asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether, in view of the former abundance of oysters in certain of the sea-lochs of Scotland characterised by exceptional purity of their sea-water combined with abundance of the plankton upon which oysters subsist, he will take steps to encourage the development of oyster fisheries in such lochs?

I am advised that it is many years since oysters existed in any appreciable quantity in Scottish waters and that, although in recent years efforts have been made to resuscitate the fisheries, these proved unsuccessful. I do not therefore consider that the matter can usefully be reopened in present circumstances.

asked the Minister of Shipping whether he is aware that the proposal to close the shelter-deck of open shelter-deck vessels will, because of added weight, weaken their structure and increase strain; that the resulting deeper immersion of the ships will lead to greater deck damage in bad weather, and their speed will be reduced; and what steps he is taking to prevent the crews of the vessels concerned being exposed to greater risks of injury and loss of life?

I have been asked to reply. The decision to close the shelter decks of open shelter-deck vessels and to have the load lines reassigned will apply only where the resulting increase in draught is warranted by the condition of the ship's structure and will not be prejudicial to the seaworthiness of the ship. Due regard will be had in each case to the probable effect of increased draught on the speed of the ship. The increase in draught allowed in any case will not under present arrangements exceed twelve inches, and the increased draught will be used with discretion in exceptional trades and under exceptional conditions. I hope this information will dispel such apprehensions as are indicated in the hon. Member's Question.

In view of the fact that the speed of a ship may be altered and that there is a greater likelihood of damage being done in heavy weather if it is low in the water, will the Minister see that the greatest care is taken before these open shelter-deck vessels are altered?

I understand that my right hon. Friend has in mind all those points.

asked the Minister of Economic Warfare what action he is taking to prevent the export of large quantities of iron ore from Bilbao to Germany; and whether this question was taken into consideration when the recent loan of £2,500,000 by Great Britain to Spain was made?

So far as I am aware, no export of large quantities of iron ore from Bilbao to Germany is taking place. I shall, however, be very glad to receive any information which my hon. Friend may have on the subject. All relevant considerations were borne in mind when the recent loan agreement was negotiated.

Does the right hon. Gentleman really think it wise to lend large sums of money to Spain at a moment when that country appears to be so hostile to us, and will he be careful not to pay too much attention to the views of the grand appeaser in Madrid?

There is a Question later on the Order Paper to-day, put by my right hon. Friend the Member for New-castle-under-Lyme (Mr. Wedgwood) to the Leader of the House, on the subject of the loan agreement. Perhaps the House will be willing to wait for the reply to that Question.

asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement regarding the proposed loan to the Spanish Government of over £2,000,000; and whether the House will have a chance of debating and voting on the issue before the transaction is completed?

My right hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a statement on the subject of this loan agreement on 10th April last. The agreement will be laid as a White Paper. It would not be a good thing to debate it—just now—certainly not in public.

Is the Prime Minister aware of the fact that this money will go straight into German pockets; is there any chance of any of it being saved; and is not our representation by the right hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) in Spain a little too expensive?

Many people thought in July of last year that Spain would enter the war against us, and I think that it is very largely due to the brilliant discharge of his duties in Spain that our relations with that country have tended to improve and not to deteriorate at this critical time.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the handing-over of this money to Spain is causing deep anxiety throughout the country and a great deal of unrest and that the public cannot see in the newspapers of Spain and in the public utterances of Spanish statesmen any gratitude or recognition whatever of this country; and are we to wait for another fait accompli from Spain?

I do not know what is meant by the last remark about another fait accompli at all. This policy has been most carefully considered, and the state of our affairs in every part of the world does not allow matters of this kind to be handled in a rough and reckless or debonair fashion. We do not wish to do anything which would give any excuse for a breach at the present time between us and the Spanish Government; and I certainly consider that the starving condition of the people of Spain fully justifies assistance being given by Great Britain, and by the United States, if she chooses so to act, irrespective of whether any expressions of gratitude are forthcoming or not.

Is the right hon. Gentleman—

rose—

asked the Secretary of State for War whether any arrangements have been made with the Protecting Power for non-commissioned officers and other ranks amongst British prisoners of war in Germany to pursue studies interrupted by the war, on the same lines as those arranged for officers?

Arrangements have been made, through the British Red Cross Society, to afford non-commissioned officers and other ranks in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany the same facilities as officers. for pursuing studies interrupted by the war.

:asked the Minister of Labour whether it will be both his policy and practice in the registration and calling-up of women for war work to utilise all suitable single unoccupied women, irrespective of their income, over a wide range of ages before calling on those women who are married, with or without children, or engaged in other necessary family commitments?

My right hon. Friend cannot wait to register a large number of age groups before taking action, as the process of registration necessarily takes time. It was decided to register married women as well as single because some married women have no domestic responsibilities: moreover, the position of married women who are normally wage-earners must be safeguarded. My right hon. Friend will take into full account the domestic responsibilities of all women concerned, whether married or single; the question of income does not arise.

asked the Minister of Information whether, in view of the Government's policy that further definitions of war aims, other than those already made, must await the appropriate opportunity, he will reconsider his decision to support a scheme for ventilating peace aims and for arranging discussion at the British Broadcasting Corporation; and whether, since this organisation is often selected for broadcasting official views, he will refrain from giving approval to any such policy as specified since it may entail unfortunate reactions abroad?

In the speech to which the Question appears to refer, my right hon. Friend stated that he was personally not opposed to the discussion of peace aims by private individuals. No decision has been taken with regard to the question whether such discussion should be given publicity by the B.B.C.

Does my hon. Friend not think that at this moment the inevitable result of discussion by private individuals over the B.B.C. on this subject will be to cause a feeling in the minds of neutrals and the enemy that we are anxious to make peace?

I am aware that my right hon. Friend does not consider the present phase of the war very suitable for such a discussion.

asked the Prime Minister whether time will be found for the consideration of the Motion about the leased naval stations standing in the names of the hon. Members for Bilston, Cheltenham (Mr. Lipson) and the Combined English Universities (Mr. E. Harvey)?

There will, of course, be the usual Parliamentary opportunities for discussing this matter, but I have not heard of any general demand which would make it necessary to give a special day at the present time.

Is not this Treaty more important to the future of our Empire than any other that we have negotiated for many years, and is it not the only one to be made at the present time between two nations that really trust each other?

The question is whether those admirable sentiments require at the present time the emphasis which is laid upon them.

asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware of the confusion arising from differences of meaning of the word "billion" on the two sides of the Atlantic; and whether, in view of our new economic intimacy, he will confer with the Governments of the United States of America and Canada, so as to obtain uniformity in this matter.

The word "billion" has, it is true, different, or alternative, meanings on the opposite sides of the Atlantic, but I do not think this has led to any difficulties in accounting. For all practical financial purposes a billion represents one thousand millions, especially in the case of anything we owe.

Is it not a fact that the confusion is likely to be increased as a result of the new relations between Canada, the United States and ourselves?

I have noted the point.

asked the Prime Minister when he expects to receive the report from the Chancery Judge on the camps expenditure?

asked the Prime Minister whether he has yet received the report from the Chancery Judge appointed to decide primâ facie cases of waste; and, if so, will he cause a copy to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REFORT or placed in the Library?

I am unable to say when the report will be received. As regards the second part of the Question of my hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Sir W. Smithers), I would refer him to the answer given to him on 2nd April.

asked the Prime Minister whether he will issue a White Paper giving details of the action taken and results obtained as a result of the first 11 reports of the Select Committee on National Expenditure?

The 11th report of the Select Committee, published on 8th August, 1940, contains a summary of the action taken by Departments on the recommendations contained in the Committee's first eight reports. I understand that they have in preparation a similar summary dealing with later reports.

Will my right hon. Friend take advantage of the great amount of work done by the Select Committee on National Expenditure and its sub-committees, and see whether some good results cannot be derived from their examination?

Certainly, Sir. I read very carefully any criticisms which emerge in these reports, even though in many cases they appear to be very remote from the terms of reference which were given to the Committee. I can assure my hon. Friend that we shall do our utmost to profit by any of the recommendations in cases where action has not been already taken in that sense.

asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that, since he gave instructions to lift the political ban on artistes and musicians performing for the British Broadcasting Corporation, Sir Hugh Roberton, conductor of the Orpheus Choir, who had previously come under the ban, has offered several concerts by his choir to the Scottish Regional director, and has been informed by him that he has not been authorised to lift the ban; and whether he will take steps to ensure that the instructions given by him are fully carried out?

I am informed that the B.B.C. Scottish director was notified by the Concert Secretary of the Glasgow Orpheus Choir of a performance to be given by Sir Hugh Roberton on a date for which the B.B.C. 's programme arrangements had already been made. The Scottish director replied that the whole matter was being reconsidered in the light of the reply which I gave to the hon. Member on 20th March. The Corporation assures me that its policy in the planning of programmes and the issue of invitations to broadcast will be in accordance with that reply. This does not imply that any special favour will be shown to musical performers simply because they are engaged in propaganda unhelpful to the interests of the country.

Is the Prime Minister aware that Sir Hugh Roberton says that when he approached the Scottish Regional director for the possibility of a concert, he was told that they could not consider it because they had had no instructions from London at all to lift the ban after the Prime Minister's statement?

I gather that, by very prompt and rapid action, they put in a demand within a few hours of my making the statement and consequently the official notification had not percolated through the usual channels.

As the Prime Minister had given a reply to the Supplementary Question of mine on that date and considerable confusion seemed to exist with regard to the wording of that, I want to know quite definitely whether, irrespective of any views held by Sir Hugh Roberton, the ban on the choir and his conducting of it is entirely removed?

Yes, Sir, free from any bias on one side or the other.

Then why does the Scottish director desire to reconsider the application, according to the answer of the Prime Minister?

Immediately after I had given my reply a demand was put in by the manager of this choir, or by whoever conducts their business, for an opportunity to broadcast. The pro- gramme was already complete at that time, and the full directions had not reached the Scottish branch of the B.B.C. from here. Now they have, and they are going to be carried out strictly; neither will these people be given any advantage because of the views expressed nor will there be a ban because of the expression of those views.

asked the Prime Minister whether arrangements have now been made for a day for the discussion of the question of the distribution and rationing of food?

Yes, Sir, but the date is not yet settled.

asked the Minister without Portfolio whether, with a view to establishing increased purchasing power for the post-war period, the Government will consider incorporating, as a part of their reconstruction plans, some method of treating women equally with men for services rendered in their respective employments?

I have noted my hon. Friend's suggestion.

Will the right hon. Gentleman appreciate the importance of increased purchasing power after the war?

Indeed, and a lot of the other implications in the Question.

Can my right hon. Friend say whether he has formulated any policy yet with regard to the more equitable treatment of women in industry and the Civil Services under postwar conditions?

That is not a matter for me at this stage.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what are the highest and lowest interest rates charged by the clearing banks to the agricultural borrowers for loans since the outbreak of hostilities?

I regret that this information is not available.

Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer really mean to tell the House that the Treasury are not sufficiently interested to obtain from the banks these very vital figures, in view of the importance of the national larder? Is it not really a confession of complacency that he has no real answer to give, and will he try again?

