I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Some 14 years ago Mr. Speaker gave me permission to bring in my first Ministry of Defence (Creation) Bill under the Ten Minutes Rule. I brought in that Bill because from personal experience in the War I was not satisfied that the administration of our three fighting services was as efficient as it might be when it was largely administered by the Committee of Imperial Defence. There always were difficulties in the administration when we had only an Army and a Navy. There was a good deal of friction in the old days, but fortunately the line of demarcation was the high water mark where the sea water touched the shore. That was a very good line of demarcation then, but there was a good deal of friction over coast fortifications as to where the Royal Engineers should drop their observation mines and their electro-contact mines, and where the Army should put their cordon of search-lights for the defence of our ports. There was a good deal of friction and many difficulties at times to settle. Sometimes there were even dog fights. The late Lord Randolph Churchill suggested that a Minister of Defence should be created to be over those two services and settle differences.

Since that time, the air development has come upon us and all nations are creating very large and efficient air forces and are depending largely on the bomb. The Navy could not help in any way in an aerial bombardment of London, and neither the Army nor the Navy could help in an aerial bombardment of our chief cities, our great factories, our royal dockyards, our shipyards or our homes. That has to be left to the Air Force. The Air Force has to-day that duty, and many duties in different parts of the world. It has also to assist the Navy and the Army with their air requirements. New and very difficult problems have been created by the introduction of this third service, but I submit that it is no solution of the problem for some people to advocate the breaking up of the Royal Air Force into a central force, a smaller and weaker Naval air force, and an Army air force. During and since the War in manoeuvres the air has become a connecting link between the two services, and we should strengthen that link and not weaken it; we should consolidate it and make it as strong as possible. I submit that the way to do that is to put a Minister of Defence over the three fighting services to whom he could give wise guidance.

Can we learn anything from the past? Before the War, under the Committee of Imperial Defence, we were badly handicapped. The Navy was deprived of Zeppelins in the North Sea. The Germans had a monopoly of aerial reconnaissance in the North Sea before the War. The Committee of Imperial Defence advocated that we should build Zeppelins, but after the "Mayfly" accident, the Admiralty tore their recommendation up and refused to build Zeppelins. Towards the end of the war Zeppelins were asked for by Admiral Beatty and a few were supplied, but they arrived too late to be of any use in the War. It was exactly the same with the torpedo-dropping seaplanes and aeroplanes. Before the War they were shown to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), when he was First Lord, and to Lord Fisher. We sent three torpedo-dropping aeroplanes to the Dardanelles and the gallant pilots got three hits out of three shots on enemy shipping, but the Admiralty refused to develop the torpedo-dropping machines. They were asked nine months before Jutland for that development, and it was turned down. Towards the end of the War Admiral Beatty asked for these machines, but they were delivered too late. I submit that under a Minister of Defence that would have been impossible. In the case of aircraft carriers, before the War one of the directors of Beardmores, submitted plans to the Admiralty for aircraft carriers. That was turned down by the Admiralty, and when War broke out we had to convert cross-Channel steamers into aircraft carriers because we had nothing else. That would have been impossible under a Minister of Defence. Take the case of the submarines. Before the War all the submarine experts warned the Admiralty of the danger of enemy submarines. The Admiralty took little or no notice of their submarine experts, with the result that during the War we lost 6,750,000 tons of British shipping because of the action of enemy submarines. I submit that a good deal of that would not have been lost if we had only studied the submarine menace a little more before the War. Under a Minister of Defence that would have been looked into, I am certain. These are a few of the Naval errors.

As to Army errors, when war started we found that the Army had only three one-inch pom-poms for the anti-aircraft defence of this country—one over the Treasury, one over the Admiralty Arch, and another one. Would that have been possible under a Minister of Defence? Would he not have inquired, and said, "Surely you have more than three one-inch pom-poms to defend a great city like London from Zeppelins and hostile aircraft?" We have only to look at General Sir William Robertson's book. He said that before the War there was no Army policy got out for a war. He said he could not make any plans or orders because nothing was ready. Then there was the case—and it is on record—of General Sir Ian Hamilton, who was sent to the Dardanelles with no plans from the War Staff. Would that have been possible under a Minister of Defence? I think not. Then there was Lord Kitchener who, when he sent the last man in the Expeditionary Force across the Channel, said "If I had any more men, I have got no munitions for them." Would not a Minister of Defence have looked into that? I submit he would. But it is not good to dwell too much on the errors of the past, except to draw lessons from them. Otherwise, it is not too profitable.

Towards the end of the War the right, hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) set up his War Cabinet. It was composed of the Ministers who did not have departmental responsibilities, and it functioned very well. There was an authority giving executive orders over the three fighting services, and they accepted those orders, and the system worked uncommonly well. Since the War that has been allowed to drift away, and there is no authority over the three fighting services. We have got back to the Committee of Imperial Defence, with its innumerable sub-committees and sub-sub-committees guiding the three fighting services.

I submit that we should look for a moment into the Committee of Imperial Defence and its organisation. It has many sub-committees, the chief of which are the Chiefs of the Staffs Committee and the Supply Committee. We were told in this House when the Chiefs of the Staffs Committee was set up that everything would be all right, that the Chiefs of the Staffs Committee would look into everything. I have raised certain questions with Ministers and ex-Ministers and other people in authority, and they have always said, "It is perfectly all right; the Chiefs of the Staff Committee will look into it. They are the people." I read my "Times" of 14th December last and I saw a letter from Viscount Trenchard. He says the Chiefs of the Staffs Committee have done nothing about looking into the great problems of defence, much less to solving them. The Chiefs of the Staffs Committee have, been torpedoed by a member who was six years on it, and chairman of it 2½ years. I ask the House, "Have the Chiefs of the Staffs Committee given us any guidance on some of the vexed questions of the day, any guidance on the question of the battleship versus the bomb?"

There is so much confused thinking over this battleship versus bomb question that I really think the Chiefs of the Staffs Committee might have looked into it and given the nation guidance. In one of our leading papers, the "Morning Post," there was a letter last Monday from a naval officer dealing with this question of defence, and he stated that if an aerial bomb dropped alongside a surface ship it could do little or no damage. I ask this House, "If you drop a 1,000-lb. bomb under the quarter of any ship in existence would it not damage her propellers, her propeller shafting and her rudder, and make her leak aft?" That is an instance of the wrong guidance which has been given to this country by certain people who want to minimise the effect of the aerial bomb.

I ask the Prime Minister whether he could not have an experiment made. Take an old battleship, build her up inside to make her as unsinkable as naval constructors can, and then send up the airmen with bombs to attack her—but not with bombs manufactured or ordered by the Admiralty. Let the airmen choose their own type of bomb, with an armour- piercing point, and have their own explosive in the bomb. Then send them up and see whether they will do a little more damage, perhaps, than was done to the "Centurion." Try the 1,000 lb. bomb for a start. The whole world wants these experiments. We have America talking about 40,000-ton battleships. The sooner large experiments are carried out and the world knows of them the better. The Chiefs of the Staffs Committee have never given any guidance about putting ships under smoke screens—small smoke bomb or phosphorous bomb screens. Have any experiments been carried out? If not I submit they should be. It is not the slightest use for the First Lord of the Admiralty to come down to another place and make a wonderful speech saying that the whole Navy, practically, has been turned into an anti-aircraft platform. We cannot prevent the bombing of ships by anti-aircraft guns. It is impossible. The guns may do a certain amount of damage, but look at what happened at the front during the War. In spite of those great barrages, with every gun that could be aimed at aircraft firing, the airmen got through. Certainly a few were "downed," just as men going over the top were "downed," but mostly the aircraft got through. People who say that anti-aircraft guns can stop aerial bombardment have not the vaguest idea of what they are talking about.

I should like to dip for a moment into the future. We have only to look at the Mediterranean and see what happened when the Italo-Abyssinian crisis came to a head. Our Fleet was moved from Malta to Alexandria. I do not know whether it was moved because of the Savoia bombing machine of the Italians, which was fairly near by. That machine can carry two tons of bombs, can fly 1,250 miles at a top speed of 266 miles an hour and has a cruising speed of 236. A pretty formidable weapon. I, personally, think the Admiralty were wise in taking every precaution and in moving the Fleet away from Malta. But let anybody imagine the grand harbour of Malta with the Fleet there, and the nearest nation hostile and able to fly over and drop these large bombs, as they can now. The Fleet could not stay there for a minute.

The aerial bomb is becoming a very formidable weapon. I can give an example of the moral effect of the aerial bomb in the Mediterranean. A short time ago, during the Greek rebellion— the last one, the Venizelos rebellion— some of the rebel cruisers put to sea. The Greek Government were not quite satisfied with their naval air pilots, they did not think they were loyal, so they had to call up any pilots they could find to man the machines and send them to search for the rebel cruisers. Those Army pilots were not very efficient, but, however, two of the machines located one rebel cruiser and dropped a 250-lb. bomb 500 yards off. I do not think the pilots wanted to sink their own national ship or injure their own nationals only to shake them up. The next bomb they dropped 100 feet off the beam of the rebel cruiser. What happened? The whole of the crew—all the engine staff and everybody else—came on deck and refused to steam the ship any more. They refused to go on. They said to the officers, "If you do not take us back to port we will do nothing, the ship will stay here"— they were so alarmed, they had had a pretty good shake up from that 250-lb. bomb. That will give an idea of the moral effect of bombing. [ Laughter. ] I said "moral effect."

If what I have said of Malta is true— and I do not think any Member can deny that the battleships could not stay in Malta if there were a hostile near nation, on account of the aircraft—it is also true of Gibraltar. A short time ago an article appeared in one of our leading papers with a great picture of the Rock of Gibraltar. The article had been written by a former Governor of Gibraltar who had not long given up that position, and it was headed "Gibraltar is safe." Well, the great rock may be safe, but it certainly would not be safe for the British Fleet to lie behind the breakwaters there if a near nation was hostile and there was an aerial attack. The ships cannot lie in the dockyards now because of the bombs. The sooner we in this country understand that the better.

If what I have said is true of Malta and Gibraltar, it is surely true of Devon-port, Portsmouth, Chatham and Sheerness. Have the chiefs of staffs given us any guidance about those? Have they done anything about having a war port up as far as they can in the North-West of our islands? Rosyth is too near Germany. What have the chiefs of staffs done about that? Have they given us any guidance? I submit that they have not. These southern ports are all open to an aerial bombardment, and it is high time we considered it. When anybody says, "Shift Portsmouth, or Chatham or Devonport," the answer always is, "That is where the wives and the children of the seamen live." That is not war thinking. The sooner we look into the whole question of our war ports the better.

If we set up a Ministry of Defence with a Minister over it all, I can imagine him sending for the chief of the Naval Department and saying, "You want a large battle-fleet. Tell me how you are going to use a battle-fleet when oceans separate you from a hostile nation?" I put that question the other day to a well-known admiral of very high scientific attainments. I said, "How would you use a battle-fleet 3,000 miles from its base?" He said, "It would be impossible." To be effective with your Navy you must work on to the enemy shore with your battle-fleet, and there you would be met by fast craft carrying torpedoes, mine layers and submarines dropping mines and firing the Whitehead torpedo, aircraft dropping bombs and the White-head torpedo. It would be impossible for the fleet to operate on an enemy coast. A Minister of Defence would look into that, and I think he would rather question that provision. He would ask his chief naval officer: "Would the security of this Empire suffer if you did not have battleships?" and the chief of staff would say, "Well, Sir, we want the battle-fleet so that light craft, if they are being chased or are in difficulties, can come and shelter behind the fleet." If light craft were being chased by hostile cruisers they would soon flick up an aircraft with their catapults and see where the fleet were, and they would not be likely to go into the jaws of death. The argument that the battle-fleet is required as a screen for lighter craft to shelter behind does not cut much ice with me. If the raiding cruisers came within sight of the battleships, they could alter their course 16 points, and the battleships would not overtake them, as they would not have the speed. The whole of the battleship question needs to be threshed out. Take Admiral Richmond and bring him into the councils of high authority. Ask what he thinks about it, and ask what the other admirals think about it. Let us have the benefit of their experience before we are asked to spend something like £120,000,000 upon a replacement programme for our battleships.

The Minister of Defence would also talk about cruisers. He would say, "How many cruisers have you? You have only 50? Surely it would be better to have more cruisers and fewer battleships." Then he would say to the chief of the Navy, "How does it come about that foreign countries have destroyers of larger displacement than we have?"—and faster, as a right hon. Gentleman reminds me. Then he would turn to the question of submarines, and he would say, "How is it that we are the fifth Power in submarines? Surely that cannot be quite right." Some hon. Members and some Members of the Government say that we should do away with submarines. I am an old submarine man. From the day the French had success with their submarines Coubet, Gustave and Narval, they forced us to build submarines in this country, and the French will never give up submarines. It is no good Ministers going to these conferences and starting off by saying, "We will give up submarines," because all that the French do is to say, "The islanders have got the wind-up."

My Minister of Defence would send for the head of the Army and he would say to him, "What are your war plans? Have you got your war plans out? Have you asked the Navy and the Air Force about it?" "No, we have not done that," the answer would be. "Oh, you have all got your separate war plans," the Minister would say. Then he would say "What about tanks? Have you tanks for working with artillery, heavy tanks and light tanks in sufficient quantitites, and is your mechanisation following on right lines? Have you an anti-tank rifle?"—and so on. Then would send for the Minister of Air or the head of the Air Service and he would say, "You have an expansion programme of 1,500 first line machines by 1937. I understand that other nations also have an expansion programme. Are you following that out? How is that going?" Then he would say, "Where is your research done? At Farn- borough? Farnborough gets about £500,000 a year, and in the last 10 years it has had some £4,000,000 or £5,000,000. What have they to show for that?" I think you could get some value out of criticism from above.

After those preliminary remarks, I submit that the House now turn to my Bill. My Bill seeks to set up a Minister of Defence. I should choose as Minister in charge of the defence forces one who is air-minded, who has had some experience of the air and who values the air bomb. The air bomb is gradually becoming the master weapon. I would set up a council to advise the Minister that would consist of service officers who had passed through the Imperial Defence College. That College has been in existence for nine years and has trained officers very efficiently. They would give advice on defence problems. I would attach civil members who have great experience of industry. In a future war it will not be only a matter of the Navy, the Army and the Air, but you will have to bring in the whole of industry. You should have some of the ablest brains in your country to advise on these matters. I attach very great importance to that.

I would have representatives of the Dominions, and when they were sitting in council that body would form in effect an Empire Defence Council. The problem is not only our own defence but that of the whole of the Dominions, and we ought to have Dominion representatives to go into the whole question. We have a very good example in Australia where there is a scout and cadet movement. That ought to be extended throughout the whole of the Empire. It is not necessary for me to go through all the Clauses of my Bill, but I would like to refer to one, which proposes to place the representatives of the Admiralty, Army and Air Ministries on an equal footing. I would call them the First Members of the Navy, the Army and the Air Board. Somebody said to me that we ought to call them air lords, because we have sea lords already and we might want Army lords, but I think we ought to have them all on the same footing.

