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Commons Chamber

Volume 320: debated on Wednesday 17 February 1937

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House Of Commons

Wednesday, 17th February, 1937.

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

Member Sworn

A Member took and subscribed the Oath.

Private Business

Newquay and District Water Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next.

Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Waltham Joint Hospital District) Bill,

Read a Second time, and committed.

Oral Answers To Questions

Germany

Colonies

1.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will inform the German Government that the restoration of the German colonies is not a discussible subject?

I have nothing to add to previous statements on this subject made on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

Am I to understand that we no longer adhere to the statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 2nd May, 1935, that this subject was not a discussible one?

The hon. Member had better read the statements that have been made.

Has the Noble Lord any guarantee that this subject will not be discussed with Germany without the concurrence and presence of the allied and associated Powers?

I think that hardly arises from the question. I cannot add anything to what I have said.

Naval Agreement (Negotiations)

3.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any negotiations for a new naval treaty are being conducted between Germany and His Majesty's Government; and, if so, whether he is in a position to make a statement?

Negotiations have for some time past been proceeding between His Majesty's Government and the German Government with a view to concluding a bilateral agreement dealing with qualitative limitation on the basis of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. Satisfactory progress has been made, and it is hoped that agreement may shortly be reached on all outstanding points. The conclusion of an agreement with the German Government depends on the conclusion of a similar agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, with whom parallel conversations are now proceeding.

May I take it that the German Government are not raising any difficulty by reason of the fact that His Majesty's Government are in negotiation with the Russian Government?

I said that satisfactory progress has been made and it is hoped that agreement will shortly be reached on all outstanding points. The conclusion of an agreement with the German Government depends upon the conclusion of a similar agreement with the Soviet Government, with whom parallel conversations are now proceeding.

I asked whether the German Government are not raising any objections by reason of the fact that the British Government are negotiating with the Russian Government?

Are the Government prepared to extend this bilateral system of agreements to other countries?

Locarno Treeaty

5.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Dominions are parties to the arrangement, arising out of the infraction of the Locarno treaties by Germany on 6th March last, for assistance to France and Belgium in the event of unprovoked aggression; and whether they have been consulted on the subject?

I think the hon. Member may be under some misapprehension. I would recall that, in conformity with Section III of the Text of the Proposals of 19th March, 1936, the position of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in this respect is still governed by the Treaty of Locarno, to which the Dominions are not parties. His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have been kept informed of every phase of the negotiations arising out of the events of 7th March last.

My question is, have the Dominions associated themselves in any way with the joint action which the British Government are taking with France and Belgium in this matter?

My point is that at the present time we are still governed by the Treaty of Locarno, to which they are not parties, but they have been kept informed.

While that is perfectly true, is it not possible for the Dominions, if they so wish, to associate themselves with this action, and have they, in fact, done so?

League Of Nations (Reform)

2.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the views of His Majesty's Government on the reform of the League of Nations have yet been conveyed to the German Government?

The views of His Majesty's Government on this subject have been publicly stated on various occasions, notably at the Assembly of the League on 25th September and in the House of Commons on 5th November.

In view of that answer, is it the opinion of the Government that it is not impossible for the German Government to answer the British questionnaire?

It is certainly the desire of the British Government that any steps should be taken that might lead to the resumption of negotiations.

In view of the statement made by Herr Hitler on 3oth January that the British Government would be satisfied with the reasons why they have not answered the questionnaire, and as those reasons do not operate now in view of the answer of the Noble Lord, will he convey a copy of his answer to Herr Hitler?

Spain

4.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can now give the House any information regarding the participation of Italian warships and soldiers in the rebel operations against Malaga; and whether the Foreign Office has been in consultation with the Admiralty regarding the new naval situation which has been created in the Western Mediterranean?

As regards the alleged participation of Italian warships in the attack on Malaga, I can add nothing to the reply which I gave to a question asked by the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) on Monday last. With regard to Italian soldiers, my information is that a force of about 6,000 men entered Malaga on 8th February, including about 3,000 Italians. With regard to the last part of the question, the Foreign Office are continuously in contact with the Admiralty with regard to the situation arising out of the Spanish civil war.

In reply to the Noble Lord's answer to the first part of my question, may I ask how long it takes the Foreign Office in these days to acquire information in regard to important matters of this kind? Is it not a long while since the incident took place?

As I have already explained, it is not what the House is entitled to, but what information is available. His Majesty's Government's representatives send such information as is available, and I have no reason to think that that has not been done.

Is it not a very long time that has elapsed between the incident complained of and the Foreign Office knowing anything about it? Is it not a serious reflection upon the competence of the Foreign Office?

Are the Foreign Office in possession of any unofficial information in regard to the movement of Italian warships?

Is it in order for an hon. Member to make a statement that war vessels of a certain country took part in certain operations, without first having ascertained that in fact they did so?

The hon. Member, I take it, makes himself responsible for the information in the question.

15.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has any statement to make with regard to the bombing from the air of two of His Majesty's destroyers in the Mediterranean on 15th February?

17.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether a report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet as to the bombing of two British destroyers by a large aircraft, apparently a Junker machine; and, if so, whether he is taking any steps in the matter?

I have received a report from the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, to the effect that on 13th February last, His Majesty's Destroyers "Havock" and "Gipsy" when in the vicinity of Cape Tenez, Algeria, were bombed by an aircraft presumed to be in the service of the Spanish Insurgent authorities. It was stated that the aircraft appeared to be of a four-engine Junker type, and that four large and two small bombs were dropped without effect. In accordance with the instructions which have been issued to His Majesty's Ships to defend themselves against attacks such as this, fire was opened on the aircraft. Steps have been taken to lodge a suitable protest with the insurgent authorities.

Does the First Lord consider that this was an accident or was it that as this was a new type of destroyer it was done deliberately to find out what kind of anti-aircraft gun she was fitted with?

I have no reason to suppose that that was the case. I imagine that it was one of several incidents which have occurred during the Spanish civil war in which gross errors have been made.

Is not this evidence of the reckless irresponsibility of units of the German air force who are serving with the insurgent forces, and does it not justify the charge that they have been engaged in bombing defenceless refugees fleeing from Malaga?

Are our destroyers armed with the latest anti-aircraft guns? If so, why did they miss?

22 and 25.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1) how many public demonstrations have been organised in Malta in support of the insurgents in Spain; and who was responsible for organising them;

(2) whether he is aware that Monsignor Pantalleresco, the Dean of Malta, who is the nominee of His Majesty's Government, is acting in a way contrary to the expressed policy of the Government in relation to the situation in Spain; that at a large demonstration which was organised ostensibly for religious purposes he submitted a telegram of good wishes to General Franco and subsequently sent it to General Franco; and what action was taken, if any, to warn Monsignor Pantalleresco against interfering in this civil war?

I have made inquiries of the Governor, who informs me that no public demonstration has been organised in Malta in support of the Spanish insurgents. I understand, however, that at the Roman Catholic festival of Christ the King on 25th October of last year Monsignor Pantalleresco, Dean of the Cathedral, read out a telegram which he sent, in the name of the congregation, to General Franco in the following terms: — "Catholic Malta gathered in its thousands feast Christ King in communion of spirit pray final victory of arms of Catholic Spain"

Does not the right hon. Gentleman regard that interference in a civil war on the part of His Majesty's Government's nominee as being directly contrary to the expressed and spoken and written policy of His Majesty's Government, and does he not feel that the Government are entitled to intimate to their nominee that this ought not to be repeated?

We cannot regard this Monsignor, acting in connection with a festival of the Church, as His Majesty's Government's nominee. I know that Catholic people all over the Empire are as entitled to their views as the hon. Member is to his views.

Has not the hon. Member's party sent money to the Government of Spain?

Does not the right hon. Gentleman regard this action on the part of the Dean of Malta as being as much anti-British as it is pro-Franco?

No, unless I concede that every Catholic who openly in this country expresses a preference for one side or the other is anti-British, and that I decline to believe. After all, many people take the other view, and are allowed to express their opinion. The Government's position is non-intervention, but hon. Members opposite seem to be very much on the opposite side.

May I point out, first of all, that there is no implication of anything either anti-or pro-British in the question? I am asking the right hon. Gentleman whether he thinks it is consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government for one of their nominees to organise a huge religious demonstration and to take advantage of that opportunity to send telegrams to Franco, and whether ii is not the case that there is less religious tolerance in Malta now than there was before?

Royal Navy

Royal Naval Reserve (Transfers)

7.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many officers between the ages of 21 and 30 it is proposed to transfer from the Royal Naval Reserve to the Royal Navy; and whether, before arranging for this transfer, due consideration has been given to the possibility of re-absorbing into the Royal Navy young officers who have voluntarily retired during recent years owing to the poor prospects of promotion and who are still under the age of 35?

The total number of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who will be transferred to the supplementary list of the Royal Navy will depend on the requirements of His Majesty's Fleet and the number of volunteers. About 50 will, it is hoped, be entered by the beginning of April. As regards the second part of the question, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Wight (Captain P. Macdonald) on 29th July last.

Is the First Lord giving any consideration to the making of more promotions from the lower deck?

Will the right hon. Gentleman undertake to make a statement of some detail on that matter?

Yes, Sir. I will certainly deal with it, but the right hon. Gentleman will see that there are other questions on the Order Paper to-day.

12 and 13.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty (1) the number of commissions as lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, Royal Navy, respectively, to be given to Royal Naval Reserve officers; and the numbers of commissions of paymaster-lieutenants to be given to Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers;

(2) whether he will state the reasons for appealing to reserve accountant officers to transfer to the Royal Navy for the first time in the modern Navy instead of instituting a scheme of promotion to commissioned rank for accountant branch ratings, similar to the promotion schemes open to the seaman branch, engine-room artificers, and Royal Marines, observing that among accountant ratings are some of the most highly educated ratings in the Navy, qualified by several years of naval training and experience to become an efficient type of officer?

The first part of Question No. 12 is answered in the reply I have already given to the hon. Member for East Dorset (Mr. Hall-Caine). Owing to the present rapid expansion of the Fleet, the shortage of officers of the Accountant Branch has become acute, and there is an urgent need for officers fit in all respects to perform the duties of their rank immediately on entry. The duties and responsibilities of such officers are very varied, and it would take a rating promoted from the lower deck at least 2½ years to acquire a knowledge of them. For this reason, after the most careful consideration, the Admiralty has reluctantly concluded that it would not be possible to meet the shortage by a scheme of promotion from the lower deck.

As far as possible, the shortage has been met by the transference of certain duties to warrant officers, the number of whom has therefore been substantially increased. There remains, however, an immediate requirement of about 30 commissioned officers, and it is proposed to obtain them by transfer from the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. In the autumn of 1935, during the period of hostilities between Italy and Abyssinia, it was found necessary to call for volunteer accountant officers from the Reserves for service with the Fleet. During their time with the Fleet they became thoroughly conversant with the duties of commissioned officers of the Accountant Branch. It was the expectation that these officers could be obtained at once to supply an urgent need that led the Admiralty to adopt the new scheme. That this expectation was fully justified is borne out by the fact that all the officers who have so far been considered for transfer to the Royal Navy served with the Fleet during the period to which I have referred, and are in all respects fully qualified to enter at once upon the duties they will have to perform.

Are there not a number of men in the first-class lower ratings who are quite capable of training for promotion? Why is not consideration given to them?

I have given my personal consideration to this question, and in this particular case we were dealing with an emergency and had to fill up vacancies at once. There were no men immediately qualified for these places. That was our difficulty.

Marriage Allowance (Officers)

8.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware of the recent decision to grant marriage allowance to the officers of the Royal Indian Navy at the rates of about £112 10s. per annum for a lieutenant of 30 years of age, £135 for a lieutenant-commander or commander, and £180 for a captain; and whether, in view of the improved financial position of the country and the increasing expenses of young married naval officers, particularly at Malta, he will provide moneys in the Estimates for marriage allowances for naval officers and so redress a long-standing grievance?

The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, I am afraid that I am unable to add anything to the reply given to the hon. and gallant Member on 27th January.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the cost of living at the home ports and at Gibraltar, Malta and other ports have all gone up, and that the cost of domestic services, education, etc., has gone up—that everything has gone up?

Yes, Sir. I am aware of those facts, but I fear that I can add nothing to the answer that I have already given to my hon. and gallant Friend.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman consider that naval officers' babies are just as important as bombs and torpedoes?

Fuel

9.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty the number of tons of coal and the quantity of fuel oil, respectively, used by the Royal Navy for the years 1920, 1930, and 1936, respectively?

The Royal Navy, including shore services, used 1,033,000 tons of coal in the financial year 1920; 448,000 tons in 1930, and 434,000 tons in 1936. As regards oil fuel, I would refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Clay Cross (Mr. Ridley) on l0th February.

Torpedo Factory, Greenock

10.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the fact that in December, 1936, 196 men employed in the Royal Naval Torpedo Factory, Greenock, had to travel 10 or more miles to their work, and that many more whose homes were beyond that distance from Greenock lived in lodgings in Greenock during the week and went home for the week-ends, he will take steps to secure the erection, near the torpedo factory, of suitable dwelling houses for these men and their families or, in any event, for a substantial portion of them?

I regret that the Admiralty is unable to take such steps as the hon. Member suggests. The matter appears in the first instance to be one for the local authorities or for private enterprise.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that considerable work of this sort was done by the second Labour administration and that at the present time there is an acute shortage of houses in this area?

As this has been a longstanding problem, will the Admiralty recommend to the local authorities who are responsible the erection of suitable dwellings more conveniently situated to their work?

I agree with the hon. Member that the primary responsibility is that of the local authorities.

Does not this question indicate the desirability of bringing production to those areas where population and housing already exist?

Cruisers

11.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, to allay public anxiety, he will make a statement on the respective strengths of the British fleet and foreign fleets in the 8-inch-gun cruiser class, showing in particular whether the British ships of this class are efficient ships in respect of gun-fire, armour and speed?

The numbers of 8-inch cruisers at present completed or building by the British Commonwealth of Nations and foreign Powers are as follow:

British Commonwealth15
United States of America18
Japan12
France and Italy7 each
Germany3

For details concerning the size and armament of these vessels I would refer the right hon. Gentleman to the Command Paper "Fleets," the 1937 edition of which will shortly be published. I am glad, however, to take this opportunity of saying that there is no warrant for assertions which have recently appeared in the Press that our ships in this category are outclassed.

Promotions (Lower Deck)

14.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has been able to ascertain the number of ratings qualified professionally for sub-lieutenant; and, as 78 have passed the educational examination, whether he will inform all ships and establishments that the Admiralty desire a larger number of suitable candidates to come forward so as to increase the number of direct promotions to commissioned rank from the lower deck in order that larger numbers may be sent before the annual fleet selection boards to be held in the near future, because there is a general impression throughout the service that only a few lower-deck candidates are desired?

The Admiralty has already sent a communication to all commands and establishments calling attention to the importance attached by the Admiralty to the success of the scheme for promotion to commissioned rank from the lower deck and is taking steps to investigate the reasons for the small numbers of ratings promoted. The information asked for in the first part of the question could only be obtained by inquiries of all ships and establishments in the Fleet. It would be of doubtful value, since the various professional qualifications which are required before a rating can be recommended to the Selection Board may be held by persons who are not suited, or are not candidates, for promotion.

Air Training (Sub-Lieutenants)

16.

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty in how many cases sub-lieutenants who have not obtained their watch-keeping certificates have been detailed for training in the Fleet Air Arm?

Up to the present 12 sublieutenants have commenced training as Fleet Air Arm pilots before obtaining their watch-keeping certificates.

Can my right hon. Friend say how these sub-lieutenants will obtain their watch-keeping certificates without which they cannot be promoted to lieutenants and may therefore lose their seniority in their naval rank?

They will be promoted to the acting rank of lieutenant when they have become qualified by service and confirmed on obtaining their watch-keeping certificates, after completing their initial flying training. They will obtain these certificates while serving afloat in Fleet Air Arm appointments.

Gold Coast

18.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that the Gold Coast Government contemplates the passing of an Ordinance whereby the Paramount Chiefs will be given power to secure the removal from their districts of any non-native African to whom they may personally object; and whether, as this course is likely to undermine native confidence in British administration, he will have the Ordinance withheld?

I have ascertained from the Governor that no such Ordinance is contemplated.

While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for his reply, may I take it that no Ordinance is contemplated which will give greater powers to Paramount Chiefs?

The hon. Member knows that we are endeavouring to develop native local government and indirect rule, and we are increasing the power of local native authorities, not of any Paramount Chief individually. They are part of the local native authority.

Kenya (Betterment Fund)

19.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, seeing that the late Secretary of State undertook to consider the establishment of a Betterment Fund for Kenya Colony, as recorded by Lord Moyne when Sir Alan Pim's report became available, it is now proposed to carry out the promise then given?

One of Sir Alan Pim's recommendations is that an improved system of native taxation should be devised and until that recommendation has been considered it seems that no useful purpose would be served by setting up a fund at the present time, especially as the Colony's estimated expenditure on the four main native services for 1937 is approximately £16,000 in excess of the provision which, under Lord Moyne's proposals, would have been available for the fund in respect of the same year.

East African Territories (Taxation)

20.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the recent reports dealing (inter alia) with the question of native taxation in the East and Central African Dependencies, he can obtain information on the methods and incidence of such taxation in, other territories, including the Union of South Africa?

As I informed the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benson) on 1st February, the various systems of native taxation are now under consideration by the East African Governments. Information regarding systems of taxation obtaining in other territories in Africa is, of course, fully available to them.

Palestine

Tariffs

21.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what is the present position with regard to the possibility of the imposition of tariffs against Japanese and German goods entering Palestine, in view of the fact that these two countries are no longer Members of the League of Nations; and what attitude the Mandates Commission took in the matter at their recent meeting?

Tariff discrimination in Palestine against Japanese and German goods is not possible as long as Palestine remains a party to the commercial treaties with Japan and Germany. As regards the possibility of discriminatory action in the event of the application of those Treaties to Palestine being terminated, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to the hon. Member for Heywood and Radcliffe (Mr. Porritt) on 16th November last, to which I have nothing to add. As regards the second part of the question, the Permanent Mandates Commission did not, so far as I am aware, deal with this particular matter at their recent meeting.

Are the Treaties in question Treaties between this country and Japan and Germany, or Treaties between Palestine and those countries?

They are Treaties with this country, together with the Colonial Empire, including Mandated Territories.

Will the right hon. Gentleman explain how it is that a Treaty which we entered into can be regarded as applicable to a country which, for Customs purposes, is treated as a foreign country, namely, Palestine?

A great many of these commercial treaties between the United Kingdom and foreign countries apply not only to the United Kingdom, but to the non-self-governing part of the Empire.

Revenue

23.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what was the estimate of revenue of the Palestine Administration last year; the amount of surplus over the estimate; and how it is proposed to use the surplus?

The Palestine financial year runs from 1st April to 31st March. The estimated revenue for the nine months' period 1st April to 31st December, 1936, was £4,547,915. The approximate statement of actual revenue for the same period is £3,212,176, being £1,335,739 below the estimate. No later figures are yet available. The nominal accumulated surplus balance of Palestine at 31st December last was £6,372,658. The question of its use will be considered, in conjunction with the estimates for the year 1937–38, when the general financial position of Palestine can be comprehensively reviewed, but in view of the heavy increase in expenditure on defence and security in Palestine it will be difficult to make any precise determinations.

Tel-Aviv (Municipal Boundaries)

26.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware of the decision to extend the municipal boundaries of Tel-Aviv and that Arab villages formerly under the Ramleh rural administration have been brought, contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants, under the jurisdiction of Tel-Aviv; what is the total acreage of the transferred area; and whether the inhabitants of transferred districts will be subject to a higher rate of local taxation in consequence of the transfer?

I have no information regarding the matters referred to in the hon. Member's question, and I am asking the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine for a report.

Is it not a fact that Tel-Aviv is the most up-to-date and best-managed part of Palestine from the point of view of health and administration, and if the whole country were on an equal footing, would it not be a far better country?

I understand that the municipality of Tel-Aviv is very well managed.

Is the fact that it is the most up-to-date part any excuse for an attempt to swallow up the independence of other people?

Is the light hon. Gentleman aware that there are also many Jewish houses on the border of Tel-Aviv which have been amalgamated with Jaffa, in spite of the fact that their water, gas and electric light supplies come from Tel-Aviv?

British Forces (Strength)

27.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what is the aggregate strength of the British Forces now stationed in Palestine; how long this force will be detained in Palestine; and what was the strength of the British garrison before the outbreak of the present disturbances?

The British Forces now stationed in Palestine consist of: Eight Infantry battalions, of which one is returning to this country next month in the ordinary course of relief; one field company, Royal Engineers, and ancillary services; together with one flight Royal Air Force and three sections of an armoured car company. I am unable to say for how long these forces will remain in Palestine. The normal garrison stationed in Palestine consists of two infantry battalions, one flight Royal Air Force, and three sections of an armoured car company.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, when it is decided to give the Arabs the right to their own country, these forces will be withdrawn?

I cannot accept that statement, and quite obviously I am not in a position to say anything about the future of Palestine until I receive the report of the Royal Commission.

As long as these forces remain, will they be allowed in all circumstances to maintain order?

Coloured Persons (Inter-Departmental Conference)

24.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when he expects to receive the report of the Inter-Departmental Committee, appointed last November, upon the steps to be taken to mitigate the hardships from which coloured persons are suffering in certain parts of this country?

The subject was considered at an Inter-Departmental Conference held in December last, and as a result it was decided that special inquiries should be made and further information collected from the various departmental authorities who are in local touch with different sides of this problem. These inquiries are now proceeding, so I regret that I am not yet in a position to make any further statement.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Home Office seem to be totally unaware of the existence of these persons, and having been in touch with them, may I ask whether the Board of Trade is being consulted in this direction?

I understand that the India Office, the Board of Trade, the Home Office, my office, and, I think, two other offices attended the Inter-Departmental Conference, and we are all making inquiries into what is a very complex problem.

Trade And Commerce

Colonies (Indian Cotton Imports)

28.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether there has been an increase or decrease in the import of Indian cotton goods to the Crown Colonies during the past year; and whether he can give the figures?

I regret that the figures for the past year of imports of Indian cotton piece goods into the Colonial Empire are not yet available. The figures for exports of such goods from India to the Colonial Empire, which may be regarded as approximating to the import figures, were approximately:—

  • 45 million yards in 1931–32,
  • 32½ millions in 1932–33,
  • 26 millions in 1933–34,
  • 33½ millions in 1934–35, and
  • 45¾ millions in 1935–36.

Are we to understand from that reply that the Indian mills can compete with Lancashire goods on equal terms, and if so, why do they require a 20 per cent. duty as protection in India?

That question should be addressed to the India Office and not to me. I was asked to state certain facts which show that the export of Indian cotton goods to the Colonial Empire is now back, almost exactly, to the figure of 1931–1932.

31.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the quantities of tea imported from Japan and Formosa, respectively, in the years 1934, 1935 and 1936; and what steps are being taken to counteract the growing competition with the tea product of British Colonies?

Particulars of imports from Formosa are not separately recorded in the United Kingdom trade returns, but the total imports of tea consigned from Japan (including Formosa) were 3,700,000 lbs. in 1934, 3,800,000 lbs. in 1935 and 6,100,000 lbs. in 1936. These imports are, however, still very small compared with imports from British Colonies which amounted to 159,000,000 lbs in 1936. The Colonial percentage of total imports into the United Kingdom actually increased in 1936 and there appears to be no reason to take any special steps to give further assistance to imports from the Colonies which are already encouraged by a preference of 2d. per lb.

Is it not a fact that although the aggregate may be regarded as small for the time being, the figures show a rapid increase and is that being kept under review?

The figure has admittedly gone up to 6,000,000 lbs. in one year, but that is the only year which shows any appreciable increase and, of course, the figures are very small compared with the figures of Colonial tea. I gather that the general opinion of Colonial producers is that they can produce better and more tea.

Cuba (Jamaican Labourers)

29.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that concentration camps are being built in Cuba to hold 40,000 Jamaican labourers awaiting deportation under new labour laws which prohibit them from working any longer in the sugar plantations in Cuba; what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the proposed repatriation of these labourers; and, if it takes place, what preparations will be made in Jamaica to give these labourers shelter and subsistence and to provide employment for them?

My attention has been drawn to a recent statement in the Press regarding the construction of these camps, but there is at present no official confirmation of the report. While His Majesty's Government have been seriously concerned over the attitude of the Cuban Government towards immigrant labour from British Colonies in the Caribbean area there is no confirmation of the report that repatriations of British West Indian labour on a large scale are contemplated. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is making inquiries on the subject from His Majesty's Minister at Havana.

Should questions upon this case be directed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs?

Cuba is a foreign country and we have a Minister there, and anything concerning actions of the Cuban Government is obviously a matter for the Foreign Office.

Would the right hon. Gentleman not point out to the Cuban Government that they are not giving these black men a square deal?

Zambesi Bridge

30.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the amount for which Imperial funds are responsible for the negotiation and arrangement of the construction of the bridge over the River Zambesi; and what contribution is being made by the Portuguese Government to the same?

The construction of the Zambesi Bridge has been financed solely from loans raised by the Government of Nyasaland, which are guaranteed by the Imperial Government under the authority of the East Africa and Palestine Guaranteed Loans Act, 1926.

I am not sure whether the hon. Member is referring to the amount of the whole loan or only the amount in respect of the Zambesi Bridge. I think the Zambesi Bridge cost approximately £2,000,000.

Aviation

Aerodromes (Acquisition Of Land)

32.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air what is the area of land of Parlaunt farm, Langley, for which the Slough Council was willing to pay £63,000 for the purposes of an airport but as to which the Ministry told the council they must not pay more than £50,000; whether the land is wholly agricultural and therefore derated; and what is the value at which it has been assessed for purposes of Income Tax?

I have been asked to reply. The area which the Slough Urban District Council propose to acquire as an aerodrome is about 190 acres in extent. The council have made a compulsory purchase order for the acquisition but objections have been raised and the acquisition is to be the subject of a public inquiry before confirmation of the order is considered. I have no information which would enable me to reply to the other points which are raised in the hon. Member's question.

33.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether, as proposed by the Nottingham Corporation, a compulsory purchase order for the acquisition of 165,967 acres of land in the parish of Tollerton for the purpose of an aerodrome has been made, the land belonging to Earl Manvers; what price the owner is asking or what has been agreed; if the purchase has been effected; and what is, the present value at which the land is assessed for purposes of Income Tax?

I understand that the Nottingham Corporation, in the exercise of powers made available to local authorities by Section 9 of the Air Navigation Act, 1936, have made a compulsory purchase order for the acquisition of some 166 acres of land for the purpose of extending the aerodrome at Tollerton, and that part of this land is the property of Earl Manvers. I regret that I have no information as regards either the price negotiations that have taken place or the value of the land for Income Tax purposes. As regards completion of purchase, Section 9 of the Air Navigation Act provides that the compulsory purchase order must first be confirmed by my Noble Friend as provided for in the First Schedule to the Act, and it is now being considered in that connection.

With regard to these 166 acres, will the hon. Gentleman ascertain the price and make it known as soon as possible?

When these extensive purchases of land are made, does any Government Department take any steps to check the price by the annual value for Income Tax purposes?

I would point out that this is not a question of 165,000 acres; it is a question of 166 acres.

34.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air what progress has been made with regard to the proposals lately before the Darlington Corporation to spend £30,000 on the purchase of 350 acres for the purpose of an air-port on the south side of Yarm Road and east of Lingfield Lane; whether powers of compulsory purchase have been obtained; whether the matter has been taken to arbitration and, if so, what was the arbiter's award; what has been the assessment of this land for purposes of Income Tax; and what, in addition to the purchase price, is likely to be the expenditure on draining, clearing of hedges and trees, levelling, and other expenditure for making the land suitable as an air-port?

The Darlington Corporation, in the exercise of powers made available to local authorities by Section 9 of the Air Navigation Act, 1936, have made a compulsory purchase order for the acquisition of 370 acres of land for an aerodrome in the vicinity mentioned. The order has recently been submitted to the Secretary of State for Air for confirmation in accordance with the requirements of the Act, and is now under consideration. As regards the other information asked for by the hon. Member, it is regretted that no information is available in the Air Ministry.

Are any steps taken by any Government Department to check these enormous prices by the annual value for Income Tax purposes?

Yes, Sir, the Ministry of Health under the Act, appoint a valuer to inquire into he financial considerations of these purchases, and if they are not satisfied they make representations accordingly.

Will the latter part of my question be gone into and a reply given as to the expenditure likely to be entailed for drainage and other purposes?

That, again, is a question which ought to be addressed to the Ministry of Health.

Scotland (Aircraft Industry)

35.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether there are any factories for producing aeroplanes or aeroplane parts in Scotland; and whether the Air Ministry proposes to take any steps to encourage the development of such factories in the West of Scotland?

As regards the first part of the question, a factory for the manufacture of aeroplanes and aeroplane parts is in course of erection at Dumbarton. As regards the second part, information respecting the suitability of certain districts for aircraft manufacture has been given to manufacturers by the Air Ministry, but if my hon. and gallant Friend has any particular place in mind I would undertake to see that the attention of the aircraft industry was drawn to it.

In view of that kind offer, may I ask the hon. Gentleman to point out to his right hon. Friend that Ayrshire is particularly suitable both strategically and for other reasons?

Scampton And Hemswall Aerodromes

36.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether he has considered the representations made by the Transport and General Workers' Union in December last, that the contractors responsible for the construction of the Scampton and Hemswall aerodromes were not observing in all respects the fair wages clause; whether investigations have yet been made, and when he hopes finally to deal with the matter; and whether, in the event of the complaint being found to be substantiated, he will take steps to cause the contractors to pay proper overtime rates from 20th August last, when their attention was called to the matter by the union, to all the persons who have been in their employ since that date?

The representations referred to are under consideration, and the necessary investigations are being carried out as expeditiously as possible. If the complaint is substantiated, the question of retrospective adjustment will, as is customary in such cases, receive due consideration.

While thanking the hon. Gentleman for the final paragraph of his reply, may I ask whether he appreciates the fact that six weeks ago the Department informed the union concerned that the matter was under active investigation?

I am aware that there has been some delay, but that has not been the fault of the Air Ministry.

French Air Service

37.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether he has any information about the new French air service between Bayonne and Bilbao, and/or Santander?

I am informed that a decree was recently published by which the French Government authorised the Société Air Pyrénées to operate, until 31st December, 1937, a regular commercial air service between Toulouse, Bayonne and Bilbao on the understanding that it rests with the company to obtain the necessary authorisations in respect of the section in Spanish territory. I have no information of a more detailed nature.

Imperial Airways, Limited (Subsidies)

39.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air the total amount paid in subsidies to date to Imperial Airways, Limited, giving the amounts paid by the Dominions and Colonial Governments, separately?

