I beg to move, in page 36, line 20, to leave out Sub-section (2).

When the Committee adjourned on Wednesday I was saying that we regard the provisions in this Sub-section as objectionable and unsafe. They are objectionable from the point of view of every other member of the Legislative Assembly. The Government are proposing to treat every member of the Legislative Assembly with contempt. We feel that this is an unsafe principle to introduce into any constitution in any colony within the Empire. Surely a member of the Legislature should be selected to perform these functions. One would have thought that the Governor would select the leader of the Assembly rather than appoint an official from outside. It would be much better if the Governor charged the leader of the Assembly to look after the interests of the State in his absence; otherwise, it can only mean that he has no confidence in the members of the Assembly. The person from outside, who is to be selected by the Governor, has the right of attending any joint sitting of the Chamber or any committee of the Legislature. The Clause says:

"The functions of the Governor. … shall be exercised by him in his discretion."

That means that the selected person has the full powers of the Governor inside the Legislative Assembly, with the exception of a vote, and the members elected to the Assembly cannot object. The person to perform these functions should be directly elected to the Assembly. Under the Bill, they have no power to object to the person selected on personal or political grounds; they have no power to object to the appointment, and, even if they had, the Governor need not take any notice of them. When a Governor has declared that the peace and tranquillity of a Province is in danger it should naturally be the duty of the Governor to perform these functions himself, but it appears that having as it were declared that a state of war exists the Governor proposes to retire to a position behind the lines and leave other people in the firing line. That is not a good principle to lay down in a new constitution for a very old Empire. We contend that the Governor should take full responsibility in these circumstances for subsequent actions of the elected Legislative Chamber. The person to he appointed should not be elected from outside to exercise greater power than any of the elected members. Sub-section (4) says:

"Nothing in this section affects the special responsibility of the Governor for the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of the Province or any part thereof."

He is therefore still under the responsibility of keeping the province in a state of peace and tranquillity. This proposal in the Clause is very dangerous, and is one which may be copied by other parts of the Empire. It takes away from elected representatives the power to do the work for which they have been elected, and allows the Governor to take charge, which really means that matters will be left in the hands of the official element. We object to the proposal.

Before the Secretary of State deals with this Amendment might I make an inquiry. Does this power appear in any other constitution within the Empire? Has any official in any other Assembly the power to intervene in any circumstances? May I ask what is the origin of this proposal? I cannot charge my memory with the proceedings which have led up to Federation in this Bill, but is this proposal founded on some recommendation?

It has been in existence for the last five years.

That emphasises what I was going to say. I have been dealing with these matters since 1919, and I took some part in the legislation under that Statute. I am familiar with the fact; that circumstances have arisen since 1919 in which the Viceroy has had good reason to intervene, and I am aware of the difficulties which it created. I remember an occasion when the late Speaker of the Legislative Assembly informed me of a case in which this had occurred, and of the consequences. I thought it was a serious interference with the right of the Assembly. The Committee will no doubt agree that there is no more sensitive aspect of our legislative arrangements with India than such proposals to interfere with Legislative Assemblies. I speak as a friend of the Bill, and in the circumstances I would press this point upon my right hon. Friend. I think this Bill is the best scheme that can be devised for the difficulties of the Indian situation, and I am anxious that nothing shall be included in these proposals which will give rise to further difficulties. This sort of difficulty has occurred again and again under the 1919 Act. But put the situation at its worst. I do not know why my right hon. Friend should indicate any displeasure at these observations.

The only reason is that the position is precisely the same as that in the Federal chapter, where the Governor-General has his counsellors, and that we have discussed at great length.

Then I make no apology for discussing it again. It should occur to my right hon. Friend immediately that there is a great difference between a counsellor intervening and an official doing so.

A counsellor is an official.

If my right hon. Friend with his knowledge of what has happened in India during the last few years thinks that this sort of procedure is likely to lead to tranquillity, with the greatest possible respect I think he is making a mistake. I intervene, not as an opponent of the Bill, but as one who wishes to see the Bill work smoothly. I am convinced that this kind of process will give rise to all sorts of difficulties. When my right hon. Friend interposed I was saying, put the circumstances at their worst. Suppose that a situation arises that is detrimental to law and order and that the Governor under this Clause has to intervene. There would be a Minister available in the Assembly to communicate any views that the Governor wants presented. Frankly, I think that this is a very serious invasion of the rights of a legislative assembly. We would not tolerate it here. Is there any free parliament which would tolerate the intervention of an official even in such difficulties as these? I speak with some feeling, because I am anxious that this system shall work smoothly. I beg my right hon. Friend to pause before this power is placed in the hands of a Governor to be exercised through an official over a Legislative Assembly.

It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I attempt to dissipate a feeling that this is a very exceptional power of a very wide-ranging nature. We had the privilege of discussing the question of the official bloc and the question of the official element in the Legislature on the last occasion on which the Committee considered these subjects. In this case, we are not considering any such wide questions as to whether there should be an official bloc in the Legislature, or whether the Governor should have a lack of confidence in the Legislature and should consider it necessary to have an official element in that Legislature. The Government do not intend to continue the official bloc within the Provincial Legislature. The hon. and learned Member for South Nottingham (Mr. Knight) said that, whenever a Governor had to intervene in such a question of law and order, he could operate through his ministers. If he will turn to the Clause dealing with the Governor's special responsibilities, he will see that it is not intended, in the operation of the normal special responsibility, that there should be the appointment of any official such as is suggested here.

Here we are dealing with a very particular case. If the hon. and learned Member will turn to Clause 57 he will see that it includes provisions as to crimes of violence intended to overthrow the Government, and in such cases the Joint Select Committee thought it essential to give the Governor special power to take over any department of government that he thought necessary for combating such violence and such dangerous operations as were likely to overthrow the Government by law established. That surely is a very particular, special and important case. It is only in such a case that under Sub-section (2) of this Clause we give the Governor power to appoint an official. The object of that is fairly clear. If the Governor has to take over certain departments of government, if circumstances are so serious as to demand the operation of his powers under this Clause, it is surely treating the Legislature in a much more straightforward way to give the Governor a mouthpiece in the Legislature to explain his actions and to try to enable the Legislature to work with him.

That is the answer to the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Parkinson). I could appreciate his apprehensions were we intending to short-circuit the Legislature, to show a lack of confidence in the Legislature and to continue perhaps an official bloc in the Legislature; but I have shown that our objective is that the Governor should work with the Legislature. If in any unfortunate contingency he had to take over certain departments of government he would then have an opportunity of explaining his position and his actions to the Legislature, and so enable it to work with him.

Our objection to this Sub-section is that it is trying to carry on a sham Parliamentary system, when, as a matter of fact, all the conditions have disappeared, The assumption here it that there is some kind of conspiracy, some kind of terrorism. The assumption is that the Governor cannot get his ministers to act. We believe that these crimes of violence, this terrorism and conspiracy, can only be dealt with by Indian ministers themselves. It seems to me that the responsibility should be placed on Indian ministers and on the Legislature. If it be found that the Legislature and the ministers are unwilling to take the responsibility, we think it is better to have a clean cut and to say that the parliamentary system has broken down. Under these provisions, what happens is that the ministers are enabled to shuffle out of their responsibility. The Governor is to be allowed to send down an official to act as a minister in the Legislature and to expound his policy. That is not at all a desirable thing.

To begin with, we are trying to make an experiment in the Provinces in responsible government, and in the circumstances we want the official to be an official, a civil servant as he is in this country, and not a kind of half politician and half civil servant. If there be any necessity for explaining things, let the Governor do it himself; let him say that things have broken down; but do not try to carry on a kind of sham half-and-half parliamentary system. It really means that under this provision you would slip back into the dyarchy that now exists in the Provinces. Dyarchy has worked in some places with very great difficulty, but the principle is wrong. I do not like the principle of mixing up the officials and the ministers. I think what you want is a clean cut, either to have Parliamentary government, and put the responsibility on the Minister and the Legislature, or else to say frankly that it has broken down and that the Governor has taken over all responsibility.

I only rise at this juncture to say that several of my hon. Friends would like to have spoken on this Amendment, but, in view of the fact that we are behind with the business and that an undertaking has been given, as far as my friends are concerned, that we should try to get as far as possible to-day, we do not intend to" make speeches on any of these points further than briefly moving and explaining certain Amendments. It is generally understood in the Committee that we are endeavouring to reach the end of Part IV of the Bill at to-day's Sitting, and it is clear that, unless such a course as I have indicated is taken, we cannot arrive at that point in the Bill which it is hoped to reach. I only wish to make it clear that this does not in any way mean that our opposition to any of these proposals is exhausted. Many of them, of course, are going to be redundant. A great question having arisen in the last few days which has altered the whole situation, we realise that we have got behind with these proceedings, and for that reason we intend to do everything in our power to expedite the business to-day.

I do not know whether the observations of the hon. and gallant Member are intended to imply any reflection upon other hon. Members who have put down Amendments.

Not at all.

I would only point out that all the long speeches have been made on Amendments put forward from other quarters of the House and that there has indeed been comparatively little discussion upon the Amendments put forward from our side. At the same time I, too, feel that we have to get on with the business, and I do not propose to detain the Committee long. I always listen with pleasure and interest to the hon. and learned Member for South Nottingham (Mr. Knight). I gather from his speeches in this Parliament and the last Parliament that he has been a powerful influence, the hidden hand as it were, behind all the great movements which have taken place in this country for the last 30 years, and we now know the part he has played in connection with this new Indian Constitution. That being so, I think the Government ought to treat his arguments with a great deal more consideration and not brush them lightly aside as the Secretary of State did.

I wish to reinforce the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee). I ask the Committee to consider the position which this Clause envisages. There is a subversive movement aiming at the overthrow of the Government. There is a difference of opinion between the Governor and the Minister, and the Governor is taking over the Minister's powers. There is also a difference of opinion between the Governor and the majority in the Chamber; otherwise, he would be able to form an alternative Government. We take it that he is unable to do so, and he is therefore faced with a hostile Chamber and a hostile Government. Surely it is dangerous to send an official into that hostile Chamber to act for the Governor. Is it not likely that such a course may lead to unpleasant incidents and cause the atmosphere to become even more dangerous? An official going into the Chamber in such circumstances, when passions are running high, may be shouted down; the result may be very regrettable and cause the situation to become worse. From that point of view it would be better that the Governor, acting on his own responsibility, should not attempt to send anybody into the hostile Chamber to explain his position.