No, Sir. I gave my hon. Friend certain information a little while ago as regards the average rate of interest, and I have also noted, as I dare say my hon. Friend has done, that in the Sixth Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure it is stated that:

"the evidence we have received does not support the conclusion that the lack of adequate credit facilities has been a substantial factor in hampering the agricultural industry"

Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is not a question of lack of credit but a question of too high charges in bank interest to agricultural borrowers? That is the point.

asked the Postmaster-General whether his attention has been called to a recent regulation made by the committee of the Stock Exchange, Throgmorton Street, London, restricting the use of private telephone lines and teleprinters to members of stock exchanges registered under the provisions or the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1939; to what extent this is likely to affect the revenue of his department, and what action he proposes to take in the matter?

I have no knowledge of the regulation referred to. Private telephone or teleprinter service can, normally, be rented by any person when and where it is available, although under present conditions the requirements of Defence and of the public services frequently make it necessary to refuse applications, and in some instances private services previously existing have been withdrawn. The question of the effect on Post Office revenue does not appear to arise, and my right hon. Friend does not propose to take any action.

asked the Prime Minister whether he has any statement to make on the war situation?

Might I be allowed to preface my remarks by expressing to you, Mr. Speaker, the very great satisfaction of every part of the House at your return after your indisposition, and also our satisfaction that your indisposition kept you out of your official residence on a recent occasion.

I have no statement which could be usefully made to the House to-day, beyond what I said before we separated or what has appeared since in the newspapers. Operations of many kinds are going on, and we have others to think of besides ourselves. I should deprecate any proposal for a Debate at the present time, and I hope the House will once again show its forbearance to those who are charged with the conduct of the war, and will display to the world those qualities of poise and steadiness which have been its characteristic on so many difficult and anxious occasions.

The only piece of news I have for the House which has not yet been published, is that the Mediterranean Battle Fleet, under Admiral Cunningham, at daybreak yesterday, bombarded Tripoli harbour for 42 minutes, inflicting very heavy damage both on the port and on the shipping in the harbour, the extent of which is not at present fully known. On the way there, our aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm intercepted five German troop-carrying planes, and shot down four in flames. I have not yet heard whether they were full or empty. The Fleet was not seriously molested and suffered no loss in ships.

The House will, of course, show all the forbearance which the Government think necessary in this situation and particularly desires not to embarrass the operations of our troops in any way. Would my right hon. Friend bear in mind, however, the absolute necessity for a proximate Debate on this subject as soon as it can possibly be held? He will be aware of the anxiety expressed in Australia at the lack of authentic news and that Parliament there has been called together for the purpose of hearing a statement. May I also ask whether it would be convenient—because it would cause far less embarrassment—for the Foreign Secretary to make a statement, in any conditions that the Government might think appropriate, upon his recent visits? Finally, may I ask my right hon. Friend—who has just told us good news, or at least comparatively good news— whether it is true that the Germans have occupied Samothrace?

I should think it not unlikely, but I have not at the moment direct confirmation of that. With regard to a Debate, it is quite obvious that once the situation reaches temporary arrest a full statement should be made to the House as to what has happened in the past. As to scanty information being given, I must frankly say that we have had the very greatest difficulty in obtaining fuller accounts, or accurate accounts, of the difficult and intricate movement of our Forces in Greece. They have been of the most complicated character and have been carried out with extraordinary skill, but we have not received from day to day—even the Government—full information from the Commanders engaged. But that has not been any hindrance to the course of the action or operation, and I have asked that we may in the future receive fuller reports, if possible without prejudice to the interests on the spot. With regard to a statement by the Foreign Secretary on his tour, either in public or in Secret Session, I should deprecate that at the present time because I do not think that the materials are available for the necessary presentation of the Government's case to the House.

May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he realises the fact that the Foreign Secretary has been abroad on a most important mission presumably—because he is one of the key members of the Government—for no less than six weeks or two months, and that there are questions, such as the position of Iraq in relation to the British Empire and the position of Spain, about which there is most calamitous news this morning? Surely he does not wish to deprive the House of its right, if it wishes to do so, of having a full statement from the Foreign Secretary, either in private or in public, about the result of his visit?

No, Sir; if there is a desire to have a statement on foreign affairs, that is one question, but to have a statement on the recent tour by the Foreign Secretary would not, in my opinion, be convenient at the present time, either to the House or in the public interest.

In view of my right hon. Friend's remarks about the difficulty of obtaining news from Greece, which I quite understand, does the same difficulty apply to getting authentic news as to what is going on in Libya? The public are very exercised in their minds about what is going on there and ought to be reassured if possible.

I think one is very accurately informed of what is going on in Libya—

Greece is much more important.

I do not think we must embark upon comparisons of the different classes of dangerous duties which are set to His Majesty's Forces. In reply to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir A. Southby), I do not think any statement on the subject of Libya would be appropriate at the present time and, indeed it may be, for a little while to come.

Is my right lion. Friend aware that the public are very uneasy about the situation, and that a statement, in secret obviously, by the Foreign Secretary might remove some of the uneasiness?

As to the uneasiness of the public, I am bound to say that I have not formed that view. The public are showing all those qualities of stability and phlegm, when things are not going well, that have made us what we are and have carried us thus far.

rose —

We cannot have a debate on this subject now.

It will probably be convenient "for the House to discuss the various Motions on the Order Paper as one on the first Motion, and for the Motions to be put separately at the end.

I beg to move,

"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935 by the Governor of Madras on 30th October, 1939, a copy of which was presented to this House on 28th November, 1939"

The purpose of the Motions which I am submitting to the House to-day is to extend for another 12 months the Proclamamations issued under the provisions of Section 93 of the India Act. Under the terms of that Section, a Governor of a Province, if satisfied that a situation has arisen in which Parliamentary government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Act, can by proclamation assume all or any of the powers vested in the Provincial bodies and authorities. This situation arose in October, 1939, in consequence of the action of the Congress Parties so-called "High Command" in ordering the Congress Ministries to resign. Proclamations under Section 93 were accordingly issued in seven Provinces, and their continuance in force for a further 12 months was duly approved by the House on 18th April of last year. There has been no change in the situation since then, and we have, I regret to say, no alternative to a further extension of these emergency provisions.

I would remind the House, however, that these Motions are only concerned with seven out of the 11 Provinces of British India. In the four Provinces of Bengal, Assam, Sind and the Punjab, with a population of something like 100,000,000 persons—one-third of the whole population of British India—Provincial self-government has continued to work uninterruptedly under composite Governments, comprised of Hindu and Moslem Ministers. On all the questions most nearly affecting the ordinary life of the citizen—all the questions, in fact, which occupy most of the attention of this House in times of peace—these 100,000,000 of Indians have now for four years been enjoying the advantages of democratic self-government. Ministers and legislators have continued to gain experience and are making their effective contribution, not only to the welfare of their constituents within the wide sphere of their direct authority, but to India's general war effort. I think we ought not to under-estimate the significance of this remarkable advance in self-government over so large a field. Nor can we afford to ignore the importance of the voice which these Provinces, through their Governments are bound to exercise in any deliberations affecting the future Constitution of India.

From this point of view, it is, of course, a matter of deep regret that the 200,000,000 inhabitants of the other seven Provinces of India were, by the ukase of the Congress High Command, forbidden to continue to build up the practice and tradition of self-government. Their Governments too had made a satisfactory beginning, and if they made mistakes—as even we here have been known to do—the remedy lay with their electors. So far, indeed, as the Provincial electorates are concerned, it must be admitted that they nowhere showed any signs of distress at the suspension of Parliamentary government, in this respect no doubt differing very widely from what would be the attitude of our own electors if they were deprived of the services of this Front Bench. In fact, the change to direct personal government by Governors and permanent officials met with general acquiescence and indeed good will. Whatever political unrest there may be in India to-day has certainly not arisen in any way from the suspension of Provincial self-government. There has, I should add, been no discontinuity or abrupt reversal in either administrative or legislative policy. In a few instances, indeed, notably in connection with prohibition, legislation has had to be modified in consequence of legal decisions, but generally speaking, the work of beneficent social policy continues in full progress and with broad public approval. The House, consequently, need not fear that the continuance of direct government in these Provinces for another 12 months will of itself add to the difficulties of the political situation.

What, indeed, was really serious in the action of the Congress-controlled Minis- tries was not so much the direct and immediate result of their action in the Provinces themselves, as the complete disregard displayed by the most powerful political organisation in India for the responsibilities of self-government and the indirect effect of this evidence of Congress methods upon the general political situation. When we speak of responsible Parliamentary government, we are apt to emphasise one particular aspect of that responsibility—I mean the responsibility of Government towards the party majority in the Legislature. But responsible Parliamentary government, if it is to work successfully raid be worthy of the name, implies a threefold responsibility. There is, first and foremost, responsibility to the Crown, in other words, to the general welfare, the duty of maintaining a substantial continuity and efficiency of government, of seeing, in the old phrase, that "the King's Government is carried on" There is, secondly, the responsibility to Parliament as an institution, founded, if I may say so, Mr. Speaker, on your authority and upon the rights of minorities, which, subject to the established procedure of Parliament, are in your keeping. It is only in the third place, and subject to these dominating responsibilities, that a Government is responsible to its supporters in Parliament for the promotion of particular policies in which they are interested.

In the present case Ministers resigned, not as a result of any differences with their Governors, not over any issue of Provincial policy, and not at the instance of their own supporters in Parliament. They resigned, prepared to bring about a complete breakdown of the administrative and Parliamentary life of their Provinces, at the orders of an outside executive who wished, in this imperious and irresponsible fashion, to express its disapproval of the absence of a statement by the British Government on war aims framed to its liking. I can only say that whatever may have been the motives which inspired the conduct both of the Congress High Command and of the Provincial Ministries, there is no greater danger to democratic self-government in India as elsewhere than party totalitarianism. What has been even more immediately serious has been the effect of this demonstration of Congress methods upon other dements in India—the non-Congress Pro- vinces, the Moslem community generally, and the Princes. It has confirmed, to the point of a fixed determination, their already growing reluctance to take part in, or come under, any Central Government in India which is likely to be subject to the control of a majority in the Legislature which, in its turn, would simply obey the orders of the Congress Central Executive. Congress repudiated the Federal provisions of the Act of 1935 largely because they weighted representation to some extent in the Legislature, in favour of minority elements, in what it regarded an undemocratic sense. Congress, I fear, is blinded to the risk that no alternative Constitution is now likely to emerge which can secure for it as great a measure of influence and control over India as a whole as it would have exercised under the present Act.

