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Commons Chamber

Volume 392: debated on Wednesday 22 September 1943

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House Of Commons

Wednesday, 22nd September, 1943

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers To Questions

Refugees (Inter-Governmental Committee)

3.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which States have been invited to appoint representatives to the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees; what are the names of the representatives so appointed; of whom will the executive of the committee exist; and who will be its chairman?

As the answer is long, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Committee will really begin to function? I understand that only one meeting of the original executive committee, appointed about three years ago, has been held

I understand that the Committee is meeting now. The next meeting wil be on 30th September.

Following is the reply:

The present membership of the Inter-Governmental Committee is as follows:

Australia.France.
Argentine Republic.Hayti.
Belgium.Honduras.
Bolivia.Ireland.
United Kingdom.Mexico.
Brazil.Nicaragua.
Canada.Norway.
Chile.New Zealand.
Colombia.Paraguay.
Cuba.Netherlands.
Denmark.Peru.
Dominican Republic.Sweden.
Ecuador.Switzerland.
United States ofUruguay.
America.Venezuela.

Guatemala and Panama both withdrew in 1940, but they have been invited to resume membership.

The following States have been invited to become members and to appoint representatives:

Costa Rica.Persia.
Czechoslovakia.Poland.
Egypt.Portugal.
Greece.South Africa.
Iceland.Spain.
India.Turkey.
Iraq.U.S.S.R.
Luxemburg.Yugoslavia.

The executive committee consists of the Ambassadors of:

Argentina.United States of
Brazil.America.
Netherlands.

Monsieur Vienot attends on behalf of the French Committee of Liberation, and the United Kingdom is represented by Lord Winterton, who is Chairman.

Lipari Islands (Political Prisoners)

4.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many and of what nationalities were the political prisoners found in the Lipari Islands by our invading Forces; what are their present conditions of living; and what use has been or will be made of these enemies of Fascism in forwarding the cause of the United Nations?

The Allied Forces found that there were no political prisoners on the Lipari Islands when they landed there on 17th August. The prisoners had all been removed six weeks before.

Have any other prisoners been found in other parts of Italy that we have occupied?

Yes, Sir. According to the latest information I have, about 100 political prisoners were found in or near Palermo, and they were all released.

Will any use be made of these prisoners in the administration of or in recreating democratic feeling in Sicily and elsewhere?

I could not say until I have more information on the subject than I have at present. They are released and being cared for. I think they are in need of care.

Spain

5.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement concerning the recent discussions between General Franco and His Majesty's Ambassador in Spain?

11.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can give the House any information relative to the interview on 10th August between the British Ambassador and General Franco, particularly in regard to Spanish help to Germany in the use of ports available to German submarines, the official recognition of the Blue Division in Russia and how this can be reconciled with non-belligerency; whether the German Gestapo in Spain is to be allowed to continue; whether British rights in Tangier are now properly safeguarded; and whether Spain is now prepared to adopt a policy of genuine neutrality?

The interview was arranged on the eve of my right hon. Friend's annual visit to this country. On instructions from His Majesty's Government, the attention of the head of the Spanish State was drawn to the various complaints which His Majesty's Government had been forced to make from time to time of discrimination against British interests. While some of these complaints had been remedied, my right hon. Friend drew attention to cases that still required to be dealt with if General Franco's proclaimed policy of equal treatment of the belligerents by Spain was to be effectively carried out. Among other questions specifically referred to was the position of the Blue Division, and it was made clear to General Franco that so long as it remained in the Soviet Union it was a serious obstacle to the development of cordial Anglo-Spanish relations. I have no information to show that Spanish ports are available to German submarines. As regards Tangier, I would invite my hon. Friends' attention to the reply which I am giving to-day to Questions on this subject.

May I ask the Foreign Secretary what the response of General Franco was to this request? If it was unfavourable, is any further step contemplated?

The Spanish Government have undertaken to look into our complaints, and we look to them for an early improvement in the situation.

Is the right hon. Gentleman reasonably satisfied that things are progressing in the right direction?

Does not General Franco's attitude constitute a still more nauseating form of neutrality? May we be sure that he will in no circumstances be invited to any of these conferences?

French Committee Of National Liberation (Russian Representation)

6.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement on the appointment of a Russian representative, or representatives, to North Africa; and what has been the attitude of His Majesty's Government on this matter?

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics informed the French Committee of National Liberation on 26th August that it had decided to recognise the Committee and to exchange plenipotentiary representatives with it. I need hardly add that His Majesty's Government welcome this development.

Russia And Czechoslovakia

7.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement to the House about the proposed visit of President Benes to Moscow; and what steps he has taken to facilitate his visit?

During M. Molotov's visit to London last year discussions took place regarding the conclusion of agreements between His Majesty's Government or the Soviet Government on the one hand and any of our other European Allies on the other concerning post-war arrangements. As a result of these discussions His Majesty's Government understood that both Governments held the view that it was preferable for neither of them to con- clued any such agreements for the moment.

When President Benes spoke to me of his proposed visit to Moscow with a view to concluding such an agreement I naturally informed him of the discussions which had taken place with M. Molotov and the matter was also mentioned to the Soviet Government in accordance with our understanding of the arrangements reached between us in 1942. Shortly afterwards I was informed by President Benes that his visit had been postponed.

Discussions are however proceeding between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments, and I hope to have an opportunity to discuss the matter personally with M. Molotov at my forthcoming meeting with Soviet and American representatives. I am of course also maintaining close contact with the Czechoslovak Government.

14.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why, at the instance of officials of his Department, a reference to future co-operation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which appeared in the text as circulated to, and published in, the Press, was cut from the script of the Czechoslovak Prime Minister's recent broadcast to the people of Czechoslovakia?

I think the hon. Member is under some misapprehension. In the speech which he delivered over the B.B.C. on 2nd September, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister in fact referred to the desire of the Czechoslovak Government to continue in the future their close collaboration with the Soviet Union, as also with Great Britain, the United States of America and France. His Majesty's Government and the Czechoslovak Government were in agreement regarding the final text of Monseigneur Sramek's speech, an earlier draft of which had been circulated to the Press in error.

When the right hon. Gentleman says that there was agreement regarding the final text, does he imply that some such cut as I suggested in my Question was in fact made before the final text was agreed on?