I know it is the desire of the Committee that I should answer as briefly as possible. At the same time, it would be a discourtesy to hon. Members opposite if I did not deal with the points they have raised. There are two questions which we have to consider here. The first is: If there is a reserved department, should the Governor have the right of having an official in the Legislature to answer for that department? I thought that when we were dealing with the Federal Chapter we had accepted the principle that, where there is a reserved department in the case of the Federation, the Governor-General will have his councillor to take part in discussions in the Legislature upon questions affecting that reserved department. We were all agreed upon that principle. The case is exactly the same in the relation to the Provinces. Again, suppose that a situation has arisen which is so serious as to make it essential that the Provincial Governor should reserve in his hands a department or certain departments. In that case I suggest to the Committee the obvious course is to treat the Provincial Governor just as we have treated the Governor-General in the Federation, and enable him to have an official answering in the Provincial Legislature for any department or departments which are reserved.

The second issue raised by the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) was this. If, he said, a situation of that kind arises, is it not better frankly to admit that there is a breakdown in the Constitution and that the Parliamentary system therefore cannot continue in the Province? I suggest to the Committee that it is unnecessary to go as far as that. In a case of that kind it is only necessary for the Governor to take over one department or several departments without bringing to an end the whole machinery of Provincial Government. I think it is much better, for both those reasons, to follow the provisions of the Bill and to treat the Provincial Governor as we have treated the Governor-General and in the case of there being any reserved departments or a reserved department to let him have an official to explain the position in connection with that department or departments in the Provincial Legislature.

There are one or two Amendments to this Clause on the Paper, and there was an understanding, I think, that, if moved, they should be put before the Committee in a few words without discussion, the discussion being

I beg to move, in page 36, line 40, after "section," to insert:

"or with respect to the operations of persons preparing or attempting to take any action likely to hamper or paralyse the exercise of the executive authority."

My hon. Friend's Amendment would greatly extend the scope of this Clause. The object of the Clause itself is to deal with crimes of violence—speaking generally, with crimes which might lead to a dangerous terrorist outbreak. The Joint Select Committee thought there was justification for making exceptions of such cases and for ensuring special precautions with reference to keeping the sources of secret intelligence absolutely uncompromised. The Joint Select Committee drew a distinction between these crimes of violence and the more ordinary kinds of crime, and they had particularly in mind the danger to an informer in cases of this kind if by chance his name was in any way compromised. They felt that in other cases there was not the same risk. In other cases, such as the cases contemplated, I think, by my hon. Friend, it is probable that the informer would come actually as a witness into court, whereas in a case of terrorism it is very likely that he would not come into court at all, and in any case it would be quite exceptional for the agent's name to be given any sort of publicity. There is really no end to the extension that you would have to make if the Amendment were carried, and the result would be that you would undermine the whole basis of ministerial responsibility. The Joint Select Committee was particularly anxious to avoid that—to keep the ministers responsible over as wide a field as possible, and only to detract from that responsibility in the exceptional cases of terrorist conspiracies which might be likely to lead to an outbreak that would overthrow the Government. That being so, I hope very much the Committee will follow the advice of the Joint Select Committee add not extend these special powers over so wide a field as that suggested by my hon Friend.

I beg to move, in page 36, line 40, to leave out from "given" to the end of the Clause, and to add:

"(a) by any member of any police force in the Province to another member of that force except in accordance with directions of the Inspector-General of Police or Commissioner of Police, as the case may be, or to any other person except in accordance with directions of the Governor in his discretion; or

(b) by any other person in the service of the Crown in the Province to any person except in accordance with directions of the Governor in his discretion."

This is really little more than a drafting Amendment. This Clause, as the Committee knows, gives the Governor power to make rules for dealing with sources of information in respect to certain matters which are not disclosed. The Clause as drafted only covers the case where information came in the first instance to an officer of police. In fact, information of this kind very often comes, in the first instance, to a district magistrate or a subordinate official other than a police officer. It is obviously the intention of the clause that that information which comes to an official other than a police officer should be subject to the same rules of procedure. That is effected by the amendment which is now proposed. It also makes two other alterations which are merely verbal and I will not trouble the Committee by saying anything about them.

I beg to move, in page 36, line 44, at the end, to add:

"Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent the transmission of any report or information to the Governor-General or to the Central Intelligence Bureau."

I do not think that this Amendment is necessary, for this information could be transmitted to the Governor-General without any such provision. I think that it is better to leave the wording as it is and to rely on the chain of responsibility between the Governor and the Governor-General to see that this information goes to the Governor-General.

My name is attached to the Amendment, and, in view of what my hon. Friend has said, I am prepared to withdraw it.

Does the hon. Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Sir N. Stewart Sandeman) desire to withdraw the amendment?

Yes, Sir.

I beg to move, in page 37, line 18, to leave out, "and secretaries to Government."

This Amendment really goes with another Amendment in line 25, to leave out, "and of the Governor." The point involved is the responsibility of ministers. This clause was devised in the Joint Select Committee in order that the Governor should be fully informed of everything so that he might be able to exercise his special responsibilities. In this Clause the responsibility of keeping the Governor informed is laid on both ministers and secretaries. The effect of that is that the secretaries are turned, as it were, into the watch-dogs of the ministers. It is an example of lack of confidence in the ministers. We consider that where there is a matter involving a special responsibility of the Governor and the secretary sees it occurring, he ought to bring it to the notice of the minister, and that it is the minister's business to bring it before the Governor. It is a. dangerous thing to put the officials in the position of being, as it were, reporters to the Governor when the minister is doing something which may call for the intervention of the Governor.

It is easy to appreciate the point of the hon. Gentleman, but the difficulty is that at present under the Constitution the secretaries to Government have a definitely recognised position, and, in transacting business, it is the custom for secretaries to Government to forward matters in this way. It would be importing into our intentions under this Clause new implications if we were to consider that we were going behind the minister's back in this provision. It is following upon the present practice to lay a duty upon the secretaries to Government to bring matters to the attention of the Governor. It will be no different from the ordinary way of business within a Government department when, for instance, a secretary responsible for a particular branch of the administration marks the name of the Governor on a particular file to which the Governor should pay attention. We consider that by giving the secretaries as well as the ministers this duty we are doing something which is perfectly reasonable and which will be understood by those in India who are accustomed to conducting the business of government. We have no intention of going behind the Minister's back in this matter.

I beg to move, in page 37, line 18, after "Government," to insert:

"and the Inspector-General or Commissioner of Police."

The Inspector-General of Police is the head of a department, and there are many other persons in the same category, although, owing to his functions, he occupies a position which demands special consideration. The normal channel between the head of a department and the Governor would be the secretary to the department, because, as the Under-Secretary explained, secretaries to departments occupy a special position in India and that special position has in some sense arisen out of the position of the Governor and the Governor-General. The Inspector-General, like the head of any other department, would have access to the Governor, if the Governor so desired. There is the further point that if these words were inserted it might be difficult to resist the suggestion that all other heads of departments should similarly have this statutory position. For these reasons we think that the Committee would be wrong to insert these words. Naturally, the most careful consideration has been given to the whole question of the Governor receiving proper information as to the matters with which the Inspector-General of police would have to deal, and we are satisfied that the position is completely safeguarded by the Bill as it stands. Having regard to what my hon. and learned Friend may not have appreciated, the liaison through the Secretary, and the fact that the Governor can always see the Inspector-General if he wishes to do so, I hope my hon. Friend will see his way not to press this Amendment.

That, of course, is all right in the majority' of Provinces, but I submit that in the case of Sind it is vitally important that there should be direct access. Where a new Province is being set up, and where the risks of communal rioting and communal oppression are extremely grave, there ought to be a special provision for access. Our difficulties arise through treating the Provinces as if they were all alike. There is the greatest possible diversity of civilisation and difficulties in the Provinces. We are making regulations in this Bill which will cover the majority of cases, but what provision is the Government making for meeting the difficulties in special cases?

I regard this Amendment as essential, and I do not think the Solicitor-General has met the case which was put up by my hon. and learned Friend. The Solicitor-General is afraid that if this privilege were granted to the Inspector-General of Police it would be difficult to resist granting a similar privilege to the heads of other Departments, but the Inspector-General of Police and the police question generally are in a different category from the other Departments, as the Bill throughout recognises. Therefore, this privilege seems to me to be a necessary one, and it would not in the least entail the grant of such a privilege to the heads of other Departments.

My advice to the Committee would be to leave the Bill as it is, and for two reasons. First of all, I think the position is quite safe. The Governor, under his rules of business, can give the Inspector-General what instructions he desires, can tell the Inspector-General that he wishes to see him on such and such a day of the week or at specified intervals, and that he wishes to have sent to him a whole category of particular papers. By that means he can ensure that the Inspector-General has the necessary access to him. If there were particular dangers in a particular Province, obviously the Governor would have to take those into account in settling his rules of business and his relations with the Inspector-General. I suggest that that is a very much better way of doing it than to make a differentiation between one Province and another. That would create the maximum of difficulty.

Secondly, I suggest to my hon. Friends behind me that it is much wiser not to mention the Inspector-General or the Commissioner of Police by name. As soon as you isolate him from the other heads of Departments we run the risks that are so well described in the Report of the Statutory Commission. We immediately make the Inspector-General and the Commissioner of Police the targets of criticism from all the discontented elements in a Province. In view of the fact that the Governor can make what arrangements he likes between the Inspector-General and himself, and that it is the duty of the Secretary of that Department to bring to his attention questions that may affect his special responsibilities, I suggest that on the whole it is much better to leave the Bill as it is.

In view of that statement, for which I am very much obliged to the Secretary of State, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 37, line 37, to leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and to insert "two Chambers."

The effect of this Amendment would be to require that there should be a second chamber in every Province. When the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were put into effect, with unicameral legislatures, we had the system of dyarchy, with important subjects reserved, but under the new system there is to be complete autonomy, and that being so it seems wise to institute in every Province a complete legislature, that is, one with a second chamber. It may be argued that there will be difficulty in providing a supply of capable men for both chambers, but there is also the possibility, in the view of some people, that we may not get the necessary number of efficient men for a lower chamber. At any rate, with the legislatures charged to deal with a larger list of subjects of a most important character it does seem necessary to have a revising chamber in order to provide a check on hasty legislation.

