarding the date.

I desire to say no more, because my hon. Friend is in charge of the Bill and he will take his own course, and will advise the House to do what he thinks proper, but, for what it is worth, I tender my advice to the House, and the point is simply this. The Clause which my hon. Friend has called the definition Clause describes the testator as a person who dies after the 31st December, 1934. My hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk (Mr. Turton) pointed out that in certain circumstances my own suggested date will be an earlier date than 31st December, 1934. It is for the House to say whether it prefers the date 31st December, 1934, or the date when the Bill becomes law by receiving the Royal Assent, or some later date, or some intermediate date. My proposal is made in the interests of clarity. It is very desirable that the public, especially the unlearned public, shall have in this Bill a very clear definition as to the testators to whom it will apply. At present that information is tucked away in obscure language in a definition of "testator", but it is only a definition used in connection with the date, and not a definition of a testator apart from the question of the date of his death. If my Clause is accepted this definition will not be required.

My hon. Friend opposite will advise the House as he thinks fit and make his own decision. I put forward this Clause to give the House the opportunity of saying what date is preferred, the 31st December, 1934, or the date when the Bill becomes law, or some other date. So far as the definition of testator is concerned, somebody has suggested that we want a definition, but I submit that we do not. A testator is a person who leaves a will or testament. The fact that he does not dispose of some of his property does not prevent him from being a testator. Somebody has invented an expression which I have never heard—"intestator." That may be a Yorkshire expression. But, for once, "testator" means what it says, and I do not think any definition is wanted apart from this question as to which class of testators are to be covered by the Bill—people who die after the Bill passes or people who die after the 31st December, 1934.

Frankly I think that most lawyers in the House will prefer my right hon. and learned Friend's way of dealing with this to that of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne). At the same time I am not alone in wanting this Bill not to come into operation until January, 1935. Perhaps now, or in another place, the Attorney-General would so alter the wording that it shall be quite clear that the Act will not come into force until 1st January, 1935. I quite agree that it is a monstrous thing that the date of operation should be tucked away in a corner where nobody can find it.

If the hon. Gentleman desires that date to be put in it is for him or somebody to move that the words should be "1st January, 1935," instead of the words "the commencement of this Act". I cannot undertake to do that in another place. My duties in connection with this Bill are very limited. I do not know who will be in charge of it in another place, and now is the time.

There is no question in the minds of the promoters that a proper date is a date such as the 1st January, 1935, or the 31st December, 1934. My right hon. and learned Friend put before the House the advantages of bringing the Act into operation at once, and I said that if that was the legal view I should have no objection to that, but I am still in favour of the words in the Bill. I had been advised that there was a further point in Clause 6 which would have to be dealt with, but the right hon. Gentleman now tells me that that is not necessary. We are dealing at the moment, however, with the date only, and if the object of the Amendment is to bring the Act into operation immediately it receives the Royal Assent instead of the 1st January, 1935, I think the House would prefer the words in the Bill.

I think the motion before us is that this Clause be read a Second time, and, if that were got out of the way, it would be in order to move an Amendment to leave out of the new Clause the words "the commencement of the Act" and to insert the words "1st January, 1935." That would produce the effect which a great many Members of this House want. The House hears such a variety of speeches from the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) that I am not sure whether hon. Members appreciated the real importance of the argument which he included in his last speech, and that is the importance of giving testators time to look round. This Measure will produce a great change in the law, and people who have executed a will will not, perhaps, tumble immediately to the effects of the change, and six months is not too long a time to enable them to take stock of the new position. The interests of lawyers and others have been freely referred to this morning, but not so much the interests of testators. I think the least we can do is give them a full six months to revise such documents as they may have made.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Clause, in line 1, to leave out "commencement of this Act," and to insert "first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five."

This is a manuscript Amendment, and I do not think I need to argue it, because the House is fully seized of the problem, and I feel we can agree with the hon. Member for Central Leeds (Mr. Denman) that an opportunity ought to be provided for testators who may think of bringing their wives back into the fold of their wills to do so.

I beg to second the Amendment.

If all wills made in this country were to be affected by this Bill I should agree with the Amendment, but I always understood that it will affect only a very small number of wills. If the date 1st January, 1935, is included no will up to then will be affected. On this question of the date, I would point out the difference in the attitude of the Government towards the same question in another Bill. They are introducing a Bill next Monday to commence on 1st January, 1936, so far as young children are concerned. This Bill, of course is only concerned with a quarrel between the rich people of this country, and nothing else.

No.

This Bill has arisen because some people have too much money to give away. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name"] If we had a Socialist State, this Bill would not be necessary.