What the hon. Member was suggesting was that the cuts were made by us. What I am saying is that the cuts were made by agreement with the is' representative of the Government concerned.

But is it not the case that there was pressure on the Czechoslovak Prime Minister to agree to the cuts?

There is no question of pressure being brought to bear. We are perfectly entitled to point out to an Ally who is going to use the B.B.C. the point of view we may have. It is for him to accept our advice or not.

Post-War Reconstruction (International Labour Office)

8.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to what extent the International Labour Office is co-operating with the Governments of the United Nations in the formation of plans for post-war reconstruction?

Following upon the first resolution adopted by the International Labour Office Conference held in the United States of America in 1941, arrangements have been made to maintain contact between the International Labour Office and existing agencies of the United Nations dealing with post-war problems. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, they have kept in touch with the International Labour Office on post-war reconstruction problems, and these matters were discussed with the acting Director of the International Labour Office during his recent visit to this country. I understand that during this visit the acting Director was also in touch with the Governments of other member States on these matters.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether he had any hand in the preparation for the Conference at Hot Springs?

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will put that question down. I am not quite sure.

Tangier (Internationalzone)

9.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will define our present attitude towards the Spanish occupation of Tangier?

16.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is now prepared to take action, in concert with the French Committee for National Liberation, with the object of restoring the international zone at Tangier?

17.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he proposes to open negotiations with the Spanish Government for the restoration of the international status of Tangier; and whether he can give an assurance that conditions in the Tangier Zone are to-day as favourable to the interests of the United Nations and their nationals as before the occupation by the Spanish Government?

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have always made it clear that the modus vivendi reached between them and the Spanish Government early in 1941, the terms of which were summarised in a statement by the then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 26th February, 1941, was of a provisional nature pending the possibility of a final settlement, and that it was without prejudice to our own rights or to those of third parties under the relevant international instruments. They have always maintained their protest against the original unilateral action of the Spanish Government in the Tangier Zone. Under this modus vivendi British rights in that Zone have been and are fully safeguarded.

His Majesty's Government are, however, keeping the situation at Tangier under constant review and it is their intention to put forward at the first suitable opportunity for the consideration of other interested parties, proposals for the future of the Zone. In view of the present international situation and of the position of some of those parties it is not, however, practicable to open the necessary negotiations now.

Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government have informed the Spanish Government that they are bound to take a serious view of the use of the Zone by the German Consul-General and by German nationals for unneutral activities directed against British interests. They have requested the Spanish Government to put an end to these abuses and to ensure the maintenance of the strict neutrality of the Zone, which the Spanish Government declared in June, 1940, to be the exclusive object of the Spanish occupation.

Is the reply of General Franco to that request satisfactory or is it still being considered?

It was not a communication with General Franco himself. That was a communication I had with the Spanish Ambassador. I think I would rather leave the matter where it is at the moment.

The right hon. Gentleman is not going to be too hard, is he, on this great Christian gentleman, Franco?

Sweden (German Transit Facilities)

10.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has now been officially informed whether Sweden has suspended transit facilities for German military freight as well as for German troops going to and returning from Norway; and whether he is satisfied that German troops are not using these facilities in the guise of tourists?

As regards the first part of the Question, the Swedish Government have officially stated that the facilities for transit of German troops and war materials through Sweden were finally terminated on 20th August. As regards the second part of the Question, the Swedish Government have informed His Majesty's Government that they have instituted suitable measures to prevent the use of these facilities by German military personnel dressed as civilians.

Rudolf Hess

13

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is now in a position to make a full statement on the visit of Hess to this country?

15.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will issue a full statement regarding the arrival in this country of Hess?

Yes, Sir, I propose to make a full statement which I will, in view of its length, with permission, circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Would not my right hon. Friend agree that, all information about Hess having been withheld in the past from this House and from the country, it was rather unfortunate that when news was to be given it should be given in America?

I am sure that the House and my hon. Friend will make allowances for the circumstances. [HON. MEMBERS: "What were they?"] It is true that in the earlier stages we did withhold this statement, but my right hon. Friend the Minister of Information had no intention of acting discourteously to this House. I thought we were justified in so doing because we thought that a certain amount of perplexity was not unhealthy for Germany.

In view of what my right hon. Friend has just said, that the statement will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT, does he not consider that Members of this House are just as much entitled to have a statement made verbally to them as was the American Press in New York?

It is not a question of "entitled." I am in the hands of the House. The statement is rather long, and there are a great many Questions, and I thought it was more convenient.

Would not the right hon. Gentleman consent to let us have this statement at the end of Questions?

If the House so desires. I only did not want to give too much importance to a gentleman who is not worthy of a great deal.

At the end of Questions

May we have a statement from the Foreign Secretary in regard to the Hess incident?

We have much other Business before us to-day, and I should have thought the statement not of sufficient importance to take up time now.

Following are the facts about Rudolf Hess:

Hess flew to Great Britain in a Me.110, from which he landed by parachute in the evening of 10th May, 1941, at Eaglesham in Scotland. He was wearing the uniform of a captain in the German Air Force. He gave his name as Alfred Horn and stated to the Home Guard and the police that he was on a "special mission" to see the Duke of Hamilton, and that he had intended to land at Dungavel, 12 miles distant from the spot where he landed. The prisoner was taken to Maryhill Barracks, and amongst his possessions were found photographs of himself and of a small boy, also the visiting cards of Dr. Karl Haushofer and Dr. Albrecht Haushofer, his son. No other documents or identifications were found on the prisoner.

On Sunday, 11th May, at 10 a.m., Wing-Commander the Duke of Hamilton arrived at Maryhill Barracks and visited the prisoner with the interrogating officer and the military officer on guard. At the prisoner's request the latter two officers withdrew. He then stated to the wing-commander that the latter had lunched in his house in Berlin at the time of the Olympic Games in 1936 and added: "I am Rudolf Hess." The wing-commander had no recollection of the prisoner and was not aware that he had ever seen or met Rudolf Hess. The prisoner then proceeded:

"I am on a mission of humanity. The Führer does not want to defeat England and wants to stop fighting."