The total amount paid in subsidies to Imperial Airways, Limited, from 1923 to date was £4,528,920, of which £674,380 was contributed by Dominion and Colonial Governments and the Sudan.

Internal Air Lines

38.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether he will indicate which, if any, of the internal air lines shown in the Appendix to the Maybury report have now ceased to operate?

As a detailed statement is involved, I am circulating the reply in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Can my hon. Friend ascertain from the right hon. Gentleman whether some steps will be taken to prevent this falling off in internal air traffic to the prejudice of the air ports concerned, and whether some subvention could be made to make internal air lines capable of carrying on economically?

Following is the answer:

Internal air lines shown in Appendix 1 (1936) of Maybury Report and not operating in February, 1937.

1. Summer Services suspended for winter months.

Railway Air Services, Limited.

Birmingham—Bristol—Southampton—Brighton.

Bristol—Cardiff—Weston—Plymouth.

Portsmouth, Southsea and I. of W. Aviation, Limited.

Portsmouth—Ryde—Bournemouth.

Channel Air Ferries, Limited.

Brighton—Ryde.

Norman, Edgar, Western Airways, Limited.

Cardiff—Bristol—Bournemouth.

Guernsey Airways, Limited.

Southampton—Alderney—Guernsey.

Aberdeen Airways, Limited.

Edinburgh—Aberdeen.

Blackpool and West Coast Air Services, Limited.

Leeds—Blackpool.

Manchester—Liverpool.

2. Ceased operation.

Crilly Airways, Limited.

Bristol—London—Norwich.

Bristol—Leicester—Norwich.

Liverpool—Leicester.

Factories And Aerodromes (Concealment)

40.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether he can assure the House that adequate precautions are being taken to conceal the new aircraft factories and aerodromes from aerial observation; and whether adequate provision is being made for underground hangars, etc.?

I am advised that the matters referred to are being accorded all due attention.

May I understand that some of the new hangars at any rate are underground, or are there any of them underground?

As the object of any measure would be concealment, I do not think that object would be attained by my answering that question.

Aircraft (Fire Prevention)

41.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether the Air Ministry has tested any new apparatus for the prevention of fire in aircraft, and with what result?

Yes, Sir. Approval has recently been given for the adoption, in so far as installation in particular types of aircraft is practicable, of the Graviner Extinguisher which operates automatically in the event of the aircraft crashing and will tend to prevent the ignition of escaping fuel. In addition, tests are proceeding and should shortly be completed with the Henderson Safety Fuel Tank.

Is the possibility being considered of requiring the compulsory fitting of this apparatus to passenger-carrying aircraft?

Defence

Countering Air Attacks (Committee)

42.

asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air the personnel of the committee appointed on 27th February, 1935, to investigate the possibilities of countering air attacks; how many meetings of the full committee have been held; and whether any report as to its conclusions has been received?

The members of the committee are:

  • Mr. Henry Tizard (Chairman),
  • Professor E. V. Appleton,
  • Professor P. M. S. Blackett,
  • Professor A. V. Hill, and
  • Mr. H. E. Wimperis.
Lord Rutherford is assisting the committee in a consultative capacity. The committee is continuously at work, collectively and individually, and it reports regularly to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Food Supply

46.

asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been directed to the speech made by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence at Fareham on 13th February, in which he dealt with the need for increasing home agricultural production; and whether that speech may be regarded as an expression of Government policy?

I have seen a report of my right hon. Friend's speech, in which he drew attention to the improvement which has taken place in the agricultural industry and—what would naturally be in his mind—the benefit of increased home production in the event of war. I do not regard my right hon. Friend's speech as expressing any new policy, but rather as emphasising facts which must commend themselves to all of us.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that we have it on high scientific authority that a large proportion of the land of this country is still not in full productive capacity, and does he not think that, in the interests of defence, at any rate in wartime, that matter should be dealt with?

Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that a large part of the difficulty that we had with our food supplies at home in the last War was due to the fact that our land was not in full productivity in 1914?

Fuel Oil

48.

asked the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence whether he has given consideration to the question of obtaining the maximum amount of oil from coal mined in Great Britain; and, if so, what steps are being taken to develop industry to secure the supply?

Yes, Sir. The question is continually under review by the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to which I referred in the reply I gave on 26th January to the question by the hon. Member for East Middlesbrough (Mr. A. Edwards). The different processes for obtaining oil from coal either as the main purpose or as a by-product are carefully observed with a view to obtaining all possible information as to results obtained.

Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that our defence and other requirements are likely to be met from natural resources in the future, and is he aware that his colleague, the President of the Board of Trade, declared that there is little hope of the Government proceeding on the lines of further development of the production of oil from coal?

No doubt all resources will have to be utilised to provide for any emergency.

But will the right hon. Gentleman say what resources other than natural resources the Government have in mind?

I do not know what the hon. Gentleman means by "natural resources." I was answering a question as to processes for obtaining petrol from coal, and if the hon. Member regards that as a natural resource we should no doubt use it.

Lesser Ports

49.

asked the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence whether, with a view to reducing the dangerous concentration of shipping at the larger ports of the country, he has given consideration to plans for the improvement and increased use of the lesser ports on the coasts of Great Britain?

Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that there are numerous small ports in Ayrshire?

Shadow Factories

50.

asked the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence whether he can now announce the terms upon which the groups constituting the shadow aircraft and engine manufacture schemes will operate?

As the answer is necessarily very long and contains a list of names and a number of figures, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Having regard to the fact that I previously asked the right hon. Gentleman to give the specific figures which are being paid under the heading of "Management," will he be good enough to abstract those figures and give them to the House?

The answer is a very long one, and I will send my hon. Friend a copy of it.

Following is the reply:

Arrangements have been made with the following firms for the manufacture of aircraft and aero-engines in shadow factories now being erected and equipped under their supervision:

  • Messrs. Austin Motor Company, Limited,
  • Bristol Aeroplane Company, Limited.
  • Daimler Company,
  • Rootes Securities Limited,
  • Rover Company, and
  • Standard Motor Company, Limited.

Of these firms Messrs. Austin Motor Company, Limited, and Rootes Securities Limited will undertake the manufacture under the shadow scheme of air frames as well as aero-engines.

During the first year the firms concerned will be paid management fees of £5,000 for the erection and equipment and planning for production of each of the air-frame factories and of £24,000 in the case of five of the firms, and £20,000 in the case of the sixth, which is only responsible for assembly, for the erection and equipment and planning for production of each of the aero-engine factories.

When production is started the firms will receive management fees calculated at the rate of £225 or £200 per air-frame according to type and £75 per engine. After the first year advances on an agreed scale will be made which will be set off against the management fees earned for the production of air-frames and engines.

Provision has also been made whereby a percentage of any savings in manufac- turing costs below a figure to be determined after a period of initial working should accrue to the firms concerned.

Provision has also been made for the supervision of expenditure both in the erection and equipment of the factories and in manufacture, for the termination of the work on due notice if necessary during the currency of the scheme and for the maintenance of the factories in good running order after the expiration of the production period on terms to be agreed. Certain supplemental provisions in regard to the future use or disposal of the factories and to a number of other matters of detail have also been made.

Agricultural Districts (Air Raids)

51.

asked the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence whether the defence of agricultural districts, such as Lincolnshire, against attacks by aeroplanes with incendiary and poisonous gas bombs is being taken into account; and whether the necessary action is being taken?

Schemes of air raid precautions are being prepared for agricultural districts as for other parts of the country, and special investigations are being made into the problems of contamination of crops and measures of decontamination and preservation in so far as they may be possible. As regards incendiary attack from the air, I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the reply given by the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department to my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys) on 9th February. The grant of assistance to local fire brigade authorities towards the provision of emergency appliances and personnel will be based upon the state of local emergency fire brigade schemes and their urgency.

Transport

Safety First Association (Grants)

43.

asked the Minister of Transport why the application of the National Safety First Association for a grant towards the cost of its activities was refused; and upon what ground he discriminated between the application and that made by Mr. Gordon Stewart?

There is no discrimination. A similar grant was made to the National Safety First Association for a specific purpose in 1934.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether applications have been made other than that referred to by the National Safety First Association, and whether he has considered any such applications from them?

I daresay there have been a good many, but there is no obligation on me to give Government money on application by private societies.

But is there not, if not an obligation, an inclination with regard to individuals, as was the case with Mr. Gordon Stewart?

No. This money was granted for a specific purpose, a salutary purpose, namely, the saving of child life, and the recipients in question undertook to produce five times the amount of money that the Government have offered to subscribe.

Omnibuses (Cheap Fares)

44.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he will ask the London Passenger Transport Board to afford facilities to prospective passengers to ascertain, before boarding an omnibus in London whether cheap fares are in operation, having regard to the fact that the notices with regard to cheap fares are inside the omnibuses?

The Board state that the structure and design of their omnibuses are unsuitable for the display of outside notices.

Can my right hon. Friend say why they have designed omnibuses so that the public cannot be given proper information as to the conditions under which they run?

The omnibuses were designed for what they would take inside, not outside.

Is not this information given in the case of trams, and could not the omnibuses adopt a similar device? There is absolutely no reason why they should not.

Is it not a fact that they prefer advertising Bovril to giving the public the necessary information?

Locomotives (Cinders)

55.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware of the risk of red hot cinders from locomotives causing damage to persons or property in towns and cities in the case of heavy main-line trains; and whether, to eliminate this risk, he will introduce legislation requiring main railway lines to be electrified at, and for, say, two miles from termini and intermediate stations, and the heavy trains with steam locomotives in front set in motion by separate electrical locomotives pushing the trains over the electrified portions, and thereafter the steam locomotive taking up the load without the aforesaid risk?

Motor Coach Tours

56.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware that by refusing to sanction the licensing of the type of motor coach tour known as a fantail tour, he is depriving persons who are unable to afford private motor cars of the advantages of a long-distance holiday; and will he state on what grounds he makes this discrimination between persons who travel by parties in motor coaches and those who proceed in private motor cars?

I do not accept these premises. The only decisions given by me are on appeals.

As the effect of the appeal is as stated in the question, does my right hon. Friend think that it is unreasonable to ask that he should give the House some reason for the decision?

No, Sir. The decision given by the Traffic Commissioners was a reasoned decision, and on reading it my hon. Friend may find that his impression, as conveyed in the question, is removed.

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether there has been any falling off in the advertised programmes of these tours, which are so helpful to the workers in industrial areas?

Is not the function of my right hon. Friend a judicial one in this matter, and is it proper to bring Parliamentary pressure to bear upon a Minister who has to exercise a judicial function?

Does not the Minister realise that these vehicles are engaged just as a motor car is engaged, and are the property of the hirers for that particular week and they ought to be able to use them wherever they are situated?

Motor Lorries (Statistics)

58.

asked the Minister of Transport how many motor lorries and other freight-carrying roadway vehicles of 3 tons, 5 tons, 10 tons, 20 tons, and over

Weight unladen.1932.1933.1934.1935.1936.
Exceeding 1 ton, not exceeding 2 tons21,65221,70823,49320,26021,268
Exceeding 2 tons, not exceeding 3 tons6,96611,70419,31920,84027,134
Exceeding 3 tons, not exceeding 5 tons1,8452,8643,8493,2663,060
Exceeding 5 tons, not exceeding 11 tons1,430961774682827
Exceeding 11 tons21

Record Sheets

59.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware that the examiners of the Traffic Commissioners are in the habit of taking away from firms original record sheets for the purpose of instituting proceedings in the court and so making it difficult for the owners to place original documents before their solicitors who may have to defend them; whether this action has his approval; and whether, in view of Section 16, Clause 4, of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, he will see that instructions are given to the police and the licensing authorities that original documents should not be taken away but, if necessary, that the officers should take copies for their requirements?

This is not a matter as to which I have any jurisdiction or power to issue instructions.

Does the right hon. Gentleman consider that it is a satisfactory procedure that officials should be able to go into offices and take away private papers, and if he has no power to stop such proceedings can he tell me who has?

A reference to the Act will show where the power lies. 20 tons capacity, respectively, were put into service during each of the last five years?

As the answer contains a number of figures I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the answer:

The information in my possession relates to the unladen weight of motor goods vehicles and not to their carrying capacity. The numbers of mechanically-propelled goods-carrying road vehicles exceeding 1 ton unladen weight registered for the first time under the Roads Act, 1920, during each of the last five years were as follow:

After a careful reading of the Act it appears that the power is with the Minister of Transport. Can he give us any information on the subject?

Tramcars (Bow Road)

60.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he in informed of the danger arising to the public resultant from the fact that tramcars going to London, Ilford, and Leytonstone stop 15 feet away from the refuge opposite Bow Road underground station, thus occasioning the necessity for people boarding or alighting from tramcars to cross the roadway where there is no pedestrian crossing, and to stand and wait where there is no safety refuge; and whether, in view of the large number of people using this spot, he will consult with his advisory committee and the local authorities to ensure the extension of the existing safety refuge or the stoppage of the tramcars at the existing one?

I am prepared to examine any proposal of the local authority for improving conditions at this point.

Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the local authority should be approached by him?

I thought the hon. Member was going to put before me some views which he held, and I was promising to consider them. If the local authority have views of that kind, I shall be most happy to consider them. The suggestions I make are not always acceptable to local authorities, although the motive with which I make them is just as good.

Railway Electrification (Compensation)

61.

asked the Minister of Transport whether householders adjacent to the proposed new electric railway track running through Leyton will be paid compensation for disturbance and loss of amenities during and after construction?

The board's Act of 1936, which authorises the railway extension to which the hon. Member refers, contains provision of the Land Clauses Acts as modified by the Acquisition of Lands (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919. Moreover, the Act provides for the payment of compensation in respect of houses or buildings injuriously affected by the working of the underground railways. The question whether compensation is payable in any particular case is a matter for determination by the official arbitrator appointed under the Act of 1919.

Does that mean that the individual householders have the right to approach a particular body in order to secure compensation?

I tried to make it plain in the answer that the individual is secured if he has a sustainable claim. Perhaps the hon. Member will study the wording of my answer.

Roads (Isle Of Lewis)

62.

asked the Minister of Transport whether, in view of the fact that the Department of Agriculture in Scotland has refused, the local people are too poor, and the County Council of Ross and Cromarty unwilling, to bring the cart road to the village of Orinsay, Isle of Lewis, up to the standard required for modern transport, he will consider the urgent needs of the people of Orinsay and take action to have the present grievance met?

I will consider any proposal from the county council, pro- vided that they are willing to place this road on the county list of highways.

Traffic Commissioners (Appointment)

63.

asked the Minister of Transport with regard to his appointment of a commissioner and three deputy commissioners for the West Midland traffic area from the borough and urban district panel, how many local authorities had nominated for the panel each of the gentlemen selected; how many local authorities nominated the gentlemen, respectively, who received the greatest and second greatest number of nominations for the panel; and on what grounds were the recommendations of the majority of nominating local authorities not accepted?

I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave him on this subject on 4th February. I will, if he so desire, send him a copy of the correspondence.

Cheyne Walk, Chelsea (Barrier)

64.

asked the Minister of Transport whether he will make a regulation under the powers conferred on him by the London Traffic Act, 1924, Third Schedule, Section 20, instructing the Chelsea Borough Council to remove the barrier erected on the embankment in Cheyne Walk, as an object likely to hinder the free circulation of traffic in that street?

I am advised that the removal of the structure referred to cannot be effected by a regulation under Section 20 of the Third Schedule to the London Traffic Act, 1924.

Can my right hon. Friend say by whom he is advised in this matter?

I am advised by the appropriate Government legal authority. The matter is not free from complications, but the advice I have received is quite decisive. I will tell my hon. and gallant Friend, if he desires, the reasons on which that advice was based.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the erection of the barrier has meant a very great reduction in road accidents at that point?

The Coronation

45.

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the large number of visitors from the Empire, United States of America, and other countries who will be staying in this country during the Coronation period, he will consider the desirability of setting up at an early date a comprehensive committee which will be able to co-ordinate and encourage schemes for public and private hospitality to these visitors?

I understand that plans are being made by the combined Empire societies, by the English-speaking Union, and other organisations to prepare and encourage schemes for public and private hospitality to visitors from overseas to this country next summer. Schemes directed to this end have the fullest approval of His Majesty's Government, but I do not think any useful purpose would be served by Government intervention.

(by Private Notice) asked the Lord President of the Council whether he has any statement to make regarding the price of seats on the Government stands to view the Coronation procession?

Yes, Sir. This is a question which has given rise to prolonged consideration. The subject was approached with the idea of using these stands to accommodate representatives of the many-sided life of the nation. Obviously, if this was to be done, prices had to be fixed which would not be a bar to anyone invited to attend. The net cost of a seat on the uncovered Government stands is about 30s., and on stands covered,. £2 5s. It is clear, however, that such charges would be beyond the means of many people whose presence should be made possible. We examined very carefully various proposals involving differentiation of charges, but came to the conclusion that any scheme based upon differentiation was unworkable; and accordingly the Government have felt justified in fixing the price for uncovered seats at 15s. and for covered seats at £1 2s. 6d.—the Treasury finding the balance. These seats are not to be sold to the general public, but only to persons chosen by the groups amongst which the representation is to be allotted.

I take it for granted that when the Coronation is over the Treasury will recoup themselves by selling the timber?

Not exactly, I am afraid. As a matter of fact, the return of the timber is included in the tenders which were put in for the erection of the stands.

Special Areas Bill

47.

asked the Prime Minister whether he can now state when the new Special Areas Bill will be introduced?

I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave to him on Monday last in reply to a question on this subject.

But did not the Minister of Labour on behalf of the Government promise this Bill last month, and did not the Prime Minister himself promise my hon. Friend the Member for Spennymoor (Mr. Batey) last week that he would make a statement this week, and how much longer shall we have to wait?

South Normanton Colliery (Explosion)

(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary for Mines whether he has any information to give the House respecting the colliery explosion which occurred at Winterbank Colliery, South Normanton, on Monday night last.

I have been asked to reply, in the absence of my hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary for Mines, who was not aware that this question was being asked. I understand that an explosion occurred at about 9.30 p.m. on Monday night on a longwall machine-cut face, whereby four men were killed and four injured. Three other men who were working on the face are missing and there would seem to be no hope that they can have survived. They are beyond an extensive fall which is in course of being cleared, but at 2.30 this afternoon these men had not been reached. Investigations into the cause of the accident are proceeding. The House will wish to join with me in expressing our deep sympathy with the relatives and friends of those who have lost their lives in this tragic disaster.

Methylated Spirits (Scotland)

I beg to move,

"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to control the sale in Scotland of methylated spirits and of methylated spirits in admixture; and for other purposes connected therewith."
I do not intend to take up the time of the House with arguments to prove the disastrous effects of drinking methylated spirits, or in substantiating the contention that the evil in Scotland is extensive enough to warrant control. I believe that those effects are well-known to hon. Members who represent Scottish constituencies, and are appreciated by them. Far be it from me to say that this practice does not extend South of the Border, but if the control which we suggest for Scotland works satisfactorily, the Bill will no doubt be pointed out in future as one more instance of the superiority of Scottish over English law, and its adoption by England will, I believe, be suggested.

The main provisions of the Bill which I am asking permission to introduce are based upon an Enactment by the Parliament of Northern Ireland which has proved satisfactory in dealing with this particular evil. Hon. Members are probably aware that retailers of methylated spirits have to obtain a yearly Customs and Excise licence. It is proposed in the Bill that certain further conditions be attached to the granting of a licence, such as the registration of the applicants with the local authority, the keeping of a record of sales and the selling only upon receipt of an order signed by the purchaser, stating the purchaser's address and the purpose for which the spirits are required.

This is not a party Measure, because it has the support of hon. Members in different parts of the House. I believe also that is has the approval of a very large section of public opinion in Scotland. If the permission for which I am asking be granted and the Bill be not opposed at a later stage, and if the House sees fit to refer it to the Scottish Stand- ing Committee, surely the combined wisdom of all the Members representing Scottish constituencies will be able to strengthen what may be found weak in the proposed machinery and delete any provisions which appear unnecessary, and so devise a scheme which will find favour in this House and in another place and which will, while restricting to the minimum the inconvenience to those who sell or use mineralised methylated spirits for legitimate purposes, should provide a means in Scotland of combating what I am convinced is a real menace to the mental, moral and physical welfare of our people.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Miss Horsbrugh, Mr. Chapman, Mr. Davidson, Mr. Guy, Mr. Erskine Hill, Mr. Hunter, Sir Douglas Thomson, and Mr. Westwood.

Methylated Spirits (Scotland) Bill

"to control the sale in Scotland of methylated spirits and of methylated spirits in admixture; and for other purposes connected therewith," presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 85.]

Coal Mines (Employment Of Boys) Bill

Reported, with an Amendment, from Standing Committee A.

Bill, as amended ( in the Standing Committee), to be considered upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 84.]

Minutes of Proceedings to be printed.

Message From The Lords

That they have agreed to,—

Public Works Loans Bill, without Amendment.

Orders Of The Day

Ways And Means

Considered in Committee.

[Sir DENNIS HERBERT in the Chair.]

Defence Loans

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That is is expedient—
(1) to authorise the Treasury, during the five years ending on the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and forty-two, to issue out of the Consolidated Fund sums not exceeding in the aggregate four hundred million pounds to be applied as appropriations in aid of the moneys provided by Parliament for the Navy, Army (including Royal Ordnance Factories) and Air services for those years:
Provided that the amount so issued in respect of any service for any year shall not at any date exceed the aggregate of the amounts proposed to be so issued in respect of that service by the estimates upon which this House has, before that date, resolved to grant sums to His Majesty to defray expenses for that service for that year;
(2) to authorise the Treasury, for the purpose of providing money for the issue of sums as aforesaid or for replacing sums so issued, to raise money in any manner in which they are authorised to raise money under and for the purposes of Sub-section (1) of Section One of the War Loan Act, 1919, and to provide that any securities created and issued accordingly shall be deemed for all purposes to have been created and issued under the said Sub-section (1);
(3) to authorise the old Sinking Fund to be used in the said five years for providing money for the issue of sums as aforesaid instead of being issued to the National Debt Commissioners;
(4) to provide for the repayment to the Exchequer, out of moneys provided by Parliament for the said services in such proportions as the Treasury may direct, of the sums issued as aforesaid with interest at the rate of three per cent. per annum as follows:—
  • (a) until the expiration of the said five years interest only shall be payable;
  • (b) thereafter the sums so issued shall be repaid, together with interest, by means of thirty equal annual instalments of principal and interest combined;
  • (5) to provide for the application of sums paid into the Exchequer under the last foregoing paragraph, so far as they represent principal, in redeeming or paying off debt, and, so far as they represent interest, in paying interest otherwise payable out of the permanent annual charge for the National Debt."—[Mr. Chamberlain.]

    3.55 p.m.

    When I announced a few weeks ago that it was the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill authorising them to raise £400,000,000 for purposes of Defence, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said that this was a proposal unprecedented in time of peace. I am not disposed to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman about that. It is, of course, true that this will not be the first time that loans have been raised for the purpose of paying for Defence, and no doubt hon. Members will have in their minds the precedent of Naval and Military Works Acts, 1895 to 1905. I should be sorry to regard those Acts as a precedent for what we are doing now. The circumstances of the time are entirely different, and the amounts that were then raised were trifling, compared with what we are thinking of to-day. The whole borrowings of the Treasury under the Naval and Military Works Acts did not sum up altogether to £45,000,000. They were raised at a time when the Income Tax varied from 8d. to 1s. 3d. in the £; and in those happy days Super-tax had not been invented.

    Looking back upon what has happened since, I think we must also say that the view which was taken when those Acts were passed that the expenditure on Defence for which they were intended to provide for something quite abnormal and exceptional, proved not to be borne out in practice. When they came to an end, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Asquith, summed up his view of the procedure in words which, I think, perhaps it might be useful if I were to read to the Committee, because they seem to me to set out very admirably the impressions made upon the mind of a statesman of great experience by the procedure that had been adopted, and the dangers which would be inevitable if this practice of raising money by loan for Defence expenditure were to become a permanent feature of our finance. Speaking on 30th April, 1906, in the Budget Statement, Mr. Asquith said:
    "There must undoubtedly arise from time to time cases of charges which properly fall under the head of capital expenditure for which temporary borrowing is legitimate; but in the main I regard this as a most unhappy chapter in the history of our national finances; and, so far as the Army and Navy are concerned, my intention is at the earliest possible moment to bring it to a close. The system as it has been developed of recent years, has in my opinion, three fundamental vices. In the first place, it tends to confuse the distinction between capital and revenue charges. In the next place it inevitably encourages in the spending departments, crude, precipitant and wasteful experiments. And in the third place (and this is not the least important consideration) it draws large items of annual expenditure from any effective Parliamentary supervision."
    Of those three vices, as Mr. Asquith called them, the first, namely, the tendency towards confusion between capital and revenue, seems to me to be inevitable in any measure of the kind that we are now contemplating. Nevertheless, perhaps the Treasury may be trusted to preserve that distinction as far as is possible. As to the encouragement of a general tendency to spend extravagantly, it is that consideration which led me to say a week ago that it was never more necessary than now to preserve Treasury control in its traditional form. But as to the last, which was described as not the least important consideration, namely, that under the procedure then adopted Parliamentary control was withdrawn from expenditure—that fault at any rate we have been enabled to correct in the proposals which I am to describe to the Committee.

    It will be seen then that I do not wish to found a justification of this proposal upon the precedents to which I have alluded. The real justification for a course which I admit and which I maintain is unprecedented, is to be found in the unprecedented conditions of the time—conditions which have led us to undertake this vast expenditure and have made it necessary to compress that expenditure within a comparatively short period of time.

    On Thursday last the Leader of the Opposition, addressing my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, put it to him that it would be impossible to discuss this Measure without being put in possession of the data on which the Government think it necessary to ask the House to consent to such an action. It seemed to the Government that that was a reasonable proposition. If the House or the Committee are to be asked to approve the raising of very considerable sums of money by loan, during the next few years, it is only reasonable that they should be informed as far as possible for what purpose those sums will be required and what is the sort of scale of expenditure which makes it necessary to consider raising anything by loan at all. Accordingly we have endeavoured in the White Paper that is now in the hands of hon. Members to give to them the information for which the right hon. Gentleman asked, and, without entering upon details which it might be dangerous to make public since they could not be confined to hon. Members, at any rate to give a sufficient story of the task that we have undertaken, to give hon. Members a fairly clear idea of its scope and variety.

    I thought a week ago that when I came to mention the sum which we had in mind to ask for power to borrow, there were indications of a certain surprise among hon. Members opposite. I must say I do not quite understand why they should be surprised. They certainly could not have been surprised at the proposal to borrow, for I had made it clear in my Budget statement last year that even then that was my intention. The only thing, therefore, to which their indication of astonishment could be directed was the amount which we proposed to borrow. But if that be the cause which led to their surprise, then indeed there was a necessity for the present White Paper, for it must be clear that if they were surprised at the amount it could be only because they had not in the least realised up to now the formidable extent of the task which lay before the Government.

    I suppose that, except for those who are bound to be giving constant attention to this matter and have been studying it in all its details, it really is extremely difficult to appreciate how vastly more costly is the equipment for warlike purposes of to-day than it was at the close of the Great War. In every country which has any armed forces at all, ever since 1918 experts and scientists have been working to try and devise new means of increasing the striking and offensive power of their forces. [HON. MEMBERS: "After 'a war to end war.'"] I am only relating the facts now; I am not commenting on them. Every hon. Member knows that every country has felt so little confidence that there would be no more war that it has been making every effort to increase its own striking powers. That has resulted in the invention and the development of new weapons, new means of trans- port, new devices, new equipment, and in many cases the provision of greatly increased quantities of these new weapons.

    It must be remembered that, parallel with this tremendous effort directed to increase the power of offence, there has naturally been carried on an equally intense effort to find a counter to this offence. Every improvement in offence immediately calls up some corresponding development of defence. I hardly know which is the more expensive of the two, but I do know that a country like ours, with vast responsibilities in all parts of the world, with its multitudinous vulnerable points, cannot neglect either offence or defence. It is absolutely essential for us to equip ourselves at home and along the lines of communication with the newest methods of repelling attacks. We must provide forces which are capable of being despatched wherever they may be wanted. We cannot afford to allow our fighting forces to go into the field to meet others better armed than themselves.

    The White Paper shows where and how the cost is going to be incurred, and whilst it does not provide details of cost (though these, of course, will in due time be provided in the Estimates which will be laid before the House) it does for the first time make an effort in public to estimate the order of the total expenditure on defence which we have to contemplate during the next five years. Let me say once again, although it has been repeated so often, that even this figure of £1,500,000,000 cannot be regarded as final or certain. If circumstances should change and allow us to slow down or reduce our programme, all the better; we shall be thankful enough to do it. On the other hand, as conditions have changed to our disadvantage since we first contemplated this programme, they may change again, and it may be that in the end we shall find that even £1,500,000,000 has not represented the total amount that this country has been compelled to spend in this respect.

    In considering the Resolution which is before the Committee it seems to me that there are several questions which hon. Members will desire to have answered or to answer for themselves. Granted that what I am proposing is a grave departure from existing precedents, the first question which hon. Members opposite will ask will be, is this programme extravagant; is it unnecessary; is it inopportune? Other hon. Members in other parts of the House may ask a different series of questions. They may ask, is this programme so exiguous as to be inadequate; does it fail to meet the risks which everyone can see in front of us; ought we to have so contrived that it should be completed in a shorter time? Those are grave questions. They concern the safety of the country. Let me say that it seems to me that the Government which bears the responsibility for our safety, which has access to all kinds of information relevant to the consideration of this question—the Government alone can answer those questions, and the Government alone must in the long run be responsible for the results which must follow upon the answer that they give. But if the programme is to be condemned on the first count, if it is to be condemned as going too far, as being extravagant or premature, then we are entitled to demand that those who make that criticism should tell us wherein it is excessive; that they should tell us, in the light of the information given in the White Paper, what it is that they suggest ought to be cut out. Are we to cease to build capital ships? Are we to allow our fleets to meet fleets of other Powers which are now building ships of great tonnage and high gun-power to replace old capital ships—are we to meet those with old ships? Can we afford to drop that part of the programme witch contemplates the gradual replacement of these old ships by new ones? Can we halve our aeroplane programme, or cut it clown by a third? Can we say that it is unnecessary to pile up reserves of ammunition, so that, if our forces are to be again engaged in war, they should pass through the same tragic and bitter experiences as our forces did in the first months of the Great War? Are we to leave our towns here without protection against air raids? Are we to abandon forts and bases overseas? Hardly a day passes in this House but my right hon. Friend the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence is asked questions by anxious hon. Members who have thought of some precaution which they fear may have been overlooked, and which they desire to bring to his attention. I challenge the Opposition to name one single item of those which I have enumerated, or of those which are mentioned in the White Paper, which they can tell us they would, if they stood in our place, cut out from that programme.