Are we to understand that in the happy Socialist State of the future there is to be no inheritance at all?

In the proper order of society these problems cannot arise.

Will the hon. Gentleman tell us what would be a proper order of society.

I imagine that the Attorney-General has put the date in the Bill for the sake of security and clarity. Might I ask the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) one thing? It is the intention of the Bill to deal with cases of very great hardship. Why are we asked that it should come into operation on the 1st January, 1935, when some of those very hard cases may arise immediately upon the passing of the Bill? If the Bill is necessary, it ought to be available so that cases may be dealt with immediately upon the passing of the Bill.

The hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) has given the key-note why this manuscript Amendment should be accepted. He says that very few wills would be affected by the Bill. I think that that is so. The position contemplated by this Bill is an unnatural one which very seldom arises, but if you put it off until January, 1935, the wills will be put in order, and there will be no cases. If you give a reasonable time, as was suggested by the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams), a man who has unnaturally disinherited his lawful wedded wife and his children will say to himself, "I find I cannot do it. I must go and put my will in order," and he will go and put his will in order. That will be a disaster for my profession, because he will not have to go to court about it, and a strain upon a very deserving class will be avoided. The way to avoid it is to put in the proposed words, "January, 1935." I do not gamble and I will not be affected by the Betting Bill, but I would be prepared to bet that there will be none of this class of will in existence, because they will all be put in order, if this Amendment is inserted.

The hon. and learned Member for Argyllshire (Mr. Macquisten) has confirmed my opinion that, as I told the House just now, there will be less work for lawyers, and that is the reason why the Amendment should be accepted by the House. I congratulate the hon. Member for Central Leeds (Mr. Denman) most sincerely upon his agreement with my view.

It was due to the hon. Member's lucidity, which made it impossible to mistake his meaning.

My only object in rising on this occasion is to express the hope that the Amendment will be accepted, as it will meet the whole of the difficulties which have arisen between the promoters of the Bill and the Attorney-General. If they can be dealt with in this way, we shall be able to get on with the Bill and perform a useful morning's work. If this Amendment is accepted, it will smooth out of the way all the real difficulties in the Bill.

For the reasons which I gave a moment ago, I am perfectly willing to accept this Amendment. I have always thought that time should be given for the ground to be prepared. The experience of other countries shows that the result of legislation of this sort is not a large amount of new litigation, but on the contrary it has very often led to the making of just wills. It is desirable that time should be given for the preparation of the new conditions. I am afraid that what has been said from the Socialist Benches regarding the rich is also not quite accurate. We find in practice that this is not a question of the wills of rich people at all. Most of these very hard cases arise out of very small wills. People may build up a business together, and from inadvertence or from spite some change is made at the last moment, very often against the woman or the man who has been the partner in building up the business. Hon. Members must not be led into thinking that we are dealing with rich people; we are dealing with all classes, and probably more with the lower middle-class than with any other.

I oppose the Amendment. This morniz we have heard very useful arguments in favour of the being brought into force at the earliest possible moment. We all hope that the Bill will be passed by the end of July, and in that case there will be five months left before 1st January. In view of what the Attorney-General has said about the correspondence he has received and of the correspondence which has also been received by my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne), it is very desirable that the Bill should be brought into force at the earliest possible moment. There is no adequate reason why it should be postponed to 1st January. Although I do not wish to be disloyal to my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster, who has done so much and acted so wisely in promoting this Bill, I must support the Attorney-General, and I hope that the new Clause will be accepted.

Speaking for myself, I should have thought that if this were a good Bill, and if the hon. Member for Kidderminster believed in his Bill, he would agree with me that it should be brought into force at the earliest possible moment. Apparently, he thinks less of this Bill than I do.

It has nothing to do with thinking well of the Bill. It may be desirable to give time for people to know about it.

Those who support this Amendment forget that it cuts both ways. It will be possible for a testator, the effects of whose enmity, vindictiveness and spite this Bill is trying to cure, to cut people out when the Bill is passed by making over his estate in the form of a debt which will be a first charge upon the assets of the estate when he dies. My hon. Friends who seek to give the testator time to make a just will by postponing the operation of the Bill till the 1st January next are at the same moment giving the vindictive testator the opportunity of taking legal measures to prevent the Bill from affecting him. I see no answer to the proposition that, if this is an evil which we desire to remedy, it ought to be remedied at once, and, far from the Amendment giving the testator an opportunity to make a just will, if he just motive in his mind it will give the same testator, with that unjust motive, an opportunity for making his motive effective, to the detriment of his wife and family. Accordingly, I shall resist the Amendment.

