I beg to move, in page I, line 16, at the end, to insert the words "and give effect to the said conditions."

These words, as the Committee will see in the printed Bill, were left out by the other House to avoid questions of Privilege, and I move to insert them now simply in order to make the Bill complete.

Before this Clause is added to the Bill, would the Financial Secretary explain what this collection is? The other night it was not made quite clear what it contains. This is one of those occasions when we are asked to agree to something without knowing to what it is we are agreeing.

This collection is a collection of moths, butterflies, stuffed animals and things of that kind. It contains in particular a very wonderful collection of what, I believe, are scientifically called Lepidoptera, which to you and me, Captain Bourne, means, as I have said, bugs, butterflies, moths and the like. When I used the phrase "zoological museum" the other night, I may have given to the House a wrong impression that any of these specimens are alive. They are not. They will form a very valuable addition to the existing collection in the British Natural History Museum. I hope that this explanation will satisfy the hon. Member.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 7, to leave out from the beginning, to "apply," in line 8, and to insert:

"Within six months next after this Act shall have come into operation, and thereafter within three months after a vacancy in the office of chairman or deputy chairman of the court of quarter sessions shall have occurred, the court of quarter sessions for a county shall."

The general objection that has been advanced time after time, both on the Floor of the House and in Committee, to the way in which this legislation is being approached, is that, instead of having a bold, constructive scheme of reorganisation, the Government have contented themselves with shreds and patches applied almost haphazardly from point to point. The particular objection we have to the Clause as it stands is that in this instance the Government, quite apart from their general policy of shreds and patches, have not even applied a whole patch at the time. The position is quite adequately expressed by a sentence or two of the speech of the Attorney-General last week on the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill. He said, dealing with general objections that have been made:

"In spite of these criticisms—and we realise that there are many criticisms which can be urged—I do not think that those who urge them always realise the difficulties of solution or that they give sufficient credit for the amount which has been done—piecemeal, if you like, but if you are going to build a structure of this elaboration and complexity there is something to be said for doing it gradually and not making a sweeping reform at once."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th July, 1938; col. 1692, Vol. 338.]

Our objection here is not that they are not making a sweeping reform at once, but that they are not making even this small piecemeal reform at once. The general purpose of the Clause is to provide machinery which will enable a good deal more criminal work to be sent to courts of quarter sessions instead of to the assizes, thus relieving the Judges on assize of a good deal of criminal work, and allowing them to deal with the congested civil business on assizes more quickly—and the way in which civil business on assizes is now dealt with amounts almost to a public scandal—and, as a result, to get the Judges back to London as quickly as may be in order to deal with the shockingly congested state of the civil list in London. It is the opinion of everyone that we cannot extend the jurisdiction of quarter sessions, which already deal with very important cases, if we leave the constitution of quarter sessions as it is, and it is the opinion of everybody, without exception, who has had any time to consider this matter, that there ought to be a legally-qualified chairman of quarter sessions.

I am not going to take the time of the House by going into all the reasons. They have been dealt with before. In any event, where there is no controversy about the advisability of having a legally qualified chairman, there is no need to take time in advancing the arguments in its favour. But one would have thought that, in those circumstances, it would have been an easy thing for the Government to legislate for a legally-qualified chairman at all quarter sessions, so as to enable them to proceed, even in the piecemeal fashion which they prefer, with the reorganisation of the legal system of this country. But what does the Clause propose? Instead of making it compulsory for quarter sessions to have a legally-qualified chairman, it makes it optional. It allows quarter sessions which decide to have a legally-qualified chairman to have one, and allows those who do not desire it to do without. The result of accepting the Clause, without the Amendment which we would like to see made in it, would be that, for the first time in the legal history of this country, you would have existing side by side parallel systems of the administration of the Criminal Law; so that if your case is being tried in one part of the country you get one standard of the administration of justice, and if it is being tried in another part of the country, you get another standard—a secondary standard and an inferior standard.

The ground upon which the distinction is made as to whether a man charged with a quite serious criminal offence is to have the advantage of a first-rate system of justice or a second-rate system of justice is purely geographical and arbitrary. No one thinks that that is a good system. When the matter was discussed in Committee, it was admitted, on behalf of the Government, that they did not think it a good system. The Solicitor-General said expressly that no one contemplated the continuation of this double system permanently. But the Bill contemplates it. There is nothing in the Bill to enable it to be brought to an end. If we passed it now, no one could say that at some future time we might not amend it and bring this absurd double system to an end; but there is nothing in the Bill as it stands to bring it to an end. The Government say it is as well to have a preliminary period, but this is not said in the Bill to be a preliminary or a trial period. There is no way under the Bill of determining that period. Where everybody is agreed that the present sysem is wrong, there is no reason why there should be a period of experimentation at all. There is no need to establish, for the first time, this dual system, merely for the purpose of allowing it at some time to be brought to an end. It has been said that there are practical difficulties, but I see none, and I hope the Government will not insist on making some half a dozen bites at a very small cherry, but will swallow it whole.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I propose to follow the example of my hon. Friend and to be equally brief. Before I deal with the Amendment, may I express the very deep regret I have always felt with regard to these matters that more of the laymen—if they will allow me so to call them—of this House do not take more interest in these matters? They seem to think that these are matters which concern lawyers only. But we lawyers are only giving the benefit of our experience to the House. These matters do not affect us very much; but they do affect our client, the costs he is put to, and the kind of justice he is getting. I wish the laymen of the House would take a much keener interest in these matters. As the hon. Member said, everybody who has considered this question of the jurisdiction of quarter sessions is agreed that nowadays, whatever be the jurisdiction exercised by quarter sessions they should be presided over by experienced qualified lawyers, whether banisters or solicitors. That is quite apart from any relief which may be given to the Judges going on assize, by relieving them of cases which they now are called upon to try.

As I have so often mentioned to the House, I was privileged to be a member of what is known as the Peel Commission. The purpose of that Commission was to inquire into the delay in the King's Bench Division. We discussed that the other day. There is continued delay in the trial of actions in the King's Bench Division, amounting now to a positive scandal, both on assizes and in London. When we were considering it on the Peel Commission we felt that the assizes could be relieved if the jurisdiction of the quarter sessions were extended. We all felt that we dare not extend it unless we had a qualified judge. Therefore, we said that, in any event, there should be a qualified chairman. On page 71 of our report, paragraph 209, we said:

''We are, however, very strongly of opinion that all chairmen of quarter sessions should possess legal qualifications."

A little later we deal with the salaried chairman. There is no part of this Bill dealing with salaries. It has nothing to do with whether a chairman is paid a salary or not, but only with the question of his qualifications. We say:

"In those counties where it is not desired to have a salaried chairman, we recommend that only a chairman with the legal qualification thus defined should be eligible for appointment."

Whether he is paid a salary or whether he is not, he ought to be a qualified chairman. Apparently, that is also the view of the Government, and, if that is their view, why not do it? Instead, in this Bill, unless they accept the Amendment, they propose to say "Let each county come along and ask the Lord Chancellor to appoint a qualified man. If the county do that the Lord Chancellor will appoint him. If the county will not do that, they will continue with their late chairman and the Lord Chancellor will not have any power at all to make a recommendation, still less an appointment." Let there be one group for the whole country. Let the Lord Chancellor appoint in every instance, and, before he appoints, let him consult the county as to what their views are and find out what persons are properly eligible. It is beyond me why the Government adopt the attitude they do of this half-measure and leave two jurisdictions, as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman) has said.

Let me take my own county. I am now the chairman of quarter sessions, possessing the legal qualification, I hope, which will recommend itself to the Lord Chancellor. There will be in the county of Montgomery an extended jurisdiction. Merioneth has a layman and Radnor has a layman. It would be perfectly easy to appoint somebody with the necesssary qualifications from the North Wales circuit—they would be only too willing to do it if asked—for Merioneth, and from the South Wales circuit for Radnor. If there is any other difficulty, they have only to approach those who already possess the qualifications and are acting in one county, and ask them whether they will take the other county as well. My own sessions never last more than a day, and usually about half a day. Fortunately, crime is practically nonexistent in Radnor, and the same applies in Merioneth. For example, if I were asked "Would you also take Merioneth?" "Certainly." "Would you take Radnor?" "Certainly." It would mean only an extra day. There are no practical difficulties at all. Therefore, for the sake of one uniform system covering the whole country, I hope that the Attorney-General will accept the Amendment.

The Mover and Seconder of the Amendment, with clarity and brevity to which I would pay my tribute, have put their argument in an attractive way. They say, as everyone will agree, that the ultimate ideal is legally qualified chairmen and uniformity throughout the country, and they ask, why not; therefore, do it by compulsion now? The answer to that is that the system of quarter sessions is a very old one and it is rooted in local tradition. There are, as the House knows, many quarter sessions which to-day have legally qualified chairmen. This has been brought about by such people as my hon. and learned Friend- the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) and others being willing to undertake this work and this position, and the increase in the number of legally qualified chairmen, apart from this Bill altogether, has been definite, substantial and steady.

The qualified chairman has not been under the same definition of "legal qualification" proposed by this Measure.