The most significant symptom of the changed situation is the growing strength of the demand, voiced by Mr. Jinnah, Leader of the Moslem League, for the complete severance from the rest of India of the North-Western and North-Eastern zones, in which Moslems constitute a majority, and their establishment as completely independent States controlling their own foreign policy, their own defence, their Customs, and their finance. I am not concerned here to discuss the immense practical difficulties in the way of the so-called Pakistan project stated in this extreme form. Nor need I go back to the dismal record of India's history in the 18th century or to the disastrous experience of the Balkan countries before our eyes to-day, in order to point out the terrible dangers inherent in any break up of the essential unity of India in its relation to the outside world. After all, there is no British achievement in India of which we have better reason to be proud than the unity, with internal peace and reign of law, which we have given her. It is enough for my purpose if I can impress upon the House, on the one hand, the underlying determination of Moslem India not to accept any Constitution which does not give reasonably free play to the individual life of the predominantly Moslem units, and, on the other hand, the growing danger of the preaching on both sides, Hindu and Moslem, of extreme and incompatible policies.

It was the recognition of this danger, as well as the hope that the gravity of the war situation might bring the parties together in a spirit of responsibility and of co-operation, that led His Majesty's Government to make the new statement of policy which was made public by Lord Linlithgow in August last. What was the essence of that statement? It was that the framework of India's future Constitution should be devised, not by this House, but by Indians for themselves. That was a far-reaching and, indeed, a revolutionary announcement, the full importance of which has not, I think, even yet been fully appreciated either in this country or in India. It was in effect a recognition in advance of India's status as a Dominion. That recognition was coupled with two conditions. One was that provision would have to be made for the due fulfilment of the obligations which Great Britain's long connection with India has imposed on her. Some of these, such as, for instance, the obligations towards existing members of the Ser vices, are by their very nature terminable. Others, like those arising from India's present dependence upon this country for her defence, will naturally be subject to modification with the growth of India's own capacity to defend her self unaided. Others, such as the Treaty obligations of the Crown towards the Indian Princes, are of a more enduring character. In any case, none of these need stand in the way of shaping the permanent structure of India's future Constitution, which is to be essentially an Indian Constitution framed in accordance with Indian conceptions of Indian conditions and of Indian needs.

Even more important in this connection is the second, namely, the stipulation that the Constitution itself, and also the body which is to frame it, must be the outcome of agreement between the principal elements in India's national life. That is an essential pre-requisite to the success of the future Constitution, for, if Indians cannot agree upon the kind of Constitution they are prepared to work, how are they likely to agree upon the actual working of it? Our Constitution here works because there is behind it an unwritten agreement, based upon centuries of tradition, as to the limits within which the majority can exercise its position of advantage. Elsewhere, in all federal Constitutions, previous free agree- ment upon the nature of the Constitution and the limits within which majority rule can be exercised, has been the condition upon which the various elements of the federations have been prepared to act together. Anxious as we are to see the responsibility of Indian government resting upon Indian shoulders, we can only transfer that authority to some body which can assume it without immediately breaking down or breaking up.

Subject to that requisite of agreement, which is, I submit, inherent in the circumstances of the Indian situation and is not arbitrarily imposed by ourselves, the whole constitutional field is open for the modification or fundamental reconstruction of the existing Act. Indian statesmen need not be bound either by the system of government at the Centre contemplated in that Act, or by the relations between that Centre and the constituent units. If they consider that agreement can be promoted by a redistribution of powers or by a rearrangement of boundaries, or by changes in the electoral system, that is for them to discuss and settle. If they come to the conclusion that our type of democracy, with an Executive dependent upon a Parliamentary majority, stands in the way of agreement, and that Indian needs might be better met by an Executive deriving its authority more directly from the federated units and, like the American Executive, independent of the Legislature, that, again, is their responsibility.

We who, in this House, wrestled for many months with the intricacies of the existing Act—and I still look upon that Act as a very remarkable piece of constructive statesmanship—should be the last to underrate the difficulty of the task which lies before Indian statesmanship. It is a task which calls, not least for sheer hard thinking in the working-out of the practical ways and means of solving an immensely complicated problem. It is a task which calls, above all, for that mediating and moderating spirit, without which great ends cannot be achieved in human affairs. This is the task to which we have invited Indian statesmanship, and while the decisive, final resolution of so fundamental an issue obviously cannot take place in the midst of the life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged, there is nothing whatever to prevent Indian political leaders, Indian thinkers, Indian business men engaging now in those preliminary discussions and studies which are so essential to success and which, no more in India than elsewhere, can be hastily disposed of. We at any rate, are only too anxious to promote such study and discussion in every way possible. All the same, the main responsibility, both for the initiation and for the completion of this high inquiry, rests with Indians themselves. We can only pledge ourselves to hasten, to the utmost degree, decisions on relevant issues which lie within our power. But it is upon Indian statesmen in the main, and not upon us, that the time-table of future constitutional progress must depend.

So much for the major constitutional problem. There was the further question whether, in the interval, there was any practical step which the Government could take and which, without prejudging the major issue, could contribute towards its solution. There could, of course, be no question of changing over the whole basis of administrative and legislative power in the supreme crisis of the war, or of placing the direction of India's war effort in the hands of an entirely new Executive. Nor, indeed, could that have been done without at once raising those very issues of the division of power between the conflicting elements in India which are still unresolved. What we could do, and did do, was to invite Indian leaders representing the main political factors to join the Viceroy's Executive Council. The invitation to them was not only to take charge individually of important Departments of State, but also to partake fully in the collective responsibility of the country. Their inclusion would have brought the Indian membership of the Council, official and un-official, up to a substantial majority of the whole. But it would not have so altered the essential character of the Council, as to deprive the Governor-General of his existing trusted advisers, or so as to commit the Indian leaders who joined it to any course which would have deprived them of a free hand in dealing with the future. We believed, and still believe, that it would give real power, increasing power, and valuable experience to men who have hitherto been in political opposition. Above all, we hoped, and still hope, that the creation of such a coalition Executive, bringing the older and the newer elements together, would afford an opportunity for Indian leaders, in the atmosphere of the common effort for India's security, to forget for a while their differences and begin to envisage their problems in the light of a wider Indian patriotism.

So far, our hopes have been disappointed. Congress rejected, out of hand, both our major and our interim proposals. Its attitude is "all or nothing," and by "all" it means the immediate independence of an India governed by a Constitution which would ensure Congress control. It refused even to discuss the matter and proceeded to launch a curious campaign of Mr. Gandhi's devising. In pursuance of that campaign, Congress leaders, including ex-Premiers and ex-Ministers, as well as members of the rank and file, have made speeches which have been intended and calculated to interfere with the war effort. They have deliberately challenged fine or imprisonment with the same unquestioning obedience to the party whip, as when they resigned office in the Provinces, and in many cases, I believe, the same misgiving and reluctance. The situation thus created is naturally embarrassing, as; of course, it was meant to be embarrassing. But, clearly, the Government cannot punish ordinary offenders and overlook the same offences when committed by men whose position and whose course of action deliberately enhance the significance and the political effect of the offence.

This campaign of civil disobedience by instalments has now been in progress for nearly six months. The first phase, in which illegal action was confined to leading members of Congress, continued up to the beginning of January. The second phase, which included members of Provincial and local committees, ended early this month, and we are now in what may be called the rank-and-file phase. Magistrates, while vindicating the law, have treated the problem with great common sense, ignoring nonentities and in many cases imposing fines without the option of imprisonment. This latter procedure has been so discouraging to some of those whose chief inducement was the prospective electioneering advantage of a prison sentence that Mr. Gandhi has had to announce that the payment of a fine will count as an equally meritorious sacrifice in the Congress cause. On the whole, I think I can say that the movement has proceeded languidly and without evoking much popular interest, except perhaps in the United Provinces, which have in recent months contributed more than half the offences. In the middle of March some 7,000 offenders in all had been convicted, of whom some 5,000 were still in prison. The whole business is as regrettable as it is irrational, but the Government had, and have, no alternative to enforcing the law.

Apart from Congress, the Government's major policy for the constitutional future may be said to have relieved the anxiety of the various elements which compose India's national structure. As regards the more immediate policy of the expansion of the Viceroy's Council, acceptance in principle unfortunately did not lead, as we at one time hoped, to actual agreement in detail. The Moslem League in particular asked for a measure of representation on the Council as against the Hindu elements and made stipulations as to the future which the Viceroy could not see his way to accept. It was, of course, always open to the Viceroy, failing the support of the more important parties, to add to his Council individual Indians of high character and ability, but such a course would not have achieved the desired object, which was to associate representative Hindu and Moslem leaders with the conduct of the war and so bring them closer together for the future. It was, therefore, very reluctantly that Lord Linlithgow decided, after some months, in November last, to discontinue, for the time being at any rate, his unwearied efforts, carried on ever since the war began, to bring the various parties together, leaving the door open to further reconsideration by those directly concerned.

No one can look upon the present deadlock with satisfaction, least of all patriotic Indians who, looking beyond the narrower aim of sectional leaders, are concerned deeply with India's progress towards that equal partnership in our family of free nations which is their goal as well as ours. They, better than anyone else, can help to find a solution. But —and I must add this—they can do so only if they direct their efforts to the real sources of the difficulty. In the last few weeks that distinguished veteran statesman. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, whose breadth of outlook and courageous initiative played no small part in the deliberations which led up to the existing Federal scheme, brought together in Bombay a number of eminent Indian public men outside the two main contending political organisations to consider the situation. In the end a resolution was passed—though I am not quite clear as to how many of those who attended one or more meetings of this Conference concurred in it—which has since been discussed by Sir Tej with the Viceroy and submitted to His Majesty's Government. The resolution asked for a complete reconstruction of the Executive Council, converting it into one consisting entirely of unofficial Indians drawn from important elements in public life. This new Council should be responsible, while the war is still in progress, to the Crown and not to the Legislature, but should in substance be treated in regard to all inter-Imperial and international matters on the same footing as a Dominion Government. The resolution also asked that this reconstruction should be accompanied by the announcement of a definite time limit within which India is to attain to the same measure of freedom as is enjoyed by the Dominions.

I should be the last to approach in a critical or unsympathetic spirit proposals brought forward by men of such eminent public service as those who have associated themselves with this resolution, or animated by such a genuine desire to promote India's constitutional progress and also her active participation in the war effort. I will, therefore, only touch very briefly on some of the most obvious difficulties which such a scheme, it carried into effect, would present in practice. The scheme proposed by the resolution would amount, not to the modification of the present form of government, but to its supersession by an entirely different type of government. That is certainly something going beyond what we think practicable in the midst of the ever-increasing strain and urgency of the war situation. It would also create internal constitutional problems of no little difficulty, both in relation to the Provinces, whether those now enjoying self-government or those administered under Section 93, and to the Princes, and in that and other ways it would raise the still unresolved issues of the constitutional future.

