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Commons Chamber

Volume 304: debated on Monday 22 July 1935

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House Of Commons

Monday, 22nd July, 1935.

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

Private Business

Easington Rural District Council Bill,

Derwent Valley Water Board Bill,

Lords Amendments considered, and agreed to.

Camborne Water Bill [ Lords],

Read the Third time, and passed, without Amendment.

Exeter Corporation Bill [ Lords],

Severn Navigation Bill [ Lords],

Read the Third time, and passed, with Amendments.

Poole Road Transport Bill [ Lords],

St. Bartholomew's Hospital Bill [ Lords],

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.

Oral Answers To Questions

India

Bombay (German Motor Car Factory)

1.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether he has now received further information as to the German-equipped motor car factory proposed to be erected in Bombay?

I am still awaiting a report from the Government of India.

Whipping

2.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India how many sentences of flogging were passed by the criminal courts in British India in each of the last five years for which records are available, and the number of floggings inflicted for offences against prison discipline during the same period?

I am circulating the figures for the years 1929 to 1933. Those for 1934 are not yet available.

Will the hon. Gentleman recommend to his chief that the asperities of prison discipline in India should be toned down?

I will certainly convey what the hon. Gentleman says to my Noble Friend, but I do not think that there is any likelihood of any alteration in policy at the present time.

Following are the figures:

(1) Number of persons sentenced to whipping by criminal courts in British India, 1929 to 1933.

19298,100
19307,648
19316,309
19326,514
19334,987*

* Excluding Punjab and Agra, for which figures are not yet available.

(2) Number of punishments of whipping inflicted for offences committed by convicts in British India.

1929221
1930220
1931174
1932186
1933255

Earthquake-Proof Buildings

3.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether he has now had any reports from the Government of India as to the steps they are taking to investigate the problem of building earthquake-proof houses?

The attention of the Government of India has been called to the subject in connection with a previous question, and the erection of earthquake-proof buildings will of course receive the fullest consideration of the authorities in connection with the rebuilding of Quetta.

Will my hon. Friend recommend to the Government of India that they should secure expert advice from countries where buildings have for many years been constructed to withstand earthquakes?

My hon. Friend no doubt will be glad to know that an officer of the Geological Survey of India has made a study of this question and is now reporting on the recent earthquake.

Will these houses be proof against the new Constitution?

Isturbances, Lahore

4.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether the Sikh-Mohammedan troubles at Lahore are now subsiding; and whether any British troops are still employed or held in readiness to restore law and order there?

I regret to state that fresh trouble broke out at Lahore during the week-end. Large crowds of Muslims assembled with the object of proceeding to the Shahidganj Gurdwara. They assumed from the beginning a violent attitude towards the police and despite charges by the police and mounted police, they refused to disperse except temporarily. Firing became necessary on two occasions on Saturday after all other efforts to disperse the crowds had failed, and after a warning had been issued by magistrates, again on three occasions on Sunday when the crowd had again become violent. In all eight rounds were fired on Saturday and 15 on Sunday. The number of persons killed is reported not to exceed 10. At 9 p.m. it was reported that the situation was under control, and responsible Muslims were doing their best to persuade their co-religionists to desist from defiance of the law. Four companies of British troops have been on duty or in reserve during the week-end and will continue to be employed, together with other military forces which have been despatched to Lahore, until the situation returns to normal.

In view of the necessity of employing British troops in these unfortunate communal troubles such as those at Lahore, will my hon. Friend go slow with the plans for the Indianisation of the Indian Army?

Are British troops only being employed, or are any native troops being employed?

I think that the answer to the last supplementary question will really answer the first. There are, of course, Indian troops available for dealing with these disorders and they have been standing by, but it just happens that these particular companies have been used in the circumstances I have detailed.

Mr M R Masani (Passport)

5.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for India why the passport issued by the Foreign Office to Mr. M. R. Masani, No. 219,993, 1930, has been impounded, although Mr. Masani is a British subject; and whether he will take steps to restore to Mr. Masani full facilities and the use of a British passport for travel purposes on the same terms as other British subjects?

The passport was impounded and renewal was refused at the request of the Government of India, who considered that Mr. Masani's activities in India were such as to make it undesirable that he should be in possession of a passport for travel abroad. My noble Friend is not prepared to agree that his passport shall be returned to him, but an emergency certificate valid for his return to India will be issued to him when required.

Is there any account of any offence committed by this British subject; is Mr. Masani charged with any definite offence against the law of India or of Britain?

The Government of India inform us that they consider that his activities in connection with Communism make it undesirable that he should travel abroad, and they refuse him a passport.

Will the hon. Gentleman inquire, or cause inquiries to be made, to see whether the charge of being a Communist is a true one; and is it not the case that this man is a prominent member of the Indian Socialist Society, a constitutional and legal society, working within the Congress party in India, and is not a member of the Communist party at all?

I would remind the hon. Gentleman that it is not the policy of the Government to refuse passport facilities to Indian Socialists as such, but we are informed by the Indian Government that owing to Mr. Masani's Communist activities, he does not deserve a passport for travelling abroad, and in these circumstances my Noble Friend is not willing to renew his passport.

If on inquiry it is found that even that charge is unfounded, will his passport be returned to him?

May I ask whether the excellent answer of the Under-Secretary referring to the safety of Socialists travelling abroad applies also to Communists, or is there a distinction between Communists and Socialists?

Will the hon. Gentleman have further inquiries made to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the statement with regard to Communism; and is he aware that Mr. Masani himself definitely dissociated himself altogether from any Communist activity, and, in these circumstances, does he not think that the passport ought to be returned?

The questions which have been put to me by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen will certainly be conveyed to the Government of India, but our definite information from the Government of India is contrary to that which has been prevailing here.

Italy (Military Service)

6.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any statement to make on the conscription for military service in Africa of English youths born in Rome of English parents?

Under the terms of the relevant Italian legislation none but Italian subjects are liable to conscription for military service.

In view of the fact that this report has been very widely circulated, has the Secretary of State for foreign Affairs any means of bringing to the notice of newspaper proprietors the great disservice that they do to international friendship by circulating such an unfounded report?

I certainly hope that my hon. Friend's question and my answer will be given publicity in the Press.

Proposed Eastern Pact Of Non-Aggression

7.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress has been made towards the conclusion of an Eastern pact of non-aggression; whether he has received any reply to the explanation given to the German Government of the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject; and what is the present standpoint of the German Government on the question?

In regard to the first part of the question the position is still that indicated in the speech which I made in the course of the Debate on 11th July. In regard to the second and third parts, I have received no communication from the German Government.

Does it not appear that the German Government are showing very little enthusiasm for the conclusion of this pact?

I think that I had better wait and see developments before I express an opinion.

Bolivia And Paraguay

9.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether and in what manner the appreciation of this country has been expressed to His Excellency the President of Chile for the important part, as is now known, he played in bringing about the cessation of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay?

A Note expressing the congratulations of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was on my instructions addressed to the Chilean Government by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Santiago on the 17th June.

While thanking my right hon. Friend for his answer, does he not agree that the lead taken by the President of Chile provides an example which might well be followed elsewhere, and that it is calculated to strengthen the very friendly relations which already exist between this country and Chile and all the South American nations?

It is because we wish to give testimony to the good work of the President that we authorised our Chargé d'Affaires to convey the message.

Naval And Military Pensions And Grants

10.

asked the Minister of Pensions whether, in view of the fact that the granting of pensions for war disabilities is largely dependent upon medical evidence, there is an independent tribunal of doctors to whom the Minister refers in the event of a divergence of opinion between the Ministry's doctors and other medical authorities?

Arrangements are in force, as has on previous occasions been explained to the House, which enable me to obtain the independent advice of eminent specialists, nominated for the purpose by the Presidents of the Royal Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons, in certain cases which present serious doubt or difficulty on the evidence. Responsibility for the ultimate decision, except where an appeal can still be made to a statutory tribunal, must, of course, rest with the Minister.

Can the hon. Gentleman inform the House whether all cases or what percentage of cases are sent to such a body?

No, Sir, I think that both my predecessors said that they could not send all cases. However, if there is any serious difference we make it a practice to refer for advice to the independent experts.

Is the hon. Member aware of the increasing number of cases that are being reported to Members of Parliament because of these complaints?

I do not think that my brief experience at the Ministry of Pensions bears out that statement.

11.

asked the Minister of Pensions whether he is aware that Mr. Henry Fisher, of 9, Brompton Row, Dewsbury Road, Leeds, was originally granted a pension of 24s. a week, but that this was reduced to 8s. a week in 1922; that he is totally unable to work and that, in the view of the highest medical authority at Leeds infirmary, his disability is due to a piece of shrapnel lodged in his chest; and will he consider, therefore, increasing Mr. Fisher's pension?

In view of the strong opinion expressed by the surgeon at Leeds Infirmary, the whole case, including opinions in favour of the claim, was submitted to an eminent independent specialist nominated by the President of the Royal College of Physicians, who confirmed the view of my Department that on the available evidence it could not be said that Mr. Fisher's condition was due to the presence of a retained foreign body. In the circumstances I much regret that I cannot see my way to adopt the course suggested.

If there is any doubt in the medical evidence will not the man be given the benefit of that doubt? He was originally in receipt of a pension of 24s., which has been reduced to 8s., and he is completely incapacitated from working, and, in the opinion of those who have operated on him, his disability is due to a piece of shrapnel in his lung.

The eminent outside specialist, to whom the hon. Member refers, and to whom the case was referred, considers that his illness is not due to the presence of this piece of shrapnel.

If an equally eminent doctor says it is, cannot a third doctor be appointed to decide?

Can the hon. Member say how long after the actual wound was inflicted the doctor appointed examined the man, and what was the difference in the period between one examination and the other?

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at an early date.

Trade And Commerce (Russia)

12.

asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department whether, since the conclusion of the trade agreement between Britain and Russia last year, there has been any reduction in the premium charged by the Exports Credit Guarantee Department in respect of exports to Russia; what the premium now is; and how it compares with that charged in respect of exports to other countries?

The premiums charged by the Export Credits Guarantee Department in respect of exports to Russia have been reduced by about a third since the conclusion of the trade agreement between Great Britain and Russia last year. The premiums are fixed by the Department's Advisory Committee having due regard to the circumstances of each case and are confidential. The premium rates compare favourably with those charged in respect of exports to many other countries.

Will the Minister be good enough to give the House the exact figures indicating the terms now offered by Germany and those offered by the Export Credits Department.

The terms offered in Germany have been the subject of a previous question to which I replied in some detail.

Is there any reason why the figure for Russia should be confidential, in view of the fact that the consignee is the same in every case?

The department keep the figures confidential in every case. There is no discrimination.

Is the Minister aware that the Export Credits Advisory Committee has been openly accused by a prominent business man of profiteering at the expense of British industry and that repeated representations have been made from every quarter of the House? Is it not time that the terms were reduced?

The Advisory Committee is taking risks with the taxpayers' money, and they must have prudent regard to all the circumstances of each case. In this particular case if the Soviet Government have any proposals to make the Committee will be glad to examine them. At the present time we have no concrete proposal before us.

Is it not the fact that in no single case has Russia defaulted? In view of the fact that the German terms for five years' credit are known the wide world over, is there any reason why our terms should not be known, and, if trade is available, ought we not to take advantage of it?

If the Soviet Government want to put definite propositions forward, they know what approach to make.

Agriculture

Barley (Foreign Imports)

13.

asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is now in a position to make any announcement on the subject of the methods to be adopted to deal with the foreign competition in barley, particularly malting barley, which is causing so much difficulty to British agriculture?

Applications for an increase in the import duty on foreign barley are now before the Import Duties Advisory Committee, and I am, therefore, unable to make any statement on this subject.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that British barley growers were badly beaten last year, and that this year's harvest is about ready, and, unless something is done at once, barley growers are going to be beaten again?

Following the ordinary practice, the application is not before me, but before the Import Duties Advisory Committee.

Eggs (Imports)

14.

asked the Minister of Agriculture wheter he is aware that there was a 21 per cent. increase in the number of eggs in shell imported in June, 1935, as compared with June, 1934; and whether he can state what percentage of these eggs have been put into cold storage?

I am aware that the increase in the number of eggs in shell imported in June, 1935, as compared with June, 1934, was as stated. During the quarter as a whole, however, the increase compared with the corresponding quarter of last year, when imports were at lowest for many years, was less than 6 per cent., and there was a decrease of about 1½ per cent. compared with the second quarter of 1933, which was taken as the basic period. I have no information about the percentage of imported eggs which is put into cold storage.

In view of the fact that the industry is extremely anxious lest these eggs should be put into cold storage and produced when production and home prices are at their maximum, will the right hon. Gentleman make further investigation and give an answer if I put down a question next week?

Can the Minister say whether the voluntary restrictions are being carried out?

They are being carried out in regard to most other countries except the Netherlands, which is largely increasing its imports into this country.

Cannot the right hon. Gentleman take steps to force the Netherlands to keep to the voluntary arrangement?

Hyde Park (Victoria Gate)

15.

asked the First Commissioner of Works whether he will consider the removal of the existing lodge at Victoria Gate, at the north-west corner of Hyde Park, so as to allow of the widening of this gate and relieve the serious hold-up of traffic which occurs at this point by reason of the fact that there are at present only two narrow gateways for incoming and outgoing traffic?

I am advised that the widening of this gate would not, by itself, afford any material relief to traffic, and that very large consequential alterations in the park itself would also be necessary. But I will give my hon. Friend's suggestion careful attention in connection with the problem of traffic generally in the park, which is under review, in consultation with the police authorities.

Will the right hon. Gentleman in that connection consider the desirability of having a roundabout round the grass plots on the West of Victoria Gate, which would be of material assistance in sifting the traffic coming from the East and the South?

When I referred in my answer to consequential alterations, I was referring to alterations that would involve a very large roundabout and a complete re-layout of all the road and the grass plots in that corner of the park.

Addington Garden Estate, Croydon (Bricklayers)

16.

asked the Minister of Health whether he has received any complaints from the National Housing Trust, Limited, who complain that there is a shortage of bricklayers for their proposed 4,000 houses on the Addington Garden Estate, Croydon?

Footpath, Mexborough

17.

asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that a piece of land which has been let for many years to the Mexborough Urban District Council and used by the public as a footpath has now been closed to them after the council had agreed to purchase the land at the price suggested by the owner's representative; that the offer was withdrawn and a larger price demanded, while at the same time a larger rent was asked; and whether, in view of the inconvenience to the general public caused by this and similar incidents, he will obtain powers to prevent the exploitation of the public by such means?

The hon. Member has been good enough to bring this matter to my right hon. Friend's notice, and he has also received a statement from the urban district council. The hon. Member will appreciate that having heard only one side my right hon. Friend cannot express any opinion upon the merits of the case, but the council already have powers of purchasing land compulsorily at a price settled by arbitration, and he doubts whether further powers are needed.

Is the hon. Member aware that this local authority desired to purchase the land at the owner's price and that the owner withdrew the offer and demanded three times the original amount or three times the original rent, and does not the Minister think that where public convenience is disturbed in this way there should be power to deal with such an owner.

I understand that there are powers, and, if the hon. Member will read my answer, I think he will find the information he desires.

Wyton Sanatorium

18.

asked the Minister of Health whether he has yet replied to the Huntingdonshire County Council's request for permission to sell Wyton Sanatorium for Consumptive Children and adjacent lands, comprising nearly 200 acres, to the Air Ministry; and whether he can state where it is proposed that the children in question are to be sent and the price paid for the lands and buildings by the Air Ministry?

My right hon. Friend understands that the county council are considering whether, in view of the reduced demand for beds for children, this sanatorium is still needed for its present purpose, but they have not yet submitted any proposals to him.

Contributory Pensions Act

19.

asked the Minister of Health the numbers, respectively, of unmarried women and girls who are contributors to the old age, widows', and orphans' contributory pensions scheme, and of unmarried women drawing old age pensions under the scheme; and whether he is satisfied that the benefits ultimately accruing to this class of contributors represent a fair return for the amounts contributed by them?

I have been asked to reply. As regards the first part of the question, I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave on the 3rd July to the hon. Member for Central Edinburgh (Mr. Guy). As regards the second part, I see no reason to doubt the fairness of the basis adopted in the Acts.

Naval Armaments (Anglo-German Agreement)

20.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many new submarines may be added to the German Navy without conflicting with the recent Anglo-German Naval Agreement?

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement only limits the total tonnage of the submarine force that Germany may acquire, without limiting the number of vessels, which depends on the size of the individual units. At the present time the completed tonnage of British submarines is approximately the figure to which the British Commonwealth is limited by the London Naval Treaty, namely, 52,700 tons. Under the terms of the Naval Agreement, except in the special circumstances indicated in the agreement, Germany may build up to 45 per cent. of this figure, namely, 23,715 tons, unless meanwhile the British submarine tonnage is reduced, when the figure to which Germany may build would be correspondingly reduced.

Can the First Lord say whether the "special circumstances" which may arise will entitle Germany to build an unlimited number of submarines and whether they are the sole judges as to whether "special circumstances" have in fact arisen?

No, Sir. The "special circumstances" may enable Germany to build up to equality with us, but that is the limit, and they have to tell us what they are going to do; to give us warning.

Is it not a fact that the German Government have said that they have the minimum requirement of submarines, and that even if we were to reduce the number of our submarines they will not necessarily reduce theirs?

21.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty the average age of all capital ships of the naval Powers at the present time?

The average age of the capital ships of the principal naval Powers at the present time is as follows:

Years.
British Commonwealth18
United States18
Japan18½
France22
Italy20½
Germany20
U.S.S.R.21

22.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether a provisional programme of future British naval construction has been communicated to the German Government; and whether he is prepared to give the House particulars of this programme?

Certain provisional figures were communicated to the German Government as a basis of discussion. These figures, however, are hypothetical since they are dependent on the building programmes of other Powers, and to disclose them at the present juncture would be prejudicial to the success of the forthcoming Naval Conference.

Does the First Lord mean to say that Hitler was given particulars of the provisional programme of the British Government which have been withheld from the British House of Commons?

We have to put forward a hypothetical programme to every country with which we have conversations, not only to Germany, and the House of Commons has never pressed for those details. If the House of Commons does press, all I can say is, on good authority, that if they are disclosed it will ruin any chance of getting a naval conference.

23.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the fact that Great Britain is bound by the London treaty not to begin to replace her capital ships until January, 1937, he has made any request to the German Government not to start the construction of capital ships under the Anglo-German agreement until that date?

The conversations with the German representatives were of necessity of a confidential nature, and it is not desirable, therefore, to state what passed, but, naturally the British representatives did their best to persuade the German Government to build up their fleet at a moderate rate. As was officially announced in Berlin recently, however, the first two German capital ships were laid down towards the end of 1934: the date of laying down any further ships has not yet been announced.

Does that mean that the Government have given permission to the German Government to construct new powerful battleships at a time when our ships will be over 20 years of age?

It is not a question of giving permission at all. It is a question of limiting the number of ships Germany will build.

Coal Industry (Overtime, Scotland)

24.

asked the Secretary for Mines when the report of the inquiry into the question of overtime in the Scottish coalfield will be published?

Scotland

Fishery Cruisers

25.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how long the "Brenda" and the "Freya" were in Leith Harbour on their last visit; the purpose of their visit; and the date of their departure?

The fishery cruiser "Brenda's" last visit to Leith Harbour covered a period of two days for the purpose of coaling after which she sailed on 19th instant. The fishery cruiser "Freya" sailed on 17th instant after a period of two and a-half days in Leith Harbour for coaling.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether there was any lag in the protection afforded by the fishery cruisers?

Unfortunately there was slight overlapping owing to a misunderstanding in the transmission of a telegram, which I regret.

Unemployment Assistance

27.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he can state the estimated future charges which will be borne by the Exchequer and the local authorities of Scotland, respectively, on account of able-bodied unemployed persons coming

Authority.Estimated total annual future charge in respect of able-bodied persons coming within the scope of the Unemployment Assistance Act, 1934.Estimated total annual future charge in respect of all able-bodied unemployed persons.
Local Authority.National Exchequer.Local Authority.National Exchequer.
Cost.Percentage of total cost.Cost.Percentage of total cost.Cost.Percentage of total cost.Cost.Percentage of total cost.

County of:

££££
Aberdeen

*

90,970100·00

*

92,223100·00
Angus

*

44,815100·009782·0945,76197·91
Argyll2310·3959,06999·614,7897·2661,14192·74
Ayr3,0860·77397,51499·238,8242·16400,08597·84
Banff

*

55,255100·00

*

55,559100·00
Berwick

*

6,269100·00340·506,74899·50
Bute420·3412,15899·665624·3912,24695·61
Caithness

*

34,960100·00

*

35,231100·00
Clackmannan6561·6539,04498·359452·3639,15897·64
Dumbarton4,9773·16152,32396·847,7734·83153,02695·17
Dunfries

*

36,625100·00

*

37,110100·00
East Lothian

*

26,335100·004311·5926,75298·41
Fife3,0031·17254,59798·836,5032·47256,37897·53
Inverness

*

48,618100·00

*

48,864100·00
Kincardine

*

15,754100·00

*

15,957100·00
Kirkcudbright

*

8,933100·00

*

8,974100·00
Lanark

*

749,070100·008,6421·13754,10598·87
Midlothian6421·0162,95898·991,8572·8463,56397·16
Moray and Nairn

*

40,536100·00

*

41,124100·00
Orkney

*

2,091100·001535·712,52594·29
Peebles1241·806,77698·202413·416,83696·59
Perth and Kinross.

*

33,405100·003340·9634,54099·04
Renfrew3,5952·71129,30597·296,2354·57130,08395·43
Ross and Cromarty.

*

67,371100·00

*

68,544100·00
Roxburgh

*

20,664100·001250·5921,07399·41
Selkirk2241·3316,67698·674572·6516,79697·35
Stirling5130·41124,08799·591,4571·16124,54098·84
Sutherland

*

6,652100·0060·096,68599·91
West Lothian

*

90,524100·004670·5191,93899·49
Wigtown

*

12,834100·00

*

13,105100·00
Zetland

*

3,836100·00

*

3,965100·00

Burgh of:

Aberdeen9,8654·51218,53595·4918,4687·72220,62892·28
Airdrie4560·44103,44499·561,7871·69103,90898·31
Arbroath

*

30,263100·00

*

30,271100·00
Ayr8301·5952,27098·411,7303·1952,48996·81
Clydebank9,5016·01157,99993·9912,3737·22158,92792·78
Coatbridge1,2150·71172,28599·292,2810·90172,77899·10
Dumbarton2,4922·8587,40897·153,4853·8287,75296·18

within the scope of the Unemployment Act, and all able-bodied unemployed persons whether or not they come within the scope of the Act?

I am circulating a statement giving the desired information in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the statement:

Authority.Estimated total annual future charge in respect of able-bodied persons coming within the scope of the Unemployment Assistance Act, 1934.Estimated total annual future charge in respect of all able-bodied unemployed persons.
Local Authority.National Exchequer.Local Authority.National Exchequer.
Cost.Percentage of total cost.Cost.Percentage of total cost.Cost.Percentage of total cost.Cost.Percentage of total cost.

Burgh of—contd.

££££
Dumfries7812·5131,11997·491,1213·4731,22196·53
Dundee1,9040·40475,89699·6011,8492·41478,85197·59
Dunfermline9751·9749,42598·031,2762·5149,52397·49
Edinburgh54,63410·89501,76689·1191,09615·21507,80584·79
Falkirk2,9505·8950,05094·113,9767·3150,42492·69
Glasgow189,6685·283,589,33294·72350,8268·843,618,17491·16
Greenock1030·03356,59799·974,7951·33358,30598·67
Hamilton4,3473·35129,75396·655,0343·73129,98296·27
Inverness5402·1525,16097·851,1494·3525,29295·65
Kilmarnock4660·6275,53499·387360·9675,61699·04
Kirkcaldy2,3973·1576,10396·853,7244·6476,55895·36
Motherwell and Wishaw.6660·28237,03499·722,2920·96237,68799·04
Paisley7,5814·30176,41995·7011,1995·94177,26394·06
Perth170·0438,68399·961,9634·7739,23195·23
Port Glasgow1,4311·20118,86998·802,9302·39119,59597·61
Rutherglen9151·9746,48598·031,7403·5946,72196·41
Stirling1,6615·2331,73994·773,1008·8332,02391·17

* The "Block Grant" appropriate to the expenditure on which the estimates are based is greater than the future charge to be borne by the Local Authority.

NOTE.—The cost to the local authority has been estimated on the basis of expenditure incurred during the three months December, 1931, and January and February, 1935, in accordance with figures supplied by the local authorities. The contribution payable by the local authority in terms of Section 45 of the Unemployment Act, 1934, has been included in estimating the cost to the local authorities.
In making the calculations the proportion of "Block Grant" applicable to the expenditure on the able-bodied poor has in each case been deducted in order to arrive at the net charge falling on the Local Authority. The amount so deducted has been included as part of the charge falling on the Exchequer.

Small Holdings

26.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he can make any statement with regard to the report of the economic survey of small holdings outside the crofting counties undertaken by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland in the autumn of 1934 and referred to on page 66 of the Department's Report for that year?

The report will be published to-morrow. It presents an analysis of information collected from 201 small holdings of 16 different types, showing with regard to each type the amount of capital invested, labour employed, output of produce, and, finally, the financial returns accruing to the holders.

Unemployment

Special Areas

28.

asked the Minister of Labour whether his attention has been drawn in the commissioner's report for the special areas to the desirability of the establishment of a fund for the financing of industries in the special areas; and whether, seeing that under the Special Areas Act no such power is granted to the commissioner, he will consider taking such steps as may be necessary for the creation of such a special fund?

This is a subject which will no doubt be among those discussed in to-morrow's Debate. I ought to point out at once, however, that what the commissioner actually says is that, as the result of certain enquiries which he proposes to make, he may find it necessary to advise that a special fund should be granted for this purpose.

If the Commissioner puts forward the suggestion, will the Department give it its sympathetic consideration?

Any opinion or recommendation of the Commissioner will naturally be carefully considered.

Unemployment Assistance

29.

asked the Minister of Labour whether he can give any reason why new orders making changes in the unemployment regulations have not been circulated to the Members of the House, in view of the fact that they have already been published in one of the London evening newspapers?

I am afraid my hon. Friend has been giving too much credit to unauthorised statements in the Press. Any draft of new regulations will be laid before Parliament as soon as it is made.

Has the Parliamentary Secretary seen the reports in the newspapers which give the fundamental alterations which are to take place? Is it not perfectly evident that the report is in the possession of the Department, and should not Members of the House have it as well?

Tinplate Mills, South Wales

45.

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the apprehension occasioned in the Llanelly and Swansea area by the threatened closing down of Messrs. Richard Thomas and Company and removal to Scunthorpe, he is prepared to meet a deputation of Members of Parliament to consider the matter?

My colleagues and I are always anxious to meet other Members of the House, but I think it would be better to await the results of the further discussions referred to by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade in the Debate last Thursday. I can assure the hon. Member that the Government fully appreciate the anxiety felt in this matter.

Aviation

Gliding (Financial Assistance)

32.

asked the Secretary of State for Air what assistance is being given by the Government to encourage the development of gliding?

As already announced, it has been decided to afford financial assistance to the gliding movement, within a maximum of £5,000 a year for a period of five years. A draft scheme for the allocation and administration of this subsidy, submitted by the recently reconstituted British Gliding Association, has been accepted in principle.

Is the Under-Secretary prepared to place the agreement before the House for consideration?

Accidents

34.

asked the Secretary of State for Air how many fatal accidents per hundred thousand miles flown occurred during 1934 on the services of Imperial Airways, Royal Dutch Air Lines, Air France, and Société Anonyme Belge d'Exploitation de Navigation Aerienne?

In the case of Imperial Airways, there were no fatal accidents in 1934 and their total mileage on regular air services in the year was 2,315,000. I am not in a position to furnish the desired information in respect of the other companies.

Petrol Tanks

35.

asked the Secretary of State for Air what progress has been made in the evolving of an unburstable petrol tank for aeroplanes?

The position generally remains as stated in the reply given to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Handsworth (Commander Locker-Lampson) on the 6th June, 1935. A number of tanks of a new type are about to be ordered for trial, but I cannot at present make any statement as to the likelihood of its adoption for service use.

Royal Air Force

Dependants' Allowance

33.

asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is prepared to authorise the continuance of the allowance of 10s. 6d. per week made to the parents of Cecil G. Davies, Royal Air Force, deceased, who served in seaplane Iris II. when it was destroyed on 4th February, 1931, which has been paid from the date of the airman's death, but which it is now proposed to suspend on account of the father's earnings having exceeded 28s. per week?

The regulations make the payment of allowances to the parents of a deceased airman dependent on their pecuniary and other circumstances. The particular case referred to was investigated as recently as November, 1934, and it was then decided that continuance of the allowance was not justified. I am, of course, quite ready to review the case if the circumstances have changed since then.

Earthquake, Quetta (Barracks)

36.

asked the Secretary of State for Air whether, before the building of the Royal Air Force barracks which suffered damage by earthquake in Quetta, estimates were made, or tenders invited, for buildings of earthquake-proof construction; and whether all future buildings in India for the use of the personnel of the Royal Air Force will be built with a view to the greatest measure of security against earthquakes?

I have been asked to reply. So far as I am aware, the answer to the first part of the question is in the negative; as regards future building, no decisions have yet been taken, and, owing to climatic conditions, new construction cannot in any case begin until next spring. I am satisfied, however, that the military authorities in India are fully alive to the importance of new buildings being constructed on earthquake-proof lines in areas that are liable to shocks.

Italy And Abyssinia (Armaments)

37.

asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps have been taken by His Majesty's Government to prevent the purchase of arms and military equipment during the past year by the Ethiopian and Italian Governments from this country?

I have been asked to reply. I hope to be in a position to make a full statement on the whole subject shortly.

Territorial Army (Sunday Shooting, Pontypridd)

38.

asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he is aware of the constant shooting practice that is taking place upon the Sabbath day by Territorials at the Treforest, Pontypridd, shooting range; and, in view of the serious interference caused to worshippers at the whole of the chapels and churches in the area, he will issue instructions prohibiting shooting practice upon the Sabbath?

I am informed that on two Sundays recently firing took place on this range between the hours of 10 and 1 o'clock. It is usually possible to avoid range-practice at hours when interference may be caused to worshippers, and I am taking up this particular case with that object.

Mercantile Marine (Aliens)

40.

asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to aliens on British ships, being under three years' contractual agreements, domiciled in this country marrying British women, and at the expiration of their service returning to their own country leaving wife and children chargeable to the Poor Law; and whether he is prepared to make inquiries with a view to remedying this matter?

Prior to the hon. Member's speech on the Home Office Vote last week the attention of my Department had not been called to any such cases. If the hon. Member refers to alien seamen domiciled here who are signed on articles opened in this country for a round voyage, the position is that such men are given leave to land for discharge on return of the vessel to the United Kingdom, but there is no power under the Aliens Order, 1920, to prevent them leaving this country of their own accord. If, however, the hon. Member is referring to cases of non-resident alien seamen who may contract marriages with British women during a temporary stay of their ship in port, and are not eligible in the ordinary way for a free discharge in this country, I can only say that to grant any alien seaman a free discharge because of marriage to a British woman would only encourage marriages of convenience and seriously weaken the administration of the Aliens Order. I should of course be glad to discuss with the hon. Member any particular case which he may have in mind.

Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman not aware that a certain shipping company in Liverpool has a hostel in which negroes are domiciled? These people are aliens. They arrive here under special contract. They marry and leave at the end of three years when their contract is finished. They leave their wives and children behind them. I want to know what steps, if any, are to be taken to prevent English women being married here to black men who are not domiciled here and never return to this country after they have left their wives and children here?

If the hon. Gentleman will read my answer, he will see that that case is covered.

Parliamentary Franchise (Absent Voters)

41.

asked the Home Secretary whether he will consider amending the Representation of the People Act, 1918, so that the wives of serving officers and men of His Majesty's forces could be included in the absent voters' lists, so that they will not be debarred from exercising their franchise should they be living with their husbands who are serving at some place away from their home?

Wives of naval or military voters living with their husbands anywhere in the United Kingdom can be registered as electors and if registered are entitled to vote in the same way as anyone else. The possibility that after registration the wife may move with her husband to another constituency and an election may occur before she acquires a qualification in her new place of residence is not peculiar to wives of naval or military voters, and my right hon. Friend cannot hold out any hope of legislation on the lines suggested.

Chain Letter Schemes

42.

asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to the serious nuisance of chain letters asking each recipient to make five or six copies within three days of receiving the same, sending such copies on to five or six other persons with 6d. to the first name on the list, and suggesting that if this is done the subscriber will in due course receive many hundreds of pounds; and what action the Home Office is taking in the matter?

I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which my right hon. Friend gave to questions on this subject on the 27th June last.

Does my hon. and gallant Friend not consider that these chain letters are as prejudicial to the morality of the public as the taking of a ticket in a lottery?

If my hon. Friend reads the answer, he will see that the Home Secretary gave some very good advice to the general public on the matter.

