Commons Chamber

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House Of Commons

Tuesday, 19th February, 1935.

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in, the Chair.

Private Business

Private Bills (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),

Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in the case of the following Bills, referred on the Second Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—

Bognor Gas and Electricity Bill.
West Hampshire Water Bill.
Chester Water Bill.

Bills committed.

Private Bills [ Lords] (Petition for additional Provision) (Standing Orders not complied with),

Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in the case of the Petition for additional Provision in the following Bill, originating in the Lords, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, namely:—

Stourbridge Navigation Bill [ Lords].

Report referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.

Private Bill Petitions [ Lords] (Standing Orders not complied with),

Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in the case of the Petitions for the following Bills, originating in the Lords, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, namely:—

Middlesex County Council [Lords].
Weymouth Waterworks [Lords].

Reports referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.

Reading Corporation Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till Thursday.

Oral Answers To Questions

Scotland

Historical Records

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will consider making arrangements for a survey of Scottish historical records in the hands of private owners, so that, where necessary, steps could be taken for their transference to the National Library of Scotland or the Register House?

A survey of historical records in private ownership is within the sphere of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and the appointment of another body does not seem called for. Many gifts and loans of charters and legal records have been made to the Register House, Edinburgh, and of historical and literary records to the National Library of Scotland. I am glad to express my appreciation to the donors, and to make it clear that the Register House and National Library welcome communications from persons prepared to deposit records.

River Pollution

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether the Scottish Advisory Committee on the Prevention of River Pollution is proceeding with its investigations; and when recommendations to the Government for the better control of pollution may be expected?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. With regard to the second part, I understand that the Committee are at present examining the condition of particular rivers and that when that programme is complete they propose to submit a comprehensive report on the prevention of river pollution.

In view of the long delay that has occurred, would it not be advisable that they should make a temporary report?

I think that is rather a, matter for the Committee. I shall be glad to consider getting into communication with them on the subject.

Land Drainage

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he can state the annual amounts paid by way of grants towards agricultural land drainage since the institution of the scheme, together with the proportion of the grant towards the total cost of the work done each year?

As the reply includes a table of figures I propose, with the hon. Member's permission, to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the Reply:

Since 1921 a scheme for the assistance of agricultural drainage in Scotland by way of grants has been in operation during each financial year ending 31st March. Particulars of the grants paid to date in respect of these schemes and of the proportion of the grant in each year to the total cost of approved work are as follows:

Year.	Total Amount paid in Grants.	Proportion of Grant to Total Cost of Approved Work.
	£
1921–22	14,826	50 per cent.
1922–23	38,621	50 per cent.
1923–24	32,048	50 per cent.
1924–25	29,831	50 per cent.
1925–26	9,112	30 per cent.
1926–27	14,732	33⅓ per cent.
1927–28	7,767	33⅓ per cent.
1928–29	10,056	33⅓ per cent.
1929–30	11,893	33⅓ per cent. as regards £9,814.
	11,893	^*50 per cent as regards £2,079.
1930–31	23,110	33⅓ per cent.
1931–32	24,020	33⅓ per cent.
1932–33	11,054	25 per cent.
1933–34	7,834	25 per cent.
1934–35	2,111†	25 per cent.
^* A special rate for the relief of unemployment in the depressed areas.
† This represents the amount paid to date. Claims for payment can be submitted up to 28th instant, and this amount will be substantially increased.

Milk Prices

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he can state the price at present being received by milk producers in the South-Western area of Scotland; and how that compares with the price paid in November and December, 1934?

The average nett price per gallon received for the month of January by all ordinary producers in the area of the Scottish Milk Marketing Scheme was 1s. 1d., as compared with 1s. 0¾d. and 1s. 1d. respectively for November and December, 1934. These nett prices however are subject to a deduction for haulage charges in accordance with the prescribed scale, the maximum being at the rate of 1½d. per gallon.

Dog Racecourses (Betting)

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is aware that at dog-racing courses in Scotland men are employed to perambulate the grounds touting for customers for the totalisator; that these men supply the customers with tickets registering the bets and take the money; and whether he will consider the necessity for preventing this practice which has been stopped in England?

After inquiry my right hon. Friend understands that on one dog racecourse in Glasgow spectators are supplied with tickets in connection with what is known as the "human tote." My right hon. Friend is not in a position to make any statement as to the legality of this form of betting, but in any event it will be illegal after 1st July next under the Betting and Lotteries Act, 1934.

Agricultural Securities Corporation

10.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he can make a statement as to the present position of the Scottish Agricultural Securities Corporation?

As the answer involves a tabular statement and many figures, I propose, with the hon. Member's permission, to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Is my right hon. Friend satisfied that the work of this corporation is sufficiently well-known to the farming communities?

A considerable number of applications have already been received. The fact that the subject has been raised by question and answer will probably draw attention to the matter.

Following is the answer:

From the commencement of the Corporation's operations in September, 1933, to 9th February, 1935.					Loans on Heritable Security.		Loans under the Improvement of Land Acts.
					Number.	Amount.	Number.	Amount.
						£		£
Applications received	…	…	…	…	191	674,165^*	6	2,868
Loans completed	…	…	…	…	101	306,245	—	—
Loans awaiting completion	…	…	…	…	22	72,200	2	2,068
Loans under consideration	…	…	…	…	22	138,505	1	200
Loans refused by applicants		…	…	…	46	114,320	3	600
Loans rejected by the Corporation			…	…
Loans withdrawn		…	…	…
					191	631,270	6	2,868
^* Subsequently reduced to £631,270.

Whithorn School (Curriculum)

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he can make any statement regarding the decision to discontinue the teaching of Latin at Whithorn School?

Last year the education authority of Wigtownshire rearranged the curriculum at Whithorn higher grade public school. The curriculum at the time offered the opportunity of pupils taking either, or both, French and Latin. In view of the very small number who, in the preceding years, had taken Latin, the education authority decided that the only foreign language to be taught should be French. On full consideration of all the circumstances my right hon. Friend sees no reason for interfering with the discretion of the responsible local authority.

In view of the fact that there is a very sharp feeling among many people in the parishes concerned, will the hon. Gentleman keep this matter carefully in mind?

The matter has been very fully and carefully considered, in view of the representations made, and, in. all the circumstances, I have nothing to add to the answer which I have given.

Coal Industry

Work-Sharing Schemes

14.

asked the Secretary for Mines how many colliery companies have agreed with their employés to share the working time so as not to throw out of employment a number of them; and is he in a position to say how many would be out of work if no such arrangement was in operation?

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given to him yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour. The statement therein referred to will include particulars of work-sharing schemes in the coal mining industry.

Statistics

11.

asked the Secretary for Mines whether he can state the total amount of coal produced by machinery during 1934; and the amount so produced in the same period in South and West Yorkshire, respectively?

This information will not be available until about the end of March.

13.

asked the Secretary for Mines whether he can state the number of separate mines employed in producing coal in each district during each of the last five years?

As the reply involves a statistical statement I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the reply:

Districts				Number of Mines which produced coal in
				1930.	1931.	1932.	1933.	1934 (provisional).
England and Wales.
Northumberland	…	…	…	97	100	95	97	97
Durham	…	…	…	235	218	212	209	216
Cumberland and Westmorland	…	…	…	33	34	32	28	24
Lancashire and Cheshire	…	…	…	181	174	161	155	145
Yorkshire, South	…	…	…	105	103	106	99	102
Yorkshire, West	…	…	…	112	104	96	97	98
Nottinghamshire	…	…	…	45	46	46	45	45
Derbyshire, North	…	…	…	96	88	91	91	89
Derbyshire, South	…	…	…	12	10	10	9	10
Staffordshire, North	…	…	…	59	61	76	75	79
Cannock Chase	…	…	…	36	36	37	38	35
Staffordshire, South, and Worcestershire			…	73	58	45	47	46
Leicestershire	…	…	…	15	13	13	13	12
Warwickshire	…	…	…	19	18	18	18	18
Shropshire	…	…	…	37	37	28	31	28
Forest of Dean	…	…	…	45	37	33	33	32
Somersetshire	…	…	…	14	13	13	13	12
Bristol	…	…	…	3	3	3	3	3
Kent	…	…	…	4	4	4	4	4
South Wales and Monmouthshire		…	…	470	447	417	409	409
North Wales	…	…	…	25	24	23	24	23
Scotland.
Fife, Clackmannan, Kinross and Sutherland			…	54	53	46	43	43
Lothians (Mid and East) and Peebles			…	29	30	28	29	28
Lanarkshire, Linlithgow, Stirling, Renfrew and Dumbarton.				206	203	185	177	192
Ayrshire, Dumfries and Argyll		…	…	59	59	56	54	54
Great Britain	…	…	…	2,064	1,973	1,874	1,841	1,844

Mines Inspectors

12.

asked the Secretary for Mines how many of His Majesty's inspectors of mines in Great Britain have sons occupying official positions in the district over which they have supervision as mines inspectors?

Three.

Can the hon. Gentleman say in what districts they are?

I could not give the districts. One is an overman, another an undermanager and the third is an agent.

Can the hon. Gentleman give an assurance that this practice will be discouraged?

I could not give an assurance in general terms of that kind. It depends on the circumstances of the case as I have said in a previous answer.

Has the hon. Gentleman assured himself that in these particular cases there is no reason for this?

I have.

Motor Insurance Companies (Deposit)

17.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the losses which have fallen upon the motor-car owners by reason of the recent insolvency of a motor insurance company which had become an authorised insurer under the Road Traffic Act, 1930, by depositing £15,000, he will take legislative action to require that the deposit of an authorised motor insurer shall be adjusted annually so as to be commensurate with the insurer's liability to policy holders; and will he also seek power to obtain annually from every authorised motor insurer a certificate of solvency?

Serious practical difficulties would arise if companies were required to make deposits commensurate with their liabilities and in this way to immobilise a substantial proportion of their working capital. Whilst companies would thus be seriously handicapped in the conduct of their business, the suggested requirement could not be justified by reference to the position of the policy holders and other claimants in the case of the great majority of insurance companies. The suggestion made in the last part of my hon. Friend's question has been noted.

What protection mow is given to policy holders if under the 1930 Act the£15,000 is shown to be obviously insufficient to protect them against an authorised insurer undertaking a larger liability than is covered by his assets? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the grave danger to which the public are exposed by the methods of authorisation to issue insurance policies?

Yes, I am well aware that there are risks where a company is undertaking risks which are outside the full range of its powers, but I should not care to answer such a question as the hon. Baronet has put without notice.

Is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to allow existing policy holders to continue under this risk?

If the hon. Baronet could suggest action which would be feasible and would not interfere with the working of these companies on a proper basis, I should be very glad to consider it.

Has the right hon. Gentleman at any time compared the amounts that have to be deposited by these companies and by industrial insurance companies, and is he satisfied that the deposits in the former case are substantial enough to meet the claims upon them?

Having regard to the fact that the deposit is inadequate for the protection of the insurers, will the right hon. Gentleman give his attention to the possibility of instituting a more rigorous and more frequent form of audit so that he may himself be able to control the situation, which he clearly cannot do at present?

That is one of the questions that are under review at present. In my opinion, it is probably a more hopeful suggestion.

Will the right hon. Gentleman expedite the review?

22.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will consider initiating legislation to prevent in future the results to persons insuring against risks exemplified recently in connection with the Anglian Insurance Company?

The Assurance Companies (Winding-up) Act was passed as recently as 1933 in order to enable the Board of Trade to take action in cases such as the hon. Member has in mind. The Board have already taken action in two cases and will not fail to take action in future cases where, on the information available, there is reason to believe that a company coming within the scope of the Act is insolvent. As I stated last week, I shall continue to watch the situation and I shall not hesitate to ask Parliament for further powers if at any time this appears desirable and practicable.

May we take it for granted, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman has found out already that the Companies Act gives him power to intervene when it is too late; and will he be good enough to consider, in addition to the suggestion made to him a moment or two ago that there should be a more frequent audit of the accounts of these companies, a suggestion that the Board of Trade should require a more frequent actuarial calculation of the assets and liabilities of the companies?

This, of course, would certainly be involved in the audit question.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say what is the position of people who were receiving compensation at the time this company went into liquidation? Have they any remedy at all?

If specific cases were put to me I should be very glad to prepare an answer, but I should not care to answer the case without consideration.

I have had one anyhow.

Mercantile Marine

Loss Of Oil-Tanker "La Crescenta"

18.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, arising out of the loss of the oil-tanker "La Crescenta," with all hands, he is aware that the master of the vessel wrote to relatives on 6th July last from Los Angeles, to the effect that they had had a. bad break down at sea during the preceding week; that a member of the crew, in a letter to a relative, stated that the ship was getting very old, was continually breaking down, and that there had been a dispute about the cost of engine repairs at Los Angeles; and whether, in view of these circumstances, he will cause full inquiry to be held into the loss of this vessel?

I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my deep sympathy, in which I am sure that the House will join, with the relatives of those lost in this disaster. Full enquiry is being made into the loss of the vessel. I should explain that the enquiry is necessarily taking somewhat longer than usual as the vessel was engaged mainly on trade between foreign countries and rarely visited this country. I am not aware of the facts given in the first part of the question but if the hon. Member has any definite information regarding the condition of this ship I should be glad if he would forward it to me.

At what date can we have a reply?

I could not say that.

Coloured Seamen (Wages)

20.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will ascertain and inform the House what are the rates of pay paid by the Peninsular and Oriental and British-India Steamship Lines for lascars signed on Asiatic agreements?

I am informed that the rates of pay for individual lascars signed on Asiatic agreements, excluding petty officers, vary from 18 to 50 rupees per month, according to rating and length of service.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these lascars are paid at a considerably lower rate than white British sailors; and does he not think that British subjects employed on the same ship should have the same salary irrespective of colour?

I gave the rates of pay of individual lascars. I am informed that the number of lascars is usually much larger than would be the case if they were white seamen.

Is it not a fact that 95 per cent. or more of the lascars employed on British ships are signed on under Asiatic and not European agreements and that, therefore, they are paid not more than a quarter of the rates paid to British seamen?

If the hon. Member will put down a question on the subject, I shall be glad to find an answer for him.

Is it not a fact that at least 95 per cent. of the lascars are signed on outside Europe?

I would rather not express any opinion or make any statement without having a chance of inquiring into it.

In view of the fact that a subsidy has just been paid to ship-owners, is this not a good time to encourage them to employ British seamen?

Certainly. That is what we are doing.

21.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can give any information as to what is the monthly rate of pay for coloured able-seamen employed on British steamers?

If engaged' in this country, coloured able-seamen are paid £8 2s. per month, but under National Maritime Board arrangements there is provision for considering special cases. The rates of pay of coloured seamen engaged abroad vary, but I am informed that customary rates for lascar able-seamen engaged in India range from 20 rupees to 32 rupees per month, while Chinese engaged abroad receive about 30 dollars (Chinese) per month.

Is it not a fact that these lascars who are signed on outside Europe are paid about a quarter of the standard British rates of the Maritime Board and that the unemployment benefit arising out of the employment of these coloured seamen is costing the State over £2,000,000 a year to subsidise cheap coloured labour?

Is it not a fact that the rate paid to the lascar is £1 15s. per month and to British seamen £8 6s. 6d., and is it not time that this scandal ended?

I have given such information as is in our possession with regard to the rates of pay of both classes.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give the figures not in rupees but in pounds and shillings?

If the hon. Member would like me to give him the sterling equivalent, I should be glad to have it worked out.

Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the firemen are receiving £2 5s. and—

We cannot pursue this subject at any length at Question Time.

Commodities And Stock Exchange Securities (Speculations)

23.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that large numbers of shares in James and Shakespeare were held by nominee companies formed by the banks, and did not represent investments by the banks concerned; whether he will request that the investigation into the affairs of the aforementioned company shall call for the particulars of persons owning the shares standing in the names of the four nominee companies who would have profited from the pepper gamble if it had succeeded; and whether arrangements will be made, if possible, that those persons should make compensation to those who have been ruined by the speculations in which they were innocently involved?

26.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that a winding-up order has been made against Messrs. James and Shakespeare, Limited; and whether, in view of the circumstances connected with this company and the recent pepper-pool operations, he will cause an inquiry to be made?

I would refer the hon. Members to the answer given yesterday by my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to the hon. Member for the Gower Division of Glamorganshire (Mr. D. Grenfell).

Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the powers of the Official Receiver under Section 182 of the Companies Act are sufficiently wide to enable him to make an inquiry into matters of grave public moment not immediately connected with this particular company; and is it not a fact that the Official Receiver will be limited to inquiries concerned with the promotion and conduct of this particular company and will not be able to inquire into the very grave matters concerned with commodity speculation in other companies and concerns?

I believe that the hon. Gentleman has a question down to that effect a little later on the Order Paper—No. 50.

The answer given to me yesterday did not cover the second point in the question. Will the right hon. Gentleman therefore inform the House whether the investigators will call for the names of persons to whom reference is made?

Very wide powers are given in the course of compulsory winding-up, and reports will be made to and by the Official Receiver.

47.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, after the experiences of the public arising from the action of so-called stags in relation to Stock Exchange flotations and of speculators in the produce market, and as the Government have no control over the continuously repeated abuses in these markets, he will introduce legislation to place the Stock Exchange and the Mincing Lane market under charters, not for the purpose of controlling speculation, but for the normal protection of the public?

As regards the recent attempt to corner a. commodity, I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer given yesterday to the hon. Member for Gower (Mr. D. Grenfell). With regard to other forms of speculation, I am content to leave it to the authorities concerned to take any measures that may be practicable in the public interest to prevent abuses in matters under their control.

In regard to the latter part of the question, will the right hon. Gentleman consider whether it is possible to give charters to these excellent organisations in order that they may control dealings in the public interest?

If the hon. Member will look at the answer given yesterday, he will see that there is a prospect of an inquiry, and it would be premature to consider other steps before that inquiry has been held.

The answer given yesterday was in reference to gambling in regard to one particular article. This is a much larger question; that charters should be given to these organisations so as to give them control. It is a rather larger issue than the gambling which has been going on recently.

I agree that it is a larger issue, but it arises out of a particular instance, and I would like to see what happens in this particular instance before considering whether it is desirable or necessary to go further in the matter.

50.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he proposes to take any action to prevent joint stock banks becoming involved in transactions similar to the recent pepper-pool operations?

I think the hon. Member is under a misapprehension. It is entirely contrary to the banking practice of this country for a joint stock bank to speculate in commodities, and I have no reason to assume that any of the banks did so on this occasion.

51.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he proposes to take any action to prevent a recurrence in other commodity markets of the recent pepper operations which have had such grave financial results in the city of London?

I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer given yesterday to the hon. Member for Gower (Mr. D. Grenfell).

I presume the right hon. Gentleman refers to the investigation by the Official Receiver. I should like to ask him whether the Official Receiver has sufficient scope in his inquiry to deal with the matters raised in this question?

I think so.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the wisdom in the public interests of causing an inquiry to be made into this grave public matter, which is giving rise to a great deal of misgiving, especially with regard to the connection between certain persons involved in the recent commodity speculations and persons involved in other commodity pools, for instance, tin, to which his colleague has referred.

I think we had better await the result of the inquiry.

Trade And Commerce

Russian Timber

24.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what reply has been given to the communication received from the Canadian Government asking that the imports of Russian timber to this country in 1935 should be restricted to a figure below that permitted for 1934?

25.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that the contract made by Timber Distributors, Limited, with the Russian Government for 400,000 standards of timber, which contains a fall clause allowing a reduction of 22s. 6d. per standard in prices, is an infringement of Clause 21 of the Ottawa agreements, both as regards quantity and price; and whether he will withhold his approval from this contract?

30.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether any protest has been made to the British Government by the Canadian Government with regard to the importation into Great Britain of Russian timber under a fall clause and at prices with which it is impossible for Canada to compete, seeing that this is in contravention of Article 21 of the Ottawa Agreement?

I am not yet in a position to add to the reply which was given on the 11th February to the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Bossom).

Can the right hon. Gentleman state when a reply will be given in view of the immense importance to Canada to know whether the imports from Russia will be less than those of last year?

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Canadian Government have protested that Article 21 of the Ottawa Agreement is being nullified by this importation; and does he recognise that it must be so with the fall clause which gives Russia the opportunity of reducing prices by approximately 10 per cent. below the lowest tender of anyone else?

Does my right hon. Friend favour the use of home-grown timber; and do the Board of Trade encourage people to increase employment by growing timber at home?

With reference to the question put by my hon. Friend behind, I am afraid that I cannot add to the information already given, but we have had no protest from the Canadian Government. May I answer the further question put with regard to the source of the particular timber? That is a general question with which I have not attempted to deal in my answer, but last year the contract was, I think, 350,000 standards, and the proposal that has been made this year is for a contract of 400,000 standards, and that is a matter we are taking into consideration.

Have the Canadian and other authorities been consulted in the matter; and, if so, will sanction for the contracts be held up until replies have been received from them?

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that the Russian timber is cut to length and size suitable for building in this country, whereas the Canadian timber is not; and, in view of that fact, will he support this contract?

Is it not a fact that what the hon. and gallant Gentleman has stated is not correct?

29.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the fall clause in the agreement for the import of Russian timber in 1934 was prohibited; and whether it will also be prohibited in 1935?

At the request of His Majesty's Government, the timber interests concerned arranged that the contract for the 1934 season for the importation of Russian sawn soft wood should not contain the fall clause. As has already been stated, questions raised by the contract for the 1935 season are receiving careful consideration, but I am not yet in a position to make a statement.

Has it not since been announced in the Press that the fall clause was going to be prohibited in 1935?

Cannot the President of the Board of Trade say that such a very scandalous clause will not be allowed, as it is not fair to anyone?

Is it not a fact that this fall clause would completely do away with the operation of the Ottawa Agreement?

28.

asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the quota of 350,000 standards of sawn soft wood from Soviet Russia was duly observed in the year 1934; or, if exceeded, what action was taken?

No quota was fixed for the importation of sawn soft wood from the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in 1934. The contract between the White Sea Timber Trust and Timber Distributors, Limited, for 1934, provided for the importation of a maximum quantity of 350,000 standards of sawn soft wood. I understand that this quantity was exceeded by 4,595 standards or slightly more than 1 per cent. I do not propose to take any action in the matter.

Cotton Industry (Surplus Spindles)

27.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what progress is being made in the redundancy scheme for the cotton-spinning trade; and whether he contemplates the introduction of legislation on the subject?

I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Crossley) on the 19th December to which at present I have nothing to add.

Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that there are a considerable number of redundant spindles which cannot be offered to a non-existent redundancy board; and will he take into consideration the desirability of setting up this redundancy board even if the total number of redundant spindles may not have been offered at the present time.

I can only repeat what I said on previous occasions. If the proposal for the elimination of surplus spindles received the support of a sufficiently influential proportion of the trade, I shall be glad to ask Parliament for statutory sanction for the collection of the necessary levy.

Can my right hon. Friend give any indication of what is a sufficiently large proportion to justify bringing forward legislation?

I cannot give the exact figure, but I hope that the general assurance will be sufficient to enable the industry to proceed with its plans.

May I ask my right hon. Friend whether, as all the replies were received before Christmas, he will make up his mind definitely before very long?

The delay does not rest here. The delay, such as there is, is in Lancashire, and not here.

Will the right, hon. Gentleman inform the House whether he has accepted the basis of redundancy, and the basis of compensation which should be paid?

No, Sir, I think that the committee are much better capable of assessing these values than a Government Department would be. I have no doubt, when they are ready to put forward ripe proposals, they will take these valuations into careful account.

Is it not a fact that very considerable progress has been made, and will the Government indicate that they will do their level best to introduce this legislation, even if the total number of redundant spindles is not offered in the first instance?

I gave an assurance, which I made public in the House on the 19th December, and that assurance still remains binding on the Government.

Anglo-Argentine Convention (Meat Trade)

15.

asked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether, in view of the prior rights of Empire over foreign producers in the British market, the committee set up to inquire into the means of ensuring a reasonable return to cattle producers will include representatives of the Dominions as well as the Argentine and the United Kingdom?

My hon. Friend's question is, I think, based on a misapprehension. The inquiry to which he refers is concerned solely with the economic and financial structure and working of the meat trade between Argentina and the United Kingdom and results from the provisions of the Protocol to the Anglo-Argentine Convention dated 1st May, 1933.

Cotton Exports (Canada)

19.

asked the President of the Board of Trade to what extent Lancashire cotton goods are now finding an increased market in Canada under the Ottawa Agreement?

Particulars of our exports of cotton goods to Canada are published in the monthly and annual trade returns. During the year 1934 exports to Canada of cotton yarns were double, and exports of piece-goods more than double, the quantity exported in 1932.

Is it a fact that a more generous interpretation of the Ottawa Agreement would enable Lancashire to export much more without doing any harm to any Canadian producing interest and with benefit to the Canadian consumer?

British Army (Tank Training)

31.

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether further consideration has been given to the possible use of Dartmoor as a training area for tanks; and if, before any de cision in this direction is taken, the local authorities concerned for the maintenance of the amenities of this holiday district will be called into consultation?

Tentative inquiries were made as to the possibility of using Dartmoor for the purpose of tank training in the coming season, but the idea has now been abandoned.

His Majesty's Silver Jubilee (Celebrations)

32.

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he can now state what part the Territorial Army is going to take in the forthcoming Jubilee celebrations?

33.

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office what part will be taken in the Jubilee celebrations by the Scottish units of the Territorial Army?

The arrangements are still under consideration, but I hope to be able to snake a statement in about a fortnight's time.

May I ask my right hon. Friend, in view of the fact that Territorial soldiers have pledged themselves to leave their certain employment and go overseas for a definite time for a small reward, to keep them carefully in mind and give them a prominent part in the celebrations in England?

I think that I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that they will be given a prominent part.

Naval And Military Pensions And Grants

34.

asked the Minister of Pensions whether he is prepared to grant under royal warrant a pension to the widow of the late Alexander Morrison, private No. 15,089, South Lancashire Regiment, who had a life disability pension of 22s. 8d. per week?

As the conditions of the Royal Warrant are not fulfilled in this case, I have no power to award a pension. Mr. Morrison was in receipt of disablement pension at the 30 per cent. rate for a gunshot wound, and he died of an acute attack of pneumonia.

Is the Minister aware that this lady lost her son, 19 years of age, and that the man was receiving a disablement pension for life? Under the special Warrant is not there authority under special conditions to grant a pension to the widow?

There is no authority under the Warrant to grant the widow a pension, but I will consider the point raised by the hon. Member with reference to the son.

Loud-Speaker Vans

35.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the action of the Chingford police in the case of Miss Mathieson's loud speaker, he will state what instructions are given by his Department regarding the use of a loud-speaker van in the streets; whether the police have instructions to proceed against the users of such vans; and whether he is aware that such loud-speaker vans have been used by a parliamentary candidate in the streets of Chingford in 1931?

I have no power to issue instructions in this matter; it is a question in each case whether the relevant statutory or by-law provisions are infringed; and it is the duty of the police to take action if any, infringement is observed. They have no record of the use of loud-speaker vans for election purposes at Chingford in 1931.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say why an attempt was made in this case to prevent Miss Mathieson from using a loud speaker? What was the reason in this case?

I answered a question which the hon. Member put to me on a previous occasion, in which I made it clear that the police drew the attention of the ladies in question to what they considered might be a. breach of the by-laws, if no more than that.

Is it possible for any lady to have a loud speaker?

Workmen's Compensation

36.

asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the delay in getting cases of injured workmen who have been served with the statutory 10 days' notice before the medical referee under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act; and whether he will consider making it compulsory on the employer to continue paying compensation to the injured person until his case has been before the medical referee, as this would speed up the examination?

I do not appear to have received any complaints on this point. If the hon. Member will send me particulars of actual eases in which there seems to have been undue delay, I shall be glad to consider them.

Education (School-Leaving Age)

37.

asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education whether he is aware of the latest returns of youths who have left school without entering employment; and, if so, whether he will reconsider the question of raising the school-leaving age?

I am aware that the returns to which the hon. Member refers show an increase in the number of unemployed juveniles. This is mainly due to the large numbers leaving school at Christmas. With regard to the second part of the question, I have nothing to add to the answer I gave on Tuesday, the 29th January last, to the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies).

Can we have some information as to how much worse the situation will have to be before action is taken?

I cannot prophecy in answer to a hypothetical question.

Is it a fact that we are so short of labour in industry that it is impossible to raise the school-leaving age?

Agriculture (Home-Produced Butter)

38.

asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he will instruct the Agricultural Reorganisation Commission for Milk to investigate the position of domestic producers of butter and to formulate a scheme for ameliorating it?

In so far as the position of domestic producers of butter is affected by the working of organised milk marketing in Great Britain, I have no doubt that it will be reviewed by the Reorganisation Commission. In the circumstances my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for Scotland, and I do not consider it to be necessary either to vary the terms of reference of the commission or to give it a specific instruction on this point.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the unremunerative price which home-produced butter is fetching at the moment is one of the chief causes of the embarrassment of the Milk Board, by the butter producers being compelled to throw their milk on to the board?

The Reorganisation Commission has already power to investigate that matter.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is not the foreign imports of butter that are causing him and the Reorganisation Commission some embarrassment?

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the butter which is produced by the farmer's wife is fetching an unremunerative price to-day and doing great harm to the millinery trade?

County Court Office, Shaftesbury

39.

asked the Attorney-General whether, in the new arrangements for county court premises at Shaftesbury, it is intended to establish the new county court office on the first floor of licensed premises; and, if so, whether there is any precedent for such conditions?

New county court offices are urgently required at Shaftesbury and the only suitable premises the Office of Works have been able to find are two rooms over off-licence premises. The entrance from the street is 8 feet wide and the stairs leading to the upstairs rooms have a separate door. The Office of Works are hiring the rooms on a short tenancy only until other suitable accommodation becomes available.

In the further consideration of this matter, will the Solicitor-General have regard to the fact that under the existing law it is impossible to hold ordinary sessions or a coroner's inquest on licensed premises, and why should not that apply also to county court offices?

As I have said, these rooms have been hired on a short tenancy and are the only ones available at the moment.

Who established off-licences? Was it Mr. Gladstone?

Ophthalmic Benefit Joint Committee

41.

asked the Minister of Health whether the names of the Ophthalmic Benefit Joint Committee have been lodged with him; and, if so, whether representation has been given to the Scottish Association of Opticians as the only examining optical body in Scotland?

The Ophthalmic Benefit Joint Committee is a non-statutory and unofficial body, and my right hon. Friend is not responsible for its constitution. A copy of a recent report of the committee, in which a list of the members is given, has, however, been sent to my right hon. Friend, and from this it appears that direct representation on the committee has not been given to the Scottish Association of Opticians.

Will my hon. Friend represent that the claims of Scotland should not be overlooked in this matter?

Water Supply

42.

asked the Minister of Health whether, in the further powers contained in the Acts for water undertakings, he will see that a clause is incorporated binding the undertaking to put in a connection to an adjacent undertaking or undertakings with the object of securing the mutual advantage of assistant supply in times of drought?

The suggestion of my hon. Friend has been noted though, as at present advised, my right hon. Friend doubts whether it would be either desirable or economical to impose the general obligation suggested.

Can it be given as an instruction?

No. I think the position is clear. If it is profitable to inter-connect, it will be done. If not, it will not be done.

Are we to understand that the subject of water supply is being faced on the question of whether or not it is profitable?

43.

asked the Minister of Health how many times the Regional Advisory Water Committee, formed last year for part of Lancashire and Cheshire, etc., has met since its formation; if the consultative committee for the three regional committees in this part of the country has been set up; and, if not, when it will be?