His friend Haushofer, he stated, had told him that the wing-commander was an Englishman who would understand his point of view. He had tried to arrange a meeting in Lisbon. He had three times before tried to fly to Dungavel, the first time being in December, 1940, but had been turned back by weather or various other reasons. He did not want to come during the time of British successes in Libya lest it should appear that it was the weakness of Germany which prompted the flight, but that now Germany had had some success there he was glad to come. He stressed that his presence showed his sincerity and the German willingness for peace His main theme was that Hitler was convinced that Germany would win sooner or later; that he (the prisoner) wanted to stop the unnecessary slaughter. He asked the wing-commander to get together the leading members of his party to talk over things with a view to making peace proposals. He then stated that he could tell him what the Führer's peace terms would be. The wing-commander pointed out that there was now only one party in Great Britain. The wing-commander immediately flew to London and reported this conversation, stating that, though he could not be sure, he believed the prisoner was, in fact, Rudolf Hess.

Mr. Kirkpatrick, of the Foreign Office. who had during the period of his official duties in Berlin before the war become acquainted with Hess, was at once down up to Scotland to identify the prisoner. He had three interviews, on the 13th, 14th and 15th May. At the first of these he confirmed that the prisoner was Rudolf Hess. During these interviews Hess further elaborated the object of his visit. He stressed the enormous power of Germany in the air and in U-boats, which latter, he stated, would grow much greater. He affirmed the certainty of England's defeat by blockade, if not very quickly, in the course of two or three years. He expressed his horror at the prospect of the prolongation of the struggle. He had come, he said, without the knowledge of the Führer to convince responsible persons that, since England could not win, the wisest course was to make peace at once. He gave his word of honour that the Führer had never entertained any designs against the British Empire, nor had he ever aspired to world domination. The Führer would sincerely regret the collapse of the British Empire. Hitler had declared to him as recently as 3rd May that he had no oppressive demands to make on England.

The solution which Hess put forward was as follows:

  • (i) That Germany should be given a free hand in Europe;
  • (ii) That England should have a free hand in the British Empire, except that the ex-German Colonies should be returned to Germany;
  • (iii) That Russia should be included in Asia, but that Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which would have to be satisfied either by negotiation or as the result of war. There was, however, no truth in the rumours that the Führer contemplated an early attack on Russia.
  • (iv) That the British should evacuate Iraq.
  • (v) The peace agreement would have to contain a provision for the reciprocal indemnification of British and German Nationals, whose property had been expropriated as the result of war.
  • (vi) The proposal could only be considered on the understanding that it was negotiated by Germany with an English Government other than the present British Government. Mr. Churchill, who had planned the war since 1936, and his colleagues, who had lent themselves to his war policy, were not persons with whom the Führer would negotiate.
  • Hess concluded by emphasising that the Führer really wanted a permanent understanding with Great Britain on a basis which preserved the British Empire intact. His own flight was intended to give Great Britain a chance of opening conversations without loss of prestige. If this chance were to be rejected, it would be the Führer's duty to destroy Great Britain utterly and to keep the country after the war in a state of permanent subjection. These so-called "terms" were restated by Hess in a signed document dated 10th June. The only new point made in this document was the provision that a simultaneous armistice and peace must be concluded with Italy.

    It was, throughout, made clear to Hess that there was no question whatever of any talks or negotiations of any kind taking place with Hitler or his Government. Hess has been dealt with as a prisoner of war since his arrival in this country and will so continue to be treated till the end of the war.

    Royal Air Force

    Danish Industrial Plants (Bombing)

    18.

    asked the Secretary of State for Air how many bombing attacks have been made upon industrial plants in Denmark producing, or capable of producing, material useful for Germany's war effort?

    The works of Burmeister and Wain in Copenhagen were successfully bombed early this year. No other attacks have been made upon productive plant in Denmark.

    Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the productive capacity of Denmark is being harnessed to the German war effort, and should not some effort be made to interfere with it?

    Bombers are not few, but the targets are very many. I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that they are all carefully studied before priorities are decided upon.

    Bomber Command Casualties

    20.

    asked the Secretary of State for Air the casualties sustained by personnel of Bomber Command during the year ending 15th September, 1943?

    Destroyed Enemy Aircraft (Mediter-Ranean)

    21.

    asked the Secretary of State for Air how many enemy aircraft have been destroyed, both in combat and on the ground, in the Mediterranean war theatre from 10th July up to the last convenient date?

    An analysis of communiqués shows that 1,245 enemy aircraft have been reported destroyed in combat in the Mediterranean theatre between dawn on 10th July and nightfall on 10th September. No estimate can be given for the number of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground.

    Women's Auxiliary Air Force (Wives' Leave)

    22.

    asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he will arrange that any lady serving in the W.A.A.F., who is the wife of a man serving in His Majesty's Forces, will get her leave at the same time and for the same period of leave as her husband?

    Subject to the exigencies of the Service, personnel of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force married to members of His Majesty's Forces can normally take their leave at the same time as their husbands. The grant of an identical period of leave is not always possible since the leave entitlements of husband and wife may not be the same. Where, however, the husband is on embarkation or disembarkation leave and the wife's full leave entitlement is exhausted, compassionate leave may be granted up to a maximum of 14 days.

    While appreciating what my right hon. Friend has said, I still hope he will go into the matter and on compassionate grounds see that when a husband and wife are in the Forces they receive their leave at the same time.

    Requisitioned Houses, Manchester

    23 and 24.

    asked the Secretary of State for Air (1) whether he proposes, at the earliest practicable moment to provide accommodation at the airport for the personnel at present using the corporation houses and for the speedy return of the houses to their proper use, in view of the general shortage of housing accommodation in Manchester;

    (2) whether he is aware that, in September, 1940, the commanding officer at Ringway airport asked the Manchester Corporation to permit, as a purely temporary measure, the use of 50 corporation houses on the Wythenshawe estate for the accommodation of R.A.F. personnel, for whom there was at that time no accommodation available at the Ringway airport and why, in spite of the temporary nature of the arrangement and repeated representations by the Manchester Corporation for the return of the houses, they are still being used by the R.A.F. personnel?

    I much regret the inconvenience caused to the Manchester Corporation by the continued occupation of this property, which has been due to the acute difficulties of housing Royal Air Force personnel at the station in question. I am now hoping that it may be possible to adapt certain alternative accommodation, and the Town Clerk has been invited to attend an early meeting to discuss the matter.