My hon. Friends and I have an Amendment on the Order Paper to bring about a directly opposite state of affairs, namely, only one Chamber in every Province. We are opposed to two Chambers. We felt there were strong arguments for two Chambers' in the case of the Federation, in so far as the Princes were involved there, but we do not feel those arguments apply with any force in the case of the Provinces. At the moment all the Provinces have single Chamber Legislatures, and we fail to see any reason for suggesting that some of them should now have two Chambers. Surely the democrats in India will feel that we are giving them a democracy of a kind which suits the Conservative Party in this country, intended to safeguard Conservative interests both in this country and in India. We on this side have never felt there was a strong case for a second Chamber in Great Britain, and that that case is becoming weaker year by year and we feel that when we are setting up new Legislatures we ought not to set them up on lines which we as a party intend to put an end to in this country. We fail altogether to understand why it should be proposed that some Provinces should have two Chambers and others only one.

I have been making inquiries among my hon. Friends, and they tell me that the reason might be that there is a higher standard of education in the Provinces named, but that would be a good reason for a single chamber, and I see no reason whatever in that for two Chambers. We are told that the reason might be that these are bigger Provinces with an older tradition and a higher prestige, but again I cannot see that that is the reason for giving a single Chamber in the remaining Provinces. The Fifth Schedule lays down how the assemblies are to be elected. There is a method of election to the Legislative Assemblies that makes it unnecessary for the Legislative Council to be elected at all, because we think that that is over-lapping, and is not democracy. Our experience in this country ought not to be allowed to commence in India, and hence we oppose the amendment.

I support the point of view put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Ince (Mr. G. MacDonald). Feeling has been aroused in India against the Bill from many points of view, one of which is that the Bill does not give the common people of India the democracy to which they think they are entitled. The suggestion to put up two Chambers is likely to add force to that argument. It might be easily said that what the Government propose to give to the democracy with the one hand they propose to take away with the other. The only reason I have ever seen for a second Chamber is to enable people who consider that their interests are at stake, people of wealth, captains of labour and others with vested interests, to put a spoke in the wheel of the aspirations of the elected Chamber. From that point of view, this proposal is a very bad one.

I do not make any pretentions on this matter, but it would appear that asking the Provincial Legislatures to have a second Chamber is almost the same as if we were to go to our county councils and say: "We know that you are elected persons, but we are going to set up another body to revise the work that you do." The present proposal seems to arise from a traditional Conservative policy that proper legislation is impossible unless there is a second Chamber. No particular principle is at stake. While the Government are prepared to set up second Chambers in certain Provinces, in other Provinces they are content with one Chamber. If there were any principle at all, the Government would either say that there is no need for second Chambers and would in that case wipe them away, or they would say that there is need for second Chambers and would apply that principle to every one of the Provinces. I view the proposal with a very great deal of misgiving.

Politicians in India who represent a point of view which may be comparable with the point of view of ourselves on these benches object to the Bill, not because they do not want a Bill giving them some democracy, but that the Bill sets up a form of democracy in which the common people do not have a real voice in the government of the commonwealth of India. When this matter was considered in regard to the Province of Bombay there was no question that others should be brought in on the same lines. I repeat that this appears to be merely following out traditional Conservative policy which I suggest is getting outworn. There is need not for more second Chambers but for the abolition of second Chambers.

It may be convenient at this stage if I answer some of the general points which have been raised by hon. Members in regard to second Chambers. The Committee will see that on the one hand we are asked to approve that there should be second Chambers in all Provinces, and, on the other hand, as far as I can see, that there should be no second Chambers at all. Between these two extremes, the Bill suggests second Chambers for five Provinces which may with justice be regarded as the major Provinces. I shall have a word to say about the Punjab and the other Provinces in a moment.

This matter has been more carefully considered than might have been gathered from the speech of the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Banfield). There has been close and detailed consideration of it from the earliest days of the Statutory Committee. The Statutory Committee set out the arguments on both sides in this matter, and came to no final and definite conclusion. The franchise committee also considered the matter and came to the same general conclusion as the Statutory Committee; that was, not to decide finally on the matter. The Bound Table Conference sub-committee engaged on studying this matter recommended that, generally, the three Provinces of Bengal, the United Provinces and Bihar should have a second Chamber. The result of the discussion in the Joint Select Committee was that the Provinces of Madras and Bombay were added. The result is that the five Provinces included in the Bill are having a bi-cameral Legislature.

It will be seen that this matter has been exhaustively considered for several years. The reason why these Provinces have been suggested for second Chambers is partly that by general discussion it is agreed that they would be suitable for a bi-cameral form of government, partly because there are certain interests in them which we think would be well served by a bi-cameral form of government and partly because the Provinces or Presidencies concerned have at one time or another signified their approval of, or have wished for, a second Chamber. In general terms, our information goes to show that in all these cases the second Chamber would be acceptable, but in some cases considerable opposition has been manifested. I think that puts the situation quite fairly.

Do I understand that applies to the five Provinces which are included in the Bill, but that there are elements in those Provinces that would approve of the second Chamber.

Certainly.

Will the hon. Gentleman also tell us what bodies have recommended second Chambers? For example, have the existing Provincial Councils of the Provinces that are to have second Chambers, approved of the idea, or have they disapproved?

In at least three of the cases—I have not the exact details—the actual legislatures have approved. In all five cases we have a substantial recommendation from the Provinces that there should be a second Chamber. The Joint Select Committee, when they reviewed this matter in detail, decided that it was in the interests of these Provinces or Presidencies that there should be second Chambers. When I come to the case of the Punjab, for example, it may help to explain why there is a difference between the Provinces. The suggestion for a second Chamber in the Punjab was rejected without a division by the local legislature in 1932. Throughout the discussions upon second chambers there has been very marked opposition to the establishment of a second Chamber in the Punjab, and we have not desired to press it absolutely against the expressed wish of the Province. With regard to the other Provinces—Assam, the Central Provinces, Orissa, the North-West Frontier Province and Sind—the main argument against the establishment of a second Chamber has been the difficulty of finding personnel to man two chambers of the legislature satisfactorily, the difficulty of expense and the feeling that in these Provinces, which are rather smaller than the other Provinces, it may not be necessary to the same extent to have two chambers of the legislature. Those are the reasons why, partly through the history of the case, partly through the needs of the particular Provinces, and partly from the size of certain Provinces and the personnel, we have decided to insert in the Bill "Second Chambers only" for the Provinces of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces and Bihar.

The only other arguments which have been brought forward have reference to the belief that some hon. Members have in two Houses, and the belief that some hon. Members have that two Houses would be disastrous. I can only say that the predilection of myself and, I believe, of my right hon. Friend, is probably well known to be in favour of two Houses, and that the predilection of hon. Mem- bers opposite is very distinctly against it. I think that those who want to study the matter further would be wise to read the books and treatises on this subject, and that I should not take up the time of the Committee further upon it.

May I suggest that it would be convenient on this Amendment to deal as far as necessary with the specific Provinces or districts referred to in the other Amendments and then only to take a formal motion on them?

The Under-Secretary has explained to us the reason for establishing a second chamber in certain Provinces. I thought he was rather careful in his statement with regard to those Provinces added by the Joint Select Committee. He did suggest there was a demand in the Provinces, but I think he is well aware that those Provinces never asked for second chambers as Provinces. As regard their legislatures, they were opposed to a second chamber. It came down to this, that certain elements demanded it, and, as he explained, certain interests wanted it. I think it is up to this Committee to examine what those interests are. I was well aware when we went round India exactly what those interests were who asked for a second chamber. They consisted of people like the Talukdars of Oudh and the Inamdars of Bombay. I can remember a packed room of moneylenders who wanted it, and I can remember wherever we went it was always "the interests." This matter was looked into very closely by the Statutory Commission. A request arose for special seats for landlords. We examined what really happened in constituencies, and we found that the landlords got ample representation. The result was that we rejected the suggestion for special seats for landlords. Many of us thought that there was no need whatever for the landlord interest, which was going to be so powerfully represented in the lower House, to be represented in the upper House as well.

What has been put in particularly here are Madras and Bombay. You are leaving out those Provinces where, on the whole, wealth is more equally distributed, but where you have very wealthy capitalists and very wealthy landlords, the interests that you want to protect in the second chamber, they are precisely those interests whose wealth will inevitably ensure their very great influence in the lower chamber. I notice that the Under-Secretary did not put forward the usual suggestion that we were going to get specially good men in the second chamber. He did not endeavour to equate the possession of brains and money. Your upper chambers, if they are to have any utility, are to correct inequality, but the only inequality they are going to correct, and that on the wrong side, is the distribution of wealth. There is no suggestion of having upper chambers to give special advantage to weak minorities. In fact this is formed on the old basis that the people with wealth should have the ultimate power. We think that that is objectionable, first of all on the general grounds that most of us agree that very serious economic evils in India are not so to be overcome, and you are going to strengthen all the reactionary influences; and secondly, it is against the expressed opinion of Indians. I am at a loss to understand why the opinions of Indians in the Punjab should be so important to the Government in this case, whereas they are rejected in every other instance. If it be a good argument in the Punjab to reject a second chamber, it is an equally good argument with regard to a number of other matters in this Bill. We think it is a very expensive, utterly useless and reactionary proposal to establish second chambers in Provinces when they have done perfectly well without them all these years.

To save the time of the Committee, I do not propose to speak on general principles, but to confine myself to one Province, namely, the Province of Assam, and I would ask the Secretary of State to reconsider his decision upon it. The Under-Secretary did mention two points. He said that Assam was not recommended for a second chamber because there was not the personnel available, and it might be too expensive. Only last year in Assam there were three ex-Ministers who were taking no part in public life. One was a Hindu, another a Mohammedan and the third an Indian Christian, and I am quite sure the Secretary of State would agree with me that one of the best places for ex-Ministers would be in a second chamber. The other point is that of expense. In the Assam Legislative Council I have heard it said on all sides of the House, and especially by the Congress party, that the salaries that we were paying Ministers and executive councillors were too great. It was pointed out that the Prime Minister of Japan got less money than an executive councillor in Assam, and for that reason I think we may all assume, if the principles of the Congress party are genuine, as I have no doubt they are, that the cost of the Assam Legislature will be reduced.

On the Legislative Council we used to sit for approximately 30 days a year for a salary of 20 rupees per day while we sat, and one and a half first-class railway fares for travelling expenses. According to my calculation the cost of an upper chamber on these terms, including clerks and everything else, would be about 30,000 rupees a year, and as the expenditure of Assam is 2 crores and 40 lacs, it would amount to about one-800th part of the total expenditure. We have a council chamber there that would do for the two Houses. There would be no necessity for them to sit at the same time, and the same clerks would do. Therefore, I hope I have proved to the Secretary of State that, on the grounds of expense and of personnel, there is a very strong case for a second chamber for Assam, and I hope he will write to India and find out what the present opinion is, because I believe ex-Governors are on my side in this matter.