Two regional advisory water committees have recently been agreed, one for North, Central and South-East Lancashire and the other for Cheshire and North-West Derbyshire, following the recommendations made by a preliminary conference of the authorities held in October last. The first meeting of the former committee will be held on the 21st instant, and of the other committee in the near future. It is not proposed for the present to set up any formal consultative committee for the three regional committees in Lancashire and Cheshire.

May I ask why the consultative committee has not been set up, bearing in mind that the Minister said at a meeting in Lancashire at the end of last year that it would be set up? Why is not that being carried out?

It is obvious that it will be set up when there is anything to consult about. The first thing is to ensure that the regional committees undertake their powers, and, when they are in a position to consult, I presume they will do so.

Does that mean that we have to wait until some national dis-equilibrium arises before the committee is set up?

May I ask whether the Minister is aware that the Yorkshire Advisory Committee passed a resolution to the effect that their work was of no avail, because they did not have any statutory authority?

In taking note of these matters, is the Minister taking into consideration the industrial requirements of water in the counties of Lancashire and Cheshire?

Certainly. The policy of the regional committees must be a slow one, because all the local authorities in the area must co-operate. The question of industrial requirements is one of the main points which the regional committees have to consider.

Is there any reason why progress in this particular area should be slower than elsewhere?

Tin Regulation Scheme

44.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is watching developments in the tin market; and whether he proposes to take any action to protect the public against speculative pool operations in this essential commodity?

His Majesty's Government watch developments in the tin market, but do not consider that any action on their part is called for. One of the advantages of a complete and elastic scheme such as the tin regulation scheme is that it largely eliminates the opportunity for, and risk of speculation, both by providing a means of adjusting supply to demand and by securing as far as possible that the fullest information regarding stocks and supplies is available to the public. In fact the price of tin has remained remarkably stable for many months with the result that speculation has, I understand, greatly diminished. In addition in the tin scheme there exists a buffer pool under the control of the participating Governments which can be used as an additional safeguard against serious fluctuations in price. The hon. Member will recollect that the World Economic Conference reviewed the operation of the tin scheme and expressed their full approval of the scheme and its operation.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the very grave injury which the high price for tin means to the tinplate industry in South Wales?

Not in the least. I have always understood from the consumers of tin that the essential thing for them is a stable price, and I have not heard any objection from consumers that the price is unreasonable. What is important is that at a World Economic Conference, in which every single country was represented, producers and consumers, went into this question most thoroughly and thought that the scheme was not only reasonable but essential.

Are His Majesty's Government in favour of all these arrangements for keeping tin at a high price?

His Majesty's Government to-day are in exactly the same position with regard to this scheme as His Majesty's Labour Government were when the scheme was adopted.

Is my right hon. Friend aware of the great benefits which have accrued to home producers of tin as a result of this tin restriction scheme?

Yes, Sir.

May I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman has any information as to the operations of this buffer pool to which he referred to in his reply?

The whole of the facts have been fully stated regarding this buffer pool. The pool has to collect, I think, 8,000 tons of tin, which every producer has the right to produce, and which will then be under the control of the Governments concerned.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say, if he can, what are the financial results of the pool?

No, Sir. It is obvious that if you are to have a buffer pool controlled by Governments in order to prevent speculations, you cannot disclose the exact position of the pool from day to day.

Is it not a fact that this tin scheme operates gravely to the dis advantage of British Empire producers of tin and entirely to the advantage of high cost producers in foreign countries?

No statement could conceivably be farther from the truth. The Labour Government followed, if I may say so, an absolutely sound policy in this matter, and decided that before initiating the scheme they must be satisfied that it had the support of the great majority of producers, and that it was in the interests of the producers of tin within the British Empire. They fully satisfied themselves on that, and the scheme was endorsed by the World Economic Conference. For once a consistent policy has been carried out by all Governments.

53.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has received any representations against the attempts being made to create a complete monopoly in tin; and whether he proposes to take any action to prevent this essential commodity coming under the control of one powerful group?

No, Sir; no representations have been received, and the area of production of tin is so wide that it is almost inconceivable that it should come under a single control.

Is it not the case that the price of tin is twice the cost of production in certain parts of the world; and does the right hon. Gentleman not consider that that price is unduly high?

I should not dream of answering the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question without notice. Obviously, the cost of production must vary from mine to mine. If you take the price of tin generally to-day and compare it with the prices of other commodities, you will find that, to take coal for instance, in which the hon. Gentleman is interested, in terms of 1913, coal I think is 126 and tin 114.

Air Defence Measures

45.

asked the Prime Minister whether the women's legion new movement to assist in the organisation of help to the public in case of enemy gas attacks under the Red Cross and St. John Ambulance Societies is approved, encouraged or supported by the War Office; and whether he will give full particulars for the information of those interested?

I have made further inquiries, and I am informed that the War Office and other Departments are sympathetic in principle to the movement, and the subject is now being discussed by the three Defence Departments. I understand that full particulars of the movement in question were announced in a letter to the "Times" on the 25th January.

46.

asked the Prime Minister whether he is now able to make a statement as to the results of the experiments carried out in the East End by the Home Office, with the co-operation of the War Office and Air Ministry, as to the best means of making dwelling-houses proof against aerial gas attack?

No experiments have been carried out in the East. End by the Home Office or any other Government Department as to the best means of making dwelling-houses proof against aerial gas attack.

Do I understand that the widespread reports and various publications on this subject are entirely without foundation?

I am much obliged to the hon. Member for sending me a pamphlet, one of the publications to which I suppose he has referred. I have made full inquiries, and the answer I have given is in accordance with the result of those inquiries.

Income Tax

48.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether there is any differentiation of treatment between the small income tax defaulter of payment and those who owe large sums; and whether he will make a statement of the general procedure that is adopted to recover payments?

The hon. Member may rest assured that all practicable steps are taken to secure payment of taxes that are due and that there is no discrimination in this respect between those who owe small sums and those who owe large. As regards the second part of the question, the procedure for the recovery of taxes is governed by various provisions of the law, and is scarcely a subject which could be dealt with within the limits of a Parliamentary answer. But if the hon. Member wishes for further information on the subject or has a particular case in mind, perhaps he will communicate with me further.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is unrest among smaller income tax payers because of recent evidence which has appeared in the newspapers? One person who went into bankruptcy was found to be owing £14,000 in income tax and surtax, and they think that he should have been brought to book long ago.

My answer is that there is no ground for unrest or apprehension.

Is it not the case that men who are receiving unemployment assistance are being pressed and threatened with prosecution for not paying income tax, and will the right hon. Gentleman give sympathetic consideration to these cases? These people are absolutely bewildered and ask why they should be called upon to pay income tax when they are in receipt of money from the Unemployment Assistance Board.

Is it not a fact that the £14,000 due for income tax is a case which has been running on for a number of years? Is it, not quite incredible that it should have been allowed to run on for such a number of years?

Royal Mint (Silver Jubilee Medals)

49.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what precedent there is for the sale through the Royal Mint of medals in connection with the Silver Jubilee in competition with the accredited makers of these goods, who must work for profit and unprotected?

I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer which I gave on the 14th February to the hon. Member for the Moseley Division (Mr. Hannon) of which I am sending him a copy.

Foreign Loans

52.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that many pre-war foreign loans issued in London are not receiving full contract service; that the defaults are evidence that the market was unable to assess correctly the credit of foreign countries and institutions whose obligations the market floated on British investors; and will he, preparatory to any future consideration of the removal of the embargo upon the issue of foreign loans, arrange for the Government's economic advisers to draw up and publish for the protection of British savings a list of foreign borrowers who over-borrowed before the War and are now in default upon their pre-war obligations issued by the loan market in London?

I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to the hon. Member for North Newcastle-on-Tyne (Sir N. Grattan-Doyle) on the 4th February.

Fishing Industry (Irish Terri- Torial Waters)

16.

asked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether he is aware that the Irish Free State, in its Sea Fisheries Protection Act, 1933, claims, as territorial waters of the Irish Free State, that portion of the seas within which citizens of the Saorstat Eireann have, by international law, the exclusive right of fishing; whether the British Government accepts the proposition that international law gives Irish Free State citizens any fishing rights to the exclusion of British subjects of any other member of the British Commonwealth; and whether he has invited, or will invite, the Irish Free State Government to reconsider their attitude on this question in view of the injury to both British and Irish fishing interests?

As I have explained to the hon. and gallant Member in reply to a question put by him on 5th February, the view of the Government is that the control of fishing within the territorial waters of the Irish Free State is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State. This position was recognised in the British Commonwealth Merchant Shipping Agreement of 1931, Article 12 of which provides that

"nothing in the present agreement shall be deemed …to restrict the right of the Government of each part of the Commonwealth…to regulate the sea fisheries of that part."

In the circumstances, I am not aware of any ground on which I could usefully make representations to the Irish Free State Government in the sense suggested in the last part of the hon. and gallant Member's question.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is not a question here of regulation, but of the power to prevent Scottish or English fishermen from fishing in a proper manner within the three-mile limit, while subjects of the Irish Free State have free access to our territorial waters?

Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to be able to make representations for any English, Scottish or Welsh citizen of this country to the Irish Free State, but I am not going to make representation unless I am absolutely sure of my ground. In this case I have grave doubts.

Are all the right hon. Gentleman's actions in these matters guided by considerations of the most strict reciprocity?

No, they are guided by common sense.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider entering into negotiations on his simple point whether the line of the three-mile limit is drawn accurately and reasonably or not, in view of the evidence which one has to the effect that it is unreasonably drawn on many parts of the coast?

I would ask my hon. Friend to remember that in all the negotiations between ourselves and the Irish Free State I have never had experience of any simple point.

Is it any use relying upon common sense alone in any dealings with the Irish Free State; and will the right hon. Gentleman consider the common sense of denying to their nationals the right to fish in our territorial waters so long as they deny the corresponding right to our people?

Morocco (Spanish Customs Charge)

40.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has now, in response to his inquiries, received from the Spanish Customs authorities an explanation of the Customs charge made upon the baggage of British passengers when passing through the Spanish zone in Morocco from the French zone to the international port of Tangier?

Yes, Sir; the charge levied was a gate tax, which is payable by British subjects. In the view of His Majesty's Government this tax, however, is not leviable on goods in transit, and His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan is pursuing this point with the Spanish authorities.

Business Of The House

May I ask the Prime Minister what business it is proposed to take on Friday?

The Report on Third Reading of the Herring Industry Bill, which, I understand, has just gone through Committee, and the Second Reading of the Post Office and Telegraph (Money) Bill. If there is time, other Orders may be taken.

Herring Industry Bill

Reported, with Amendments, from Standing Committee B.

Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

Minutes of Proceedings to be printed.

Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to be considered upon Friday, and to be printed. [Bill 33.]

Selection (Standing Com- Mittees)

Standing Committee B

Mr. William Nicholson reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee B: Major Despencer-Robertson; and had appointed in substitution: Sir William Wayland.

Mr. William Nicholson further reported from the Committee; That they had added the following Ten Members to Standing Committee B (in respect of the Metropolitan Police (Borrowing Powers) Bill): Mr. Bracken, Sir Cyril Cobb, Mr. Duff Cooper, Captain Crookshank, Mr. Rhys Davies, Sir John Gilmour, Sir George Hume, Sir Henry Jackson, Captain Lumley, and Mr. Ernest Young.

Standing Committee C

Mr. William Nicholson further reported from the Committee; That they had nominated the following Members to serve on Standing Committee C: Lieut.-Colonel Acland-Troyte, Mr. Bailey, Colonel Baldwin-Webb, Mr. Barfield, Mr. Bateman, Mr. Batey, Mr. Boulton, Captain Bullock, Mr. Clarke, Viscount Cranborne, Mr. Daggar, Mr. Dickie, Mr. Doran, Mr. Drewe, Mr. Sales, Mr. Essen-high, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Glossop, Miss Graves, Mr. George Hall, Mr. Hartland, Mr. Howard, Captain Michael Hunter, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Janner, Sir Alfred Law, Mr. Lyons, Sir Frederick Mills, Mr. Morgan, Mr. Palmer, Mr. Pike, Sir Walter Preston, Miss Rathbone, Mr. Arthur Reed, Mr. Rickards, Mr. Aled Roberts, Sir Thomas Rosbotham, Brigadier-General Spears, Mr. Summersby, and Mr. Wills.

Mr. William Nicholson further reported from the Committee; That they had nominated Standing Committee C as the Committee on which Government Bills shall not have precedence.

Reports to lie upon the Table.

Message From The Lords

That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to authorise the lending overseas of pictures comprised in the collections of the National Gallery which are by British artists." [National Gallery (Overseas Loans) Bill [ Lords].

And also a Bill, intituled, "An Act to consolidate the Unemployment Insurance Acts, 1920 to 1934, and certain other enactments relating to those Acts." [Unemployment Insurance Bill [ Lords].

Unemployment Insurance Bill Lords

Read the First time; to be read a Second time To-morrow, and to he printed. [Bill 34.]

Orders Of The Day

Government Of India Bill

Considered in Committee.

[Sir DENNIS HERBERT in the Chair.]

3.40 p.m.

I think it was the wish of the small committee which was set up some time ago that I should remind this Committee of the substance of what was then arranged. That committee, as Members will know, had no power. They arranged and agreed among themselves, and with the Government so far as they could do so, to complete the Committee stage within 26 days, increased, so far as might be necessary, up to 30 days. Having, as I say, no power over other Members, but merely being representative of different groups—there were 14 Members of the House present at that committee—they desire that an appeal should be made in their name to Members of this Committee generally to endeavour to work the Committee stage in the spirit of that agreement. So far as the Chair is concerned, there is no difference whatever in the functions of the Chair. In making that appeal, I would remind hon. Members that it means speeches as short as possible and as few as possible, and I think it has been suggested that the Government representative very often should rise perhaps somewhat earlier than he has done on previous occasions in order to give the Government's view. That may dispense possibly with the necessity for further speeches from supporters of the Government, if the Government put their case sufficiently without requiring adventitious aid.

There is one other point that I would like to refer to with regard to the position of the Chair. It may save time considerably if as seldom as possible appeal is made to the Chair for advice, information, explanations, or anything of that kind. I shall be very glad to do the best I can in that way by being accessible to Members outside the Chamber on any points that they may wish to bring before me, in order to avoid discussions on the Floor of the House. The right of the Chair with regard to the selection of Amendments could not be, and was not, discussed in any way by that committee and, like all other powers of the Chair, it remains entirely unaffected by this arrangement.

3.43 p.m.

On a point of Order. I would wish to make it quite clear that I consider myself, personally, strictly bound to assist the Government in getting this Bill through in the 30 days of the Committee stage, but I do not at all want to be bound beyond that, and I think it would be a pity if it went forth that Members were engaged beyond that general acceptance of the total time. For instance, I hoped that perhaps I might draw from you some statement in public that the particular allocation of the stages now put down for this Bill is intended to be elastic and provisional and can be modified at the convenience of the House, the sole obligation which we have entered into with the Government being to abandon opposition to the Committee stage within the 30 days, if the Government majority hold together. I should like to have it on record that these provisional allocations are of an elastic character. It would seem, looking at this time-table, that probably more time will be required on the early stages of this Bill. They are fertile in large points of principle—the first 60 Clauses of it are peculiarly fertile in large points of principle—and it would seem that the 30 days would give an opportunity for a very full and free Debate upon the main selected points which the Committee would wish to discuss. I should deprecate our starting upon this discussion with any feeling that we have from the beginning to hustle through our task, to hurry on our task, and that everything has to be got through with the very greatest despatch. The Committee, I trust, will be permitted to work its way into the Bill in the ordinary manner, the agreement and understanding that we finish within 30 days being, of course, paramount. I put these observations forward in order that none of us may be held bound by detailed interpretations proceeding far beyond the subject matter of the main agreement.

3.45 p.m.

Before you answer the right hon. Gentleman, Sir Dennis, may I remind you of what hap pened at the conference of the various groups. We were none of us anxious to restrict the discussion of any important interest at all, but we all, including the hon. Members who, I think, represented my right hon. Friend, agreed that it was much better to have some kind of provisional time-table to which we should try to work, and I think we went so far as to hope we might from time to time have guidance from the Chair as to what progress we were making upon those lines. That does not mean that we wish the arrangement to be entirely inelastic, but I am sure that, unless we are ready to run the risk of going through the number of days and then finding at the end that great subjects have not been discussed, it is essential, if this agreement is to be kept—and I hope it will be kept, and I have no reason to think it will not be kept—that we should try to keep to this time-table.

3.47 p.m.

Further to the point of Order. My right hon. Friend talks about this agreement being kept. As I have said, the agreement exists, and it is clearly understood that the allocations are provisional. We find ourselves compelled to debate this Bill in Committee only seven days after the Second Reading, which is very unusual and a change of plan, whereas at least a fortnight should have intervened. Certainly I do not feel that we ought to be held in any strict manner to the allocation, and I think my right hon. Friend is putting an altogether stiffer interpretation upon it when he says that it might have some element of elasticity or some term like that. It is more than that. We must have free and easy debate and work our way into this Measure in a free manner, subject to the broad and general agreement which exists.

3.48 p.m.

I omitted to say, as I should have done, and as the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) reminded me, that the provisional arrangement agreed to by that committee was quite definitely that the published time-table was to be provisional, that the committee remains in existence, and that it will meet again from time to time as may be necessary in order to review its working. Perhaps I may just explain by way of example, how I think we stand now under the arrangement. We are now entering on the first period of six days allotted to Parts I and II of the Bill, and, as I understand it, if Parts I and II were finished earlier than the six days, we should be a little ahead and we should go right on to the next compartment. We should then have longer time, if it were necessary, for that compartment. On the other hand, if Parts I and II take more than the six days, there is no Guillotine that falls, and we go straight on with the discussion, but it means that we run into the next compartment, and in other words we are a little behind our provisional time-table. It may be that in that next compartment of time we shall make it up, and we must endeavour to do so, as far as we can, but the working of the time-table is entirely elastic. The small committee hope to meet again from time to time in order to revise the time-table as may be necessary and to make proposals with a view to guiding this Committee as to what it thinks is probably the sort of time-table it would desire to adhere to, if possible.

3.50 p.m.

It seems to me that this arrangement all depends upon the spirit in which we all agree to carry it out. We all have certain rights in this matter as Members of the House of Commons, and we have collective rights, and all that we are concerned about is that those Amendments which we on this side consider important should have as fair a chance of discussion as those with which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) and his friends are concerned. People do not quite understand that if we felt we had the power to stop the Bill we would use that power, but we have not and, therefore, we propose, with the assent of the Committee and the House, to do our best to amend it in such ways as we think necessary. This proposal, whoever made it, is an excellent one for dealing with a Bill of this kind, but it can only be successful if all of us without reserve consider one another and do our best to get the Bill through.

Clause 1—(Short Title)

I beg to move, "That consideration of the Clause be postponed."

I am quite prepared to accept the Motion.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 2—(Government Of India By The Crown)

3.52 p.m.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 13, to leave out "his territories in India," and to insert "the territories in India for the time being vested in him."

This Amendment will not take long to explain—

I am quite ready to accept the Amendment.

It is all very well to encourage as much rapidity as possible, but when an hon. Member gets up to move an Amendment and the Secretary of State says that he is ready to accept it we are left in the dark as to the reason for moving it. We should be glad if the Secretary of State would say a few words to enable us to know the effect of the Amendment.

I assure the hon. Gentleman that it is only a drafting point. My hon. Friend wishes to retain the words of the Government of India Act. There is no reason why we should not retain them, and it was on that account that I immediately accepted the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Question, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.

Clause 3—(The Governor-General Of India And His Majesty's Representa Tive As Regards Relations With Indian States)

3.54 p.m.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 7, after "Manual," to insert:

"after consultation with the Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council established by this Act and styled the India Advisory Committee."

In order to make clear what this Amendment means, I will ask the attention of the Committee to a. proposed new Clause which appears later on the Order Paper in the name of my Noble Friend the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) and myself, which defines the India Advisory Committee which we contemplate. It is as follows:

"(1) There shall be a Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council styled the India Advisory Committee.

(2) The India Advisory Committee shall consist of the First Lord of the Treasury, or other person who is the Prime Minister for the time being, the Secretary of State for India, and all persons being members of His Majesty's Privy Council who shall have held the office of Governor-General of India before or after the passing of this Act, or shall have held after the passing of this Act the office of His Majesty's Representative for the exercise of the functions of the Crown in its relations with Indian States.

(3) It shall be the duty of the India Advisory Committee to advise His Majesty as to the appointment of persons to the offices of Governor-General of India, His Majesty's Representative for the exercise of the functions of the Crown in its relations with Indian States, and Governor of any Province, and as to the removal of such persons from such offices."

Put shortly, the Amendment I am moving will provide that the appointment of the Governor-General of India under this Bill and His Majesty's Representative in India shall take place only after consultation with living ex-Viceroys who happen to be members of the Privy Council. That would, in fact, include all the living ex-Viceroys. There is a precedent for the proposal which I am making, for under the Government of India Act, 1919, Section 3, it is provided that the Governors of the Provinces in India, except the three major Provinces, shall be appointed after consultation with the Governor-General. The Amendment which I am putting forward, accordingly, only extends that precedent to the case of the appointment in future of the Governor-General. It is worth while for the Committee to consider what is the nature of the office to which the Governor-General is to be appointed and what is the kind of man who will be required to discharge the functions of that office.

I have not addressed the House or any Committee of the House upon the subject of India since the day on which the Select Committee was set up. On that occasion I set forth the views which I held as to the dangers which have to be encountered and the difficulties against which we have to guard ourselves. Never after the Select Committee was set up did I express any opinion whatever on this very important matter, nor did I address the House in the Debates on the Report of the Select Committee or on the Second Reading of this Bill. I voted in support of the recommendations in the Select Committee's Report, and I also voted in the Lobby in favour of the Second Reading of the Bill. I am sure that there is nobody who gave a vote in favour of this proposal for a new Constitution for India who did not feel that he was taking upon himself a very grave responsibility. Never since I became a Member of this House have I given a vote after such serious deliberation, or with as grave anxiety as I felt about the judgment which I had to form in connection with the policy which we are to adopt for India.

None of us, I am sure, can forget that we are proposing to impose a system of democratic responsible government upon people whose whole traditions are alien to the fundamental theory upon which democratic government rests. We are giving it to 350,000,000 people, a population nearly three times as large as the whole populations which are assembled within the orbit of the United States of America, a people, or rather, I should say, many peoples, divided by a war of tongues, by deep cleavages of race, by bitter antagonisms of creed, by all the con-tempts and hatreds involved in caste. And one thing we have to keep in mind which we are apt to forget is that these people have never been a nation. They really have no unity which has not been created for them by the advent of the British people in India who have given to these immense hordes a common law which has operated through this gregarious tumult confined within borders, which, after all, are only a geographical expression.

That is the problem with which we are dealing, and we must not imagine that it is an easy one. There are a certain number of people who, I gather, are able to take the complacent view—and after they have announced it think that no further argument is required—that bad self-government is better even than good government by somebody else. But even if you admit that idea as a good foundation for your policy, it is obvious that it acts only within very restricted limits. As soon as you find people uncomfortable enough, or irritated enough, or depressed enough, look how readily they depart from this idea of democratic government, and rush to other forms for help. We have seen it take place within our own time in different countries of Europe, but nothing in my view has been so remarkable in all history as the way in which vast numbers of the citizens of America, who have hitherto been given up to a, theory of extreme individualism, have rushed with one accord to place their burdens and troubles in the hands of one individual who they hope will be able to save them from their difficulties. Accordingly, we are challenged with the clear fact that what we are doing here is to embark upon the most colossal experiment that has ever been attempted in human history. If it breaks down we shall be responsible for one of the greatest catastrophes that has ever been known. It is, above all, our duty to see that it does not break down, and that it cannot break down, and, as I take it, while we are considering the various Clauses of the Bill, it must be with the strict intention of adopting every precaution by which we can save this great experiment from failure.

We have put into this Bill many safeguards, but all of those safeguards revolve round a single individual, and that is the Viceroy. He is the linch-pin of the whole system. He is the keystone of all this mighty fabric. If the Viceroy fails, nothing can save the system you have set up. You may say that the Viceroy always has behind him the India Office, but in nearly all cases in which he has to act, he has to do so by his own discretion. On occasions he will not have time to consult anybody, and the decision will depend upon his foresight and his insight, his tact, his judgment and discretion; and even when he does consult the India Office on most of these problems the foundation of the reply of the India Office must be the impression which the Viceroy himself has formed. That is the information upon which alone they can form an opinion. Accordingly, I cannot imagine any office in the world in which the appointment is more important than that with which we are dealing in the case of the Viceroy of India.

What are the main functions which the Viceroy has to perform? I have had taken out for me a list of the things he has got to do, and I am sure that every hon. Member would be as staggered as I was if he saw the list I have in my hand on eight closely type-written sheets. Many of the matters dealt with are undoubtedly routine matters, but a very large majority of them are matters to which the Viceroy would require to give his own personal attention and careful deliberation. I need not worry the Committee by going through all these matters, but let me remind them of one or two of the things which stand out on the face of the Bill. The Viceroy is to be the head of the Executive. He has to preside over the Ministers. He has got to take part in all deliberations. He has got to form the rules for the transaction of business. He has got to arrange what is done in the case of the vacation of seats. And, in addition to all the ordinary duties of presiding over the deliberations of Ministers, he himself is charged with three separate departments of his own. He has got to look after ecclesiastical matters. He has go to deal with finance; and he has got to deal with defence. You may say with regard to finance that he has to appoint a financial adviser. It is perfectly true, but there is a vast number of questions arising out of finance upon which he, personally, will have to decide, because it will be impossible for him to defend his actions, as he is bound to do, unless he applies his mind to the reasons for the actions he has taken.

Those are not matters such as one is familiar with in Government Departments in this country where a Minister can readily accept the judgment of a subordinate upon a matter which he knows will be defended by the Department in due course. The Viceroy has to defend his own actions, and he has to show in a large number of instances the reasons why he differs from the advice given to him by his Ministers—a totally different situation from anything we know in this country, or in any democratic system of which I have ever heard. On these questions of finance, it is obvious there will be many quarrels between the Provinces and the Federal Government. There will be the question of income tax, for example, and there are many questions between the Provinces and the Federal Government on finance which the Viceroy personally will have to decide. When it comes to the ques- tion of defence, the Viceroy cannot simply leave that to his skilled advisers and pronounce a, judgment. I do not know whether hon. Members have taken the trouble to look at the Instructions which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India has issued to the Governor-General and Governors in connection with this Bill. Those Instructions consist of a remarkable series of powers and checks upon powers to be exercised by this one individual who is charged with these colossal duties. One paragraph alone which I might read to the Committee gives some idea of the amazing discretion and tact which the Viceroy will be compelled to display in dealing with this situation.

What has he got to do in the exercise of his judgment in connection with defence? He has not merely to decide himself what is to be required, but he has to take his Ministers into consultation. I do not for a moment question the necessity of these Instructions. I think they are admirable for the purpose. They exhibit exactly what is expected of the Viceroy, but if you look at Instruction XVII, for example, it says:

"Our Governor-General shall encourage the practice of joint consultation between himself, his Counsellors and his Ministers. And seeing that the Defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people it is Our will in especial that Our Governor-General should have regard to this instruction in his administration of the Department of Defence."

That is to say, that although the Governor-General has the last voice upon this question of defence, he has got to bring his Ministers together into consultation, and to try to get their co-operation and to try to come to a common view. Instruction XIX says:

"And We desire that, although the financial control of Defence administration must be exercised by the Governor-General at his discretion, nevertheless the Federal Departmnt of Finance shall be kept in close touch with this control by such arrangement as may prove feasible, and that the Federal Ministry and in particular, the Finance Minister shall be brought into consultation before estimates of proposed expenditure for the service of Defence are settled and laid before the Federal Legislature."

Anybody who knows what has happened in the government of India, especially in the struggle between the civil department and the military department with regard to expenditure upon defence, knows that this will require the very utmost limit of the time and the patience, the perseverence and the forbearance of the Viceroy in endeavouring to arrive at this co-operation which the Instruction quite properly sets out. What I have said shows that the Viceroy will have a full 24 hours each day; but things do not by any means stop even there. He has to keep in close touch with everything that is going on, because of the duties imposed upon him in watching to see that none of the things which Parliament seeks to have safeguarded shall be in any way infringed. In particular, the Viceroy is given special responsibilities with regard to minorities, safeguarding the interests of public servants, and discrimination in trade. Just imagine what that means. Things which might injure the public servants of India might be subtly or insidiously introduced into acts of administration which it would be very difficult to detect, but the Viceroy is enjoined to keep a constant watch upon those things and to deal with them if they occur. When it comes to minorities, the Instructions provide that he has a special responsibility for the safeguarding:

"Of the legitimate interests of minorities as requiring him to secure, in general, that those racial or religious communities for the members of which special representation is accorded in the Federal Legislature, and those classes who, whether on account of the smallness of their number or their lack of educational or material advantages, or from any other cause, cannot as yet fully rely for their welfare on joint political action in the Federal Legislature."

That is another very exacting duty, because nothing has been more trying in India in the past than endeavouring to resolve the difficulties which occur between religious communities. Then, subtly, the draftsman has added this to the Viceroy's difficulties:

"But he shall not regard as entitled to his protection any body of persons by reason only that they share a view on a particular question which has not yet found favour with the majority."

I imagine the draftsman must have heaved a sigh of relief when he succeeded in getting that sentence off. As to discrimination in matters of trade, there is a difficulty which taxes the skill of the most subtle administration. The instructions recognise that there are many ways of indirect discrimination which might not be obvious at first sight, and with regard to that matter the instructions require and charge him to regard

"discriminatory or penal treatment covered by this special responsibility as including both direct discrimination (whether by mans of differential tariff rates or by means of differential restrictions on imports) and indirect discrimination by means of differential treatment of various types of products."

I do not know what kind of staff the Viceroy is to be supplied with in order to perform all these duties, but whatever the extent of the staff direct responsibility is placed upon the Viceroy for the action which he is to take in any single case, and it is the most exacting duty I have ever known put upon any single individual in the history of our legislation. But what I have said touches only the fringe of the matter, because the Viceroy is at the same time to deal with all matters connected with the Indian States which are not confided to the Federal Government. He has still to exercise the right of the Paramount Power, and that involves many most delicate transactions and will take up a great deal of the Viceroy's time.

I myself have had the privilege of being in the company of a Viceroy for many days, and seeing him at his work under the old conditions. That Viceroy was one of the most skilled administrators this country has ever possessed, a man of outstanding ability, as recognised by everybody, and with immense capacity both for work and for the rapid survey of papers; and in my experience, except for the hour when he rode in the morning, he was chained to his chair for the whole day. Further, the Viceroy has to appoint the Commissioners of the Commissioners' States. He has to concern himself with Baluchistan; he has to deal with railway matters; he has to appoint three-sevenths of the members on the Railway Federal Board; and as an anti-climax he has to see that the broadcasting system of India is fair and equitable. In addition to all these things he has to play a part which is even more important in the East than here, he has to play the part of the representative of the King, and never fail in keeping up those great ceremonial duties which appeal so much to the mind of the Indian populace.