    If the Opposition are to answer these questions, are we not entitled to know whether the Government, in assessing the strength of the armed forces of our country, are working on the assumption that we are fighting our own battles, or on the assumption that we form part of a system of collective security?

    I do not think that it would be in the public interest to set out a theory of whom we are going to fight, or who might be our allies in the event of our having to fight. Our programme is not directed against any particular Power or group of Powers, but it is the duty of the Government to put before the House the programme which they consider necessary for our safety and for the fulfilment of our obligations; and again I say that, if that is challenged, it is the duty of the Opposition to say in what respect they consider our programme extravagant.

    The next question which I imagine hon. Members will wish to consider is this: Assuming that the programme is accepted, should the cost be met as we propose, partly from revenue and partly from a loan; or should it be met entirely from taxation? I had hoped that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition would have spoken on the subject this afternoon, in order that we might be edified by the spectacle of Satan rebuking sin; but I understand that he has delegated that office to the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence). He could not have made a better choice, for, if there is anybody among hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Front Bench opposite who would, I am sure, go to the stake in defence of the interpretation which he puts upon his principles, it is the hon. Member for East Edinburgh.

    I notice that the attitude of the Leader of the Opposition is not that of the fanatic who says that all expenditure must come out of taxation, but rather takes the form of a plaintive protest that it is too bad that the Government should get away with a proposal to raise £400,000,000 by loan when he himself and his friends got into sad trouble when they raised £100,000,000 for the purpose of keeping the Unemployment Fund solvent. I wonder that the right hon. Gentleman should bring up that particular incident, or should think that there is any analogy between what happened at that time and what we are proposing now. I have on my table a calendar which has a quotation for every day in the year, and, happening to cast my eye upon the quotation for to-day, it appeared to me singularly appropriate to the particular matter to which I have just alluded. It comes, quite unexpectedly so far as I am concerned, from Ellen Terry, a lady who at any rate knew a great deal about human nature. This is what it says:

    "There is all the difference in the world between departure from recognised rules by one who has learned to obey them, and neglect of them from want of training, or want of skill, or want of understanding. Before you can be eccentric, you must know where the circle is."
    The trouble is that the party opposite did not know where the circle was. They had lost the confidence of the country, and they had lost it largely because of this borrowing on behalf of the Unemployment Insurance Fund.

    They were borrowing, without any particular plan, for expenditure which was continuous and for the repayment of which they had made no provision. I may remind the hon. Gentleman who so triumphantly made that observation of something that was said by Miss Bondfield at the time. She said:

    "If you came forward and wiped out the limit of borrowing powers at £40,000,000, and went on borrowing to £50,000,000 or £60,000,000"—
    I may remind hon. Members that it was £100,000,000 before they had finished—
    "it would be a dishonest course, because it would be contracting a debt which you saw no possible way of paying off."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th November, 1929; col. 1103, Vol.232.]
    In the proposals that we are making today we have elaborated in some detail our measures for paying off the debt. We can borrow £400,000,000 without loss of credit because, since we first took office, we have so reorganised the finances of the Unemployment Fund and of the country that they are now without parallel anywhere in the world.

    Let us consider for a moment what is the alternative before us, and let us assume, at any rate for the moment, that £1,500,000,000 is the sum which has got to be expended over the next five years. That is an average of £300,000,000 a year. If we do raise £400,000,000 by loan and apply it to this purpose, that is an average of £80,000,000 a year. On these two assumptions, then, we should have to find out of revenue £220,000,000 for this purpose on the average each year during the next five years. This year the Estimates for defence, including Supplementary Estimates, come to £188,000,000. That means that, on the average and on these assumptions, £32,000,000 extra, above what we have done this year, will have to come out of the revenue. £32,000,000 is a substantial sum but if you are going to add to that another £80,000,000, if you are going to raise £112,000,000 a year out of new taxation or expanding revenue, then I say that you would be putting a burden on the country which would cripple our resources, and would in my opinion throw back the whole course of progress which is now so marked.

    I assume that the Committee are going to answer that question, whether the cost ought to be met from taxation only, in the negative. There still remains another question, namely, whether the powers asked for provide for borrowing on an excessive scale. In the Budget statement which I made last year I sought to lay down in advance the general principles on which I thought we ought to proceed in this matter. I pointed out then to the House that the inevitable result of the enlargement of our forces, and of the various concomitants of enlarged forces, would be a permanent increase in the annual cost after the enlargement had come to an end. I said that, in my judgment, the whole of that increased cost ought to come out of revenue, and I added that some part of what might be called the capital expenditure ought also to come out of revenue, but that the actual amount could not be laid down in a hard and fast way, but must be determined from time to time in the light of the circumstances reigning when that decision had to be taken. Taking that as a general principle, and reckoning once again, for the purposes of argument, that the actual expenditure to be found during the next five years is £1,500,000,000, I do not think that it would be claimed that the amount of borrowing which I am proposing is excessive, considering that the taxpayer will still be bearing nearly three-quarters of the whole amount of the expenditure during that time.

    Let me come to the machinery of the Resolution, and the way in which we are providing for the raising of this money. The first section of the Resolution authorises the Treasury to issue out of the Consolidated Fund sums not exceeding in the aggregate £400,000,000 during the period not exceeding five years, counting from 1st April, 1937. There follows a proviso, and the effect of the proviso is that no borrowed money can be spent on Defence in any year until Parliament has approved the relevant Estimates. That means, of course, that when the Estimates are presented to Parliament they will show, in the first place, the gross amount of the expenditure, secondly, the amount of the appropriations in aid from borrowed money, and, thirdly, the net total which will remain to be borne on the Vote; and that, of course, will apply to any Supplementary Estimates for Defence as well as to the original Estimate. I maintain that that procedure gives Parliament full control over the whole operations of financing our Defence expenditure for the next five years.

    It is quite true that technically in Committee of Supply it is not possible to move to reduce the amount of the Appropriations-in-Aid, but in practice that does not in the least interfere with the control of the House, because the Committee of Supply can reject the net amount of the Estimate on the ground that they object to the amount of the Appropriations-in-Aid. Therefore, just as in the case of token Votes, they will keep complete control over the whole procedure.

    Paragraph (2) authorises the Treasury to raise money in any manner in which they are authorised to raise it for the purposes of Sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the War Loan Act, 1919. In brief, the effect of that is to say that the Treasury may raise this money in any manner which seems to them best to meet the requirements of the particular time for which they raise it. They can raise it by Treasury Bills, and by various forms of loan, with or without a Sinking Fund, and with various other conditions attached.

    Paragraph (3) provides that the old Sinking Fund may be used for Defence instead of for reduction of Debt. Hon. Members, of course, are aware that the old Sinking Fund, which is any achieved surplus on the Budget, automatically goes to the reduction of Debt; but except in very unusual circumstances it would be rather absurd to be utilising Budget surpluses to pay off debt at the same time that you are borrowing other money, and, therefore, the provision is made that the Treasury may apply any realised surplus to the service of the Defence Departments, and such surpluses would count as part of the £400,000,000. Finally, paragraphs (4) and (5) provide for interest and repayment, and it is laid down that during the borrowing period, that is, during the five years, interest only will be chargeable to the Defence Departments, but at the close of the five years, interest and Sinking Fund will be chargeable on their Votes in the form of equated annuities for 30 years.

    The hon. Member is illuminating, but a little distracting. I might, perhaps, mention that neither the rate of interest of 3 per cent., which is the rate charged on the Defence Departments, nor the term of years have any relation to the term or the rate of interest at which the Treasury will raise the money. This is merely a book-keeping entry between the Departments. The Treasury borrowings will be part of their borrowings for general purposes. They will raise money from time to time in whatever way seems most economical, but you must have a round figure of interest to be charged to the Departments, and we have considered that 3 per cent. is appropriate for that purpose. That is really all that I need say at this stage about the machinery.

    Will my right hon. Friend say whether he means us to understand that the 30-year period is also inter-Departmental?

    Yes. The terms of the loans raised by the Treasury have no relation whatever to the 30 years. They may be for different maturities and different times according as it seems convenient at the moment. I understand that the Opposition wish to raise a number of points upon the financial proposals or the financial aspect of these proposals in the course of the afternoon, and that they would desire to have a reply to those criticisms or those questions later in the evening. I shall be very happy to listen to the Debate and do my best to reply to anything that needs reply at the close of the proceedings this evening.

    I want to say one or two words in conclusion. On the occasion to which I have already alluded the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said that this was essentially a war measure. I took him to mean by that that the scale of the proposals was such as to put it into the same class as measures which were found necessary during the Great War. But if he meant anything more than that, if he really sought to convey that this Measure was a Measure which was likely to lead to war, I deeply regret that he should have given utterance to any such sentiment. I regret it, because it is fundamentally untrue. It is the very opposite of the truth; on the contrary, this is a Measure for the preservation of peace. [Interruption.] This only confirms the suspicion which I have always entertained that many hon. Members opposite, while paying lip-service to the necessity for having some armaments, are really wholehearted pacifists and do not want any armaments at all. But to leave this country with all its wealth, all its territory and all its trade connections, inherited or acquired, unarmed and helpless, in face of a world which is armed from top to toe, would be to provide a standing temptation to a possible aggressor which some day might prove to be irresistible.

    Everybody knows that the British Empire stands for peace, and that it never will use its Forces for aggressive purposes. On the contrary, it will exert all its influence to preserve peace not only for itself, but for others as well. We know from our own experience that our influence waxes and wanes in proportion to our strength. The strength that we are now rapidly gaining from day to day and from week to week is in itself a steadying factor in international affairs, and probably the greatest bulwark for peace that exists in the world to-day. Holding these views, convinced as we are that this great programme is essential for our own safety and a major factor in the safety of other nations, it would be impossible for us to shrink from meeting it.

    No one, least of all the Chancellor of the Exchequer, can see this growing accumulation of burdens without a feeling of disgust and shame that civilisation is trying to break its own back instead of trying to settle its differences by give-and-take, and turning its energies to the pursuits which might bring prosperity and contentment to all. For the time being at least, we can do nothing but set our teeth and go forward with measures which we cannot afford to lay aside. Peace, political appeasement, disarmament are not attainable by any one Power alone, but whenever and wherever we can find others who share our views, we shall rejoice in their company to seek to find a more fruitful, a saner and a worthier solution.

    4.46 p.m.

    The immediate purpose of this Money Resolution is to authorise a loan of £400,000,000 for armaments spread over the next five years. This is, as the Chancellor himself admitted, a financial proposal which, in time of peace, is unprecedented and of such a startling character that it will call forth from us, as I warned him after he made his Budget speech last year, a direct challenge in opposition to his proposal. I hope to make abundantly clear why we regard this innovation in the finances of the country as wholly improper, fraught as we believe it to be with grave and dangerous consequences to the well-being of our people. But, though the financial issue is the immediate purpose of this Resolution, quite clearly finances cannot be considered in vacuo, unrelated to the still large issues of public policy that are involved. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, both at the beginning and at the end of his speech, devoted himself to that wider theme. Broadly speaking, his defence of the innovation was that the finance was unprecedented, because it had to deal with an unprecedented situation. In order to understand the position I will begin with the White Paper. The Opposition asked for this White Paper in order to ascertain what was the policy of the Government with regard to rearmament. It was not merely our right to ask, but our duty to obtain this information for the enlightenment of the people of this country. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has not in any way suggested otherwise to-day.

    We, in this House, and the people of the country, have a right to know certain things. We have a right to know what general principles of international policy underlie the rearmament proposals, and we have a right to know on what general principles of co-ordination of defence the expenditure which the Government contemplate is to be incurred. I would have the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee note that we did not ask, and the people of the country have no desire to be made public, those details of strategic defence which it may be contrary to public interest to disclose, but those details are quite different from the principles of policy about which the democracy and its representatives are entitled to be informed. In response to our request the Government have given us this White Paper. I wish to use words of studied moderation, but I can only describe its contents as a tragic farce. I say without fear of contradiction that there is not a Member of the House, whether he sits with us or on the benches opposite or on the Liberal benches below the Gangway, who has kept himself well informed on the progress of defence and has read the speeches of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the White Paper of last year, to whom this White Paper which was given us yesterday brings, except in one particular, any essential new fact.

    I make no claim whatever to be an expert in military or naval matters, but I honestly believe I could have written practically every word of that White Paper with the solitary exception of the matter relating to the new ships that are to be laid down in the current year. I do not find a single new fact or a single description of policy which, from my knowledge of what the Government have previously said, I could not have put down on paper and published myself. Even with regard to the additional ships that are to be laid down in the current year I think with a little imagination and conjecture I could have guessed at the proposals that we have before us. It can all be summed up by, "The Government want more of everything—more ships, more men, more planes, more guns, more munitions and more factories." [Interruption.] That is all right, then, we are agreed upon it.

    But what is left out? That is what I want to bring to the attention of the Committee. There is not a hint of direction, there is not a hint of co-ordination and not a hint of real planning of defence as a whole or of the civil population in particular. Still less is there any suggestion of correlating this vast, amorphous mass of expansion to any clear conception of international policy. There is not a single word about the League of Nations, not a single word about collective security, no suggestion of any kind that the defences of this great Empire are affected for better or for worse, by the fact that the League of Nations exists, and that the Government are pledged up to the hilt to the electorate to respect the conception of collective security. I listened to the Chancellor with very great attention to discover whether he would give us any enlightenment on these questions. We have had no additional illumination of any kind. To paraphrase the words that he used about an hon. Friend behind me, there was no illumination and no enlightenment, nothing but expansion of the facts that are in the White Paper itself. He told us that new weapons were being forged, new means of transport, new devices, and that we should require to meet them with correspondingly new methods of defence. He emphasised the fact, I suppose for the benefit of some of his recalcitrant back benchers, that there was nothing final about the figure of total expenditure on rearmament during the next five years. He told us that there would be full control by the House, but, as I pointed out last year, that control is purely illusory. Control consists in giving the House information of the programme that is proceeding. It does not consist in merely telling the House how much expenditure on the programme is going to be used up in any particular year, and that is all that we shall get.

    This information is the total amount that will be afforded us in order to judge. not the immediate strategy of the Government, but the policy that lies behind these proposals, and that is what the House and democracy are entitled to know. In other words, what the Government say is, "Give us the money and we will do the rest." I think the Chancellor himself said the Government only can be the judge—"We are in a position to know, and you must leave the Government a free hand to get on with the job." So we are really back with the old slogan of 1935—"You can trust me" I ask, in view of the experience of the 15 months that have elapsed since the General Election, whether that slogan has the same potency that it had in November, 1935. Why should we, why should the country, to-day trust the Government? Everyone knows now that that trust was misplaced, and we have that on the authority not of Members on this side, not of Members of the Liberal party, not of some of the back benchers or the colleagues of the Prime Minister, but from no less a fountain source than the Prime Minister himself. In that speech of devastating candour that he made in November last, he told us quite deliberately that the pledges that were given at the last General Election were given with his tongue in his cheek, and that he had realised that the democracy had to be cajoled into the policy which he thought it necessary to pursue.

    I remember a friend of mine whose promises were frequently dishonoured, and I said to him on one occasion, "I wonder how you can sleep at night for the lies you tell." His answer was characteristic; he was Irish, and he said, "They were not lies when I told them, I meant to keep my promises when I made them, and it was an accident that I was unable to do so." Here is a case of promises made of loyal adherence to the League of Nations and collective security, and of refusal to take part in a great armaments race. I have the words actually used, but I do not wish to take up the time of the Committee; they are familiar to all hon. Members. At the time those words were being uttered, if I understand the speech made in November aright, they were made with the intention of being broken if necessary.

    But the past is past, and I put this question frankly to the Government: What is the reason why they should not reveal to-day to the country something of the underlying policy on which their programme rests? Is not the country entitled to know? Is it not the country that ultimately will have to bear, first, the financial burden which the Government are imposing, and later the consequences, good or bad, which this policy will bring about? We are entitled to know, the country is entitled to know, and the Government are acting unconstitutionally in a democratic country in failing to give information of the general line of policy which they have in mind. I am not asking for detailed strategy which might be of use to the enemy, but for broad outlines of policy.

    I have come to the conclusion that there is one reason, which is good to the Prime Minister, why they are unwilling or unable to give us the main outlines of their policy. The simple answer is that they do not themselves know because they are disagreed upon the point. They are divided on this as they have been divided on large numbers of other questions in the past. Some of them are thinking in terms of the old opposition to Bolshevism, some are thinking in terms of Germany, some are desperately anxious to have Mussolini on their side. Some of them recognise that collective security is the only hope for world peace, but they are not strong enough to get their point of view accepted by the Cabinet. Some of them are for straffing the League of Nations and returning to the glorious isolation of the British Empire, regardless of the fact that the British Empire standing alone under modern conditions is extremely vulnerable, as the Chancelor himself has admitted. Some are for the Navy above everything else, some for the Army, some for the Air Force, some must have an Army—and the White Paper suggests it but does not say so—capable of being transported and equipped for Continental service on a large scale.

    The complacent Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence says, "Well, let them all have a bit of their own way." The Prime Minister, wanting peace in his lime in his party, prefers to make no decision but to go back, not merely to the slogan of 1935 but to that of 1931, "the doctor's mandate" and "the agreement to differ." I remember something of that doctor's mandate. It included a promise to make an inquiry into the fiscal system, but the promise was not honoured after the Election. It took in some of our colleagues on the Liberal benches, and it took in my noble friend Lord Snowden, who was in consequence loyal to his new allies for the duration of the Election. But to-day we are not dealing with matters of merely internal significance, important as they were. We are dealing with the vital issues of peace and war, and while the Government havers and has no clear policy internationally or in the co-ordination of defence, the ship of State drifts ever nearer to the limitless calamity of another war. I will not develop that side of the case further because other right hon. and hon. Members who have more intimate knowledge of it than I have will deal with it in later stages of the Debate.

    I pass from that to the smaller issue which forms the immediate subject under discussion. The question narrows itself down on the financial side to this—if the Government are to be given a free hand to spend £1,500,000,000 on rearmament during the next five years, how is the money to be found? Shall it be met out of revenue, or shall we be asked to find a substantial proportion of it by a war loan in time of peace? That is the answer to the criticism the right hon. Gentleman made of the Leader of the Opposition. There is no doubt that it is a war loan in time of peace. As I understand the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he defends his policy under two heads. In the first place he says a great proportion of the £1,500,000,000 is non-recurring expenditure, and therefore it is reasonable that it should be met by raising money through a loan. In the second place he says that the country cannot reasonably bear the whole of this burden at the time, and it is right and proper to make posterity pay part of it. He said, I think, "To pay for it out of revenue would throw a burden on the country which would cripple its resources and throw back the progress it is now making."

    I am exceedingly sceptical of the first contention that a large part of this expenditure is to be of a non-recurring character, but whether I am justified or riot in that view I am certain that the second contention rests on a complete fallacy. On the question of non-recurrent expenditure, there is no direct connection between non-recurrent and capital expenditure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer made no attempt to relate them to one another, and there has been no attempt made by him or in the White Paper to relate either to the £400,000,000 which we are asked to find by way of loan. In regard to the question of capital expenditure, there is no proposal in this White Paper to buy out the armament firms and to transfer their profits to the State. In one sense that would be capital expenditure which would have a certain amount of reason. There may be proposals for building factories, but they come into a different category.

    At the end of the five years where shall we be? We shall have built a number of ships, constructed a number of aeroplanes and made a number of guns. Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer seriously suggest that when we come to the end of these five years the Service Ministers will say, "Thank you very much, we will not ask for any more ships or guns or aeroplanes for a little while because we are amply satisfied with the return to the normal pre-construction period"? I do not believe it, and I can hardly imagine that the Chancellor does so either. It is the experience of history that when the Forces have grown, and have added ship to ship and gun to gun, the appetite grows by what it feeds on, and so far from being able to retrench it is likely that we shall find the bill in five years' time not less but greater than the bill at any time during the five-year period. There are a large number of considerations that point to that.

    During the last two or three years there has been a substantial rise in prices. I have figures for the wholesale price level for 1935 and 1936 and at the end of 1936. In 1935 it was 98; at the end of June, 1936, it was 95; now it is 109. These are the wholesale prices given in the "Economist" on 9th January. There is an increase between the end of June last year and the end of December of 14 points. I do not need to press precise figures. The Chancellor knows perfectly well that during the last 12 months or thereabouts wholesale prices have begun to rise considerably. I shall proceed to show that the effect of the Chancellor's proposals will be very much to increase the velocity with which prices will rise. But suppose that the Chancellor disregards that view, does he seriously suggest that the velocity of the rise in prices is likely to be checked? I cannot imagine that he will take that view. He must anticipate that in the course of the next five years, with all this enormous armaments programme, not only in armaments but in everything else there will be a very great rise in prices. Therefore, when the five years are over, on his own showing, he will find that so far from his being able to come down substantially from the peak he has spoken about he will stay up there, and his bill will be much greater than he anticipates. That is my view, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer may differ from it.

    On the second point I think that I stand on still firmer ground. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has enunciated the theory that you can postpone the burden which the reconstruction of armaments forces on the nation, and that if you were not to postpone it you would be throwing a burden on the country which would cripple its resources. That is contrary to what is stated by all those best qualified to judge with regard to facts of this character, and it is contrary to common sense. The idea that you can postpone the burden of armaments undertaken inside a country merely by a financial operation, is absolutely devoid of foundation. Take an example. You want to make shells, and men are taken off making other things in order to make the shells. You want to make armoured cars. The men who have to make those cars are taken off the making of private motor cars. You want to make guns, and so on. All these people have to be taken away from their work at the time, because you cannot make the guns, the shells, the ships, the munitions that you want to-day, five years hence. They have to be made to-day, and you have to divert the productive capacity of the country today, at this time, from work on things that would be used for other purposes. Anyone who has taken notice of what has been written during the last few decades, beginning with the War, knows that that is a fact, and inescapable.

    If you can float a foreign loan and say to another country: "Make these munitions, these ships, these guns, and we will pay you over a period of 30 years," you can escape the burden at the moment and postpone it to posterity. Or again if it were true that there was a large balance of unemployed capital and labour in the direct line of work which could be called into action by the financial procedure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it still would not be true that you postpone the burden to posterity, but it would be true that the particular financial action would make it possible to do things without suffering loss.

    Will the hon. Member explain why, if we had a foreign loan instead of a loan raised at home, that would avoid the difficulty which he foresees of men making guns and so diverting their labour from the making of other things?

    There is no difficulty. It is perfectly clear. It is the same as it is for private individuals. If I borrow money from somebody and set them to work and they agree to work, as a result of the money that I borrow, I can continue my existing activities, and if I promised to pay back in two or three years time the burden would not fall upon me at the time but in the future. In precisely the same way, suppose that the United Kingdom went to America, as they did do in the War, and said: "We want so many guns and ships, will you make them?" That at the time would not divert the labour of the people of this country from their other avocations but would enable them to throw on to posterity the burden of meeting that debt. If it is an internal loan it has only one effect. The same men, the same capital, the same machinery and the same plant will be used for making the ships, guns, munitions, clothes, or whatever the things may be, in this country, whether you borrow the money or find it out of taxation. Therefore, there is no substance in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's argument that to raise the money out of taxation would cripple the resources of the country, while to raise it out of loan would enable us to save the resources of the country and not to cripple the country at the time. The only difference is one between internal distribution. If the loan is paid for out of the income of the people, and they forego other expenditure that would otherwise be incurred, it would make very little difference, but if, as is nearly always the case when a loan is raised, it were paid for out of capital, probably by bank money to a very large extent, it would have only one effect, and that would be inflation.

    That being so, let us see what is going to happen. I will take three possibilities that may arise in the course of the next few years. The first possibility is that while this programme is in operation we shall meet the terrible calamity of war. I hope, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that I and others shall say nothing to bring that calamity nearer. We cannot wholly shut our eyes to the possibility that that tragedy may happen in the middle of this programme. If that takes place, which is the better, that we shall have placed the burden of preparation for it out of revenue and start as far as that is concerned with a clean slate, with our financial head unbowed, or shall we be better off if we enter into the war burdened already before the war has begun with a great war debt? I do not believe that the Committee can hesitate between those two alternatives, and I hope that it is not necessary for me to say any more on that subject. Suppose that calamity is mercifully avoided and that the expenditure does not happen with a war, what are we going to do at the end of the five years? Are we going to borrow another £400,000,000 for the next five years, or are we then, at long last, going to pay for the expenditure on armaments out of taxation? Shall we be better off because we have borrowed the first £400,000,000? Every one in the Committee knows that we shall be worse off and that our position in consequence of the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be such that nearly everyone will regret that that course was taken.

    Let us take the Chancellor of the Exchequer's assumption that at the end of the five years, the peak having been passed somewhere during the five-year period, expenditure falls. What are we going to have then? We are going to have a catastrophic slump. Anyone who has read any of the literature on the question of booms and slumps and has thought intelligently about it knows that that is a fact. There is almost unanimous economic opinion on that question and it is in opposition to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's proposals, on this ground, that it may be wise, whether it be in accordance with orthodox traditions or not, in a slump to borrow money and pump new purchasing power into the community, enabling it to keep itself afloat, but it is thoroughly bad to un- balance the Budget at a period when a boom is shortly coming, because that accentuates the boom and accentuates the slump which is to follow.

    I presume that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has had brought before him the facts that underlie that wide concensus of opinion, and that therefore in what he proposes he is sinning against the light. He contrasted, in his opinion, favourably to himself and the Government, the debt which he is intending to create with what happened in 1931. He must be relying upon the ignorance of the Committee on economic matters. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh, but if they laugh not merely out of courtesy to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, they laugh with their tongues in their cheeks. The wealth of historic facts connected with the recovery of Sweden, the United States and other countries bears out the point that I am making. The Chancellor of the Exchequer endeavoured to get a cheap score about 1931 and talked about the policy of borrowing for unemployment. He knows perfectly well that it was not the party on this side but his own party that started borrowing for unemployment. I am prepared at the proper time to go into all the facts. The main fact that is indisputable is that to unbalance the Budget in a time of slump may be unorthodox and undesirable in other ways, but it has certain merits in attempting to recover from the slump, but if you unbalance the Budget deliberately, as the right hon. Gentleman proposes to do, in a time of coming boom, it is a most dangerous course and will probably bring most dire consequences when the crest of the boom has passed.

    I should like to quote what Mr. Beckett, chairman of the Westminster Bank said at the annual meeting:
    "Our country is still one of the very few which manages to balance income and expenditure, and this situation is of such fundamental importance, both for our own self-esteem and as a visible sign to the outside world of our determination to be rooted in stability, that we must again be prepared for sacrifice. So far as it is possible, therefore, the bill for armaments should be met out of current revenue. We must be prepared to face heavier taxation, with this consolation—that the country is in a far better position now to bear an added burden than it has been for a number of years past."
    Then Mr. H. G. Henderson, the well-known economist, writing in "The Economist" says:
    "I think it is fundamental that extraordinary Government expenditure should be met out of taxes rather than loan. We should tax ourselves to the hone rather than risk further credit inflation."
    Further, on 5th December "The Economist" said:
    "One important inference from it is that the non-recurrent volume of rearmament is no justification whatever for a loan Budget."
    If the Committee will bear with me I will read one further extract from the same newspaper of 23rd January:
    "The point may be sharpened by a contrast with the Public Works Loan which was urged on the Chancellor of the Exchequer some three or four years ago. A loan at that time would not have been inflationary for there were idle savings. It could then have been used for works which would have enriched the nation, not for armaments. Nevertheless, the self-same Government and the self-same Chancellor who refused, in the name of orthodox finance, to raise a loan three years ago when it was economically sound and could have been usefully employed, are now proposing deliberately to intensify the oscillations of the trade cycle in order to raise money far the sterile purposes of war."

    I do not think so. It may be the same control, but "The Economist," which is read by hon. Members in all parts of the House, is not tied to any party, and I suggest that the article written by the editor of "The Economist" is worthy of consideration by the Committee. Let me come to the point of my remarks as to the financial aspects of this loan. It is rank inflation. Monetary terms of that kind mean nothing to many people unless they are translated into concrete facts. What is the meaning of inflation? It means that when the resources of, the country are becoming used to the full, as they are at the present time, with the exception of the depressed areas, then to pump additional purchasing power into the country, causes the Government to compete with individuals for capital goods. The raising of a loan would bring additional money into the market whereby the price of things would be forced up. The effect of raising a loan is to place a tax—it is every bit a tax although it is disguised in this way—on large numbers of people. And those who have studied this question know that such a tax falls largely on the wrong people. If you deliberately impose a tax you can impose it on the specific classes whom you wish to tax, but inflation is a disguised tax which falls upon people according to no preconceived plan whatever.

    I will tell you the people who will suffer first; they are the old age pensioners, the unemployed, and others with fixed incomes. Other people if they do not escape altogether will pay only a small part. But that is not all that happens when you have inflation. First of all you pay once through increased prices, and when you have paid in that way you pay a second time to certain individuals, who because of the vast profits they have made during the inflationary period are able to exact their toll from the bulk of the people. If the burden is met out of taxation these consequences do not arise. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says, "Here is this vast sum of money, £80,000,000, and already we have spent about £30,000,000. Do you mean to say that it can be imposed upon the Budget without crippling the resources of the country"? Certainly it can. He knows, and anyone who has studied the finances knows, that there is going to be a considerable increase of buoyancy in the revenue.

    The Chancellor never forestalls his Budget; I should be exceedingly foolish to attempt to do so; but we all know that there is a great buoyancy in the revenue and it is exceedingly probable that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will take this into account in the course of the next financial year. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is expected to put 3d. on the Income Tax, and he may add a little more if he thinks it desirable. With this buoyancy in the revenue, and proper additions to direct taxation of all kinds, there is no insuperable difficulty whatever in meeting this bill. Of course, it would be a hardship. I do not say, "Never mind putting something on the Income Tax," but what I do say is that if there is this underlying necessity for the life and safety of the country these burdens can perfectly well be borne out of taxation. There will be this advantage, that when it is all over there will be no increase in the Debt. It would not be reduced, that is true, but there would be no further increase of the enormous sum at which it now stands.

    There are three aggravations of the policy that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is adumbrating, which arise from the general policy of the Government. The first of these is the treatment by the Government of the Special Areas. So far as the ordinary areas of the country are concerned there is already beginning a complete absorption of capital and labour. We have been told that there is a shortage of steel and of bricks, a shortage of bricklayers, and what is already existing in certain industries is gradually spreading through the ordinary parts of the country. But by their woeful nelect there exist at the same time these terrible stagnant pools of unemployment in other parts of the country, and the failure of the Government to bring these into the general apparatus of production means that we still have immense unemployment when a boom is recognised to be close upon us. In that connection I want to stress that the attitude of the Government towards the problem in Jarrow has been simply criminal. The proposal for steel works at Jarrow was turned down by the iron and steel interests because they said there was enough iron and steel being produced and that we did not want any more.