That brings me to the underlying issue raised but not faced by the Bombay resolution. If I may say so without discourtesy to those who have sponsored it the resolution seems to me to have been directed to the wrong address. I have already pointed out that the time-table of India's constitutional advance depends far more upon Indian agreement than upon ourselves. But the same applies to any far-reaching alteration of the present constitutional position. As I think I have already made clear, our existing proposal for the expansion of the Viceroy's Council is in suspense, not because those concerned—I am leaving Congress on one side for the moment—condemn the proposal on the ground of inadequacy, but mainly because of the difficulty of reconciling Moslem and Hindu claims for relative position. That difficulty is not lessened, but inevitably enhanced, by any suggestion of a new type of Executive with more extensive powers. It is unfortunately evident that Sir Tej Sapru and his friends have not been able to secure beforehand for their scheme any kind of agreement, if not between Congress and the Moslem League, at any rate between the latter and other representatives of the Hindu majority. Mr. Jinnah, the leader of the Moslem League, has since repudiated the scheme as being on entirely wrong lines and as a trap, to use his phrase, into which Sir Tej had been led by Congress wirepullers. The general secretary of the Mahasabha party, on the other hand, a vigorous exponent of Hinduism, has declared that he will not cooperate in any scheme in which the numerical majority of the Hindu element is not reflected in the composition of the Council. There is obviously no such agreement here as would afford the reconstructed Council political support or even acquiescence in the Legislature.

On the other hand, if the reconstructed Council is to be composed, not of leaders who between them can secure some measure of political backing, but of men individually eminent but politically unsupported, then the objections which weighed against that course in the case of an expansion of the existing Council become much more formidable if it is a question of an entirely new Council with greatly enlarged powers. It would, I think, be very difficult to persuade Parliament to confer Dominion or quasi-Dominion powers on a body so constituted. Nor would such a body, between their responsibility to the Crown on the one side and in face of an unfriendly Legislature on the other, be likely for long to maintain its precarious position. My appeal to Sir Tej and his friends would, therefore, be, not to cease from their efforts, but to concentrate, first and foremost, upon bringing the contending elements in India together. Whether they can best do that by the exercise of their persuasion upon the existing party leaders or by building up a strong central party of men who are prepared to put India first, their efforts may well be decisive in shaping the whole future of their country.

Meanwhile, there are other fields besides that of politics in which India's future is being shaped. In Africa, in Malaya and now in Iraq, India is establishing her claim to consideration as a major factor in the winning of the war. Her troops have, by their gallantry and technical efficiency, made a conspicuous contribution to our victories in Libya and Eritrea. They have faced the trying ordeal of modern war, largely under the leadership of Indian officers who have amply justified their training and the confidence placed in them. Her young Navy has earned the highest commendation from the Admiralty—no easy critics—for its indefatigable work in the seas east of Suez. The expansion of her infant Air Force is only held back as against the rush of recruits by the imperative need elsewhere of a still inadequate total supply of machines. Her industries have already made an unprecedented contribution to her war effort and ours in every kind of military supply.

Can my right hon. Friend tell us—what many of us consider is the most important matter in this Debate—what advance there has been since the last Debate in the production of munitions and the intake of men into the Army?

I was only referring to this matter quite briefly because of its bearing on the political situation. I am not prepared to go into details, but, of course, my right hon. Friend is at liberty to raise these matters and, so far as I am in a position to answer, I shall be only too happy to do so. What I was going to add on this point—and it is a large part of the answer which I can give to my right hon. Friend—is that, thanks to the stimulative energies of Sir Alexander Roger and his colleagues in the technical mission which was sent out by the Ministry of Supply, as well as to the policy of mutual cooperation with her neighbours set on foot by the Delhi Conference and continued by the Eastern Group Supply Council, India will do so on an ever-increasing scale as the war progresses. All these things constitute a real and indefeasible advance in that progress towards self-dependence and true equality which constitutional developments can and should confirm, but which they cannot of themselves create if the basic conditions are not there.

Our desire in this House, a desire, I think, shared by all parties, is that India should advance, and advance rapidly, all along the line in the indispensable prerequisites to the fullest conceivable measure of freedom. From that point of view, we welcome with pride her achievements in war as evidence of her growing capacity to meet her own defence. We welcome the industrial progress, which will not only sub serve the needs of that defence, but contribute to her general economic strength. We should welcome even more, perhaps, any measures that can raise the standard of nutrition and health of that vast agricultural majority of a population which has, with an almost staggering increase, risen from 350,000,000 to 400,000,000 in the last decade. Above all, we welcome every effort that Indians can make to come together and find a solution to India's complex and difficult problems which will do justice alike to the claims of her diverse elements for a due recognition of their individuality and to the need of that wider unity which is essential to her peace and prosperity.

I have dwelt to-day, deliberately, upon Indian responsibility in this matter, for unless Indians are prepared to face that responsibility now, they will fail to face it hereafter. Agreement imposed by us from without cannot survive the withdrawal of our power to enforce it. Only real agreement, freely reached, can stand that test. It is for Indian statesmen to find that measure of agreement which is indispensable if we, on our side, are to make our further contribution towards the completion of our own task in India, the task of joining with Indian statesmen in crowning the peace and unity already achieved with freedom.

The House will agree that whenever the right hon. Gentleman makes a statement on any subject with which he is concerned he gives us a clear and lucid picture of the problems involved. On this occasion he has done as he always does in that respect. Nevertheless, I felt some little concern when he had to admit that there is practically no change in the situation from the time when it was last before the House. That indicates that, strong as may be our hope of additional assistance from India and of a better understanding and a closer relationship, we have made no progress in that direction. While it is true, as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, that seven of the Provinces arc co-operating very cordially in the Provincial Governments, there must be a considerable element of dissidence in those Provinces and in the half of India outside. These differences present to us the problems with which we are concerned at the present time.

The first thing that must impress us at this time is that India is a vital spot in the British Commonwealth and that on India the whole of the Empire may break down or break up. There is more man-power in India than in the rest of the British Commonwealth, and if only we could secure full and willing co-operation it is difficult to estimate how much that would mean to our war effort. In my opinion no better opportunity is likely to occur over a long period of years than we have now, when there is in power in this country a Government formed on the lines of the existing one. For the time being any way, everyone is concentrating on an endeavour to obtain the maximum unity of effort in this country and in the rest of the Empire, and in that respect I feel that a certain special responsibility, if my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will permit me to say so, rests upon the members of this party in the Government to press forward the particular lines we have taken. When the right hon. Gentleman last spoke on this subject, in November, he spoke of the flow of willing volunteers to the Armed Forces, and as an instance of it mentioned that for 300 vacancies in the Indian Air Force Reserve there are 18,000 applicants. I think I am right in saying that he also said that enthusiasm for the Air Force was very strong in India. The House would like to know to what extent that enthusiasm has been maintained. What proportion of recruits are we getting to all the Services; or is it the case that we are getting a very limited number indeed, and are not receiving that full co-operation for which we had hoped?

Further, is anything being done to develop the tremendous man-power there is available for the manufacture of armaments? Particularly we should like to know whether anything is being done in the matter of the manufacture of aircraft and internal combustion engines, because it does seem that there we have a reservoir which might relieve us almost of all our perplexities—if we could get them here. It would be interesting also to know from what parts of India volunteers are coming, because then we should be able to judge more or less the extent of the opposition and the resistance, for one saw with no little concern that only in the last day or two Mr. Ghandi has made an announcement that the civil disobedience campaign is to go on. Are we relying on what are termed the fighting races only or are we getting help from others, because it is only since the Mutiny that we have begun to talk about the so-called fighting races and not taking much into account the other parts of India which give help in that respect? There was one other point raised in the Debate last autumn to which one would like an answer, because there is considerable criticism about it. It concerned the Indian workers who are being brought to this country to work in armament factories, and the question was whether they have the same pay and conditions of service as their European opposite numbers. On that occasion the right hon. Gentleman said that he was unable then to give any information, but the matter was being inquired into.

Those are a few of the questions which were raised in the previous Debate to which so far there have not been definite answers. But, after all, the background has got to be looked at when we are considering this problem and the difficulties we are faced with in getting full and wholehearted co-operation. There are more people in India than in the rest of the British Commonwealth, and the tragedy is that most of them are living under conditions of degrading poverty. There are 90 per cent, in the villages deeply immersed in debt. There are 21,000,000 landless labourers whose income amounts only to 1d. or 2d. a day. There is tremendous mortality arising out of poverty and associated diseases. There is a lack of big schemes for health services. These things must be taken into consideration when we are calling upon a people to assist us in present conditions. There is in India a tremendous contrast between riches and poverty, a greater contrast than in almost any other part of the world, particularly when we consider the riches of the native rulers. One readily acknowledges the generous help they have given to our war effort, but one thinks that probably the help would have been quite as large, and perhaps larger, if it came from an India where the general level of prosperity and good will was even higher than it is. Indirect reference has also been made to the diversities in language creating difficulties in securing co-operative effort.

Another point we have to notice is that a promise of independence was given to India after the last war. Quite honestly, we have to admit that the fulfilment of that promise has not been carried out, and although Lord Linlithgow's offer has been submitted, it docs not go the whole way towards what was expected when that promise was made.

Could the hon. Gentleman say when that promise was made?

The promise was made during the war that they would be given independence when the war was over. Since then the Executive in India has increased its power, and forces are still maintained which are often used against the masses if they show any resistance. I have supported the Government in their actions, and do so now, but I have mentioned these matters because one has to take notice of the various factors which go to make up the problem. In the last discussion the right hon. Gentleman said, and I said so too, that the best hope we had was that all parties in India should get together and come to some under- standing and submit their proposals in order that they may be considered with a view to arriving at a settlement. But look at the conditions facing us in that respect. The right hon. Gentleman has to-day told us something of how, it seems, the various opposing elements and leaders are determined that in no circumstances will they compose their differences. The President of the Congress, Dr. Prasad, said in November, 1939:

"The present crisis has arisen owing to the outbreak of war in Europe and the action of the British Government in declaring India a belligerent country without the consent of the Indian people"

In that respect we acted very unwisely. It would have been wise had we at any rate gone through the process of consulting with India and its leaders at the very outset, in order to get their cooperation. But that we failed to do, and it gave an opportunity to other elements who were out to stir up trouble, and they have exploited the opportunity to the full. Then the Viceroy, also speaking in November, 1939, and referring to the discussions that had taken place between the rival "elements, said:

"The discussions which have taken place between the representatives of the Congress and the Moslem league have not ended in agreement"

Further, Mr. Gandhi, replying to Mr. Jinnah, said:

"Jinnah Jinnah Sahib looks to the British power to safeguard the Moslem rights. Nothing that the Congress can do or concede will satisfy him"

Mr. Jinnah said:

"I assure Mr. Gandhi that the Mussulmans of India depend upon their own inherent strength"

Those quotations will indicate to the House the difficulties and problems which have to be faced before we can arrive at anything like an understanding in India or at an endeavour to work out a peaceful settlement. The present situation affords us a favourable opportunity— never better. Despite mistrust, there is at least one strong, common bond during the present struggle between India and this country, and that is the common detestation of Nazidom and all that it represents. In this matter we have India's full sympathy. I suggested to Indians on the last occasion that they would be wise to accept the Viceroy's offer and to endeavour to make the best possible use of it, and to strengthen their position in that direction. One hoped that India would be content with Dominion status. One sees the difficulties. Dominion status applies to people with a common language and' inheritance and not so well to people who have an altogether different point of view. Unfortunately, the Indians have not seen their way to adopt my suggestion. Where are we now? Surely it is for this country to try to suggest an incentive to which Indians may work.