That brings me to the second point. No Service man would ever say a word against the very able Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey; but he has a very difficult task. He is Cabinet Secretary; I am not sure that he is not the Secretary of the Privy Council; and he is Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence as well. It is an impossible position when one man has to be divided up like that, and cannot give his whole time and thought to these great problems of defence. I hope we shall have a full - time Secretary studying these problems of defence. All the intelligence services I would get together—I think that that is very important; and also, as regards research and scientific work, I should like to have all new ideas looked into very carefully. Lord Fisher in his book says that the Admiralty are the past masters of blocking new ideas, and I have found that to be the case in my own experience when serving under that great Department. Hospitals and medical services also I would bring together. A colleague of ours in this House, who used to sit in the place from which I am now speaking, and who was a doctor, went out to Malta and was making some inquiries at the military hospital. He asked, "How do you treat this sort of malady?" and they told him. He said, "I am not quite satisfied about that; how do they do it at the Naval Hospital?" "Oh," was the reply, "we know nothing about what they do at the Naval Hospital." That is the actual experience of a doctor who went out there; the Army doctors did not know or confer with their colleagues of the Navy.

I would like now to say a word about the criticisms of my Bill. It is said that, if a Ministry were placed over these departments of defence, it would only add to their dead weight. But they have the Committee of Imperial Defence over them now, and, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) has said, they have a warren of committees and sub-committees. I submit that it would be no greater weight to have a Ministry of Defence over them. Then it is said that you would have to have a super-man as Minister of Defence. I do not think people would say that the present Prime Minister, the late Prime Minister, or the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, are super-men. They are statesmen of great ability, but they are not quite super-men, and I do not think there is much in that argument. It is said, too, that the Minister of Defence would be a greater man than the Prime Minister, but that is a ridiculous argument. The Prime Minister surely would choose a colleague who would work with him.

I would make an appeal to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister may not go the whole way with me over this question of a Ministry of Defence and the putting of a Minister of Defence over the three Fighting Services, but I would ask him to create the machinery, to start it, to see whether we are forging the right weapons of war. Many people are disturbed about this question, and I think the Prime Minister should look into it. The taxpayers of my constituency say, "We do not want our money wasted on the wrong weapons." They say to me, "Admiral, do try and see that they get the right weapons of war, and that nothing is wasted on obsolete weapons." I make that appeal to the Prime Minister in the interests of the taxpayers in my constituency and throughout the country; and I would ask him also to forge the right weapons of war in the interests of the young Service people, the young men who have to use these weapons of war, and not to place them in the position in which General Henderson and myself were placed at the beginning of the War. We were asked for aircraft, pilots, and bombs from all theatres of the War, and we could not provide them. We did our best with the help of our great aircraft industry, but we could not do it at first, because this House had made no provision for it, nor any provision for reserves, and we were handicapped in that way. I am one of those who believe that a strong Britain means more for peace among the nations than a weak Britain; I believe that a strong Britain is necessary in order that we may carry out our obligations under the League of Nations; and I believe that a strong Britain is the rock of hope on which the collective security of the whole world rests. I ask the Prime Minister not to fail Britain by the faulty high-level-bridge administration of the three Fighting Services.

When I drew the first place in the Ballot, I had Bills sent to me by kindly people all over England—Bills dealing with licensed houses, the export of horses, matrimonial causes, electricity, all sorts of Bills; but I thought the matter over and chose this Bill. I present it to the House with great deference. I know that all those Bills to which I have referred ought to be on the Statute Book, but I thought it was more important to defend our home-land and the homes in it. I bring forward this Bill with great diffidence, as I have said, but I really have felt that the Service men in this House should give guidance wherever they possible can in these difficult matters of defence.

I apologise to Members of the Opposition for not having any of their names on the Bill, for I know that some of them are very interested in it. I did ask the former Under-Secretary of State for Air, the hon. Member for West Islington (Mr. Montague), but I did not get an answer from him, and, as I had a very important engagement in my constituency on that evening, I had not time to get the name of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood), who always backs these Bills so well. But I have among the supporters of the Bill my right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert), who is a statesman of wide experience. He was for many years Civil Lord of the Admiralty. The late Lord Fisher had the greatest admiration for the ability of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton. I was at the Admiralty at the time, and whenever Lord Fisher had a difficult problem to solve he would always send for my right hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend earned the esteem and affection of all naval men and civil men who worked with him at the Admiralty, and I am quite certain that from his wide experience he will give us good guidance to-day.

11.44 a.m.

I beg to second the Motion.

My hon. and gallant Friend made me blush with his compliments. I was going to say of him that he rendered notable service at the Admiralty, but I really must refrain from expressing the sentiments that I feel for him. At any rate, he has rendered notable service to the country in bringing this question before the House to-day. He speaks from a technical point of view; I speak from a civilian point of view; and I would say this, that spending is not defence. We want wise expenditure. I have taken the trouble to look up the expenditure for the past 10 years. The Government say, rightly, that our defences are inadequate. In the 10 years from 1925–6 to 1934–5 we have spent on the average £112,000,000 a year. The total is something like £1,120,000,000, yet our defences are inadequate. There must be something wrong. These are astronomical sums. This year the expenditure is £124,000,000. Before the War it was £80,000,000 and, when I went to the Naval Review last year, I saw a very large number of ships which were built in the days when I was at the Admiralty. I cannot help thinking that our expenditure has not been wise. All the services had the advantage of the War stores and to-day we are told we are to have a new expenditure of something like £250,000,000 to £300,000,000. If that is so, I should like it to be more wisely spent than it has been in the past as finance is not an unimportant matter in the question of defence. We have a War debt of £7,000,000,000. I do not know whether the Chancellor proposes to have a loan. We shall hear later. But finance is all-important.

Taking my hon. and gallant Friend's illustration about the lessons of the late War, in a time of emergency exports cease. We have to pay for imported food. I should like the House to consider what would have happened in 1917 if we had not had the American loans to assist us in providing food. In this connection, though it may seem remote to naval and military experts, the question of food is all-important. In the last War we were never in danger of invasion, but we were perilously near starvation. You may have a fortress with the finest armaments and the most gallant defenders, but you must have provisions, and in 1917 we had six weeks supply of corn only in the country, and we were saved then by the heroism of our mercantile marine. Never once did they falter, although our coast was like a cemetery for merchant ships. We do not want these things to happen again. Again, great industries are coming South. The population round London is increasing. Something like 11,000,000 people have to be fed from the Port of London. Is the Port of London safe to rely on for the feeding of this enormous population? Is the Channel safe? Can you bring ships up the Channel? We had then difficulties enough, but to-day the difficulties are enhanced by the advent of aircraft. The Government, wisely, in their first year said, "We will grow more wheat." British agriculturists grew wheat, but what happened? They said, "You must grow only 6,000,000 quarters. If you grow more, we shall stop giving you extra support." This question of food may not appeal to the naval and military experts, but in my judgment you must have first things first, and we must remember that Britain is the heart of the Empire and, if the heart fails, the extremities will wither.

I think sometimes of those Napoleonic strategists who spend something like £20,000,000 on a base at Singapore and leave the food supply of London in the same position as in the last War. They leave Woolwich, the great military arsenal on the east coast, most vulnerable to air attack. My hon. and gallant Friend has instanced Chatham and Portsmouth. According to the First Lord of the Admiralty everything in the garden is lovely. All is perfect. I should like my hon. and gallant Friend's Minister of Defence to make an enquiry as to whether there is waste in the Admiralty. I am certain that there is enormous waste there. Look at your shore establishments. Look at the large proportion of men on the land compared with the fighting Services. You will find an enormous disproportion. It has been brought to my attention quite recently that in the repairing and construction of ships in the dockyards the work in my hon. and gallant Friend's time and mine was under the capable guidance of Sir James Marshall, who was a practical shipbuilder. To-day I understand it is in charge of an Admiral. An Admiral knows little about the practical construction of ships. These are questions that require elucidation, because we do not want waste.

I am sure that one reason that has influenced my hon. and gallant Friend is the state of Europe. Europe to-day is one vast arsenal. Armaments are growing. They are in the charge of dictators. There is more loot in London than in Addis Ababa. I should prefer that London should not be at the mercy of any dictator. We must recognise, however much we value on the League of Nations, that it has failed to arrest armaments and has failed to avert war, and British security cannot rely upon collective security. It can only rely upon its own strong right arm. A little imagination is required. My hon. and gallant Friend has shown how difficult it is to get the older Services to adopt new methods. We are to-day at the parting of the ways. Are we going on building large battleships? Are we going on with the mechanisation of the Army and leaving out of account this new weapon which has absolutely transformed the whole of future warfare? I remember that before the War the submarine was regarded as a toy. It was a very terrible toy in the War and very nearly brought us down. I shudder to think what would have happened if Germany had won. Probably England would have been discovered to be a spiritual home for the Jews. In my younger days we had a two-Power naval standard to protect us against invasion. To-day we should have a two-Power air standard, because, though we might not be able to prevent invasion, we certainly should be able to put up a good defence and make it pretty hot for those who might attempt to invade us. In this question the Air Force must come first, the Navy second, and the Army third. An Air Force can bomb our cities, can close the Channel which is very important indeed—to food ships, and can make our naval bases insecure.

My hon. and gallant Friend rightly asked the Government to examine the question of battleships. A battleship costs £7,000,000, and is all in one restricted area. The battleship requires a convoy. The Great Fleet could not leave Scapa Flow without a hundred destroyers. Then there is the Army. It is to be mechanised, and for what purpose? Is it to go abroad. Do not make any mistake, the embarkation at Southampton will not be carried out so easily, with aircraft swarming in the air, as it was during the last war. Let us look at the proportion of expenditure. The expenditure this year is £124,000,000, of which the Navy absorbs £60,000,000, the Army £43,500,000 and the Air Force £20,600,000. That is to say, that on the most important force there is only one-sixth of the expenditure. That is wrong. We require more co-ordination. What has been the co-ordination? When I was at the Admiralty the co-ordination was really a fight between the Departments and the Treasury. When we had a forceful personality like the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) at the Admiralty we got all we wanted. That was the co-ordination, and I suspect that that is the co-ordination to-day, and that it is a fight between the heads of the Departments and the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Therefore it is necessary to change this system and to have a coordinating Minister. The Committee of Imperial Defence on whom my hon. and gallant Friend poured contumely—he could not pour too much—have had a thousand meetings, I understand, according to the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the last four years. They must have been like squirrels running round a cage for all that has been done. We have had this huge expenditure and still inadequate defence.

My hon. and gallant Friend spoke of the Prime Minister who comes down here with an air of the most engaging innocence. [An HON. MEMBER: "It serves him well."] I sometimes think that there is a good deal behind that innocence when I know how he has handled the Conservative party and the attacks of the Press peers. I do not think that there is a Simple Simon behind our Prime Minister to-day, but he has his other work to perform. He is the Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, but he has all these other duties. He has to keep his erring colleagues in order. I wonder if the Prime Minister would be able to pass an examination on the deluge of Bills which is now almost drowning the House of Commons. I do not think that he would be able to pass a real examination upon all those Bills. We ought to co-ordinate the question of defence; it is a full-time job for any Minister. These are days of real emergency. The country has trusted the Government, and I ask the Government not to fail the country.

12 n.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) said in his well-informed speech, that there were no names of Members of the Opposition upon it. But he will be aware that in matters like this we are very critical as to the meaning of such a Measure. There are wide differences of opinion on our own benches with regard to the fighting services. Some hon. Members hold that there is no need at all for any defence force, and others, of whom I am one, believe that there ought to be a defence force, but even I am very critical as to how it should be constituted. Though I give support to this Measure in the main, there are certain reasons why I think that the present position should be improved upon. In looking through the Army and other Estimates over a long period I have come to the conclusion that there is ground for economy. Most of us have had a good many things to say about economy, and when the hon. and gallant Member states that his constituents are desirous of having the money spent in the very best way, every hon. Member in the House will be in agreement with him. There cannot be any difference of opinion upon that point. Therefore I join in support of the Measure upon the chief point. But, though I agree that there must be a defence force as the world is at present constituted and that it would be folly to allow ourselves to be unarmed and at the mercy of any other country, I feel it my duty as a Member of Parliament to do all I can to keep the spending of money within bounds and to try to make the force as efficient as possible. The words contained in the Memorandum of the Bill are words with which almost anyone can agree:

"For purposes connected with the development and maintenance of the three fighting services, namely, the Navy, Army and Air Force, in an up-to-date and efficient condition,"

We all agree with that.

"With the utmost economy, consonant with the increased efficiency which this Bill is designed to effect, and for other purposes in connection therewith."

On general lines I do not think that anyone who believes in a defence force at all could disagree with the main points of the Memorandum. Following this line, I wish to refer to one or two criticisms made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who moved the Second Reading of the Bill. Many naval men are strongly inclined to their own particular service, and I expected this morning that the hon. and gallant Gentleman would urge that whoever was to be chosen should be of the Navy. He did not do that, but urged that the person appointed ought to be someone connected with the Air Force. I do not think that that ought to be so.

I beg the hon. Member's pardon; I did not say that. I said that a Member should be chosen as Minister who had had air experience. I meant a civilian, and not an air officer.

I accept the hon. and gallant Gentleman's explanation, but even there, I do not agree. The choice ought to fall upon a man with a knowledge of the whole of the fighting services. The next point is in regard to the selection of service Members from officers who have passed through the Imperial Defence College. Men can win promotion in the ranks without going through any of these colleges, and we ought not to lay down any particular line as a recommendation for positions in this service. It ought to be left open. These points should be examined when the Bill goes to Committee, and put right. As to the question of economy, when Estimates are brought before us we find that those who stand for the Army back expenditure on the Army, those who stand for the Air Force back expenditure on the Air Force, and those who stand for the Navy back expenditure on the Navy. It is difficult to get the old sea dogs to agree at any time that there is any other service worth looking at than the Navy.

Time has proved that we have to recognise something different from that point of view. Every year on the Army Estimates there is criticism of the cavalry regiments. I have been met every time with strong opposition. The old cavalry men have told me that it is impossible to do without them. The former hon. Member for Enfield got into such a rage one day that it was only his courtesy that prevented him from striking me. He said: "I wish I was on a charger. I would cut your head off.'' I think he would have done it, so strong were his feelings in support of the cavalry. That condition of things has prevailed for a very long time, but we find that a change has come about in the situation, and the War Office have announced the details of a reorganisation. They realise that the time has arrived to alter the cavalry system. For years we have continued to spend money on the cavalry, although there has been no need for it. Anyone who served in the great War in France and saw the cavalry regiments there and what they had to do, and saw the horses strewn all over the country, with no chance at all in modern warfare, must have come to the conclusion that the time had arrived to do away with the cavalry. That is 20 years ago, and the cavalry system has been defended up to the present time. It has been argued that we cannot do without the cavalry.

Now, the War Office has realised that a change is necessary. It is an indication that the time has come when co-ordination is needed for the three fighting services. They need to be brought together for the purpose of finding out whether they can be worked with more efficiency and at less cost. I think it can be done, and I hope the House will assent to the Bill so that we may see what can be done in that direction. In my opinion it will save millions of pounds, and we shall get a better service than we have at the present time. The Air Force has come along and altered the whole aspect of modern warfare. I do not want the Air Force to dominate everything. I want it to be recognised that the Navy and the Army have also their part to play, and that the whole three services must come together and work together. We must get away from the old conditions, where the cavalry man was always fighting for his ideas, believing that what kept the country safe in his early period, 50 years ago, is necessary now. It is not necessary. The whole position has changed.