I am not quite sure whether the right hon. Gentleman is keeping in mind the effect of his Amendment. The effect of this Amendment, if I refer to the proposed new Clause on page 252 which he mentioned, is to establish a committee to advise as to the appointment of the Governor-General. I can understand the relevance of a great deal of what the right hon. Gentleman has said as to the importance of the post, and that that indicates the importance of choosing the right man, but I have ventured to interrupt because his Amendment, so far as I can see, is confined entirely to the appointment of a committee not to advise or assist the Viceroy in his work but merely to deal with his appointment.

apologise if I have gone beyond the bounds of fair exposition of the point I was making, and I apologise particularly to the Committee for taking up time, but I did think it important, in connection with the question of the appointment, that we should realise what kind of man we require for this post. I shall not pursue the matter any further, and will only add that it must be obvious from what I have said of the duties pertaining to the great office of Viceroy that India will require of our very best, and that there is no one in the whole world who exercises a responsibility and discharges duties of anything like the magnitude that are to be placed upon this single individual.

I ask, therefore, whether we can leave the appointment of a man to such an office to the mere play of political chance. Can we feel sure of the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for India, of any party in a partisan Government, always being willing and free to choose the appropriate man for the office? I have a great belief in Prime Ministers, and I have a childish faith in Secretaries of State for India, but I cannot trust the judgment of even the most distinguished of them to so great a degree in this matter. We cannot afford to make a mistake, for, believe me, if the Viceroy fails the system is immediately brought to disaster. He is the key to the whole position, and I cannot imagine that a Prime Minister or a Secretary of State would feel himself embarrassed by consulting with the ex-Viceroys available and obtaining their judgment; and, on the other hand, I can quite well imagine a situation in which a Prime Minister would be glad to be able to answer to his party that he was bound to take other people's views into account in making the appointment. It is for these reasons—and again I apologise for expressing them at so great length—[HON. MEMBERS "No!"]—that I ask the, Committee to consider this Amendment very seriously, and to take action by which we can really feel more assured in our minds that the appointment to the office of Viceroy will be entirely safe in the hands of those who have the duty to recommend him.

4.27 p.m.

I am torn between two desires. On the one hand, I should like to follow my right hon. Friend over the very wide field he has traversed, and on the other hand I am very anxious, in the first speech which I deliver in this long Committee stage, to follow both in the letter and the spirit the advice just given from the Chair, that the Government speeches should be few and short. On the whole, with all due deference to my right hon. Friend, I am going to try to follow the very wise advice given by you, Sir Dennis Herbert, this afternoon. I hope, therefore, that no one in the Committee will think I am perfunctory or that I am not dealing adequately with the arguments on any particular Amendment.

Let me begin by saying that I have great sympathy with the object which I think is in the mind of my right hon. Friend, namely, to get the appointment of the Viceroy on to the broad ground of a national rather than a partisan appointment, and that we should take every step to ensure that we do get for this post a man who will not only command the support of a particular section of the community here, that may be in power only for a limited period of time, but will really represent the nation rather than any particular section of the nation. Secondly, I agree with my right hon. Friend in a great deal of what he-has said about the importance of the Viceroy's post. Obviously, it is an important post, and a very delicate one. Let me say in passing, however, that great as its difficulties are I think my right hon. Friend seemed in his argument rather to assume that the Viceroy is going to be a lone, isolated individual standing by himself. That is not the ease. The Viceroy will have his advisers and behind his advisers will have whatever staff he needs for dealing with the kind of questions to which my right hon. Friend has just referred. Behind his own staff there will be the whole body of the Services, stretched over India from one end to the other, upon whose loyal advice and constant help I am certain that he will always be able to depend.

Let not my right hon. Friend imagine that the Viceroy will be acting almost in the dark, and that the kind of situations which he has just described will be constantly coming upon the Viceroy unawares. I do not think that that is likely to happen. The Joint Select Committee rightly attached a great deal of importance to the need for the Viceroy to be. constantly kept informed, not in any haphazard way but regularly and methodically through the official channels, of the kind of situations which I think was in the mind of my right hon. Friend. Moreover, there were, on the Joint Select Committee, three living ex-Viceroys, and they all agreed quite definitely that with those means of information at his disposal, with a staff at hand—after all, he is to be the judge of the numbers of his staff and of the expenditure which is to fall upon the Votes—with those services and this machine at his disposal, the Viceroy ought to be able to carry out his duties, complicated even though they are.

Having said, I hope, enough to show my right hon. Friend that I agree with him, first of all in his desire to ensure the best possible appointment for the Viceroyship and, secondly, in his evident desire to give the Viceroy every possible help in carrying out his difficult duties, let me now turn to the actual proposals which my right hon. Friend makes. He proposes, in the case of the Viceroy, that a special committee of the Privy Council composed of those ex-Viceroys who are members of it, should be a consultative committee, and that the Prime Minister should consult them before submitting a name to the Crown. I have summed up what my right hon. Friend means when he talks of this consultative committee, but even after his speech I am still left in doubt, for this reason: In his speech he spoke of this body as a purely consultative one, whereas in the New Clause which he has put down for discussion at a later stage, he talks of the committee as an advisory committee whose duty it is to advise the Crown. My right hon. Friend who, I know, is an expert in these constitutional questions, will at once see that these two conceptions are quite different. A consultative committee is one thing and an advisory body, whose statutory duty it is to advise the Crown, is quite a different thing.

An advisory committee whose statutory duty it is to advise the Crown would really take the responsibility away from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. It would introduce into our Constitution a totally new kind of procedure in which it might well be that the majority of the committee composed of the ex-Viceroys might advise the Crown—"advising the Crown" is, as my right hon. Friend knows, a technical expression—to make an appointment that is not approved by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. The effect of that would be to withdraw from this House and from the Cabinet any responsibility for the appointment. While I am most anxious to keep this appointment as far as possible out of the ordinary ruck of party politics, and I think every other hon. Member is anxious to do that, I see grave objections to introducing a new procedure into our Constitution and taking this appointment out of the control of Parliament. I hope that at some later stage of this discussion my right hon. Friend and those who are working with him will make it quite clear whether, when they speak of an advisory committee in the proposed new Clause later, that is what they mean.

I can make that perfectly clear to my right hon. Friend now. The effective words of the Amendment are "after consultation." That is the only point that really matters, and the fact that the body which the Prime Minister has to consult is described as an advisory committee does not affect the duty of the Prime Minister in regard to it, or the duty of consultation which is imposed by the Amendment. I have no particular predilection for the word "advisory"; call it any other kind of committee you like.

Does not Subsection (3) of the right hon. Gentleman's proposed new Clause carry the matter a great deal farther than he has just said? It states:

"It shall be the duty of the India Advisory Committee to advise His Majesty…"

The effective Amendment which I am moving at present is that consultation be had with a body which is to be set up. The particular character of this body is a different matter, and I am prepared to alter the words of the proposed new Clause which we have not yet come to, in order that the body shall perform the duties of consultation alone.

I take it that the right hon. Gentleman does not stand by the words of Sub-section (3) of his proposed new Clause.

No.

And that he does mean consultative body, and not advisory body?

I know perfectly well that a body to advise the Crown in this respect would be an invasion of the Royal Prerogative. I do not propose that at all.

That being so, and having cleared that difficulty out of the way, let me now address myself to the proposal in the sense which my right hon. Friend has just described, namely, a consultative committee. I put my difficulty to the Committee without reserve, and I hope that hon. Members will face it. I am, first of all, nervous of the existence of a committee of this kind bringing the appointment of the Viceroy into public discussion. I think there is a great deal to be said for the Prime Minister of the day consulting individually the ex-Viceroys, and I can conceive that that usually happens, but as soon as you set up a committee by statute you run the risk of bringing the question of the appointment into discussion in the House. Questions may then be asked whether such and such a member of the committee agreed with the recommendation, which might become the subject of party controversy. I would very much like, if possible, to avoid that kind of risk.

Whether it be possible to reach the result that my right hon. Friend desires by some other means I am not sure. I am not sure, for instance, what it is that he and those who are supporting this Amendment really desire. Do they desire to keep the appointment out of the field of purely partisan appointments If that be the case, I would be inclined to think that the right way to achieve that would be a convention between the Prime Minister and ex-Prime Ministers namely, before a name is submitted to the Monarch the Prime Minister would consult the ex-Prime Ministers and the Leader of the Opposition on the subject. The effect of such a convention would, I think, avoid the risk of a future Prime Minister repudiating an appointment made by one of his predecessors. If, on the other hand, what is desired is to bring to bear upon a recommendation of this kind the expert opinion of those who have had first-hand experience in the highest post in India, I think you ought to consult the reigning Viceroy as well as the former Viceroys. I still think, however, that it is better to consult them individually rather than to set up in the body of the Bill a statutory committee that will be liable to the kind of risks that I have just described.

I hope that my hon. Friends will address themselves to these difficulties. We all want to get the best possible man and we all want his merits to be considered but not from any party or sectional angle. I am inclined to think that the setting up by statute of a committee of this kind would either be of no avail in the event of a Prime Minister's ignoring the recommendation of the ex-Viceroys, or it might be embarrassing, in the event of a discussion arising in this House as to why a- particular individual was or was not recommended. The position of the Government is, in a sentence or two, to be described as follows: We see grave danger in blurring Ministerial responsibility. We feel that whatever consultation there may be and with whomsoever that consultation may take effect, the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet ought to be clear and distinct; we feel, secondly, that if there is to be consultation it would probably be much more effective if it went on by convention rather than by provision of this kind in a Bill, a provision which, as I say, either will be of no avail or may be very embarrassing to the individual who is eventually appointed. Speaking generally, the Government could not, I think,, accept the Amendment in this form, but I should welcome an opportunity of hearing the views of hon. Gentlemen in all parts of the House on the subject.

4.45 p.m.

Like the right hon. Gentleman, I do not wish unduly to detain the Committee, but I would like, on behalf of my hon. Friends on this side, to say at once and without any qualification what our attitude is with respect to this Amendment. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne), if he will allow me to say so respectfully, scarcely advanced an argument in favour of the change implied in the Amendment. I heartily agree with him that the responsibilities of the Governor-General under the new regime, as, indeed, they have been under the old, will be very heavy and exceedingly difficult to discharge, but I did not quite gather what the drift of his argument was—whether it was that the responsibilities were so onerous that no single individual could be expected to discharge them, and that, therefore, they should be discharged by some representative body in India. That, at any rate, seemed to me to be a logical deduction from the right hon. Gentleman's argument. I think, however, he succeeded none the less in disclosing his real purpose. If I understood him aright, he is really rather concerned as to what might happen as regards the future appointment of Viceroys in the event of the entry into office of Governments to whom he is politically opposed.

We can test the value of the operation of this proposal if we project our minds into a time when there is an alternative Government differing in complexion from the present one. Suppose that a Labour Government comes into office, and this scheme is in practice. The Advisory Committee which the right hon. Gentleman visualises is to include the Prime Minister, who would naturally be a Labour man, and the Secretary of State, who also will be a Labour man; but will there be any other Labour representative on this Committee of the Privy Council? Every other member of the committee will be politically opposed to the Government, if we may take our experience hitherto as a reasonable guide, because I cannot recall any Viceroy of India who on his return has associated himself with the Labour movement. [HON. MEMBERS: "Lord Chelmsford."] Lord Chelmsford specifically declared, when he joined the Labour Government, that he did not accept the ordinary party beliefs and policies of Labour. Therefore, I am strictly correct in what I have just said. How does that work out in practice I How could anyone expect a Labour Government to be prepared to relegate the responsibility of determining who is an appropriate person to exercise the function of Viceroy or Governor-General of India to a committee of honourable people I dare say, but of people none the less who are politically opposed to themselves?

Serious political issues may arise from time to time between the new India and the Government in this country, Labour or Conservative as the case may be, and it is fair that the Labour party should anticipate that the person whom it would appoint to exercise this very important function should be a person in strict accord with its outlook in relation to Indian affairs. Why not? Would right hon. Gentlemen opposite appoint a Socialist? The Tory party's great complaint at the moment is that the Government have become so Socialist, and if it is proper for right hon. Gentlemen opposite to complain of our influencing Tory policy, we are entitled to complain of Tories influencing our policy. Therefore, we shall vigorously object to this attempt to preserve high appointments in India in the future to the Tory party. The right hon. Gentleman and his friends may as well get rid of the impression that they are to exercise a. permanent control over the policy of this country in relation to India. We are entitled to express our view about it, and, if we are the Government, we are entitled to determine what shall be the policy of the country.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke of his desire not to make an appointment of this sort too strictly partisan in character. He wants it national and representative. The way to arrive most nearly at representative opinion in this country is to determine who are the people who have been elected by the people of this country to be the Government for the time being. If it happens to be a Conservative Government, it is presumed to be representative of the people of the country; If it happens to be a Labour Govern ment, it is presumed to be representative of the people of the country. I do not want to be more partisan in this matter than the occasion demands, but I say emphatically that we are not going to allow ourselves to be drawn into any sort of scheme whereby an additional safeguard in relation to future appointments in India is introduced so as to give the Tory party a permanent lien on the offices held in that country.

4.51 p.m.

I wish that the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) had had a bigger House to listen to his speech. I do not think that the Secretary of State ought to be afraid of making new constitutional precedents. He has here a constitution which is neither a democracy nor a dictatorship, neither a Parliamentary Government nor an autocracy, which is neither monarchy nor dyarchy. It is something that he is doing quite afresh. Therefore, we have to make our precedents, and I am certain that, if we can convince him that we have to make our precedents, he will be prepared to do it. I would ask him and the hon. Member for Caerphilly to consider, not the dignity of politicians in the House of Commons, but the way in which the people in India will look at this matter. This Constitution is being set up in which admittedly the Viceroy is, as my right hon. Friend calls him, the linch-pin or the keystone. Everything depends on getting the very best man, a man who possesses an extraordinary range of powers and experience, to fill this post. We are all agreed that it is all-important to find the right man. It may be very difficult for a Prime Minister, in face of his own political supporters, to appoint the right man. He may learn that the right man is not a follower of his own party, and it would be a great assistance and support to the Prime Minister to be able to turn to his party and say, "I am enjoined by the Government of India Act to consult a committee of the Privy Council. After such consultation we came unanimously to the opinion that So-and-so was the best man, and we have considered the interests of India and the interests of India alone." Have not the people of India the right to ask that of us? Have not they a right to demand that we English politicians should put aside our party prejudices and passions in appointing their Viceroy, and appoint him solely and entirely on account of his fitness for this extremely difficult and complicated task? I would ask the Committee also to consider the position of the Viceroy himself after he has been appointed. When he has to use these very invidious and delicate powers, will it not be a great support to him if everybody, not only in England but also in India, knows that he has been appointed after consultation with the greatest experts that the Empire holds on this subject?

Who are the people who, according to our suggestion, should be consulted? The men who have themselves borne that particular burden, and who know as nobody else can know the ramifications and difficulties involved. The hon. Member for Caerphilly talked of keeping the office of Viceroy as a Tory preserve, or something of that sort. That is not the character of the present ex-Viceroys. They are not people of a political complexion with which I personally sympathise, but I am perfectly certain that they and their successors would never recommend anybody with regard to what his English politics were, but would only recommend people whom they believed to possess the qualifications necessary for dealing with Indian problems. Surely, it is going to help enormously the whole working of this scheme if the people in India know that the man sent out to them as Viceroy has been appointed absolutely free of any party considerations here, that he has been appointed after consultation with men whom they know, Viceroys under whom they have lived, men who know their conditions. Will not that assure the new Viceroy of a welcome which he could not possibly get under the present system?

The Secretary of State sems to think that this might drag such appointments into party politics, but the object is exactly the contrary. I would ask him to recall his own experience during the past few months. How did he set about getting his Indian reform proposals through? He got a Joint Select Committee appointed, on which he put as many ex-Viceroys as he could find, and other people who could speak with authority to the people of England. The report of that committee, backed by those men, has enormously facilitated the task of the right hon. Gentleman; and so it will be in the future with regard to any Viceregal appointments if the public in this country, in India, and in the whole Empire know that the appointment has been made after consultation with people who, in their capacity as ex-Viceroys, stand above party and irrespective of party. If it is known that the appointment has been made in that manner, there will be far less disposition to question such appointments than there has been in the past.

The committee that we suggest is intended to be a purely consultative committee. If "advisory" is the wrong word to use, that can easily be altered. The object is that these experts should be consulted, and that the whole question of the appointment of Viceroy should be lifted above party politics. If the Labour party fear that, they show a strange lack of faith in the ability contained within their own ranks. I am certain that a panel of the kind suggested would not consider the question from a party point of view, but would supply what the whole working of the Constitution very much needs, and what India needs. I hope it is not out of order to say that this committee is intended also to advise in regard to the appointment of Provincial Governors. We cannot discuss that question in detail at the present moment, but I would like to say this, that the appointment of Provincial Governors in the past, and, indeed, in the last 10 years, has not been above the reproach of being affected by party considerations in this country; and if we passed an Amendment of this sort we should be doing a very great deal to give Indians an assurance that appointments of that kind would not occur again, and I believe they would be profoundly grateful to us for it.

5.0 p.m.

The Amendment has already undergone a, change since it was introduced. The right hon. Gentleman who moved it will recognise that it would be very different if the words that appear in Sub-section (3) of the new Clause which appears on page 252 of the Order Paper were adopted. That fact invalidates a great deal that was said in the course of his speech. The Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) has asked us to assume the general acceptance in India of an appointment which had behind it the unanimous recommendation of this Advisory Committee. Why should he assume that such an Advisory Committee would be unanimous? What provision is there if there should be a division of opinion on the Advisory Committee? I suppose that there would be five members of the suggested committee. There would be the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, and I believe there are three past Viceroys who are spared to take part in our counsels. Assume a position where there is a, division, that the three in exercising the duty with which they have been entrusted by Parliament came to the conclusion that there should be one appointment, and that the Prime Minister of the day and the Secretary of State thought that the appointment should be of another kind.

I ask the bon. Gentleman whether, with his knowledge of public affairs, he thinks that that is likely. Does he not think that men of experience and responsibility, meeting together, would in nine cases out of ten come to a unanimous agreement?

I do not know why they should. Suppose that there is a question of policy. Suppose that there were those three members holding views upon the Indian question like those of the Noble Lord himself, and holding those views very sincerely and very vehemently. They would probably disagree with the expressed outlook of the present Secretary of State and Prime Minister. That division would be bound to manifest itself amongst five people of very wide experience. Probably they would reconcile their differences before the end, but the very fact that there were these differences between five men of very high experience would almost certainly leak out; and if the Viceroy so appointed carried out policy which was considered a failure whom could we criticise in later years f The Noble Lord just now expressed an opinion about the recent appointment of Governors. It may be an advantage that he can express his criticism. If it is a criticism he can bring it to bear on the Secretary of State in such measure as is allowed.

I was not accusing this Secretary of State.

I am not suggesting that the Noble Lord is doing so. He said that some of these appointments are open to question, but if he has that objection he can express it now to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister of the day. To whom would he express his objection under the operation of this Amendment? It is quite possible that the Secretary of State of the day would take refuge behind the Amendment and say that the appointment wk's not his, and that he must not accept sole responsibility. It is a most dangerous Amendment. Divided responsibility in a matter of this kind means very often that there is not the same sense of responsibility as is felt when the appointment is in the hands of one man. I do not think that 'an appointment by such an Advisory Committee would be more welcomed in India than appointments as they are made today. I am rather astonished that this grave constitutional innovation should be suggested from the other side of the Committee. We are very anxious to deal with the more outstanding controversies raised by the Bill, and those who sit on the Liberal benches wish to state that if there is a Division on this Amendment they will support the Government.

5.7 p.m.

I should not have intervened but for the speech of the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer). I should not like it to go out from this House to the public that the appointments of Governors made from this House had been failures. I believe that the entire population of India prefers a Governor who has come from this House or the other House to a promoted civil servant. I served myself under the Noble Lord's father, who was an admirable Governor. I should hope that the noble Lord himself will in due course be a Governor in India. I should have much more confidence in him than in any promoted civil servant. We must not depreciate the importance of this House in the training of people for the job of carrying on as Governors in India. I like this House. I like all Houses of Commons. I think we are the training ground—

I never suggested for a moment that people with Par liamentary experience should not hold this office.

I am sure that if the selection was made by ex-Viceroys and people of that sort no Member of Parliament would be chosen. I would sooner trust myself to the tender mercies of the Secretary of State. Not that I am a candidate, mind you.

5.9 p.m.

It is rather important that we should be clear as to what proposals we are discussing. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) made it quite clear just now, in answer to the Secretary of State, that what he contemplates and what he wishes the Government to consider is a consultative committee, consultative to the Prime Minister. Unfortunately that is not the actual Amendment before us. If we read the words of the Bill with the Amendment it is clear that the Governor-General in India is to be "appointed by His Majesty after consultation with the Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council," and so on. That means consultation by His Majesty. Later on, on page 252 of the Amendment Paper, it is stated in a new Clause that the India Advisory Committee is to "advise His Majesty." It seems obvious, in view of the explanation of my right hon. Friend, that he is not going to press the Amendment in the form in which he has moved it.

I ask my right hon. Friend to realise that the effective words are "after consultation."

But as the Amendment stands it is to be "His Majesty, after consultation" with a committee of which the Prime Minister is only one member. If the wording were "His Majesty after the Prime Minister has consulted" such and such people, that would more truly express my right hon. Friend's view. I want to lay stress on that, because if the Amendment falls in its present form it disposes of some of the objections of the right hon. Gentleman opposite and of the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones). The objections of the hon. Member for Caerphilly would have validity if there were a question of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State being outvoted by ex-Viceroys in such an advisory committee. However, as I now understand the proposal, all that the Prime Minister has to do is to consult the ex-Viceroys, and, having consulted them, to come to his own conclusion independently and on his own responsibility.

Does the right hon. Gentleman not forget the point that under the operation of Sub-section (3) of the new Clause on page 252, the main proposal, not only is the person to be appointed after consultation, but in point of fact he cannot be removed without reference to this Advisory Committee?

That, I understand, is a separate Amendment. At any rate, I think it is clear that the Amendment in its present form cannot stand, and it is not really being pressed. Therefore, to that extent the objection falls. The idea is that the Prime Minister is expressly to consult ex-Viceroys before coming to a decision on his own responsibility. No one can doubt the immense importance of the functions of the Viceroy or the immensity of his task. It always has been an immense task, and under this Bill his responsibility is, if anything, to be enhanced. Whatever the burden of work may prove to be, it is vital that the very best man should be chosen. It is, however, rather doubtful whether actually defining and circumscribing the area of consultation upon which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have to come to a decision is altogether desirable.

I admit that the authority of the ex-Viceroys is very high indeed. The Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) spoke of them as "the greatest experts, as men who know what no one else can know". But they are not the only persons whose advice might have to be taken. We are apparently asked to believe that they are pygmies in considering what is good from the point of view of India, but giants when it comes to selecting a Viceroy. In any case, they are not the only people whose advice it may be desirable to select. The present Viceroy is not included in this proposal. At any rate, there is a grave objection to specifying a particular list of people who are to be consulted. At once the question arises, "Not only were they consulted, but what were their views?" Will it help the situa tion in India if a doubt should arise that the views of, say, two of the ex-Viceroys were overruled by the Government?

I really doubt whether in practice it is desirable to make semi-public this question of consultation. More than that, we are really up against something which is fundamental to our Constitution. We heard a great deal in the earlier Debates on India of the vital importance of responsibility in Indian politics. I think it is no less important to strengthen the element of responsibility for British politicians. I think it would be a danger to the whole conception of our Constitution if we assumed that the Prime Minister is a mere party man who is to be guided by mere party motives in the selection of high officials, whether it be Viceroys, Ambassadors or anything else on whom the future of the Empire may depend, and that he must be specifically instructed to do what should be his obvious duty, that of consulting anyone who can help him in coming to his own responsible decision. Surely the whole essence of our government is that those who hold office under the Crown are responsible not merely to their party for carrying out a party policy, but to the Crown as embodying the permanent welfare of the nation and the permanent unity of the Empire, in the selection of the best men they can get for high Imperial posts. Certainly, while I sympathise entirely with the motive underlying the Amendment, what I hope is that this office above all will be one that every Prime Minister and every Secretary of State will think it his highest duty to select from the point of view of India's welfare and of Imperial strength and unity and not from the point of view of party. I think we shall do well to leave things in that hope and that faith rather than attempt to put a narrow, circumscribed, and I believe ineffective fetter upon the responsibility of the Prime Minister.

6.16 p.m.

I rise with great hesitation but also with a tremendous temptation to follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) in delivering on the Committee stage a speech that I was precluded from delivering on the Second Reading, but for a different reason from his. I was a member of a meeting upstairs which came to an honourable understanding to do the whole of this job in 30 days, and I have been watching the time very anxiously on this very minor and to me unreal Amendment. The whole discussion has gone on the assumption that new Viceroys are going to have more responsibilities to shoulder when India has self-government than when India was ruled from here. That seems to me to be a fantastic conception. If this even confers a measure of self-government—I understand that right hon. Gentlemen who are responsible /for the Amendment are of that group who believe that we are giving India too much self-government—the responsibilities of the Viceroy are bound to be diminished and not increased, because more is being shouldered by the Indian people themselves. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head and, therefore, I must assume that, when he talks of the Bill going too far, he does not really think it.

The discussion is unreal because, if one looks at the experience of the other places where self-government has been conferred, whether Ireland, Australia or anywhere else, what happens is not that the particular nation concerned ask us to set up advisory committees to appoint their Governors-General but that they themselves set up advisory councils and insist that we accept the Governor-General and Viceroy that they nominate. That is the next stage, and the right and proper stage. Just as Ireland insisted on nominating its Governor-General, and Australia is insisting on it, not merely for the Commonwealth but for the various Colonies, so India will demand the same, and rightly so, and any advisory committee that you set up to assist in the appointment of a Viceroy or Governor-General should be a committee of Indians and not a committee of the British House of Commons or of ex-Viceroys or anything else. I hope, now that all sections of the House have expressed their views on the matter, it may be possible to dispose of it and get on to important matters.

5.20 p.m.

I only rise to put a question to the Secretary of State which possibly may shorten the Debate. I think there are many people in all parts of the Committee who realise that the Amendemnt raises a point with which we are not very anxious to deal. There is always a danger in a democratic country of partisan appointments. There is always the danger of the spoils system, and, if that should come about in this case, our future in India would be hopeless. On the other hand, we in this country and, above all, the Tory party have always been very careful about putting the prerogative of the Crown into commission, and, although my hon. Friends who have moved the Amendment have been careful to say that this is only consultative, the whole argument of my Noble Friend the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) was that India would know that this Committee has recommended a particular appointment, but of course they would not know that it was merely consultative, and no one would know what passed. The appointment would be an appointment made by His Majesty for which the Prime Minister and the Government had accepted responsibility.

One of the dangers of putting the prerogative into commission in this way is that you cannot circumscribe the personnel of the committee. If you had a committee like this set up you could not resist the claim of the Indian members of His Majesty's Privy Council to sit upon it. That is the sort of danger. Cannot this matter be dealt with in another way? This House and another place are going to be called upon in due course to present an Address to His Majesty praying him to issue a Proclamation to bring the Federation into being. It seems to me that it would be perfectly proper for this House in presenting such an Address to express their strong feeling as to the spirit in which and the principles upon which the Government of the day should advise His Majesty in regard to the appointment of the Governor-General of the Federation. I would ask the Secretary of State whether he would be prepared to consider that method of dealing with it, which would put formally on record the strong feeling of the House of Commons and would not tie His Majesty within the bounds of some statutory definition in the exercise of his discretion for which the Government of the day is responsible but which is, nevertheless, in a very real sense, in the opinion of the people of the country, his discretion in the exercise of the Royal Prerogative.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.25 p.m.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 10, to leave out from "Majesty" to "as" in line 13.

If these words remain in the Bill, it will be a Federation of all India. If they are left out it can be only a Federation of British India. The object of the Amendment is to get a Debate, and if possible a vote, on the supreme issue of whether we are to have a Federation of the Indian States plus British India or whether we are to make it, as the Indians themselves wish, a Federation of British India alone. The chief argument in favour of a Federation of all India is that thereby we bring the Princes in as a safeguard that the conduct of the Central Government—

On a point of Order. Does the Amendment in its present form open this wide question of a Federation of all India or of British India? My own view is that it raises a much narrower point, a point in connection with paramountcy.

I am perfectly prepared not to move it on this occasion but to raise it on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." I think you, Sir, will agree that we can have a Debate either there or on that Question.

It is a little difficult sometimes to understand exactly what is the intention of an Amendment or what the particular point is which the hon. Member proposes to discuss, and I have had some difficulty over this Amendment. It is not a very satisfactory place in the Bill for raising this point, and, if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is prepared to discuss it either on a later Amendment or on the Question "That the Clause stand part," I think that will be better.

I am prepared to do it on the Question "That the Clause stand part"

Clause 5.

No. If once Clause 3 is passed I may be told that it is too late.

I can help the right hon. and gallant Gentleman on that. My intention is certainly, in the circum- stances, to call Amendments on which this question could be raised on Clause 5, which deals definitely with the inclusion of States in the Federation.

In that case, I will not press the Amendment now.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.29 p.m.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 22, at the end, to insert:

"(3) The person appointed to fill either of the said offices shall hold that office for the period specified in the Commission under the Royal Sign Manual by which he is appointed to that office, subject to a power of removal by His Majesty on an address presented to His Majesty by both Houses of Parliament.

Provided that the person for the time being holding either of the said offices may by leave of His Majesty resign that office by writing signed by him."

This raises a quite different point from that which we discussed just now but one of equal importance. It is that the Viceroy should have some security of tenure in his office. The more I think about this Bill and this Constitution the more important it seems to me that he should have security of tenure. It is a great mistake to think that the Viceroy's actions are not going to be criticised on all sides. We recognise, of course, that he will incur violent criticism in India whatever he does. He will also be liable to criticism in this country which will be of a particularly difficult and dangerous type to him, because he will be unable to reply to criticisms in this country. The hon. Member for Bridgeton (Mr. Maxton) speaking just now said that it seemed that the Viceroy was going to have more power under the new Constitution than he has under the old. While in a sense that is true, he will certainly have a great many more difficulties. Therefore, we have to see what conditions we can provide to make his path as easy as possible, and one of the conditions that I want to give him, which it seems to me and my hon. Friends most important that we should give him, is some sort of security of tenure.

The principle of security of tenure is fully recognised in our Constitution. It is a position enjoyed by every judge in the country. Why have judges been given that position? They did not always hold it. There was a time when the judges of this country were removable by the Crown. Why was that altered? It was altered because it was found highly undesirable in the interests of the State that the Government of the day should interfere in the administration of justice. Therefore, His Majesty's judges have been put into this position by an Act of Parliament under which they are irremovable except on a petition being presented by both Houses of Parliament to the Throne. Parliament has felt that it was necessary to give judges that security to enable them to carry out their duties efficiently, but will not the duties of the Viceroy of India be much more difficult and far more important, affecting personal, private and political interests just as much as the decision of any judge in this country. If it be right that the judges of England should be given this security of tenure and be irremovable except by an Address of both Houses of Parliament, then, surely, it is far more necessary that the Viceroy of India, who may have to do things far more uncongenial to certain politicians, should be placed in the same position.

You may say that in contemplating the Viceroy being removed from his office by the Government of the day, I am contemplating something which never has occurred and never will occur. That is not the fact. We have had in quite recent history cases where two pro-consuls have been forced to resign by the Government of the day. You may say that forcing a pro-consul to resign does not come within the ambit of this Amendment, but I think it does. If a Viceroy knew that he could not be dismissed without an Address by both Houses of Parliament, he would not be likely to resign unless he thought that an Address would be forthcoming. But we have the cases of Lord Lytton, who was forced to resign by Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Lloyd, who was forced to resign by the late Labour Government, to show that there is no security of tenure enjoyed by pro-consuls at the present moment.