I desire to adopt the same attitude as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cirencester (Mr. W. S. Morrison). It seems to me that, if there is some deficiency in the existing law which is resulting in a number of people suffering real hardship, the manifest duty of this House, when it decides to amend that law, is to see that the hardship is removed at the earliest possible moment. I express no opinion—and, indeed, I should probably be out of Order in expressing any opinion—as to whether the precise form of this Bill is the right way to achieve the object, but, assuming that it is going to be put into shape, it seems to me that the right thing to do is to see that it is brought into force at the earliest possible moment. For these reasons I shall support the Clause which has been moved by the Attorney-General, and shall oppose the Amendment.

I desire to add a few words in agreement with the last two speakers. It appears to me that, if we intend to carry this Measure into effect, we ought to take the earliest opportunity of putting its provisions into practice, and I believe that people who have already studied the reports which have been published will have had ample opportunity of finding out, from the papers and from the general information which is going about, whether a Measure of this nature is likely to be passed or not. I cannot understand why it should be argued that there should be any delay in this matter at all. If a person wishes to change his will, he can do so in a few hours. A person who is vindictive is very likely to find out quickly what has happened in regard to a Measure of this kind, and will take such steps as are necessary without waiting until the 1st January next year; or, on the other hand, he may wait until the day before the 1st January, in the hope, I will not say that he may die, but in the hope that if he does die his vicious intentions may be carried out in spite of the fact that such a Measure is likely to come into operation later. In these circumstances, I think the House ought to accept the Clause.

I desire to support the Amendment. I am always frightened lest hard cases may make bad law. We have to remember that many people in this country have made provision for their wives and families otherwise than by their will, and there may be nothing in their will relating to the surviving wife or one or more children. Obviously, if there is nothing in the will to that effect, there will be a primâ facie case for the particular person who has been left out to go to the courts and say that no reasonable provision has been made. In the case of persons of this sort, many of them belonging to the lower middle class, who make provision outside their will for one particular charge, or perhaps for a wife if they are living apart, or something of that sort, ample time ought to be given to enable them to understand what is intended by the Bill, and to afford them the opportunity of making some provision in their will or explaining why they have made no provision by their will, so that anyone who wants to take advantage of the Act cannot do so without the court being fully seized of all the facts relating to the case.

Would the hon. and learned Gentleman be good enough to tell us whether, in the event of a person consulting him under the provisions of the Bill in such circumstances as he has outlined, he would advise him to take the case or not?

I should advise anybody who had made no provision by his will for a wife or child to make a new will, and to put into the will the reason why he had not made such provision.

That is not my point. Supposing that due provision had been made in his lifetime by the testator, would the hon. and learned Gentleman then, in view of the provisions of this Bill, advise a person who desired to contest the will to do so?

As the Bill is at present drafted, it would entirely depend upon whether I was informed by that person that any due provision had been made. That is the whole point. With the Bill as it is at present drafted, the great difficulty would be to find out what, if any, provision had been made outside the will, and it is because, where people have made provision outside their will, there may be nothing in the will at the present moment relating to that particular member of their family, that I think they ought to have at least six months in which to make a new will.

I should like to say a few words as a friend of the Bill who understands the motives of a number of those who have taken part in this discussion. I want to advance the Bill. The immediate question before the House is whether the Bill should come into operation at the earliest possible date, and I want to commend to the House the view that that course should be taken. The Bill is designed to end a scandal which has affected a good many people for a good many years, and the practical consideration put by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ash-ford (Mr. Spens) is that this delayed change in the law should be still further delayed, so that persons who are affected by it may be able to make further preparations to avoid it. The hon. and learned Member for Cirencester (Mr. W. S. Morrison) actually went so far as to propose a device by which this Measure could be defeated, and, as a matter of fact, that device can be used at any time, even if the Measure comes into operation. The creation of a charge to avoid the purposes of the Act will be open to anyone after the Act comes into operation if they choose to take that course, so that the hon. and learned Member is not, if he will allow me to say so, really assisting the House to get on with the Bill, but, on the contrary, is getting it off the Bill by making that suggestion. He reminds me of something that was said by a very great Member of this House—that the practice of the law was not calculated to liberalise the understanding; and, as I have listened to this discussion, a good deal of it has appeared to me to be an exemplification of that statement, especially the speech of the hon. and learned Member, whose constituency at the moment escapes me, whose desire seems to be to prevent any change in the law.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has no right to say anything of the sort. If he had followed the proceedings of the House he would have known that frequently I have raised my voice in favour of amending the law.