Never mind that for the moment. I was saying that the nomination of chairmen with legal qualifications has been steady and substantial during recent years. The main purpose of this Clause is, as the House knows, to enable the local authorities and the quarter sessions, if they so desire, to have salaried legally qualified chairmen. There are many areas already in which there are chairmen with legal qualifications, and there are chairmen in a number of districts without legal qualifications but who, with very long experience on the Bench, are acting as chairmen under the existing jurisdiction with very great competence and efficiency. If the House accepts this Amendment it will say to these chairmen, "Although you have fitted yourself by 20 years' service on the bench for the position of chairmen, although you have been chosen by those who do this work to be chairman, and although no one has the slightest complaint against the way you do your work"—and indeed some of the unqualified chairmen may be doing their work just as well as, I might almost say better than, some legally qualified chairmen—"you cannot continue to serve." I think it would be contrary to the feeling of this House that these men should feel, in spite of all that, that they should be compulsorily removed from their office at this time by an act of this House.

There is another point of principle which might appeal to some right hon. and hon. Members. The acceptance of this Amendment would compulsorily bind the local authority as to salary where they had not got someone willing to act. I do not stress that point, but the first point is one which will commend itself to all Members of the House. That is the basis upon which the Bill has been introduced, and I think it is the basis agreed upon by the majority of the Court of Appeal Committee. My hon. and learned Friend read some sentences which he Construed in a different way. I do not want to have an argument about that. It may be that they were not quite clear, but I believe that this was the procedure which they intended, because they say that power should be given to appoint a salaried chairman. That implies, I think, that it should be voluntary because if you made it compulsory and you could not get a qualified unpaid chairman, then there would be no question of getting power to pay the salary: you would have to pay such persons as were available.

We believe this is the right method. We do not believe that the day will be long postponed when all quarter sessions will have legally qualified chairmen and full jurisdiction. I can give the House this assurance, that the progress made in obtaining legally qualified chairmen will be kept constantly under review by my Noble Friend, and if counties fail without reasonable cause to obtain legally qualified chairmen he will, of course, consider asking Parliament for further powers. We believe that under the Bill the process of obtaining legally qualified chairmen will go on, and that it will go on with the good will, which is very important, of the members of quarter sessions, and that the day will not be far distant when, on a voluntary basis rather than compulsorily, each quarter sessions will have a chairman with the necessary legal qualifications and with the extended jurisdiction. I hope that I am not unduly optimistic. In view of these assurances, I hope that hon. Members will see their way not to press the Amendment.

I am speaking as a layman, because I have been so long away from the Bar and I had so little practice there. It seems to me that the Attorney-General is looking at this question from the point of view of the quarter sessions people, and not from the point of view of the litigants. You are going to have this position in counties, that just because you must not upset the feelings of certain chairmen who have been presiding there for years, the quarter sessions in those counties are to have restricted jurisdiction.

indicated dissent.

Well, it will not be extended. Therefore, it will be restricted as compared with the others. The Attorney-General assumes that, necessarily, the people who will be retained will be the good ones, but clearly there have been some unqualified ones. It is a very long time since I attended quarter sessions at the Bar, but I remember there were some persons then presiding who ought not to have been there. I should have thought that the likelihood of the retention of an incompetent chairman of quarter sessions will be just in those places where the general level is low, and where probably personal prestige, and a desire not to upset the old man, will prevent an application, with the result that those who are to be damnified will be the ordinary people of the county, simply in order to pander to the sense of importance of one or two people.

I should like to emphasise the argument which has been made by the Leader of the Opposition. It seems to me that by this Bill there is a general recognition that county quarter sessions as now conducted are very unsatisfactory. If they are unsatisfactory, I take the view, and I hope it will be the view of those who have proposed the Amendment, that it should be altered in some uniform fashion, and that there should be no attempt made in this Bill to give to some counties a better type of jurisdiction, and a better standard of justice than adjoining counties may have. I should like to tell the House, briefly, what I stated in Committee. I know of two adjoining counties, possessing the same county quarter sessions jurisdiction. In each case the quarter sessions were presided over by a lay chairman. The position in one county became such, however, that the learned county court judge of the district was asked to preside at quarter sessions, and he did preside, and in his hands of course, justice was and is pro- perly and satisfactorily administered. The next county has no legal chairman of the quarter sessions; so far as I know he has no legal qualfications. When a person is committed for trial in one of these counties it is a matter of luck where he is arrested as to which tribunal is going to try him. This House should not subject any person to the risk of having to be tried by a court which is recognised under this Bill as a second-class type of tribunal.

I must protest against the statement of the hon. and learned Member that this Bill will recognise an existing quarter sessions as a second-class tribunal. They are recognised as tribunals with the jurisdiction they have to-day and the work they are doing to-day.

I did not intend to say that this Bill recognises quarter sessions as a second-class tribunal. If I said that, I withdraw it, and I am glad that the Attorney-General corrected me.

Is it not perfectly clear that what the Clause proposes to do is to set up two kinds of quarter sessions, one with an extended jurisdiction and one with a second-rate jurisdiction.

What I intended to say was, that, whatever the position has been up to now, this Bill, for the first time, sets up a kind of dual jurisdiction, giving to some counties, by virtue of the position of its chairman an extended jurisdiction, while in other counties it leaves the jurisdiction untouched. Therefore, it recognises, and indeed creates, two types of jurisdiction. It is very unsatisfactory that anyone who is to be tried for a criminal offence should be able to say: "Simply because I was arrested on this side of the borderline, I am to be tried by a second-class type of tribunal."

I hope that I understood the Attorney-General when he said that the present system is an old one and that it is rooted in local tradition. I hope that vested interest will not be allowed to stand in the way of a proper, easy, accessible, impartial, uniform administration of justice. I do not mind how old the system is. I do not mind whether the chairman of any county council or the chairman of any quarter sessions is going to be offended by the endeavour to promote a better system of justice. I hope the House will not think about persons. I cannot conceive why a man who has been administering justice for a period of years, and who is told that his period is coming to an end, not because of him, but because of the alteration that is required in the whole system of justice—I cannot see why he should be offended. If he is offended because of the efforts to get better justice, then he has no right to preside over any quarter sessions. The Attorney-General says that the system is rooted in local tradition. I do not mind if it is rooted in local tradition. If it stands in the way of a better system of justice, even if it is rooted in local tradition, it should go. I have yet to learn that there is any justification for saying: "We will set up a second standard of justice because, and only because, we do not want to interfere with something that is rooted in local tradition." I hope the House will not accept that type of argument.

Quarter sessions have important work to do. In addition to presiding over trial by jury, the chairman of a county quarter sessions presides over the court of appeal from the one court in the land which affects a large number of people, namely, the police court. You put into his hands the right to say whether or not a man was properly convicted. It is a very important jurisdiction and personal considerations ought not to weigh. I have in mind one instance where something happened in that connection which justifies me in saying that I think a case has been made out overwhelmingly that these important powers should be only in the hands of legal chairmen of quarter sessions, and that legal chairmen of quarter sessions should be in the same position throughout the country.

With regard to the question of payment of quarter sessions chairmen, it is a fact that in many counties the chairmanship is in the hands of legally qualified men who do it voluntarily, in discharge of public duties in the manner, for example, indicated by my hon. and learned friend the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies). Their numbers are increasing. I think there are only three cases in England to-day where it has been found necessary to seek power to pay the chairman of quarter sessions, namely, Middlesex, Lancashire and Hertfordshire, and in Hertfordshire I think the power has not yet been exercised. But I do not know that the appointment of a legal chairman of quarter sessions is necessarily to be accompanied by any compulsory local expenditure. We are not dealing with the question as to whether the chairman of quarter sessions should be paid, but with the fundamental principle that someone with proper qualifications for the administration of justice should be in charge of these courts, and that we should not have any second-class courts in the country. I do not think that a small sum of money should stand in the way of getting a proper administration of justice, and as Parliament is proposing to alter the system, I think we should alter it in the way suggested by the unanimous report of the majority of the committee. They say:

"We are, however, very strongly of opinion that all chairmen of quarter sessions should possess legal qualifications.

Will the hon. and learned Member read the subsequent paragraph?

Certainly.

"We have been impressed by the steady progress toward the ideal of confining appointments as chairmen of quarter sessions to trained lawyers. We have also taken account of the fact that in many instances persons of legal eminence are found willing to render voluntary service in their counties. We do not, therefore, think it necessary that legislation should be introduced to make the appointment of salaried legal chairmen compulsory in all counties."

I take it that the next passage is the one which the Attorney-General wants me to read:

"We do not, therefore, think it necessary … to make the appointment of salaried legal chairmen compulsory."

The Amendment does not ask the House to insist on a salaried legal chairman. All we ask is that, as the Government realise there must be some alteration in the present position, if in one county there must be a salaried chairman to administer justice, the same need is manifest throughout the country. The only objection is that you might offend somebody. There are many counties where it is notorious that the work at quarter sessions is done badly, and in those cases the chairman will use his influence to see that quarter sessions do not apply for the appointment of a legally qualified salaried chairman. He will have the right to say that, no matter how they may be criticised, it is not compulsory, and we will carry on as before. That is the reason why I think the Bill in its present form will seriously interfere with the proper administration of justice. I hope the House will accept the Amendment in the interests of justice, and in order to get a uniform and fair treatment for all accused persons. I do not think the difficulties which have been suggested will arise, and I hope that in the public interests the Amendment will be accepted.

