asked the Minister of Transport whether, in the light of experience during the last three months, he proposes to continue and extend the system of marked crossing-places for pedestrians?

asked the Minister of Transport if the experimental uncontrolled pedestrian crossings have proved a success; and whether the scheme is to be adopted throughout the country?

I would refer the two hon. Members to the answer which I gave yesterday to a question on this subject.

Does the hon. Gentleman intend to make it compulsory for pedestrains to use these crossing-places and not to cross at places where there are no marks?

I can only answer that question when the time arrives.

asked the Minister of Transport the number of persons killed and injured in road accidents for the first nine months of the year, giving separate figures for the various classes of motor and horse-drawn vehicles, and comparable figures for the previous year?

The number of persons reported as having died as a result of road accidents which occurred daring the first nine months of 1933 was 5,243. As the weekly returns date only from the middle of March last, it is not possible to give exact figures for the first nine months of this year. Taking the period as a whole, the number of fatal accidents appears to have been approximately the same as last year, but comparison for the last two months of the period shows an improvement. Statistics of persons injured in road accidents during 1933 are available only for the year as a whole, but it is estimated that during the first nine months of that year the number was approximately 164,100. For the corresponding period of this year the number of persons injured was approximately 176,200. The rate of increase over last year has been falling steadily during the last two months. The hon. Member will find particulars of the numbers of different classes of vehicles involved in road accidents in 1933 in the Home Office returns for that year. Similar particulars for this year will not be available until the annual returns have been received and tabulated.

May I ask why the hon. Gentleman does not take more drastic powers for dealing with all those people who drive to the danger of the public?

The House did confer certain powers on me, and I have tried to use them to the full.

Has the hon. Gentleman any separate figures of the number of accidents that take place where a vehicle is passing from a main road into a by-road and vice versa?

No, Sir, not for the country as a whole.

Am I to understand that the schemes laid down for the passage of transport and foot passengers must be submitted to the hon. Gentleman before they are allowed to be proceeded with by the local authorities?

I do not quite understand the purport of the question. Parliament has conferred certain powers upon the Minister of Transport, and those powers are used. Other powers are in the hands of the local authorities.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department the number of persons killed and injured by motor-drawn vehicles in the Metropolitan Police District during the first six months of the year, giving separate figures for children?

As the answer is in the form of a tabular statement, I propose to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

asked the Minister of Transport whether, in view of the inclement weather likely to prevail during the winter months, it is proposed to provide an omnibus service proceeding from south to north over the temporary Waterloo Bridge between the hours of 8 and 10 a.m. daily for the convenience of those persons whose avocations render it necessary for them to travel to the West Central District and who, in the absence of such service, will be compelled to cross such bridge on foot?

I am glad to be able to inform my hon. and learned Friend that the London Passenger Transport Board have to-day commenced an omnibus service from south to north over the temporary Waterloo Bridge and that between the hours of 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. the service will be operated at intervals of 3½minutes.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether facts before him are sufficient to show that the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement is being faithfully carried out on both sides?

From the information available I see no reason to doubt that the ratio of payments called for in the agreement will be realised.

Is the hon. and gallant Member aware that Russia to-day is selling to this country more than ten times the value of fish which she is buying from this country, and will he not make representations to redress this disproportion?

The aspect of the trade of which the hon. Member is thinking is the canned salmon trade, which is not entirely a Russian interest.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has any statement to make with regard to the condition of trade and employment?

It would not be practicable to deal adequately with this subject within the limits of a reply to a question. I would refer my hon. Friend to the Trade and Navigation Accounts for September, the Board of Trade Journal of 18th and 25th October, and the Ministry of Labour Gazette of October for the latest available figures of increased trade and employment.

Arising out of the figures disclosed in these documents, what steps are the Government taking to reduce the present high level of imports of manufactured goods?

Every category of manufactured goods is examined very carefully. By far the greater proportion are processed again after arrival here and provide employment in this country.

Does that apply to motor cars?

asked the President of the Board of Trade the total value of United Kingdom manufactured goods imported during the last 12 months into Ceylon upon which preference is granted; and the total import of manufactured goods into Ceylon during the last 12 months upon which preference is not granted?

So far as can be ascertained from the trade returns of Ceylon, it appears that, during the 12 months ended August, 1934, imports of manufactured goods of United Kingdom origin subject to preferential rates of duty were valued at about 16 million rupees, while imports from all sources of manufactured goods upon which preference was not granted, including goods free of duty, were valued at about 56 million rupees.

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office what steps are being taken to remedy the block in the promotion of officers in the Army Education Corps?

A committee, under the chairmanship of my noble friend, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, is at present examining the promotion situation in the Royal Artillery, Royal Corps of Signals, Royal Army Service Corps and Army Educational Corps. It is not possible to say what steps, if any, will be taken in respect of the Army Educational Corps until the recommendations of the Committee have been received.