Betting And Lotteries Act

43.

asked the Home Secretary whether he can inform the House that there has been any substantial diminution of betting and gambling in Great Britain since the passing of the Betting and Lotteries Act last year; whether his attention has been called to the fact that some 6,000,000 people during the football season have been in the habit of laying bets each week by means of postal subscriptions to football pools; and what proportion these numbers bear to persons who took tickets in lotteries which are prohibited by the legislation above referred to?

I have no means of obtaining the information for which my hon. Friend asks. The effect of the Betting and Lotteries Act, 1934, does not appear to be correctly described in the last part of the question. Before that Act all lotteries in this country were illegal except those authorised under the provisions of the Art Unions Act, 1846, and the Act of last year while maintaining the general prohibition of lotteries, exempts from that prohibition certain types of small lotteries which are described in Sections 23 and 24 of the Act.

Having regard to the fact that we were informed that the object of the legislation passed by the Government last year was to reduce betting and gambling, is it not desirable that the Home Office should have some information as to whether that object has been achieved?

Is it not a fact that before the Act was passed many lotteries were allowed which are not now allowed and which are of a harmless nature?

Celluloid (Accidents)

44.

asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to certain serious accidents to adults and children owing to the use of celluloid; and whether any steps can be taken to prevent such accidents in the future?

I presume my hon. Friend refers to accidents to members of the public from toys and other articles containing celluloid. Such accidents have occasionally been brought to the notice of my Department and the danger is widely known to exist; but I am afraid that so far as the Home Office is concerned nothing further can be done without legislation.

When the programme is a little less congested, will the Home Secretary consider the introduction of legislation to deal with this matter?

There are very great difficulties, but it will certainly be considered.

Transport

Motoring Offences (Minister's Letter)

46.

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to a letter addressed recently to a conference of magistrates by the Minister of Transport, urging them to consider thoughtlessness on the roads as equal to conscious and deliberate wrongdoing; and whether he will restore the practice whereby Ministers, other than the Home Secretary, refrained from giving advice to magistrates as to how certain laws concerning their respective Departments should be interpreted?

Yes, Sir. My right hon. Friend was invited to attend the conference in question and to speak. Being unable to attend in person he sent a message. My hon. and gallant Friend is under a misapprehension in suggesting that the message purported to interpret the law.

Arising out of the answer, is it not a fact that the magistrates were advised to treat cases of carelessness with as great severity as acts of wilful negligence, and does that represent a new policy on the part of the Government towards motorists?

The message which was sent was agreed with the Home Office before it was sent, and I think my right hon. Friend was acting perfectly properly as Minister of Transport in calling the attention of magistrates to the legislation which had been passed. It is his duty to preserve life, and I consider his conduct was perfectly proper.

Are we to understand that motor legislation does make a new departure in the law, by which deeds of carelessness are to be punished with as much severity as those done of wilful purpose?

Road Traffic Act (Haulage Contractors)

50.

asked the Minister of Transport how many interviews his Department has had with those firms of heavy haulage contractors who are suffering under the regulations of the Road Traffic Act; and whether it is his intention, as a result of the representations made to him, to promote an amendment to the Act so as to meet the difficulties which have been pointed out to him?

If, as I assume, my hon. Friend refers to the Orders made under the Road Traffic Act, 1930, with regard to the movement of abnormal loads by road, this is a matter which affects not only haulage contractors but Highway and Bridge Authorities and the Police. Bodies representing all these interests have been consulted and as a result my right hon. Friend proposes to amend the Orders in question.

In expressing my gratitude to my hon. Friend, may I ask whether these Amendments can be made without delay?

A draft Order will shortly be circulated to the organisations interested for their comments on it.

Questions To Ministers

47.

asked the Prime Minister on what subjects questions can be addressed to the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy); and whether he has an office and, if so, where it is located, and what staff is at his disposal?

I would refer the hon. Member, as regards the appointment and work of my right hon. and Noble Friend, to what I said during the Debate in Committee of Supply on the 10th July; but I think that for the present questions should be addressed to the departmental Ministers. My right hon. and Noble Friend is accommodated in the Ministry of Pensions building in Great Smith Street. No special staff has been assigned to him, any secretarial and typing assistance being provided by the staff of the Ministry.

Monmouth Assizes (Sentences)

48.

asked the Home Secretary whether he has considered the sentences passed on the persons charged at the court of assizes at Monmouth on Friday last; and whether, in view of the exceptional circumstances which prevail in the area, he is prepared to recommend clemency in each of the cases?

Seventeen persons were tried at this assize on charges of riotous assembly and unlawful assembly. Two were acquitted, four were bound over, and 11 were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, varying from four to nine months. The decision as to the appropriate sentence for each defendant was taken by the court, after a trial which lasted 10 days and there does not appear to be any reason for thinking that all relevant considerations were not before the court. If grounds can be shown for clemency in any particular case or cases, it will be the duty of my right hon. Friend to consider them, but at present there is nothing before him to suggest that any action on his part is called for.

Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that throughout the country these particular sentences are regarded as being excessive and as evidence of class prejudice on the part of the judge, and will the hon. and gallant Gentleman, having regard to that fact, get his right hon. Friend to consider—

I am not trying to express views; I am merely saying that that is the view held by large sections of the working-classes throughout the country. I am not endorsing it or denying it myself. I want the hon. and gallant Gentleman, having regard to that feeling which is widely held outside, to give special consideration to these long sentences with a view to their immediate reduction.

Would the Home Secretary meet a small deputation of Members who represent this area?

I am certain that my right hon. Friend will always be prepared to listen to Members of this House.

Smuggling

49.

asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether, in view of the growth and development of more modern methods of smuggling, he will build a number of swift motor boats, and let the building of such vessels by open tender?

I am informed that the Customs Department already possess such motor boats and other vessels as in their opinion are necessary for the protection of the Revenue. Additions thereto are made from time to time as required.

Are the Government adding to the fleet already possessed by the Inland Revenue?

Division No. 280.]

AYES.

[3.33 p.m.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelColville, Lieut.-Colonel J.Grattan-Doyle, Sir Nicholas
Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)Conant, R. J. E.Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Cooke, DouglasGrigg, Sir Edward
Ainsworth, Lieut.-Colonel CharlesCooper, A. DuffGrimston, R. V.
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd.)Cooper, T. M. (Edinburgh, W.)Guinness, Thomas L. E. B.
Assheton, RalphCopeland, IdaGuy, J. C. Morrison
Astbury, Lieut.-Com. Frederick WolfeCraddock, Sir Reginald HenryHacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyCroft, Brigadier-General Sir H.Hales, Harold K.
Barclay-Harvey, C. M.Crooke, J. SmedleyHamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Beaumont, M. W. (Bucks., Aylesbury)Crookshank, Col. C. de Windt (Bootle)Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry
Benn, Sir Arthur ShirleyCrookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)Hartington, Marquess of
Bernays, RobertCross, R. H.Hartland, George A.
Boulton, W. W.Crossley, A. C.Haslam, Henry (Horncastle)
Bowater, Col. Sir T. VansittartDalkeith, Earl ofHeligers, Captain F. F. A.
Bower, Commander Robert TattonDavies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Henderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsford)
Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.Davison, Sir William HenryHerbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)
Boyce, H. LeslieDenman, Hon. R. D.Herbert, Capt. S. (Abbey Division)
Brass, Captain Sir WilliamDickie, John P.Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)
Briscoe, Capt. Richard GeorgeDower, Captain A. V. G.Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.
Broadbent, Colonel JohnDugdale, Captain Thomas LionelHudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Brocklebank, C. E. R.Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)Hudson, Robert Spear (Southport)
Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks., Newb'y)Dunglass, LordJackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)
Bullock, Captain MalcolmEden, Rt. Hon. AnthonyJames, Wing-Com. A. W. H.
Burgin, Dr. Edward LeslieElliot, Rt. Hon. WalterKerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)
Burton, Colonel Henry WalterEllis, Sir R. GeoffreyKerr, Hamilton W.
Butler, Richard AustenElmley, ViscountKirkpatrick, William M.
Cadogan, Hon. EdwardEmmott, Charles E. G. C.Knox, Sir Alfred
Campbell, Sir Edward Taswell (Brmly)Emrys-Evans, P. V.Lambert, Rt. Hon. George
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)Everard, W. LindsayLeckie, J. A.
Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmFleming, Edward LascellesLeech, Dr. J. W.
Caporn, Arthur CecilFord, Sir Patrick J.Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Cautley, Sir Henry S.Fox, Sir GiffordLennox-Boyd, A. T.
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A. (Birm., W.)Fremantle, Sir FrancisLevy, Thomas
Chopman, Sir Samuel (Edinburgh, S.)Ganzoni, Sir JohnLewis, Oswald
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston SpencerGlossop, C. W. H.Liddall, Walter S.
Clarry, Reginald GeorgeGluckstein, Louis HalleLindsay, Kenneth (Kilmarnock)
Clayton, Sir ChristopherGoff, Sir ParkLindsay, Noel Ker
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.Goodman, Colonel Albert W.Lister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-

Memel

8.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has received any assurance from the Lithuanian Government regarding the fulfilment of their obligations at Memel; and whether any steps have yet been taken for the setting up of the chamber of representatives and the constitution of a directorate enjoying the confidence of the chamber?

I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to a similar question put by the hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. Cove) on 17th July, to which I have nothing to add at present.

Business Of The House

Motion made, and Question put,

"That this day, notwithstanding anything in Standing Order No. 14, the Proceedings of the Committee of Supply may be taken after Eleven of the Clock, and that the Proceedings on Government Business be exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)."—[The Prime Minister.]

The House divided: Ayes, 206; Noes, 46.

Llewellin, Major John J.Orr Ewing, I. L.Spears, Brigadier-General Edward L.
Lloyd, GeoffreyPercy, Lord EustaceStanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morland)
Locker-Lampson, Rt. Hn. G. (Wd. Gr'n)Petherick, M.Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)
Locker-Lampson, Com. O. (H'ndsw'th)Peto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)Storey, Samuel
Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)Pickthorn, K. W. M.Strauss, Edward A.
Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.Pike, Cecil F.Strickland, Captain W. F.
Mabane, WilliamRamsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)
MacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. Sir CharlesRamsbotham, HerwaldSueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.
MacAndrew, Major J. O. (Ayr)Rankin, RobertSugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham)Rathbone, EleanorSutcliffe, Harold
Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)Reid, David D. (County Down)Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
McEwen, Captain J. H. F.Remer, John R.Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Derby)
McLean, Major Sir AlanRickards, George WilliamTitchfield, Major the Marquess of
McLean, Dr. W. H. (Tradeston)Ropner, Colonel L.Todd, A. L. S. (Kingswinford)
Macquisten, Frederick AlexanderRosbotham, Sir ThomasTouche, Gordon Cosmo
Maitland, AdamRunge, Norah CecilTufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Manningham-Buller, Lt.-Col. Sir M.Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)Turton, Robert Hugh
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.Russell, R. J. (Eddisbury)Wallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Mason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel JohnSalmon, Sir IsidoreWardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)Salt, Edward W.Wedderburn, Henry James Scrymgeour-
Monsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. EyresSamuel, Sir Arthur Michael (F'nham)Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Moreing, Adrian C.Samuel, M. R. A. (W'ds'wth, Putney).Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)Sandys, DuncanWilloughby de Eresby, Lord
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties)Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.Wills, Wilfrid D.
Moss, Captain H. J.Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.Womersley, Sir Walter
Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.Shute, Colonel Sir JohnWood, Rt. Hon. Sir H. Kingsley
Munro, PatrickSimon, Rt. Hon. Sir JohnWorthington, Sir John
Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's Unv., Belfast)
Norle-Miller, FrancisSmith, Sir J. Walker- (Barrow-in-F.)TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
North, Edward T.Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)Sir George Penny and Lieut.-Colonel
Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.Sir A. Lambert Ward.

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)Rea, Sir Walter
Attlee, Rt. Hon. Clement R.Griffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro', W.)Rothschild, James A. de
Batey, JosephGriffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding)Salter, Dr. Alfred
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)Grundy, Thomas W.Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (Darwen)
Buchanan, GeorgeHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Thorne, William James
Cleary, J. J.Hamilton, Sir R. W. (Orkney & Zetl'nd)Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Josla
Cocks, Frederick SeymourHarris, Sir PercyWest, F. R.
Cove, William G.Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Williams, David (Swansea East)
Cripps, Sir StaffordLansbury, Rt. Hon. GeorgeWilliams, Dr. John H. (Llanelly)
Daggar, GeorgeLogan, David GilbertWilliams, Thomas (York, Don Valley)
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Lunn, WilliamWilmot, John
Dobbie, WilliamMcEntee, Valentine L.Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)
Edwards, Sir CharlesMaclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)
Gardner, Benjamin WalterMainwaring, William Henry
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)Mason, David M. (Edinburgh, E.)TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Gibbins, J.Maxton, JamesMr. Tinker and Mr. T. Smith.

Message From The Lords

That they have agreed to—

Amendments to—

  • Gloucester Corporation Bill [Lords],
  • Urmston Urban District Council Bill [Lords],
  • Swansea Tramways Bill [Lords], without Amendment.

That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to amend the Weights and Measures Acts, 1878 to 1926, by making provision with respect to the measuring, sale and conveyance of sand, ballast and similar materials, with respect to the marking of bottles for use as measures, and with respect to the discharge of the functions of the Board of Trade; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid." [Weights and Measures Bill [ Lords.]

Orders Of The Day

Supply

[17TH ALLOTTED DAY.]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir DENNIS HERBERT In the Chair.]

Navy Estimates, 1935

Admiralty Office

Motion made, and Question proposed;

"That a sum, not exceeding £1,130,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Admiralty Office, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936."

3.41 p.m.

I beg to move to reduce the Vote by £100.

I see that it is suggested in one newspaper that among the matters for discussion to-day is the breakdown of the catering arrangements in the "Maine" on Tuesday last week. As far as I am concerned, I do not want to raise that matter. I want to assure the First Lord of the Admiralty that there was no need for him to have sent me a letter of apology, because I have little or no cam-plaint. The Vote is put down in order to discuss something much more important, namely, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement which was recently signed. It is not my duty this afternoon to deal with the juridical part of the agreement, because that was dealt with a week on Thursday in the debate on foreign affairs. This afternoon, therefore, while just touching on the effect of the Agreement upon our Treaty obligations, the relations of various Powers, and that idea of collective security which is given so much space in our speeches and accounts for so little in our actions, I propose to examine it to a large extent from the point of view of the effect upon the building programmes of the naval Powers of the world. This Agreement cannot be squared with the declaration of February of this year, which stated that the release of Germany from the Versailles Treaty was to be part of a general settlement of Europe, and I do not think the Government can say that they have been in any way consistent in their action in dealing with that Treaty during the early parts of this year. I do not know whether the Goverment share the view which was expressed in the "Times" in June of this year, when it said:
"There are parts of the Treaty of Versailles which it is best to forget about"
and
"The judicial validity of the Treaty cannot be terminated except by the act of all the signatories, but those parts of it which were not meant to be permanent in their original form, and which it has not been possible to reshape by common agreement, must simply be left lying in ruins."
I am not sure whether that is the attitude of the Government. If it is, it would have been as well if the Government had said so before the beginning of this year. Let me say for the party which sits on this side of the Committee that we have repeatedly urged that there should be a reconsideration of this Agreement; and we urged it at the time when the Government seemed blind to the urgent need for a frank acceptance of the principle of equality while the going was comparatively good. Obviously, too, there is urgent need for limitation of German armaments voluntarily accepted by Germany, but, in our opinion, there is no reason to assume that the limitation of German armaments could not have been agreed upon collectively. Nor has any reason been given for suddenly throwing over the method of negotiations to which we have lately pledged ourselves anew. The method employed must involve grave consequences which, in our opinion, could have been avoided.

The inconsistency of the Government in these matters is most marked. Only in March of this year we were parties to the Geneva decision which so strongly condemned Germany for repudiating the land and air force clauses of the Treaty, whereas the White Paper on defence, which was issued in the same month, referred to German armament as the reason for the standstill of the Disarmament Conference and the necessity for this country increasing her armaments. Then came Herr Hitler's speech in which he stated the naval claims of Germany. This was jumped at by the Government and accepted without any effective consultation with the other Powers with whom we had made so many declarations a few months previously; with little consultation with the signatories of the Washington and London Treaties which are exclusively naval agreements; with, I understand, no consultation at all with the Dominions; while there was no reference to the League of Nations or the Disarmament Conference. These organisations can, I think, reasonably complain that they have been rather shabbily treated in this matter. I would ask: Why the haste in accepting this offer? If it was so acceptable and agreeable, why was it not used as an opportunity for convening a conference among the naval Powers? If Germany were the only naval Power it would have been a different matter, but there are others with whom we have treaties which are expiring and which should form the subject of an international conference this year.

This matter could have been so dealt with that we should have carried the other Powers with us, not only to deal with the naval side of armaments, but to take all other arms into account. We should have made every effort to extend co-operation by using Geneva and the League which, I am afraid, are forgotten and abandoned by this Government. I would like to ask the First Lord to state whether the Government have given up the idea of a multilateral agreement and whether they are now going to depend upon bilateral agreements with all other naval Powers. I have before me a cutting taken from the influential American review the "Nation", which deals with this important aspect. It says:
"Having reached the conclusion that multilateral disarmament pacts are impossible under existing conditions, the new British Government apparently feels that bilateral agreements offer the only means of avoiding an armament race. It hopes that the German Pact may be followed by similar agreements with France, Italy and Soviet Russia, and that the same technique may possibly be adopted in subsequent negotiations with the United States of America and Japan."
Then it points out a matter with which I am in entire agreement:
"One wonders, however, whether the Baldwin Government has thought through the implications of this revolutionary change in policy. The limitations of bilateral as contrasted with multilateral action are much the same in the naval field as in tariff negotiations. The issues discussed do not relate to two nations alone."
The same article says,
"If pursued to their logical conclusion they would spell the end of all co-operative international organisations, such as the League of Nations."
I want the First Lord of the Admiralty to pay some attention to that, because the principle underlying the agreement which was entered into between this country and Germany does give an indication that we have given up all hope of a multilateral agreement on naval armaments and are going to deal with the problem from the point of view of bilateral agreements. I do not think it is claimed by anyone that the Anglo-German agreement will assist disarmament. I do not think it is limitation, it is rearmament with a vengeance. At one stroke it increases the naval power of Germany by four times that which was allowed by the Treaty of Versailles. All the First Lord can claim for it is that our great hope in this country is that the new agreement may remove from the minds of nations any idea of competitive naval building. It is certainly a novel idea that the creation of at least five great battleships, 16 cruisers, 47,000 tons of aircraft carriers, 52,000 tons of destroyers and again at least 30 submarines will not lead to an increase of naval construction. I said "at least" the tonnage referred to. The Agreement does not provide for 35 per cent. of the existing tonnage owned by the British Commonwealth for all time, but any increase in British tonnage will be followed by an increase in German tonnage. Clause 2 even provides that there shall be an increase in the event of abnormal building by other Powers. Paragraph (c) of that Clause says:
"If the general equilibrium of naval armaments as normally maintained in the past should be violently upset by any abnormal and exceptional construction by other Powers, the German Government reserve the right to invite His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to examine the new situation thus created."
What are the reactions to this Agreement in the other European countries? It cannot be said that France and Italy are pleased with it. Under the Washington Agreement France and Italy agreed not to exceed 175,000 tons of battleships. This Agreement gives Germany a battleship tonnage in excess of that which was given to Italy and France by the Washington Agreement. France and Italy now have 33½ per cent. of British battleship tonnage, whilst Germany is allowed 35 per cent. The French reactions have already been seen. Almost immediately after the Agreement was announced the Naval Commission of the Chamber of Deputies passed unanimously the following Resolution:
"In view of the fact that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement annuls the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and that the Washington Agreement was accepted by France only by reason of the clauses of that Treaty, the Commission considers that complete liberty in naval matters is restored to France till the conclusion of new agreements. The Commission invites the Government to take all the necessary measures to ensure that France has always in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic naval forces sufficient to assure her security."
I think France is not sorry to regain her freedom and to be in a position to bring forward a programme to meet her own needs, and if France insists on increasing her naval strength then the German and British Governments will clearly also have to consider increases. We all know that Italian naval policy depends very largely upon the strength of the French fleet, and we ourselves will feel the competitive effect of the Agreement, however much it has been disguised up to the present time.

One may ask: What of the Baltic? This Agreement gives complete command of the Baltic to Germany. Russia, which was uninterested in naval matters in post-War years, has now become very much interested. The Agreement has been denounced in Moscow and other capitals, while some Powers with little or no naval tonnage are very much concerned about the new position. I am not going to deal with the very important question of submarines. As our Government have in past discussions on naval armaments raised the question of the abolition of submarines, it does seem strange that in this Agreement Germany is not only allowed to exceed the 35 per cent. provided for other naval armaments but can, after notification, or shall I put it stronger, after consultation with the Admiralty, increase her submarines to a point of parity with ours. As I understand that submarines are to be the subject of separate discussion, I shall leave the question there for the present.

One of the most depressing features of the Agreement, apart from the points that I have mentioned, is that it does not provide for a limitation of the tonnage of the ships. The new programme recently announced stated that Germany was building two 26,000-ton battleships. I know that the First Lord, in reply to a question to-day, stated that these battleships were laid down at the end of last year, but that did not prevent those responsible for negotiating this Agreement from endeavouring to come to an agreement on the size of battleships. In 1930 the then Government declared that battleships, owing to their size and cost, were of doubtful utility and that they would work for their abilition. Even this Government, in July of 1932, submitted to the Disarmament Conference an offer to reduce the maximum size of any battleships to 22,000 tons and the maximum calibre of the guns carried to 11 inches. I am of the opinion that this Agreement will make it impossible to secure a reduction in the tonnage of battleships. Then there are to be cruisers of 10,000 tons each, with 8-inch guns. That is also very bad, for it will make it impossible to secure even European agreement on a lower maximum for cruiser tonnage; for here is Germany leaping in one bound from the 6,000-tons limit allowed by the Peace Treaty to the maximum limit decided upon at the Washington Convention.

This new programme clearly indicates the desire of Germany to build up a fleet of powerful, offensive units, which I think will give a fresh impetus to other Powers to follow suit. Then what an excuse it will be for the Admiralty to go out for extensive building of all classes of ships by this country. This will lead to a policy of expansion in all navies, as regards both the numbers and the size of ships. The First Lord, speaking at the 1900 Club, in the presence, I think, of the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), reminded his hearers that the Navy was on a regime of treaties, which had resulted in What was fashionably called to-day a slimming diet. May I suggest that it was a very satisfactory diet, and that there ought not to be much complaint about it. From 1920 until the present time no less than £1,000,000,000 have been spent on the Navy of this country. The position reminds me of the story of the farmer who consulted a doctor about his health. The doctor suggested that the farmer should go in for dieting, presented a diet and asked to see him in three months' time. When the farmer called again at the end of three months very little improvement was apparent. The doctor inquired whether he had kept to the diet, and the farmer answered, "Yes, sir, but my difficulty has been to fit it in with my other meals." I think that that might be the position as far as the Navy is concerned.

There are, I think, very few people in this country who are aware of the benefits which this nation has had as a result of the naval holiday which was provided for in the Washington and the London Agreements. It will probably shock the world when it becomes generally known that between 1936 and 1942 the number of men-of-war belonging to the five Naval Powers that subscribed to the Treaty, and which will pass the age-limit and become due for replacement, comes to the total of something like 720 ships. I saw an estimate in the "Daily Telegraph" last year by the naval correspondent that it will cost no less than £800,000,000 for the replacement of overage battleships under the Washington and the London Naval Treaties. And here we have a Treaty which, in my opinion, can never take the place of those multilateral treaties which were then agreed to. The Anglo-German Agreement does not limit the German tonnage, as I have already pointed out, to 35 per cent. of the existing British tonnage. As our Navy and other navies expand, so will the German navy increase.

Who is there in this House or in the country, outside the Admiralty or the Government, who has been informed of the Naval programme of this country? I was very interested in the reply by the First Lord of the Admiralty to the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) to-day, as to why it is that the programme could not be communicated to this House and the country. The communique issued at the close of the second part of the Anglo-German naval talks stated that there had been a full and frank exchange of views on programmes of future naval construction. The Germans have been shown our programme, and we have been shown the German programme. Not only that, but the British projected programme has also been shown to the French, the Italian, the Japanese and the American experts, but it has not been disclosed to Parliament or the country. Why this secrecy? Why is it that this very important matter has been kept from the House of Commons? If disclosed to other nations, why not disclose it to the people who will be responsible for paying for these armaments? Quite apart from the feeling on this side of the House in connection with this matter, the disclosure of this programme should be insisted upon from every quarter of the House. Is it that the Government and the Admiralty are committed to a vast programme of naval expansion, and that the Cabinet is afraid of public opinion? One high naval authority recently said that in the last four years the Admiralty had to swim against a strong current of opinion. We all know that there are a number of Admiralty representatives who would willingly scrap the existing agreements. Some members of the present Government never favoured the London Agreement, and would willingly see it lapse.

Again, may I say that what has been disclosed to some of the other nations ought to be disclosed to the House of Commons and the country. Our naval programme was disclosed to America in June of last year, and a statement appeared in the American press in that month. A correspondent wrote:
"The British Government in the recent naval talks with the United States representatives at No. 10, Downing Street, proposed a great increase in British naval strength.… Mr. Norman Davis transmitted to Washington after last week's naval talks certainly informed the United States Government that the British Government wanted 70 cruisers in order to guarantee our Empire sea routes. This, it may be recalled, was the very demand made by the present Lord Bridgeman at the Three-Power Conference in Geneva in 1927."
It was this demand which wrecked the Conference at that time. We insist, as far as it is possible, that the programme which the Admiralty has in mind should be disclosed to this House. There is no question that the Admiralty has revived its claim to 70 cruisers. The First Lord should let the House know, and also how far this demand is one of the chief obstacles in obtaining an agreement with the other Powers. As I have already pointed out, this was the obstacle to an agreement in 1927. I know there are hon. and right hon. Members who blame the Labour Government for the London Agreement, which fixed the cruiser strength of this country at 50 cruisers, but I wonder whether there is any truth in the rumour that there were some very highly-placed officials at the Admiralty who were of opinion long before the London Naval Agreement that 50 cruisers were sufficient if an agreement could be obtained. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement will not make it easier to obtain any agreement at all, for whatever increase is granted to us, a proportionate increase will be given to Germany. I must say that I am not hopeful, that is, if the Government continue their present attitude, that there will be a Naval Conference at all. If there is some prosepct of obtaining a Conference, I would that the First Lord should take the House into his confidence. It is seven months since the last Naval Conference was adjourned. At that time the Home Secretary, who was then Foreign Secretary, in a broadcast talk dealing with that Conference, expressed the very strong hope that the Conference would reassemble in two or three months' time. Seven months have elapsed, and there is very little prospect of the Conference being convened.

I would again ask the First Lord whether he will, in the course of his speech, tell the Committee what progress, if any, has been made in getting the nations together to deal with this important matter? What does he himself desire? Does he desire freedom for building? I well remember, when he introduced his Estimates of 1932, he said that it was his dismal duty to introduce a low Estimate, and in a recent speech he said he was very pleased to say that there had been an increase in the Navy Estimates by 20 per cent., as compared with the time when he took office. I suppose that had the increase been 50 per cent. he would have been even more pleased. I realise the amount of propaganda that is going on at the present time for scrapping the Treaty. I have heard a good deal lately about the age of this country's battleships. Perhaps hon. Members will be good enough to look at the reply to the question I put to-day in which it is shown that the average age of our battleships at the present time is as low as that of any other naval Power in the world. Then, of course, we are being prepared for a very heavy programme of replacement. There has already been a very heavy cost for repairs, and we are being prepared by propaganda for a very large increase in the number of cruisers. I think that the Anglo-German Agree- ment will be used by a number of these propagandists for the purpose of endeavouring to achieve what they really desire.

I do not think that the public in this country is fully seized as to what the increase in armaments, which, in my opinion, is inevitable if the policy of the present Government continues, will cost the country. During the present financial year, with the Supplementary Estimate which is to be discussed later in the day, the proposed expenditure on armaments this year is £130,000,000, equivalent to an Income Tax of 2s. 8d. in the pound, while the projected programme of aerial and naval expansion for the next three years, if the Government get their way, is bound to lead to still higher expenditure, unless a change speedily can be effected in Europe and the Far East. We are increasing expenditure in this country at the present time much more rapidly than in the years immediately before the Great War. In the five years 1908 to 1913, armament expenditure in this country increased by £14,000,000, whereas this year our expenditure for the same purpose is £23,000,000 more than it was in 1931. In 1913 we spent £72,500,000 on armaments; this year it is to be £130,000,000, or £58,000,000 more than it was in 1913, although we are now on sterling and not on a gold basis. A very real danger at the present time is the increasing threat to our financial stability by a return to the war spirit and preparation for war. Hon. and right hon. Members have spoken of the threat to financial stability by misrepresentation of the speeches of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps). This is a very much more dangerous threat to stability than anything my hon. and learned Friend cared to say or cared to do if he had the power. In 1908, when the last armament race really gathered speed, we had a National Debt of £700,000,000, some of which was money borrowed for the Napoleonic wars. To-day our debt is nearly £8,000,000,000. In 1908 we collected from indirect taxation £70,000,000; this year it is £295,000,000, exclusive of a levy upon bread—wheat—another £7,000,000.

I would ask the Committee to allow me to deal with the difference in the cost of naval construction to-day from what it was in pre-war days, and I am sure my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping, who has some experience in construction, as he was First Lord at that time, will see the tremendous changes which have taken place in costs to-day as compared with the time when he was at the Admiralty. The "Warspite," a battleship of 31,000 tons, launched in 1914, cost £2,500,000. The "Nelson" and "Rodney," completed in 1927, cost £7,000,000 each. Battleship construction has gone up from an average of £78 per ton in 1913 to £178 per ton for the last battleships. The cost of constructing light cruisers has gone up three times—from £71 per ton to £228 per ton for 1932–33, though last year it was down to £209. The cost of constructing submarines has gone up three times what it was in pre-war days. The same can be said of all other naval construction. It is as well to remind this Committee that in 1931 there was a committee appointed which was called the May Committee. The Government of the day accepted almost all the recommndations of that committee, and applied them in so far as they reduced wages and unemployment benefit of the poorer people of this country.

While I am very much impressed with the figures the hon. Member has given us, he will, of course, hear in mind the change in the value of the pound.

I assumed that my hon. Friend would have known that without being told. The May Committee reported in 1931 and recommended that before the next Naval Conference the Government should appoint a representative committee to inquire into the whole subject of naval design and to consider whether any modification might be adopted, with or without international agreement, such as would lessen the cost of naval defence without endangering naval security. That recommendation has been before the Government for four years. They must be aware of the very large increase in the cost of construction, and I would therefore like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it is the intention of the Government to appoint a committee to inquire into the matters referred to in that recommendation. Even those hon. Members who are desirous of building a very large Navy are concerned about the question of where the money is to come from. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping wants, I feel sure, to go in for a programme of replacement of battleships. I am not sure what his view is concerning the London Treaty, which limited the number of cruisers to 50. I know he is very anxious, while wanting replacements and expansion of the Navy, that the cost should not be met out of the current revenue. I think it was on 27th June this year, and in the presence of the First Lord of the Admiralty, that he said that he did not want to shock the right hon. Gentleman, but that the only way in which we could deal with this situation was to have a defence loan.

In that he was supported by the hon. and gallant Member for North Portsmouth (Sir R. Keyes). There is a gathering round the idea that, instead of placing a burden upon the taxpayer at the present time, in which case he might be made aware of what armaments are to cost, there should be a defence loan, spread over 30 years. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping knows something, and so does the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert), about loans which have been raised for naval purposes. I am not sure whether they had not something to do with the old Naval Works Act, 1895 and 1905; if they had not, they had something to do with the payment of interest upon the money which was borrowed during that time. It was argued that, owing to the very heavy cost of naval works at that time, the cost should be met out of loan. It is interesting to read what seine of the Chancellors of the Exchequer said about it. Sir William Harcourt, speaking on the Naval Works Act in 1895, reported a speech of Mr. Goschen, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1888, with which he said he entirely agreed. When dealing with borrowings, Mr. Goschen had said that he was glad that the hon. and learned Member had called attention to the subject of borrowing, because it enabled him to say once more and most clearly that the present purpose of the Government could not be drawn into a precedent for building ships by means of loans. He should himself much deplore the fact that if this were in any way turned into a precedent for meeting the needs. The needs should be met out of the revenue for the year. If there is to be a very large expansion, I trust that the taxpayers will know what the expansions will cost them.