    I think the hon. Member is now getting a little wide of the Resolution. I do not think he can discuss the Jarrow incident.

    I bow to your Ruling, but I was not going to deal with it further. I was merely explaining, trying to show, that the state of the country is one of approaching boom, and that it is because of this boom that the policy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is entirely wrong. I think I am entitled, merely in passing, to answer a possible objection and say that the country could not be in a state of boom because there are pools of unemployment. I will content myself by saying that these stagnant pools of unemployment which the Government have failed to bring into the apparatus of production are due to their fault.

    I am entitled to say that what the hon. Member has just repeated was not out of order in the least degree, and I did not stop him while he was saying that. I stopped him when he came to deal with a certain definite proposal with regard to a particular project, and I wanted to keep the Debate from going outside the limits of what is relevant to this Resolution.

    I had no intention of transgressing the Rules of Order. I had finished, and I only wanted to make a passing remark.

    On the point of Order. There is a whole section in the White Paper dealing with supplies of all kinds, our industrial resources, the allocation and creation of new sources of supply, and I submit that a reference to certain matters, even to individual cases, may be essential in discussing this matter. For instance, there is the question of the allocation of aeroplane factories. We have had an outstanding example recently where an aeroplane factory was proposed to be placed in one district but has been shifted. Now we are to have 75. Surely, we must be allowed to refer to the Government expenditure on factories and to their plans? I submit it involves the whole question of war materials, steel, aeroplanes, factories and so on.

    The right hon. Gentleman has confirmed what I said in my explanation just now. It does not alter the fact that the hon. Member was going beyond the limit which the right hon. Gentleman has himself explained to the Committee; and that is the reason why I stopped him.

    The second aggravation is that the Government continue to pursue their policy of restricting imports at a time when we are approaching a boom period and when they are proposing to inflate. I will quote from an article in the "Times" newspaper which was written with reference not to this country but to another country, but which I venture to think is applicable here. The article reads:

    "It has become increasingly clear that prices are rising rapidly in France not solely on account of expensive social legislation, but because French industry is at the moment incapable of meeting all the demands made upon it by the rearmament programmes and by the general expansion of commercial activity. In these conditions, to exclude foreign goods is no longer to do a service either to manufacturers or to the community as a whole. By keeping supply short of demand it encourages a rise of prices which may eventually nullify the increase in purchasing power on which the Government rely for national recovery."
    I venture to commend that to the Government, and if they are going to introduce inflationary measures, I would ask them not to keep out foreign goods to the extent they have done in the past.

    The third aggravation is that of armaments profits. The Government appointed a commission, and they were delighted that that commission did not recommend the taking over by the Government of the private manufacture of arms. But if the Government have accepted with pleasure the decision of the Commission on that point, they have utterly failed to implement either their own promises or the recommendation of the Commission that there should be a very strict limitation of profits. The Commission was very emphatic that it was not enough merely to have a certain amount of departmental costings and control over the armaments industry, but that there should be something much more rigid and embracing. It had to be something which not merely existed, but which they would be able to show to the public did exist. As far as I know, and as far as the House has been informed, the Government have done nothing of any substance in that matter. They may have some control which they consider to be adequate, but I am bound to say that I do not know of it. I have had prepared some information which shows what the armaments firms at any rate expect will be their increase in profits. I have the facts with regard to the increase in the prices of the shares of the armaments firms since the General Election. I do not intend to refer to all of them, but they show increases varying from a 35 per cent. increase in price to a 269 per cent. increase in price. I will give the figures for what I believe to be the leading armaments firms.

    John Brown's 6s. ordinary shares stood at 19s. 3d. in November, 1935, and now stand at 40s., an increase of no less than 108 per cent. Cammell Laird's 5s. ordinary shares stood at 7s. 6d. in November, 1935, and to-day stand at 16s., an increase of 113 per cent. Hadfields' 10s. ordinary shares stood at 18s. 6d. in November, 1035, and to-day stand at 40s. 6d., an increase of 119 per cent. Vickers' 6s. 8d. ordinary shares, which stood at 19s. 9d. in November, 1935, stand at 37s. to-day, an increase of 87 per cent. I do not wish to be unfair or to state the facts incorrectly in any way. I do not say those increases have arisen owing to the loans proposal; I am merely contrasting the prices before the Government came into office after the General Election with the prices to-day. The whole policy of the Government has affected them, and it is clear that those firms do not expect the limitation of profits to be very drastic. Probably they know pretty well how much the Government will do in that matter.

    I have occupied a considerable time, but this is a very important matter. I will only say, in conclusion, that my hon. and right hon. Friends on these benches will go into the Division Lobby against this Money Resolution. We shall do so for two reasons. In the first place, we shall oppose the Resolution because neither the White Paper nor the Chancellor has disclosed any relation between this proposal and foreign policy; nor is there any sign of that co-ordination of the different parts of Defence which is essential for efficiency in safeguarding this country against a foreign foe. In the second place, we shall oppose the Resolution because it adopts the time-honoured way of placing the burden upon the wrong shoulders. Instead of placing it upon the broadest backs and choosing a method of doing so by appropriate taxation, it is being placed on the backs of the poorest people. By inflation, the Government are creating a disguised tax which, at the time, falls upon the backs least able to bear it, and when the period is over leaves the people of this country indebted for years to come to individuals, thereby creating a state of instability in the country which I and my hon. and right hon. Friends hold to be of the gravest danger to the community.

    5.52 p.m.

    It seems to me that there are three main issues involved in this Debate, and as we shall be able to cast only one vote, it is all the more incumbent upon us who are fortunate enough to catch your eye, Sir Dennis, to make our position clear on each of these three issues. I listened with great interest to the speech which the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) has just delivered. It was a speech such as we have learned to expect from him, with his great erudition and his mastery of financial subjects; but there was one issue—and it seems to me to be a central issue—with which he did not deal, and which we must face. I would define it thus: Are we, in all the political and economic circumstances of the time, willing to assume, as Members of the House, our share of the responsibility for large expenditure upon armaments, or do we repudiate that responsibility, and are we prepared to oppose this expenditure root and branch? Those of us who, on the one hand, understand the provocation offered to Germany by the refusal of the Allied Powers to disarm while Germany was still a democratic and peaceful country, and those of us who, on the other hand, realise the disturbing effect of vast unproductive expenditure on the economic and social fabric of the country and the degree to which the vacillating foreign policy and Imperialist economic policy of the present Government have aggravated the international situation, have a difficult decision to make.

    Nevertheless, we have to take and judge the situation as we find it now. More money is being spent on armaments by the great Powers of the world in a single year than was spent by the same Powers in five or six years before the War. There is no need to condemn Germany. The moral responsibility may well be attributed by historians of the future to the post-war Governments of this country and France, but the fact remains that it is the dictatorship countries—Germany, Italy and Japan—which are now setting the pace in this race. In China, in Abyssinia and in Spain they are defying the League of Nations and dishonouring their signatures to the Kellogg Pact. If we are resolved not only to defend our own territory against such ruthless attacks, but to establish lasting peace on the basis of law, buttressed by collective security, we cannot afford to allow the dictatorship countries to grow relatively more powerful, and we must be prepared to contribute in proportion to our wealth and resources to that system of collective security which alone will enable the peace-loving Powers to dispose of a force so invincible as to be an effective deterrent against aggression.

    There are four great differences between our strategic situation and the situation of a generation ago. First, we are no longer strategically an island. John Bright could boast,
    "There is no causeway to Britain; the free waves of the sea flow night and day for ever round her shores."
    But now there is a causeway, through the air. Secondly, there is the growth of a new military conception rendered possible on the one hand by scientific, mechanical and industrial developments, and facilitated on the other hand by the new technique of dictatorship, and that is the conception of a whole nation, men and women, finance and industry, organised in peace time so as to develop its maximum war potential almost at the outbreak of war and to sustain the conflict to the full extent of its resources. Thirdly, a natural development of this conception and of such weapons as aeroplanes and mechanised forces is the knock-out blow. No longer can any nation hope for a year or two, or a few months, or even weeks, in which to develop its defensive measures. Lastly, there is the formidable fact of the emergence of this new technique of dictatorship, master of the whole life of the country and of all the means of moulding and expressing opinion, tolerating no opposition, working in secret, recognising no law but its own interests, and controlling forces of such destructive power as no dictator in history ever dreamed of.

    It was for these reasons that my hon. Friends and I voted for the armaments Estimates last year. It will indeed be the duty of all of us, especially at a time of mounting expenditure, to scrutinise these Estimates searchingly and critically, but this year, as last year, we shall support any armament measure, the necessity for which may be proved. Therefore, my answer to the first question is that the policy of the dictatorship countries has made large expenditure on rearmament in this country an evil and dangerous but inescapable necessity.

    But that is not the only question, nor is it perhaps the question which is most strictly relevant to this Debate. The Government are asking us for authority to expend on armaments out of revenue and loaned money no less than £1,500,000,000 in the next five years. My next question, therefore, is: Are we justified in giving the Government so great a measure of our confidence? The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to those on one side of the House who would ask was the programme too large and said he would find, on the other side of the House, hon. Members who would declare that it was not adequate. Those hon. Members have not yet had an opportunity of speaking and we shall, of course, listen with interest to their contributions to the Debate. But, £1,500,000,000! What does it mean? Even £1,000,000 is not too easy to envisage. We know it means work for 4,000 or 5,000 men for a year. It is the livelihood of 4,000 or 5,000 families for a year. What else it means must depend, of course, on the objects for which it is spent. But add a nought to it and make it £10,000,000 or add another nought and make it £100,000,000 or make it £1,000,000,000. Very few people have any conception of the difference which the addition of a nought or two makes, of what is involved in the national effort and strain upon our financial and social system caused by expenditure on this scale.

    I cannot help wondering whether those Members who, if they contribute to the Debate, are going to take the line indicated by the Chancellor, realise that the armaments expenditure of this country over the next five years, leaving out Sundays, will be at the rate of £1,000,000 a day. Imagine spending £1,000,000 a day, in peace time, on armaments. Let us compare the cost of this programme with the cost of previous armament programmes not in peace time, because, of course, there is no available standard of comparison for that, but in war time. The great father of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer speaking at Birmingham in May, 1902, estimated the whole cost of the Boer War at £228,000,000. Now we are proposing an armaments expenditure in five years in peace time of seven times the total cost of the Boer War. We are proposing to raise £400,000,000, nearly double the cost of the Boer War, by loan before a shot has been fired.

    Let me give another illustration of the magnitude of the proposals for which the Chancellor of the Exchequer expects to be criticised on the ground of their inadequacy. If we calculate the total cost of the great War to this country up to March; 1919, that is to the end of the financial year 1918–19, we find that it was £8,400,000,000. We also find that we lent roughly £1,800,000,000 to our Allies while, on the other hand, we borrowed £800,000,000 for ourselves. Subtracting the figure of £1,000,000,000, representing our net loans to our Allies, we find that our war effort up to March, 1919, cost us £7,400,000,000 or an average of £1,500,000,000 a year. That means that if we allow for the higher level of prices during the War years, it would be an understatement to say that over the next five years we are going to spend the equivalent of what it cost us to maintain that huge and exhausting effort for one year in the great War.

    Faced by these proposals, we have to ask ourselves two questions about the Government's policy. First, we must try to satisfy ourselves that we are getting full value for the money spent by the Government. In the second place, we must try to satisfy ourselves that the Government are vigorous in their pursuit of a peace policy which would make unnecessary a substantial part, at any rate, of this great armaments expenditure. I hope we shall have other opportunities of discussing the details of the Government's plans and the administration of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence and I also hope—and in this I warmly agree with the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick Lawrence)—that we shall then have more information than we have received in the White Paper now before us. The Chancellor of the Exchequer made an effective debating point when he turned to the Opposition and said, "If you think these estimates are not correct, show us the items to which you object." But where can we find in this amorphous White Paper, any definite detail on which we can put our hands and say, "That is too much." Take the case of the Army. Never yet have we had an answer to this question which I and other Members have frequently put to the Government. What is to be the role of the Army in the next war? Is it to be an Imperial force, operating with our Navy and policing the Empire, or is it to take part in Continental warfare on a great scale, as we did in the last War? Until we have answers to some of these fundamental questions, it is impossible for us to place our fingers on particular provisions of guns or of tanks and to say: "This or that is too large."

    There is much that I would like to say on those subjects, but I know that many other hon. Members wish to speak and I therefore want to confine my observations to-day to the broader aspects of the Government's policy. Meanwhile, however, I want to comment on the financial administration of the rearmament scheme. Money, as the hon. Member for East Edinburgh said, is being poured out. Armament shares are rising on the Stock Exchange. The Royal Commission which the Government appointed two years ago has reported that the Government's, system of price control is weak and inadequate, and the Government cannot make up their minds what to do about that report. What are they doing now, I would ask, to control prices? Has a system of costs ascertainment been instituted? Are the prices paid by the Government based on ascertained costs plus a percentage, and, if so, will the Chancellor of the Exchequer tell us what that percentage is and, if the percentage varies with different categories and classes of goods, will he tell us the percentages for some of the main categories? Nothing will undermine public support for a national effort of rearmament as much as profiteering out of the nation's necessities. It is, therefore, a matter of urgency that the Government should define their attitude towards the report of the Royal Commission. I hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he replies to-night—and I remember that Wednesday is the day of the meeting of the Cabinet—will be able to tell us whether the Government have yet made up their minds to accept the recommendations of the Royal Commission's report.

    Armaments, however, are only the expression of policy. I do not wish to digress too far into vital problems of foreign affairs in a Debate which is primarily concerned with finance, economics and defence. For my part, I greatly admire the speeches of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But no discernible result comes from those speeches, or, if it comes at all, it comes, as in the case of Spain, too late to be effective. The right hon. Gentleman's speeches are not echoed in the country by his colleagues, and the speeches of other Ministers are often wholly different in tone and substance from those of the Foreign Secretary. When he spoke in the House after our reassembly in January, when he was speaking, as he said, most grave words, when he was inviting the co-operation of Members of all parties and even of his opponents in tasks of such gravity as those with which he saw himself confronted, only two junior Members of the Cabinet gave him the support of their presence on the Front Bench. Fine sentiments and graceful speeches by a single Minister are no substitute for firmness and tenacity in action by a united Government. This bill for £1,500,000,000 is, in part, the price which we have to pay and which in successive speeches hon. Members on this side prophesied that we should have to pay, for the Government's feebleness and vacillation in the Abyssinian dispute.

    Of the Government's repeated and continuing failures to make collective security a reality, I will leave my hon. Friends to speak. I do not wish to say much on foreign affairs this evening, but I must refer to the reply which the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave to an intervention by the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson). The Chancellor of the Exchequer told us that he was going to speak again to-night and he will correct me if I am wrong, but I understood him to use words to this effect, that it was not in the public interest to theorise about who our enemies and who our allies may be. I have not yet heard such a flat repudiation of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in this House and of the policy which he has consistently, though as I say, without much backing from his colleagues, put before this House.

    The right hon. Gentleman has purported to quote my words. Let me say that I do not recollect using the word "theorise." I certainly said that on this occasion I did not think it was in the public interest to suggest that these proposals were directed against anybody or that we should be engaged in war with any country in alliance with any other country. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If hon. Members say that I am not telling the truth, I must leave the matter to the OFFICIAL REPORT to decide. I am saying what was in my mind. I do not say that I am repeating the exact words which I used; I am trying to put it to the right hon. Gentleman that I consider there is an entire difference between the circumstances of this occasion and those of the occasion when the Foreign Secretary was speaking. We are now discussing the finance of a great measure of rearmament and my desire was to avoid the implication that that measure of rearmament was directed against any particular Power.

    The right hon. Gentleman certainly said what he has just stated to the House. I did repeat that part of it too, but that is not the part which is relevant to my argument. As he said the OFFICIAL REPORT will show what his actual words were, but it is vivid in my memory, and evidently in the memory of a great many hon. Members around me too, that he used the word "theorise" or "theory"—I am not certain which it was—about our allies. He said that also about a possible enemy, but he did say that it was not time now to theorise about who our allies would be. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, not in one speech or in two speeches, but in a series of speeches throughout the country and in this House of Commons, has said that we are loyal to our obligations under the League of Nations and that it is only for them and on behalf of the League that our forces would take the field. If the OFFICIAL REPORT proves that the right hon. Gentleman said that it was not in the public interest to theorise or to make a theory about who our allies would be, it is a flat repudiation of the policy which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has stated in this House.

    I must say again that what I said in answer to an interruption by an hon. Member opposite was not meant as a general reflection applicable to all times and circumstances; it was a statement having direct relation to the particular circumstances which we are discussing now.

    The statement was that we were not to theorise or to make theories about our allies, and my statement is that it is vital that we should have in our mind and base our policy on a perfectly definite theory as to who our allies will be. Our allies will be those who are prepared to defend the reign of law against aggression. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who are they?"] That is the policy which has been repeatedly laid down in this House.

    This is extremely interesting. Not only have we convicted the Chancellor of the Exchequer of making this statement, but from the interruptions to which I am now subjected, it is clear that the supporters of the Government themselves are not in agreement with the policy which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has laid down.

    I am not prepared to discuss who they are. I said the League of Nations, but that is not the point. The point which I am making is this, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has laid down a perfectly definite League policy, which has been repudiated by hon. Members opposite. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Let me say this one further thing, that it is vital that this misunderstanding, this doubt, in the minds of hon. and right hon. Members opposite should be cleared up and that the country should be informed what the policy of the Government really is. Faced with the dangers which we know to expect, with the possibility, let us say, for example, of a triple attack upon the British Empire, in the Far East, in the Mediterranean, and a knock-out blow aimed at the heart of the Empire here, is your policy collective security; or is it military alliances, and, if so, with whom; or is it isolation? If it is either of the first two, say so. Tell us frankly, and tell us what steps you are taking to make it effective, so that the help is forthcoming if and when the emergency should unfortunately arise.

    But, while, on the one hand, it is necessary to create an effective deterrent to aggression by means of collective security and those measures of rearmament which not France and Britain alone but all those peaceful little Powers which we are accustomed to call neutral Powers—Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries—are carrying out, if, on the other hand, we do nothing to remove the grievances of the dissatisfied Powers or to eradicate the causes of war, we shall be faced with two dangers—either the dictatorships, driven to despair, will attempt a war gamble against even the greatest odds, or our civilisation may collapse under the mere weight of its armaments. The Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke himself of the back of civilisation breaking under the weight of these armaments. Of this there can be no doubt, that vast, unproductive expenditure on armaments, especially if financed by loans, must force up prices, lower standards of living, and inflame industrial and social discontent. The right hon. Gentleman rightly said that we cannot afford to let our armies go into the field and meet other armies better equipped, but it is equally true that we cannot afford to let our civilisation break, as he said, under the weight of these colossal armaments. I therefore say that we ought to be satisfied by the Government that effective measures are being taken to make these armaments unnecessary. We have to face the necessity now of building up armaments, but let us at the same time be working in such a way that if our efforts are successful, it will not be necessary to complete the whole of this crushing burden of armaments.

    A committee has been appointed on access to raw materials, and that is good in itself, though it is rather slow in getting to work, but the conditions which are driving the world into feverish rearmament and towards the brink of war need a far more drastic cure than that. We cannot expect peace and disarmament in the political sphere while this Protectionist Government is still waging war in the economic sphere. Three men, in three different countries, made last week, on the same day or, if not, within a day or two of each other, three remarkable declarations. M. Spinasse, the French Minister of National Economy, exclaimed in the French Senate that
    "Quotas are a weapon of economic war."
    Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State, in America, was reported the same day as saying:
    "A revival of trade would be the most powerful single force for … "
    What? Prosperity? No, but for—
    "averting the danger of war."
    General Smuts declared over the wireless:
    "The new tariffs have proved a greater impediment to world peace than the ideologies."
    These military armaments are provoked by economic armaments, but the fatal policy of Ottawa blocks the way. The Government used to say that they would lower tariffs if only these foreign countries would do so also. Now France, Italy, and other countries have reduced tariffs and abolished or ex- panded quotas, the United States of America is moving, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Belgium are moving, but they say frankly that Ottawa is an obstacle and that they cannot get far without British co-operation. At the time of the Anglo-Franco-American Currency Agreement, the British Government paid lip service to economic disarmament, but while other countries have been abolishing or expanding quotas, we have been adding to our tariffs week by week. New import orders have been coming out week by week; but there have been two additions to the free list. The one is secondhand typewriters and the other, in a draft Order which came into our hands yesterday, is what is described as "Used rails." Those are so far the two contributions that we have made to the reduction of tariff barriers and the revival of trade.

    Critics are sometimes challenged to state their policy. I will summarise mine for removing the causes of armament for war under three heads. First, work vigorously and consistently for the abolition of quotas and of Imperial preference, for restoring the open door in our Colonial Empire, for the reduction of tariffs and the abolition of quotas, and form a low tariff group with those countries which are working in the same direction and with any others that like to come in; secondly, let us appoint a fact-finding commission under the League to investigate frankly and objectively any grievance which any dissatisfied nation may bring before the Council of the League; and, thirdly, assure Germany and Italy that it is our intention that, once a settlement is reached, they should have equal rights and status with all other members of the League and would therefore enjoy the advantages of these proposals and of the restoration of international trade. Now let the Government tell us what their policy is for securing peace and for removing the causes of war, and what steps they are taking to give effect to it.

    I pointed out earlier in my speech certain vital respects in which the present situation differs totally, and in particular in the degree of peril, from that with which our forbears were faced. Yet there are some lessons to be drawn from history still. Take the situation in 1859, when Napoleon III was supposed to be contemplating the invasion of Britain. The Navy was increased, the notorious fortifications of London were built, and then, a year or two later, Gladstone and Cobden made the commercial treaty with France and the danger and the panic passed. Until the Ottawa policy is reversed, and until the Government take steps to remove those new tariffs which General Smuts describes as impediments to peace, and while we are still ignorant of their real intentions in regard to the rival policies of collective security, military alliances, and isolation, and in the absence of any effective measures to stop profiteering, we cannot cast a vote which implies confidence in their policy.

    Now I come to my third and last question. Assuming that this expenditure is necessary and even that the Government's handling of foreign and economic affairs deserves our confidence, ought we to approve the method adopted by the Government for raising the money? We should consider the demand for these borrowing powers in relation to the prevailing economic situation. As the hon. Member for East Edinburgh pointed out, prices are rising, the cost of living is going up, bacon and bread are going up, steel prices have risen from 15 to 20 percent. in the last 12 months, and in many cases it is impossible to get delivery of steel for civil requirements, and bottle necks are forming in iron and steel production, in machine tools, in aircraft construction, and in the recruitment of skilled workmen. Before ever public expenditure on this scale was thought of, economists and bankers, in their speeches and articles, were urging the Government to put on the brake of taxation, and to try to even out the trade cycle at this critical stage—for this is a well proved maxim—the bigger the boom, the sharper the slump.

    Now there is a real danger that after 12 months or two years our conditions will be like those of the United States of America in 1928, and into these conditions of hectic economic activity the Government propose to inject the additional and violent stimulant of a net addition of £400,000,000 worth of loan expenditure. Perhaps the Prime Minister, watching apprehensively these feverish conditions, and observing on the other hand the fall in gilt-edged stocks, consoles himself with Disraeli's reflection that there is
    "nothing like a fall in the price of Consols to cool the blood of our good English people."
    But the result of this inflation must be soaring prices; a fall in the standard of living on the one hand and demands, such as have already been raised, for cutting the expenditure on social services on the other hand; agitation for higher wages, industrial strife and social discontent, embittered by the feeling that the brunt of the sacrifice is falling on the poorest classes, who cannot obtain such compensation as accrues to the rich from high prices for shares and high profits; and the slump which must follow so artificial a boom will materialise in a tidal wave of unemployment. The Government talks of the trade recovery, precarious as I believe it to be with its protectionist basis, which its artificial measures, its tariffs and quotas and subsidies have produced. Then let it tax the recovery for the purposes of rearmament, and let those who are making most out of rearmament pay the highest taxes. If we cannot pay our way now, in a time of cheap money and reviving trade how are we going to pay it in a war or in a slump?

    Nevertheless, while I aril alarmed at the amount and at the conditions on which the Government propose to borrow, I am not arguing that in no circumstances and under no conditions should the Government borrow any part of the expenditure, but authority for borrowing should be asked for and debated each year in the light of the financial and economic situation at the time of the introduction of the Budget. Moreover, the conditions must be strict. Repayment should start from the date of issue. When loans are made for productive purposes it is common for the repayment of the loan to be postponed until the undertaking begins to be productive, but where, as in this case, the expenditure, however necessary on other grounds, is economically unproductive, repayment ought to start from the date of issue, as it did in the case of the Palmerston Loan, in the case of the Naval Works Loan and the Military Works Loan at the end of last century, to which the Chancellor referred in his opening speech, and in every other comparable precedent which occurs to me.

    My next criticism is that a period of 30 years for repayment, which of course works out on an average at a shorter period, is far too long for an armaments loan. Hon. Members opposite have often quoted the precedent of the Naval Loan of 1889 in urging this loan policy on the Government. In that case the expenditure was £21,000,000 on the building of 70 ships, and it was provided that one-seventh of the loan should be repaid annually. Fifteen years later 30 of those ships were condemned as worthless, and under the conditions proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer our fathers would have had to go on paying another 10 or 15 years for ships that had been scrapped. There may be some works, such as docks, harbours and industrial buildings, which may be capable of being used economically in normal conditions. Will the Chancellor tell us how much of the loan will be expended on works of that character? The charge for obsolescence which must be provided out of this loan for ordinary armaments will be very high indeed; and I believe that most Members opposite, as well as Members on this side of the House, will agree with me in wishing that much of this material may be destroyed long before the currency of the loan, which the Chancellor proposes, expires. In any case our children will be paying for ships and tanks which will have been scrapped years before, and for works which, although they may be structurally permanent, will have no economic value in normal times. It is therefore my contention that any loan which may be proved to be necessary for such purposes, other than for capital works which would possess a lasting economic value, should run for not more than 10 years and that repayment should start from the date of issue.

    Why this demand for statutory authority to borrow for a period of five years at all? That is a question to which the Chancellor did not address himself in his opening speech, but to which I hope he will reply in concluding to-day's discussion. Why is this authority necessary at all? It is unprecedented. This House ought not to part with its power to grant or to refuse the Government borrowing powers in relation to any emergency which may arise, having regard to the financial and economic situation and the taxation proposals of the Government at the time. The right time to ask for borrowing powers is when the Finance Bill is introduced.

    While, therefore, I accept the necessity of substantial measures of rearmament at the present juncture the method by which the Government propose to raise the money seems to me open to the gravest objections. Moreover, this Financial Resolution is, as I have pointed out, a work of supererogation. If the Chancellor requires borrowing powers for the next financial year let him seek them in the Finance Bill. Further, when the Government bend their energies to the constructive work of peace and economic disarmament, and not till then, will they begin to have some claim to the confidence of this House. Above all we must face the fact that this expenditure will in itself be, as the Chancellor so frankly indicated in his opening speech, a grave threat to the economic and social fabric of this country. Its only justification will lie not in the creation of great fleets of ships and aeroplanes but in its success in deterring aggression while, by a constructive foreign and economic policy, the foundations of peace are laid.

    6.40 p.m.

    We have listened to two interesting speeches, but I am bound to say that when we examine them we may think that the contents of those speeches go a considerable way to account for the position occupied in the country by the parties whose leaders have just spoken. Let me deal first with some of the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Whigs. In the speech which he has just delivered he spoke with his usual vehemence but with, in my opinion, something less than his usual fairness. He suggested, on no information whatever and, I submit, on no grounds, that there was some difference between my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the other members of the Cabinet. Does he suppose, if that were true, that he is paying any compliment to the Foreign Secretary in supposing that he would remain a member of the Cabinet?

    The right hon. Gentleman again and again refused to yield in his own speech, and I do not propose to yield to him at the moment, though if he wishes later to interrupt me he may do so. I understand that he believes in the policy enunciated by the Foreign Secretary, and presumably believes in his honesty. On what basis does he suppose there is any difference between what he said and what my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said this afternoon? Let me try to make it clear why we believe it to be absolutely fantastic to suggest, as is done by hon. Members opposite in speech after speech, that there is something in the fact that we are building armaments which is contrary to the idea of the League of Nations, that the idea of national armaments is one in which a loyal member of the League must not indulge. We are very familiar with the dilemma—I have heard it again and again in this House—which has often been posed with skill by the Leader of the Opposition.' He poses the dilemma, "Does the Government believe in collective security or does it not? If it does believe in it, then it does not need these armaments. If it does not believe in it, it is not a loyal member of the League." There is not an hon. Member who has not heard that argument again and again in this House and in the country, but the fallacy of it is visible immediately you begin to examine the words "Do you believe in collective security?" That phrase can mean two very different things. It may mean "Do you believe that collective security would be a good thing and are you prepared to work for it?" It may mean, also, "Do you think that we have got it already?" If anybody thinks we have got it already, then he must indeed be oblivious of the events of the last few years.

    I am sorry that I did not catch the interruption of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), but perhaps he will deal with his point later. There is an idea, commonly held, that the Covenant contemplates armaments only for the purpose of combined action by all nations. It is remarkable how few of the most frequently-speaking friends of the League of Nations have ever read the Covenant. If they will look at Article VIII they will find that the Covenant itself contemplates the existence of such national armaments as are consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. If that is dualism, as is so often suggested in a favourite word by the Leader of the Opposition, it is a dualism expressed in the Covenant itself.

    Let me take the next argument used by the right hon. Member for Caithness (Sir A. Sinclair). Picturing the horrors by which this country might be faced, he posed the example of a possible triple attack, and one of those attacks was to be in the Mediterranean. By whom was he imagining that attack to be made? I do not think it is very difficult to guess that he was imagining an attack by a fellow member of the League, and, if he was imagining that, with what right does he taunt the Government for not necessarily supposing, in considering their armaments policy, that every member of the League is going to be loyal? There is literally no answer to that.

    Abyssinia is a most admirable example from my point of view. I have seen in the "Manchester Guardian" the reported utterances of the right hon. Member for South Hackney (Mr. H. Morrison) in a speech which he delivered the other day at a by-election which is now pending. Half that speech was an attack on Italy as a danger to the peace of the world, and in the other half he was saying that the Government, instead of indulging in armaments, ought to be relying on the collective security of the League of Nations. By what possibility can hon. and right hon. Members opposite attempt to reconcile those statements? If they will examine the constitution of the League they will see that for some of the most important actions of the League the League Council has to be unanimous; yet, while they say that we ought to rely upon the collective security given by the League, they are themselves supposing one member of the Council to be disloyal to the League.