On general principles I prefer, if we are to have a second chamber in this country or in any province, that it should be a hereditary House of Lords, and not an elected Chamber. My principles are not personal; they are entirely based upon the fact that, if the second Chamber is elected, it has great power, whereas if it is not elected it becomes an advisory body and has not great power. I think that, when we were considering establishing in India that democracy with which we have flourished in this country, we might have taken that leaf out of our own book, instead of inventing this Continental idea of a second Chamber elected by wealthy men. Obviously, you are, establishing there a vested interest in the representation of wealth.

I cannot see that that has anything to do with this amendment.

It is absolutely necessary that, when we are considering whether there should be one Chamber or two, the Committee should realise that one of those chambers is elected by 45 per cent. of the more wealthy of the population, and that the other Chamber is elected by 10 per cent. of the more wealthy of the population. The only difference between those Chambers is the percentage of the whole population that is allowed to vote. The Government have accepted the idea that there shall be, in a great many of these Chambers, special representation of rich people. That, I maintain, is not an English tradition, is not based upon English example, but is based upon the fears of the rich people in India with regard to this Constitution. Goodness knows, they have no reason to be at all afraid of this constitution. If we were elected by only that half of the population which had more money than the other half, the views of my hon. friends on these benches would be very materially modified. The principal argument against having this suppositious richly elected second Chamber in the Provinces is that these people, who are already rich, are going to be paid—

The right hon. and gallant Gentleman is now going much too far away from the Amendment.

It is impossible to discuss this very important question of whether there should he a second Chamber without the Committee realising why the second Chamber is being set up. It is to protect the rich, and to find salaries for them. India is not a rich country, and most of these Provinces cannot possibly afford it, Assam included. It is not merely the salaries of the members, but it is all the fact that you have joint session" to consider, you have elections to consider, your Ministers of State have to deal with two separate bodies instead of one. You have all these additional expenses thrust upon people who are living on the verge of starvation.

I put down an Amendment to leave out Bihar. Bihar is an admirable example of a Province which needs no second chamber. It is not a talukdar Province; it is, like Bengal, a zemindar Province, where the cultivators are small people, where the zemindars are entrenched behind privileges given to them from the Central Government. Bihar has had one-third of its territory taken away and added to Orissa. It is now a homogenous Province, almost entirely Hindu—much more largely Hindu than either the United Provinces on the one side or Bengal on the other. Communal troubles there have been, but there have not been any for the last 10 years in Bihar. You have there a perfect example of a homogenous community, anxious to develop their agriculture and anxious to deal with the very important question of the coalmining which takes place in the north. You have a Province which has exactly the interests and the prospective future of this country. It had, if I remember rightly, an Indian for a Governor not long ago, so much confidence had the India Office in Indians and in that Province. It is proposed now to set up, in that extremely poor Province, this extremely expensive second Chamber. I do not know why the Round Table Conference decided on Bihar. I am perfectly certain that the Legislative Council of Bihar and Orissa at the present time would not desire a second chamber. As there is no argument in favour of it, whether from the point of view of wealth or from the point of view of the protection of British interests, of where there are very few in Bihar as compared with other Provinces, I think we might spare Bihar the infliction of a second Chamber. As for the other Amendments, I should certainly oppose any of the Provinces being cursed with a second Chamber. If the second Chamber were nominated or hereditary, there would be something to be said for it, but there is nothing to be said for a second Chamber elected by the rich, for the rich, to protect the rich in a constitution which already protects nothing else.

Where-ever you have a legislative body, I think it is a safe principle to have a second Chamber. It is possible to see throughout the world what a moderating influence the second Chamber has on the first, especially when the first is actuated by such principles as sometimes permeate it. Let me assure the hon. Member below me, who stated that he was no believer in second chambers, that, if our second chamber disappeared, then democracy in this country, as he understands it, would also disappear. A second chamber acts as a brake upon the wheel of the first chamber to prevent the passing of ill-digested legislation which on second thoughts would not have been passed even by the first chamber.

I was interested to watch the face of the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) while the hon. and gallant Member for Blackburn (Sir W. Smiles) was saying that the place for ex-Ministers was in the second Chamber. Let me deal with this question in its proper perspective. First of all, our proposals have behind them a large body of support in India. From the greater number of these councils we have actual resolutions. For instance, it will interest the right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) to know that the Legislative Council of Bihar have actually approved of a second Chamber.

When?

Recently, in the last year or two, in connection with these proposals. In the case of the Provinces where there has not actually been a resolution of the council in their favour, we have made it our business to find out what we believe to be the general feeling. I am convinced that in all these instances there is a substantial demand in the Provinces for a second Chamber. The Committee will remember the duties of these second Chambers. There seems to be an impression in our discussions this morning that the second Chambers will have equal powers with the first Chambers. It is definitely the intention of the Bill, and it was the intention of the Joint Select Committee, that in the case of the Provincial second Chambers as distinct from the Federal second Chamber, their powers should be of a delaying character rather than powers of veto.

And revisory.

Delaying and revisory. That fact immediately appears when hon. Members look at the numbers suggested to form the two Chambers. The Provincial second Chambers will be only about one-third, as far as I remember, in numbers compared with the first Chambers. That is to say, in a joint session, the means by which differences will be settled between them, the second Chamber is bound to be in a substantial minority. The Joint Select Committee itself accepted that plan, but it none the less attached great importance to having these Chambers in the Provinces for which we recommend them for delaying and revisory purposes. Let us remember that Provincial autonomy means the granting of very wide authority, much wider authority than has yet been exercised in any of the Indian Provinces. To those who are cautious by nature, there is strong justification for revisory bodies of this kind, and I base my case upon that need, and I believe it is a very real one.

I come to the question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn of whether there should or should not be a second Chamber in Assam. There the position is not easy to settle. Assam is a poor Province. In spite of what he said, there is not a large personnel available for two Chambers. None the less, there is the fact that there is a substantial body of feeling in that Province in favour of a second Chamber. I have had evidence brought to my attention in recent weeks that upon the whole the feeling in favour of a second Chamber in Assam is growing rather than diminishing. My own view is that the difficulties in the way of a second Chamber are the two difficulties of the expense of a second Chamber and of finding the personnel. But without giving any kind of pledge upon the subject, I am ready to look into the question of the feeling in the Province, and I own that, if I am satisfied that there is really a strong and substantial feeling for a second Chamber in the Province, even if there are these two difficulties to which I have just alluded, I do not think that I should be prepared to oppose it, but we must have evidence that there is a substantial feeling in the Province itself. I hope that these remarks are sufficient to show why we have selected these particular Provinces and what it is we intend that the second Chamber should actually do.

I wish to say a word of apology for saying that Bihar had not expressed any wish to have a second Chamber. The right hon. Gentleman, when he was dealing with the question of the Assembly, said that he would attach no importance to the view of the Indian Assembly on a question which meant abolishing themselves. He cannot have it both ways. If he applies that to the Assembly at Delhi which would abolish itself if it supported this reform, it must apply also to the Legislative Council in Bihar. The Legislative Council in Bihar at present is elected in precisely the same way as a second Chamber will be under this Bill, and naturally they too will have a reluctance to abolish themselves. The same principle which applies, if it applies, to the Assembly at Delhi and All-India, must apply also to the Legislative Council in Bihar. Naturally, there will be a reluctance to support a change which would abolish themselves, so I do not attach very much importance to that, but as they have, in their Legislative Council, supported a second Chamber, even if it be that the richer people in Bihar are represented in the Legislative Council, I do not think that in that case I can press my Amendment for leaving out Bihar, since I wish to press for all time the right of the Legislative Assembly at Delhi to throw out the whole Bill.

I am not raising a point of controversy, but I want to say that on general grounds I would prefer not to have the second Chamber. If the question were quite open, I should vote against the second Chamber in India in relation to these Provinces, but there is a long history behind it. There is a very divided opinion. There is some Indian demand in support of the second Chamber, and we are not committed in any sense as to the constitution of the second Chamber, which has to be dealt with later. We shall in subsequent discussions deal with the powers of the second Chamber. I am very anxious that these powers should be limited, as was intended by the Joint Select Committee, simply to the right of revising and imposing delay, and, further, it will be seen by those who care to refer to the report of the Joint Select Committee that it was intended in a certain measure that this should be experimental, and that, while no definite term was imposed, it was suggested that after the first few years of experience a Province that had only one Chamber might make a request for two, if experience justified it, and that a Province which had two Chambers might make a request to have one in future.

With the consent of the second Chamber?

Of course, with the very limited vote of the second Chamber, and, in such instances as that, the second Chamber could not override the vote of the Lower Chamber having regard to its very much smaller representation. I do not think that in this matter any great question of principle is involved. I think that Indian opinion, being divided, might express itself in favour of the second Chambers as indeed has been done in some instances. I only want to assert that I am opposed altogether to these Upper Provincial Chambers having the power over the constitution of the Council of State, but I do not want to be held, in the course of later discussions on this Bill, responsible for having supported the proposal for second Chambers for the Provinces as electoral bodies over the Council of State at the centre. To that, I and my friends here are strongly opposed. As the Montagu-Chelmsford report was divided upon this subject, inasmuch as it suggested that a second Chamber might be needed later on when there became a larger measure of self-government, and inasmuch as the Statutory Commission hesitated as to what its recommendation should be, and having regard to the recommendations that we have had from some of the Indians more immediately concerned, I cannot see that any great question of principle is involved. Therefore, I am prepared to support the Government.

Is my right hon. Friend also prepared to reconsider the question of a Punjab second Chamber. I cannot help thinking that if a second Chamber is good for the United Provinces it might be good for the Punjab.

The question is quite different from that in the case of the Punjab. The Punjab is the one Province in which there has been overwhelming feeling against it. I think it would be a great mistake to reconsider that case.

The Amendment has served the purpose of eliciting most interesting explanations from the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary, and in view of the fact that the Clause goes a long way in the direction desired by the Amendment, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I do not know whether hon. Members who have their names down to the following Amendments wish to move them.

I do not propose to move my Amendment.

Sir Walter Smiles?

No.

I have an Amendment down to this Clause which has not been selected. Therefore, I desire to speak on the Clause without the opportunity of moving that Amendment. This Clause deals with the composition of the Chambers of Provincial Legislatures.

The right hon. and gallant Gentleman should discuss that, not on this Clause, but on the Fifth Schedule.

On the Schedule we discuss the allocation of seats on the communal award, but that is not where, in my opinion, we can raise the question of communal electorates.