I ask the Committee to conceive the position in which the Viceroy may find himself. He may have to make decisions at very short notice indeed. He has to play a most difficult hand all through. One day he has to be a parliamentarian, he can go down to either Chamber and address them, he can try all the known parliamentary arts behind the scenes, and the next moment he may find himself in the position of a Mussolini having to close down the Chambers, to make ordinances and to defy the popular opinion of the moment. He may have to do things which are very difficult for the English public to understand, not knowing the circumstances of the case. Above all things, he must feel that he is given a chance of playing his hand boldly, and playing it through. If at the time when he is facing Congress, when he is facing some grave civil crisis in India or some threat to the Indian frontier, with immense issues hanging in the balance, if he feels that he may be overruled from Downing Street at any moment, it will not facilitate his task and improve the way in which he plays his hand. We have to face the fact that if there is one thing about which the people in India are unanimous, it is that they want to get as far away as they can from Downing Street. You will find great unanimity of opinion among Indians on that subject, and also among the British in India. By the Constitution you are creating, you are turning the Viceroy into a sort of patriot king, the old theory of George III, to work with a Parliament. But he has all these powers in reserve by which he can function without Parliament if he wants to do so.

You have to lean more and more on your Viceroy, and you cannot do it successfully if he is liable to be interfered with by Downing Street at every turn. Frankly, I want to put the Viceroy into a position where he cannot be tripped up by political intrigues in this country. I want to give him the same security of tenure and the same dignity as is possessed by His Majesty's judges at home. It has been shown to be of enormous benefit to the administration of justice that judges should be put into that position, and I believe that it will be found equally to the benefit of the whole position of the Viceroy and the way he carries out his duties, that he should feel that he can play his hand, take the action which he thinks right, and carry out the powers that Parliament has conferred upon him, without being tripped up by some miserable little Secretary of State acting from party motives. Therefore, I hope very much that the Government, in making all these new con- stitutional experiments, will give a favourable consideration to the proposal which I have advanced.

5.40 p.m.

I speak with some diffidence as one of the pigmies and miserable little Secretaries of State, but please do not let my Noble Friend think that I am not as anxious as he is to keep the position of the Viceroy as independent as possible, and as free and unsusceptible to partisan attacks in this House or in another place as it is possible to do. Unfortunately the position is not quite as simple as my Noble Friend seems to make out. For instance, I do not think that the analogy of the judges of which he made a great deal is at all as close as he seems to think. The judges are not executive officers. They have nothing to do with policy. They are appointed for life, and for many generations past it has been the general feeling in this country that that being so, and in view of the fact that judges might give decisions hostile to the Government of the day, a special procedure should be adopted in connection with their tenure of office. The judges, therefore, unlike the Viceroy, are appointed for life, and not for any short period of time. And their action cannot be criticised in this House except in the formal manner of an Address.

The position of the Viceroy is quite different. The Viceroy it an executive officer carrying out from day to day executive policy, and, further than that, under the proposals of this Bill, carrying out a policy over a large field of his activities that is of very direct interest to public opinion generally in this country, and, as a result of that, to this House. For instance, can it be conceived that this or any other party will wish to withdraw from the possibilities of any Parliamentary discussion the great field of the Viceroy's reserved departments, and his special responsibilities? While I hope that we shall maintain the tradition that has been in existence for many years past in this House, namely, that this House does not attempt to administer in detail Indian affairs, I cannot conceive of Parliament divesting itself of the opportunity to discuss, and, if necessary, to criticise actions that are so constantly in the minds of every hon. Member of the House. If we adopted the suggestion of my Noble Friend it would be impossible to ask questions upon Indian subjects?

Why?

On the analogy of the judges. I am assuming that my Noble Friend intends that the sole object of his Amendment is to withdraw this kind of subject from discussion.

I am afraid that my right hon. Friend has misunderstood me. My analogy of the judges was in regard to the importance of their work. I did not suggest that their work was the same as that of the Viceroy. I merely said that the work of the Viceroy was far more important than that of the judges, and quite as unsuitable for Parliamentary interference. That does not in the least prevent Parliament from asking questions and getting the same information as it does to-day.

I may be stupid, but I really fail to see any distinction. If the object is not to cut off the Viceroy from Parliamentary criticism, then I do not see the object of the Amendment.

He would be irremovable under the Amendment. How could he be criticised?

I should have thought that the proposal was double-edged, and that the Opposition of the day—not this particular Opposition—if they knew that they could not make the kind of criticism that is made to-day of the administration, that is, by criticising the Secretary of State, for he is the right person to be criticised, they would be very much tempted to put down a Motion for the Viceroy's recall. I could not imagine anything worse from the point of view of India or from the point of view of the Governor-General himself. The fact that a Motion of want of confidence was discussed in this House, even though it were defeated, would have the worst possible effect upon opinion in India, and upon the future position of the Viceroy. My own very definite view, therefore, is that the procedure outlined in the Amendment not only would be a serious innovation, but a great mistake. I think that it would be much wiser to strengthen the Convention as far as we can in every possible way by cooperation between one section of the House and another, and that we do not attempt to impede the Viceroy's action in matters of detail, but that we should act better by strengthening the Convention than by attempting to accept a proposal of the kind outlined in the Amendment, which I think would have disastrous results.

5.47 p.m

I do not think that my right hon. Friend has, made quite clear what are the legal implications of the proposal. Until I am told definitely that our proposal would make it impossible for the House to discuss policy in India, I should like to emphasise what I feel to be the reason of my Noble Friend in putting forward the Amendment. The object is to strengthen the hand of the Viceroy in India, not to protect him from legitimate criticism here on major points of policy. The reason for that is obvious. Quite apart from the great variety of his work, so much of his work and his responsibilities will depend on the action of others, upon Indian Ministers whose action he cannot control, indeed by whose advice he is bound to be guided, except where his special responsibilities are concerned, it seems to me, therefore, that there will be great and constant danger of friction between the Governor-General and the Ministers controlling various departments that interlock, so to speak, with the Viceroy's special responsibilities. It is because of that fear of friction that it seems to us to be necessary to put the Viceroy in an unassailable position vis-a-vis the public in India.

Take the greatest of the Viceroy's reserved Departments—Defence. The Government of India's Despatch of September, 1930, pointed out how Army administration interlocks with railways, roads, posts, telegraphs, finance, etc. Yet, so far as I can see, the Bill gives the Viceroy no definitely stated power in regard to posts, telegraphs or roads, the administration of which may vitally affect the efficiency of defence, for which he is responsible. Take the telegraph department. In the rebellion of 1919 in the Punjab and Bombay a very large number of telegraph clerks had to be got rid of on account of sedition. If the Viceroy suspects that such influences are at work in Departments upon which the efficiency of the Defence Department so largely depends, it may be extremely difficult for him to ascertain what the position is in regard to sedition in the Telegraphs Department. Take, again, the question of roads. These are in the charge of Provincial Ministers.

I fail to see how this argument affects the question of the Viceroy being appointed to his office for a fixed period, without there being the power of removal by Parliament.

It is because I think that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has rather misinterpreted the purpose of the Amendment, that I was endeavouring to show what I believe to be the real purpose underlying it, namely, to strengthen the position of the Viceroy's office vis-a-vis Indian Ministers in Departments upon the working of which the efficiency of defence, for which he is responsible, greatly depends.

That is a matter which may be referred to, but it cannot be developed in argument.

I will only briefly outline the fact that roads are in the hands of Provincial Ministers, and that at the present time Provincial Governors get instructions from the Viceroy as to exactly how they are to keep up roads of military importance. We have not heard that the Viceroy will have any such power under the Bill, and it seems to me that if he attempts to exercise supervision and guidance in regard to roads of strategic importance, he may find himself in very grave conflict with Ministers in one Province or another. It is because I believe that there will be risk of serious friction in regard to the exercise of the Viceroy's responsibility for defence, the finance of the Army and so on, that I feel there is a great deal more in the Amendment of my Noble Friend than my right hon. Friend has realised. Therefore, I am glad to support it.

5.53 p.m.

I do not wish to pursue this matter for more than three or four minutes, but we regard the Amendment as fundamental, and as transcending any mere question of detail. I have listened with the utmost interest to the short observations of the Secretary of State. He said that we ought not to pass the Amendment because we ought not to take away the right from the House of Commons to criticise the Viceroy. H we thought that any such right would be taken away, where legitimate criticism was justified, we should not propose the Amendment. It is exactly because we think that there should not be criticism of the Viceroy on partisan grounds, where it is not justified in the public interest, that we would take that right of criticism away. We hear talk about the convention. Is it not a convention that we do not criticise His Majesty's judges here, unless there are very grave grounds for so doing? I consider that we might get a very good convention if we placed the Viceroy's office above the arena of partisan discussion and debate. We might get a convention that he was not to be brought into the politics of the day unless there were some absolutely supreme reason for so doing.

I should like to ask the Secretary of State a question about this convention. I have always understood that a convention demanded more than one party, and I have been very interested in noting that no hon. or right hon. Member opposite has defined his attitude in regard to the convention. We have heard not once but many times right hon. and hon. Members opposite say that they reject the whole policy of safeguards, upon which the Government base the whole of this Constitution and upon which they seek to persuade us that it is harmless. The party opposite reject the policy of safeguards outright. I respect their point of view, but I do not agree with it. If the Viceroy in the future came to the conclusion that it was essential to exercise his safeguards, what would be the attitude of the party opposite? Holding the views that they do about safeguards, what would be their attitude if the Viceroy sought to exercise his safeguards? They would say: "You may exercise your safeguards, although we have stated publicly that we condemn them root and branch, and if you do so you must resign and we will send another Viceroy who will not exercise the safeguards." That is the reason why we regard the Amendment as fundamental.

The right hon. Gentleman is seeking to cloud the issue by words, as he has done throughout. If you can only make a subject dull, you generally carry your policy. The Minister has deceived us, I do not say deliberately, because he has managed to deceive himself before he has deceived us. I should like to put this question to him, without the least desire to be acrimonious. We might as well get down to brass tacks. He is pretending that there is agreement on the part of parties here to keep this matter out of politics, whereas we know that there is no such agreement, and that the first opportunity on which hon. Members opposite can bring it into politics they will do so. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that if the Viceroy is to be in a position to carry out his duties he should know that he will not be dismissed for so doing. What will be the position of the Viceroy otherwise? Faced with a position in India which he knows demands the exercising of a strong hand and the exercising of the safeguards, he may know that there is a Government at home which is committed to the abolition of the safeguards and that even if the Government were inclined to be reasonable, it is pledged to its supporters. Will not the Viceroy in those circumstances be hampered in his attitude, in advance, because he will not know whether or not he will get support at home?

On the other hand, if the Viceroy knows that a Constitution has been set up, the handiwork of all sections in the House, that it stands immutable so far as any individual Government is concerned, that under that Constitution he will be able to exercise his prerogatives and power and he knows that if he exercises his safeguards he cannot be dismissed except by an Act of Parliament, will not his hands be greatly strengthened? The right hon. Gentleman said that we were wanting to take this matter from Parliament, but I would remind him that the House of Lords is as much Parliament as the House of Commons. If the Governor-General can be dismissed in exercising his prerogative and doing his duty, there ought to be a vote of both Houses of Parliament. Only so will that unfortunate official, whoever he may be, be able to carry out fearlessly the duty which we are devolving upon his shoulders through this Constitution. Only so will he be able to exercise the safeguards without fear, if it becomes necessary in the interests of the people of India to do so. For the reasons that I have given, we regard the Amendment as absolutely vital, and we hope that the Government will for once act in a spirit of reasonableness, and accept it.

6.0 p.m.

I do not care to give a vote for this Amendment without offering in a few sentences my explanation to the Committee. I admit, quite frankly, that there are disadvantages in this proposal, as there were disadvantages in the previous proposal we discussed this afternoon. Anyone can see how we trespass, or seem to trespass, upon the plenary responsibilities of the Government of the day, and to some extent on the liberty of discussion in this House. But the defects are but the shadow of the far greater defects inherent in the structure of the Bill. I agree that these kinds of remedies would not be proposed were the disease which we are resisting and endeavouring to check as far as we can, not so grave and desperate. A public functionary is being created under the Bill unique in character. Nothing like it has ever been conceived, or ever will be conceived after an experience which future years will no doubt bring. This is not the time to enlarge upon the functions of the Viceroy, but to suggest that they will not be functions exciting the fiercest controversy and almost continuous friction is to miss the whole point.

Hon. Members opposite seem to suppose that now that responsible self-government is being given to India, the Viceroy will have nothing to do. It is not merely the vast range of subjects with which he will have to deal, but also their highly controversial nature. At any moment he may be called upon to resume autocratic government of a Province, to sweep away a Constitution. At any moment he may be called upon to dismiss Ministers, to dissolve Parliaments and veto legislation. Now that the Government by their Measure have dragged India into party politics, and have raised issues which will not slumber during a whole generation, the position and actions of the Viceroy will be the subject of continuous criticism in this House, whichever party occupies the seat of power or opposition. There will be criticism. The Viceroy will be expected to act in regard to the reserved powers to maintain security of defence, and great anxiety will be caused as to whether he is, in fact, discharging that duty. You may see that movement from this side of the House. On the other hand, in India you may have great resentment of his exercise of safeguards, and pressure being put upon him by his Ministers, complaints of the autocratic temper of the Viceroy, Ministers in conflict with the Viceroy, and with the Houses of Parliament over here, and the Ministry of the day in conflict with them. Is it to be wondered at that in these circumstances, when you have this official lifted up so entirely out of the common run of all political devices and arrangements, around whom these storms are going to beat—is it strange that we should in the best way we can, and by the best amendments we can propose, seek, in the first place, to free his appointment as much as possible from partisanship, to ensure continuity in the appointment of any such functionary and to secure him a certain reasonable stability once he has undertaken these duties?

Those are the objects of the Amendment. It may be that the actual wording of the proposal shows defects—many of us can see them—but, nevertheless, the object is of the most serious character. The speeches which have been made from the Government Bench, and the speech of the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy), have indicated the serious character of the difficulties we are endeavouring to meet. The Government have brushed them away and leave the Viceroy, confronted not merely with the difficulties I have mentioned, but with crises of a most extraordinary character, to be dismissed from his office in the ordinary manner as if he were no more than a simple official placed in this extraordinary position. It seems to many of us that his dismissal ought to be affected in the broad, open light of day, and by the full act of Parliament. It should not be a matter which should rest exclusively with the executive. It is true that the executive, if it wished to dismiss the Viceroy, would presumably command a. majority of the House, and I cannot myself conceive that in these matters the present House of Lords would use its veto on Indian questions, which I observe are not subject to the Parliament Act.

It seems to me that when you are placing the Viceroy in this position, charged with these peculiar functions, he is going to be the storm centre for many years, and the least you can do is to fortify his position in some way, not relieve him from the criticism of Parliament, but make sure that his dismissal, if it is decided upon, shall operate only through the most formal, ceremonious and grave methods in which such an act can take place. It is too much to expect that the Government will accept the Amendment in its present form any more than they did the pertinent Amendment by which the right hon. Member for Hill head (Sir R. Horne) sought to mitigate the defects of the Bill; but while pointing the moral of the danger in which we stand we may still express a hope, a faint hope, and, therefore, a hope which requires to be cherished all the more, that as our discussions continue the Government will take steps to reassure the sincere and urgent fears which are held not only in this House, but with increasing force throughout large parts of the country.

6.8 p.m.

It is interesting to see exactly where the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) stands. We have listened to him upholding the rights of Parliament against the encroachments of Indian self-government. The whole issue between him and the supporters of the Government so far has been that he wishes to maintain the effective control of Parliament over the centre in India, even if he is prepared to resign it with regard to the Provinces. Now, in support of this Amendment, if it really could have any effect, he would set up in India an autocratic form of government under an English-born Viceroy. The Amendment, if it really was effective, would enable the Viceroy to snap his fingers at any British Government and govern entirely in consonance with his own views—views which may be more coloured by Indian environment and interests than by Imperial interests here. Is there, however, really any possibility that the Amendment would achieve the end we all desire, namely, the elimination of the Viceroy's functions as far as possible from party controversy? The Noble Lord the right hon. Member for Aldershot ( or Wolmer) quoted the case of I was one who had the tion for the administration of in Egypt. The Government of which it was a Member had complete in him, but the fact remains that the next Government took a different view of his policy. Would the situation here in Parliament, or in Egypt, have been better if Lord Lloyd had been able to defy, the Secretary of State and could have said, "Turn me out on a Motion of Censure in both Houses of Parliament if you can."

Suppose such a Motion had been carried by the Government in this House and not carried in the House of Lords, you would have had a complete and hopeless deadlock making the Government of Egypt the very focus of party controversy. Sorely the one thing which helps to keep our representatives in foreign countries, and indeed in the Empire, out of party politics, is that the primary duty of the Secretary of State is to protect them in this House, to state their case and defend them, as long as there is any reasonable chance of agreement. Even when there is a good deal of difference of opinion behind the scenes, I have known cases where the Secretary of State has regarded it as his first duty to defend his representatives abroad, whether Viceroys or Governors, and when things come really to a deadlock, when the possibility of resignation arises, it arises in a form which prevents a lot of party controversy and does less injury to the public interest than a raging, tearing controversy in Parliament culminating in a Vote of Censure or a demand for resignation. In this matter we must trust to the sense of public responsibility on the part of the Government, and we should be wise to leave it there, retaining as far as necessary the general control of this House over those branches of Indian policy which are still reserved, at the same time exercising a wise self-restraint in our interference with India.

6.13 p.m.

I merely want to comment on what the right hon. Member for Spark-brook (Mr.Amery) has said. It seems to me that the usefulness of his speech has been completely minimised by the dramatic statement we had from the Front Opposition Bench, when the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones), speaking officially for the Opposition, said that there was going to be no nonsense about it: every Viceroy in future was going to be a Socialist.

I never said anything of the sort.

At any rate, that every Viceroy under a Socialist Government was going to be a Socialist.

Why not?

What I said was that a Labour Government should be as capable of appointing a Viceroy as any other Government.

I think the hon. Member said something stronger than that, and I think he will find that is so if he will read the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow. He made it perfectly clear that when the Socialist party are in power they are going to insist on the right to have a Socialist Viceroy. His whole point was that they were going to do this because the Conservative party had previously taken such steps, and they were determined that the Conservative party was not going to have a lien on the appointment of the Viceroy in the future, regardless of the fact that only one Viceroy since the War has been a Conservative, and he is hardly one who would be welcome in the right wing of Conservatism at the present moment. The hon. Gentleman having spoken thus for the Opposition, and the leader of the party having endorsed what he said just now, it seems imperative that we ought to do all in our power to see that these political considerations shall not come into these matters. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook mentioned the fact that the moment a Socialist Government came into office, Lord Lloyd's brilliant regime in Egypt was brought to an end, simply on account of the change of Government. Can we conceive, with the vital change which we are making in India, that any such position as that is going to be satisfactory? Anything that we can do to stabilise the position and take the Viceroy out of politics must be in the interests of the people of India and of the whole Indian government, in connection with the administration from the House of Commons, and I hope that my noble Friend will press the Amendment.

6.16 p.m.

I do not want to delay a decision on this matter, but I hate to see quarrels arising between people who ought to be good friends. Why should there be any suspicion on the part of the Conservative party about Socialist or Labour nominees for important posts. If the Conservative party can accept their Prime Ministers from the Labour party, why worry about Viceroys? If my hon. Friends propose to go into the Lobby on this Amendment, I shall be glad to support them. I take it that this Measure, as drafted by the Government, puts the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief beyond criticism in the House of Commons, that it puts them in a position similar to that of His Majesty himself. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Well, it does not matter with reference to the point which I am making. The attempt of the Amendment is to extend the power of criticism of the Viceroy in the House of Commons—[HON. MEMBERS: "To diminish it"]—and to give to me, as an individual Member, the right to put down a Motion in the House of Commons for the removal of the Viceroy.

If I went to the Table to-day with 'a Motion for the removal of the Viceroy of India it would be refused, but Once this Amendment is carried, as I hope it will be, the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan) and I, on finding any particular Viceroy in India objectionable to us, can put down on the Order Paper a Resolution for his removal. Whether that Resolution would ever be called or not would be a matter for the Government of the day, but the Resolution would be framed in such terms as to achieve practically all the purposes that a wide discussion would provide. Because of that fact I am ready to support the Amendment. If it be asserted that the Amendment really limits the powers of the House of Commons over the Viceroy, I say that it certainly defines them. I have never known, during the years that I have been a Member of Parliament, any opportunity which the House of Commons had for free criticism of the Viceroy. I see such an opportunity pro-vided in this Amendment, and I am prepared to support it for that reason.

6.20 p.m.

I trust that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, even at this late stage of the discussion, will give some indication that he sympathises with the object of the Amendment. I was rather surprised at the way in which my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) expressed himself. He seemed to be labour ing under some confusion of thought. This Amendment has nothing to do with the resignation, but only with the dismissal of the Governor-General, and the object of the Amendment, however poorly expressed it may be, is to prevent just that peculiar kind of circumstance which might arise if the hon. Gentleman who spoke earlier from the Front Opposition Bench really gave effect to the views which he expressed. I am sure that when he reads his statement tomorrow he will find not only that he said that Labour would have its own way—and we could be under no apprehension as to what he meant—but that for the first time in the House of Commons we had a declaration that in these matters party politics were to predominate. [HON MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I am within the recollection of am Committee when I say that his declaration could only mean one thing. It meant in effect "When Labour rules, Labour will make all these appointments at the beck and call of political agitators on the Labour side."

If we have arrived at that position, surely it is not too much to ask that these great servants of the State, labouring under grave disabilities and with all these heavy burdens upon them, at least 'when they are discharging the duty which has been imposed upon them by Parliament of representing the authority of His Majesty in India, shall not be liable to be dismissed ignominiously without first having an opportunity of testing the views of both Houses of Parliament. It has been said that the Secretary of State would put up a defence for them in the House of Commons, and it is right and proper that that should be so but on such occasions we would require more than that. We want to be sure that by no sudden change of Government, whatever the colour or complexion of the new Government may be, shall policy be suddenly changed, and resignations demanded and dismissals effected. Some sort of machinery in this Measure for that end is desperately and urgently required.

In the discussion on the Amendment moved by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) the Secretary of State suggested that these matters were too delicate to be woven into the Bill and that we must leave them there. We have 450 Clauses which are apparently to be inflexible, and the vital things for our protection in reference to these Clauses are, we are told, too delicate and subtle to be framed in Amendments to the Bill. This Bill in order to succeed ought to have consisted of a long Preamble and five or six wide and sweeping Clauses capable of wide interpretation. However, if I pursued that line of thought I should exceed the limits of a discussion on this Amendment, but I trust that, even now, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will give some indication to relieve the serious apprehensions which exist in the minds of a small body of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen in the Committee who feel very deeply on this question.

6.24 p.m.

The hon. Member for Hampstead (Mr. G. Balfour) has made an extraordinary speech. This suggestion that the Conservative party have never dealt with these subjects, such as the appointment of judges and other matters, by party methods is complete nonsense. The system of party government in this country has been adopted in order that the party which is in power may control the policy of this country in all its aspects. That is the function of party government, and the reason why the right hon. Gentleman opposite quite properly controls the Viceroy as to the policy which he considers the Viceroy ought to follow, is because that is the principle of democracy in this country. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) and his friends are really mistaken. They ought to have put down an Amendment by which the Secretary of State would always be appointed by the Conservative party. Then they would get the safeguards which they really desire.

A very inadequate assurance.

Instead of that they are putting forward a lot of ingenious arguments which are designed to do nothing really except to make out a case that when there is a change of Government, the new Government is to have no power to impose its policy upon India. But such a Government has as much right to impose its policy on India as any other Government, and as much right to appoint a person in India who will carry out that policy as any other Government, and I devoutly hope that if a Labour Government comes into power in this country, it will see that all officials in other countries carrying out the Government's policy are people who carry out that policy loyally, and, if necessary, who sympathise with that policy.

Now we know.

The noble Lord opposite spoke of judges. May I point out that the greatest scandals in this country in the appointment of judges have been in connection with appointments by the Conservative party? It is perfectly well known to many lawyers that in the past there have been some most scandalous appointments made on the political basis by the Conservative party in this country.

If the hon. and learned Gentleman thinks so, why did he not support the Amendment which I proposed earlier to take these appointments out of the hands of the politicians?

Because I believe that in this country politicians to-day do not do the things which they used to do in the not very distant past. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I agree that hon. Members opposite know better than I do, because they are in touch with the Conservative office, and they know whether any pressure has recently been brought to bear as regards the appointment of judges in this country—matters of which I have no knowledge whatever.

On a point of Order. I would draw your attention, Sir Dennis, to the fact that the hon. and learned Gentleman has suggested in a very pointed manner that there has been some disreputable transaction in regard to recent appointments of His Majesty's judges, and I would ask you whether, in the event of his having such a matter to bring forward, he ought not to bring it forward at another time by putting a Motion on the Paper, so that the matter can be considered, with the gravity which is proper to it?

I was just on the point of intervening to point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that he was getting beyond the Amendment. The hon. and learned Gentleman when he makes a direct accusation with regard to the recent appointment of a judge, is, I think, going somewhere very near raising the question of discussion in regard to a judge at present on the bench, and that, I am sure, he does not wish to do.

I specifically stated that in my view there was no longer, among politicians, a desire to make appointments of that sort. I pointed out that it was something which admittedly took place. [HON. MEMBERS: "Recently?''] If hon. Gentlemen will be a little less warm I will explain exactly what I meant. Many hon. Members opposite jeered when I stated that it was no longer the practice, and I naturally retaliated and, I think, rightly retaliated, by saying that they know better than I do what the practice is to-day. I am not connected with the party that is in power to-day. [HON. MEMBERS: "What party?"] I said that they know better what has happened as regards recent appointments than I do—and so they do.

Am I right in understanding that the hon. and learned Member wishes the Committee to understand that he had no intention of suggesting that there had been any misbehaviour recently with regard to the appointment of judges?

I never made such a suggestion.

Then I consider that that explanation disposes of that matter sufficiently, and there is no reason to continue that discussion.

On a point of Order. The issue, as I see it, is that the Amendment before us is with regard to the appointment of a Viceroy, and the implication is that certain party politicians could use it for party purposes. The broader issue concerning His Majesty's judges has been raised, and is it not, therefore, in order now to make the general statement that judges are now appointed on a party basis, without regard either to capacity or ability?

That is entirely outside the question which is now at issue before us.

As I understood the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer), his argument was that the Viceroy should be put in the same position as regards criticism in this House as a judge.

Not as regards criticism, but as regards security.

I understood the Noble Lord to say that as he was to be given the same right of tenure as a judge, he was only to be removed by the exceptional procedure which is applied to a judge. And there is some question as to whether or not that now applies to the head of the Unemployment Assistance Board. Therefore, that would signify—and I think the Secretary of State took this view—that this House, in dealing with him, must deal with him as with other people who are dealt with by that special procedure; that is to say, it would put him into the category of those who could only be dealt with by special Resolution in this House.

He could only be dismissed by special Resolution.

And therefore he would be in the category of people who could only be criticised by a Resolution brought forward in both Houses especially for that purpose. Certainly that is how I should have thought it would have been interpreted in the procedure of this House, and I do not know why the Noble Lord and his friends have suddenly awakened to the idea that party politics are likely to be introduced into the question of dealing with India. I imagine that the reason is that they see the likelihood of the party to which they belong being shortly defeated in the country, and they are therefore hoping to get the appointment of the next Viceroy, when this Bill comes into operation, and to be able to keep him there while the Labour Government is in power, and they hope to find him there if they ever get back to power again afterwards, which, of course, is extremely problematical. If one believes in democracy—[HON. MEMBERS: "Do you?"] Certainly, I profoundly believe in democracy, and I always thought the right hon. Member for Epping believed in democracy. Surely it is clear and certain that if you rely on the party system, then each party, when it is in power, has a right to control policy and to have officers who are prepared to carry out that policy.

6.35 p.m.

I feel that the supporters of the Amendment are doing the Labour party a serious injustice in this matter. Those who have criticised the Government say that the appointment of a Viceroy is one of the most important things you can do and that therefore Parliament ought to have the right to say that, before the Viceroy can be removed, both Houses of Parliament should be consulted and an affirmative vote take place. Hitherto the practice has been that if a Viceroy did not do what the Executive of the day thought fit, that Executive has had the power to dismiss him. The hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) said that would not have been bad in the past, because he accepted all that the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) had said, but that it was not right now, because it has been announced that in the future the Labour party will only appoint people of somewhat similar views to their own. Therefore, he says that what was right before, what was fine before, what was grand before, is no longer grand, because in the future the Conservatives might not always be in a majority. Therefore, the people of this country have not now to exercise majority rule.

What was good enough in the past is to be changed, but if democracy means anything, it means not merely altering unemployment benefit, but altering a wide range of policies. Therefore, the hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth says, "Oh, this has to be stopped, because the Labour party may make appointments in the future." What is the case against the Labour party? Nobody can say that one of their appointments has ever been a bad appointment, whether in the field of Viceroys or elsewhere. Indeed, the real criticism against the Labour party, if there be one, has been that they have packed these appointments with folk who took an antagonistic view to their own.

I hope the hon. Member will avoid leading other Members into temptation.

Surely I am entitled to say this, because the Labour party is impugned and is told that it cannot make good appointments.

In dealing with that, the hon. Member is coming to an issue which must not be discussed on this Amendment.

The Labour party has made certain appointments, and nobody has ever impugned those appointments. I say further that I welcome the very proper statement that there is a tendency to assume something which is not true. I must take sides with my Labour colleagues in this, because it is fundamental to my principles that the working people are in no way inferior to the Conservative party.

This Amendment has nothing to do with the question of appointment, but only with the question of dismissal.

But it was stated clearly by the hon. and gallant Member here that he accepted the sentiments of the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook in full, but the statement of the Labour party that they were going to make their appointments in their own way altered the position fundamentally, and the need for the Amendment was not the need for an Amendment by the Conservative party if they remained in office, but only a need if the Government altered. If they think that the Labour party or the working people are inferior and cannot send to be Viceroy a person who comes from the working class, that he cannot be trusted with the duties of that high office, while I would normally have accepted the idea of safeguarding the rights of Parliament in these matters, I cannot on this occasion accept it, for this reason, that it would mean the acceptance of an inferiority complex on the part of the working people.

6.40 p.m.

The hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan) is obviously under an entire misapprehension. Assuming that a satisfactory Viceroy was appointed by the Labour party, he, I presume, would desire that that gentleman should be kept in office and should not be turned out by a following Tory Government. The whole object of the Amendment is that the person who holds this admittedly vastly important office should not be removed except by an Address from both Houses of Parliament. We in this House have made that require- ment with regard to our judges, because we consider that their office is a matter of vital importance to the country and that it should be independent of the ebb and flow of party politics. If the dismissal of a single judge is a matter of vital importance to this country, surely the dismissal of a Viceroy, holding all the judicial power that the right hon. Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) indicated earlier in the Debate, is of importance in a far greater degree.

This Amendment is no reflection on the Labour party or on any other party. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Of course it is not. That only shows that hon. Members opposite have an inferiority complex, and people who have an inferiority complex are beyond argument. Their argument has so far gone to show, what many of us rather feared, that this is going to be in their view a political office, only to be used for furthering Socialist principles and ideas. We were told on the Joint Select Committee that this was to be the end of constitutional reform in India except for the long time during which they would look forward to Dominion Status, but we hear to-day that every Labour Government that comes in will appoint a Viceroy and any other person whom it can control in order to enunciate and put forward Socialist principles. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"]—Now the House and the country know. The Socialist party cheer that statement, that in the future this Measure will be worked in order to enunciate Socialist principles in India. There can be no doubt in the future as to how this Bill will be worked. It is going to be a pawn in party politics in this country and used for the advancement of Socialism, with all the evils connected with it, in India. It was necessary for me to point that out, but is it not plain to everyone how essential it is for the person holding the high and important office of Viceroy not to be subjected to the ebb and flow of party politics, and only to be dismissed, as in the case of our own Judges, on a Resolution approved by both Houses of Parliament?

