(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Scotland, whether he is aware that a destructive plague of caterpillars has swept from the Ochil Hills, in Perthshire, to the Campsie Hills, in Stirlingshire, and that some 10,000 acres of sheep pasturage have already been affected; whether outbreaks have been reported from other parts of Scotland: and whether he can make any statement as to the origins and causes of the plague and as to the steps which may be usefully taken by agriculturists and the Department of Agriculture for Scotland for the speedy arrestment of the plague.

I am aware that extensive damage has been done during recent weeks by caterpillars of the Antler Moth in the areas referred to in the Question and in other upland areas in South and Mid Scotland. The position has been investigated by the authorities of the Edinburgh and East of Scotland College of Agriculture, and it is stated that the rare periodic outbreaks of this pest have always followed upon a season in which much snow has lain on the hills until late spring or early summer protecting the young caterpillars. I understand that control by artificial methods at this juncture is regarded as out of the question. It appears that in the opinion of expert entomologists the outbreak is past its zenith, that the pest is not likely to spread to the low ground, and that the damage done is not permanent, and may very quickly be repaired by growth of new grass. The Department are in communication with the College as to whether any further action is requred by way of advice to farmers on the subject.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether this pest is also attacking the fronds of the bracken, and whether investigations are being made as to whether some permanent advantage might not be secured in that direction?

My information is that it is rather an underground pest than a leaf pest; that it attacks the roots. I will call for a report as to whether it is attacking bracken.

Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that this pest, which is ruining small agriculturists, is completing the work which has been done in this part of the country by the Milk Board?

I do not think the Milk Board is concerned with these particular areas.

(By Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government, in association with the French Government, have come to any decision regarding the maintenance of naval control of the Spanish coast, in view of the withdrawal of German and Italian forces; whether His Majesty's Government propose to make any suggestions for the immediate withdrawal of foreign nationals acting as combatants in Spain; and whether, failing satisfactory arrangements on these points, they propose that full facilities shall be accorded to the Spanish Government for the acquisition of arms and supplies?

With regard to the first part of the Question, the right hon. Gentleman will be aware that at the last meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee, Lord Plymouth made a statement on behalf of His Majesty's Government, in which he outlines certain proposals for reconstituting the Naval Observation Scheme. It is hoped that the Italian and German representatives will be able, at this morning's meeting of the Committee, to state the views of their Governments with regard to these proposals. With regard to the second part of the Question, His Majesty's Government have consistently pressed, and will continue to press, for the withdrawal of all foreign combatants from Spain. With regard to the third part of the Question, in the event of no satisfactory settlement being reached on the question of patrol, a new situation would be created in respect of which I am not at present in a position to make any statement.

May I ask whether any consideration will be given to the granting of belligerent rights without the withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain?

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman would expect me to enter into details as to what is at present a hypothetical situation. The Committee is now meeting, and I think we must await the outsome of their proceedings before I make any further statement.

Are we to understand that the question of belligerent rights has been considered?

There is no question of an agreement being reached on it at this morning's meeting.

In view of the fact that the House will not meet until Monday, and that very serious decisions may be taken meanwhile which will affect British interests very much, would it be possible for the right hon. Gentleman to promise to make a statement before the House separates this afternoon, if any conclusion is come to at the meeting this morning?

Certainly, if there is anything I can say. It is difficult for me to say anything now, as the House will appreciate, but I suppose a communique will be issued at the end of the meeting, however long it takes to-day. I doubt whether it will be possible for me to make any statement beyond the terms of the communique until I have had time to consider the outcome of the meeting and to consult with my colleagues.

Before we part with this Measure, I propose to say a few words, and they will be very brief, because I have no desire to cover again the wide range which has been traversed in the exceedingly interesting Debates we have had during the previous stages of this proposal. I want rather to sum up the position as it will be when the Bill is passed. In the Debate on Monday, on the Money Resolution, the Chancellor of the Exchequer described the old Gold Standard as a measuring rod. That, I agree, is a correct description, because contrary to the opinion of many people, the old Gold Standard was not self-acting but indicated when action should be taken if the principles on which it was based were to be adhered to. I will give another analogy which, I think, is appropriate to the actual facts. There used to be a practice, which I hope is no longer carried out, on the part of certain dog fanciers who were very particular about the shape of the ears of a dog. They used to put a piece of cardboard of the shape they wanted the ears to be alongside the ears of the puppy and then cut the ears of the dog to the shape of the cardboard. That analogy more closely fits the working of the old Gold Standard.