I shall support the Amendment from my own experience as a lay member of quarter sessions, and also as a member of a committee which from year to year has to Meet and decide whom to recommend to the court as chairman. I do not know whether the Attorney-General has ever acted in that capacity, but I have reached the conclusion that chairmen of quarter sessions are like old soldiers—they never die, and, as far as I can see, they rarely fade away. In the course of my experience I have been responsible for removing the chairman of a petty sessions and the chairman of a quarter sessions. It is an exceedingly painful experience, not for the chairman, because he does not hear, but for the person who has to endeavour to make him understand that his period of usefulness has really expired. This is a very important matter. It is a well-known maxim of English law that justice should not only be done, but should appear to be done. Can it be expected that a man who is being tried for what is, to him, a very serious offence, where his own character is at stake, can be persuaded that he is getting a fair deal when he knows that he is brought before a chairman of quarter sessions who cannot try certain cases because they are regarded by the law as very important? No matter how unimportant his case may be to other people it is everything in the world to him, and to ask him to have his case presented to the jury by a person who has no real acquaintance with the law or the rules of evidence, and all the other technicalities which are essential to the jury properly understanding what it is they have to find, seems to me to be asking him to accept something more than you have a right to expect any man to accept.

When I have listened to a legally qualified chairman explaining to the jury what false pretences are, I have come to the conclusion that false pretences to the law are those things which are not false pretences to the ordinary man, and that what are false, pretences to the ordinary man are perfectly innocent actions in the eyes of the law. I have found it difficult to reconcile the legal definition of false pretences with a common sense definition, and men on a jury must very often, even when they get the best advice in the world, find themselves rather befogged, and if the law is to be explained by a man who is as badly qualified in the law as the defendant himself, it is an intolerable position. This desire to give extended jurisdiction to quarter sessions is partly due to a desire to relieve assize courts of some of the cases which they now have to try.

On another Bill the other night it was made clear to the House that some of those courts are exceedingly overworked and that very great difficulties arise. There may very well be some most hard-worked assize courts which will be unrelieved by this Measure because the local justices, meeting in quarter sessions, either do not want to have this extended jurisdiction or have not the pluck to get rid of a chairman who is regarded by everybody in the district with veneration rather than respect. Amusing as it may sound, when the right hon. and learned Gentleman talks about its being rooted in local tradition, that very often covers a multitude of sins of social prestige and injustice rather than anything that is very dignified or anything that ought to be preserved. I hope that the Government will listen to the appeal that is made by the lawyers in this matter and that they will not disregard the appeal of laymen that the matter should be brought to the end which it ought to have reached many years ago.

In listening to the speech of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman), I confess that I approached this matter with a completely open mind, but after hearing the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, I feel that the information which is necessary in order to come to a decision on this Amendment is not before the House. The question which I asked myself is, in how many cases at the present time are quarter sessions not presided over by lawyers? I am thinking particularly of the part of the country which I know so well. During the last 10 years, I happen to have had as much experience as any hon. Member in judicial work as a recorder in two towns, one of which is among the largest cities in England. I carry my mind back to the days when, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition told us, things were not perhaps quite what they might have been, days rather before my time, when the clerk of the court asked, "Do you plead guilty or not?" and when the accused said "Not Guilty", the clerk said, "We shall see." Then the chairman, who was perhaps more worthy of veneration than respect, as the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) said, asked the accused, "Do you wish to say anything to the jury before they find you guilty?" But those days are long past.

When I think of the counties on the Northern and North Wales Circuits, I begin to wonder whether it is necessary to have paid chairmen. In Cheshire, for instance, a member of the bench occupies high office on the staff of another place as Chairman. In Pembrokeshire, for instance, the gentleman who presides is a Justice of the High Court. In Carnarvonshire, until quite recently, it was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). In Cumberland, although he has recently been replaced by the deputy-chairman, it was the county court Judge. In Westmorland, the quarter sessions are presided over by one who is a member of the Privy Council. The same thing applies in Derbyshire, and a Lord of Appeal presides in Oxfordshire. It seems to me that, throughout the whole of the counties where there is work to be done, trained legal people preside. Therefore, before making this fundamental change, we ought to consider to what extent it is really necessary. If the description of what is happening in other parts of the country given by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne is true, then the sooner a change is made the better.

I am in favour of there ultimately being legal chairmen. For the last 10 or 15 years, we have been tinkering with the quarter sessions, until the whole system has reached a state in which it is in need of an absolute overhaul. The only county which I can think of which is likely to be affected by extended jurisdiction is Cornwall. I am told that there is very little work at the quarter sessions there, and curiously enough the borough court of quarter sessions is in Penzance. It may be that what little work there is in Cornwall under this extended jurisdiction will go to the Penzance Sessions, and probably the number of prisoners tried there will increase. Where we have gone wrong in recent years is that we have thrust on to the quarter sessions cases which they ought never to be asked to try. The other day I was asked to take a case which was one more or less of attempted murder, but I declined to take it, because I felt that it was my duty to send the case to the assizes. My view is that we must completely reform the quarter sessions.

An Act which we all thought was a most excellent one, but which I must confess in my experience has been a lamentable failure, is that which gave the right of appeal to everybody. What happens under that Act is that there are appeals, not from people who have been wrongly convicted and who ought to have every facility to go to the quarter sessions on appeal, but from old criminals, whose conviction was absolutely justified and who desire to have a second trial. The time of the quarter sessions is taken up with appeals of which the House never thought when it passed that Act. There is a great tendency nowadays to give increased jurisdiction in a different way to magistrates who, as the hon. Member for South Shields said, are worthy of veneration if not respect. What is happening all over the country is that they are trying cases which, when I was a young man, would have gone to the assizes, cases, for instance, of causing grievous bodily harm. The result of not sending these cases to the quarter sessions or to the assizes, with a view to saving expense, is that the charge is reduced and the person is tried in the police court. In my view, the way to deal with the question of quarter sessions is to take away, in some manner or another, a considerable amount of the jurisdiction which has been given, where there are not qualified chairmen. I do not know how many qualified chairmen there are in the country—

I can give the hon. and learned Gentleman the figures which were given to us. There are 136 chairmen and deputy-chairmen throughout the country, of whom 103 are qualified, so that the Government are really fighting for the existence of 33.

Let us put the number at 15, because I am certain that in some of the sessions there is no work for a deputy-chairman to do. Consequently, when there are so many qualified lawyers dealing with these matters, I cannot help thinking that the whole question is rather a storm in a teacup. With regard to appeals to quarter sessions, I am convinced that a great mistake is being made. There used to be an appeal from the first magistrates to the whole bench of the county, but now the appeal is from one set of magistrates to another set which is numerically of the same strength. Considering the whole matter, I do not think the Amendment will serve the purpose which it is intended to serve.

There seems to be some contradiction between the last two points made by the hon. and learned Gentleman. He says, I think with a good deal of justice, that we have gone too far in extending the jurisdiction of magistrates sitting in courts of summary jurisdiction, but he also complains of the additional facilities provided for appeals by poor persons from those courts to courts of quarter sessions. I should have thought that the fact that we have put so much work on courts of summary jurisdiction, would have made it all the more necessary to be very careful to provide facilities for appeals by poor persons to quarter sessions. There may be a number of frivolous appeals, but I think there must have been a great number of cases since the passing of the Act which the hon. and learned Member has in mind, where wrong convictions or too heavy sentences have been redressed at quarter sessions and where appeals could not have been brought, but for the provisions of the 1933 Act. It not infrequently happens that courts of summary jurisdiction not only make mistakes in convicting persons but imposing sentences which are too heavy, and the right of appeal to quarter sessions and the right to free legal aid for such appeals under the 1933 Act, is of considerable value.

There is a point which has not. I understand, been raised up to the present. We naturally think of quarter sessions as courts which sit four times a year, but in a great many counties that is no longer the case. Many counties take advantage of the provisions for adjourned quarter sessions. In the County of Devon for example, we have eight quarter sessions every year. We have even more than that, because there are provisions which enable quarter sessions to sit when there is a particular case to be tried. Therefore the service rendered by quarter sessions is becoming of greater importance. As a result of these additional sittings, we are able to give people who are committed for trial on indictment a speedy trial in a way which was not formerly possible. That is something which we ought to bear in mind in considering the Amendment.

Take the case of a man who is charged with one of the offences set out in the First Schedule. If this Amendment is not carried, his position will be this. If he happens to be charged in a county where there is a qualified chairman, within the terms of this Bill, he will not have to wait for the assizes but can go to the quarter sessions or the adjourned quarter sessions. That is to say, he is certain of obtaining a speedy trial, and if he is in custody that may be a matter of great importance. But if he happens to be charged in one of the other counties which have not appointed qualified chairmen, and where it is not open to quarter sessions to try the offences set out in the First Schedule, he will not be able to obtain a speedy trial at quarter sessions. He may have to wait for the assizes in that county, or it may be necessary to commit him to the assize town of some other county. It seems to me that the provision for committal to assizes in another county often involves great hardship, and, personally, I should like to preserve, as far as we can, the system whereby a man is entitled to be tried in his own county. But we should without the Amendment have that anomaly that the man who was in one of the counties—it may be the minority counties—without a qualified chairman, would be deprived of this considerable advantage of a speedy trial at quarter sessions.

The task of a chairman of quarter sessions does not end when he has summed up to the jury. He has a very important function to perform, because he has to decide upon the sentence to be imposed. Very often at quarter sessions there are not many cases in which pleas of "Not Guilty" are entered. There are always a number of pleas of "Guilty," and sometimes people are simply sent up for sentence from courts of summary jurisdiction, perhaps with a recommendation for Borstal treatment. Speaking from my own experience, and having appeared on a number of occasions before courts of quarter sessions, I have noticed that, as a rule, it is the chairman, and possibly one or two people sitting on his right and left, who decide the sentence. Generally, it is obvious that it is the chairman who decides what the sentence shall be.

Not always.

I think the hon. Member will agree that where there is a large bench of magistrates it is impossible that all of them should be effectively consulted.