Can the Under-Secretary say approximately when the recommendations are likely to be received?

Not at this stage. It will be a little time yet.

asked the Minister of Labour the reason for the increase of registered unemployed persons at the Wakefield Employment Exchange from 5,147 in June, 1929, to 9,311 in June, 1934; and whether the Government have any proposals to put forward for providing work which will reduce the number?

The increase which occurred between June, 1929, and June, 1934, in the number of unemployed persons registering at the Wakefield Employment Exchange was mainly due to increased unemployment in the coal mining and woollen and worsted industries. As regards the second part of the question I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to him yesterday by my right hon. Friend.

Can the hon. Member tell me what there is in that reply which is going to provide work for people who are out of employment?

Can my hon. Friend say what effect the Parliamentary representation has upon employment in the area?

Can my hon. Friend state how the level of unemployment in June, 1934, compares with that of 1931, when the Labour Government were in office; and, further, what has been the recent course of unemployment in Wakefield?

The figures for June, 1931, were 9,187. I am glad to say that the figure now is just over 7,000.

Can the hon. Gentleman say what the Government are doing to deal with the problem of unemployment in the coal-mining industry?

The figures I have read, showing a drop in the last three months, are themselves evidence of what has been done.

Is it not the case that the Labour Government was a minority Government, and that the present Government is a majority Government?

asked the Minister of Labour the present assets and liabilities of the Unemployment Insurance Fund?

After allowing for the accrued charge for debt services under Section 18 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1934, there is a sum of approximately £8,950,000 in hand on the Insurance Account of the Unemployment Fund; the amount of the funded debt outstanding is about £105,740,000.

asked the Minister of Labour (1) whether he can state, to the last convenient date, the number of persons registered as unemployed in Scotland who are in receipt of transitional benefit;

(2) whether he can state to the last convenient date the number of persons registered as unemployed in Scotland and in receipt of standard benefit?

At 24th September, 1934, the latest date for which figures are available, there were 103,724 insured persons with claims admitted for insurance benefit and 129,351 with applications authorised for transitional payments, on the registers of Employment Exchanges in Scotland.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 8, to leave out "or" and to insert "and."

The purpose of the Amendment is to bring the words of this Clause into line with Section 1 of the Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797, where it is made an offence to seduce a member of the Forces from his "duty and allegiance." Here it is "duty or allegiance," and our contention is that the substitution of the word "or" for the word "and" creates an entirely new offence, an offence that has hitherto been unknown to English law, because it is obvious that duty may be something very much less, and more trivial, than allegiance. If I persuaded a soldier to overstay his leave by half-an-hour, I might be guilty of seducing him from his duty, but no one would argue that his allegiance was in any way questioned. The learned Attorney-Genera] pointed out in answer to me in Committee upstairs that the Act of 1797 itself created more than one offence. That is true. There are, as it were, two limbs to Section 1 of the Act of 1797. The first makes it an offence to endeavour to seduce a soldier from his duty and allegiance, and the second limb of the Section proceeds like this:

"To incite or to stir up such person or persons to commit any act of mutiny or to make or endeavour to make any mutinous assembly or to commit any traitorous or mutinous practice whatsoever"

So it is true that that Act does create more than one offence, but in spite of that I do not think it can be seriously maintained that the offences there referred to, namely, committing any traitorous or mutinous practice, are really synonymous with endeavouring to seduce a soldier from his duty; and I suggest that seducing him from his duty is much wider. The offence of mutiny is quite different from a mere breach of duty, and I think there are two clear difstinctions. For instance, instance, I can endeavour to seduce a soldier from his duty without involving any other soldier in the offence, but I am rather doubtful whether a man can commit the offence of mutiny by himself. I was looking up the "Manual of Military Law" a day or two ago, and there I found this definition:

"The term 'mutiny' implies collective insubordination or a combination of two or more persons to resist or induce others to resist lawful military authority."

There is the first distinction. Secondly, as I submit, mutiny means something in the nature of open definance or open revolt against constituted authority. I have here Chambers' "Twentieth Century Dictionary," and I would like to read the definition given there of mutiny, which is as follows:

"To rise against authority in military or naval service; to revolt against rightful authority."

the noun is:

"Insurrection against constituted authority; revolt; tumult; strife."

A soldier may very easily be guilty of some dereliction of duty which may fall very far short of open defiance or open revolt against constituted authority, and I think I can pray in aid the terms of the various Army and Navy Discipline Acts which have been passed from time to time in this House. In this Clause there is frequent reference to the offence of mutiny and to various mutinous offences. The various Statutes, however, do not stop at mutiny, but go on to lay down a great number of other offences of which a soldier or a sailor may be guilty, and if mutiny included any breach of duty it would follow that all these further Sections to which I have referred would be surplus and unnecessary.

