House of Commons
Tuesday, April 28, 1942
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.]
New Writ
For the County of West Sussex (Chichester Division), in the room of Major John Sewell Courtauld, M.C., deceased.—[ Major Sir James Edmondson .]
Private Business
London County Council (Money) Bill
Standing Orders Applicable Thereto Complied With
Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in the case of the following Bill, referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders which are applicable thereto have been complied with, namely—
London County Council (Money) Bill.
Bill to be read a Second time.
PRIVATE BILLS [Lords]
Standing Orders Applicable Thereto Complied With
Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in the case of the following Bill originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into which are applicable thereto have been complied with, namely—
Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Bill [ Lords ].
Bill to be read a Second time.
Oral Answers to Questions
Questions
Nominee Shareholdings (Identity)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the increasing practice of hiding the identity of company shareholders under the title of bank nominees; and whether, in the public interest, he will take immediate action in the case of nominee shareholders in newspaper or public utility companies to secure the names of the real shareholders being made available to the public in the ordinary way?
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will take steps to amend Section 101 of the Companies Act, 1929, so as to require bare trustees, who are registered shareholders, to disclose, and companies to register, the names and addresses of the persons entitled to call for a transfer of the shares, but expressly providing that companies shall not thereby be affected with notice of any trust?
There is full power under Regulation 80A of the Defence Regulations to compel disclosure to the Department concerned of the beneficial ownership of shares held by nominees, where it is considered necessary or expedient to obtain the information in the interests of the public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war. I am considering with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary whether any further action is necessary.
If the identity of the beneficial owner is easily concealed, is there much value in the public right of inspection of the register as provided in the Companies Acts?
The Companies Acts, as my hon. Friend knows, are a very complicated affair, and to begin to modify them would be a complicated legislative business. We have under the Defence Regulations power to obtain the information which my hon. Friend has in mind. It can be obtained by Ministers and by Departments, and it is within their discretion whether it should be disclosed to the public.
Will my right hon. Friend make it public, or is it a secret of the Department?
It is a matter for their discretion.
Does my hon. Friend know of any Government Department which has exercised the powers which he has just outlined to find out who is behind some of these company holdings?
I think that the powers have been used but the information has not been made public. I repeat that I am consulting with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to see whether any improvement in the present arrangements under the law and the Defence Regulations is possible or desirable.
What steps should a member of the public take to obtain this information?
Clothes Rationing
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will, in consideration of the extremely dirty nature of the work and the excessive wear and tear of clothing of men engaged in maintenance work in steel works, review the position in regard to clothing coupons, with the idea of granting them an increased allocation in proportion to the unusual nature of their work?
Supplementary coupons will be issued as from 4th May to many types of maintenance workers in the iron and steel industry.
Fuel Rationing Scheme
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that gas and electricity meters are read continuously, and that accordingly only one-ninetieth of the individual quarterly accounts relate to the same date; and in these circumstances will the rationing of fuel be on a quarterly or an annual basis?
Sir William Beveridge's Report, which is now available in the Vote Office, was prepared after full consultation with representatives of the industries supplying gas and electricity. It takes account of the facts stated in the first part of my hon. Friend's Question, and proposes that the rationing period for each individual consumer should be on an annual basis and should be related to the dates at which his meters are read.
Do I understand that you cannot penalise anybody until 12 months have gone by?
My hon. Friend cannot get away from it as easily as that. If he will read the Report, which is now available in the Vote Office, I think that he will find the answer to his question.
Can the right hon. Gentleman or most of his colleagues or most of the public read their meters, never mind the Report?
I was practising on mine last week-end.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can furnish an estimate of the cost of making and fitting to gas and electricity meters in domestic premises with automatic cut-outs which will interrupt the supply when the amount of the ration has been consumed?
No, Sir. The manufacture and fitting of automatic cut-outs on the scale that would be required is quite beyond the capacity of the industries concerned, but the scheme outlined in Sir William Beveridge's Report does not involve any such provision.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can furnish an estimate of the number of persons who will be employed in determining the fuel ration of the 12,000,000 householders in the country; and how long will it take them to complete the task?
asked the President of the Board of Trade the number of officials estimated to be required by the proposed Fuel Rationing Scheme; and the estimated cost in salaries?
Sir William Beveridge estimates in his Report that, in addition to a small headquarters staff, 10,000 to 15,000 temporary clerks would be required for the first six weeks or possibly two months. Thereafter the staff would be much reduced. They would be distributed between 1,500 Fuel Offices already in exist- ence throughout the country. The weekly cost for the first two months would probably be between £30,000 and £40,000 and correspondingly less thereafter. The temporary staff would partly be recruited by transfer or loan from other Departments, and part-time and voluntary workers would also be used in the initial stages.
Does not my right hon. Friend think that, instead of setting up this huge so-called temporary staff, it would be better to release another 15,000 miners from the Army?
As has already been announced by my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal, the House will have an opportunity of debating all these matters, at an early date, and perhaps you, Sir, would not expect me to go into these questions of detail now.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will, as an experimental measure, before introducing a complicated system of fuel rationing, authorise merchants and undertakings to withhold supplies to persons making improper use of gas, electricity and coal?
I am afraid that my hon. and gallant Friend's proposal is impracticable. Suppliers of fuel are not in a position to judge whether or not fuel is being properly used by their customers.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that, although this matter has been under the notice of his Department for so long a period, no such system as that suggested in my Question or any other system has been brought forward as complicated as the proposed system?
Has not the time come to declare war upon waste, however inconvenient?
That is what the Government hope to achieve.
Does the fuel rationing scheme apply to Northern Ireland?
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, before introducing a domestic rationing scheme, he will give an assurance that the unnecessary consumption of electricity in illuminated signs, shop windows, interior of stores, etc., will be stopped?
Sir William Beveridge in his Report recommends, as an accompaniment of a domestic rationing scheme, the imposition of restrictions on the consumption of electricity for such purposes as are named in this Question. I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend that an Order to effect such restrictions is desirable, and I have such an Order in preparation, but the consequent saving would, I am afraid, be a very small contribution to what is required.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether before reaching any final decision about introducing a fuel rationing plan he will institute a test period of three or six months to ascertain what economy can be effected through a publicity campaign instructing the public how it is possible to economise in the use of electricity, gas and coal?
The Mines Department has since last summer been conducting an intensive economy campaign. I regret to say that, in spite of these efforts, purchases of solid fuel for domestic consumption increased by approximately one million tons as compared with a year before. I think that my hon. and gallant Friend will agree that this experience is not encouraging.
Was not the increase largely due to the exceptionally severe winter?
We cannot be sure that we shall not have another severe winter.
Government Departments
Board of Trade (Transfers from Ministry of Economic Warfare)
asked the President of the Board of Trade how many persons who were held on the establishment of the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the 21st February, 1942, have been transferred to, and were held on, the establishment of the Board of Trade on 23rd April, 1942; and what number of these are established Civil Servants?
The number is 29, of whom 5, including Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, are established Civil Servants.
Were all these persons employed in the Post-War Relief Department?
The great majority are in the Post-War Commodity Policy and Relief Department, which was transferred to me when I was moved to the Board of Trade from the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Some of them have not yet been able to move physically to the Board of Trade building owing to the difficulty of accommodation.
Director-General of Works and Buildings
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works and Buildings, on what date Mr. Hugh Beaver was appointed Director-General of Works and Buildings; and on what date he resigned his partnership in Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners?
Mr. Hugh Beaver was appointed Director-General of Works and Buildings on 21st April, 1941. He resigned his partnership in the firm of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners on 1st March, 1942.
What salary is Mr. Beaver now getting?
I have not the figure in my mind.
Are we to understand that this gentleman was still a partner of the firm up to March of this year, when the firm was in contractual relations with the Ministry?
He took no part in the affairs of the firm, but he was a member of it until 1st March.
He was not an active partner, but what we want to know is, Was he drawing an income out of the firm?
Presumably he was. He never told me what he got.
Is it not a condition of appointments to Cabinet or Government rank that people appointed should resign their partnerships in private or public firms which are in contractual relations with the Government? Would my hon. Friend not consider it rather irregular for this public official to hold these two appointments?
The rules governing such appointments were laid down in a Treasury Circular of 24th February, 1940, which has been considered and approved by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. Until his resignation from the firm Mr. Beaver's case fell within this category. It was perfectly in order.
Would it be true to say that this gentleman was drawing a salary and his firm drawing fees, concurrently?
Until he resigned his partnership in the firm of Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, Mr. Beaver was drawing no salary at all from the company.
Is it not a fact that this gentleman was convicted, along with a firm of contractors, of misuse of petrol?
Women Motor Drivers
asked the Minister of Labour what progress has been made in the replacement of male chauffeurs by women in Government Departments and the placing of the men thus replaced on more suitable national work?
Instructions have been issued to the local offices of the Department providing for the interviewing of chauffeurs who are registered under the Registration for Employment Order, including men employed in Government Departments, and, in appropriate cases, the men will be transferred to more important work. Statistical information as to the results of the interviews is not available.
Questions
War Damage (Household Chattels)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the case in which war damage, sustained to household chattels before the date of operation of the War Damage Act, 1941, and belonging to a married man and his wife, was assessed at £208 19s. 6d., and the fact that a deduction is to be made from this amount for a premium of £2 1s. 10d.; whether this would have been the premium charged had the scheme been in force at the time the damage was sustained as laid down in the Act and as set out in Section 15 of Explanatory Memorandum P.C.S.5?
My attention has been drawn to this case. For reasons of practical administration and for the advantage of many of the claimants, the very large number of claims outstanding, when the War Damage Act became law, have been assessed for compensation as if they were the subject of an insurance policy. No premium is levied where the loss is less than £100 or payment is made on hardship grounds. In other cases the premium is calculated on the actual loss only.
Would my right hon. Friend agree that this is hardly carrying into effect the Chancellor's desire that one principle should obtain for both those people who suffered before the War Damage Act and those who suffered after, and that those people who suffered damage before are placed at a grave disadvantage in comparison with those whose damage occurred after the passing of the Act?
I do not think that is really so. In this particular case the claim that my hon. and gallant Friend refers to was paid to the extent of £209, with a deduction of £2 for premium which would have been chargeable had the case fallen at a later stage when the War Damage Act was in operation.
Would my right hon. Friend agree that had a similar amount of damage been assessed to a person whose furniture was damaged after the passing of the Act, there would have been no premium charged because a married man and his wife would have been exempt up to £300; and that this is an imposition on people who suffered before the passing of the Act and is not in accordance with the purpose of the Act as placed before the House?
I do not think that is so. My hon. and gallant Friend will find, I think, that it is quite equitable as between the two sets of persons.
Coal Distribution (Scales and Weights, Lorries)
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will consider amending the Weights and Measures Regulations whereby coal merchants are compelled to carry around on their carts and lorries scales and weights, weighing approximately 4 cwt, since these scales and weights are not used and a safeguard is provided by the county council inspectors who furnish their own weights, in view of the saving in transport by the additional space which would enable extra coal to be carried on each vehicle, and the utilisation of the old iron of the scales and weights which would be made available as metal for war weapons?
I am already considering representations which I have received to this effect and have asked for the views of the interests concerned.
Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind what he told us a few moments ago, that the Government wish to check waste in any form, and this is real waste, and what is done is nothing more or less than window dressing?
Yes, Sir, and I have already been in consultation with the local authorities and coal distributors on the matter.
It sounds quite favourable, Mr. Speaker.
British Army
Recreational Facilities
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he can make a statement on the facts of the accident in Cheshire that brought about the death of David Thomas Hicks and injury to seven members of the Auxiliary Territorial Service; and will he see that adequate transport facilities are provided where required for reasonable recreation?
A soldier and a noncommissioned officer are awaiting trial by Field General Court-Martial in connection with this accident. I can therefore make no statement at present, but will communicate with my hon. Friend later. Existing instructions authorise the use of transport for recreation on such a scale as present circumstances allow.
asked the Secretary of State for War whether facilities were provided for the men and women serving in the Army within a reasonable radius of Main Road, Manchester, to be present at the Western Command and Northern Command football match, held in the evening of 8th April in aid of the Forces Welfare Fund; is he aware that most of the men who were present arrived without a meal; that there was great interest in the match in both commands, yet few could be present; and will he see that, in future, non-commissioned ranks are provided with at least the same opportunities for relaxation as commissioned ranks?
Men and women within a reasonable radius would need no special transport facilities. I do not know whether those who came arrived with or without meals; the match took place at 6.45 p.m. As for the third part of the Question, it is not unusual, even in peacetime, for those of us who have work to do to be prevented from attending football matches in which we take a great interest. And as to the fourth part, noncommissioned ranks already get at least the same opportunities for relaxation as commissioned ranks.
Army Council (Officers' Appeals)
asked the Secretary of State for War how many Army officers have appealed to the Army Council since the outbreak of war; how many of these appeals have been successful; and what is the average length of time that appeals take from the date when an officer decides to appeal to the time when he gets the decision from the Army Council?
One thousand and forty appeals by officers have been dealt with by the Army Council since the outbreak of war. Two hundred and fifty-six of these have been wholly or partly successful. Figures from which the last part of the Question could be answered are not available.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is great dissatisfaction because of a feeling that this appeal to the Army Council has become really a formality, and that at least there is interminable delay in getting grievances heard and justice done to officers?
No, Sir, I am not aware of of any such feeling, and from my own knowledge it is not by any means a matter of formality, because each appeal has to be seen by three members of the Army Council individually. That is the procedure which has been laid down and which is followed, and I do not think that after that procedure there is any chance of very much injustice.
Requisitioned Houses
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that a Durham gentleman and his wife have been compelled to live in an hotel in Durham City since June, 1941, and to pay in addition to their hotel expenses 17s. 6d. per week for the storage of their furniture, in order that the Army may occupy their house in Hurworth Village, near Darlington; and will he say how much longer this will continue?
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will issue an order preventing officers from requisitioning any private house, so forcing the owner of the house to live in an hotel and pay for the storage of his furniture?
It is not the policy of the War Office to requisition occupied houses, except in cases of absolute necessity. The house at Hurworth referred to in the Question was unoccupied and unfurnished. The owner of the house was at the time living in another house which he possessed in Durham. He subsequently sold his house at Durham, notwithstanding the fact that his house at Hurworth had at that time already been requisitioned. I cannot say when it will be possible to derequisition the, house at Hurworth.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that they requisitioned it and left it in four months? Is he further aware that it was then cleaned and refurnished? Is he further aware that his Department then broke into it, after the Dunkirk affair, and that there were two large houses owned by captains in the village and that owners of large houses have not taken in any officers at all? Is he further aware that this lady offered, if they would allow her to do so, to go to the house to minister to their needs?
That is a long string of questions upon which to express agreement or disagreement, and in the case of at least one of them my information is contrary to that given by the hon. Member.
Home Guard
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that in connection with the erection of bomb shelters for the Home Guard on private property, where it is necessary to requisition land, many forms have to be filled in in duplicate and triplicate; and whether, in view of the fact that in many cases sums of no more than 5s. per year for rent are involved, he will instruct the various land branches to find a method of dealing with these matters which does not involve such a waste of time, money and paper?
This work is done under Defence Regulations and creates a claim against the Department under the Compensation (Defence) Act, 1939. The Act lays down that no claim shall be entertained unless made in a prescribed form and manner and it would be wasteful, even if it were practicable, to prescribe different forms and manners according to the size of the claim.
asked the Secretary of State for War the revised rates of subsistence allowances for members of the Home Guard; and from what date they have operated?
The revised rates have operated from 1st March. They are, for a continuous period of duty of 5 to 8 hours, 1s. 6d.; for 8 to 15 hours, 3s.; for 15 to 24 hours, 4s. 6d.
Have these rates actually been published in the Press? There seems to be some doubt about the matter.
I cannot say whether that is so, but I will look into the matter.
Will my right hon. Friend consider the possibility of making a further adjustment so as to bring Home Guard rates of subsistence allowance equal to the subsistence allowance given to fire watchers?
The review was undertaken so as to bring the rates into reasonable relation. I think they are now in reasonable relation, though they are not exactly the same.
Royal Engineers (Commissions)
asked the Secretary of State for War what is the principle in operation when granting commissions in the Royal Engineers; and must the applicant be a serving soldier before application is made for a commission?
Commissions in the Royal Engineers are in general granted to serving soldiers, but since the need for officers with high technical qualifications cannot be wholly met from this source some few direct commissions have been granted to civilians who possess these qualifications.
Ceremonial Parades
asked the Secretary of State for War whether in the reorganisation process of the Army he will discontinue all ceremonial parades of troops during the time of war and so avoid unnecessary time and trouble that it takes to prepare for them?
No, Sir. Occasional ceremonial parades have their value, and I see no reason to restrict the discretion of General Officers Commanding-in-Chief.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when these are reported in the Press people ask why there is any need for this kind of thing in time of war? I am sure they ought to be dispensed with; there is no need for them at all.
The testimony of Commanders-in-Chief who have seen active operations is exactly to the contrary.
Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the opinion of those Commanders-in-Chief is open to criticism?
Burma Operations (Gloucestershire Regiment)
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he has any statement to make about the action in which a battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment fought against an overwhelming Japanese force in Burma?
A fairly full account of this gallant action has appeared in the Press, and I shall be pleased to send my hon. Friend a copy of the communiqué , to which, however, there is nothing that I can add.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any congratulations have been sent to the regiment? Would he be prepared to send a letter of congratulation signed by his own hand?
If I sent a message signed by my own hand it would take some time to get there, but I will certainly consider my hon. Friend's suggestion.
Missing Soldiers
asked the Secretary of State for War whether the organisation of the British Red Cross Society for searching for soldiers reported missing has now been completed?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer given to my hon. Friend the Member for Denbigh (Sir H. Morris-Jones) on 19th December last, of which I am sending him a copy.
Could the right hon. Gentleman say without notice and of his own knowledge whether in fact anything whatsoever has been done in the matter of this organisation in the Middle East?
Yes, Sir, but there is, of course, a great shortage of voluntary searchers in the Middle East. The burden of searching falls upon units and the military authorities out there, who have also many other important duties to attend to.
Could the right hon. Gentleman say without notice whether, in fact, any searchers have been appointed at all?
If the hon. Member wishes to press me on details he had better put down a Question, and I will answer it.
Officers' Emergency Reserve
asked the Secretary of State for War how many persons have been accepted for the Army Officers Emergency Reserve; how many have been called up as officers; and what he proposes to do regarding those who have not yet been called up?
Between August, 1938, and 18th April, 1942, the number accepted for the Army Officers Emergency Reserve was 41,603. Up to 18th April, 1942, 26,863 were called up, including about 800 posted to Officer Cadet Training Units. The Reserve now numbers 4,331, who form a pool from which officers can be drawn if occasion arises, but half of them are over 50, and I cannot hold out much hope that it will be possible to make use of their services.
Would it not be very much more satisfactory if those who are not likely to be wanted were told so, so that they would be able to take up some other form of national service?
Officers are always released from the Reserve if they wish to be, but I will certainly consider my hon. and gallant Friend's suggestion. A short time ago there was a review, and a good many officers were told. Whether another review is called for, I will consider.
Is it necessary that these figures should be made public? If they are common knowledge, why ask a question; and, if not, is it not dangerous to publish them?
Dependants' Allowances
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that the dependants of many men now serving are in France where they support themselves on loans from friends; and whether he will arrange for the normal allowances to be credited to each such soldier monthly in a suspense account to enable him to repay the loans at the end of the war?
I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to an answer given to my hon. Friend the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Ammon) on 25th February, 1941, of which I am sending him a copy. The whole question of the treatment of married officers and men whose families are in countries to which remittances cannot be made is at present under review.
Will my right hon. Friend take into consideration the fact that the British Legion make special representations on behalf of these men, who now receive only half the normal allowance?
As I said, the whole question is under review. When the review is completed, I shall be pleased to answer another Question.
Post Office Organisation
asked the Secretary of State for War whether he has seen complaints regarding the inadequacy of Army postal services, resulting in a mass of undelivered letters being returned to the families of men killed in Malaya and else where; and whether he is satisfied with the present organisation of the Army Post Office?
I have seen a paragraph in a newspaper, to which I think my right hon. Friend refers, which seems to me to base an untrue, general accusation on a single instance which I am investigating. I am satisfied that the Army Post Office organisation generally is working efficiently, in face of great difficuties.
Requisitioned Land (Weeds)
asked the Secretary of State for War whether, in commandeering agricultural land for military purposes, the Army has any responsibility for keeping its area free from noxious Weeds?
Departments have no legal responsibility for removing Weeds from requisitioned land. I am, however, well aware how they may injure food production, and command land agents take preventive measures in concert with county war agricultural committees.
Is it not a very bad example to farmers when they see land which was commandeered from them overgrown with docks and thistles?
That may be so, but the answer to my hon. Friend is that command land agents take preventive measures, in concert with county war agricultural committees.
If I give examples, will my right hon. Friend look into them?
Certainly, Sir.
Training, Sussex Downs (Historic Monuments)
asked the Secretary of State for War what action it is proposed to take about the ancient monuments on the Sussex Downs, scheduled by a military officer and a Hove antiquary as specially worthy of preservation, when the area is used for Army manoeuvres?
As my hon. Friend was informed on 13th April, every effort will be made to avoid damage to these ancient monuments.
As representing a part of this area, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend would instruct his Department to get into touch with the Ministry of Works and Buildings, which has a special responsibility for ancient monuments, in view of the fact that some of these tumuli, which are pre-Roman or Roman, are of unique interest and value?
I will certainly consider that suggestion.
Scotland
Old Age Pensions
asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is in a position to make a statement regarding the representations by the County Clerk of Lanarkshire on behalf of certain Scottish local authorities on the subject of supplementary allowances to old age pensioners and the Determination of Needs Act?
I have sent a full reply to the County Clerk of Lanarkshire on the subject of supplementary pensions referred to, and I have informed him that the question of applying the Determination of Needs Act to public assistance is under consideration by the Government. As I understand that the subject is of interest to a number of hon. Members, I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a copy of the letter sent to the County Clerk.
Following is the copy :
"Scottish Office,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.I.
21st April, 1942.
W. H. Rodger, Esq.,
Lanarkshire House,
191, Ingram Street,
Glasgow, C.I.
Dear Sir,
I am directed by the Secretary of State to refer to your letters of the 20th March and 8th April transmitting three Resolutions, adopted by a Conference of representatives of certain public assistance authorities in Scotland.
As regards supplementary pensions, the Secretary of State is glad to note the Conference's agreement that the Assistance Board observed the spirit of section 13 of the Old Age and Widows' Pensions Act, 1940, in those cases to which it applied. The object of the section was, of course, that no individual pensioner should suffer a reduction in his allowance by reason only of the coming into operation of the 1940 Act, and that this was in fact secured is a matter which cannot be too widely recognised.
In April, 1940, only some 40,000 pensioners in Scotland were receiving supplementation from public assistance authorities; by September, 1940, the number receiving supplementation from the Board had risen to over 100,000. In more than 50 per cent. of the cases taken over by the Board the amount the pensioner had been receiving from the authority was less than the amount payable under the Board's scale; in a further 10 per cent. it was the same; and in the remaining cases where it was greater, section 13 operated to obviate any reduction on transfer. Thus eighty thousand pensioners in Scotland benefited from the operation of the Act; not one suffered a reduction in his or her allowance .