It cannot possibly be raised on this Clause.

There are 362,000,000 Hindus who are opposed to this communal election.

The right hon. and gallant Gentleman is now attempting to argue the point which I ruled that he must not argue. He must abide by my ruling.

The composition of the Assembly is the most important thing in this Act, and yet we are all prohibited from discussing it.

The right hon. and gallant Gentleman must not say that. I have pointed out that the place to discuss it is on the Fifth Schedule. It will then be perfectly in order to discuss it.

When we come to the Fifth Schedule we shall already have decided that there is to be com- munal representation, and the only thing that we can discuss on that Schedule is the allocation of the communal award to the different communities. There is no opportunity of discussing the question of communal electorates.

I cannot follow the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. The Clause states that the composition of the Chamber or Chambers of the Legislature of a Province shall be such as specified in the Fifth Schedule. That leaves the Committee free to alter and amend this schedule to such an extent as the Committee thinks fit.

If you will look at the Schedule, you will see that we can alter the number of seats that can, be given to the Mohammedans, the Hindus, the women, or any one else; but we cannot alter the fact that over the whole of India elections are to be held on a communal electorate instead of on a general list as in this country. We shall have no opportunity of discussing whether the English system of a general electorate or, as the Mohammedans believe but as the Hindus deny, the system of separate elections is best. I submit that it can only be discussed here, and that it would be out of order on the Schedule.

I think that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is mistaken. It seems to me that a different Sub-section can be put in for Sub-section (4) of this Schedule. The right hon. Gentleman's Amendment will not be prejudiced, but I cannot allow a general discussion on a Schedule which is not before the Committee.

Before I call the Amendment standing in the name of the hon. Member for Gower (Mr. D. Grenfell)—in page 38, line 23, to leave out "twelve" and to insert "six "—I want to point out that this is a repetition Clause. Normally, we should not take this Amendment. However, there is a special reason why it should be selected.

I beg to move in page 38, line 23, to leave out "twelve ", and to insert "six ".

We consider that twelve months is too long, and that the Chamber or Chambers should be called within at least six months of the last session. The provision ought to be that it should be called within six months of the previous sitting and not within twelve months.

This Sub-section is founded on equivalent wording in all the Dominion Constitutions. We consider that, especially in the circumstances of India, it is particularly important to retain the Sub-section. There is no intention that the Governor should dispense with the sittings of the Provincial Legislature. The difficulty arises out of the particular situation in India. In India very often the Provincial Legislature will meet in the month of February and sit, say, to the end of March. There are then climatic conditions which make it extremely uncomfortable to conduct business, and the result is that there sometimes occurs a period of over six months between one session of the Legislature and another. The practical effect of the hon. Member's Amendment would be that it would be necessary to prorogue the Legislature in a Province on each occasion. We maintain that that would be extremely inconvenient. There has been no abuse hitherto. This is merely a formal provision, and there is no intention that the Governor should not summon the Legislature for a particular period. In reality we consider that business would be very much upset by prorogation, and I hope that the hon. Member will not press his Amendment.

I should like us to be careful about always adopting these precedents that we get from colonial Legislatures. I realise the difficulty about the climate. Perhaps six months is too short, although we think that twelve months is too long. In that case, we might perhaps agree on eight or nine months, but I do not like leaving the period this very long time, over twelve months, in which the Chamber shall not meet. It is true, as you said, Captain Bourne, that this is a repetition Clause, and we do not propose to put the Committee to the trouble of dividing on a number of these repetition clauses; but it must not be taken that we in any way agree with them.

I beg to move, in page 40, line 35, after "one-sixth," to insert "of,".

I beg to move, in page 50, line 12, to leave out "Legislative Assembly," and insert "Legislature."

The object of the amendment is to carry out the intention already expressed in the Bill. The proposal in the Bill is the result of an agreement which was reached with all other parties, and this is not an attempt, as hon. Members opposite will realise, to give cheap education to well-to-do Europeans in India. It is not in any sense an attempt to give extra grants to the children of well-to-do parents because they send their children to this country for their education. The Europeans and Anglo-Indians referred to are Europeans who occupy inferior positions in India, generally in industrial concerns. It was agreed with the other communities that these European schools should receive protection to this extent, that their grants should not be proportionately reduced, should not be taken away, without a vote of three-fourths of the Legislature. The European community in India are grateful to the Secretary of State for the improvement he has made in the Clause. As it now stands the position of these schools is greatly strengthened, and the object of the amendment is to carry a little further the principle of the Bill and the arrangements that have been made. If the amendment is included then a vote of both Houses will be required before any reduction can be made in the position of these schools.

There is one point which should be remembered. The amendment does not raise any financial question. The total amount to be granted for education in the Provinces will still remain in the hand of the lower chamber. No alteration will be made in the financial control of the lower chamber, and in the Provinces the Upper Chamber is not to have financial control. Therefore the amendment will not be giving them control over the financial position. The proportion of money spent on European schools will have to remain as before. But it may possibly happen, owing to some incident in the Provinces, that there may be a wave of feeling which would lead the Lower Chamber to try to get something back on the Europeans by taking away the provision for European schools, the object of the amendment is to enable the upper chamber to then step in and postpone any reduction of that kind until the Province has had an opportunity of reconsidering the whole question. I recommend the amendment for three reasons. First, that it carries out an agreement already reached, secondly, that it only extends to a certain extent the protection already given by the Bill and, thirdly, that these people, Europeans and Anglo-Indians, have been promised this protection. The amendment merely carries that protection a stage further than the Clause does.

I desire to support the amendment. The Joint Select Committee in their Report said:

"We observe with satisfaction that the White Paper gives practical support to the suggestion made at the Third Round Table Conference for safeguarding Government grants-in-aid for the education of the Anglo-Indians and domiciled European communities."

These communities have been somewhat disturbed by the possibility of the withdrawal of the grants-in-aid to their schools. The chief organiser expressed that fear to me some time ago, and anything which would prevent a withdrawal of the grants ought to commend itself to the Committee. I strongly urge that the Amendment should be accepted.

I should like to ask the Secretary of State a question about the Clause as it stands. The assent of the Governor will be required to a resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly in order to make it effective in carrying out a change of policy with regard to these schools, and I should like to ask whether that would be a matter of routine and quite apart from any action the Governor may take under Sub-section (3)?

We all appreciate the reasons which have prompted the hon. Member for Stirling and Clackmannan (Mr. Campbell Ker) to move the Amendment. He referred to the agreement which was come to at the Third Round Table Conference at a committee over which Lord Halifax presided and whose members were Sir Hubert Carr, Sir Henry Gidney, Sir Muhammad Iqbal and Mr. Jayakar. That agreement was to safeguard future grants-in-aid for the education of Anglo-Indians and Europeans. The Government, following their own conviction as well as the conviction of the Joint Select Committee, have inserted Clause 83 with a view to implementing to the full the agreement arrived at on that occasion, and it is certainly a cause of great satisfaction that it has been possible to put this provision in the Bill and safeguard future grants-in-aid for the education of these important sections of the community in India. We recognise the strides which Anglo-Indian-education has taken and are confident that it will continue to fulfil a useful purpose in the educational system of India. That is why we attach such importance to this Clause and have had such pleasure in inserting it in the Bill. The hon. Member considers that by proposing to have a vote of both Chambers he will strengthen the safeguards for Anglo-Indian education. At first sight it would appear that this would strengthen the position, but let us examine it in more detail. The position of the Upper Chamber in the Province is not exactly the same as the position of the Upper Chamber in the Federation. It has always been held that the Upper Chamber in the Province should not have the same power of control over supply as the Upper Chamber in the Federation, and I am afraid that we cannot, for this particular Amendment, alter the functions of the Upper Chamber in the Province.

We cannot accept the Amendment. It is impossible to accept it in view of the powers of the Upper Chamber in the Province in matters of supply; they are not the same as the powers of the Upper Chamber in the Federation. But consider the great strength which is afforded by the agreement as it is implemented in this Clause. It will be necessary for three-quarters of the members of the Provincial Assembly to be present and voting to overturn a decision arrived at. That exactly implements the agreement; and it is a further reason why we want to adhere to it. I read out the names of the committee which considered this matter, in order to show the wide range of interests and communities represented on the committee. It is very important for the future of Anglo-Indian education that we should not depart from an agreement come to by representatives of these different communities. When we consider that three-fourths of the Assembly are necessary, not only three-fourths of the members present, it will be seen that the protection is very strong indeed. The hon. and gallant Member for Camborne (Lieut.-Commander Agnew) asked a question about the Governor. If he will read Sub-section (3) of the Clause he will see

"Nothing in this section affects the special responsibility of a Governor of a province for the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities."

Therefore, this clause would operate without reducing in any way the special responsibility of the Governor in all that is entailed for the protection of minorities.

Do I understand that in order that this grant may be reduced it is necessary that three-fourths, not of either the members present or whatever may constitute a quorum in that particular chamber, but three-fourths of the statutory number of members, must both be present and must vote in favour of a resolution of that kind, and that otherwise the grant continues?

That is so.

After the statement of the Under-Secretary, for which I am sure the Anglo-Indian community is very grateful, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 50, line 14, to leave out from "grant" to the end of the Sub-section, and to insert:

"shall be made for the benefit of the said community or communities not less in amount than the average of the grants made for its or their benefit in the ten financial years ending on the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-three:

Provided that if in any financial year the total grant for education in the Province is less than the average of the total grants for education in the Province in the said ten financial years then, whatever fraction the former may be of the latter, any grant made under this Sub-section in that financial year for the benefit of the said community or communities need not exceed that fraction of the average of the grants made for its or their benefit in the said ten financial years.

In computing for the purposes of this Sub-section the amount of any grants, grants for capital purposes shall be included."

This looks a very formidable Amendment, but it is merely included in order to make perfectly clear the provisions which the agreement had in mind. It merely carries out the very words used by the hon. Member for Stirling (Mr. Ker), when he said that the grant should only be reduced in proportion to the general educational grant. If the general educational grant for a particular year were, say, £1,000, and the Anglo-Indian grant for that year was £100, then if the general educational grant were reduced to £800 the Anglo-Indian grant would be correspondingly reduced to £80.

I beg to move, in page 51, line 7, after "State ", to insert "or the Ruler thereof."

This is to make clearer what has always been the intention of the Government, namely, that no discussion can take place in a Provincial Council on any matter connected with any Indian State or connected with any Indian ruler without the previous assent of the Governor. It is really a drafting Amendment to make clear what has always been the intention, namely, that we should prevent discussions upon the conduct of an Indian ruler by a Provincial Council, the council having nothing whatever to do with the internal affairs of the Indian Ruler's State.