In the Debate upstairs some reference was made to the Naval Discipline Act of 1866. It was pointed out, again quite rightly, that these words in this Bill, namely, "duty or allegiance," occur in that Act, and it was suggested by, I think, the learned Attorney-General that if we were looking for precedents, we ought to take the more recent 'and modern precedent of the Naval Discipline Act of 1866. My answer to that is that that Act applies only to a very limited class of persons. It applies, in the first place, to those who are normally subject to naval discipline—that is to say, those who are in His Majesty's service in the Navy—and, secondly, to people who happen for the time being to be on board one of His Majesty's ships or on board a ship hired by the Government in time of war. Those are the two classes of persons covered by that Act, and, after all, they are only a very small minority of the citizens of this country. They are a very limited class, and I submit, therefore, that with regard to the great majority of the people of this country, the substitution in this Bill of the word "or" for the word "and" in, the Act of 1797 creates a new offence.

I apologise for going so much into statutory precedents, but I think that it is important because of the defence that was advanced on the Second Reading by the learned Solicitor-General, who defended the Bill on the ground that it was merely a procedure Bill. How can it be said to be merely a procedure Bill, when here, in the first Clause, before ever we reach some of the more controversial aspects of the Bill, we have an entirely new crime? And what a crime it is. I will take a single example to show how wide might be the scope of the offence. Before the War there was an Army Order which laid down that all officers in the Army should grow or attempt to grow a moustache. If the mother or wife or fiancee of an officer endeavoured to persuade him to shave his upper lip she would be endeavouring to seduce him to commit a breach of duty or to seduce him from his duty. That may be an extreme example, but it shows how far this offence can be taken. If I am guilty of persuading a soldier to overstay his leave for a short time I am again endeavouring to seduce him from his duty. Therefore, I suggest that this is not only a, new offence, but an extremely wide and vague offence.

It may be asked whether we think it is desirable that people should endeavour to seduce soldiers, sailors or airmen from their duty. We do not, and I am not arguing from that point of view, but I do suggest that in these matters there comes a point at which the soldier or the sailor might be trusted to look after himself without any legislation. Even if it be wished to create some such offence as this, it is, after all, a, very much lesser offence than the kind of crime that we have been considering in these Debates. If it be wished to make it an offence, surely we must do it separately and not bring in all this cumbrous machinery about the possession of documents, search warrants and the rest of it to deal with such a minor crime. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman on second thoughts can see his way to accept the Amendment, I do not think it will injure in any way the main purpose of his Bill. After all, the Bill is not aimed at the kind of minor offender I have tried to describe, but against the man who is endeavouring to conduct Communist agitation and propaganda among the troops. A man like that does not stop short at merely endeavouring to seduce soldiers from their duty. His aim is always to seduce them from their allegiance. I maintain that by carrying this Amendment and restoring the words that were in the Act of 1797 we shall not do anything to weaken the avowed purpose of this Bill, but we shall prevent ourselves from creating this new and vague offence in the criminal law.

I beg to second the Amendment.

My hon. Friend has made a closely reasoned speech in favour of this most reasonable Amendment, and I think the Attorney-General would be wise to accept it and to make clear to the public that this Bill is not an attempt to enlarge the scope of historic legislation which has covered propaganda in the Army and Navy in the past. There is a genuine fear outside that the Government are trying to introduce a new spirit into our legislation. I know that the Attorney-General will get up and in his persuasive way profess his innocence and declare that the Bill is merely strengthening and clearing up existing machinery. As a result of the criticism outside and inside the House he has made substantial concessions. If my right hon. and learned Friend will now make this slight alteration, it will satisfy public opinion and allay a good deal of the criticism of the Bill.

The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Dingle Foot) who introduced this Amendment moved a similar Amendment in Committee, and I am bound to say that the fact that he thought it worth while to move it then, and to move it now in what the hon. Gentleman who seconded described as a closely reasoned speech, seems to suggest to me that there is some much greater importance in the distinction which he seeks to make than I might have otherwise suspected. I hope I have shown that the Government are open to arguments on a fair basis even if the arguments seem a little due to unnecessary fears, but on this occasion I have carefully considered the point that was made, and I found myself in one of two positions. Either this is a matter of no moment at all, in which case I cannot understand the hon. Gentleman attaching so much weight to it, and those who have been associated with him in procuring propaganda for their views attaching so much weight to it; or else I find that it is a matter of some importance, and then I have to see whether or not the words in the Bill are the right words.

I was inclined to think that the matter was not of any very great importance; that was my first impression; but on looking into it before the Committee discussed it I began to change my opinion, and I will try and explain my reasons for changing it. "Duty and allegiance" are words which are contained in the Incitement to Mutiny Act of 1797, but that Act of Parliament, as the hon. Gentleman will well know, continued from time to time and was substantially re-enacted in 1817. The Act of that year was described as:

"An Act for the punishment of attempts to seduce persons from their duty and allegiance to His Majesty or to incite them to mutiny or disobedience."