Exact comparison between the scales of local authorities and the Board's scale is difficult because of the necessity for taking into account the other provisions under which need is assessed as, for example, the treatment of rent. There is also the question of the extent to which the special circumstances of an individual case are taken into consideration, and the extent to which the amount of the supplementary pension is adjusted in order to meet these circumstances. Mr. Johnston has, however, had enquiries made. The results of those enquiries shows that of 21 authorities—out of the 55 in Scotland—whose scales on paper appear to be more favourable to the single pensioner living alone than the Board's scale, the difference in 13 areas is 6d. or less. Similarly, in the case where a pensioner is one of a married couple, out of 13 areas where the Board's scale on paper appears to be less favourable, the difference is 6d. or less in 7 areas.
In actual practice small differences in the scales on paper may be and indeed frequently are eliminated by the Board's rent rule. For example, in Clydebank—in which (on paper) the excess of the local authority's scale over the Board's scale appeared to be most marked—it has been found that in not a single case on the Board's current Clydebank register did any person becoming entitled to pension after August, 1940, and having previously been in receipt of relief from the local authority suffer any reduction in his income through transfer to the Board.
The investigation, carried out last week and therefore taking account of any recent increases in Local Authorities Public Assistance scales, indeed covered a wider area, including not only Clydebank but also Rutherglen, Bridgeton and West Stirlingshire, with the following results: —
Number of new pensioners 45 Comparison of payments by the Board with the payments that would have been made by the local authorities if supplementation had remained with the latter: — Increases 28 No change 13 Reductions 4 45
In the 4 cases where the Board's payment is less than the local authority's would have been, the reduction in 3 cases was 6d. and in the other case 1s. 6d.
Mr. Johnston is unaware of any individual complaints of hardship, but if you know of any such complaints made locally, he will, as always, be prepared to transmit them at once to the Board for investigation if you will let him know the facts .
As regards clothing, which is specially referred to in your Resolution, Mr. Johnston is informed by the Assistance Board that 1,500 grants were made in December, 1941, and over 5,000 in the last three months of the year in the 2 Glasgow districts alone. His attention has, here again, not been called to any specific cases of hardship but if any such cases are brought to his notice he will have immediate investigation made.
There would not therefore appear to be any justification for the Conference's general assertion that old age pensioners in Scotland are worse off under the Assistance Board than if they had still been under the necessity of applying to the public assistance authorities for supplementation.
One of the main objects of Part II of the Act of 1940 was, by placing old age pensioners outside the scope of the poor law and enabling their needs to be met on the basis of a national scale approved by Parliament, to remedy the inequalities which then prevailed between one area and another. Now, as Mr. Johnston understands it, the Conference's proposal would mean that the amount of supplementation which a pensioner would receive, would once again be made to depend on the standard adopted by the local authority of the area in which he happens to reside. But the remedy for any insufficiency in the rate of supplementary pensions at present being paid by the Assistance Board would not, in the Secretary of State's view, be to leave the amount of the supplementary pension to be determined by the varying public assistance scales of local authorities. The old age pension was fixed on a national basis. The Board did not reduce but levelled upwards the supplementations in force prior to the 1940 Act, and the fact that some local authorities have now further raised their public assistance scales would not appear to be a reason why in these areas and in. these areas alone the old age pension supplements should be increased.
The Secretary of State has noted the terms of the Conference Resolution which deals with the adequacy of the pension granted under the Contributory Pensions Acts to widows under 60 years of age. As you are no doubt aware, the Government have appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge to consider and report on all the schemes of social insurance which are at present operative in this country, and Mr. Johnston understands that an opportunity will be afforded to Local Authority Associations to place before that committee any proposals for reform which they consider to be necessary.
With regard to the remaining Resolution of the Conference, the suggestion that the principles of the Determination of Needs Act should apply to public assistance has reached the Government from various quarters and is at present being examined. Mr. Johnston discussed the proposal with the Associations of Local Authorities in Edinburgh yesterday. It is probable that a further meeting with the Associations will be held on this point within the next few weeks, and you will no doubt be informed of this through the Associations.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.) T. D. HADDOW,
Private Secretary."
Juvenile Delinquency, Glasgow
asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the numbers of boys under 14 years of age who have been charged before the juvenile courts of Glasgow with various offences during 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942, respectively?.
The figures for the last four years are 2,071, 2,125, 2,939, and 2,785 respectively. Comparative figures for 1942 are not yet available.
Can the Minister give any explanation for this increase in juvenile crime?
As a matter of fact, the figures show a slight decrease for 1941, but the question is large and complex.
Training in Citizenship (Circular)
asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will cause to be placed in the Library of the House a copy of the circular recently issued by him through the Scottish Education Department on training in citizenship?
Yes, Sir.
Will copies of the circular be made available through the Vote Office to hon. Members?
I cannot say without notice about the Vote Office, but I shall be glad to send a copy to any hon. Member who desires it.
Coal Industry
Miners (Release from Armed Forces)
asked the Secretary for Mines how many ex-miners have been released from the serving Forces up-to-date; how many it is intended to release for the purpose of returning to the mines; and whether the men themselves can make application to be considered?
I am not at present in a position to add to the answers I have already given. A certain number of men serving in the Army in the British Isles are now being released from a limited number of military establishments, and some will shortly be released from the Royal Air Force. It is hoped to secure a further increase in man-power by the return to coalmining of a number of ex-miners employed in other industries. Before an application for release is entertained by the War Office, it must be established that the man is an underground worker and that there is a job immediately available for him in the mines. After names have been submitted by the collieries to my Department they are examined by the War Office, and men in categories not expressly excluded are released. Ex-miners now serving in the Army at home may approach the colliery to which they wish to return. The procedure for release from the Air Force is somewhat different. Colliery companies will, in the next few days, be asked to place in work a limited number of men whom the Air Ministry is prepared to release.
Is the Minister aware that there is a lot of discontent, both among men serving in the Army and among people outside, about not knowing the method of procedure? Have not some men been sent back who did not wish to leave the Army but had no voice in the matter? Should there not be some method by which men could be heard and the whole matter be reconsidered on its merits? Is not the whole thing mixed up now?
This arrangement has been made with the coalowners and the Miners' Federation. The men must know that they are invited to return to the mines. No man is compelled to come back, and he need not come back if he does not want to, but I would point out that more than 20,000 names have been sent forward of men for whom there is an offer of employment in each case.
Can the men themselves or the trade union make application?
A man cannot offer himself a job. The only person who can offer employment is an employer. The trade union is well aware of the organisation for bringing men back.
Is there not considerable delay in releasing men who fulfil all these conditions and who are in this country? Can the Minister explain the reason for this delay?
I do not think there is considerable delay in releasing men who are eligible for release. As I have said, a very large number of applications have been made by employers for men to work in the mines, but the number released is small in proportion.
When a miner in the Army applies to his colliery company to be taken back, and his application is not acceded to, is he told the reason why he has not been brought back to the mines?
I do not think an answer is given in each case, but there are certain categories of soldiers who are not now eligible for return to the mines, and, in general, the men know in which category they are.
Is the Minister aware that a number of ex-miners have been returned without requests from employers?
Numbers of ex-miners have been returned, but there is work available for them.
But Without the request of an employer at all?
I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter on the Adjournment at an early date.
( for Mr. Ness Edwards) asked the Secretary for Mines whether he is aware that men given six months' leave of absence from the Armed Forces for work in the coal mines are now arriving in the coalfields without adequate means of maintenance and without the means to obtain working clothes and tools; and whether he has any statement to make thereon?
Men returning from the Forces for work in the coal mines are transferred to Class W Army Reserve. Their pay and wives' allowances cease on discharge to Class W Army Reserve. It is recognised that these men must be helped to take up work quickly in the pits, and they are being guaranteed pay for any gap there may be between discharge from the Army and their actual employment in the mines. In addition, a grant of £2 10s. is being made to each man for the provision of working clothes, and the owners are supplying tools in order to relieve the men from any expense in that connection. I ought to add that the men, on leaving the Army, retain necessaries in their possession (which include shirts, underclothing, etc.) and one pair of Army boots. They receive in addition civilian suit, cap, collar and tie, or the cost to the War Office of providing them. Owners are also arranging to make advances to the men in cases where they are in difficulty regarding maintenance pending receipt of wages for work in the pits.
Does my hon. Friend not agree that most colliery companies do not provide working clothes; and is not special provision made in connection with the Order to which he referred?
A circular has been sent to each owner, and I hope that the contents of that circular will be put into effect.
Did my hon. Friend say that every discharged miner is provided with a civilian suit?
Yes, Sir.
Is he aware that there is very great dissatisfaction among the men? There are provided with £2 with which to get a civilian suit. Can my hon. Friend get a civilian suit for £2?
I am not supposed to provide the civilian suit. That question must be put to the representative of the War Office, not of my Department.
Fuel Efficiency Committee (Recommendations)
asked the Secretary for Mines whether he has received a report from the Fuel Efficiency Committee appointed in September of last year; and whether he is satisfied that the measures that are being taken to prevent the waste of coal in industry are effective?
Yes, Sir. I have received two useful interim reports from the Fuel Efficiency Committee, outlining their proposals for preventing waste in the use of coal in industry. These have been given careful consideration by my Department, and most of their recommendations have been adopted. I am sending my hon. Friend some particulars.
Will the hon. Gentleman keep in mind that people working in industry are themselves going short of coal, and that it does not help them when they see coal being wasted at the place where they are working?
I have just told my hon. Friend that the Committee have made reports, of which I will give him a copy, and I am sure he will be convinced that a very considerable effort has been made to save coal.
Producer Gas
asked the Secretary for Mines whether he can now make a full statement on the steps that are to be taken to encourage the utilisation of producer gas?
I have been asked to reply. I am not yet in a position to make a statement, but I hope to be able to do so in the very early future.
In view of the urgency of this matter, can the hon. Gentleman assure the House that he is doing all he can to expedite it?
I hope my hon. Friend will have early evidence that that is so.
Domestic Stocks, Clydeside
asked the Secretary for Mines whether he is aware that many persons on Clydeside have suffered hard ship this winter from the shortage of coal and the bad quality of that supplied, accentuated by the fact that many persons are unable to take more than two hundredweights of coal at a time; and whether he will take steps to increase stocks of coal in the district and improve the quality by seeing that coal is not taken from inferior seams while better seams are left unworked and that the price of the coal is related to its quality?
I am aware that owing to the prolonged spell of severe weather this winter it was not always possible for merchants to meet the full demands of domestic consumers, but every possible step was taken, in Clydeside and elsewhere, to see that those without stocks had first call on the available supplies, and I am not aware that there was serious hardship in the district as a whole. With regard to the second part of the Question, I have no evidence to show that inferior seams of coal are being worked and superior seams reserved, and in fixing the retail prices of coal, which are controlled by my Department, regard is necessarily had to a number of considerations, including, of course, the quality of the coal.
Arising from that reply, in which the hon. Gentleman says that he has no evidence that an inferior quality of coal is being supplied, if he will come with me, I will show him tons and tons of inferior coal of a kind which we have never had supplied before.
The hon. Member does not say that he knows where inferior coal has been brought to the surface. What he says is that inferior seams have been worked and superior seams reserved. I do not know of such cases.
It is correct. I know of a case, and that being so, will the Department make inquiries and give us some satisfaction, because it is causing a tremendous amount of discontent?
I do not think it would serve to allay discontent if a statement were allowed to pass to the effect that inferior coal is being worked and superior coal reserved. I have no proof of that.
Can the hon. Gentleman say whether there will be any increase in price arising out of the rationing undertaken by his Department, or whether it will be possible to justify an increase of 4s. 4d. a ton as a result of the smaller quantities supplied to consumers?
I think my hon. Friend had better give me notice of that question, and then I will give him an answer.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in certain areas no coal is available for either commercial, industrial or domestic purposes, and why is that so?
I know that coal is in short supply in certain areas.
Silicosis
asked the Secretary for Mines whether his attention has been directed to the case of John Pickard, Cefneithin, who, after working 26 years in coalmines, was eventually rendered totally disabled by silicosis but failed to recover compensation because he had not worked in the mines for a period prior to complete disability, and who is now dependent upon public assistance; and whether he will consider legislation to provide adequate protection for such sufferers from silicosis?
I have no information with regard to the particular case of John Pickard. General questions of workmen's compensation legislation are for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, with whom I shall keep in close touch in regard to future legislation affecting the coalmining industry which I hope will arise from the forthcoming report of the Industrial Pulmonary Diseases Committee.
Is my hon. Friend aware that under existing legislation, in cases of this kind where a certain period of time elapses after a man has ceased to work in the coal pits, he fails to recover compensation on the ground of silicosis although he has obviously got it, and will that point be kept in mind in future legislation?
I hope it will be possible to give compensation to all men who have been proved to have contracted silicosis in the course of their employment.
; Can the hon. Gentleman say when we are likely to have the report of the Committee, which has been under consideration for a long time?
I answered a Question on that subject the other day.
Questions
Petrol Rationing (Motor Cycles)
asked the Secretary for Petroleum whether any decision has yet been arrived at as to how long the allowance of petrol for motor cycles will be continued?
I propose to abolish the basic ration for motor cycles from 1st November.
Will the hon. Gentleman say how members of the Home Guard are to get to their work if they do not get a petrol allowance?
That is a general matter affecting both motor cars and motor cycles, and is being dealt with by the War Office.
Why wait until November?
The House will appreciate that the abolition of the basic ration for motor cars involves a very great increase in the work of the divisional petroleum officers in dealing with applications from people who have genuine need of an allowance instead of their basic ration. My policy is to get through the abolition of the basic ration for both motor cars and motor cycles without any increase in my staff, and as motor cycles use only a small amount of petrol and are used principally by munition workers going to work, I am prepared to wait.
War Operations
asked the Prime Minister, in respect of Cmd. 6351, whether the Minister of Defence has power to issue operational orders direct to principal or subordinate commanders in the various theatres of war?
Operational orders to Commanders in the various theatres of war are issued either by the Service Department or Chief of Staff concerned, or, in matters which affect the general conduct of operations, by the Chiefs of Staff in their corporate capacity.
asked the Prime Minister whether the organisation for joint planning, as set out in Cmd. 6351, was in full operation before the opening of the Far Eastern campaign?
Yes, Sir; with the exception that the Joint War Production Staff was not in existence before the opening of the Far Eastern Campaign.
Can my right hon. Friend say whether it has yet been determined at what stage in this complicated hierarchy things went wrong in the planning of our defences in Malaya?
I think the hon. and gallant Member had better put that Question down.
National Finance
Income Tax (Wage-Earners)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many weekly wage-earners he estimates are assessable for Income Tax; how many have made returns of income; and how many have been assessed?
I presume that my hon. Friend is referring to weekly wage-earners who are assessed on the half-yearly basis. As stated in my Budget Statement, the number of liable weekly wage-earners for the year 1941–42 is estimated at 5,500,000. The number who made returns is considerably in excess of 5,500,000, because it includes those whose incomes exceed £110 a year (or £55 for the half-year) but whose allowances exceed their total income. There is no information available of the comparatively small number who failed to make their returns for the year 1941–42.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to the scheme which is about to be introduced in the United States of America for collecting Income Tax from workers' current earnings; and whether he will examine the practicability of this scheme before coming to a final decision to take any further action in this matter in this country?
My attention has been drawn to the proposals for the deduction of Income Tax from wages in the United States of America. As I understand them, however, they are only to be brought into force at a time to be authorised by the Secretary of the Treasury. I would suggest, therefore, that it is premature to draw any comparisons until that time arrives.
Can my right hon. Friend make an examination of the machinery of this scheme in view of the fact, to which he drew attention in his Budget speech, that some such plan would be a benefit to the community?
I will certainly do that.
Bank Funds Conversion (Commission)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether commission is paid to banks in the case of conversion of any of their own funds into Government stocks, subscriptions to which are eligible for stockbrokers' commission?
I understand the expression "stockbrokers' commission" to refer to commission at the rate of ⅛ per cent. or less, payable in certain circumstances to bankers or stockbrokers. If so, the answer is in the affirmative.
Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that this is a case where he might ask bankers who lend public deposits to the Government and convert them into Government stock to waive their commission?
My hon. Friend will appreciate that in no case is commission on subscriptions payable both to a banker and to a stockbroker.
But does he not think it is inequitable that banks, which are lending large sums of public money, should also be paid commission for their services?
Shipping Salvage Awards (Income Tax)
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether salvage awards made to men who rescue vessels in heavy seas are liable to assessment to Income Tax in addition to the assessment made on their wages?
Following a recent review of the matter, I have authorised a special war-time concession under which salvage awards made to officers and crews of ships not specifically employed on salvage work, in respect of services rendered during the war, will not be assessed to Income Tax.
Questions
Mercantile Marine Achievements (Publicity)
asked the Minister of Information whether he is aware that, in view of the security interest involved, the public does not get a great deal of information about the achievements and work of the Merchant Service; and whether arrangements can be made to increase the amount of material made available on this subject, particularly as regards photographs and films?
Yes, Sir. We have this matter constantly in mind, and efforts are being made to increase the amount of material on the Merchant Service made available for broadcasting, films, photographs and publications.
Black-Market Offences (Penalties)
56 and 57.
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) whether his attention has been drawn to the case of Mr. William Henry Johnstone, of Netherleigh, Woking, a director of Woodlands (Chemists) Limited, who, after being fined£10,000 and £15 15s. costs for a quota offence, filed his petition in bankruptcy; and whether he will take steps to prevent people convicted of black-market or quota offences from evading the penalties imposed on them in this way;
(2) whether his attention has been drawn to the case of Mr. Isaac Isenberg, who was told that if he did not pay the fine of £7,521 and £21 costs recently imposed on him for a quota offence by 12th June he must go to prison for three months; and whether he will consider taking powers to sequestrate the offenders' property in such cases?
The two cases to which my hon. Friend refers are illustrative of a general problem to which my right hon. Friend has been giving his attention. The question is already under consideration of amending the existing law relating to the enforcement of fines so as to enable appropriate action to be taken in cases where large fines are imposed under the Defence Regulations.
Is my hon. Friend not aware that there are two distinct issues involved in these two cases? One case deals with a limited company and the other with a private individual.
My hon. Friend can be assured that we have every aspect of this question under consideration, and we are anxious to extract the maximum amount from the pockets of these people consistent with being fair to the other creditors.
West End Club (Police Visit)
asked the Home Secretary whether he can give any information about the police visit to New Ham Bones Club, Ham Yard, Shaftesbury Avenue, on 21st April; and how many names of people were taken, their ages and occupations?
This club was entered in pursuance of a warrant granted under the Licensing Act, and the names and addresses of 15 men and 19 women were taken. In this type of case it is not the general practice to record the age and occupation of persons present, but I am informed that the ages appeared to range from 24 to 45. The question of proceedings is under consideration.
Do I understand from that reply that a number of the individuals there were of military age? Why are they not in the Army?
It would be quite consistent both to be in the Army and in a club such as the New Ham Bones at the same time.
Were they in uniform?
The only person in uniform at this club was a member of the Women's Land Army.
Invasion Committees
asked the Home Secretary whether any instructions have been issued to Regional Commissioners regarding the formation of invasion committees; and where copies of these can be obtained?
The answer to the first part of the Question is "Yes, Sir." It is not usual to publish Departmental papers of this kind; but the lines on which we are proceeding have been described in statements made in this House and at meetings recently held by Regional Commissioners with hon. Members.
Is it possible for any Member of Parliament who takes an interest in these matters to obtain copies of these circulars? To whom are they sent?
They are sent to the people who should have them. I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman, having had a great deal of Army experience, will see that it is not really desirable to circulate widely papers of this kind. If he wishes to be regarded as a special case himself I will communicate them to him.
Is it not the case that no one understands these documents and that they will be a handicap rather than a help?
Everyone understands these papers except the hon. Member.
Are they sent to Regional Commissioners only?
They are sent to Regional Commissioners, and they are also sent to those officers whose work demands that they should have them.
Surely if they are sent to Regional Commissioners they should be sent to Members of Parliament?
Food Charge, Marlborough Street
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether he can give any information in connection with the charge made at the Marlborough Street Police Court, on Wednesday, 22nd April, against a number of men of conspiracy in buying and selling all kinds of food; whether he will give the names and the occupations of the men concerned; and whether he took charge of cases of tinned food?
As the case to which my hon. Friend refers is still under investigation by the police, it will not be proper to furnish the information requested at this stage.
Ministry of Supply
Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners
asked the Minister of Supply the value of work placed through Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners since 1st January, 1941; and the amount of fees and expenses paid or credited for the same period?
The value of the work placed since s 1st January, 1941, is approximately £5,070,000. The amount paid or credited e for the same period on account of expenses was £549,801, and on account of fees£18,750. The two latter sums include t the fees and expenses in respect of a large amount of work placed before but executed after 1st January, 1941.
Would the hon. Gentleman say whether these figures definitely do not include any work which has since been transferred to the Ministry of Works and Buildings?
I think some of it does include part of the work that has been transferred.
asked the Minister of Supply the amount of fees and expenses paid or credited by his Department to Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners up to 31st, December, 1940; and what capital cost of work does this figure cover?
The amount paid or credited up to 31st December, 1940, on account of expenses was £665,250 and on account of fees £19,750. The capital cost of the work covered by these figures was £21,640,000.
Cotton Control
asked the Minister of Supply who are the members of the organisation which has replaced the Cotton Importers and Distributors Association; what salaries they are paid; what was their previous connection with the importing and merchanting of cotton; and whether he will state their respective ages?
The importation and distribution of cotton are administered by the Cotton Control, the services of merchants being used for certain purchases and in the distribution to spinners of all imported cotton. The male staff employed by the Control in this connexion number 31, of which 26 were previously employed by firms dealing in raw cotton, two had experience in cotton mills, one is a chartered accountant and two have general office experience. The number of the female staff employed is 23. I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate further particulars in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
Following are the particulars :
Male Staff. Number. Salary per annum. Ages. £ 1 1,000 53 1 800 29 1 601/700 55 1 501/600 40 5 401/500 32; two at 36; 38; 46. 7 301/400 33; 38; 39; 41; 43; 46; 55. 15 201/300 21; 27; two at 33; 36; two at 37; 38; 39; 42; 43; 49; 51; two at 57.
All the female staff are employed as stenographers or junior clerks.
asked the Minister of Supply the reason for the closing down of the Cotton Importers and Distributors Association on 31st March, nine months after it had been brought into existence by his Department?
The agreement with this association was made for a period of one year and was not renewed. It is considered that the purchase and distribution of cotton will be more effectively carried out in present conditions by direct contact between the Control and the cotton merchants.
Can the hon. Member explain why his Department brought this institution into being and then cut its throat after nine months?
This arrangement was made in the first place because the Ministry of Supply were anxious to get some focussing point for merchants. After it was brought into being the simplification of supply, owing to Lease-Lend and further restrictions on transportation, made it necessary for the Ministry to deal directly with merchants instead of going through the Cotton Importers and Distributors Association.
Royal Navy
Air Operations (Administration)
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the increased importance of the air in naval operations, he will reorganise the functions of the Sea Lords so that the administration of the Fleet Air Arm comes under a senior Sea Lord instead of as now the junior?
The hon. and gallant Member is incorrect in assuming that the relative importance of the individual responsibilities of the members of the Board of Admiralty can be assessed by the principle of seniority. Each of the Sea Lords is directly responsible to the First Lord for the efficient discharge of that part of the Board's business which is assigned to him.
Can the hon. and gallant Gentleman assure me, the House, and the country that the importance of the air in naval matters is adequately represented on the Board of Admiralty?
Yes, Sir. I can certainly assure my hon. and gallant Friend of that.
Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman assure the House that the Admiralty deplore the recent attempts which have been made to sow the seeds of dissension or to imply that there is dissension between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy?
Cigarette Prices (Shore Base)
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has considered the letter from a group of men in the Royal Navy serving at a shore base, sent to him by the Member for West Fife, complaining that they have to pay the full Budget rate of 2s. for a packet of 20 cigarettes; and is he prepared to grant them the same concession as has been granted to other Service men?