I am disappointed that the offer of the Viceroy has received such little acceptance. One agrees that it is absurd to ask for immediate independence and Withdrawal of Forces, or for the matter to be even considered at this stage. Nevertheless, a way must be found for discussion and for getting views as to the best course to be adopted. As I see it, the trouble is that, even when we win the war, the British Empire might break up on the anvil of India unless a way of meeting the difficulties can be found. I urge upon the right hon. Gentleman and his friends in the Cabinet a small thing. It is that he should, first of all, go to India himself. There is a lot to be said for creating the right atmosphere and giving Indians the feeling that we are really concerned about them and their immediate problems. I do not say that his going there would solve all the problems, but it would, at any rate, do something to make a better atmosphere, and that would be worth while.

It might be well if we considered introducing into Parliament and embodying in a Bill a scheme whereby, after a certain number of years—five, 10 or 20 if you like—independence would be given to India. If that were done, you would provide a clear and definite objective to which the Indian nation could strive. After a time the Indians would have to begin toning down the disruptive tendencies of various sections among themselves in order to prepare for the conditions that would arise at the end of the period.

Does the hon. Gentleman mean independence or Dominion status?

I am now talking of independence. The hon. Member will remember that I have already indicated some of the difficulties that arise with regard to Dominion status. I am suggesting that the matter be approached from a new angle and that we declare that, a definite number of years hence, independence will be granted. There is a precedent, which must not be driven too far, set by the United States of America with regard to the Philippines, whereby, in 1946, full independence will be given to that country, as embodied in an Act of Congress that has already been passed. If we adopted such a course it would have the effect of turning the energies of agitators into making preparations for dealing with the conditions that would arise, and it would give an opportunity for the British Government to endeavour to mould opinion there and to go on with education in a larger measure than they have done. It would make it possible to arrive at some method of obtaining a larger measure of co-operation between India and ourselves. One hopes that, as a result of the educative work in the intervening years, India would elect to remain part of the British Empire; but it would be the choice of a free people, a wholly different thing from the feeling of being compelled and pressed to stay in.

In the meantime, there could be a properly planned Federation, to which the right hon. Gentleman is not wholly unsympathetic. There would have to be no packing of the Central Legislature; let it be democratically elected by the same electorates as vote for the Provincial Assemblies. Its authority should be restricted only by the rights of the Provinces and, if wished, by the reserved power of the Viceroy, during the preliminary period. There should be a clear division of function between the Central and the Provincial Legislatures. I believe that, with some such programme, we should get the whole-hearted and enthusiastic co-operation of India in our war effort. We should be able to draw upon India's illimitable resources of manpower and to get a much better flow into the Armed Forces of the Crown. It would give an opportunity for the better elements in India to come together and pool their resources, powers and energies, and we should see whether a system could be worked out which, when the time came, could give India a Government worthy of that country and bind India to the British Empire with bonds that could never be broken.

I listened with very great interest to the Secretary of State for India, who placed before us very clearly, in a beautifully expressed statement, the situation that exists. He left with me a sense of frustration and disappointment One cannot help feeling that, unless some progress is made in obtaining the cooperation of Indian leaders, developments may occur in India that may become very serious. The Secretary of State told us of the great difficulties in getting any agreement among the chief organisations of political and religious opinion in India. What brings political parties of different views together to face problems practically is constructive action, and unless means of obtaining co-operation from the Indian leaders are found, those differences will grow wider and deeper as time goes on. Broadly speaking, one of the serious problems which arises in many spheres in this war is our inability to get the cooperation of people in many parts of the world who, while essentially our friends and deeply committed to our cause, yet, because of superficial reasons sometimes, short-sightedness, or fear in other cases, adopt an attitude of non-co-operation, neutrality and of hesitancy, which means that in the case of India while Indian troops are doing magnificent work, which we all welcome, on the political side there is this deplorable situation, in which thousands of leaders who are really wholeheartedly committed to our cause are being imprisoned by ourselves.

I do not think that I am capable of making any detailed constructive suggestions, and I speak only in order to voice what I believe is the feeling of a very large section of opinion in this country and all over the world, namely, that it is not enough for us and our Government to say to the Indian people and to their politicians in a negative way, '' You must settle your differences before we can do anything more." We have made mistakes in the past. I agree with the last speaker that it was a vital and very unfortunate mistake that Indians were not more fully consulted at the outbreak of the war. But that is in the past. It is now our duty, and I am sure it is of vital importance, that we should make every effort to make some progress in associating Indians with the conduct of the war and with the control of India's contribution towards the war. I would suggest to the Secretary of State that anything that is done during this war no doubt must be of a temporary nature and that, therefore, he should not be too particular or too punctilious in the constitutional precedents which might be set up by any action that he now takes in carrying out the vital principle that Indians should have a very much greater control over the affairs of India during the war.

I was disappointed that the Secretary of State seemed to see so many difficulties in the suggestion which has been made by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. The initiative which he and others have taken seemed to me to be the most helpful action that has occurred for some time in India. I would suggest that, if it would help, the Secretary of State should go to India and meet the Indians, that precedents and customs should not stand in the way, and that everything should be done to gain the co-operation of Indians who have learned from us, from the West, to aim at obtaining for their country the very things for which we are fighting. After all, in Asia to-day there are countries that have attained great importance in different ways. It is not unnatural—in fact, it is absolutely natural, and what we in this House and in this country all desire—that Indians should be responsible for their future. I do not believe that the immediate political difficulties and differences between the Moslems and the Hindus will ever be overcome unless some means of breaking the present deadlock is found.

Of course, I associate myself with the right hon. Gentleman in deploring the attitude which the two big organisations in India have taken up. That the Congress leaders, whom one has met personally and who before the war began were associated with supporting the democratic cause, should now adopt the attitude that the Indian people should not contribute towards the war effort, is an attitude which it is difficult for me to understand. At the same time, Moslems who are supporting the war make it very difficult by accentuating their difference from Hindus in regard to obtaining Indian unity and self-government, and that is a situation which I believe, as I have already said, will not be modified unless statesmanship can find some means of giving to Indians the responsibility for facing these difficulties and overcoming them themselves. If not, I fear that people will become discouraged, and will get a feeling of frustration and hopelessness which will only still further play into the hands of the extremists. While realising that during the war it is not the time for making big constitutional developments. I hope that the Government will realise that there is an immense body of opinion throughout the world—and this must also be impressed upon the Indian leaders—which wishes to see some development take place and wishes to see Indians co-operating with us. I therefore urge the Secretary of State not to be in any way punctilious in creating temporary expedients to that end.

I cannot help feeling that there is some unreality about this Debate to-day, in which we are discussing the fate of 400,000,000 people, thousands of miles away, while nearer home the fate not only of most peoples and of this Empire, but of every single thing that we and India have in common is in the balance. I think it should be the duty of speakers to-day to try and bring an air of reality into this Debate by remembering that what matters is not what is said here and the attention that is paid to it here, but the effect that what we say here will have in India. These Debates are read widely in India; our proceedings will be recorded at great length in the Indian Press, and I should like to see the House concentrate to-day on sending out a definite message to India. I welcome whole-heartedly the speech made by my right hon. Friend, and I may say that his appointment as Secretary of State for India gave me more pleasure than any other appointment when the Government were formed last May. He has well justified the hopes and the faith of those who have followed his career in the past and who know his views.

The message I want sent to India is threefold. Though it may seem strange to say so, I think that political India needs reassuring as to our good-will. By propaganda which appears to us ridiculous, but which is sedulously carried on and finds a fertile field in politically half-educated Indian minds, large numbers of the most promising type of Indian—I mean the educated young Indians—have been led to believe that England is lacking in goodwill. It has been the custom sometimes to poke fun and to mock at the half-educated Indian—the Indian who puts after his name "Failed B.A.", the Indian who has attended a secondary school and has not progressed much further—but I would like to remind the House that they are the people on whom India depends for her future development; they are the people on whom on every Indian village depends for its local government, they are the people who, mishandled in Bengal, were persuaded by propaganda to work in the Terrorist movement until it was converted by the Lord President. They are a most important section of the community. I think we must make an effort, even though the need for it may seem unreasonable, to impress our goodwill upon India, and for that purpose I think it should be seriously considered whether my right hon. Friend should not go to India himself. I do not support the idea of another Round Table Conference, but I think India needs reminding that we in this country are not only perfectly sincere but are perfectly united in our wish to see India arrive at Dominion status.

The second point I would like to impress upon India is that we are determined not to let the situation drift, that we realise that the present situation is a bad one, since four-fifths of India's leading politicians are in prison and large numbers of Indian women leaders are either in prison or have just been released. In many Provinces there has been a complete breakdown of any system of elected government, and I think my right hon. Friend should stress his firm determination to get Provincial self-government working again somehow, even in a mutilated form, in those Provinces where it has broken down. There is a good number of leading Indians of experience, responsibility, and moderate and realistic views who, I think, could be prevailed upon to take office in the Provinces where self-government has broken down, even though it might seem rather a mutilated and emasculated form of democratic government. The one thing I missed in my right hon's Friend's speech to-day was a declaration that he was determined not to let things drift.

It is my third point which I consider to be the most important. It must be firmly impressed upon India that this is no longer a British problem, that there is no division in the House of Commons nor in this country about the future of India. It is purely an Indian problem. What I might call the venue of the problem has left Westminster and is now in India. In Indians could agree in demanding any particular form of Constitution, they would receive the most sympathetic hearing here. We must tell India that we are profoundly disappointed at the complete failure of Indian political talent to arrive at any form of agreement; we are profoundly disappointed that Congress, instead of fastening on to the reality of Dominion status, has pursued the will-o'-the-wisp of independence, as if it is possible that, when they could not agree on Dominion status, they are any more likely to agree upon a completely independent Constitution. We are profoundly disappointed that Congress has not looked at the great work which is to be done in India in regard to social problems. The hon. Gentleman on the other side of the House, in a speech most of which I am afraid I thought rather ill-informed, did say something very true when he touched upon poverty and health conditions in India and of the tremendous need for social reform and social services. We must tell India that we are profoundly disappointed that Indian politicians, taking them by and large, have failed to realise the great field for their endeavour which lies before them on the social side. We must make it quite clear that this is an Indian problem. If India cannot agree on the sort of Constitution she wants, can we hope that she will be able to work any sort of Constitution? She has to prove to this country that she can. If we are asked to impose a Constitution— and that is the tacit implication—it must be clearly recognised that the imposition of a Constitution implies the continuance of the power that imposes it

. Finally, there is this point. The problem that faces civilisation and will face civilisation for scores, if not hundreds, of years to come, is the simple problem of survival. None of our social problems, none of our political problems, no problem of any description, can be compared in importance with the great question of whether we are to survive as decent, kindly, humane people or to be regimented and to fall under the domination of vigorous, virile, inhumane barbarians. We are conversant with that aspect of the problem; does India realise it? Do Indian politicians really think that they can go on talking about constitutional and political problems, parish-pump problems, without any regard to what is happening in the rest of the world? Do they realise that our greatest gift to India is that she is united and at peace? My right hon. Friend has said that the population of India is now 400,000,000. What was it in 1741? I should be very much surprised if it was more than 60,000,000 or 70,000,000. That increase has come because Britain has guaranteed to the Indian cultivator peace to live and to have children and to hand on his land to his successors. India cannot divorce herself from her position as a unit in the world. Unless and until Indian politicians are prepared to admit that they are in the British Empire and that they look to the British Empire for protection, in their own interests and not in ours, there will be no further progress.