    Some of the points which I am now putting were put with considerable force at the Labour party's own conference at Edinburgh. I do not wish to taunt hon. Members opposite too much with what was said at that conference, but it is really going a little too far for the right hon. Gentleman to suppose that, because armaments are being contemplated in this Resolution, the Government have abandoned all belief in the development of the League into something which it is not at present, or are not using the League, in so far as they can, to serve the cause of peace, although they do not regard it as something other than it is or believe that it can give complete security at the moment. An hon. Member asked: "What about Abyssinia?" By all means rely upon collective security alone, if you wish to share the fate of Abyssinia.

    I dare say we could have a very interesting Debate on that question. However much the hon. Member devotes his mind to the subject, I do not think that he will really come to the conclusion that the lesson of Abyssinia is that armaments are unnecessary. Let me turn from the leader of the Whigs to the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) who first spoke. He complained in his interesting speech that in the White Paper which has been issued there was no mention of the League of Nations. I have not confirmed that observation, but I have no doubt that he is right, and that the League of Nations is not mentioned in the White Paper. Nor, on the other hand, is the agricultural policy of the Government or the Midwives Act.

    If the implication is that, because the League of Nations was not mentioned, a relevant consideration has been left out, I would ask hon. Gentlemen opposite to examine their own record about the League of Nations. One would think, from speeches delivered from the benches opposite, that the League of Nations and support of collective security had been the continuous and steady policy of the Labour party. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear!"] I am glad to hear that "hear, hear," because it shows that there are Members who still believe in that erroneous idea. I have obtained from Transport House a report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party at Hastings in 1933, and on page 185 of that document is a full account of the official resolution which was put forward and passed unanimously on the subject of war and peace. Lest hon. Members should think it is a short resolution, I would remind them that it contained 340 words and set out the Labour party's policy on war and peace. In that resolution, from beginning to end, there is no mention of the League of Nations, and no mention of collective security. What there is, is a pledge by the Labour party to take no part in a war of any kind and an instruction to the executive to enter into immediate consultation with the Trades Union Congress in order to concert measures for a general strike in the event of any war or threat of war, whether waged in pursuance of our duty to the League of Nations or otherwise.

    Shortly afterwards, the leaders of the Labour party did as they often do: They went to the trade union leaders and they heard their master's voice. The leaders of the trade unions were not at all keen on the general strike, having had some experience of it, and the consequence was that at Southport, in the following year, there was a Resolution which said a great deal about the League. The policy at Hastings in 1933 was: "No war of any kind, whether the League of Nations binds us to take armed action or not." Next year at Southport—the report is no longer in a red cover—the decision was: "We should not go to war in any circumstances, even to defend our own shores, without the consent of the League." I am not going to ask which is the more sensible of those two proposals. They both incurred, as they deserved, the contempt of ordinary reasonable men.

    I have dealt briefly with the Labour party's own record; what is the Labour party's belief at this moment? That is rather a vital point which should be cleared up by some subsequent speaker. There seem to be two points which are relevant in the Debate. The first is: Does this Resolution contemplate more expenditure on armaments than is justifiable? The second is: Is it right to raise such part of the costs as this Resolution suggests, by means of loan? Those two questions are distinct. On the first question, whether it is right to contemplate this quantity of arms, I am not clear where the party opposite stands. I heard all the speech of the hon. Member for East Edinburgh with the exception of two or three minutes, and he may have dealt with that matter while I was away, but I did not hear him say that he thought that the total amount of armaments contemplated was excessive. Perhaps some hon. Members, speaking from the Front Bench opposite, will make clear whether the Opposition believe that it is excessive.

    It is true that the right hon. Gentleman who spoke from the Liberal benches—[An HON. MEMBER: "Whig."] "Whig" seemed to be resented. I did not mean to be discourteous, and that is why I changed the word. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that no discourtesy was intended. In his speech the right hon. Gentleman said that he was appalled by the vast figure of £1,500,000,000. No one on this side of the House suggests that that is not a vast figure, but I should have thought that, if the right hon. Gentleman was going to make any point as to its excessive character, he would have compared it with the figures of Germany and other countries. Comparing our figure with the expenditure that has been undertaken abroad, appalling as our figure may appear, he would be a bold man who would say that it was out of proportion.

    I agree that there is a margin of error, but I think we know enough to be sure that it is greater than our figure. I should say that in the last few years £1,500,000,000 had been exceeded, but I agree that the estimate cannot be very exact. I hope that subsequent speakers will agree that when we are considering this figure comparison with the figures of other countries would be a more relevant consideration.

    Let me come to the leaders of the Socialist party. The interruption by the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) was to ascertain whether we were relying upon allies or the loyal Members of the League. Let me ask hon. Members opposite to assume that the new armaments are to be used as they would use them if they formed a Government, and that our League policy is what they themselves would want; do they say that the figure is excessive? I hope that somebody will answer that question in the course of the Debate. I do not wish them to fall into any trap, so I would remind them of what was said upon the subject by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton), moving the famous resolution at the Edinburgh Conference. Although the resolution was carefully designed to mean nothing at all, and was objected to on that ground with considerable skill by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bow and Bromley (Mr. Lansbury) and the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps)—who thought that there should be some delay in voting on it in order to find out what it meant—the speech of the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland contained these words:
    "I myself judge, in the light of the facts and figures regarding rearmament in Germany, that a Labour Government, if it came into power to-morrow, and was faced, as it would be, with the present world situation, that such a Government, pending an international agreement to reduce and limit armaments—and such a Government would strive its utmost to negotiate such an agreement—pending that, a Labour Government would be compelled to provide an increase in British armaments."
    If that is still their policy, what is the use of the Leader of the Opposition going to Gorton and referring to any expenditure on armaments as the price of blood?

    If the hon. Member proposes to quote me, let him quote me exactly. I never used the phrase "price of blood."

    I am sorry if I have misquoted the right hon. Gentleman. I have the "Manchester Guardian" quotation, and I think his words were "£400,000,000 for blood."

    It is a very simple point, really. I was comparing a question of two different loans, and I said that £100,000,000 was the price of keeping people alive and the other, £400,000,000 for weapons, was the price of blood.

    I do not think I misrepresented the right hon. Gentleman, and I am extremely sorry if I misquoted him. It was represented that armaments expenditure was expenditure on death or on blood.

    I imagine it is for what the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland said it would be for if the Labour party were in power, and had to re-arm. If he meant that the Labour party would re-arm for purposes of creating a war, it is very good that the country should know it, but I imagine that he meant that they would re-arm for Defence. I was quoting the view of the gentleman who is, I think, chairman of the executive of the Labour party. I hope I have not got the exact title wrong. I do not think that what he said in moving the official Resolution is unimportant. He said that if the Labour party came into power to-morrow they would be compelled to increase British armaments. I now have the quotation in my hand. It is in the "Manchester Guardian" of the 15th instant:

    "Now we are going to have £400,000,000 for death."

    That, I gather, is the correct quotation. At Edinburgh we have one leader of the Labour party saying that if they got back to power they would have to re-arm, and then one of his colleagues speaking at a by-election in February says that any rearmament that is done, although they admit it to be necessary, is expenditure for death. If right hon. Gentlemen opposite can reconcile that with their consciences, I have nothing more to say on the subject.

    Apart from the question of the amount of armaments, there is the question whether the money should be raised by loan. I agree with some of the remarks that have been made on the Opposition side as to possible objections in certain circumstances to raising money for armaments by loan. Supposing it had been the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to raise the greater part or the whole of this expenditure by loan, the objections which have been raised from the other side would have some force. But I would remind hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite that that is not so and that the power to raise this money is to be spread over five years. That period may include periods both of what is known as slump and what is known as boom. Must we really credit the Chancellor of the Exchequer in advance with the intention of making the greatest use of this power in time of boom and no use of it in time of threatened slump? I suggest it is useful to have the power in order that you may, in the light of your best economic and expert opinion, issue your loans at the best time. Further, I do not regard it as entirely valueless that we should demonstrate to the world at large that we are determined in this matter, and I believe that is one of the greatest contributions to peace that can be made.

    Does the hon. Member seriously suggest that the decision to raise £400,000,000 over five years is to warn other nations of what we propose to do, so that they may themselves get their plans ready for a great armament race over five years?

    I do not suggest it seriously or at all. The case for this loan was that which was stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The money is needed, and it would be an intolerable burden on this country, and a set-back to any chance of the furtherance or continuance of prosperity, to raise the whole of the amount by current taxation. [Interruption.] The hon. Member need not think I will evade his point. Even if it had been difficult, I would not have tried to evade it. As regards encouraging other countries to pile up armaments, if the hon. Member's attention had been concentrated on the more important world affairs, he would have known that the piling up of armaments has been in progress abroad for some years.

    The hon. Member is doing himself less than justice. He has tied himself up in his own rhetoric. He was supposed to be explaining the reason why the Chancellor of the Exchequer has asked for powers to borrow over five years. He has not addressed himself to that question. The issue before the Committee is not that of borrowing or raising money by taxation, but why it should be announced at this moment that the Chancellor must have power that he may not exercise.

    I still think it is a valuable thing. I do not want to alter my speech too much in deference to the hon. Member, but he has raised an interesting point. If he follows discussions in such papers as "The Economist" he will know that some good economists are even questioning whether it is entirely wise to have annual budgets confined to a single year, and that it is well to plan over longer periods. I believe, in the case of a big rearmament programme, that it is useful to plan over a period of five years, and I believe it useful on the economic side to have the power to arrange your borrowing as may be necessary.

    The hon. Member who spoke from the Front Opposition Bench gave as an example to prove wasteful expenditure on the part of the Government the rise that had taken place in certain shares on the Stock Exchange. I am sure that he is aware that the price of a company's shares on the Stock Exchange is not controlled by the company itself, and does not in itself prove anything relevant to the profits that company is making. Even if it did, what was the first example which he chose?—John Brown shares. I would ask hon. Members opposite if they really regard a sister ship to the "Queen Mary" as an increase in armaments? What we have to consider is whether there is anything in this Resolution that indicates excessive armament. I have submitted that, on the published declarations of the leaders of the Labour party, there is no ground for saying that these armaments are excessive, even if in the future the League of Nations can develop as we hope.

    As regards the policy of raising part of the cost by loan, the case that has been made against the Chancellor is founded on arguments that would have been excellent if he had been proposing to raise the whole or the greater part by loan, but they have little application when he proposes to raise only the amount mentioned in these proposals. Since "The Economist" has been mentioned, I hope that right hon. Gentlemen opposite have been studying some of the letters on the subject from Mr. Keynes, who has not taken the extreme view that nothing whatever should be raised by way of loan. I fully recognise that that view was also taken by the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last. I submit that the case made for this Resolution is overwhelming, and that no good reason has been put forward against it. There is no ground whatever for saying that by supporting this Resolution you are in any way being disloyal to the League of Nations.

    7.10 p.m.

    I should like to say a word in reference to the Memorandum on the Defence Loan. I will not say that it tells us nothing. It does tell us that the Government propose to borrow £400,000,000 as a maximum. It also sets out some rather complicated machinery, the whole of which is entirely unnecessary, which will only clutter up the bookkeeping of the Government and also the Estimates when they are presented. The suggestion of fixing a sinking fund to a Service Department is of no use. It serves no purpose, and as far as I can see, the Chancellor has made no suggestion of any advantage that can accrue from it. The case of a Department like the Post Office, which is actually earning money and pays out of its surpluses for money borrowed and invested in profitable undertakings, is no parallel. A departmental sinking fund is just as much a heresy as earmarked taxation, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who I think in his last Finance Bill prided himself on his financial orthodoxy and his support of global taxation in his abolition of the Road Fund, is doing here exactly the opposite by attempting to fix a sinking fund to a non-revenue department. So far as I can see, it is with the idea of attempting to build up a suggestion that he has made some provision for the repayment of the debt.

    What is the proposal? That the various Service Departments shall be debited with the amount they borrow, and that they shall pay interest on a sinking fund of that amount. But that is merely an inter-Departmental matter. It has no bearing on the repayment of the money borrowed as to the terms, the amount of interest or the period. Although it says in the White Paper that the money allocated to the Department and then allocated by the Department by the Treasury shall be used for the redemption of debt, that gives no guarantee. It is no certain arrangement that we shall pay off the £400,000,000. For this sum the sinking fund necessary over 30 years at 3 per cent. would be £8,500,000—a less annual sum than we pay in the statutory sinking funds.

    What is to prevent a Chancellor of the Exchequer who is so unorthodox as the present Chancellor has shown himself to be from using the money allotted under this departmental sinking fund to satisfy the legal demands of the statutory sinking funds? Nothing whatever. He would still have kept within the letter of the law, and not a single penny of the £400,000,000 would have been repaid. The Chancellor himself, towards the end of his speech, referred to the complaint—I think the legitimate complaint—of Members on this side, that whereas we were condemned for borrowing £100,000,000, the Chancellor himself proposed to borrow £400,000,000. He suggested, with a very apt quotation, that only those who knew how to keep the rules were entitled to break them. When, as a Chancellor, has he shown any signs of knowing the rules, and what are the rules that he knows? They are certainly not the rules of political economy; they are certainly not the rules laid down by our big economists and bankers at the present time.

    The policy of the Chancellor, ever since he became Chancellor, has been a violation of all the advice of the best economists of every country in the world. He has certainly shown no knowledge of the rules which he claimed the right to break. He has blocked, or helped to block, international trade by a fantastic system of tariffs; he has cut down during a slump when all economists recommend that Government expenditure should be increased; now he is piling up expenditure financed by borrowing when all political economists and the majority of the bank chairmen are strongly advising a diametrically opposite course. He may say, and I have no doubt that hon. Gentlemen behind him will say when they come to reply, "Well, at any rate under the present Chancellor this country has come back to prosperity." There is an old saying that post hoc is not ergo propter hoc. It is perfectly true, as has been said many times from these benches, that prosperity has materially improved in the last five years, but for that no thanks are due to any policy of the National Government. This country lagged behind other countries in the return to prosperity, and at the present moment the improvement in this country since 1929 is far less than in a very large number of other countries. If hon. Members will look at "The Economist" of three weeks ago, they will find there a list of countries' recoveries, in which we are ninth in the scale. Prosperity has come back to this country, not because of the National Government or anything it has done, but because there has been a general trade revival.

    Surely the hon. Member does not suggest that this country has made no contribution to that revival?

    What contribution has this country made? Can the hon. Gentleman tell me why trade has revived during the last five years in the rest of the world? We do not know. We can no more explain why booms come than why slumps come.

    Surely, booms and slumps can be regulated and controlled by financial policy, and surely the financial policy of President Roosevelt and of this country has helped to cause a general rise in world prices, which will lead to the restoration of better times.

    I am aware that in recent years a great deal of thought has been given to this matter, and economists are groping for a policy which may help to smooth out the great fluctuations, but no one can explain why the slump passed. The hon. Member says it was due to the policy of this country and of President Roosevelt, but how can that be the case when the two policies were diametrically opposite? President Roosevelt spent money open-handedly from the very beginning of the slump; he poured money out. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, from the very moment that he became Chancellor, cut national expenditure. What is the use of saying that the policies of these two countries are responsible? They are diametrically opposite. Whether an economic law in America works one way, and in Great Britain in another way, I do not know—

    They do not raise prices. It was going off the Gold Standard—and we were driven off the Gold Standard—that helped to raise prices in this country. As I have said, economists are groping for a policy, and what is the policy that they are recommending at the present time? Their recommendation is that we should avoid any possible suggestion of inflation. If the hon. Member will read the "Economist," if he will read the speeches of the various bank chairmen, if he will read the articles of Professor Keynes in the "Times," he will see that in every case they are afraid of inflation, and are recommending that this particular expenditure which we are discussing should be met out of taxation and not by loans. If the hon. Member looks at Sweden, where there has been a definite, conscious policy, he will find that there they are carrying out the policy recommended by the bank managers and economists of this country—taxation in time of prosperity, and expenditure in time of slump. Every canon of political economy as we know it is diametrically opposite to the policy that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is proposing to carry out.

    His defence is that such taxation would tend to cripple our resources. The hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) has already pointed out that that is an old argument, but one which has no validity. The whole of the wealth that is to be poured into armaments is current wealth, that is to say, wealth created during the current years; and if that wealth can be created in the current year, it can be paid for by taxation just as readily and just as easily as by loan. Let me give an example. Reference has already been made to the expenditure during the War. We have a National Debt of some £7,000,000,000 incurred in those four years. If we cancel out what we borrowed and what we lent, our net indebtedness abroad amounts to £1,000,000,000 of the £7,000,000,000, leaving £6,000,000,000 which was created in this country during those four years. The whole of that £6,000,000,000 represents wealth created, or rather, goods created and services rendered, during those four years inside this country. It was not borrowed; it was not imported from abroad; £6,000,000,000 worth of goods and services was created in this country; but, owing to the policy of borrowing, that £6,000,000,000, which was created then by a combined national effort, is still hanging round the necks of the people of this country. They created wealth and made a financial fetter for themselves.

    The whole of that amount ought to have been met out of taxation, with the exception of the £1,000,000,000 which we owe on balance. If taxation had been applied, that taxation might have been crushing to some people, but at any rate it would have left us practically free from debt at the end of the War. To-day the goods and services which we propose to pour into armaments are produced for the most part in this country, and the cost could be met by taxation. If it is not met by taxation, if it is met by borrowing, we shall merely add another burden to our country, a burden which our children will have to carry, just as we are carrying the burdens which were imposed, but which need not have been imposed, during the War. I shall certainly vote against this Money Resolution, because I regard it as bad economics, because I regard it as in no way lightening the burden on the country. It is, in fact, merely imposing the burden twice over—once in the necessary production of goods and services, and, in the second place, in a debt which will hang on and on and increase our financial difficulties in the future.

    7.28 p.m.

    The Debate has covered such a very wide field, and hon. Members have expressed so many different views on various subjects. I hope the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benson) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his arguments, which I confess I had some little difficulty in understanding. I was not one of those who were surprised at the amount, large though it is, of the Defence loan which was announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for if we are to bring our depleted defences completely up to modern requirements, and of a strength requisite for our security on the basis of the standards set by some other nations, I have always been advised by those competent to judge that the cost must be enormous. What we are being asked to do to-day is to pay the price, to a very large extent, of having given a lead to the world in disarmament. That was acquiesced in by all parties, and most vigorously by the party opposite, and I think it ought to be taken into account when hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite now come down to the House and criticise so severely the Government's proposals and the necessary cost.

    The maintenance of peace dominates all other issues. I have never believed that peace can be secured by weakness, and it is because I believe that a strong Britain is not only essential to our security, but will have such an enormous influence and be such a great factor in helping to secure peace, and, I hope, put a stop to this mad armaments race, that I welcome the Government's proposals. The nation will not shirk this gigantic burden. I am sure that the Government are fundamentally right in spreading a portion of this extraordinary expenditure over a period of years, for otherwise, surely, we should be getting near to committing suicide. What I think the country really wants to be assured of is that it will get real value for our expenditure and that the amount is sufficient to place all branches of our defences, including the Territorials, so sadly lacking in equipment, into such a state of efficiency and necessary strength as to be sure, so far as it is humanly possible to say, that we shall have reasonable security in all eventualities.

    Are the Government satisfied, for instance, that industry is being harnessed in such a way as to secure the best out of it both now and in the event of war, and in the most expeditious way? We should like to hear rather more about the Government's plans for growing more food in this country. How are these doubts, engendered perhaps through experience gained in the late War, to be allayed? I know it is not easy, but I am inclined to think that if a committee of, say, three independent persons with undoubted experience and competency were to be appointed with a watching brief, it might go far to satisfy this anxiety. Among those three I would like to suggest that my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), with his unrivalled experience in these matters, would be the most acceptable both to this House and in the country, if he would accept such a position.

    I trust that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Financial Secretary, who I see in his place, will not take it amiss if I make a few observations with regard to the Chancellor's unenviable task of meeting this horrible bill. I am quite satisfied, as I think the whole House will be, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his proved skill, will raise his loans in the most economic way and at the psychological moments. But it is the extra burden that we imagine is going to fall upon revenue that is exercising the minds of many of us both in and outside this House. Although the Chancellor is not likely to unburden his mind to us as to which way his thoughts are turning, I hope the Financial Secretary will not object if I unburden my mind, because I wish to try to be constructive. Taxation to-day has reached a figure that is unprecedented in peace-time, and I make no apology for referring to taxation, for the taxpayer, as is commonly known, and particularly the Income Tax payer has always borne his burden unflinchingly and without recourse to rancour, and he will do so in the future. We all know that this bill has to be met and we have all to bear our share.

    I saw it reported in the Press that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillsborough (Mr. Alexander) speaking to one of his audiences a few nights ago, told them that it was the rich classes of this country that had placed the Government in power in order to get them to bring forward a rearmament programme, and this Defence loan was a way of getting out of paying for what they themselves had demanded. If that report is true, I hardly think it is a fair way of putting the case. It is really unworthy of the right hon. Gentleman, because he must know it is not a fact.

    I did not say the rich people had put the Government in power for the purpose. I said there was a rearmament programme introduced at the demand of the rich people. I am afraid I do not often get accurately reported in that particular paper.

    I have the report in my hand, but the right hon. Gentleman may have been misreported and I will accept that. Of course he knows such a thing as that is not the fact. We must all take our share in proportion to our means, for our security is fundamental, and no one knows that better than the right hon. Gentleman opposite. We are enjoying to-day a period of peace time, I confess not without anxiety, but with war time taxation. There is a limit even to the height at which Income Tax can be economically imposed. Has that limit been reached? The Chancellor of the Exchequer will have to decide that question—a very difficult and vital one—when he comes to consider in which way this burden is to be carried. I am frankly disturbed when I ask myself the question what margin is there in Income Tax, for instance, in the event of war, for obviously there is no margin.

    This Debate naturally is wide, because the subject covered by the Resolution is a wide one, but we cannot go into a discussion which is more appropriate to the Budget.

    The speeches have roamed over such wide fields, and taxation is such an important factor in connection with the raising of this money, that I thought I might refer to it.

    I thought we had been quite in order so far in arguing that the policy involved in this Resolution was wrong and that we could in the circum, stances refer to taxation. Do you rule that this is anticipating a Budget discussion?

    No, I understood the hon. Member was going far more into the details of taxation. So long as he deals with the argument that the burden of taxation is heavy, I shall not rule against him.

    That was exactly what I intended, but I could not have made myself sufficiently clear. I am now thinking of the effect on the nation as a whole, not the individual, for there is nothing that cripples and stifles industry more than a too high Income Tax. Today industry is prosperous and we are told that revenue is flowing into the Treasury very satisfactorily. But when the cycle turns the other way, which it inevitably must do, sooner or later, that is what has to be considered—the effect on employment, the cost of our social services which no one wishes to see curtailed, but which so largely depend on a prosperous industry. A few days ago an interesting Debate took place in this House on the trend of population on a Motion introduced by the hon. Member for the King's Norton Division of Birmingham (Mr. Cartland), a young bachelor, and he was to a great extent supported by numbers of young bachelors on both sides of the House. We can all feel gratified that they are at any rate taking such a feeling interest in this most important question. That gives hope for the future. But I heard no one advance the argument that a too high Income Tax is the greatest barrier to-day to large healthy families. That is a question which affects our race and Empire and which ought to be taken into consideration most seriously.

    My only object in making these observations with regard to taxation is to express a desire that whatever further burdens have to be imposed they shall be in a direction that will do the least harm to what I would call our fundamental position, so that we may avoid, so far as it is possible in less prosperous days, the undermining of those sources of revenue upon which the workers and the poorest people have to depend for their livelihood. This expenditure on armaments is what we might term major expenditure with which the Great War made us familiar. The sum of £400,000,000 was perhaps the cost of three months of the Great War. If such an expenditure, horrible though it be, is going to secure us from and perhaps place us in a position to prevent war, do not let us flinch from the effort.

    What we are legislating for to-day, as I conceive it, is not only the protection of this country, but the protection and security of the whole Empire. I take it for instance, that we should never enter on war unless the whole Empire decided it was of vital Imperial interest. If this is the case, are we right in our methods of Imperial diplomacy? Is the Foreign Secretary in close enough touch with Dominion opinion? Does the Foreign Secretary require improved machinery for the closer collaboration with the Dominion representatives? We must not drift into a crisis and then suddenly find a difference of opinion existing. Our policy must, therefore, be an agreed Imperial policy all the way. The last War found us with a definite and clear case, and the Dominions evidently had no doubt about that. But how different are the conditions in which we live to-day, when literally a war might come from the blue, and if there was no agreed Imperial policy and the necessary machinery for action, where should we all be? If we are to have an agreed policy why not follow the precedent of the late War and institute an Imperial Committee in London to help guide such a policy?

    There is another doubt in my mind which I am going to be bold enough to express, and which I deem to be as much in the interest of the Dominions and Colonies as of ourselves, and that is as to whether an agreed Imperial war policy should not from now onwards be based on Imperial finance; I mean loans secured on the revenues of the whole Empire, which would be a first charge, and therefore the finest security in the whole world. All the Dominions and Colonies, including India, would be represented in due proportion, the whole under the management of Imperial Commissioners. Such finance, I have very little doubt indeed, could be worked on a very low interest basis, repayable in say 20, 25 or 30 years. On a population basis, if that could be taken—I do not suggest for a moment that it is the right basis—our share might come to something like three-fifths of the whole. London would issue for the whole Empire and the whole of the loans required would be under the management of the Imperial Commissioners at the Bank of England. If, unfortunately, we are obliged to fight, my point then is that it must be a definite fight in which the whole Imperial strength is whole-heartedly concentrated—all our brain power, our man-power, our financial power concentrated at one centre.

    In considering these huge proposals today it is really not the size of the immediate cost of rearmament that causes the greatest anxiety but rather whether behind the Government proposals there are really any well-thought-out plans, but I trust my right hon. Friend the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence has them already locked up in his desk, and I hope he will be able to enlighten us on this very important matter. I feel most strongly that we here at home ought to view afresh and must face the reality of Empire. We must not flinch from bringing to an issue questions of delicacy, and perhaps of real difficulty, in our own family and, moreover, no time should be lost in doing so. If the doubts that I have endeavoured to express should be well founded and there should be a germ of helpfulness in the suggestions I have with all humility ventured to place before the House, then I would urge the Government and the Opposition parties, in view of the extraneous pressure from dictatorships and the cumbrous methods of democracy, to give their immediate consideration to the general Imperial attitude, for I can only think and believe that that is of vital concern for the protection and future prosperity and existence of our Commonwealth of Nations. If the Empire is prepared to act on this matter, vital to us all as one whole unit, then the influence that it can exert for world appeasement cannot be over-estimated.

    7.48 p.m.

    I should like to assure the hon. Member that he need have no anxiety with regard to the burdens that will be caused by this loan. The Gov- ernment will see that they fall upon the shoulders of the working class, and not upon the landed and financial interests. The speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was concise and clear as usual, but not very inspiring. A reference that he made to the finance of the Minister of Labour in a preceding Government interested me. It occurred to me that the same financial canons were followed then as are being followed now, and that the inspiration with regard to the finance of the Treasury was the same as is behind the arrangements covered by the present Resolution. I take it that he was a little bit ungenerous in criticising the responsible Treasury official, who was the same individual who had quite evidently guided the present Chancellor of the Exchequer with regard to this Resolution. The Resolution appears to me to be one that can commend itself to many Members if they accept the League of Nations and the collective peace policy. The experience that we have had of the League of Nations in recent years has made it plain that it is a very feeble institution in time of crisis. The collective peace system proved futile in the case of Manchuquo, and also in the case of Abyssinia, and consequently it appears, to me that, while the Government are loyal to the League of Nations, as they were during the time of the Abyssinian situation, they are also taking the precaution to increase their armaments and greatly to multiply their forces. At the same time I believe that the Government would have been acting wisely if they had made it perfectly plain that they have not any great faith in the League of Nations.

    The speech of the hon. Member for Norwich (Mr. H. Strauss) was quite evidently inspired, although it was delivered from a bench behind that which he usually adorns. It would be as well if the Government would be quite honest and make it plain to the whole country how little faith they have in the League of Nations, and that this phrase "collective peace system based upon the League" is very much a phrase, and nothing more. I believe it would mean a great deal if we got rid of a lot of the hypocrisy and cant associated with this institution. The Abyssinian Emperor put his faith in it, and in a lot of these phrases, and he and many of his people suffered very greatly in consequence. One of the things most necessary at the present time is to get clear in the public mind that this institution is a complete imposture as an instrument of peace. The Government's policy appears to me to be based upon a realist conception of the League of Nations. It also takes into account the idea of the balance of power and that in future developments Britain will be able to depend upon certain allies.

    I have been wondering if the Government are not rather optimistic in thinking in terms of five years in which they will be able to prepare for a conflict. When I think back a year to the previous White Paper, it is evident now, from the steps that are being taken and the acceleration of the policy and the additional amount of money that is going to be spent, that the Government evidently believe that the situation with regard to the possibility of war is about 100 per cent. worse than it was this time last year, and I am wondering why it is that they are still thinking in terms of a five years' interval for preparations for a conflict that they evidently believe is practically inevitable. The Government have to face this criticism, that what they are providing is either not enough or too much. If they have decided that they can bank upon certain allies in the next war, I wonder whether they are going to be justified in that assumption, because in view of recent developments and recent expenditure it does not appear to me that, in the event of war in the next 12 months, the British Government would be in too strong a position in facing certain foes in Europe to-day.

    The Government's proposals have been received with considerable concern in certain countries, which rather disproves the lion. Member's statement.

    I have noticed references in the German Press. The comment is that the proposals are amazing and that they are colossal. In the Italian Press it is stated that they have come to a gentlemen's agreement with Britain, and therefore the proposals do not concern them.

    And that the poorer countries might find themselves in a very unfavourable situation in the event of a European war.

    I was pointing out that when Britain was trying some few months ago to bluff the Italian dictator and it did not come off, there was a very general opinion in Conservative circles in this country that British armament was not in a sufficiently strong position to enable this country to make good the bluff against Italy at that time. Evidently the hon. Member agrees.

    If that was so, as far as I can judge, the international situation and the evident apprehension of the Government are 100 per cent. worse than was the case a year ago. I cannot see that the programme for which the Government are responsible is really sufficient, on the assumption of the Government that the League of Nations is no use, that the collective peace system is a hopeless business, and that they can rely only upon the support that might be obtained with the balance of power. Recent events have shown that evidently it does not do to depend very much upon treaty obligations. I wonder whether the foreign policy of the present Foreign Secretary is not putting this country into a position in which it will be left by itself. I notice that the Liberal party which has now vanished from the House was very enthusiastic about the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, because evidently he was the one white-headed boy in the present Government and the only one that could be depended upon always to say the right thing. Little Lord Fauntleroy is the Foreign Secretary, but he has very wicked colleagues who will not allow his foreign policy to have a chance. As far as I can see his foreign policy, I am not the least bit enthusiastic, and I do not think that he has been the least bit successful.