In regard to the selection of a man for the chief position in connection with the three services, I am in a difficulty. I do not want us to create a despot or an autocrat. I can see the danger of one man being in charge of the three fighting services. The time might come when he would assume that he was even more powerful than the Monarch or more powerful than the Prime Minister. That position might arise if we are not careful. When I heard the suggestion this morning about giving immense powers to one man, I wondered what would happen if by any chance we appointed the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) to this position. What a tragedy that would be. He is a man of genius, although his genius is ill-directed many times, and if he got the power of a superman one wonders where he would land us. That is a danger that I see in this Measure. Therefore, we must be very careful in the choice of the man for the position. We have seen what has happened in other countries, where great power has passed to the head of the Forces and much difficulty has been created. Although I believe that it is necessary and essential that the three fighting services should be co-ordinated, I realise the danger into which we may be led if we have the wrong kind of man.

What I have said must not be taken as the official view of my party. I am speaking entirely for myself. In regard to the fighting services I have always believed that it is essential that we should have efficient services to defend our shores. Some of my hon. Friends may disagree with me, but they know my point of view. Although I am as peaceful as any man can be, although I am not desirous of having any fighting and I do not want to be a party to fighting, I do want us to have an efficient service, with due economy, and the best service that we can get for the defence of our shores.

12.13 p.m.

As many hon. Members are anxious to take part in the Debate I shall occupy only a very few minutes of the limited time at our disposal. I should like to congratulate the Proposer of the Measure on his admirable speech, and I should also like to congratulate the Seconder. I welcome, perhaps, even more the admirable speech of the hon. Member for Leigh (Mr. Tinker). It has enabled us to get the whole of this proposition into a non-party form, and I am perfectly certain that if and when it comes to facing a crisis we shall face it again as a united House of Commons and not as a divided House.

I should like to ask the Prime Minister whether he would mind if I criticise a speech that he delivered in 1928? I have read it with the greatest care and I wish to take up two points. In the first place, he stated that no one could be found to carry so heavy a burden as would devolve upon a Minister responsible for the three Fighting Services. He went on to elaborate what has been described as a complete rabbit warren of committees and sub-committees. I do not think that the difficulty is so insuperable. There are many hon. Members who during the last 20 years have taken part in politics and in the War, and who saw the overlapping and the mistakes that were made in the field, and I do not think that it would be very hard to find a Minister or even an ex-Minister who would be able to handle the task set before him and be quite loyal to any Government which might appoint him. Therefore, if those are the two great arguments against the proposal— first, that you cannot get a man to do it; and, secondly, that it is better done by a rabbit warren of committees—I do not think there is much in the long speech which the Prime Minister made in March 1928.

The absence to-day from the Debate of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) is very much to be regretted, because his speech on the same occasion was brimful of advice and knowledge drawn directly from personal experience, and I do hope that hon. Members who are listening to this Debate or taking part in it will find time to read the speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman on that occasion. I took out four points from the speech and I will quote them very shortly. The right hon. Gentleman was dealing with the question of the Committee of Imperial Defence and these various Committees, and he said: led to the terrible story of the Dardanelles. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs gave one other valuable contribution to the Debate. He said:

12.23 p.m.

I want to intervene for only a few minutes, because this is a private Member's Bill and I know that the House wants to hear as many points of view as possible. Frequently we have discussed this question of a Ministry of Defence, but never as an isolated problem of administration. It has tended to become confused with the question of foreign affairs, or with questions of strategy, or with questions of this arm or another of the Services. I want to look at it strictly from the point of view of efficient performance by the State of a particular function, that is defence. I leave out altogether any question of whether this is an emergency period. I leave out any question as to what the Government proposals are. We shall have an opportunity of criticising the Government's policy and proposals. I leave out any question as to the amount of the defence forces. The essential point is how, whatever provision is made for defence, it can be made most efficiently and most economically, and as to how we can get the best measure of control.

Looking at this question as a problem of defence I want to say that, while I support the ideal underlying this Bill, I cannot tie myself at all to the details of it. I am afraid we shall find that the answer from the Front Bench will be that there is a great deal of agreement on the principle of co-ordination but that they cannot decide exactly how it should be done. They will probably say that there is no real agreement with regard to a Ministry of Defence. I think we have today a far more general opinion in favour of a Ministry of Defence than we have had before. There was a long series of very authoritative letters in the "Times." There have been a number of leading articles in that paper also, very well informed. I think it will be found that there is a certain general measure of agreement.

First of all, I should like to suggest that we should apply ourselves to certain general questions. The first thing is that Defence is one problem, and not three separate problems. What you require is a unity of supreme direction, unity of plan and a unity of outlook, and I suggest that this can be obtained only by having a unity of defence doctrine, not three separate doctrines—a naval doctrine, an air doctrine and a military doctrine—but one defence doctrine. That means, in fact, that your problem of defence is considered by collaboration between representatives of the various services and also by civilians. The second thing is that we must see that parliamentary control and ministerial responsibility are retained. I saw a suggestion that Defence should be handed over to some kind of council with some one not responsible to this House. That is dangerous, and it is impossible. I am not very satisfied with regard to the proposal in the Bill for a Council of Defence. Such a Council of Defence might be used as a kind of authoritative Sanhedrim and we might be told when we raised questions that they had been approved by the Council of Defence. It might tend to be a collection of elderly gentlemen tied down to ideas of the past. The suggestion in the Bill with regard to membership of this council is rather vague and I do not understand how the council is to be the nucleus of a general staff.

I do not want, however, to deal with details this morning, but with general principles. The general principle upon which we must insist is ministerial responsibility. The next thing is that you want to have some clarity as to what the functions of a Minister of Defence are going to be. The suggestion that a Minister of Defence is to be a superminister, absorbing all the three services, that you should have a Minister who is responsible at one and the same time for major problems of defence and yet be dealing with detailed administration is all wrong. You must have a clear distinction, which all good administration requires, between the function of making broad decisions and the function of carrying out detailed administration. I want to see a Minister of Defence who is supported by a staff trained to think in defence terms. I am not quite clear as to how the Bill proposes to organise that staff. To my mind, what we require is not a trinity of staff representing the particular views of the various services, but essentially keeping apart, but a staff so organised to consider problems, whether they are of man power or of operations, in which you get the collaboration and the experience of the three services. I do not want to see a Minister of Defence entirely detached from the services. That is quite impossible, and the exact relationship docs require careful working out. The Bill is a little vague as to the relationship between a Minister of Defence and Ministers who are dealing With the actual administration of the three services.

The wiser plan is to let detailed matters of co-ordination, referred to by the hon. and gallant Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter)—who has put us under an obligation by moving the Bill—matters of the co-ordination of hospitals and the like, be dealt with as a separate administrative matter. The point we want to deal with is the question of direction and decision on broad policy. It is a mistake to say that we have in the Committee of Imperial Defence such a body or that there has been co-ordination by the Committee of Imperial Defence. It is an advisory body, not an executive body. The body which ultimately must decide is, of course, the Cabinet, and the Cabinet consists of Ministers some of whom sit on the Committee of Imperial Defence and some of whom do not, and they have to decide on the conflicting views of the three departments. We are told that there is co-ordination by the Chiefs of Staff who serve on the sub-committees. I am told that it is not etiquette for a chief of staff of one department to criticise the chief of staff of another service. In fact, the harmony of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee is arrived at by never discussing major points or matters of policy. The problem of defence is regarded by each of them as one in which there are three separate spheres, and that there is a separate authority in each of these spheres. That is all wrong.

I say emphatically that it is not a job which can be given to an overworked Prime Minister. It should be given to a Minister without Portfolio, but because he is without portfolio he must not be without a staff. He must not be a mere figure-head presiding now and again over a meeting of three plenipotentiaries from the three services and acting as a referee when the fight gets too vigorous. He must be a representative of the Cabinet who is charged with the functions of defence and co-ordinating defence. There is no reason why he should thereby become too powerful for any other member of the Cabinet. I know there have been occasions when the leader of a particular department has been considered as too powerful. I think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has on occasions been given too great a separate power, and that it would be better if he considered his financial questions with other members of the Cabinet. There has been too much detachment there. In other days we have seen a Foreign Secretary who has tended to be too much detached in his office. The function of defence is a great one, but it is not the only one. I see no reason why a Minister of Defence should become a whale among minnows.

I believe that the right way to approach this is by building up the nucleus of a Defence staff around a Minister, and by their having a planning Ministry and that under their control there should be built up co-ordination and the fusion of certain departments of administration. I believe that the whole question of supply should be given to an under Minister, who should be the contracting Minister for the three fighting services. In any event the Cabinet must take the final responsibility. We want in the Cabinet Ministers who are well informed. Of course Defence cannot be left to the Minister of Defence alone. He has also to consider the representatives of the Dominions, India and the Colonies, and civilian Ministers who are bound to be brought into consultation, but the essential advice on defence should be rendered to the Cabinet by the Minister who is supplied with advice not from three detached services but from one general staff dealing with these problems.

The Bill also errs when it does not deal adequately with the question of finance. The Estimates of the three services must not be left to a scramble decided by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as it has been suggested, on the strength or weakness of the particular Minister. The making of allocations between the Services, the decision of priorities in defence and of distribution between the different Services, must be a function of the Minister of Defence and his advisers and therefore it is clear that among other departments he would require to have a finance department. Broadly speaking, I think it is the duty of the Government to-day and I think it has been the duty for a long time of the Government to be frank with the House on defence problems, as to what the real problem of defence is to-day, as to how they intend to deal with it and also as to how actual decisions are come to in a changing age. With regard to defence, I am bound to say that in every discussion we have had hitherto the replies received by us in this House have for the most part not been replies addressed to the arguments which were put up in the course of the Debate but have been rather in the nature of outside essays in defence of things as they are.

12.37 p.m.

We have just listened to a speech which has been an admirable illustration of that quality for which the late Lord Haldane so often appealed, namely, clear thinking on essentials. I think the right hon. Gentleman's speech has commended itself to the House and it is in that sense that I should like to associate myself whole-heartedly with it. The Leader of the Opposition has laid down certain principles which I think we can all accept, namely, that defence is one problem, that it will require a united outlook of doctrine, of planning, and of execution, and that that, in its turn, must be subject to Cabinet responsibility and the overriding authority of Parliament. I do not think that any of us can quarrel with that view. Nor can we do anything but applaud the happy thought which caused my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) to make use of the opportunity of the Ballot in order to draw the attention of the House to this essential principle. That, I am sure, is what he is contending for much more than the actual detailed provisions of the Measure before us.

At a time like this when we are confronted on the one hand by the problem of the tremendous dangers which may arise from new scientific developments, and on the other by the tremendous burden which we have to face, it is vital that we should, in the words of my hon. and gallant Friend, create the right weapon and be sure that nothing is wasted. To quote the language of the White Paper issued last year: Minister, all the elements in our national life which may have to enter into a consideration of the problem of war.

More than that, it is a flexible machinery which makes it perfectly possible, and has made it possible in the past, for the Dominions to enter into our scheme of co-ordination and planning and no additional legislation such as this Bill contemplates is required for that purpose. Where that machinery falls short of meeting the needs of the situation is that, while it does provide for the co-ordination of all departments of national life, it does not provide sufficiently for the effective co-ordination of the three fighting Services. There is provision to a certain extent for that in the Committee of the three Chiefs of Staffs, but it suffers from the fact that you have there three equal representatives of separate and necessarily, to some extent, rival organisations who meet together. If they agree, it is largely agreement on non-fundamentals and adjustments of point of view. It is very difficult for them, without a head over them, to face a searching inquiry into the principles of their three Services and their relationship or to effect any far-going reorganisation. To my mind what is needed—and the right hon. Gentleman opposite laid his finger on the point—is a Minister who shall be free from the administrative pre-occupations of a great Department and who can give his whole time to the problem of co-ordination and can supply from above that initiative which none of his three equal and to some extent competitive colleagues can supply.

That is the really vital function that is still missing in our machinery and organisation of defence. I entirely agree that it would be very much better that such a Minister should be assisted in that work—apart from the three Chiefs of Staffs—by a single staff trained to look at all these problems from a common point of view. At present, all papers are prepared by the staffs of one or other of the Chiefs of Staffs in the Admiralty, War Office or Air Ministry, as the case may be. What is required is a staff with a common outlook, and the ground for that has been prepared in the last decade by the admirable work of the Imperial Defence College. Very little change is, therefore, required except that the Government ought to come to the con- clusion that there should be a Minister free to preside regularly over the Chiefs of Staffs Committee, and to make that his main work, combining it, no doubt, as would obviously be convenient, with the vice-chairmanship of the Committee of Imperial Defence, taking part in a good many of the sub-committees, but making that his primary task. Thus you would bring about not merely co-ordination between the three Services, but initiative in planning and reorganisation and initiative in the readjustment of financial relations.

There again, so long as things are as they are, each Department will get that amount of finance which the energy of its chief or the public opinion of the moment may induce the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give. In the past this has meant that too little has been given to the new service of the air and too much to the older services, but in future it may equally well mean that the pressure of public opinion may cause too much to be assigned to the air, to home defence, with a consequent neglect of the equally vital defence of all the oceans of the world. There must be someone with a co-ordinated conception of our strategical needs to stand between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Departments when the main issue of the allocation of expenditure is being considered. I do not think further interference with one existing machinery is needed.

I do not wish to detain the House much longer, but there is another thing I want to mention, and it is that the head of the three services must be a civilian. I think he ought also to be a Minister. It has been suggested that he should be a civilian non-Minister, and in that there would, at any rate, be the advantage that he would be able to stay on from Government to Government. But I think that the advantages of having one who can speak to the Cabinet as a colleague and not as an official, who is in continuous touch with the many other problems which are bound to affect the problem of defence and who can speak to the House of Commons, entirely weigh down the scale on the other side.

In conclusion, if we are to succeed in a war—and I trust the need for it may not arise—the one thing which the experience of the late war burned in my mind was that it is essential in future that the leading men in the fighting services should understand political, economic and national problems. The Imperial Defence College has made great preparation in that direction. But it is no less essential that anyone who rises to a high place in the political life of this country should have pondered on these terrible and urgent problems of war which, after all, may come upon the nation. It is therefore essential that an opportunity should be given to men in public life, through that ministerial appointment and its under secretaryship, to become familiar with those problems and bring them to the mind of the colleagues with whom they are continuously in touch. They ought to become familiar with them in the way in which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has shown himself to be familiar with them. I would not be afraid to entrust that high position to my right hon. Friend, for he has clearly shown his grasp of the subject. The creation of such an office would be of inestimable value in making the civilian element of the Government of our nation, which after all must be the deciding factor, familiar with and appreciative of those immense problems which they may conceivably be called upon to face. That is all I wish to say. I only hope that when the Government come to deal with this problem, they will show themselves alive to the very wide sense of anxiety in the country and in the House as to whether our organisation is going to give us full value for the heavy expenditure which we have to face, and, more than that, give us real security.

12.50 p.m.