I can quite understand the provision that a Provincial Council should not discuss what is happening in an Indian State or even what the Ruler is doing in that State, but this Amendment applies also when the Ruler is out of his State, travelling about. He is then more or less an ordinary person, and why should he have this privilege?

The answer would be the same answer as I have just given. It has nothing to do with the Provincial Council. The position would be just the same whether the Ruler was in his State or out of it. The Provincial Council has not a locus standi in the matter.

Suppose that a Ruler stays in a town in British India and some event occurs there, and some question arises which affects him not in his capacity as Ruler but as a private individual, such as a debt due to a tradesman. The clause puts a sanctity around him as an individual and not as the Ruler of a State. Would it be possible to discuss that matter in the Provincial legislature?

I do not think that that is the position. We are really continuing the present position. Neither now nor in the case contemplated by the hon. Member would there be any locus standi for the Provincial Council to intervene. It it were a legal case, for the collection of debts, and so on, it would have to be dealt with, I assume, in the ordinary legal way, though off-hand I cannot remember what exactly is the legal position of the courts in the case of Princes. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General reminds me that as a sovereign a Prince is exempt from legal proceedings of that kind in India just as he is in this country.

If he is exempt from legal proceedings is not that just a matter that ought to be raised in the Legislative Council? Suppose there were a case of instigation by a Ruler to assault and kidnapping in a British Indian Province. Could not the Ruler be brought up and the case dealt with?

We do not contemplate that in the provincial councils it would be possible to make criticisms of the personal conduct of a Prince. Where intervention is necessary owing to gross misrule, the intervention no doubt will always be taken in the field of paramountcy. The intention here is to safeguard the persons of the Indian Princes from possible attacks in councils that really have no locus standi in the matter at all.

Is there power in the federal legislature to discuss these matters?

The procedure there is exactly the same.

This seems to be another move in what I regard as the rather dangerous direction of shielding the Indian States from all breath of publicity. The Secretary of State has described this as a purely drafting Amendment, intended to carry out a suggestion already agreed to but are we wrong in supposing that the insertion of these words has something to do with one of the complaints made by the Princes in those speeches, of which an unofficial copy was recently circulated. I am not anxious to oppose any reasonable safeguarding of the rights of Indian Princes as to protection against impertinent comment on their behaviour but when the Secretary of State tells us that the Provincial Councils have no concern whatever with the internal administration of the Indian' States that that is a matter solely between the paramount power and the States themselves, there are two things which ought to be remembered. In the first place if there is any general disorder in an Indian State, whether caused by the misbehaviour of the ruler or by his public conduct in the administration of the State, it concerns the British Indian taxpayer. The British Indian taxpayer is apparently expected to pay for intervention should intervention become necessary. I asked the Secretary of State a question last Monday as to the charge at present incurred upon the revenues of British India owing to interventions of the paramount power in the affairs of the Indian States. The right hon. Gentleman's reply showed that the amount could not be exactly ascertained but that according to a rough estimate made in 1932 the expenditure came to £600,000 a year.

Is not the hon. Lady now dealing with what is really a Federal question? The Committee is considering the Provincial Legislatures.

I realise that, but I do not know how the taxation is distributed. I know that in future this will come out of the Federal taxes—

If it comes out of the Federal taxes the matter cannot be raised here.

I merely wanted to make the point that, broadly speaking, it is the British Indian taxpayer who bears the burden whether he pays the tax in his capacity as a Provincial taxpayer or not. It is one and the same individual who has to bear the taxation. I want to suggest that there are dangers in going as far as we seem to be going in the direction of shielding the Indian States from publicity. We have the curious anomaly that the Provincial Legislatures are going to be hampered at every turn by the power of the Federal Legislature to block legislation—

I cannot see that that is a matter which arises on this Amendment.

I do not want to say any more about it. I merely want to point out that we seem to be making a very one-sided bargain. The Indian States can interfere in the affairs of British India but the representatives of British India may not even ask a question or raise a discussion either in the Central or Provincial Legislatures on any matter affecting the Indian States. Yet in the long run, if things go wrong in the Indian States it is the British Indian taxpayer who will have to meet the cost.

I beg to move, in page 51, line 23, to leave out "or partially excluded."

The Committee will remember that under the Bill there are two types of excluded area—excluded areas being backward tracts, not susceptible to Parliamentary institutions. Under the proposals in the Bill there will be totally excluded areas and partially excluded areas. The totally excluded areas which are very few will be administered by the Governors. There are, really, only two substantial tracts as far as I can remember in the whole of India, which, being so remote from association of any kind with Parliamentary institutions, are, it is considered, better kept out of the Parliamentary system altogether. In the case of the totally excluded areas therefore, there would be no discussions on administration in the Provincial Councils. The Joint Select Committee took the view that very often discussions of that kind would be extremely dangerous, say, in connection with tracts like the hill tracts in the North East of India. My Amendment proposes to draw a distinction between those areas and what we call the partially excluded areas, the areas which are not so backward and concerning which Parliamentary discussion will not be a risky affair. The Amendment proposes to allow freer discussion of the affairs of the partially excluded areas. It will enable the Councils to discuss those affairs without the previous assent of the Governor.

Will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to say whether, in view of the fact that discussion can sometimes take place in respect of the partially excluded areas, there is any provision for bringing them, in due course, within the purview of democratic government?

Yes Sir, the boundaries can be altered under Clause 272. Supposing one of these backward tracts advances and becomes capable of inclusion in the ordinary administration of the Province there are powers under the Bill and those powers would be used.

On a point of Order. I wanted to raise a point on Clause 86.

The Committee have already agreed to Clause 86 standing part of the Bill.

I rose in my place.

I beg to move, in page 53, line 40, to leave out "powers of the Governor-General and ", and to insert "power".

This corrects a mistake in the Bill. There is no power provided for the Governor-General to disallow Acts. This is a power which is confined to His Majesty, and the Amendment will make the paragraph read, therefore:

"shall be subject to the provisions of this Act relating to the power of His Majesty to disallow Acts,"

and so on.

I hope I shall carry the whole Committee with me when I say that we all object to this power of making ordinances, in India or anywhere else, where there is a legislative body in existence, but, as I understand it, this particular power is that of the Governor and only applies when the Legislature of the Province is not in session. Perhaps the Secretary of State would enlighten us as to whether there is any power on the part of the Governor to make such ordinances apart altogether from the Legislature being in session. Notwithstanding that we on this side do not at all care for this power of making ordinances, particularly having regard to experience in the past, it seems to me that there is a saving feature in this case, in that if an ordinance is promulgated by the Governor, it has to be laid before the Provincial Legislature and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature or if a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislature. That would appear to be some semblance of the Legislature having some control over this matter.

There is one other consideration. I do not know if the right hon. Gentleman can tell us—the Bill is so long and complicated that it is very difficult to keep all its Clauses in mind—with whom lies the power to call together the Provincial Legislature. Is it with the Governor alone, or has the Legislature itself power, as we have here, I imagine, to direct Mr. Speaker or the appropriate authority to call the House together in a case of emergency? I am directing my mind to making it impossible for the Governor, having made an ordinance, not to call together the Legislature for a long period of time so that the Legislature might not have the opportunity of passing a resolution disapproving of his ordinance. My own feeling is that, while we disapprove entirely of the right of making ordinances, we must appreciate that when the Legislature is not in session this power in special circumstances might be necessary, and having regard to the safeguard I have mentioned, if the right hon. Gentleman can satisfy us on the two or three points I have raised, my hon. Friends and I may not feel compelled to go to a division against the Clause. It is, however, a very important matter to India and one which in the past has had a very serious effect on the Indian question, on the relations between the Indians and ourselves, and, as far as I can see, on the general question of transferring responsibility to the Indian people.

I quite appreciate the point of the hon. and gallant Member for South East Leeds (Major Milner) in raising this discussion. The power to call the Legislature together depends, under Clause 62, upon the Governor. Clause 88 gives the Governor power to make an ordinance in the case of some very important occasion arising when the Legislature is not in session, and I cannot see that such an emergency power as this can be particularly obnoxious. I am sure the hon. and gallant Member realises the object of including this provision in the Bill. The ordinance, as he will have realised, will lapse on the expiration of six weeks after the calling together of the Legislature, unless some other decision has been taken on it by the Legislature itself. The calling together of the Legislature, as I have said, will depend upon the provisions contained in Clause 62, and those powers cannot be unduly extended. We had a short discussion about the Sessions of the Legislature just now. There is no intention under this Clause to give any power to the Governor to gain rule without any reference to the Legislature. There is no intention of giving him, under this Clause, any sort of dictatorial power to dispense with the sessions of the Legislature. It is designed for the purposes I have described, and I therefore hope the hon. Members opposite will withdraw their objection to the Clause.

I think we might have a little more enlightenment on this point. The Under-Secretary of State has told the Committee that the Governor will issue an ordinance and that the same Governor will have the power to call or not to call the Legislature together. We are back on the same point that we raised some time ago on the power of the Governor-General to issue a proclamation. The position here is very much akin to that, and I should like the hon. Gentleman to give us some indication as to how long it would be possible for an ordinance to remain in force without the Legislature being called together to ratify or to cancel it. It would relieve our minds if we knew how long this gentleman would be able to be in the position of a Hitler, a Mussolini, or a Stalin. We must safeguard that point at any rate, and it seems to me that if we have here a gentleman who can issue an ordinance and then decide when he can call together the authority to cancel it or otherwise, we are indeed right in asking the Minister to explain the point a little further.

Has an Acting-Governor the same power to promulgate an ordinance as the Governor? In the Third Schedule to the Bill special provisions are made with regard to the salary and allowances of an Acting-Governor, but there is nothing to show that the Acting-Governor will have the same powers as the Governor.

There is not any difference between the power of the Governor and that of the Acting-Governor in this respect. His powers are the powers of the Governor. The point raised by the hon. Members opposite is an interesting one. They realise, I feel sure, that we are dealing with ordinances made upon the advice of Ministers. They are ordinances not made in the field of special responsibility by the Governor, which are the kind of ordinances that would be made here by the Government in a time of emergency, as to which the Government of the day has to obtain Parliamentary approval within a given time. I think the real check is the check of ministerial responsibility to the Provincial Council. These ordinances are made upon the advice of Ministers who are themselves responsible to the Provincial Council.

Will the Minister who advises the Governor to issue an ordinance be able also to advise him when he shall call the Legislature together to cancel out the ordinance?