    Will the right hon. Gentleman in giving consideration to this matter make known that it would be easier to build alternative accommodation for the personnel of the Royal Air Force than to deal with the evils arising out of the overcrowding of the civil population?

    I can only assure the hon. Member that it is not easy to find the labour for building houses at the present time, for the Royal Air Force or anyone else, but I am very anxious to meet the Manchester Corporation in this. We will certainly do our best.

    Has the time not arrived now for the Cabinet to reconsider their decision to stop house building and get on with house building all over the country? Folk are desperate.

    Aircraft Production (English Electric Company)

    25.

    asked the Minister of Aircraft Production whether the accounting section of his Department has allowed as a cost of production the compensation paid to certain directors of D. Napier and Son, Limited, by the English Electric Company?

    As the hon. Member is doubtless aware, it is contrary to the normal practice to give particulars relating to individual contracts. I am, however, prepared to say that the answer to his Question is in the negative, although it is proper to point out that the Company have asked that the matter should be reconsidered.

    Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman keep in mind when the matter is reconsidered the fact that one gentleman was paid as compensation an amount equal to his full salary until he reached the age of 103?

    26 and 27.

    asked the Minister of Aircraft Production (1) whether the taking over of a certain factory by the English Electric Company was done with his consent; and whether he is satisfied that the transfer has led to a more satisfactory state of production;

    (2) whether the acquisition of the firm of D. Napier and Son by the English Electric Company was conditioned by an undertaking of his Department that the acquisition would result in the passing of the management of a certain factory to the control of the English Electric Company?

    The factory to which the hon. Member refers is one owned by my Department and managed on an agency basis on my behalf by D. Napier & Son, Limited. When a controlling interest in this Company was acquired by the English Electric Company I did not consider that it would be in the public interest to change the agency, and, at my request, the English Electric Company agreed that D. Napier & Son should continue under their new management to act as agents. Although a great deal of re-organisation has been found necessary under the new management, I am satisfied that they are making good progress towards establishing production upon a more satisfactory basis than it was formerly.

    Is not the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that there is very grave dissatisfaction at the shadow factory not only at the changes in the management but the manipulation of a London finance house?

    I am not aware of that fact, but I am aware that where a factory has to be reorganised as a result of bad management beforehand there is always a lot of discomfort for the workers.

    African Colonies (Housing And Town Planning)

    28.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can now give the names of the town planning experts he has selected to advise on the lay-out of urban housing estates in the various African Colonies; and whether any have yet taken up their duties?

    I have been asked to reply. Owing to the great demand in this country for town planning experts, difficulty has been experienced in finding suitable candidates for Colonial appointments. It is intended, however, to appoint an adviser on housing and town planning for West Africa, who would work under the Resident Minister. If a suitable candidate can be found, it is hoped that this appointment will be made shortly. So far as East Africa is concerned, the question of appointment of a town planning expert will be considered in connection with various housing proposals which are now under examination.

    Did I understand my hon. Friend to say that the appointment of only one expert for the whole of East Africa is under consideration?

    I only asked whether that was what the hon. Member said just now. Did he refer to the "expert" and not "experts"?

    Kenya (Workmen's Compensation)

    29.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when it is proposed to establish workmen's compensation law in Kenya; and whether the setting up of a labour advisory board is under consideration?

    Owing to pressing preoccupations connected with the war, workmen's compensation legislation has not yet been introduced in Kenya. But in the meantime, by agreement with employers, compensation claims are being paid on the lines laid down in model legislation; in some cases, even where claims would not be statutorily covered. Legislation will be proceeded with as soon as conditions permit. It is understood that the appointment of a Labour Advisory Board will shortly be announced.

    Will my hon. Friend make representations that at an early date a workmen's compensation law should be enacted?

    Owing to the complex and technical character of the trade union legislation, it is not possible to call together the ad hoc committee which is dealing with this question. The members have had to deal with various questions connected with food. It is hoped that will be done as soon as possible.

    Palestine

    Jewish Refugees, Ss "Patria"

    30.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has received information as to the losses to their luggage by theft or pilfering sustained by the Jewish refugees detained on the ss. "Patria" at Haifa while the luggage was in official custody during its salvaging from the vessel or its transport to the internment camp; and whether he will follow the precedent in the case of similar losses on the ss. "Dunera" and arrange for either compensation or, at least, an ex gratia payment to be given to those who have suffered in this way?

    The case of the "Patria" is not analogous with that of the "Dunera." The property of those on board the "Patria" was not at all times in charge of the Government, and, while the records show that some pilfering on the part of labourers and others took place, leading to prosecution and conviction in five cases, my right hon. and gallant Friend is satisfied that every practicable effort was made by the officials concerned to safeguard the property during such time as it was in official custody; and there was no specific evidence that loss or damage was incurred during that period. The Commission of Inquiry into the loss of the vessel reported at the time that the loss was the result of sabotage; and my right hon. and gallant Friend does not regard the circumstances under which the property in so far as it came under official charge did so contrary to the desire of the Palestine Government, as justifying any ex-gratia payment.

    Was not the salvage of the vessel undertaken by the Palestine Government, and did not the pilfering take place during that period of salvage, and does not that involve a moral obligation on the Palestine Government?

    I understand that the pilfering did take place after the vessel sank, but I do not know whether it actually took place during the time in which the Palestine Government were in charge.

    Will my hon. Friend look into that point and make further inquiries as to whether or no the pilfering took place during the salvage?

    Did the Commission of Inquiry give any indication who was responsible for the sabotage?

    In the circumstances ought not some ex gratia payment to be made?

    In view of the fact that this property was all that these people had left in the world, do the Government really think it worth while going into fine points of individual responsibility before making good a loss which was not the fault of these people at any rate?

    British Police Officers (Casualties)

    31.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will give particulars of the circumstances in which British constables have been wounded or killed on duty or otherwise in Palestine during the last 12 months; and whether compensation is available for such men and their dependants?

    Five British police officers have been killed and one wounded during the last 12 months. I am circulating particulars in the OFFICIAL REPORT. In addition, three died and three were injured as a result of accidents whilst on duty. The answer to the last part of the Question is in the affirmative.

    Have the guilty parties been arrested and punished, and on whose behalf have these attacks been made? What were the fundamental reasons for these attacks?