When the right hon. Member says "economically exclusive grounds," he will realise that we are by far the largest purchasers of overseas goods in the world.

That does not affect the point I was making. In my view, the Government have not always, particularly in trade matters, taken that wide international view which undoubtedly is of great importance at the present time. I will conclude with the observation that if there is a wide international use of the powers that the Government are seeking in this Bill, and if the Government are going to grasp the opportunity here provided to take the lead in monetary matters throughout the world, I believe that sterling may have the most important rôle to fill in the future development of this immensely important question; but if the Government take what I would call a parochial view—even though the parish may be the whole of the British Empire—if they think merely of the results to the people of the British Empire in the immediate future, they will be sacrificing a tremendous opportunity, they will be injuring the ultimate prospects of the British Empire, and they will be failing in their duty to the civilisation of the world as a whole.

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

I say at once that we are glad that the Government have endeavoured to meet the points which we thought were of substance in regard to Clause 17 as it originally appeared in the Bill. The amendments which have been incorporated in the proposed new Clause are of importance to those who hold the views which I and other Members express. I think, however, I should hardly be doing justice to my own views if I did not say that I still regret that an Amending Trade Marks Bill should include within its ambit a fundamental change in the basis of trade marks legislation, in that it should allow in any circumstances statutory control of conditions to run with the sale. I have been somewhat exercised in my mind as to whether, in view of the obvious good intent of the Parliamentary Secretary and the Solicitor-General, I should still divide on the Clause because of the principle involved. I think it is true that as the Solicitor-General says, to a large degree the more objectionable features of the original Clause have been removed, and for that we desire to express our thanks. The only point about which I am still not quite certain is exactly how and when an action arises. One of the objections that we had before was in regard to the possibility that the owner of the goods at the time of the first sale by the trade mark proprietor, or the actual user of the goods for the time being, might be proceeded against. Am I quite clear in understanding now that the only place at which an action will lie will be against the owner of the goods under the contract in writing? If that be so, I do not think I need ask my hon. Friends to divide against the Clause.

Can the Solicitor-General tell me whether this Clause will in any way affect criminal procedure? A good many years ago these proceedings used to take the form of a prosecution in the police court under the Merchandise Marks Act. I remember a case in which a very well-known firm of brewers found that beer which was not of their brewing was being sold in bottles bearing their registered mark. On several occasions proceedings were taken under the Merchandise Marks Act and were dealt with expeditiously and cheaply. I shall be grateful if the hon. and learned Gentleman will tell me whether or not the Clause in any way affects the alternative remedy which is still preserved in the Merchandise Marks Act.

The point to which my hon. and learned Friend calls my attention is not affected by this Clause. I do not think the Merchandise Marks Act is very much affected by the Bill. There are penalties under Clause 21 for acts of the character of fraud—false representation and so on. With regard to the point put by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, what the Clause now drafted enacts is that the restrictions that are imposed must be observed by any person who is owner for the time being of the goods if he has notice of those obligations. That is to say, supposing the goods have passed through an intermediate stage and have been sold and resold and the second purchaser receives them with notice of the restrictions imposed by the manufacturer on the original sale, if he does any of this limited number of things the proprietor of the mark is entitled, even in the case of a second or third owner of the goods, to enforce the right that he has reserved to himself.

I congratulate the hon. and learned Gentleman on the great care that he has shown in drafting the Clause, because he is a master of accuracy in these matters. Only a few minutes ago he reproved me for drawing attention by mistake to a marginal note in another Bill. I accepted the correction but the Secretary of State for Scotland on another point to which I drew attention said that the reference to the Central Electricity Board was there by mistake, thanked me for drawing attention to it and said he would have it put right.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 34, at the end, to insert "to the extent to which."

I beg to move, in page 3, line 13, at the end, to insert, "to the extent to which."