I was unable to indicate the hon. Member to whom I referred and, since the hon. and learned Gentleman apparently thinks that the description applies to him—

That really will not do. The hon. and learned Gentleman pointed deliberately at me. There are only two of us sitting on this bench. He said the name of my constituency escaped him. That I can well understand. If he did the decent thing, he would withdraw.

On a point of Order. Is it in Order for one Member of the House to point at another?

The direction in which I was looking and pointing—I apologise if I was out of Order in pointing—happened to be a direction in which were sitting three learned counsel in the law, and the fact that one of those three gentlemen chooses to get up and accept for himself a description which I did not put upon him the House will judge in its own way. I was going to say, in conclusion, that I hope the House will follow the advice of the Attorney-General and enable this change to come in the law as speedily as possible.

The hon. and learned Gentleman says the tendency to follow the law does not liberalise the mind. In the case of some gentlemen who follow the law it seems to labourise the mind and not increase their intelligence. Most people hate to think of the way the Chancellor of the Exchequer comes and plunders their estates. I am glad to think that one of the reforms that has been introduced in Italy is that there are no Death Duties. A testator with a grown-up family may select one particular member of it and settle him in life with capital or in a business. Some may not want to consult lawyers, least of all learned counsel, and, if you do not give them reasonable time to turn round, there will be cases of very great hardship and fresh litigation which everyone wishes to avoid. After all, it is only a miserable minority of mankind, half-witted people, that the Bill is meant to deal with.

rose—

I think the hon. Member has exhausted his right.

No, with great respect I have not spoken. I want to support the Amendment. The hon. and learned Gentleman below me has made a very powerful case, but let us test it. None of us desire that a person should make a will actuated by motives of vindictiveness or ill-will to his wife or family. A similar Bill to this was introduced by the hon. Lady the Member for the combined Universities (Miss Rathbone), and, in one speech, she took a rough and ready estimate of the number of people who might be affected by a Measure of the kind. She assumed—a figure which was not accepted in any sense as correct—that one out of every thousand might be regarded as a person who would be unjust. I will accept her figure for the purposes of my argument. It still leaves a vast number of just wills, and the House should be careful, in introducing what the Attorney-General has said is a very important change in the law and in attempting to remedy a grievance, that we do not inflict a greater hardship on a larger number of people.

There is on the Paper an Amendment which is very germane to this matter. It seeks to give to a testator the right to make a statutory declaration at the time that he makes his will as to the reasons why he does not make what the court may in the absence of such a declaration wrongly decide as to what is or is not reasonable provision for his wife and family. If that Amendment should be accepted as being in the general interest of a vast number of people, surely it would be a reasonable thing for the House to say, "We will give those people who are concerned an opportunity of explaining their reasons why they are making the provisions of their will in a certain way." If the Attorney-General's proposal is carried, there will be a large number of people making just wills who will have no opportunity of making a declaration. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) and his friends have shown a most persuasive desire to accept Amendments couched in terms calculated to help the purpose of the Bill. I am sure if they accept the Amendment they are helping to improve the Measure, and at the same time they are avoiding the possibility of doing grave injustice to a number of people who would otherwise suffer.

I support the Amendment, But on grounds which have not yet been put before the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman below me said that in

I beg to move, in page 1, line 7, after "will," to insert "or otherwise."

The Amendment, which stands in the names of my hon. Friends whose absence I very much deplore, is one upon which they set considerable store, and for that reason, although I am not acquainted with the full brief on behalf of the Amendment, I move it more or less formally. I think that this is a matter giving a certain width of scope to the Bill which the hon. Member in charge of it will be able to accept.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This is obviously a matter which ought to be provided for. The first words of Sub-section (1) of Clause 1 are to this effect:

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, if a testator has not by his will made reasonable provision for the maintenance of a spouse or child, the court may at its discretion"

make such reasonable provision as it thinks fit. If the testator has in any way, other than by his will, made reasonable provision for the spouse or child, it is a matter which ought to affect the jurisdiction of the court, and obviously be taken into account. I think that this is a matter which the promoters of the Bill should accept.

I hope the promoter of the Bill will accept the Amendment. Clause 1 says:

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, if a testator has not by his will made reasonable provision."

I know of cases where the man had bought annuities for his wife and children. That is a reasonable way of providing for their future, apart from providing for them in the will. Our trouble is, that the Attorney-General gives advice to the hon. Member in charge of the Bill and he declines to accept that advice. In Committee upstairs he accepted all the advice given to him by the Attorney-General, but this morning because he did not accept some sensible advice we spent an hour in discussion, and he was defeated in the end. I hope that if he declines to accept the advice of the Attorney-General he will on this occasion accept the advice of an ordinary layman who, with a great deal of humility, can claim to have some common sense, if not legal knowledge.