On this side of the House we look upon the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with a great deal of apprehension. We can see no prospect of disarmament or limitation of armaments; in our opinion, there is going to be a very large expansion of armaments. The Government should take note of what was said by two very eminent statemen in this country with very large experience in the building up of armaments. I refer, first, to the late Mr. Gladstone, who as far back as 1860 said:
"We have no adequate idea of the predisposing power which an immense series of measures of preparations for war on our part has, in actually begetting war. They familiarise ideas which lose their horrors. They like the inward flame of excitement, of which, when it is habitually fed, we lose consciousness."
Similar words were used by Lord Grey in 1914, who said:
"Every country had been piling up armaments and perfecting preparations for war. The object in each case had been security. The effect had been precisely the opposite of what was intended and desired. Instead of a sense of security there had been produced a sense of fear which was yearly increasingly.… Such was the general condition of Europe. Preparations for war had produced fear and fear predisposed to violence and catastrophe."
Our view is that, unless the present policy of the Government is materially changed, both in regard to its foreign policy and its building up of armaments, the words uttered by those two very eminent statesmen, almost on the eve of war, may be said to be the position of this country.

4.22 p.m.

I have very little criticism to make concerning the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. It is probably the best arrangement that can be made in the circumstances. I hope that the Government are correct in their forecast that it will be of the greatest importance at the future Naval Conference. I feel that the Agreement is liable to be misinterpreted and misunderstood, especially in this country. Simply taking the fact that we have agreed to the German nation building up a navy of 35 per cent. of our tonnage sounds as though the superiority of our Navy over the German navy will be very large and marked, but is that really so? During the War, if we simply take tonnage versus tonnage, our superiority on many occasions was such that we might have expected many great victories, but we did not always obtain them.

Take the case of the Battle of Jutland. In the opening phases of the Battle of Jutland, our superiority in tonnage was very great, and yet we lost two vessels, while the enemy lost none. Similar circumstances prevailed throughout that battle. Tonnage superiority was greatly in our favour, but the German ships were superior to ours in construction and very often in performance.

People assume nowadays that no nation builds ships or other warcraft but for defence purposes, but we have to build our ships for the defence of a vast Empire which is spread all over the world. Germany has no overseas possessions and only requires to build ships for defence in home waters. That is a great handicap against us, because with a ship that is only required for home waters the question of radius of action does not need to be taken into account in the way it does when we lay down and build our ships. Furthermore, with ships which are required to be continuously at sea or to go for long voyages, such as our ships have to do, there must be proper accommodation for crew, provisions and so forth. That does not apply to ships which are built only to go to sea for two or three days at a time.

What does the new Naval Agreement amount to? By it Germany is given a brand new navy. Anybody who attended the magnificent Naval Review last week will agree, on the other hand, that a great deal of our Navy is not what you might call new; in fact, it is verging on the obsolete. Germany will be able to build cruisers, destroyers and other vessels, making full use of the latest inventions of science and of engineering skill, while we, presumably, will be going on with our old policy of spending millions of pounds trying to bring up to date our old ships or even recent ships such as the cruisers of 1928 and 1929. We are going to be very seriously handicapped, compared with what the Germans will be able to do, unless some fresh naval agreement is reached when all the nations of the world are assembled round the conference table. Even if an agreement is reached, it appears that the new Germany Navy will put many of our ships prematurely obsolete, apart from those ships that are already getting on that way. We seem to be faced with the necessity for a large shipbuilding programme. If I am correct in my deduction, the sooner the country realises that we shall have to build a large number of new ships, the better it will be. The country should be told in plenty of time, so that they may realise the reasons and the necessity for it, should the occasion arise. It is bad to spring these things on to the public before the public have had time to appreciate the whys and wherefores.

I do not believe that there is any such thing as a war party in this country, yet we have something which is almost worse; we have what I may call a "my-country-always-wrong" party, who are only too pleased to twist round and misinterpret as many facts as they possibly can. That brings me to the question of submarines. From what I have read, I feel that some of the statements that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) has made concerning the abolition of submarines has given food for what I call the "my-country-always-wrong" party. I have never had any doubt but that the Government have pressed in every way they could for the abolition of all submarines, provided always that every other nation agreed. Be that as it may, the submarine is essentially an offensive weapon. It cannot be looked upon as a defensive weapon. Even the keeping off of ships from close blockade as it used to be maintained in the old days, can now be done by aircraft and by electrical and wireless-controlled boats. Though submarines might be useful as well, they are certainly not necessary or essential, and that is not a reason which justifies their existence or our not continuing to press for the abolition of submarines.

I should like to ask the First Lord if he can tell us why Germany requires more submarines than she had in 1914? Submarine warfare is one of the most inhuman methods of warfare yet evolved. During the Great War I was many times called upon to pick up drowning women, children and civilians out of the water as a result of submarine activities, and on other occasions I was sent to the help of hospital ships which had been torpedoed by submarines. I feel very strongly that, on both moral and humane grounds, we should continue to press for the total abolition of submarines. If we have to fight, I hope we shall always fight clean and not hit below the belt, which is necessarily what submarine warfare amounts to.

If the my-country-always-wrong party do not believe that the present Government wish to abolish submarines for moral and humane reasons, perhaps they will agree that submarines should be abolished on the principle of self-preservation, which I imagine is a thing about which most of that party think a great deal. This country nearly lost the last war through the activities of submarines. We should have been nearly starved if we had not been able to bring the War to an end. At one period our food supplies could not have been maintained for more than a very limited time, and thousands of battleships at Scapa Flow or Rosyth would not have availed us against the submarine menace. If, therefore, that party look at the question from the point of view of self-preservation, they will see that, apart from the fact that there are very high moral reasons for the abolition of submarines, it is actually in the interest of a nation which is so dependent as we are on long lines of communication, and which is rendered such splendid service by its Merchant Navy.

I cannot help thinking that this Naval Agreement with Germany is going to end up in a new naval armaments race. It may not necessarily be a race in tonnage; it may be a race in regard to the design of ships, a race to make one ship superior to another. But, even if that be so, and fighting power is maintained, it will mean increased expense, and will amount to the same thing in the long run. What can be done? I realise that we must face things as they are in the world to-day, and that we as a great nation must build up ships, tanks, aeroplanes, or whatever may be required in the present conditions for the defence of our great Empire. At the same time, I feel that we should have in mind something more—that we should be looking forward to the world as we hope it will be in the future, when nations will live together in peace and security. We hear a great deal nowadays about collective security, and personally I feel that we are on the right road in dealing with the question of collective security. In fact, I believe that, as the world gets smaller owing to increased and improved means of transport, we shall eventually live in the world as nations live to-day, with their own courts and their own police forces, and that eventually we shall have something in the nature of an international police force, including an international Navy such as was suggested by the late President Theodore Roosevelt before the last war. I do not say or imagine that such a thing is practicable at a day's notice; I very much doubt whether many Members of this House will live to see it; but I believe that eventually it will be possible, and, in view of that possibility, I feel that, when naval agreements are made, we should not only think of the present, but should always have our eyes on what we are aiming at for the future.

As regards the immediate present, I cannot help feeling that the only solution of the very grave and difficult naval problems with which the world is faced is that the two great English-speaking nations, the British Empire and the United States of America, should co-operate ever more closely and in such a way that the world may be told that, in the event of any nation attempting to break the Kellogg Peace Pact, the navies of the two great English-speaking nations would stand together as one, as they did in 1917 and 1918. This arrangement for co-operation would be no threat, and need cause no jealousy in the world, because the two great English-speaking nations affectionately dislike each other sufficiently to make it quite certain that neither of them would go one better than the other. I feel that, in order to make sure that a naval armaments race shall be prevented, these two navies should co-operate to a closer extent even than they do now to maintain the future peace and security of the world, pending an all-round settlement among all nations combined.

4.38 p.m.

We have all listened with great interest, as we always do, to the hon. and gallant Member for Burnley (Vice-Admiral Campbell), whose gallant deeds in the war will always remain a glorious record. I agree with him that there is a danger that this Anglo-German Naval Agreement might be misunderstood by the British public, and that its full significance will not be appreciated. We all know that, under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was placed under certain naval, military and air limitations. As far as the Navy was concerned, she was forbidden to build more than a certain tonnage, she was not allowed to build capital ships over 10,000 tons, and she was not allowed to construct submarines at all. We know that during the last year or so she has been breaking that agreement and has been seeking to re-arm, and that for some time past she has been constructing submarines. We have heard from the First Lord of the Admiralty that at the end of last year she laid down two warships of, I think, 26,000 tons, or, at any rate of a tonnage far exceeding her limit of 10,000 tons under the Treaty of Versailles. The news that she was re-arming became general property.

Accordingly, on the 2nd February we had the London Declaration, which has been referred to by the hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall), but there is something in that Declaration to which I would draw the attention of the Committee. By that Declaration France and Britain agreed, in return for a general settlement which would include an Eastern Pact and a Western Pact, that, when Germany returned to the League,
"there would be simultaneously established an agreement regarding armaments which in the case of Germany would replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles."
I would draw particular attention to the word "simultaneously." It will be seen that this agreement suggested a bargain that, in return for Germany giving new security to Europe by joining the League again and signing an Eastern Pact, we would agree that Part V of the Treaty of Versailles should be replaced by a general armaments agreement. Consequently, it follows that the giving to Germany of the part of the agreement which she wants weakens the bargaining power of the other nations in regard to the part of the agreement which they want, and, therefore, makes the prospect of a general settlement more remote. Moreover, under that agreement the two Governments state that they are agreed that neither Germany nor any other Power whose armaments have been defined by the Peace Treaty is entitled by unilateral action to modify its obligations, and at Stresa, when Italy came in, it was stated that:
"The three Powers … find themselves in complete agreement in opposing by all practicable means any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe and will act in close and cordial collaboration for this purpose."
Finally, there was the famous meeting at Geneva, when the Council of the League laid it down that:
"It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the other contracting parties."
It will be noticed that the word "parties" is in the plural. It seems to me that this agreement goes quite contrary to all those three resolutions—the resolution of the League of Nations, to which we were a party, the resolution at Stresa, and the London resolution of February last.

What happened? On the 21st May, Herr Hitler demanded a naval strength equal to 35 per cent. of the British Navy, and it has already been announced that he had been constructing submarines. As a result of that, we had certain naval discussions, after which the whole of Herr Hitler's claim was conceded without any modification. It was conceded on the 18th June, an historic date—the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo; and it has been suggested on the Continent that that date was fixed by the German delegates because it was the date when the Prussians and the English were fighting against the French. Certainly it has been made use of in propaganda on the Continent. I would like to ask the Government why they were in such a hurry to sign that agreement. We informed the French Government that discussions were going on, and the French Note was only received on the morning of the 18th June, having been delayed owing to the fall of the. French Government and the formation of a new Government. The French Note objected to the agreement, and desired that it should be further discussed, but a few hours later, without acceding to the French request and without any delay at all, we hurriedly signed the agreement.

We have been told by the Government that, if Great Britain had insisted on prior consultation with her friends or with the other nations, the Agreement would have been lost. What does that mean? It means that we were faced by a German ultimatum: "Either sign this or we will go away and build up to greater strength." As a result, the British Government surrendered; apparently there was no bargaining whatsoever. No doubt there were points that the British Government would have liked to be brought into the Agreement. For example, as I pointed out to-day at Question Time, we cannot begin to replace obsolete battleships until January, 1937, and, therefore, we should have tried, if we were going to have this agreement at all, to get the German Government, in consideration of our agreeing to a settlement with them, to delay the construction of their battleships, so that we should all be able to start fair—[HON. MEMBERS: "They had already laid them down!"]—They could have stopped going on with them if we had made a bargain of that kind.

Then there is the question of supervision It has always been suggested in all these agreements that there should be some kind of supervision so that we can see that the different categories are not exceeded. That was all the more important in this case seeing that Germany, as we now know, has been building submarines and large ships about which nobody in this country apparently had any correct information. Unless we have supervision, therefore, it is possible that the same thing may happen again. Then there is this arrangement about submarines. Germany is not only to have 45 per cent., instead of 35 per cent., but she can build up to parity with us without our consent, merely by notifying us of her intentions. It has been stated on behalf of the Government that the German Government have a minimum requirement of submarines apart from the number that we have. Therefore, if as a result of some naval conference it were agreed or proposed that our submarines should be cut down in number by one-half, that would mean that the German Government would consider then that 35 or 45 per cent. of our strength would not be sufficient. If they are to make a stipulation of that kind—as has been stated on behalf of the Government—that makes any international arrangement about the limitation of the number of submarines practically impossible.

Further, we were not allowed to consult our friends. We were told that the Agreement had to be signed there and then or not at all. There has been a good deal of controversy as to who won the battle of Jutland, but there was no doubt as to who won the victory in concluding this Agreement on 18th June. It was won by Herr Ribbentrop and his delegation. It was not only a defeat for our own interests but a defeat also for the collective system and a defeat for the principles embodied in the agreements we have made. In my view other countries are justified in considering that the signing of this Agreement was an act of bad faith. It is contrary to the Treaty of Versailles, which is still a legal document, and therefore in my view it is illegal and ultra vires; and, if there were any international tribunal which had the power to settle this thing—and I am not sure that there is not such a tribunal in existence—I think it would have no alternative but to say that that was so. The Foreign Secretary has said in defence of this Agreement that it was to the advantage of other naval Powers, that it would not leave the Baltic States to the mercy of Germany, and that in his opinion it would further a general agreement for the reduction or limitation of naval armaments. I want to examine for a moment these particular points. Take the argument that it would not leave the Baltic States at the mercy of Germany and that it would be to the advantage of other naval Powers. On 6th July, 1935, there appeared in the "Times" a long article from their Scandinavian correspondent in which he discusses the effects of the naval Agreement upon sea power in the Baltic. These are some of the things he said:
"The German rearmament admitted by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement upsets the naval equilibrium in Northern Europe which dates from the end of the War. That equilibrium gave Sweden. Finland, Norway and Denmark 17 years of effortless security, during which they began to feel that they only among European States had solved the problems of peace and disarmament. By this agreement to her naval rearmament, Germany in the Swedish view more than recaptures her pre-war position in the Baltic."
The article goes on to say that a Swedish Liberal paper, whose name I will not attempt to translate, says:
"The German Fleet will now be in unchallenged control of the Baltic. Every new unit added to the German Fleet makes Sweden's position so much the worse. Even before 1914 our position was better as then the Russian and German Fleets about balanced."
The article goes on:
"Commenting upon Sir Samuel Hoare's statement in the House of Commons last week the same newspaper, one of the most responsible organs of Swedish opinion, goes on to say: 'Since England has allowed the Baltic and the Skagerack to be alienated from the sphere of British interests we have only France to look to for our support.'"
It goes on to discuss the position of Denmark and says:
"It means that the problem of Danish National defence will have to be considered afresh. Moreover, British superiority in the North Sea is now believed to be at an end."
Then with regard to Finland:
"In Finland the revival of German naval strength will prove an encouragement to the irresponsible Nationalist element, who, in spite of the constant official discouragement, seek in Russia a legitimate field for expansion. The first effect of the Naval Agreement has been to strengthen the hands of all those who are in favour of naval rearmament and air force extensions … The days of disarmament are over in Sweden."
It is quite certain that other States not mentioned in the article, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania feel themselves greatly in danger by the Agreement because in the Baltic they will be placed at the mercy of German naval power.

Then let us take the case of France. France is a country with two sea-boards—the Mediterranean and the Channel—and she has a large Colonial Empire to defend. Yet under this Agreement I understand that Germany will be allowed to construct 166,000 tons of new battleships whereas the present strength of France in modern battleships, including not only those built and building but those which are projected, is only 154,000 tons. That would give the German battle fleet a superiority over the French. That will certainly lead to a big increase in the French Navy. It was suggested the other day that before the War the French Navy was in a position of considerable inferiority to the German Navy and that by this Agreement Germany would be placed in a position of inferiority to the French. But it must be remembered, as I have pointed out previously, that before the War we had a naval agreement with France under which France was able to transfer ships to the Mediterranean while we defended the Northern coasts of France in the North Sea. That agreement does not exist to-day, and France can no longer rely on the British Navy to defend her Northern coasts. Instead of that, we have an agreement with Germany. It seems to me that the only Powers who will be helped by this Agreement are Japan in the East, and Italy in the Mediterranean—because it seems to me that the French Fleet will have to be concentrated in the North Sea, and the British Fleet as well, and that we shall leave Italy in mastery of the Mediterranean. So far as the Far East is concerned, Japan will be supreme there.

As for the general agreement suggested by the Foreign Secretary, so far as I can see the only result of this will be an armaments race which will be to the benefit of the armament firms in every country in the world. What about the effect on our own country? As was mentioned this afternoon at question time, in two years' time practically all our battle fleet will consist of old and obsolescent vessels. I think the position is that in two years' time, when we are released from the provisions of the Treaties of London and Washington, we shall have only three battleships under 20 years of age. All the others will be over 20 years old. By that time some of these new German ships will possibly be ready—certainly before we have finished building our new ships. We were told that seven months ago the Germans had laid down a programme of two 26,000-ton battleships; two 10,000-ton cruisers; 16 very large destroyers of 1,625 tons displacement with 5-inch guns, practically equivalent to light cruisers; 20 submarines of 250 tons, six of 500 tons and two large submarines of 750 tons. She is laying down now in this year's programme more submarines than she had when the war broke out in 1914. Perhaps the First Lord will tell us what the ultimate battle fleet of Germany will be under this Agreement and under the arrangements now being made? It seems to me that under the tonnage allotted to her Germany will have five battleships of 26,000 tons in addition to the three ships of the "Deutschland" class that she has already got. These vessels will be supported by a very large fleet of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Many of these ships will be in commission before any of our modern ships will be ready.

Another point is that many people believe that there is some naval agreement between Germany and Japan. These two powerful nations are now outside the League and now own no allegiance to the Covenant. It is quite certain that the new German Fleet combined with the Japanese Fleet will be much stronger than the British Fleet. In addition, the German Fleet, being all concentrated in the North Sea, will prevent the British Navy from fulfilling in distant waters its obligations under the League Covenant if ever it is called upon to carry out those obligations. The British Fleet will be concentrated in the North Sea and there will be naval ports constructed in the North Sea. Rosyth and other ports, harbours and dockyards used in the war will be re-opened, and all this will lead to more reconstruction and more expenditure. I see that the "Berliner Tageblatt" says that this Agreement
"will give Germany strength to assert her mission in the North Sea and the Baltic."
It seems to me very strange that the Admiralty should have agreed to that plan which is so greatly detrimental not only to our own interests but to the system of collective security in the world.

It is also true that this Agreement contains many of the features of a potential alliance. For example, the British Government can tell the German naval authorities that if they wish they can increase their navy above the 35 per cent. if they feel they are threatened by increases in the French Navy. That can be done without consultation with any other nation at all. If the Germans say that they are in danger through re-building on the part of France, we ourselves can give the German naval authorities permission to increase their fleet. There are tendencies in this country in the newspaper Press and even in the Government to favour the Nazi regime in Germany, and these are having a great influence over the Admiralty and the Foreign Office. I agree that this matter should have been dealt with as suggested by my hon. Friend who opened this discussion. I think we should have stood for our collective security and said that any building by Germany beyond the terms laid down at Versailles would be illegal unless approved by general agreement, and we should have warned her that, if she did not conform to that general agreement, the other Powers would have to organise themselves and confront her with such a superiority that, even with her increase, she would be placed in a position of hopeless inferiority. Instead of doing that, the Government signed an Agreement which broke the Stresa Pact, and repudiated the collective front and will lead to an expansion of armaments and an increase of the power of the Nazi Government. Speaking for myself, I have always been ready to support expenditure to keep the Navy efficient for the defence of our shores and upholding international obligations and upholding the League. Also speaking personally, I am not prepared to vote a penny for ships that are to be used merely to carry out a policy of making Nazi Germany the predominant Power in Europe.

5.1 p.m.

The two hon. Members who have spoken from the Opposition benches have made a most powerful indictment against the whole policy of the Government in their naval Agreement with Germany. I endorse what they have said. It is a deplorable position in which this naval Agreement has placed us. We have made it behind the backs of those with whom we have undertaken to act. Hitherto, the word of England has been taken to be reliable and true. In making this Treaty, we have gone behind the Agreement that we made at Stresa and the resolutions that we were parties to at Geneva. Nothing could be more deplorable. There must be most unfortunate reactions on the whole of our foreign policy. It places this country in a highly dangerous position in naval matters. It ties our hands, but it does not necessarily tie the hands of Germany. The Prime Minister the other day stated that there is the greatest difficulty in getting information about armaments, whether naval, military or air, in autocratic countries whereas in democratic countries that information is almost public property. That is true. Germany is governed by an autocracy and has all the elements of secrecy in the carrying out of her naval policy. What is to bind Germany to this Agreement? We are bound, and, if we broke it, we should be accused of having broken an agreement. I will ask another question. What Treaty or engagement has Germany kept since the War? Germany has become almost a professional treaty-breaker. Yet you have nothing but the word of the German Government to guarantee the fulfilment of this Agreement, which you cannot accurately check and which you are obliged to accept by the Treaty because, if you say, "We believe the German Government has not kept its engagements, and we must have an increased programme," you will immediately cause diplomatic repercussions.

What are the British Admiralty going to do about this? They showed us at Spithead the other day a most admirably managed naval review, but, when analysed, the position is not satisfactory. Allusion has already been made to our deplorable position as regards battleships. We shall have to deal with that question, because it is unthinkable that there should be a compact, completely modern and ultra powerful, if small, fleet of battleships stationed at naval bases close to our shores of which we had only too great experience in the great War. We are forced for our own safety to take immediate measures to meet the modern vessels which Germany already has under construction. There has been no proposal made, and we have had too much experience of late years of the dilatory methods of the Admiralty in laying down a few keel plates in the financial year for which construction has been authorised and spreading construction over a very long period. It is the same with cruisers. What are we going to do about cruisers? A very large proportion of the cruisers now figuring as effective will be obsolete in two or three years. If we are to be safe on the seas, immediate steps will have to be taken to construct modern cruisers. Yet we are tied by the London Agreement, which was made greatly to our disadvantage, restricting our replacement of worn-out vessels but allowing the other parties to the agreement to replace their vessels at a much earlier date. There is in that treaty an escalator clause. If we find that, by reason of the construction of other countries, the naval position warrants it, we can claim to increase the number of our cruisers. That becomes extremely urgent at the moment because ships of the "Hawke" and "Frobisher" class are due to be put out of commission and thrown on the scrap heap. They are, however, effective ships and are urgently needed.

The position in regard to submarines is even worse. After all, cruisers and battleships take time to construct, but submarines can be constructed with great rapidity. Their parts can be made in different factories scattered over a wide area, and they can be quickly assembled and launched. In fact, a very large increase of submarines can be made secretly, and they can be in the water almost before anyone knows anything about it. Yet the Admiralty agreed to this enormous increase of German submarine power, far beyond anything that the other Powers would be disposed to agree to, and contrary to the policy for the suppression of submarines, which they have always declared to be their desire and which most Englishmen desire. What does Germany want with this immense submarine fleet? She had experience of the use of submarines in the War. Does anyone think that that experience is going to be allowed to lie idle and that she will not make use of it? What is this fleet for? Obviously, it is to bring pressure upon other naval Powers, particularly upon this country. Germany is out to repair the damages of the War. If we have not a fleet which can hold its own, we shall have to submit and pay blackmail to German pressure when she is ready. We want in these days a firm, patriotic, naval policy, We have not had it from recent Boards of Admiralty, and I trust that my right hon. Friend will be prepared with such a declaration.

Finance is a difficulty. We are driven into a corner. We cannot finance the necessary replacements brought about by the neglect of earlier Boards of Admiralty by the ordinary method of charging it against revenue. The time has come when we shall have to face a naval loan. There are great advantages in a naval loan with payments spread over a reasonable term of years. It can be done very cheaply now. It will immediately find employment on a large scale in the shipyards and the works of Sheffield, Leeds, Birmingham, and elsewhere, and it will keep together a band of skilled workmen whom we may need at any moment and who are gradually being dispersed. There is every reason why we should have a sufficient naval loan launched at the earliest possible date to enable us to make good these alarming and dangerous naval deficiencies which are driving some of us almost to despair. England has always depended on her Navy. The time has not come when she can cast her Navy aside. A Navy which is not equal to its task and not able to keep us in peace and security in face of other Powers which desire to be aggressive is a delusion and a waste of money. On all grounds, I urge upon the Government to realise what they have done by this naval Agreement and what it means to Germany and to ourselves, and to take the necessary measures for our security and protection.

5.13 p.m.

I have listened to a good part of the Debate. So far the speakers on both sides are in complete agreement with one thing, that is, in disapproving the Anglo-German Agreement, some from one point of view and some from another. I regret to have to strike a different note myself. It was to me quite incomprehensible. It was very strange certainly coming immediately after the Stresa Conference, which was summoned for the purpose of denouncing the unilateral rearmament of Germany without the consent of all the signatories to the Treaty of Versailles. There was no point in that Conference unless it was summoned for the purpose of considering a definite breach of the Treaty in disarmament. Herr Hitler had announced that he proposed to build up a great army and that he was building a great air fleet, and he also said he was building submarines. The Stresa Conference met to deal with that situation. It brought together statesmen from various countries in Europe to denounce that breach of the Treaty. Not satisfied with the meeting at Stresa, there was a second meeting at Geneva to consider what should be done in the event of that process going on, and what sanctions could be applied. A committee was appointed to consider that question, and the British Government invited the Germans over here to consider what measure of rearmament was to be permitted to them in view of the departure from the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. This was a bilateral conference. Other Powers were not present, the Powers represented at Stresa not being assenting parties. First you condone the breaches of treaty which had already been committed. But you are not satisfied with that. You proceed to arrange for further departures: an increase in the battleships of Germany, an increase in her destroyers, and, most fatal of all in my judgment, an increase in submarines. I can understand the feelings of Italy and of France when those negotiations were proceeding, and a part of the Agreement which especially dismayed me was the light-hearted way in which we not merely condoned the number of submarines constructed, but actually arranged with Germany that she be allowed to construct a great many more—I am speaking from memory, but I am not sure that it is not twice as many as she has already constructed—and under certain conditions that she should increase her armaments not by the 35 per cent., but up to a limit of 100 per cent. under certain conditions. Having regard to our experiences of the War in reference to submarines that was an extraordinary proposal.

We heard a very striking speech from the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Vice-Admiral Campbell), and I entirely agree with that speech, when he recalled the incidents of the War and how near we came to being beaten by the submarine. I may say we were more nearly beaten by the submarine than by the German guns, the German air fleet or the German army. It came very near. We were within a few weeks of starvation, and if we had not devised some means to check the destruction of our merchant ships we should have been beaten, the Allies would have been beaten, and Germany would have been triumphant. She thought that she was winning, and anybody who goes through the figures can see how, month by month, she was sinking our ships. The aggregate of ships, taking those of the Allies as well, that had been sunk to April, 1917, was something like 8,000,000 tons. It was a terrible figure. When you take all that into account, you begin to realise that the Germans had some reason to believe that they were going to pull it off. It is quite true that we were able to devise means of counteracting that, but what always happens between attack and defence is, that attack wins first of all, and then the defence finds some means of checking it, then the attack begins again and finds some other measure of getting round the defences. Luckily before that could take place the Germans were beaten, but I would not like to say that the last word in the power of the submarine was uttered in the War of 1914–18.

I agree with the hon. and gallant Admiral that it was on the whole the cruellest method of war. It was an attack upon civilians. Their ships were sunk, sometimes scores of miles away from the shore in very rough weather, especially in the Atlantic off the coast of Ireland, and they had a very poor chance of the boats getting alongside. The losses of our sailors through submarines were almost equal to the losses of those who were engaged in the Navy in proportion to the number of people in the Mercantile Marine. You cannot go to any seaport town now and see the lists of those who fell in the War without being staggered at the number of sailors—in every little seaport town along the coast—who were drowned by these submarines. I cannot understand why three months after Stresa the Government agreed not merely to condone the action of the Germans, but agreed that they should increase the number of their submarines, and that, under certain conditions, they could even treble them.

I have had no explanation and I cannot comprehend it, especially as there was an opportunity afforded, at any rate, for another attempt to abolish the submarine altogether. There is no difference of opinion between the right hon. Gentleman opposite and myself as to the fact that the Germans were prepared to co-operate for the abolition of the submarine, and I should have thought that before we had entered into a bilateral agreement, we should, at any rate, have made another effort to put an end to the submarine altogether. It may be said that we had already attempted it. The Government of which I was the head tried to do it, but the French refused. I am not sure whether the Japanese refused then or not, but the conditions are different now from when that proposal was put before us. I have never doubted that it was to our interest, as the hon. and gallant Admiral said, to abolish it. I never doubted that we should be only too delighted to abolish it. The whole point was, when there was an opportunity of co-operation with Germany in an effort to abolish it, why we should have agreed with them to increase the number before making another attempt to abolish it altogether.

When the French refused to agree, the conditions were very different. The Germans had no submarines. The French, therefore, had nothing with which they could bargain, and bargaining with us did not matter. They did not want to build submarines against us, and they knew perfectly well that we did not want to build submarines against them, but the Germans were starting to build submarines. They were building a formidable flotilla, and, after all, they are the masters of the submarine. I do not want to say a word about the French Navy, but they were not comparable to the Germans in the matter of handling the submarine, or to ourselves in the method of dealing with the submarine. They had the most wonderful Army in the world. But here were the Germans beginning to build, people who knew how to handle submarines and had experience in handling them, and had done it with infinite, deadly and diabolical skill. It would have been worth while making another effort when the French knew that if the Germans built submarines they were in a fairly precarious position. They might very easily be cut off from their Colonies, a very serious matter for them. Their building of submarines is of very little use in checking submarines, and, whatever the number they may build, it will not enable them to protect their mercantile marine and their troopships against the German submarines.

Therefore, it would have been worth while, when the Germans came along and said: "We are going to start building submarines, but we are willing to enter into a pact with other nations to abolish them altogether," taking advantage of the suggestion. I ventured to put a question upon the subject, but I was referred to reports in the Press. I am sorry that when I got my notice from the hon. Gentleman over there I was not present. I was in the country at the time. It adds neither to his dignity nor authority to suggest that I was afraid. I am not going to run away in this House. I will just say what the reports were to which I was alluding. Two of them appeared in papers that are supporters of the National Government, and others apeared in papers that are not supporters of the National Government. I will quote from the papers that support the National Government. I had not got them by me when I spoke in the Central Hall, and I was very general. So that there should not be any possible mistake as to what I meant, I instantly sent a copy of this document to the Press to make quite clear what it was to which I was alluding. Here is the "Scotsman," an out-and-out supporter of the National Government, never failing from the very first moment they came into existence:
"Indeed, I learn that during the initial stage of the recent Anglo-German talks, the German delegates suggested the insertion in the agreement of a clause pledging Germany to support any effort by Great Britain to secure the abolotion of the submarine. Our Government, however, refrained from including such a clause in the exchange of notes, lest it should be resented by France as aimed at herself, as the chief European champion of the submarine."
That appeared in the "Scotsman." I will give another paper which is quite consistent in support of the Government, and that is the "Liverpool Post":
"I understand, indeed, that during the critical stage in the recent Anglo-German conversations the German delegates, when discussing the undertaking to refrain from unrestricted submarine warfare, proposed the insertion in the agreement of a clause pledging their country to support any British move for the abolition of the submarine altogether. Our Ministers, however, out of consideration for France, who is the chief European champion of this weapon, did not agree."
I refrain from quoting other passages from papers which are critical of the Government. Here you have the "Scotsman" and the "Liverpool Post" making these categorical statements. Those two paragraphs appeared six days before I alluded to the matter in my speech. I said that I sincerely hoped that those statements were incorrect, because I still think it was a fatal error not to have postponed assenting to the construction of submarines by the Germans, until, at any rate, another effort had been made to abolish submarines altogether. Six days passed after those statements appeared. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, in his reply in the House, said that everybody knew it except me. When was a contradiction of those statements made? They are both highly reputable newspapers, and I have no doubt that the Admiralty have a full record of every reference to this subject in the Press. They must have a very careful press cutting agency for the purpose of collecting any reference to their work. Therefore, these statements must have been there.

Was the attention of the right hon. Gentleman called to those statements? If not, why for six days were they left uncontradicted, seeing that he said, in answer to the hon. Member for Rusholme (Mr. Radford), that it was most mischievous that foreign countries should be under the impression that we turned down an offer of this kind to suppress submarines. His view was that it was mischievous. Were the statements made by these newspapers corrected? If so, I have not seen the corrections. Six days after the statement appeared in those newspapers. I put my question in reference to it. Lest it should be suggested that I meant that the Germans proposed that if we dropped submarines they would drop them, let me say that that never entered my head. I was discussing the question of international agreement with regard to abolishing bombers, and then I came to submarines. I sent these quotations to the Press to make it clear what I was quoting, and I ask now why was not that statement contradicted if it was so very mischievous?

But what is far more important than any personal issue between the right hon. Gentleman and myself is that we should have agreed to enter into a Pact with Germany, the master of the submarine, who sunk millions of tons of our ships; that we should have entered into a pact with her not only condoning what she had done, but agreeing to her increasing the number of those deadly weapons, and in certain conditions agreeing that she was to treble the number. I am not surprised that there is no one in this House who has got up to defend those weapons. The right hon. Gentleman, even in his pretty careful reply, admitted that the matter was mentioned at the Naval Conference. According to the "Scotsman," the Germans made the actual proposal that a clause should be inserted in the Agreement for co-operation on the policy of submarines. The right hon. Gentleman does not deny that the Germans were quite prepared to co-operate. Herr Hitler said so in his speech. I am at a loss to understand, with all the recollections that I have of the terrible anxiety this country went through, and the appalling peril at one moment, why the Admiralty and the Government should have agreed to this particular clause in the Agreement, which recreates the same danger we had before.