    Following are the particulars:

  • (a) Killed.
  • (i) Constable H. Rowland, whilst searching an orange grove at Ramleh, was attacked by absconding offender and sustained fatal injuries, 15.:h October, 1942.
  • (ii) Constable A. H. Smith was fired upon and killed by a suspicious character in Nablus, 2nd June, 1943.
  • (iii) Constable A. J. Bailey as in (ii) above.
  • (iv) Constable H. R. Perriam, on challenging a suspicious character in Hebron, was fired upon and. killed, 22nd June, 1943.
  • (v) Constable A. G. Burnell, whilst assisting in rounding up absconding offenders near Beisan on 14th September.
  • (b) Wounded.
  • (i) Sergeant T. A. Stevens as in (a) (v) above.
  • Coloured Subjects (Discrimination)

    32.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that a distinguished West Indian cricketer at present in this country was recently asked to leave a London hotel simply on the ground that he was coloured; and whether, in the interests of maintaining the good name of this country, he will take steps to protect visitors from the Colonies against being subjected to these insulting forms of discrimination?

    34.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that Mr. L. Constantine, the West Indian cricketer, was refused admittance to a London hotel; and what steps he proposes to take to prevent coloured British subjects from being insulted in this way?

    36.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been drawn to a recent incident at a London hotel, arising from a successful attempt to impose a colour bar; and what steps he is taking to prevent a repetition of this?

    38.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been drawn to the exclusion from the Imperial Hotel, London, of Mr. Constantine, a Negro citizen; and what steps he is taking to prevent the exercise by hotel-keepers and others of racial discrimination which is repugnant to the traditions of this country?

    40.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the operation of the colour bar in some places in this country, he will consult with the Secretary of State for the Home Department with a view to securing, that racial discrimination against Colonial subjects in this country is made illegal?

    41.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he proposes to take any action in respect of the treatment recently of Mr. L. Constantine the West Indian cricketer, by a London hotel on the ground of his colour; and whether he will give the name of the hotel concerned?

    My right hon. Friend is aware of the incident referred to in these Questions. It is understood that legal proceedings are pending, and it would therefore be improper for me to comment on the incident itself. The hotel in question is the Imperial Hotel, Russell Square. I am glad, however, to have the opportunity of stating on behalf of my right hon. and gallant Friend that he most strongly condemns any form of racial discrimination against Colonial people in this country.

    Will the hon. Gentleman not go farther and ask that this matter shall be considered from the standpoint which I suggested, that any discrimination against coloured subjects should be made illegal?

    There is a Question down to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on the legal position.

    Will my hon. Friend consult the Home Secretary on whether it would not be possible to oppose the renewal of the licence of this hotel?

    Are the proceedings now pending criminal or civil in their nature? If they are civil proceedings will my hon. Friend consult with the Attorney-General to discover whether it is not a crime for a common inn to refuse to accommodate anybody?

    Has the hon. Gentleman suggested to the Home Secretary that such a refusal should be made illegal? Has he himself made such a recommendation?

    Is it not an offence under the common law for any person to take any steps whatever which are likely to cause disaffection among various classes of His Majesty's subjects and, if so, why are not criminal proceedings taken?

    Seychelles

    35.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has any information regarding the application received by the Kenya Government from the Seychelles asking for incorporation in Kenya Colony?

    I understand that the Seychelles Taxpayers' and Landowners' Association forwarded, without the knowledge of the Government of Seychelles, a Memorandum proposing the amalgamation of Seychelles with Kenya, to the Mombasa Taxpayers' Association and also to the Government of Kenya, with a copy for transmission to Sir Cosmo Parkinson. My right hon. and gallant Friend has no further information.

    Does that mean that the Government of the Seychelles are not asking for incorporation?

    No, I do not think that is the case. I think the Memorandum has been sent, as I stated in my reply.

    Officer's Conviction, Malta

    37.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies in what circumstances Captain Eric Strologo, of the Royal Artillery, stationed at Malta, has been sentenced to a period of hard labour by a civil court on a charge of arresting illegally a Maltese youth whom he believed to be tampering with a military truck?

    Captain Strologo was tried by a bench of the Supreme Court of Malta, consisting of the Chief Justice and two puisne judges. He was convicted under Article 85 of the Criminal Law, which reads as follows:

    "Whosoever without a lawful order from the competent authorities, saving the ones where the law authorises private individuals to apprehend offenders, shall arrest, detain or confine any person against the will of the same or provide a place for carrying out such arrest, detention or confinement shall be punished with hard labour or with imprisonment from seven months to two years. In slight cases the Court has power to award imprisonment from one to three months or fine."
    Captain Strologo was in fact sentenced to 13 months' imprisonment with hard labour under Article 86, which reads as follows:
    "The punishment of the crime contemplated in Article 85 shall be hard labour from 53 months to three years in each of the following cases. If the individual arrested, detained or confined shall have received any bodily harm, or if the detention or confinement shall be continued by the offender in the knowledge that a writ or order has been issued by the competent authority for the release or production of the person detained or confined"
    The sentence of 13 months' imprisonment with hard labour was subsequently reduced to three months by the Governor.

    In view of the fact that at the time of the alleged crime the accused was serving as an officer of His Majesty's Forces, and therefore subject to the protection of military law, why did this officer not appear before a military court?

    I do not think I had better comment any further on this point, because there is a possibility that the officer in question will appeal to His Majesty in Council.

    Has it been made quite clear that if an appeal were made to the Privy Council this officer would not be called upon to pay any part of the very heavy expense involved?

    Will my hon. Friend give an assurance that he has looked personally into this matter, because it is the duty of the Colonial Office to look into it?

    Nigeria Supply Board

    39.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why there is no African member of the Nigeria Supply Board, although European interests are represented; and whether he will take immediate steps to ensure adequate African representation on the Board?

    The Board to which the hon. Member refers is an executive and not a deliverative body, and the Government are responsible for all matters of policy. The object of the Board is to bring about the closest co-ordination between the several Departments concerned with supply, and the commercial members of the Board were appointed on account of their experience in dealing with such matters, and not in order to represent European commercial interests. The question of representing African as compared with European interests does not therefore arise.

    Is it not strange that all the members of this Nigerian Board should be European, and that none of them should be African? Does it mean that there is no African capable of representing his own country on the Board?