The provisions of the Sections of the Act carry out what the Title describes. The hon. Gentleman will notice that the scope of the Act is a double one. It is to prevent persons from attempting to seduce certain members of His Majesty's Forces from their duty and allegiance, and also to prevent them from inciting them to disobedience. Disobedience clearly covers the most minor and unimportant acts which a soldier is commanded to perform. Therefore, you get the combination of two different sets of offences—seducing him from his duty and allegiance, and inciting him to acts of disobedience. In substance, it is the same as the two offences which the hon. Member says this Bill creates, of seduc- ing a man from his duty and seducing him from his allegiance.

The words "or allegiance" occur in the Preamble but not in the operative part of the Section.

I am not troubling the House by reading out the long verbiage of an early Act of Parliament. I can do so if necessary. I thought that if I read the Title of the Act it would be sufficient. I think that the Title of the Act, subject to any correction which the hon. Gentleman may make, accurately describes the language of the Sections that follow. When I look further into it I find that the Army Act draws a distinction between acts of incitement to disobedience or to mutiny or to, neglect or refusal to obey orders and the seduction of a soldier from his allegiance. For instance, under Section 7 of the Army Act every person subject to military law who endeavours to seduce any person from allegiance to His Majesty is liable to suffer death or such less punishments as the Act mentions. Therefore, it is a separate offence to attempt to seduce a soldier from his allegiance. The other acts which it is illegal to perform, namely, attempting to persuade a soldier to disobey orders, or to disobey so as to show wilful definance of authority, are all enumerated in what the hon. Gentleman rightly described as a number of detailed provisions in the Sections which immediately follow. But the matter does not stop there. When I turn to the Naval Discipline Act, 1866, which is reprinted from time to time so as to bring it up to date in accordance with the most recent decisions of the House, I find that in Sections 12 and 13 it is an offence for certain persons to seduce sailors from their duty or allegiance to His Majesty. The hon. Gentleman quite rightly says that these provisions in the Army Act and the Naval Discipline Act apply only to serving soldiers and sailors, but even that is not quite accurate. The Army Act applies to a serving soldier under military discipline, but the Naval Discipline Act applies to persons under naval discipline and also to any civilians who may happen to be on one of His. Majesty's ships for the time being.

I said that.

I did not catch that part of what the hon. Member said, but I am glad to have official authority behind me for the statement. The position, therefore, is that sailors and soldiers are under penalty of death or a long term of imprisonment if they seduce a fellow soldier or sailor from his duty or allegiance. I ask myself whether there is any reason why a civilian should be free to commit an offence which a serving soldier or sailor is not free to commit. We know perfectly well that under our Constitution everybody is bound to come to the aid of the civil authority, that everybody is a potential policeman, if I may put it that way; in the same way as, in this realm everybody must regard himself as not in a different class from soldiers and sailors but as one who may be called upon to defend his country but is happy in having other people who have undertaken that very responsible duty on his behalf in ordinary times of peace and quiet.

If the hon. Member attaches such importance to the distinction between "duty and allegiance" and "duty or allegiance" I cannot help saying that there would be something quite wrong in submitting that a soldier or sailor is under any stricter obligation with regard to not inciting a man to commit a breach of his duty or allegiance than is a civilian. I think it, would be intolerable if a soldier or sailor were to be liable to a long term of imprisonment for an offence which a civilian might commit with impunity. I hope I have not been too technical or legal in my statement of the position. Having regard to the great importance which the hon. Member and his friends attach to this point, I am bound to attach the same importance to it, and I ask the House to say that it is not the very trifling matter which the ingenious gentleman who seconded the Amendment appeared to suggest. If it be a trifling matter I do not understand why, after two days had been devoted to it in Committee upstairs, we have been asked to consider it again this afternoon. If, on the other hand, it be not a trifling matter, I respectfully suggest that my view is the right one.

I am sure the House is grateful to the learned Attorney-General for the exposition of the law which he has given us, but, if I under- stand him aright, he has now gone back upon every word which he has previously said, both publicly and privately, and in letter form, because up and down the country, in Committee and in correspondence, he has said that this Bill creates no new crime. I take it that the right hon. and learned Gentleman now admits that, in fact, this Bill does create a new crime.

Will the hon. and gallant Member refer me to a single letter or statement in which I have made that statement without qualification? Has he got one here?

I have the reports of the Committee here, and I can turn the statement up in a very short time. Also, I happen to have this handy—that the Prime Minister's journal, the "Newsletter," in an article this month, follows what the Attorney-General has said, and goes on to say:

"The Bill, as he explained,"—

That is, the Attorney-General—

"is merely a procedure Bill, which deals with an old crime"—

Implying that it does not constitute a new crime—

"and makes the machinery for dealing with it more efficient."