I beg to move, in page 4, line 2, to leave out "have been originally invalid, or to."

We all, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton (Mr. Benn), appreciate the care with which the Solicitor-General has treated the Bill. I am sure, whatever standing we may have on this side as contributories to its drafting, the right hon. Gentleman will sympathise with us in trying to follow the large number of detailed Amendments that have been put down to the Clause. Up to the present I am not convinced that the Government have really met the substantial part of my argument in Committee by this series of Amendments. The Parliamentary Secretary makes it clear to me from one part of his remarks that, in the case of articles in respect of which the trade mark has become the common name for the substance after the date of registration, he is not meeting me at all. That is to say, in the case of such articles that are to be given these special and new protections in the Bill. We had quite a long Debate on this matter upstairs, and I do not wish to keep the Members of the House in full session for any length of time upon it. But when you deal with such articles as Aspirin or Aspro, which are just names given to a perfectly common and generally used mixture of salts to deal with common ailments, such as headaches and complaints of that kind, it seems ridiculous to give this protection to what is not a specially devised article to which you attach a trade mark, but merely a much advertised name for the packing of it. I suggest that the Clause puts into the trade marks legislation of this country a point which it was never intended such legislation should cover, and that is, that there should be a protection in law for the goodwill established by much advertising, very often very misleading to the public, in order to keep up the price of well-known and perfectly common remedies for the people.

I accede at once to the request of the right hon. Gentleman to do the best I can to explain the extent to which we have tried to meet him. I sympathise with him when he sees the number of Amendments on the Paper which would require the exercise of much patience if, for instance, one were to write in the Bill in red ink exactly what they mean, but he can take my assurance that the Amendment of substance is the first one, and that the other Amendments are consequential and carry out the intention of the first Amendment. That intention was a matter that was raised by an hon. Gentleman from the other side in the Standing Committee, and it was—I think I can explain it shortly in this way. Under the present law the more successful you are in making known your trade mark, the more you run the risk of losing the value of that trade mark. The instance I gave upstairs was Kodak. If Kodak became synonymous to camera, then Kodak would cease to be a trade mark and anyone could sell his camera under the name of Kodak. Perhaps it would bring it home a little more if I imagined that the right hon. Gentleman or those with whom he is associated had invented the name "C.W.S." to be attached to goods, and had registered it as a trade mark.

A very accurate forecast.

Supposing he did so there is nothing whatever in this Bill to prevent anybody else from making that commodity, all that the Bill says is that you may not take that word which has been used as a trade mark by the right hon. Gentleman, and attach it to the goods of somebody else. The example that he gave of Aspirin is, I imagine—I do not know, but I believe it to be—a good example of the evil at which the Clause aims. Somebody invented Aspirin.

Oh, no.

Then I am wrong. I do not know whether Aspirin is a trade mark or not.

I beg the hon. and learned Gentleman's pardon. I thought he said that somebody invented the substance.

I do not mean the substance, but that somebody discovered that acetyl-salicylic acid was a specific for headaches and attached to it the trade mark "Aspirin". Aspirin was so well advertised and so well-known that everybody who wanted acetyl-salicylic acid asked for aspirins. The moment that occurred the value of the trade mark disappeared and anyone could sell under the invented name. That is the situation which the Committee recommended to be dealt with, because it was considered to be unfair to people who spent a great deal of money, and, perhaps, carried out a great deal of research in securing that their product should be pure and carefully got up, to find that the trade mark, through their very success, had become public property. What was suggested in Committee by an hon. Gentleman on the other side of the House was that, as the Clause stood, it would apply to cases where a general name was used by somebody and attached to the goods. The case was given of brown bread. What was said was, why should anybody be enabled to adopt "brown bread" because they had registered that as a trade mark?

I beg to move, in page 10, line 9, at the end, to insert:

"(7) Where an assignment in respect of any goods of a trade mark that is at the time of the assignment used in a business in those goods is made after the commencement of this Act otherwise than in connection with the goodwill of that business the assignment shall not take effect until the following requirements have been satisfied, that is to say, the assignee must, not later than the expiration of six months from the date on which the assignment is made or within such extended period, if any, as the Registrar may allow, apply to him for directions with respect to the advertisement of the assignment, and must advertise it in such form and manner and within such period as the Registrar may direct."