I always listen with interest to any advice given to me by the hon. Member. I am rather surprised that he should twit me on not having accepted the advice of the Attorney-General this morning. With regard to the hour that was taken by the discussion, very little was taken up by the remarks of mine. I have the greatest sympathy with the object of the Amendment, but I cannot accept it, because it is unnecessary. If it were necessary I should accept it at once, but the advice that I have received, including the advice of my right hon. Friend the Attorney-General, is to the effect that the Amendment is unnecessary. In Clause 1 (2) the Court is given special power to take every factor into consideration in deciding on any application that may be brought before it, and it is clear that one of the considerations must be any settlement made otherwise than by will, or any money given in the lifetime of the testator. The Court must be made aware of all these facts. I am advised that to put in the proposed words would complicate the position and would not achieve the end which the mover of the Amendment has in view.

The hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) raised the question of an annuity having been arranged, and said that it would be wrong that an annuity or a settlement should be disregarded. The test to be applied is, does that annuity form part of

"the present or future income of the applicant."

If so, the Court is expressly directed to have regard to such annuity. Is it a:

"matter or thing which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant or material in relation to the applicant."

The answer is, yes. It is obviously relevant and material, therefore the court must have regard to it as being relevant to any present or future income and as being relevant and material in relation to the applicant. It follows that the insertion of the words, "or otherwise," or the insertion of the words in the next Amendment, "or by any deed," would be harmless but superfluous.

On a point of Order. May I be permitted to withdraw the Amendment?

That is not a point of Order.

The hon. Member who is sponsoring the Bill—

I owe the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) an apology. I forgot that he was the hon. Member who moved the Amendment. Am I to understand that he wishes to withdraw the Amendment?

Yes. I rose for that purpose, in order to save time, because I think the explanation is adequate. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

On a point of Order. May I ask whether the next Amendment, which stands in my name, and which is very material, will be called. If we are to have a wide discussion on the two Amendments it might save time. Is it your intention to call that Amendment?

It depends on what happens to the present Amendment. Is it the wish of the Committee that the Amendment be withdrawn?

No. I am not entirely satisfied with the explanation that has been given by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) and the explanation given earlier by the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Withers). The words, "or otherwise," are probably too wide, but I cannot understand the attitude of the promoters of the Bill. If they wished to put in words in Sub-section (1) to give the Courts full discretion, I could understand their attitude. If they said: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, if the testator has not made reasonable provision for maintenance," that would be quite an intelligible position to take up, but they have put in the words "by his will." Therefore, they are indicating to the spouse or child that if they are not mentioned in the will and if they are mentioned in a deed they can go to the court. That appears to me to be a misfortune. I agree that to some extent these Amendments are redundant, but it is the misfortune of this country, perhaps, that these laws are read not only by lawyers but by laymen—

As I was saying, although these words may be redundant, they are nevertheless advisable. The Bill will not only be read by lawyers but by laymen and, therefore, it should be quite clearly stated that if a man makes provision by will or deed for his spouse or children that they cannot use the Bill. It is not really any answer to say that under Sub-section (2) the court has a wide discretion. In many matters the court is given a wide discretion. We want to prevent the court being delayed and hindered by a number of applications which will be dismissed on the ground that provision has already been made in some deed or otherwise. The hon. Member for Kidderminster is not serving the cause of poor litigants when he suggests that the words "or by any deed" should be excluded. The Attorney-General knows what great difficulties the courts are under owing to the number of litigations before them and we should be chary before taking any step which will cause a greater amount of confusion and dislocation of work. I can only see one way out. If the hon. Member for Kidderminster cannot accept these words then you will have to appoint additional judges. We want additional judges as it is, and if the hon. Member is going to propose that they should be appointed I am quite willing to withdraw my support of the Amendment. But if we are going to have the same number of judges to do this work—and a great deal of work will be involved when the Bill becomes law—we should put in the words "or otherwise" or my own Amendment, "or by any deed."

Many jointures and portions are made, and in nearly every case where a man has provided his wife with a jointure deed he will exclude her from his will, because he has already made proper provision for her, and will not desire to take away from the little remains for his children. If she is of a malevolent frame of mind or wants the memory of her husband to be embittered in the courts, she will take steps to bring an action to get reasonable maintenance under the Bill. There are many malevolent and litigious persons who wish to keep the courts busy with their own litigation, right or wrong, they have a litigious mania, and in its present form the Bill encourages this litigious mania. I would ask the hon. Member for Kidderminster to think over this matter and if he cannot accept this Amendment to accept mine, which will really be a benefit to his Bill and also a benefit to the spouse and children.