6.45 p.m.

I wish to bring the Committee back from the efforts of the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) and the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan) to the Amend ment before us, which is that the. Viceroy should not under this Bill be removed from office save by a vote of both Houses of Parliament. The hon. and learned Member who rallied to the support of the Government—I should imagine to their extreme discomfort—used every form of forensic skill to justify the rejection of the Amendment, even to the extent of making a venomous misrepresentation of party appointments in the past. We feel that there is a distinct danger that if a Government of which the hon. and learned Member is a shining light comes into power, the office of Viceroy will be subject to the real ebb and flow of party politics. It has been laid down in a book to which the hon. and learned Member wrote the preface, called "The First Workers' Government"—an admirable, if rather heavy tome—that appointments were to be made by Socialist Governments to various offices, irrespective of ability, but with the one essential that the holder of the office should be a good Socialist. It is probable that a Viceroy who did his duty under the Government of India Bill—and, goodness knows, it will be a very arduous duty—might well find that he failed to fulfil the qualification that he was a good Socialist. In fact, I think it would be almost impossible to find a good Socialist who was competent to be a good Viceroy. It would, indeed, be impossible to find a good Socialist who would be a good deputy collector.

Under this Bill the position of Viceroy will be one of peculiar difficulty. He will, in fact, be the ultimate safeguard, other than the armoured car, the tank and the machine gun, which the Federal Government of India will have. The only safeguard which it will, have is the strength, integrity and fearlessness of the Viceroy. If the Viceroy who is delegated to carry out that important post is constantly to be subject to the fear of recall to Great Britain, the situation will be almost impossibly difficult for him. He will probably be faced with considerable opposition in India, and even those who support the Bill do not anticipate that everything will be plain sailing. It is possible that he will be faced with a hostile Federal Assembly, the composition of which, it is already admitted, he cannot change, even if he wishes, because, although he may dissolve it, the same proportion of parties will be re-elected. The only power he has for the preservation of good order and good government is the final drastic power of suspending the Constitution and taking it over himself. It is almost impossible to believe that any man subject to constant recall to this country from a Government which was possibly out of sympathy with the ideals of good government and good administration and upheld Socialist government and Administration—two very different things—would be able to function unless he had the security of tenure which would be established by this Amendment. We are not asking anything unreasonable. We have endeavoured to make our judges immune from the flow of party feeling or of personal advantage by establishing them in their position so that they cannot be removed except by a Vote of both Houses. Our object is that the Viceroy of India, a more important office than that of any judge, should be put in the same position.

6.50 p.m.

rose—

Divide!

I have sat through the whole of this Debate, and perhaps the Committee will allow me to say two or three sentences. I am not going to continue the controversy which has been carried on during the last half-hour, but I want to bring the Committee back to the central point of this Amendment, which goes to the very foundation of Parliament. The situation contemplated in the Amendment is the position in office of a Viceroy who has lost the confidence of His Majesty's Government. The Amendment proposes that, although he has lost that confidence, he shall continue in office. I cannot understand how anybody who is familiar with the history of this House and the desirability of strengthening its foundations can contemplate a situation in which a high officer of State like the Viceroy should continue in office when he has lost the confidence of His Majesty's Government. This is an Amendment which, in the interests of Parliament itself, should not be supported. What sort of confidence is the Amendment going to give to the people of India who are to be brought within this system if they are to contemplate the continuance in office of a Viceroy who has lost the confidence of the Government, and yet remains in office and can only be removed by an Address to the Crown from both Houses?

If the Viceroy has lost the confidence of the Government, he will have lost the confidence of Parliament.

I am afraid the hon. Member is a little confused about the meaning of the Amendment. It is contrary to public policy that the principle

Division No. 50.]	AYES.	[6.55 p.m.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut-Colonel	Emmott, Charles E. G. C.	Rawson, Sir Cooper
Alexander, Sir William	Erskine-Bolst, Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)	Reid, David D. (County Down)
Atholl, Duchess of	Everard, W. Lindsay	Remer, John R.
Balley, Eric Alfred George	Ford, Sir Patrick J.	Sanderson, Sir Frank Barnard
Balfour, George (Hampstead)	Goodman, Colonel Albert W.	Somerville, Annesley A (Windsor)
Blaker, Sir Reginald	Greene, William P. C.	Taylor,Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Bracken, Brendan	Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John	Thorp, Linton Theodore
Broadbent, Colonel John	Gritten, W. G. Howard	Todd, Lt.-Col. A. J. K. (B'wick-on-T.)
Brown, Brig,-Gen. H. C. (Berks., Newb'y)	Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)	Touche, Gordon Cosmo
Burnett, John George	Jones, Sir G. W. H. (Stoke New'gton)	Wayland, Sir William A.
Burton, Colonel Henry Walter	Kimball, Lawrence	Wells, Sydney Richard
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer	Knox, Sir Alfred	Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Courtauld, Major John Sewell	Lennox-Boyd, A. T.	Wise, Alfred R.
Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry	Levy, Thomas	Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount
Croft, Brigadler-General Sir H.	Nicholson, Rt. Hn. W. G. (Petertf'ld)
Davison, Sir William Henry	Nunn, William	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Dawson, Sir Phillp	Oman, Sir Charles William C.	Mr. Ralkes and Mr. Donner.
Dixey, Arthur C. N.

NOES.
Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)	Cautley, Sir Henry S.	Edwards, Charles
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. Christopher	Cayzer, Sir Charles (Chester, City)	Eillot, Rt. Hon. Walter
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.	Cayzer, Maj. Sir H. R. (Prtsmth., S.)	Elmley, Viscount
Alnsworth, Lieut.-Colonel Charles	Cazalat, Thelma (Islington, E.)	Emrys-Evans, P V.
Albery, Irving James	Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)	Entwistle, Cyril Fullard
Allen, Sir J. Sandeman (Liverp'l, W.)	Chapman, Col. R.(Houghton-le-Spring)	Essenhigh, Reginald Clars
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd)	Chapman, Sir Samuel (Edinburgh, S.)	Evans, Capt. Ernest (Welsh Unlv.)
Allen, William (Stoke-on-Trent)	Cleary, J. J.	Fialden, Edward Brocklehurst
Amory, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.	Cocke, Frederick Seymour	Foot, Dingle (Dundee)
Anstruther-Gray, W. J.	Colfox, Major William Philip	Foot, Isaac (Cornwall, Bodmin)
Apsley, Lord	Collins, Rt. Hon. Sir Godtrey	Fox, Sir Glfford
Atke, Sir Robert William	Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.	Fuller, Captain A. G
Assheton, Ralph	Conant, R. J. E.	Galbraith, James Francis Wallace
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley	Cook, Thomas A.	Ganzonl, Sir John
Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)	Cooke, Douglas	Gardner, Benjamin Walter
Banfield, John William	Cooper, A. Dull	Gault, Lieut.-Col. A. Hamilton
Barclay-Harvey, C. M.	Copeland, Ida	Gibson, Charles Granville
Barrie, Sir Charles Coupar	Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.	Gillett, Sir George Masterman
Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B.(Portsm'th,C.)	Cranborne, Viscount	Gledhill, Gilbert
Benn, Sir Arthur Shirley	Cripps, Sir Stafford	Gluckstein, Louis Halle
Bennett, Capt. Sir Ernest Nathaniel	Crooks, J. Smedley	Glyn, Major Sir Ralph G. C.
Bernays, Robert	Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Galnsb'rc)	Gon, Sir Park
Blindell, James	Croom-Johnson, R. P.	Goldle, Noel B.
Bossom, A. C.	Cross, R. H.	Gower, Sir Robert
Bower, Commander Robert Tatton	Crossley, A. C.	Grattan-Doyle, Sir Nicholas
Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.	Cruddas, Lieut.-Colonel Bernard	Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Arthur
Boyce, H. Leslie	Culverwell, Cyril Tom	Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)	Curry, A. C.	Grenfell, E. C. (City of London)
Brass, Captain Sir William	Daggar, George	Griffith, F. Kingtley (Middlesbro', W.)
Briscoe, Capt. Richard George	Dalkeith, Earl of	Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)
Brocklebank, C. E. R.	Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.	Grigg, Sir Edward
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)	Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)	Grimston, R. V.
Brown, Ernest (Leith)	Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)	Groves, Thomas E.
Buchan, John	Danville, Alfred	Grundy, Thomas W.
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.	Dickle, John P.	Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.
Bullock, Captain Malcolm	Doran, Edward	Gunston, Captain D. W.
Burghley, Lord	Drewe, Cedric	Guy, J. C. Morrison
Butler, Richard Austen	Duckworth, George A. V.	Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.
Butt, Sir Alfred	Dugdale, Captain Thomas Lionel	Hall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)
Cadogan, Hon. Edward	Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)	Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)	Dunglass, Lord	Hamilton, Sir R. w.(Orkney & Zetl'nd)
Campbell-Johnston, Malcolm	Eady, George H.	Hammersley, Samuel S.
Caporn, Arthur Cecil	Eden, Rt. Hon. Anthony	Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry

in this Amendment should be embodied in the law. I look at it from the point of view of the people of India, and I ask what confidence will it give to them when then are brought into this system to have a Viceroy who has lost the confidence of His Majesty's Government and yet remains in office?

Question put, "That those words be there inserted."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 49; Noes, 324.

Harris, Sir Percy	McLean, Major. Sir Alan	Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (Darwen)
Harvey, George (Lambeth,Kennlngt'n)	Maclean, Nell (Glasgow, Govan)	Samuel, M. R. A. (W'dt'wth, Putney).
Harvey, Major Sir Samuel (Totnes)	McLean, Dr. W. H. (Tradenton)	Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Haslam, Henry (Horncastle)	Macpherson, Rt. Hon. Sir Ian	Savery, Samuel Servington
Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)	Magnay, Thomas	Shaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)
Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.	Mainwaring, William Henry	Shaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)
Henderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsford)	Makins, Brigadler-General Ernest	Shute, Colonel Sir John
Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)	Manningham-Buller, Lt.-Col. Sir M.	Slmmonds, Oliver Edwin
Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.	Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.	Sinclair, Maj. Rt. Hn. Sir A.(C'thness)
Hore-Bellsha, Leslie	Martin, Thomas B.	Skelton, Archibald Noel
Hornby, Frank	Mason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)	Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Horsbrugh, Florence	Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John	Smithers, Sir Waldron
Howard, Tom Forrest	Meller, Sir Richard James	Somervell, Sir Donald
Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.	Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)	Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)
Hudson, Robert Spear (Southport)	Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)	Soper, Richard
Hume, Sir George Hopwood	Miner, Major James	Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.
Hunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)	Mitchell, Harold P.(Br'tl'd & Chisw'k)	Spears, Brigadler-General Edward L.
Hurst, Sir Gerald B.	Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)	Spender-Clay, Rt. Hon. Herbert H.
Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.	Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale	Spens, William Patrick
Iveagh, Countess of	Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. Eyres	Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morTand)
Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)	Moore, Lt.-Col. Thomas C. R. (Ayr)	Steel-Maitland, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Jackson, J. C. (Heywood & Radcliffe)	Morgan, Robert H.	Stevenson, James
James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.	Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties)	Stones, James
Jenkins, Sir William	Morrison, William Shepherd	Storey, Samuel
Jesson, Major Thomas E.	Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.	Stourton, Hon. John J.
Joel, Dudley J. Barnato	Munro, Patrick	Strauss, Edward A.
John, William	Nathan, Major H. L.	Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, North)
Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)	Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.	Strickland, Captain W. F.
Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)	Nicholson, Godfrey (Morpeth)	Stuart, Lord C. Crichton.
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)	Normand, Rt. Hon. Wilfrid	Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.
Ker, J. Campbell	O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir High	Summersby, Charles H.
Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)	Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.	Sutcliffe, Harold
Kerr, Hamilton W.	Orr Ewing, I, L.	Tate, Mavis Constance
Kirkpatrick, William M.	Paling, Wilfred	Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Knight, Holford	Patrick, Colin M.	Thompson, Sir Luke
Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton	Pearson, William G.	Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Lambert, Rt. Hon. George	Peat, Charles U.	Thorne, William James
Lansbury, Rt. Hon. George	Penny, Sir George	Tinker, John Joseph
Law, Sir Alfred	Percy, Lord Eustace	Train, John
Lawson, John James	Peters, Dr. Sidney John	Tree, Ronald
Leckie, J. A.	Petherick, M.	Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Leech, Dr. J. W.	Peto, Geoffrey K.(W' varh' pt' n, Bllst'n)	Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Lees-Jones, John	Potter, John	Turton, Robert Hugh
Leighton, Major B. E. P.	Powell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.	Wallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Leonard, William	Pownall, Sir Assheton	Wallace, Sir John (Dunfermline)
Liddall, Walter S.	Radford, E. A.	Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hall)
Lindsay, Noel Ker	Ramsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)	Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Lister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-	Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)	Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Little, Graham-, Sir Ernest	Ramsden, Sir Eugene	Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.
Lieweilln, Major John J.	Ratcliffe, Arthur	Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Joslah
Lloyd, Geoffrey	Rathbone, Eleanor	Weymouth, Viscount
Locker-Lampion. Rt. Hn. G. (Wd. G'n)	Roa, Walter Russell	White, Henry Graham
Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)	Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)	Whiteside, Borras Neal H.
Loder, Captain J. de Vers	Reld, William Allan (Derby)	Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Loftus, Pierce C.	Rickards, George William	Williams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Logan, David Gilbert	Robinson, John Roland	Wills, Wilfrid D.
Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.	Ropner, Colonel L.	Wilmot, John
Lunn, William	Rosbotham, Sir Thomas	Wilton, Clyde T. (West Texteth)
MacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. C. G.(Partick)	Rots Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)	Womersley, Sir Walter
MacAndrew, Capt.' J. O. (Ayr)	Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward	Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir H. Kingsley
McCorquodale, M. S.	Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)	Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)
Macdonald, Gordon (Ince)	Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)	Young, R. Hon. Sir Hilton (S 'v' noaks)
Mac Donald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham)	Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp' l)	Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)
Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of w.)	Salmon, Sir Isldore
McEntes, Valentine L.	Salt, Edward W.	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
McKie, John Hamilton	Samuel, Sir Arthur Michael (F'nham)	Major George Davies and Dr.
		Morris-Jones.

7.7 p.m.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 23, to leave out Sub-section (3).

This Amendment is largely covered by one which stands in the name of the right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood), but I am so impressed with the complexity of the duties imposed on the Governor-General that I feel I must take this opportunity of impressing on the Committee the necessity for affording the Governor-'General every possible assistance in carrying out these duties. The staff provided for the Viceroy seems to me to be very inadequate. The right hon. Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) put very clearly before the Committee the enormous range of duties and the responsibility of the Governor-General. May I remind the Committee what will be the duties of the Viceroy as representative of the King-Emperor and through his paramountcy. His duty as representative of the King-Emperor is likely to result in his being very much in demand in the future. Probably representatives of British India in the Central Legislature will also bring as much pressure to bear as possible on the Governor to exercise through his paramountcy his authority to make the Princes accept the wishes of British India. It is very significant that the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) in his speech a few. days ago showed that there was a good deal of jealousy of the power of the Princes. That speech also showed that Congress, with help coming from the Socialist party, may probably bring pressure on the Governor-General to exercise his paramountcy in accordance with their wishes. There are 297 Clauses in this Bill that refer to India. Of these 297 Clauses, 116 lay upon the Governor-General heavy and specific duties. I would ask hon. Members to read Clauses 11, 12 and 45. In Clause 12 eight specific large duties are laid upon the Governor-General. He is enjoined in that Clause to exercise his individual judgment. In addition, he has at the Centre to exercise a dyarchy which is to be the cure for the failure of dyarchy in the Provinces. Anyone who realises the large part that religion and defence play in the life of India, especially in the North-West, will realise the greatness of the responsibility of the Governor-General in these matters, and he has only three counsellors to assist him on such questions.

As Viceroy he has to deal with between 500 and 600 Princes who control one-third of India, involving journeys to various parts of India for social and military functions, durbars and other events, and including his keeping in touch with all the States. That is in itself work for one man. Meanwhile, he is subject to continual pressure from the Central Legislature. That pressure will almost certainly he exerted in the matter of Army expenditure, and it will be difficult for him to resist it. We have in this Bill three matters of legislation—Federal subjects, Provincial subjects and Concurrent subjects. Concurrent subjects in my view will undoubtedly lead to continual friction between the Federal and Provincial Governments. One of the most awkward duties of the Governor-General will be to act as mediator between the Federal and Provincial Governments, especially in such matters as criminal law, trade unions, and marriage and divorce matters. It will be seen how important these matters are. When I think of the Secretary of State discussing with a prospective Viceroy his various duties, I recall a little story of the employer engaging a house boy and telling him that his hours would be from six o'clock to six o'clock. The boy asked, "Is that all?" and the, employer replied "Yes." The boy then asked "Well, do you think you can let me have some bricks and mortar." The employer said, "What for?" and the boy replied, "I should like to build you a house in my spare time." To imagine that the Governor-General can carry out all the duties placed upon him by this Bill is like asking him to build a new Taj Mahal. I only add that it is absolutely necessary to strengthen the hands of the man appointed to this post. The omission of this Sub-section would, I think, clear the way towards meeting the difficulty.

7.13 p.m.

I sympathise with the motive of the hon. Member in moving this Amendment, but I should like to give the House a few reasons why the Government think it impossible to accept it. May I repeat that whenever I take part in the Debates I hope to be as commendably brief as the hon. Member was. The difficulty in accepting this Amendment is that we think that it would in fact make the duties of the Governor-General much more onerous in the future. He would not be asking for bricks and mortar to build a house: he would spend most of his time writing letters to the opposite number, the Crown Representative for the States, and his duties would become all the more complicated. We feel it would be inadvisable to change the present arrangement. There is at present one man who fulfils the two duties suggested to be filled by the Governor-General and the Representative for relations with Indian States. We feel it would be very much more desirable to continue the present arrangement. I would remind the Committee that all three ex-Viceroys and Governors-General who were on the Joint Select Committee agreed that the present system should continue, and no such suggestion as that made by my hon. Friend was put forward. For these reasons we think it would be advisable to continue on the basis of the present system and on the lines suggested by the present Bill.

I apologise for interrupting, but a phrase used by the hon. Gentleman emboldens me to ask a question which we have not been able to raise before because an Amendment dealing with it was not called. Why do they refer to the Viceroy as "the representative?" Why is he not called "the Viceroy?"

It is very difficult to get exactly the right phrase. I was attempting to define what, in fact, will be the functions which the Viceroy will perform when dealing with the realm of paramountcy outside the federal sphere, and I think the phrase "Representative of the Crown" in relation to the Indian States is a suitable phrase in which to refer to the Viceroy.

But why does the Bill not use the word "Viceroy"?

I think the Bill is attempting to make clear the very difficult issues raised by this point. Those who read the Bill will see that while representing His Majesty his functions in relation to the States are best described in the words I have used, "Representative of the Crown."

Are we to understand that the term "King's Representative" will be the official description of the Viceroy in his dealings with the States?

No, I do not think my hon. Friend need draw any general conclusion from this statement, because I am dealing with a specific Amendment, and I do not think he should take any words of mine as indicating any alteration of the title. If I were to pursue further the difficulties likely to arise from having two gentlemen to perform these functions the Committee would see how delicate the situation might be. For instance, the Representative of the Crown in relation to the States might desire, if disorder arose in a particular State, that the Army might come to his assistance. On the proposal that there should be two gentlemen fulfilling these functions, the Army would be under the control of the Governor-General, and there would, therefore, have to be a certain interaction between those two officials and an exchange of messages which would deprive the Army of the advantage of that lightning rapidity of action to which my right hon. Friends who have criticised us attach so much importance. It would be possible for me to develop the subject further, but when I tell the Committee that we consider this proposal would lead to great confusion, I think I have done enough to show that we prefer the arrangement which is in the Bill.

The question having been raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Camborne (Lieut.-Commander Agnew) and the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer), can some guidance be given to us on this point of the title of the Viceroy? Upon page 89 of the Joint Select Committee's Report we find the words:

"We assume that the two offices will continue to be held by the same person, and this being so we think that the title of 'Viceroy' should attach to him in his governing capacity."

It would be of some help to us if we could understand whether the term "Viceroy" is no longer to appear in our Statutes and legal documents, and if a term which is fully understood by the people of this country and which has gathered round itself very honourable associations is to be discontinued.

7.20 p.m.

I can understand that the Government would not wish to make any hasty departure from what has been the practice, namely, that the Governor-General and the Viceroy should be one person, but before we pass to the next Amendment it is important that the Committee should try to visualise not only the immense range of the Governor-General's functions, which have been so admirably described by the right hon. Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne), but some of the probable causes of friction referred to already, and the unceasing anxieties which are most likely to beset the Governor-General in the reserved departments and in the discharge of his special responsibilities. What could be greater than the anxiety of a Viceroy responsible for the defence of that vast Empire, with its very vulnerable frontier, and very warlike populations on the other side of the frontier, and with its vast problem of internal order while he is controlling an army whose means of communication are out of his hands and in a country where there are influences at work which have great and exceptional opportunities of demoralising, at any rate, the lower ranks of the Government service. I wonder whether the Government realise some of the influences which were brought to bear on the police and revenue officers during the civil disobedience movement.

I have very great difficulty in connecting the arguments of the Noble Lady with the Amendment.

Surely a Governor-General weighed down with great anxieties would have extraordinary difficulty in knowing all that is happening in the communication departments, on which the efficiency of the army must depend, and that must add greatly to the responsibilities of his office. He is made responsible for the internal order and security of India and does not control all the means necessary for handling the situation. He has no means of assuring himself of conditions in the departments of communications, which are so vital to defence, yet which he does not control. He has no means of ascertaining what is the morale—

Will the Noble Lady explain how there would be any better means of ascertaining that information supposing there were two officers instead of one?

He would have more time in which to refresh himself for carrying these very heavy anxieties, if he had not the dual responsibility of maintaining relations with the 500 States and of discharging his special responsibilities in British India. I think, therefore, the Committee may well agree that it is necessary to separate the two offices. I quite understand that there may be no desire to do this hastily, but the day may come when it may be necessary to separate these two functions, or to separate the social functions of the Viceroy, which play so large a part in his life, from the actual discharge of his duties to the Federation and to the Indian States, and we have moved this Amendment in an endeavour to focus the attention of the Committee for a little longer on a point which seems to us of tremendous importance.

7.24 p.m.

I think this discussion is very useful. There is the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot), which I am sorry the Parliamentary Secretary did not answer there and then, because it is a point we ought to clear up at an early stage.

I am ready to give the answer at once. "Viceroy" is a term which has never been used in a Statute or in the Warrant of Appointment; it is a term of courtesy and not of law, but it is intended, following the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee, that it shall continue.

I am very glad the hon. Gentleman has made that admission, because the expression in the Bill is a very clumsy one, though no doubt the appropriate one. I am glad to know that it is not intended to make any alteration in the title. From that point of view, this discussion has been useful. My Noble Friend the Member for Perth and Kinross (Duchess of Atholl) is perfectly right. We ought to pause on the threshold of this great Measure to realise the enormous and appalling burden which we are putting on the shoulders of one man. For that reason I am particularly sorry that the Government were unable to meet us on earlier Amendments moved this afternoon. When we are putting a burden on the shoulders of one man which is, as the hon. Member for Bridgeton (Mr. Maxton) pointed out, greater than any Viceroy has previously borne, being, in fact, the greatest and most responsible of any position in the British Empire, do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that because we put it in an Act of Parliament therefore one individual can necessarily carry it out. I believe the truth to be that we are giving the Viceroy of India a humanly impossible task, a task which no man, even though he had the knowledge and experience, could have the physique to carry out. To start with, he has to be an individual of the most extraordinary authority and experience. He has to be a trained parliamentarian, a man who knows how to handle legislative assemblies, a man who knows all the ways round the division lobby, if I may put it that way, a man who knows what effect an argument or statement will produce in debate; and at the same time has to be a man of action. That is a very rare combination. He has to be an administrator and, above all things, a man whose nerves will not fail him in a crisis.

Will the Noble Lord indicate what added burden is now contemplated which has not been borne before?

The added difficulty can, I think, best be described in this way. In the first place, there will be a state of great friction in every Province, a state of very great friction which may at any time boil up into a state of danger. Secondly, there is the impossible condition of dyarchy brought about in the Federated Assembly. We shall be putting the Viceroy in the position in which Provincial Governors have been in the past of having all the disadvantages of parliamentary government without any of its advantage; but that is a point which we can discuss better on a subsequent Amendment. I am surprised that my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin raised this point, because I thought it was the view of the Joint Select Committee that the position of the Viceroy would be more difficult under the new Constitution. Certainly it is the view of a great many members of the Joint Select Committee. I recall a famous letter which Lord Zetland wrote to the "Times" when the Committee were appointed in which he detailed the almost superhuman task the Viceroy would be called upon to fulfil. The amendments to the scheme made by the Joint Select Committee which have placed so many more safeguards and weapons in the hands of the Viceroy have not tended to lighten his burden. Not only has he the duties of his immense dual capacity to discharge within British India, but he has also the supervision of all the Provincial Governors and, as well, all the dealings with the Indian States, all the frontier problems, and Baluchistan. Therefore, it is a burden which is immensely greater than anything we have previously known. It is a burden that all previous Viceroys of India have had to bear, and added to that he will have to face discontent in a dozen Provinces and an impossible Parliamentary situation at the Centre.

That is the burden which the Govern. ment are putting upon the shoulders of one man who at one moment will have to be a Parliamentary leader and the next moment an autocrat. We shall have to find somebody who will be a mixture of Charles I and Horatio Bottomley to carry it through successfully. That is one of the reasons why I believe that the whole of this scheme will end in a terrific and tragic disaster, although I hope not, from the bottom of my heart. It is putting so much on the Viceroy that no ordinary human being could possibly fulfil it. The situation is well described in Gilbert's description of the heavy dragoon:

"The pluck of Lord Nelson on board of the Victory,
Genius of Bismarck devising a plan,
The humour of Fielding (which sounds contrad ictory),
Coolness of Paget about to trepan,
The science of Jullien, the eminent musico,
Wit of Macaulay, who wrote of Queen Anne,
The pathos of Paddy, as rendered by Boucicault,
Style of the Bishop of Sodor and Man,
The dash of a D'Orsay, divested of quackery,
Narrative powers of Dickens and Thackeray,
Victor Emmanuel—peak-haunting Peveril,
Thomas Aquinas, and Doctor Sacheverell,
Tupper and Tennyson—Daniel Defoe,
Anthony Trollope and Mr. Guizot!"

That is what the Viceroy of India is to be in future. Let us realise that such individuals are extremely rare.

7.33 p.m.

I hope that my hon. Friends will not press this Amendment to a Division. I do not think it will help the Government of India to have two parallel Viceroys instead of one. It seems to be almost universally agreed that under the new Constitution the Viceroy will have more work than under the old, but as he will have the Assembly, his councillors and such an infinity of patronage to keep everything sweet I contemplate that his life will be perfectly even.

Amendment negatived.

Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill," put, and agreed to.

Clause 4 ( The Commander-in-Chief in India), ordered to stand part of the Bill.

CLAUSES 5 ( Proclamation, of Federation of India) AND 6 ( Accession of Indian States).

7.34 p.m.

I should like to move, "That the consideration of Clause 5 be postponed." If that be assented to, I shall also move, "That the consideration of Clause 6 be postponed."

Perhaps it would be for the convenience of the Committee if the right hon. Gentleman moved that both Clauses be postponed.

I beg to move, "That the consideration of Clauses 5 and 6 be postponed."

I am very much obliged to you Sir, for bringing to my knowledge the fact that it is in order for me to do so.

I ask the Secretary of State if he will agree to their postponement, because it would be a very right and proper thing to do, and it would not in any way delay our proceedings. Part II is one of the most important features of the Bill, because it raises the great issue of the Federal system and the conditions under which the States will accede to it. I always understood that this matter would not be raised this week. There are a great many reasons why it should not be raised. To begin with the text of the Bill has only just gone out to India—about a fortnight ago—and the Princes and others will be studying it in detail. They will have very little time in which to take decisions which are so important and to decide what Amendments, if any, are required. I understand that the view of the India Office is that any Amendments of that kind can be inserted on the Report stage, but the consideration of this matter on Report will be very much abbreviated, and there will be very little time to do anything. It seems most undesirable that we should have to decide Clauses 5 and 6 before the discussions which are taking place among the Princes in India have reached a conclusion. I understand that a meeting is to be held on the 27th, and, if this Bill had taken the course which I was led to expect, namely, that it would not be brought on until next week, we should not have to debate these very important Clauses without knowing what the main view of the Princes in India was going to be.

If the Princes decide not to come in at this stage, it will not be necessary to move various Amendments to a Clause to which I will presently refer. If, on the other hand, they are coming in, and we are faced with the question of the institution of the federal system, it is absolutely necessary that Amendments should be moved to make that system a reality; for instance, the question of the anomalies of Princes voting in and out on Income Tax, and so forth, must be settled, as must the various questions, which one would not wish to press until they are necessary, as to their becoming naturalised British subjects if they accede to the Federation. All sorts of questions arise as to what kind of Instrument of Accession and terms of accession the Crown will accept. Suppose that a Prince accedes with such limitations as to make him a partner and a participator in the Assembly and yet, at the same time, withhold any very large derogation from his own internal powers. Those matters will all have to be looked into and studied, and will have to be the subject of Debate and Amendment in this House, and the House will decide upon them as it sees fit.

It is, in my opinion, very improper to bring on the Committee stage of the Bill so close to the Second Reading, to hustle the House and other people who are concerned, and to force them to the gravest decisions and discussion of the gravest matters in the Bill within such a very short time of the Second Reading being disposed of. The Bill, which is of enormous complexity, has been printed under a month, and the task of putting down Amendments and relating one set of Amendments to another is one of very great difficulty to a person not possessing the organisation of the great Departments of State. These two Clauses would far better be discussed at a later stage when we shall know much more of the position in India, and when still more mature consideration can be given to the various aspects of the Bill, and to the Amendments which are appropriate to it. I hope that the Secretary of State will agree to this postponement.

No, he will not.

Ah, I suppose you have arranged it. There is too much of that. That is one of the things which have been commented on outdoors, the way in which the Socialists on the Front Opposition Bench and the Socialists on the Government Bench are doing their deals behind the backs of the Conservative party. I did not expect to hear this subterranean process so nakedly exposed by the hon. Gentleman, who already knows beforehand exactly what the Secretary of State will do. I expect it is all pretty well laid out and drawn up from start to finish. I dare say the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps), who has re-entered, is to be put up to make one of those firework speeches to give a sort of sham opposition to the Bill to cover his eager scuttling into the Government Lobby.

I regret very much that this interruption from the Front Opposition Bench led me from the more calm and temperate manner in which I had hoped to couch my appeal. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will consent to these Clauses being postponed. He will, by so doing, enable a better discussion to take place, and will not be taking an unfair advantage of the House, and he will clear himself altogether of any desire to force a decision from the House on these Clauses before the Princes' decision in regard to their coming in or not has taken place. I will not say any more at the moment because, as we are in Committee, I can easily return to the topic. I will merely content myself by asking the right hon. Gentleman whether he will agree to the Motion I make.