If any of the magistrates feel strongly about it, surely it is usual for them to retire to consider the sentence. I have known of a single magistrate insisting on a very large bench of magistrates retiring in order that the chairman's recommendations might be adequately considered.

That may be so but I think it is comparatively rare for the magistrates to retire in order to consider the sentence. It may happen in some cases but I think, as a rule, it is the chairman who, more than anybody else, determines what the sentence shall be, and that is a function of great importance. It is not merely a question of deciding on terms of imprisonment. He has sometimes to decide very difficult questions. When a young man appears in the dock, he has to decide whether the case is a proper case for Borstal treatment or not. He has to decide whether certain offenders should be put on probation or not, which is not at all a simple matter and, in every case, he has to decide what is the correct sentence. If we are to have lay chairmen who have no particular experience of the law outside their own county courts of quarter sessions—and I suggest that we are bound to have some whose experience is limited in that way—does it not mean that they will not have the necessary range of experience to enable them to deal with questions of this kind and to decide what cases are suitable for Borstal treatment, and so forth? It seems to me that in cases of that kind, it is desirable that we should have someone presiding over quarter sessions who has had experience of a large number of cases, and who appreciates the exact effect of the sentences which he pronounces. For those reasons my hon. Friends and I support the Amendment.

I hope that the Attorney-General will give us some guidance upon this very important question. As a Member of the Standing Committee, I heard some rather alarming statements about the different and varying standards of justice applied in different parts of the country as a result of the absence of qualified chairmen. The Attorney-General this morning has given the House an excellent account of the work of the chairmen of the quarter sessions, but if the Attorney-General has even one solitary case of incompetence, then this Amendment is justified up to the hilt. No one should know better that the learned Attorney-General whether there is maladministration of justice in some parts of the country because of the existing state of affairs. In Standing Committee an hon. Member opposite mentioned some alarming cases that had come within his own experience. He is not present to-day. He also made a dramatic statement about a visit he had paid to a prison in which he was allowed to address the prisoners. Instead of the hon. Member talking to them the prisoners talked to him, and some of them were seething with discontent. Here is my point: One of the prisoners said, "If I had been tried in the next county I would have been dealt with far differently." It is possible that different standards exist. The Attorney-General must know whether there is any variation in the standard of justice, and I hope he will give us the benefit of his experience before we vote, as I understand the Amendment will be taken to a division. It is a matter of importance to lay members of the House and to backbenchers that the Attorney-General should speak.

I am sure that the House does not wish to be inordinately detained over this proposal, and I rise to make a suggestion which may commend itself to the Attorney-General and to the hon. and learned Members who have moved and seconded the Amendment. The learned Attorney-General gave us only two reasons why the Amendment did not commend itself to him. The first was that it would impose the power to require a local authority to pay the salary, of a full-time qualified chairman. But since the Attorney-General did not himself labour that point—indeed I believe he said he did not attach very much weight to it—I think that objection might be passed over. The second reason he gave was that there were a few cases of unqualified chairmen who by a lifetime of experience had put themselves into a state of qualification to carry out their duties almost equal to that of qualified chairmen. In support of his reluctance to remove these chairmen the Attorney-General said that the proposal would not commend itself to the House.

I would be glad if he would listen to the suggestion I am going to make, because at present there is no one on the Front Bench to hear what I have to say. The Attorney-General is obviously in some difficulty here, and he is going to be in a greater difficulty if he is to resist the unanimous feeling of the House in the matter. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that it would obviously not commend itself to the House to require the removal of those chairmen who have given a lifetime of service. Obviously it has commended itself to the House, and to me it will appear a very strange thing indeed if, having rested upon that argument, the Attorney-General is not now ready to bow to the obvious and expressed will of the House. I understand that the Lord Chancellor may have something to say about this, and that is quite proper. It is for that reason that I make the suggestion that the Attorney-General should retain power in another place to exempt from the operation of the compulsory qualification of chairmen those chairmen whom he considers to have adequate qualifications without the formal or nominal qualifications. That would not do a great deal of harm, because there would be very few cases in which the. Attorney-General would wish to exercise that power.

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) that there are some cases in which the qualified chairmen are looked upon with more veneration than respect, but in my experience some of them are looked upon with even greater apprehension than admiration, and that applies also to their colleagues on the bench. I am certain that the average bench of magistrates will be very sorry to take any steps for the removal of their chairman. I hope that the Attorney-General will see his way to accept this proposal. I recognise that it will involve some amendment of Clause 2, where the extended jurisdiction is to be given only to qualified chairmen, and it will be necessary, in a case where the Attorney-General thinks exemption from qualification to be justified, to consider whether he would be equally justified in giving or retaining the extended jurisdiction. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman neglects to accept this proposal or the Amendment he will be resisting the obvious feeling of the House.

By leave of the House I will speak again on this Amendment.

The right hon. Gentleman can speak again without permission of the House.

I apologise that my ignorance of the Standing Orders has to be so nakedly exposed. But I would like to make an appeal to the House not to pass this Amendment. As my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Warrington (Mr. Goldie) said, the area of this Amendment is not very large. Out of the 136 chairmen and deputy-chairmen of county quarter sessions at the time of the Peel Commission, 103 were men with legal qualifications.

Not within the definition of the Bill.

That is what I understood from my hon. and learned Friend. Therefore we are not dealing with a very large area; we are dealing for the most part with counties in which there is not a great deal of work, counties which at the moment have not the good fortune to have a Lord of Appeal or my hon. and learned Friend, or someone who is legally qualified, willing to preside; but in a number of cases there are men who, if they have not legal qualifications, are doing their work to every one's satisfaction. If the Amendment is passed those men will no longer be able to act as chairmen and the county will have to find someone with the necessary qualification, and very likely it will be found that there is no one available with local connections. That I think is an important reason. The other reason, which is also of considerable importance, is that this is the last stage of this Bill, or the last effective stage.

It is clear to me that the majority of the Peel Commission did not recommend legislative compulsion for the appointment of legally qualified chairmen. You cannot compel a man to be chairman of quarter session for nothing—of course you cannot. If you are to compel people to have legally qualified chairmen you can make that power effective only if there is also power to pay them. You cannot mandamus someone by order to do work for nothing. Under the present voluntary system increasingly you will get these qualified persons. I think it is important, in asking the House to resist this Amendment, to realise that it would be, at this very late stage, placing an extra charge, or potentially placing an extra charge, on local authorities without giving them any power of considering the implications of that, because we are at this very late stage of the Session. The effect of the Amendment would be, if you were to compel particular counties to have legally qualified chairmen if they could not get a voluntary one, that they must get the salaries paid by the local authorities. This Bill has proceeded in all its stages on the basis that it would be by voluntary agreement that powers would be sought to pay a salary to a qualified chairman.

Is it not right that there are 103 legally qualified chairmen now, each one of them doing this work without any payment whatever?

Yes, certainly, and that is why this problem is such a small one.

If it is small, why bother so much about it?

Because it is introducing a new principle, and nobody knows more than does the hon. Member that it is not the amount of money, but the principle, that is at stake. I can give the House the most categorical assurance that this voluntary basis has not been put in the Bill with any idea of postponing the ultimate realisation of the ideal which we have at heart of legal chairmen for quarter sessions. It is an anomaly to have two courts called by the same name, one with a smaller and the other with a larger jurisdiction, and we hope, just as much as hon. and right hon. Members opposite, to see the day when all quarter sessions will have legally qualified chairmen and when extended jurisdiction is conferred upon them all, but we hope that the voluntary power in the Bill will bring that result about in the minimum of time with the maximum of good will, and we believe that the extra time which will be given by the Voluntary system in the Bill will prove to be time well spent. I therefore ask the House not, at this very late stage, to introduce into the Bill what would be a new principle.

What is to prevent the right hon. and learned Gentleman accepting the Amendment and having inserted in another place a power to preserve the office of those chairmen who he considers to be sufficiently qualified without the formal qualification, and thereby bringing within his own control the time when the administration of quarter sessions will be symmetrical in this regard?

I thought the hon. Member had followed my speech and that he would have gathered that I believe this to be the right basis, and, therefore, naturally, I could not accept the Amendment.

I wish to oppose the Amendment. I am no lawyer, but I have had some experience as a magistrate in the administration of justice and still more experience of county administration. I am one who believes in freedom, and I am opposed to the element of compulsion being imposed when there is no necessity for it. I am satisfied that there are many courts of quarter sessions which would resent Parliament compelling them to do something which they, in their own minds, do not believe is necessary, and I think Parliament ought to allow to those courts of quarter sessions the right to decide a matter of this kind. It is for them to take into account what is necessary for the good administration of justice in their own areas, and if they believe that it is not necessary to be compelled to have a paid chairman, I do not see why Parliament should compel them to have one. It is argued, on the other hand, that this will create a difference between one court of quarter sessions and another. Why this passion for uniformity? It seems to me that the questions to be taken into account should be, first, the amount of work that is to be done, and, secondly, the way in which justice is administered, and I believe that there is no evidence to show that in all areas it is necessary to have paid chairmen.

This Amendment, too, opens the door to a very wide principle, because if you lay it down that it is compulsory to have a paid chairman of quarter sessions, there will be a very strong argument to be used in favour of having a paid chairman of a county council. The work of a chairman of a county council is much more difficult and in every way as responsible as that of a chairman of a court of quarter sessions.

The 1933 Act allows a chairman of a county council to be paid. I was paid myself.