I cannot quite understand the exact nature of the requirements of the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton). I have always regarded what he says with a considerable amount of interest and the points he has brought before the House on previous occasions have proved of great value. But on this occasion I am afraid that the only conclusion to which I can come is that his contentions and suggestions can only result in delaying the passage of the Bill into law, that they will obstruct the passing of the Bill. I hope that that state of mind not prevailing amongst those who are speaking with such enthusiasm about the Bill.

I do not think the hon. Member is entitled to say that, and I hope he will withdraw it. The hon. Member for Kidderminster has explained that he would regard these words as perfectly necessary but for Sub-section (2) of Clause 1, and I cannot see how I am obstructing the Bill in suggesting words which the hon. Member for Kidderminster says are not unnecessary.

I do not want the hon. Member to feel upset about any remark of mine and it may be that what I have said will apply better to other hon. Members. But not only is Sub-section (2) of Clause 1 a covering provision but you have in Sub-section (1) itself the important words "reasonable provision". It would be ridiculous for anyone to suggest that the will had not made reasonable provision if a larger proportion of the estate been already handed over to the persons concerned. "Reasonable provision" means what it says and requires very little explanation. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton says why not leave out the words "by his will." He may be basing his argument on the point that the word "testator" is in the Bill, but the whole object of the Bill is to provide for such cases as would come within the compass of the words, "has not by his will made reasonable provision." I hope we shall not burden the Bill with more words than are necessary. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton wants the words "or by any deed" put in. The whole point is that the court will not accept a case where "reasonable provision" has been made, and I am certain that if any litigant goes to a lawyer, a poor persons' lawyer, or a lawyer in the ordinary course of his practice, or to any society interested, they will be told that if that kind of provision has been made they stand no chance of succeeding in an action, and that it is possible that the costs will be awarded against them, and they may find themselves in the unhappy position of having to pay a heavy sum for nothing. I hope we shall be able to press on with the Measure. I must compliment my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) on having appreciated the fact that it was important to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I do not know what experience the hon. Member who has just spoken has on this matter, but I, speaking as a solicitor and a practical lawyer who might be called upon to advise on matters of this sort, seriously suggest to the House that the hands of the lawyers would be materially strengthened in advising on this matter if the words "or otherwise" were accepted. I am entirely in sympathy with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) and I can only think that the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) was somewhat precipitate in attempting to withdraw his Amendment. The main point is that the insertion of these words will give to the Bill a scope which is very desirable indeed. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) said he was in sympathy with the desire of the Amendment but that the words were unnecessary.

I said I was advised that they are entirely unnecessary.

The hon. Member may be so advised, but opinions differ on the subject and, speaking with some little knowledge of these matters, my view is that the Bill would be materially strengthened by the insertion of these words. Take the position of a lawyer in advising on this matter. If the words "or otherwise" are inserted he would be in a position to advise his client who was seeking to commence litigation, that "reasonable provision" has already been made, though that provision had been made other than by will. But someone may say, "has not by his will made reasonable provision", and insist on an action being commenced. While the hon. Member for Kidderminster may have been advised that these words are unecessary, in my view it is desirable that they should be inserted. If inserted they will, I think, avoid a lot of unnecessary and probably vindictive litigation.

I would suggest to the hon. Gentleman who spoke last that the words which follow the word "if" in Sub-section (1) are the conditions precedent which give the court jurisdiction to make an order at all. The Bill provides that the only thing that the court has to look at is whether or not the testator by his will has, "made reasonable provision". That entitles a person to go to the court merely looking at the will. It is suggested that the words "or otherwise" should be inserted here. Suppose that the hon. Member for Durham (Mr. McKeag) had a client who came to him, a person for whom in fact years ago very reasonable provision has been made outside the will, but that client does not inform him of it and the hon. Member merely looks at the will and sees no reference in it to any such provision. The hon. Member advises his client to go to the court, and the court may make an order in complete ignorance that there has been any other provision made at all. Subsequently it turns out that there was a previous provision made years ago and the court's order would be utterly illegal or void. I do hope that the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill will not accept either this or the following Amendment to insert the words "or by any deed", because, with great respect, my remarks apply in exactly the same way to the following Amendment. If this Amendment is accepted the Bill will become utterly unworkable.

Both this Amendment and the next Amendment, to insert the words "or by any deed," are misconceived. The Bill deals with the estates of testators and has nothing whatever to do with deeds, "or otherwise," at all, except in so far as that is dealt with in Sub-section (2). That Subsection provides that when applicants make an application for rectification of a testator's will consideration has to be given to what has been done otherwise. It would make the whole thing gibberish to put in these words.