I rise with some diffidence to intervene in this debate, because I cannot speak with the technical knowledge of some other hon. Members who have had experience in this matter, but, like the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Drake Division of Plymouth (Captain Guest), I have been studying the speech which the Prime Minister made in March, 1928, in the, latter part of which he quoted some words of Sir William Robertson. Those words were: I believe that in any future war a country which is to be successful must be able to mobilise not merely its defence forces but the whole power of its economic and financial resources. In that connection there is one point to which I would like to draw the attention of the House. Under the present organisation of the services there are certain questions of defence which are nobody's business, and one of those comes to my mind particularly. There is no reason why the stores of grain which exist in our Dominions and elsewhere in the world should not be stored in this country. No doubt it would be an expensive process, but at the present time it is nobody's business to attend to it, and it seems to me that under a unified system of defence services, it might be possible for matters of that sort, and others on which I do not wish to detain the House, to be more fully considered.

In a broadcast speech last Autumn, the Prime Minister startled the country by his suggestions as to the present condition of the Navy. He suggested that the Navy was no longer capable of performing its duties of defending this country and of carrying out our obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. If that be the case—and perhaps in the particular circumstances of that speech the Prime Minister was not able to give the fullest statement of the situation— it appears to me that there is something very radically wrong with the organisation of our Defence Services at the present time. It is not merely suggested that insufficient money has been spent— although I think I am right in saying that £1,750,000,000 has been spent on our defences since the War—but the question is raised as to whether we are getting value for that money. There is also raised the very much more difficult technical question, with which I do not claim to be able to deal, of the uncertainty as to whether the battleship is out of date, not by reason of its age but by reason of the development of science and of aerial warfare, an uncertainty which appears to have affected the whole foreign policy of this country. The whole policy of this country to support the League of Nations has been influenced by the uncertainty as to that matter.

It appears to me that there is there a complete lack of co-ordination between the Services. In passing, I would like to suggest that if the fleet is out of date, it is the responsibility of those hon. Members who sit on the Government side, in that they have not taken this House into their confidence sufficiently in the past; but it appears to me, speaking as a civilian, that the whole problem of defence has now been affected by the aeroplane—if you cannot defend a battleship from aeroplanes, how can you defend our large centres of population, our ports, and our towns?—and that the question also of the defence of the civil population is at the present time nobody's job. It has been handed to the office boy of the Government; it has been handed to the local authorities, which are completely unsuited for dealing with it. They have not the technical knowledge, and they have not the power to spend the required money, though it appears that nobody yet knows what would be the cost not only of defending the civil population in its capacity as individuals, but of defending our great basic industries from attack by aeroplanes. It does not appear to me that that problem has yet been fully considered, and without some co-ordination between the Services it is nobody's business fully to consider it.

I would like to draw the attention of the House to the fact that at present an ad hoc Committee of the Cabinet appears to have been set up to deal with this problem, and I suggest that that does show that as, in the opinion of the Government, at the present time there is a crisis, they have been forced to some sort of co-ordinating organisation such as is suggested in the Bill which has been presented to-day. Lastly, may I draw the attention of the House to the concluding remarks of the Prime Minister in his speech in March, 1928, when, referring to the Committee of Imperial Defence, he said:

1 p.m.

I do not agree with the last speaker that the Government were in error in placing the responsibility upon the local authorities to work out systems of defence against gas and other forms of attack by air. No doubt, if the urgency became greater, some centralised control and direction would be required, and possibly great sums of money might have to be spent by the Government, but unless some extraordinary unexpected event occurs, it seems to me there is time and that the Government were right to realise that a service of defence of the civil population against aerial attack could only be effected if considerable numbers of persons all over the land and in all the local authorities became acquainted with the problem and gave it some thought. It seemed to me that the suggestion that in the first instance every local authority should be made responsible for considering the various aspects of defence and setting up committees to inform themselves about and deal with that problem, was a right decision.

I venture to offer congratulations to my hon. and gallant Friend who introduced this Bill to-day. I have not for some time heard a debate in which there has been such a degree of unanimity on at any rate two points, not perhaps as to the necessity for bringing this particular Bill on to the Statute Book at the moment, but unanimity as to the general principle underlying it and more particularly as to the anxiety which is felt in the House and in the country on this matter. Not before have so many people in the land had a direct interest in and felt that they had some direct knowledge of war. In earlier times it has been professional armies and professional sailors who have borne the brunt, in the main, of the Empire's battles, but there are in the country now some millions of people who themselves took part, and though they are amateurs in strategy and tactics, and though many of them were quite junior and did merely what they were bid in those days, they naturally feel some direct interest, some knowledge based upon experience; and I can assure the Government that the most widespread and serious anxiety is in many people's minds as to the dangers which threaten this country and as to whether we have the right kind of machinery for meeting those dangers.

I am not one of those who lend themselves to criticism of the higher authorities or who jeer at the staff of any Service. I feel that they did their best in the war, under immense difficulties, to bring about united action and to carry out intelligent plans, and I should not like it to be thought that, in backing this Bill, I for one moment failed of admiration for the work done by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and particularly by Sir Maurice Hankey and by the heads of the Services. But it seems to me that a strong case is made out for some kind of organisation which will enable the Cabinet to be advised, broadly and generally, upon these problems of war and of preparation for war. It has already been said, but it seems to me so important that I will venture to repeat it, that war is not a matter for experts in military affairs alone. It is a matter for the whole nation to be concerned with and, unhappily, for the whole nation to be threatened by, and every resource of the nation has to be brought into operation and into co-ordination if war is to be prosecuted to a successful conclusion.

It is nobody's business to take action in the matter of making plans for the mobilisation of the whole people and of all their resources. There are many whose business it is to study that question. The Committee of Imperial Defence no doubt sets up committees which study the various aspects, of man-power, of the financial strain which will be involved, and of the co-operation between ourselves and other countries, including particularly Dominion countries, if they are so minded. All those problems are dealt with and thought over, but it is nobody's business to see that the whole thing is planned and to be ready to take the action when it is required. I believe it to be a mistake of organisation to have one set of people advising and planning for another set of people to carry out the plans, and it seems to me that some step ought now to be taken to make it possible for the preparations which must needs be made, to be made upon a national scale having regard to all the various problems and difficulties which will have to be met.

We have been told to-day how the three chiefs of the services meet together, and how difficult it is for them to deal with fundamental matters. No criticism of them is implied, but rather on the position in which they find themselves. I am not suggesting that I take one view or the other about this; I am merely a layman who cannot have the information and cannot know, but suppose it were a question of whether overlapping and the difficulties of control and discipline were such that it would be better for the Air Force—at any rate, so far at it operates overseas—to be placed solely and wholly under the control of the Navy. Suppose that were a fundamental question. Alternatively, suppose it were a question whether the Navy's function for the future should be merely to carry the aeroplanes. Suppose that were a point upon which advice was required by the Cabinet. They would, no doubt, receive the highest possible and the most skilled guidance from the Committee of Imperial Defence, but what opinions could be offered by the three chiefs of the general staffs sitting together upon such a matter?

Is it conceivable that the member representing the Air Force would come along and say, "Yes, our force should be subordinated to the Navy." It is only natural and proper that, having been brought up in the service of which he is proud, to which he has devoted so much, he should think it essential that it should remain a separate force. Perhaps he had experience of the way in which the young force was handicapped in its earlier times, and it will weigh with him. It is part of his nature, these feelings and sentiments are in his bones. Nor can it be imagined that any admiral would see his great service, with its traditions, converted from the "sure shield" into the mere carrier for any force. It is inconceivable that an admiral can see that, and yet it might possibly be what is coming in the next 10 or 20 years. I do not raise this point because I have the slightest desire to prophesy, but merely to point out how questions might arise which are so fundamental to the existence of one of the three services and that it is impossible to rely upon the Chiefs of Staffs Committee for impartial advice and for advice which is not necessarily based upon the traditions and upbringing of the gentlemen who hold those responsible offices.

From that arises the case for a general staff. I think that it was the right hon. Gentleman the Member of Epping (Mr. Churchill) who, when he was First Lord, brought into the Admiralty, against professional advice, a general staff which was able to plan naval operations as a whole and give to the Board of Admiralty the kind of advice which they required. Similarly, it seems to me that a strong case is made out for a general staff, not of one service, but a staff accustomed to think in terms of war as a whole, of the problems of running the three services together, and of their right place in the scheme of war preparations and the conduct of war. A policy minister is a difficult proposition. It does not seem to me wholly satisfactory to have somebody responsible for policy and somebody else responsible for carrying it out. The ultimate responsibility should be with him who makes the policy to carry it out. Therefore, it seems to me that this minister could hardly be, as was suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), merely a policy minister. He must have authority and the service ministers must be subordinated to his authority. That is not to say that we would amalgamate the services. Their functions and spheres are so different that they would remain three great-separate services with their own heads. What is required, either by the means proposed in this Bill or by some other means, is a minister who will be responsible for the planning for war and, if war broke out, for the conduct of the operations of war under the Cabinet.

I would like to offer my word of congratulation to the Leader of the Opposition upon his most valuable and impartial speech. It is a matter of extreme importance to the land that there should be found in the House unanimity between all parties on matters of defence. I would like to express agreement with the right hon. Gentleman that, however this co-ordinating is done, however the control is organised, it should be subject to the Cabinet, and thereby to the House of Commons. It follows from that that I agree with the proposal that the Minister of Defence or the member of the Cabinet who is Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence or however he may hold this authority, should be held responsible for policy and planning, and ultimately the operation of the three services. It follows that he should be a Member of the Cabinet and not an outside civilian or a Civil servant. I want to emphasise again to the House and to the Government that very many people throughout the country feel anxious about the situation, and want as early as possible to have some reassurance from the Government that they know what they are doing, that they have a plan, and that they mean to carry out preparations for the defence of these islands and our Empire upon a basis which will inspire general confidence.

1.12 p.m.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman who introduced this-Measure put the country in his debt during the War, for he put part of the Navy into the air. I am not certain that, he has not increased the debt owed him by the country for giving us the opportunity of debating this very urgent subject at this moment. It has produced from the right hon. Gentleman who leads the Opposition a perfect speech— I think almost the first speech he has ever made which has received the entire agreement of the House and which cannot fail to affect the Government's policy. I believe that not only the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), but others will have wished that our political arrangement permitted of his being made the first Minister of Defence. In default of that, we can only-hope we shall get the principles he enunciated to-day embodied in the new Ministry. For a new Ministry there must be. It is not enough to consider this as merely an academic debate on an ideal solution to be proposed to the Government and carried out in two or three years' time. It is urgent. It is urgent for two reasons. In the first place, we are now on the verge of spending enormous sums of money on defence, and there is a very reasonable anxiety throughout the whole country, not confined by any means to one party, as to whether that money will not be largely wasted.

In the last six months we have seen a revolution not merely in the duties required of the armed forces of Great Britain but, also, a revolution in the capacity of certain branches of those services to perform the work necessary under the new circumstances. The fact that we are now part of the League of Nations, that we must consider every- thing jointly with other loyal members of the League, obviously imposes a new set of duties on the defence services of this country. Nor is that all. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Navy itself is no longer able to operate with success in enclosed waters. We have had the agreement with Germany, which was, in effect, the banishment of the old Navy from the enclosed waters of the Baltic. During the War it became obvious that the narrow seas round England were not a field in which the Navy could remain in safety, and now we have seen the immense anxiety expressed over the safety of our Fleet anywhere in the Mediterranean; with the increasing range of aeroplanes that danger may be extended far further afield. All this is perfectly obvious to civilians in this country.

On the other hand, we have the speech made by the First Lord of the Admiralty in another place a day or two ago showing clearly that all the changes in defence policy, all the increased risks of the Navy, all the disabilities of operating in enclosed waters have passed the Admiralty by, that they are uninfluenced by them. We are on the brink of spending, it may be, £100,000,000 on this Navy, and it may well be that the whole of that sum will be wasted unless we get a civilian head in charge of defence who shall look at all these questions not from the point of view of the individual services but from the point of view of the country as a whole. After all, the country does not exist for the benefit of the services, but the services exist for the benefit of the country, and it is that change of policy and that change of attitude that we want to impress on the fighting services.

Therefore, the urgency of the proposal before us to-day arises first and foremost because there is a danger of the money being wasted, and there is a danger of our policy being determined by the ancient heads of ancient departments who have an entirely obsolete conception of the objects of decence and the proper means of securing that defence. For instance, the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook rather drew a distinction between the defence of these islands and the defence of the Empire as a whole. I do not think that is the proper distinction to draw at the present time. The change from the sea to the air has, in the first place, brought all parts of our Empire much closer together; but, in the second place, it has made the problems of any defence by sea of secondary importance. Any action taken by an enemy Power will, in future, be sudden and unannounced. There will be no declaration of war. The first knowledge of war will be the dropping of the bombs. That being so command of the air will be infinitely more important to the whole Empire than command of the sea, and that command may be achieved in the first week. With our long-drawn communications throughout the world, the necessity of protecting our food ships, coming here, the protection of our commerce on all the seven seas, still retains-its importance, but it becomes very much secondary to the question of who is going to win the air in the first week.

The defence of our islands has become a question of superiority in the one arm which may be decisive in the first week. If we have control of the air our ships throughout the world can move in peace. On the other hand, if the enemy get control of the air our ships cannot sail by day, and will be difficult to hide by night.

Take the other case. We are no longer defending Great Britain, we are no longer defending an Empire, we are defending a league of states bound together under the League of Nations, and if we are to take our proper part in securing safety for all the nations of that League we cannot undertake the duty alone. We must take on that duty in collaboration with all the other members of the League-It is no longer possible to banish from our minds any question of utilising the Baltic. It is no longer a question of what England does, but a question of what the League intends to do, what they provide, is obviously a matter for a head of all services, so that we may adjust our defences to the support which may be supplied by the other countries and if necessary divide up the armament required and so minimise the general expense and risk.

It is important that we should bring the brains of the Air Force, the Admiralty, and the Army on to a problem they have never had to consider. It is important to realise the new responsibilities as to the pooling of resources and the new arms to be used. A good deal has been said about the Imperial Staff College. I do not think the Imperial Staff College can possibly be used to the full unless it is instructed not merely in the new risks to the Navy but also in the new opportunities of collaboration with other countries. We do not want plans worked out for a war against any particular State, but we want to get our plans worked out in collaboration with other countries for the protection of ourselves and our new allies against a general danger.

1.25 p.m.

I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North St. Pancras (Sir Ian Fraser) who told us that most people in this country are unhappy at the present organisation of our defence Services. In the words of the old song,

In March, 1929, I addressed a few remarks to hon. Members on the Air Estimates. They were really out of Order, but they passed. I said: changed very much. We could have taken a fairly passive view then, but we are not wise to take a passive view to-day on any situation.

We still retain the position that we debate our three defence services separately. We have been given two Debates on Defence in general, but on those days we have really debated foreign policy, and we have roamed over the whole gamut of foreign policy and the League of Nations. We have never been able to concentrate on whether we are spending the right proportion of defence money on one Service or another. The Estimates are presented in such a way that it is out of order for us to speak on one service relative to another from the point of view of importance, and that is always a very unsatisfactory method of conducting Debates in this House. If we ever get a Defence Ministry set up, the Government must introduce their Budget of defence as one item, so that we can discuss it as one subject and decide whether we ought to spend such a sum relative to our foreign policy, and in what proportion we ought to spend such a sum on the separate services. The sum of £3 per head in defence expenditure makes everybody turn to this Debate to see whether they are going to get anything for their money.