I am obliged to the Government for having substantially met the criticisms we advanced on this Clause. There is, I understand, some objections still remaining in the minds of some people that there should be this change with regard to the assignment of goodwill in any case, but my own view is that you have met what might be a great injustice to the consumer, when a recognised trade mark with the goodwill has been transferred to some other manufacturer who may not deliver the same quality or, in fact, the same goods. If the Department will ensure that the Clause is really administered and that due advertisement is made to the public of any change in ownership of goodwill, a large part of our criticism has been met, and I do not propose to divide against the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 1o, line 36, to leave out "any," and to insert:

"the purposes of section twelve of this Act and for any other."

"The permitted use of a trade mark shall be deemed to be use by the proprietor thereof, and shall be deemed not to be use by a person other than the proprietor."

I beg to move in page 20, line 2, to leave out "colour-ably resembling it" and to insert:

"so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion."

I beg to move, in page 20, line 14, at the end, to insert:

"Provided that in any action for infringement of the provisions of this section no injunction or other relief shall be granted if the defendant establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the use complained of is not as a trade mark or likely to deceive or cause confusion."

I am afraid I cannot accept the Amendment, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me in this, at any rate, that the brevity with which he made the point in the Committee upstairs has not resulted in our overlooking it or neglecting to reflect upon it. This Amendment, however, raises a point of such substance that I do not think it is possible for the Government to accept it consistently with the policy to which they have committed themselves by introducing the Clause. That policy arises out of a case known as the Yeast-Vite case. In that case it was held in the House of Lords that it was not an infringement of a trade mark to sell goods with a label which said "as good as Yeast-Vite," or words to that effect. The Committee recommended that that was a very unsatisfactory state of the law. I do not for a moment suppose that the right hon. Gentleman would defend the practice that was held to be within the law in the Yeast-Vite case. Hon. Members will observe that the vice that was disclosed in that case was a vice of adding something to the trade mark so that it was not used as a trade mark. If I were to accept the Amendment, we should not deal with the Yeast-Vite case at all, because the Amendment would limit the action for infringement for which we are providing in Clause 15 to cases where the use is use as a trade mark. The Yeast-Vite case was one where use was not use as a trade mark, but in another way. The right hon. Gentleman's Amendment runs entirely counter to the policy which we stand by of reversing the decision in the Yeast-Vite case, and that is the first reason why the Amendment is not acceptable.

Would not the first point raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman be met if he were to accept with my Amendment the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Burslem (Mr. MacLaren)?

I think that that would make it much worse. I always fear the Greeks when they come bearing gifts. I did not look upon the hon. Gentleman's Amendment as being intended to help the Government out of the difficulties in which they find themselves. The effect of Subsection (1, b) of the Clause is to cover the case where use of the trade mark is not use as a trade mark, and is not likely to deceive or to cause confusion. That was the very case of "a substitute for Yeast-Vite," so that the omission of the words, "as a trade mark or," and the retention of the other words, "likely to deceive or to cause confusion" would still nullify what we want to do. You cannot say that the putting in of the words "a substitute for Yeast-Vite" is calculated to cause confusion. It is not. It does not say that the article is Yeast-Vite. It only says that the article is a substitute. But the vice in that case was that it was an attempt by one trader to sell his goods by reference to the goodwill established by somebody else, and that vice we should not defeat if the Clause were amended in the manner proposed.

I have not found the reply of the Solicitor-General very satisfactory. I am never impressed by legislation which while endeavouring to deal with one evil proposes to create others. In the Yeast-Vite case the design was, more or less, to deceive the public but why, in attempting to deal with that matter, should we pass legislation which may work out in a very arbitrary fashion, and seriously affect a large body of traders who have no design whatever to deceive the public? The Amendment seems to me to be the natural sequence to the Government Amendment which we have just carried. I do not see why there should be any moral distinction between categories A and B under the trade mark law when it comes to affecting the rights of other traders. The Amendment which the Government have just submitted to overcome administrative and legal difficulties arising out of the words "colourable resemblance," introduces such language as "so nearly resembling as to be likely to deceive." Obviously what we are endeavouring to secure here is that there should be no deliberate fraud imposed on the public.

indicated dissent.