The time has come for very plain speaking to India if further progress is to be made. We must stress that this is an Indian problem, although we are full of good will and are anxious to help towards a solution as far as we can. I should like to see my right hon. Friend go to India, and say, "I will try to help in bringing you together, but there must be a sense of realism" This fatal habit of living in a world of our own ideas, this fatal closing of our eyes to ineluctable facts, has brought the world into the position in which it is to-day. It is our duty to see that India does not continue to walk in that path of make-believe and wishful thinking which we have ourselves followed so long. I say this out of love for India. I have only slight knowledge of India, but I say that, apart from this question of survival, the relationship between Great Britain and India will be viewed in future as the most important item in our long history. I believe that the people of this country and of India are indissolubly linked together by common ideas of what constitutes decency, decent living, decent behaviour. We are brothers in spirit, and I think our responsibility as Members of Parliament is nowhere greater than where it impinges upon India. I want to send out to India this message of good will, and this call to face facts and to think things out honestly for herself.

So often, when one joins in a Debate in these times, one has a feeling of unreality, in the sense that the issue has no importance in relation to the stupendous events happening outside. But I do not think that any of us can have that feeling about the issue that we are discussing to-day. Even measured against all that is happening in the world outside, the future of India, and the way that these fateful years are to be handled in India, must remain matters of major importance. I think that on any one of us who takes part in this Debate there lie two duties— first, to make such contribution as he can to the discussion, and, secondly, to represent to India what is the feeling in this country to-day. On the latter point, we shall fail grievously in our duty if we are not honest. I myself think that the feeling on this Indian problem has changed very significantly in this country in the last few months, in a way which Indians ought to understand.

Public opinion, as has already been stressed by those who have spoken before me, deeply desires progress. I speak as one who joined in an effort by a group of Members of all parties in this House a short time ago to express that feeling. We tried, in the letter that we addressed to India, to express our deep distress at the present impasse, and our deep desire to see Indians coming to an agreement among themselves, so that the way might be open for an early transfer of power. This feeling is strengthened by the circumstances of the present war. After all, why are we fighting Hitler? Because our principles are not his principles, because our principle is morally opposed to his creed of a herrenvolk which has the right to exercise tyrannical domination over another people. It is a bitter thing, indeed, that while we are fighting for this principle we should be forced into a position in India that creates the appearance, at least, that we are ourselves being untrue to it. There could be no greater travesty of the truth than to say that public opinion in England desires to foster dissension in India, so as to have an excuse for retaining our control. But, side by side with our fervent desire for some constructive progress in India, there is a growing feeling—and I have sensed this among all sections of opinion lately—of disappointment and uneasiness about the Indian response to the British effort to give effect to our desire. That uneasiness centres mainly upon the Congress policy, although it is not that party alone which is unreasonable.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has reviewed the position; I do not want to go into all that again; he gave us so clear a summary of how events had developed. I would only say that, looking back to 1935, I am sure everyone in this House and the whole British public felt, that on a most critical issue and fully realising the dangers, our choice had finally come down on the side of taking the bold course as regards India and opening the way freely for full development. The way was opened freely. The working of the Constitution in the Provincial governments proved it. It proved as regards those safeguards which to some had seemed to loom so large on paper that conventions could be established in working which made those safeguards no obstacle at all, and that Indians could handle policy in complete constitutional freedom. Let us remember too that within the sphere of Provincial government of which we have had practical experience lies the handling of all those really vital questions which affect the welfare of the Indian people. The experience of Provincial government proved— and on this point I venture to disagree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Farnham (Captain G. Nicholson) —that there are political leaders in India who are sincerely desirous of furthering the welfare of the people and advancing social progress and capable of developing constructive policies on these lines.

I should not like it to get abroad that I do not entirely agree with my hon. Friend. What I meant was that Congress, by calmly throwing off the responsibility which they had to their electors and to the people, had shown, to my mind at any rate, that they put these tremendous social responsibilities in the second place when they should have been put in the first place. I hope that I have made myself clear to my hon. Friend.

My hon. and gallant Friend has made himself quite clear, but I am glad of the interruption because it gives me a chance of making the point I wanted to make. We must not think that these All-India Party leaders are the only politicians in India. There are a great number of most capable and public-spirited men who have gone into political life and who served in the Provincial Governments, and who understand their duties and take a realistic view of the situation and are anxious to get on with their job. The same conventions which have solved the problems in the Provincial governments could have solved the central problem too, but the centre was still being disputed when the war came. That meant that when the war came the British Government was still carrying the responsibility. The delay in getting on with implementing the provisions of the Act at the centre and the setting up of Federal Government in India is a tragic thing which we cannot regret enough. Perhaps some of the share of the blame for that rests on British shoulders. But still, however much one may regret that, the situation was there; it was an inescapable fact. We were carrying the responsibility. Mr. Gandhi himself recognised that fact at the outset and said that that provision must remain and that "you cannot have complicated constitutional discussions in the course of war" That was true too, in a sense, though on that point I wish to say something later. But although that was the fact, all parties, including the British Government, had agreed that to stand completely still on that position was most unsatisfactory. You cannot expect the Indians to accept indefinite delay, and, what I feel myself so strongly is that nothing can be more distressing at the present moment than that in these fateful years, when all these decisions vitally affecting India's future are being taken, and the whole course of her economic future may be settled by the way the industrial urge of equipping herself for war is handled, the task of government should rest purely in official hands. That is a most distressing and even disastrous state of affairs.

But we are in this dilemma. We want to transfer power. You cannot ask representative Indians to come in and bear responsibility unless they have power, but—and here I fully agree with what my right hon. Friend said—you cannot change the whole balance of constitutional power or transfer constitutional power except on the foundation of a new and properly balanced constitutional framework. The conflict and disagreement that there has already been over the provisions of the 1939 Act as regards the Central Government already prove the difficulties that lie in the way. Then what can you do? To men who really trust each other and want to co-operate the answer is quite easy. Let leading Indians come in as members of the Viceroy's Council in the same way as other Indians have come into the Viceroy's Council in the past. They will have plenty of power, but they must have courage too. They may have to share in unpopular decisions and duties and lose political support in the future. But I am sure that there are men in India who have that courage.

Now that is precisely what the Secretary of State has offered, but the All-India political leaders—not only Congress—would not have it. They wanted all sorts of guarantees of their constitutional position, and some writers said quite openly that there must be a real transfer of constitutional power now. That was to be the acid test as to whether the British Government meant anything. They said, in effect, "We do not trust the British, but if we get a transfer of power now, that will be something upon which they cannot go back in the future" But that is just what cannot be given, short of the formation of a new and properly-balanced constitutional structure. In any case Congress refused, and then Mr. Gandhi started his final baffling move claiming the right to preach pacifism, and as a result of that —and I want to put this to anyone who reads this Debate in India—opinion in this country has been completely baffled and bewildered.

There is one explanation, however, which can straighten the whole confusion in a simple yet sinister way. I find that people in England are asking themselves these questions. Does not the conduct of the Congress leaders show that they are out to force the British to transfer com- plete power to them before any plan is complete of a constitutional framework with its checks and balances to ensure fair treatment for all? Is not Congress, in fact, asking for a blank cheque to be filled in just as Congress wishes? Is it not that which lay behind their demand for a Constituent Assembly to be elected on an adult franchise? Is it not that which lies behind the demand for the transfer of real power now at a time when Mr. Gandhi himself says that you cannot have proper constitutional discussion? Is it not the policy of Congress to refuse to cooperate in any evolutionary steps and to remain in conflict with the British Government until its hands can be forced to concede Congress the full amount of its demands? To continue in conflict is so easy. "If the British Government offers Dominion status, ask for independence. If the normal constitutional issues cannot be raised in time of war, stage a quarrel over something else—the right to preach pacifism. They are bound to fight you over that." Is it not something like that that some of the Congress leaders have been saying in their inner councils and preaching to their followers?

Is not all that consistent with the Congress demand to be the only body entitled to speak for India, and to speak alone for India? Does not that explain other things, such as the Congress order to Ministers to resign in seven Provinces? Is it not possible that this was not merely a gesture of protest but also action taken because Congress saw the danger of a Provincial spirit of unity growing up which might set up loyalties conflicting with the loyalty to Congress? I make no charges, but these disquieting questions are being asked by many people, and, I must confess, I am asking them myself. They are disquieting in many ways. It is disquieting that the leading Indian Nationalist party should be taking such a purely negative line, seeking nothing but the easy popularity which goes to those who are against the Government and helping not at all to find constructive solutions for the many unavoidable problems. It is disquieting, too, that the leading Indian Nationalist party should not show a greater sense of reality and a truer appreciation of the position with regard to the present emergency, but should recklessly seek to embarrass the British Government when they are fighting desperately, not merely for their own existence, but for the freedom of India too. But most disquieting of all is the suspicion aroused by Congress conduct that the real objective of Congress is to establish a party domination over the State in India parallel to the Nazi and Fascist party dominations in Germany and Italy.

To British minds there is an unpleasant familiarity in this course which the Congress party seems to be forcing them to go through. We look back to what happened with Hitler in Germany. When Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland many people said that it was only what a self-respecting nation would claim to do, and when he went to Austria, and even claimed rights over the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, many people said that it was only a reasonable demand to get the whole of the German people together. But all the time people were asking themselves, "Are these the genuine motives behind these steps? Or is each move merely a step in the fulfilment of an overriding purpose to establish world domination?" Reasonable people said, "Let us try it out" And so when his final purposes were unmasked beyond any possibility of misunderstanding, things had gone so far that half the world will be devastated before his purposes can be stopped.

Is there not something parallel to all this in Congress tactics? Many of us have felt the most intense sympathy with their Nationalist demands. Many of us have felt in the past that they were right to make trouble for the British Government, as that was the only way in which they could get their demands attended to. Many of us not only listened with sympathy to what they said, but supported them in this country. But now, as we have gone forward on this course, when we have committed ourselves in the 1935 Act to a plan which we know in our hearts and minds to involve a full and effective transfer of power to Indians, and after that find no response from them, no effort at all to face the necessity of finding some balance between the parties in India, no sort of recession from their demand to be the only party entitled to speak for India—then I am afraid that we do begin to feel that there may lie behind all this a very sinister purpose which is finally being unmasked.