5.35 p.m.

The hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall) brought forward the Amendment ostensibly because of the German Agreement, but in the course of his speech it was evident that his chief anxiety was not so much the German Naval Agreement but that this country would be forced to reconstruct her naval forces and to increase those forces above their present strength. The right hon. Member for Carnarvan Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) has drawn the attention of the Committee to the question of submarines and their total abolition. There is no hon. or right hon. Member, there is no one in this country who does not agree that if the abolition of submarines were a practical suggestion, the Government and everybody in the country would do everything in their power to bring it about. But is it not a fact that the French have always stood out against the abolition of the submarine? Have not the French consistently stated that the submarine was not an offensive but a defensive vessel in war, and is it not a fact that the French will not abolish submarines? We all agree in theory about the abolition of submarines. We as a nation have more to lose from submarine warfare than any other nation. We have more to gain by the abolition of submarine warfare than any nation. I ask the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs if he really thinks that it is a practical suggestion, which will be carried out, and that France willl agree to the abolition of submarines.

Having regard to the fact that Germany is beginning to build submarines, it would be a wise step on the part of France to enter into agreement to abolish them altogether. She has far more to lose by submarines than she has to gain, once Germany begins to build. The further answer to the hon. and gallant Member is that before we agreed to allow Germany to build submarines we ought to have made another effort, and have put off this Agreement.

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his answer, but the point really is this: have we not consistently stood for the abolition of submarines, and has not France consistently refused to agree to the abolition of submarines? The point is now put forward by the right hon. Gentleman that because Germany has started to build, France may change her opinion. I am afraid that I cannot agree with the right hon. Gentleman on that point.

It might have been worth trying, but we have been trying from the first day that submarines were constructed. In 1898–99, when the first Holland submarines were ordered by the American Government, we have been trying to abolish submarines. Up to that time we had stood out against the construction of submarines because we realised that our strength lay upon the surface of the water, and that immediately underwater attack was brought in we should be the nation to suffer most. It was not until the Americans ordered the first submarine that we started the construction of submarines in this country.

I would ask this question in regard to the Naval Agreement, and particularly in regard to Germany constructing submarines, which we all deplore. What action would the right hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members who take his point of view adopt if Germany continued to build submarines as well as other vessels of war? Germany has constructed an army, and an air force, and she intends to construct a navy. What action would those who are opposed to such construction take in order to stop Germany from doing it? That is a question which deserves an answer from those who oppose this Naval Agreement. It has never been answered. It is no good talking unless behind your talk you intend to act. What action do those who are opposed to this Agreement propose to take? What action could they take? How would they start to take action? There is only one possible way in which Germany could have been stopped from constructing her forces, which she has constructed to such a large extent up to the present time, and that is by going to war with her. There is no other way. She will not listen to argument. She insists on having her forces. She has already got most of them, and nothing but warlike action would have stopped her.

The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs shakes his head. What action would have stopped her? There is a great deal of argument in the country and in the House about collective security. Collective security is a very good thing in theory, a very excellent thing, but it is not a practical possibility. You will never get the nations to act collectively against any other nation at the dictation of the League of Nations. They will not do it. The whole of the Sanctions Clauses of the League of Nations break down. They will not be put into operation. No nation will do it. Japan on the question of economic sanctions left the League. Germany left the League. If there is any question of economic sanctions, which would have to be backed up by armed force, against Italy, she would at once leave the League. The collective security of which we talk so much, would not be put into operation. Would the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs suggest that this country should go to war with Italy to stop her from doing what she proposes? If not, what other action would he take? What could he do? These are questions to which I want an answer from the Opposition.

I do not like to interrupt, but I have dealt with that question. I spoke at great length on that question last week. It is very difficult to answer a question in debate in this way, but I am not shirking it. I dealt with that question on the Floor of the House, and I am perfectly prepared to do it again.

I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has said that. I was present throughout the whole of his speech on that occasion and he was asked categorically by the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) what action he would take. He was interrupted and invited to say what action he would take, and he gave no answer. And he cannot give an answer to-day.

If the hon. and gallant Member will look at the official report of my speech he will see that I gave an answer.

With all due respect, I disagree.

Another point in regard to submarines has been brought to the notice of the Committee by the right hon. Gentleman. He said perfectly truly, as all those who were at sea realised to the full—I happened to be one—that the gravest danger to this country during the late War was the unrestricted submarine warfare instituted by Germany in her submarine sinkings of merchant vessels, against the admitted rules of the sea, which up to that time had never been broken in warfare. We were not prepared for that submarine war. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs will agree that it was the lack of preparations to counter this submarine warfare that nearly led to this country being forced to sue for peace. That is not the position to-day. I trust that we have learned a lesson from the submarine warfare during the late War. It is true that when you have attack and defence, the projectile and the armour for example, it is always war between the two. First one gets on top, and then the other; one is always a little in advance of the other. Both sides to-day have advanced. The submarine has undoubtedly improved, but the methods of countering the submarine have also vastly improved, and I cannot conceive that we in this country will ever again be placed in the perilous position we were in during the late War owing to our entire lack of preparation for meeting the submarine menace, which no naval authority, or anyone else, had foreseen would be carried out, and which reacted like a boomerang on Germany.

There is another aspect of these attacks on merchant ships which is very serious, and that is attack by aircraft. There is to-day, at any rate, a convention, not signed by all the nations, that submarine warfare in future shall not be unrestricted, that there shall be some consideration for the people on board. But there are no rules whatever governing attack by aircraft. Aircraft carrying torpedoes, or guns, can do immense damage to merchant ships, perhaps not as certainly or effectively as a torpedo from a submarine, but they can and undoubtedly will attack merchant ships in probably the same way as the submarine attacked them in the late War. There is nothing to stop them, and we know the immense strength and menace of the air forces of foreign Powers. Are we adequately equipped to deal with that very serious menace? My point is this, that it is not only a question of the danger to our merchant craft from submarine warfare, but also the extreme danger from aircraft attack to which the Government will have to pay particular attention. No doubt they have done so; I do not suggest that they have not, but it is a question which is often forgotten.

The Debate to-day has centred on the position of our naval forces, and very rightly so, but in my opinion there is a considerable danger, due to the propaganda in the Press, and the Debates which have taken place in this House stressing the inferiority of this country in the air, that the public may be led to believe that, provided the air forces of this country are sufficiently strengthened, provided that we have such air forces as are necessary, all is well with us and our security. There is a danger that the public will be led to believe that the air is going to replace the Navy and carry out the duty of our cruisers in the protection of trade. The result is that the urgent need for a reconstruction, and bringing up to date, of our naval forces is likely, so far as the public are concerned, to recede into the background as a question with which to-day they are not primarily concerned. That is a very considerable danger. Of course it is not true.

The air forces can only be used for certain purposes and within certain limits. There are limits beyond which air forces are perfectly useless so far as the protection of trade is concerned; and, so far as the security of this country and the Empire from invasion is concerned, an air force can never stop it. The only possible way of giving security to this country and the Empire is by having such naval forces as are necessary for that security; it cannot be obtained in any other way. It is true that there must be co-operation between all the three services, but the Navy to-day is the key-stone of Imperial defence, as it has been in the past, and if we are to have security there is not the slightest doubt that we shall never get it, unless we reconstruct our Navy and bring it up to date and maintain it at a strength such as is necessary for the security of this country and the different units of the Empire, and for protecting the sea routes connecting all parts of the Empire.

The Naval Review to many people may have been a wonderful sight, but I say quite frankly that to me it was a very sad sight. It was a terrible thing for a naval officer to see the ships assembled at Spit-head representing the might and naval power of this great country, which has at all times depended entirely on sea power. Only two battleships and one battle cruiser will be under age on 31st December, 1936—all the others obsolete; the cruisers very insufficient in numbers and not of the design we require—entirely due to the Washington Conference and the London Naval Agreement. We were not able to build the ships we required. We started building 10,000-ton cruisers, which we do not want, because of the Washington Treaty. They are too big to work with the battle fleet, and much too large to put on the trade routes. They are weak in their hull and badly armed. They are poor ships. We did not want them but we had to build them; 10,000 tons was the limit for cruisers and all nations built them. We cut down our numbers. We have had to be satisfied with 50 cruisers, although we know that those who are in the best position to judge have said over and over again that 70 is the minimum number of cruisers we require. We have not got them and so far as I know we do not know that we are going to have them—at least the Government have put forward no programme.

Public opinion has been mentioned. It has been said that it would not stand for an increase in our naval power. I entirely disagree. I am prepared to stand on any platform in the country, before any audience, and am quite certain that I would carry the majority of the audience if all the facts were clearly put before them and it was known that we had no security now, and that the navy as it is to-day cannot give them security. I am sure you would get an overwhelming majority in favour of this country, not only having a naval force equal to that of other countries, but a naval force of the strength which is necessary for the security of this country and our Empire.

5.54 p.m.

Before I answer any of the detailed criticisms which have been levelled against the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, let me bring the Committee back to the position under which we are working in regard to the navies of the world. Briefly the position is this. After December, 1936, all the naval agreements under which we have been working for 16 years come to an end, and unless we can put something in the place of these treaties and agreements, all navies for the future will be entirely unrestricted and unlimited. This comes about primarily because Japan has denounced the Treaty of Washington. Many hard things have been said about these naval treaties and agreements, but I do not think that anything but good can be said of the Treaty of Washington. The Treaty of Washington, in my opinion and in that of the Government, and I think also in the opinion of the majority of this House, has conferred enormous benefits on all maritime powers, because it has prevented a race in naval armaments, cut down expenditure and saved the taxpayers of every nation which has a navy.

But it has done something far more important than that. It has maintained the peace for the last 16 years, and it has maintained peace because the ratio adopted under that treaty provided a standard of defence appropriate to the defence needs of the Powers concerned, and at the same time gave no Power such a preponderance in naval strength above any other as to make it safe for that country to risk aggression. Those are the benefits we have gained under the Treaty of Washington—greatly reduced navies, giving us the defence we require, and peace, because no Government has such a preponderating navy as to make it worth its while to go to war. I am sure that I shall have the whole Committee with me when I say that we must do our utmost to try to perpetuate that state of affairs, to get regulation and restriction in naval armaments, always maintaining the principle that adequate defence must be given to every country.

Unfortunately, if we are to do this—and I can assure the Committee that we are working heart and soul to do it—we shall have to do it by some means other than the Treaty of Washington. That is because the principle of ratio has had to be abandoned. We have had to give up any idea of ratio for the future because some countries felt it wounding to their national pride to have to accept a naval strength permanently inferior to that of some other country. We, therefore, have had to abandon the principle of ratio and instead of asking naval Powers what the ultimate strength of their navy was going to be, we have to ask, what size navy do you propose to have in 1942? That in fact is the date we have taken. As I say, we have had to abandon all ideas of ratios in trying to perpetuate the state under which we have been living under the Treaty of Washington, and we have gone in for a system of programmes, because some countries think it against their national dignity to accept permanently a ratio much below that of any other country. We, therefore, go to all those countries and say, "What fleet do you intend to have in 1942?" and if we can then, having pooled all the replies, by agreement accommodate all these various naval strengths in such a way as to provide adequate defence for the country, making it, as a corollary to that, exceedingly unlikely that any country can attack another with any chance of ultimate success, we have achieved something of enormous and almost unparalleled beenfit to the taxpayers of all countries concerned. We shall have done far more—we shall have cotnributed very greatly to the general pacification of the world. That is the object in view.

Does the right hon. Gentleman mean that we are dropping ratios altogether?

Yes, we cannot go on with ratios because some countries do not like them. We, therefore, go in stages—one step enough for us. We, therefore, say: "Let us have another conference in 1942 and try to take it on by stages." The Committee will agree that if by this means we can hold the peace of the world till 1942 it is pretty good.

Yes, but I have not mentioned Germany. This is the general agreement we are trying to arrive at by the Conference that we hope to have.

No, Germany is included. With this object in view we have been having bilateral and confidential conversations with a good many countries, with France, Japan and America. These bilateral conversations are not, as some people fall into the error of conceiving, conferences at which you can settle anything which is going to be generally agreed by all. They are bilateral talks which pave the way for the Conference that we hope may be held at the end of this year. My hon. Friend opposite who opened the Debate said: "In putting forward these programmes you must have given some sort of idea of your programme to other countries. Cannot the House of Commons know what that programme was?" Anyone who knows me knows that I have always stood up for the rights of the House of Commons as much as anyone in this House, but I should like to say this: If these programmes that are purely hypothetical and depend upon the programmes of other countries are discussed in this House, if the confidential bilateral talks are openly discussed here, it will be absolutely impossible ever to arrive at a general agreement.

I do ask for the indulgence of the Committee on this matter. I will not go so far as to say that the public interests of the country are endangered, but I do say that it is against the public interests and the peace of the world to discuss these things, and I do ask the House not to press me in this direction. I would add this: The House of Commons has everything entirely in its own hands. Suppose that we do come to some general agreement at the Conference. The House can turn down that agreement if it chooses. But it has got something much more powerful than that; it has got absolute control of anything that the Government does in this way, because every year the First Lord has to come to the House with the Navy Estimates, and the House has absolute and perfect control of all expenditure and all programmes.

International agreement is not an easy thing to arrive at. Everyone who has tried it knows that perfectly well. You make it, in the opinion of the Government, absolutely impossible unless we are allowed to have the confidential talks with other Powers. It is exceedingly difficult to arrive at any agreement. I have compared it with putting together the pieces in a jig-saw puzzle. That is especially so with these naval conferences. But it is not the ordinary jig-saw puzzle. It is a jig-saw puzzle in which the pieces are continually altering in shape and size and colour. Until recently it has proved almost impossible to get any two pieces together. I have felt that if only we could get two important pieces together a start would be made towards finishing the whole puzzle.

For this reason, the Admiralty welcomed the proposal of a great country like Germany to fix her navy for ever at a point in relation to our own which we could view without undue anxiety. We would much rather Germany had not increased her fleet. But we can accept this 35 per cent. without undue anxiety. The Committee must remember that the general agreement which we hope to arrive at by a conference, an international agreement on naval affairs, would not be any good at all unless Germany were in that agreement. I am astonished at what I may call the very internationally-minded Members who are horrified at anything we have done in this direction, and especially at any arrangement come to at all after the months and years of talks we have had. We have done something, and that we have done it quickly seems to have horrified them still more.

I have tried for the past few years to face up to realities, and I have received the querulous condemnation of a good many persons in this country. The Committee must realise that we have to face up to realities, especially when dealing with dictators. The Committee must not forget, when they talk about allowing Germany to do this or that, that Germany has laid down this programme and that the ships are on the stocks. She has started it. She did not ask us, and we did not give her permission. I want to put a question to the critics who have spoken this afternoon. Perhaps the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) would answer this question: What would he have done? How would he have stopped Germany building? What would he have done if Germany had asked for 50 per cent.? Germany might have done that; she might have asked for a 100 per cent. navy. I ask the Committee to face up to the facts. Suppose that Germany had asked for that, what are the two alternatives before us? My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor) is the only one who has faced up to the position at all. There are two alternatives. One is to prevent Germany by force from doing it. Is anyone prepared to do that? Is the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs prepared to do it? The other alternative is to carry out a great expansion of our own Navy.

Let the Committee realise what I believe is perfectly true. Although this country may temporarily forget its Navy—and it has done so—the need for a Navy is bred in the bone of the British people. They know that every source of their national wealth depends on the Navy, and, if they should ever think that our Navy is incapable of fulfilling its duty, they would force an expansion on this country, no matter what Government might be in power, which would be very much more than we want and a wasteful expansion, and that is the very last thing that the Admiralty wish to see done. Therefore, I say that when Germany came forward with an offer of 35 per cent. we could accept it without undue anxiety. I think it was of great benefit to ourselves and to the world in general when we closed with that offer.

I have been asked: Why was not all this done through the League of Nations, through the Disarmament Conference? It has been said that this is a blow to the League of Nations. I entirely disagree. The Naval Treaties have never had anything to do with the League; they have been entirely outside that body. How then can it be said that we are dealing a blow at the League? The League exists for limitation, if you cannot get a reduction of armaments. Surely anything that is done in that direction, by limitation, must redound to the prestige of the League. It has been said also: Why has not this been done in conjunction with other Powers? That has been said to-day by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs and by others. Very hard things have been said across the Channel in this respect, but not by all, not by everyone. The President of the Senate Foreign Affairs Com- mittee pointed out a short time ago that there is nothing in the Franco-British Declaration of 3rd February to prohibit Great Britain from making a preliminary bilateral agreement with Germany, any more than it prohibits Italy taking separate action in Africa, or France doing the same with regard to Soviet Russia. He said further, and this is very important:
"Have we not perhaps irritated our friends for the last few years with our everlasting mania for linking into a whole all the questions under discussion in order not to solve any of them? If the 'Multilateralism' dear to our bureaucrats has hitherto resulted in nothing but trivial arguments, is it not understandable that the British should prefer less dilatory methods than those which have resulted in the re-armament of Germany on land, not to 35 per cent. but to 130 per cent. of the French Army?"
I do ask those hon. Members who have spoken to-day as if we had committed a sin by making this Agreement because we did not do everything together, whether they think we should have waited till everything could be done together. My answer is that if we had waited for that, nothing would have been done. What has this "multilateralism," which is not my word, cost Europe? In January, 1934, Germany was prepared to accept 300,000 military effectives and under certain conditions 200,000. To-day it is 550,000. It is the same with the air. I put it to this Committee that we could not afford to have this same sort of thing happen with regard to the Navy. Our responsibilities are too great, responsibilities not only to our own country and Empire, but to the world. There are two things that I have found in my discussions that it is possible to get international agreement about. The first is that no one thinks that the British Fleet can ever conceivably be used for aggressive purposes, and the second is that the ability of the British Fleet to fulfil its historic function in this world is the greatest factor for peace that the world has.

I now come to the point that has been raised of the superiority that France is given over Germany by this Agreement. In the old days before the War France had an inferiority at sea as regards Germany of 30 per cent. To-day we have given her over 40 per cent. superiority, and it is a permanent superiority, over Germany. The hon. Member for Brox- towe (Mr. Cocks) said that before the War we had alliances. I would ask if Locarno means nothing to our friends over the Channel. Let us look at the figures. We are to have 100, France 50, and Germany 35. This means that under Locarno, France would have 150 to Germany's 35, a superiority of over 400 per cent., which I should have thought security enough. In conclusion of this part of my speech, I would remind the Committee to consider the position of this country if we had turned down the offer that Germany made, and I was standing at this Box defending the rejection. I should be very sorry to be doing that. I should have had the same opposition, and I think it would probably have come from exactly the same quarters. It is not that I should have minded that very much, but what I should have minded is that a Board of Admiralty which gave advice to a Government to reject this offer, and a Government which accepted that advice, would sooner or later stand overwhelmingly condemned by humanity at the bar of history.

I now come to the point more or less of detail raised by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs. I have worked for many years with the right hon. Gentleman and I have worked against him. I worked just as hard for him as I worked against him, and even when I have been working against him, I have never been able to repress a feeling of admiration for the right hon. Gentleman. One of the reasons, among very many, is that when he wants to make a thing clear, he is a master of clarity, but when he wants to make a thing a little confused, he is an artist. The right hon. Gentleman's intervention in the Debate to-day has, if anything, by bringing in personal opinions and statements, made confusion even a little more confounded. If the Committee will forgive me, I should like to go back to the genesis of this argument. If we start at the beginning, we see that the right hon. Gentleman on the 2nd July said he was told that Germany offered to abolish submarines altogether and that we were not prepared to accept this: was this true? That was not the statement that was in the "Scotsman" I understand, though I never saw it, and I will make two observations about that. I will use the right hon. Gentleman's adjective. He said it had been called a pernicious statement. I think it is a reasonable word to use, because a statement of that sort is bound to affect our bona fides vis-a-vis foreign countries, and bound to weaken what we are trying to do in the way of peace. That little question at the end cannot absolve the right hon. Gentleman for making that insinuation. I am not a lawyer, but I am told that if somebody says: "I am told Mr. Jones murdered his wife. Is that true? I hope not, but I should like to know if it is true," that does not help him if Mr. Jones goes for a libel action.

The second observation that I would make is that the insinuation is really entirely without any foundation. We have tried—and we have been laughed at by many hon. Members in the House who have said, "Of course you have tried"—from the beginning, and we are going on trying, we are trying every day, to abolish submarines. It was started, I think, with the Treaty of Washington; it was put in the forefront of the programme that my right hon. Friend who is now Home Secretary made in a speech at Geneva in February, 1932, and, as my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council said, it was fought tooth and nail all through the London Conference, and we are going on fighting it. Do not let the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs think we have dropped it. We are going on fighting, and it stands in the forefront of Britain's naval requirement to abolish the inhuman weapon of the submarine. I took the opportunity which was given me the next day of denying very emphatically that statement, and I am rather afraid the right hon. Gentleman thought it was too emphatic.

He should have been the last to complain of that. I denied it at once. The right hon. Gentleman immediately saw that he had been lamentably misinformed by somebody, and he adopted the tactics that one of our destroyers would undertake when by bad manoeuvring it has allowed itself to come under damaging fire. A destroyer turns away and emits a smoke screen, and the right hon. Gentleman did very much the same thing, hoping that many people would say: "There is no smoke without fire." That same evening, in a statement to the Press, the right hon. Gentleman completely altered his tactics. He now claimed to have definite information that the German delegates expressed their readiness to subscribe to a clause to be inserted in the recently completed agreement, the effect of which would be that Germany would support the British Government in any attempt by the latter to bring about the abolition of the submarine, and that this suggestion was not entertained by the British Government. The Committee will observe the complete change of ground of the right hon. Gentleman. He abandoned the insinuation, as well he might, that we had opposed the abolition of submarines, and the new allegation was that we refused to incorporate the common accord of England and Germany for the abolition of submarines in the recently published agreement.

The new allegation was equally without foundation. I explained to the Press on the 4th July that at no time was it suggested that any such clause should be inserted in the agreement and that, as I said, had been confirmed by the German delegation. I got their permission to say so. I explained that what the German delegation had done was to express themselves as in accord with us in our desire for the abolition of submarines by international agreement, and with the assent of the German delegation I quoted the relevant passage from the record of our talks:
"Germany supports the Brtiish Government's desire for the complete abolition of submarines, and if it could be achieved would be prepared to scrap the submarines they might have built or building at the time."
"At the time" means the time of the International Conference, and I cannot help thinking that there has been confusion of thought on the part of the right hon. Gentleman and also of my hon. Friend who opened this Debate by confusing these bilateral talks which lead up to a conference with the conference itself, because we cannot know until the conference takes place if we can get general agreement on this question, and without general agreement neither Germany nor England is prepared to abolish submarines. We cannot know if we can get general agreement until that conference takes place which these bilateral talks are working up to. The right hon. Gentleman, in a further statement to the Press, continued to assert that, in spite of my statement to the contrary, the Germans had suggested the insertion of a clause of that kind in the recently published agreement, and he again asked why that clause had not been inserted. My answer, already made on the authority of both delegations—and they were the only people present—which I now repeat, is that no such clause was ever suggested or contemplated by anybody. An agreement that set out to deal with one thing, namely, the ratio between the naval forces of Germany and ourselves, was not the proper place for such a clause. We have talked about many things and agreed about many things, while some remain to be agreed or disagreed. Very many important things were discussed, such as qualitative limitation, but all these things, as the result of these talks, can only be put forward when we get round the table with other countries. We are very glad to have Germany with us in our attempt to abolish submarines. I am afraid that the right hon. Gentleman has been misinformed and I am afraid that, having seen that he has rather tried to confuse the issue.

I have waited until the right hon. Gentleman finished on that issue before interrupting him because I understood he wanted to make a full statement. With regard to the clause which it is suggested the Germans proposed, that is a definite statement made both by the "Scotsman" and by the "Liverpool Post."

I refer to reports in the papers, but the question which matters is this: Did the Germans, either at preliminary talks or at the formal conference, actually intimate to the Admiralty that they were prepared to co-operate with us in any efforts we initiated to abolish the submarine? [HON. MEMBERS: "He said so."] If he said so he can say it again for himself. Did we turn it down on the ground that France and the others would not accept it?

I have said over and over again that we raised the question with them, that they said they would co-operate with us, and that we decided to put it forward when we got the general conference, when something could be done.

Yes, after you had agreed to increase the number of German submarines.

How would the right hon. Gentleman have prevented Germany from increasing their submarines? Unless he is prepared to answer that question, it seems to me to be futile making a remark of that kind. We made every effort, we are prepared to go on making every effort, and we hope we shall be successful; and we shall have a better chance because we have Germany to help us. Will the right hon. Gentleman excuse me if I say again that he has tried to confuse the issue because he knows that there are a great many people in this country who say, if you go on arguing long enough about a thing, there must be something in it. I say categorically—and the right hon. Gentleman ought to take the testimony of both delegations—that there is nothing in any of the allegations he makes, and, I think I am safe in saying, in any allegation he throws out in future. If the right hon. Gentleman will not believe me and will not believe the Germans, but somehow relies on some supernatural source of information, then I have nothing more to say.

6.35 p.m.

The First Lord said the other day on a festive occasion that he had passed a great many years in zones of silence on the benches of the House of Commons, but I think that any of those who have heard him this afternoon will be sure that in those years of silence he was most carefully acquainting himself with all the Parliamentary arts, because certainly the speech to which we have just listened was one of the most successful ministerial utterances that we have heard for a long time. He has for the first time put the case which led the Admiralty into making this Anglo-German Agreement into the public view so that it may be contrasted with the various arguments which have been advanced against it from many parts of the Committee. Let me congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon his speech, and at the same time say with how much regret we have all heard that it is his intention not to be a Member in the next House of Commons. Perhaps even at the eleventh hour it is not too late for him to reconsider his decision.

I do not take a very keen or excited part in the controversy between the First Lord and my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). It is not because the quality of the combatants on both sides and the explosive material employed were not such as to give a prospect of a certain liveliness whenever it occurred, but, frankly that there is a great element of unreality in the arguments about German co-operation in the abolition of the submarine. The Government dwelt upon this as one of the arguments to recommend their agreement to the public, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs turned the argument against the Government by suggesting that they had not gone the full length in meeting the German offer for co-operation. I have never felt that there was very much in this offer which the Germans made to co-operate with us in abolishing the submarine. I should have thought it was a very safe offer for them to make—for any country to make—when the condition attached to it was that all other countries should agree at the same time and when it was perfectly well known that there was not the slightest chance of other countries agreeing. The First Lord says we cannot tell now whether other countries will agree or not. Does he really suppose that at this forthcoming multilateral conference, to which he is looking forward, and which must take place in some form or other before the end of 1936, there is the slightest chance of securing a world agreement on the abolition of the submarine? I should have thought that the French, the Italian, and the Japanese view would all be absolutely averse to it. If that be so, it seems to me that the Germans have not run any great risk of diminishing their facilities for making war at sea by offering to co-operate with Great Britain in securing this abolition.

Another statement which was made on the subject of submarines was that the Germans were willing to subscribe to the terms of the international agreement which many of the Powers have signed restricting the use of the submarine in such a way as to strip submarine warfare against commerce of its inhumanity. I am bound to say that I feel very great difficulty in being entirely reassured by that. Lord Beatty said the other day that the battle fleet was now practically secure against submarines if properly protected by its flotillas, etc. I believe that to be correct. Submarines are not needed, then, for attack upon the battle fleet. If they are not needed for that purpose, and the Germans are not going to use them, in the only way in which they can be effectively used, against commerce, it seems to me strange that they should dwell with so much reiteration on the importance of having not merely 35 per cent., but 45 per cent., and, in the long run in some cases, up to 100 per cent. If neither of these spheres of activity for submarines is to be used by them, it seems strange that they should attach so much importance to the possession of this weapon, which they have begun to construct in considerable numbers in flat defiance of the Treaty. If we are to assume, as we may for the purposes of this discussion, the hideous hypothesis of a war in which Britain and Germany would be on opposite sides and the British blockade is being enforced on the coast of Germany as it was in the late war, who in his senses would believe that the Germans, possessed of a great fleet of submarines and watching their women and children being starved by the British blockade, would abstain from the fullest use of that arm? Such a view seems to me to be the acme of gullibility.

I do not want particularly to concern myself with the dispute between my right hon. Friend the member for Carnarvon Boroughs and His Majesty's Government upon that point, but to concern myself rather with the more general aspects which were raised by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton), and which were brought forward in a speech of great calmness and study by the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks). I do not entirely find these arguments met by the speech of my right hon. Friend the First Lord. The great argument which has been put forward from many quarters has been that all of a sudden the Government broke away from the course on which they were proceeding in European affairs, namely, Stresa, Geneva, and the collective disapprobation of the breaking of treaties, and made this side arrangement with Germany. Nothing that the right hon. Gentleman said at all freed the Government policy from the reproach of inconsistency in that respect. Certainly it was a new method. Hitherto, the right hon. Gentleman was looking forward to a general conference at the end of 1936 of all the naval Powers except Germany, and he hoped that Germany would come, too. He was having tentative bilateral discussions with all these Powers, and no doubt, as each point of agreement was reached, note was to be taken that that part of the jigsaw puzzle would be satisfactory as long as it was not affected by something else. I do not understand why the German bilateral conversations could not have been treated on that basis, and why it could not have been said that in all other circumstances, if everything else fits in, this kind of arrangement will be satisfactory to both sides. The matter could then have been referred to the general conference on naval matters, as it will have to be referred. Obviously, everything is affected by that general conference because, if as a result of it our construction has to be increased, there will be a propportionate increase in the German naval construction.

Therefore, I do not quite see why Germany should have been singled out for such exceptional treatment in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman asked what would have happened if we had refused? I do not suggest that it should have been arbitrarily turned down and that we should have said there was no question of our ever making any agreement with Germany. The suggestion which is put forward by the critics of this policy is that the proper course would have been to say that this Agreement involves a breach of the treaty, that we have joined with other Powers in condemning breaches of the Treaty and unilateral action, and that we must, while noting all the facts, refer this matter to other nations with whom we have so recently joined in expressing a decided and definite view. I do not believe that if that had been done the position would have been worsened. The position is very bad. Do not let us underrate the position. The German fleet which is to be constructed under this Treaty is to be 35 per cent. of the British fleet. We have seen the first year's programme of its construction, which programme would undoubtedly be described, in our ordinary language in dealing with these affairs, as the programme of 1934, and not of 1935. It is already far on the way; even the battleships are laid down. I am bound to say that I do not know how the Admiralty were without information that even battleships were being laid down, contrary to the Treaty, before the end of 1934. I am astonished at that, astounded at such a thing. We always believed before the War that never could battleships be laid down without knowledge being obtained. [Interruption.] So that there was a slip. The Germans were entitled to build 10,000-ton ships according to the Treaty, but they, by a concealment which the Admiralty were utterly unable to penetrate, converted these into 26,000-ton ships. Let us be careful about gullibility when we see all these extremely awkward incidents occurring.

It seems to me that we have now before us the first year's programme of the new German fleet. What I want to know is—the right hon. Gentleman probably will not tell us, but I think we ought to know as soon as he can get permission to inform Parliament—in how many years do the Germans propose to complete the building, the laying down, of that 35 per cent. The year 1942 has been mentioned in another connection. I was not clear from what the right hon. Gentleman said whether it was in this connection or not. But it seems to me that if they have four programmes of the size that they announce—the 1934 programme—if they have four successive annual programmes of that size, they will practically come up to 35 per cent. of the British fleet as it exists to-day by the year 1939 or 1940. I do not say we must be told this afternoon, but we must be better informed upon these matters. Nobody wants to hamper the right hon. Gentleman or the Government in having tentative, informal, bilateral discussions and getting as many combinations together as possible and then making the super-combination in a general conference, and nobody would ask that all the offers and counter-offers which are put forward in the course of those negotiations should, while the negotiations are still in an unformed and unsettled condition, be made public. I agree with the claim the Government make in that matter, but in a reasonable space of time we have got to know what is to be the rate of German construction, if that is known to the Government, what are to be the annual programmes which His Majesty's Government consider necessary for the British fleet.

Take this question of the German fleet. In my view if, in four or five years, the Germans have built or laid down 35 per cent. new construction, we shall in that period have to lay down or build, at the same rate pari passu certainly 50 per cent. replacement of our own fleet. That is to say that in the period during which they will be building 400,000 tons, we will say, of new navy, we shall have to rebuild practically the half of our existing navy. Otherwise our position will be a most perilous one, a most dangerous one, as it is. Let me say one word about France. It is true that if we take mere tonnage the First Lord is able to show a satisfactory arrangement for France in the percentage of superiority which she would possess, but what is to be the position of the French navy if the Germans in the next four years build, by four programmes, a fleet 35 per cent. of the British fleet? The entire navy of France, except the latest vessels, will require to be reconstructed. The new German navy, although somewhat behind the French in the matter of percentages, would undoubtedly be overwhelmingly superior from the point of view of matériel. Therefore, we cannot feel at all reassured about this position unless we know the programmes, and it seems most dangerous to continue month after month, and even year after year, because I gather it may not be till next year we can be told, with the House of Commons not knowing these vital programmes on both sides, although they are known in all Cabinets of the various nations with whom we have had these conversations.