In point of fact, I hope the House will attach the utmost importance to the difference between this Bill and the words in the 1797 Act. I think some note should be taken of the fact that the 1797 Act was a temporary Measure to deal with special difficulties, namely a mutiny at the Nore and elsewhere. When it was re-enacted in 1817 the words used were "mutiny and disobedience." In my submission, to constitute an offence under that Act there has to be both mutiny and disobedience.

The words are "mutiny or disobedience."

I am reading from Archbold's Criminal Pleadings. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman tells me that is not accurate, I shall have to bow to his view, but the words are "incitement to mutiny and disobedience," which in my submission imply that there has to be mutiny and disobedience. I suggest that a mutiny implies a collective act. One individual cannot mutiny, it requires a number to do that, and, there- fore the Bill does constitute a new offence in so far, at any rate, as the 1797 Act is concerned, and I defy the Attorney-General to disprove it. There is a new crime constituted by the Bill.

Is not the hon. and gallant Member mixing up "crime" and "offence"? There is no new crime created, but a new offence is created.

I am perfectly content to accept my hon. and gallant Friend's statement that a new "offence" is created, if he prefers to use that expression. It has been suggested that this Bill is a small matter, dealing merely with procedure, intended merely to get at a small man who in a small way distributes literature, or something of that sort, which is likely to seduce His Majesty's Forces, but it is a much more serious thing than that. There are many matters which can be dealt with under this Bill when it becomes law which can-riot be dealt with now. The Attorney-General agrees that there are ample provisions to deal with the question of one soldier seducing another soldier, but he puts to the House the proposition that there ought to be provisions in the law under which a civilian shall also be liable for attempting to seduce a soldier or sailor or airman from his duty. I, personally, have no objection to the words "duty and allegiance." I think that no one ought to be permitted to endeavour to seduce a man from his duty and allegiance to His Majesty, but I do not for one moment agree that it is right and proper for an Act, with the serious consequences that this Measure would have, to be passed into law at this stage to deal with the matter of duty alone. Under this Bill, if it became law, if a wife persuaded her soldier-husband to overstay his leave, the wife would be guilty of an offence under the Bill.

It is qualified by the words "maliciously and advisedly."

The House will appreciate at once that the wife might "maliciously and advisedly" prevail upon her husband not to return to duty. She might prevail upon him, if he were called upon to go abroad, not to report at Southampton. Without question, there are not one but 100 new circumstances which might constitute offences. There are much more serious matters than that of a wife persuading her husband or a girl her sweetheart to overstay his leave. There are cases, which might easily happen, of endeavouring to persuade soldiers, for instance, not to act in a firing squad. There may be many soldiers with a conscientious objection to shooting a man in cold blood, as we know was done on many occasions during the War.

There is, in my submission, a much more serious matter behind all this. It seems to me that, supposing a state of war were declared to-morrow, it might be possible—in fact, I think it would be very likely—that the present Government would immediately pass a Military Service Act such as was passed during the War, whereby, for instance, all the males between the ages of 18 and 42 were deemed to be members of His Majesty's Forces. If that were the case, any pacifist propaganda of any kind, any literature or any propaganda addressed to any section of the community, certainly between the ages of 18 and 42, would be an offence under this Bill, even although that propaganda might not be addressed to seducing soldiers or sailors from their allegiance, and was merely concerned with attempting to prevail upon them not to take part in a war.

What is in the mind of the hon. and gallant Gentleman as to the distinction between not obeying orders as far as duty is concerned, and allegiance to His Majesty? Suppose soldiers or sailors, or both, were called out to maintain civil order and someone endeavoured to induce them not to obey the order to go out, would that be a dereliction from duty, or, on the other hand, non-allegiance to His Majesty?

I think, quite clearly a mere dereliction of duty. I should be no party, and I believe no one on these benches would be a party, to endeavour to seduce anyone from allegiance to His Majesty, but there are 101 circumstances where it might be right and proper, in the opinion of many people, to endeavour to prevail upon soldiers not to carry out some particular duty.

That is my point; you are in favour of that.

For instance, if the Army were going to be used to break a strike or anything of that sort, I should think it perfectly proper for me to address, even directly, members of His Majesty's Forces that they ought not to take the action which they were ordered to take in that particular matter. Of course, such a case—I do not know whether it has been referred to in my absence—the Curragh case occurred in 1914. There, as I understand, officers refused to obey orders, or intimated that they would not, and would prefer to resign. They would be guilty, without question I think, of an offence under this Bill in its present form, but no one would suggest that they were lacking in allegiance to His Majesty. On the contrary, they thought that they were taking the right and proper course, having in mind that allegiance, in refusing to obey orders in those particular circumstances. In my submission, there is an enormous difference between the words "duty and allegiance" and the words "duty or allegiance." I very much hope that the House may insist upon the original words in the Incitement to Mutiny Act, "duty and allegiance," being inserted.