Yes, Sir. I have had inquiries made, and I can assure the hon. Member that the naval ratings at the base in question are obtaining cigarettes at pre-Budget prices, in accordance with the concession granted in the Budget to Service men.
Agriculture
Women's Land Army
asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is yet in a position to. make a statement with regard to the admission of members of the Women's Land Army to voluntary Service canteens?
Yes, Sir. I am glad to say that the admission of members of the Women's Land Army to canteens run for the Services by the voluntary organisations has now been agreed in principle. The conditions of their admission are at present under consideration.
Is the Minister aware what great satisfaction his reply will give to members of the Women's Land Army?
Can the Minister also say whether these ladies of the Land Army will be able to get food at the canteens on railway stations when travelling?
That is one of the points of detail which is being considered at the present moment.
Dairy Cattle Diseases
asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he can give any approximate estimate of the present annual loss involved through diseases of dairy cattle; and whether, in view of the importance of this matter, arrangements can be made for a national system of regular veterinary inspection of these herds?
It has been estimated that diseases of dairy cattle involve an annual loss of not less than 50,000,000 gallons of milk as well as of appreciable quantities of meat. With a view to reducing such losses, I hope to introduce at an early date a voluntary scheme for the control of dairy cattle diseases, an important feature of which will be the regular veterinary examination of dairy cows by the practitioner.
Why should the scheme be voluntary; why not compulsory?
Questions
Kenya (Land Cultivation)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Government of Kenya is working out and applying methods of improving cultivation by Africans in the Kenya reserves; whether suitable agricultural tools, selected seed and plants and other facilities are being made available to them, with a view to meeting the needs of the reserves as a result of the conscription of labour and the demand for greater production for theatres of war?
Yes, Sir. The steady improvement of cultivation in the native reserves is a fundamental principle of Government policy in Kenya. Every assistance is being given by the Agricultural Department towards the production of more foodstuffs, including the issue of seeds, and efforts are being made to ensure that, in spite of war-time restrictions, an adequate supply of tools is available.
If there is any surplus of native production, will it be made available for the theatre of war? If so, will the price paid for European produce be paid also for African produce?
That is another question; perhaps my hon. Friend will put it on the Paper.
Africa (Crop Prices)
asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in what Dependencies in Africa a system of guaranteed prices and returns for certain crops has been worked out; and where, and why, the system will discriminate as between European and African produce?
Guaranteed prices for certain important crops are in operation in West and East Africa and in Northern Rhodesia. In West Africa, there is no question of differential prices. In East Africa, a scheme has been put in operation involving guaranteed prices for certain non-native crops, such as wheat, flax, and rye, and for European-grown maize. A scheme is in preparation for extending control and guaranteed prices to African-grown maize, which, having regard to differences in the methods in which European and African maize is handled, is calculated to have a similar effect. A maize control scheme has been in operation for several years in Northern Rhodesia, involving the payment of different prices for European and African-grown maize, owing to the differences in costs of production and standards of cultivation between the two classes of producers. After provision has been made for a fair return to the producer, the profits on native-grown maize are credited to a fund devoted to objects concerned with the welfare of the African industry; in particular, price stabilisation for the African producer and the betterment of native methods of agriculture.
Could further study be given to this problem of discriminatory payments as between Africans and Europeans, because of the general discontent among the Africans over what they regard as very unfair treatment?
As I pointed out, there is only one crop to which this system applies. The other crop is purely European-grown.
Colliery Accident, South Yorkshire
( by Private Notice ) asked the Secretary for Mines whether he can give any information regarding the disaster at Barnborough Main Colliery?
I regret to inform the House that at about 6 p.m. on Friday, 24th April, an extensive fall, described as a "rock bump," occurred at Barn-borough Main Colliery, South Yorkshire, affecting particularly 109 District of the Parkgate seam, in which 18 men were working at the time. One man got out, but 17 were cut off. I am informed that the earth movements were of such severity that the effects were felt over a considerable area on the surface. Rescue operations were immediately begun, and have been pursued unceasingly and indomitably in face of great difficulties, and I am glad and proud to say that 15 of the men who were cut off have been recovered, 13 of them alive. Efforts continue unabated to reach the remaining two men; and I am sure the House will wish me to express our hope that the last part of the labour of those very gallant men will be rewarded with success, and to express also our sympathy with those who are bereaved and those who have suffered such terrible anxiety.
I know that the House will join with my hon. Friend in the sentiments he has expressed in the last part of his answer. I would ask whether, in view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding this rock bump, some study will be made of it by one of the technical committees which has been studying accidents through falls of ground?
Yes, Sir. From the information at my disposal I think there is sufficient ground for a very special inquiry to be made into this matter, quite apart from the possible loss of two or three lives. There is a serious physical problem involved, which we are studying. I could give my hon. Friend in private some of the details, which concern me very much. I promise him that I will make an investigation, and will inform the House of the conclusions.
Business of the House
Might I ask the Leader of the House whether, when considering the Business for the next series of Sittings, he will bear in mind that the Secret Debate last week has in no way assauged the public desire for a public Debate on conditions precedent to the fall of Malaya and Singapore, and on the conduct of the war generally; and that this is especially prevalent in those parts of the country from which whole battalions were lost and have surrendered, being quite unable to fight because they landed too late?
Certainly the Government will take all such questions into consideration when deciding the Business for the next series of Sittings.
Message from the Lords
That they have agreed to—
National Loans Bill,
Army and Air Force (Annual) Bill, and
Sugar Industry Bill, without Amendment.
India
Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Mr. James Stuart .]
When it was announced by the Prime Minister that I was to go to India with the Cabinet's proposals, this House was good enough to express its hopes that the Mission might have a successful conclusion. That hope was, I know, shared by a great mass of the British people, by the Dominions and by a multitude of the friends of Great Britain and of India both in the United States of America and elsewhere. Unfortunately events have brought disappointment to these hopes, but I do not think that anyone in this country need feel regretful that the proposals were put forward or need blame His Majesty's Government or the British people for the unfortunate fact of failure to reach an agreement. Moreover, I should like to emphasise at the outset of what may, I fear, prove a rather long account of my Mission that, in my view, nothing but good will result both from the fact that the proposals were made and from the almost equally important fact that the War Cabinet sent one of its own number to discuss them in India with the leaders of Indian opinion. This method of presentation of the proposals has, I believe, demonstrated our sincerity of purpose.
Let me first say a word or two as to the background of my visit. Undoubtedly the moment was a difficult one, and a number of people have made the comment that it is a pity that something on the same lines was not done earlier. There is much in the relationships of this country to India that could be criticised, analysed and argued about, but I do not propose to embark upon any such argument, as it is far more profitable to spend the time available in an examination of the present and the future rather than in an attempt to allot blame for the past—that is a task which we can very well leave to the historians.
The moment was a difficult one, for three main reasons. First, because of the imminent approach of the enemy to the shores of India. The Japanese forces by land, sea and air were almost at the gates of India, and in such circumstances many things that might have been usefully discussed and negotiated in more peaceful times could not be dealt with because there was an overriding need to do everything in our power to carry out our duty to defend India from the foreign invader. Second, owing to events in the Far Eastern theatre of war, accompanied by a highly skilled though grossly misleading propaganda from Axis sources, an atmosphere of defeatism and of anti-British sentiment was showing itself in certain sections of Indian opinion. The Indians were, too, uncertain of the future and of His Majesty's Government's view as to what that future would be. Third, with the approach of self-government or Dominion status as a reality, communal differences of view as to the form of government which would be suitable for the future India had tended to become more definitely crystallised, and especially the idea of two separate Indias, which, even two years ago. was little more than a vague vision of certain extremists, had come to be the definite and accepted programme of the most powerful Moslem political organisation.
There were, of course, other factors in the situation, but these were the principal ones which increased the difficulties of obtaining any general understanding among the Indian peoples. It was the need for clarification of the situation and for the consolidation of Indian opinion in a favourable direction that impelled His Majesty's Government to decide that some positive step must be taken, and taken quickly. The objective and the hope of His Majesty's Government were that we might use these very difficulties of the occasion to bring together all the main leaders of Indian opinion for the double purpose of solving India's future and of reinforcing her defence against the invader that was threatening her shores. In order to accomplish this, two things were necessary: first, to give a clear and unequivocal promise as regards the future, and, second, to address an in- vitation to the various communal and political sections of Indian opinion to come together on the Viceroy's Executive Council for the immediate prosecution of the war in India. This invitation would have to be made upon the basis of the offer as to the future status of India.
In the circumstances of the communal situation in India at the present time, it must be borne in mind that the future is inevitably linked with the present, and I personally am quite confident that no more temporary arrangement could have been come to without some exposition of our future intentions. Had we attempted to deal only with the present, we should immediately have been met with a demand for clarification as to the future.
The difficulty of that communal situation has recently been emphasised by Mr. Gandhi in an article in "Harijan" of 19th April, where he makes the following statement: under the Act of 1935 or upon a more generous scale. Then, outside British India, were the Princes and their peoples, some of the Princes having special Treaty rights, arising in many cases over a century ago but the whole under the paramountcy of the King-Emperor.
Among those conflicting claims it was necessary for His Majesty's Government to act with the mind of an arbitrator and attempt to lay down some method by which the Indian peoples could determine their own future, a method that would be acceptable to as many shades of opinion as possible. It was, of course, wholly consistent with the trend of earlier declarations that if all sections of Indian opinion could agree upon some alternative method of self-determination, there would be no difficulty as to its acceptance by His Majesty's Government. In the past when it had been left to the Indian communities to agree upon some manner of deciding the future the British Government had been accused of relying upon the impossibility of agreement in order to perpetuate their own domination over India. It was, therefore, necessary, to devise a scheme whereby the refusal of a large minority to co-operate would not hold up the majority in their attainment of self-government.
So much for the considerations upon which that part of the draft Declaration dealing with the future Constitution of India was based and which resulted in the form in which it was laid before the Indian leaders and in which it appears on page 4 of the White Paper. The second part of the draft Declaration—paragraph (e)—was to deal with the immediate period before the new Constitution could come into being. It was left in vague and general terms but was subject to one vital and precise reservation. The reason for this form was that it was desired to leave open for discussion the way in which participation by the Indian leaders "in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations"—to use the words of the document—could be made most effective and immediate. The single express reservation was as to defence, and I will return to that point in detail, since it was one of the difficulties which arose in the course of the discussions in Delhi.
Let me now say a word about the manner of conducting these discussions. I Was most anxious that there should be no suspicion whatever that His Majesty's Government were handpicking those whom I saw, and, consequently, I asked the main organisations themselves to appoint those whom they wished to meet me. This they did, and they mostly expressed the wish that I should not interview any other members of their Working Committees. Certain individuals I saw, such as Mr. Gandhi, Sir Taj Bahadur Sapru, Mr. Joshi and Mr. Jayakar, the present or past Prime Ministers of all the Provincial Governments, the Governors of the Provinces and, lastly, but by no means least, the members of the Viceroy's Executive Council. It was to this latter body that I first disclosed the details of the draft Declaration, immediately upon my arrival in India, and after seeing them each one individually, it was to the same body that I first announced the failure of agreement. His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the service that has been done by the members of the Viceroy's Executive and especially by those Indians who have represented the interests of their peoples in that body, and it was for that reason that I considered it necessary to go first and last to them. As the House will know, I kept the draft Declaration from publication for the first week of my stay in Delhi, during which time I submitted it to all the principal Indian representative leaders personally. It then became clear that its contents were becoming generally known, and it was. considered better that it should be published, and this was done. The Indian Press were both helpful and fair, in that they gave the fullest publicity to all that I said to them at the Press conferences which I held every other day, while of course, at the same time, expressing their own views, often very forcibly.
It is worthy of note that the skilful and analytical minds of the Indians sometimes lead them to seek out and emphasise every point as to which there might be doubt, or disagreement, while they are apt to pass over the more uninteresting points as to which there is agreement. This sometimes gives the appearance of a much more keen and concentrated opposition than in fact exists. Upon the fundamental and vital point of their self-government and self-determination there was, I believe, no single case of disagreement, not excluding the representatives of the European community, whom I saw twice. Disagreement came upon the way in which that self-determination should be exercised and upon the transitory provisions for the government of India until the new Constitution could come into force. It must always be remembered that one legacy of the past is the unwillingness of any considerable section of Indian opinion to accept any British offer unless it is also accepted by at least one of the two principal bodies—Congress and the Moslem League. The state of internal opinion is such that unless there is to be a large measure of acceptance of an offer, no minority cares to lay itself open to the accusation of being the creature of British Imperialism. It was therefore to be anticipated, and we did anticipate, that there would either be a general acceptance or a general rejection of the draft Declaration.
Before I pass to the particular matters around which the discussions developed, I must make clear one other matter in relation to the negotiations. When I was sent to India by the War Cabinet I was given full authority to arrive at a settlement within the terms of the draft Declaration. That is to say, its essentials had to be maintained, a matter which I myself regarded as of importance, as it was the one and only way in which a general discursive and endless discussion could be avoided. But I alone was responsible for what was put forward to Indian leaders by way of explanation or amplification of details in the draft Declaration. I naturally maintained the closest contact with the Viceroy. We met, in fact, every night during my stay and discussed the progress of events. I also maintained the closest contact with the Commander-in-Chief, and both of them were most helpful, but the responsibility for what was done was mine and was not theirs. There was a tendency in some Indian quarters to suggest that they were responsible for the difficulties over defence. Nothing could be further from the truth.
There is, perhaps, one other person to whom I should make reference so as to avoid any misunderstanding, since his name has been somewhat bandied about in the Press. It so happened by coincidence that while I was in New Delhi an Economic Mission arrived from the United States of America, headed by Colonel Louis Johnson, representing directly in that matter the President. He was entertained by the Viceroy at his house on his first arrival, and while he was there one of the Congress leaders asked to see him. After consulting with the Viceroy and in accordance with the latter's advice, he saw the Pandit Nehru and in a most helpful conversation ascertained what at that time seemed to be the difficulty in the way of a settlement. I also called upon Colonel Louis Johnston by way of courtesy on his arrival and gave him as accurate a picture of the situation as I could. Thereafter, on my suggestion, and in accordance with his own personal desire to be of any assistance that he could, he had other interviews which were of great help in clarifying the situation. At no time did he act otherwise than in a purely personal capacity, and he, like two or three of my good Indian friends, merely did his best to give what help he could to the parties. I am personally most grateful to him, and I am sure the leaders of Congress are similarly so. But I wish to make it abundantly clear that there was no question of any American intervention but only the personal help of a very able American citizen.
Let me now come to the difficulties that arose. These were mostly concentrated into my discussions and correspondence with Congress leaders. The Moslem League did not deliver to me their objections until after they knew the results of my negotiations with Congress. The questions outside the Congress objections which were raised by other sections of opinion I will deal with separately. The difficulties fell under three heads, as will be observed from a perusal of the final resolution of Congress and the letter from the Congress President of 10th April which appear respectively on pages 16 and 9 of the White Paper. First were those relating to the method of determining the new Constitution; second were those relating to defence; and third were those relating to the general form of the interim Government.
So far as the first category was concerned, there were three objections. First, to the use of the word "Dominion" and its definition in the opening paragraph of the draft Declaration. This was not a matter of prime importance. The claim of Congress had been, as we know, for independence, and they were afraid that their followers would attach undue im- portance to the apparent limitations included in the definition, though I think the leaders themselves appreciated that with the added words in Clause (c, II) of the draft Declaration—
The second objection was a most substantial one. That was as to the right of non-accession of the Provinces after the new Constitution had been decided upon. In this relation I would ask hon. Members to study the two resolutions of Congress and the Moslem League and then to look at the draft Declaration. They will, I think, come to the conclusion that the draft Declaration does no more than Mr. Gandhi and other Congress leaders have constantly stated that they were prepared to do, that is, to keep open the issue of Pakistan, and they will also, I am sure, realise that the scheme of the draft Declaration is as fair a compromise as possible between the two extreme views. It was the duty of His Majesty's Government to find that agreement by compromise and not to give either party all of what they wanted and then force it upon the other. I do not personally believe that it is possible to find under existing circumstances a fairer solution of the problem, a solution which aims at and provides for a single united India but which admits that if in the last resort the parties cannot agree upon a form of Constitution which will enable them to work together, then the Moslems must be allowed in those Provinces where they can get a majority of the whole electorate to vote those Provinces out of the Union.
I should add one word of explanation as to the proposal which was made for effecting this non-accession and which does not appear in the document itself. The only ultimate test must be the wish of the actual majority of the adult male population in the Provinces—that is to say, a plebiscite. But it is not necessary to go to the trouble of a plebiscite where the result is a foregone conclusion. It was, therefore, suggested that every Province should pass in its Lower House a formal vote of accession to the new Union, but if there was a minority of 40 per cent. or more against that accession, then the minority should have the right to challenge a plebiscite, which should then determine the matter by a simple majority. I desire to emphasise once again that this whole scheme was no rigid and. unchanging plan, since it was expressed to be open to the Indian communities to agree among themselves as to a better alternative.
The third and last objection under this head was as regards the position of the Indian States. Congress has for many years now interested itself in the lot of the people in the Indian States and has declared that in any new Constitution these people, as distinct from their autocratic rulers, must have a say. They therefore protested, not against, the Indian States coming into the Constitution-making authority, but against their representatives being nominated by the rulers and not elected by the people. Unfortunately, in my view, representative institutions have not yet developed in the great majority of the Indian States, which must be dealt with as they are if they are to be brought into the Constitution-making authority. That participation, I believe, almost everyone desires, including indeed most of the States' rulers themselves.
His Majesty's Government would be only too glad to see as rapid a development of suitable representative institutions as is possible in all the Indian States, and if by the time a Constitution-making body came to be chosen there was machinery in the States by which popular representatives could be chosen, His Majesty's Government would be only too pleased. Already, as some hon. Members may know, a small beginning has been made in some States by more enlightened rulers and their Diwins, and I am certain this House would wish the British Administration in India to do all it can to encourage and expedite that development. But for the moment we can only deal with the situation as it exists historically. I need not trouble the House with all the complexities of the present constitutional position so far as the Indian States are concerned, since, under the draft Declaration, that position would have been altered only so far as alteration was necessary to adjust economic relationships with the new Indian Union or was caused by the action of the Indian States themselves in joining the new Union.
However, none of these three differences with the Congress Working Committee would have been decisive of a negative result. For though objecting and registering their protest, both Congress, the Moslem League and other bodies such as the Hindu Mahasabha, would have been prepared to co-operate upon the immediate situation despite the making of the Declaration of His Majesty's Government, and that is probably the most that one could expect in the circumstances. It would, in fact, have meant that the solution for self-determination laid down in the document would have then held the field with finality subject only to the various communities and bodies in India arriving at some alternative method by agreement.
There is one other matter with regard to the future that I must refer to, and that is the position of the minorities, such as the depressed classes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians and others. Each one wished, and not. unnaturally, to have some special and specific measure of protection included to cover its own case. But once self-determination had been promised to India as was proposed in the draft Declaration, it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to impose terms in the new Indian Constitution. To do so would be the negation of self-determination. We have, however, in the past given undertakings to these minorities, but in none of the cases other than that of the Moslems could these promises be dealt with by such a device as non-accession. The minorities are not sufficiently localised or self-contained, even in the case of the Sikhs, to make that possible, assuming upon other grounds that it was desirable.
Some other solution, therefore, had to be found. I have not the slightest doubt that these minorities, all of whom would have been represented in the Constitution-making body, in accordance with their strength under the communal award, would have obtained ample protection under the Constitution from the majority. Indeed, the forces operating within that Constitution-making body would have tended very much in favour of the minorities. But in view of our pledges we could not leave the minorities to rely upon this alone. We, therefore, inserted the express clause as to a treaty covering minority protection which will be found in paragraph ( c , II) of the draft Declaration. I should like to record here that neither Congress nor the Moslem League expressed the slightest objection to this method of treatment of the subject. The minorities themselves were, of course, unable to say at this stage what form of protection they wished for, since till the form of the new Constitution is known no one can state how within that form minorities can best be protected. That would have had to have been a matter for negotiation when the main lines of the Constitution had been decided upon. The minorities were all of them, I think, anxious to come into the temporary government had it been formed under the terms of the draft Declaration, despite their criticism of the scheme as a whole, as lacking more specific protection for their own interests.
I now pass to the second category of objection, that relating to defence. This is a matter which is far more complicated than might appear on the face of it, and one as to which there was a distinct division of opinion among Indians themselves. Upon one thing there was, I think, practical unanimity, and that was that the actual technical conduct of the war in India—the control of the Armed Forces for fighting purposes—must remain under the British Commander-in-Chief. Everyone realised that that was mere common sense, and so there was no difficulty with regard to it. The difference of opinion came when the responsibilities of the Government of India—as apart from from those of His Majesty's Government—were considered. These latter—that is the direct responsibilities of His Majesty's Government—would have been quite satisfactorily dealt with by having a representative Indian on the War Cabinet and on the Pacific Council, both of which posts were offered to the Indian leaders. It was first sought to clarify the position as between His Majesty's Government's direct responsibilities and those of the Government of India by a rewording of the final draft of clause ( e ) in the form in which it now appears in the White Paper on page 5: The document says.
It was in the attempt to get over this very real difficulty that I spent a good deal of my time at New Delhi. Various suggestions were made, and several formulae were tried, until eventually that one was worked out which became the final suggestion, and that is the only one with which I need now deal. It will be found on page 8 of the White Paper, Document No. (8). Its object was quite simple: to allocate to the Commander-in-Chief, as War Member of the Viceroy's Executive, all those administrative functions under the Government of India that were vital to his efficient carrying on of the war—that is, the governmental relations of all his Staffs, his General Staff, his Naval Staff and his Air Staff—while at the same time leaving to a representative Indian other functions of the Defence Member roughly corresponding to the list on page 8 of the White Paper under the heading, Annex (I), together with a number of other very important functions, examples of which are given under Annex (II) on the same page, and which would, in fact, have made the new Defence Department one of the largest of all Departments in India. The House will, of course, realise that numerous other aspects of defence, such as civil defence, communications, labour and so on, are already in the hands of Indian Members of the Viceroy's Council and would, of course, have so continued, although the personages might have been changed.
It was impossible for His Majesty's Government to go further with safety—and no risk could be taken at such a moment as the present on so vital and immediate a matter as the defence of India. Moreover, I do not myself believe that the minorities who contain some of the finest fighting elements in India—such as the Punjaubi, Moslems and Sikhs—would have been prepared to consent at this stage to any further devolution of defence responsibilities. The question did not actually arise, as His Majesty's Government were not able to go any further, but from the attitude of those minorities I am confident they would not have consented to any further transfer in this field. I believe that this latest formula might have gained acceptance, and at one moment, as the House is aware, the Indian people seemed to think a satisfactory solution had been found. I myself feel pretty sure that had Congress leaders been able to accept finally the draft Declaration and enter the new Government they would, upon the question of defence, have been able to rally their Indian followers behind them.