    As I regard the future and the way that things are going, I can easily visualise Britain finding herself in a position of splendid isolation, or the reverse, because of the policy of the present Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs. If that is to he the case, it would appear that the rearmament is not based upon Britain fight- ing alone, but in association with certain other Powers on the assumption that the balance of power is operating in Europe. The way in which British foreign policy has been conducted during the last year or two has appeared to me to he very strange. I believe that that policy has very often been dictated rather by the class sympathies of the Members of the Government than by their class interests. They have allowed their class sympathies to make them blind to what their class interests really should have taught them in regard to the situation. For example, one needs only to comment upon the present position in the Mediterranean and the importance of the Mediterranean in connection with British Imperialism, or upon the position that has been developing in reference to Germany. As long as Germany was repudiating Versailles, and it did not seem to concern British Imperialism, there was not very much sympathy with the other parties to the Versailles Treaty. Now that Germany is rapidly approaching the position when Hitler will present the British Government with "Stand and deliver our colonies or take what is coming to you," I think that you will have there also an illustration of how weak, from the point of view of British Imperialism, British policy has been in recent years.

    So with regard to this Resolution, I assume that the Government are basing their policy upon the old idea of the balance of power, and I believe that they are not providing a sufficient amount. They are not providing for a sufficient acceleration, and they will he woefully disappointed when the crisis becomes a little more acute than it is at the present time. As I said at the beginning, I would like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he is replying to the Debate, to make it perfectly plain that, while the Government are still prepared to remain within the League of Nations, they recognise how weak and futile that instrument has proved itself, and that they are basing their policy upon the assumption that it may be a long time before the League of Nations is of any very great use in the world. It would be a great advantage if the atmosphere could be cleared in that respect.

    As far as this Debate has gone, there is not really a fundamental difference between the Labour party, the Liberal party and the Government with regard to this matter, but, speaking for my own party, we take up fundamentally different views. We do not believe in the League of Nations or that peace is possible through any collective system. We cannot expect peace and disarmament in a capitalist world. We believe that war is one of the incidents of the working of the present economic order. The Liberal Leader said they could not expect peace and disarmament when the Government are making war in the economic sphere, and when he made use of those words, I thought that with some adaptation they could be made to represent our considered view, that, within the capitalist economic system, war is one of the weapons which ultimately will be resorted to as the crisis within that economic order becomes more acute. The Liberal Leader also said that we had to face the problem of making this armament unnecessary. That is a very sound proposition to put forward. At the same time, I do not believe that he and his colleagues are facing up to the problem. He evidently believes that, if the National Government were to change the system and reduce tariffs and abolish quotas, the League of Nations would become a wonderful peace instrument again, that there would not be the need for this armament programme, and that the nations would be inspired by this wonderful action on the part of the National Government. I do not think that anything like that would happen, or that there would follow any such consequences, because we have to go much deeper. We should find that the tariffs and quotas are not something that are brought into operation simply because of diversity on the part of the Government, but they are implicit in the working of the system because of the desire to protect and to secure markets.

    If they are inherent in the system and we are to face up to the problem of making armaments unnecessary, we shall have to go deeper and realise that we have to change the economic system altogether. Therefore we take a fundamentally different point of view from that of other parties in this House with regard to the question of armaments. One of the great factors tending to make the world go at such a headlong pace towards the possibility of war in the immediate future is the weakness of the working-class Socialist movement in the respective countries at the present time and the way in which those movements have become more or less tied up with their own capitalist class in their respective countries in the identification of the two classes with one national interest in those countries. If you had had in each of those countries, as you had after the close of the last War, a working-class Socialist movement threatening the overthrow of the capitalist economic order, threatening revolution and the capture of power and the bringing into being of Socialist commonwealths in those countries, you would not have had a situation that would have allowed the nations to drift, as they are doing, into the possibility of a war similar to the one waged from 1914 to 1918.

    The great factor that can make for peace in the world is a working-class movement in each of the countries at war with its own bourgeois class, with its own possessing class, seeking to dispossess that class and bring into being a Socialist commonwealth. I believe that that is the one great factor that can make for peace in the world. Unfortunately, as I see it, in each of the countries there has been this dependence upon the League of Nations and the assumption that you can get within the capitalist economic order the lead that will give you a sound basis for peace. That is leading the working classes all wrong in this and other countries, and consequently a crisis is here to-day which enables the Government to come forward with a Resolution for the expenditure of all these millions of pounds upon armaments or the instruments of death. If the Government in this country had been faced by a working-class movement that was in fundamental disagreement with them in regard to the armaments problem, and determined to overthrow that Government and its policy, I believe that we should never have had such a Resolution presented to the House of Commons. The National Government are very fortunate that they can come to this House and find that there is not arrayed against them a strong working-class movement in fundamental opposition to them, and threatening the whole capitalist economic order in Britain with overthrow.

    There is one paragraph in the White Paper dealing with the Army, and I want to say a few words on the difficulties which the Secretary of State for War has had in connection with recruiting. I believe that one of the factors that has weighed against recruiting has been the way in which men have been treated in the Army, the bad conditions and the little consideration shown for the men. There is one class of treatment in particular to which I would refer, and that is the way in which the Army treats men who are accepted as A1 men, who afterwards develop trouble through tuberculosis and are discharged with no pension, because the War Office declares that their tuberculosis did not arise out of their service. I put one case before the Financial Secretary to the War Office. I presented evidence from the man's doctor, who had seen him before he went into the Army and who assured the War Office that he had been perfectly sound. This is what I am told by the War Office:
    "I am afraid that it is impossible to admit his case as attributable to Army service, since we have no evidence that the disability was directly due to any specific circumstances or conditions of that service. As my secretary pointed out last September, a disease contracted during military service is not necessarily the direct result of military duties."
    That is the answer I got from the War Office.

    Will the hon. Member read the last sentence?

    I will do so:

    "The medical certificate which you sent with your letter goes no further than to show that the disease arose during Army service, but there is no evidence that specific military conditions gave rise to the disability. If you can furnish any such information I would see that the case was investigated once more, but on the present evidence a careful review does not make it possible to depart from the original decision."
    I would draw attention to the words:
    "The medical certificate which you sent with your letter goes no further than to show that the disease arose during Army service."
    If it arose during Army service, then he got it in the Army, and the Army should accept responsibility for it. How is the man to be able to prove it to the satisfaction of the War Office? The trouble came when he was in the Army. How could he have got it but through his service in the Army? Is the Minister going to say that it was hereditary, or something like that? I believe that the general treatment by the War Office of the men has been one of the factors against recruiting. I mention this case because I am opposed to this Financial Resolution on the ground that I have no faith whatsoever in the National Government or the governing class in this country. The whole system is arranged in order to protect the privileged, propertied class. Even now, under this Financial Resolution, which is practically nothing but inflation, the working classes, as the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) pointed out, are going to be taxed by the rise in prices they will have to pay for their commodities. One thing I hope will result, and that is that with the rise in prices there will be again developed such a militant Socialist movement in this country and this programme of armaments will lead to so much discontent, that it will result in the overthrow not only of the Government but of the whole system for which this Government is responsible.

    I have listened with interest to the latter part of the hon. Member's speech. Did I understand him to say that he has no faith in the League of Nations?

    I am asked whether I said that I have no faith in the League of Nations. The great Russian Socialist, Lenin, described it as a league of robbers, a thieves' kitchen, and we of the Independent Labour party think that Lenin's description was singularly appropriate. That is our view to-day, and anybody who has had faith in the League of Nations has been sadly disappointed, such as the Emperor of Abyssinia or the Chinese in Manchukuo. There has been much criticism of the position of the Government with regard to the League. We think that the leaders of this Government are practically the League of Nations. What they say goes with the League. M. Blum's Government has very largely had to follow what would be pleasing to right hon. Gentlemen opposite. We know what those right hon. Gentlemen are. We know how they have treated the unemployed, and consequently we have no faith whatsoever in an institution of which they are the pillars. I hope that I have made it plain. Our party are opposed to this Resolution. We are opposed to giving any facilities to the National Government. We do not believe that they govern in the interests of the masses of the people, but that their Government is a class Government, organised to protect the interests of the rich and well-to-do.

    I should like to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer a question, to which he might reply. I have been interested in the statements made from time to time by members of the Government and their supporters, that Britain has led the way in disarmament and has allowed our defences to get to such a dangerous position because of concern for disarmament. I should like the Chancellor of the Exchequer to tell us how many Governments have spent more money on armaments, since the close of the last War in 1918 till 1933, than the British Government. I do not know of any country which has spent more upon armaments than the British Government, with the possible exception of the United States. Possibly Russia in the last few years may come into comparison with the British Government, but I question whether, taking the period from 1918 to 1933, the Russian expenditure has been as great as that of the British Government. If my assumption is correct I hope we shall not hear so much about Britain disarming while other nations were arming. The policy of the National Government is absolutely unsound. They are having regard only to the interests of the rich and well-to-do, and I trust that as a result of their policy such discontent will be created throughout the country as will sweep away this Government and bring into being an anti-militant Socialist movement, which will be the inspiration of similar movements in other countries, and lead to a great Socialist revival throughout the world, which will be responsible for a real policy of peace.

    8.28 p.m.

    I do not know anything about the case of the soldier mentioned by the hon. Member for Camlachie (Mr. Stephen), but later on I shall have something to say about another case, and I do not think I shall find myself far from agreement with the hon. Member. I was interested in his suggestion for replacing the old-fashioned forms of warfare by a new and modern form, which I am sorry to say is spreading. I hope notice will be taken of his speech, because I foresee that when the younger generation is older it will be the very problem they will have to face; precisely that form of warfare which he advocated to the Committee and which his colleagues throughout the world to-day are advocating. I do not say this prophetically, because I know it is coming. The hon. Member also asked Members on this side of the House and also the Government to make it plain that we have no faith in the League. For myself I will not say that I have no faith in the League of Nations—far from it; but I have no faith, and I say it deliberately, whatsoever at the moment in the League being able to protect us militarily. But that does not mean that I have no faith eventually in the efficacy of the League of Nations. The two things are entirely different.

    We must think in wider terms than our own island. All history gives us a lead in that respect. As communications improve and as we are brought nearer together we must think in wider terms. In the old days we used to think of Northumbria, Wessex and East Anglia. I speak for England, although I am an Irishman, and I say that we should have been indignant if anybody had suggested that we should remove our English army from the Scotish border. Yet that has come about. We came into closer contact and began to speak in terms of the British Islands. Now that communications have still further improved we are brought, for better or worse, closer together, and eventually we shall have to think not in terms of France and Germany and of England, but in terms of the Negroid, Semitic, the Aryan races and Mongols, and ourselves, whatever that may mean. But that is a matter more for a Debate on foreign affairs.

    The Leader of the Liberal party made several remarks during the course of his speech which I should like to take up. I am sorry that at the moment the Liberal benches are completely empty. I think that on occasions there should be one of their number present to hear remarks which may be addressed to them by hon. Members of the House. The right hon. Member's views were very idealistic but completely impracticable. His argument was that free trade would prevent war and that there was, therefore, no necessity for a big loan for rearmament purposes. Did free trade prevent war in 1914 when a Liberal Government was in power? I suggest that the Liberal Government of 1914 would have been wiser to have raised a large loan for rearmament purposes before 1914, and to have seen that the arms of this country were so deadly that it would have made Germany hesitate twice before she attacked Belgium. The result might have been different if they had acted as the present Government are now acting.

    The right hon. Gentleman talked of the peace-loving democratic Germany up to the days when Herr Hitler came into power, and suggested that it was because of our policy during that period of German history that we are now faced with a dictator in Germany and the huge German armament programme. I deny it. That is not so. The policy of the German Government has been the same, republic or dictatorship, since 1918. The German policy since the end of 1918 has been like eating an artichoke. Gradually every vestige of the Treaty of Versailles has been stripped away. Allied officers were seen on the streets of Berlin and it was said that no sovereign State could look itself in the face with officers of a foreign Power on the streets of Berlin. They were removed. The Army of Occupation had to go. It was said that no sovereign State could hold up its head in the world if it was not allowed to use the flag it liked. Germany was allowed to use her old flag. And so leaf by leaf that artichoke is being stripped and swallowed, whatever Government is in power in Germany. All the leaves have not yet been stripped off; we have not yet got to the core of the artichoke, and many people think the core is the most desirable part. As far as Germany is concerned, the core is not what she had in 1914, but what she wanted in 1914, and that has not changed, whatever may have been the Government in power.

    The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal party also pointed out that we spent some £7,400,000,000 during the Great War and that we are spending approximately the same amount now in peace time; but he did not mention how much we are spending to-day on pensions to people who were disabled in the Great War, nor did he mention the lives that were lost in the Great War. If we spend the same amount, or if we even spend 10 times more, we shall still gain, because we are not losing the lives. We shall gain by spending in time rather than too late. I was delighted to see the Liberal party forced into the invidious position of championing the cause of dictatorships driven to despair. I can only say that the attitude of the Liberal party to-day has completely justified the sabre-rattling of such dictators as Hitler or Mussolini. If the Government of this country were Liberal, one would see every demand of the dictators acceded to, and their sabre-rattling would be more than justified.

    I am glad that we have the present Government in power. The right hon. Gentleman reminded us that Napoleon III contemplated an invasion of England, but he did not say that Napoleon III did not invade England because we built up our arms and were ready to meet him. He went on to point out that the whole matter was settled in the end by a trade agreement—we got rid of our tariffs and were friends again. The same thing would happen on another occasion. Other countries may be threatening an invasion of England or our Empire. What are we doing? We are doing the same as in the time of Napoleon: we are building up our arms, and in the end we shall be able to say, "Now be sensible and agree to trade with us instead of fight against us." History will repeat itself, as it has often done in the past.

    We are being asked to-day whether we wish to pay for our armaments by means of a loan or by taxation. Speaking as one of the younger generation, naturally I feel that whatever we can do in the way of paying out of current expenditure we should do. My generation has to think of a long time ahead. We have to think of all the interest that will have to be paid on debts. Although I realise that it would be impossible to raise the whole of this colossal sum out of taxation at the moment, I think that as far as possible the country should pay for its armaments out of revenue rather than by loan.

    To come down to earth from this very high level of £400,000,000 and to talk for a few moments about the way in which the money is to be spent. I would like to go into details with reference to the Services and the individuals concerned. I do not think we shall profit by talking airily about these huge figures unless we also consider critically and constructively how the pennies are to be spent. One of the greatest moves that the Government made was to appoint a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. That was not an easy job. Anyone who knows the Services and the Service Departments knows that it was necessary to move slowly and tactfully. The Minister has already done a great deal of work, but I would like to see him have a wider influence. I would like to see his Department strengthened by an Under-Secretary, partly because I think the lack of one prevents him from having the status and prestige he ought to have vis-a-vis the three Service Departments, and partly because I can in my own mind see a great deal of work that an Under-Secretary could do. Indeed, I am certain that the Minister himself would be only too glad if his Department were given more influence and wider powers. Although he may be modest about the matter, I am certain that he sees that in the end it will be absolutely necessary.

    But co-ordination must not stop at the Ministries. It must go down through the ranks. I doubt whether we shall ever have real co-ordination in our fighting Services until we have much more co-ordination of the General Staffs. I do not know that it would be any more difficult than was the appointment of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence to have some form of General Staff by which the Admirals, Air Marshals and Generals would all be in one staff. I can envisage the time—in fact it is so at the moment—when warfare is amphibious and when the three Services are so closely co-ordinated in war that it would be better for them to be administered and trained towards that end in peace. Not only must the co-ordination go right down to the lower ranks, but it must be extended to civilians. I suggest that there is a good case now for the co-ordination, from the economic point of view, of the soldiers', sailors' and airmen's lives, particularly when they leave the Services, with the civilian life of the State. As far as the Post Office, police and so on are concerned, there should be some system, which I think could be worked out by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence—for personnel is Defence—by which men, having left their jobs in the Civil Departments and gone into the Services, could come back to the Civil Departments and have the same seniority as they would have had if they had served in those Departments the whole time. If that were the case, it would do more than anything else to improve recruiting, and a spontaneous flow of recruits into the Army would do more good in the eyes of the world than all the amounts of £400,000,000 we might spend.

    I would like now to say a few words about the Navy. There are many small outlying stations where we could scrap and save without impairing efficiency. In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence to Jamaica, Bermuda and other small stations dotted over the Atlantic and the East Indies. Is an infantry battalion justified at those stations? Of what use is an infantry battalion in such places as Bermuda or Jamaica? I suggest that a good deal of that work could be done by the Navy through the Royal Marines. The garrisoning of places like that could be done much better by landing parties than by expensive infantry battalions which ought to be in our field force. That is a matter which ought to be gone into carefully.

    When we are spending money on the Navy, it would be just as well for us to make up our minds as to the future of naval tactics. We hear arguments about the big ship and the small ship. As one without any knowledge of actual naval warfare, but with a certain knowledge of history, I submit that history has shown that Britain has been at her best on the sea when she has had small powerful craft with initiative, and the power of manoeuvre as opposed to great lumbering weapons which are difficult to get out to sea, and involve such risks that we scarcely dare use them. A case can be made out for a close study of the possibilities of smaller craft, and possibly for a large increase in the number of small, powerful, speedy craft such as coastal motor boats, torpedo boats and the like which would be almost immune from air attack while themselves in a position to attack these monsters and perhaps drive them off the seas. I suggest that these are all subjects worthy of examination. While I am criticising, I am trying to do so constructively.

    A further point in that connection is that of the Fleet Air Arm. I have never been able to see why the Navy should not have its own aeroplanes if it requires them. The sole question is one of function and since when has it been held that the function of the Navy is merely to steer ships or that of the Air Force to pilot aeroplanes? The functions in war of various services may change slightly if it is a case of attack and not of defence, but in defence, I submit, the function of the Navy is the command of the sea, the function of the Air Force is the denial of the air to the enemy and the function of the Army the holding of the land. In the performance of those functions I cannot see why, in the case of the Navy, for example, if aeroplanes are required to assist in maintaining the command of the sea the Navy should not have them. Likewise, as regards the holding of the land, a position may one day arise in which each battery of artillery will require to have its own reconnaissance aeroplanes and in that case the machines ought to be Army aeroplanes. It might also be necessary, for instance, for a general to use an aeroplane. The point is to get the functions of each branch clear, and not to have them muddled up, and it is not a question of this or that service merely being employed to drive or to steer this or that particular vehicle or boat.

    In the same connection and in regard to the function of the Air Force, namely, the denial of the air, I consider it wrong that ground defences against aerial attack should be administered by the Army. If you had the ground defences against aerial attack administered by the Air Force, you would have real co-ordination between the aeroplanes in the air and the guns on the ground, co-operating with each other and administered by the same authority. When all these millions are being voted we ought to look carefully into the question of whether we are organising efficiently against the possibility of aerial attack. As it is now we would have the Navy on the sea responsible for letting us know when the aeroplanes were coming over; the Air Force operating in the sky responsible for trying to bring the hostile aircraft down; the War Office responsible for shooting at them from the ground; the Home Office responsible for issuing gas masks to civilians and the Ministry of Health responsible for the hospitals to which the wounded are to be taken. In all this muddle, who is responsible for giving an air raid warning? There must be some form of co-ordination from the beginning and all the way through. The defence of Madrid at the moment, I think it will be agreed on all sides, has been handicapped by the lack of unity among the different factions making up the popular front, who cannot always agree until the critical moment comes on who is to take command and give orders. Let us consider these questions without fear or prejudice, so that we may be ready in time, and let us benefit by the lessons of other people's experiences.

    I now come to that Cinderella of the Services, the Army. I wish to pay a tribute to the Secretary of State for War who has, of late, been receiving a good many kicks—although I agree with hon. Members that he may have been giving some as well. He has done something definite for the Army. He has shown more trust in the soldier than was formerly shown. I do not think anybody in this House has been more keen that I have been in fighting the soldiers' battle in the last year, and nobody is more pleased than I am to see the gradual relaxation of old, out-of-date, archaic restrictions. I am bound to say that the Minister has assisted us and by his attitude and by the publicity he has obtained for the Army, he has done a great deal for recruiting. As one who has criticised him on occasion I take this opportunity of giving credit where credit is due.

    The leader of the Liberal party asked what was the role of the Army, and one has heard hon. Members, in more than one part of the Committee, ask "Why should we have an Army at all?" I would ask whether command of the sea alone has ever made any country secure? During the War of American Independence we had command of the sea, but we lost that war. Between the Battle of Trafalgar, when we swept the French off the seas, and the Battle of Waterloo, there was an interval of 10 years, and we feared the French all that time. In the Great War we had the mastery of the sea from the beginning, but it cannot be denied when there were times when we were very anxious indeed. The Air Force alone cannot guard our shores and our Empire. Aerial warfare might come to a deadlock, and what would the country do then if it had no Army with which to meet aggression? There is no doubt about the necessity for the Army, and there is no doubt about its role. The only difficulty is to decide on the best way of training it to fill that role.

    There is a rule by which a Member is not allowed to ask the same question twice in a Session, and I think there ought to be an unwritten law that a Member is allowed to make the same joke once only every Session. There is one thing lacking in our military organisation which is very serious. I mentioned it the other day in the Debate on the Reserve Forces Bill. That is the question of a military police force. We are asked to spend £400,000,000 on rearmament, and we have spent recently a great deal of money on sending a military force to Palestine to clear up what is really a police problem. I think we seriously lack some form of military police force, rather like the Italian Carabinieri, or what used to be the Spanish Civil Guard, or the Canadian North-West Mounted Police. If we had some form of military police force like that, which could go to Palestine or to parts of the British Empire, I am sure it would be far more effective in clearing up troubles than in sending a very expensive expeditionary force which we really need for our home defence.

    The "Manchester Guardian" the other day said that I was advocating a military police force for use in this country. It is not for use in this country. The guardianship of Manchester and of other towns can be left to our ordinary civil police, but no one, not even the "Manchester Guardian," can deny that from the Italian point of view, in the conquest of Abyssinia, their Carabinieri, their military police force, behind the lines did invaluable service for them which could not have been done so cheaply by soldiers.

    I would like to join in the plea for equipment as soon as possible, and particularly equipment for the Territorial Army. The Territorial Army is expected to join up citizens who love soldiering and who are prepared to do their bit, give up their evenings, and so on in order to train. They are told that they are doing a patriotic job, that they are soldiers, and yet when they get there, time and again they are handed out completely old or useless equipment, with no guns, or with wooden dummies or blanks. Can you expect anybody really to be keen on joining such an army as that? You would not expect an artisan to join an institution unless he was given his proper tools, and it would do more good for recruiting perhaps than anything else, in the Territorial Army or the Regular Army, if we brought up to date at once our equipment; and I very much hope it will come. Until it does come. I am afraid we shall not get very much farther.

    While on the subject of recruiting, I would like to say that we can do a great deal for the Regular Army without spending large sums of money. Some of this money which we are now voting is to be spent on the Regular Army on providing new battalions and in other ways to stimulate recruiting. I think it is more a question of looking into the terms of service and conditions in the Regular Army than spending great sums on it that is required. There is no dearth of recruits in the Air Force, and none in the Navy, but in the Regular Army there is a dearth of recruits, and there will continue to be until the Army is brought up to date. A lad who joins to-day is told that he will get free board and lodging when he goes into the Army, so much pay, 2s. a day, and so on, but he is very soon disillusioned. He goes into the Army; he gets his free lodging, it is true, but as to his board, he gets meals up to 4 o'clock in the afternoon, but no supper; he gets his 14s. a week, but a great deal of that is stopped before it comes to his pocket, because he is put to a great deal of personal expense in buying uniform or fancy bits of uniform and things like that, which should be a charge on the Government, and not on the purse of the private soldier.

    Likewise, when he goes abroad and gets to India, he finds that, far from getting free board, he has to pay out of his own pocket anything from 1½ to 2 or 2½ annas a day on extra messing, and he then has to pay for wood out of his own pocket in order to provide himself with hot shaving water or bath water, which he would not get otherwise. I am sorry to have to make this strong indictment, but every word of it is true, and until the conditions in the Regular Army are thoroughly sorted out by those responsible and put right, both at home and abroad, in India, and until the man who goes in knowing that what he sees on the posters or pamphlets as to his conditions of service is true, and that he will get a fair deal when he gets in, and also some prospect of a Government job or of a job of some sort when he comes out, you cannot expect him, for economic reasons, to join up.

    Finally, I would like to say a word or two as to the future. For the next three or four months I do not believe there will be much danger. Germany is not yet as strong as France, as far as I know, and France still possesses the most powerful military machine in Europe. We have not yet begun to catch up. The danger period will come between the time when Germany begins to outstrip France and we ourselves have begun to catch up in armaments. This loan for which we are asking will do a great deal to keep the peace by doing exactly what some hon. Members opposite have criticised us for doing, namely, threatening the dictator Powers, but the best answer to any country in Europe or the world would be a spontaneous movement by our own people, particularly before that danger period comes, about four months from now, when Germany catches up France and we are not yet ready. If by then or before then our own people show that there is no question of party politics in our wanting to defend our homeland, and that we can combine in such an army as the Territorial Army, recruited up to strength, for the defence of our country, we shall do a great deal to ensure the preservation of peace within our own frontiers and indeed throughout the world.

    9.4 p.m.

    I will not follow the hon. and gallant Member for Chelmsford (Captain Macnamara) in all the review of the Forces by air, sea, and land which he has given to the Committee, but I should like to bring the Committee back to the financial aspect of this Resolution. At the same time, with very much that the hon. and gallant Member said on the question of recruiting for the Army I find myself in agreement, and I hope that when the Estimates come before the House this matter will be more fully ventilated. Before, however, I go on to my further remarks, I would like to take the hon. and gallant Member up on his opening remark in regard to the League of Nations. I am afraid he seemed to me to damn the League with faint praise. He believed that it was useful perhaps just in small matters, but that it was more a case of the day after to-morrow than now. We have heard a great deal about the uses of the League. It is useful to-morrow, but not to-day. Jam to-morrow, but never jam now. I think we are rather tired of that.

    The hon. Member for Camlachie (Mr. Stephen) apparently does not want jam at all. He wants a very bitter medicine, which we have all got to take, a medicine which has been concocted in Moscow and rehashed in Glasgow—a very nasty medicine. My hon. Friends here and I do not take the view of either the hon. Member for Camlachie or the hon. and gallant Member. On the contrary, we feel that we can get some jam to-day and we want to have it, and because we fail to see in the Government's statement on defence expenditure any reference to the League, or any indication that their defence policy is related to that collective foreign policy which should arise out of their support of the League, we must oppose this Resolution.

    I am not one of those who would say that with Europe as it is to-day we can neglect our defence forces. Indeed, if the Government came to the House with a statement that it wanted a considerable increase in our defence forces, because it needed them to pool them with those of other members of the League in the defence of public law in Europe, I for one, could not see my way to oppose them, but because they do not say that I have not confidence in their defence policy, which is not based on a sound foreign policy. The Government have, in fact, lowered the prestige of the League of Nations all the time they have been in office and all the previous years. They had the decency last March at least to mention the League of Nations in their White Paper, somewhat in an aside it is true, but they have not even mentioned it in this White Paper. Since last March we have seen Fascist nations triumphant and aggressive throughout Europe, acting on the offensive, and we very much fear that the big defence forces which the Government envisage will not be used to maintain public law in Europe, but may be used to keep a ring fence while the international gangsters get busy, as they have been doing in Spain.

    For that reason we have no confidence in the defence policy of the Government, but, as I said in my opening remarks, I want to go back to the financial side of this question rather than the foreign affairs side. I would ask the Committee whether the method which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has adopted for financing this big expenditure is the right one. Over a period of five years it is proposed to spend approximately £1,500,000,000, in other words there is to be an annual expenditure of £300,000,000, of which, I understood the Chancellor to say, £220,000,000 would be found by the revenue—roughly and on an average throughout the five years—and £80,000,000 on an average out of the loan. There will be two-thirds from revenue and one-third from loan. What I should like to know is what percentage of all this large expenditure can be called capital expenditure for which a loan could very well be raised. It is a sound financial policy not to raise loans for any but capital expenditure, for expenditure on something which will last and produce revenue in some form or other—perhaps not revenue in money form, but in some other form. It should not be spent on a wasting asset, and here is where I feel that we ought to know a great deal more than the Government have allowed us to know in the White Paper.

    We are to raise £400,000,000 by loan for the purpose of building or constructing—what? What will be there in 10 or 20 years' time? Will not the assets by then have gone or wasted away, and will not future generations be paying for something which has gone? Take the case of the five battleships, two laid down last year and three to be laid down in the coming year. What will be the life of those great battleships? Those which form part of the present battle fleet now were all constructed just before the War, and are said to be now becoming obsolete, and, therefore, must be replaced. They have had a life of 20 years only. Can we guarantee that the money we are now to spend on battleships will be paid off in 20 years' time? I think it is an unsound policy to raise by loan money to be spent on such things as battleships, particularly in view of the new inventions which are always coming along and the dangers which great floating forts like battleships are always subject to, especially from the air. Battleships at least ought to be paid for out of revenue. No mining or colliery company which is working a wasting asset raises all its finance by loans. It should always put by so much out of its profits every year to meet its wasting assets, and I maintain that the nation should act in the same way with a wasting asset.

    It is the same with the Army. Considerable expenditure is foreshadowed for the mechanisation of the Army, for new artillery, motor transport and tanks. Here, again, if we finance that expenditure by loan one must ask, How much of the material is likely to be of value in 10 years' time? With a constantly changing technique in the mechanisation of the armed forces, how are we to know that the new artillery, transport and tanks will not be obsolete in a short time? Looking through the White Paper, there seem to me to be only two items, perhaps, which could reasonably be put down to capital expenditure and the money raised by loan, one being the new aerodromes and the other the shadow factories to be built for the manufacture of munitions and other materials for the forces. One might reasonably expect that they will last for several years to come, but even in that case one cannot say how long. Therefore, from the technical point of view, it is dangerous in the extreme, both to the national finance and the national interest, to raise this money by loan if it can possibly be raised in any other way.

    The hon. Member appears to be speaking as though the whole cost of the expansion was to be borne by loan. He wishes to put the case fairly, and I am sure that he will agree that approximately three-quarters of the cost is to be met out of revenue. He has mentioned only certain items of expenditure which could be fairly borne by a loan. Perhaps he will tell the Committee whether he considers that the three-quarters to he raised by ordinary means is an unfair proportion. As he has analysed the items on which the expenditure will be laid out, perhaps he will look at the question from that other angle.

    It is not three-quarters but two-thirds, as I see it. I should like to be told the proportion of the money foreshadowed in the White Paper which is to be financed by loan and what proportion by revenue. I cannot see anything in the White Paper, except for what I have mentioned, which could reasonably be put down to loan. They are all wasting assets. We have not been given any in- formation in the White Paper upon which to base a judgment.