We are up against three tremendous vested interests. I have always thundered against the War Office and the Admiralty. I thought the Air Ministry was free from such a charge but, of course, it is now more or less in the same condition. We now have three impregnable services which will not give way an inch one to another. I have pleaded in this House for one service. I still maintain that there is as much difference between two soldiers, one of whom looks after a horse and another who looks after a tank, as there is between a sailor and an airman one of whom looks after an engine of the steam type and the other an engine of the petrol type. If we were looking at this problem de novo without any of the old Services existent, I believe we should have had one service long ago. As things are, it is better to start organising from the top. That is why I welcome the Measure of my hon. and gallant Friend which proposes to set up a Defence Council. I do not know whether I agree with him as to the com- ponents of the Defence Council, but there should be regular officers of the three services who have passed through the Imperial Defence College.

We have to remember that all regular officers, to whichever Service they belong, always think they are right. There cannot be anything wrong with what they do. I remember during the War when heavy artillery was starting to be directed by aeroplane. The artillery officers thought that a shell went exactly where it was fired. It never, of course, goes anywhere near. They thought it was an exact science. I remember an officer called Major Harvey-Kelly flying over a piece of line where enormous shells were being fired by the artillery, and when he saw shells bursting in a lake he sent this message by wireless: "If any battery is firing on the middle of the Bellewarde Lake they are hitting." Co-operation between the artillery and the Air Force only really started after this. It is the same with all the Services. They always think they are right. Mrs. Asquith summed the situation up at a dinner party when she said to a number of generals, "The only reason you generals ever win battles is that you have generals against you." That was quite delightful.

Whatever organisation you set up of a political character, you have to be advised by a lot of officers. The problem of our organisation to-day is that even after officers have passed through the Imperial Defence College they are still dependent for their promotion upon their own particular service. If you are to have sound advice from this collection of senior officers it is essential that the moment they have passed through the College they should be divorced from the possibility of their own service stopping their promotion. In what other way can you get a recommendation of one service against another? How could you possibly get an airman to say that a battleship was the finest thing in the world and could not be destroyed by bombs, and still think that he would get promotion in his own Service? How could you get a sailor to say that battleships were things of the past and could be destroyed by bombs to-morrow? Do you think he would ever get promotion from his own Service?

When you have passed these officers through the Imperial Defence College, they must be treated automatically, from the point of view of promotion. Otherwise you will never get unbiased advice upon the difficult problems upon which you must seek advice from the professional soldier. We have a lot of problems to deal with, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer naturally asks, about the money he has to pay: "Is it going to pay to have one battleship or 200 aeroplanes?" We cannot answer that. Who can answer it? What machinery has been set up to answer the questions like that? If you say that one battleship is better than 200 aeroplanes, will that battleship be worth 200 aeroplanes in five years' time? It is five years, before you get your battleship on the water. Who is to dogmatise as to whether the modern ship is vulnerable from the air bomb? A totally new point has arisen lately, and that is that the long-range bomber is no longer vulnerable from the fighter. That changes the whole position with regard to bombing and fighting in the air, and it is a most disturbing thought. That also raises a question with regard to the Mercantile Marine. We have always thought that the Mercantile Marine was vulnerable only from the submarine, but the increased range of the bombing aeroplane makes the whole Mercantile Marine vulnerable from the air. Is that the business of the Admiralty? Is it the business of the Air Force? Whose business is it to deal with this new threat? If every submarine were abolished to-morrow, the Mercantile Marine would still be in peril. That is a new problem, and it can only be dealt with by the experts of the three Services, considering it from a national point of view and not from a Service point of view.

Then there is the question of the dockyards. Are they to remain where they are? In view of the range of the bombing machine, would it really be of any help to move Chatham to the other side of Ireland? In three years' time I do not think it will make any difference at all. The whole production of ships is going to be very vulnerable in the near future. The other day I read a speech by the First Lord of the Admiralty. If he thinks that everything is of coleur de rose as he put it forward, the country will not agree with him. It is a most unfortunate thing that a Service Member should be at the head of a great Depart- ment. In such circumstances, nothing can possible be wrong. I do not believe the Admiralty has ever admitted that anything was ever wrong, except the refreshment department in the "Maine," and that was because we went down there ourselves. If we had not been there, the feeding would have been perfect. These are big questions which have to be decided, not in ten years' time, but immediately. The Trinity of Services is incomprehensible to the whole of the British people. We want to see some plan, some economy as compared with the spending of money in the old-fashioned way. We await the White Paper. We know that probably the Government cannot accept my hon. and gallant Friend's Bill, but we shall be very disappointed if, when the White Paper comes and the reply is given, we do not go a long way along the same lines.

1.30 p.m.

I agree with the intentions expressed by my hon. and gallant Friend in his Bill, in the sense that he wishes to see effected a greater dovetailing of the work of the three Fighting Services, and a greater economy in the expenditure of money upon them. I differ from him, however, on certain points of detail, and I am not quite sure that the Bill would achieve the object he has in view. I should like to mention, however, one point of detail in regard to which I am very fully in agreement with him, and that is the provision which he makes in the Bill concerning the co-ordination of the intelligence branches of the three Fighting Services. I served in one of those branches myself for some considerable time after the War, and the amount of overlapping that there is between these three intelligence services is perfectly fantastic. While we are debating this Bill here in the House of Commons, different sets of intelligence officers and officials are engaged at this moment, in one building and another in Whitehall, working upon exactly identical tasks. It would benefit not only the fighting services but even a non-fighting Department like the Department of Overseas Trade if these intelligence services were co-ordinated and it would well pay the Government to look into the matter.

The main point upon which I disagree with my hon. and gallant Friend is that I think the Bill fails to recognise what is a vital point nowadays in all questions of preparation for war, namely, the organisation of the whole peace time industry of the country in order that in time of war it may be fully utilised. That aspect of the question, which I think is the primary and vital one, is overlooked in the Bill. The Bill lays it down that the Minister of Defence should be responsible for the supplies of matériel, but it makes no provision whatever for any machinery of consultation between the Ministry of Defence and the industry of the country.

May I remind my hon. and gallant Friend that I pointed out that it would be necessary to include representatives of industry from civil life on the Council of the Ministry of Defence? I said that in future it would not be a question of a naval, army and air war, but also an industrial war, and that all these people would have to be brought in.

I think the Bill does not quite provide the machinery for that consultation.

Yes, it does.

The Bill also makes the Minister responsible for preparing designs for armaments, but it does not provide for the Minister consulting the industry of the country and making certain that during wartime those designs will be produced in the numbers and with the rapidity that would be required. I also think that the Bill does not make entirely clear the esential difference between peace and war, which will affect very materially the duties of such a Minister of Defence. In peace-time the whole of the Fighting Services and so on depends upon voluntary effort, but in war-time it will be a case of the nation being at war, and the differences in these respects will make a vital difference in the duties of a Minister of Defence during peace and during war.

Many of the speeches in this debate have seemed to me to consist really of criticisms of the existing Service Departments without quite making clear how the appointment of a Minister of Defence will remedy the defects to which attention has been called. Those speeches have mostly recommended the substitution of King Log for King Stork, and that will not take us any further at all. The question we have to consider is, what are the exact duties to be allocated to the Minister of Defence, and, in thinking of this Measure, we should not merely think of it in terms of the three Services, but must add the consideration of all that mobilisation of industry to which I have just referred. The four categories into which the duties of a Minister of Defence would fall are those of administration, of supply, of the relative functions of the Services, and of the question of planning.

In my opinion it is impossible to divorce what I would call administrative duties from the existing Service Departments and vest them in a new Minister of Defence. I think the day-to-day duties of administration in these three Departments must be left in the hands of the heads of the Departments as they are at present. I do not believe you can divorce administration from them. I do not think, for instance, that you could transfer questions of promotion and command in the different Services into the hands of the Minister of Defence. There is a quite obvious practical difficulty in the way of vesting such administrative duties in a Minister of Defence, and that arises out of the question who is to advise him in those matters. If he is to deal with these problems over the heads of the defence Departments, he will obviously require the best professional advice that he can obtain. But the best men are required in their own Departments and by their own Services and, if it became known that a naval officer of his staff had advised the Minister of Defence to oppose proposals of the Admiralty when he returned for his next turn of duty he would probably find his promotion affected thereby. If the Minister of Defence has to deal with questions of administration, unless he is advised by a succession of officers having experience afloat or ashore, he will find it impossible to decide on the questions that are put before him. I think we must make up our minds clearly that questions of administration must remain where they are at present, in the Service Departments, and not be vested in the Minister of Defence.

That leaves him with two very important duties and responsibilities which might very well indeed be vested in him. The first is the question of supplies, the question of mobilising the industry of the country on such a footing that in war it automatically turns over to wartime requirements. That is a tremendous task that has to be faced in future. It has been faced in great detail in one European country and we have to face it here—this question of what I will call industrial mobilisation in peace-time. That seems to be a sufficient justification in itself almost for the creation of a Ministry of Defence. The other duty that I would vest in him is what I would describe as function—the responsibility and duty of deciding between the functions of the three fighting Services. Here I fear Service Members may disagree with me but I believe that a civilian Minister is just as capable, if not more capable, of deciding upon those questions of the relative functions of the three fighting Services than any Service representative. If the questions are properly put before him by his professional advisers, I believe your civilian Minister is just as capable, or more capable of settling them than professional sailors or soldiers. Remembering that your Minister of Defence would be responsible to the Cabinet, I think those questions might safely be left in his hands. He would be able to rely upon professional advisers who have retired from the Service but were still capable of giving him advice on these points.

There is the proposal that I should like to lay before the House, that we should keep in mind these four functions of administration, supply, function and planning, and that we should decide to vest in the Minister of Defence problems of supply and function, leaving questions of administration where they already are in the fighting Departments. That leaves the question of planning. Even when you have settled your questions of function and supply, you still have the question of planning before you. You must make up your mind where you think war is likely to occur, what form it will take, and what steps you are going to take to co-ordinate the three Services for it. For this question of planning I think we have the machinery ready to be adapted to our requirements in the Committee of Imperial Defence. The question of planning can be left with them, and with the Chiefs of Staffs Committee. I do not agree with some of the hard things that have been said about the Committee of Imperial Defence. I think it performs invaluable services.

Has my hon. and gallant Friend read Viscount Trenchard's letter in the "Times" of 14th December last when he says we have done nothing to solve these great problems of defence, and they have done no planning at all?

I think my hon. and gallant Friend mistakes what I said. I was not claiming that they had done great service in regard to planning. I said I thought that for questions of planning we had the machinery available in the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Chiefs of Staffs Committee with certain adaptations, and I was claiming credit for the Committee of Imperial Defence not with regard to planning specifically but in regard to the enormous number of functions that they fulfil. There is a really valuable piece of machinery. It only requires certain adaptations to bring it into harmony with our requirements.

There is one further point about the question of who is to be our Minister of Defence. I have said I think there is a distinction to be borne in mind between the duties of the Minister in peace and in war because of the essential difference that during peace time we are dependent upon voluntary effort, and during war it will be a question of the nation at war. It seems to me that, when you are at war, the whole responsibility for the conduct of the war must be vested in the Prime Minister of the day. It cannot be vested elsewhere because the war of the future, which will mean the whole nation being at war, involves the possibility of interference with every possible department and form of national life, and the Prime Minister alone can be the man responsible. It seems to me that on the outbreak of war the question of functions between the Services will already have been largely decided. The Minister of Defence will find ample to occupy him in this question of supply, which I think we should all agree should be one of his chief responsibilities. In regard to the selection of a man for this post I agree with what was said from these benches, that it should be a man who has no bias, so far as we know, towards either of the three Services.

I should like to refer to one point which has not been touched upon. It is a commonplace to say that defence questions are all conditioned by the foreign policy of the country. That, of course, is quite true, and one is thankful to think that there are rather hopeful signs about the future of the foreign policy of this country. We have, at any rate, now a Foreign Secretary who has nailed his colours to the League mast, and I think the events of December, which are fresh in our memory, have secured this, that great international questions will in future be transacted and handled in a thoroughly responsible manner, and not in the manner of a sort of flight into Switzerland, with Joseph stopping for an hour or two to settle the fate of the Lion of Judah and the Empire of Ethiopia, while Mary looks after the luggage. I think we have secured that these great international transactions will in future be handled with greater efficiency.

But our armament policy is not so much conditioned by the foreign policy of the day as by the foreign policy of the past four or five years, and though we have to embark upon this great armament expenditure mentioned here this morning, we have to remember that that expenditure has been rendered necessary by the manner in which our foreign policy has been conducted during the past four or five years. The bill for your foreign policy comes in later. It is not the foreign policy of the day for which you pay the bill, but the foreign policy of the past four or five years. There is general agreement everywhere that this Debate has served a most useful purpose. Service Members of the House, I am sure—I know that I feel that way myself—take the greatest interest and pleasure in such Debates. One has the sensation of fighting one's battles over again when these matters are debated. But I would suggest—though I am sure it is in our minds —that when we are debating such questions as armaments, organisation and a defence Ministry the subject we are really discussing is war. It is war, and we are playing with dynamite. When we are discussing these questions we are walking through the national powder magazine, and I hope that none of us is smoking as we do it. Behind all that we say on these occasions, we should have at heart the peroration of the Foreign Secretary in the first speech which he made in this country as Foreign Secretary, when he said:

1.58 p.m.

Today's Debate reflects the feeling of anxiety throughout the country that everything is not well with the arrangements which he have at present for the control of our Defence Forces, especially at this time when we are, I hope, at last to take steps to remedy the deficiencies which have accumulated in the Defence Forces for many years past. I do not agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Nuneaton (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher) when he says that the expense is due to the foreign policy of the last four years. I think that it is due to the neglect on the part of governments of all parties. It was perhaps worth doing; we tried to set an example to other countries. They failed to follow our example, and we cannot allow the present state of things to go on and have to make good the deficiency. Undoubtedly, it will cost a large sum of money, and the country is very anxious that the money shall be properly spent, that we shall get full value for it, and that it shall be properly allocated as between the three Services. I most thoroughly agree with what was said by an hon. Member that one great defect in the situation is, that we hardly ever have an opportunity of debating defence as a whole in this House. We want a body with executive authority over and above the three Fighting Services to allocate among the three Services the money available for defence purposes, and also, in the words of paragraph (4) of the Memorandum of the Bill:

"For the proper consideration of all strategical and tactical questions bearing on the defence of the realm."

I most heartily agree with what was said by the Leader of the Opposition, that if that is to be done there must be common doctrine on defence prevailing among the three fighting services. We have heard many suggestions as to how that is to be done. We have this Bill before us to-day, and we owe a debt of gratitude to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) for having put the Bill before us. We have to consider to what extent the proposals in the Bill will give us what we want. The Bill states that there is to be a Minister of Defence, and that the heads of the three fighting Services are to be responsible to him. Therefore, in future, the heads of the three fighting Services will not be responsible directly to Parliament, but to the Minister of Defence, and the Minister of Defence will be responsible to Parliament for every detail of the three fighting Services. That is emphasised in the later stages of the Bill. In Clauses 3, 4 and 5 it is made evident that the Minister of Defence is to be responsible for every detail of the administration of the three fighting Services. I submit that no one man could possibly do that. He could not do it in peace time, and very much less could he do it in war when every department is expanded beyond all recognition. Even if he could do it, he would be unable to do what we really require to be done, that is, to be in charge of policy and planning. He could not do it.