Lord Beatty said the other day that we ought to be grateful to Germany for not having asked for 50 per cent., and the First Lord indicated that she might have asked for 100 per cent. But would our answer have been the same? I hope not. But the reasons by which it would have been defended would have been the same. You would say: "What could we do? We could not control them. Nobody is going to war to prevent them." Even after hearing the able statement to which we have listened, I must say that I regret that we have condoned this flagrant breach of the Treaty. It would have been far better, even though we could not get complete assurances in regard to the ratio of Germany with ourselves, to have carried these matters forward to the League of Nations and endeavoured to use this further breach of the Treaty by Germany as a means of gathering forces for a policy of collective security among all the nations of the world.

I do not believe for a moment that this isolated action by Great Britain will be found to work for the cause of peace. The immediate reaction is that every day the German fleet approaches a tonnage which gives it absolute command of the Baltic, and very soon one of the deterrents of a European war will gradually fade away. So far as the position in the Mediterranean is concerned, it seems to me that we are in for very great difficulties. I agree with very much that my right hon. Friend said when he spoke of the position in the Mediterranean. Certainly a great addition of new shipbuilding must come when the French have to modernise their fleet to meet German construction, and the Italians follow suit, and we shall have pressure upon us to rebuild from that point of view, or else our position in the Mediterranean will be affected. But worst of all is the effect upon our position at the other end of the world, in China and in the Far East. What a windfall this has been to Japan—I am not saying the Naval Agreement, I do not put it on that, because it is foolish to blame the evils which come from the growth of German naval power upon the Naval Agreement. But observe what the consequences are. The First Lord said: "Face the facts." The British fleet, when this programme is completed, will be largely anchored to the North Sea. That means to say the whole position in the Far East has been very gravely altered, to the detriment of the United States and of Great Britain and to the detriment of China.

Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to intervene? I do not follow his thought. At what period of our recent history—modern history—was a great part of our fleet not, to use his phrase, anchored to the North Sea? It was so before the War.

I am dealing with what has occurred since the War. The evils that have arisen in the Far East have arisen largely since the War; the injury to British interests has come since the War. Since the War we have certainly had a mobility for the British Fleet, such as it was, consisting, indeed, of old ships, which was very much greater than we possessed during the years of the German danger before the War. But that mobility is going to pass away, and the whole position of our having a great naval base at Singapore upon which a battle fleet can be based, if necessary, to protect us in the Indian Ocean and to maintain the connection with Australia and New Zealand, for that is the purpose, is greatly affected by the fact that when this German fleet is built we shall not be able to have any appreciable portion of the British fleet so far from home. Those are serious reactions. I do not say that they are reactions from the Naval Agreement, but from the fact that Germany is breaking treaties and re-establishing her naval power.

I regret that we are not dealing with this problem of the resuscitation of German naval power with the Concert of Europe on our side, and in conjunction with many other nations whose fortunes are affected and whose fears are aroused equally with our own by the enormous development of German armaments. What those developments are no one can accurately measure. Have we any measure of those activities? We have seen that powerful vessels, much more powerful than we expected, can be constructed unknown even to the Admiralty. We have seen what has been done in the air. I believe that if the figures of the expenditure of Germany during the current financial year could he ascertained, the House and the country would be staggered and appalled by the enormous expenditure upon war preparations which is being poured out all over that country, and converting the whole mighty nation and empire of Germany into an arsenal virtually on the threshold of mobilisation.

That is another point, but I entirely agree that if the slightest British financial support is given under present conditions it is absolutely wrong. In the face of that great danger I believe we should do well, by every means in our power, to try to knit up again those connections with the other Powers with which we were associated at Stresa and the other Powers with whom we have been working on the League of Nations at Geneva—to knit up those associations as well as we can and to endeavour to secure a common front as far as possible against infractions of treaties. Let me say that, above all, we ought to take the necessary measures in good time. Face the facts, yes. The facts are that we have to rebuild the fleet with great rapidity. The "escalator clause" should be invoked. Not a day should be lost in getting on, as far as we may, with the freedom we have under present treaties. If we may not build battleships till 1937, it is all the more necessary to bring some of the cruiser construction to the fore in the interval. That step must be taken. An hon. Member opposite spoke about a loan. I am sorry that the Messiah of the New Deal has left, the House for the moment, because I notice that in his programme, which I am giving myself the pleasure of studying, together with the able repartee, there is a proposal for a very large national loan, a very large use of national credit, and I think it very satisfactory at this juncture that the pundits of Liberal financial orthodoxy should be of opinion that no serious damage would be done to our financial structure and no serious violation of the canons of finance would occur if a very large use of the excellent credit we have were put into operation at the present time.

If that be so, there must be a large measure of agreement on the subject—almost national agreement—of the issue of British credit for British need. Let the defence of the country be the first charge on that loan. Let the rebuilding of the fleet and the necessary steps in the other forces be a first charge upon the use of British credit; and let the necessary measures be taken without the slightest delay, or else you will find that, whether you have an agreement or not, whether you reach multilateral unanimity or have to go on in a fortuitous concourse of bilateral agreements —whatever you may have you will find that the only real security on which you can rely is the secure defence of this country which has not been properly regarded up to the present time.

7.2 p.m.

I do not propose to keep the Committee many minutes, but there are one or two things which I and my friends require to be said. Personally, I have no interest in the controversy between the First Lord and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and I should like to join in the compliment that was paid to the First Lord by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). If you want a case in which you believe made good, I think the right hon. Gentleman would take a lot of beating in making it. The other night when we were discussing policy the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Loftus) said that he had never listened to a more depressing Debate, and never felt so depressed as he did towards the end of it. I daresay hon. and right hon. Gentlemen will say that it is in the order of things that a person like myself, holding my views, should have felt depressed that night and should feel depressed this afternoon. I should think every man and woman in the Committee to-night must feel that the condition of the world and the condition of our country are very terrible indeed.

We have got right back to the days before 1914, when everyone had war in their mind. I remember about 2½ years ago the taunt was flung across the Floor to us that we were always thinking in terms of the danger of war, and that by talking about war and preparation for war we were making war inevitable. Today, we have discussed nothing else, and the other night we discussed nothing but preparation for war. When the War ended the people of this country were told that we had won a great victory over German militarism. The German Fleet, or the bulk of it, was at the bottom of Scapa Flow. The Treaty of Versailles had laid it down that Germany was to be disarmed and the whole nation looked forward to a period when that disarmament would be followed by the disarmament of the rest of Europe. Today the challenge has been flung to us, "What would you have done to stop Germany?" That challenge ought not to have been made to my friends here, but should have been made to those who made the Treaty and led the peoples of the world to believe that German militarism was at an end, and who in the years that followed failed to implement the promises made not only to Germany but to the peoples whose sons and fathers had fallen in the Great War.

The attitude of mind to-day really amazes me—that we can calmly be telling our people that the cost of preparing our defences because of the danger of another war is so tremendously heavy that it must be met, not out of revenue, but by raising a huge loan. That is a confession of abject failure on the part of the Government. They have had four years and I appeal from their own point of view to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who disagree with me about pacifism. How many times have Ministers and hon. Members got up and told us that conferences have been held and that we were on the road towards an agreement which would lead to disarmament? And at the end of these four years we are now confessing that the civilised world must start this, mad race—what Lord Rosebery called "relapsing into barbarism." We are considering it calmly and apparently without any feeling. We are going to hazard the lives of millions of our people. The Government, through the First Lord, tell us that there was nothing else to be done. I join with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping in saying that, able as was the defence of the First Lord, he was not able to give us any reason why this agreement extenuating the breaking of the Versailles Treaty by the Germans should have been made at the very time that, after Stresa, a committee had been appointed with other nations to determine what should be done. Someone said, "Go to war." I do not want to be understood on behalf of my friends as asking that we should go to war, but I think that we might have waited a week or two until that committee, which we assisted to appoint, could have reported and the League itself been called together to consider that report.

To-day proves conclusively that so far as the League of Nations is concerned the Government have given up all faith in the League, all faith in sanctions of any kind, all belief in the validity of that scrap of paper. I am not one of those who want to charge either the Japanese or the Germans alone with tearing up treaties. Governments do that kind of thing when it suits them, and when it suits them they go to war in defence of them. The Covenant of the League has been torn up by the Germans. The Treaty imposed on her has been wiped out. The Germans left the League of Nations and the Covenant has been in effect torn up by the Government. If that is not so, why was not action taken through the League? It is said we had to make haste; we must move swiftly because the Germans were moving swiftly. Could we not, even now, get the representatives of the nations together, the German representatives as well? She is not a member of the League now, and it may not be possible to bring the matter to the League, but why should we not call the nations' representatives together and ask whether we cannot get a standstill in this matter? The Germans have had to have a standstill, or rather a moratorium, with regard to finance. Why cannot this be done? When you ask us what we would do in present conditions, the first thing we should have done would have been that. We should have called together all the Powers who are interested in this matter, and should have put our proposals for disarmament before them.

I do not believe that the military, naval and air authorities really believe that an agreement for disarmament is a practical proposition. The First Lord says that the Government have tried very hard. I am not going to blame our own Government for all that has been done. They must take their share of the responsibility. The Governments of Europe have failed. We have failed. It is no good the First Lord shaking his head. The

Division No. 281.]

AYES.

[7.18 p.m.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)Parkinson, John Allen
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. ChristopherGibbins, J.Salter, Dr. Alfred
Attlee, Rt. Hon. Clement R.Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)Griffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding)Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, North)
Cape, ThomasGrundy, Thomas W.Thorne, William James
Cocks, Frederick SeymourHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Tinker, John Joseph
Cove, William G.Jones, Henry Haydn (Merloneth)West, F. R.
Cripps, Sir StaffordJones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Williams, David (Swansea, East)
Daggar, GeorgeKirkwood, DavidWilliams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Lansbury, Rt. Hon. GeorgeWilliams, Dr. John H. (Llanelly)
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)Lawson, John JamesWilliams, Thomas (York, Don Valley)
Davies, Stephen OwenLeonard, WilliamWilmot, John
Dobbie, WilliamLunn, William
Edwards, Sir CharlesMcEntee, Valentine L.TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Evans, Capt. Ernest (Welsh Univ.)Maclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)Mr. Groves and Mr. D. Graham.
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd (Carn'v'n)Mainwaring, William Henry

Committee, when it divides on our Amendment for the reduction, will register the fact that the Government are admitting the failure of the Disarmament Conference, the failure of the League of Nations, the failure of the Versailles Treaty and the failure of the Great War. The Great War was fought to destroy militarism. The Great War, we were told, was a victory won, and Germany was, as it were, put in her place, no longer a dominant Power but simply one of the Powers of Europe. To-night we are going to register the truth of these things, and I say that that is the most depressing message to send out not only to Britain but to the world. This great country of ours is now sure that we cannot uphold peace without tremendous armaments. The Tory Government, masquerading as the National Government, which won a great victory because we could not afford to maintain the unemployed and treat them decently, are now going to embark, whether by loan or otherwise, on a tremendous expenditure. What for? For the defence of the nation. I say the greatest defence of the nation will be found in following the views of the hon. Member for Lowestoft, a Tory Member of this House, given in this House, and taken no notice of by those who replied on the Debate. No one bothered to answer the speech in which he asked the Government to take steps to call the Nations together to consider, not how to prepare for war on a large or a small scale, but to get rid of the economic causes of war. This Vote, I repeat, is a message of despair to the people of this country, and to the peoples of the world.

Question put, "That a sum, not exceeding £1,129,900, be granted for the said Service."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 44; Noes, 247.

NOES.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelGoff, Sir ParkPeto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Goodman, Colonel Albert W.Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Ainsworth, Lieut.-Colonel CharlesGower, Sir RobertPike, Cecil F.
Albery, Irving JamesGrattan-Doyle, Sir NicholasPowell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd.)Graves, MarlorieProcter, Major Henry Adam
Aske, Sir Robert WilliamGreene, William P. C.Ramsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)
Astbury, Lieut.-Com. Frederick WolfeGretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnRamsay T. B. W. (Western Isles)
Astor, Viscountess (Plymouth, Sutton)Grigg, Sir EdwardRamsbotham, Herwald
Atholl, Duchess ofGrimston, R. V.Ramsden, Sir Eugene
Bailey, Eric Alfred GeorgeGuest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)
Baillie, Sir Adrlan W. M.Gulnness, Thomas L. E. B.Reid, David D. (County Down)
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyGuy, J. C. MorrisonReid, James S. C. (Stirling)
Balfour, George (Hampstead)Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.Reid, William Allan (Derby)
Balniel, LordHales, Harold K.Remer, John R.
Barclay-Harvey, C. M.Harbord, ArthurRickards, George William
Beit, Sir Alfred L.Hartington, Marquess ofRopner, Colonel L.
Benn, Sir Arthur ShirleyHartland, George A.Rosbotham, Sir Thomas
Bennett, Capt. Sir Ernest NathanielHaslam, Henry (Horncastle)Ross, Ronald D.
Boulton, W. W.Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)
Bowater, Col. Sir T. VanslttartHeilgers, Captain F. F. A.Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward
Bower, Commander Robert TattonHeneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.Runge, Norah Cecil
Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)
Boyce, H. LeslleHerbert, Capt. S. (Abbey Division)Russell, R. J. (Eddisbury)
Brass, Captain Sir WilliamHope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)
Briscoe, Capt. Richard GeorgeHore-Bellsha, Rt. Hon. LeslieSalmon, Sir Isidore
Broadbent, Colonel JohnHorsbrugh, FlorenceSalt, Edward W.
Brocklebank, C. E. H.Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)Samuel, M. R. A. (W'ds'wth, Putney)
Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks., Newb'y)Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)Sanderson, Sir Frank Barnard
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Burghley, LordJamieson, Rt. Hon. DouglasSelley, Harry R.
Burgin, Dr. Edward LeslieJones, Sir G. W. H. (Stoke New'gton)Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.
Burton, Colonel Henry WalterJones, Lewis (Swansea, West)Shaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)
Cadogan, Hon. EdwardKerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)Shute, Colonel Sir John
Campbell, Sir Edward Taswell (Brmly)Knox, Sir AlfredSimmonds, Oliver Edwin
Campbell, Vice-Admlral G. (Burnley)Lamb, Sir Joseph QuintonSimon, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmLambert, Rt. Hon. GeorgeSinclair, Col. T. (Queen's Unv., Belfast)
Caporn, Arthur CecilLaw, Sir AlfredSmiles, Lieut.-Col. Sir Walter D.
Carver, Major William H.Leckie, J. A.Smith, Bracewell (Dulwich)
Castlereagh, ViscountLeech, Dr. J. W.Smith, Sir J. Walker- (Barrow-In-F.)
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)Leighton, Major B. E. P.Smithers, Sir Waldron
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. Sir J. A. (Birm., W.)Levy, ThomasSomervell, Sir Donald
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston SpencerLewis, OswaldSomerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)
Clarry, Reginald GeorgeLiddall, Walter S.Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)
Clayton, Sir ChristopherLindsay, Kenneth (Kilmarnock)Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Cobb, Sir CyrilLindsay, Noel KerSpencer, Captain Richard A.
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.Lister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Collins, Rt. Hon. Sir GodfreyLittle, Graham-, Sir ErnestStanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morland)
Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.Lloyd, GeoffreyStewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)
Conant, R. J. E.Locker-Lampson, Rt. Hn. G. (Wd. Gr'n)Storey, Samuel
Cooper, T. M. (Edinburgh, W.)Loder, Captain J. de VereStrauss, Edward A.
Courtauld, Major John SewellLovat-Fraser, James AlexanderStrickland, Captain W. F.
Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)
Craddock, Sir Reginald HenryMacAndrew, Major J. O. (Ayr)Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.
Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H.Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Crooke, J. SmedleyMcLean, Major Sir AlanSutcliffe, Harold
Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)McLean, Dr. W. H. (Tradeston)Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)
Cross, R. H.Macquisten, Frederick AlexanderTaylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Crossley, A. C.Maitland, AdamThomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)Makins, Brigadier-General ErnestThompson, Sir Luke
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Manningham-Buller, Lt.-Col. Sir M.Thorp, Linton Theodore
Davison, Sir William HenryMargesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.Titchfield, Major the Marquess of
Dawson, Sir PhilipMayhew, Lieut.-Colonel JohnTodd, A. L. S. (Kingswinford)
Denman, Hon. R. D.Meller, Sir Richard James (Mitcham)Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Dickie, John P.Mellor, Sir J. S. P.Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Duckworth, George A. V.Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)Turton, Robert Hugh
Dugdale, Captain Thomas LionelMills, Major J. D. (New Forest)Wallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Duggan, Hubert JohnMonsell, Rt. Hon. Sir B. EyresWallace, Sir John (Dunfermilne)
Eden, Rt. Hon. AnthonyMoore, Lt.-Col. Thomas C. R. (Ayr)Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)
Elliot, Rt. Hon. WalterMoreing, Adrian C.Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Ellis, Sir R. GeoffreyMorris, John Patrick (Salford, N.)Wedderburn, Henry James Scrymgour-
Emmott, Charles E. G. C.Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)Wells, Sydney Richard
Emrys-Evans, P. V.Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties)Whiteslde, Borras Noel H.
Entwistle, Cyril FullardMorrison, William ShepherdWilliams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Essenhigh, Reginald ClareMulrhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Everard, W. LindsayMunro, PatrickWise, Alfred R.
Fielden, Edward BrocklehurstNation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.Withers, Sir John James
Fleming, Edward LascellesNicholson, Godfrey (Morpeth)Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount
Ford, Sir Patrick J.O'Donovan, Dr. William JamesWood, Rt. Hon. Sir H. Kingslay
Fox, Sir GiffordOrmsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzle (Banff)
Fyfe, D. P. M.Orr Ewing, I. L.
Ganzo, Sir JohnPatrick, Colin M.TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Glossop, C. W. H.Pearson, William G.Sir George Penny and Lieut.-Colonel
Gluckstein, Louis HallePercy, Lord EustaceLlewellin.
Glyn, Major Sir Ralph G. C.Pethrick, M.

Original Question again proposed.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Air Supplementary Estimate, 1935

Air Services

Number Of Royal Air Force

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That an additional number of Air Forces, not exceeding 12,000 all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United. Kingdom at Home and abroad, exclusive of those serving in India (other than Aden), during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936, beyond the number already provided in the Air Estimates for the year."

7.26 p.m.

On a point of Order. We have an Amendment upon the Paper to reduce the number of men. I was wondering whether it might be for the convenience of the Committee to discuss the whole of the Estimate on this Vote.

I understood that the usual course was to be taken. Vote A is, of course, in regard to the number of men, and is separate from the Vote which deals with the machines. Perhaps the convenient course would be to discuss the whole of the subject together, because obviously you cannot discuss men apart from machines or machines apart from men.

If the Committee agree that that will be the best course to take, the Chair agrees also.

I am very much obliged for the decision of the Committee. The Estimate provides for the increase in the number of men to which the hon. Member has referred, and it provides also for an increased Estimate in money of £5,335,000. That sum of money is the estimate made of the actual amounts which will be paid out during the current financial year, and the increase in the number of men is, in the same way, the estimate of the additional number of men who will actually be taken into the Air Force during the current financial year. The Estimate necessarily carries with it, however, authority for the full programme, the orders for which will be placed during the current year—for the aerodromes and the stations required—and for the full number of personnel who are included in that programme, and which are necessary for this greatly expanded force. Though only £5,335,000 is estimated to be spent this year, we shall be incurring commitments for a much greater expenditure than that. This programme is, in fact, like the naval programmes which we have considered in the past. It is like the laying down of ships, in regard to which a limited amount of money is spent in one year but a much larger amount is spent in the years following.

While it is impossible to give precise figures of what is likely to be the amount involved in the whole of this programme in dealing with the next financial year, one may estimate that the total expenditure in the following years is likely to be something in the nature of £35,000,000 or £36,000,000 gross, less whatever may be the appropriations in aid. The House will, of course, have the opportunity year by year, as the Estimates come up, of expressing its assent or otherwise to these Estimates, but it is only fair that I should make it quite plain that we are committing ourselves to-day to, and this is the authority for, the full programme of expansion. The details of that programme were outlined in the speeches made in the House on the 22nd May.

The basis on which the programme rests is the German Government's statement of their intention to have an Air Force equal to that of France. It is stated in terms of first-line strength, but that, of course, carries with it the provision, on the scales which have hitherto been followed, of reserves and of training machines for the new force. I ought also to add that, in computing the figure of 1,500 first-line strength, we are excluding the squadrons serving overseas—at present 24 squadrons, including 264 first-line machines; and we are also excluding the Fleet Air Arm, which at present has 171 first-line machines. For both the overseas squadrons and the Fleet Air Arm a continuing provision is made in the present Estimates, and will, of course, be made in future Estimates, but both the overseas squadrons and the Fleet Air Arm are excluded entirely from this programme of home defence, which, as I have said, we put at the present day at a first-line strength of 1,500. We have taken that on consideration as being the fair figure on which to work, with all the information at our disposal.

I do not propose to give to the Committee to-night any detailed figures of the present position. I think the Committee will readily realise that the important figures with which one has to deal, and the important standards of comparison, are the programmes of other countries over a period of time. That is the basis on which we are working, and, indeed, I think it is the only possible standard of comparison and basis of work. Comparisons made at any particular moment, even if you were able to state, which very often one is not, all the information at your disposal—such comparisons, even if they are accurate, are ephemeral, and, if they are not accurate, they may be very misleading. Many superficial comparisons are inaccurate because you are not comparing like with like. Take, for example, the position of an air force with its first line fully formed and fully trained, with its reserves behind it, and with its training reserves. Such a force is obviously not in the least comparable with a force which may exist in the sense of having a number of machines earmarked to squadrons or formations. For instance, in this country we could largely increase our first-line strength at any time by taking reserves and training squadrons, allocating fully trained pilots to them, and then presenting them as a first-line force. When, therefore, I speak of first-line strength, I mean first-line strength in the sense in which we have always used that term, that is to say, meaning fully established squadrons in the first line, with their training establishments and so on behind them.

The programme on which we are engaged and its method of execution have been discussed very fully with Lord Weir, who has, of course, had access to every person and everything just as if he were a member of the Council, and I want at the outset to express the very deep debt of gratitude which not only the Air Ministry but the whole country is under to Lord Weir for coming to help us at this time. He is working as hard as if he were Secretary of State himself, and he has a fund of knowledge and experience of this industry, as well as of industry in general, which is second to none.

The distribution as between categories of machines—fighters and bombers of various classes—will be that which the Air Staff consider best suited for our purpose, taking an objective view of the situation with which we are faced. As regards types of machines, I know the Committee will not expect me to disclose particulars of machines which are coming into being with new performances, but very promising work is being done. Types are being evolved and put into production with which I do not think we shall have reason to be dissatisfied in comparison with other countries. I am going to mention, however, one particular machine, because there we have been greatly assisted by outside initiative. Some 15 months ago or more, Lord Rothermere placed an order with a British aircraft company for a high-performance passenger machine. When that machine was nearing completion, it appeared to the Air Staff that it had features of remarkable interest and value, and I therefore asked Lord Rothermere if we might make a number of tests with it as soon as the makers could deliver it to our testing station at Martlesham. He very generously said, "The machine is entirely at your disposal; make any tests you like with it." It has been through its tests, and the tests have shown that the experience gained in the production of this aircraft will be of the utmost value to the company in producing for the Air Ministry military aircraft with the same general characteristics.

Although I do not wish, for obvious reasons, to give any particulars of new types, I can give the Committee an assurance which I think they will welcome, namely, that there is a number of old types which in the course of this programme will disappear altogether. For instance, the Virginia will make her positively last appearance. The Atlas, the Fairey general purpose machine, the Hinaidi, the Virginia, and the Wapiti will all disappear from the service squadrons, the Wapiti, however, retaining a position for some time on the Indian frontier. Other machines, like the Bulldog, the Southampton, the Sidestrand and the Horsley will also disappear from service squadrons, although they will be retained for some time as training machines. From what I have heard, while some of these old types will perhaps pass from the stage with honour, we shall be rather glad to see the last of one or two of them.

I want now to say a word or two about the method of procedure as between the Air Ministry and the firms in regard to design and production. We have been going into that question very closely, and here again Lord Weir's assistance has been of inestimable value. Our object must be to get the best both out of the Ministry and out of the firms, and to get that best as quickly as possible—to apply new knowledge as we get it in design as quickly as possible, so that, as soon as possible after some new improvement has been proved, it may be translated into production, and production is quantity. Specifications are being simplified, so as to get the maximum of initiative and latitude in design compatible with essential fighting requirements and with safety. It will be necessary to adopt a different procedure varying with the degree of novelty both in type and in requirements.

Those who know this industry much better than I do as yet will, I think, agree that all aircraft construction is mobile. It never stands still. You will seldom, if ever, repeat exactly what you have done before. It is moving on all the time, and it moves, in a sense, on two planes. You may get a development and improvement of something in design and technique which has already been proved sufficiently to enable the new improvement to be put into production with the certainty that you will get definitely prescribed results within a reasonable margin of error, and obviously, in cases of that kind, you can go forward much more quickly than in cases which are completely experimental. In experimental cases, on the other hand, you have some wholly new element; indeed, you are really in a new plane of construction. Surely what you have to do there is to get this new feature proved as rapidly as you possibly can and indeed you may be justified—and we are feeling justified in certain cases—even while you are going into a new dimension, so to speak, to place orders before the prototype has been fully tested. I do not propose to give a dissertation on the ideal type. What I think we have to do is to get in each case the most effective instrument for our purpose and to get it as quickly as possible. In the fighter speed is absolutely vital. In the bomber speed may be equally important but you may have to weigh the value of adequate defence against slightly decreased speed. No air force can ever be wholly of the most advanced design. I think we have perhaps made mistakes sometimes in the past. Perhaps it was inevitable that there should be delay when you were trying to produce a machine which was going to be equally useful in this country or for different purposes overseas. There also may have been a tendency, when we started on a design, to think "I am now going to make an improvement." All that means delay, and if ever there was an industry in which the maxim ought to apply, "Do not let the better be the enemy of the good," it is this air craft industry. Get your results quickly.

There is one other consideration which I am sure would be generally accepted and that is that strategy must be governed by scientific and technical developments. It would be hopeless if we were to attempt to make the great technical advances which may come fit in to any preconceived idea of strategy. You find the new developments that are coming on. You have to try to use those that are there to foresee what is coming presently adapting your strategy to all those new possibilities. Our problem is not only to get the best types we can and to get them as rapidly as possible; we have to be sure that we have the best structure in the industry itself, and there you face two problems which, though related, are really entirely distinct, the organisation in time of peace and the organisation for war. In our peace organisation we want an industry of sufficient size and efficiency to meet all the Government calls that may be made upon it and to meet all non-Government demands whether home or foreign. The industry as it exists and is developing to-day should prove competent for that. I think the Committee would be interested to know—those who are keen students of the probelm know already—that the structure of the aircraft industry has been the subject of a very exhaustive inquiry by the Federal Aviation Commission in the United States, and it is interesting to refer to their findings. I quote two passages. They say:
"The general purpose in the relations of the Government to the industry engaged in manufacturing service aircraft should be to maintain units sufficiently stable and sufficiently well organised so that they would be available for expansion in the event of war. The strength and efficiency both in design and in production of the individual manufacturing units, rather than the number of independent units existing, should be regarded as the test of the nation's industrial preparedness."
They go on:
"We have gone into this matter at some length because of a curious argument that has been called to our attention, that the adequacy of the nation's military aircraft industry can be gauged by the number of independent units that it contains. It has been asserted that a country with 40 manufacturers living from hand to mouth is inherently in a better position than one with half-a-dozen well organised plants able to turn to any type of work and to carry on and expand their operations without exclusive dependence upon any one individual's supervision. We do not agree While a monopoly and restriction of competition are of course to be shunned, we believe that a reasonable degree of concentration of manufacturing capacity is desirable for stability and to provide an integrated organisation for emergency expansion."
I think that lesson learnt in the States is of importance to us here. There is also this to be considered. There is a limited number of highly skilled men—drawing office staff for example. There would be a risk, if you expanded this industry into a much larger number of units, that you would intensify this shortage and not get the best that you might. There will, I hope, be closer co-operation in the industry in research than there has been perhaps in the past—I think that is coming—and in that research it is of the greatest importance that it should be twofold. This will certainly always be borne in mind in the research for which the Government are responsible. You want research in the practical immediate problems which confront us to-day. You want no less a long range research. Unless your research establishments are looking forward to the problems with which the aircraft industry is going to be faced the day after to-morrow—an industry where the problems literally come out of the sky—you will find that you are caught unawares. That long range research which does not appear to be of immediate value, if undertaken now, is going to give you the answer to the problem that is going to meet you to-morrow, and will in consequence be most useful to the technical people in the industry.

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell me who is going to be responsible for this long range research?

A great deal of it is being done at Teddington now, and in the Government research establishments. There is the Aeronautical Council of Research Committee where work of this kind is continuously undertaken. The Government research people are very closely in touch with the firms and it is our object to combine to get the best out of both. That I conceive to be the right peace time organisation for the industry so that it is able to take all that comes upon it from Government orders, coupled with large-scale orders from outside, and it is also an organisation aiming at providing a proper basis for expansion if ever unhappily that is necessary.

The war organisation is something quite distinct. The war organisation means an almost complete turnover of the peace industry of the country, and it means a turning over of the firms doing civilian work to doing military work. It means that you have to have plans ready in advance so that your industry can turn over to meet the demands not only of one service but of all three services and also to meet the necessary demands of things like shipbuilding and domestic demands which must also be met in time of war, and what is necessary is that those plans should be carried forward and should be prepared so that industry should be planned for a turnover, if ever it becomes necessary, and that that should fit into the peace-time organisation. That work is of course going on all the time. It is vitally necessary that it should go on. It is essential that it should be ready if it should ever unhappily be required. But you do not want, above all, to confuse the two, and nothing could be more unfortunate, particularly when you are anxious to keep the maximum of trade and to ensure the maximum of output, than to mix the peace-time organisation and the war-time organisation, creating a dislocation which would be unnecessary and which would inevitably be involved.

I turn from that to the problem of recruiting. The numbers required for the whole programme are estimated at 2,500 pilots and 20,000 other personnel. This year we are proposing a supplementary increase in Vote A of 12,000, of whom 1,300 will be pilots. What we need is to have a steady intake of both throughout the period of expansion. I was very much struck when I first went to the Air Ministry by the efficiency with which the recruiting organisation had been rapidly developed. It was a subject about which I felt that I knew a little because I had been Secretary to the Ministry of National Service at the end of the war. I thought probably here, at any rate, was a Department in which I could make some useful suggestions, but I really could not make any. There was no recruiting organisation in the country and headquarters were inundated with inquiries. I was greatly impressed with the rapidity with which the staff, hastily increased, dealt with these inquiries and applications as they came in. Very soon the machine had been extended and recruiting was being decentralised in the country. Ten new recruiting offices were opened, in Belfast, Birmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Plymouth and Portsmouth. They are all staffed by men who are ex-officers of the Air Force and who therefore know the whole life of the Service and can deal with knowledge, sympathy and understanding which will be invaluable to recruits as they come along. I should like to acknowledge, also, the help and co-operation which we are getting from the Ministry of Labour. The response is distinctly good. I shall not give the Comittee just figures of general inquiries, because it is ineffective to deal with anything until an inquiry has become what we call a definite application—something that you can consider on its merits. There has been an enormous amount of work in sifting the inquiries before getting to the definite applications.

Of pilots there have been definite applications from 4,500. We have accepted 75 in the past month, and we expect to take them at a rate increasing up to 150 a month during the rest of this year. In ground personnel there are definite applications from 11,000, and we were able to accept in the last month 1,330. There is not only the taking-in. There is the training of this greatly increased force, and that would present a very difficult problem if we had to do it entirely through newly-created Service stations. We are increasing the number of Service training schools from five to ten, but here we find that civil aviation can make a very great contribution to our need. There are civil schools established at the great civil aerodromes, manned by officers who have passed through the Air Force, some of whom we had specially recommended for their posts, upon whom we could place as much reliance as trainers as we could on serving officers in the training schools. These 13 civilian schools will be utilised, if I may use the expression, as preparatory schools for the pilots who are being taken, with the confident assurance that we shall get all their preparatory training done as well there, and on just the same lines, as if we were training them in our own Service training stations. Having passed through the preparatory school stage in the civilian schools, the pilots will come to the Service training stations. The Committee will appreciate the great value of the passage of officers through this Service at a high standard of efficiency. They know what they have seen at the Royal Review and year after year at Hendon. They know that there is a high standard of efficiency in the officers and non-commissioned officers of this force. We have all realised and appreciated that in the past, but now we see the value of that training and efficiency as the core and training school of expansion.