But it was not upon this issue that the final break came, although it was no doubt to some undefined extent involved in the breakdown. The final question which was raised at my last and long meeting with the President of Congress and Pandit Nehru was as to the form of the temporary Government that should be in power until the end of the war and, the coming into operation of the new Constitution. I had from the outset made it clear to all those whom I saw that it was not possible to make any constitutional changes except of the most insignificant kind prior to the new Constitution which would come into operation as a result of the labours of the Constitution-making Assembly. This fact had been accepted by everyone without discussion, and it was obvious that it was a practical impossibility to start upon the discussion and framing of a new Constitution at this present time, and that if such a discussion had been practicable and had been embarked upon, it would have occupied many months, during which nothing could have been done by way of forming a new Government. Not only so, but any such alteration now made would have been thought to prejudge the situation under the new Constitution, and that would no doubt have met with opposition for that reason. Therefore, any such step as recasting the Constitution at the present time was admittedly out of the question. This was made quite clear in my letter to the President of Congress, dated 17th April, where I stated: e ) of the draft Declaration in any way that was practicable consistently with the existing Constitution. It is always possible in such circumstances by mutual understanding and with the co-operation of both sides to do much, especially when all are intent upon a common object so vital and all-embracing as the defence of India. The question as to the formation of a new Government, how the members of the Viceroy's Executive should be treated and how the business therein should be conducted, were, of course, essential matters for the Viceroy, who had to carry on the Government of India and not for me as a member of the War Cabinet on a visit to India. I therefore told the Congress leaders that the general principle of participation or co-operation was laid down in Clause ( e ) of the Declaration, which stated: discussions with the Viceroy, once Indian leaders had made up their minds that they could accept the draft Declaration upon other points. I stated that I was prepared to remain in India in such an event until the new Government was formed, so that I could, if necessary, give any help that was required, but that I was not prepared to bind the Viceroy to accept any particular arrangement for the conduct of his Executive. I informed them, after discussion with the Viceroy, that immediately they decided to accept he would call the principal leaders into consultation as to the formation of his new Government and that the only British members upon whom the scheme insisted were the Viceroy himself and the Commander-in-Chief. I also pointed out to them that, if the conditions offered by the Viceroy were such that they could not see their way to accept them, they would, of course, be free, as would any other individuals, to refuse to take office or, if they found they could not work in the Government, they would be free to resign, though naturally I hoped that such a situation would never in fact arise.
I see no other way myself in which the matter could have been arranged, but the Congress leaders, as is shown by their final letter, apparently felt that they would not have the wide powers which they thought necessary for their successful participation in the Government. As I pointed out in my broadcast on this subject from New Delhi, the position of complete power asked for by Congress—which was not demanded by any other section of opinion in India—would leave the matter in an impossible situation. The Executive Council, once chosen by the Viceroy, would not have been responsible to anyone but themselves, or, in a somewhat loose way perhaps, to their political or communal organisations, and there would have been no protection therefore for any of the minorities. I am quite confident that none of the minorities would-have accepted such a position, and least of all the Moslems. It was on this issue that the final break came, followed, as I had expected, by a rejection by the Moslem League, for reasons the precise opposite of those stated by Congress, but all of them concerned with the future rather than with the present.
I regret, and His Majesty's Government regret, most profoundly that our efforts have failed. But do not let the House or the people of this country imagine that all the results of the War Cabinet's action and of my Mission are on the debit side. There is much, I think, on the credit side as well. First, there is the advantage which accrues from the methods which have been adopted in this case. Instead of a somewhat vague Declaration put out without previous consultation with leaders of Indian opinion, a precise and clear statement of a suggested solution has been discussed in India with all the Indian leaders by a member of the War Cabinet sent there for that particular purpose. And the fact that a member of the Cabinet was sent in the stressed circumstances of to-day has indicated the depth and genuineness of our desire to reach a settlement of our outstanding difficulties. Second, the content of the scheme has put beyond all possibility of doubt or question that we desire to give India self-government at the earliest practicable moment and that we wish her to determine for herself the form which that Government shall take. However great the criticism of detail may have been, no responsible Indian leader has challenged our sincerity upon that point. I think it would be accurate to say that this is the first time that such an assertion could be truly made, and it is a most important and significant fact for our future relationships. Third, the whole of the discussions have proceeded upon a basis of frank and mutual understanding and in an atmosphere of friendliness. Though the past is still perhaps too strong for complete confidence to have been established, I have the feeling that we have taken a step forward, especially so far as the younger elements in India are concerned, who are perhaps less influenced by the struggles and bitterness of the past than some of their older colleagues who still retain their leadership.
And, finally, the whole discussion upon the issue of defence has served to bring to the front the determination of the Indian peoples to defend their own country. Such statements as that made by Pandit Nehru, a man of great courage and determination, or the more recent attitude of Mr. Rajagopalachari must do much to influence Indian opinion. The representative of the Moslem League, Mr. Jinnah, and the leaders of other parties and communities, such as the Sikhs and the Mahrattas, have all of them expressed to me personally their readiness to stand with us in the defence of their country and to do their utmost to help in every way. It is unfortunate that they do not find themselves in a position to give that help as members of the Viceroy's Executive Council, but it is good to know that each in his own way is prepared to assist. We have been brought closer, I believe, to our Indian friends as fellow defenders of their country, but we are not yet so close as we would wish or even as is necessary for the most effective defence of India.
Looking back at this historical incident, an important incident in the history of both our countries, I feel no regret at the decisions taken by His Majesty's Government. I am convinced that they were just and that we have done all that we could in an admittedly difficult situation to bring about an agreement and a better understanding between the peoples of the two countries. It is, in fact, the past exercising its influence upon all parties that has proved too strong for us, and we must now leave the leaven of better understanding to work quietly towards an ultimate and satisfactory solution of the political problem. If we are to do this, let us at all costs forgo the transient satisfaction of blaming others and of encouraging those very antagonisms which have been a major part of our difficulty.
I stated when I left India that, in default of acceptance, the draft Declaration must be considered as being withdrawn. But this does not and cannot close the door to that closer co-operation which we desire to see in the defence of India or to the solution of the problem of self-government after the war. It means that His Majesty's Government have done their best to make their contribution to the solution of the problem both in the substance of the draft Declaration and in the method of its presentation to the Indian people. For the time being there is nothing further that we can do. We must be patient and open-minded, willing to consider any proposals upon which the Indian leaders can agree. But we must concentrate upon our duty to do our utmost for the defence of India, a task in which our great American Allies have generously come forward to offer their help, a help which we and the Indians alike welcome and appreciate. Many of the Indian leaders, too, will do their best to arouse the Indian peoples in their own defence, and I hope that by co-operation in defence we may move a step nearer to the solution of our problem.
Of this I am certain, that the Members of this House, the British people, and all well-wishers of democracy the world over will continue in the hope that through a successful resistance to the brutal aggression of Japan the Indian peoples will reach their goal of self-government and self-determination without internal strife and bitterness, and that thus India will emerge as a great equal of the free nations of the world able to make her full contribution to the future of a new civilisation after the victory of the Allied cause.
My right hon. and learned Friend will realise that we in this House expected the masterly analysis of his Mission in India which he has given us. It has been my privilege from time to time to listen to delegates reporting on negotiations and to listen to very good reports of conferences which they have attended. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour has also given reports of different conferences, and he would agree with me and the rest of my trade union colleagues that we have never been privileged to listen to a better report of proceedings and negotiations than the report we have received to-day. I must confess that I follow my right hon. and learned Friend with some trepidation, which is due partly to the magnitude and the delicacy of the task with which we are confronted, but mainly to a fear of saying anything which may make this difficult task more difficult. That feeling of trepidation will, I am certain, be' shared by all who intervene in this Debate. There will be those who will make the point, which my right hon. and learned Friend has already made, that this was a belated offer and that it was made at a time when it was not likely to remove the distrust and suspicion which form our main obstacle. There will also be those who will suggest during the Debate that this offer ought to have been of a more generous character.
I myself think that this is one of the greatest missions in the annals of history. It is a Mission which has aroused the interest of more people and more nations than any other mission. I realise that the interest of certain people was displayed for reasons different from that of the interest of other people. A good section of the human family was interested only to see the Mission fail, and, as my right hon. and learned Friend suggested, they used every device at their disposal to make it a failure. He knows as I know, and he finds consolation as I do in the knowledge, that a far greater section of the human family was anxious that his Mission should be crowned with a glorious success. He had the good-will of the vast majority of the human race. The Prime Minister, when submitting to the House the proposal that the Lord Privy Seal should go to India, used words which I felt would never be responded to. He said: one of the principal negotiating parties taking part was the Congress Party. Can this reference to that party have been expected to help in the negotiations:
However, I do not suppose that that speech caused the failure. I have a feeling that the failure was looming very large at the moment when the speech was made. What I would like to ask is, What happened between the 7th and nth April? My right hon. and learned Friend, in a full and clear statement, has tried to convey to the House what happened. There are, however, other people who are trying to convey to the world what happened, and they do not seem to agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. I would not suggest that anyone is not telling the truth, but I have heard delegates' reports from conferences, and I have heard them give different versions. I heard this morning of a rather interesting definition of Mr. Gandhi, and I know my right hon. and learned Friend, when I follow the definition with another, will not misunderstand me. I heard for the first time to-day that Mahatma Gandhi had once been defined as a saint brought up in a lawyer's office. I thought when I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend that he would not mind if I defined him as a lawyer brought up in a saintly home. He seemed to do his job pretty well like a lawyer this morning, and I detected here and there, especially in the closing passages of his speech, a hint of the saint, but I saw much more of the lawyer from beginning to end. I would not have expected anything else from him; I have known him too long.
After all, he agrees that the Mission has failed. Needless to say, all of us share in the regret which he must feel at having failed. He took on a very difficult job. The country admires him for having taken on the job. Speaking for myself, I do not know of any man more fitted for it. He did his job well, and need not come here to make any apologies for not having "brought it off." If he could not bring it off I should like to know who could. But is the right hon. and learned Gentleman not in danger sometimes of effacing himself too much? He identifies himself with the proposals put forward in a way which rather suggests to me that if the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet had not discussed this question at all but had said to him, "Will you go out to India with plenary powers and try to settle this question?" he would not have submitted any other proposals than those he did submit. I know the right hon. and learned Gentleman fairly well, and I doubt whether that would have been so. I do not ask him to answer, but I doubt it.
What happened? There is a War Cabinet. Differences in the War Cabinet over the Indian problem were as wide as the differences in India. The right hon. and learned Gentleman shakes his head. I have listened to some Members of the War Cabinet speaking on India and I know—though it may be that the Japanese menace has influenced their opinions about India. After the return of the Prime Minister from the signing of the Atlantic Charter I was privileged to see him in person—just the Prime Minister and I. I am sure the Prime Minister has no objection to this. During his absence I had made an appeal to him—it was on the 1st August last year—to make a pronouncement of a progressive character regarding Indian policy. He very kindly discussed the matter personally with a back bencher—I have been elevated since. What did he say? It is not for me to disclose here in detail what he said, but I want to say frankly that he has made some progress in regard to this matter since those days, though I doubt whether he has made such progress as to catch up to my right hon. and learned Friend or to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour on the Indian question. However, I am glad to see there is some progress; it is encouraging. We may find more progress as the result of constant contact with those two stalwarts in days to come. But I do not want my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal to efface himself too much.
This Mission failed. Our-problem is how to follow up the failure. I have had to do that a time or two. Every industrial leader has had to follow up failures, and it is never an easy business. The first essential of following up a failure is to make quite sure what caused the breakdown. I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for the help he has given towards trying to find out. He absolves all his co-negotiators from any responsibility for having caused the breakdown. I take it that he means that no representative of the Indian peoples went into the negotiations for the purpose of bringing them to naught, but went in honestly determined to make them a success. And I absolve the right hon. and learned Gentleman from any responsibility. His Parliamentary colleagues unanimously would absolve him from any responsibility. All the negotiators were in earnest, sincerely striving for a solution, and yet they failed. Well, it is a help to know that all the negotiators made an honest, sincere and genuine attempt to succeed.
Then we must look elsewhere for the cause of the failure. We have been given a very full statement of what happened, and have been told that, as is always the case in the course of negotiations, prospects at one time were a little bright, that they then went darker, and that then the breakdown came. I have lived through this week-end with the Lord Privy Seal's Mission and White Paper. I think I have read every line of it half-a-dozen times. I find that the seven sections whose opinions are stated in the White Paper were all unprepared to accept the draft Declaration. Some criticised it more fiercely than others, but they all objected. Some were very severe. It rather impressed me when I noted that the Indian Princes were not quite as severe as the rest. They did not criticise; they pursued a different course. I fancy they were advised by a lawyer as eminent as my right hon. and learned Friend. They said, "We have no objection to any changes in the government of India so long as there are no changes in our sphere." That is a very good attitude to take up. "We are safeguarded by treaties" —I agree, centuries old—"and so long as those Treaties are in duration and the Armed Forces of Britain will safeguard our interests we are not very much concerned. We will stay outside the battle more or less." As for the rest, they criticised. The right hon. and learned Gentleman rightly emphasised the main points of difference.
I want to deal solely with this question of defence, leaving my colleagues to deal with other points. When that difficulty arose my right hon. and learned Friend gave an undertaking to get into touch with his colleagues in the Government. He did so. I do not know what instructions he received, but I have a feeling that from that moment things did not go quite as well. I do not know why. I think that had he been told, "If it is in this realm alone that you are finding difficulty, if it is a matter regarding the Defence Minister and nothing else, you' have a free hand. That must not stand in the way. You do the best you can. Exercise your own discretion. Use your own skill. Follow your own course." Had he had that instruction as the result of this consultation I feel convinced that my right hon. and learned Friend might have got agreement on this one issue. I realise that that might not have meant agreement on the whole issue, and that there might still have been a breakdown, but agreement on that one issue would have been helpful.
What is our great task? To remove the feeling of injustice between India and this country and between the different sections of the Indian people themselves. Unless we can do that there is no hope for us. In my opinion, agreement on the question of defence, though it might not have resulted in a final settlement, though it might have been followed by a break down, would have been helpful, and I am sorry if in the instructions which he received my right hon. and learned Friend was limited in any way. My right hon. and learned Friend shakes his head. If he could do as he wanted—
I do not want to say I could do as I wanted, because naturally I had to consult my colleagues, but in fact, my colleagues accepted the suggestion I made.
Again we see a bit of the lawyer. He suggests—
I do not want to have a misunderstanding. I do not want it to be suggested that I was saying something that was not quite frank. That was not intended. I did, out there, see the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, and I came to a statement which I thought was the most that was possible consistent with our obligations and the War Cabinet did not dispute that statement. That was the eventual compromise we came to.
I understand that what happened was this: My right hon. and learned Friend faced the difficulty, consulted with his other friends out there and came to an understanding as to the best way to handle it, but since it was a variation of what he had brought out from this country he asked for endorsement and he got it. Very well. I accept that. I thought differently, but if he says that is so, I accept it. We are told that we cannot handle this question of the defence of India in the way that some of the Indian leaders would like it to be handled. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that for the moment the defence of India is her only problem. In fact, I was staggered by the brutal frankness of the Prime Minister in the first sentence of the statement he made on nth March, which was as follows: any unkind references to the Congress. Nehru takes up a different attitude entirely. I expect my right hon. and learned Friend has received a copy of this report, which gives a different viewpoint and puts an entirely different complexion upon what happened. I understand that other leaders have gone as far as to say that my right hon. and learned Friend is deliberately misleading this country on this issue. I know him too well to accuse him of anything of the kind. I ask the Secretary of State for India to reconsider the question of defence. Perhaps the best part of the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend was his suggestion that this was not the end and that the door has been kept open. Last week he used at the Press conference the very interesting phrase in which he stated that this was not an epilogue but a prologue.
We have to face the situation as it is to-day. My right hon. and learned Friend has tried to give us a very full account of why the negotiations broke down. I agree with him that the atmosphere was. never sure, although the atmosphere has been improved. The initiative has been taken by this country on this occasion and it would be a mistake to lose that initiative. I appreciate that it may have been an indication of the serious view we took of matters that we should have sent a member of the War Cabinet to India, but I hope that we shall not now sit back and say: "There you are. We went to the extent of sending out a member of the War Cabinet to try and negotiate a settlement, on proposals in advance of any that were ever made before. If at any time any section of Indian opinion feels like accepting those proposals, we shall be pleased to hear from them." That would be a serious blunder. We must take full advantage of the improvement in the atmosphere which has followed the recent attempts.
What can we do? It is easy to get up and criticise and especially easy to indulge in hostile and destructive criticism, but what can be done from this House of Commons to-day? I understand that the All-India Committee are meeting to-day in Allahabad. I am very anxious to know the result. I should be very sorry if anything were done to cause them to go further from us. I should like to make to my right hon. and learned Friend one or two suggestions which have been made to me. I expect he has thought about them already, and may be he has rejected them already. I do not ask him to accept these suggestions in their present form, but to consider them. I would not accept some of them as they have been put to me by those who are interested in Indian welfare. It has been suggested that circumstances may arise in the very near future in which substantial sections of Indian opinion may change and may feel that they would like to bridge the gulf. Has any arrangement been made to meet the possibility of such a change? Suppose the big, representative bodies in India were to do the unexpected thing and were to come to some agreement among themselves. Suppose they were to say, "We are still unable to accept the proposals that were made to us in that form, but we could accept them in an amended form." Suppose they asked the Government to receive in this country a deputation, representative of the leading parties in India, with full power to settle. That proposal does not appeal to me overmuch, but it appeals to others, and I suggest that it should be considered. If there are reasons why it should be rejected, perhaps we might hear what they are.
It is suggested also that a better atmosphere might be brought about if the India Office were merged with the Dominions Office. I know that this matter has been considered, but I do not know whether a definite decision has been come to on the matter. I know it has been considered because I noticed a leading article in "The Times" under the very attractive heading, "Retrieving a Setback." It contained the words:
My right hon. and learned Friend referred to the Indian approach to certain questions. I formed the same approach outside India; I saw the impossibilities first. Proposals should be examined. I may be told, "The Dominions come into this. You cannot do anything which may risk lowering their status." I may be told that some Dominions have objected to this move, but I am sure it would be a helpful move. The India Office mind has been a retrogressive one, to most of us, for a long time. My right hon. and learned Friend may have found it different, but I do not think he will have done so. It has almost been a fossilised mind for a long while, and it is not the kind of mind to judge in a matter of this kind. I admit there are difficulties but it is worth while trying to get over them. As the writer in "The Times" said, it would be some indication to India that we are prepared to do something.
I would like to preface my next suggestion by saying that I hesitate to make it because it brings in an individual. I have no desire to reflect upon any individual, but the Viceroy is now in his sixth year as Viceroy in India. He has passed through difficult periods. It would ill become me at this Box to say anything derogatory, and I have no intention of doing so, but I have a feeling that it would be helpful if his term of office were not continued when it ends this time. It has been continued separately twice. I doubted the wisdom on the first occasion, and I said so in this House. I doubt it now. I know that what matters is policy and not personality. I put great emphasis on policy, but I know that good policy sometimes fails because of certain types of personality. I am just wondering. I have no desire to cast any unfair reflections. I am wondering whether this suggestion is worth while considering. This may sound brutal, but I would put it to the Secretary of State for India for him to reconsider his decision. I have already said that the man best fitted to be sent out to India was sent out. That in itself is a reflection on the Secretary of State. He has held his post for quite a while. In this House he has given satisfaction, but I understand that that is not the case in India. After all, the crisis at the moment is vital. Some in this House, like myself, have their boys in India and they are concerned; I do not want any man who has not the confidence of the Indian people, and whose words do not carry the weight that the words of a Secretary of State ought to carry, to remain in office too long. I know that this sounds unkind and brutal, and that is not my nature, but I feel that the time has come when things of this kind have to be said, and I hope the Government will take them into consideration.
I have no desire to prolong this Debate, but I want it to be realised that we are at a very serious juncture in our history. We have been connected with India for a long time. I am one of those- who think that we have done good things for India. We have made mistakes—who could carry on relationships with India for so long without making mistakes?—but it is not for us to go into the past. Our purpose today is to do something to help us in the immediate future. We may need help. The Japanese menace may do away with all negotiations, and we may pay a serious penalty. This is a problem which cannot be shelved; it must be solved. Shelving this problem, in my opinion, will prove disastrous to us, but I am certain that its solution would prove disastrous to our enemies. Hence I hope there will be no question of a lull. We cannot afford the luxury of a lull on this issue. The door must be kept open, the effort must be continued, constant contact must be maintained, otherwise we may pay a very dear penalty.
I remember that less than a year ago my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall (Sir G. Schuster), whose knowledge of Indian affairs is very extensive and whose sympathy has always been so profound, published along with a co-author a book with the title "India and Democracy." My hon. Friend wrote the Introduction to that book, and I desire to conclude my speech by quoting a few of the final sentences of that Introduction. They read as follows:
The hon. Member for Ince (Mr. G. Macdonald) appears to be advocating not only a new Constitution for India but a new Constitution for Great Britain. If I understood him aright, he took the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to task for not sending out the Lord Privy Seal with plenary powers to do anything he liked.
I am sorry if I misguided my hon. and gallant Friend. I had no intention of criticising the Government for not doing that; my intention was to say that I believe that if they had done that, events might have taken a different course.
In fact, my hon. Friend deplores that that was not done, but under democracy we have such a thing as collective Cabinet responsibility, and I for one, although I number myself among the Lord Privy Seal's ardent admirers, should not have liked the idea of his running round loose in India doing what he liked. I am afraid the Lord Privy Seal must by now be very weary of the lavish compliments that have been paid to him from all quarters, but that circumstance will not deter me from adding my humble tribute to the splendid way in which he has discharged a most difficult task. He has exercised infinite tact and patience, he has brought to this task those rare gifts of his of balancing one argument against another and coming to a judicious estimate which raised him to so high a position in the legal profession.
In those admirable speeches and broadcasts of his in which he did so much to bring the problem into a proper focus before the eyes of the world, he made one mistake. He said that he had failed. But it is not he who has failed. In several respects he has succeeded beyond all expectations. He has clarified the situation, which was extremely obscure, and I believe he has laid a solid foundation upon which the edifice of the Indian Constitution can be erected. The cause, above all others, of the measure of success he obtained is that he has been a realist in this matter. It has often been said that one of the causes of our failure in India is that we have not exercised enough imagination in exploring the possibilities of the problem. Imagination has been the bane of Indian politics for the last 25 years. If only Indians and English- men could have faced up to the stark realities of the problem—and they are sufficiently stark—instead of imagining "a vain thing," I believe this problem would have been well on the way to solution to-day.
No better example of shirking the issue and obscuring it with the products of imagination can be given than the last-minute proposal made by Congress to the Lord Privy Seal. I do not understand it, but apparently it was to the effect that some kind of Cabinet should be established during the war on the model of the British Constitution. Let us examine this suggestion in relation to the problem of defence. No one in his senses would advocate now the withdrawal of the British garrison from India so long as the war endures. Under this Cabinet system which is suggested, the British Army would have a double and probably at times a conflicting obligation. At present the British Army is under the Commander-in-Chief, who is responsible to the Secretary of State, who in his turn is responsible to the Cabinet. Would the British Army under this Cabinet system be responsible to a Minister of State in India? If so, supposing that there was a divergence of view between the Cabinet in India and the Cabinet at home, which loyalty would have precedence? Imagination is not of much help to us in a dilemma of that nature.
We all know that the disposal of the British Army in India is only half of the defence problem. The other half is what is known as the Indianisation of the Indian Army. One of my excuses for intervening in this Debate is that I was a member of the Indian Statutory Commission, better known as the Simon Commission, and in that capacity it was my duty, along with my colleagues, to study the problem in Delhi with all the expert advice and guidance that were available. It must be remembered that only in 1918 were Indians competent to hold the King's commission in contradistinction to the Viceroy's commission. It was only in 1927 that a serious effort at Indianisation was made in the shape of the eight units scheme. We came to the conclusion that the complete Indianisation of the Indian Army would be a very slow process indeed. That is no reflection upon any Indian. It is obvious that it must take Some time before a considerable number of Indians would have command of regiments or military units, and, more than this, it would take a long time before a headquarters staff could be evolved by drawing upon the existing cadres of Indian officers of junior rank and limited experience, and so long as that process is not complete I for one fail to understand how, with the best intentions in the world, you can withdraw the British Army in India.