    No, Sir. It is practically, in all cases, an official Board, and the only two commercial representatives are there only in an advisory capacity.

    That does not answer the point at all. Why cannot there be an official African on the Board?

    Northern Rhodesia (Labour,Copperbelt")

    42.

    asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been called to the comments in the Report of the Labour Department for 1942 on the unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in Northern Rhodesia as regards housing in the Copperbelt, the non-payment of cost-of-living allowances, the decline in the quality of farm labour and the inadequate diet and lack of sufficient health services for farm labourers; and what steps are being taken to remedy the position in these matters?

    Yes, Sir; my right hon. and gallant Friend's attention has been called to the Report. The general standard of housing provided by the mining companies on the Copperbelt is recognised to be satisfactory, and my right hon. and gallant Friend has recently called the Governor's attention, in connection with this Report, to the necessity of ensuring that this standard is maintained. The Report refers to the inadequacy of the accommodation existing at one mine at the end of last year. This is now being remedied by means of further building. A cost-of-living bonus is paid to African mineworkers and to certain classes of African Government employees. The Government have no power to compel private employers to pay such a bonus, but the cost of living is kept under constant review, and the Government are subsidizing maize and have declared their readiness to subsidize other essential foodstuffs if necessary. The Report refers to individual complaints that the quality of farm labour is declining, but records that conditions generally as regard diet, health services and housing on the farms, on which the quality of labour depends, are gradually improving. This progress is largely due to the efforts of the Labour Department, which is gradually bringing complaints to light and arranging for them to be remedied.

    Local Government Reform

    45 and 46.

    asked the Prime Minister (1) what steps for the reform of local government and the redistribution of the powers and duties of the various categories of local authorities are being contemplated; and whether before definite proposals are brought forward either consultation will take place with representatives of the authorities affected or a Royal Commission will be set up to inquire and advise;

    (2) whether, in respect of any local government services in which a Minister desires action to be taken over a wider area than that represented by the jurisdiction of any single local authority, care will be taken to secure that the new area will be the same for all such services so that local government may not be confused by each such service being allotted its own area by the Ministry concerned, quite regardless of other widening services and the views of other Ministers?

    47.

    asked the Prime Minister, whether, in view of the transfer, by means of Orders in Council, of the powers of local government and county councils to the Ministry of Health in connection with the national health service, the Ministry of Agriculture in connection with agricultural education and other services, the Ministry of Transport in connection with Class i roads and the Board of Trade in connection with weights and measures, he will now give an assurance that it is not the intention of the Government to transfer by this means the work and duties of the county councils to a central body?

    It is, I am assured, generally agreed that there is a strong case for the expansion and improvement of many local government services and that we should be ready with plans for execution at the end of the war. I am aware of the fears voiced by the Associations of local government bodies lest the Government, in putting forward proposals for such changes, should pay insufficient regard to their cumulative effect upon the existing local government system.

    The Government have given the fullest consideration to the representations that have been made to them to the effect that before any important changes in particular services are decided upon there should be a comprehensive and authoritative inquiry into the general machinery of local government. It is clear that such an inquiry would involve the taking of much evidence and the consideration of many highly controversial issues going far beyond those raised by the plans for meeting post-war needs in regard to particular services. It would consequently occupy much time, and the results might not in the end find general acceptance. The delay involved would be highly prejudicial to the success of our post-war plans, and in the circumstances it is not the intention of the Government to embark on a comprehensive inquiry into the machinery of local government at the present time.

    The Government are, however, very much alive to the need for avoiding any weakening of the structure of local government and I can give the assurance that in framing any proposals in relation to particular services for submission to this House, the Government will pay the most careful regard to this factor.

    A letter which is being addressed to the Associations will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

    Is the Prime Minister aware that the great danger to be guarded against is centralised bureaucracy in Whitehall?

    Is the Prime Minister aware also that the war has shown many weaknesses which will have to be removed later on, and that I hope he will soon get someone to consider it, even if we cannot have a Commission?

    Are we to understand from the answer that the inquiries that are to proceed will take place after the war and that they will be instituted and carried out by an impartial body, such as a Royal Commission or a joint Select Committee of both House of Parliament?

    We will see when we get a little nearer the end of the war, and I shall be glad to take up that point.

    Following is the letter from the Minister without Portfolio to Sir Harry G. Pritchard, Association of Municipal Corporations, and Sir Sidney Johnson, County Councils Association.

    "22nd September, 1943.

    With my colleague, the Minister of Health, I was very glad to have the opportunity recently of discussing the question of an inquiry into the machinery of local government with yourself and the other members of the deputation from the Association of Municipal Corporations and the County Councils Association. I am now able to give you the considered reply which we then promised.

    I would like to say at the outset that no aspect of your case met with a readier acceptance in our minds than your reference to the immense value of the system of local government which has been handed down to us, and we wish in the most categorical manner to repeat the assurances we gave at the time that it is no part of the plans, either of ourselves or of our colleagues, to allow this great heritage to be destroyed: rather are we convinced of the need to develop it still further. For I think that your associations recognise, no less than we do, that the system is the result of a long process of growth and constant adaptation to changing conditions, and that if it is to continue to play its full part in the life of the nation this process of adjustment must continue.

    There is, however, as you yourselves appreciate, a strong case for the extension and improvement of many of our services, some involving fundamental changes, and for plans to this end to be ready for execution after the war. It is in the light of this position that we have to consider the proposal of your associations that there should be a comprehensive inquiry into our local government system before making any important changes in particular services.

    Under normal conditions and assuming there were no special urgency in regard to any of the proposed changes, we readily admit that there would be much force in this suggestion, but conditions are not normal and the need for many of the reforms now in contemplation is urgent. I think that our discussions made it clear that any inquiry to be of value must be both wide and authoritative and, whether it were conducted by a Royal Commission or by a different and perhaps speedier tribunal, must involve the taking of much evidence and the consideration of many highly controversial issues. Frankly, we can see no way of putting through an inquiry such as local authorities and the general public would regard as authoritative under one year, and the period might well run to several.

    Furthermore, we entertain very little hope that the report of the tribunal when received—even if it were unanimous—would find general acceptance. It would be certain to involve issues far wider than those raised by the departmental plans for meeting reconstruction needs in regard to particular services and until these issues had been ultimately decided by Parliament, little progress could be made with such plans: indeed it is not too much to say that the delays involved in a comprehensive inquiry of this character are likely to be highly prejudicial to the success of our post-war plans.