I pass from recruiting to the new ground stations. We shall have to establish something like 50 new stations in all. That involves 41 aerodromes and various ranges and certain stores depots. The location of these stations must be governed by strategic considerations. I have received a good deal of correspondence—indeed, I think there is hardly a Member of the House who has not written to me to say that there is some very convenient ground in his constituency for an aerodrome.

I suspect my right hon. Friend knows that somewhere in his area we are almost bound to come into the picture. The siting of these stations must be governed by strategic and meteorological considerations, and broadly they will come in East Anglia, Lincolnshire, Huntingdonshire, Yorkshire, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Berkshire, Hampshire, Sussex, Wiltshire, Shropshire and Forfarshire. I am afraid those who are outside that list will not get such great direct advantage. We shall also be materially assisted in this by the Act which the House was good enough to pass with such rapidity the other night, and which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was good enough to support, enabling us to deal rapidly with the land as soon as we get on to it.

The Committee will not think I am taking any credit for myself, as almost the latest joined recruit, when I say that the whole of the work involved in the great expansion programme, the recruiting, the work in connection with these stations and so on, has thrown the most abnormal amount of work on to both the Service and the civil side of the staff. They have all been overworked, and they have done extraordinarily well. I would like to pay that tribute, in which I am sure the whole Committee will join, whatever their views may be about the programme.

I want to turn to a point about which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon (Dr. Addison) would certainly expect me to speak and about which I owe it to him to say a word or two; that is about the financial terms of the contracts. We all agree that firms are entitled to fair treatment from the Ministry, but the Government are entitled to a fair deal from the firms—fair treatment all round. The House already knows that I have secured the assistance of Sir Hardman Lever, Mr. Ashley Cooper and Mr. Judd. Sir Hardman Lever had experience in the War as Financial Secretary to the Treasury and before that was the particular adviser on finance to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon, and it will be agreed we could not have a man of greater experience for this work. Mr. Judd was one of his right hand men and Mr. Ashley Cooper is a man whose business experience commands universal respect. I have also obtained the assistance on much special work of Mr. Reeve, the Chairman of the Associated Equipment Company, than whom you could not have a more able and experienced man to deal with this contract work, and I think we all owe them a great debt.

When you are dealing with a variety of firms and types of contract of almost infinite variety, it is impossible to lay down hard and fast rules and say that the same conditions are going to apply to every contract. You may have a perfectly straight contract of the most ordinary kind. You may have a contract involving enormous technical chances or risks, and you cannot, obviously, have the same conditions apply. One thing above all others that we want to avoid is getting into the awful time-and-line business which was carried on in the War. If you saw in a man's books that he had honestly spent £700,000 you paid him £700,000 and £70,000 profit. If you had another man who had done the same type of work for £600,000 you paid him £600,000 and £60,000 profit. We do not want to get back into that kind of bog again.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon has said most persistently: "You have a very good team, but they cannot possibly do their work unless you give them special statutory powers." My answer was that I should not hesitate to ask for powers if I needed them, but I much preferred to work by agreement if I could get it. Sir Hardman Lever and his colleagues have been working steadily on the whole of these contract questions for a number of weeks now, and I have their authority to state that they are satisfied that all the information about costs and so on which they or we can require for the whole of this business will be forthcoming voluntarily from the firms. I hope on hearing that assurance that perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon will withdraw some of the aspersions which he has been casting on these firms.

I have not cast any aspersion on any firm at any time. It is your system on which I have cast aspersions.

The right hon. Gentleman will obviously withdraw about the system, unless he means the whole system of private enterprise. I did not know we were going to argue "Socialism in our time." Most of us have been here at Question Time and the right hon. Gentleman has continually attacked me when I said I believed I would get a square deal out of these people. I have got it, and I hope we shall not hear any more from him of this kind of suggestion.

I never mind being attacked personally, but, if people are not here to answer for themselves, when they are playing the game, one ought to acknowledge it, even if you do oppose the existing system. The right hon. Gentleman also said that we ought to encourage State manufacture, and he asked me to consider carefully what had been the experience of the War. I am not going to say for a moment that there was not a, great deal of State manufacture done in the War in certain directions. I imagine it was done by getting business men who had grown up in private enterprise and putting them in charge.

Exactly, but I thought you said it was such a hopeless system.

I see. We should have to turn to private enterprise in order to get the men to run the Socialist State. I have made my inquiries into what happened over aeroplanes, which is the subject with which we are now concerned. That certainly was not very successful. Various Government factories were established to make aeroplane frames.

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us when these Government factories about which he is now talking were established?

I think that they were established in 1917, but I can verify the date. I will have it looked up so that the information can be given. I was about to tell the right hon. Gentleman that there was a programme of production which they themselves anticipated they would be able to carry out over a period of time. That programme was, I think, 4,000 machines, and the output was 693. On the question of price they were certainly not very successful. I gave him the wrong place by mistake the other day. The place was Aintree. I will give him both places; I have them both now. It was at Aintree where we produced fighters at a cost of £5,000 a machine, when we were getting a similar machine from a private firm, an ordinary manufacturing firm, for £1,250. At Heaton Chapel which I quoted last week—I was speaking from memory—the price in the Government factory was two or three times as much as the comparable price from private firms. I do not think that we were very successful in respect of engines. As a matter of fact, during the War, we never made complete engines, except experimental engines at Farnborough, but there was a Government factory making engine parts at Hayes, and that factory turned out parts at a cost of £534,000, and the comparable price for similar parts obtained in the trade was only in the region of £350,000, so that we were not terribly successful in that respect. There was also a tendency, so I am told, to stereotype design when you come to the Government factory. If there is one industry above all others where you do not want to stereotype design but to encourage firms to go feeling and designing ahead always to get the new thing, it is in this industry. At any rate, there is no need for us to go into State manufacture in order to get our requirements fulfilled, and I certainly think that we should be very ill-advised to do so.

I have only one more word to add. This programme is our bounden duty, and I do not believe that any Government in our position to-day in the present state of the world would advance a programme other than that which we are now proposing to the Committee. It is our plain duty in the interests of this country. We will go on. We are going on, striving to get an air pact, a limitation of air armaments, and what is incomparably more difficult, even if people are agreed in principle, the limitation of air warfare. We will go on, and we are going to try for those objectives, but I am quite sure that neither in a pact where you give and receive mutual security, nor in the limitation of air armaments should we stand the faintest chance of getting either the one or the other if we remained disarmed while other people were armed. I certainly think that the programme I am submitting to the Committee is vital and necessary to our own security, and that it is the best way of getting collective security, limitation and world peace.

8.20 p.m.

I beg to move, "That an additional number of Air Forces, not exceeding 11,000, all ranks, be maintained for the said Service."

We have all listened to the explanation of the Estimates by the Air Minister, and, in justification of the view which we take of these Estimates, I have moved the reduction in the number of men, so that we can express not merely our criticism during the Debate of the increased Estimates, but also show by our going into the Lobby that we are determined to take exception at a time like this to the squandering of so much money upon the enlargement of the Air Service in this manner, quite needlessly, as we think. The Minister in his statement made it perfectly clear that the intentions are not confined merely to the Estimate that is before the Committee at the present time. He has stated definitely that what we vote to-day will commit us to a further programme not yet set out, but which, he says, will be brought in next year, and will amount approximately to a total of £35,000,000.

If the hon. Gentleman reads the Memorandum with the Estimate—I published that, so as to put everything before the House—he will see that it shows the full programme, and it is on the execution of that programme that there must fall an increased amount on next year's Vote.

I quite understand, but the point in which the country is interested is that in voting this sum in additional payments to the men, in the provision of a certain number of machines, and in the training of a certain number of pilots we are committing ourselves to an expenditure which next year will amount to £35,000,000. We are committing ourselves to the total amount of money stated by the Air Minister, and we contend that there has been no justification for this increased expenditure. There has been a great deal said in Debates on the Air Estimate and in discussions in the House about—

I made a mistake as I had not the figures in front of me. I gave the figure of my Estimate next year as gross, and it should have been net, and I apologise.

The Minister was not quite definite upon the point and, therefore, I said approximately. We will not quarrel over the figure as expressed by the right hon. Gentleman, but we do object to this country being committed to the air race that is going on, and to the explanation made by the Air Minister about the uses that can be made of the machines for civil aviation and not for war aviation. That explanation leaves me quite cold, because a civil aeroplane, as has been demonstrated before now, can very rapidly be transformed into a death dealing war machine. Whatever use may be made of these machines during the period when there is no war between different nations, we appreciate the fact that the potential use of these machines is for war purposes, and we have a right to ask the Air Minister which nation he has or the Government have in mind as the potential enemy. The right hon. Gentleman said that Germany was trying to get parity with France and that because Germany wanted parity with France the Government of this country had determined to increase the numbers of our air fleet and the personnel of those who man it.

Is it because Germany has said that she wishes to have the same number of machines as France that this country has said that we are compelled to arm? Compelled to arm against whom? By inference, against the particular nation that says it wants parity with a nation the number of whose machines we know. The only logical conclusion that anyone with reasoning faculty can arrive at is that the enemy in the mind of the Government is Germany. We have done everything we could to placate Germany. We have ignored the methods by which, if our secret service is an adequate secret service, we could have been informed of the re-arming of Germany long ago. That knowledge must have been in the possession of the Government long ago. Now we have this excuse put forward. I say to the Air Minister and to the Government when they talk about increasing the air service of this country, and they say that it is for the purpose of defence, that no nation has ever set out to arm itself with the published object of being an aggressor. They have always made it clear to the world that it is because somebody else may become an aggressor against them that they are arming, and for defensive purposes only. Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that the projected air fleet is for defensive purposes? Is it not the case that this country wrecked the projected air pact by its refusal to discontinue the use of bombing planes upon unprotected natives?

The hon. Member heard a speech by the Minister for League of Nations Affairs the other night, when that suggestion was completely exposed. There was not one word of truth in it.

I understand that the Air Minister objects to my statement that the projected air pact was ruined because this nation's representatives refused to agree to the discontinuance of the use of bombing planes upon native races. Let me quote a speech of the Noble Lord the Marquis of Londonderry in another place, on the 22nd May, 1935. He said—

it is against the rules of the House to quote words used in another place during the current Session.

I accept at once your ruling that I cannot read what has been said in another place during the current Session. The speech of the Noble Lord is here, and the right hon. Gentleman will find that the Noble Lord stated that he was impressing upon his colleagues the necessity of continuing the building of aeroplanes, and that he was also insisting upon the maintenance by this country of the use of those aeroplanes for bombing native races when circumstances in the opinion of the Government made it necessary. If the Air Minister thinks that I am misquoting the gist of the speech, he can quote the exact words or the gist of them. He does not rise.

I do not like to interrupt, but the hon. Member invites me to rise. I have not the least idea what is in that speech. The hon. Member has made the allegation once again, and I am amazed that he has done so after the speech the other night of my right hon. Friend, that the Arms Limitation Convention failed because of our reservation about bombing. I would refer the hon. Member to the long and full answer given by the Minister for League Affairs, which was made only last week, and if he reads that speech he will see that there is not one word of truth in the allegation that he is making.

I am not concerned with what the Minister for League Affairs said in this House last week. What he said last week does not contradict what appeared in black and white in the published Debate that took place in the other House, in the speech of the Marquess of Londonderry, who was then the Minister for Air. He occupied the position now occupied by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. It is a denial of that speech that I want. It is all very well for a Government speaking with half-a-dozen voices to say that so and so, speaking on such and such a night, said such and such a thing, and so and so, speaking on another occasion, said something else. Here are the words in black and white, uttered by the former Air Minister, and I have yet to learn that any Minister of the Crown has repudiated that speech or that the Marquess of Londonderry has on any occasion said that he was misreported or that he did not intend to use the words that are published in the House of Lords Official Report. The speech was delivered on the 22nd May this year—I think I am in order in mentioning the date.

The hon. Member will probably know that this is one of those cases which sometimes puts the Committee and the Chair in a position of some considerable difficulty, but there are reasons for the Rule and, so far as those reasons apply, it has been the practice of the Chair not to relax them. But where these reasons do not apply the Rule has been relaxed, and, therefore, when it comes to a question of a statement of policy by a Minister in the other House a reference to that has been allowed, but when it comes to a question of the utterances of one particular individual in another place and the correctness or otherwise of the report, that is a matter which we ought not to discuss here, and that limitation of our Debate is based on the reason that the individual in question cannot reply in this House.

May I draw your attention to the fact that this was a speech delivered by a responsible Minister of the Crown, the Minister for Air, in the other place, not the speech of a private Member, setting out the Government's air policy on the 22nd May of this year.

And that is why I hesitated when I interrupted the hon. Member earlier but I did so because I thought that he was going on to dangerous ground and that I should remind him of the rule. It is for that reason also that I have allowed him to discuss the effect of the speech as a whole as a Minister's statement of Government policy but when it comes to a question of the correctness of otherwise of the report I think he is going a little too far. So far as it is a statement of policy by a Minister of the Crown it is legitimate to refer to it so long as the hon. Member avoids dealing with questions as to the actual words.

The Minister for Air has again denied that the British representatives insisted upon certain bombing rights being retained. Is it not a fact that the Disarmament Conference set up an Air Committee in 1933 which met once, and because of the resolution put forward by the British delegates, which included the reservation of a right to use bombing planes on subject races, to which objection was taken by other nations, the Committee has never met since. Is it not a fact that the Italian Commission submitted proposals in January, 1934, that the bombing of civilian populations should be prohibited? Is it not the case that in January, 1934, the French Government in proposals on the British Memorandum, said that she not only accepted the abolition of aerial bombardment on the conditions defined in the Disarmament Conference Resolution of the 23rd July, 1932, but also was prepared

"If such a general reduction is accepted by the principal air Powers and is accompanied by effective control of civil aviation and aircraft factories"—
I want the Committee to mark those words—
"accompanied by effective control of civil aviation and aircraft factories, to accept a proportional reduction of 50 per cent. of her aircraft now in commission. The final object of these reductions should be the suppression of all national military air forces and their replacement by an international air force."
It is rather peculiar that the Government should go back on the statements made and recommendations suggested by their representatives before these various conferences and commissions. On 11th June, 1934, the Disarmament Conference passed a resolution calling upon the Air Committee which was set up in February, 1933, and had not met since March of that year, to resume work. There was much for it to do. Neither the British Draft Convention of March, 1933, nor the British, French and German proposals of January, 1934, nor the German proposals of 16th April, 1934, had ever been discussed by it. That resolution was not acted upon, the committee has not met yet. Can the Minister tell us why? Can he inform us Why the committee has not met for over two years? Probably it was because of a speech made by the then Minister for Air on the 27th June, 1934, in which he said:
"We can no longer hope that an international convention will solve the problems which agitate the whole of Europe. His Majesty's Government have, therefore, decided that they can no longer delay the steps which are necessary to provide adequately for the air defence of these shores."
That is 13 months ago. This has all been thought out. The Air Minister has stated that the plans were all ready by 1933, and he is now putting them in operation. I suggest that when the Government comes before this House with all the statements they have made regarding the necessity that has forced them to begin this air race and build up air armaments, we have a right to ask for the reasons why they have not allowed the Air Committee set up in 1933 to meet again to discuss what they were set up to discuss, the limitation of air armaments. We want to find out the real reason why that committee was never called together again in spite of the subsequent instruction by the Disarmament Conference that it should meet with little or no delay. The Prime Minister was greatly concerned about what was likely to happen to the civilian population in case of air raids should hostilities break out between this and any other country. He pictured what might happen, and wondered why after 2,000 years of Christianity we should be thinking of all manner of schemes to prevent the civil population being choked to death with noxious gases rained upon them from the skies.

What is the nation that the right hon. Gentleman expects to hurl these gases upon the people? Why cannot some convention be held? Why cannot some conference of representatives of the nation discuss these matters? I am convinced that there is no man in the House or outside it who would willingly subscribe to anything that was likely to bring nearer the day when the horrors that some of us witnessed during the last war will be reenacted in this or any other city. I am including Members of the Government in that statement. I am not questioning their good faith. What I am questioning is the blundering methods that seem to have been adopted by them in getting us into this particular pass. The situation in which the country is now could have been avoided if some other method of approach had been adopted by the Government.

We have a Queen Bee plane which is evidently looked upon as something calculated to help us if any trouble arises in this country. Experiment has shown that in shooting at the Queen Bee, the new robot machine which was demonstrated at the Naval Review, gunnery is ineffective, even if the Queen Bee flies at a low speed. Throughout the fighting services, where the Press campaign about the Queen Bee is viewed with a certain amount of cynicism, it is believed that she has done more than anything else to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of antiaircraft gunnery. It must be pointed out that the Queen Bee is in any case a very much better target than can ever be expected in wartime, and this factor only serves to enterprise the ineffectiveness of anti-aircraft defence. Yet we are supposed to be building this addition to our air fleet for purposes of defence.

We are to build shelters to protect the civil population. The civil population are being asked by circular to provide themselves with gas masks. It would be interesting to know whether the Government are prepared to introduce a Supplementary Estimate to enable the Unemployment Assistance Board to give additional payments to the unemployed, to enable them to purchase these gas masks. It is becoming a little far fetched when the civil population are told that they must protect themselves against the blunders of the Government. The whole course of the transactions during the past few years before the various committees that have been dealing with this question of the Air Force, the limitation of the Air Force and the protection of the civil population against bombs, seems farcical. It makes us wonder who is the enemy. Germany is looked upon by some as being a possible enemy, but according to Herr Hitler Germany looks upon Russia as being her particular enemy. In a book written by Herr Hitler, which has been revised, there is still the original statement. He points eastward towards Russia and her dependent republics as being the likeliest line along which Germany can expand, because she has no further desire for colonisation outside Europe. Russia and Germany therefore look upon each other as potential enemies, and they build up additional air fleets.

So it goes on. Each nation looks upon some other nation as a possible enemy, and each nation enters into the race, addings to its army strength or naval strength or air strength. It is madness raging throughout the world. In 1918, at the Armistice, the cry throughout the world was "Never again," and we believed it absolutely. Here we are arming for "Once again" or perhaps "Several times again," for no one can tell. Yet the politicians, the statesmen and the Governments of the nations are supposed to have within their hands the well-being of the people whom they rule. They allow the lives or well-being of their people to be so mismanaged as to bring death and destruction upon them. These rulers merit the fate that has overtaken rulers in the past; they merit being deposed and sent as criminals into some place where they can do no further harm by wilfulness or neglect or ignorance.

That is our justification for moving this reduction. We are sick to death of all this mad talk about re-arming. Every time you come before this House asking for additional sums to help build up armaments, you are betraying every woman whose husband perished in the last War. It is a betrayal of the children who were left orphans during the last War, and it is a gross betrayal of the men who are still walking the streets, maimed, blinded and shattered, as a result of the last War. Before you think of entering into another war, or arming for another war, let a sufficient number of years pass so that the horrors of the last War may be forgotten. As long as the horrors of the past War remain in the memory of those who suffered, drop all this mad race, and, instead, invite other nations to confer with you in one further effort to arrive at some means whereby armaments can be reduced instead of being increased.

8.55 p.m.

I have listened to practically every word that has been spoken since the Supplementary Estimate was presented by the Secretary of State for Air, and I have listened almost with horror during the last half-hour. I will try to disentangle some of the impressions created in my mind by the hon. Member for Govan (Mr. Maclean), who has just sat down. I would like, however, to commence by saying how glad the House of Commons is that the Secretary of State for Air is in the House of Commons. That does not mean that we have not appreciated the efforts and work of the late Secretary of State, but we feel that we have been handicapped by his not being here himself to defend his Department. However, he has been extremely well represented, but it is never the same thing, and an Under-Secretary cannot speak with the same authority as a Secretary of State, so those of us who are keen about this subject welcome the new Secretary of State for Air and are glad we still have our friend the Under-Secretary of State with him. The Secretary of State has only been a very few weeks in charge of a very big office, an office which at this moment is being forced to undertake a tremendous labour, the labour of expansion for national defence. I think the hon. Member who has just sat down will not complain if I say that a good deal of his speech should have been directed at a Foreign Secretary, not at an Air Minister. Whether or not the Government have handled their international policy, their League of Nations policy, their Geneva policy, with perfection is not really the responsibility of the Air Minister.

The failure to continue the work of the Air Commission and the statements made at the Disarmament Conference by the Air Minister were surely apposite to this Vote.

I think the hon. Member will not mind if I do not pursue that point any further. At the end of his speech, he took the line that the Government were responsible for the race in armaments. To an ordinary listener it sounded as though that was the general impression which he wished to create, and that he wished to create it outside the House of Commons, that the Government was a belligerous Government, doing all they could to stimulate the race in armaments. I submit, with great respect to him—he is as old a Parliamentarian as I am—that that is a very unfair charge and only worthy of the hustings.

I say it is quite unworthy. We are here to give approval to a Supplementary Estimate almost as big, I think, as any Supplementary Estimate that has been presented to this House since the War, and I am surprised to find so small an attendance of Members. I think it is pathetic that such a vast sum of public money should be just turned over like this without very close inspection. That does not mean to say that the Secretary of State's statement was not a very able and clear statement. The only excuse I can find for the Committee letting it go through this evening is that I understand it is agreed that in October a better opportunity will be given to the House to consider it in detail. I am glad of that, because it will give the Minister more time to get into his stride and to be in a better position to answer the detailed and technical questions which we would direct to him.

But while the months of August, September, and October are going by—the House, I presume, will rise next week—I wish to draw his attention to what I consider to be the most important side of aviation. On the military side it is simple, it is cut and dried, it is expensive, it is efficient, but there is something much more important than that, and that is—if you are prepared to admit that you live in a world where air control is very nearly the dominating factor, and activity, movement, and transport—to implore him to give some of his time in the next three months to the study of civil aviation. It is a subject on which I feel I may get friends on the other side of the Committee. It cannot be denied that the flying machine has come, any more than it can be denied that the bicycle has come. Therefore, let us become a nation of people who understand it. That does not mean necessarily that we should abuse it, but at any rate let us understand it, and let us be as air minded as any other country in the world. Years and years ago it was said that civil aviation must fly by itself. I have said in this House before, and it has never been contradicted—it is like crying Free Trade in a Protectionist world—that if other countries subsidise, we must do the same or else we shall get left behind. I wonder if the Committee realise how far we are left behind? If they do not mind our being left behind as much as we are to-day, they ought to know exactly how far we are behind, and then perhaps a little more British esprit de corps will stimulate them to say to the Minister, "Study this question of making the nation air minded on the civil side."

I will give a few examples of what I mean, and I know the Committee will be patient if one does not talk nonsense and is careful in what one says. I submit that both the military and the civil side are so closely interlocked that you cannot separate them. First of all, you have the ground organisation, secondly you have the pilots, thirdly you have the research, and fourthly you have the mechanics; and I feel that I shall carry everybody with me when I say that the great thing in an advanced, civilised country like ours is to have the great bulk of the population trained in the highest degree in the most important skill which the country may ever need should war come. If only civil aviation were stimulated, encouraged, and subsidised it would not be necessary to develop quite so seriously the military side, because we have always been a race that could spring to attention, a race that could rapidly improvise, and largely because our knowledge was spread widely and because, to take the Navy alone, we had such a grand merchant service that we were able to supply our fleets when war came with trained and valuable men. If we apply the same simile to civil aviation, I think we shall find that we should need to spend less money on military development.

I must touch for a moment on a military word. The bomber is the backbone of the Air Force. Many of us know the difference between the bomber, the fighter, and the reconnaissance plane, but a great many do not. As I say, the bomber is the backbone of the Air Force. What is the bomber? It is a civil development. If you look at the great civil planes of to-day, a great many of which I have been in myself, you will find that with the greatest ease they can be converted into bombers. That does not suggest that they were built as civil machines for the purpose of conversion, but at the same time I must admit that convertibility is too easy for words; and after all those hon. Members who have taken part in our Debates in the last six months must know that the origin of the air scare came from the preponderance of civil air transport possessed by Germany. Everyone knows that the German "Lufthansa" machines of various types are, and were, capable of conversion, and probably by now are converted and form part of the military air fleet of that country.

But what impresses me is that every country in the world has a better one than ourselves. If you take the American machines, the "Boeing," the "Douglas," and the "Lockheed," you will find that they are superior at present, with very little conversion, to our own best military bombers. Every other country has remarkable long-distance transport machines, and we have not. We are definitely at an inferiority both as regards civil transport and as regards possible convertibility for purposes of war. I suggest that the Minister might give a good deal of attention to the question of at least bringing us up to a level of other countries that surround us. It has been argued that the alteration of these liners would mean loss of efficiency. That can be overcome by additional horsepower. It has been argued that it is extravagant to have a large horse-power with small carrying capacity. Let me give an example of where it has been worth while to do that. Take the great German Heinkel machine that flies from Berlin to Barcelona and that has a small carrying load and immense speed. It has succeeded in taking half the South American mail away from the French. We must not shut our eyes to what is happening round us.

Let me say a word about the South American mail. What I am saying deals with the civil side; I am not saying anything that can affend the pacifist. I want to enlist him, because I believe that he is as proud of this country as I am. At present the mails are carried to South America by three lines—from America by the Pan-American Line and to Europe by German and French lines. We have more money invested in South America than all other countries put together, yet we are paying a subsidy to these German and French air lines to carry our mails, and are thus, in fact, subsidising potential bombers. I do not know why nobody seems to have spotted that fact. I do not know what the reason is. It must be due to a lack of grasp of the fact, firstly, that civil aviation is the foundation of military and national defence, and, secondly, that civil aviation cannot fly by itself. There is a race for development not only for military purposes, but for civil expansion.

Talking about South America almost takes one back to the days when admirals in the British Fleet—privateers they might be called—went round the world, and in some cases founded colonies. Wherever they went they took the British flag and British trade. Why are we not doing it in the air? Is there any answer? Is there any reason why I should fly to the West Indies in American machines and why no English machines are there at all? Last year I went to Trinidad and through the West Indies in American machines. There were no signs of British aerial activity of any sort. That is because there is no stimulus from this end. It is from here, from the Treasury Bench, that the stimulus should come. It has failed to come only because the Government have not so far realised that the backbone of any military and national defence, if it is ever required, is that there should be a great foundation of civil development.

I want to come to a point which is also said in not an unfriendly way, because I do not want to say anything unfriendly to a new Minister. He must have his chance and the critics must be patient. I have listened to speeches in this House in the last nine months by the Under-Secretary of State dealing with the development of Imperial air routes and by the Postmaster-General dealing with air mails. Both speeches were admirable. We were told, as a result of the race to Melbourne, that we were to go to Australia much faster, and that mails would be carried all over Europe to most of the capitals much more rapidly than in the past. These speeches are now nine months old, and the reason the services have not improved is that there is no ground organisation. Without ground organisation we cannot fly by night. It may be said that the development of night flying is elaborate and expensive. Why is there nothing more in this Supplementary Estimate than £500 for civil aviation, in spite of the two speeches to which I have referred, which were delivered less than nine months ago? It is because it is not appreciated that unless we fly by night we cannot accelerate air mails or the great Imperial services. It may be asked, who else does it? From Sweden, a little country with not very much money, in the last six years there has been an air service from Stockholm to Malmo and Copenhagen. That meant expensive ground organisation with beacons, radio beams and all the necessary equipment. They do not take passengers, but only mails. Germany has been night flying for 11 years on the London to Cologne and the Berlin-Hanover and Berlin-Copenhagen route. The House of Commons would gladly vote money for such development. I would sooner support a Vote of that nature that even the Vote that has been put before us. It is only because I have been convinced from what I have heard from the Prime Minister when he was Lord President of the Council and from the Foreign Secretary that it is vital that we should take care that I am supporting this Vote, but I would in many ways sooner support a big expenditure on civil aviation.

The problem of the monopoly granted to Imperial Airways is, I think, ready for reconsideration. I will not say that it has not served its purpose. I was pretty well conversant with the original stage in the granting of that monopoly. We had a period of three companies not very well able to pull sufficient weight by themselves and it was, therefore, obviously better that they should amalgamate and produce a good national service. I think that they have done it very well. The chairmanship has been in admirable hands, and the company owes a considerable debt to Sir Eric Geddes for the way in which he has controlled it. I think, however, that the new Secretary of State might give a little time to considering whether the moment has not come when the octopus must not be allowed to strangle smaller individual efforts. I know a little about individual efforts, and at this moment, on a rising tide of what might be called a boom in aviation, a good many companies of repute are making a great effort to get more business. The more business they get the more mechanics and pilots they produce, and the richer becomes the country in aviation experience. But I see signs of strangulation, signs of really good enterprises struggling against an almost impossible obstacle. I will give an illustration. We have Imperial Airways State-aided by money voted in the House of Commons year by year, and there has now been formed Railway Airways, which was created by the five great railway companies to serve the country by air lines in close conjunction with Imperial Airways.

There is thus almost a double stranglehold—there is the immense backing of the railway companies, and the State-aided support of Imperial Airways. I do not see how a small company has any hope of competing, and yet small companies are struggling to compete. I give them tremendous credit for trying. I know of one case in particular which will fly you return to Paris for £2 cheaper than Imperial Airways, and 35 minutes faster. That company is run at a loss, and quite obviously it cannot go on. The smaller companies are terribly handicapped by this octopus, and I am hoping that the Secretary of State will give a good deal of attention to this point, because if he agrees with me that what we want is the widest possible civil foundation of experienced men as mechanics and experienced men as pilots, in case the time of trouble should ever come, he will not allow—and I hope the House of Commons will not allow—any State-aided organisation such as Imperial Airways to kill small businesses of this type upon which England has all her life depended.

The case I am going to give the Committee is almost unbelievable. If you go to Cook's agency in Berkeley Street and ask them to sell you a ticket to Paris by Hillman's airline, which is a line which is running from just north of the river, they say, "No, we cannot sell you that, though we can sell you an Imperial Airway's ticket, or a French or a German or a Belgian ticket. We cannot sell you Hillman's ticket. We are not allowed to do so by the agreement between the railway companies and Messrs. Cook's Agency." It may be that there is an answer to that state of affairs, but the answer has not been given yet, I hope the Minister will find time to look into that position, because it cannot be right that the ordinary ticket agencies, when selling tickets, are not allowed to sell them for some of our own air lines which are out to help England if also, incidentally, to make something for themselves.

The last thing I have to say is that this problem of making the nation air-minded must not be regarded as a militaristic adventure. I do not think it is fair that the moment the word "air" is mentioned one should think in terms of bombs. It is tree that aeroplanes can be turned into weapons of war capable of destruction, but we in the House of Commons should get into our minds that the value of rapid inter-communication in a far-flung Empire like ours is of the greatest possible importance. We can only establish such communication if we vote a good deal of our money to the subsidising of lines in the initial stages. I remember the time it took during the War for the Ministers from the Dominions to come to England to help to discuss vital problems of Imperial safety and defence. That problem is being overcome, but the conditions are not stable. We have a line which wanders slowly along to Rangoon and other places, and eventually gets to Australia. But we must not wait; we do not know what the future holds, we cannot tell whether we are safe to leave this problem to take care of itself, and I cannot feel that anybody would object to there being in this Vote to-night a much bigger grant to civil aviation. There are many programes that could be submitted to the Secretary of State for him to study during the coming long Recess, and I do hope that he really will give his mind and his ability, which is undoubted, to the study of the problem—that civil aviation is what we have got to master, and that we have got to be equal to any other country in the world.

9.19 p.m.

I do not think there could be a greater measure of the disastrous failure of the Government's foreign policy than the fact that they are obliged to bring forward to-night a gigantic Supplementary Air Estimate. I do not say that it is a result which they have willed or that they are unappalled at the situation, but I believe, none the less, that it is true to say that by lack of courage and leadership during the last three years, by failure to seize favourable moments at the Disarmament Conference—I am not referring to the particular example which my hon. Friend dealt with just now, for there are others—they bear a very large share of the responsibility for the race in armaments taking place in the world to-day. But we have to deal with the situation as it is, and not as we should like it to be. In approaching consideration of this issue one is bound to be influenced by policy, by the way in which it is proposed by the Government to use these new air forces. If the Air Force is going to be used, all against the aggressor, as part of the collective system, that is one point of view; if it is going to be used under the old system, all against all, that is an entirely different point of view.

If the late Government, before its reconstruction, had been in power at the present time I should not have had the slightest hesitation in coming to the opinion that it was not going to use these increased forces for the collective system. It was made perfectly clear by many speeches by Ministers, by the present Prime Minister and the late Foreign Secretary, and the Government's White Paper on Disarmament, that they had practically abandoned all hope of using our air forces as part of the collective system, and I must say one is left in considerable doubt to-day. The Secretary of State, although at the end of his speech he did make some reference to the Air Convention, did not once envisage the possibility of the use of these new forces as part of the collective system. That is a very remarkable omission, which discloses only too clearly the point of view of certain Members of the Government. All the same, my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Drake Division of Plymouth (Captain Guest) said that a new Minister was entitled to a fair opportunity before he was condemned, and I am not without hope that the Government, in its reconstructed form, with its new Prime Minister and its new Foreign Secretary, may take a different attitude with regard to collective security; but I am not too hopeful. Still, I think one ought to hold one's judgment in suspense on that point for the moment.