If this Bill is passed in its present form, it will allow a chairman of quarter sessions to be paid, but it will not compel that payment. I think too that Parliament should hesitate before it deals another blow at the principle

I beg to move, in page 2, line 12, at the end, to insert:

"and, in the case of any county in Wales or the county of Monmouth, a person able to speak the Welsh language."

I will deal with this Amendment shortly, because I believe the Attorney-General is accepting it on behalf of the Government. The Lord Chancellor has to take into consideration in his appointment local conditions and any recommendations made by the county. The Amendment proposes that in the case of the counties of Wales, including Monmouthshire, he should take into consideration the ability of the candidate to speak Welsh, so that he could understand those who speak Welsh as well as those who speak English.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I am glad to be able to assist in preserving the sense of harmony which prevails so far as this Amendment is concerned. Perhaps I ought to say with regard to the inclusion of Monmouthshire that I believe there are those who think that the Welsh language is not sufficiently spoken there to make it necessary to go even as far as to say: "Shall have regard to that matter." We have accepted the Amendment in its present form, but it may be that that point may be brought up in another place.

Does that mean that the reference to Monmouthsire may be left out?

All I said was that I thought it right to point out that there are people who might make representations at a later stage that Monmouthshire should be left out of the Amendment. I am not proposing to leave it out, but as it had been brought to my notice that there are people who take that view, I thought it fair just to mention the fact in accepting the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 13, to leave out lines 5 to 11.

The purpose of this Amendment is to delete the proviso to the Clause. I said of the previous Amendment that we objected to it for the reason that even if we are dealing with this subject by a process of shreds and patches we might as well apply a whole patch. In this case the objection to the Clause with the proviso is that we get an invisible patch which leaves the gap exactly where it was. I often wish that it were possible—and in this instance I wish it more than ever—that those who decide these issues in the Division Lobbies could be limited to those who have heard and appreciated the arguments from both sides. I am told that the voting would be poor, but if it were poor in numbers, it would be good in quality, because those who then walked through the Division Lobbies would know not merely what they were voting for but why it was they voted.

Whatever may be the fate of this Amendment when we come to divide upon it, I submit that no case can be made against it either in logic or common sense. What the Clause purports to do is to extend the jurisdiction of the county court, but what I should like to convince the House of is that the Clause as it stands, including the proviso, limits the juirisdiction. Why is it that everyone who has concerned himself with the question feels that it is desirable to extend the jurisdiction of the county court? Because it is impossible under our judicial system for poor people to get access to the High Court at all. I say that with a full sense of responsibility. I know that there are the poor persons' committees and the poor persons' rules and that the advantage is taken of them, and that in such cases a measure of justice is achieved, but the poor persons' rules are strictly limited. In the first place, anyone with more than £2 a week is not entitled to a poor person's certificate at all.

Oh, yes, there is discretion.

Even though it is true that the poor persons' committees have discretion to extend the limit the discretion goes no further than permitting them in suitable circumstances to grant a certificate to a poor person whose total income does not exceed £4 a week. I say that almost everyone agrees that that leaves a very wide margin of the poorer, though not perhaps the poorest, people in the community without any means of access to the High Court. If we make justice so expensive that it is beyond the means of the people, we deny justice to them. I do not need to repeat all the arguments directed to show that even where people have sufficient means to take their cases to the High Court they are deprived of adequate justice by reason of the congestion of the courts. Most people who have approached this problem, have approached it from the point of view that one method of relieving the congestion in the High Court and approaching the ideal of making justice available to everyone irrespective of his means is to extend the jurisdiction of the county court.

The Peel Commission recommended unanimously that the jurisdiction of the county court should be extended. It is true that they were careful to point out that under the extended jurisdiction there should be no compulsion upon people to go to the county court, they preserved the right of a person to go to the High Court if he chose. I am all in favour of that. It was not to be compulsory, but the jurisdiction was to be extended. In order to realise how the jurisdiction may be extended and how this Clause proposes to extend it, let us see what the position is without the Clause at all. The position without the Clause is that if you have a cause of action in a matter where the amount at issue is £100 or less you may begin it in the county court and drive it through that court without a "By-your-leave" to the court, the defendant or anyone else. Where actions are commenced in the High Court they may, in certain circumstances, be remitted to the county court and, by agreement between the parties, they may, whatever the amount at issue, be tried in the county court. In that case there is no limit.

The limit of £100 was fixed in 1903, when the value of money was approximately twice what it is now. Bearing all those things in mind, the Peel Commission recommended, without compulsion, that the jurisdiction of the county court should be extended from £100 to £200. Had the Clause been drafted without the proviso which we are now seeking to omit, that recommendation of the Peel Commission would have been satisfactory.

I know that the hon. Gentleman does not wish to mislead the House, and I would like to point out that the Peel Commission recommended that the jurisdiction of the county courts should not be extended.

It is true that the Peel Commission thought that that jurisdiction should be extended not to £200 but to £300, but I have said already that they did not think that it ought to be compulsory. I have said that repeatedly, and I do not want to add to it by saying it again. The Government are proposing to extend the jurisdiction to £200, but the effect of their proviso is that that extension of jurisdiction becomes completely nugatory. You may commence your action in the county court, and all that the defendant has to do in order to stop the extended jurisdiction of the court is to say: "No, I will not have it." He need not give any reasons to satisfy the plaintiff, the court or anybody in the world, that his objection is founded on a just cause or upon any cause at all. He needs only to say: "I do not want it tried in the county court", and the action must then be sent by the court to the High Court. The extended jurisdiction has disappeared.

These matters are of vast importance. The administration of justice in this country ought not to take second place to anything. Here we have an opportunity of making a big step forward with the result that the courts would be available to everyone without distinction of means, but by the proviso the Government are not altering the position at all. They are proposing on the one hand to give something to a plaintiff who has a £200 claim, and to take it back immediately in their proviso, if the defendant chooses to say so. The only ground on which I have heard the proviso defended, in Committee, on Second Reading, or anywhere else, has been that you must not extend the jurisdiction of the county court too much, because it is the poor man's court, and ought to deal with small matters, and if you overload it you will prevent it from carrying out its functions of dealing with claims of £5, £10, or £20. If that is a sound contention, surely there should be a way more prudent and discreet of selecting the cases that shall be heard in the county court than by giving defendants the right to determine whether the county court's jurisdiction shall or shall not be extended.

How would the Government's proposal work? A poor man may have just sufficient means to bring his case in the county court, but not sufficient to bring it in the High Court. He commences his action in the county court. His wealthy and powerful defendant, knowing that his opponent would not have the means to pursue him in the High Court, and knowing also that his own case is poor, or for other reasons not wishing it to be tried, can take the step of entering his objection. By so doing he secures not merely that the case is remitted to the High Court, which is the formal consequence, but the practical consequence of depriving the plaintiff of the right of having the action heard at all. If you compel the plaintiff to go from a court in which he can afford the proceedings to a court where he cannot, you deprive him of the right to pursue his claim. That would be the effect of the proviso.

I hope that the House will consider this matter with a full sense of responsibility. The administration of justice ought not to be a matter of party politics. I know no one on any side in politics who desires to maintain the position that a man's right to be heard in the courts shall be according to his means. The whole purpose of extending the jurisdiction of the county court is to make that distinction less true than it was. We want our administration of justice more universal and more accessible to all but if we leave the proviso as it stands and give a defendant the right to object without submitting his reasons to anyone we deprive the great mass of the people who ought to have free access to the courts of any access to the courts at all.

There was an Amendment in the Schedule which proposed to leave out two words that are to be found in Magna Charta because a vast amount of legislation culminating in the present Bill had made those two words unnecessary; but it was felt on all sides in the Committee that it was better not to touch Magna Charta and better to leave the two words in, for the sake of preserving tradition, even though the words had become meaningless. I am asking the House to preserve not the letter but the spirit of Magna Charta, one aspect of which was that the law should be equally available to all. If you leave this proviso in, you aggravate the present position whereby a man's right to have his case defended in the courts is dependent, not solely on the justice of his case, but upon the depth of his pocket.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I do so in the temporary absence of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies). This matter is highly controversial. The Peel Commission made no recommendation for extending the jurisdiction of the county court, but the extension conceived by the Bill is taken away by the proviso which the Amendment seeks to leave out. I would remind the House that the county court judges have to deal with workmen's compensation cases, and I know of nothing more difficult than the decision, which the county court judge is the peculiarly chosen instrument for making, whether a man is a workman, whether what is before the court amounts to an accident, and, if so, whether it arises out of or in the course of the employment. These issues have been entrusted by this House to the county court judge as a fit tribunal to try them, and I cannot accept the view that the learned judge who tries these important issues should not try issues which are more simple.

I do not accept the proposition stated just now that the High Court is not accessible to poor people. I hope it is not right, and I think it is not right. But we all know that there is a big congestion of work in the High Court, and one of the ways in which that congestion can be eased and justice made more ready and accessible would seem to be by an extension of the jurisdiction of the county court judge. Some of the cases that are clogging up the lists in the High Court are what are known as running-down cases—claims for damages arising out of the driving of motor cars and so on—and a great deal of the work which comes into the county courts to-day also consists of claims of a running down character. I fail to see how it can be said to any court that, while it is fit to try issues involving a claim for£90 for personal injuries resulting from negligent driving of a motor car, it is not fit to try such an issue if the claim is for £150. The issues are precisely the same whether the action is for £75 or £175.