7.42 p.m.

Let me first call attention to the curious way in which the right hon. Gentleman makes an appeal of this nature. He indirectly accuses me of wishing to take an unfair advantage of the House, and of conspiracy with hon. Gentlemen opposite. There is no reason for postponing these Clauses, first of all because everybody has been in possession of the substance of them ever since the Joint Select Committee reported. The two Clauses follow almost exactly the Recommendations of the Joint Select Committee, and they do not come as new proposals to the House about which hon. Members have only heard in the last few weeks. Every hon. Member who has followed the details of the discussion has known all about them since last November; so also has everybody in India. The Clauses follow the Recommendations of the Joint Select Committee's Report, which has been in the possession of everybody, here and in India, who is interested in the question, since last November.

Is it not a fact that the most important part of the discussion now taking place among the Princes in India is upon the differences which exist in the text of the Bill from what is to be found either in the White Paper or in the report of the Joint Select Committee, and that upon those differences important decisions turn? How can it be said that all those matters have been known all that time? It is those very differences which will determine the Princes' decision.

There is no substantial difference in these Clauses. The only difference is in small details which undoubtedly make the present proposals more desirable than the proposals in the report.

If I may interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, I should like to point out that on this question I have on the Paper an Amendment to Clause 6, which shows a very substantial difference to exist between the Bill and the Majority Report as it affects the Princes.

I am afraid I cannot now discuss a future Amendment, but, if any change has been made in the drafting of the Clause as compared with the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee, that change is likely to make the proposal more, and not less, agreeable to the Princes. My right hon. Friend, so far as I know, is under a (misapprehension as to what is likely to happen at the meeting of the Princes which I believe is to be held in a week's time. The information that I have goes to show that the Princes are interested in details of drafting, and it is most unlikely that any new issue will be raised on the bigger questions of this Chapter. If it is only a matter of drafting, we can certainly adjust the drafting at some future stage of the Bill, and that seems to me to be no reason whatever for holding up the discussion of these two Clauses. More over, let me remind my right hon. Friend that, at the meeting of the various groups which was held upstairs, one or both of his hon. Friends put the question as to when the discussion of the Bill was going to start. There was no secret about it at all. I think it was I who said that there would be two days this week, namely, Tuesday and Wednesday, and subsequent discussion proceeded on the lines that Chapter I would undoubtedly be the Chapter to be discussed. No suggestion of any kind was made as to postponement.

7.47 p.m.

In my opinion, it would have been entirely out of order in such a committee if any suggestion had been made about postponement. Such power as that informal committee had was entirely in regard to the general allocation of time. The fixing of the date on which particular subjects should be raised was not a matter for the committee, but for the Government. The Government are not obliged to have any agreement on that matter, but we are perfectly free to criticise the action of the Government in fixing the date. Nor has the right hon. Gentleman the slightest right to shelter himself behind a committee which dealt with matters to which the question of the date on which subjects should be discussed was wholly irrelevant.

My right hon. Friend totally misunderstands my argument. I am not suggesting that the committee had the power to settle the time-table or to impose its will upon the House. I am meeting my right hon. Friend's charge that I was taking an unfair advantage of the Committee in pressing these two Clauses. I can only tell him that he was represented, as I understood, by two of his hon. Friends at this committee meeting upstairs, and I am speaking within the memory of several hon. Members who were present when I say that there was no question whatever about the Bill being taken on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week.

How do you mean, there was no question?

It was assumed, and the discussion—

It was irrelevant to the business of the committee.

Really, my right hon. Friend is misrepresenting what I am trying to say. I am meeting his charge that I am taking an unfair advantage of this Committee. I am doing nothing of the kind. It was well understood in the committee upstairs that the discussion would take place this week, and the whole basis of our subsequent discussion upstairs was on the lines that Chapter I was going to be discussed. In view of these facts, I urge the Committee to decide against any postponement. If the Princes or any other section in India have points of detail to urge, either on this part or on any later part of the Bill, we shall have an opportunity of dealing with those Amendments when the time comes, but nothing that my right hon. Friend has said in any way shakes my view that it is altogether unnecessary to postpone these two Clauses.

7.51 p.m.

On a, point of Order. May I ask you, Captain Bourne, whether this discussion is in order? I am not aware that there is any Motion before the Committee—[HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] If there is a Motion before the Committee, it does not appear on the Order Paper, and I desire to ask you whether in these circumstances a Motion to postpone the discussion of Clauses is in order?

A Motion to postpone a Clause can be made by any Member at any time before an Amendment has been proposed to that Clause, and does not require notice; but discussion upon it must be strictly limited to the advisibility of postponing the Clause, and must not go into the question of merits.

7.53 p.m.

I hope there will not be a long debate on this question, because I think it would be very undesirable. I do not wish to accuse the Government of doing anything unfair, but I am very sorry that they have not made a better response to the appeal of my right hon. Friend. I think there would be a great gain if this discussion were taken after the Princes had met, but, since the right hon. Gentleman is unable to meet us, I am afraid the only thing we can do is to divide against him on the subject, and I hope we shall do so as quickly as possible.

7.54 p.m.

I think the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) fails in one particular. He argues that these Clauses ought to be postponed because, he says, there is a prospect of a meeting of the Princes some week or so hence. But surely he knew that last night, and, if so, why did he not put down a Motion to postpone these Clauses, so that we should have known exactly what was happening? He could have done that last night, or even last week. He has suggested that we are conducting a sham fight, but it seems to me that he is laying himself open to a charge of deliberate obstruction.

7.55 p.m.

I only want to deal with the question which has been raised as to what was done upstairs. The arrangement come to upstairs was undoubtedly that the first six days should be given to Part I and Part II of the Bill. It was set out in typewriting for us before we came to the meeting, and I had the advantage, with the Noble Lord, of considering the typed suggestion. Ultimately, after it had been adjusted, it was agreed that the first six days should be devoted to Parts I and II of the Bill. The question was then raised as to when the Bill would come before the House, and we were told that Tuesday and Wednesday of the following week would be proposed. To postpone any part of the Bill now would be to eat up time that is needed for very important matters. Let it not be thought that the subjects which have been before the House to-day are the. really important matters. There are other and vital questions which will arise in the discussions on the Bill, and the opponents of the Government must realise that those who want these other matters raised must have their fair share of the time as well, particularly when we come to deal later on with the Schedules, where there are matters which vitally affect the day-to-day conditions of the people in India.

I do not want to continue the Debate, but simply to suggest that it may be an advantage rather than a disadvantage to have this Debate now, before the Princes meet. In India they still attach some importance to what is said in the House of Commons. It is not as if the right hon. Gentleman and his friends had been deprived of the opportunity of putting down their Amendments; they are on the Paper; and, if they can be discussed and the opinion of the House on them ascertained, I should have thought that, instead of hindering things in India, that expression of opinion would help things in India, and might induce the Princes to come to some conclusion, knowing what the House of Commons bad done in Committee. It would not bind them, because there will still be the Report stage and the Third Reading. If the Princes should take some unexpected action, undoubtedly our course on Report and Third Reading would be influenced accordingly, but there is an advantage, surely, in Parts I and II being fully discussed now, so that the Princes may know what is the position and the outlook of the British House of Commons.

7.57 p.m.

This is not a question of what was done in a Committee, or of the bonâfides of the Government, but simply a question of common sense. We as a House of Commons have to decide, in dealing with this matter, whether it is common sense to deal with it before the people concerned have made up their own minds. If it were any ordinary business matter coming before a board of directors, they would say it was farcical to discuss what certain people were going to do if they became 'members of the board, before it was known whether they were going on to the board or not. Similarly, it is farcical in the case of this Bill to have for the first time in history a Federation before the constituent parts have been formed. There is a still greater anomaly when it is proposed to deal with the coming in of the Indian Princes, and the whole matter is to be discussed on these two Clauses before they have signified whether they are coming in or not. This is no Committee point, but a question of common sense, and I submit that the suggestion that these two Clauses should be post-poned is a very reasonable one. We shall have 30 days in which to deal with this matter. Why should we not postpone these Clauses until we know where we are? Considering the House of Commons as, I hope, a. body of commonsense people, I should think it would be agreed that this is a proper proposal, and that we should delay consideration of these Clauses until we know what the Princes are going to do.

7.58 p.m.

As I have been subjected to severe criticism from the Front Opposition Bench, I think it right to point out to the Committee how very reasonable is the proposal which I am making. If normal constitutional practice and the reasonable orderly custom of Parliament had been followed, and at least a fortnight had been allowed to intervene between the Second Reading and the Committee stage of a Bill of this magnitude, the difficulty would not have arisen. That is the course which I understood was to have been taken. Then the Government decided to bring the matter forward a week earlier, and get these two very decisive Clauses dealt with at this stage, which happens to be before the discussions which are proceeding in India will mature. That is a limitation of proper and regular constitutional procedure and custom, and, in addition, it is an alteration of the original course which we were led to believe would be taken. I make no charge of any kind against the Government in this matter. I have been assured that the ante-dating of the Committee stage to this week had no ulterior motive, and I accept that assurance completely, but nevertheless the inconvenience remains, even if the purpose does not exist, and, if the proper normal course had been taken, that inconvenience would not have existed at all. The inconvenience is patent to every one. Hon. Gentlemen opposite would like, naturally, as it were, to force the Princes' hand by getting a decision in this House beforehand, but I think it is a very great pity that the Princes cannot be allowed to decide this matter before we have been subjected to the necessity of taking our decision. I certainly shall press my Motion to a Division.

7.59 p.m.

We know now that, if the Princes do not come in, Part II of the Bill, at any rate, will fall to the ground. If that happens, we shall have wasted our time and placed ourselves in a most undignified position. I wish to protest against the possibility of our being placed in such a position.

8.0 p.m.

May I add one word on behalf of common sense? As a great deal may depend on what the Princes in India decide a week hence, and as we have been told that the quite slight difference between the Select Committee's Report and the terms of the Bill may weigh, is it not just as well that the Princes should know to what decision this House has come, and whether there is to be a Federation or a Council of Greater India, before they have their meeting?

8.0 p.m.

I cannot understand the course of reasoning which induced my right hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth (Sir A. Steel-Maitland) to make the statement that he has just made. I rise to protest against the charge made by the Opposition Front Bench that my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) is guilty of obstruction in this matter. I should have thought that, whatever our views on this Measure may be, as we belong to the same party as the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State, he would at least have risen in his place to protect us from such an accusation. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State clearly realises that there is no intention or desire to adopt any obstructive tactics by a small body of his fellow Conservative Members in this Committee. I felt it only fair to say that for my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping, who perhaps had some diffidence, when expressing his strong feeling on this matter, in making a protest. Should another accusation of a similar kind be levelled against my right hon. Friend, I hope that the Secretary of State will take the opportunity of supporting his fellow Members on this side of the Committee.

8.2 p.m.

I do not intend to join in this discussion except to say that the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) is not really so thin-skinned as to be upset because someone says a kind word to him in a back-handed way, Reproofs are continually hurled against us, and we are told that we are acting subterraneously with the Government, and so on. Why should the right hon. Gentleman be hurt if someone suggests that he has done something merely for obstruction? It is not worthy of him, and I hope he will not do it again.

8.3 p.m.

I would make an appeal to the Secretary of State. He has had a lot of support from the Front Opposition Bench, and he has been supported in a long speech by the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot). Does not my right hon. Friend realise how dangerous it is to get his support from every side of the House except the Conservative side? It is true that he had some support, for what was called the common-sense point of view, from the right hon. Member for Tamworth (Sir A. Steel-Maitland). But is it a wise thing for him to depend on the Radical party and on the Socialist party, and not to make a concession of any sort to his friends? There could have been nothing more reasonable in this House than the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). We are very anxious indeed to conduct this Debate with fairness, and the suggestion my right hon. Friend made was a perfectly fair one. Suppose that the Princes decide to turn down the Secretary of State. Would the House of Commons, which the Prime Minister says is a business House of Commons, then spend a long time in discussing something which is quite academic?

The Secretary of State really ought to be more reasonable. Is it not much

Division No. 51.]	AYES.	[8.8 p.m.
Alexander, Sir William	Greene, William P. C.	Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)
Atholl, Duchess ol	Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John	Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Balfour, George (Hampstead)	Gritten, W. G. Howard	Templeton, William P.
Bracken, Brendan	Jones, Sir G. W. H. (Stoke New'gton)	Thorp, Linton Theodore
Broadbent, Colonel John	Kimball, Lawrence	Todd, Lt.-Col. A. J. K. (B'wickon-T.)
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer	Knox, Sir Alfred	Touche, Gordon Cosmo
Courtauld, Major John Sewell	Lennox-Boyd, A. T.	Wayland, Sir William A.
Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry	Levy. Thomas	Wells, Sydney Richard
Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H	Hacquisten, Frederick Alexander	Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Davison, Sir William Henry	Nunn, William	Wise, Alfred R.
Dawson, Sir Philip	Oman, Sir Charles William C.	Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount
Erskine-Boist, Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)	Raikes, Henry V. A. M.
Everard, W. Lindsay	Rawson, Sir Cooper	TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Fuller, Captain A. G.	Remer, John R.	Mr, Donner and Mr. Bailey.
Goodman, Colonel Albert W.	Sanderson, Sir Frank Barnard

NOES.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel	Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)	Brass, Captain Sir William
Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)	Banfield, John William	Briscoe, Capt. Richard George
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. Christopher	Barclay-Harvey, C. M,	Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.	Batsy, Joseph	Brown, Col. D. C. (N'th'I'd., Hexham)
Ainsworth, Lieut.-Colonal Charles	Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)	Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Aibery, Irving James	Benn, sir Arthur Shirley	Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd)	Bennett, Capt. Sir Ernest Nathaniel	Burghley, Lord
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold O. M. S.	Blindell, James	Butler, Richard Austen
Anstruther-Gray, W. J.	Bottom, A. C.	Butt. Mr Alfred
Apsley, Lord	Bower, Commander Robert Tatton	Cadogan, Hon. Edward
Aske, Sir Robert William	Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.	Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)
Assheton, Ralph	Boyce, H. Leslie	Campbell-Johnston, Malcolm
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley	Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)	Caporn, Arthur Cecil

wiser for him to meet us on this very small point? I doubt whether at any time in these Debates we shall again put forward such a request. I hope that the stony heart of my right hon. Friend will relent. We have to read this immense Bill. We did not draw it up. The Secretary of State drew it up, and we want a little more time to study it. We shall make ourselves absolutely fantastic in the eyes of the public if we now discuss something which next week may 'be blown to particles. I would appeal to the manly and robust common sense of the learned Attorney-General. I beg him to plead with the Secretary of State, and to recognise that if in the course of the next few years the 'Socialist party once more return to power, aided very largely by some of those who now support this Bill, we and the Secretary of State will have to work together to turn the Socialists out. Why then refuse to give way to a most modest request? There is nothing obstructive in it. It is what the right hon. Member for Tamworth calls real common sense. I know that the 'Secretary of State is tired and requires a little refreshment, and I ask him to make this first evening of our Debates pleasant by granting a little concession to his friends.

Question put, "That the consideration of Clauses 5 and 6 be postponed."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 41; Noes, 290.

Cautley, Sir Henry S.	Horsbrugh, Florence	Paling, Wilfred
Cayzer, Sir Charles (Chatter, City)	Howard, Tom Forrest	Palmer. Francis Noel
Cayzer, Maj. Sir H. R. (Prtimth, S.)	Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.	Patrick, Colin M.
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)	Hudson, Robert Spear (Southport)	Peake, Osbert
Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)	Hume, Sir George Hopwood	Peat, Charles U.
Chapman, Col. R.(Houghton-le-Spring)	Hunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)	Percy, Lord Eustace
Chapman, Sir Samuel (Edinburgh, S.)	Hurst, Sir Gerald B.	Peters, Dr. Sidney John
Clarry, Reginald George	Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.	Petherick, M.
Cleary, J. J.	Iveagh, Countess of	Peto, Geoffrey K. (W'verh'pt'n, Bilston)
Cocke, Frederick Seymour	Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)	Potter, John
Colfox, Major William Philip	Jackson, J. C. (Heywood & Radcliffe)	Powell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.
Conant, R, J, S.	Janner, Barnett	Radford, E. A.
Cook, Thomas A.	Jenkins, Sir William	Ramsay, Alexander (W. Bromwich)
Cooke, Douglas	Jasson, Major Thomas E.	Ramsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)
Cranborne, Viscount	Joel, Dudley J. Barnato	Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Islet)
Cripps, Sir Stafford	John, William	Ramsden, Sir Eugene
Crooke, J. Smedley	Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)	Ratcliffe, Arthur
Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Galntb'ro)	Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)	Rathbone, Eleanor
Croom-Johnson, R. P.	Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)	Rea, Walter Russell
Crossley, A. C.	Ker, J, Campbell	Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)
Cruddae, Lieut.-Colonel Bernard	Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)	Reid, William Allan (Derby)
Culverwell, Cyril Tom	Kerr, Hamilton W.	Rhys, Hon. Charles Arthur U.
Curry, A. C.	Kirkpatrick, William M.	Rickards, George William
Oaggar, George	Lansbury, Rt. Hon. George	Ropner, Colonel L.
Dalkeith, Earl of	Law, Sir Alfred	Rosbotham, Sir Thomas
Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.	Law, Richard K. (Hull, S.W.)	Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)	Lawson, John James	Rothschild, James A. de
Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)	Leckie, J. A.	Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward
Danville, Alfred	Leech, Dr. J. W.	Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)
Dickie, John P.	Lees-Jones, John	Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)
Doran, Edward	Liddall, Walter S.	Salmon, Sir Isidore
Dugdale, Captain Thomas Lionel	Lindsay, Noel Ker	Salt, Edward W.
Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)	Lister, Rt. Hon. sir Phillip Cunliffe.	Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (Darwes)
Dunglass, Lord	Little, Graham-, sir Ernest	Samuel, M. R. A. (W'dt'wth, Putney).
Eady, George H.	Llewellin, Major John J.	Savory, Samuel Servington
Eden, Rt. Hon. Anthony	Llewellyn-Jones, Frederick	Shaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)
Edwards, Charles	Lloyd, Geoffrey	Shaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)
Elliot, Rt. Hon. Walter	Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)	Shute, Colonel Sir John
Elmley, Viscount	Loder, Captain J. de Vara	Simmonds, Oliver Edwin
Entwistle, Cyril Fullard	Loftus, Pierce C.	Smithers, Sir Waldron
Essenhigh, Reginald Clare	Logan, David Gilbert	Somervell, Sir Donald
Foot, Isaac (Cornwall, Bodmin)	Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.	Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)
Fox, Sir Gifford	Mabane, William	Soper, Richard
Galbraith, James Francis Wallace	MacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. C. G.(Partick)	Sotheron-Eatcourt, Captain T. E.
Ganzonl, sir John	MacAndrew, Capt. J. O. (Ayr)	Spender-Clay, Rt. Hon. Herbert H.
Gardner, Benjamin Walter	McCorquodale, M. S.	Spene, William Patrick
Gault, Lieut.-Col. A. Hamilton	Macdonald, Gordon (Ince)	Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morland)
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)	MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham)	Steel-Maitland, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Gibson, Charles Granville	Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)	Stones, James
Gillett, Sir George Masterman	McEntee, Valentine L.	Storey, Samuel
Gledhill, Gilbert	MeEwen, Captain J. H. F.	Stourton, Hon. John J.
Glossop, C. W. H.	McKie, John Hamilton	Strauss, Edward A.
Gluckstein, Louis Halle	McLean, Major Sir Alan	Strickland, Captain W. F.
Glyn, Major Sir Ralph G. C.	Maclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)	Stuart, Lord C. Crichton
Golf, Sir Park	McLean, Dr. W. H. (Tradestan)	Summersby, Charles H.
Gower, Sir Robert	Magnay, Thomas	Sutcliffe, Harold
Grattan-Doyle, Sir Nicholas	Mainwaring, William Henry	Tate, Mavie Constance
Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Arthur	Makine, Brigadier-General Ernest	Thomas, James P. L. (Herelord)
Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)	Manningham-Buller, Lt.-Col. Sir M.	Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Griffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro', W.)	Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.	Thorne, William James
Griffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding)	Martin, Thomas B.	Tinker, John Joseph
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)	Mason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)	Titchfield, Major the Marquees of
Grigg, Sir Edward	Maxton, James	Train, John
Grimston, R. V.	Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John	Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Groves, Thomas E.	Meller, Sir Richard James	Tufnell, Lieut.-Commandar R. L.
Grundy, Thomas W.	Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)	Turton, Robert Hugh
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.	Milner, Major James	Wallace, Captain D. E. (Hornby)
Gunston, Captain D. W.	Mitchell, Harold P.(Br'tf'd a Chisw'k)	Wallace, Sir John (Dunfermline)
Guy, J. C. Morrison	Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)	Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hall)
Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.	Mitcheson, G. G.	Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Hall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvll)	Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. Eyres	Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.
Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)	Morgan, Robert H.	Watt, Captain George Steven H.
Hamilton, Sir R. W.(Orkney & Zetl'nd)	Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)	Weymouth, Viscount
Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry	Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties)	White, Henry Graham
Harvey, George (Lambeth, Kenningt'n)	Morrison, William Shepherd	Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Harvey, Major Sir Samuel (Totnes	Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.	Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Haslam, Henry (Horncastle)	Munro. Patrick	Williams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Hatlam, Sir John (Bolton)	Nathan, Major H. L.	Wills, Wilfrid D.
Headlam, Lieut.-Cot. Cuthbert M.	Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.	Wilson, Clyde T. (West Toxteth)
Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.	Nicholson, Godfrey (Morpeth)	Womersley, Sir Walter
Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)	Normand, Rt. Hon, Wilfrid	Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)
Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John Waller	O'Connor, Terence James
Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.	O'Donovan. Dr. William James	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Hore-Bellsha, Leslie	O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh	Sir George Penny and Major
Hornby, Frank	Orr Ewing, I. L.	George Davies.

Clause 5—(Proclamation, Of Federation Of India)

8.17 p.m.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 33, to leave out from "Majesty," to the end of the Sub-section, and to insert:

"to declare by proclamation that as and from the day therein appointed there shall be established an advisory council styled the Council of Greater India, constituted in accordance with the provisions of the. Fourth Schedule to this Act."

This is the point in the Bill at which we are advised it is appropriate to raise the whole question as to whether it is right and wise at this moment to commit ourselves to the Federation plan proposed in the Bill. The form that the Amendment takes is to put forward an alternative Schedule which embodies the recommendations made in the Conservative Minority Report of the Joint Select Committee. The Schedule that we have put down is only what can properly be described as a skeleton Schedule. I make no complaint against the Government, because I realise the difficulties with which they are faced, but I ask them to recognise that private Members are faced with very great difficulties indeed in drafting Amendments without all the resources at the disposal of the Government. They have rushed on the Committee stage, for reasons which no doubt seem to them perfectly proper but which enormously increase the difficulties that confront private Members. I wish to make this caveat at the beginning of the discussion, that it will be no answer to us to point out any gaps in the proposed Fourth Schedule. If the Amendment were accepted, it would be perfectly easy for us to confer with the Government and other interested parties and substitute a new form of Schedule which works out much more fully the scheme that we have in mind. The Schedule is merely put down to bring the Amendment into order and to indicate generally the type of advisory council that we have in mind. I hope it will be clear that we do not stand in the least by the letter of the proposed Schedule. We want to raise on the Amendment the fundamental question whether it is right and wise, when we are proposing this great extension of democratic government to India, to combine it at the same time with Federation. Even at this eleventh hour I want to make an appeal, not only to the Government but to all Members of the Committee, to think once and twice before we commit ourselves to this plan. The more I consider it the more certain it seems to me that it will land India and the Empire in disaster.

I want, in the first place, to review quite fairly the argument that led so many of my hon. Friends to believe that Federation is necessary at the same time that you are extending Provincial Autonomy. We have been told that it is impossible to combine Provincial Autonomy with an autocratic Centre. That, I think, is not an unfair summary of the argument. My hon. Friends contend that, in order to get harmony and consistency and coherence, you must have democracy at the Centre when you are establishing democracy in the Provinces, and they have affirmed that the present Government of India at the Centre is much too weak to work well with autonomous Provincial government. If that was the only argument, there would be a very simple answer to it. It would be perfectly simple to strengthen the present Government at the Centre. I am no lover at all of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. I think in many respects they were very ill-conceived and over-hasty, and I am not in the least wedded to maintaining the Centre in its present form. It would be quite easy to strengthen the powers of the Viceroy in regard to the Centre without following the plan proposed in the Bill. But my hon. Freinds and the Government go a great deal further than that. They say not only is the present Government of India not strong enough to fit in properly with autonomous Provinces but it is also not democratic enough, and they go on to say that you cannot get efficient working of Provincial Autonomy unless you combine the autonomous Provinces in one vast Federation with responsible government.

This matter was debated to a certain extent in the general discussion that we had before, and I remember that this led to a very interesting speech from my Noble Friend the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy). I do not think I am misrepresenting him when I say that the main argument that he stressed was that the legislation of the Provinces was so intimately bound up with all-India questions, especially in regard to taxation, finance and trade, that it was perfectly impossible for any Province to have a healthy political life unless it had a fair voice in the Government of India at the Centre, and that by no other means could you get contented Provinces and harmony in the working. He gave it as his opinion that if the central finances of India and the general central legislation of India were dictated by an autocratic, or, as he insists upon calling it, but which to me it is not, an irresponsible Government, then, at the very start this scheme will have no prospect of success. I hope that I am not misrepresenting his argument. If we accept that argument at the commencement, our first reply to-day is that the Government have not in the least got out of that dilemma by adopting the Federation which they are proposing in this Bill, for this reason. The powers of the Central Legislature are not self-governing powers. They are called responsible, but they are, in fact, a very crude and very had form of dyarchy. No one who has studied this question can fail to be impressed by the Report of the Simon Commission on the breakdown of dyarchy in all the Provinces and the reasons which they gave, which showed that dyarchy inevitably must break down wherever it is tried.

Take the question of finance, and this is really fundamental. Of the central budget of 1933–34 of £58,000,000, no less than £49,000,000 would be non-votable under this Bill. The cost of the Army was £34,000,000, pensions £2,500,000, and debt £12,000,000, which gives a total of £49,000,000 out of £58,000,000. What sort of responsible Government is it that has two-thirds or three-quarters of the budget outside the choice, scope and authority of the popular assembly'? What should we think in this House of Commons if in our Budget of £800,000,000 or £1,000,000,000, £600,000,000 or £700,000,000 was beyond our control? These items are far more beyond the control of the Indian Assembly than anything like the National Debt is beyond the control of the House of Commons. I know quite well that Chancellors of the Exchequer in the past have been at pains to show that a very high proportion of our own Budget is settled by matters largely beyond their control, but that is only true in a certain limited sense. For instance, it used to be argued that the Debt services, which form such a large part of our Budget, were quite beyond the control of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but that was never really so. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer has shown that it was not true, because by his wise administration and sound policy he has reduced the rate of interest at which the Government can borrow and has so enormously reduced the Debt services.

But when you come to an item like £34,000,000 for the Army in the Indian Budget, it is a matter which is absolutely beyond the control of the Indian Legislature. I ask hon. Members, and especially hon. Members opposite, who believe in democracy a great deal more than I do, especially democracy in the East, how they think that any such legislative assembly could be set up as being democratic, which claims to be democratic, and which has the title "Democratic" conferred upon it. If hon. Members when they talk about responsible government do not mean democratic government, I do not know what they do mean. [An HON. MEMBER: "They are the same."] Certainly in modern politics they are the same. What does responsibility mean? It means responsibility to the electors. Unless that be the case, you have no right to call the Viceroy irresponsible as you have done. That is a point on which I ventured to make a protest before Christmas. You have absolutely no right to call the present Government of India irresponsible unless you can confine responsibility to democracy.

This is rather an important point. I do not think that any of us has described the position of the Viceroy as being irresponsible. We have pointed out that a legislature, in which the elected majority is not, and cannot be, responsible for the carrying out of any of the policy it has advanced, is an irresponsible legislature.

That is exactly the legislature you are setting up by this Bill. You have an elected majority, and it cannot control one farthing of the Army expenditure, which is more than half the budget by itself. Therefore, by the showing of my right hon. Friend you are setting up an irresponsible legislature and calling it a responsible legislature, and that will land us into far greater difficulty that admitting the fact that you cannot have a properly responsible legislature in the Centre of India at the present moment and telling the Indians so candidly and fairly. In my short political experience I have never known politicians get out of their difficulties permanently by telling lies. I have known a great many politicians tell a great many lies thinking that they could thereby get out of difficulties. Very often they get out of their difficulty for a moment, but inevitably the lie comes home to roost, and that is exactly what is going to happen. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members opposite have had bitter experience of that fact, and they know the truth of what I am saying. That is exactly the sort of difficulty into which you are going to land yourself at the present moment. The Constitution, which you are forming and calling responsible, containing a legislature which you are trying, as the accredited representatives of the people, to invest with all the panoply and jargon of democratic politics—that is a body which will at once find itself unable, in the phrase of the right hon. Gentleman, to have any decisive influence on the greater part of its budget, which every hon. Members knows to be the core and kernel of one's internal policy. It is for that reason that we feel that this experiment of Federation is bound to end in disaster. That is the argument which is urged in the Conservative Minority Report of the Joint Select Committee, and the argument which we tried to advance before Christmas and on the Second Reading of the Bill. I should like to ask my hon. Friends opposite to review the course of events since then and to say whether there is any glimmer of hope that what we then foretold will not come true. We told the Government quite clearly that what they are now proposing will in no wise satisfy Indian political aspirations. Do they deny that now? Have they got a single responsible Indian politician who will bless this Bill?

Sapru.

The lonely Sapru.

He did not bless it in the Minority Report which he wrote and signed himself. Certainly the Government can find no important section of Indian political opinion that will take the slightest responsibility for this Bill, or will even say "thank you," for it. On the contrary, they spit it back in your face; they reject it with scorn, and with all the expletives that the Indian can muster, and that is saying a good deal. Exactly what we foretold has happened. The Congress is going to enter into the electoral machinery in order to try and smash it, and in doing so they will have the support of so-called Moderate Liberal opinion in India, because Moderate Liberals will never have the courage to stand up to the popular cries that Congress use. Moderate Liberals in India, as far as I can make out, are very much like Moderate Liberals in England. They use a great many phrases which go a great deal further than they mean, and when they are confronted with those phrases by more logical, resolute people, whether it be the Congress party in India or the Independent Labour party, the Clydeside Group, in this House, they find themselves in a very difficult position.

We have seen happening exactly what we foretold. We have seen the whole popular democratic movement in India fighting this Constitution line by line and at every point they can. What prospect does that open out when you get your Federation going? How are you going to get the harmony which my Noble Friend the Member for Hastings speaks of between the Centre and the autonomous Provinces? How are you going to get that strong government which is going to bind the autonomous Provinces of India together? You are going to get nothing of the sort. You are going to get a bear garden, with Governor baiting, Viceroy baiting as the chief occupation of the Federal Assembly at Delhi.

As in Ceylon.

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) says, "As in Ceylon." Certainly, and as we have seen in all the Provinces under dyarchy, especially in the more difficult Provinces like Bengal. The Central Assembly is going to be the focus for all the political forwards of India. It is going to be the great arena, the great battleground of the most ardent spirits, the most extreme leaders, who are going to the Centre in pursuit of the biggest game, the Viceroy. Therefore, it seems to us to be flying in the face of all the facts that are emerging about India, flying in the face of the teachings of history and flying in the face of all our own experience in India during the last 15 years, to think that you can get this contentment or efficiency by setting up a Legislative Assembly based on a democratic franchise, claiming it to be democratic but withholding from it the power of really being able to take a responsible share in the government of the country which it is supposed to represent.