The learned Attorney-General challenged me to give him an instance where he stated that this Bill was merely a re-enactment of the old law, and did not create a fresh offence. Here is one instance which my hon. Friend has handed to me. True, it was the Solicitor-General in this instance, but the Attorney-General may agree with him. The Solicitor-General said:

"The Clause really re-enacts, with very minor differences, the existing law, and the offence constituted by the Clause is already a felony—a serious class of offence known to our criminal law."—[OFFICIAL REPORT (Standing Committee A), 8th May, 1934, col. 25.]

My hon. and learned Friend is not here. The hon. and gallant Gentleman stated that one of us said that the Measure created no new offence. Now he quotes a sentence from the learned Solicitor-General saying that the Clause creates no new offence.

Does the learned Attorney-General draw any distinction between the Bill and the Clauses in it? That is what he is doing now. There is no distinction. The Clause, obviously, is in the Bill, and a statement of that sort made in reference to a Clause was made in reference to the Bill. This is a serious matter. I was not altogether clear from what the Attorney-General said whether he really was determined to resist this Amendment. I rather gathered that, under pressure, he might be disposed to accept it. I very much hope that he will, because this matter has caused a great deal of anxiety, and I am sure that he himself has had a great many letters about it and representations of one sort or another. He has admittedly already given way on a great many matters in this Bill, and I suggest that this one is not in his view of great importance, and it would tend to expedite business and allay a good many anxieties if the Amendment were accepted.

I feel obliged to take part in the Debate on account of the very important statement which has just been made by the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner). As I understand it, he has based the whole of his agreement with this Amendment on the ground that there is a great distinction between seducing a man from his duty and from his allegiance to His Majesty. I put the specific question to him with regard to the use of either naval men or army men in a civil dispute, and whether, if anyone were to endeavour to seduce them from their duty, whatever their orders might be with regard to maintaining order in that dispute, that would be merely a dereliction of duty, or whether it would come under the question of allegiance to His Majesty, and his reply was that it would be merely a dereliction of duty. That is the whole crux of the question. The hon. and gallant Member, therefore and, I suppose, the whole of the Socialist party—I do not know whether the Mover of the Amendment is of the same opinion —desire that the maintenance of order by means of the Army or Navy should no longer be above politics, and that anybody should be permitted to endeavour to seduce the troops from carrying out their orders and thereby prevent them from maintaining order. If that were to come into effect, there would be no more liberty in this country.

We have heard a great deal in this Debate about the liberty of the subject, but if the men of the Navy, Army and Air Force are to be subject to seduction from their duty without that being an offence, then there will be no more liberty for anybody in this country. [An HON. MEMBER: "The quarter-deck!"] I would know perfectly well how to deal with them on the quarter-deck. One of the greatest blessings which this country has got is the absolute confidence of the people that law and order will be maintained, ultimately if necessary by the armed forces, whatever civil disturbance there may be, or whatever the cause of that civil disturbance may be. Very often that is not so in foreign countries. The cause of unrest and trouble in foreign countries frequently in history has been due to the fact that men, either civilians or soldiers, have got hold of the army and used it for their own particular political purposes. [HON. MEMBERS: "No !"] Yes, politically they have used the weapon of the Army in civil strife. I would deplore the day if it ever came into force in this country, because it would be the end of our liberties. I would ask the hon. Member who moved this Amendment whether he agrees with the Socialist party that it should not be an offence for anybody to endeavour to seduce soldiers or sailors from their duty in the maintenance of order when there is civil strife in this country? Does he agree with the Socialist party?

I made it quite clear that I was not in favour of people endeavouring to seduce troops from their duty, and I did not say that if some satisfactory distinction could be arrived at between serious breaches of duty and trivial breaches of duty I should not be in favour of making that an offence, hut I said that I was entirely against putting this comparatively minor offence, which has never existed up to the present time, in this Bill, with all its complicated provisions about the possession of documents, and so forth.

After the speech made by the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds I think the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Dingle Foot) will now see that this is not a minor matter but one of great importance. Has he not changed the opinion that he. had before the hon. and gallant Member spoke? I hope that the House and the country will now be perfectly clear about the opposition to the Bill. The Socialist party desire that they shall be perfectly free to endeavour to seduce the members of His Majesty's Forces from carrying out their duty in the case of any civil disturbance. That is one of their aims and objects in opposing the Bill. They desire to use the Forces of the Crown for their own political purposes and to bring politics into the Services. The day when that comes will mean the end of the liberty of the subject in this country.

After the very rousing challenge that has just come from the quarter deck, may I say that the state of affairs which he envisages would quite clearly, in my opinion, be a breach of allegiance and not merely a breach of duty, and I think that it would be so held in a court of law. I do not know whether the Attorney-General would agree, but I have very little doubt that it would be so, and therefore the question put by the hon. and gallant Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor) does not arise. I should like to suggest to the hon. Member for Penrith and Cockermouth (Mr. Dixey), who intervened just now with regard to the word "maliciously," that the presence of the word does not add what he thinks it does. It is used in a good many Acts of Parliament, and does not as a rule mean personal spite but deliberately doing the act which constitutes the offence. I think the Attorney-General will agree that in any trial under this Bill no extra evidence would have to be produced to prove malice; if the facts were proved, malice would follow as a matter of course. That is my reading of the Bill.