    Now I come to the third point, which is the effect of a loan policy upon the economic state of the country. My hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) pointed out in his speech that to-day we are in the upward swing of the trade cycle and we may be beginning boom conditions. If things go on as they are going at present I should say that we should most certainly be finding ourselves in the same condition as that in which the United States found herself prior to the big collapse in 1933. We were gradually coming out of the depression of 1929 and 1933. Like the rest of the world, we have replaced capital goods, a building boom has started and there is a certain improvement in our export trade, not a big one and nothing like enough, but still an improvement. The indications are that the Colonial parts of the world are experiencing the benefits of increased commodity prices and that they are increasing their purchases with us. All that indicates that we are approaching boom conditions. On the top of it comes this heavy expenditure by the Government on Defence.

    My objection is that the Government are meeting some of that expenditure by loan which will only have the effect of intensifying these boom conditions. We have the three items, replacement of capital goods, building boom and increase in the export trade. Now comes the financing of our defences by a loan. This is a most dangerous situation, but the Government are only aggravating it by their financial policy. I should have thought we should hear something from hon. Members opposite about those very interesting articles in the "Times" by Professor J. M. Keynes, warning this country of the danger of boom conditions and telling us the way in which we ought to meet them. Unfortunately Professor Keynes has too often been a kind of Cassandra in this matter, too often proved to be right in his prophecies. He was certainly right over the Versailles Treaty. Let us hope that he will not be right on this occasion. I fear that what we have heard in the last two days shows that many of his prophecies are in danger of becoming true.

    Loans can be reasonably made and the National Debt be reasonably increased only at a time of economic depression when we require to raise the purchasing power of the people and develop public works because private capital cannot function. That is when the public can be asked for a loan, even for Defence purposes, but to do it now when prices are rising and there is a danger of an increase in the rate of interest, is the worst thing the Government could do. Low rates of interest have been the cause of the improvement of economic conditions and it is wrong to aggravate them by increasing the debt and causing a rise in prices and still higher rates of interest. The Government are only preparing the way for a serious slump. The danger today is that if more money goes for the purpose of investment, whether it is in Government stock or any other capital investment or investment in capital goods, it will withdraw from circulation and possible consumption, consumable goods, and that will increase the amount of money in circulation while not increasing in proportion the amount of consumable goods which that money can purchase. That will lead to a dearth of commodities and rising rates of interest.

    What is the alternative? The Chancellor of the Exchequer showed that the alternative was to increase taxation. It will be wrong of me to anticipate the Budget statement. I realise that the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not go into this matter in detail, but I think we can take exception to the remark he made that it will be a grave danger to increase taxation beyond a certain amount. The sources of revenue are by no means exhausted and it is perfectly possible to finance the greater part of this expenditure out of revenue. There are a number of reasons why I feel that it is quite reasonable to say that. We have not by any means reached the limit of direct taxation. An increase in the Income Tax would yield a considerable amount. Another 9d. on that tax would raise, I believe, about £35,000,000. That will be a 1s., with the 3d. last year. Moreover, over the two years there is an increased buoyancy to the national income. It will be possible for the Chancellor to estimate for an increase in the yield. There is then the possibility of introducing something like the Excess Profits Duty once more, whereby we might get a revenue out of industrial profits. Everyone knows that the profits on equity shares are going up. Industrial shares show increased dividends.

    I say that it is not impossible to introduce such financial mechanism. I believe that in that way it would be possible for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to finance this scheme without having recourse to a loan at all. The extra amount required for the next five years will be £80,000,000 a year. I maintain that unless he can show to us far more reason than he has done in his speech to-day why this cannot be done, we shall be fully justified in opposing the financial side of this Resolution. What we need to do is to plan our national economy and in such a way that while raising the necessary money for national Defence—which, however, should be a Defence plan based on collective security and the League of Nations—we should do so not by assisting and furthering these boom conditions, which will lead only to a most serious collapse in a year or two, but should take time by the forelock, control the movement of prices and interest rates and go on the principle that in a time of boom you should raise taxation, if you want to raise money, rather than do it by raising a loan.

    9.26 p.m.

    The hon. Member has made a strong argument against inflation, and has painted its evils. I quite agree that inflation may be a very bad thing. It all depends on the facts of the case whether a certain policy is inflationary and whether it is used at the wrong time. The same point was made the chief attack on the Government in the speech of the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence). He dislikes what the Government are doing; there is nothing good in it whatever. Still more he dislikes the way they are doing it. He said, first of all, that the raising of £400,000,000 by loan will cause a rise in prices. If that stood alone, if the whole of the Government's policy were confined to a loan, I should be inclined to agree with him, and when I first heard the Chancellor of the Exchequer I confessed that I felt some uneasiness. The hon. Gentleman has a very acute mind and a mind which is well instructed in economics, but is it not rather too abstract, because he takes out of the whole picture one single feature, the £400,000,000 on loan, disregarding that £1,100,000,000 to be raised by taxation?

    The £400,000,000 is the subject of our Debate to-day. We are not now on the Estimates; we are on this question of the £400,000,000. That is why I spoke about it.

    I submit that you must look at the whole picture, and not the part which happens to suit your case. When you are taking £1,100,000,000 out of the taxpayers' pocket for five years, the effect of the loan on prices and inflation is very much modified.

    Does the right hon. and gallant Gentleman think that prices are more likely to rise if the money is raised by loan than if it were raised by taxation?

    I think so, because the more money you leave in people's pockets and the less you tax them, the more money there is about. All economists are agreed that transferable expenditure is a very valuable thing. Loan expenditure can be accelerated or deferred; it can be used in time of slump and stopped in time of boom. How does the hon. Member for East Edinburgh know that the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not mean to use his loan expenditure in this way? I can imagine that at a time when things were booming more would be spent out of taxes and less out of loan, and that if there were a prospect of a slump more would be spent out of loan and less out of taxes. I think that the hon. Gentleman has looked at the matter too narrowly. He went on to say that we should be very badly prepared for war if we spent this money. That was a curious argument. There are two ways of being prepared for war—either being fully armed and ready for it, or having no arms and being rich, and between the two I am rather for strong than for rich, although I quite agree with him that finance is an element in all war, and certainly modern war. But at this moment of time the first thing necessary to this country is an ample armament.

    Then he said, "Do not inflate currency: inflation is a disguised tax." There, again, I agree that it may be. Yet it may be a very beneficial operation, and it is a very difficult thing to say that you can tax certain people and depend on the tax resting there. You may say that you will raise the £220,000,000 a year from the rich, but who knows on whom the burden of that tax really falls? I do not believe that in all cases inflation is an evil, and I do not believe that any economist thinks so. It was suggested that the whole cost should be met out of taxes. We may quarrel as to the exact proportion. It is quite easy to argue that a line should be drawn here or there, but I think that most people, economists as well as ordinary people, would agree that a certain sum ought to be raised by loan. You have both the economic argument and the human argument. The human argument is that people think they ought not to be taxed to pay the whole cost of a benefit of which a large amount will be drawn by prosperity. That may not be sound economics, but it is an argument which no Chancellor of the Exchequer can ever disallow. Lastly, the hon. Gentleman said that the Government had no foreign policy and that they were placing the burden on the wrong shoulders. If he means that no one can look through the darkness very far ahead I entirely agree with him. Who can say what is going to happen in the next six months, or even before that time? Is it not wisest to take measures to protect ourselves, to protect our Empire, and then to see what is going to happen? Here we have a large sum being spent in this, country, with the burden fairly adjusted between taxes and loans. I do not think that anyone can ask more of the Government. They have done what they ought to have done, and I think it will make our position much clearer and our influence much greater in the disordered world around us.

    I have only one more word to say, and that is with regard to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Caithness (Sir A. Sinclair), who, I am sorry to say, is not in the Committee at the moment. He still seems to think that Free Trade will cure all evils. Does he, I would ask in his absence, think that Free Trade will prevent war? History has shown that Free Trade and Protection have nothing to do with war. Free Trade England entered the last War as an ally of Protectionist France. No doubt statesmen in all countries will con- tinue to say in their perorations that economic peace must come before actual peace, but Free Trade and Protection have no more to do with peace and war than have the phases of the moon. I see that the hon. Baronet the Member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris) has just come in, so perhaps I might repeat what I was asking the Liberal party in their absence. Do they really think that Free Trade will bring peace, or is it merely a useful peroration, that is always there, and can always be drawn upon?

    As the right hon. and gallant Gentleman has been courteous enough to challenge me, may I say that, if the Government would meet the appeal of M. Blum in the spirit in which it was made, it would be a considerable contribution towards peace?

    It is pathetic. If I wanted to be rude I might have said that I thought it nonsense and dangerous, but all I will say is that the hon. Baronet is suggesting an erroneous theory. I need hardly say that I support the Government, and think they are entirely right.

    9.39 p.m.

    I am sorry that, instead of making one task of this matter, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will have to come to the House every year for a certain amount of money. I am afraid that that will inflict upon us a repetition of some of the arguments that we have heard to-day, and we do not want to hear them more than once; we do not want constant repetition of these effete economic theories. I look at this expenditure and this loan from the point of view of the men with whom the money is to be spent. Practically the whole of it will be spent on wages. A battleship represents wages almost entirely. There is the digging of the ore from the mine, the smelting of the pig iron, the making of the steel; there are the ship carpenters, there are the gun-makers. It is all work, and it is all going into the pockets of the highest class of wage-earners that we have; it will increase the circulation of money. Who has borne the burden of all this disarmament in the last 20 years? The people on the Clyde, the Tyne, and other places of that kind. Artists in steel were put on the dole. It is infinitely better that they should be working and making a livelihood for themselves, while at the same time making us proof against the nervous fears that are so bound up with our present-day life. Is it not better that they should be getting good wages than that they should be idle and drawing the miserable dole, with its means test and all its other abominations?

    Moreover, if naval construction is going on, it increases the possibilities for the mercantile marine. The case is like that of Edinburgh, which is the home of printing. Why? Because it has always had the printing for the Law Courts, and that has provided a kind of backbone for the business. In the same way, the Clyde had always battleships and cruisers building, and that was a backbone for the shipbuilding industry. When that building ceased as a result of the Washington Conference, the loss fell on the unfortunate shipyard workers and steel workers. I was connected for a time with a company that made paper, and the bottom fell out of that company's business in a disastrous way after the Washington Conference. Of course, I have suffered, like all the rest of us who have to pay high Income Tax and Super-tax. That happens on both sides of the House. I have often wondered how, for instance, the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) can look so cheerful when I think of the amount of Super-tax he must be paying. But the attitude I have always taken in regard to taxation is that it is not what the Government share may be, but what is left, and, if what is left to me is sufficient to keep me in comfort, I am grateful to this great country that gives me the opportunity of earning it. I do not ask whether the State is getting more than I am or not; it is enough for me that I have sufficient left for myself, while at the same time I am protected by all the organisation of civilisation which enables me to carry on, and by all the organisation of democracy which enables me to express my views without being immediately run into a concentration camp.

    The spending of all this money in the next few years will get rid very largely of the hard core of unemployment. The taxation will no doubt be taken from various sources, but the people who will bear the heaviest burden will be the Income Tax and Super-tax payers, and I hope that the burden will not be made too heavy. I remember that, when the £1,000,000,000 War Loan was raised during the last War, an appeal was made through the Inland Revenue Department to the patriotism of Super-tax payers. A most moving letter in the handwriting of Mr. Bonar Law himself was circulated. At that time I was connected with a company which had very large reserves, and we rushed and put what spare cash we had into it. It was one of the most wonderful appeals ever written. The bankers had advised the Government that they would have to pay 10 per cent., but Mr. Bonar Law said he would not do that, and went and consulted Mr. Kennedy Jones, who told him not to pay a penny more than 5 per cent. The Super-tax payer is just as patriotic as the poorer taxpayer. I believe that the whole of the money for the last War could have been borrowed at from 2½ per cent. to 3 per cent. by appealing to the patriotism of those who had it. I hope the rate of interest on the proposed loans will not be too much, and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer could find it practicable to accept some of it in lieu of payment of Death Duties I believe it would assist considerably. You talk about the taxation of the rich, but Death Duties are a terrible thing for some estates.

    I was hoping to guide the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the ways of raising money at the cheapest possible rate, but perhaps I wandered a little from the Resolution. The point I want to make is that this money is not being lost. It is being circulated. Almost the whole of it disappears in wages. There may be a few firms which, owing to their large turnovers, are making a good profit, but compared with the amount that will go in wages these are not considerable. This policy will help one of the most capable classes in the population, the shipbuilders, and will get them back to their old occupation of which they have been deprived for years, because we set out to persuade the rest of mankind to disarm. We are doing what we ought to have been doing for years past. It is easy to shout "Peace." We had a demonstration of it in the peace ballot, which was a direct invitation to get into war. I do not believe we shall go into war. We shall only be in a position to defend ourselves from attack. This country will never stand an aggressive war.

    The loan is to be devoted mainly to the Navy and Air Force, and the British Navy has never been used to conquer anybody. It has been used to defend. It is an instrument of defence which was started by King Alfred. Before the Navy was formed, the country was constantly being ravished by invasion. It has maintained our shores inviolable for all these years. This will be well spent money. It will make for the prosperity of the country and the peace of the world, and we should all, in all parties and classes, support it.

    9.40 p.m.

    When the hon. and learned Gentleman began his speech I was hoping that he was going to come down upon our side, because at one stage he said that so far as taxation was concerned he did not care how much he had to pay away, provided enough was left him to live in comfort. That is a doctrine which has often been put forward from our benches, and I hope I may say something in harmony with it later on. There is a section of the community who are taxed so little relatively to their great wealth that they are enabled to do much more than live in comfort. A case can be made along these lines for a substantial increase in taxation to pay for these charges which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put before us. I welcomed the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and I hope it may not be long before he is in our Lobby.

    I might be willing to barter that if the hon. Gentleman would come over. It would be worth a high price to get his support. One of my hon. Friends reminds me that we want some good lawyers. We are sometimes rather conscious of our lack in that direction. [Interruption.] Why should I not be frank? The Debate to-night has run wide, but I wish to concentrate attention upon what it is we are being asked to vote upon to-morrow night. It is not a vote for or against armaments in general. It is not a vote for or against armaments at any particular level. These are subjects for debate on later occasions, on the Votes for the Service Estimates. This vote is nothing of that kind. It is a vote for or against a Resolution authorising a particular method of raising £400,000,000 over five years, and against that Resolution His Majesty's Opposition will vote with conviction to-morrow night.

    It is principally to the financial aspect of the matter rather than to those wider aspects which you, Captain Bourne, have permitted to be introduced to-day, to which I wish to address my remarks. The consequence of this Resolution will be that the British Budget will be gravely unbalanced for the next five years. There was a time when an unbalanced Budget terrified Treasury officials and was regarded by Members of the party opposite as being a very dangerous condition of our finances. The addition of £400,000,000 to the National Debt will raise the National Debt to a higher figure than it has ever reached at any time in peace or war in the history of the country. In March of last year the total National Debt stood at just under £7,800,000,000. The internal debt was just under £6,800,000,000 if we leave aside the nominal external element, which has become nominal since the present Government came into office and ceased paying anything to the United States. Therefore, it is more realisatic to focus on the internal debt, on which interest is being paid, rather than on the external debt on which interest is not being paid. The internal debt stood last year at £6,800,000,000.

    If you add this £400,000,000 you will get a total, including the external debt, of over £8,000,000,000—nearly £8,200,000,000—and a total internal debt of nearly £7,200,000,000. Your previous high-water mark was in 1920, when the external debt was £7,800,000,000 and the internal debt £6,600,000,000. This means that you are going to wipe out at one blow all the slow and painful efforts which the Treasury officials have made to build up sinking funds and to inculcate successive Chancellors of the Exchequer with prudent methods of finance in the whole period since the War. All that will be gone down the wind of history, and you will be back in a situation where the dead weight debt is more massive than ever before, and the total sum which has sooner or later to be repaid will be standing at a record height for all time. That is a solemn thought, and the Committee should not be unmindful of it.

    I should have hoped that some financial purists from the benches opposite would have rallied to our support in opposing such finance. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is proposing a scheme of repayment over 30 years, but who believes in these paper schemes stretching over such periods? The whole of financial history, as he knows well, is full of schemes of a hopeful character promising to repay such and such sums over 30, 40 or 50 years, and they have all broken down at a very early stage. Let me cite only two recent examples. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) in his Budget in 1925 announced to a delighted Committee that he was going to repay the whole debt in 50 years, and he laid out a pretty little paper plan with that object. The next year it collapsed, and it will never revive again.

    Yes, in 1926, when the Government provoked the lock-out of miners by their foolish return, as everyone now admits, to the Gold Standard in 1925 for which action the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that time takes the major responsibility, and that is, no doubt, one reason why the plan collapsed. Again, Lord Snowden had a very pretty plan in 1929, whereby a deficit incurred in one year should be repaid in subsequent years and not be carried forward, but that plan collapsed the very next year, in 1930. Whether the Chancellor's plans for repayment will collapse as soon as that I do not guess and, after all, it is only, as he said, a book-keeping entry. My point is that in the light of past experience it would be very rash to attach any value whatever to these paper schemes stretching over long periods of time for repayment of additions to the debt. These are only intended to reassure public opinion, which otherwise might be rather dubious about such additions to our indebtedness.

    Moreover, if I may turn to another argument against this loan policy, what is it that you are borrowing for? You are borrowing to make instruments of war many of which, assuming that peace is kept, will very soon be obsolete. Long before the 30 years are over they will be out-of-date. They will be superseded by new types and you will therefore be continuing to pay interest in respect of assets which will have lost their effectiveness and will probably have been scrapped or melted down again to make new and better instruments. Therefore, even if you take the standpoint that it is legitimate to borrow provided you repay the loan within the life of the asset created, the Chancellor's mode of prepayment is much too slow to justify the procedure of raising this loan. Further, as my hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence), in his exceedingly able and interesting speech explained, the Government have refused—and the Chancellor has held his present position now for a number of years, through good and bad trade; he has almost seen us through a trade cycle—in times when trade was very bad, to undertake loan expenditures even for works of capital and productive use such as might have been set afoot in the distressed areas, or even in other parts of the country, and even now, while £400,000,000 is apparently readily to be raised by loan for this purpose, there seems great doubt as to whether even a very much smaller sum will be forthcoming for these other objects—for the restoration of employment in those areas where unemployment remains most intractable.

    My hon. Friend also made it abundantly clear that all this talk of putting the burden of this expenditure on the future is a sheer delusion. Let me quote the final words of the Government's White Paper:
    "It would be neither practicable nor just that the whole burden of making good these deficiencies in the short period of five years should be thrown on the taxpayer during that time."
    In other words, the Government apparently hold the view that it is possible to push part of this burden forward upon the future. I believe that is sheer confusion. All that you can do by borrowing, as distinct from taxing, is to make taxpayers, and in particular the working class, who pay so large a share of the taxation through indirect taxes, which have been greatly increased since the present Government came into office, pay tribute in the future to bond holders. The whole thing is in the future—it is a transfer of wealth in the future in consequence of your monetary operations.

    But the real cost of armaments for which you are raising the money now, whether by taxation or by loan, lies in the diversion of men and materials and money from making objects needed for peaceful use to making instruments of war. Here I am purely on a point of economics and not on the question whether these armaments are necessary or not. I do not want to introduce that complication here. It is more convenient to discuss one thing at a time. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is suggesting that somehow or other this burden is going to be pushed forward into the future by this mode of finance. I submit that he is merely laying up a burden for one class in the future for the benefit of some other class in the future, while, by this expenditure, we are now being deprived of houses, schools, bridges and other supplies which might have been made with the labour, the steel, the bricks and the rest which are being devoted to the programme in dicated in the White Paper. The view of my hon. Friends is that it is better, in public finance as in private, to pay as you go rather than go to the moneylender, as the Chancellor proposes, for this large sum.

    I am anxious not to go beyond the Ruling that you, Sir, have given and not to enter more deeply than you think proper into details with regard to taxation, but, in view of the fact that the White Paper states that it would be neither practicable nor just that the whole cost should be borne in five years, I hope I shall not be going beyond your Ruling if I offer a few general observations to seek to controvert the view that it is not practicable that the whole cost should be thrown on the taxpayer within the next five years. I hold the view, having lately looked at some of the most recent publications that are available to us, that it is perfectly practicable to put the whole burden upon the direct taxpayer and that there are several alternative ways in which it might be done. We are very conscious just now of what many call the arms racket. We are conscious of the fact that enormous profits are being made by armament firms in spite of all the promises that have been made that those profits should be controlled, and in spite of the fact that the Royal Commission, which was appointed by the Government and reported in September last year, most strongly recommended that the profits of armament firms should not only be limited, but also that they should be limited in so straightforward and well advertised a fashion that the public in general should be satisfied that they were so limited. Nothing has been done and, therefore, great fortunes are being accumulated and large profits are accruing 1.0 these armament firms and to kindred enterprises. One way—it would appeal to a sense of justice—in which a large part of this money could be raised would be by a special tax analogous to the Excess Profits Duty of the last War upon persons who have secured undeserved additions to their wealth through armaments. That would be one way.

    Would the hon. and learned Member propose that course? We would welcome such a suggestion.

    If a man makes a large fortune, fully one half of it is taken away in Death Duties.

    There is very little of that. The State gets all back. In some cases more than all. Take the case of a man who leaves £5,000,000; you take the whole of it.

    I welcome the suggestion. I am more and more of the opinion that the hon. and learned Gentleman is just on the margin of coming into our Lobby. There is a great deal to be said for this second alternative, for the hon. and learned Gentleman's suggestion, that we should steeply increase the Death Duties scales. That would be in the tradition of the distinguished family to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer belongs, because one of the steepest increases in Death Duties in modern times was put on, as he will remember, by his brother the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain), when he put up the Death Duties on the estates of millionaires from 20 per cent. to 40 per cent. Afterwards it was put up to 50 per cent., and there is a lot to be said for putting it up to 75 per cent. If that were done there would still be, in the case of the man leaving £2,000,000, the sum of £500,000 untouched by taxation. I am not anxious to incur your displeasure, Captain Bourne, by giving too much statistical information on this question, but I would say in passing, that, if you put Estate Duty up by 50 per cent., you would get another £50,000,000 a year. Take the surtax payers, that fortunate bunch of people, about 90,000 in number, who, at the present time, have an income of more than £2,000 a year. A slight adjustment of the surtax rate would bring in another £40,000,000. I have been anxious only to illustrate, and if it were in order and there were time, I should be able to make many practical detailed suggestions to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which would show quite clearly that this sum could easily be raised, in contradiction to the statement in the White Paper, by an increase in direct taxation.

    What is the alternative? My hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh has referred to this proposed loan finance as inflationary, and he was justified in using that term. It is an inflationary loan which will increase the cost of living, and, therefore, hit hardest the poorest section of the community. This loan finance which pretends to let off the taxpayer imposes taxation through the increased cost of living upon the poorest section of the community. If I may refer again to the Chamberlain tradition, the right hon. Gentleman's father once asked what ransom would property pay? That was in the days when he was Republican, Radical and Equalitarian. The Chancellor of the Exchequer to-day asks what ransom will the poor pay? There can be little doubt—many authorities have been quoted in support of the view that at this phase in the trade cycle there can be little doubt—that you are going by means of this loan, raised at this time and for this object, to raise the cost of living very subtantially.

    There is yet one more argument, in addition to those used by my hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh, which I should like to put to the Committee. Such a loan will be inflationary at this stage in the trade cycle when, outside in distressed areas, there is beginning to be a shortage of many forms of material and skilled labour, but it is still more inflationary when you take account of the purpose for which it is to be spent. If the loan were being raised in order to make, not armaments but houses, or to increase the production of foodstuffs or clothing or what not, items that enter into the consumption of working people in this country and other classes of consumers, then the loan would, at any rate, result in a substantial addition to the quantity of consumable goods which would enter into the living standards of the people. But this loan is to be used to make armaments. It is true that wages will be paid, but that is true of any form of expenditure and is equally true of house building, bridge building or anything else. The system of finance which is here advocated will add nothing, as far as the armament products are concerned, to the consumable goods available for the masses of the people. Therefore, corresponding to this great additional effort directed away from productive forms of work, there will be no addition to the production of consumable goods. Therefore, there will he an even steeper rise in the cost of living, as my hon. Friend indicated.

    I hope that I have given sufficient reason to show that we have solid ground for opposing this proposal on purely financial arguments. It is bad finance, it is bad from the point of view of the general interests of the community and from the point of view of preventing a collapse and a slump as soon as the spurt of armament production comes to a head, if ever it does. From this point of view it is thoroughly bad finance.

    I turn from that to certain other considerations. When I turn to the White Paper and read it through, as an attempted justification of this Resolution on the Paper, I confess that I am filled with the deepest misgivings and gloom. One reads of a co-ordinated plan. The phrase "co-ordinated plan" appears at the top of page 4, where it says:
    "Part of the co-ordinated plan which has been drawn up."
    The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, we understand, will speak tomorrow, but I hope that he will not think me discourteous if I say that up to date he has inspired no confidence at all among my hon. Friends that he is effectively co-ordinating anything; no confidence at all. It may be, as suggested by an hon. Gentleman who spoke earlier, that he is short of staff. That may be one difficulty. It has been suggested that he ought to have more assistance. Many of us think that it would be a great advantage if more of the younger and fresh-minded men from the Services were to be recruited to his staff to modernise the outlook of the officials at present advising him. That may well be, but it is a matter for further Debate to-morrow. We have no confidence that he is effectively co-ordinating anything and no confidence in him or his staff as it is at present constituted. For that reason whatever the total—and to-night I am anxious to leave this point without pronouncing any opinion upon it—which it is desired or which it is determined to spend on arms, we have no assurance whatever that under the Government's present arrangements that total will be spent to the best advantage, none at all. We have no assurance that there is any plan for effective co-ordination and for the efficient spending of whatever sum may be voted.

    There is one further point on page 4 of the White Paper, a financial point, on which the Chancellor of the Exchequer might say something. We are told at the bottom of page 4 that:
    "The wide dispersal of the territories comprised within the British Empire and the dependence of these islands upon supplies from overseas lay a special responsibility upon British Forces and, above all, upon the Navy."
    There is a very wide dispersal of our Dominions and Colonies, and I should like to know whether, in connection with this scheme of finance, there have been any negotiations and, if so, whether they have reached the stage of completion, whereby those who are to be protected by the British Navy and other armed forces are going to contribute any proportion, according to their ability, towards the additional cost. Are the Dominions going to contribute anything additional to these common costs, or is it all to fall upon us? Are any additional contributions in sight from any of the Colonies or other Dependencies? That is a financial point on which we should be glad to have information. This paragraph in the White Paper suggests that the territories within the Empire have a common interest with us in being defended. That being so, are they making any common contribution towards the cost of that defence?

    It has been said, and I will leave the point to be developed to-morrow, that the White Paper makes no reference whatever to the League of Nations, nor to collective security, nor to the background of foreign policy against which alone any such policy as this can be justified. But there is a background to these proposals. There is a background of history, of recent history, and it would be impossible for these proposals, put forward as they are, to be understood unless the events of recent years are borne in mind. Since the year 1931, when this Government entered into office, there has been a rake's progress towards world catastrophe, coming nearer and nearer, and, unless we can divert the march of events, many of us may not long remain to comment upon them.

    The Government in 1931 inherited a very fair international prospect. There were low armament charges compared with anything we have now before us, and the prospect of bringing them lower still if only they played their diplomatic cards with skill at the international conferences then planned. They made a tragical mess of disarmament. That is a story which has been told before and it should never be allowed to be absent from our memories when judging these matters. They made an utter mess of the Disarmament Conference. They threw away wonderful opportunities, which will never come back in the lifetime of any of us. Had those chances not been thrown away this White Paper would have been outside the bounds of possibility and armaments would be far lower than they are, and the prospect of getting them lower still would have been within our grasp. [Interruption.] I have said that they made an utter mess of the possibilities of international disarmament. In 1932 they lost wonderful opportunities, which at that time presented themselves, of getting substantial reductions in armaments, by international agreement, all over the world.

    If the Government at that time had accepted the proposal made by Signor Mussolini's emissary, backed it up and put it through there would be no bombing aeroplanes in any land to-day, and in that case a very large part of this expenditure would be completely unnecessary. I am not going to develop that argument but the records are perfectly clear, that the British Government threw away that opportunity by failing to back up the many nations which were willing at that time to line up behind Signor Mussolini. At that time and on that issue it would have been the right thing to do. Later on they ran away from him in another sea. Having made a mess of disarmament they are now making, I fear, a terrible mess of rearmament.

    May I once again refer to the speech made in this House by the Prime Minister on 12th November, 1936? It is one of the most serious counts against the Government, and they have now admitted it, that during the period in the years 1933 and 1934, when Herr Hitler had just arrived in power in Germany and was beginning to show what manner of policy he intended to pursue, through fear of electoral consequences they concealed the truth from the British people. Let us begin by getting the arithmetic of these things right. How can we judge what forces we should have within the framework of collective security, or otherwise, until we know the plain facts about other people? The Prime Minister has admitted that through fear of electoral consequences, the fear that he might, had he told the people the truth, have lost the forthcoming election—he said that he and his friends were very worried about what was then happening in Europe—he did not tell the truth regarding what they then knew to be proceeding in Germany and elsewhere. Not only so but, perhaps through defects in the Secret Service, they did not appreciate the fact that German rearmament in the air was proceeding with unexpected rapidity, and a little later we were confronted with the statement that Germany was stronger in the air than we were. All this is part of the background of this White Paper, and it will be proper to develop it at another time.

    We on these benches have our responsibility for what we did when we were in Government from 1929 to 1931. During those years there was no need for any such White Paper to be produced and no need for any such policy as lies behind it to be pursued. From 1931, uninterruptedly, the present Government, with minor variations of personnel, have been in office. They have the complete responsibility for the events of the last six years. They have had an ample majority in this House and so far as our national policy is concerned they are wholly responsible. This White Paper is the outcome of a series of tragic and preventible errors which have been made in the conduct of our foreign policy. Foreign policy is the background of all this armament business. Had our foreign policy been otherwise conducted since 1931 we should have a very different armament situation to-day. In this region we have nothing for which we need apologise. Our record can be defended, and theirs can be attacked, effectively. And in the light of their past performances we have no shred of confidence in the Government or in the policy they are asking the country at this time to pursue.

    10.25 p.m.

    I understood when the Debate began to-day that, on the Opposition side at any rate, the criticisms were to be principally financial, and that it was desired that an answer to those criticisms should be made before we pass to-morrow to other aspects of the questions before us. That expectation has not been altogether borne out, and the Debate has ranged over a somewhat wider field than I had anticipated. I do not propose however, to touch upon other matters than those which are strictly related to the financial aspects of this proposal, and I will leave to my right hon. Friends who are going to speak to-morrow the task of replying to any criticisms which have been made on other sides of the affair.