In that case would the court be entitled to know whether an annuity had been bought?

Certainly. The applicant would have to disclose absolutely everything in regard to any present or future income from any source. He has to disclose that under Subsection (2). The wife or husband would have to show not only what was got from the testator but from all sources. These words are entirely misconceived and would be redundant. We are dealing with a testator's estate—

Suppose that on some previous occasion a certain amount has been made over to the person and he has spent the lot? What is the position?

That is a matter which the court would have to consider. Suppose that the testator handed over to his son £10,000 to set him up in business, and then the son spent it, and when the testator died the son was not mentioned in the will because the testator thought that he was already provided for. What would be the position? The son would have to go to the court. The other people would say, "Oh, this boy ought not to have £10,000, for he has already had £10,000," and then the judge would have to consider whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable that he should or should not have anything more. I suggest that that is the position.

But surely Sub-section (2) deals only with the present or future income of the applicant. Therefore the case put by the hon. and learned Member for Ashford (Mr. Spens) is the very case in which it is necessary to have the words "or otherwise".

Is not the answer to that the wording of Sub-section (2), "consider relevant or material" matter?

Yes.

I must say that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Withers) has held out a pleasant vista of future litigation. The prodigal son will always be coming before the courts, and as to the other members of the family, how it will provoke the spirit of human kindness when they come to show how he wasted his substance in riotous living. He may have come back on one or two occasions and have had as many fatted calves slain for him as are slain in the South of Ireland to-day, and provision may have been made again and again for him, but at the end of the day he comes to the court and says, "Oh, yes, it is quite true, but the death of my beloved father and mother has given me such a shock that I promise to be a good citizen from now onwards, and I therefore pray that notwithstanding all that I have received and all that I have dissipated I may have some share of the estate from which my father has unjustly disinherited me." These matters are to come before a judge but questions of that kind are not questions which it is competent for a judge to decide. These are matters which ought to be decided by a jury of the applicant's peers, otherwise you will have as many opinions on these points as there are judges. When these matters are referred to a jury you go to the country as it were upon them, and you would get a far more commonsense view in that way than you will get under this system. I think probably the proposal to amend the Clause is sound. I would deprecate leaving the matter as it-is in the Bill.

I do not know whether my opinion on the question is of any interest or importance to the House, but the view presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Withers) appears to me to be the right view having regard to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of the Clause and the use of the word "reasonable" twice in Sub-section (1). I very much doubt whether the additional words proposed would not introduce unnecessary complications.

How is "reasonable" to be defined? What is reasonable to one person may be considered most unreasonable by another person.

I owe an apology to the House for my absence at an earlier stage when this Amendment, which stands in my name, was proposed. I hope the House will accept my apology and will not consider it due to any discourtesy on my part that I was not present to move the Amendment myself. The object of putting down the Amendment was to make clear the point which I now understand from the Attorney-General is in his opinion covered by Sub-section (2) of Clause 1. But in the case of estates of any considerable size I would have said that it was the practice to-day in normal circumstances that the majority of the children of any father making a will did not expect to inherit under that will. I think the ordinary practice of people of substance is to provide for their children by deed, or settlement, and it ought to be made clear that there is no intention in this Bill to interfere with that practice. Surely it is the case in connection with the normal estate of any considerable size, that married daughters, younger sons, and so on, have been provided for by deed or by settlement prior to the death of the testator. If the object of the Bill is to alter the whole law of inheritance, let it be done in a straightforward way. I, for my part, think there is a great deal to be said for the Scottish system of inheritance. If we wish to adopt it let us do so, but I am afraid that by tinkering with the present English system of the free right of testamentary disposition we may produce a great many more anomalies than those which we seek to remove.

A Bill was actually passed in this House applying the Scottish system. It was sent to a Select Committee, and the Select Committee declined to have the Scottish system because, they said, it was a hard and fast system. They turned it down and they recommended the particular system which is in this Bill.

The hon. Member speaks as an Englishman, and I know that there is a certain prejudice against Scotland. But I say that in theory there is a great deal to be said for the Scottish system. It is, at any rate, an understandable, theoretical system of inheritance. It is based upon a principle which one can understand and follow. But this is a proposal to interfere as I say with the free right of testamentary disposition which exists in England by trying to make tinkering amendments in the present system. I submit that that involves certain dangers and may create as many hardships as it seeks to remove. We have here in contra-distinction the spirit of Scotland and the spirit of England. Whereas in Scotland the system is operated upon general established principles, we have in these proposals a typical example of trying not to lay down any new system, but to tinker with an

I beg to move, in page 1, line 8, after "or" to insert "legitimate."