My main reason for rising is to draw attention to the extraordinary nature of the defence put forward by the Attorney-General, in regard to this Amendment, which is as serious a thing as the words of the Clause itself. What the Attorney-General has put before us quite plainly is that if anything is an offence on the part of a soldier or a sailor it should be an offence for a civilian. That seems to me to be a proposition which would not he supported by any of the great constitutional lawyers upon whom we rely. What is the Army Act for, if the duties of civilians and of soldiers and sailors are the same? Why should it be necessary to put down that very long series of enactments, the whole point of which is to create offences for the serving soldier and sailor and not for the civilian? Everyone realises that those who put on His Majesty's uniform, as so many Members of this House have done from time to time, feel that they take upon themselves obligations and duties which did not attach to them in their civilian capacity, and that if they are found guilty under the special Acts which govern the Services they have no right to complain of punishment for something, which, as a civilian, they could have done with impunity.

Now the Attorney-General suggests that this is an entirely unreal distinction. It seems dangerous to suggest that we should bring the whole body of civilians within the ambit of military law. The suggestion is that we are all to be drilled, and not only the soldiers and sailors. We have seen the military spirit creeping along in other countries until it goes beyond the actual service of the Crown, and is brought to bear upon the whole civilian population. When we look at countries like Germany we see the way in which civilians have been drilled into subjection, and we have been rather proud that such things were not done and were not necessary among ourselves. This proposal of the Attorney-General seems to go far beyond the actual importance of the Amendment, important as that is, and that a representative of the Crown should, by any inadvertent word of his, give out that he is sanctioning the militarisation of our ordinary life, would be a most disastrous thing to go out from this House. People who are not ordinarily concerned with politics are gravely concerned with this question of liberty, as all will have realised who read the recent magnificent Rectorial Address of General Smuts. To him, the gradual sacrifice of liberty is something to which everybody's attention should be called. General Smuts was looking mainly at the things which alarmed him, but if anyone like him should read the report of what the Attorney-General has just said they will be very gravely alarmed that the poison is spreading almost without anybody noticing. I beg the Attorney-General to reconsider the matter and, if he cannot reconsider the Amendment, to reconsider his definition.

I rise to clear up a misapprehension which is in the mind of the hon. Member for West Middlesbrough (Mr. K. Griffith) in regard to the argument addressed to the House by the Attorney-General. My right hon. and learned Friend was not suggesting, and he is surprised that any misunderstanding should arise, that in all matters the civilian population should be subject to military law and that the same category of offences which we know have a special character and apply to those who subject themselves to the Army Act, ever could or should apply to civilians.

Did the hon. and learned Gentleman hear the speech of his right hon. and learned Friend?

Yes.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that there was no distinction between the civilian and the soldier.

I heard the speech made by the Mover of the Amendment and the Attorney-General's reply; my right hon. and learned Friend was speaking solely in regard to the definition of this particular offence in the Naval Discipline Act. This is an offence unlike a great many offences in the Army Act, and it is an offence whether the civilian does it or whether a member of the Forces does it. It is an offence for either a member of the Forces or a civilian to incite another member of the Forces to disaffection, and my right hon. and learned Friend was tracing how the House has defined this offence on successive occasions. The old Act of 1797—I have provided myself with the actual words—says "duty and allegiance" but when this House considered the Naval Discipline Act of 1860 and was dealing with a similar offence when committed by a sailor, it made the alteration that we are proposing to make in the Bill, that is to say, instead of saying "duty and allegiance," it said "duty or allegiance." So far as this specific offence of incitement is concerned, there is no conceivable reason why a soldier or sailor should be subjected to a code different from that to which the civilian is subjected. The arguments against this offence, which is of a subversive nature, are exactly the same whether they apply to anyone in the armed forces or to a civilian. It would not be right for this House to draw a distinction between the offence defined in the Bill and that defined in the Naval Discipline Act.

The deduction drawn by the hon. Member for West Middlesbrough was a complete misapprehension of the nature of the argument which was put before the House by the Attorney-General. I do not wish to repeat that argument. Different persons may hold slightly different views as to where duty ends and allegiance begins. A perfectly possible view is that allegiance, when applied to a soldier and sailor, subsumes in itself the duties which have been undertaken by the soldier and sailor; it is also possible for anyone to imagine circumstances in which no sensible person—I hope we are sensible in this country—would dream of launching a prosecution. Instead of endeavouring to define the difference between seducing from duty and seducing from allegiance, assuming that there is some substantial difference —which I do not admit— we think it is right to follow the precedent of the Naval Discipline Act and to make it an offence if a civilian endeavours to seduce a member of the Forces from his duty, because his duty includes the obligations which he has undertaken and upon which the national existence may depend.