That is the dilemma which has been before us all the time. The only people who really faced this dilemma were the Simon Commission, before they were squared. I do not wish to use a bad expression, and I say, before they were converted. I do not wish to attribute any unworthy motive to any of my hon. or right hon. Friends who disagree with us on this subject. The question is far too serious and difficult for us to bandy charges of that sort about. We all realise the difficulties with which we are faced, from whatever angle we approach this question. In their original report the Simon Commission faced this problem and said that you cannot have responsible government at the centre in India at the present time, that it was no use thinking of a democratic assembly, and that if you do you will only get exactly the same evils of dyarchy as they were then exposing in the Provinces. If we had only been allowed to proceed on the lines originally suggested by the Simon Commission we should have avoided this great fraud, because that is what it is, nothing more and nothing less, of a pretended democratic federal centre, from which we have necessarily to withhold vital power.

The Noble Lord keeps on talking about a democratic assembly at the centre. We repudiate the idea that it is a democratic assembly. It is a reactionary assembly; an oligarchy.

The Noble Lord says that politicians in India dislike the proposals of the Government. Does he suggest that they would like any better the proposals that he is advocating?

I do not think my hon. and gallant Friend puts us in any dilemma by that question.

I was only asking for information.

If my hon. and gallant Friend can point out to me a single policy on which the Indian politicians are agreed which would have any chance of acceptance by public opinion in this country, there would be some point in his interruption, but he and I know perfectly well that anything which this House can propose is totally unacceptable to the Indian politicians. Therefore, if we are going to do anything which would be acceptable to this House and would commend itself to public opinion, we have to do something for which we shall not get thanks but for which we shall get abuse from the Indian politicians. That being the case, is it not better to be perfectly honest with them and not give them cause to say that we have acted ingenuously and have proposed something which is different from what it pretends to be Is it not much better for us to say, quite clearly, how far we are prepared to go in Indian self-government, and to give them something which has a chance of being honestly worked.

I have always felt that there is a strong case for making a bold experiment in regard to Provincial self-government. It would be far wiser for us to say: "We are prepared to give you these great powers which will enable you to show how far you are sufficiently experienced to use even greater powers. It is true that there must be some questions which affect all-India which also affect your Provincial legislation which we are not prepared to put into the hands of Indian politicians at the present moment." The Government are not prepared to put these matters in the hands of Indian politicians. If this House and the Government would only have the courage and straightforwardness to tell the Indians so we should have far less trouble in the end. But by erecting a legislature, which is supposed to have power to pass laws, and call it responsible government, and to dangle prospects in the future of Dominion status, as if India was in any description comparable to Australia or Canada, is simply asking for trouble in the future. It is the sort of make-believe attitude which has gained Englishmen the reputation of being hypocrites. The English people like to talk about aspirations which they do not regard as practical at the moment, such as discussing a Scottish Tem perance Bill, but in dealing with other nations we have to be careful about not pretending to give, or do, or say, more than we really mean. We shall never satisfy the Indians with this Federal machinery. We shall merely incite their contempt, lead them to think that we are dishonest and that with a little more pressure, obstruction and 'agitation, they can get what they want.

The whole of this machinery is going to be used as the thin edge of the wedge by which the controlling powers of the Viceroy are to be whittled away until complete swaraj has been obtained. I do not mean to say that these powers of the Viceroy should be permanent, but I say that not in the lifetime of any one present can we divorce ourselves from responsibility for the Indian Army, the defence of India, the debt services and pensions, and matters of that sort. As far as this generation is concerned the thing is not practical politics. But erecting a Federal Assembly, which is not allowed to deal with these matters, is like putting a boy in a bun shop and tying him up so that he cannot reach the buns, he can only smell them. You do not satisfy the boy by doing that, you only excite his anger and wrath. That is precisely what we are afraid is going to happen by the plan of the Government. We suggest, following the recommendation of the Conservative minority report, that it would be much better to have an advisory council to make the Viceroy aware of the feelings in the various Provinces and States in regard to all-India questions, but to leave the settlement of these questions in the hands of the Viceroy and his advisers.

I know that Indians will not accept such a proposal, but their objection to it cannot be more violent than their objection to the present scheme. You are not going to lose anything in that way. On the other hand, Indians who reject it would never be able to obstruct such a machinery or prevent its smooth working in the same way as they can obstruct and wreck your Federal Legislature. If you have this central assembly on an advisory basis you will know where they stand, and the Viceroy need not take their advice. The only protest they could make would be a boycott and a decision not to tender advice, but it would not mean the breakdown which would inevitably occur in the working of the federal assembly proposed by the Government. In spite of all the adverse criticism which we should undoubtedly get from Indians and hon. Members opposite it would be far better, for a generation at least, to allow Provincial Autonomy to be tried before attempting to confer central responsibility on the people of India. You cannot, it passes the wit of man, it was beyond the brains of the Labor party even, to devise a plan by which this central responsibility can wisely and rightly be entrusted to Indians at the moment, and, therefore, it is far better to put the whole of your central machinery on an advisory basis, to allow experience to be accumulated in the ordinary day to day working of the Parliamentary machinery and ministerial responsibility in the Provinces before going on with this much greater and more difficult experiment.

It has been said that there is no finality in such a position because the Labour party would not accept it, and that if they came into power they would repudiate it. The Labour party do not accept the Bill. They have divided on every occasion they dare; we have no sort of political unity in England on this question. The Labour party are perfectly free to do everything they can to introduce their idea of the way in which India should be governed, they are not bound by the Bill in the slightest extent. Therefore, we have nothing to gain in the conciliation of Indian opinion or in the conciliation of Socialist opnion by following the plan of the Government. On the contrary, we shall be landing India with a Constitution which is absolutely without parallel in the history of Constitutions throughout the world; a country which is three times as great as the United States of America and far more complicated than the whole of Europe put together, and you are making this vast experiment at a time when the greatest political unrest exists and in a form which will lay yourselves open to the just reproach that the whole of your grant of so called responsible government is a fraud and a sham. We feel that a Constitution based on these lines can only end in disaster, and we can have no part or lot in such a business.

8.55 p.m.

I shall not detain the Committee long because I intend to confine myself to the narrower issue which is embodied in the Amendment and to which the noble Lord did not make much allusion. I am sure he will agree that it is not of much avail to criticise the Government's proposals unless you have an alternative set to put in their place. The proposal of the noble Lord is not original. I will not deceive the Committee. I and my colleagues on the Indian Statutory Commission were originally responsible for it. The report of the Commission is a remarkable document because it appears to be used as a foundation for all the various conflicting proposals which are brought forward from all sides on this question. I remember that when we first returned from India it might have been thought that we had brought back the plague instead of a very acceptable set of recommendations. I would refer the noble Lord to two passages in our report. The first occurs on page 9 of Volume II and in it we say:

"In the course of our enquiries we became more and more convinced of the impossibility of continuing to look at one-half of India to the exclusion of the other."

The trouble was that although we were able to look at the other, we were expressly debarred by our terms of reference from making any recommendations as to the interests and concerns of the States. However, early in our deliberations we came to the conclusion that a Federation of all India was the only ultimate possible solution. For that reason we made a very tentative recommendation in the paragraph in which we recommend this proposal of the noble Lord. I would point out that it is very tentative indeed. We made that recommendation because although we felt that it was not possible for us to make any recommendation with regard to the Princes we wanted to open the' door by which eventually they might enter. The second passage in the report to which I want to draw attention is this:

"The whole scheme for the Council (for greater India) as we conceive it, is designed to make a beginning in the process which may one day lead to Indian Federation. What we are proposing is merely a throwing across the gap of the first strands which may in time mark the line of a solid and enduring bridge."

Had we known how expeditiously that bridge would be constructed by the Princes themselves we would not have thrown strands, whatever that may mean, across the gap.

The hon. Gentleman has said that the Simon Commission dealt with this question and recommended All-India Federation.

No, it was not within our terms of reference to recommend All-India Federation, but we did the best, possible with a Federation of British-India and also made recommendations, with a view to bridging the gap, if I may use that phrase.

Yes, I understand the point as to Federation and bridging the gap, but can the hon. Member tell the Committee when it was proposed by the Simon Commission that Federation should be brought into being, which is quite another point.

Does the hon. and gallant Member mean the Federation of All-India?

Yes.

Of course, that was not possible for us. Within the terms of reference on which we were working we were not able to concern ourselves with the accession of the States. It was not possible for us to make any recommendation at the time before there was even the possibility of All-India Federation. But perhaps I may return to the point which I was making in answer to the Noble Lord. As I have said, our proposal was a very tentative one, but the proposal which the Princes made at the Round Table Conference rendered it entirely obsolete.

There is just one other point to which I would refer. It is true that in the Statutory Commission's Report there is an unequivocal statement with regard to dyarchy. I do not think that it is a statement which even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) would be able to explain away I remember warning some of my colleagues that that statement was a rash one. It was too categorical, and I now say frankly that the Noble Lord is right that we recommended against dyarchy in any shape or form at the Centre. The reason why we did so—rather rashly as I think—was because we thought we had discovered a means by which it could be circumvented. I need not go into that question now, because it is not relevant to this Debate, but I wish to say that when the proposals were examined by the Joint Select Committee that Committee came to the conclusion that, although our proposal was not dyarchy in form, it certainly was so in fact. I admit that we were wrong and that dyarchy at the Centre was inevitable.

9.3 p.m.

I support the Amendment, and I think the Committee ought to appreciate the fact that it has two great advantages. It is honest, and it leaves India some hope. We are apt to under-estimate the harm that is done, not so much abroad as in India itself, by the pretence that we are giving them something which they want. I believe that at the present time they have more tender feelings for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) than for the Secretary of State. That is simply because they know what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping is after, while on the other hand they resent this perpetual habit of saying that we are giving them something and of treating them as though they were children. It is undignified to go on pretending that by this Constitution we are providing something for the benefit Of India. We may be producing something—and I am sure hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite think they are producing something—which will be of permanent advantage to India, but, as far as India is concerned, what we are proposing is obviously worse at the Centre than the present situation. It is because of that fact, that we have got such a bad name in India, and the Amendment, therefore, has the enormous advantage of being honest. The other advantage is that it leaves to every Indian hope for the future. If this Bill becomes an Act, as it is, being a treaty between the British Crown and 800 Princes in India—

No, 560.

There used to be 800, but in any case it is a treaty between the British Crown and a large number of Princes who are going into the Federation on the strength of this Bill and, in exchange for a share in the Government of India, they are sacrificing certain rights under the Bill. The drawback is that never can we alter it. It is futile and useless to talk about putting in a Clause about Dominion status in the future, because we know, as they know, that the Bill cannot be altered once it is passed. Once this Bill goes through in its present state, there is no chance of any further step towards freedom, towards Dominion status, towards a democratic franchise. All those things are barred out for all time. Even if you had a Labour Government in office consisting solely of the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps), no change could be made. This Committee does not know that, but everyone in India knows it, and it is because of that that they are so desperately against the Bill.

It must have come as a. surprise to most people that even the Mohammedans, the special darlings of this Bill, have turned it down in the Assembly, that the Congress party, which is so anxious to be united with the Mohammedans, is also against it unanimously. That is not mere cussedness. It is not the desire to get more, either. It is the fear that here is the end for all time of the aspirations for a united India, of the aspirations for freedom, the fear that the Constitution is cast-iron, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, and can never be altered. The Instructions can be altered if the Indian Assembly asks for an alteration and both Houses of Parliament here agree, but, if you look through those Instructions, you will see that they carefully avoid touching on all the fundamental objections that the Indians have to the Bill. It is true that under the Instructions you can, I think, extend the franchise, but you cannot touch the principal vice, which is the communal system of elections, and it is to that more than to anything else that the Hindus object.

If this Amendment is carried, it is true that the Indians will object to the Constitution and will vote against it as unanimously as against the present Bill, but at any rate it will be a more honest declaration of what England is prepared to do. It is true that every single scheme for the next step forward in Indian self-government will be objected to by the Indian people, by the politicians in India. That is bound to be so, but that does not alter the fact that it is our duty to put forward what we believe to be the best scheme for India, and then let them take it or not, as they like and when they like. That would be meeting all our promises and doing our duty by this country and by India. But here, in this scheme, we know and they know that we are putting forward a scheme which we do not think to be the best for India. We are putting forward this horrible system of "Divide and rule," of division between Mohammedans and Hindus, a system which would not be tolerated in this country, which we, with all our 900 years of experience, would not dream of imposing upon any civilised country. We are imposing it on them, not because we think it is right, but because we believe that, by imposing this scheme on India, we can continue to rule India behind the shelter of those people who stand to benefit by the scheme. That is not honest, and I prefer this Amendment. I prefer autocratic rule at the Centre by a Governor and his Advisory Council rather than a permanent, eternal settlement on an unjust basis, on an un-English basis, which no man can alter and which no man in this country can honestly support.

9.10 p.m.

I agree with one thing which the right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) has just said. It is our duty to frame the best Bill we can for India, and in doing so we are also bound to give some consideration, not to what is said about our Bill, but to whether, when it is on the Statute Book, it is likely to work. From that point of view, I believe the scheme at present before the Committee is the one which is most likely to be effectively worked.

Does the right hon. Gentleman really mean to tell the Committee that he approves of communal representation?

Yes, certainly. It is the only form under which you can have democratic elections without a complete breakdown, but I do not wish to touch on that point now. I wish to point out that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman has supported this Amendment from a point of view entirely different from that from which it has been moved. He objects on principle to the Indian States and their rulers coming into any form of Indian Federation, because he dislikes their type of rule and believes their influence will be bad for the future government of India. My Noble Friend the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer), who moved this Amendment, moved it from an entirely different point of view. He wants to keep the Indian States out of the picture, not because he believes at bottom that Federation for All-India is a bad thing, but because he believes that bringing in the Princes at this stage will involve responsible government at the Centre, and he is himself violently opposed to that responsible government. Indeed, his speech in moving an Amendment whose object is to exclude the Princes from Federation and only give them a position on an advisory council, was from first to last devoted, not to the desirability of excluding the Indian States, but wholly to a condemnation of the new Constitution that is to be set up. Of that condemnation, every word was an even stronger condemnation of the Government of British India as it exists to-day and as it presumably would continue to exist if his Amendment were carried.

The Noble Lord raised the issue that under the proposed Federal scheme there would still be a large field in which the members of the Central Legislature would not be responsible. That is perfectly true. They would not be responsible for the control of defence or of foreign policy. They are not so to-day, but they would at any rate have some responsibility and exercise it in respect of an enormously large area of duties where the Centre is in constant contact and possibly at variance with the Provinces. My Noble Friend described the position of an irresponsible Legislature as comparable with that of a boy shut up in a bun shop and not allowed to touch a bun, allowed to scream and jump about, but not to touch a bun. Well, at any rate, under the Bill now before the Committee the boy will have a reasonable chance of touching a bun or two, will have something to keep him occupied, will have something that involves training and responsibility.

It is true that that does mean in some sense a system of dyarchy, but the trouble is that, do what you will, you must have dyarchy somewhere in India to-day, Dyarchy only means a division of functions, a division of responsibilities, and so long as any responsibilities are exercised by this Parliament and controlled from here, and other responsibilities are exercised by Ministers or representatives responsible to an electorate in India, you will have a dyarchy. But the worst form of dyarchy, as experience has shown in every part of our Empire, as well as in America, is when you have a dyarchy between an irremovable executive on the one side and an irresponsible, vociferous majority in the Legislature on the other. There you have the kind of Government that creates the maximum of friction and produces irresponsibility on the one side and alternatively creates violence and timidity on the other. It is a system that has never worked in this country or anywhere in the British Empire. It is far better, if we are to have dyarchy anywhere, to make your point of contact or line of division between two great functions like defence and foreign policy which, after all, touch the daily life of India very little, and then to give to Indian responsibility the whole field of their internal social, domestic and economic affairs.

That is, at any rate, the cleanest cut you can get, and from that point of view I venture to say the system which is contemplated in this Measure is infinitely superior to the present system. Surely our experience of the last 15 years has been that the present system breeds irresponsibility, and how things are to work once you set up effective autonomy in the Provinces and you have the Central Legislature with nothing else in mind and no opportunity to do anything, except make mischief, I find it very difficult to perceive. It is a fundamental mistake on the part of my Noble Friend to assume that if you keep the Indian States out and leave the situation as it is to-day, you can for long prevent such a state of affairs arising in the Central Legislature as will force responsibility at the Centre in the most undesirable form. It will mean a responsibility which will seriously prejudice the whole relations of British India to the States. It is in the interests of the States and in the interests of the Viceroy's moral responsibility to the whole of India, that the affairs of India should be dealt with by all who are affected by them.

At present, owing to the purely accidental arbitrary division between British India and the Indian States, the States are more and more affected by the legislation of British India. It was that consideration, not any sudden wave of emotion, which led the Princes at the Round Table Conference to declare that they wished to come into the Federation. It was because by that means alone they could effectively protect their interests. It seems to me that from the constitutional point of view my Noble Friend and those who support hint are really failing to realise that by keeping the Indian States out they are in no way helping the cause which they want to promote. I do not want to lay excessive stress on the argument which is the main ground of the opposition of my right hon. Friend opposite, that the Princes may be a very conservative and reactionary element. I do not want to overstress the fact that their position, their history and their interests bind them to the British Empire and the Crown; but I want to stress the fact that we have there an indigenous tradition of government and responsibility.

There are among the Princes and their ministers men who made their mark at the Round Table Conference as practical statesman and who will make their mark in any Central Indian Legislature. Therefore, from the point of view of responsibility, from the Conservative point of view, I should have thought he would have welcomed the accession of the Princes, as well as from the point of view of the good Government of India as a unit, which it is fundamentally for defence purposes, tariff purposes, railway purposes and all purposes that are covered by the Central Government. India is a unit, and to break it up would be as absurd as to take a dozen counties of this country out of England and leave them under a separate administration. The only objection to the Princes coming in is the entirely mistaken idea that by keeping them out you will prevent responsibility arising at the Centre. You cannot do it. The only difference is that in the one case you will get a system suited to India and more effectively responsible, and in the other case you will get agitation by an irresponsible Legislature leading to conditions under which this Parliament, whatever Government is in power, will be forced to make a change. The result of that change would be far less satisfactory than the Measure which is now before us.

9.21 p.m.

In listening to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), I often wonder why he was not selected for the Joint Select Committee. I always think that his type of mind would have come to its natural fruition in those 18 months of extended study of this subject. He has certainly given a lot of time to it since. Why, I may ask him, is there any objection to hon. Members—the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer), who moved the Amendment, and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood)—supporting the Amendment from different points of view? Surely there is nothing criminal in that. Every point of view can be supported from different sides. Personally, I am inclined as a Conservative to the point of view of the Noble Lord who proposed the Amendment. I was very much interested in a speech of the hon. Member for Finchley (Mr. Cadogan). He has told us—it is not the first time we have heard it, not from him but from other members of the Statutory Commission, who spent such a long time in India and furnished such a valuable report—how they arrived at their conclusions when they were in India, and how they came home and spent a year and a-half in the hot air and stuffy atmosphere of a Committee Room upstairs and changed the opinion to which they had come when they were in contact with the facts in India. They told us that the reason was that they had listened to the arguments of the other side.

Then, of course, there is a declaration of the Maharaja of Bikanir at the First Round Table Conference; that is all important. But surely, since then he has heard of other declarations by other Princes which are not on the same lines at all as that of Bikanir. Surely he forgets when he quotes, as he often does, and as his leader on that commission does, from the report of the Simon Commission some of the phrases we have so frequently heard that even if the Princes were to come into a system of Federation there are other pre-requisites to Federation. It is necessary that the Provinces of India should become self-governing entities. Have we got any nearer to that I In this wonderful Federation which we are going to propose for India we are going to have 11 Provinces. Two of them do not exist to-day. Has such a thing ever been proposed in the history of the world? When the States of America were joined together in Federation, Virginia had been self-governing for years, and they were people of our own blood and not like the Indians, new to the forms of Western government. We are at one stroke to force these people into a Federation before the Provinces have shown themselves able to govern themselves. After all, what degree of provincial government there is now is merely there under the careful nursing of British officials.

Then suddenly this is proposed. Do the Princes like this scheme? Princes of importance such as Diholpur, Bahawalpur and Patiala have spoken of the proposal very doubtfully. From the point of view of the British Government it would be most advantageous if the Princes came in, for it is hoped they would preserve the principle of conservatism necessary for a policy of continuity in India. Is it in keeping with the best traditions of this country that we should give to these people this responsibility untrained as they are? We have so far forgotten our traditions that in the Province of Punjab, which was created by the British, we should only have a single representative in the legislature. The difference between the section of the Conservative party who agree with this Amendment and the Government is that we believe, like some of our Socialist friends, in the inevitability of gradualness, while the Government believe in immediate chaos. We propose that you should have this joint Council to let the Princes get into their stride, while Provincial Autonomy is being worked out.

Has this proposal even been put directly in front of the Princes who have been exposed to all kinds of pressure to bring them into this scheme? When we are told that the Viceroy has advised them in their own interests to come into the Federation we know what that means. We know the whole history of the outburst of the Maharajah of Bikaner. The Princes went to the Viceroy to ask him what was going to happen, and whether the British were going to leave India. Did he not advise them to make friends with the politicians of British India and that it would be better to put up a scheme pleasing to the politicians? The Princes want us to remain in India to protect their rights and to save the country. I would like to say what I can in support of this proposal, because it is one of the most important, involving as it does the whole question of the immediate Federation or a gradual scheme by which these people can become accustomed to their work. I should ask the Government to think twice, for the scheme put forward has not been received with any degree of favour by politicians in India. I allow that no scheme would be accepted with favour in India. They will work any scheme as long as they know that the Government will not give them any more, but they will bluff to the extreme to get more from this Government. In the interests of the people of this country, of the 350,000,000 of people in India who have no idea. of politics, but want to get on will their job in peace and quietness, I would urge that you see how Provincial Autonomy works before giving Federal Autonomy at the Centre.

9.30 p.m.

The short answer to the hon. Member who has just sat down is that the Princes have let it be known that they would not come into any scheme at all unless it gave responsible Government.

Which Princes?

All Princes.

Has the hon. Member read the full report of the speech of the Maharaja of Patiala which made it clear that they have by no means made up their minds, and are not enamoured of Federation?

I was simply saying, not that they were enamoured of Federation, but that they refused to come into any scheme that did not give responsible government. They cannot, therefore, come into any scheme with an advisory council of the kind proposed in the Amendment. The Noble Lord who moved the Amendment spoke a great deal about democratic government, about democracy in the Provinces and at the Centre. We on this side of the Committee do not agree with that. We do not think that even in the Provinces democratic government is being given. We do agree that a step towards it is being made, but at the Centre we do not think there is any democratic government at all. There is nationalism, oligarchy and wealth, but not democratic government. We on this side of the Committee are not enamoured at all of the scheme for the federation of all India. I think I am right in saying that the Labour party would prefer a federation of British India which left the Princes out. I believe that is the general view in my party, an atmosphere I feel within the party. I am saying that because I have no definite resolution of the party in my mind at the moment, but I believe that that is the opinion of most of those with whom I am associated.

I recognise that sometimes the spirit of nationalism must be placated in order eventually that democracy may be attained. I think that is the teaching of a good deal of the history I have read. Looking at the scheme in a practical way, I think it is a cautious, creeping movement towards the better government of the millions of people in India, and a move towards the goal of Dominion status which the Indian people want. I think it is a scheme of that kind, but that all the safeguards and machinery can be enshrined in that deathless phrase "Safety first." It is a "safety first" scheme for India. I do not understand the motives or the reasons which have caused the Noble Lord and his friends to take the line they do on this question of federation. I can understand them thinking that in the Provinces the Government are going too far and too fast. I can understand them wanting to go back to the time before the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, to the old form of Indian Government which existed then, but I cannot understand them approving of the principle of allowing the Provinces to go forward to wider schemes of activity and power and democratic government and leaving the Centre unsupported by the Princes and unsupported by a representative assembly—not a democratic assembly, but an assembly representing various interests of India and the Provinces—leaving that Centre absolutely unsupported by an assembly of that kind, and bobbing about like a cork upon the waters of the unknown future.

9.36 p.m.

I had not intended to intervene in this Debate, but I should like to give an answer to some of the arguments raised this afternoon, and in rising to my feet I would claim the indulgence of the Committee, because, without long Parliamentary experience, it is not easy to rise to one's feet and make a speech after sitting here for several hours without even having had something to eat round about 8 o'clock. I have no set speech to deliver, but I should like to take some of the arguments and to answer them if I can. The right hon. Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) supported the idea of federation on the ground that matters affecting the whole of India should be dealt with by all those people who were affected. I hope I am not misrepresenting him in describing his point of view in a sentence. Surely that is a very remarkable argument in favour of Federation as it is proposed to-day. It has been made perfectly clear by the Princes of India that they will not allow laws emanating from Delhi, federal laws, to be applied in their own States except at their own discretion, and even then by their own machinery. Therefore, I do not think that argument stands. Then we had a speech from my right hon. Friend the Member for Finchley (Mr. Cadogan) in which he dealt with the same subject of federation in relation to the Simon Commission. He will forgive me if I say that he omitted to mention that the Simon Report specifically referred to Federation as an "ultimate" goal, not as a proposal of to-day or to-morrow. Then I think he went on to describe dyarchy at the Centre as being a suggestion which the Simon Commission rejected, and as he said "rashly" turned down. The Simon Commission may have produced a report with many faults—personally I think it was a most remarkable, indeed a monumental, document—but whatever the demerits of the report I fancy the word "rashly" as an adequate description would scarcely receive the support of many Members of this Committee. Therefore, I think that that part of his speech, if he will forgive me for saying so, lacked conviction.

The Mover of this Amendment, the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer), spoke of responsible and irresponsible government, and much has been said on that subject. The right hon. Member for Sparkbrook said that Indian politicians would have certain powers at the Centre; that there were "certain buns" to be eaten. I agree that there are a certain number of buns to be eaten, but they are only to be eaten by the rich boys, by the Brahmins, by the foreign educated Babu. The masses do not get a bite, let alone a bun; the peasants do not come in, the inarticulate folk, the untouchables, do not come into the picture. It is the rich boys only who get the buns. [Interruption.] Yes, I know that special seats are to be allotted to the Depressed Classes, but it does not follow that their lot is to be improved. It is both curious and remarkable that in all the Debates and arguments we have had those who support the proposals of the Government expect virtues in the Indian politicians which are conspicuously lacking in our own. We are told that the whole trouble in India at the present time arises from the fact that the politicians there have not got responsibility, that it is because of their irresponsibility that they behave in this irresponsible manner, as, for instance, turning down these proposals at the present time. It has been pointed out that we are to have dyarchy at the Centre, which has been turned down by the Simon Commission. Surely nothing is plainer than that if these proposals go through, whatever we do, the elected members of the Central Legislature will learn to regard Great Britain as an obstacle to their onward march towards a home-made Utopia, and will therefore learn to hate us.

So much has been said to-day about responsible and irresponsible government that, with the permission of the Committee, I would like to analyse the question of responsible government in the East, particularly as members of the Labour-Socialist party have expressed faith in a democratic form of government in India. As I understand it, responsible government means that the masses who are in a majority are ruled by a minority. The welfare of the masses ruled by a minority depends entirely on that minority carrying out the prejudices and the fanaticism of the majority which put them into power. That means that responsible government can only work, as it has only worked in this country, if it is worked with a spirit of consideration and toleration and, possibly, of kindness. That is why, if it has not been a success in the United Kingdom, at any rate it has worked; but if we attempt to transfer this system to India, a sub-continent of Asia, where there is no spirit of tolerance, where there is no spirit of kindness, and where the people are not homogeneous, as in this country, how can we hope that it will work? It is not common sense to expect it. Not only are the essentials and ingredients of this system lacking, not only is there no toleration and no consideration, but there is the greatest hostility, the greatest hatred, between various sects, both religious and racial.

We have seen various attempts made at giving democracy to the East, and know that in every case the system has gone down in a turmoil of misery and bloodshed. The hon. and gallant Member for Hitchin (Sir A. Wilson), who spoke on the Second Reading of the Bill, drew attention to the fact that in Mesopotamia the attempt at democracy had ended in oligarchy. We know what has happened in Egypt, in Persia and in Turkey, and in China we have seen the retreat of civilisation from Hankow and Wei-hai-wei. We are always told that we are to gain something by giving up some British interest, but at the end of it all we have witnessed the misery of the people. The hon. Member for Chertsey (Sir A. Boyd-Carpenter) made an eloquent and moving speech the other day in which he drew attention to the position in Egypt. I, too, have been in Egypt I went there after we had relinquished power in that country, and I know that what he said was perfectly true. The peasant will come to you at night and say, "Where are the English? Why are they here no longer? When so- and-so was here we could at least get water, but now, unless we can bribe the Mudir and the Omda, we can get nothing."Now we are going to do the same thing in India on a far greater scale, repeat the same disastrous error and more terrible disasters will come.

We were told by the, Attorney-General in the Second Reading Debate that we need not fear for the Untouchables, be cause they would be given the vote and would be able to take care of themselves. Those illiterate people are to be given the vote and told by His Majesty's Government to take care of themselves: What will they be but demagogue fodder, to be exploited by every subversive politician and revolutionary who comes along? What of the Bramins? Will they fail to look after their own interests? What of the Mahommedans? Will they keep the peace with the Sikhs? What of the Hindu moneylenders Will they not oppress the Untouchables if they get an opportunity? This is the underlying philosophy of the whole proposal that if you have different sets of people with conflicting interests striving for power at each other's expense, then you will bring peace and well-being to the peoples of India. I must apologise if I have spoken too long or with too great feeling, or have expressed myself in a manner which I should not, but some of us who have opposed these proposals, and who have done so even before the White Paper was published have not done it for fun, but because we are sincerely opposed, and wish to save the British Empire if we can from terrible ruin, suffering and disaster which we fear are impending.

I would like to say a word in support of the Amendment. The Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot has put forward this constructive suggestion. Whatever may be said against it, the hon. Member for Finchley admitted that the Simon Commission were responsible for it. Whatever may be the demerits of the proposal, it is at any rate a form of government which is understood in the East. It is an oriental form of government, and we are dealing with the East and not with the West. It is a form of government which has been worked in the East for many thousands of years. Therefore, I shall vote for the Amendment, which I hope will be pressed to a Division. The Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot dealt with the Centre and Finance, and pointed out that the largest part of the Budget will not be in the hands of Indian politicians. Therefore, he said, we are setting up irresponsible government but calling it responsible. We are nevertheless giving to the professional Hindu politician certain powers over finance. That is common ground, and not disputed.

May I draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to one very startling fact, and if the Secretary of State would explain the principle underlying it, I should be very much obliged to him. For years, people of our own stock, of British race and British blood, have been refused any kind of control over finance in the Legislative Assembly at Nairobi. We are assured that Englishmen in Kenya are not capable of dealing with finance, but we are told that your Hindu, your nominee of the Princes, your moneylender, your priest or your Brahmin, elected to the Central Legislature at Delhi, are to have powers which are refused to Englishmen in Kenya. What is the principle of that policy? If we are told that, regardless of all human experience, democracy is the best form of government in the East, what about democracy in Africa? Are Englishmen alone in the British Empire to be given no consideration? Is it always to be the Boer in South Africa, the Turkish aristocrat in Egypt, the nationalist in China and now the Brahmin in India? Where do we come in? I should really be obliged if I can have an answer to these questions. I hope I am not misrepresenting Members of the Socialist party when I draw attention to their assertion that the Tory party sometimes thinks in terms of a colour bar. If there has been any question of a colour bar as regards policy in India, prejudice has been against the white man.