Then what is the purpose of the Clause? I shall be glad to give way if we can have an explanation of it.

The Solicitor-General has already explained the purpose of the Clause. It is to reverse the Yeast-Vite judgment and to prevent Trader A from trying to sell his goods by reference to a standard which has already been set up by Trader B. Even if his representations do not deceive the public, we believe that to be a wrong practice, and I do not believe it is a practice which the hon. Gentleman himself would condone. If that be so, it seems to me—and I am no lawyer—that to alter the Clause in the way proposed would completely defeat the object which I think we are all trying to achieve.

It is becoming the habit on the Treasury Bench to deal with Amendments proposed from this side by saying that they defeat the purpose of the Clause without giving any argument to show that that is so. It is useless for the Parliamentary Secretary to direct questions at my right hon. Friend and myself as to whether we would stand for a practice such as that described in the Yeast-Vite case. Of course we would not, but that is no argument. We are not concerned with that. What we are concerned with is that when Parliament sets out to remedy an abuse which has been discovered in the trade marks law, it should not do so in such a way as to cause irritation among the great body of normal traders. Why should such abuses lead to a type of legislation which is restrictive on the great body of traders, who have no intention to defraud the community? Why, as a result of an abuse by one Mader, should the law of

I beg to move, in page 22, line 1, to leave out Clause 17.

I beg to move, in page 23, line 12, at the end, to insert "to the extent to which."

"or comprising any of its essential features."

I beg to move, in page 35, line 10, to leave out:

"such date as the Board of Trade may by order appoint,"

"the first day of July, nineteen hundred and thirty-eight."

The right hon. Gentleman was perfectly correct in stating that we are hoping to introduce a consolidation Measure as soon as possible, and to bring this Bill and the consolidation Measure into force in such a way that the new rules which we shall have to make in connection with this Bill will be based upon the consolidation Measure and will, therefore, eliminate a number of those references to which the right hon. Gentleman sensibly objected. In circumstances of this kind we are very anxious to keep the date on which this Bill shall be brought into operation elastic. We are grateful for the offer of assistance which the right hon. Gentleman has just made to pass the consolidation. Bill through the House, but I am sure he will appreciate that although a great deal of work has been done on it, it will, in the present circumstances, take a certain amount of time to complete. Then we have to make up the rules. At the same time, I must admit that we do not want to delay the coming into force of the present Bill any longer than we can help. The Departmental Committee, whose report was really the genesis of this Bill, was appointed as long ago as 1933 and reported in April, 1934. It has taken some time to prepare this Measure, but it is one which is generally admitted on all sides to be urgently required in the interests of trade, and perhaps not least in the interests of the export trade. Therefore, my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade is anxious to bring this Bill into force as soon as it can be done. I am prepared to give an undertaking that it shall not be brought into force before the end of six months, at any rate. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be prepared to leave it at that, and that if we find we are able to get the consolidation Measure through the House and to get the rules made, he will leave us with the option of bringing it into force as soon as possible.

The last words of the Parliamentary Secretary were very welcome, because the suggestion of my right hon. Friend is one that should be followed up by the Government. It would be bad if it went out from the House that the Government were always asking for elastic legislation. The Government ought always to be able to tell the House on question such as this how long the Department concerned will take to do the necessary work and to give a definite date. It is unfair to ask the House to give a sort of elastic doctor's mandate to the Government to decide when decisions of the House shall become operative. We welcome the Parliamentary Secretary's undertaking, and I would like to ask him whether, if the Department finds that the Bill can be operated before the date mentioned in the Amendment, it will take the necessary steps.

That is the whole point of my remarks in asking the right hon. Gentleman not to press the Amendment. It is because I think we shall be able to operate the legislation before the date that he suggests that I am anxious for him not to press the Amendment. We will not start it within six months, but, if it is possible to do so, we would like to bring it into operation before the date suggested by the right hon. Gentleman.