There is another difficulty inherent in the situation in the circumstances of the Indian Army. I do not want in any way to tread on toes in this matter, but these facts have to be faced. The fact that India is not a single nation is in no respect better exemplified and better illustrated than in the difference between the martial races and those who cannot be considered in that category. In the last war, for instance, the Punjaub, exclusive of the Ghurka battalions, provided 62 per cent. of the Indian fighting forces in the field. Contrast that effort with the effort of Bengal, which, with a population of 45,000,000, provided 7,000 recruits, while the Punjaub, with less than half that population, provided 349,000 recruits. I do not want to enlarge upon this subject, but I wish merely to say that such a circumstance as this will not make it any easier for a new Government of India to deal with the problem of defence.
Lastly, the danger to internal security, which the presence of the British Army does much to mitigate, will have to be studied in much more of a realistic spirit than has been evident hitherto among Indian leaders. Indian leaders are very prone to endeavour to draw an analogy between India and the Dominions. Apart from the consideration that there is not very much in that analogy, whenever it is drawn it seems to be an argument against the Indian leaders. I am not an expert in constitutional history; I believe the Secretary of State is. Perhaps he will correct me if my facts are wrong. But I believe I am correct in saying that Natal was unable to secure an earlier attainment of self-government because it would have been unable to deal with the hostile elements on its frontiers. The hostile elements on India's frontiers are infinitely greater than anything Natal ever had to cope with. Since 1850 there have been more than 70 campaigns on the North-West Frontier. I still have hopes that some such recommendation as was pre- sented to Parliament by the Statutory Commission might be adopted in the transition period until India is able to protect her own frontiers with her own Army. Starting from the perfectly legitimate assumption that Indian defence is not exclusively an Indian problem, but Imperial in its scope, we suggested that protection from external danger and aggression should not be regarded as the function of the Indian Government in its relation to an Indian Legislature until such time as India was competent to defend herself—that it should be the concern of the whole Empire and that it should be effectively controlled by an Imperial agency, in this case the Governor-General, in concert with the Commander-in-Chief, who would not be a member of the Viceroy's Council. Appropriations of revenue for this purpose would be authorised by the certificate of the Governor-General. As to internal security, every demand for Imperial troops would be put forward only by the express authority of a Governor of a Province. These were the recommendations of the Statutory Commission. Let anyone improve upon them if he can. No one has done so as yet.
It is an irony of fate that just at the psychological moment when we were never more united in a common purpose, and never more inspired by the same political ideal, there should be a rift in the collaboration between the Indians and the English, just at the moment when they are fighting side by side on the field of battle. This circumstance is to be all the more regretted when we reflect that all that divides us is not any external or domestic matter of policy in India—I can think of none which is in dispute—but rather the question of finding a constitutional formula. As to the particular form the Government of India should take, all races and creeds that I know of, however divergent their views may be upon other subjects, are agreed that they should have a democratic Government founded mutatis mutandis on the British model. Nothing could be more repugnant to the ethics of the Indians than Hitler and all Hitler stands for. Hatred of Hitler is the common denominator which blends together all shades of opinion, however unhappily contrasted in other regards against the common foe. Hitler's methods are the methods of Genghis Khan, though infinitely more disreputable. Hitler's form of government is the government of the Mogul emperors, without their sense of aesthetic values. What sort of régime would Hitler introduce into India? The same sort of régime that the Mogul invaders set up which caused India so many years of tribulation to cast off. There would be the same brutal tyranny at the centre, there would be the same spy system, the same system of torture and the same exactions from the agricultural peasant, the same extortionate tribute levied on the produce of his industry and toil.
One word upon the final note addressed by the Congress leaders to the Lord Privy Seal. Once again is dished up this accusation that the British Raj is responsible for the rivalry between Hindu and Moslem. Anyone who has been in India five minutes realises that it requires no encouragement from any outside influence to create or aggravate this deplorable communal schism. It cannot be laid to our charge. True it is that the main obstacle to constitutional advance has been the clash of interests between the two major communities, but that is for Indians themselves to determine. I have always thought that for politicians in England to take any side in these communal differences is to be thoroughly deprecated There is no sort of analogy between the alignment of political parties at home and the alignment of those in India. As we know, their divisions are mainly racial and religious, and furthermore there are numerous examples of striking anomalies which make it very difficult for any Member in this House to claim any affinity with any party in India. For instance, you will find in the ranks of the Congress a Hindu Brahmin who, if he is true to his faith and consistent with the ethics of his faith, believes not only that men are born unequal but that they remain unequal, who holds to a most rigid system of caste and privilege, reactionary to the last degree, and yet who advocates an extreme form of democracy. On the other hand, among the Moslems, who are, as it were, the Socialists of India, who reject caste and privilege, whose basic principle is the equality of man, you will find many in their community who are reluctant to regard democracy as an appropriate form of government for the Indian peoples.
It would be an evil day for India if we had a Secretary of State, a Viceroy, a Governor or any civil servant taking sides in these communal rivalries and disputes. It is utterly false to say that we have ever taken sides or aggravated this rivalry for our own ends. This burning rivalry has never been of the smallest service to us; and even if it had been, it would never have required any stoking from us to have kept it aflame. That not even the appalling peril in which India now stands can bring the two countries together is the measure of the problem, and affords definite proof that what I have said is true. It has frequently been alleged by Indians that our continually-reiterated promise to speed India on her way towards complete self-government is not sincere. It might be justifiable for us to insinuate that Indians are not sincere in their demands for full self-government when they must be aware that those obstructive tactics which some of their leaders have pursued are the tactics best calculated to withhold it from them. While I do not share the facile optimism of some hon. Members in believing that these evils in India can ever be resolved so long as one community in India is intransigeant, I insist that a golden opportunity is afforded to us by the world situation today, not only of binding the peoples of India together, but of binding the Indians to ourselves in the friendliest bonds that can unite us—collaboration in a common political purpose.
I do not know whether in this I differ from my hon. Friend the Member for Ince or not, but I have great faith, if my right hon. Friend will allow me to say so, in the Secretary of State. I believe that he is wholly sympathetic to Indian aspirations, his knowledge of Eastern affairs, I suppose, is unrivalled in this House; and I believe that Indians are increasingly aware that from the India Office to-day there is more likely to be assistance than obstruction. But the idea that we can grant India full Dominion status and implement to the full the Government of India Act, dropping all the safeguards, so long as the war continues, does not, I believe, find countenance in any responsible quarter. Looking back on our recent relations with India, I cannot resist the conclusion that there has been exaggeration on both sides. We may have exaggerated the dangers of accelerating the pace towards the final goal of full Dominion status: the Indian leaders may have exaggerated the facility with which full self-government could be operated. These exaggerations should be allowed to cancel each other out.
In the last war many of us in this House fought side by side with Indian soldiers. My regiment on one occasion shared a line of trenches with Indian troops. History repeats itself, and again Indian and British soldiers fight side by side, with the same ideals; again fighting shoulder to shoulder, but this time in the face of an infinitely greater danger and menace to those common ideals. Not the least valuable of the fruits of our victory—and victory surely will be ours—will be the fact that India and ourselves will be making the same contribution and the same sacrifice for the same political ideals. I believe that that will make for more rapid realisation of India's just aspirations than could be extorted by agitation, at the expense of that mutual friendship and understanding.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ince (Mr. G. Macdonald) addressed the House with that forthrightness and sincerity which always command respect. He has dealt in detail, and with some criticism, of the course of events and the conduct of the Mission of my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal. He was followed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bolton (Sir E. Cadogan), who dealt with matters in much greater detail than I propose to do. In general, I think that this is one of the occasions when one might more properly think of what may yet be done than ask questions about why certain things have not been done in the past. I do not think—and in this I lean towards the more optimistic part of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ince—that this Mission has been in any way a retrograde step. I think it marks an advance, and I associate myself at once with the opinion that it is upon the position resulting from this Mission that we must look for an advance, and also with the view that we should welcome from friends of India, wherever they may be found, any suggestion which is likely to help.
I rejoice that this Mission took the form it did. There has been far too much of what I think the Secretary of State has described as "long-range cannonading" between this country and India. One of the most distressing things in the relations between ourselves and the Indians for a good many years has been the fact that we have been quite unable to convince them of our sympathy and sincerity. Many of us have had no greater ambition than to do something to help. Words of ours, when sent across the wires to India, were immediately subjected to the keen, critical, and analytical minds, to which my right hon. Friend has referred, of the Indian peoples, and those words, which seemed to us to have a perfectly plain meaning, were credited with various hidden meanings, none of which they were intended to have. I hope that it will be possible in all future negotiations with the Indian people to meet them man to man with no artificial restrictions. My right hon. and learned Friend went to India with a plan which was, I think, inspired by the conscience of the people of this country. He went representing a united House of Commons; for I cannot feel that any notable section in this House does not approve his proposals as an advance on anything which was offered before. I believe that this Mission and this plan have carried the cordial good will of the overwhelming mass of the people engaged in this world-wide struggle. It has helped to put us right with the United States and the Dominions, where there have perhaps been doubts about the wisdom of our policy in the past. Not only must there be no weakening of our effort to build on this foundation, but we should, if possible, quicken our endeavour in every conceivable direction and be ready to consider any new ideas which may be put forward.
There is one aspect of this Mission to which I would draw the attention of the House. It relates to the background which was described for us by my right hon. and learned Friend. At this time, when cliques of dishonest men are seeking by every device of fraud and force to enslave the masses of the human race, when India herself is in grave peril from an enemy who is at present almost at her gates, an enemy whose record in the last few months will stand very high in the records of human infamy, even in the company of those who are conducting this present war, it will stand out as something grand that in these circumstances we sent out a Mission to India which had the reverse object of that which the most powerful forces are trying to accomplish in the world to-day, and that is, to extend the freedom of the world. Therefore, in this Empire and Commonwealth this Mission may stand out as the most reassuring effort in the somewhat lamentable history of Indian affairs in the last few years. That is my profound conviction, and I hope that the House will think that I am not putting it out of its true perspective. It is open to anyone who is so minded and may think it worth while to make a debating point—I do not think it is worth much more—and say that this effort was only made under the compulsion of events as a last-hour effort. If there are those who feel that way, I believe that history will put a very different interpretation upon the event. In any case the answer has surely been given by Mr. Gandhi himself when he said, in the passage quoted from "Harijan" by my right hon. and learned Friend, that the people of India must settle their communal differences to themselves or they will get no further. That is the effective answer to those who say that this great and inspiring Mission was made as a last-minute effort. Indians have failed to value that our honour is engaged in fulfilling the undertakings made as long ago as the Act of 1919. Indians are jealous of their honour. I hope they will allow us equality in this respect.
It is indeed an indubitable, if a lamentable, fact that for years past it has been impossible for this country to arrange for India any Constitution which would be acceptable to the people of India. It is only the people of India who can do that of themselves. I do not want to be drawn into a discussion of the technique as to the means by which the people of India might deal with the matter, but the sole point that I am making is that the duty is on the shoulders of the people of India to arrive at a determination of what is the best Constitution, and now we in this country have undertaken to accept the Constitution which is acceptable to them. I am sure we shall be prepared to consider any proposals to that end. My hon. Friend the Member for Ince mentioned one or two proposals which have been canvassed and which it was thought might be helpful at the present time. I find myself in agreement with some of them, but they are all minor points at the present time. This is a matter which is not to be settled upon the basis of detail, but I hope that such matters as the possible reconstitution of the Provinces and the boundaries of the Provinces so that they may coincide with the communal reality may be considered. Although it is a personal opinion, there is a great deal to be said for the immediate transfer of the conduct of Indian affairs to the Dominions Office. Many suggestions of that kind could be made, and I hope that none will he rejected out of hand. As I have said, I do not intend to make a long speech, but I wish to say that I and my fellow Members have always felt our responsibility as Members of the House of Commons for the conduct of affairs in India. I say this in order that it may be on record, that the attendance in this House when my right hon. and learned Friend was addressing it was the largest attendance on the subject of India that I can remember in a growing period of service in this House.
A grave time lies ahead in India. In the early days of the war the Congress Party passed a vote of sympathy with the people of this country, and we can assure them from this House of Commons that the sympathy which they extended and showed to us at that time is felt sincerely by every Member of this Assembly. They have a great part to play. They are not merely fighting for their own independence and freedom. They cannot, holding the views they do about Fascism and Nazism, stand outside the ranks of all these countries which are engaged in the great task of rescuing humanity. There are masses of people in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in all the subject countries, who look to her no less than to other countries for rescue from the ruin and misery in which they find themselves. I welcome most cordially the speech of Pandit Nehru in calling upon his people for action at this time. Mr. Rajagopalachari and others have spoken on that line, and I hope that they will proceed. The doctrine of non-violence, which makes an appeal to India and to many people outside of India too, is one which is only applicable when we are dealing with a foe who has a conscience. But the foes whom we are fighting to-day do not come into that category. When this period of trouble passes from the world it is my conviction that there will be a new fellow- ship of peoples who, in the words of the Prime Minister, will have been born out of the blood and the toil and the sweat of these days. I am convinced that it will be an abiding sorrow to the leaders of the Indian people and to all Indians as well as to all their friends if, when that time comes and these trials and troubles are over, we cannot turn our energies and thoughts towards the peace with the knowledge that India has stood, in this work of the rescue of humanity, by the side of every one of the United Nations without qualification or reserve.
I should like to say a word of admiration for the statement which the Lord Privy Seal made to us to-day. I cannot imagine anything more clear, more just or more impartial. When I read that the Lord Privy Seal was going out to India on this special Mission I, knowing him to be a lawyer and a very able lawyer, had the idea—perhaps quite wrong, I acknowledge—that he would arrange some cunning formula for the different contending parties in India which each might read in a different way and which, although it might make for a solution for a moment, might give rise to grave misunderstanding later. I am very glad that the Lord Privy Seal did nothing of that kind. He has come back and brought us a plain statement of the very difficult situation in India. He put the case clearly before the different parties in India—Congress, Moslems, Sikhs, the depressed classes and all the others—and I think that whatever the individual reasons for their refusal, the broad reason is really communal, and that is a difficulty which will have to be overcome by themselves before they can expect His Majesty's Government to go any further.
As the Lord Privy Seal has said, this Mission has not been in vain. It has, I hope, taught many people many things about India which they did not suspect' before, and has, I hope, not least of all taught something about India to the representatives of our Allies who went there by accident as it were and took no direct part in the negotiations but by their contacts had a certain influence on their course. I hope they have all learned something about the difficulties in India. I hope the Lord Privy Seal has come back a lot wiser—although I suppose that is not possible—about the situation there. Still, I cannot help thinking that if the right hon. and learned Gentleman had spent his time wandering about incognito in the villages of India, especially among the Punjaub and the other fighting classes, with as honest an interpreter as it was possible to find, he would have learned even more than he did by simply consulting the leaders of the different parties.
I was one of those who, seven years ago, fought the Government of India Bill to the very end. I am not sorry I took that part; we were a goodly company. We fought and we lost. I read a speech made in another place about two months ago by one of the great architects of that Bill, who said that it was now dead and that the people who were most anxious to heap most earth on its grave were those who took most part in promoting the Bill at the time.
There was great propaganda in the Press of this country to send out a negotiator such as the Lord Privy Seal. Some papers itched to get rid of our Empire as a thing of which we ought to be ashamed. They were anxious to shed the mantle of Empire. I read in the "Observer" of 15th March: heart into the conflict and electrify the common people in India into taking part in the defence of their country, I believe that idea is wholly false. For many generations the fighting men in India have been drawn from particular races. For instance, you will find in Hyderabad City the descendants of Arabs who were brought across 150 years ago to help the Nizam to keep order. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about China?"] The difference between China and India is very marked. In Southern India people have suffered for many years from malaria. They have not the stamina to take part in a real fight.
Why not?
The hon. Member can speak later. I have often had to suffer his speeches in silence. The fighting races of India chiefly come from the North-West—the Trans-frontier Pathans, Afridis, Mahsuds, Waziris, the Cisfrontier Pathans, Yusafzais and Khattaks. Of such men Major Yeats-Brown said the other day:
"They fight not so much for money as for honour."
In the great Province of the Punjaub you have thousands of splendid Punjaub Mohammedans. Then there are the peoples of Hindu faith, Sikhs and Dogras, Rajputs and Mahrattas, and outside India you have the wonderful Gurkhas. These are the fighting classes of India. Those people have produced no fewer than 1,000,000 volunteers. There is no registration in India as there is here, and 50,000 a month are coming in. [ Interruption .] If they have not been trained, it is because there have been great difficulties in the way of armament and in securing a sufficient number of officers. Perhaps it may be stated that the Government of India have not done enough to provide the necessary arms. That matter was very much gone into in a recent Debate in another place, and explanations were made of the difficulties of getting the machinery to India because it was thought that it was more urgently required here. I should like to read a couple of sentences from two letters which came by the last mail from people belonging to the fighting class in North-West India. Perhaps they will give the House some idea that there are other people in India besides the politicians with whom we are doing our very best to come to an agreement. Here is a quotation from one letter from a very responsible and highly placed Mohammedan:
"If the British Government do a deal with Congress, coerced by certain British newspapers, if when India is attacked and invaded Congress be in power, being a body of industrialists and capitalists, essentially of non-martial elements, it will, to save itself and the moneyed people from hardship, toil and suffering, surrender in the manner and fashion of Thailand. I hope the British Government will realise the folly of notions propagated by the 'Manchester Guardian' and the like about coming to an arrangement with Congress."
That was written by a highly-placed Indian to an Indian gentleman in this country.
He ought to be ashamed to write such things.
Order The hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) gets plenty of opportunities of addressing the House, and he must refrain from making a running commentary on other hon. Members' speeches.
Here is a quotation from a letter from another Mohammedan who has done great service for the British Government in his own country:
"The Government, as usual, is giving latitude to the Congress Fifth Columnists and others."
Those are the opinions of some of the people belonging to the fighting races. India is now in grave danger, and it is up to us to find out by every means in our power how we can lead the fighting races on to our side in order to save the situation. Even before the Lord Privy Seal went to India, Pandit Nehru very bravely called upon his people to defend India. On the other hand, Mahatma Gandhi has told them to die without offering resistance. I do not believe either injunction will be followed by the non-fighting races of Southern and Eastern India. I do not believe they will sacrifice themselves in war, to which they are not accustomed, even at the demand of their political leaders; and I do not believe they will apply the scorched-earth policy in order to carry out the pacifist ideas of Mahatma Gandhi. The whole defence of India depends now on getting some measure of agreement in bringing in the fighting races to fight for India, and not putting them in the background by unnecessary negotiations with some of the political parties. That is my opinion. I spent many years in India. I think hon. Members will understand that many people who have served in India for many years, and who have known the rank and file of the Indian races, in the villages and in the regiments, feel that these people are now being sacrificed.
I am afraid I cannot join hon. Members who have praised the Lord Privy Seal in connection with his Mission and his achievement in India. I listened very carefully to his speech, and, frankly, I thought he was most immaculately insensitive to the real forces that are at work and the real policy that ought to be applied in the present situation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman conveyed to me the impression that he was legalistically remote and that the Indian problem appeared to him as a sort of legalistic problem. As far as I could gather from him, he has no conception that we are now at a great historic period where great revolutionary forces are on the march, and that we in this country have to take our part in guiding those forces towards a higher realisation of betterment for men in India and in this country.
The Lord Privy Seal went to India as a spokesman of the Government. What Government? When I read the speech of the Prime Minister again, I cannot imagine how the Lord Privy Seal could have thought he could accomplish much in India. Knowing him as I do, remembering his past and his Left inclinations and desires, I cannot imagine how, after the Prime Minister's speech, he could have gone to India on his Mission. I need only instance two things in that speech. The first is the emphasis which the Prime Minister laid on the preservation of the rights of the Princes, a thoroughly reactionary declaration. The preservation of the rights of the Princes in this modern world does harm at this moment both to the interests of India and the interests of the Empire, and certainly it makes no contribution to the progress that we want to see come out of the war. I notice, secondly, that the Prime Minister went out of his way to emphasise the virtues of the Moslems. He said that the Lord Privy Seal, on behalf of the Government, would strive to procure the necessary measure of assent not only from the Hindu majority, but also from those great minorities, among which the Moslems were the most numerous and on many grounds the most pre-eminent. I do not know whether that was an invitation to the Moslems, but certainly it appears to me to have been a direct incitement to the Moslems and, therefore, to have prejudged the issue almost before the Lord Privy Seal went to India.
Recently, I was reading a passage from Disraeli's "Sybil" in which it is said that it needs a man of great vision and courage to write British history. If we had that man of great vision and courage to write British history, it would be found that the men who appear to be doing things are not really the men who are doing them, and that behind the men who appear to be doing things and carrying out policies are other forces and other persons who never appear on the surface. I am rather afraid that the Lord Privy Seal, when he went to India, although he was the messenger, had behind him those forces of reaction, those forces in this country which even now in this war have not realised the revolutionary and progressive nature of the war that we are conducting. A policy of reaction for India is no contribution to the destruction of Fascism. It is quite the opposite.
Great emphasis has been laid to-day on the communal differences. I have great suspicions about this. The Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winter-ton) shakes his head, but I always take notice of him when matters of this kind are being discussed, because he is very representative. I gather from speeches which have been made to-day that there are a great desire and a great need to defend the Moslems against the Hindus, that the Hindus are in overwhelming numbers, and if they were to be given the right of self-government, this large body of people would tyrannise, or, to put it at a lower level, would give no justice to the Moslems. Curiously enough, that was not the argument of the Prime Minister in 1932. Quite by accident, I happened to find on a bookstall a volume of speeches on India by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill. I should like to give the House a few quotations. He stated in a speech delivered in this House:
I am not going into the details of the proposals, but, quite frankly, I must say that it does not appear to me that the Lord Privy Seal had anything concrete to take out with him. There is no democratic substance or meaning in the proposals. In some past Debates in this House hon. Members have decried the power and influence of Congress, and this has been echoed in "The Times." We were told in a number of speeches of the declining membership of Congress and of its more and more unrepresentative character. The amazing thing is that when the Lord Privy Seal went to India he could not escape dealing with Congress for most of his time. The breakdown resulted from the claim for a national Government and the transference of control over defence. I hold that there is no solution to the problem until we give India self-government. I hold that there is no reality in self-government unless the control of defence passes over to India. I have been taught the meaning of defence by the Prime Minister himself. He was pressed to give it up in this country, but he would not. Power is in the hands of those who control the Armed Forces of a State, and the reality of democracy in India depends on the control of the armed powers of the State. There cannot be any getting away from that. But the Lord Privy Seal would not move on that. So long as we stand on that basis we shall be unable to solve the Indian problem.
The Lord Privy Seal has said that there can be no further offer from this country, and that the next move must come from India. If that is so, it shows the bankruptcy of statesmanship in this country, which is utterly unable to realise the responsibility of government. Why do we not pass over the control of the Armed Forces of India to the Indian people? Why do you not respond to their demand and rouse and lead the millions of Indian workers against Fascist aggression? Because the Government envisage the war from a different angle. The war in the East for this Government is a war of Empire, and if they conceive of it as a war of Empire, they are going dangerously near to losing the Empire. There is only one concrete step that they can take if India is to realise herself as a nation fighting a national battle, and that is that the Indian people and their representatives must have control of it. The responsibility must be placed upon their shoulders.