    However, I might perhaps make one remark in answer to the repeated criticism that we have not explained how our Defence programme is related to our foreign policy. That appears to me to contemplate that our foreign policy in relation to Defence is of a comparatively simple character. If it were in fact contemplated that, in considering what Defence measures were necessary for the safety of this country, we had to take an enemy A and consider how we could defeat that enemy with the aid of B and C Powers, with whom we were in alliance—if that were what we had to consider—it would be comparatively easy to draw up a Defence programme and to show how it was directly related to the problem we have to solve; but, of course, that is not the case. We have not to single out a particular Power as the enemy, nor are we, as a matter of fact, in alliance with other Powers on whose aid we could count in that particular case. What we have had to do is to consider a whole series of hypothetical emergencies in which we might be opposed to this or that Power, or this or that group of Powers, and in which we might find ourselves fighting alongside other Powers or groups of Powers. We have had to draw up our Defence programme to the best of our ability, with the best advice we could get from expert advisers, to enable us to feel that it is so drawn up as to make us as safe as we can make ourselves against any of those hypothetical emergencies.

    I come now to the financial criticisms to which I have listened this evening, and they may be reduced to a very small category. There was indeed one of a specific character which has been made more than once—for instance, by the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benson), the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) and possibly by others. It was that we ought not to have asked for statutory powers to enable us to borrow for the whole period of five years, and that the proper course would have been to come year by year to ask for powers to borrow what we might require during each year and that the necessary provisions could have been inserted in Clauses of the Finance Bill.

    I apologise to the hon. Member, but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir A. Sinclair) said it, and the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale certainly supported that view in a series of interjections. The matter was, I think, dealt with very adequately by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich (Mr. H. Strauss) in the very admirable speech which he made. I venture to supplement what he said by two further considerations. First I would remind the Committee that the programme which we are considering is not a programme of one year. It is a programme which it will take several years to complete. Even when you enter into commitments in the course of a single year, those commitments may involve you in continuing expenditure over a series of years. I have only to take the case of building a battleship to show what I mean. You lay down a battleship in one year, and you can spend a comparatively small sum on it in that year, but before you can complete it, you must go on spending at an increasing rate until you reach the peak, and then the expenditure diminishes again.

    If we had adopted the course suggested and instead of asking for statutory powers to cover borrowing for the whole period, we had said we were going to reveal only what we contemplated it would be necessary to borrow in a single year, the party opposite would have been the first to complain and to say that that was not the way to deal with a programme which was going to extend over five years. The theory of planning which is so often pressed upon us goes by the board if you propose to present your plan year by year and on general principles that seems to be an unanswerable reason for bringing the matter forward in one year and not by separate instalments.

    There is a second consideration which is one of practical convenience. It would be impossible to deal with this matter by Clauses in the Finance Bill, for the simple reason that before the Finance Bill is introduced the House must have considered and passed the Estimates. We cannot produce the Estimates without showing upon them how much of the money is to be found by appropriations-in-aid to be met by borrowing, and we cannot do that until we have introduced and made progress with Bills such as those dealing with statutory powers of borrowing. I need only add, in conclusion on this subject, that the House would find it extremely inconvenient if, year after year, they had to take up time in going over the same ground over and over again to the detriment of other business which is always so pressing at this time of year. So much for that point.

    Now I come to another point, namely, the question of borrowing. Incidentally, I must remark that the question which I put in my opening statement as to whether the party opposite did or did not challenge the extent of the programme contemplated in the White Paper has never been answered. The hon. Gentleman who followed me said nothing about it. He avoided the question altogether. The hon. Member who has just addressed the Committee, bearing in mind no doubt the quotation from his speech at Edinburgh which was recalled to the Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich—the speech in which he said that the Labour party themselves would have to increase armaments if they were in power—also avoided it on the ground that he did not wish unduly to complicate the situation.

    I do not want any misunderstanding. If I make a speech, I am prepared that it should be quoted, and if it is accurately quoted I do not mind hearing my words repeated by other lips. But what I said was that the Resolution before us dealt simply with the question of whether or not a certain sum should be raised by loan. It was that question I said, which we were discussing, although the Debate had been allowed to go rather wide, and it was on that question that we were going to vote to-morrow. Therefore, I said that these other matters, however interesting in their right time and place, could be discussed later on the Service Estimates, and I did not propose to consider them to-night.

    If hon. Gentlemen did not consider it convenient to consider that question to-night, I suppose we may take it that the programme is not challenged and that what the Labour party is challenging us on to-night is on the question of whether the £400,000,000 can be found by taxation or by loan. There are two main objections which have been raised to the proposal to borrow this £400,000,000. The first was made by the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) and repeated by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton), namely, that it was impossible to establish that any part of this expenditure would be non-recurrent. On that point I would say, first of all, that it will be agreed at any rate by the hon. Member for East Edinburgh that a great part of the expenditure is recurrent and that it is not proposed to find the money for that recurrent expenditure out of borrowed money. That, I think, is understood.

    The right hon. Gentleman says that I shall agree with that, but the right hon. Gentleman has never attempted to address himself to that question. I certainly do not agree that that has been proved already, because there has been no attempt to prove it.

    The hon. Member's theory is that the whole of the expenditure is recurrent, but I deny that.

    I said that we did not know whether non-recurrent expenditure was the same as capital and that in any case where there was capital or merely non-recurrent, even so there were considerable arguments against raising it by loan.

    I think the hon. Member's memory is perhaps a little at fault. He went even further and said that it was very doubtful whether any of the expenditure was non-recurrent, and that was certainly the argument of the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland. I agree—I said so at the beginning—that it is extremely difficult to take every item in the programme and put it into one category or the other and say whether it is recurrent or non-recurrent, but I did say, first of all, that it is only a portion of what we believe to be non-recurrent expenditure which will be found out of borrowed money, and, secondly, I said that it cannot be denied that a considerable part of this expenditure is non-recurrent. For instance, take the erection of shadow factories. When they are built we shall not have to duplicate them. They will not come back on us every few years, and their life will certainly be more than 30 years. There are, of course, a great number of works of a permanent character, such as barracks for men, sheds, and so on, but, above all, what I want the Committee to bear in mind is this, that one of the reasons why we are forced to undertake this enormous expenditure in a comparatively short time is because we have to overtake arrears which have been accumulating for a long period in the past. When you have overtaken those arrears, again they will not come back on us. Once they have been overtaken and the stores, for example, or reserves, have been brought up to the new level, that is non-recurrent expenditure.

    This is a very important question, and we want to be clear on it. In the White Paper, as I understand it, there are two classes of factories. There are the shadow factories, which are refered to in paragraph 28, and there are other factories, which are referred to, I think, in paragraph 32. Now the right hon. Gentleman is speaking of these shadow factories as if they were to be built and owned by the State, but that is not the understanding which I have. I thought the shadow factories referred to in paragraph 28 were to be the property of private firms but that the factories referred to in paragraph 31 were national factories. As far as the Government factories are concerned I think his argument applies, but not to factories which are to be the property of private firms.

    I am much obliged to the hon. Member for that explanation because it enables me to make clear what evidently he has not fully appreciated, and that is that these shadow factories, at any rate in the great majority of cases, will be State-owned factories. They will be the property of the State after they have been built and the necessary experience has been obtained by working them on what I might call sample orders. They will then remain as war potential factories, which will be worked by the particular firms but will be themselves the property of the State. Therefore, those factories represent non-recurrent expenditure just as much as the Government factories to which the hon. Member referred and which are alluded to in paragraph 31 of the White Paper. As to the second and more theoretical argument regarding the effects of borrowing £400,000,000 of this expenditure, I must confess to not being a theoretical economist myself and I had a good deal of difficulty in following his argument. In listening to him I was repeatedly puzzled to know whether his argument was directed against placing any orders at all for armaments or was merely against the practice of borrowing a part of the money required, because he stated that the vice of this proposal was that men would be taken away from ordinary commercial occupations, the making of textiles for example, in order to make armaments or munitions which were of no economic value. Did the hon. Member not say that?

    I do not want to keep interrupting, but the right hon. Gentleman invites me to reply. I said that whether you borrow money or raise it by taxation you are diverting people from the occupations of peace to the occupations of war, and the difference between the two is this: In the one case, by abstracting the money from taxation, you are not inflating, but when by means of a loan you get additional purchasing power, and thereby compete with the existing purchasing power of the community, you are inflating, and that, I think, is a recognised fact.

    I do not really appreciate the point of that. The hon. Member spoke of diverting people from commercial work in order to make armaments, and said that the danger would be averted if there was a foreign loan, and when I asked him why that would avert the danger he said because in that case the armaments would be made abroad and somebody else would suffer the damage instead of ourselves. It shows how difficult it is to follow these theoretical arguments; but I did understand this quite clearly, that when we did not borrow we were always wrong and when we did borrow we never did it at the right time. He explained to us that when, in the period of greatest depression, I steadfastly refused to borrow for public works, I was then transgressing all the proper canons of real economists, and that now I was borrowing just at the wrong moment. At least, I have the right hon. Gentleman right this time. I am afraid that I do not accept his conclusions.

    When I look back over the history of the past few years and compare what has happened in this country with what has happened in other countries where they have incurred enormous deficits, I fail to see that those deficits have assisted their recovery or that we have suffered material damage from the fact that we did not borrow at that time. If we did not borrow then, it was not because we objected on principle to borrowing but because we could not find any works which were economic in character and suitable for borrowing. I said that over and over again at the time. Where we did find it possible by Government assistance to hasten or to anticipate works which we considered to be of economic value, again and again we took that opportunity. One has to repeat those things so often because the same old arguments are repeated on the other side. Let me remind the Committee once again of the project of hydrogenation of coal, the building of the "Queen Mary," and the great schemes in connection with the development of London traffic and the main line railways.

    We are not borrowing this time because we think it right to borrow on principle at this moment, but because the circumstances of the time seem to make that expedient. The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland has maintained, as indeed his colleague maintained, that I am wrong in saying that it would be impossible to find the whole of this £80,000,000 a year during the next five years out of taxation. He somewhat exaggerates what I said. I did not say that it was impossible. Obviously it would be possible to raise it in various ways, although if the object of raising taxation to that extent were, as is suggested in the Resolution passed by the Liberal executive, to damp down consumption, one would look to indirect taxation rather than to direct taxation to produce that result.

    We have to consider not merely what is going to happen to-morrow or even next year. One has to take a rather longer view of things than that. When the right hon. Gentleman says that it is not going to make any difference at all whether you put off the burden to a future generation, I wonder how many taxpayers he would get to accept that view. When he suggested that it makes no difference whether you add 1s. 6d. to the Income Tax or whether you spread the burden over the next 30 years, how many converts would he have to his view? It is absurd to suggest that you can push up taxation to extravagant heights without it having some serious effect first upon psychology and so upon the recovery that is taking place in the country. When it is not practicable to run taxation up to those heights, I do not mean that it is impossible to do so. You can bleed the country at almost any rate until it is bled white, but it is not wise to do so. The chances are that if you attempted to do so you would check the progress of industry to such an extent that you would cripple the national resources in revenue for some considerable time.

    Hon. Gentlemen opposite talk as though this extra expenditure upon Defence is all that we have to take care of in the next few years. Are they not forgetting also that we have to consider the growth of Civil expenditure? Do they think that that Civil expenditure is going to remain where it is? Do they not know that it automatically increases every year, that in pensions alone the sum is going up until it ultimately reaches a charge of something like £80,000,000, from the £40,000,000 where it is to-day?

    We have to consider that we cannot keep the social services for ever where they are. We do not want to cut down all expenditure except expenditure on Defence. We have to consider that the revenue, buoyant and expanding as it is, has to sustain the burden of increasing expenditure not only on Defence but on Civil purposes as well. If we had proposed to borrow the whole of £1,500,000,000 there might be something to be said for the view of hon. Members that the result would be inflationary in effect. I know that inflation is a word dear to the hearts of hon. Members opposite. I am not at all sure that they know what it means. They regard it as a sort of term of abuse.

    I am not sure that there is not a certain inflationary effect going on already. Increased supplies of gold, and other causes, are raising prices, and we are getting the benefit in the increased prices of primary commodities because of the increased purchasing power of those countries which are chiefly dependent on the exports of those commodities, and we see the result in increased exports from this country, due to that increased purchasing power. But when the hon. Member said that this comparatively small proportion of the total to be raised by loan was going to, have an inflationary effect, that is a purely theoretical deduction, and I doubt very much whether it will be substantiated in fact. What I do say is that the expenditure of this money is going to give increased employment. A great deal of it will go to the Special Areas, and the whole expenditure will be fairly balanced over the whole country, at any rate, for the next year or two.

    Do not let hon. Members think that anything any economist says is infallible. They sometimes make mistakes. But it would be a mistake to suppose that Mem- bers of the Government, who do not profess to be theoretical economists, are entirely blind to the possibilities of doing something to control booms and slumps. We are perfectly alive to the fact that the present activity in trade is not likely to last for ever, and that there is a duty on the Government of the day to watch what is happening, and when and if they think it necessary to take measures to ease off the extreme points of the curve, and to slow down by degrees instead of suddenly.

    There is only one other point I want to touch on, and it was one made by the right hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland, to whom the whole trouble of the world is due to Imperial Preference. The death warrant of the peace of the world, in his view, was signed at Ottawa in 1932. He believes that if we would give up Imperial Preference and throw open the trade of the Colonies to the whole world, at last we might see our way to peace. There is a good deal more than economic theory involved in Imperial Preference. If the right hon. Gentleman had his way he would probably soon lose us the British Empire. Does he think that if we were to throw the Colonies free to the competition of the Far East, that would be likely to conduce towards the peace of the world? What it would be likely to conduce to would be unemployment in Lancashire.

    On the general policy of Imperial Preference my views are well known. The agreements which are at present in force may be modified in one way or another; I am not suggesting for a moment that they are perfect or not capable of improvement; but the policy of treating members of the British Commonwealth of Nations rather better than the inhabitants of other countries is a phase of Imperial policy which is far above mere questions of economics. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman carried very much conviction, if I may say so, by his remedy, such as it is, but I think it is one that will make us thankful that he is sitting on those benches and not on these.

    Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to answer the question that I put as to whether other parts of the Empire are going to make any contribution?

    I beg pardon. The hon. Gentleman, in asking that question referred to paragraph 8 of the White Paper, which says that:

    "the wide dispersal of the territories comprised within the British Empire and the dependencies of these islands upon supplies from overseas lay a special responsibility upon British Forces and, above all, upon the Navy."
    Let me explain that these words had reference rather to the position of this country, and its responsibilities to the Colonies and territories for which it is directly responsible, than to the Dominions. It is perfectly true that we are dependent largely, for supplies of essential materials, upon the Dominions, and in that sense, therefore, the dispersal of the Dominions over the world does lay this special duty upon the Navy; but so far as the Dominions are concerned it was not the intention of the paragraph to suggest that we had any right to call upon the Dominions to make any contribution to the common fund. The Dominions, of course, have as a matter of fact spent a great deal of money upon perfecting or improving their own defences, and that is their contribution to the common fund; but there is no other form of contribution that I am aware of under discussion at the present time.

    Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again," put, and agreed to.—[ Mr. Paling.]

    Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

    Statutory Salaries Money

    Resolution reported,

    "That it is expedient—
  • (a) to provide for increasing to the amounts hereinafter specified the annual salaries charged on and payable out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in respect of the following offices, that is to say, the offices—
  • (i) of county court judges in England and Wales to two thousand pounds;
  • (ii) of the chief of the metropolitan police magistrates to two thousand three hundred pounds;
  • (iii) of other metropolitan police magistrates to two thousand pounds;
  • (iv) of the recorder of Londonderry, the county court judge and chairman of quarter sessions for the counties of Armagh and Fermanagh, and the county court judge and chairman of quarter sessions for the county of Down, respectively, so long (in each case) as the office is held by the existing holder, to such amount as is equal to the total annual remuneration now paid in respect of those offices;
  • (b) to provide for the annual salaries charged on and payable out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in respect of the offices of the chairman and of the other members of the Scottish Land Court, and the annual salaries payable out of moneys provided by Parliament in respect of the offices of the Commissioners of Crown Lands (other than the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries), of the Lyon King of Arms, of the Secretary to the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in Scotland, and of the Lyon Clerk, being of such amounts as may be determined by the Treasury, and for the annual salaries payable out of moneys provided by Parliament to the clerks attached to the judges of the Supreme Court, being of such amounts as may be determined by the Lord Chancellor with the concurrence of the Treasury, so, however, that any salary of which the amount is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph shall, so long as it continues to be payable to the existing holder of the office or employment in respect of which it is payable, be at an annual rate not less than that of the total remuneration at present paid to him in respect of that office or employment;
  • (c) to authorise the payment out of the Consolidated Fund and out of moneys provided by Parliament, respectively, of such sums as may become payable in consequence of such provision as aforesaid;
  • (d) to provide for such consequential amendments of the enactments relating to the salaries aforesaid as may be necessary."
  • Resolution agreed to.

    Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolution by Sir John Simon, Mr. Elliot, the Attorney-General, the Lord Advocate, Lieut.-Colonel Colville, and the Solicitor-General.

    Statutory Salaries Bill

    "to make further provision as to the amount of the salaries payable in respect of certain offices; and to make consequential Amendments in the enactments relating thereto," presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 86.]

    The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

    Papworth Village Centre (Trainees)

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Captain Margesson.]

    11.3 p.m.

    I want to raise in the House to-night certain matters relating to Papworth Tuberculosis Sanatorium and Papworth Village Settlement. I do so for two reasons. The first is that certain information has come into my possession concerning Papworth which is disquieting. The second is the unsatisfactory nature of answers given to some questions I had on the Order Paper last week to the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Health. I would like to say at the outset that I have no intention and no wish to do an injury to anyone. I want to avoid being vindictive, and I do not want anyone to think I have taken up this matter because I want to do any harm either to anyone in the institution or to those who govern it. At the same time, there are certain things which ought to be brought to the public notice, and if a remedy can be found for these things I shall be quite satisfied. It may he that to some of the criticism I shall offer there will be a perfect answer, but the answers given up to the present time have been very unsatisfactory and very disquieting indeed.

    I had this matter brought to my notice because a patient died at Papworth on the morning that he was instructed to go to work. I know that the Minister of Labour will probably not be able to answer effectively this particular point, but I think I ought to make a point regarding this case. It is the case of a young man who had been suffering from tuberculosis for a considerable length of time, and was known to be in a fairly acute stage of tuberculosis, and yet was asked to prepare himself to go to work in the printing shop. Then are two stories told of this case. The first one is that the man was on his way to see the doctor, but quite satisfactory information—and I am given to understand authentic information—was given that this young fellow was actually on his way to work in the printing shop at Papworth and collapsed in the corridor and was dead within 15 minutes. It does seem to me that with all the people who are unem- ployed in this country at the present time, it should not be necessary to ask a patient who is suffering so acutely from tuberculosis to do any work of any kind. I am told, and I do not want to attempt to compete with doctors, that this victim died from what is known as a pulmonary aneurism. I have looked up the dictionary to find out what a pulmonary aneurism is. One definition is this, from Chambers' Twentieth Century dictionary:
    "A soft tumour arising from the dilatation of an artery acting on a part weakened by disease or injury."
    In Stormont's English Dictionary this is the definition:
    "Dilatation of an artery, a tumour filled with blood which communicates directly or indirectly from an artery and arises from a wound, laceration or a simple dilatation of an artery."
    It ought to be possible for medical men who are continually supervising tuberculous cases to find out the stage in the disease when a thing like this may happen. If you have a person who is suffering from general weakness, such a state of things as this is always likely to arise, so I am given to understand by medical men. If the people of Papworth are correct in dealing with cases of this kind, many sanatoria authorities with which I have been connected as a member of the Lancashire County Council are absolutely wrong in the methods they are adopting. Another case occurred where a man collapsed at his work suffering acutely from tuberculosis. Surely we ought not to be asking people in this stage of the disease to do work of any kind. There is another case that I want to raise. I am sorry the Minister of Health is not here.

    There may be a misunderstanding. I understood that the hon. Member desired to raise not health but industrial questions, and that is why I am here.

    The questions that I wish to raise are mainly industrial, but I expected the right hon. Gentleman would be here. The next point is as to an answer given me to a question with regard to people working in the workshops. I have been to Papworth as a result of the questions that I put on the Order Paper and letters that I subsequently received. I thought it better not to depend on mere hearsay. I went there a week or two ago and investigated the matter as far as I was able. The result was that I put further questions on the Order Paper last week. I want to refer to an answer that I got regarding men from training centres being sent to Papworth to work in the workshops side by side with the victims of tuberculosis. Here again the Minister of Health comes in. This is the reply that he gave to me:

    "These young men work in hygienic workshops and also in the open air. They are aware before they come that they will be employed in a tuberculosis village settlement. They do not reside there. The tuberculosis patients are under constant medical supervision and are trained in the necessary precautions to guard against conveyance of infection. In these circumstances, I am advised that no special risk is involved."
    I put a further question to him as a supplementary regarding these sanatoria being set up mainly for the purpose of avoiding infection and contagion, and the Minister of Health gave me this reply:
    "I do not think that there can be any objection. These men go quite voluntarily, and, as far as any risk is concerned, they are just in the same position as the medical staff and the nurses, and other people associated with them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1937, col. 553, Vol. 320.]
    I confess that that reply gave me a vigorous shock. In fact, we have always advised that people suffering from T.B. should be isolated as much as possible, and the very fact that a person might sleep in the same room as a patient suffering from T.B., even when there is no expectoration whatever, is a source of danger. All the medical men with whom I come in contact say that there is a possibility of infection if you are only breathing the same atmosphere. I wonder that the Minister of Health should have put over a thing like this having regard to his responsibility. It it were a case of diphtheria, smallpox, typhoid fever, scarlet fever, or any of these infectious diseases which have to be isolated, and someone said that they wanted to act as nurse, and children were going into the room and so forth, would any medical man say they were only running the same risk as the doctors and the nurses and the staff run? The thing is utterly preposterous. I cannot appreciate the position that the Minister of Health took up, and from the point of view of infection alone, this practice of sending non-T.B. workers to Papworth should be put an end to as early as possible. When I went down to Papworth I had no idea that I should meet with what I saw and heard. The Minister of Labour, in his reply to me last week, said:
    "I understand that 24 men who were trained at Government training centres, as well as a considerably large number of other non-tuberculous men, are at present employed at the Papworth Village centre."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1937, col. 551, Vol. 320.]
    These men were informed he said before they took up employment at Papworth. As far as I am concerned—and I want to say this in common fairness to one of the medical men on the staff at Papworth—I do not know how it is that I have different figures. I was shown a list by a certain medical man at Papworth of 28 names of men employed in building, carpentry and cabinet making, who were trainees. The two men to whom I spoke came from what I consider to be distressed areas. One of them came from Wallsend and the other from Liverpool, and both these men as well as others told me that they were not warned of the kind of place in which they were to be employed. They were offered a job, and they made the further statement—and I hope that the Minister of Labour will make further investigation into it—that they had been told by one of the foremen or chargemen or whatever you may call them, that they were not going to be sacked. No matter how much they were dissatisfied they were not going to be discharged, and they dare not leave on their own account. I want the significance of that last remark to be fully borne in mind, because I understand that this "dare not leave on their own" would mean that if they went away they would be charged with voluntarily leaving their employment, and if they were out of work, there would be no unemployment benefit for them. I do not know whether that is true or not. I am giving the information which was given to me, and I was asked to do what I could for this type of case.

    So the hon. Gentleman said. I am passing on the information as it was given to me, and very much uncoloured. These two men were sent there and were working in the same place. There were other non-tubercular men in the place, and there were also patients suffering from tuberculosis in various stages. These men object on this ground also, that they felt that if they went to any other place of employment after they had finished at Papworth the stigma of having been employed in a tubercular settlement would still hang around them, and it would be detrimental to their getting further employment. That is the nature of the complaint that was expressed to me freely.

    There is another matter to which I should like to draw attention, and that is the rate of pay. These men are engaged on woodwork, and one of them, I understand, had had a certain amount of training as a ship's carpenter. They complained very bitterly about the rate of pay, namely, 38s. for a full week. I do not see how we can defend that, even if we regard them as semi-skilled men. If it be correct that these men are being paid this rate, it is most unfair.

    They made a further complaint that sometimes they are sent out on erection work which involves their staying away from their lodgings from one to five days, and they have no extra allowance for staying away, but have to provide for themselves. If they were engaged in the building trade and were sent away, they would get an allowance for living away from their homes. As trade unionists, we take a very serious view when this kind of thing is going on without let or hindrance.

    One further point. This settlement has the reputation of being a tubercular colony, and as far as I am concerned up to the end of last month my opinion of the Papworth Settlement was a very high one. I could offer certain criticisms but I am not going to do it. What gives me cause for dissatisfaction more than anything else is this, that whilst I was there I met a young man who had been there nearly a year. He has recovered to some extent and he wishes to remain at Pap-worth and to colonise. He gave me his case. He said that if he was sent back to London he had not a friend or relation in the place. The man wants to stop there. What gives me cause for disquiet is that two men who are longing to get away, who are not suffering from tuberculosis cannot get away and a man who is suffering from tuberculosis and wants to stop there is not allowed to do so. If that is going on then I say that Papworth can no longer be called a tuberculosis colony for the treatment of tubercular patients.

    11.21 p.m.

    I want to say that I am astonished that any speaker in this House or anywhere else could have spoken for more than two minutes without paying the highest possible tribute to one of the finest institutions in this country. The method by which this question was raised in the House, by question and answer, was unfortunate enough and the speech of the hon. Member this evening has been still more unfortunate. His questions have caused intense resentment among the people who have been interested in Papworth from its inception, and the fiercest indignation among the vast body of men employed at Papworth. They have asked me to let it be known here and elsewhere that the vast majority of workmen at Papworth are more than satisfied with their conditions. They appreciate the great work that has been done for them in curing them of their illnesses and giving them health and happy employment and all that has been done for their social welfare and recreation. These men are proud of the place which has done so much for them and intensely resent the form of the questions and the sort of speech that has just been made.

    11.23 p.m.

    The hon. Member first raised this question by question and answer without having had any previous correspondence with me on the matter. I have only a few minutes in which to deal with questions which also affect the Minister of Health, and there are one or two statements of the hon. Member which must be answered. Let me take the first case the hon. Member mentioned. The case of the man who died. The hon. Member had some correspondence with the Minister of Health, and he knows the answer. Let me read a letter which the Minister of Health wrote to the hon. Member, but which he has not read:

    "Ministry of Health,

    Whitehall, S.W.I.

    15th February, 1937.

    Dear Mr. Rawson,

    I am now in a position to inform you of the result of the inquiries which I have caused to be made by the Medical Department of the Ministry in connection with the question which you asked in the House on the 28th January as to the employment in factories at Papworth of persons suffering seriously from tuberculosis. I am advised, as a result of very careful inquiry, that it is not the fact that persons suffering seriously from tuberculosis are employed in the factories at Papworth or that they are so employed until a few days before death, save in the exceptional case of a patient who is otherwise fit dying from rupture of a pulmonary aneurysm, an event which cannot be foreseen. It is, however, of course, the case that patients who are receiving sanatorium or hospital treatment, as well as ex-patients who are settled in the village settlement, take part in work in such degree as may be medically prescribed as suitable in the individual case. I am also advised that at Papworth every possible care is taken in each case in deciding from the medical aspect what form and amount of work is proper for the particular patient, and that the prescription of work by the medical officer is based from day to day upon his intimate personal knowledge of the physiology, pathology and psychology of each patient. The therapeutic value of patients engaging in light occupation on proper medical prescription is well recognised and it could not, I am convinced, be carried on with greater care than that exercised at Papworth.

    Yours sincerely,

    Kingsley Wood."

    I would add that I am informed that it is not the fact that the man died at work, but that he died on his way to a medical inspection. I am further informed that the man who died was not doing anything that could be described in the ordinary sense as work. He was given the occupation of moving the lever of an addressograph with one finger. It is most desirable that tubercular patients, where it is practicable and where they are not too ill, should be given something to occupy their minds, if not their bodies. I understand that medical opinion supports that, without question, and, as even those who have no medical knowledge well know, a pulmonary aneurism may collapse at any time.

    I would point out that the last complaint the hon. Member made was more a compliment than a complaint. He refered to a man who wanted to get to Papworth, but could not. The reason is that this great institution is so valued by those who suffer from this dreaded disease—as the man to whom the hon. Member referred knew—and my information is that the Settlement was full. The hon. Member is taking a very peculiar way of making it easier to enlarge this beneficent institution by raising the matter in the way in which he has tonight.

    There are many things I could say if there were time, but I will restrict myself to one or two things. First of all, the hon. Member said that the men to whom he has spoken have the feeling that they are in danger if they leave, but I can disabuse their minds of that idea. That fear is completely ungrounded, and the facts with regard to the trainees is a clear proof of that. There have been, since last August, 38 trainees from four different centres who have gone voluntarily to Papworth, and of those, 14 have left. Since the question was raised, I have had inquiries made of all the 14 cases, and I can only find one case in which there has been a disallowance of benefit, and that was after inquiry by a Court of Referees, in which case the benefit was cut by three weeks. It is clear that the 14 trainees left this institution without any harm whatever. If the particular men to whom the hon. Member referred have that feeling, let them approach the Cambridge Exchange manager, and they will soon have their minds disabused.

    As to suitability of work, the opinion of the medical officer has been given and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health gave his opinion on the Floor of the House on Thursday and I can add nothing to that. I can only say it is a very strange thing that this question should be raised in regard to 24 trainees now working there when, side by side with them, are journeymen trade unionists who are paid the full trade union rates of wages. There are 88 ordinary work- men, working under similar conditions, the bulk of them in the building trade working out of doors, but others engaged in carpentry and leatherwork. They are working in the colony for the benefit of the whole institution. They go there voluntarily; they have no fear and they get no harm. As the Minister of Health said, it is never possible in these cases to-say that there could be no danger at all but there is no special risk, according to medical opinion.

    Because there is work to do and they are glad to do it. Of course they do not live in the settlement; they go in and do the job at the full trade union wage and they are glad to get the work.

    It is of course. I can best sum it up in this way: If hon. Members opposite will turn to the "Daily Herald" of l0th February, they will find a great article entitled "T.B.," by H. V. Morton. It is an article about Papworth, and I commend to them and to the House this paragraph:

    "In a sane and rational world, Papworth would not be in any way remarkable. It does not merely soothe the social conscience by doing something and failing to do enough. It strikes to the root of the problem of T.B. by realising that many people can be cured, and can lead profitable lives if they can work, after their cure, under specialised conditions which do not exist elsewhere."

    It being Half-past Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.