    It is after the most careful consideration of this prospect that the Government have come to the conclusion, that they would not be justified in deferring further consideration of the various Departmental proposals affecting particular services until the whole position had been the subject of a comprehensive inquiry. As I have already said, however, the Government are very much alive to the need for avoiding any weakening of the structure of local government. When, therefore, they consider any proposal for a change in a particular service, the effect which that change is likely to have on local government is one of the principal factors to which they give consideration; but it is not, and cannot be, the only factor, and there may be occasions when improvements in particular services, for which there is a clear case, can only be brought about at the cost of some modification of local government structure.

    (Sgd.) WILLIAM A. JOWITT."

    68.

    asked the Minister without Portfolio when the Government expect to be in a position to announce their proposals for local government reform; and whether he can assure the House that no action will be taken by curtailing the existing responsibilities of local authorities which is likely to prevent the best type of resident from continuing to serve on such bodies?

    In regard to the first part of the Question, I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer by the Prime Minister to previous Questions. In regard to. the second part, the point raised is one which the Government will certainly bear in mind when considering the cumulative effect of proposals relating to particular local government services.

    Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that action has already been taken in withdrawing services from local authorities which they have hitherto satisfactorily administered with the general approval of all their citizens?

    In every case that consideration has been, and in the future will be, borne in mind.

    Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman consider a Royal Commission to go into the whole question of local government?

    The hon. Member was here and heard the Prime Minister deal with the matter.

    Armed Forces

    Commander-In-Chief

    48.

    asked the Prime Minister whether he has now any statement to make upon the appointment of a commander-in-chief having operational control of all fighting services in the United Kingdom and other theatres of war in which British troops are engaged?

    Inoculation And Vaccination

    63.

    asked the Prime Minister whether he will cause a declaration to be made to remove widespread doubts in the three Fighting Services that any soldier, sailor or airman, man or woman refusing inoculation or vaccination whether for service at home or abroad will not be penalised in any manner whatsoever and that threats now frequently made of stopped or restricted leave, future gratuity or pension refusals or other financial loss, or refusal of medical treatment for illnesses assumed to have arisen through non-inoculation are all unauthorised?

    Inoculation is voluntary in all three Services, and I am assured that this is well known. In the Navy, however, in the interests of the health of ships' companies, it is necessary to refuse to those who have not been inoculated permission to land in ports where there may be danger of contracting any of the diseases against which this treatment is aimed. If individuals who refuse to be inoculated have been threatened in any way and if my hon. Friend will forward the particulars to the Mnisters concerned, the facts will be looked into.

    Statutory Rules And Orders

    49.

    asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to the varying practice in different departments in signing Statutory Rules and Orders; that in some cases orders are signed under seal, in other cases by a variety of officials in a department whose status is always indicated, and in other cases by persons whose status is not indicated but who state that they are authorised by the Minister; and whether he will take steps to ensure a greater measure of uniformity in this and other directions?

    I am advised that trying to achieve uniformity at the present time would cause more trouble than it is worth.

    May I ask my right hon. Friend to consider the possibility of arranging that Orders should be signed by Ministers only in order to ensure that no new Order shall be made unless the Minister has signed it?

    It always comes back to the Minister. The Minister is always responsible ultimately, and the Government are always responsible collectively. If the Minister has not himself seen or signed an Order, as certainly sometimes necessarily occurs, he, nevertheless, is responsible and can be brought to book in this House. There is the great remedy.

    Is it not very undesirable that laws should be made by persons who are not even Members of this House?

    It is not a question of making laws but of administering certain Acts of Parliament which have already received the assent of the House and which are administered under the strict scrutiny of Parliament, and of the hon. Gentleman.

    Is the Prime Minister aware that it is not a question of making laws but of the Departments taking upon themselves powers which really should he those of the House of Commons?

    50.

    asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to the practice, in the phrasing of Statutory Rules and Orders, of making reference to the fact that an earlier Order or Regulation has been amended, but without stating in the Order which makes this reference the number of the Order which contains the amendment; and, in view of the importance of His Majesty's subjects having the least possible difficulty in understanding the meaning of Statutory Rules and Orders, whether he will give directions that the present practice be modified?

    The Defence Regulations themselves are published from time to time in consolidated form in volumes which contain tables and notes showing how and when the various Regulations have been amended. So far as these Regulations are concerned I am advised that any further elaboration of cross references would only tend to confusion. I am also assured that in printing Orders made under Defence Regulations it is the general practice when referring to any previous Order to give in a footnote the number not only of that Order but also of any intervening Orders which have amended it. Arrangements are being made to secure that this practice will be uniformly followed.

    Will the Prime Minister consider whether all these Rules and Orders should not in future be written in Basic English?

    War And Peace (Three-Power Conference)

    52.

    asked the Prime Minister whether he will take steps for the convening of a conference, on an equal footing, of leading representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, for the prosecution of the war and the establishment of a durable peace?

    I have at present nothing to add to the statement I made on this subject yesterday.

    Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether Mr. Cordell Hull proposes to attend the conference of Foreign Secretaries in person?

    That would be a very proper question to raise in the Congress of the United States.

    Colonies (Self-Government)

    51.

    asked the Prime Minister whether the pronouncement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies at Lagos on 17th September that no country can be self-governing without being economically independent represents the views of His Majesty's Government?

    My hon. Friend is presumably referring to what was said by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies at a meeting with representatives of the Press in Lagos on 12th September. I have not seen a verbatim record of this, but should prefer to await the text before expressing any opinion upon it.

    Is it wrong then to assume that the report published in the newspapers and emanating from Reuter is inaccurate, because the report definitely used the words have used in this Question?

    I prefer to await a full report. There are reports of our speeches—and we have all gone through the experience—which you could not say were inaccurate, yet, on the other hand, you had to be tried for your life for them, you would like to be sure that the exact words were on record or otherwise.

    War Decorations And Medals

    53.

    asked the Prime Minister whether he has considered the Motion on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. Member for Stroud and other hon. Members concerning the King's Badge; and whether the Government intend to take any action in the matter?