After all, the test is coming very quickly. One cannot debate it to-night, but it is coming in the matter of the willingness of the Government to press, if the situation arises, that all our forces should be used, with those of others, for the collective security of the world in the case of the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. If they make no effort to do so then very large numbers of those who are willing and anxious to support the Government in a collective policy will be turned into bitter antagonism against them both in this House and throughout the country, and, I believe, at the General Election also. I hope that situation will not arise. Then there is the question of the western security pact, which affects very closely the Estimate we are considering to-night. One cannot help feeling considerable disappointment that all these weeks have gone by without the Government having yet succeeded even in initiating, so they told us, negotiations and discussions with the other countries as to the possibility of carrying it through. That, again, is bound to cause the greatest anxiety as to their earnestness and sincerity regarding the using of our air forces solely for the purpose of collective security.

On the assumption—for the sake of argument let me admit it—that the Government intend to use these forces on the collective basis, and that they have arrived at the lowest limit which it is possible to reach as a result of pressure and negotiation at the present time, I fully agree that our Air Force must be of the highest possible efficiency, and I believe it is, so far as it exists to-day, more efficient in personnel, in daring, in skill, than any other air force in the whole world. In so far as we are to make a contribution to general air action it is clear to me that our contribution must be worthy of this great country. In the Draft Convention of the Government in March, 1933, the basis was fixed at a parity of 500 each for the Powers. I do not see how it is possible that this country can be represented in a system of collective security on a basis of less than parity too. But it is up to the Government to see that limitation and parity itself are fixed at the lowest possible level.

If we do not play our part worthily in collective security, it simply means that we are relying for our protection on the forces of other countries, and that from every point of view seems to be undignified, wrong and of no service to this country and the world. If our contribution is to be of the highest efficiency, surely it is necessary that we should have worked out in common with the air forces of other countries some basis of action. Clearly it will have to be done in the case of the Western air pact of five Powers. There will have to be contact between the staffs of the various air forces, every kind of co-operation will have to be envisaged, and areas worked out in case of having to deal with an aggressor. But we do not have to wait for that; there are our obligations under the League Covenant. Just as before the War there was contact between the British and French military staffs as to the action that might be taken, although no agreement existed, so now, when we have obligations which are patent to the whole world to act in certain contingencies, it is the duty of the Government and the Air Ministry to be in contact with the air staffs of other countries, so that if the necessity arises we can play our part without any delay in taking action against an aggressor.

If you are going to work for this system efficiently, you require that there should be not only limitation but international inspection; otherwise, you get the dreadful nightmare that while there is parity of 1,500 machines you get a Press campaign alleging that certain States have got 2,000 machines, and that will be used to urge further expansion of our force. If you are to arrive at any basis of stability, with a view to ultimate reduction, surely it is essential that there should be international inspection, so that we may all know how far it is true that we have got the machines we all say that we have got. I hope that my right hon. Friend will say that we do attach great importance to that, and that he will press it in connection with the negotiations of a Western air pact. The Secretary of State said that the reason for the increase in our force was the development of the German air force, and the fact that we and our old allies are so largely responsible by the folly of our policy since the War for Hitler Germany and the present situation does not make it any the less dangerous. Germany to-day has made it perfectly clear that she is opposed to the collective system, and that she is not willing to work loyally with the rest of the nations of Europe and the world, and one can have no confidence whatever in the German point of view.

While the race in air armaments between the two countries has been going on, there has been a mutual visit of the Legions of ex-service men of the two countries. It is very desirable that good feeling should be promoted in this way, but do not let it be misinterpreted. Do not let anybody in Germany think that it means that we approve of their attitude to other human beings or other races. There are ex-service men who can regard themselves as being honourable antagonists in past wars and possibly in future wars, or ex-service men can meet with the desire to do all that is in their power to see that war does not break out again. There has been very little evidence as to the latter desire on the part of the German ex-service men.

It hardly seems to me that that arises on the Air Estimates.

I will abide by your Ruling. The Secretary of State made some criticism of State factories. I am very sorry that the Government have not seen fit to set up some State factories. The argument that it is uneconomic to do so and possibly Socialistic is entirely destroyed by the fact that they exist for the Army and Navy. If it be wrong to have them in the Air Force, it must be wrong to have them in the other two. That a certain number of State factories should be set up is in accord with the feeling of the people of the country. It is not merely a matter of rigid control of the prices, but that enormous contracts are being given out, and even if the profit on each aeroplane is small the profits are large in the aggregate. I hope that the possibility of development on these lines will not be altogether overlooked.

The main part of the new force which we are being asked to vote for to-night consists of bombers. There are some who feel that it is desirable to try and restrict the areas and the people that should be bombed when they are used. I submit again that that matter is governed by the purposes for which you are using your air force. If it is simply going to be run on the old pre-war system of one nation against another, I should have thought that any attempt to restrict bombing was not only impossible but undesirable. Old-fashioned war is not a gentleman's game; it was pure savagery. It is no use trying to dress it up in anything else, and if all are in it the sooner it will be stopped. The mere horror of the war weapon will make it certain that sooner than later human beings will make up their minds that they will not tolerate this thing any longer. On the other hand, if you are using your air force on the collective basis, then, solely for the purpose of maintaining world order, you are acting on police lines and you will want to use, as police always do, the minimum of force and to do the least possible harm consistently with attaining your object. The test one has to apply in considering this estimate to-night is the purpose for which the increased air force is to be used. The fact that the Government have contributed to the present situation, as I maintain, by their failure to act in the last two years, does not make it any the less necessary that we should do our best for our country and for the world in the present situation.

We do not feel confident; we have very considerable doubt not unmixed with hope, that the Government are going to work courageously the collective system. For that reason, we could not vote against them; but there are elements which make us feel very doubtful, and for that reason we could not vote for them. [Interruption.] It is a perfectly clear and logical attitude, and I am trying to put it clearly. In the past we have had very good reason to doubt the sincerity of the Government in regard to the collective system, but since then there has been a reconstruction of the Government, and the new Ministers have not been in their offices very long. We think it is only fair that they should have the fullest opportunity of showing where they stand. If they show that there has been no change in the attitude which the Government have taken up during the last few years, you may be quite sure that we shall take every opportunity of voting against them in this House, as being unfit to control the affairs of this country in any way whatever.

9.37 p.m.

As I do not propose to trouble the Committee for much more than five minutes, I hope that the hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) will forgive me if I do not follow him down the various political avenues which he explored so admirably. Earlier to-day we discussed a subject which, as I hope to show in a sentence, is not unconnected politically with that which we are now considering. Had I been able to catch the eye of the Chair during that Debate, a thing which I did not achieve, I might have taken the opportunity to comment upon the unfortunate innuendoes of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and I would have liked also to mention the odious and dangerous Nazi régime with which we have recently made the first agreement for limitation.

I come now to the question of air limitation. I would like the Government to reassure the Committee that we are aiming as a first step at a Western air pact of mutual guarantee, and that there is no intention in their mind to make any bilateral agreement with any single Western Power on the question of the air. If the Government can give me that assurance later, I shall be extremely obliged. If I had spoken earlier in the day, I might also have said how sinister I regarded the possible raising of the total tonnage of German submarines to 100 per cent. of our own submarine craft, because the submarine is a weapon which, more than any other single cause in the last War, threatened our existence. To-night we are discussing a weapon which has grown into being an incomparably more terrible and destructive force even than the submarine; one which is able, and, indeed, certain, unless the policy of Europe is mended, to bring death and destruction in their swiftest and most inexorable form, right on to the very hearths of every innocent male and female non-combatant.

As I am proposing to consume only three more minutes of the time of this honourable Committee, I wish to spend them in asking the Government two questions, asking them and perhaps amplifying them with one or two sentences. The first question is a rhetorical one to which I therefore expect no answer; indeed, I am sure that no answer can be given. It is this: Is it not difficult for a man who tries to examine the position of the Government objectively and candidly to understand their air policy? Is it not almost impossible for one to make up one's mind about the air policy of the Government? We have been constantly assured—conclusively and decisively assured—by the Prime Minister that the lack of a solution of this pressing problem of the air can only mean, sooner or later, the end of our civilisation; on the other hand, we have had the noble predecessor of the new Minister for Air stating—I am paraphrasing what he said—that he regarded it as a ground for satisfaction that he had successfully resisted the public outcry for the abolition of the use of the bombing aeroplane. It is indeed difficult for a man to make up his mind upon the Government's air policy.

I now come to the second question, which I hope will be answered later to-night by the Under-Secretary of State. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Air used the words: "In our position as it is to-day." It is owing to that appeal to realism that I am putting this second question, and I earnestly beg the Government to answer me. Unlike my hon. Friend the Member for East Wolverhampton, who has now left the Chamber, it is upon the answer to this question that I shall determine the way I shall vote to-night. I do not enjoy voting against the Government. It is not a particularly pleasant thing to feel inside one a tug-of-war among several conflicting loyalties. This is the question that I wish to put to the Government: What is their long-range air policy? Are they or are they not in favour of and aiming at an international air police force? Everybody in this Committee knows, whatever detestable forms party propaganda may take in the constituencies, that the Government want war no more than anyone else, and yet war can only be finally destroyed if the policies which have been pursued in Europe become fundamentally different. I know that a strong case can be made out for showing the terrible Hitler and those few men who now determine the misfortunes of Germany that, in terms of short-range policy, we are not going to allow them to outbuild us in the air, and I should not have objected to the increase, the almost mountainous increase, of £5,000,000 which we are discussing, had it been clear that the Government intend to pursue, as their ultimate objective, the only policy which can destroy war in Europe for ever.

More and more supplementary Estimates will be asked for in one or other of the three Services; more treasure is going to be squandered; more sums of £5,000,000 will be taken from the taxpayer through the medium of the House of Commons, and more sums will be spent on all types of arms until the day when Europe finally makes the League strong. The House of Commons is entitled to ask the Government to support the pooling of security instead of both setting and following the example of aggravating insecurity.

9.44 p.m.

The hon. Member for West Leeds (Mr. V. Adams) is known to all hon. Members as perpetually sitting on the horns of a dilemma. While we regret that he still has this mental trouble with him to-night, we know that he will not expect me to follow him in his particular purview. The hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) however raised some question to which I would like very briefly to refer. He spoke of his hope that the Government would press forward with an Air Pact—a hope which, I am certain, is echoed by all Members on the Government Benches, for it is by no means the sole prerogative of the party below the Gangway to encourage the Government in this respect. But there are ways and there are means, and it would appear that the Liberal party below the Gangway are pressing the Government to go forward in exactly the path that will inevitably lead to disaster. That path was laid down with chapter and verse at the League of Nations Union Conference only a fortnight ago, when His Majesty's Government were bidden to proceed energetically and immediately for two things—first, the abolition of military aircraft, and, secondly, the international control of civil aviation. At the same time the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) urged the Government not to attempt too much, and it is because I believe that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Darwen was advocating the right policy, and that the League of Nations Union was advocating the diametrically opposite and wrong policy, that I want to say a word on that subject.

If we are to achieve anything in the Western Air Pact, we have to fight for that which seems practical. It is obvious that to endeavour to obtain the abolition of military air forces, at a moment when throughout the world they are being increased, would only lead us to that dismal failure which we have witnessed at Geneva during the last few years. Again, the international control of civil aviation seems, unfortunately, to have become the very touchstone of orthodoxy to those who believe in the collective system of security. They speak as though the whole of the problems of international aviation will be solved the moment that civil aviation is internationalised or controlled, but, as those who have read the reports of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva will know, there is no problem that bristles with thornier difficulties than that of the international control of civil aviation. And even if we could achieve that end, would it be worth anything?

A few weeks ago I saw a suggestion that the position of civil aviation vis-à-vis the military air forces was parallel with that as between the Mercantile Marine and the Royal Navy. But the tonnage of the Mercantile Marine is 30 times that of the Royal Navy. Lest my argument should be voted out of court on account of the small size of the British civil air fleet, let me take France. The French air forces are 30 times the size of the French civil air fleet, so that the comparison of the Mercantile Marine and the Royal Navy with the civil air fleet and the air forces is incorrect in the ratio of 900 to 1. Therefore, this problem of the control of civil aviation is entirely beside the point if we are endeavouring to face realities. On the other hand, it is a vast problem full of the greatest difficulties. That ratio of 900 to 1 will change, and many of us hope that the increase in civil aviation will make it change all the more rapidly, but the process can only be a gradual one, and, therefore, it would be fantastic for His Majesty's Government to expend their efforts in that direction when we have an opportunity of achieving, not abolition, which is impossible, not inter- nationalisation of civil aviation, which would be useless at the moment, but the useful procedure of going forward and attaining, as we have attained in the Naval Pact with Germany, an agreed limitation. It is in the hope that an air pact will constitute an agreed limitation of air forces and avoid the difficulties and dangers of stressing the unreal problem of the control of civil aviation that I suggest the Government should proceed on those lines.

Many of us in this House have endeavoured for some years to impress upon the Government and upon those who sit with us on these benches the deplorable state of our Air Force, both numerically and, to a certain extent, qualitatively, in comparison with the air forces of foreign Powers, and thus it is with some sense of approval that we see these Estimates to-night. It is not that we would not have wished that the results of the Disarmament Conference had been such that any increase in our awn Air Force and every other could have been completely avoided, but that, unfortunately, was not to be. The Government have faced the resulting issue squarely, and I believe they have behind them the almost unanimous opinion of people throughout the country who are not tied to a party. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Little skirmishes may occur, but, if you take the opinion of the average man in the country, it is no part of his policy that we should be defenceless against air attack.

Having approved of the decision of the Government to increase our air forces, this Committee has another duty, namely, to see that the money which it votes is well spent, and perhaps I may be allowed to call attention to this aspect of the matter. I do so because the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon (Dr. Addison) has drawn attention very often to this point during the last two weeks. He has suggested that the cost, or perhaps it would be better to say the value of the money that we shall put into this development, represents a continual struggle between the Air Ministry on the one hand, as representing the taxpayer, and, on the other hand, the aircraft industry and the aircraft manufacturers. Seeing that I have, at one time and another, been a member of both those bodies politic, I may perhaps express one or two recollections to the Com- mittee. At one time I was in the Technical Department of the Air Ministry, and at another I had the honour of manufacturing British aircraft. Needless to say, if I were not able to-night to take an entirely impartial attitude, I should not dream of standing up and addressing myself to this question.

In the first place, it is not the fact that the aircraft industry can fix prices in any way. I believe there is more competition among the various units in the aircraft industry than in almost any other industry in the country. The whole crux of the matter is: "What is the official policy?" One of the first suggestions that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon advanced, which has been re-echoed elsewhere, is that we ought to have a national aircraft factory. I believe that to be wrong. The whole atmosphere during the War was reeking with suspicion as between the industry and the Air Ministry because the Government were at the same time the judge of the products of the industry and its competitor. I believe that to be an impossible position, and I heartily congratulate the Secretary of State that, as long as the industry does its duty, he is standing foursquare against this development.

As I look back over the years, what do I suggest are the particular points that the right hon. Gentleman should watch? First, I think we need a little more radical thought in this development. Is this expansion that we are voting to-day to be a mere multiplication of what we have had in the past or is the extra money that we are about to vote to be utilised to face the whole problem on a new and a wider and a better scale? I can put my thoughts into words, because I saw a very interesting analogy not long ago. It was stated in the Press that the Chief of the London Fire Brigade had made a vital departure from practice in taking his firemen from sitting along the side of the fire engine, out in the cold and the rain, and providing them with a shelter and a hood in the front of the chassis. It is fantastic that, all these years after the invention of the motor car, when everyone else rides about under cover, we should have kept our firemen sitting along the side of the engine. But that is the type of persistent anachronism that goes on unless some great mind comes along and com- pletely changes the whole manner of thinking about a particular problem Secondly, I would suggest that, if he could get some great brain, such as Mr. H. G. Wells, who 20 or 40 years ago told us exactly the type of machine that we should be having on our roads and in the air to-day, to give him a specification of the aeroplane that we ought to have in five or 10 years time and he then gave that specification to the practical engineers in the aircraft industry, we should have much finer aeroplanes and much better value for the money that the Committee is asked to vote than if we take up, as we are unfortunately doing, the specifications that we have used for so many years, merely adding 50 miles per hour in speed or a few hundred feet a minute in climb.

I sincerely trust that the Air Ministry, with the aid of these gentlemen who with such public spirit have come in to help them, will plan a little more ahead than has previously been the case. In spite of the fact that the Secretary of State requires aero engines at a much greater rate than he can obtain them, there is one aero engine factory in the Midlands which is scarcely producing engines at all, and that is because there had not been planning—there were not air frames, the part of the aeroplane other than the engine, coming forward which would take the engines produced by that factory.

The Air Ministry, as a great technical public service, is clearly divided into many watertight compartments. Each technical officer has his own particular aspect of the problem to guard jealously and with care, and, as a result sometimes and, as I believe, all too frequently, the decisions of these technicians rule the ultimate policy to much too great an extent. I will give the Committee an example of what I have in mind. Some of the Air Ministry technicians a few weeks ago were discussing with other engineers, on a body which has been set up in order to standardise certain dimensions and sizes, a particular aspect of the problem and the attitude of the Air Ministry technicians was definitely this: "We want a certain improvement, and we cannot worry about what it will cost." Some amazement was expressed by the engineers from the industrial side, but that was the point that was maintained. If the Air Ministry insist on technical changes without relation to cost, this programme is going to be much more expensive for the country than it need be, and I hope that all these decisions of a technical nature, by people well down in the Air Ministry hierarchy but nevertheless having a big financial effect in the long run, will be most carefully watched.

My right hon. Friend stressed his intention of pressing forward research both in the Government establishments and in the industry. If I may separate the two problems, I believe there is not so much need at the moment for research as for specific experimentation. As the result of Air Ministry apathy, this country was left hopelessly behind in the development of the retractable undercarriage, which is now at last being developed even here. We are still behind in the development of the variable pitch air screw, manufactured with success in America, France and Germany. That is the type of problem—a specific engineering problem rather than a general research problem—which we need to investigate. I was delighted that the Secretary of State referred to the generosity of Lord Rothermere in lending the Air Ministry a civil aeroplane, not so much for his Lordship's generosity, as that it definitely stamps the importance to this country and to the air defensive position of the interest that she takes in civil aviation. For too long I believe we have felt that the responsibilities of the Government and of this House ended when we gave Imperial Airways a monopoly for the Empire services. That was a long time ago and it is impossible for anyone to maintain that in 13 or 14 years that system is still imperative for the salvation of British civil aviation. On the contrary, we know that there are many non-subsidised companies who have started, in spite in some cases of the opposition of this great subsidised company, Imperial Airways.

I am bound to point out to the hon. Member that there is only a very small vote for civil aviation, and I hardly think that is a new service.

I only proposed to make a very brief reference to this subject, but it does follow very clearly from what the Secretary of State for Air has said that civil aviation is a material part of the whole of this Vote. He is going to spend tens if not hundreds of thousands of pounds on the Service aircraft developed from this civil aircraft of Lord Rothermere. Therefore, while bowing to your Ruling, I do hope that the Secretary of State for Air will bear in mind this fact which has come to his notice so early in his career at the Air Ministry and that it will enable him, as previously no Air Minister has done, to put development of civil aviation in the forefront of Service policy.

I should like to express, on behalf of those of us who have fought somewhat for the increase in the Royal Air Force, our indebtedness to the predecessor of the present Secretary of State for Air. Lord Londonderry had a very difficult task during the period he was at the Air Ministry. There is not the slightest doubt that he was endeavouring to bring public opinion and the Government to a realisation of the need for air defence, and I would like, while he is no more there, to thank him and the Under-Secretary of State for Air for all they have done to make this expansion possible. [Interruption.] Yes, I would not be at all ashamed to say that if we had not had this expansion we should have been in a much worse position to maintain our European and world position and to bring to bear such forcefulness as is necessary to back up our spoken word. I was saying when I was interrupted from below me that we are content to leave the matter in the hands of the present Secretary of State for Air.

10.8 p.m.

If the Government really needed any justification for the unfortunate steps they are compelled to take at the present time by this very large expenditure, that justification would have been amply found in the two speeches to which we have listened from the Opposition. The hon. Member for Wolverhampton East (Mr. Mander), in seeking every ground to attack the Government, was obliged to turn on the Secretary of State for not having stated on this occasion that we were pledged to support collective security. Surely that point is clear. In view of repeated pronouncements of the Government on this general line of policy, really it was not necessary for the Secretary of State in introducing a Supplementary Estimate with great brevity to underline that particular point yet again.

I omitted to notice that the right hon. Gentleman did it. The other attack was much more unfortunate because the hon. Member for Govan (Mr. N. Maclean), speaking for the official Labour Opposition, never appeared to come to grips with realities at all, but instead repeated the charge that this Government stymied air limitation by refusing to abandon the reservation in respect of police bombing. It is amazing that after this specific point was dealt with at great length and in great detail by the Minister for League of Nations Affairs last Thursday afternoon the hon. Member for Govan should have had the nerve to base an attack on that idea. He can refresh his memory from column 616 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of last Thursday's Debate.

May I remind the hon. Gentleman that I was not quoting from the OFFICIAL REPORT, but I was about to quote, when I was restrained by the Chairman, the late Secretary of State for Air in another place when he was stating the air policy on 22nd May.

That is precisely my complaint. There was the Debate last Thursday in this House which he could quite easily have quoted had he wanted to do so.

I had the precise statement of the late Secretary of State for Air. It was only relevant to the point I was making, backed up by the statement of the Government policy at the first meeting of the Air Commission, from the report of which I read and of which, if he was sufficiently interested, the hon. Member might have made a note.

A lot of water has passed beneath the bridges since then, and that matter was dealt with last Thursday.

It is obvious that the hon. Member does not mean to deal with realities so I leave it at that. Those of us who do not intend to allow this particular fabrication to pass for honest currency will—

May I ask for your permission, Captain Bourne, to read the extract from the report in the other place to justify the statement I made here? I cannot have it said that I am making a fabrication in this House.

I think I must adhere to the rule that we cannot quote speeches made in another place during the same session, but I think the hon. and gallant Member had better not use the word "fabrication." Obviously, we cannot debate here what was said in the same session in another place, and it is desirable that Members in all parts of the House should remember that rule, and not transgress it.

I bow to your Ruling, and if the word "fabrication" was misunderstood, I withdraw it at once. I was referring, not to any statement the hon. Member has quoted, but to the general insinuation—I use that word instead—which is being widely used by the Opposition, and if the hon. Member for Govan refuses to answer that point, all I can hope is that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on that bench will take an early opportunity of stating their view on this matter. It is intolerable that this insinuation should go on.

We have had the facts stated clearly in the OFFICIAL REPORT last Thursday, and by that we can agree to abide. For the moment, I leave it at that. I want to refer briefly to one particular point—the possibility of air limitation by agreement. On Thursday last, in anticipation of this Vote, a number of hon. Members, including the right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) complained that the Government had failed to take advantage of Germany's offer either for limitation or the possibility of the abolition of the air arm. It is true that as long ago as 1933 at the Disarmament Conference, Germany claimed that she was ready, if other people would do the same, to aim at the abolition of air bombing. It is quite true that in his speech of 22nd May Herr Hitler stated in no fewer than six separate paragraphs, some of which were very precise, that he was prepared to aim at the abolition of the air weapon. I never doubted that Herr Hitler would make that pronouncement, and I do not doubt his sincerity in this respect, for the reason that it is clearly wholly in the interests of Germany, if her intention is bad, to secure the maximum limitation of the air arm, or indeed its total abolition. Nothing could suit the German Government better.

There are a number of reasons for that with which I have not the time to trouble the Committee, but one very great and pregnant one is the geographical position of Germany. Whereas before 1914 Germany, with her paramount Army and her interior lines, was in a position to bully Europe as she wished, that position is totally reversed with the advent of the air arm. Her interior lines and proximity to her frontier of her industrial areas makes Germany, more than any other country, open and susceptible to air attack. If the intention of Germany is bad—and I am not prepared to assume that under the present regime it is otherwise than bad—then it is wholly to the selfish advantage of Germany if she can secure the abolition of the air arm. Therefore, I most earnestly hope that the Government, while making their ultimate objective the total abolition of all armaments, will not be so unwise as to agree to any measure of air disarmament unaccompanied by compensating disarmament in other directions. Do not let us throw away the one great lever that we have of securing general disarmament by weakening that weapon and by frittering it away piecemeal. We all want to secure the abolition of air bombing and air armaments, and the right way to set about it is to couple with it general disarmament, and not to proceed separately.

10.18 p.m.

I am sure that every Member of the House must feel to-night that this is a very shameful business. I do not believe that the Prime Minister or any citizen of this country belonging to any party can fail to contemplate with horror all that is involved in this proposal. I see that in a speech which he made in 1932, discussing this subject with his usual frankness, the Prime Minister said—and I should think that probably from that point of view he said truly—that the only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill women and children more quickly than the enemy if you wish to save yourself. That may be true. I am quite sure that there is no man or woman in any town, village or city in England, nor, I believe, in any other country, who wishes to smother, destroy and cover with odious and blistering gases the citizens of any other nation. This Vote is the outward and visible sign of the bankruptcy of statesmanship.

If the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Wellingborough (Wing-Commander James) will attend to me for a moment, I will say, on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Govan (Mr. N. Maclean), that I do not accept that his statement as to the grave responsibility that attaches to the Government for the position into which we have drifted and which has culminated in this horrible Vote, was an insinuation. It was not. It was a statement of fact, and it can, unfortunately, be proved. Whatever share others may have to bear for this dreadful result, all these years after the War, it is undeniable that the action of the Government, by losing one or two precious opportunities of furthering the abolition of the air arm, has eventuated in the present position. The hon. and gallant Member opposite gave us a glimpse of his mind. I believe that had it not been for Service pressure, the Government would have taken a much more definite line with regard to police bombing than they have taken. The hon. and gallant Member's speech was an indication of the attitude that we are not prepared to abolish police bombing until we get a reduction in many other things.

The right hon. Gentleman must not misrepresent me. I said nothing with reference to police bombing. I was talking about air operation in general.

The hon. and gallant Member's speech was a little narrower than I thought. He was referring to the use of aeroplanes, which are the active and offensive part of this business. It was to the abolition of that, that the hon. and gallant Member was objecting, until we get abolition extended into other fields. If you take that line you will not get abolition in anything. I have no doubt that it was the Service pressure that made the Government lose such opportunities as they had, and which gradually has pushed us into this deplorable condition. The Secretary of State was good enough to refer to some criticisms that I have been putting forward, in questions and elsewhere. In dealing with that matter I hope that he will not take my criticism of the methods that are in contemplation and those that have been pursued, as implying any acquiesence in the deplorable policy which has resulted in this Vote. The point of my criticism is that if you are going to spend public money in this way, certain things should apply. The right hon. Gentleman forecast two positions—the peacetime position and the wartime position. With great respect, he was irretrievably wrong in both. He said that his peacetime position—I will try not to misrepresent him—was that we must have an industry strong enough and compact enough to meet Government requirements, and to supply overseas demands.

All demands. You do not want too large a number of suppliers. That is the method which is being adopted, and in the evidence given before the Public Accounts Committee, on 14th May, by the Secretary to the Ministry it appears that the Minister is now proposing to depend for the most part, if not exclusively, on 14 or 15 firms which are included in what is known as the Society of British Aircraft Constructors. The right hon. Gentleman said that they must be able to meet his needs in peace time, as well as oversea orders. Last year only 15 per cent. of the Air Ministry's requirements were obtained on a basis of competitive tender, and it is anticipated, I see, that the forthcoming orders, to use the words employed before the Public Accounts Committee:

"Will require the whole maximum possible output of all the firms in the industry."
That, I suppose, would be the case, except that there would be a margin for oversea supplies. I challenge that method of doing this business, deplorable as it is. The right hon. Gentleman—I am not going to imitate his adjectives or adverbs—prefers what he calls a friendly business arrangement, and suggested that I have some hostility to some or all of these firms. I have no hostility to them at all. While they are engaged in the business of making aircraft, they naturally and reasonably expect to make aircraft for a profit, and nobody can complain if they do. I have never said a word against any of these firms, and I do not propose to do so. It is not the firms we are discussing; it is the system. The right hon. Gentleman is satisfied that, somehow or other, by an elaboration of friendly arrangements, these firms will be doing the work practically on a non-competitive basis, that by the advice of these distinguished gentlemen, with some of whom I worked years ago, he is going to get the best terms available.

When I suggest that he should have powers to investigate costs, I am not talking in the air, because if the right hon. Gentleman will take the trouble to inform himself, he is now creating the very same position which nearly landed this country in disaster during the War. There was then a small group of firms upon whom the war Services Ministries were accustomed to rely. They took the whole of their output, and they endeavoured to arrive at prices by friendly arrangement—exactly the position which the right hon. Gentleman is now recommending the country to adopt. What happened? Some of the gentlemen whom the right hon. Gentleman has now got with him were not satisfied. In the investigation of costs we were necessarily arriving at a clear statement of fact. For instance, there is a question of overhead charges.

I do not want the right hon. Gentleman to misunderstand me, or to mislead the Committee. I am quite well aware of the desirability of investigating overhead charges and costs. What I informed him was that Sir Hardman Lever and his colleagues were perfectly satisfied that every one of these firms was going to give to the Ministry the fullest facilities for investigating overhead charges and costs.

I sincerely hope that in six months' time they will be satisfied that they have got them. But there are one or two other considerations to bear in mind before the Minister gets into that position. These firms, like every other firm of this type—it is their business and I am not blaming them in the lea—maintain considerable overseas organisations to sell aeroplanes and aeroplane engines. We had the other day the statement of the President of the Board of Trade that some hundreds of aeroplanes and 583 aeroplane engines were sold abroad. I can produce advertisements in foreign journals by British firms which are advertising their wares. I am not blaming them for it. But those things enter into the overhead charges. They also enter into the capacity of the firms to produce. I want the Committee to bear in mind that a good many of the types that are now being produced—all honour to the draughtsmen and ingenious people and the experimentations of the firms themselves—are being developed by the assistance of the Air Ministry and its officers at the experimental stations and so on. I do not fancy developing a system whereby our own Air Ministry at public expense helps to develop efficient types, and then we find a firm that manufactures these or other types encouraged by the Secretary of State to go for overseas orders.

Do not let the hon. Member be too sure. We had some very interesting observations from the right hon. and gallant Member for the Drake division of Plymouth (Captain Guest), who spoke of the adaptability of civil aeroplanes to military purposes. I do not like it, and I am certain the country does not like it—that our money should be used to assist a monopoly group of private firms in developing types, some of which anyhow are advertised and sold abroad. I am not saying by whom they are sold. It is a very undesirable system. I am not criticising on that ground so far as this Vote is concerned. What I am criticising is the Government making use of this system in the way they are doing. I come now to what actually occurs. I shall not bore the Committee with many details but I will refer to an actual return which was made by the successor of Sir Hardman Lever when he went to the Treasury—Sir John Mann—and I will quote what he actually said to the Treasury in a report to the Treasury on this particular point in April, 1917. This report was asked for, I well remember, by Mr. Bonar Law, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I will refer to what was said about national factories in a minute. This is what Sir John Mann said on the question of cost examinations:

"Cost examination.—Investigations have been made into the cost of certain goods and services carried out by contractors for the Ministry. Between four and five hundred of these investigations have taken place and are of inestimable value both in negotiating with contractors and for the purpose of forcing prices down."
He gives an example of a brass stamping investigation which resulted in a saving of £300,000 a year. He goes on:
"In our estimates for 1917–18 we have taken as the cost of gun ammunition a total of £413,000,000. If we had estimated the cost of the same quantities of this ammunition at the prices ruling in March, 1916, the total would have been £456,000,000"—
March, 1916, was after the original application of this system had brought about the great reduction in prices already. He continues:
"—which shows a reduction of £43,000,000. This saving is notwithstanding the increased cost of labour which on a very, very rough calculation is estimated to represent another £28,000,000."
So that in addition to an additional cost of labour of £28,000,000, by this process which the right hon. Gentleman scorns to adopt, they saved £43,000,000. I claim that the conditions there were absolutely identical with what they are going to be now when the right hon. Gentleman fills up these firms with orders to the maximum of their capacity. There is some collateral evidence which supports my contention, and while I wish the right hon. Gentleman well in obtaining a friendly arrangement—I hope he will have better luck than we had—do not let us forget that when we were trying to make a friendly arrangement on the same basis for exactly this kind of thing, although not for aeroplane engines, this country was engaged in a life and death struggle for its existence, and there was every stimulus in those days to make a friendly arrangement with the utmost expedition. The results I have just quoted from Sir John Mann's report were obtained under those circumstances.