The hon. and learned Gentleman seems rather concerned about the inference being drawn from the speech of the Attorney-General by hon. Members on this side of the House. The significant fact about the discussion on this Amendment is the inference drawn by the supporters of the Government. One hon. and gallant Gentleman immediately showed us the logic of the speech and wishes he had us on the quarter-deck. By a process of elimination of the speeches made in Committee, it is clear that it is the type of mind represented by the hon. and gallant Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor) which has made this Bill possible. I have the good fortune to have the Committee reports containing the speeches upon this point. I think that the Solicitor-General has been put up to tone things down, because the Attorney-General is rather alarmed at the infer- ence which his own people have drawn from the fact that he wants to apply the same law to civilians as applies to soldiers and sailors. That is a fair deduction from the speech that he made. We are now getting to know what type of mind is behind the Bill. If hon. Members will look at the Clause with which we are dealing, they will see that certain words which were clearly in the old Mutiny Act are not in the Bill, and I believe that the hon. and gallant Member for South East Leeds (Major Milner) was responsible for the elimination of those words. During the Committee stage the Attorney-General did not quite know what was in the minds of the people who drafted the Bill. I think that that is really the situation. This is what he said in Committee:

"I cannot conceive anybody really thinking that, as long as man is under a duty to His Majesty or to his country, having freely, as we do in this country, chosen to serve in His Majesty's Force, he ought to be seduced from his duty. There might be some niggling point whether he was only seduced from his duty and not from his allegiance."

I gathered that it was not a niggling speech when the right hon. and learned Gentleman was speaking just now.

"I should think that that very likely was the reason why the words in the Naval Discipline Act were made as they read today, and as they are constantly reaffirmed by this House. It would be intolerable if a member of the Navy were asked to neglect his duty to go on board, for instance, after leave, and if it should be open to him to say, "It is quite true I have been seduced from my duty to go on board at the end of my leave, but I am prepared to sing God save the King, and therefore I have not been seduced from my allegiance.'"—[OFFICIAL REPORT (Standing Committee A), 15th May, 1934, col. 66.]

That is the substance of the speech that the right hon. and learned Gentleman made in Committee, and I submit that it is a different kind of speech from that which he made this afternoon. To-day, of course, he is armed with all the necessary knowledge of the military and naval law, and he lays it down very definitely that there is no reason why a civilian should be exempt from and soldiers and sailors should be subject to certain penalties under the same conditions. As he himself said, a soldier or sailor undertakes certain duties, and he knows very well that, as has just been pointed out, men in the Services are very conscious of it. The only point that I rose to make was that the Attorney-General was not as sure in Committee as to the reasons for this distinction as he is today. It is quite clear that the original idea behind this Bill was that the average civilian should be subject to the jack-boot and the quarter-deck in the same way as the average soldier or sailor. I do not think that the Attorney-General has done himself any good, or that the explanation of the Solicitor-General has at all improved the position.

I should not have intervened in the discussion on this Amendment if it had not been for the speech of the hon. Member for West Middlesbrough (Mr. K. Griffith). There is no question at all about any soldier or sailor who fails in his allegiance to His Majesty, or in his duties, being subject to heavy penalties, nor is there any question about any member of His Majesty's Forces who induces a soldier or sailor to commit such an offence being also liable to heavy penalties; but to say, as the hon. Member for West Middlesbrough said, that to make civilians similarly liable to punishment if they induce members of His Majesty's Forces to commit any breach of duty is militarising our nation, is an absolute travesty of words. I think it is an ill thing that a member of the great old Liberal party should talk about that being a militarisation of our nation, and say that it would be the death of our liberties if civilians were not to be free to induce the men in our Services to disobey orders and commit a breach of their duties.

I think it would be a pity if the discussion of this important matter were obscured in the minds of the ordinary people to whom the law applies, either by an excess of legal verbiage or by the sort of rollicking bravo that came from the old salt from Paddington. I use that expression as a marine compliment. One would imagine, after hearing such a speech as that of the hon. and gallant Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor), that the British Navy is honeycombed with sedition, that it is on the verge of mutiny, and that it would only require some dangerous Communist to drop a leaflet and the whole thing would topple over in disgrace and ignominy. We know very well that that is a most ridiculous travesty of the situation.

Is the hon. Member accusing me of suggesting in my speech that the Navy was on the verge of a revolution?

I was venturing to suggest that.

Then I must ask the hon. Member to withdraw that statement, for there is no foundation for it whatever in anything that I said.

I cannot withdraw the impression that was created in my mind, and the impression which I gathered from the hon. and gallant Member's speech was that, if these serious penalties were required, and the terrible trumpetings from the quarter-deck were justified, there must be something pretty dirty down below.