I take India as the test case of the general attitude of the Government throughout the whole war. To me the tragedy is that the war, and the world situation, the fight against Fascism, demand that the control shall be directed from the Left. It has been directed from the Right. It is the Right that is applying the policy in India, and so long as that happens, so long as we are in that position, the war will never achieve the object of liberation throughout the world that it ought to achieve. The Lord Privy Seal went to India with great hopes, not because he was an eminent lawyer, not because he was the most eminent lawyer, but because the forces of the Left had faith in him. They believed that he might go out with a Left policy. Dozens of people have said to me, "What do you think about Stafford going out to India? I am sure he will do something, not merely to settle differences between us and India but as a concrete case of the Left coming back into more and more power in the conduct of affairs at this moment." They looked to him. My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman) has even more faith in the right hon. and learned Gentleman than I have. He thought he would have been going along the right road. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Left road."] Yes, independence for India. I am not ashamed to say it quite openly. There has been far too much mealy-mouthed talk to-day. It has been said so often that I do not believe any intelligent person in India believes it at all.
In these matters the Left in this country looks to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. For the moment he has bitterly disappointed. The Right is very pleased. I hope he is not very pleased. I ask him from his vantage point in the War Ministry not to be encased in solid, inert, concrete, by those who are around him in the Cabinet. Let him lead, in India and elsewhere, the forces of the Left. Let him make this war worth fighting for. It is not worth fighting for merely and solely to defeat Hitler. It is something far beyond that. I appeal to him, therefore, to take his courage in both hands. He went there with the mantle of Moscow on his shoulders, not because he represented any organised body of opinion in this country, like the trade unions or even the Labour party. Because he had come back from Russia he was a symbol to millions of people in this country on the way the war should be won, or the action that should be taken and the objects for which it should be fought. His failure in India has somewhat tarnished his reputation. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I am glad to find that my Labour friends are supporting him now. He is evidently coming back into the party. I ask him to renew his efforts to settle the Indian business on the only principle upon which there can be any hope, and that is the immediate full recognition of the Indians' right to self-government, and in that, curiously enough from his point of view, I can assure him that in every committee of the Labour party that has considered the matter in recent months he has a full backing. The Labour party has decided recently, in more than one of its organs, that India should now have full, free independence, and I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman to fulfil his mission in a way which will not only satisfy Indian public opinion, but which will make the war a reality to all the common people throughout the world.
It is hardly possible to imagine two speeches in greater contrast than those to which the House has just listened. I think the speech of the Lord Privy Seal was more realistic than either of those two extremes, and I should like to bring the House back more closely to the themes with which it dealt. I am indeed very much tempted to deal with many of the things the last speaker has said, but I will resist the temptation. I will put only one point to him. When he was talking about the unreality of this so-called pretext of communal differences, he said, quoting from a speech of the Prime Minister's several years ago, that the Moslems needed no protection, because if they felt themselves in trouble, they were armed and they were ready to sharpen their swords. Is that the sort of India that the hon. Member wants to see, an India in which the Moslems, because they are afraid they may not get political justice, will defend themselves with arms and by sharpening their swords? I am forced to say with the greatest regret that there are many of us who know India and who think it very likely that that is the sort of India we shall see if a political constitution is established which has not the support of the main communities. That is a real danger which the House should realise.
I would like, however, to come back to my right hon. and learned Friend's speech and to his Mission. I am one of those who think it has accomplished a great deal of good. I am grateful to His Majesty's Government for having made the Declaration that they did and to my right hon. and learned Friend for the way in which he handled his Mission. He was able to sit down at the same table and to have frank talks—not at arm's length, but directly man to man—with the main political leaders, a thing which has not happened for many years. In all that he said there was nothing vague or equivocal. He made our position quite clear and that is what Indians like. They are tired of sanctimonious sermons and long-winded pronouncements in official "mandarinese." And so my right hon. and learned Friend has helped by his Mission to establish not only respect for himself, but a proper understanding of the true situation. It is, I submit, extremely important that we should face realities in this matter at this critical time. In one respect indeed I do not think that my right hon. and learned Friend made quite enough of the magnitude of the advance made by the Declaration of His Majesty's Government as interpreted by himself during his conversations. It is important that the realities which underlay it should not be minimised or clouded by political controversy and misunderstanding. So although my right hon. and learned Friend went over some of the points I will venture to go over them again.
The Declaration involved, first, a definite promise that there was to be a new Constitution as early as possible—immediately after the war. Secondly, the framing of that Constitution was to be in the hands of an Indian elected body—on lines which have always been pressed for by the Congress Party. Thirdly, the Declaration said—and this is an important point which my right hon. and learned Friend did not mention—that all those matters which concern the relations between Britain and India were not to be allowed to interfere with the actual Constitution but were to be dealt with outside by a treaty. Fourthly, the Declaration stated that the Constitution was to provide for completely free self-government. For that purpose it contemplated Dominion status, but it used words to show—and my right hon. and learned Friend himself made this still more clear—that, whatever the strict formal constitutional position may be, Dominion status does in fact carry with it a right or power if so desired to declare independence. Lastly, the Declaration made clear that the differ- ences between communities were not to be allowed permanently to hold up constitutional advance. The Gordian knot was to be cut by allowing communities, if they so desired, to contract out. I would put it to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberavon (Mr. Cove) that it is impossible to conceive any statement which could go further to meet the demands of the extreme nationalist parties. It covers everything they have asked for, and it is ridiculous to argue, after this, that we are fighting this war with Imperialistic aims at the end of it as the goal at which we are striving.
But all that concerns the future goal, and we have to come back to the reality that the negotiations broke down. It is important that we should be clear in our minds on what grounds they did break down. The fundamental reality is simple, and I regret indeed that so much was said about technical details as to what should be done in dealing with the position of the Defence Minister. That never really was the fundamental difficulty. The fundamental difficulty was this. We have said all along, with complete honesty, that we cannot transfer real constitutional responsibility on to the shoulders of Indian Ministers except on the foundation of a properly balanced Constitution, which protects the rights of the various communities of India and is accepted by them. We have said, "We want to transfer constitutional responsibility to you as quickly as we can, but to settle that fairly balanced Constitution is a long and complex matter." No one knows better than this House how complex it is. We have said, "It is hardly possible that all that complex business should be handled during the war. Meanwhile, come in and work with us within the framework of the existing Constitution. Lend us your experience and guidance, and use your influence with your own people to help towards the goal of winning the war." To that the reply of the Congress party leaders has been, in effect, "Give us Dower now without waiting to discuss the complicated provisions of the Constitution. Give us the power and we can easily settle with the other people. If you do not give us full constitutional power now, we will not take any share in Government." Could we accept a demand like that? What would have happened if he had? What would the Moslems and the Princes have said? But it is not only what they would have said—there are deep principles involved. We cannot betray the other communities for the sake of appeasing a powerful majority And it would be betrayal to give away this constitutional power without their agreement. This is the vital point. This is the real issue which has been brought out so clearly in the White Paper and the correspondence. This is the issue to which Nehru is now referring in his speeches. Therefore it is important to be perfectly honest with ourselves on this issue and for each of us to ask himself exactly where he stands. Nehru and the Congress leaders have accused us of boggling over formalities, of not recognising the urgency of the times. They have said, "In the very height of your own crisis in 1940, your Prime Minister proposed union with France. That would have involved immense constitutional change. Why not show similar imagination now? To say you cannot do these things in time of war is a mere excuse."
That is a serious point, and, as I have said, it must be faced honestly. I can speak only for myself, but I say that if there were a united India to deal with we could do something, even in the crisis of the war. But we cannot allow the emergency to be used by one of the parties, even though it may be numerically in a majority, to short-circuit the whole problem and get possession of complete power with disregard of the views and rights of the other parties and other communities. As my right hon. and learned Friend said, any arrangement of that kind—however much you called it provisional—which definitely transferred constitutional power could not avoid affecting the whole of the future.
It seems the reality of this need for agreement within India is being faced in a new spirit now. My right hon. and learned Friend referred to Gandhi's recent statement and I think it is significant that this facing of realities has brought from Mr. Gandhi that clear pronouncement that until India can settle her own internal differences she is not fitted to claim independence. I think too that the action of the Congress Party of the Madras Legislature led by Mr. Rajagopalachari, now facing up to the need of coming to some agreement with the Moslem League, is very significant. Perhaps these are signs of hope for the future. But for the present they are only signs, and in the meanwhile we have to carry on.
The question then which we should all be asking ourselves to-day is: What does this mean, and what are our responsibilities in the immediate future? The first thing that we have to recognise is that the full responsibility has fallen back clearly on the shoulders of the British Government and, above all, responsibility for the defence of India. That demands vigorous efficiency and ruthless energy. That is the acid test by which we shall be judged not only by India but by the world. I want to put to the Government a question which I have often put to them before. Have we shown those qualities of ruthless energy and vigorous efficiency sufficiently clearly in the past? I have often expressed doubts, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State knows, whether India's potentialities as one of the great arsenals of the democracies have been visualised on a sufficient scale. On several occasions I have been to see him with representatives of all parties. He has met us very frankly. About a year ago I thought that everything possible was now to be done. But I confess that since then. I have become once again oppressed with doubts about it. I am confirmed in that view by letters I have received from India and I have been recently confirmed in that view by an independent witness. Colonel Johnson, about whom we have already heard to-day as the representative of the United States in India, is reported in "The Times" of 23rd April to have said, speaking to India: about political issues. They will all disappear in chaos unless we take up this responsibility which we have to defend India and fulfil that responsibility to the utmost.
None the less political issues remain of importance because they must react to some extent on the response we get from the Indian people in this war effort. Therefore, do not let us because of this political deadlock take up the attitude that everything in the political field has gone dead. The human and political contacts must be kept alive. Faith in the future must be preserved. There are many aspects of importance in that field. As a preliminary I would say—and I was glad that my right hon. and learned Friend said this—that we must understand each other's position. It is no use saying that the Indian leaders have been narrow and unreasonable. We have to realise that we are not dealing merely with people who are independent personalities but with leaders of political parties, whose actions must be governed by the forces of the parties that stand behind them. I am sure this House, and particularly hon. Members opposite, will realise that to ask political leaders—and this is perhaps some parallel to the situation—to take their place in a coalition under a Government which it has been the whole essence of their existence to oppose is to ask them to do a very difficult thing indeed, particularly if they feel doubt as to whether that Government has shown all the vigour it ought to have shown in the conduct of the war. I think that one has to face the fact that to ask the Congress leaders to come in and work with the British Government in any interim arrangement has been a very difficult thing to ask. Though I have often suggested ways of bringing them in, I have felt too there was little real chance of getting them to accept anything except the final stage when they themselves can finally take over and form their own government. These are human issues and political issues with which we in this House are very familiar, and I think we ought to understand them.
Beyond that I hope, and what we read in the Press gives us some justification for that hope, that leaders like Jinnah and Nehru will, although they maintain complete freedom to criticise the Government and remain outside it, yet play their part as they think they can play it in stirring up the country to the terrible peril of the immediate urgency. I think it is that hope and that belief that we ought chiefly to emphasise when we are talking about the position to-day.
Beyond that I venture to think that there are other things that can be done. I hope very much that everything possible will be done to get really representative Indians to come over here to accept the offer of the Prime Minister to sit with us m the War Cabinet and on the Pacific Council. I also want to urge that everything possible should be done to get the Provincial Governments back into office. There is nothing in the present situation or in all that has happened recently to make it impossible for the political parties to come back into power in the Provinces. And that is important for, after all, if it is a question of stirring up the people, of organising a Home Guard, of getting the civil population to realise what they have to do, the Provincial Governments are the Governments which are in closest touch with the people.
Let me turn to another matter. Although it may be regarded as a somewhat unreal suggestion, I urge that Indians should now, even in the present emergency, choose men to sit down to think over all the preliminaries to the preparation of a new Constitution. It is no use flinging the whole problem, without any pre-digestion, into the realm of plebiscites and constituent assemblies, on the scale of the constituent assembly indicated in the White Paper. There are many details to be thought out. The Congress Party, on their side, if they desire to keep India united, should be thinking out what they can do to safeguard minorities and allay their suspicions. The Moslem League, too, if they want to contract out, should be working out precisely what that will mean; how the territorial divisions can be arranged so as to give the maximum protection to their own people; how to decide what their relations should be with the other Indian Union. Lastly, I urge that if some measure of agreement could be reached between the various communities as to the interim arrangement it should be made clear that the main obstacle in the previous conversations would disappear and that the whole position might once again be reviewed.
These are all practical steps to bring nearer the future goal. They might help to revive the spirit which characterised the opening of the recent conversations. They would help, too, to keep before the eyes of all the Indian parties that, in fighting for victory in this war, they have before them a prospect which is really worth fighting for—something more than a vague and nebulous dream. I have always thought that a belief in post-war purposes has a very real bearing on the war effort itself. I always thought it a mistake to separate our post-war purposes from our immediate war effort and to put them into separate watertight compartments. I believe that people fight better if they know the post-war goal towards which they are striving. Therefore, I would like to end with the expression of one thought, casting my eye into the future. I recognise the reality of the communal problem and the difficulties of reaching agreement in India. I recognise that those difficulties cannot be disregarded and yet that they cannot be allowed to become a permanent bar to India's constitutional development. I accept as necessary that there may have to be some division of India into separate communities. I agree, therefore, that the British Government have been right to face that possibility. But when I read in the White Paper about "contracting out," and plebiscites, I am painfully reminded of the provisions that were made for dealing with Europe after the last war and of the sequel to those provisions.
Are we never to get beyond these racial rivalries? Cannot India do better than that? It is not for us to preach to India unless we can do better ourselves. Our future, as well as the future of India, must depend not only on success in this war but upon the way in which the aftermath of the war is handled. If we in the Western Democracies can show that the freedom which we have won is to be used in co-operation for the general progress of all classes and all nations, and if we can show, too, that we have the energy, imagination and ability to achieve this purpose in terms of security for peace and social progress, then we shall be able to appeal in a more convincing way for unity in India and for Indian fellowship with us and our Allies.
Most of the speeches delivered to-day have alluded to the supreme task which the Lord Privy Seal took upon himself when he undertook his Mission to India. There is a general feeling that, far from the Mission being a failure, the Lord Privy Seal has prepared the ground for a further very considerable advance in Indian self-government. I believe the hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. Cove) struck the other note of violent criticism, but even it sprang out of a desire to give India Home Rule immediately. We have to recognise that we are faced with a crisis, as the hon. Member eloquently put it, in the history of the British Empire, but it is not the first crisis that the Empire has had to face.
The first crisis, I presume, was when we lost the American Colonies. Anyone who has read the history of that period realises that those Colonies might well have been kept in allegiance to this country if a statesmanlike attitude had been adopted towards them. We passed through another crisis, which nowadays we often forget, when a great administrator decided to set up a different Constitution for Canada. We owe the allegiance of Canada largely to the fact that he took the bold step of reversing the policy of the Government, and therefore one of the most prosperous and powerful of the Dominions is still attached to the Empire. May I remind hon. Members of a similar crisis in South Africa at the beginning of this century, when that very rugged Liberal statesman had the courage to give Home Rule to South Africa? Since then, we have received numerous benefits from South Africa, not the least of which was the presence in the War Cabinet during the last war of one of the greatest statesmen that the Empire has ever produced.
We are at another crisis. We ought to address to ourselves the question whether the Lord Privy Seal made a real, honest attempt to meet the much more difficult situation in India when he went out there on his recent Mission. I need not emphasise the considerable difference there is between India and the other Dominions to which I have referred. With slight exceptions, the other Dominions are more or less homogeneous. They are populated very largely by European people, but even in Canada, during the last war, the division between the French and British residents was pretty profound, I believe. In India, we face an entirely different problem, both in magnitude and in depth, between the different sections of the community. Religious difficulties are very serious, but when we criticise the conduct of the religious communities in India, we are apt to forget that differences between sections of the Christian Church have divided our own country for, more or less, a century, although those sections profess to belong to the same Christian Church. When there are profound differences such as there are in. India, we realise at once how difficult it is to bridge the gap between them.
I do not wish to take up the time of the House by going in any detail into some of the questions so ably placed before us to-day by the Lord Privy Seal. I am left with the feeling that even he finds it rather difficult, when he analyses the position, to say exactly why the negotiations should have broken down. They apparently did not break down over the question of the Constitution that was to be set up. That is a matter for the Indians themselves, and presumably they all agreed that there would have to be some kind of interim Constitution. Then there was the question of defence. What I felt was what really brought the negotiations to disaster was the element of suspicion, and I think that to-day's Debate, and particularly the statement of the Lord Privy Seal, will have done a great deal to break down suspicion. I am sure that hon. Members of this House are in deadly earnest in their desire to concede the fullest measure of self-government possible to India at the earliest possible moment, but we must not blind ourselves to the difficulties.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon suggests that we should immediately give a Constitution to India. I take it that the Lord Privy Seal went out with the idea of attempting to lay the foundations of that Constitution. After all, constitution-building is a very difficult art, and very few people have succeeded so far in building constitutions. Take our own Constitution here: it is very difficult to say exactly what its elements are, but it works all right. [An HON. MEMBER: "The Prime Minister offered one to France, did he not?"] Had France acted upon it, I expect we should have found very considerable difficulties. What the Lord Privy Seal did was to anticipate the difficulties and try to remove them, before a Constitution could be granted. I am glad to think that the result of his visit and of the Debate today will be to convince Indians that we are all extremely anxious that the greatest experiment in democracy in the history of the world should be attempted as soon as the Indians desire it. We want an overwhelming expression of a united desire to have it; it will be the most glorious thing that can possibly come out of the crisis we are living in at present.
I only wish to address the House for a very few moments, and I would not do so, in view of the number who wish to catch Mr. Speaker's eye, but for the fact that to some extent I have had a unique experience of Indian affairs in so far as I was actually a Minister at the India Office longer, I think, than anyone else has been. I have served on two Round Table Conferences, and I do not know how many other conferences and committees, and I know intimately all the protagonists—because they are protagonists, let me remind the House—in the struggle which is going on, which has been going on for a long time, and which will go on for a long time to come between the leading Indians under whatever system of government there is in India. Perhaps I might congratulate the right hon. and learned Gentleman, not because it has become the habit to do so, but because it represents my most sincere views, not only on the work he did during his Mission, but on the clear and succinct account he has given of it to-day.
I want to address myself to two points. I am not sure that even my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall (Sir G. Schuster) sufficiently emphasised the nature of Hindu-Moslem differences. It is not an unimportant fact that we talk of communal differences. "Communal" has a distinct meaning. There are two great communities in India. They are much more than parties, they are two great communities, Hindus and Moslems, and I wish to say something which I hope will offend nobody on either side of the House. I wish to make an observation which obviously must be made with great caution. I have a great number of Moslem friends, not only from the time I was in India but also from certain work which I did in the last war in connection with the Arabs. I lived with Moslems, slept side by side with them, ate out of the same bowl and knew them intimately, and I hope it will not be wounding to any of my hon. Friends if I say that a great many Moslems believe that there is a feeling against them in this House. They say that the Hindus or the Jews can get representation; they say that you can frighten the House of Commons about Palestine by putting the Jewish case, or that you can frighten it by putting the Hindu case, but the poor Moslems, who are the largest community in the British Empire outside the Christian community, cannot get a hearing. I have always tried to convince my Moslem friends that that is completely untrue and that any case will get a hearing in this House, but I have perforce had to add that it is unfortunate that in many cases the Jewish or the Hindu community seem to produce better briefs for the information of hon. Members than do the Moslems. Possibly the latter are not as acute politicians.
I want to go a step further and say something which I do not think will be misunderstood. In the past—and I think anyone who has had experience of India will agree with me—the Moslems have felt that for reasons partly connected with the extremely intellectual character of the Hindu religion their Moslem representatives were not as good at putting a case as were the Hindus or the Jews. They no longer feel that to-day. They have found in my friend Mr. Jinnah one of the most acute analytical brains that any community has had in India for many years. Quite apart from whatever views we may hold about Britain and India or the British and Indian points of view, let us deal with the situation as it is. If any of us belonged to such a very numerous community, of which large numbers are fighting in our Forces to-day, and if we had a leader of the nature of Mr. Jinnah, we should certainly not think that this was the time for abating any of our claims. If we were to hand over—if we did everything that my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Mr. Cove) suggested, if we went out of India to-morrow, taking all our troops, and said we would leave India to fight the Japanese as best she could, there would still be the Hindu-Moslem problem, and when my hon. Friend says that we could get a settlement of the communal issue, I feel bound to ask him how. That is a question which everybody has been asking. How are we to do that? We can only get a settlement of the issue by reason of the willingness of both sides in the controversy to come to a settlement.
May I say, in parenthesis, that I was one of the principal opponents of the Prime Minister on the occasion of the Government of India Bill? I think he did a great deal of harm at that time, but I do not think it is fair to associate the harm he did then with the atmosphere today. [ Interruption .] I think he has changed. He has certainly changed in other respects. The Prime Minister was perfectly entitled to his point of view then, and it is only fair to him and to us to point out the existence of this tremendous issue. It is too often assumed that the mere conferment of self-government in itself solves the religious or racial difficulties. It certainly has not done so in the case of South Africa. If anyone doubts that, let him read a book which has just come out, entitled "There are no South Africans." If that is true of South Africa, it is true of India. After all, Afrikanders come largely from the same racial stock as we do, but in the case of Hinduism and the Moslems there is a fundamental difference between the two conceptions of everything in this life and the next. In this country, where religious differences have really ceased to matter, it is almost impossible to bring home to any audience the nature of these difficulties. How are they to be solved? I believe somehow, eventually, on the lines of the proposals made by the Government and most eloquently and admirably advocated by the right hon. and learned Gentleman.
I still think that the proposals fundamentally broke down on the communal issue. I admit that you can make a point—to some extent it may be a good point—on the question of defence that certain things were proposed to which Indians could not agree. I do not agree with that view. But fundamentally the talks broke down on the communal issue. I hope that none of my friends in the Hindu or Moslem communities will think I am being rude if I venture to think aloud and say that I have at the back of my mind a very strong feeling that both communities are slightly frightened at this moment at the effect of having complete control without any British supervision. You have only to read the speeches of Mr. Jinnah to see a good deal of significance. He has said he would rather fight than submit to Hindu domination. I believe that something on the lines of the proposals of the Government will be essential if we are ever to solve this question.
I wish to say only one word about defence. I do not see how you could possibly have expected any different system or any different proposal from that which the Government put forward, for this reason, that it seems to be assumed in some of the speeches made on this side of the House and in the country, that if you handed over defence, if there was no question of any Englishman having anything to do with it, you would have solved the problem because you would be handing over the defence of India to Indians themselves. But, unfortunately for this point of view, there are thousands of European troops there, thousands of American troops, and it is quite impossible to do that in the middle of a battle, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman pointed out.
I agree with what was said by the last speaker but one, that the trouble, not with the Government of India but with the British Government, has been the slowness with which they have permitted the manufacture of munitions in India. I honestly do not think that has anything to do with the Indian problem. It is due to other causes which I propose to bring out, if I am fortunate enough to catch Mr. Speaker's eye in the Debate on Defence. It is a sorry tale, but it is not due to Anglo-Indian relations but to other causes. There are those large numbers of Indians who joined the Army under the old conditions who are being trained. I notice that the hon. Gentleman who so admirably represents the Communist party in this House feels very bitter against the Government, and against the Tory party in particular. I do not intend to argue with him, but I would call his attention to one fact. He has probably heard of Mr. M. N. Roy, a very remarkable man of whom much will be heard in the future. [ Interruption .] He may be no good, but if the hon. Member will consult those with whom he is in close touch in Moscow, he will find that they do not share his opinion. He is the leader of the Workers and Peasants party in India and takes a view which I think is prophetic. His view is that just as in China, as the result of the revolution there, the old ideas and regimes have been destroyed, so when power is in the hands of the workers and peasants, you will not hear much of the type of leader like Mr. Nehru. His argument is that the Hindu leadership in India is largely in the hands of people who in no sense represent the mass of the peasants and workers.