The Bill proposes, on the one hand, to give to the county court an extended jurisdiction up to £200, but, on the other hand, to give the defendant the right to take it away. I do not like this jurisdiction only by consent of the defendant. I should have thought that, if the right were to be given to anyone to say whether the jurisdiction should be kept in the county court or not it should be given to the county court judge. The object of the Amendment is that nobody shall be given the right to say that a case in which the amount claimed exceeds £100 shall be taken out of the county court and transferred to another court which is more inaccessible and where the procedure is more lengthy. There are county courts established all over the country, giving cheap and ready access to a system of justice in which people have confidence, and which is a uniform system, not differing from one place to another. In 1903 the limit of jurisdiction of the county courts, which before that time had been £50, was fixed at £100, and I venture to think that now, in 1938, this House should reconsider the matter and say that what was good enough in 1903 is not necessarily good enough in 1938 as the limit of the jurisdiction of the county court judge. In courts possessing Admiralty jurisdiction the limit is, I believe, £500, and in bankruptcy matters it is a good deal higher, although these matters may give the county court judges very difficult questions to decide.

Injustice might arise if the defendant is given the right to say, without assigning any reason and without satisfying the judge on the matter. "I object to this trial." That means that he will get a far longer time to put forward defences which may not eventually be found tenable, and time, probably, to perpetrate some kind of injustice on the man who has brought his claim in the county court in the first instance. I welcome the proposed extension of the jurisdiction of the county court judge; I think it is a good step for the administration of justice throughout the country; but I hope that those responsible for the Measure will accept the Amendment, and, while accepting the £200 jurisdiction, will agree that the defendant shall not have the right, by a mere statement of objection, to oust the jurisdiction of the county court judge.

On this occasion I hope that the Government will not accept the Amendment. It seems to be assumed, by those who want a compulsory increase in the jurisdiction of the county courts, that if the Bill goes through in its present form that provision is going to be a dead letter. I certainly do not take that view. I think it will be found that a considerably larger number of actions will be started in the county court if the Bill goes through in its present form. It frequently happens nowadays that a plaintiff brings an action in the High Court, and, after he has issued his writ, or after he has issued his statement of claim, the defendant applies for the action to be remitted to the county court on the ground that the plaintiff has not sufficient visible means to meet his costs if his action should fail. That happens almost every day, and I think it would be found that quite a number of defendants, particularly if they were insurance companies, as they always are nowadays in running-down cases, would hesitate to drag a plaintiff into the High Court when he himself had elected to go to the county court.

Although this proviso will not achieve everything that the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment had in mind, I think it will result in a substantially larger number of cases being tried in the county court, but if the Amendment were carried it seems to me that certain objections would arise. Reference has been made to the congestion in the High Court. None of us would deny that congestion, which, indeed, was the subject of an animated debate in the House only a few nights ago, but it does not seem to be sufficiently realised that there is also a problem of congestion in the county courts. Those of us who occasionally go into the county courts in the Metropolitan area are frequently made aware of this. It often happens when a case is in the list in the county court, and counsel, solicitors, litigants and witnesses are all there, they spend more than half the day there, and it then becomes apparent that their case will not even be reached. They have to go away, not until the next day, but, it may be, for several weeks. It is also a common experience that, when a case has been started, say after the midday adjournment, it is a long case and it is impossible to finish it. Then there is an adjournment, again not until the next day, but until a date three or four weeks later. I think everyone will agree that that is a most unsatisfactory way of treating any case. It is impossible for the judge to retain clearly in his mind the impression he has formed at the first sitting when he comes to give his judgment on the second day three or four weeks later. That is a position which very often arises when cases of any length and complexity come to be tried in the county court.

Of course, if these larger claims are to be brought before the county court, they will for the most part take rather longer to try than the smaller claims with which the county courts habitually deal. As matters stand, the Amendment, if carried, will not effect any reorganisation of county court business. If it were proposed that there should be some reorganisation, entirely different considerations would arise. We are proposing to put this additional burden on the county court system as it now exists. What is the position? A litigant in one of these cases has the choice, if the Bill passes in its present form, if he has a claim of less than £200. Either he can go to the assizes, in which case his action will be tried and finished during the duration of the assize—

It may not be reached.

That is so. But if the action is reached at all it will be disposed of before the end of the assize. If it is not finished on one day it will be resumed on the next day. But if he goes to the county court he is likely to find himself in the difficulty I have mentioned, that he will have this very long adjournment. I hope that at some time in the near future we shall have an inquiry into the despatch of business in the county courts, and that we shall overhaul the whole system of county court circuits. But we have not reached that position yet, and, therefore, we should be in this difficulty. The hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment said that the difficulty arises when a man has to take his action in the High Court and cannot afford it—that justice is denied him because he cannot afford it. That is a problem, of course, that is constantly arising; and we shall not get rid of it even if this Amendment be passed. I should certainly support the hon. Member if he were to propose at any time that we should have a searching inquiry into the delay and the expense of litigation. I hope that that matter will be fully inquired into before long on the lines of which the hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. A. Herbert) and others have spoken and that we shall, before many years have passed, be able to bring about a substantial reduction in the expense of proceedings. But it seems to me that this Amendment is only a second best, and that if it were carried, as things are now in the county courts, it would create more difficulties than it would solve.

I apologise for intervening at this stage, because I know the House wants to get on with other business; but I understand that the Amendment to which I have put my name—in page 13, line 11, at the end, insert:—

"Provided also that if the action is in respect of loss or damage caused by mining subsidence to a dwelling-house of which the rateable value does not exceed forty pounds the judge may, if he thinks fit, having regard to the relative means of the parties and irrespective of the amount claimed, order that the action shall not be transferred to the High Court.—

which was to be moved by the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) is not likely to be called. Therefore, I shall have to content myself with supporting the Amendment which has been moved by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman). It would, perhaps, be misleading to speak of any form of court as being popular, but the people do think that in the county courts they are able to obtain justice quickly, and within the reach of their pockets. I could give a number of typical cases brought into the county courts which, I think, would have appealed to the Attorney-General and the Government. Take, as an illustration, a workman's compensation case. A man applies for £500 damages. He cannot go on with that if the other side object.

But that is a case which must be brought in the county court in any case.

Then suppose it is the case of a miner's cottage which has been wrecked by subsidence. The man wishes to take it to the county court. It may cost many hundreds of pounds to prepare his case. Is it proposed to take him to the High Court if the county court is competent to deal with the case? It may be that an unfeeling, rich employer or colliery owner may say "I will give him a run for his money," and that the man may not, in that event, be able to fight the case because of the limitation of his own pocket. But if a county court Judge could take the case, there should be no need for him to go to the High Court. It is only a matter of technicalities, of hearing evidence from experts, and the county court Judge is easily able to reach a decision on it. I cannot see why it should be considered that there is anything in the atmosphere of the county court which makes it possible for them to try a case involving £100, and not to deal with a case involving £200. That is the sort of thing that puzzles me—I speak as a layman—and I hope the Attorney-General will give some solid reasons for refusing this Amendment.

We have had four speeches on this Amendment—three in favour and one against. I advise the House not to accept the Amendment, largely for those reasons given by the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr Foot). The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman) started by saying that there was no case in reason, logic or common sense for the proposal in the Bill, and my hon. Friend who has just spoken said that he cannot understand it. The hon. Gentleman, perhaps, was carried away by that eloquence which we all enjoy, because, after all, the proposal in the Bill differs from that of the Commission only by the difference between £200 and £300, which is not very great. Apart from that, the proposal in the Bill is the proposal of the Peel Commission which very carefully considered the matter in all its aspects. They recommended that the jurisdiction—and there one means compulsory jurisdiction—of county courts should not be extended. In order to facilitate the bringing of cases before the county court by consent, however,

"the plaintiff should be allowed to initiate proceedings in the county court in cases of a type now within the jurisdiction of that court where the sums involved are not less than £100 and not more than £300, with an absolute right in the defendant to transfer to the High Court."

The Peel Commission deal with the matter in considerable detail in paragraphs 188 to 205 of their report. I do not propose to go over those considerations in detail, but I would commend them to hon. Members who feel that there is some lack of reason or common sense about the proposals in the Bill. They did not come to the conclusion they did through any doubt as to the capacity of county court Judges to try cases up to £200, or up to £300. It has never entered anyone's head that the Judges were not fully capable of trying them. Their reasons were based on the best interests of those for whom the county court is primarily intended and the sort of case for which the county court is primarily intended. That case is the small money claim, very often brought by people who are representative persons and who employ solicitors. They

I beg to move, in page 13, line 10, to leave out "shall," and to insert:

"or the court may, if the judge or court having regard to all the circumstances of the case thinks fit so to do."

The point of this Amendment is a very short one, and I think I covered it on the general argument on the last Amendment. If the right to try these cases of between £100 and £200 is not to be an absolute one, if there is to be a discretion to have these cases remitted from the county court to the High Court, then do not let the sole discretion be that of the defendant himself, but let it be the discretion of the court. The words in which we propose to secure that condition are the precise words which are included in the County Court Act with regard to actions remitted nom the High Court to the county court. The analogy is taken from those cases where defendants in the High Court desire to have cases commenced in the High Court tried, on grounds stated, in the county court. In those cases the defendant has not the absolute right to have the cases remitted to the county court. He may apply, and when he applies the court can, in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, decide whether the case shall proceed in the High Court or be remitted to the county court. Why should not that discretion in corresponding cases where it is sought to transfer cases from the county court to the High Court equally apply? Why leave it to the pure discretion of the defendant? Let him make his application and state his reasons, and then let the court decide whether it will accept the extended jurisdiction. That is much better, much wider and more practical than the provision in the Bill, and it is not in conflict with anything which the Peel Commission intended.

I beg to second the Amendment.