Does my hon. and gallant Friend know that in 1918 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) actually considered whether he should set up a Minister for Defence in war time, and he was only prevented from doing it through some personal considerations, but he actually did consider it, and very nearly did it.

All I can say is that I am very glad he did not do it. We want this authority on the lines as set out by the Leader of the Opposition. I do not pretend to be able to say exactly what line that should be. An hon. Gentleman said that we must not have a Service member, but a civilian. Of course, you must have a civilian, because he must be a member of the Cabinet. I do not think that a member of any of the three fighting services should be given the supervision of these very important matters. We must have a civilian, provided that the civilian has a considerable amount of knowledge of the problems on which he will have to adjudicate. What would be his relations within the Government to the heads of the three fighting services I do not know. The view held in some quarters is that the whole idea of the Cabinet needs to be changed and that the Cabinet should consist of Ministers Without Portfolio. If that course were adopted one of those Ministers might very well take charge of the very important functions of supervising the three Fighting Services. I do not pretend to say exactly what should be the details but it is obvious that we want something of that sort. I hope that we shall get some guidance from the Government as to their view.

2.6 p.m.

We have had an amazingly interesting Debate, and I join with other hon. Members in paying my tribute to the hon. and gallant Member who introduced the Bill. I agree very much in regard to many of the technical arguments against a Ministry of Defence that were advanced by the hon. and gallant Member for Nuneaton (Lieut. Com. Fletcher). It seems to me that my hon. and gallant Friend who introduced the Bill has under-rated some of the dangers and difficulties of a Ministry of Defence. I would remind him of the speech that was made in 1928 by the Prime Minister, who reminded us that in a war there was a great tendency for Ministries to expand into further Ministries. He said: Office. It would be found in practice that the problems involved would be too detailed, too responsible and far too great for any one Ministry to undertake.

I think my hon. and gallant Friend was a little too severe and did not quite appreciate what the Committee of Imperial Defence is doing. I am convinced that the problems now before us have not only been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence but that they have considered other problems which we have not considered. While I do not agree with my hon. and gallant Friend in regard to his solution, I do agree that the present system needs radical amendment. Under the present system we do not and under the system proposed by the hon. and gallant Member we should not get over the weakness of what we may call fair "do-s" all round between the Services. It is obvious that the chief of staff of one Service if he finds that the chief of staff of another Service has behaved rather well in not pressing the demands of one Service against another, he will play the game by him next time. We should not get over that difficulty in a Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence would have to fight all the three Services— a harder job than the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to do—with the support of the Cabinet behind him.

We must have, as suggested by the Leader of the Opposition, some sort of executive body. The first thing that that executive body should do is to decide on what is to be the strategy of this country in the next few years. When you decide what our strategy is likely to be you can decide what are to be the functions of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. When you have decided, as the hon. and gallant Member for Nuneaton said, the functions of the Army,' the Navy and the Air Force, you can allocate your supplies, your munitions and your money. What do I mean by strategy? I mean that the executive body would have to decide and advise the Government what is to be the function of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in the event of hostilities. A fundamental decision is, what is to be the function of the Army? Upon that depends the whole of your strategy. Under what conditions are you going to fight? Are you going to commit yourselves to an expeditionary force?

Once you commit yourselves to sending one man abroad, you cannot limit your commitments. If you commit yourself to sending one Division abroad, you cannot limit your commitments in Divisions. Every other country will say that we started the last War with six or seven Divisions, and that Britain would expand as she did in the last war.

Therefore, the first decision must be, are you going to send a land expeditionary force abroad? If so, you have to face the problems arising out of that decision, such problems as taking the expeditionary force overseas, your Naval problem, your Air problem, the relationship with your Air Force and the type of machine that is to act for recognisance purposes to connect up with the land forces. If you decide that our strategy will not include the sending of an expeditionary land force overseas, then you will have to alter the whole of your naval strategy and the whole of your air strategy. The first thing, therefore, that we ought to do is to decide what our general strategy is going to be in the event of hostilities breaking out. I do not presume to advise the House on what is right or wrong, but it seems to me that probably this country would gain in world opinion if we limited ourselves to action from the air and the sea, and if we used our fleet to carry out the historic role of pressure and economic blocade which inevitably brings victory in the long run.

I do not agree with many of the extravagent claims put forward by my hon. and gallant Friend in regard to the effect of bombing. Any one who served as an infantry officer in the last War and had tri face the barrage that was put up against us, knows that we had a much greater barrage from artillery than from any air barrage. The claim about bombing from the air is greatly exaggerated by the Air Force.

Will the hon. and gallant Member tell me what were the extravagant claims that I made? I was dealing with bombing by ships, and it had nothing to do with bombing ashore. I challenge the hon. and gallant Member across the floor of the House to tell me where I was extravagant.

:I take up the challenge. The extravagant claim was that a bomb was dropped near to a war- ship. The evidence that my hon. and gallant Friend gave was that the bomb was dropped 150 yards away from some freak warship, manned by some freak revolutionary sailors, without efficient anti-aircraft guns aboard. He gave that as an example of bombing.

I gave it as an instance of moral effect. I said that the bomb caused the crew to come up. The striking effect of bombs is known to me as a torpedoist and is not known to the hon. and gallant Member.

The moral effect is going to be one of the great objectives of the Air Force in the future, but I am sure that the moral effect that the hon. and gallant Member gave as an example is not the moral effect which we are going to have from the Royal Navy. I do not believe that the effect of dropping the bomb which he gave us would be such as to effect the morale and personnel of the Royal Navy. May I point out where I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend? I agree that if 20 years ago the Air Force had been developed to its present state of perfection and we had had a large force of aeroplanes, it would have had an enormous effect and would probably have prevented Germany from going to War. I say that for this reason: Germany, especially when you consider the position of the Ruhr Valley, is in an extraordinarily dangerous stragetical position as opposed to this country, because if the Ruhr were bombed that would demobilise practically the whole of Germany's industrial output. On the other hand this country, though we are not invulnerable, does not fear attack from any northern or western frontier. Therefore, it might be and probably is to the advantage of this country to confine its military activities to the sea and to the air.

All that I plead for is some committee with executive authority which could advise the Government on general strategy, so that once a decision was reached the Chiefs of Staffs of the various services could work out what to do, and the money could be allocated. I believe that if we had some such committee we could to a great extent break down the vested interests of the services. The Committee that I suggest would go into the problem of strategy and report to the Cabinet, and when the Cabinet bad made a decision that committee would see that the Services carried it out. The difficulty is, how are you to compose that committee? I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that it must be a body which is controlled or controllable by the House of Commons. After looking at the problem from various angles I think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) has probably given us the right solution. I believe that if we used the present Committee of Imperial Defence and had a whole-time Cabinet Minister as its vice-chairman, with the Prime Minister as chairman, we could get over any of the difficulties that we now foresee.

That committee would report on the strategy and the many things that we have to do if war should occur. It would put its decisions before the Cabinet, and the Cabinet would approve of them. There would be Cabinet control and therefore control by this House. When the Cabinet had approved of a decision the Committee of Imperial Defence would tell the Army, Navy and Air Force and the various other Departments which have to be brought into consideration to get on with their jobs. I know that the Minister who is to reply to-day will give the House an assurance that these great problems are being tackled. I hope he will also give an assurance that there will be some body set up with executive powers, so that when a decision is arrived at it can be put into force.

2.20 p.m.

I rise to oppose the Bill for the very good reasons that I wish to put before the House. I also want to oppose the very blatant military mind that is behind the Bill's introduction and behind much of the support that has been given to it. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who introduced the Bill said that a strong Britain would be a powerful force for peace. "A strong Britain" is a generalisation that can be very dangerous. I will particularise. A strong Britain for war under the leadership of the present Government is a menace to civilisation. A strong Britain for peace under the leadership of a Government based on the mighty organised working-class movement would be a Britain that would contribute to the advance of civilisation. [An HON. MEMBER: "What is the present Government; based on?"] The present Government is based on undiluted fraud and deceit. Were we not told in this House that one of the greatest assets they had at the election was the belief that had been inculcated in the minds of the people that the Prime Minister was an honest man? We have had an exhibition of honesty on the question of Abyssinia. I would like to know the innermost feelings of the predecessor of the present Foreign Secretary on that question.

I want to particularise. We hear about defence. I am sorry that hon. Members around me are led into the trap of the militarists on this question. Defence of what? The country. That is another generalisation. But what is meant? The right hon. Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) told us that during the War the west coast was a graveyard for ships. The right hon. Gentleman could have said that the Welsh Valleys to-day are a bigger and more terrible graveyard than ever the west coast was. He could have said that the north-east coast is a graveyard, and that in bonnie Scotland there is area after area that is a graveyard— counties, towns and villages, where thousands of men, women and children are destroyed or are being destroyed. Who is destroying the country? Those who are talking about defence of the country.

I remember how during the War an Irish patriot, Sir Roger Casement, was put into the Tower and executed for soliciting support from Germany for Ireland. But I remember also working in Belfast before the War, when certain gentlemen who were Members of this House were proposing to sever their allegiance to this country and to transfer that allegiance to Germany. I worked in Belfast and lived in Bangor. I came out one morning to find the streets patrolled by Ulster Volunteers while German guns were being landed at Bangor to be used against the British by gentlemen who occupied seats in this House. Those gentlemen were prepared to forsake this country and to give their allegiance to another. They were getting weapons from that other country to be used against the soldiers of this country. I saw the weapons myself. I was held up by the Ulster Volunteers and I did not get to my work that morning. The Volunteers were there with fixed bayonets.

We have been told this morning about the strength of militarism in Germany, a militarism which has been built up mainly with materials obtained from Britain, built up with British finance from the Bank of England and built up by British foreign policy. What is war fought for? Loot. I remember that in 1914 in the Clyde Valley the walls were covered with notices that "Your King and country need you." Wars are fought for loot.

I must remind the hon. Member that we are discussing a Bill to set up a Ministry of Defence and that he must not discuss the virtues or vices of war.

I am sorry if I have gone beyond the limits of the Debate, but I want to emphasise the point upon which we should centre our attention to-day. The President of the Board of Education said yesterday that this was a wonderful country. If you went to other countries you would hear then discussing war, but that in this country we were discussing education. If any foreign representatives visited the House to-day they would hear hon. Members talking about the preparation of our industries for war and the character of the war that is coming. That is not what we want. We want to pursue with all our attention a policy of peace.

The subject of this Debate is not the issue of peace or war, and I must ask the hon. Member to confine himself to the proposal to set up a Ministry of Defence.

I am sorry if I am, wrong. Instead of this House centring its attention on such a Bill as this, which I oppose, and discussing preparations for war, the whole attention of the House should be centred on peace. I am talking about defence. The Prime Minister said in the Albert Hall that there was no defence against air bombing and regretted that aeroplanes had been invented. It is one of the greatest inventions of man, and the only thing the Prime Minister can say regarding it is that he regrets aeroplanes should have been invented. We want every invention. I want the people of this country to be defended. I do not want them to be slaughtered again, but the way to defend our country and develop a policy of defence is to develop a policy of peace. That is the kernel of my argument, which I consider I am entitled to put forward in this House. Millions of young Britishers were killed in the last War, and millions more will be killed if there is another war. We are told that civilisation will be destroyed if there is another war. I object with all the power I have to men going on to public platforms and declaring from the knowledge they have of the development of war conditions that another war means the destruction of civilisation and then for the time of the House of Commons to be taken up as it is to-day with a discussion in which we are now engaged.

The hon. Member seems to be saying what I have ruled is not relevant. He is apparently protesting against the Debate being raised at all, He must confine himself strictly to the question before the House, or I must ask him to resume his seat.

The centre of my argument is that the people of this country can only be defended through the development of peace and not through the building up of war-like forces. Therefore, I got up for the purpose of opposing the Bill and to put my point of view. I want hon. Members to face up to this question frankly. If war means, as they say it does, the destruction of civilisation, then every conceivable force we have should be directed towards the development of peace throughout the world.

2.30 p.m.

The whole House, with the possible exception of the hon. Member who has just sat down, is sincerely grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) for bringing forward the Bill. We are grateful to him for two reasons. It has given Members an opportunity of expressing their views and their anxieties on the whole subject of the organisation for national defence in advance of the Government's statement and the Debate which has been promised to the House on the general question of defence before the individual service Estimates are con- sidered, In the second place, it has given the House an opportunity of clearing its mind on one preliminary issue about the organisation for defence. As regards the first point, the general question of our defence organisation and the anxieties which are felt by hon. Members, the House will not expect me to anticipate the statement which has been promised to the House by the Government. But I will say this, that the Government accept the test stated by the hon. and gallant Member. The Government are responsible for starting the machinery which will forge the right weapons of war, and we accept the responsibility for seeing that whatever proposals are presented to this House are the result of a coordinated decision by the Government on the question. As to what are the right weapons of war in relation to that programme, we shall certainly not, in dealing with this most difficult question, give the House any cause to complain that we regard everything in the garden as lovely. That is as far as I can go this afternoon on the general question.

On the second point, the preliminary issue raised by the hon. and gallant Member, perhaps the best way the Government spokesman can assist the House—that is the Government's business on a Friday afternoon—is to make a few comments on that preliminary issue. The preliminary issue is this: Is your defence organisation to take the form of, as it were, a federal union of distinct executive departments working together, developing a common mind and subject, in the last resort, to the decision of the political head of the Government, or are you to take the alternative course of basing that co-operation on executive unification of the departments under one executive head? It is not a question as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Thornbury (Captain Gunston) said, of whether there is to be a common executive decision on common subjects of defence. Of course there must be an executive decision. The executive decision must be taken by the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. But, short of that, you have to decide whether your organisation is to be, to use a rather loose phrase, of the federal type or of the unified executive type. On your decision on that question will depend whether you choose an organisation of the Committee of Imperial Defence type or an organisation of the Ministry of Defence type, as proposed in the Bill.

I will only attempt to suggest to the House a few considerations on that point. Like many other hon. Members, I think my approach to the problem—perhaps not, in all respects, my conclusions, but my approach to the problem—is almost identically that of the Leader of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman made one of the most clear-headed speeches on this subject that I have ever heard. You have to make that preliminary choice between the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Ministry of Defence, and that choice will be influenced, I think, by three questions. First, what is the organisation which will function best in times of peace; second, what is the organisation which will function best in time of war, for you cannot change your whole organisation on the outbreak of war; and third, what is the best organisation for preparing in peace time executive machinery which, in the nature of things, cannot exist in peace time but must be created in war time? That is to say, the whole question which has been raised by some hon. Members of the mobilisation of national effort.

On the first question, of efficacy in time of peace, a Ministry of Defence does involve a responsibility towards this House which, in spite of what has been said, I think few people would be prepared to assume. It is Parliamentary responsibility which is the controlling consideration in this matter. The Minister under this Bill would be responsible for the whole supply of equipment to all the Services, for the recruitment of all the Services, for the higher administration of the Services, for particular miscellaneous duties like those connected with the Meteorological Office, for civil aviation, and, at the same time, he would be responsible for drawing up ultimate operational plans for any future war and thinking out every problem of world strategy.