No. Technically, at any rate, the Governor calls the Council at his discretion. The argument I was making was that it would be very unlikely that the Governor, with a Ministry responsible to the Legislature and its life dependent on the Legislature, would be anxious to keep the Legislature out of any action in the matter. The position is exactly the same as the position in this country when, within the knowledge of hon. Members, the Government of the day has taken action under the Emergency Powers Act. The Government in their own defence have called together Parliament at an early date in order to get sanction for their action. If hon. Members think that, in spite of my answer, there is a risk that the Council would not be summoned in due time, I am prepared to look into the matter again.

May I suggest that there might conceivably be a time limit for an ordinance, say, of six months, and that it should expire if it has not been confirmed in that time.

That is a point into which I am prepared to look. I am certain that the position is safe, but I am prepared to look into it to see if we can make it safer.

Will the right hon. Gentleman look into the advisability of adding after "Governor" in the second line, the words, "acting under the advice of his Ministers."?

The hon. Member has forgotten that these are terms of art, and that where nothing is said it means that the Governor acts on the advice of his Ministers. There is an Interpretation Clause in the Instrument of Instructions.

On the assurance of the right hon. Gentleman we will not divide against this Clause.

I beg to move, in page 54, line 27, to leave out "powers of the Governor-General and," and to insert "power."

This deals with the same point as the Amendment on the previous clause.

We ought to have a word or two from the Under-Secretary on this point.

I explained the whole thing on the last Amendment.

As I understand it, Clause 88 refers to ordinances made during the recess, and Clause 89 refers to ordinances dealing with certain subjects.

I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman's point would come better on the Question "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

If, when the Under-Secretary moves an Amendment, he will read it out, it will help us very much. He simply refers to "this Amendment," and we do not know which he is moving.

The amendment was put from the Chair, and it deals with exactly the same drafting point as I explained at some length on the previous Clause. As I explained in moving the last amendment, there was no power provided in the Bill for the Governor-General to disallow Acts. It was therefore inaccurate in Clause 88 to include the words "powers of the Governor-General ". I tried to point out that it was inaccurate in Clause 89 to make the same drafting mistake. I therefore move this Amendment which restricts the disallowance of a Bill, which is provided for elsewhere, to His Majesty.

I beg to move, in page 55, line 10, to leave out from "discretion" to the end of the clause.

The object of the Amendment is to provide for cases in which the Governor's power to issue an ordinance shall not be qualified by requiring the prior consent of the Governor-General. When the matter came before the Joint Select Committee there was some doubt whether the Governor should have the power to issue ordinances at all, but as a compromise it was felt that the consent of the Governor-General should be necessary, but that there ought to be some limit to it in cases of great emergencies in which the Governor was not able to communicate with the Governor-General. One hears that communications are so good now that the Governor could obtain the consent of the Governor-General in a sufficient time, but there is one sort of case in which that might not be possible. For example, a case which required the Governor to issue an ordinance might be a strike or riot which severed all communication for the time being between the Governor-General and the Governor. He might in that case have to take necessary action at once without first obtaining the sanction of the Governor-General.

There has been a good deal of discussion upon this question. As my hon. Friend has reminded the Committee, there are some people who think that only the Governor-General ought to issue ordinances, and there are other people who think that it should be done by the Provincial Governor. The Joint Select Committee took the view that the wise course would be to make the Governor of the Province primarily responsible, their reason being that Jaw and order is a provincial subject and that therefore the Governor is the person mainly responsible for its maintenance, but, in order to ensure that the Governor should not act rashly or independently of the general policy of the Governor-General—after all, an emergency of this kind is a very important moment—the Governor-General should have his concurrence. The Committee took the view that there need be no undue delay in the Governor-General giving his concurrence. He could give it by telegram or telephone, and therefore there was no need why the con- currence of the Governor-General should hold up action which in the nature of things ought to be urgent. My hon. Friend has raised the possibility of communications being broken between the Governor-General and the Governor. In a case of that kind the Governor-General ought certainly to give the Governor of the Province his previous concurrence. He ought to make it clear that in a case where communications are broken between the Centre and the Province the Governor is entitled to take his action with the tacit concurrence of the Governor-General. Speaking generally, I think the best course is to adopt the proposals of the Committee, namely, that it is the Governor who acts, but that he does obtain, in normal instances at any rate, the concurrence of the Governor-General.

Will the possibility of acting in that way be made clear in some way? Otherwise, one can imagine a Governor who would hesitate to take action because it required prior sanction. If he had general instructions that in these cases of extreme urgency he should anticipate the Governor-General's sanction it would be very much plainer.

I think I can undertake to say that it shall be made clear to the Governor-General and the Governors that in cases of this kind there should be no delay. At the moment I am not quite clear whether it is so established in the Bill; but I will look into the matter. I agree with my hon. Friend that there ought to be no gap in the system.

If the right hon. Gentleman can guarantee that the point will be looked into, at all events, and that there shall not be a gap of this kind, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I hope the hon. Member for the English Universities (Sir R. Craddock) will not think me offensive in any way, but we have just had an example of how some civil servants—or perhaps I ought to say an example of a type of civil servant, of whom I think there are very few—who must always be secured or backed up, or safeguarded by higher authority. I myself should have thought that a responsible man like the Governor of a Province would have been prepared to accept responsibility under all circumstances, and that there would be very few conceivable occasions when he would require to have the prior concurrence of the Governor-General before he would dare to act. I recognise that the necessity for obtaining that concurrence is in many respects a safeguard, in that it may prevent a Governor acting hastily or foolishly, as we have known some persons of responsibility, particularly one or two military officers, act in the past in India, with very disastrous results. We understand this Clause to be the ordinance-making Clause. The previous Clause was one under which the Governor acted on the advice of his Ministers This is the Clause, I take it, under which he can act independently of, without regard to, and even contrary to the advice of his Ministers. That being so we take the strongest exception to this Clause. If time permitted and I were so disposed I could go into very great detail on the subject, but it will suffice to say that we take exception to this extremely wide and, as we think, oppressive and unnecessary power which it is proposed to give to the Governors of so-called self-governing Provinces. According to the second line of the Clause, all the Governor has to be satisfied of before he makes an ordinance under the powers given to him is that

"circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action for the purpose of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions."

I ask the hon. Gentleman what circumstances are envisaged by those words. Is it not possible to define them much more clearly? Would it not be an advantage to have some sort of direction to the Governor as to what circumstances would be considered sufficient to justify him in exercising this extremely powerful weapon for making an ordinance without regard to his Ministers, to the Legislature or to anyone else than to the Governor-General at the other end of a telephone or telegraph wire? That is my first objection—that the Clause is too vague, too wide and does not give a sufficient direction to the Governor of a Province.

Secondly, there is no provision that the advice of the Governor's Ministers should even be asked. I can conceive circumstances in which, even if that advice were given, it might be right for the Governor not to have regard to it and, indeed, to act in direct contradiction to it. But there is no provision here that in a Province having a legislature and a responsible Government the Governor is under any obligation to consult his duly-constituted Ministers. That obligation ought to be put upon the Governor, whether he deems it right to act upon the advice he receives or not. Hon. Members on this side had put down an Amendment to leave out the first line and a half of paragraph (c). That paragraph apparently makes it obligatory upon the Governor when an ordinance extends a previous ordinance to communicate it to the Secretary of State and through him to Parliament. We certainly think that in view of the wide power given, and the consequences of ordinances in the past, many of which we believe to have been harmful to the whole Indian question, and to have made matters more difficult and feeling more bitter, that all ordinances without exception ought at once to be communicated to the Secretary of State and, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament, and had that Amendment been called we should certainly have moved to leave out the words which limit it to an ordinance extending a previous ordinance of a further period.

I personally regard the necessity for the concurrence of the Governor-General as desirable. If this power is to be conferred it must be exercised with some regard to uniformity and consistency, and should not depend on the mere whim of an individual Governor. For instance, the hon. Member for the English Universities who, with his hon. Friend sitting in front of him, is the only representative of the Diehards present in the Committee—I apologise to my hon. Friend the Member for Prestwich (Sir N. Stewart Sandeman) for overlooking him—might be inclined, if he were a Governor of a Province, to issue ordinances much more frequently than, for example, my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) who in the near or distant future may be a Governor of a Province. I cannot imagine my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe at any time exer- cising dictatorial powers of this kind, but the hon. Member for the English Universities would, I imagine, be frequently engaged, if, indeed, he were not engaged during the whole of his time, in promulgating such ordinances with, I am afraid, extremely disastrous consequences. That power should not be dependent upon a whim.

The hon and gallant Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner) has been attributing to me all those acts of rashness and precipitancy, and I really must protest against them. I trust that the hon. and gallant Member will see his way to withdraw them.

I will certainly do so if the hon. Member in any sense took offence at my observations. I did not intend them in any way to indicate precipitancy on his part, but intended the words to bear a rather different construction. If he takes any exception to what I said, I withdraw my remarks. The power of making ordinances ought not to be dependent upon the mere whim of a Governor for the time being, but there ought to be some good sound advice. This very important power ought not to be put into the hands of one man, however responsible he may be. For that reason, as well as many others which I could adduce if time permitted, we take exception to the Clause, and, unless we are satisfied in regard to it, we shall certainly vote against it.

I oppose the Clause for reasons somewhat similar to those just put forward by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South East Leeds (Major Milner). He said that the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) would not make use of these powers if he had the opportunity, but I am not so sure of that. Mankind follows much the same line, and if you give a man general powers he may be inclined to use them. We, as Members of Parliament are here for the purpose of preventing absolute power being put into the hands of any one person. As democrats, we must adopt that attitude, and I ask the Under-Secretary why this power is being given. The first part of the Clause states that the Governor shall have power to put ordinances into operation for six months and that by a subsequent ordinance it may be extended for a further period of six months if he wishes. Sub-section (3, c) states that the ordinance extending a previous ordinance

"shall be communicated forthwith through the Governor-General to the Secretary of State and shall be laid by him before each House of Parliament."

I am anxious to know why, in the case of the first six months period, that course is not followed. I know there may be cases where the Governor may have to take certain powers. Even in this country, under the Emergency Powers Act, the Secretary of State can exercise certain powers but he must immediately submit them to Parliament, and the powers can only continue for one month before they are renewed. If we are following somewhat similar lines in India to those which we followed here, how is it that these powers may continue for a period of six months and then for a second period of six months if the Governor desires? On a Clause like this, we—I am speaking also for myself—who have not great knowledge of the Bill or of conditions in India are very anxious to pick up the points, and to use our efforts in order to get to know as much as we can. I want to know why we are to give the Governors of Provinces exceptional powers such as are not exercised in this country.