The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman) said that his proposal was not in conflict with the recommendations of the Peel Commission. I disagree. The Commission said that there should be an absolute right in the defendant to proceed in the High Court.

I do not think they meant it.

If the hon. Member has some powers, unknown to me, whereby he can penetrate into the minds and into the meaning of the Peel Commission, other than is expressed on paper, I cannot, of course, compete with him.

If they meant it, they were wrong.

It is clear what they meant. They meant that in trials for over £100 the defendant should have the right to have his case tried by the High Court, if he so desired.

In the Clause as it stands the defendant only has the discretion.

It is clear that the Commission intended that there should be this absolute right. The hon. Member said that there were other objections besides those dealt with on the last Amendment. The analogy he gave of a man seeking to get a case remitted from the High Court to the county court is not a complete one, because when that is done he is not suggesting that the High Court is not a fit and proper court to try his case. The Amendment would produce a rather unfortunate and untenable state of affairs. The defendant would have to make an application which would mean that the county court was not a proper court to try his case; that the court was not good enough to try his case, and not on the grounds that the case would involve a difficult point of law, or that it was a test case, requiring a number of expert witnesses, and that the High Court was the more proper tribunal. The Amendment would mean the setting up of machinery under which a man would apply to the court and say, in effect: "I want my case tried, not by you but by a court which is more highly qualified." On the grounds we discussed on the last Amendment and also on the grounds I have mentioned, which I hope the hon. Member will appreciate, I trust he will see his way not to press the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 13, line 16, at the end, to insert:

"(3) Any person who obtains a certificate as prescribed by the rules of the Supreme Court (Poor Persons) shall be admitted to take or defend or be a party to any legal proceedings which by virtue of this section may be commenced in a County Court and which could not previously have been so commenced or any legal proceedings which, whether by virtue of this Act or otherwise, are remitted by the High Court to the County Court."

One of the objects repeatedly advanced in Committee for making the extended jurisdiction of the county court an absolute one was that in the High Court the poor persons' rules were available to the defendant, whereas in the county court there was no procedure or means whereby people, without means even to pursue their case in the county court, could obtain assistance. The purpose of the Amendment is to make the poor persons' rules as they now exist in the High Court apply to the county court, but with limitations. It is not suggested that we should in this Bill make the poor persons' rules apply in the county court absolutely. What is suggested is that in cases, whether under this Bill or otherwise, which are remitted from the High Court to the county court, there shall be power to the poor persons' committees, under the poor persons' rules, to grant a certificate that will enable persons without means to get assistance, to be excused from court fees, and be able to bring their cases in the county court exactly as they can in the High Court. I hope this is an Amendment which the Attorney-General will be able to accept.

I beg to second the Amendment, which is a very important one. It unfolds to the layman one of the major hypocrisies of the law as it stands at present. The modest Amendment is designed only to see that that major hypocrisy is not made worse. The hypocrisy has been to tell the general public that you have established a system under which poor persons' cases can be conducted, but you establish that principle in the High Court alone, although 95 per cent. of the poor man's litigation goes to the county court. Therefore, as things stand at present, the provision for the civil litigation of poor persons is as to 5 per cent. a reality and as to 95 per cent. hypocrisy. It is made all the worse in that with regard to county court you not only do not give a poor person assistance in the conduct of his case, but you insist on his paying the court fees, which are grossly out of proportion to those in the High Court, in relation to the sum involved. There is a Statute which says that "to no one will be denied, and to no one will be sold, justice."

What is proposed to be done is this. You proceed to extend the county court jurisdiction up to£200, a very good thing in itself, but because these people are poor and do not matter, and, there- fore, they ought to be treated as dirt, you do not trouble in your legislation to say: "We realise that by doing that we are taking the 5 per cent. of poor people who do get their litigation attended to and cutting the percentage into two, so that 2½ per cent. are actually being deprived of what right they have at present." That is really a monstrous thing to do. Every litigant who has a claim, say, for £150, on the average, can go to the High Court and get proper legal assistance and be spared his fees. You are saying to him by the Bill, "We are enlarging the jurisdiction of the county court, and whereas last week you could try your case of £150 with a lawyer and have your fees remitted, next week you shall pay your fees and you shall not have a lawyer." That means a denial of justice. I know that the Attorney-General does not want things to be made worse, and, therefore, I hope he will accept the Amendment.

If the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith (Mr. Pritt) had been present in the earlier proceedings of the Bill, he would not have made the statement he has made in the last part of his speech. I agree that it is an important point. The question earlier in the proceedings was: will the poor persons committee say or feel that they ought to say to an applicant for a claim of £150 we cannot help you because you can now commence your action in the county court. An assurance was given, which I can repeat, that in the case of actions between £100 and £200 the position of an applicant who applies to the poor persons committee and is proposing to start his procedure in the High Court will in no way be adversely affected by the Bill. The Amendment deals with a different point. Remitted actions are already covered in the poor persons procedure. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman) was speaking of cases of £150 which an applicant starts in the county court or would like to start in the county court. If he wishes to proceed, as he could have proceeded last week, he can so proceed, and his case will be considered by the poor persons committee exactly as it would have been considered last week; but there are other cases which have to be considered, and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne knows that I cannot accept the Amendment.

The work of the poor persons procedure depends on the voluntary cooperation of solicitors and up till now it has been confined to the High Court. No extension could be made except with their consent and after full consultation with them. I cannot, therefore, accept as an Amendment to the Bill an extension which might be regarded as a very big extension of the principle to the county court. I hope the hon. Member will appreciate the reasons and will not press the Amendment. An assurance has been given that cases started in the High Court will not be in any worse position than they are. The question of the extension of the principle of the poor persons procedure is one which, obviously, cannot be discussed now, but is one which will require consideration in the future.

Who gave the assurance that these very patient and devoted bodies who consider these cases will never have it in their minds that the case may not be started in the county court?

The assurance was given by my Noble Friend.

I would willingly withdraw the Amendment if I felt that its object could be achieved by other means. By rejecting the Amendment the Attorney-General is saying to people who have no means at all, "You must commence your action in the High Court," while if they had some means they would be entitled to commence it in the county court. That is the effect of the argument. A poor person does not get his expenses paid in the county court. He has to pay the witnesses, bring his doctor, he has to have his case properly prepared, and a great deal of disbursements are involved, quite apart from those which he is excused under the poor persons' rule, and the effect of rejecting the Amendment is to compel a man who has no means at all, and because he has no means, to carry on his action in the most expensive of the courts.

The other objection of the Attorney-General was that you can only carry out the poor persons' procedure by the voluntary co-operation of both branches of the legal profession. That is true, and it is freely rendered. It is the generosity of both branches of the profession and their co-operation which makes it possible in the case of the High Court. What reason has the Attorney-General to suppose that the same voluntary co-operation and generous service will not be rendered in the county courts where it is easier for the practitioner to enter and in exactly the same kind of case. You are not adding to the number of cases. The Amendment only affects cases which can be commenced in the county court under the Bill, but which would otherwise have to be commenced in the High Court. We are only proposing to say that the voluntary co-operation which has made the system work in the High Court shall be carried into operation in the county court. I cannot see what the difficulty is.

I am disappointed that the Attorney-General has not seen his way to accept the Amendment. He resisted it on one ground, and that was that he had not had time for consultation with those who, in fact, carry on poor persons' work. Is there any reason to suppose that they will be opposed to the Amendment going into the Bill? It is not proposed to impose any additional burdens on them at all. It is just as easy—it may be easier—for them to commence and carry on proceedings in the county court as in the High Court. Where they have to go some distance to an assize court, the county court is on their own doorstep, and it means that they would be saved a great deal of trouble which is involved

I beg to move, in page 2, line 6, to leave out "exceeding" and to insert "less than." This is the only Amendment we propose to move on the Report stage of this very important Measure. There is room for some other very important amendments in the Bill, as drafted, but the time available for its consideration is short, and we are all agreed that the Bill should pass through its final stages to-day. The principal reason for moving this Amendment is to give the Minister an opportunity of telling us what has been the result of his statement on 19th July during the Committee stage of the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman then said:

"I will weigh what has been said and before the next stage of the Bill I will take consultation with all those concerned in the committee."—OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th July, 1938, col. 2077, Vol. 338.]

He will now, I presume, be able to tell us what has happened since. I, therefore, confine myself to stating one or two simple points in favour of the Amendment. If the Bill passes in its present form it will, as far as these words are concerned, be a fundamental departure from the recommendations of the Committee upon which the Bill is based. We fear that if these words go on to the Statute Book for the first time in the history of our country, implying that the maximum holiday with pay shall be one week, not only will they stabilise that idea in the minds of unscrupulous employers, but they will be quoted against trade unions in future negotiations as to holidays with pay, particularly in offices and shops. This is, as far as we know, the only instance in which the right hon. Gentleman has departed from the main recommendations of the Committee. While we appreciate his difficulties in negotiating with some parties behind the scenes, we ask him to accede to the request which is embodied in this Amendment. He must not take exception to our having put down this Amendment, because I can assure him that if we were on the Government side of the House and he were on the Opposition side and if a proposal of this kind were moved, he himself would be a very fierce critic of the words in the Bill as it stands.

There is a difference of opinion at once between the hon. Gentleman and myself. He says that the Bill is a fundamental departure from the report of the committee.

These words.