The object of the Amendment is to make it clear that the expression "child" in the Bill refers to a legitimate child. I am afraid I have not sufficient knowledge as a lawyer to know whether this is absolutely necessary or not, but I think it would be the object of the promoters of the Bill that the rights conferred in the Bill should be confined to legitimate children. It may be that I am wrong. There may be an argument put forward that equal rights should be given to illegitimate as to legitimate children, but I am assuming that the object of the promoters is that the rights conferred in the Bill should be confined to legitimate children. I understand, from what I am told by legal authorities who have much more knowledge of these matters than I have, that in the ordinary practice of the interpretation of deeds and wills the expression "child" may mean either a legitimate or an illegitimate child. It means a legitimate child unless either the circumstances render it impossible that it could refer to such a child or the language of the will shows that the testator intended to use the expression in a different or a more extended sense. In either of these cases, it may mean or include an illegitimate child, or step-child, or grand-child. Therefore, I ask the House to make it quite clear that in this Bill the Legislature does not intend the expression "child" to be used in these wider senses in which it may be used in the ordinary interpretation of wills. I hope the House will accept the view that the new powers and rights that it is intended to confer in the Bill should be confined to the legitimate children of the testator. All the Amendments on the Paper in my name to Clause 6 are consequential upon this Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

There is, I think, some doubt about the point, and I think it ought to be absolutely clear one way or the other. It is a very important point, because the question of legitimacy might not arise for many years afterwards. It might never be raised. One has felt very great sympathy with those who may be in the position of not having been born legitimate children, but at the same time those of us who have had experience—and I may say that in Scotland solicitors and counsel for the poor have always a considerable experience of this regrettable aspect of life—know that you cannot always be sure in matters of that kind. The Scottish law has been very broad and charitable in that matter for centuries. We have always had the practice of the very sound principle of legitimisation by subsequent marriage. It is the one case in recent years where the English have adopted the Scottish law. It is very regrettable that the Scottish law is not adopted in this matter, but you cannot have the Scottish law of legitimisation on subsequent marriage without the father of the child admitting in his own heart paternity.

Here you may have case after case happening 20 years afterwards, and claims and trials, and think of the indignation of the mother and other members of the family if these other people suddenly appear from the ends of the earth. You are admitting a most dangerous principle. If you leave this without a clear definition, you will be introducing a matter of great dispute and perhaps of great injustice. It is all very well to speak of the system of blood tests but I have had cases where—well, one does not want to enter into these details, but one could not help having the feeling that a great injustice was being done, and we saw only the other day the case of a young man who had gone a score of times to prison rather than admit paternity, and who finally succeeded in getting clear proof that he had been victimised. You might have cases occurring again and again. Some hon. Members may have seen a play called "It's a Boy," in which there is a man who makes a professional practice, whenever any person of substance is getting married, of introducing himself, having perhaps heard of some scandal in early life, and making use of that knowledge. If you do not have this definition, you are opening a gate, perhaps, to some very extraordinary proceedings, and if it is necessary to make the thing clear, I think that this Amendment ought to be accepted.

I am a little sorry that the hon. Gentleman has raised this issue, because it seems to me that in some cases the only child of the marriage might be an illegitimate child.

Of the marriage?

We passed a law some time ago to legitimatise the illegitimate child.

You took it from us.

We have taken a good many doubtful things from Scotland. I do not like to see Parliament doing anything against the illegitimate child, because it is not its fault that it is illegitimate. The illegitimate child may be the best. I think it is recorded that some of the most eminent men this country has ever produced were illegitimate children. Consequently, I would ask the House not to insert this word. If my knowledge counts for anything, I think that the illegitimate child from the start is under a disadvantage, and to place it under a further disadvantage by adding this word to the Clause would be grossly unfair to the child.

The hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has made an eloquent defence of the Bill on grounds which show, if I may say so with respect, that he quite misunderstands it. His defence is based on the view that in its present form the Bill covers the illegitimate child. I speak subject to what the learned Attorney-General may say, but I think "child" means legitimate child and nothing else. Therefore, the defence of the Clause which the hon. Gentleman has just delivered is founded on misconception. The only reason why, I think, the Amendment ought not perhaps to be accepted is, that it introduces new matter where there is no confusion, because "child" means a legitimate child. If, on the other hand, there is some doubt which the Amendment would clear away, there seems to be no reason why it should not be accepted.

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman say that an illegitimate child is not a child in law?

That is so.