We feel these suspicions and doubts, but the final stage has not yet been reached. As I have said, I make no charges, the doubts and questions which I have raised may be wrong. I pray that they may be. I appeal to Mr. Gandhi to prove it, and if it is any help to him, let me add this: We are all to blame. The present leader of the Moslem League, Mr. Jinnah, is equally unreasonable and intractable. In fact, when I think of the leaders on both sides, I am reminded of these words of Francis Bacon's:

"To certain zealots all speech of pacification is odious. 'Is it peace, Jehu? What has thou to do with peace? Turn thou behind me.' Peace is not the matter, but following and party"

Let us admit, too, that we have been in the wrong, that on the British side there has been blame. Our case may have been presented badly and unimaginatively, and the Government of India may have been very wooden. I have always felt that there are very great difficulties in the handling of negotiations of this kind by the Viceroy, who has to consider his day-to-day administrative position. He cannot enter freely into the sort of heart-to-heart discussions which would have been desirable at the outset. I have always felt that. But if we admit blame on the British side, I would like to add this: I feel that one person who certainly is not to blame in this matter is my right hon. Friend the present Secretary of State. He succeeded to an extremely difficult position, and since he has held it he has made repeated reasonable and most courageous efforts to get over these difficulties. I also feel this House of Commons and the British public are not to blame, except possibly for a certain measure of indifference. But somehow or other—and this is another thing that I want to get across to India—we feel that we have been "let down" We feel that we have been honest in our desire to find a constructive way of doing what the Indians want, and that if only they could have understood what is in our minds, and what our purpose is, this present situation could never have been allowed to arise. Beyond this, I firmly believe that the great body of Indian opinion does desire to have a free and fair democracy and not a party domination. It recognises that there are real problems in devising a constitutional form for such a system and is willing to make a constructive effort to help in their solution.

In these circumstances, what should we do? I want to urge certain courses on the Secretary of State, as well as to address an appeal to the Indian people. I want to say to the Secretary of State what has already been said, "Go on with all possible steps to get representative Indians to join in the task of government, not only in Viceroy's council but in the Provinces as well. Get men of ability, no matter what their political status. Get some of the men who have shown their capacity as dewans in the Provinces, or in fields of commercial enterprise, as well as men who have been well-known figures in the political field. Appeal to them that here is a supreme chance of serving India, but do not say it is no use going on if the representative parties do not support you." It is the help of good Indians who know their country that I want in this critical time, and not a political bargain. We must be clear about this. I was struck by a passage in the "Times" this morning referring to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's proposals, which read:

"The proposals, however, contain demands which it would be difficult to meet in war time, particularly that asking for the creation of a Viceroy's Executive Council consisting entirely of non-official Indians, which implies the transfer of the portfolios of defence and finance from experienced British to inexperienced Indian hands."

I venture to say that this puts the thing all wrong. It is not a question of ability or inability, but a question of constitutional significance. If we are asking these Indians to come in now, they must come in on a very clear understanding that to bring them in signifies nothing in the way of changing the balance of power and constitutional responsibility. They must come in as part of an honourable understanding that they will support an effective war policy. They must come in knowing, as I have already hinted, that they take political risks, and that they may have to join in loyally with their colleagues in the Viceroy's council in carrying out courses which may be unpopular. I believe they would come in. But to put the matter on questions of ability seems to me to be creating an entirely wrong impression. It is ridiculous to claim that there are no Indians who are capable of being Finance Members. I wish I myself were again Finance Member in India so that I might have the opportunity of handing in my resignation and offering to serve as an Under-Secretary under some of the Indians I can think of, who could so well fulfil that rôle.

Of course, when we come to the question of defence we touch upon more difficult issues. I have often felt that there was a great deal to be said for having a Civil Member of Defence in the Viceroy's Council, and I see no reason why the Civil Member of Defence should not be an Indian. But that does not touch the real problem of defence for India, the essence of which is that India at present is not able from her own resources to supply all that is necessary for her defence. The mere appointment of an Indian Defence Member, which is claimed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru as something which would have such a great psychological effect, fills me with a certain amount of apprehension therefore, in the sense that I think it might be misunderstood as meaning more than in fact it could mean now. Apart from this, I could read Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's plan, if it goes no farther than has been reported as the substance of the resolutions passed at the Bombay conference in the middle of March, as offering something to which it would be not impossible to agree; but it must be agreed to on the very clear understanding—there must be absolutely plain speaking on this and no possibility of misunderstanding—that it is merely a question of getting representative Indians to share in the task of Government so as to have people who would be in sympathy with the great body of opinion in India and give wise advice and that there can be on question of transferring power or altering the balance of power short of a new situation resting on a completely reformed and newly-constituted constitutional structure.

Turning from the question of the Viceroy's Council and following on the point I have just made, I cannot see why constitutional discussions in India should not go on during the war. My right hon. Friend has said the same thing. Why wait all this time? There are immense preliminary problems to be discussed; all the questions of dealing with the essential difficulty of the mixture of communities, which can be solved either by some form of segregation of the administrative units or by introducing some different form of democracy to the Parliamentary democracy that we know—all these problems demand intense and long study which ought to be tackled now. Therefore, I support what my right hon. Friend has said about this, and I was glad to hear him say it. But I want to add something too! Cannot we get the whole thing going in a different atmosphere from that which we have had before? It seems to me that we have got into the wrong atmosphere by approaching these questions through the leaders of the All-India political parties. These men have never held office; they have never shown their ability as practical statesmen. All the real tasks of government, except defence —the tasks affecting the welfare of the Indian people, which is all that anyone ought to care about—lie with the Provincial Governments. The Provincial Ministers and the Dewans of States have proved themselves. Why should not they get together? Why should not we try to start these constitutional discussions in a different atmosphere? Not long ago Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Premier in the Punjab, said in a speech:

"India stands on the threshold of complete freedom, if she will only settle her inter-communal problems;"

and he went on to put the spirit of his own Province and his own Provincial patriotism in the right way by saying:

"There will be no Pakistan or Sikhistan or Hindustan in the Punjab"

To those who have tried to get down to the realities of the case, such a statement comes like a breath of fresh air. It may seem a strange thing for such of us as feel strongly the importance of preserving national unity for India to applaud a statement which seems to breathe of Provincial patriotism; and no doubt there will be sectional difficulties in India as elsewhere if Provincial patriotism is made a reality and a unifying force. But those are straightforward and familiar difficulties which can be dealt with straightly man to man. It is by handling difficulties of that kind that India will really find herself.

I want to make one more suggestion to my right hon. Friend. It seems to me so important in these critical times that we should get closer to India. We want to get closer to them, we want them to get closer to us. Can nothing more be done in that direction? Would it not be pos- sible to have an Indian Under-Secretary of State? Would it not be possible to bring over a man like Sapru, put him in the House of Lords and make him an Under-Secretary, or even to bring over a Congress leader—in any case a genuine representative Indian? Let him be here. Let him live in our atmosphere and see what we are up against. Let him send back trusted words to India which will tell them what the British people are fighting for, and which will banish for ever from their minds the ridiculous idea that this is only another war for Imperialist purposes. I believe that such a step might have great effects. Finally, I wish once again to put on record an appeal to all Indians who have wisdom and the trust of their own people to bring these gifts to the common task. Let them be courageous and constructive—not petulant and negative. Let them take their chances and their political future in both hands, and let them look back on the record of Congress and say "This must all be changed" Congress in the past has always said "no" You cannot save humanity or create a national India by saying "no"

I am quite sure we have all appreciated the words on India which have fallen from the lips of the hon. Member for Walsall (Sir G. Schuster). Most of us appreciate the many great works he has performed and the considerable energy he has displayed for many years in trying to secure an understanding between this country and India. It is all the more reason, therefore, why I must express my profound regret at some of the sentiments he has expressed to-day. It is quite true that he made no charges against the most important and most powerful political party in India, but he did not hesitate to call in the hypothetical man-in-the-street who would express these charges for him. These charges contain, I am sorry to say, a number of suggestions that the Congress party in particular has been activated, at least in some respects, by poor and base motives. I hope and believe that he will realise it has been a disservice to this country to make such imputations.

May I tell the hon. Member that I made no imputations? What I have done is to give, quite honestly, the sort of explanation which my mind finds for the things that have happened, and appeal to Congress leaders, for whom he speaks, to come forward and prove me to be wrong.

May I make it quite clear that I do not necessarily support Congress leaders, and that I am not identified with any particular group or groups in India, but that I speak as an Englishman interested in this matter? If the hon. Member looks up the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow, he will find that he disclaimed making any charges, but that now he apparently alters that and does make certain charges. Certainly that hypothetical man-in-the-street, whom he brought into this discussion, did seem to suggest that Indian Congress leaders were ready recklessly to seek to embarrass the British Government. I took down those words, and if that is not an imputation of poor motives, I should like to know what is. Other similar suggestions were made that the Indian political movement was not inspired supremely with the desire to secure freedom for India, but rather sought to embarrass this country in her hour of need. I may be wrong in interpreting the observations of this hypothetical representative who has been brought in by the hon. Member, but nevertheless that is the impression I had in that respect. I am afraid it will not have an encouraging effect in India itself. Whatever may be said about the alleged desire of Congress to equate itself with the Nazis, which was the illustration the hon. Member used, there is no more democratic party?n the world than the Congress party. Its methods of appointment and the selection of its various representatives are, in many respects, far more democratic than anything we have in this country. I hear one of my hon. Friends appealing to the Deity, but I am sure the Deity will endorse what I am saying.

Anyone who knows the methods by which the Indian Congress is elected, and the methods by which all the villages play their part, will know that Indian democracy is exemplary to ours in many respects. That being so, I think it is unfortunate that there should be this altogether wrong and mischievous suggestion of some sort of connection between the base inspirations of the Nazis in Europe, and the constructive nature of Congress. It is said that Congress apparently desires a blank cheque, but the obvious reply to that is, that Congress is so familiar with dishonest cheques that it desires neither dishonest nor blank cheques. All that Congress has been trying to do is what other parties have been trying to do, namely, to secure from this country recognition that India has a right to political independence. There is, of course, a considerable difference between Congress, on the one hand, and the Moslem League. on the other, and other relatively small bodies, but the great bulk of Indian opinion, whether Moslem or Hindu, all agree that they wish to secure from this country the admission that they have the right to full and complete independence. Another speaker who addressed the House gave quite a lecture to the Indian people, and assured them that they were with us in this great struggle for survival. He appealed to them to recognise that if the Nazi system was to prevail, they would suffer as much as we. I am inclined to agree with that, and that there would be a great danger to India if the Nazi system were to prevail. But does anyone suggest that there are no other means by which this vicious recrudescence of barbarism cannot be destroyed? Does anyone suggest that the will of man is incapable of overcoming barbarism only if it takes up barbarism in reply? If that is so, what is the significance of the great souls in history who have stood alone and suffered and died at its hand, and yet in the end have prevailed? Certainly our own Christian faith is a reminder of the other ways by which this barbarism can be stopped.