I contend that the words in the Bill carry out the intention of the committee as expressed in the Report. The only reason why I agreed on the previous occasion to which the hon. Gentleman referred to consult the members of the Committee, instead of taking a decision was because it was pointed out to me what had not occurred to me before that the words "at least" might be read in two different ways. We had always read them as we understood the Committee intended them to be read as applying not with regard to the period but with regard to the powers. It has been impossible to consult all the members of the committee because they are scattered and more than one is on the high seas. I have put the point to the chairman, Lord Amulree, whose view I am sure will be taken as representative of the committee's desire. Paragraph 146 of the report of the committee recommended that legislation should be introduced in the following sense:

"In every industry under a trade board the trade board should be given authority to consider and to determine whether in the circumstances of each industry the provision of a holiday of at least one week with pay is one that for the time being should be granted,"

In the case of agriculture the committee said:

"The Agricultural Wages Committees should be given authority to consider and determine whether in the circumstances of each area the provision of at least seven days with pay is one that for the time being should be granted."

The attention of the House was called to the words "at least one week" and "at least seven days" by many hon. Members during the Committee stage. I want to draw the attention of the House also to the words "for the time being," and to quote paragraph 134 which reads:

"It seems to us not unreasonable in view of what we have said above that the period of the holiday should be more than one working week, but having in mind the desirability of proceeding judiciously in the matter for reasons connected with production we think that our recommendations in regard to the annual period of consecutive paid holiday for industrial and kindred workers should be confined to a minimum of a working week after the qualifying period has been served."

I put these points to the chairman of the committee. I put to him the ambiguity which led me to take the decision to approach such members of the Committee as I could approach, and Lord Amulree authorises me—and the House will understand that he is not in a position to bind the committee but his view will, I am sure, carry the greatest weight—to say that in his opinion the Bill, as drafted, carries out the intention of the committee. His view is that the recommendation in paragraph 146 must be read in conjunction with paragraph 134, that as stated in paragraph 143 an annual holiday with pay should be established without undue delay as part of the terms of the contract of employment of all employés and that the holiday should consist of at least a week. That is the goal, but in the committee's opinion it was necessary to proceed judiciously, and, having regard to the general position in industry and the fact that most voluntary holiday agreements provided for a holiday period of a week, their view was that as a first step trade boards and agricultural wages committees should be given power to provide holidays for a week. The position would then be reviewed in 1940–1 in the light of the situation then existing, the committee contemplating that, having regard to developments in industry generally, it might then be desirable to extend the powers of trade boards and agricultural wages committees to give holidays for a period exceeding a week.

That is the statement which Lord Amulree authorises to be made and it bears out my view that we have interpreted, according to the judgment of the chairman, what was meant by the committee. Let the House consider another point. There is an ambiguity, and I have given the House the chairman's view that the Bill carries out the intention of the committee, whatever the precise wording may say. But let me put this point. The hon. Member said that this would be quoted against the trade unions. I beg to differ with him on that. Let us consider the circumstances in which the Bill was introduced. The committee got to work and we got the report much too late in the normal way to permit of implementing it this Session, but I saw one thing clearly. Here was a great range of workers, most of them in the lower-paid categories, and if the clear distinction which is drawn by the committee on the main proposal namely, between voluntary agreement up to 1941 with the possibility of general compulsion after, was to be carried out, it was clear that, unless we could legislate before the Recess, these workers would be at a disadvantage of some months compared with their more fortunate fellows.

That is the only reason that made me put on pressure, in order to see whether we could get a move forward, so that these workers might not have five months or possibly seven months disadvantage compared with the others. Then what happened? We drafted the Bill. Hon. Members know what is the procedure in a matter of this kind. The Bill is produced and we invite the observations of both sides in the industry, the Trades Union Congress on the one side and the employers' Confederation on the other. That was done. The result was that we approached the Opposition on the basis of this Bill—not some other Bill—with the full knowledge of all concerned and the signatures of six trade union members to the Report. On the basis of that agreement we came forward with the Bill, within this short time, and I am now asked by the Amendment to make what would be a fundamental change in the Bill. I could not possibly do that.

For these reasons I cannot accept the Amendment. I assure the House that the Government drafted the Bill in the firm conviction that it carried out the meaning and intention of the Amulree Committee. If in the course of the next two-and-a-half years every trade board in the country and every agricultural wages committee can get a week's holiday with pay established on this enabling basis, we shall have achieved a very great reform for which the whole country will be grateful.

The Minister's speech is somewhat disappointing. I do not feel that I can accept with complete authority the statement of Lord Amulree. It is less than two years since this House in its unfettered judgment agreed to the Second Reading of a Bill which provided a fortnight's holiday with pay. That was indeed an expression of the social conscience.

But do not forget that the original Bill was for six days' holiday, and that it was only after the Amulree Committee began to sit that the increased number was put in.

That is not my point. I am referring to the Bill of my old friend, Mr. Rowson, now dead. He introduced a Bill for a fortnight's holiday with pay, and it received the approval of this House on Second Reading. There can be no challenge about that.

The Bill which received a Second Reading in this House provided for one week's holiday with pay. I was one who worked with the late Mr. Rowson to get it through.

Of course I accept the hon. Member's statement, but my recollection is that nearly all the discussion was on the basis of a fortnight's holiday with pay and that the proposal was supported on the Government side of the House. I come to the Amulree Committee itself. The intention of the Committee is, of course, very difficult to interpret, and if Lord Amulree interprets it in one way, I as an ordinary layman, who was not a member of the Committee, am entitled to interpret it in another way. The Minister of Labour stresses the phrase "for the time being." On this issue I attach no importance whatever to that phrase, because quite clearly if words have an ordinary meaning, "for the time being" really means until there is an Act of general application, with an interim period dealing with two or three categories of workpeople who should have their own arrangements until there was a general measure brought before the House. Therefore the phrase "for the time being" really does not apply to this argument.

The right hon. Gentleman also stressed the term "applied judiciously." My experience of trade boards is that they are a little too judicious. I do not therefore attach much importance to that particular term. There are two phrases that occur in the report of the Amulree Committee and they can bear only one meaning. If you say "at least one week," the week is a minimum. If you say "a minimum of a working week" you are envisaging the possibility of a holiday longer than one week. I do not see how that conclusion can be avoided. It may be that agricultural wages committees and trade boards will give a round week. It may be that some of them will be a little reluctant to give even that. But that is not the point. I still hold that it is not in accordance with the spirit of the Amulree Committee Report that the week should be made a maximum, when repeatedly the statement is made about a holiday of at least one week or the minimum of a working week.

In these circumstances I do not feel that we can withdraw our Amendment. We must stand by it. I do not want it to go forth from this House that we, having exhausted a good deal of the day on a Bill which seems to me to be of minor importance compared with this, have been in any way responsible for wrecking this Bill; but at the same time we are bound to make our protest again now and in the Lobby to record our view that the word- ing of the Bill does not in fact accord with the statements made in the Amulree Committee's Report. I am not on the point as to whether the bodies concerned would be likely to implement the longer period. It may be that they would not. It may be that if more than a week were given it would be given by the ordinary negotiating machinery outside the terms of the agricultural committees and trade boards. I am simply on the specific point that according to the views laid down by the Amulree Committee the statutory bodies should be empowered, if they so choose, to extend the holiday beyond the working week.

Having moved in Committee the Amendment which has caused all this trouble, it would be very discourteous on my part if I were not to take a few minutes in which to acknowledge my right hon. Friend's courtesy in having carried out exactly what he said he would do when the Amendment was withdrawn on the Committee stage. It would also be very ungracious of me not to accept—and I fully accept—what he has told us of the history and genesis of the Bill. I know what anxiety he felt that the Bill should become law rapidly, and we all appreciate, I am sure, the personal interest that he has taken in pressing forward this movement. I also accept Lord Amulree's interpretation of what was in his own mind and what he believes was in the mind of his colleagues in their report; and I hope my right hon. Friend will in return acquit me of any impropriety in this matter. I was not a member of any of these committees or ordinary channels by which this matter was arranged, other than as a back bench Member of the House of Commons, but in these semi-Fascist days the House of Commons is almost the last body that is ever allowed to express its views on anything. I was told that this Bill could only pass into law rapidly if it carried out exactly the report of the committee, and that otherwise it would have to be postponed.

The agreement was made, not on the report, but on the Bill.

Yes, but the agreement was made between other persons than Members of the House. We were told, and I think properly told, that the only chance of getting the Bill was to stick to the report, and, therefore, my hon. Friends and I decided that we would relate our Amendments to the report, and although I fully accept Lord Amulree's interpretation of the report, I think it was not unreasonable for us to assume that the Bill did not carry out the exact terms of the report, seeing that the words used were, in two passages, "at least" a week's holiday. Now "at least" means, ordinarily, "not less than" Lord Amulree now tells us that it means "not more than," and, fortifying that argument, he points to another part of the report, where it speaks of "minimum", and says that "minimum" is always understood to mean "maximum." It all seems very confusing to me, and it reminds me of the White Knight, who said "The song is called 'Long, long ago.'" "Oh, that is what the song is," said Alice. "No," said the White Knight, "the song really is 'A'sitting on a Gate' ".

We are entitled to interpret the report according to the ordinary rules of grammatical English, although I know that those rules are not cultivated as well as they might be in certain quarters. I have sufficient experience of authors to know

I want to say one thing bearing on the relative means of the terms "at least" and "not exceeding." The Minister said, on the Committee stage of the Bill, that universal compulsion was ruled out for at least three years. I hope we may take that as meaning that universal compulsion is ruled out for not more than three years, and if I could have a personal assurance from the Minister on that point, I think I would refrain from following my hon. Friends above the Gangway on this side into the Lobby in support of the Amendment.