I myself am convinced that if and when India, as it is bound to do, becomes a Dominion after the war, you will see a vast change in the relationship of Congress to the mass of the people—a very vast change indeed, and perhaps it will be a change largely on the grounds advocated-by the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher). The importance of this argument is that Leftist people in this country talk as if the leaders of Congress and others represent the last word in democracy. They represent nothing of the sort. They represent if anything the very first word in democracy—it may be a step in democracy, but the very first step. I think these facts should be remembered in the struggle on behalf of the Moslems and the Communist party respectively. It is a struggle on behalf of what is largely a theocracy in each case which they have a perfect right to desire if they so wish. The Moslem party and Congress are based on the religious views of that community in each case.
Therefore, I say that in face of these enormous differences these age-old difficulties, I think the Mission of the right hon. and learned Gentleman was a completely successful one. One thing that I must particularly congratulate him upon, in conclusion, if I may do so without sounding frivolous, is that he is the only man who in 20 days' discussion has succeeded in getting those very able and charming people, the Indian leaders, to reach some sort of conclusion, even though it was a negative one. As a rule, discussion in the East, over the smallest point, lasts for at least two or three months. I agree with everything that has been said for the Government. I believe that the visit has been of very great value, for two reasons. It has brought into the open, first, the immense difficulty of the situation; and, secondly, the desire of the Government, and of the House of Commons, to see a solution reached.
Might I ask a very important question? Is it not the case that General MacArthur led a Filipino Army under a Filipino Government, and could not General Wavell lead an Indian Army, under an Indian Government?
I never denied that. All I said was that you could not alter the military control, in the way desired by the hon. Gentleman, in the middle of the war.
I am sure that no one doubts the sincerity of the Government, or indeed of others, but there is a world of difference between the sincere attitudes of the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton), my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Mr. Cove), the hon. and gallant Member for Wycombe (Sir A. Knox), and the hon. Member for Walsall (Sir G. Schuster). I suggest, therefore, that we have diversity with sincerity, and that, although sincerity obviously is a preliminary necessity of any attempt to find a solution, it is only a preliminary necessity, which will enable us to move on to something at least quite as important. I am sure that the Lord Privy Seal will admit that, sincere as the Government's offer was, the opposition of the Indian Congress was equally sincere. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and his colleagues are also sincere. If we recognise the sincerity of everybody, all the way round, we come back to where we started, and ask why the negotiations broke down. I appreciate as much as everybody else does the gallantry of the Lord Privy Seal in flying across to India, not with high exposives, but with high intentions; and I agree that that action has had a psychological effect. Nor does anyone deny that it is very difficult indeed to secure a solution to the alleged problems of India—not primarily because of those communal conflicts between Hindu and Moslem, but because of the conflict between the Indians on the one hand and ourselves on the other. There are more kinds of communal conflict than one.
We tend to forget that, although there are those conflicts in India between Hindu and Moslem, the Hindus and the Moslems are united in their determination to secure independence for India. Although there are very profound racial and religious differences in India, they are not so formidable as we have been led to believe. The noble Lord did not mention that one of the greatest Moslem scholars in the world is the President of the Indian Congress, and that the Northwest Province, although Moslem, is pro-Congress. Some weeks ago I put down a Question to the Secretary of State regarding the Momin community. The Secretary of State did not know much about the Momins, and, I confess, neither did I. He made inquiries, and so did I. When I said that the Momin Conference professed to represent 45,000,000 people, he replied that I had misread the telegram, and that the figure was really 4,000,000 to 5,000,000. Within a few days I received a dozen cablegrams from India saying that I was right, and the Secretary of State wrong. I do not know exactly what the true figure is, but certainly the Momins, among other Moslem communities in India, remind us that the Moslem League is by no means to be identified with the whole Moslem world in India. I suggest that there are possibly more Moslems supporting Congress, either in Congress or allied to Congress, than are supporting the Moslem League. The more I inquire into the facts, the more I find that likely to be so. The Noble Lord did not mention that. I do not say that he purposely refrained from doing so—he is too honest for that—but this fact makes us realise that there is another aspect to the alleged religious and racial conflict in India.
Reference has been made to the conflicts in India, but there is not a country in the world where there are not these powerful conflicts. They have, or they had, racial conflicts in Russia, in Poland, in Germany, and here. They are reconciled in some way, which is not always the most desirable way. They exist in India. When we appreciate that none of the other minorities, Christians, Parsees or Sikhs, complains of domination by others, we shall be able to resolve the problem into more manageable proportions. I think the Lord Privy Seal will agree that during his negotiations little reference was made to the communal difficulty. It came out only when the report on the negotiations was published. Here is a cable received from Nehru himself. He says:
It is quite true that I did not discuss the minority question with Congress, but that does not mean that there was no difficulty. I was discussing it with all the minorities. Naturally, it was not a matter that I discussed with Congress.
One does not doubt that there were all these matters, and that my right hon. Friend discussed them. But there was no breakdown on that issue, and there was no preliminary sign that the negotiations were going to break on that issue. It was an issue which was left to be dealt with later—no doubt, a substantial issue; but the real cause of the breakdown was other than communal difficulties.
Let me put it this way. It was the reflection of the communal difficulties on another problem. I do not think one can divorce them. It was not, in form, on the communal question that the breakdown came; but there were various opinions on that, which were naturally the reflection of the communal difficulties.
I assure my right hon. and learned Friend that I have no wish to misrepresent him, or to keep anything back. I simply state what was the opinion of Congress, and of Nehru himself. There is need, I think, in view of our emphasis on the need for sincerity to show that the Congress interpretation is not the same as the interpretation of my right hon. and learned Friend. I only mention that in passing for there is now little time to spend on the matter, so much time has been given unnecessarily to the communal differences to-day. I submit that these communal differences have been resolved, in some measure, inside Congress. We must not think of Congress as being just a political party or a narrow religious, racial sectional party such as the old Centre party on the Continent or, if you please, the Labour party here. It is a comprehensive political organisation in which there are Moslems and Indians, Christians and Sikhs, in which there are all castes and all types, many Socialists and many non-Socialists. If they could be reconciled within Congress and meet together as an Indian body, as by far the most representative Indian body, it is worth while considering that fact instead of over-emphasising the danger, of which we have heard so much, about irreconcilable internal religious, racial and other differences.
One of our greatest weaknesses in the past in dealing with Indian matters has been that, unconsciously or consciously, we always seem to approach the Indian mind with a British bias. I have heard it said by members of my own Party that we must try to give India her freedom in order that she should help us and add her weight to ours in the war that we are fighting. I am not assuming that that is an unimportant matter but, on the other hand, unless we make it subordinate to the main question of securing freedom for India without resort to war, we shall merely become lost in the labyrinth of expediency. I repeat that it is not an unimportant matter, but if India once has the suspicion that we now desire India's co-operation with us merely or mainly because we find ourselves in difficulties and that we would not have bothered had those difficulties diminished then—if we give them that impression—we shall do incalculable damage not only to India but to ourselves.
The crucial question as I see it is this. I have examined very carefully the White Paper and the many reports put out by various interested parties, but I believe I am right in saying that the actual breakdown in negotiations was precisely on the question of the transfer of political power. The Lord Privy Seal mentioned it towards the end of his very interesting analytical speech. I agree that the defence question was important, but even that hinged on the question of the transference of political power. The statement of the Lord Privy Seal really was that Congress demanded complete power and that that could not be granted. May I suggest that in fact they were not asking for complete power for themselves at all? As far as I can tell, they were asking for the initial pledge of complete responsibility for the formation of a government. They felt that if they were to have a real responsible central government then, instead of. the Viceroy being there acting as Prime Minister they should have their own Prime Minister and that that Prime Minister, even as in this country should have the responsibility of forming a government at the centre to act during the war period. That can be interpreted as a demand for power in neither more nor less degree than the power of the dominant party in this House. It has as its leader the present Prime Minister, who is not only Prime Minister but also the leader of the Conservative Party. He is sent for by the King, who places upon him the responsibility of forming a Government. As I understand it, Congress suggests that the same procedure should be adopted in regard to Indian affairs.
Although there may be great risks and dangers attached to it, nevertheless by taking the risks and accepting the dangers and adventuring on that bold course, one could solve the problem, at least temporarily. Mr. Nehru, who is accepted as the leader of by far the greatest single political organisation in India, should be asked to form a Government. He should be Prime Minister and upon him should be a responsibility, such as that which rests upon our Prime Minister, of forming a Government adequate and appropriate to the present situation. But it seems to me that that proposal did not receive as much consideration as it might have received.
Would my hon. Friend say to whom he would be responsible?
I might reply by asking to whom is the Viceroy responsible? The Viceroy is responsible to the British people and Nehru would be responsible to the Indian people. Although I agree that there would be anomalies and difficulties, there are anomalies and difficulties already in the present situation. The Viceroy of India is not an Indian and is not appointed by India. He is not responsible to Indians; he is responsible to this House of Commons, to the Government and indeed, in a minor way, indirectly to myself. That is an anomaly to say the least of it. Although there are anomalies, difficulties and inconsistencies in any case this proposal is worth considering. That certainly is the essential proposal put forward by Congress and I wish the Lord Privy Seal had dealt with it more fully. We might then have had some fuller understanding in this House of what is alleged to be a constructive alternative to the proposals that he made. Of course there are other statements relative to the negotiations. Jawaharlal Nehru in his cable states: Let no one think therefore that rejection of these proposals means any kind of sympathy with the aggressive Powers in the world to-day. On the other hand, I know there are some who suspect the influence of Mr. Gandhi and who think that his non-violent views may have had something to do with the rejection. I wish the Lord Privy Seal had said more about that point. All I need add is that, whatever we may think about Mr. Gandhi's views, he has always made it perfectly clear that he will not embarrass either the British Government or his own friends in Congress who do not accept his view. Mr. Gandhi is in a minority in Congress as far as non-violence is concerned. The majority have adopted nonviolence in the past as an expedient. I repeat that Mr. Gandhi is at one with Congress in the purpose they have in mind, and is at one with the peoples of this country in the purpose we have in mind—a world of freedom and democracy. He disagrees with his colleagues regarding technique. If there be any who imagine that because Mr. Gandhi comes to that conclusion, he is just a fool or an unworldly person out of touch with reality those persons might, quite rightly, looking back on three years of war and looking to the future of the world, question whether they themselves are not the fools. Is it not strange and ironical that one who is not a Christian, but a Hindu, should be the outstanding figure in the world to-day who dares to suggest that Christian methods can be applied to high politics as well as private affairs?
I am glad that an assurance has been given that this is not the end. It cannot be the end, for every time we say we can do no more we are acting as defeatists and playing into the hands of our enemies. We must use to the uttermost our methods of intelligent discussion, debate and good will, and, in the end, I am positive that those weapons will prove to be more powerful than all others for serving human interests. We have to realise that India, for good or ill, will be vastly different when the war is ended, and so will this country. The great forces which have been referred to will affect the whole world, including ourselves and India. We hope and believe that India, in the course of time, will have her freedom, and I believe that we should say so here and now. [An HON. MEMBER: "We have said so."] My hon. Friend says that we have said so. Well, a few months ago we were more hesitant about it. Now we are saying it more openly, and the Lord Privy Seal has made it perfectly clear, although he did not use the word "independence," that the term "Dominion status" carried with it the right of secession.
Whether Indians themselves will one day be satisfied with that or not, I do not know, but if we want real co-operation among ourselves and the peoples of the East it can only be secured on the basis of mutual respect, which carries with it a recognition of personal and national dignity and independence. I want to see India a free partner with other democracies in the world, but that can only be so, if she herself is free to make the choice. We ought to look to India to redress in some measure the calamities and defeats which democracy has suffered in the western world in which we dwell. Although there is much talk about fronts there is one front where a great blow can be struck against the forces of reaction and that is on the Far Eastern Indian front. I believe we must bend ourselves to the task of recognising the claim of the Indian National Congress for responsible political government. If and when we do that, we shall not only help India but, what is equally important, help all races to move out of the present nightmare and tragedy of suffering to the beginning of a new and finer era of justice and freedom.
There was one point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for West Leyton (Mr. Sorensen) which I do not think should be passed unchallenged, though we all recognise his sincerity and earnestness of purpose. He committed himself to the statement in the early part of the speech that the communal issue either did not exist or was grossly exaggerated.
May I assure the hon. Gentleman that I have never said, here or elsewhere, that the communal problem did not exist?
The hon. Member said that it was grossly exaggerated, that excessive importance should not be attached to it and that there were more Moslems outside the Moslem League and attached to Congress than inside the League. I do not believe the hon. Gentleman has any first- hand knowledge of India. I think he has relied upon informants who have led him up the garden path. If he had said that 20 or 25 years ago or perhaps even more recently there might have been some measure of truth in it, because the Moslem League was then far weaker than it is to-day. But I say now, without fear of contradiction, that anybody who knows the position of the League, knows that it has never represented more clearly the masses of the Moslem community than it does to-day. Then there are the other minorities outside the Moslems, of whom he said that they are not under apprehension of the domination of Congress, or, in other words, of the caste Hindus. I wonder if the hon. Member has ever read in Indian newspapers of the large public meetings held in Bombay by the Parsee community when they said that the policies being enforced upon them by the Congress Government which were doing excellent work in many directions, were ruining their whole means of livelihood and the businesses they had built up. These are small matters but I do not think the House must be misled into a wrong sense of perspective in these other matters.
I agree with the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) who said that the communal question was there and had to be solved. When it is solved, practically all our difficulties will have gone, because nothing can then stand in the way of the complete independence for India which every section in the House and the country so ardently desires to see. I would rather examine the proposals put forward in the White Paper and in the speech of the Lord Privy Seal mainly to see how far they carry us along the road towards a solution. That solution can be summed up in one sentence. You must banish the fear in these minorities that their social, religious, cultural and economic conditions will not be secure under the domination of the caste Hindus. Once that is done, practically all our difficulties go by the board and little or nothing will stand in the way of India obtaining her full and rightful place as an equal partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations or, if she prefers, her own independence.
It seems to me that inadequate attention has been paid to some passages in the draft Declaration and the White Paper which, to my mind, carry us very far forward—much farther forward than we were before—to that goal which the House and the country have set themselves. I do not speak for the moment of the terms of the Declaration itself, although they are impressive for their sonorous language copied from the Statute of Westminster, and the provision that those special responsibilities which the British Government must maintain until the new government in India is fully established are to be in a treaty negotiated with the new government rather than in the Act itself. I refer mainly to the use of the word "Union" instead of "federation," as expressing the basis of the new Constitution. It may appear to some that the use of the term "Union" instead of "federation" is merely a question of words. I do not view it in that ligh, for it seems to me that it goes very far beyond that stage. Without going into academic questions of constitutionalism, I think the difference is this—that "federation" means a supreme central government handing something back to the constituent units, which are the Provinces, and that "Union" means the Provinces, or the constituent units, giving powers to the central government for the purposes of unity, strength and direction.
As to the great minorities, let us be quite clear in our minds what we mean by minorities. At the second Round-Table Conference, figures were put forward showing that what we call the minorities are 52 per cent. of the population of India. What we are really talking about when we speak of minorities is a majority of the population of India. These great minorities—I use the term only because it has passed into common parlance—are gathered together mainly in certain Provinces or States, and the stronger those Provinces are made, the more secure will all those people feel about their own future—political, cultural and economic. At the Round-Table Conference the great discussion was about the residual powers. Under a Union, the residual powers must remain with the Provinces, and, therefore, they must carry a far greater sense of security to those who have hitherto felt insecure and uneasy than would any other method we might devise. I ask the House, and those who are concerned with this aspect of the Indian question, to get rid of the term "Province" altogether. It is a ludicrous term when applied to these great aggregations of people. Let us call them States—Bengal with its 60 millions population, Madras with its 49 millions, the United Provinces with 55 millions. We are bound to go astray if we consider these great bodies of people as merely pale satellites around an all-dominant centre somewhere in Delhi. Not only are there these large numbers of people, but people who have their own language, their own history, their own culture, their differing social and economic development. If we will get firmly into our minds that these are States, self-governing States, autonomous States, linked together in a Union for common purposes, rather than satellite Provinces gathered round an all-dominant central power, I think we shall get far nearer the true solution of the Indian question—not only the communal question, but the administrative question and all the other ancillary subjects—than we shall if we talk of federation, which is the term used in the great India Act of 1935.
I think everybody must feel that it is a very regrettable fact that in the unity of India we have established there should be admitted the possibility of a secession of any of these constituent States and the still dimmer possibility of their being linked together in another confederation. Yet I am convinced that it is in this direction that we shall solve the doubts and fears which lie behind the communal differences. It is more or less a truism that what you can always get you do not always want. If these States, and the minorities in the States, feel that they have the right to secession—if under the Union they feel their liberties and their cultural, economic and social position are not guaranteed, they have the right to secession—is it not more than probable that two things will happen—first, that they will feel comparatively secure, and secondly, that they will not be put in the position where they will be insecure? I think it is obvious to anybody who knows how these Provinces are constituted and geographically placed that only under the direst necessity would it ever pay any Province to secede or contract out. After all, the great problems in India, the great and almost crushing burdens which new Governments will have to bear, are not political in the narrow political sense, but social and economic, and when one comes to social and economic questions, there is not a very great difference between the Mohammedan and the Hindu in many respects; both have immense common interests.
I am rather horrified when I hear light-hearted talk about a redistribution of the Provinces. It has been said in this House that no Government has ever carried through a Redistribution Act and survived at the next Election. Let the House mark this, that one cannot transfer a district, one cannot divide a district in any part of India, however logical or illogical its attachment to the particular area may be, without bringing upon oneself a tempest of dissent. All I can say is that I should pity any man who attempted any form of considerable redistribution of the provincial entities in India and of the systems of administration and communications which have grown up around the Provinces as they are at present constituted.
I want to direct the attention of the House to a further great step taken in the scheme that was put before the people of India. When my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has offered to India—to our minds clearly, to Indian minds not so clearly—in the months which have passed, free and equal partnership, there has always been the question of how machinery to give expression to that partnership was to be devised. Congress has demanded a Constitutent Assembly based on adult franchise, without exception the most unsuitable body the mind of man could conceive to frame a great and delicate instrument such as the new form of government in India. That able jurist, Sir Maurice Gwyer, has demonstrated its unsuitability.
In the Declaration which my right hon. and learned Friend took to India he not only laid down in language which clarified beyond all possible doubt the intention and purpose of this House and the country, but he propounded an electoral system of proportional representation securing the reasonable representation of all elements in the population. He therefore took to India not only this finished and complete goal of Dominion status, or if desired, independence, but the means by which the Constitution could be hammered out on the soundest basis we can imagine, almost immediately on the termination of the war. Why did it break down? There is no doubt that the question of defence entered rather largely into it. I should like to talk rather frankly on this question of defence. My right hon. and learned Friend was, I am afraid, partly the victim of our own mistakes and of the manner in which we have treated the defence of India right up to the present time, reserving it as entirely in our own province and as our own business and never delegating to Indians any partnership in it. A very wise man once said of India that as the fruit of delays, we have to do a great deal very quickly—that we have to do more, and perhaps have to do it more quickly than might be otherwise desirable.
Do not let us forget that the situation to-day is discussed in every bazaar in India, in Asia and in Africa, and do not let us shut our eyes to the fact that the situation has been changed by Malaya, Singapore, Burma and Rangoon. Everyone must ardently wish that, even at the present time, when my right hon. and learned Friend says that we have been nearer to agreement than at any other time, some further steps might be taken towards the authoritative representation of public opinion in India, especially in the Provinces, on defence now that the war has come to the very gates of that country. All these difficulties might have been easier but for the opportunities lost in the years that have passed—in that misbegotten controversy between Lord Curzon and Kitchener. If we had seized the occasion then to divide the functions of command and administration and placed a civilian in charge of administration the differences with which we are now faced in India would not have existed, and the transference to Indian hands would have become relatively simple. After all, we have come down to what was really the crux of the matter. The main difficulty which my right hon. and learned Friend had to meet was the question of the form of government in the interim period. Those who have read the White Paper and those who have listened to his calm, efficient and lucid speech in this House to-day can have no doubt whatsoever that my right hon. and learned Friend's analysis of the scheme put up by Congress is penetrative and final. None of us can accept, and no one in India will accept, what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for West Leyton in those rather easy, pleasant and so attractive remarks. The opposition which rejected what was proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend represented over 52 per cent. of the people of India.
Hon. Members may have noted the words of Mr. Jinnah, when he said that the Congress party's aim appeared to be to set up an irremovable Cabinet responsible to nobody but the majority, and that such a Cabinet would be a Fascist grand council. I am sorry to say that that description is not entirely incorrect. You cannot get away from the fact that the Moslems felt it would be the death-knell of their ambitions. When all is said and done, where do we stand to-day? I hope that this House is not insensible to the fact that, the Executive Council now functioning represents a substantial majority of Indians—Indians drawn from the highest ranks in public life and consisting of public-spirited men of honesty, rectitude, integrity and patriotism. However, I think there is something else. To my mind one of the transcendent changes is the removal of discussion in India from the stage of slogans being shouted by one side and being counterpoised by slogans on the other, to a stage where people have to sit down and think. Having gone so far, may I ask my right hon. and learned Friend to hold it there, pin it there and carry these discussions still farther forward? I ask him once again to consider the machinery I have suggested—to set up a small working committee to study and work out the principles of the new Constitution with interim reports issued so as to keep public mind alive to the progress which is being made. I would ask him again not to leave the question of an Indian Defence Minister at this stage. I ask him not so much to keep an open mind on the subject, as to see whether the remaining difficulties cannot be removed and remedied so that an Indian Minister may take a very substantial part in the administrative side of the defence of India, leaving to its Commander-in-Chief supreme direction of the Armed Forces in the field.
I quite agree that you cannot attain a maximum effort in Indian defence unless there is associated in the Indian mind the conviction that defence has purely an Indian bearing and importance. Beyond that, I do not think at present we can go. In view of the rejection of the scheme which was put up and the alternative which was offered, I do not think at this moment that we can refashion the actual administrative body. We must recog- nise it is a body with a substantial Indian majority bent entirely on securing the safety, welfare and interest of India. Having reached that stage and a refreshing position of greater reality we can recall the wise words used by a former Member of the House, in which I have always found my greatest consolation in times of difficulty in India, when we could only look as through a glass darkly and not clearly see the distant goal—to ponder the path at our feet and look straight on.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Mr. Cove) made a very forceful speech in which he said some things with which I agree. In particular, he stressed the necessity for popular support in India as elsewhere, but he also said a number of other things with which I strongly disagree. He seemed rather to cast doubt on the sincerity of the Lord Privy Seal. I felt, as I have no doubt the great majority in the House and the country felt, that the fact that my right hon. and learned Friend was sponsoring these proposals and was himself taking them to India was the best guarantee that they were fair, just, and indeed generous, or he would not have assumed that responsibility. In short, the fact that he undertook that duty was the best guarantee of the bona fides of those proposals and of the success of his Mission if that was possible. In regard to something else that my hon. Friend said, I know of no decision of my party to hand over full responsibility to the Indian people at present and to walk out of India. I was a member of a committee which quite recently made proposals very much like those which the Government in fact carried into effect. Indeed we had in mind that the Lord Privy Seal should be the instrument of those proposals, but certainly we have never agreed, and I know of no decision to that effect, that full responsibility should be transferred at this present and most difficult time.
Will not my hon. and gallant Friend agree that the party to which we both belong has been for many years committed to self-government for India?