I have the full conviction that in India, not merely Gandhi, but many others, have a resolute conviction, a profound determination, and an unquenchable faith in the same principles in which we believe and for which we are fighting this war. and that no amount of temporary victories by the Nazi or Fascist hordes would prevail for all time. If we are in this struggle on the basis of mere survival, then India has the right to determine how her survival shall be effected and what form it shall take. Although I admit, after trying for many years, as has the last speaker, to secure understanding and agreement between ourselves and India, that it has been exasperating to find that in the end it has not availed, it is no excuse for impatience. If the hon. Member for Walsall does not mind my suggesting it, his speech was a melancholy baying of impatience, as if he had come to the end of his tether after many discussions and conferences in which he had sincerely tried to do his best. It seemed that because he had failed he must therefore start on another tack. Whether I am wrong or not, it is not for us to become impatient if after a great deal of active effort we find response is somewhat weak.

Similarly I noticed in the discussion which took place earlier the assertion that India must not be detached from world affairs. She must recognise herself as an integral part of the great struggle that is taking place. I am convinced that India would not deny that. India was condemning Nazi, Fascist and Japanese aggression long before there was any united conviction on that point in this House. When China received the first assault of Japanese aggression it was the Indian Nationalist leaders who gave voice to their sympathy and support. Members of this House at the time were somewhat inclined to express sympathy with the aggressor. From the beginning this Indian Nationalist Movement has recognised its affinity with similar movements in other lands. It expressed its sympathy with Republican Spain. It was the Indian Nationalist Movement which condemned Nazi and Fascist aggression and it is not for us, rather late in the day, now that there is unity, to lecture India on the ground that she should recognise herself to be an integral part of the world. The sooner we drop that kind of rather condescending lecturing to the Indian people on that ground, the better it will be for that desirable understanding which we all wish to see between ourselves and the Indian people. We are all opposed to Nazism, of course, but India is entitled to say, "We desire to be opposed to Nazism, but we desire to overcome it in the way we think right."

When it was suggested earlier that this is no longer a British but an Indian problem, I wondered whether that was entirely true. My hon. Friend the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon) suggested that we should be willing to say to India that in 10, 15 or 20 years' time she should have her independence. How many Members will agree to that? Would the Secretary of State agree to it? I very much doubt it. As far as we have gone up to now is to say that at some distant date we may grant Dominion status. We have never stated, nor I am sure would the Secretary of State for India state to-day, that he agrees with the suggestion that we should at some distant date concede the right of independence to India. If there is this division in the House as to whether she should be granted independence or Dominion status, or even not that, how can anyone suggest that this is no longer a British problem but entirely India's problem and that it is for her to reconcile her different points of view and then we, who have been desiring to do good to India, will be only too pleased to do it? Would it not be well for us to reconcile our differences, to make up our minds whether to grant independence or Dominion status or something less? If we did that, we should be in a better position to say to the Indian people that if only they will make up their minds what they want, we will do the same and the two united nations will come to a clear understanding. I appreciate the motive entirely, but nevertheless regret the suggestion that a great contribution would be made to understanding between this country and India if we could persuade some Indian to come here and be an Under-Secretary of State. If anything along those lines was going to be achieved, it would have been much better to suggest that some Indian should come here to be a member of the Cabinet. Why not ask Mr. Nehru or the leader of Congress? [Interruption.] An hon. Member says "Ask Sorensen" If you like, I will consider the suggestion, but I am not an Indian, and my whole point was directed to suggesting that an Indian might come here, a responsible person representing nearly 10 times as many as there are in this country. If that suggestion were to be put forth, there might be something more worthy of consideration.

The suggestion has been made that Indians would be better occupied if they concerned themselves with the further development of the Provincial Governments. There was a certain discrepancy between two speakers on that point, one suggesting that they would be better occupied in that way, thus throwing into greater prominence men of ability at present unknown, and on the other hand the admission that in fact these men had already proved their merit in these Provincial Assemblies which have for two and a half years administered the affairs of very large areas. When it is admitted, as it is to-day, that the social conditions of the Indians are deplorable in the extreme, when it is realised that the average expectation of life is round about 24 while here it is round about 57, and that that is an index of those social conditions, and when further it is suggested that there is enough to do in the field of social welfare not to bother about political matters, there is one factor which is familiar to every one of us and also to the Indian leaders in these Provincial Assemblies. They could not possibly develop social welfare very much further because of the central limitation of finance imposed by this country. India is a poor country, actually if not potentially. If ever there is to be the wealth available for the improvement of the social services, and therefore in turn for the raising of the standard of life of the teeming millions of that country, obviously there has to be a considerable development of industrial life.

Has the hon. member ever heard of the work being done by the Bengal Provincial Government? If he has not, I shall be glad to send him information to show that his last statement is wounding in the extreme to Indian public opinion. He suggests that a Provincial Government is not able to carry out a vast scheme of social reform which it is in fact carrying out.

I am perfectly aware of many schemes which are being carried out for the benefit of the Indian people. I have never denied it. But everyone knows that the central limitation of financial powers has been one cause of the frustration of that development in social welfare which is earnestly desired by all friends of India in this country. The Secretary of State would not deny that there are two factors operating against the further and swifter development of social welfare. One is the central limitation in finance, by which the greater portion of the funds secured from the Indian people is not spent upon social welfare at all. The other is the fact that India is still largely a peasant and agricultural country, and therefore must be industrialised in some measure if the resources of the land are to be improved. If it is desirable, as I am sure it is, still further to industrialise large areas of India, what has this country done to assist that end? Have they or have they not limited the development of the shipping industry in India? Have they or have they not in recent years arranged more and more that India should remain largely an agricultural country while the manufactures are carried on in Australia and other Dominions? The answer is undoubtedly that the whole trend of industrial policy in recent times has been to retain India as a large agricultural country, leaving to our Dominions those industrial developments which we feel are desirable.

I find it impossible to sit any longer to listen to the hon. gentleman's misstatement of the position. Can he quote a single instance of the policy of this country which has been designed to encourage industry in Australia and Canada as opposed to India? Does he take no account of the fact that by allowing India to have complete fiscal autonomy since the last war Lancashire has lost a cotton trade export of 2,000,000,000 yards and allowed India to build up her own trade in just the very things in regard to which, if we were looking after our own interests, we should try to interfere with her?

I have not suggested that there is no industrial development in India. Everyone knows that for various reasons there has been a considerable development in the cotton industry in India and that in the last few years a good deal of cotton and textile machinery —

Has the hon. Gentleman ever heard of Tata's and the development of the iron and steel industry, and does he know that India is one of the largest producers of pig iron in the world?

I am familiar with that, and I know that a representative of that famous industry once sat in this House. Everyone knows that there has been considerable industrial development, but I am saying that in recent times there has been a tendency in our policy to develop the agricultural life of India rather than its industrial life.

That is completely untrue.

Give us some evidence.

I shall give my speech in my own way, but I shall be only too pleased to provide the right hon. Gentleman with the information he desires, as he promised to give information to me. For the moment I will continue my speech in my own way and stand by what I said, which is that, while there has been industrial development in India, the tendency has been in recent times rather to limit that development and to encourage the agricultural life of India. That is not a matter about which there is any need to impute base motives.

Give us evidence of it.

Although the hon. Member may wish to make his speech in his own way, he must not mislead us and harm India on questions of fact.

If it harms India, I should like to know in what way it does so. I should be glad to give hon. Members evidence in the proper way by sending it through the post or giving it to them directly. I am conscious that I have spoken too long. I have been diverted from what I wished to say, but I shall say it all the same. At the present time the best of the Indian people are languishing in gaol. I am not saying that the faults are all on one side, but it is nevertheless true that the majority of political leaders of one complexion in India are in gaol. It is true that ex-Prime Ministers and ex-Cabinet Ministers are in gaol and that numbers of students have been arrested and are in gaol. Some of the finest women are in gaol. That fact is beyond dispute, and I would ask hon. Members to realise that so long as that position exists Indian people will be disinclined to listen to well-meant but ineffective orations in this House from myself or any other Member. Why are they there? Can there be any denial that one reason why they are there is the same reason for which people are languishing in internment camps and in gaol in Germany? In their own way, and in a way in which we do not necessarily approve, these Indian leaders, many of them of the highest culture, refuse to accept the domination of their country by our Government here, and because they refuse to accept it they are sentenced to imprisonment.

A reference was made to half-educated Indians, and I wonder whether the hon. Member who used that term realised that an ex-President of the Cambridge University Union is languishing in gaol, having been arrested by orders of the British Government. One would not assume that he is a half-educated Indian, seeing that he has been to Cambridge; that would disprove any suggestion of his semi-education. I only mention this again because it is well to realise that, although we have our own point of view regarding what Indians should do, Indians feel deeply that they are entitled to work out their salvation in their own way. At the present time they feel that the best way they can do it is to be in a concentration camp or in gaol or under arrest, because in that way they can show that they are challenging the assumed right of this country to impose its will upon the Indian people.

I want to see the warmest co-operation between this country and India. I am glad that my hon. Friend on the Front Bench, speaking with necessary caution as a representative of the Labour party, admitted that we might have to reach the stage where independence, even though remote, had to be conceded to the Indian people. I am glad that that has been said, because it is elementary justice on our part. We talk about Indians realising their international responsibilities. We rightly talk about India taking a part with us in the great struggle in the world to-day. We have no right, however, to say to India, any more than we have to say to America, that she must take her part in the way we demand. We are glad that America has come to our aid. We shall be glad for more and more aid from India. We are grateful for the aid that has already been given. I suggest, however, that the fundamental need which we must all face is that when we think of India we must not think of peoples like ourselves who inhabit Canada or New Zealand, but peoples in many respects totally dissimilar, and peoples, therefore, entitled to their point of view as we are to ours. Although I believe that we shall have to concede that independence, I think, at the same time, that our task must be to acquaint India more and more with our need and her need; to assure her more and more that our needs are ultimately the same; to ask for her cooperation; and to beg of her that, if and when she receives independence, her first action will be voluntarily to elect to become a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Meanwhile, we can prepare that end by more and more recognising that India has her own point of view and that the less we lecture her and the more we seek co-operation with her, the greater will be her response and the more we shall open the path towards real co-operation between ourselves and that great land.

I was sorry to interrupt the hon. Member in his speech just now, but will he accept from me the assurance that the picture he was putting before the House that the Government had concentrated on the development of the agricultural industry to the neglect of the manufacturing industries does not bear the remotest resemblance to the facts? If he had been in India in the last 20 or 25 years and followed the course of fiscal practice in that time, he would have carried only one conviction away—it would have been that the dominant voice in India, in politics and in the Legislature, was not the agricultural voice. The agricultural voice is rarely heard, and agricultural development has almost had to be in defiance of political opinion. The voice expressed in the Legislature is almost entirely one in favour of a high protective tariff which agriculture has to pay. The industrial development of India is a wise development, taking the large view. In a country with an eccentric monsoon it is essential that it should take place. The fact remains that a great industrial development has taken place under a high protective tariff, for which the agricultural community, which forms something like 70 per cent, of the whole, has had to pay the price. I do not say the price is not worth paying. I think that on the whole it is, in the larger and permanent interest of the country, but to try to lead this House to believe that the manufacturing industries of India have been neglected is to make such an extraordinary misrepresentation that reluctant as I was to interrupt I could not allow the statement to pass unchallenged

I did not say they had been neglected.