But he would have a council to help him. He would have specially selected Civil servants and officers from the three Services to assist him. Though he would be responsible he would have assistance from the best brains in the State.

If my hon. and gallant Friend will allow me to say so, that does not meet my point. That was why I said that Parliamentary responsibility is the controlling test in time of peace. The future Minister may be helped by a number of committees. He may be helped by all the committees which now exist under the Committee of Imperial Defence, but he will be responsible to this House. My right, hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill)—

I have not said a word.

My right hon. Friend has not said a word on this occasion and I was only about to refer, in the most friendly way, to a speech made by him in 1922 when he pointed to the appalling burden of responsibility which would rest on a single Minister of Defence placing the Service Estimates before this House. But while it is very doubtful whether such an executive organisation could function in times of peace, it is clear that it could not begin to function in time of war, and I will ask my hon. and gallant Friend the member for Hertford to consider this point. I am not, as the House will see in a moment, trying to riddle this Bill or to make debating points upon it. What I am going to say now is in illustration of the difficulties which must arise in some form however you try to set up a Ministry of Defence. Under Clause 2, Subsection (2) of the Bill the Minister of Defence in time of war will be responsible for all the operational plans of the Army, Navy and Air Force. He will, however, have no right, except in times of emergency, to issue any executive orders for the carrying out of those operational plans, the result being that the Army, Navy and Air Force will be operating on plans which they cannot change, and will be responsible for issuing orders to carry out those plans, without being able to change the plans in any respect. In other words they will be in precisely the same position as Napoleon's marshals in Spain between 1808 and 1814.

I say that merely as an illustration and for this reason. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North St. Pancras (Sir Ian Fraser) and one or two other hon. Members said that you could not have the Minister responsible for a plan unless he was also responsible for carrying out his plan; that whoever planned must be executively responsible. If you take that test, then I think you cannot stop short of the complete executive unification of the three Services. That has been shown by several remarks made in this debate. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wallasey (Lieut.-Colonel Moore Brabazon) asked what was the good of having a joint staff when the promotion of the members of that staff depended upon separate executive departments. So, if you use that argument, your Minister of Defence must be responsible not only as he is under this, Bill for recruitment and for higher administration but he must also be responsible for the whole promotion arrangements of the Services. I sincerely hope hon. Members are not going to agree with the suggestion of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wallasey that promotion should be automatic throughout the services.

Finally, in deciding on the choice between an organisation of the type of the Imperial Defence Committee or an organisation of the type of the Ministry of Defence, I think the House should take into consideration the question of the mobilisation of the nation for war purposes on the outbreak of war. The Bill brought forward by my hon. and gallant Friend proceeds on the assumption that you can best get a Ministry of Munitions and a Ministry of National Services in time of war by creating those departments in time of peace as departments of the Ministry of Defence. I believe that to be a fundamental miscalculation, because a Ministry of Munitions is not merely a combination of the contracts departments of the three Services, nor is a Ministry of National Services a mere combination of the recruiting departments of the three Services. They are each of them organisations which depend upon the mobilisation of the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour, and other large sections of Government machinery, which in peace time are wholly occupied in activities which have nothing to do with war, but which have to be turned over very largely to war activities in time of war. The only way in which you can prepare those great new centres of executive action, which can only come into being after war has broken out, is in an organisation of the Imperial Defence Committee type, where it is possible to bring together all the departments which will eventually be concerned in the war control and the war action. In that way alone can you prepare the new department which has to be mobilized after the outbreak of war. For all those reasons I suggest that the House will probably feel bound to decide that the type of organisation they wish is that of the Imperial Defence Committee.

Then there is the other very grave question. Is the existing Imperial Defence Committee the right kind of organization? In what respects does it require strengthening? In what respects does it need to develop new co-ordinating organs? That question is one that I certainly do not wish to pre-determine by anything I say in this Debate. It is, in fact, a subject on which I do not want to give the House even the most minute appearance of self-satisfaction. I think any co-ordinating machinery of this kind will require constant development. Obviously it has already been developed, in many respects, to an extent which is not realised by most hon. Members in this House. It is no longer true that the Chiefs of Staffs Comittee is the only co-ordinating organ in the Imperial Defence Comittee. But that is a question with which I do not wish to deal, and it will be dealt with in the eventual statement by the Government. I have tried to assist the House by clearing up the nature of the preliminary choice.

It is wonderfully cleared up.

In conclusion, perhaps I may say that after this Debate it may seem desirable to the House not to take a formal vote on this Bill. I do feel that to ask hon Members who are strongly of the opinion that something needs to be done to vote in favour of the Bill when they do not agree with its actual proposals, or to ask them to vote against it because they do not like its actual proposals and thereby to indicate that perhaps they feel satisfied with the existing position, would be asking them to take a false position. I should be extremely glad if my hon. and gallant Friend agreed with me on that point.

2.53 p.m.

I wish to support the appeal of my right hon. Friend that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who introduced the Bill should not force us to take a vote on it. The hon. and gallant Member, by the opportunity which the introduction of his Bill has accorded, has given this House one of the most interesting and, I hope, most fruitful debates of recent times, but obviously it is a debate which at this stage must be wholly inconclusive. The sequel will come when the day is fixed by the Government for a discussion of Defence at large, when they lay their whole proposals before the House and the House is called upon to take a decision. If my hon. and gallant Friend presses his Bill to a vote this afternoon, may I remind him that, under the Rules of this House, whether the Bill be carried or not, he will be quite unwittingly limiting the freedom of discussion by the House when the main question comes before us. That is a question of procedure on which I do not wish to dwell, but if the hon. and gallant Member has any doubts, perhaps he will make inquiries in the proper quarter and he will understand what I mean.

If I venture to intervene for a few moments in this Debate, it is because I have no intention of intervening in the later one when people more expert than I am will speak, and because I want to say a few words as a lay administrator of some experience and not as, in any sense, a military, naval or air expert. I want to direct attention to the question of what underlies the anxiety—which I think has been so obvious in every speech to-day—as to whether we are setting about these defence problems in the right manner. I am not surprised at this anxiety. The House and the country have experienced in recent times some very rude shocks for which they were wholly unprepared, which remain to this day in large part an unexplained mystery and which make us anxious lest they should be repeated in more critical circumstances when they might be almost fatal. I am going to recall to the mind of the Prime Minister, for the purpose of illustrating what I mean, one or two of his own utterances. It was on 28th November, 1934, that the right hon. Gentleman, after due notice of the case which my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) was going to raise in respect of our air defences and in particular of the growth, the unexampled growth, of the German Air Force—it was after due notice and full inquiry from the best source available that my right hon. Friend said: Crown. He said, on 10th December, 1935:

Well, Sir, why do I cite these things? They are not pleasant; they are not reassuring. It is because those things could not have happened if the thinking machine of the Government was working properly, if their defence organisation was really efficient. The Prime Minister has himself set a problem to every Member of the House. He has spread the responsibility which is primarily his over all the Benches, and it is now up to him to provide a solution of the problem, which he admits and in which he must ask us to give the Government the powers that they need. I am wholly with the Noble Lord who has just spoken in thinking that it does not need a creation of a Ministry of Defence to deal with this problem, and I think it is far more in accordance with our practice, and our wise practice, to develop institutions, to alter and amend, if necessary, to meet growing needs or to remove defects in them, than to scrap existing machinery and turn to something entirely new.

I add that I should dread the appointment of a Minister with a Ministry of Defence, which is what is really contemplated, I think, in the hon. and gallant Member's Bill, not merely because I think it would place a quite intolerable burden—intolerable in the literal sense, for it is a burden that no man is strong enough to bear—on the shoulders of one man, but because it would lessen almost to vanishing point what I think it is vital to preserve, namely, the responsibility of the civilian heads of the three Services. I am quite Certain that if you ever allow it to be understood that the responsibility which enabled a First Lord of the Admiralty—I take him as an illustration, because I served a good many years in that office in a subordinate post, and for a few months I was first Lord of the Admiralty—I venture to say that if you once allow it to be understood that the responsibility of the First Lord for the efficiency of the Fleet is shared with someone else, you have done an injury to the Fleet from which you will find it difficult to recover. I therefore wish to preserve intact and undiminished the responsibility of the civilian chiefs and their advisers respectively in the three services. I want to see a co-ordinating authority, and above all an authority which, surveying the results achieved in each field or proposed in each field by the immediately responsible Ministers, brings them together and works them, or sees that they are worked, into a consistent whole.

Very reluctantly I have come to the conclusion that it is impossible in present circumstances for the Prime Minister to be the effective head of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I was one of the earliest members of that body. I was not a member actually when it started, but the moment I became Chancellor of the Exchequer I was as far back as 1903 placed upon that Committee. I knew then how much time Mr. Balfour, as he then was, gave to this child of his creation; how he started it, how he directed it, and how he himself drafted its conclusions. I think it was the right conception at that time that the Prime Minister, because he is the most powerful of all Ministers, should be the head of the Defence Committee; but the Prime Minister to-day has too much on his hands. Every class of work has increased in complexity, and either the Prime Minister must cease to be Prime Minister for home affairs, or he must cease to be head of the Committee of Imperial Defence. You must have a Minister there whose main business, whose almost exclusive business, except as a Member of the Cabinet, should be the work of that authority. I agree with my right hon. Friend—I am not certain whether the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said the same thing, though it is entirely in keeping with the very remarkable and interesting speech which he made—that this Minister at the head of the Committee of Defence ought also to be the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee.

I thought it a great advance when the Chiefs of Staffs Committee was created, but I had a rather rude shock there because two ex-Members have revealed how they worked it among themselves. A certain amount of compromise there must be, but when there was a really difficult problem about which they did not agree, they shelved it instead of bringing it to the Cabinet or the Committee of Imperial Defence for decision. So that those problems which were probably most vital to the economical use of our resources, whether in money or material or men, were just the problems which tended not to be presented either to the Committee of Imperial Defence as a whole or to the Cabinet which had the executive responsibility for their decision.

There is another question. Modern warfare has altogether altered its character from, shall I say, the days of Wellington and Nelson. It does not now suffice to have the best Army and the best General Staff or the best Navy and the best Board of Admiralty. Modern warfare is an affair of nations, not of armies and of navies only, and you have got to co-ordinate not merely the three forces but to co-ordinate the whole of the civil activities of the population. When the Government began to get anxious about air defence, before they had decided on expansion but when they were already aware that there was a problem which might require expansion, did they set inquiries to work at once to discover what was the state of our industry, what the production could be in any given time, what notice manufacturers would require and whether they had the tools, the gauges and other things of that kind, which are preliminary to the process of manufacture. Is anything of that kind being done now? Has there been any survey of our industrial resources and how they could be best employed? I hope it has been made and has already produced results; but it is a standing problem. It is not a problem to decide once and then to leave it until somebody gets uneasy and raises it again or until a growing body of public opinion mounts up. It ought to be a matter continuously under review in connection with the activities of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

There is again the whole question of labour and how you are going to employ it. You cannot consider recruitment for the services without considering the supplies for the services when they are actively employed, and the people who will be available to provide those supplies. All this side of the question presents increasing difficulties and is becoming an ever more acute problem. I will not say more than that the discussions in America on neutrality and neutral rights are of profound interest for all other countries. It may be that, fighting in the best of causes and with the widest measure of moral support that any country can hope, we might yet find resources upon which we largely depended in the last War denied to us in any future war. The League of Nations is for the first time employing economic sanctions. What is the result of that going to be on the productive activity in war material of other countries and on the relative position of our services as a great industrial nation to produce a greater output of articles needed in the war than those against whom we might conceivably be opposed? These are very big questions; they are tremendous questions. I am not competent to say whether a bomb from the air will destroy a battleship or whether a battleship can destroy an aeroplane. These are questions wider in scope than any of those, although I do not under-rate those. They need, not such time as the Prime Minister can spare from his many duties, but a Minister chosen for his special aptitude for this task, doing it as his main task, and as much his only task as his Department is the task of any other Minister in the Cabinet.

In the evolution of the Committee of Imperial Defence, no single individual has contributed for so long a time or in such large measure to all that it has achieved —and it has achieved a great deal—than the Secretary of the Committee, Sir Maurice Hankey. I do not believe it is possible to go on accumulating duties upon the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. To replace Sir Maurice Hankey in that particular work, I hope the Government are looking ahead to find a suitable man on whom some day can fall the responsibility of the work now done by him. The Secretary has been overworked, with his treble duties of Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, Secretary to the Cabinet and Clerk to the Privy Council. The Prime Minister himself has raised the point. The speeches which I quoted are our justification for demanding great changes, and evidence that everything is being done to prevent a continuance or a recurrence of such events as those for which the Prime Minister has twice stood at the Table of this House within the last two years, to ask the pardon of the House.

3.19 p.m.

While the right hon. Gentleman was discussing war material and the need for organisation of industry, he left out of consideration the element which alone can handle war material. When he was insinuating as to the difficulties that arises from secrecy in Committees and among Departments, he failed to point out this one great essential. In speaking of the reorganisation of industry for the purposes of war, and the efficiency of that industry, he did not mention the subject—dealt with no less recently than in the latest report on those areas—of the physique of the men in the distressed areas. You cannot organise industry unless you have efficient men. Hon. Members opposite have referred to the Leader of the Opposition as though he was speaking for the whole of the Labour party. He is not. This debate is on a private Member's Bill. I, for instance, am opposed to it, and I desire the opportunity not only to say that, but, if the promoters of the Bill had had the courage to put it to the vote, I should have been delighted to vote against it. What a tragedy it is that none of those who claim that this Government is a National Government have been present to-day. I wish the Lord President of the Council could have been here to give his experiences in the last war. That of itself would have been some contribution. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who introduced the Bill made a great point on the question of a strong Britain, but everything that has followed from that has meant a Britain strong for war, not strong for peace. That would seem to me to defeat the very object that has been claimed by the great mouthpieces of this country, that Britain always stands and is ready to fight for peace. We now learn from the last speech that the whole difficulty is to find an immediate means of efficiently arming for war, and not for peace.

Having already given some rulings on this subject, I think I ought to remind the hon. Member that this is a Debate on the question of preparation for war, and not on the question of preparation for peace. It is on the setting up of a Ministry of Defence.

The whole atmosphere of the Debate will give a great impetus to the armaments race, for, despite the efforts of the Chair, the question of war has gone right through it, and that emphasis is going to tell very severely against the peace of the world. All this is being done under the guise of the centralisation of the three Forces. I would ask those who are well acquainted with the question of co-operation of departments in industry what generally happens when you set about forming a combination between three big industrial concerns. The difficulties that it is expected to remove by this centralisation are merely transferred from three separate offices to one. That was made very plain in the last speech. Even in regard to those matters on which the right hon. Gentleman could not unseal his lips, one could see the underlying difficulties of forming what the Bill seeks to form. Apart from that, the heads of departments know, or should know, every detail of what they are doing. You only waste time if you bring heads of departments, with technical knowledge, into a room with a chairman who is a civilian. Before he can make a decision he has to understand what the technical men are talking about. That takes some time, as I know from experience in industrial matters.