9.52 p.m.

The hon. Member for West Islington (Mr. Donner) has manifested great spiritual force and conviction, even in the absence of material refreshment and support, and he almost won me to his side when he passed from India to East Africa, and argued very properly that you cannot proceed on certain principles in some parts of the Empire and deny them elsewhere. It is on that basis that I would appeal to him to consider the position of India. Running right through his speech, and right through most of the speeches, not only supporting this Amendment but in support of the whole opposition to the Bill, is the feeling that we are going to allow the character and quality of government to deteriorate unduly in India, that we are abandoning people to whom we are most definitely responsible, the masses of India who cannot speak for themselves, and that this represents a dereliction and an abdication of our duty in the Indian Empire. It is from that point of view that I would ask those who are supporting this Amendment to consider what they are doing. They would agree that the welfare of the masses in India must, to a large extent, during the experiment which we are now introducing, depend upon the morale and the spirit of the great Services. Here is a new pilot being put in charge of a delicate and complicated machine, or a series of complicated machines, and during that period there must be some system of dual control, so that we shall be able to resume control if by any chance the pilots whom we are putting there find themselves unable to steer the machine properly.

I agree that one of the fundamental considerations which ought to guide our decision in this matter is the morale of the Services. From that standpoint I would ask hon. Members to consider this Amendment. It is generally agreed, in spite of arguments which, in point of fact, are destructive, not merely of the Federal Clauses of the Bill but of the Bill as a whole, that we are committed to Provincial self-government throughout British India. There is no dispute upon that.

It is on the question of the preservation of law and order.

I do not think that the question of the preservation of law and order affects this argument. Every Member of the House is committed to trying the experiment of Provincial self-government in India on a very large scale, but I would suggest to my hon. Friends who support this Amendment that Provincial self-government in itself does not answer the main question which is disturbing the Services. The Services are, I believe, prepared to work that experiment loyally. They have shown immense powers of adaptation during the last few years. They have responded loyally to the great strain which has been put upon them, and they are quite prepared to make any further response which may be called for. But they ask, and I think they are entitled to ask, where are we going, and what is the aim in view of this great experiment? Is it, they ask, true, as is said in so many quarters, that the British are going to leave India; and, if not, what is to be our role in India? Provincial self-government alone provides no answer to that question. Obviously, it commits India to a line of development which makes control at the Centre more difficult. It means that you are going to develop one of those things which have always given rise to difficulty in all Federations, namely, the claims associated with State rights; that you are going to make a greater difference between British India and the Indian States. We are for the time being setting India upon different lines of government, and I think the Services are entitled to ask how these two processes are to be reconciled. If there is not going to be established a firm control at the Centre, what of Indian unity, and what of our role as the unifying central authority? That is the question which the Services are asking.

What answer do they get from this Amendment? The only answer that they get is the answer once given by a great statesman in this House: "Wait and see." They are left in greater obscurity than ever before. They cannot tell what the future is going to be in India. I suggest that the right course is to tell India definitely here and now the broad lines upon which we intend to proceed in regard to the central authority in India—to tell the Princes in India, even before they meet next week, to tell the Provinces and to tell the Services, the broad lines on which we intend to proceed. After all, this Federation is novel in character. It establishes a triple partnership between Provinces, Princes and the Crown, with the great Services, directly appointed by and responsible to the Crown as the unifying impartial authority, hold executive power at the Centre. I believe that the assurance given to the Services by the main principles of this Bill will do much more to restore and to steady their morale and sense of security about the future than leaving the whole question as hon. Members who support this Amendment wish to do. I would appeal to them in particular on the basis of an example which has some relevance to our argument this evening. In Ireland I think we made one vital mistake in that we failed to settle Ireland while a settlement in Ireland was still compatible with Irish unity. We failed to make a settlement in Ireland which would prevent division between the North and the South—

At what moment in English history was such a settlement possible?

I am astonished to hear that question from the right hon. Gentleman, for I can remember him moving strongly, just before the War, in favour of a settlement intended to preserve the unity of Ireland. I remember the arguments which he used in that behalf, and I am surprised that he does not remember them himself.

Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman think that at any time a settlement in Ireland was possible on the basis which he suggests Does he not realise that, when Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill was brought in, Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington all realised that, if that Bill were passed, power would fall into the hands of the extremists, as it has done to-day? They were right. Unity of self-government in Ireland in those circumstances was impossible.

If I were to pursue that argument, I am afraid I should take the Committee a very long way from the subject which is now before it. I will only say that I am absolutely convinced that there was such a time. [HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] I would remind hon. Members that that view was held by a Liberal Unionist who gave great strength to the Conservative party—

You were then a Liberal.

I do not want to pursue the argument about Ireland, because obviously it would not be in Order, but let me, before I sit down, repeat the statement which caused these interjections. I am convinced that there was a time when the unity of Ireland could have been preserved, and I hope we shall not make the same mistake in India.

10.2 p.m.

I hope my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) will not mind my saying that I do not think I ever heard so many surprising statements from him in the course of one speech as in that which he has just delivered. It seemed to me that he did not make clear the distinction between dyarchy in the sense of a division of powers between a Government and the Legislature, and dyarchy or division within a government. He said that dyarchy was unavoidable in India, by which he seemed to convey the idea of dyarchy in Government. But at present India has a unitary government. There are differences between the powers of the Government and of the Legislature in India which are not in existence here, but the Government is a unitary government, and there is all the difference in the world as regards strength and efficiency between a unitary government and a dyarchical one. I would also remind my right hon. Friend that there are very few Governments—I think only those of France and the Dominions besides this country—in which all the members of the Government are responsible to and members of a Legislature, and are therefore liable to be put out of office by the Legislature.

I was also very surprised to hear my right hon. Friend speak as if he thought there was as much unity in India as there is between the counties in England. He said that you might as well refuse to unite India as refuse to keep the English counties united. That statement leaves out of account all the tremendous differences of race, language and religion in India, and the fact, which perhaps is even more striking, of the great differences between the Provinces, which are governed to-day on a more or less democratic system, which it is proposed shall be completely democratic, and the States, which are under autocratic rule.

The only other statement of my right hon. Friend which I feel I must challenge is that in which he told us that the Princes feel that through Federation alone they can protect their interests. I will read to the Committee what was said by the Maharaja of Patiala in the Chamber of Princes about a month ago, as reported in the "Hindustan Times." He said:

"We are not enamoured of a Federal Constitution as such. We have never approached His Majesty's Government, and requested them to devise the Federation to safeguard our future."

He went on to say:

"The circumstances under which some of us agreed to consider a federal proposal, as providing a suitable scheme of cooperation between British India and the States, are indeed well known. It was not from any desire on our part to hinder British India in the realisation of its legitimate aspirations but rather to help India in her constitutional progress and political development, without sacrificing our own sovereignty and internal autonomy. But to-day responsible men in British India, men who I know hear no towards the States, have not hesitated to say frankly that in the present scheme of things Indian States have become a positive hindrance rather than help to British India. I would not have taken such an expression of views from however eminent a quarter seriously but for the fact that it seems to be widely held in all sections of political opinion in British India. And if that is the view of men of moderation in the country it is a matter for Your Highnesses seriously to consider whether we should put ourselves in the position in which practically every important body of opinion in British India considers us unwelcome partners, and looks upon our entry into Federation with suspicion."

Would the Noble Lady speak a little louder so that we can hear?

I am sorry. This is the most important point. He went on to say:

"The benefits of a Federal scheme to the Indian States are in any case not so over- whelming that whatever the opinion of British India, it would be in our interests to go in."

I therefore would ask my right hon. Friend when and where it was that the Indian Princes made clear that they could only serve their interests by coming into a Federation. It is quite clear from that speech that the Maharaja was feeling anxiety about this question, anxiety which had been clearly expressed by two of his colleagues, the Maharaja of Dholpur and the Maharaja of Jhalawar, about a month or so earlier. Their anxiety may very well be greater now. Since then the Indian Assembly has rejected a proposal for All-India Federation, and we have had the declaration of His Majesty's Government on Dominion Status as the goal of India's development.

There is a very interesting letter in the Press to-day from Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who during his long service in India served in many of the States and is still in close connection with many of the rulers. He writes that many of the Princes regard this goal of Dominion Status as incompatible with the proposed Federation and the discharge of our treaty obligations to the States, and that these Princes regard it with considerable apprehension. Therefore the statement made by my right hon. Friend, and, of course, made most explicitly in the Report of the Joint Select Committee, that the Princes are willing now to enter an All-India Federation, but only if the Federal Government is a responsible one, does not hold water. I think most of us must deplore the fact that this Debate should take place and that this Committee should be asked to come to a decision on this very important question of Federation before the Princes have met to consider it.

It seems quite obvious that the proposal we have put forward offers an opportunity to the States and their representatives of consultation with the Government of India in regard to Customs, railways, posts and telegraphs, and all matters of common concern, and what would be of great benefit to the people of India, namely, a common policy in regard to diseases of men, animals and plants, without exposing them to the influences which they fear from entry into a Legislature with politicians from British India, and without exposing British India as a whole and the interests of this country in India to the dangers which we see from the proposed transfer of powers. I have already said something about the insecurity of defence that seems to be inevitable from the separation from the control of the Viceroy of all the communications on which the efficiency of the Army so largely depends. On another Amendment I hope to say something about the financial burden the proposals will put on the masses of the people.

Let me now say a few words about the transfer of control of commerce, a transfer which I am sure, if the thousands of people in this country who depend for their livelihood on trade with India understood, they would not hear of for one moment. Of course I shall be told that the Viceroy has a special responsibility to prevent any tariff being imposed which is intended to penalise Britain more than it could be expected to help India. It seems to me obvious that if the Viceroy is to be able to read the mind of his Ministers and know what their aim is in proposing a particular tariff, he will have very often to be gifted with second sight, in which case perhaps the Highlands of Scotland will have to be searched for a Viceroy with suitable qualifications. But the question might well be put to-day whether the present tariffs on textiles going into India are imposed in India's interest or with a desire to penalise this country. Any Member who has taken the trouble to read the last Budget speech of the Finance Member of the Government of India must have observed that between the financial years 1932–33 and 1933–34 there was actually a drop of three crores, that is about £2,000,000, in the revenue from tariffs on textiles going into India.

I hope that the Noble Lady is not anticipating a Clause which is to be discussed subsequently.

I am most anxious not to do so, but I do not know what other opportunities there may be of discussing that particular point. The transfer of the control of commerce is a matter of tremendous moment to many commercial and manufacturing interests in this country, and I do not suppose that any proposal so vitally affecting the livelihood of thousands of our working people in the industrial districts has ever been proposed in this House, or is ever likely to go through this House, with so little knowledge on the part of the people concerned of what is being enacted.

Then I come to another danger inherent in this Federal proposal, of which even less has been heard. I refer to the danger caused by what I am told is the largely unexpressed but nevertheless very really felt dread of a great majority of Moslems in India at having to enter a Federation in which they see that Hindus must largely predominate, as Hindus predominate in the States even more than in British India. Knowing what one does of the antagonism that exists to-day between Hindus and Moslems, it seems to me that that inevitably must be the attitude of many Moslems if they realise what is being proposed. The Moslem delegates to the Joint Select Committee and the Round Table Conferences, I think, were induced to acquiesce in this proposal on account of the communal award, which gives them a majority in three Provinces and the largest block of votes in a fourth, and by the fact that Provincial Autonomy is to be so exclusive, so removed from any supervision by the Federal Government, that they will be able to have things their own way in the Provinces in which they are in a majority. But if hon. Members doubt the existence of these apprehensions, I would remind them that they have had two memorials from Moslems who are actually thinking of setting up an independent Moslem federation of the five areas in the North-West of India, in which Moslems predominate. This proposed federation is known as Pakistan, a name which represents the initials or other letters in the names of the areas concerned. And it should be noted that the "a" in the first syllable is said to stand for "Afghanistan." Hon. Members may have read in the Press a recent letter from Subas Chandra Bose, a Hindu Congress leader now in Rome, in which he spoke of Afghanistan as being the Piedmont of India's independence. When a prominent Hindu speaks thus of Afghanistan, a great Moslem country, as the Piedmont from which might come the inspiration for India's complete independence, one realises what a very dangerous situation might very easily arise if the Moslems in the North-West of India came to feel that they were not getting a fair deal under the Indian Federation. They very naturally might begin to look on an Afghan Kabul as their spiritual home rather than on a Hindu Delhi. It is only 120 years since an Afghan ruler was King of all North-West India as far as Delhi, and therefore anything that makes for disaffection among the Moslems of North-West India might easily lead to most serious trouble on the frontier, even to attempts to carve out a greater Afghanistan in North-West India.

When we remember how many of these Moslems of the North West fought for us loyally and gallantly in the late War, it seems to me tragic that they should be forced into a position in which many of them may find it difficult to remain faithful to their loyalty and may be tempted to begin intriguing with their fellow Moslems across the frontier. I believe, therefore, that the dangers of this Federation are infinitely greater than most of us have realised. Men with long experience of maintaining order in India have assured many Members of the House that the dangers involved in these proposals are far greater than the difficulties and troubles that we may have to face if we do not go further than I. and my hon. Friends propose. I believe myself that it is impossible to exaggerate the danger to which we expose India, and our rule in India, if so much power is given at a time when there is such bitter antagonism between these rival communities and when much the strongest political party in India is, the Hindu Congress party.

May I say a final word in reply to the hon. Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet), who asked my Noble Friend the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) whether any politicians in India desired anything less than what the Government were offering. Only a few days ago I saw an extract from a letter written by a responsible person in India in which a comment was made on the number of men there were who in public were calling out for Dominion status and independence, but who in private were expressing grave apprehensions in regard to it. There is considerable other evidence to show that many Indians find themselves in a position in which it is much more difficult for them to say in public what they really feel than it is for us here. I think that all hon. Members who are honest with themselves must realise what a tremendous test of moral courage public life makes. We here are tested every day in this matter. But in India there are fetters of community, of caste, of tremendously strong family ties, and all these things mean pressure on men in public life, so that we should not blame Indian politicians, or blame them too much, if sometimes they find it difficult to come into the open as we should certainly think it was our duty to do.

Finally, many men who have served long and recently in India say that the East, above all things, desires security and will accept the ruler who will give her security. The masses there have suffered so much in the past through lack of it that they now most greatly desire security and impartial justice. Both these benefits have been brought to India in full measure in the past 70 years, and both, I believe, will be greatly imperilled if the proposals of the Bill go through. And because fear so greatly the dangers involved in the Bill and feel that this Council of Greater India is a practical measure of meeting the desire of the Princes in these matters of common interest without exposing India to the dangers I have mentioned, that I have much pleasure in supporting the Amendment.

10.23 p.m.

In the course of this discussion there is one aspect of the subject upon which we have not heard a single word, and that is the effect of this Clause upon Indian India,, not on the Princes but on the people of the Indian States. Many speakers have speculated as to whether the Princes will or will not come in, and several speakers have offered their opinion as to whether it is or is not to the advantage of the Princes to come in, but I have not yet heard any speaker discuss the question of how coming in will affect the people of the Indian States. As I see it, in the past the Indian States, that is the Princes of the Indian States, have been buttressed upon the British Raj. In the future the British Raj will be buttressed upon the Princes. The relation between the two will be like the two sides of a corn stack, each leaning upon the other.

The extent to which the smooth working of the whole proposal is dependent upon the Princes has been made clear throughout the discussions. Supporters of the Bill have laid stress upon the loyalty of the Princes and argued that the known conservatism of the Princes is a guarantee of stability and order and resistance to subversive and revolutionary forces, but it is not equally clear how that new relationship and intimacy is to affect the Princes' own subjects. I know that it can be argued that it is going to make no difference. Already the dependency of the Princes upon the paramount power has been quite clearly defined. It is defined in Treaties and Sanads. In the words of the Harcourt Butler Report:

"It also depends upon usage and the promise of the King-Emperor to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes."

Elsewhere it is stated that:

"The promise of the King-Emperor to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes carries with it a duty to protect the Prince against attempts to eliminate him and to substitute another form of Government."

That has always seemed to me a strange kind of dependency; the dependence of autocratic Princes upon the greatest and most successful democracy in the world.

When on the Second Reading of the Bill the right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) told us that the ideas which maintain a democracy at home will not maintain any form of tyranny abroad, and that a free Britain and a coerced India cannot go together, he was talking in terms of British India. I wonder whether he remembered that in fact our democracy at home is pledged to defend several hundred little coerced Indias, in the States. It is true that, by general consent, some Indian Staten are as progressively governed and as contented and happy as any part of British India. Some who have visited both tell us that the States are happier than British India, but how many of those States, and what about the rest?

I do not pretend to know the answer. but I am increasingly uneasy at the mist that hangs over this great subject and at the small knowledge that a great majority of Members of this Parliament and of the British public have of the conditions of life of these people towards whom we are taking such great responsibilities. From that point of view it may be said that the responsibility is not changed, that we have done it already, that we have set our names to these Treaties and Sanads, but it appears to me that a new situation is being created in two ways, first, that a new relationship is being set up which is, in effect, a reinitialling of Treaties many of which were made generations ago, Treaties of which the effect has been, as the Harcourt Butler Report has pointed out,

"that many States owe their continued existence to the solicitude of the Paramount Power."

That has been so in the past. Under the new arrangement is it still to be more so in the future? It appears to me that the danger is of two kinds, first that by this new arrangement the Princes may feel that we have given a kind of guarantee that we are in the future, as in the past, going to hold them up on their gadis, and, secondly, shall we not almost be obliged to maintain the power of the Princes by the very fact that the smooth working of the machine is going to be so dependent upon their good will? That is an aspect of the question that has been increasingly oppressing my mind.

There is another aspect of the question, and that is how far the introduction of the Princes is going to affect the subjects in British India. We know that in the Lower Chamber alone the representatives of the Princes, who are to be their nominees and not the choice of their people, are to be three times as numerous as the representatives of Labour, women, and the depressed classes put together. That is in the Lower Chamber.

What about the British?

If the right hon. Gentleman means the British British I think that they can feel safe. An Indian writer said only last week that we are taking away the white bureaucrats and putting brown autocrats in their place. As far as British interests are concerned I think that the Princes will take care they are protected, because if we are swept away they would meet with something far worse from their own people. Consider the kind of powers which are being given to the Princes in this central government. They are to include power to legislate on such questions as marriage—a very suitable question on which to invite the opinion of the Princes—divorce, the custodianship and guardianship of children, factory legislation, and a number of other questions which vitally affect the interests of the poorest and least protected classes of the community in India. Suppose the majority in the Council of State, in which there is not to be a, single representative of women, the depressed classes or the Labour party, joined with a minority or majority in the lower chamber of the Federal Government, they would be able, absolutely and for all time, to block any progressive legislation however much desired by the Provincial Government, and where the views of the 'Central Government on any of these subjects, conflict with the Provincial Government, the former has priority.

We shall have an opportunity of discussing the details of this relationship on future Amendments and I merely allude to it now to make this point. Are hon. Members right in assuming, as many of them do, that if Indian politicians are so roundly condemning these proposals as they say, then it is mere factiousness on their part to do so. They do so because they are not getting enough and want more. It is difficult from the kind of information which is leaking through to know what is really working in the minds of most of the statesmen in India whose opinion one respects. It seems as if many of them really mean that they would rather have no Bill than this Bill, and if that is the case it is a consideration which should make us pause. To my mind there is all the difference in the world between offering to India a measure which falls short of her national hopes and aspirations, which she yet recognises as a small step in advance, and in forcing upon India a measure which she regards not as a step in advance but as a definite step backwards on a path leading to a morass. It is a doubt of that nature which led me to vote against the Second Reading of the Bill.

I confess I am not certain even yet as to whether I was right or not. I feel at present that it is extremely difficult to judge. When the report of the Committee was discussed a month ago my own opinion was that these proposals represented an advance, certainly for those whose interests I have studied most closely, namely the women. I believed that they represented a considerable advance in the Provinces generally, but the two stops in my mind, to use a Quaker expression, are these. Do those Indians whose judgments we most respect, such people as the- members of the Servants of India Society and Mr. Shastri and Mr. Gandhi himself who, whatever faults he may have, really and truly cares for the interests of the poor and oppressed, regard it as an advance? Is it their solemn and considered judgment that this Bill is a step in advance or do they consider that they would rather have no Bill than this Bill? I feel that on that question the evidence as yet is inconclusive.

The second thing which causes a stop in my mind is the question of the effect of the proposals regarding the Princes. Are we solemnly reaffirming a former alliance which is in the long run, an unnatural alliance an unreal alliance, an alliance to which a democracy ought never to consent if it means that we are pledging ourselves once again to maintain autocracy in its place where there should be freedom, and to resist the aspirations of people "rightly struggling to be free"? As I understand our obligations at present, however justified the people of the Indian States may be in objecting to autocratic rule, however much they may desire democratic institutions, we are pledged to resist that desire. We ought not be so pledged. Our treaties with the Indian States should be subject to reconsideration and adaptation to changed conditions. The fear that sticks in my mind is: Are we, instead of making that change more possible, making it less possible by this Measure?

10.38 p.m.

The hon. Lady who has just spoken touched on two very important subjects in her interesting speech. She referred first to the position of the Princes. I think she fails to realise that the passage of this Bill will -not make any more binding the obligations already existing between us and the Indian Princes. What she is quarrelling with is what has been done in the far distant past, but, unless she is prepared to tear up our treaties and other engagements with the Indian Princes, she cannot get out of recognising our obligations towards the States in India.

Does the hon. Member realise that they are supported by British troops?

The right hon. and gallant Gentleman asks me do I realise that these Princes are supported by British troops. They are supported by the British word given in our treaties and engagements. I think I heard the right hon. Gentleman say something about Kashmir. When our great grandfathers sold Kashmir to the present dynasty the British word was good, and it remains good. The hon. Lady also raised the question of the welcome which the present reforms might be expected to get from Indian politicians. I think the days have long gone by when we can consider the welcome which these proposals will receive or have received from any politician. That is due to the delay which has been forced upon us, very largely by the present opposition in this House to these proposals, Thanks to the years wasted in discussion and inquiry we have missed our chance of securing co-operation and agreement. I think that in the end we have to do what we think right, regardless of the reception it may have in India. I do not know if I shall be out of order if I endeavour to bring the discussion back to the Amendment before the Committee, but the Amendment is one that substitutes for the Federation set out in the Bill an Advisory Council. It was moved by the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer). I was sorry to hear him use the word "Hindu" as a term of abuse, and I was sorry to hear the hon. Member for Islington use the words "Brahmin" and "Babu" as terms of abuse, or at any rate not as complimentary terms.

In the absence of the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer), may I say that I was present when he was speaking, and he did not use the word "Hindu" as a term of abuse.

I am very glad to hear that, but he referred to Hindus as being masters of epithet, adjective, and disingenuousness.

The hon. Member referred to the Member for Islington. Did he mean me?

I was not aware the hon. and gallant Member had spoken, but I meant the hon. Member for West Islington (Mr. Donner). I ask the Committee to consider the reasons that were adduced by the Noble Lord in support of his Amendment. I think that as a master of disingenuousness the Noble Lord has few rivals. We were asked, first, to reject the present scheme embodied in the Bill because it had not received the welcome of the Indian politicians. We have never claimed that it has. We were asked to reject the Bill because the Federation at the Centre was not democratic. We have never claimed that it was. We were asked to reject the Bill because it gave no power to the elected representatives of the Indian people, and a few sentences later we were asked to reject it because it gave too much power to the elected representatives of the Indian people. Finally, he accused us of deceiving the Indian people, and his suggested Amendment, he said, was better. He did not claim that it was welcome, he did not claim that it was democratic. His final proof that it was better was that it was a purely Advisory Council, and that the Viceroy would be under no obligation to accept its advice. I wonder who is deceiving the Indian people there. I think this Amendment may have formed a very convenient foundation for a most interesting Debate, but as a serious proposal I can not consider the arguments adduced in its support as being worthy of our serious consideration.

On the main question of Federation with British India, I want to say why I think it is essential. It is essential because there is no halfway house possible between responsibility and irresponsibility. We have heard a lot about responsibility to-day, but it seems to me that hon. Members have used the word in a mistaken sense. They consider that responsible government is responsible because the elected member is responsible to those who elect him. The Government is responsible or not according as the members of the Legislature are responsible for the consequences of their own actions. It is responsible in so far as their criticism is responsible criticism. We have got to make up our minds which way we are going. Either we must have no responsibility, or else we must say that critics must try to acquire a sense of responsibility by having to answer for the carrying into effect of their criticism. To return to the Amendment for a moment, nobody has claimed that it has been accepted by a single person in India or that it has been suggested to a single person in India. The Noble Lady blames us because we claim that the Princes are in favour of Federation. We may well blame her when she announces that the Princes are all against Federation.

The hon. Member must not misquote me. I read out a passage from a speech of the Maharajah of Patiala which showed that people were not justified in saying that the Princes were insisting on Federation.

I am not going to argue with the Noble Lady, or we shall have a serial addition to her speech. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"] I apologise if I said anything I should not say. This scheme has not been suggested or accepted by anybody in India as the scheme embodied in the Bill has.

10.47 p.m.

I would ask those who sympathise with the Noble Lord the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) to vote with him on this Amendment for the simple reason that, although I think that it has many doubtful points in it, it is 4,000 times letter than the deplorable scheme of Federation which the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill has brought forward. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman when he was at New College took up the Indian special period—which I do not think he could have done—but he has forgotten a great deal since then of the origin of the Indian and semi-independent Indian States. For many years people who were instructed in the history of these States were taught to treat them as a homogeneous whole. How they could be regarded as if one State were the same as another, I cannot imagine, for the Indian States are a most astonishing collection of anomalies. Like most matters in India, they are coloured yellow, while the British Dominions are coloured red. In other respects they have no similarity whatever. In the Himalayas human sacrifice is hardly forgotten and sometimes occur. Some of the 188 States of Kathiawar are about the size of an English manor and with a very exiguous population. On the other hand, there are States as large as France, which contrast with little States not much larger than your back garden. To regard these States as a homogeneous whole seems to me to be preposterous.

In every respect they differ from each other and represent a state of things which came into being in a critical period of the English conquest of India, when Lord Cornwallis, or Wellesley, or Hastings were tidying things up, and there were certain Princes who made pacts with them. These pacts made by the Princes represented the most extraordinary arrangements. In some cases the Prince was a kind of viceroy who was saving himself from obvious destruction by doing homage to the British power and hiring a mercenary army. In another State the newly-appointed Gov ernor, when the rest of the States attacked the British, made a pact with them, and to this day has transmitted the State to his descendants. Some of these Indian States are things one venerates, ancient States that have weathered a thousand storms of the Moguls and similar peoples. On the other hand, other States are, things of yesterday, a hundred years younger than the British Raj. There is no similarity, and you cannot treat them altogether.

Look at their anomalies. In one case you may have a large and discontented Mahommedan population ruled by very nearly the only non-Mahommedan—that is an exaggeration—the representative of a small non-Mahommedan population. In another State you may get a Mahommedan ruler of a State in which nine-tenths of the inhabitants are Hindus. The Bill treats all these as the same sort of thing, not seeing that the dissimilarity is extraordinary. We are bound to individual treaties, and we cannot ask those Princes to throw away privileges and merge them—commit what I can only call constitutional suicide in the body of a figurative India. Can you believe that certain Indian Princes—and some of them are very odd people—desire to be federated I There are certain Princes whom the Government have desired to absent themselves from their State; I do not know whether these desire to be federated. There was a very great Prince, the fifth greatest in India, and we do not know whether he desired to be federated. He reverted to primitive methods and sent his Adjutant-General to assassinate in the streets of Bombay a barrister who had run away with his favourite. That Prince was removed by the British Government—quite rightly. The right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill and the Government believe that a Viceroy, who will be either a superman or a dummy, will be able to deal with these people. Looking at the absolute anomaly of the whole thing, that no one State is like another, I should prefer a Central Government dealing directly with individual States, rather than handing over the whole of India, federated more or less, to a body in which there will be people, not in sympathy with the Viceroy, who will really be the supreme authority.

10.55 p.m.

The Amendment we are now discussing is similar in principle to another standing in the names of myself and four other hon. Members, or rather there is a series of Amendments to Clauses 18 and 23, together with a new Clause which, somewhat crudely, I admit, explains exactly the lines on which it is proposed to work. The difference between my Amendment and the one we are discussing is that mine is within the framework of the Bill. I accept the electoral machinery which the Bill provides, but propose that that electoral machinery shall, for the time being at any rate, produce not a Legislative Assembly but a Federal Advisory Council. This is the first time I have taken any part in the Debates on this problem, though I have endeavoured for a long time to study the problem. I have taken very little part in the controversy outside, but I have always felt that if we are going to make an experiment we ought to make it on the condition that if we have made a mistake we can retrace our steps. That seems a practical proposition and a business-like way of approach. Therefore, I accept the general conception of Provincial Autonomy, subject to qualifications which will come up later on, but so far as the Centre is concerned I have always taken the view that it was a mistake to set up any measure of responsibility there in the first place. I cannot understand logically why, as dyarchy has failed in the Provinces, it should be desirable to introduce it in the Centre.

At the moment we have at the Centre what I think is a bad system. We have what I call the presidential system; not a system of democracy but the system which exists in the United States of America; not the system of responsible representative government as we understand it, but the presidential system of an executive, on the one hand, and a legislative authority on the other, the one having no effective control over the other. That I call the presidential system, and it is a bad one, so bad that every country that has copied it except the United States of America has had ceaseless revolutions as a consequence. If we examine the constitutional forms which exist in South America it will be found that to a very large extent the revolutions which have taken place there arose out of the fact that there is an irremovable executive and an independent legislature. That has always seemed to me fundamentally wrong, and therefore I have never applied the words "democratic government," in the sense in which we use them, to the system of government in the United States.

India to-day, apart from what changes may be made by this Bill, has a system of government which is substantially the same as that of the United States of America, with the one difference that instead of India having the very expensive process of a presidential election, we provide something which is just as efficient and probably more efficient. They have their States in the United States, each with a Governor and with a legislature, and the one irremovable by the other, exactly as we have at this moment in the Indian Provinces.

It being Eleven of the Clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to make his Report to the House.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

Cattle Industry (Emergency Provisions) Money

Resolution reported,

"That it is expedient—

(1) to provide for extending, by not more than six months, the period during which cattle or carcases of cattle must have been sold in order that payments in respect thereof may be made out of the Cattle Fund under section two of the Cattle Industry (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1934;

(2) to authorise the Treasury to make, during the months of April, May, and June, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, advances to the said fund, not exceeding in the aggregate one million and fifty thousand pounds, out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and to provide for requiring that any such advances shall be repaid from the Cattle Fund to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom before the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and thirty-five; and

(3) to provide for other matters connected with the matters aforesaid."

Resolution agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolution by Sir John Gilmour, Sir Godfrey Collins, Mr. Elliot, and Mr. Duff Cooper.

Cattle Industry (Emergency Provisions) Bill

"to provide for extending by not more than six months the period during which cattle or carcases of cattle must have been sold in order that payments in respect thereof may be made out of the Cattle Fund; for the making of further advances to the said fund out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom: and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid "; presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time To-morrow, and to be printed.—[Bill 35.]

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

Adjournment

Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Captain Margesson.]

Adjourned accordingly at Three Minutes after Eleven o'Clock.

Volume 298: debated on Tuesday 19 February 1935