Yes, certainly, but that is quite a different thing from the immediate transfer, in the middle of a war, of full responsibility with the dangers and constitutional changes that involves. It is clear from the Debate that it has been a source of satisfaction to all concerned, both here and in India, that the Government, particularly having regard to its constitution, roused itself to the necessity of making the effort which culminated in my right hon. and gallant Friend's Mission. The pity of it is that that effort was too late—too late. One of these days, if we are not careful, those words, "Too late," will be written on the tombstone of Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations. I believe that a much less ambitious programme would have satisfied the chief Indian parties two years, or even one year, ago. We have only, for example, to consider the development which the Pakistan idea has undergone in these two years to realise what a difference there would have been had the recent Declaration been made only that short time ago. I think it a fair assumption that in those days the proposals which have now been turned down would most likely have been accepted. And I cannot resist saying that in my judgment the Prime Minister bears a great responsibility in that matter, as in others, because it would appear, at any rate to the outsider, that he stubbornly refuses to take many essential steps until the pressure of events compels him to do so. Nevertheless, the offer was made, and every credit must be given to the Government, to the Lord Privy Seal, to the War Cabinet, and I have no doubt that my hon. Friends formerly on these Benches, now part of the War Cabinet, the Dominions Secretary, the Minister of Labour and my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) played their part in prevailing upon the War Cabinet to make the Declaration they did. I also think the method adopted, that of consultation and discussion, was also the best that could have been adopted. Any other method would have been resented.
In the matter of defence, I think the majority of the House must agree that the Government eventually went quite as far as could be expected in present circumstances, though I have some sympathy with the resolution passed by Congress, which expressed a doubt as to the full competence of the Government of India in that matter. I think my right hon. and learned Friend also took a use- ful step in introducing the leaders of the Congress party, and it may be others, to the Commander-in-Chief. That introduction may be quite valuable in the future.
On the face of the documents, and apart from the great variety of comparatively minor objections put up by the different communities, objections which, looked at from their own point of view, I do not depreciate in any way, the discussion clearly broke down on the Congress demand for immediate and final executive authority untrammelled by any control. I rather regret that the Lord Privy Seal did not pursue that matter a little further. Congress said they were prepared to discuss and find a satisfactory solution to it. In fact, Congress seemed to me to be really claiming something which we have not got in this country. While the King acts on the advice of his Ministers, I believe there is nothing in our Constitution to prevent His Majesty demanding the resignation of Ministers of the Crown, or dissolving Parliament of his own volition. Congress could not expect, as they seemed to expect, to have at once a greater power than we possess, namely, absolute power without responsibility to anyone, and the very power which they demanded would, I am sure, be rejected out of hand by each one of the minorities in India. It is, however, just possible that with further discussion some agreement might have been come to in that matter whereby the final authority might have been left with the Viceroy as the King's representative. Nevertheless, my right hon. and learned Friend made a good and a worth-while effort. I think that the Indian representatives made a serious mistake and that there must have been forces at work which do not appear on the surface. I wonder whether the doctrine of non-violence, as preached for so long by Mr. Gandhi, might not have been one of the factors influencing the situation and the eventual decision. One thing, I think, the Indians forgot. In a democratic country one can never go back. Had they assumed the reins of office, their powers would have grown by use, and the Viceroy or this House could have done little to prevent the early and complete transfer of all authority. The promised land was not only in sight but actually within reach.
The practical question now is, Where do we go from here? I refuse to discuss the question as if we were holding an inquest. New forces have been awakened, fresh impulses stirred, and the fact that the effort was made is a great step forward. I assume that while in form the offer is not open because it has been withdrawn, yet, if the Indians can agree among themselves, the same Declaration or the same offer is at their disposal. Is that so? The question then is whether in the meantime we can take some steps, some of which were suggested by the hon. Gentleman who spoke before me, to advance the day and further to prove, if further proof be necessary, our sincerity to the Indians. The Government might well transfer the India Department to the Dominions Office, and they or the Viceroy might also well consider reconstituting the Viceroy's Council in some appropriate form. I hope that some steps of that sort will be taken and that we shall not relapse into our former state of sloth and sleep. In India we have not got, any more than in Malaya or Burma or the Middle East, the popular support which is essential to our cause. We must get it if we are to win this war. There are clearly also lessons to be learned from this Mission by my Indian friends, if they will permit me to say so. The path of freedom is always slow, difficult and perilous. Risks have to be run. Education and constitutional development are always slow processes, and to obtain results it is necessary to compromise, to make party and communal sacrifices for the future and for the common good. If those lessons can be learned on the one side and we take such steps as are open to us on the other, the future of India can be much brighter.
May I thank the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner) for his courtesy in abbreviating his interesting and helpful speech in order to give me sufficient latitude for my reply? He has paid, and, indeed, all speakers have paid, a just tribute to my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal for the conspicuous ability, sincerity and, not least, good temper with which he discharged his difficult Mission. No more fitting ambassador could have been sent, not only because of his position as a member of the War Cabinet, but also because his sending marked in a peculiar degree the unity of outlook and policy with regard to India which has been reached by the Government, and, I might add, by Parliament and public opinion in this country. I say advisedly "reached" because the Mission and the unanimous policy for which my right hon. and learned Friend endeavoured to secure acceptance were not a sudden improvisation to meet a critical external situation, the death-bed repentance of an unregenerate Imperialism. They were the natural and, indeed, inevitable culmination of a steady development, during these last few years, of thought and feeling about India and Indian political aspirations.
The Act of 1935, which was so fiercely contested at the time, was a great piece of constructive statesmanship which might by now have carired India far on the road towards complete freedom if it could have been promptly implemented. But we have all long since moved beyond it. We no longer think in terms of India's' progressive advance towards full control of her own destiny by stages decided here and under a Constitution laid down by this House. We think, instead, in terms of India's inherent right to that freedom under a Constitution of her own devising. It is because Indian leaders have, I think, not fully realised hitherto, or not fully believed in, this change of our outlook in its bearing upon their relations both to ourselves and to each other, that the Mission of my right hon. and learned Friend has, I believe, been of such permanent value for the future, whatever its immediate outcome.
The primary task assigned to my right hon. and learned Friend was to remove all doubts as to the sincerity of our purpose. We had already declared, at the very outset almost of the career of the present Government, that we wished India to attain the same full freedom as is enjoyed by the Dominions and, for that matter, by ourselves, and to do so as soon as possible after the war under a Constitution of Indian devising. That pledge was subject only to two stipulations. One stipulation was that the Constitution should provide for the due fulfilment of the obligations imposed on us by our historic connection with India. The other was that the Constitution should carry with it the acceptance of the principal elements in India's national life. Indian political opinion was not prepared to be- lieve that we really meant what we said. It read into the stipulation about obligations an intention to superimpose on the Constitution conditions and safeguards which would, in effect, make it no longer the Constitution of a free country—to take back with one hand what we professed to give with the other. Again, it read into the stipulation about agreement a cynical acquiescence in the indefinite continuance of disagreement and, consequently, of the present régime in India.
The main object of the draft Declaration was to set these suspicions at rest. The full meaning of Dominion independence Was set out in the preamble in terms taken from the famous Balfour Declaration of 1926. Moreover, as my right hon. and learned Friend has already pointed out, the provision in Section ( c ) for settling by treaty all matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility, from British to Indian hands not only emphasised Indian equality of status but expressly laid down that the terms of the treaty should not restrict the power of the future Indian union to decide its relationship to the rest of the Empire, in other words, restrict its de facto power to secede from the Commonwealth. How could we have gone further than that? Again, in order to meet the charge that we deliberately wished to postpone a settlement we put forward two suggestions. One was that, failing previous agreement between the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities on some other form of Constitution-making body, we would set up the one defined in Section ( d ) of the draft Declaration immediately on the cessation of hostilities.
The other point was to answer the charge that we were giving the minorities, and more particularly the Moslem element, a veto on all progress. There was only one way of cutting that Gordian knot—as my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall (Sir G. Schuster) called it—and that was to tell the majority that they were free to go ahead and achieve full freedom without waiting for the minority. It was made equally clear to the Moslem minority—an element, I might add, of over 90,000,000 people—that, if, in the last resort, they could not find the Constitution of the new Indian Union acceptable to themselves, either at the outset or upon further reconsideration, they were not to be denied the prospect of an equal freedom.
In this respect we were only following a familiar Dominion precedent. The Canadian Federation was originally formed by four only of the present Provinces. Others joined in the next few years. On the other hand, Newfoundland has always remained outside. The Australian Commonwealth and the South African Union afford similar examples of making special conditions for entering or else standing out altogether. In the case of India, the Act of 1935 left the States free to stay out, but provided for the adhesion of a minimum number of States before the federal provisions of the Act came into force. This restrictive provision also was tacitly waived in the draft Declaration. Our ideal undoubtedly remains a united all-India including the States as well as British India, sufficiently united at any rate to present a common front to the outside world. The unity which we have given to India, a unity of law, of administrative procedure, of economic and transport policy, is an achievement of which we have every right to be proud, but we would sooner see India divided and free than keep her various elements for ever chafing against us and against each other under a sense of impotent frustration.
The practical arguments for unity are undoubtedly overwhelming. I have little doubt that they would prevail if it were not for the deep-seated fear of the Moslems, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) eloquently referred, that their distinctive culture and way of life would be at the mercy of a permanent Hindu majority. The root of that fear, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Reed) said, we must banish, lies largely, I believe, in the assumption so often made that unity implies a Central Executive on the British model, an Executive responsible in theory to a Parliamentary majority, but responsible, perhaps, in fact, to the party caucus behind that majority. Yet our British system, which we have developed in a homogeneous country, is not necessarily the best suited to so complex a structure as that of India. There is no sealed pattern of freedom. The United States, Switzerland, the former Germanic and Austro-Hungarian Federations, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may all supply useful precedents for Indian statesmanship to study. What, indeed, is needed, perhaps even more than new constitutional methods, is a new spirit of compromise. It is by making Indian statesmen conscious that the solution of the problem is their own undivided responsibility and not ours, that both the right methods and the right spirit are most likely to emerge.
Our main concern was to indicate a solution for the future which left no doubt as to our own intentions and which struck as fair a balance between contending points of view as it was possible to attain. We did so because it was only in the light of a solution recognised as essentially sincere and fair, even if not wholly acceptable to any one section, that there could be any hope of the co-operation in the present of Indian political leaders either with ourselves or with each other to face the crisis in front of India.
It being the hour appointed for the interruption of Business, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put .
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Mr. James Stuart .]
Even so, it could only be a question of co-operation, of "effective participation and of active and constructive help"—to quote the language of the draft Declaration—within the existing constitution. It could not be a question of control, free from the ultimate responsibility of Parliament here, exercised through the Secretary of State and the Viceroy; it could not be that, both for the practical reasons which have been given in connection with defence by my right hon. and learned Friend, but above all for the reason that there was no agreement as to who should exercise that control.
The demand for a National Government put forward by Congress has been repeated in more than one speech in this House. But such a National Government would have been responsible in the last resort neither to Parliament here, under the existing Constitution, nor to an agreed and what my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall called a fairly balanced Constitution in India, but only to its own majority—a majority, presumably, of Congress or at any rate of Hindus. That demand, whether made by Sir Tej Sapru and his colleagues or by Congress, was the one thing which the Moslems and other minorities were determined at all costs to reject. They were and they are convinced that such a Government would in fact prejudge the whole future situation to their detriment. There was therefore never any question in our view of conceding that demand, because it was in fact, if not in intention, a demand which precluded all agreed co-operation in India.
Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware of the resolution passed by the Indian Congress held at Poona, where an absolute assurance was given on the very point with which the right hon. Gentleman is dealing—that the minorities would certainly be considered?
The minorities, unfortunately, did not accept that resolution. Within the limits of the ultimate responsibility of the Viceroy and Parliament, who in this matter are in a sense trustees for the future Constitution of India, my right hon. and learned Friend was given the widest latitude. Indeed, as the House will have appreciated from the White Paper and from his own speech, he went to the utmost lengths in order to meet the wishes of Congress. There was no more that he could offer. My right hon. and learned Friend has given the House a full and most lucid account of his negotiations and of the reason for their breakdown. I will not cover that ground again. There is only one point that I would add, but it is perhaps the most significant and illuminating point in the whole story. My right hon. and learned Friend flew many thousands of miles to meet the Indian leaders in order to arrive at an agreement with them. The Indian leaders in Delhi moved not one step to meet each other, either without him or in his presence. They made no attempt to reach agreement among themselves. The Congress demand for a National Government was declared by its President to be the "unanimous demand of the Indian people." Why then was no attempt made to afford evidence of that unanimity by bringing forward, in concert with the Moslem League and other parties, an agreed proposal? For the simple reason that it could not have been done. That is an aspect of the situation which we must face. We do not do so for the purpose of imputing blame to any Indian section. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall very truly said that it is by no means an easy matter for men whose whole life has been concentrated in opposition to each other to come to a speedy agreement. Even in this House we had to be at war for many months before a National Government was secured. We have to face this aspect, however, in order to realise why it was impossible for my right hon. and learned Friend to meet the demand for a. so-called National Government.
While the Mission of my right hon. and learned Friend failed of its immediate object, in a wider sense I believe it has been very far from a failure. It has been, if I may adopt an epigram of his own, the epilogue of an old chapter, the chapter in which the contending elements in India have attempted to attain their ends by belabouring His Majesty's Government, and also the prologue of a new chapter in which Indians are beginning to realise that the key to India's problems is in their own hands. Since my right hon. and learned Friend left India Mr. Gandhi has summed up that point in a striking passage quoted by my right hon. and learned Friend in which he has declared the attainment of independence impossible until Indians have themselves solved the communal tangle. That declaration is, I think, sufficient answer to speeches which have been made suggesting that it is we who have exaggerated, if not indeed invented, the communal issue.
Are the Government accepting all that Gandhi says?
I accept this statement, because in it he says what I have spent two years in saying. Even more important as evidence of a new approach are the Resolutions which were passed at the statesmanlike instigation of Mr. Rajagopalachari, ex-Premier of Madras, by the Congress members of the Madras Legislature. By the first of these Resolutions the All-India Congress Committee was urged to waive its objection to the Moslem League claim for separation if eventually persisted in, for the sake of removing every obstacle from the way of establishing a national administration. By the second the national All-India Congress Committee was requested to permit an approach to the Moslem League with a view to the re-establishment of popular government in Madras Province. It would appear that this patriotic and courageous declaration has met with the disapproval of the Congress President and Mr. Nehru. It may be that their attitude will be sustained by the All-India Committee which is to meet in the next few days. Be that as it may, this new and hopeful initiative has been taken. It would never have been taken but for the visit of my right hon. and learned Friend.
How many were present when the resolution was passed? Only 32 out of 200 passed that resolution.
No; I believe 39 out of 42 supported it. At any rate, will anybody suggest that it was an undesirable resolution, or that the desire on the part of Congress members to come to reasonable terms with their Moslem colleagues to re-establish free government in their Province first, and to make progress with free government for India, was wrong? If only three had supported it, I should honour them for doing so.
It has been asked, What is precisely meant by the withdrawal of the draft Declaration? What we have certainly not withdrawn is our main object and purpose, namely, that India should, as soon as possible, obtain full freedom, under constitutional arrangements of her own devising and suited to her own peculiar conditions. On the other hand, the particular method which we suggest for arriving at a constitutional settlement, more particularly the present Provincial basis, both for setting up a constitution-making assembly and for non-accession, has not met with sufficient support for us to press it further. It may be that alternative methods can be devised which might afford a better basis for the definition of boundaries for the major elements, and might give representation for the smaller elements, such as the Sikhs, whose natural anxieties we fully appreciate. It is for Indians themselves to improve on our suggestion, if they can.
As regards the interim situation, the particular proposals made by my right hon. and learned Friend in order to secure the whole-hearted co-operation of Con- gress, as well as of the other political parties, have, of course, lapsed. But the Viceroy will, no doubt, always be willing to consider practical suggestions within the framework of suggestion ( e ) of the draft Declaration, put forward by responsible party leaders, more particularly if put forward, as the hon. Member for Ince (Mr. G. Macdonald) suggested, jointly, and based on a broad measure of agreement. It is, indeed, upon the agreement and initiative of Indian party leaders that any further advance must depend. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall raised the question of the desirability of re-establishing self-government in those Provinces in which Congress has refused to carry it on. That, of course, is most desirable. It would have been a natural consequence of the success of my right hon. and learned Friend's Mission. The door is open now, and it remains open.
What exactly does the right hon. Gentleman mean by "the door remains open"? Supposing the Congress Party in those very Provinces agreed themselves to carry on self-government, would the British Government agree?
Yes; if in any of those Provinces the Congress Party are prepared to assume the responsibilities of government and to give that help to the prosecution of the war which they have declared they wish to give, we are only too ready to let them resume office under those conditions. Meanwhile, the Government of India must get on with the immediate task before them. I must make it quite clear that our anxiety to secure a wider measure of active co-operation from the political parties in India by sending out my right hon. and learned Friend in no way implies any lack of confidence in the ability or energy of the Executive Government of India. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government have the most complete confidence in the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, who has handled a continuously difficult situation with prudent wisdom, and whose vigorous initiative has been invaluable in everything bearing on the conduct of the war. That confidence extends no less to the existing Executive Council. The Indian members, who form the majority of that Council, are men of high ability and of experience in active politics, in administration, and in business. Their patriotic willingness to stand aside for others who might command a greater measure of organised political support is something that we have sincerely appreciated, as they, I feel sure, recognise the value which we attach to their continued service to India at this critical time. What I have said of the Indian members applies equally to the European members, and indeed, to the whole of the administrative services, Indian and British, which have wrestled so ably with the innumerable problems created by war conditions.
The hon. Member for Ince and the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds have made the suggestion that the work of the India Office might be transferred to the Dominions Office. I think that that suggestion is based upon a very insufficient realisation of the work of the India Office. The main work of the India Office does not consist in controlling, restricting, interfering with India. Its main work is that of an agency in this country on behalf of the Government of India. The Government of India have in peace, and even more in war, a great Army to maintain, part of it directly drawn from this country and the rest largely officered by this country and largely equipped from this country. In order to secure from the Government of this country, and to give, what India needs, it requires a considerable military staff. India has neighbours which make the foreign policy of this country a matter of vital interest to her. From that point of view again she has to have a considerable staff here to keep in touch with the Foreign Office and see that India's interests are not neglected. Further, there is a vast range of economic problems which vitally concern India and with regard to which it is important to her to see that the policy of this country does not neglect Indian interests. All these matters, if India were a self-governing Dominion, would still have to be carried on, but carried on by an enlarged High Commissioner's office like the offices of Australia House and of Canada House, but as long as the ultimate responsibility for these matters rests with the Secretary of State they must be conducted under his immediate eye, and he is still what the High Commissioners for the Dominions are, in that sphere at any rate—the chief agent and representative of the Government of India and of the interests of India.
This is a very important point. Is this being put forward as a conclusive argument? Are we to understand that a High Commissioner should not do what is now being done by the Secretary of State? Would it not be right to remove the root cause of all the trouble, mistrust and suspicion and so give an indication of our sincerity?
The Dominions Office, which deals with only diplomatic and not administrative problems, could handle these problems for India if the other matters were handed over to a representative of an Indian Dominion Government. But to make in the meanwhile an unreal pretence, administratively impossible, that we were really changing the situation would be a mere sham and camouflage which would fail to impress anyone.
Has not India a High Commissioner here?
Yes, for those purposes which are entirely within the discretion of the Government and Legislature of India, and they cover a wide field, but they do not cover the field of those matters which must for the time being still be the responsibility of the Secretary of State.
To come back to India, we rely also no less upon the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Wavell, and upon all ranks in the Fighting Services of India. The Indian Army has a great tradition, of which those serving in it are justly proud. In this war it has won new glory upon many a hard-fought field. Side by side with it, its record has been shared by troops which the Indian Princes have, with their accustomed loyalty, placed unreservedly at the disposal of the King-Emperor. India's younger Services, the Royal Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force, have already proved their quality and earned high commendation from all whom they have served. It is upon these trained and properly equipped Services, together with their old British and newer Allied comrades in arms, that India must rely for her defence, whether on her outer marches or in the case of actual invasion. In the latter event the Army can undoubtedly receive great help from the general body of the population. The steadfastness of the public in face of danger, its eagerness to co-operate with the military authorities in every way, including the whole field of Civil Defence, the securing of information and in guerilla operations—all these things can be of invaluable aid to the operations of Regular troops.
We are glad to believe that Indian political leaders are anxious to give that aid, even if they are not prepared to co operate on the lines which, in our opinion, would give the best results. All the same, it is to the trained officers and men of her Regular Forces, and to their effective and adequate equipment, that India must look for her security now and in the years to come. These were matters into which my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal also looked during his visit to India, and the information and suggestions which he has brought back will be of the greatest value to us. My right hon. and learned Friend's Mission, whatever else it has done—
Lord Halifax's speech.
I will answer that point now. Lord Halifax spoke not upon any instructions from here but with an intimate experience acquired by many years as a Viceroy—a Viceroy who was more sympathetic to Congress and more closely in touch with it than any other Viceroy has been, and if he used phrases which might possibly have touched Congress susceptibilities—
When delicate negotiations were going on.
Well, I do not think the hon. Member would find that we were as sensitive as that about some of the phrases used about us throughout these negotiations in Indian quarters. But with regard to my right hon. and learned Friend's Mission, whatever else it has done—I believe it has done much, as time will show—it has at any rate had one immediate effect. It has brought home to the public here and elsewhere something of the complex character of India's political structure and of the inherent obstacles to any simple, off-hand solution. They are not obstacles which should discourage us in our purpose. We have behind us a record of achievement in the building-up of the present structure of the Indian Empire of which we can well afford to be proud. If we can achieve the transfer to Indian shoulders of the responsibilities for the maintenance of that fabric, and if we can play our part in the transformation of an administrative machine into a free and self-reliant national life, we shall have even better reason for pride. It is not in any spirit of apology for our own past that we should approach this great problem. Rather should we approach it with abundant faith in ourselves, in the principles for which we stand, in the vision of a Commonwealth of free nations transcending all differences of race or creed, and linking together East and West in the common cause of human progress. It is to those same principles, to that same vision, that we hope by sincerity, by good will, by patience if need be, to win the free and unfettered allegiance of our Indian fellow citizens. For the moment, if I may quote words used in this House by Burke of the difficulties of the Indian situation in his day, there we are, and
"we must do the best we can in our situation. The situation of man is the preceptor of his duty."
Motion, "That this House do now adjourn," by leave, withdrawn.
Government of India Act, 1935
Proclamations Under Section 93
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Madras on 30th October, 1939, a copy of which was presented to this House on 28th November, 1939."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935 by the Governor of Bombay on 4th November, 1939, a copy of which was presented to this House on 28th November, 1939."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the United Provinces on 3rd November, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 1st December, 1939, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th January, 1940, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar on 10th November, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 2nd December, 1939, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th January, 1940, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Bihar on 3rd November, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 3rd December, 1939, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th January, 1940, respectively."
Resolved,
"That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province on the 10th November, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on 2nd December, 1939, copies of which were presented to this House on 28th November, 1939, and 16th January, 1940, respectively."—[ Mr. Amery .]
Governors' Allowances and Privileges (Amendment) Order
Resolved,
"That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty in pursuance of the provisions of Section 309 of the Government of India Act, 1935, praying that the Government of India (Governors' Allowances and Privileges) (Amendment) Order, 1942, be made in the form of the draft laid before Parliament."—[ Mr. Amery ."]
To be presented by Privy Councillors or Members of His Majesty's Household .
The Orders of the Day were read, and postponed .
It being the hour appointed for the Adjournment of the House , Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order .