What does the Stock Exchange think will be the results of this friendly arrangement? We have had some rather illuminating observations on their mind anyhow lately. I see that this is what the "Daily Express" says—and I do not suspect them of being partial to my views—with regard to certain flotations on the 26th June, by a group of underwriters, I suppose:
"A firm of stock brokers purchased a large number of shares that were being issued by the Bristol Aeroplane Company and others and they resold them. Thus one firm of brokers expects to make £200,000 out of this little deal."
That was only one item, and I see, judging by a calculation made as late as the 19th July by Mr. Francis Williams of the "Daily Herald" that aircraft flotations inspired by the Government programme, has already resulted in seven new aircraft issues, raising from the public a total of round about £6,450,000, of which about half appears to have gone in profits for the promoters, stock exchange firms, etc. I have no doubt that that is a correct statement. We have seen in the papers every day, more or less, for weeks what is happening about these shares and the enterprising flotations that have been going on. I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the capital and sinking fund charges of that £6,000,000 are going into this account. Are Sir Hardman Lever and his friends to be allowed capital and sinking fund charges on £6,000,000 or on £3,000,000? I say that the right hon. Gentleman is not entitled in view of the tragic experience of this country in this business to take the line he is taking. He is setting up a gigantic monopoly and taking the whole of their produce for what is said to be an agreed price. Just as we felt under more dreadful experiences that we had to get more extreme powers, so ought the right hon. Gentleman now—

The right hon. Gentleman has now called to my mind powers which will require legislation, and they must not be discussed to-night.

The Secretary of State referred to my criticisms and justified the reasons for his not taking these powers. I am sorry that he was out of order, but I was replying to his disorderly speech. Among other disorderly things that the right hon. Gentleman did was to animadvert upon my criticism of this form of expenditure without it being spent through the media of national factories. I will return to that point. The right hon. Gentleman is proposing to spend these millions of pounds—£5,000,000 to-night and £36,000,000 next year on the Air Force Vote—and goodness knows how much it will be after that if this Government happens to be successful at the next election, which, pray God, it will not be. I propose to continue both inside this House and out to point out the assistance which he could gain by the national factory system. I never heard of the little place which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned the other day, but it appears to have been very expensive. When he was making his speech I took care to interject a question when these factories about which he talked were built. He said that he thought it was about 1917, and I gathered that some were later. Everybody who knows anything about factory construction knows perfectly well that if you are to make a factory to construct aeroplane engines, you will not get it functioning at an economical rate in a smooth fashion in a year's time. I cannot accept his statement with regard to any one of the three factories which he mentioned without further information. Here are some of the oncosts of one national factory. The actual producers of aeroplanes in this factory were 33 per cent. of the total personnel. There were draftsmen, tracers, wireless testers, wind and water tunnel testers, the publication department, printers, experimental flight officers, experimental engine test stations and all the rest of it. The report goes on to say these were included in the incost of this factory,

"not forgetting the policemen who search the pockets of the workmen for anything they may have in them and salute every Austin seven that comes along."
If all these things are included in the oncosts, of course the costs were very large, and I am not prepared to accept the right hon. Gentleman's glib account of these factory costs. It is no good laughing. I will give the right hon. Gentleman some more facts. The testimony I am now going to give is that of one of the men he has now got. This relates precisely to the national factories. This was what they found out about national factories. This relates not to three factories but 86 national factories. It was by the examination of the costs of production in these factories that we were enabled to bring down the immense prices which had previously been paid to monopolistic firms. It is because of that that I want the right hon. Gentleman to have a few test factories of his own, and it may be well worth his while. This is the official report on these 86 national factories. The capital expenditure of this group was £25,000,000,
"Goods have been produced at the cost of £33,000,000 which, if they had been bought at contract prices, obtained after the application of the costing system, would have cost £42,000,000, representing a saving of £9,000,000."
It goes on to say, with respect to a group of 11 factories which cost £1,500,000, that they produced at a cost of £3,500,000 goods which at contract prices would have entailed an expenditure of £6,000,000. In these cases, and these factories had only been built one year and 10 months, the saving was very much in excess of the total cost of the factories. That is to say, the whole thing, lock, stock and barrel, was paid for, and more than paid for, in one year and 10 months. The right hon. Gentleman happens to have some of these people in an advisory capacity. I want them to have something more than advisory powers. I want them to have the same kind of powers as produced these results, but I am afraid he is so overcome by his prejudices in favour of the system of private enterprise that he really has never given this subject fair consideration. I have not exaggerated. Every statement I have made is an under-statement. They were not Socialists the men who devised this system. So far as I am aware they did so because they found it was the businesslike and sensible way of doing it.

Here let me refer to another question which the right hon. Gentleman dismissed as a somewhat airy aside the other day. I can tell him that I shall not be put off by that sort of thing, either here or outside. I made a suggestion in a question that there should be some pooling arrangement with respect to the purchase of materials and machinery. The right hon. Gentleman would not have it. As a matter of fact, one of the greatest contributing factors to the economy was the centralised system of purchase of supplies, a centralised system for production and distribution, and the order of priority of materials and machinery. If the right hon. Gentleman is taking the whole of the output of these firms, what is wrong with such an arrangement as that? It is a businesslike way of doing it. I also think that if this machinery is to be paid for at this prodigious cost, it should not be used for the manufacture of aeroplanes for people in other countries. We want some assurance on that point. All that the right hon. Gentleman said about that was that there was an adequate system of safeguarding our interests. That is not good enough. If we are to employ the whole of the capacity of these firms, it is the whole of their capacity. Let them be controlled establishments in the same way as they were—

Again, the right hon. Gentleman is going on to matters which would require legislative action to deal with.

I am afraid that I am going rather beyond the licence afforded me by the irregularities of the Minister himself. I should like to say to the right hon. Gentleman one final word. [Interruption.] I am not going to apologise for taking up the time of the Committee on this matter. We are voting £5,000,000 extra now, and there will probably be many millions more to vote in the future; and when the right hon. Gentleman is beginning this type of expenditure he owes it to himself as well as to the country to investigate without prejudice what was learned when other people had this job to do. He cannot pass it off by flippant answers to questions. That will not do. The right hon. Gentleman has got on his own staff the man who under my instructions pooled the whole thing. When manufacture was scattered and disorganised and being done in a lot of separate places during the War this country had a very indifferent and inadequate supply. It was only under the system which I recommend that the right hon. Gentleman should adopt—if he wants to save public money—urder the direction of Lord Weir in 1917, that we obtained efficient and abundant supplies, with all the powers that I have been talking about. We are entitled to ask the right hon. Gentleman to give much closer attention to this matter than he has evidently given to it hitherto. If he does not do so, he is going to establish in this country a very powerful monopoly, trading not only at home but abroad, which will mean that in this deplorable business we shall have growing up a group of powerful vested interests which will make it more and more difficult for the State in the time to come to do its duty by the taxpayer, while at the same time being fair to the manufacturer. It is a very serious thing to contemplate the immense monopoly which the right hon. Gentleman proposes to establish and strengthen in this country. It is wrong—apart from the fact that the whole Vote represents a deplorable failure of policy. I should be glad, although I am not so vain as to think it, if the exhortations and experiences of a small Opposition like ours could make any difference to the right hon. Gentleman. I think it right that Parliament at this time, when it is embarking on this prodigious expenditure, should have recalled to it the terrible misfortune that arose when we pursued this system in time of war.

10.56 p.m.

I feel that this subject has been dealt with so exhaustively, both by my right hon. Friend in his speech and now in the speech to which we have just listened, that the Committee will not wish me at this late hour to deal with it at any very great length. Listening to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Swindon (Dr. Addison), in which he had not a good word to say for this system, I was reminded that we are dealing to-night with a programme of expansion which, we hope, will be concluded within a couple of years. If state factories were to be put up, whether they were good or bad, quite apart from the dislocation that Would be caused to the industry by removing so many of the skilled craftsmen who are so difficult to come by nowadays, the factories would never be set up in time to carry through the programme which we are discussing.

Describing the way in which firms are allowed to sell machines to foreign countries, the right hon. Gentleman criticised the system and said it was not good enough; but it was good enough for his Government. We are following exactly the same plan and the same principles as were followed by his Government when we sell machines to foreign countries in exactly the same way. If foreign countries are going to buy aeroplanes, we feel that they might as well buy aeroplanes here and give employment to our people. The right hon. Gentleman has not yet realised what my right hon. Friend said in his speech, that we now have complete powers for the investigation of costs. We have every facility for the inspection of all books, and that we have got those powers by agreement, and not by compulsion, is a good thing.

I was interested to notice that the right hon. Gentleman was himself advocating this method in one of those numerous and interesting volumes which emanated from his fertile pen during the last few years. In commenting on the powers which he took to investigate costs independently and to prescribe fair prices—under conditions, I would remind the Committee, very different from what they are to-day—he makes in his diary this entry:
"I have instructed Lever to keep this in the background, because if we can get what we know are just prices, with reasonable allowances for a fair profit by friendly efforts, it will be all to the good."

That was when we had the statutory powers. The fact that you have powers is often one of the best reasons for not requiring to use them.

We have the powers now, but not by compulsion. I turn now to the speech which was made by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Drake Division of Plymouth (Captain Guest), in which he regretted that more money was not being taken in this Vote for civil aviation. He said that although we were embarking on a programme of expansion, civil and military aviation were so closely interlocked that if we took money for civil aviation we should not have to spend so much money on military aviation. As I think we have heard before in this House, the Government, while they are desirous of developing as much as they can the future of civil air transport, are also anxious as far as possible to avoid entangling military with civil aviation. We have adopted that policy, not only on grounds of principle, but because we think it would be definitely detrimental to this great new form of transport if it were subordinated to military aviation, and also on the practical ground that the programme upon which we are now embarking may be called a short-range programme, and, that, therefore, looking ahead for the next five years, to expend the funds at our disposal on civil aviation now, with a view to achieving military ends, would be the most extravagant way of laying out those funds.

In saying this, however, I am not seeking in any way to controvert the thesis that, in the more distant future, a flourishing aircraft and engine manufacturing industry and a far-reaching system of commercial air transport would have a very definite defence value. That proposition is unchallengeable, and we may hope to see one day, instead of being, as it is to-day, a relative bagatelle, commercial aircraft plying in ever-increasing numbers over all parts of the globe, and vastly outnumbering military aircraft. But, unfortunately, that day is not yet, and to-day we have to face the problem of our defence with an eye to the immediate future; and, with that in view, I think the best way to allocate the funds at our disposal is as is done in this Estimate. Nevertheless, we are determined in other ways to push on the development of civil aviation by all means in our power and within the limits imposed on us. I hope to see Vote 8 rising steadily in the course of the next few years.

My right hon. and gallant Friend has commented on the fact that we have only taken £500 for civil aviation where we should have taken a larger sum for developing ground organisation and night flying; but I would remind him that in the Estimates presented in March last Sub-head C of Vote 8 showed an increase from £11,000 to £127,000, which I think is a very good and definite sign that this year these very necessary questions of ground organisation and ancillary equipment for which he has so wisely pressed will be dealt with. Then we have the survey, as a result of which we hope, as my right hon. and gallant Friend knows, to get more aerodromes; and I am glad to say that in this matter we have the help of Mr. Frank Pick, than whom no one in this country knows more about questions of transport. We have still another committee sitting to co-ordinate the efforts of the Survey Committee, and its chairman is Sir Henry Maybury, to whom I think we all ought to be grateful for giving the necessary time to this valuable work.

The hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) and the hon. Member for West Leeds (Mr. V. Adams) asked me about the Western Air Pact, and whether we were going into bilateral pacts. Our aim is at the earliest possible moment to achieve this Air Pact, and here I may also answer another question of the hon. Member for West Leeds about our long-range policy and what we are doing about an international police force. The hon. Member knows as well as I do that an international police force is a very visionary thing at the moment. If we could only succeed in getting the Western Air Pact established, that would mean for the moment the international Air Force of Europe.

The hon. Member for Govan (Mr. Maclean) said the projected Air Pact had been brought to naught and our discussions at Geneva rendered futile because of our insisting on police bombing. I am glad to have this opportunity, which should not be necessary, of giving a categorical denial to that statement. There is not a shadow of foundation for it. We have pursued this policy of police bombing for the last few years because in outlying parts of the Empire where we have to maintain peace and protect life and property we have considered that we can do it in this way in a cheaper and a more humane manner, but we have always made it perfectly clear—

Is it not the case that the late Secretary of State for Air expressed himself as being glad that he had been able to retain the bombing of native races—I am not quoting his exact words because I dare not—for punitive purposes?

I was just saying that we were anxious to retain this policy of police bombing because we consider that in those parts of the world where we have to maintain peace and order we can do it in a cheaper and more humane manner, but we made it clear that we would give way over the question. May I quote the words of the rapporteur of the Air Committee. In his report he says:

"The United Kingdom delegation announced that in the event of general agreement on the convention the police bombing reservation would be withdrawn."

If that is in 1934, it does not come from the Air Commission since the Air Commission has not met since 1933.

As a matter of fact I am not sure about the date but this is the latest report, It was quoted only a few days ago by the Minister for League of Nations Affairs and in those circumstances I should not have thought the statement would have been made again to-day and I am glad of the opportunity I now have of contradicting it. [Interruption.] It may not be contradiction to the hon. Member. I do not suppose he wishes to use it as such.

I was about to quote a definite statement made by the late Secretary of State for Air on 22nd May, 1935, but I was not permitted to do so because it meant reading a Debate in another place. This House is being regaled with statements of 1934 and 1932 which have nothing whatever to do with the statement made by the Secretary of State two months ago. I am asking you, Sir, how I can best go about the matter of getting the speech of the late Secretary of State quoted in the House in order to make the statement that I was actually about to make when I was ruled out of order.

I do not know of any method that the hon. Gentleman can use at this moment of quoting

Division No. 282.]

AYES.

[11.13 p.m.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)Dobbe, WilliamMaclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)
Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)Edwards, Sir CharlesMainwaring, William Henry
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. ChristopherGardner, Benjamin WalterNathan, Major H. L.
Attlee, Rt. Hon. Clement R.Gibbins, J.Parkinson, John Allen
Batey, JosephGrenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)Salter, Dr. Alfred
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)Griffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding)Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Buchanan, GeorgeGrundy, Thomas W.Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, North)
Cape, ThomasHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Tinker, John Joseph
Cleary, J. J.Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Williams, David (Swansea, East)
Cocks, Frederick SeymourKirkwood, DavidWilliams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Cove, William G.Lansbury, Rt. Hon. GeorgeWilliams, Thomas (York, Don Valley)
Cripps, Sir StaffordLawson, John JamesWilmot, John
Daggar, GeorgeLeonard, William
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Logan, David GilbertTELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)Lunn, WilliamMr. Groves and Mr. D. Graham.
Davies, Stephen OwenMcEntee, Valentine L.

NOES.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelBaldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyBrass, Captain Sir William
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Baldwin-Webb, Colonel J.Broadbent, Colonel John
Answorth, Lieut.-Colonel CharlesBarclay-Harvey, C. M.Brocklebank, C. E. R.
Albery, Irving JamesBateman, A. L.Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks., Newb'y)
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd)Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Apsley, LordBeit, Sir Alfred L.Burghley, Lord
Aske, Sir Robert WilliamBossom, A. C.Cadogan, Hon. Edward
Astor, Maj. Hn. John J. (Kent, Dover)Boulton, W. W.Campbell, Sir Edward Taswell (Brmly)
Atholl, Duchess ofBower, Commander Robert TattonCampbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)
Bailey, Eric Alfred GeorgeBowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.Campbell-Johnston, Malcolm
Bae, Sir Adrian W. M.Boyce, H. LesleCaporn, Arthur Cecil

a speech delivered in another House this Session. As regards quotations from documents on previous dates, the hon. Gentleman is entitled to put what importance on them he likes.

I can only repeat that it has never been our intention and it is not our intention to-day to prevent by any insistence on this Clause any possible limitation of air armaments. We are increasing our air armaments to-day so that we can play our proper part in that system of collective security, and we could not do that while we were so weak. We could not play our part if we were relying on others to protect us, and all we could do was to send them a message wishing them the best of luck. Also it is important to realise that the military forces in the collective system must be sufficiently strong to act as a deterrent against a possible aggressor. The hon. Member for Govan (Mr. N. Maclean) said that by increasing our air armaments we were betraying the mothers of England and those who suffered in the last War. We would be betraying the people of this country much more if we allowed it to remain unarmed.

Question put, "That an additional number of Air Forces, not exceeding 11,000, all ranks, be maintained for the said Service."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 44; Noes, 224.

Carver, Major William H.Herbert, Capt. S. (Abbey Division)Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)
Castlereagh, ViscountHills, Major Rt. Hon. John WallerReid, David D. (County Down)
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)Horsbrugh, FlorenceReid, William Allan (Derby)
Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)Howard, Tom ForrestRemer, John R.
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A. (Birm., W.)Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.Rickards, George William
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston SpencerHudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)Ropner, Colonel L.
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)Rosbotham, Sir, Thomas
Colman, N. C. D.Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)
Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.James, Wing.-Com. A. W. H.Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward
Conant, R. J. E.Jamieson, Rt. Hon. DouglasRunge, Norah Cecil
Cook, Thomas A.Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)
Cooper, T. M. (Edinburgh, W.)Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montross)Russell, Hamer Field (Sheffield, B'tsde)
Copeland, IdaKerr, Hamilton W.Rutherford, John (Edmonton)
Courtauld, Major John SewellKnox, Sir AlfredRutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)
Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.Lamb, Sir Joseph QuintonSalmon, Sir Isidore
Craddock, Sir Reginald HenryLaw, Sir AlfredSalt, Edward W.
Crott, Brigadier-General Sir H.Law, Richard K. (Hull, S. W.)Samuel, M. R. A. (W'ds'wth, Putney)
Crooke, J. SmedleyLeckie, J. A.Sanderson, Sir Frank Barnard
Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)Leech, Dr. J. W.Sandys, Duncan
Cross, R. H.Leighton, Major B. E. P.Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Cuverwell, Cyril TomLennox-Boyd, A. T.Selley, Harry R.
Davidson, Rt. Hon. Sir JohnLiddall, Walter S.Shaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)
Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)Lindsay, Noel KerShute, Colonel Sir John
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Lister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Simmonds, Oliver Edwin
Dawson, Sir PhilipLittle, Graham-, Sir ErnestSimon, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Denman, Hon. R. D.Llewellin, Major John J.Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's Unv., Belfast)
Dickie, John P.Lloyd, GeoffreySmith, Bracewell (Dulwich)
Dixon, Captain Rt. Hon. HerbertLocker-Lampson, Rt. Hn. G. (Wd. G'n)Smith, Sir J. Walker- (Barrow-in-F.)
Dugdale, Captain Thomas LionelLockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)Somervell, Sir Donald
Elliot, Rt. Hon. WalterLovat-Fraser, James AlexanderSouthby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Ellis, Sir R. GeoffreyMacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. Sir CharlesSpears, Brigadier-General Edward L.
Elliston, Captain George SampsonMacAndrew, Major J. O. (Ayr)Spencer, Captain Richard A.
Emrys-Evans, P. V.Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Entwistle, Cyril FullardMcLean, Major Sir AlanStanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morland)
Everard, W. LindsayMaitland, AdamStewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)
Fielden, Edward BrocklehurstMakins, Brigadier-General ErnestStorey, Samuel
Fleming, Edward LascellesManningham-Buller, Lt.-Col, Sir M.Strauss, Edward A.
Ford, Sir Patrick J.Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.Strickland, Captain W. F.
Fraser, Captain Sir IanMarsden, Commander ArthurStuart Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)
Fyfe, D. P. M.Mason, Col. Glyn K. (Croydon, N.)Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray F.
Ganzoni, Sir JohnMayhew, Lieut.-Colonel JohnSugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Gluckstein, Louis HalleMeller, Sir Richard James (Mitcham)Sutcliffe, Harold
Goff, Sir ParkMellor, Sir J. S. P.Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)
Goodman, Colonel Albert W.Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Gower, Sir RobertMoreing, Adrian C.Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Graham, Sir F. Fergus (C'mb'rl'd, N.)Morrison, William ShepherdThompson, Sir Luke
Graves, MarjorieMuirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.Titchfield, Major the Marquess of
Greene, William P. C.Munro, PatrickTrain, John
Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnNation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.Tree, Ronald
Grigg, Sir EdwardNorth, Edward T.Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Grimston, R. V.O'Donovan, Dr. William JamesTurton, Robert Hugh
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir HughWallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Guinness, Thomas L. E. B.Orr Ewing, I. L.Wallace, Sir John (Dunfermline)
Gunston, Captain D. W.Pearson, William G.Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Guy, J. C. MorrisonPenny, Sir GeorgeWells, Sydney Richard
Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.Petherick, M.Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Hales, Harold K.Peto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)Williams, Charles (Devon, Torguay)
Hannon, Patrick Joseph HenryPickthorn, K. W. M.Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Harbord, ArthurPike, Cecil F.Wills, Wilfrid D.
Hartington, Marquess ofPowell, Lieut. Col. Evelyn G. H.Wise, Alfred R.
Haslam, Henry (Horncastle)Ramsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothian)
Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Helgers, Captain F. F. A.Ramsbotham, HerwaldLieut.-Colonel., Sir A. Lambert
Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.Ramsden, Sir EugeneWard and Dr. Morris-Jones.
Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)Rankin, Robert

Original Question put.

Division No. 283.]

AYES.

[11.23 p.m.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelBossom, A. C.Castlereagh, Viscount
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Boulton, W. W.Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Albery, Irving JamesBower, Commander Robert TattonCazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd)Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.
Apsley, LordBoyce, H. LeslieColman, N. C. D.
Aske, Sir Robert WilliamBrass, Captain Sir WilliamConant, B. J. E.
Atholl, Duchess ofBroadbent, Colonel JohnCook, Thomas A.
Bailey, Eric Alfred, GeorgeBrocklebank, C. E. R.Cooper, T. M. (Edinburgh, W.)
Bae, Sir Adrian W. M.Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks., Newb'y)Copeland, Ida
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyBuchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.
Baldwin-Webb, Colonel J.Burghley, LordCraddock, Sir Reginald Henry
Barclay-Harvey, C. M.Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)Crooke, J. Smedley
Bateman, A. L.Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmCrookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)
Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)Caporn, Arthur CecilCross, R. H.
Beit, Sir Alfred L.Carver, Major William H.Cuiverwell, Cyril Tom

The Committee divided: Ayes, 191; Noes, 41.

Davidson, Rt. Hon. Sir JohnKerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)Rosbotham, Sir Thomas
Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)Kerr, Hamilton W.Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Knox, Sir AlfredRuggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward
Dawson, Sir PhilipLamb, Sir Joseph QuintonRunge, Norah Cecil
Dixon, Captain Rt. Hon. HerbertLaw, Richard K. (Hull, S. W.)Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)
Dugdale, Captain Thomas LionelLeckie, J. A.Rutherford, John (Edmonton)
Elliot, Rt. Hon. WalterLeech, Dr. J. W.Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)
Elliston, Captain George SampsonLeighton, Major B. E. P.Salmon, Sir Isidore
Emrys-Evans, P. V.Lennox-Boyd, A. T.Salt, Edward W.
Entwistle, Cyril FullardLiddall, Walter S.Samuel, M. R. A. (W'ds'wth, Putney).
Everard, W. LindsayLindsay, Noel KerSanderson, Sir Frank Barnard
Fielden, Edward BrocklehurstLister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Sandys, Duncan
Fleming, Edward LascellesLittle, Graham-, Sir ErnestSassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Ford, Sir Patrick J.Llewellin, Major John J.Shute, Colonel Sir John
Fraser, Captain Sir IanLloyd, GeoffreySimon, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Fyfe, D. P. M.Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's Unv., Belfast)
Ganzoni, Sir JohnLovat-Fraser, James AlexanderSmith, Bracewell (Dulwich)
Gluckstein, Louis HalleMacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. Sir CharlesSmith, Sir J. Walker- (Barrow-in-F.)
Goff, Sir ParkMacAndrew, Major J. O. (Ayr)Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Goodman, Colonel Albert W.Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)Spears, Brigadier-General Edward L.
Gower, Sir RobertMcLean, Major Sir AlanSpencer, Captain Richard A.
Graham, Sir F. Fergus (C'mb'rl'd, N.)Maitland, AdamStanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Graves, MarjorieManningham-Buller, Lt.-Col. Sir M.Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morland)
Greene, William P. C.Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)
Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnMarsden, Commander ArthurStorey, Samuel
Grimston, R. V.Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel JohnStrauss, Edward A.
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.Meller, Sir Richard James (Mitcham)Strickland, Captain W. F.
Gunston, Captain D. W.Mellor, Sir J. S. P.Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)
Guy, J. C. MorrisonMills, Major J. D. (New Forest)Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.Moreing, Adrian C.Sutcliffe, Harold
Hales, Harold K.Morrison, William ShepherdTaylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)
Hannon, Patrick Joseph HenryMuirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Harbord, ArthurMunro, PatrickThomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Harlington, Marquess ofO'Donovan, Dr. William JamesThompson, Sir Luke
Haslam, Henry (Horncastle)Orr Ewing, I. L.Titchfield, Major the Marquess of
Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)Pearson, William G.Train, John
Heilgers, Captain F. F. A.Penny, Sir GeorgeTree, Ronald
Heneage, Lieut. Colonel Arthur P.Petherick, M.Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)Peto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)Turton, Robert Hugh
Herbert, Capt. S. (Abbey Division)Pickthorn, K. W. M.Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John WallerPike, Cecil F.Wells, Sydney Richard
Horsbrugh, FlorencePowell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.White, Henry Graham
Howard, Tom ForrestRamsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.Ramsden, Sir EugeneWilliams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)Rankin, RobertWills, Wilfrid D.
Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)Reid, Arthur C. (Exeter)Wise, Alfred R.
Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)Reid, William Allan (Derby)
James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.Remer, John R.TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Jamieson, Rt. Hon. DouglasRickards, George WilliamLieut.-Colonel Sir A. Lambert
Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)Ropner, Colonel L.Ward and Dr. Morris-Jones.

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)Gardner, Benjamin WalterMainwaring, William Henry
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. ChristopherGibbins, J.Nathan, Major H. L.
Attlee, Rt. Hon. Clement R.Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)Parkinson, John Allen
Batey, JosephGriffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding)Salter, Dr. Alfred
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)Grundy, Thomas W.Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Buchanan, GeorgeHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, North)
Cape, ThomasJones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Tinker, John Joseph
Cleary, J. J.Kirkwood, DavidWilliams, David (Swansea, East)
Cripps, Sir StaffordLansbury, Rt. Hon. GeorgeWilliams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Daggar, GeorgeLawson, John JamesWilliams, Thomas (York., Don Valley)
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Leonard, WilliamWilmot, John
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)Logan, David Gilbert
Davies, Stephen OwenLunn, WilliamTELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Dobbie, WilliamMcEntee, Valentine L.Mr. Groves and Mr. D. Graham.
Edwards, Sir CharlesMaclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)

Motion made, and Question put:

"That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £5,335,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on

Division No. 284.]

AYES.

[11.32 p.m.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-ColonelBae, Sir Adrian W. M.Boulton, W. W.
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.Baldwin, Rt. Hon. StanleyBower, Commander Robert Tatton
Albery, Irving JamesBaldwin-Webb, Colonel J.Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd)Barclay-Harvey, C. M.Boyce, H. Leslie
Apsley, LordBateman, A. L.Brass, Captain Sir William
Aske, Sir Robert WilliamBeaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)Broadbent, Colonel John
Atholl, Duchess ofBeit, Sir Alfred L.Brocklebank, C. E. R.
Bailey, Eric Alfred GeorgeBossom, A. C.Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks., Newb'y)

the 31st day of March, 1936, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Air Services for the year."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 195; Noes, 42.

Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Hartington, Marquess ofRamsay, Capt. A. H. M. (Midlothi)
Burghley, LordHaslam, Henry (Horncastle)Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)Haslam, Sir John (Bolton)Ramsden, Sir Eugene
Campbell-Johnston, MalcolmHeilgers, Captain F. F. A.Rankin, Robert
Caporn, Arthur CecilHeneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)
Carver, Major William H.Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)Reid, William Allan (Derby)
Castlereagh, ViscountHerbert, Capt. S. (Abbey Division)Remer, John R.
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John WallerRickards, George William
Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)Horsbrugh, FlorenceRopner, Colonel L.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston SpencerHoward, Tom ForrestRosbotham, Sir Thomas
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)
Colman, N. C. D.Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward
Conant, R. J. E.Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)Runge, Norah Cecil
Cook, Thomas A.Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)
Cooper, T. M. (Edinburgh, W.)James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.Rutherford, John (Edmonton)
Copeland, IdaJamieson, Rt. Hon. DouglasRutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)
Courtauld, Major John SewellJones, Lewis (Swansea, West)Salmon, Sir Isidore
Courthope, Colonel Sir George L.Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)Salt, Edward W.
Craddock, Sir Reginald HenryKerr, Hamilton W.Samuel, M. R. A. (W'ds'wth, Putney)
Crooke, J. SmedleyKnox, Sir AlfredSanderson, Sir Frank Barnard
Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)Lamb, Sir Joseph QuintonSandys, Duncan
Cross, R. H.Law, Richard K. (Hull, S. W.)Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Cuverwell, Cyril TomLeckie, J. A.Shute, Colonel Sir John
Davidson, Rt. Hon. Sir JohnLeech, Dr. J. W.Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Davies, Edward C. (Montgomery)Leighton, Major B. E. P.Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's Unv., Belfast)
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)Lindsay, Noel KerSmith, Bracewell (Dulwich)
Dawson, Sir PhilipLister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Smith, Sir J. Walker- (Barrow-in-F.)
Dickie, John P.Little, Graham-, Sir ErnestSouthby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Dixon, Captain Rt. Hon. HerbertLlewellin, Major John J.Spears, Brigadier-General Edward L.
Dugdale, Captain Thomas LionelLloyd, GeoffreySpencer, Captain Richard A.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. WalterLockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Elliston, Captain George SampsonLovat-Fraser, James AlexanderStanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'morland)
Emrys-Evans, P. V.MacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. Sir CharlesStewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)
Entwistle, Cyril FullardMacAndrew, Major J. O. (Ayr)Storey, Samuel
Evans, R. T. (Carmarthen)Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)Strauss, Edward A.
Everard, W. LindsayMcLean, Major Sir AlanStrickland, Captain W. F.
Fielden, Edward BrocklehurstMaitland, AdamStuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)
Fleming, Edward LascellesManningham-Buller, Lt.-Col. Sir M.Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Ford, Sir Patrick J.Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.Sutcliffe, Harold
Fraser, Captain Sir IanMarsden, Commander ArthurTaylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)
Fyfe, D. P. M.Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel JohnTaylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Ganzoni, Sir JohnMeller, Sir Richard James (Mitcham)Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Gluckstein, Louis HalleMellor, Sir J. S. P.Thompson, Sir Luke
Goff, Sir ParkMills, Major J. D. (New Forest)Titchfield, Major the Marquess of
Goodman, Colonel Albert W.Moreing, Adrian C.Train, John
Gower, Sir RobertMorris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)Tree, Ronald
Graham, Sir F. Fergus (C'mb'rl'd, N.)Morrison, William ShephardTufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Graves, MarjorieMuirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.Turton, Robert Hugh
Greene, William P. C.Munro, PatrickWard, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. JohnO'Donovan, Dr. William JamesWells, Sidney Richard
Grimston, R. V.Orr Ewing, I. L.Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.Pearson, William G.Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Gunston, Captain D. W.Petherick, M.Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Guy, J. C. MorrisonPeto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)Wills, Wilfrid D.
Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.Peto, Geoffrey K. (W'verh'pt'n, Bliston)Wise, Alfred R.
Hales, Harold K.Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Hannon, Patrick Joseph HenryPike, Cecil F.TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Harbord, ArthurPowell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.Sir George Penny and Lieut.-Colonel
Sir A. Lambert Ward.

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)Edwards, Sir CharlesMaclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. ChristopherGardner, Benjamin WalterMainwaring, William Henry
Attlee, Rt. Hon. Clement R.Gibbins, J.Nathan, Major H. L.
Batey, JosephGrenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)Parkinson, John Allen
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)Griffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding)Salter, Dr. Alfred
Buchanan, GeorgeGrundy, Thomas W.Smith, Tom (Normanton)
Cape, ThomasHall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, North)
Cleary, J. J.Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)Tinker, John Joseph
Cocks, Frederick SeymourKirkwood, DavidWilliams, David (Swansea, East)
Cripps, Sir StaffordLansbury, Rt. Hon. GeorgeWilliams, Edward John (Ogmore)
Daggar, GeorgeLawson, John JamesWilliams, Thomas (York, Don Valley)
Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)Leonard, WilliamWilmot, John
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)Logan, David Gilbert
Davies, Stephen OwenLunn, WilliamTELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Dobbe, WilliamMcEntee, Valentine L.Mr. Groves and Mr. D. Graham.

Ordered, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—[ Captain Margesson.]

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee also report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

Cattle Industry (Emergency Provisions) (No 2) Bill

Considered in Committee.

[Sir DENNIS HERBERT in the Chair.]

Clause 1—(Amendments Of Ss 2 And 3 Of 24 & 25 Geo 5 C 54, 25 Geo 5 C 12)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill.

11.42 p.m.

I was informed earlier in the day that if I dared say anything more about cattle I should be prosecuted for cruelty to animals. In these circumstances we had better let the Bill go through.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read the Third time To-morrow.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

It being after Half-past Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Sixteen Minutes before Twelve o'Clock.