The position as far as this party is concerned is that no one is speaking for the party to-day. No one can speak for it, because this matter has not in any way been decided. I want to enter my protest against this method, even on a private Members' day, of the Government trying to ascertain opinion instead of honestly coming forward with their own proposals. They try to discover what they consider the aggregate opinion in order to be able to lay their plans well. Is not that in contradiction to what is contained in the Bill? Why does any Government which knows what it is going to do seek to have the opinions of others? If those in charge of the Government's affairs in the three departments know what is wanted, why do they require to ask anyone's opinion about it? Had these benches been full, as they would have been on an ordinary day, we should have had a tremendous lot of opposition to the Bill.

3.27 p.m.

I protest against the remarks of the hon. Member who has just sat down. He accused all those who have taken an interest in the Debate, and sat throughout it, of being warmongers, language with which we are familiar and which we hear very often from platforms which he frequents, but I do not think it is language which should be used in this House. I do not believe he thinks us warmongers or that he has any idea in reality, but that we are just as anxious to avoid war as he is. I can assure him that this Debate, showing that the country is determined to look after its defences, is going to have a better effect upon the peace of Europe than many Debates for a long time past, because the one thing that is wanted in Europe to secure stability and confidence is the feeling that this country is able and prepared to play its part. To speak of a system of collective security if this country is not able to play its part is to speak of a dream that can never be realised.

I rise late in the Debate only to express my gratitude to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) for his speech. He has put, with all the weight that he commands, better than any of us could the feeling of deep anxiety which is very widespread among supporters of the Government on this subject. I do not think I have missed three sentences in the whole course of the Debate, but I am bound to say that I have listened to it with very great disappointment, not that the speeches from different points of view were not admirable—every contribution was interesting and most were far better than I could myself hope to make—but I felt all the time that those speakers who were dealing with organisation were dealing with it as if we had plenty of time in which to work out a system which would serve our needs and that those who felt the urgency of the present situation, who felt that we have an emergency to deal with and who explained how imperative it is that we should decide at once on various grave questions affecting the three Services, nevertheless had not any very practical way of suggesting how the situation should be met.

I say with all respect to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) that I cannot support his Bill. I hope, as a matter of fact, that he will not press the Bill. Although I have every sympathy with the objects for which be brought the Bill into this House, and I am grateful to him for bringing it in, and although there was much in his most entertaining speech which I greatly appreciated, if he were to press the Bill to a Division I should certainly have to vote against it. I am with him in the objects he wishes to serve, but I do not believe those wishes would be served by the creation of a Ministry of Defence.

We have had two sorts of projects discussed this afternoon. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister without Portfolio, who spoke for the Government, said that there were generally speaking —and I think he was right—two broad solutions, the federal solution, with the Minister in charge of three closely coordinated Services, and the Committee of Imperial Defence solution, with a special Minister as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence taking the place hitherto taken, except for two or three years when Lord Salisbury took it, generally by the Prime Minister. I am convinced that the federal solution, as the right hon. Gentleman calls it, of a Ministry of Defence, whatever may be said for it as a system up to which you gradually work, cannot be recommended as the thing to be set up in an emergency. So far from making things easier to deal with, it would make them more complicated. It would, create another bottleneck and lead to delays in decisions instead of speed, and, on the whole, it would create controversies rather than assuage them.

I cannot conceive a Minister suddenly, at this moment, able to take charge of all three Services. He would find himself overwhelmed by the problems placed on his table every morning. I am convinced that with the delays and doubts that would arise, the one who was appointed could not do the thing unless he were a man the like of whom I do not see on the horizon of this country at the present time. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the right hon. Gentleman opposite."] I have the greatest confidence in the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), but I do not think that even he could wrestle with this job at the present time. If we are to move towards that kind of solution, we must do so not by appointing a Minister and trying to form an organisation under him, but by working from the bottom upwards and ultimately, possibly, establishing a Ministry of that kind. Failing a Ministry of Defence, we have to tackle the other solution given in the weighty speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham of appointing a special Minister as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence who would be responsible for deciding the problems that beset the Services at the present time, and responsible also for orders given to industry and to see that industry was fitted as far as we could make it, to deal with this emergency.

Not so much deciding as foreseeing that they are discussed and decided.

I thank my right hon. Friend for his correction. I know that naturally such a Minister with special responsibility should advise the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, where the decision must always lie. With great respect to my right hon. Friend and to other right hon. Friends who compose this Government, I rather doubt whether that will satisfy the country at the present time. We are facing a very grave emergency indeed. It is just as grave an emergency in the region of defence as 1931 was in the region of finance, and there is profound anxiety about it in the country. What is the difference between now and 1931? When we came to the brink of the precipice in 1931 with small but honourable exceptions a different team was appointed to get the country out of the mess from that team which had got the country into the mess. A different Government was formed to deal with the crisis. In this matter of defence, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, we are relying on the very Ministers, for the most part, to get us out of the trouble who got us into it. They are asking us with assurance not only in this House but in another place to accept their statements, statements which they have constantly in the past found it necessary to revise. We have been told again and again: "You can trust us that the steps we are taking are adequate," but the moment comes when they have to say: thing different from what the Government are doing.

I am expressing no lack of confidence in the Government. They may be doing what is necessary, or they may not. We are waiting for their proposals; I express no opinion about them, but we have had such disillusionment in the past that I think it would be wise for the Government to secure now the support of an independent body who would say: "This is the right course to take, and we advise that this course should be taken." I press that upon my right hon. Friend. I can understand that he was not in any position to say very much today, and he certainly faithfully carried out his task. I hope that we shall get a very much clearer exposition of where the Government stand on many of these major problems when the White Paper is published and when the time comes to debate it. In the meantime, I commend the suggestion which I have made to the attention of my right hon. Friend.

3.38 p.m.

I have supported two Labour Governments in this House, and those two Governments have had to come to the House year after year for supplies for the Defence Forces. If and when another Labour Government is formed that Government will also have to come to the House for supplies for the Defence Forces. A Labour Government has as much responsibility, and recognises its responsibility, for the defence of the country as any other Government, and I hope that it always will have. It is true that so far as we as a party are concerned we place peace, the maintenance of peace and the establishment of peace traditions in the very forefront of our programme. Peace is our first consideration, but when we have given that consideration we have to bear in mind that the country requires to be defended if there are any countries that want to attack us. We have had a very long Debate and I shall not detain the House long. I should not have intervened but for two things that have struck me in the speeches. One was in the admirable speech of the Mover of the Second Reading of the Bill. I want to congratulate him on that speech. I have listened to the hon. and gallant Gentleman many times in speeches on naval matters and I recognise that he is an authority on that subject. I enjoyed his speech today very much.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman discussed the position of the dockyards, and I could not be indifferent to what he said. He pointed out very forcibly what is now general knowledge, that our dockyards are not very happily or safely placed, and that something needs to be done to give greater security to those who will be engaged in the repair or construction of warships. I do not want to labour the point with reference to the position of Portsmouth, Devonport or Chatham. It is acknowledged that in the event of another war, especially a war with a European Power, none of these dockyards is safe from attack from the air or even from the sea. During his speech the hon. and gallant Gentleman, in reviewing the position of another dockyard, said that it was too near Germany. I am interested in that dockyard. It is Rosyth. I agree that Rosyth is near Germany. As a matter of fact it was constructed because Rosyth is near Germany. But still it is a considerable distance from Germany. I want to draw the hon. and gallant Gentleman's attention to the fact that while it is near Germany I think that even from the air point of view it is pretty well defended. We have three aerodromes within a comparatively short distance of Rosyth. Let us remember that Rosyth is not out on the German Ocean, or the North Sea as we prefer to call it; it is well inland and in a position to be very well defended. I am prepared to say that at this moment Rosyth Dockyard is the safest dockyard we have in this country.

Rosyth was constructed at very considerable expense. I believe the sum spent on it was over £11,000,000. It is an admirable dockyard. I am not sure that there are not things that can be done in that dockyard that cannot be done in any other dockyard. I remember that a short time before the dockyard was reduced to a care and maintenance basis in 1925 the Hood had to dock there. It was docked in one of the densest fogs we have ever had on the coast, and without a scratch being made on the ship. Even a ship like the Hood can be taken in at any moment of the day regardless of tides. The dockyard is there ready to be opened up whenever this House decides that that is essential. I hope that those who are considering the problem of defence will remember that we have that dockyard in existence, and that all that it requires is to be re-equipped. A very considerable part of the equipment of Rosyth has been transported to other parts of the world. With comparatively little expenditure we can have a first class dockyard ready in a short time, and, if new dockyards are to be constructed in what are regarded as safer parts, I hope due consideration will be given to the claims of Rosyth. The town in which Rosyth lies has been very badly used by both the Admiralty and the Treasury. The town council has a bad score against these two Departments. They were badly let down by them. They provided all the services which the Admiralty required very willingly. Everything was done to encourage the Admiralty to establish the dockyard at Rosyth, and I say that with comparatively little expense you can have a first-class dockyard at Rosyth which will be perfectly safe from attack, from the sea or from the air. If it is open to attack from the air, then I would ask why we have three aerodromes within a comparatively short distance. The Air Ministry would not be doing their duty if they could not provide that the dockyard is safe from attack by air.

The other point upon which I want to say a word is the mobilisation of industry. I want hon. Members to approach very carefully any suggestion of that kind. One hon. and gallant Member has spoken about conscription. I agree with the principle of central control embodied in the Bill, but I must warn those who are enthusiastic about the defence of the country that they must approach the question of the mobilisation of industry very gently and very carefully. If they wish to take public opinion, and especially the opinion of the organised mass of the workers in this: country, with them on the question of defence they had better approach the question of the mobilisation of industry very carefully. Nothing will arouse public opposition to the steps which may be necessary to be taken for defence more than the fact that before we have put our: house in order we should look still further: ahead to the mobilisation of industry, practically placing the whole country on a war foot- ing. That aspect of the question has aroused a little opposition from this side of the House. We recognise that the Government, who are responsible for the country, must attend to matters of defence. That is absolutely important. But when we begin to lay plans at this moment as if we were just about to enter war, it is another matter. I do not think we are about to enter another war. We are not in the position to-day in which we were in 1914, Then we had not a National Debt of nearly £8,000,000,000. We have that debt hanging round our necks to-day, and we ought to enter into the next war, if there is to be one, a great deal more reluctantly than we entered into the last. I hope it will be possible to stave off war, and while the Government must be responsible for the defence of the country, I sincerely hope that everything possible will be done to establish good relations between the various countries in the world.

3.51 p.m.

The constituents of the hon. Member for Dunfermline (Mr. Watson) will derive as much pleasure from reading his speech as the House had from listening to it. I would like to assure him at once that there is no real fear of conscription being introduced into this country in time of peace. To do so would be absolutely and entirely opposed to the British ethos of personal freedom. Though all of us would be willing to serve the country in an emergency or in a crisis, we would, none the less strenuously, oppose any system of general compulsion in time of peace. I feel that I must crave the indulgence of the House for speaking to-day because I must confess that I am in a condition of unpreparedness, comparable with our lack of military equipment in 1914 and comparable moreover with that lack of equipment, naval, military and aerial, which is to-day apprehended by so many hon. Members. Reference has been made by the hon. Member for Dunfermline to 1914. My own reading of the international situation is that relationships to-day are as bad as, if not worse than, they were in the same month that year in which the War started. There is only one new element of consolation present in Europe to-day and that is the emergence of the new principle of collective security.

So much has been said by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen of great and shining distinction, who are able to speak with special knowledge on the matter, that I hesitate to go further into this Debate. I was unable to be present during its Opening Stages but I assure my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) that the earlier public and private conversations which he and I exchanged, long ago convinced me of the essential value of this reform, whatever may be the international conditions prevailing at any specific moment, be they good or be they bad. He and I had the honour of serving in 1932 upon an unofficial economy committee arranged by our own party and in the hot and grilling summer of that year we tried to devise means of recommending to the Government a cutting down of national expenditure. He convinced me then that many millions might be saved by co-ordinating the three defence Services under one central Ministry. If the hon. Member for Springburn (Mr. Hardie) were present I would remind him that we are now in 1936 and not in 1932. He said that Great Britain should be strong for peace. The arguments which he used were used by some of us four years ago when there was a chance of attaining general appeasement throughout Europe by proposing the widest possible measures for general disarmament.

Do let us face the facts as they are in Europe to-day. International relations are steadily and rapidly deteriorating, and the only way for Great Britain to be strong for peace is for her to be sufficiently powerful to deter. Let us face this further fact that the long-range danger to European peace and civilisation comes not from Signor Mussolini but from the men who are at present misruling Germany. We have to look ahead, and in this Debate we have to answer the following question: Will a Ministry of Defence strengthen our contribution to collective security? For from Great Britain must come a contribution to that new system proportionate not only to the risk which she runs, but also to the position which she occupies. I would say to my hon. Friend the Member for Springburn (Mr. Hardie) and such members of the Labour party as are still within the Chamber, that the crisis with Germany, or with any future major aggressor upon the Continent of Europe, may come at some considerable interval of time from the present. It is not inconceivable that the decision to resist any such aggression and the ability, in the happier alternative, to be able to deter that aggression might have to be made by and might be vested in a Government drawn from the Left of opinion. It is not by any means inconceivable that an international crisis caused by this new terror that has emerged in central Europe, might befall Europe at a time when this country is blessed or cursed by a Labour Government. What then would my hon. Friend the Member for Springburn and his colleagues say, if, at this moment, when it is by no means too late, we had failed to make ourselves as efficient as possible and as fully competent as possible to render our contributions to collective security?

I believe in the co-ordination of the Services, if possible in the form advocated by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter), and if that is not possible, in the lesser, but no less progressive form indicated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain). To-day the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham tried to prove, very courageously, if I may say so with respect, that there was some meaning in the Prime Minister's phrase about his "sealed lips." I congratulate him on discovering some meaning in that phrase, for hitherto I had been quite unable to discern any meaning in it. It may be that the Prime Minister was referring at that time to the condition of our defences. But when we were expecting some explanation on 19th December, the lips were opened and nothing proceeded from them.

Nevertheless, neither a Minister of Defence nor increased national armaments will be a long-term solution of this problem. I believe that such a solution can be found only in the pooling of air forces under some international authority. In the meantime, looking at the matter in terms of short-range politics, I think that in the name of freedom Great Britain has to make her full contribution to collective security. Let that contribution be efficient, and let all arms be co-ordinated under some Ministerial authority, for a strong Britain has today come to be one of the chief bulwarks in the world against tyranny. We must discard by some means, either in the full or the less full form, the clumsiness which seems inseparable from three distinct Defence Ministries. Let Britain's strength be efficient, balanced, and capable of full economy of energy.

3.58 p.m.

The Debate which has taken place has been a very interesting one, and I am grateful to the whole House for the way in which they have discussed my Bill. I have heard it said that it takes 40 years to get reforms in this country, but I submit that to-day we have started a reform. I do not wish to embarrass the Government, and I therefore propose, with your permission, Sir, to withdraw my Bill.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill, by leave, withdrawn.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

Whereupon Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 2.

Adjourned at Four o'Clock until Monday next, 17th February.