Before a reply is given on behalf of the Government may I put one or two additional questions in regard to the Clause? The power of a Governor of a Province is very great under the Bill. He can issue orders-in-council when the Legislature is not in session, and he can, under this Clause, promulgate ordinances even against the wishes of the Legislature. Under Clause 90, to which I shall do no more than refer at this moment, he can promote Acts of Parliament as well. It has been suggested that we are giving power to a Governor of a Province in India to do only what is done in this country in a case of emergency. When a Government in this country promulgates anything like an ordinance, Parliament meets and can question the Government on their action, but nothing of the kind can take place in India. The Governor is a permanent official who is not at the recall of the legislature of the Province but at the recall of the Government of this country. The parallel therefore does not hold good.

My hon. friends have been right in stressing the personal aspect of the matter and the attitude of mind of Governors of Provinces. The hon. Member for the English Universities (Sir R. Craddock) took umbrage when my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South East Leeds (Major Milner) spoke of the attitude of one Governor as against another. I can very well imagine half a dozen Governors in half a dozen Provinces where exactly the same conditions prevail. One Governor who may be a very irritable gentleman will be promulgating ordinances on the slightest provocation, but the other, a very generous large-hearted man, would not do anything of the kind in exactly the same circumstances. An hon. Member smiles at that. It is not a question of party when you come to personality. I could trust my life on humanitarian grounds to some members of other parties, because they would be generously minded when in a position of trust. I am not speaking of their policy, but of their administration. Some hon. Members opposite, however, irritate me beyond measure as soon as they begin to speak. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name!"] On the other hand, I can listen to speeches from members of the Government, and, although I disagree with their policy, I am not irritated by what they say. The same applies to Governors of Provinces in India. I can visualise hon. Members of this House being appointed Governors of some of the Provinces. The first thing they would do would be to seek opportunity to promulgate an ordinance. If some Members of the present Government had an opportunity they would promulgate an ordinance against us at any time, but I am not going to dwell upon that. I see some hon. Gentlemen opposite who would not do so.

The point is: Is it not possible to put something into the Clause to indicate the conditions, under which an ordinance shall be promulgated? The Secretary of State rather suggested that that would be possible, when he said that there might be occasions when an ordinance will be promulgated in the interests of law and order, when the whole of a Province had got out of hand, when the Constitution which we are now giving had literally broken down, and there were riots and terrorism. We should be very much more satisfied had the Clause indicated the kind of condition of things which must prevail in a Province before the Governor were moved to promulgate an ordinance. Whatever we do on this Clause, I ought to inform the Government that we are not at all happy at the enormous powers which are being granted to Governors in these cases.

This, obviously, is an important Clause, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke first asked why is it here, and why is it necessary? This Bill, of course, sets up substantially Provincial autonomy, and, therefore, in ordinary circumstances the administration is carried on by Ministers. The Committee has already passed a Clause—more than one perhaps—which places on the Governor certain special responsibilities. I will not repeat them, because they are familiar to every hon. Member present. Obviously, you cannot place special responsibilities on a man unless you give him the means of fulfilling those responsibilities. So far as executive action is concerned, as any executive action is taken in his name, he can, of course, act executively in his individual judgment or discretion if the Bill empowers (him to do so, but, obviously also, if you look at the special responsibilities placed upon him, occasions may arise where, in order to fulfil those responsibilities, it is necessary for him to proceed by ordinance. Therefore, everyone on the Committee, wherever he sits, and whatever his general views about democracy, must agree that, granted that these special responsibilities are to be placed on the Governor, it is quite clear that, in order to fulfil them, it may be necessary for him to proceed by ordinance. Therefore, it would be quite wrong to put the responsibility upon him, and not to confer the ordinance-making power. The Committee having passed Clause 52 and the other Clauses giving the Governor special responsibilities, that must be unanswerable.

Suppose the working people of a Province wanted to become trade unionists and organise themselves into a very powerful organisation, would it be possible in that case for a subject like that to come within the purview of the issue of an ordinance?

Plainly not. The hon. Gentleman knows that the Government of India to-day and in the past has always encouraged trade union organisation, and anyone who searched this Bill from one end to the other would not find any places where he could say that what the hon. Gentleman has just put enables or entitles the Governor to say that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take individual action satisfactorily to discharge his functions. I can assure my hon. Friend on that point.

The other point I was making was that, so far as this Clause is concerned, it must cover the whole ground that is covered by the Governor's individual judgment and special responsibilities. The other point as to the six months follows the recommendation of the Joint Committee, who said that if the ordinance were extended beyond the six months, there should be Parliamentary sanction. You can argue one way or the other, but we have in that matter taken the middle course. It is only if it is to be extended beyond six months that Parliamentary sanction should be required. For these reasons, I hope my hon. Friends may see their way not to vote against this Clause.

Whatever justice in the scheme there may be for the promulgation of ordinances, there is no reason, I think, why the Governor should have power to enact acts—why he should have the power of making permanent legislation. I would like the Solicitor-General, if he deals with this, to explain what part of the Governor's particular responsibilities require the promulgation of permanent Acts. I consider that one must regard anything in the nature of an ordinance as something altogether apart from the general business of government. It is a confession that that government has broken down to a certain extent. But to propose that this power should be extended over permanent legislation, really does infringe very gravely the whole position of the Legislature. Will the Minister explain the kind of circumstances he thinks may arise which requires the enactment of permanent legislation as apart from the passing of a temporary ordinance?

I would like to support my hon. Friend in the point he made. I cannot see circumstances arising to necessitate the passing of emergency legislation of this description. I can understand the value of an ordinance in certain circumstances, but I do not see the necessity of legislation of a permanent character being enacted by a Governor over the heads of the Legislature. There is a further point. It is the view of the Indian delegation that if such legislation were required, it should be by the Governor on his own responsibility, without attempting to get the consent of the Legislature for that measure. This is what they say in their report:

"In respect of the Governor's Act. … most of us would prefer that, if any legislation were required for the discharge of the special responsibilities imposed on the Governor, ho should take the entire responsibility for such legislation and should not be required to attempt to secure the assent of the Legislature."

Will the Minister give attention to Sub-section (4), and say whether we should be able to overrule an Act of the Governor if we thought it was not the right thing to do?

The Committee have already agreed to give the Governor power to promulgate ordinances for certain specific purposes. This question of giving the Governor power to enact an Act is also regarded by His Majesty's Government as necessary in order that the Governor may have all the powers necessary for dealing with every contingency. We do not anticipate that this power to enact Acts will be one that will be used very frequently. In fact, if the Committee will refer to the Report of the Joint Select Committee, they will see that in paragraph 104 the Joint Select Committee say:

"If the obstacle to any legislation which the Governor thinks necessary to the discharge of his special responsibilities lies, not in the unwillingness of the Legislature to pass it, but in the unwillingness of his Ministers to sponsor it, his remedy lies, not in a Governor's Act, but in a change of Ministry."

That shows that this power is not one intended for daily use. The object, I think, is best illustrated by taking the example of terrorism. In the case of terrorism it is a well-known fact that if, for example, the terrorists consider that a power taken by the Executive is likely to be terminated very shortly, all that the terrorists or those who are conspiring against the Government need do is to lie low for a short period, and raise their heads again after the time which the Executive have announced as the termination of the ordinance. In the case of an Act, the Governor could take the opportunity of putting upon the Statute Book some permanent legislation with the object of dealing on a permanent basis with such a grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province. In the case of a long-term question such as terrorism, than which there is no greater menace to the stability of a Province, we feel that we must arm the Governor with powers of this sort. I repeat that we do not intend that this power should be frequently used, but I think the Committee will agree that it is a power which the Governor ought to have. I was asked whether Parliament could repeal the Act if it were sent home to it. The answer is that, if such an Act were sent home through the Governor-General to the Imperial Parliament, Parliament could not repeal the Act, but it could, of course, challenge the Government and the Secretary of State. In view of these arguments, I hope we may now be allowed to have the Clause.

It seems to me that in this matter the Government have departed to some extent from the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee. Surely, the Joint Select Committee did not contemplate that an Act of a permanent nature dealing with such a subject as terrorism should be placed upon the Statute Book by a Governor in this way. In paragraph 104 of their Report, the Joint Select Committee say:

"We agree with the members of the British-India Delegation in thinking it undesirable that the Governor should be required to submit a proposed Governor's Act to the Legislature before enacting it. …. If, on the other hand, the obstacle lies in the unwillingness of the Legislature, there can clearly be no point in submitting the proposed legislation to it, and to do so might merely exacerbate political feeling."

They go on to say that, since there may be intermediate cases where an opportunity may usefully be given to the Legislature for revising a hasty or unconsidered decision previously made or threatened, they consider that in such cases a Governor's Act might usefully be submitted to the Legislature. This seems to me to indicate that the Joint Select Committee only contemplated this happening in a case where the question involved was not one of first-class importance, but merely one of revising a hasty or unconsidered decision. They say earlier that they do not favour trying to pass the Act through the Legislature if the Legislature is opposed to it.

I think that possibly the hon. Member is under a misapprehension. The Bill is intended to implement the general findings of the Joint Select Committee. With regard to his previous remarks about the British-India Delegation, I think there is a great deal to be said for its advice. There should not be any confusion between the Legislature as such and the Governor; that is to say, we should not try to make a Governor's Act look as if it had been passed by the Legislature of the Province. With that end in view we have drafted the Clause as it is here. Sub-section (2) gives the Legislature a chance of associating itself with the Act, or with part of the Act, but there is no intention in the Bill of making a Governor's Act have the appearance of being an Act of the Provincial Legislature.

I think that the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) is right in substance, and that this Clause does not carry out the paragraph of the Joint Select Committee's Report. Clearly, our opinion was that it should not be necessary, in order to enact a Governor's Act, to submit a draft of that Act previously to the Legislature. In this Clause, I think by inadvertence—I have only just observed it—those who drafted the Bill have made it impossible for a Governor to enact a Governor's Act unless he has first submitted a draft to the Legislature, and that, I think, is the point which the hon. Member desired to make. That was certainly not the intention of the Joint Select Committee. I hope that the Secretary of State may be able to look into this point between now and Report, and make quite sure as to whether a slight mistake has not been made in drafting.

I will certainly look into the point which my Noble Friend has raised. Generally speaking it is our wish to carry out the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee, and, as I say, I will look into this matter and see why there is an apparent difference between the recommendation and the Bill itself.