    [ That in the opinion of this House all Members of His Majesty's Forces who are honourably discharged either permanently or temporarily, with or without disability pension, shall be entitled to receive and wear the King's Badge.]

    In view of the interest taken in this matter by a large number of Members in all quarters of the House, the proposal has again been carefully examined. In the opinion of the Government, however, there are good reasons for adherence to their previous conclusion in the matter, which was announced to the House on 9th June, 1942.

    On another Question I am suggesting that we should have a Debate on these matters presently, and that will be a better time than now.

    54.

    asked the Prime Minister whether the Africa Star will be granted for service in Cyprus between 10th June, 1940, and 12th May, 1943?

    57.

    asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to the Motion on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. and gallant Member for Eastbourne, on War Decorations and Medals; and whether he will give time to debate this subject?

    [ That, in the opinion of this House, an opportunity should be given to Parliament to debate the recommendations of the Committee on the Grant of Honours, Decorations and Medals in time of war, approved by His Majesty and presented to this House in August, 1943, before His Majesty's Government take the necessary steps to put them into operation.]

    59.

    asked the Prime Minister the grounds on which the grant of the Africa Star is, for the Navy, restricted to service on shore or in harbour in the same areas and between the same dates as the Army; and whether, in view of the extensive collaboration in all North African areas of activity of His Majesty's naval vessels, the officers and men concerned will either be granted the Africa Star or allowed to choose between this award and the general 1939–43 medal?

    60.

    asked the Prime Minister whether he will consider extending the grant of the general 1939–43 medal to anti-aircraft gunners in this country, in view of their constant arduous services in dealing with enemy air attack?

    61.

    asked the Prime Minister whether he will recommend that the 1939–43 medal be awarded to all personnel of Anti-aircraft Command, Balloon Command and the Air Sea Rescue Service who have been under enemy air attack either in Great Britain or home waters?

    62.

    asked the Prime Minister whether the Government are prepared to consider the issue, as a token of the nation's gratitude, of a special medal or chevron to wives and parents whose husbands and sons have been killed?

    66.

    asked the Prime Minister the considerations governing the decision that Anti-Aircraft Command should not be classified as an operational command for the purposes of the award of the 1939–43 Star; and whether he will review the question of an award to men in this command?

    Service in Cyprus will not qualify for the Africa Star. Malta alone of the Mediterranean islands is included in the award of this Star, by reason of its heavy action and long ordeal in combination with the operations in Africa. In the Navy the 1939–43 Star takes priority of award over the Africa Star, and no one eligible for the former will receive the latter. The reason for this is that, from the naval point of view, service in the African campaigns cannot be accepted as ranking before the worldwide services performed by the Navy in other areas of operations. Sea-going personnel of the Air-Sea Rescue Service and of the barrage balloons will qualify under the same rules as the Navy. Service on land on the home front presents many difficult borderline cases on which opinion may well mature. When the Africa and 1939–43 Stars are manufactured after the war, they will be given as mementos to the next-of-kin of those who have suffered death as a result of service in a theatre of operations during the periods laid down. With regard to the Motion standing in the name of my hon. and gallant Friend and other Members, I consider it desirable that this matter should be open to debate when the House meets again later in the year. I have given a great deal of attention to this subject and will myself take charge of the Debate. We are going to get on with the giving out of the medals. We are not going to delay the issue of the ribbons but the question is whether some others should come in. There are officers and men, some of whom have been fighting for three years continuously, and who, perhaps, have only a decoration for personal gallantry on their breasts. They will value it very much. We must be careful riot to destroy the value of the award by making it practically universal. On the other hand, it may well be that some expansion may be permitted from the present conception. Everyone will recognise the difficulty of the problem and how easily opinions may differ upon it.

    Would my right hon. Friend consider the award of this medal to the civilians, fishermen, yachtsmen and others who helped to evacuate our Forces from Dunkirk at great personal risk?

    While thanking my right hon. Friend for his reply, may I ask him how the Debate will arise? Will it take place on the Adjournment of the House?

    I think we can easily find a peg to hang it on, but I certainly hope the House will be able to find time to discuss this, because we obviously want to make these awards correspond with the general wish and feeling of the country and of the House, which represents the country, and also to make them in a form which will be acceptable to the far more critical opinion of the Fighting Services.

    May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he intends to issue ribbons to the legitimate next-of-kin so that they will be able to wear them as women members of the British Legion proudly wore their husbands' ribbons after the last war?

    I will consider that. At present I have not advanced beyond giving the Star afterwards, when it is ultimately issued, as a token. There may be something in the hon. Gentleman's suggestion, and I will look into it.

    Can my right hon. Friend tell us when the Army, Navy and Air Force orders actually governing the details of these awards will be published?

    We have issued a White Paper on the subject which I think was comprehensive, but I will inquire into the exact state of the issue of the orders. As I say, there must be no delay.

    Can my right hon. Friend say whether it is the intention to announce policy before or during the Debate?

    I have announced policy, and a White Paper has been laid. I might have a few codicils to add as result of rumination in the interval, but what I should seek would be an opportunity to profit from the Debate, to see what is the real feeling.

    International Food Conference

    55.

    asked the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government have agreed to draw up periodic reports on the steps taken to implement the recommendations of the Hot Springs Conference with reference to long-term production policy; and when a report will be submitted to the Interim Commission?

    The proposal of the Hot Springs Conference was that each nation should consider the possibility of drawing up periodic reports for submission—not to the Interim Commission which is at present formulating a specific plan for the permanent body, but to the suggested permanent organisation in the field of food and agriculture which is not yet in being.

    Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is widespread anxiety in the country over this matter and the delay in announcing the long-term policy for encouraging production?

    We have a lot of anxieties, and one cancels out another very often.

    Civil Service Unions (Trades Union Congress)

    56.

    asked the Prime Minister under whose authority the warning was issued from 10, Downing Street, on 12th August, 1943, to civil servants that they were liable to penalties if they retained membership of trade unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress?

    Would it not have been better, and would it not be better in the future, when statements like that are issued for it to be stated that they are issued under the authority of the Cabinet? Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that Downing Street, London, is not the only Downing Street in the country?

    I should have thought that it was tolerably well identified as the place from which from time to time the Prime Minister of the day issues announcements on the authority of the Cabinet.

    But will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that he was in America when that statement was made?

    I know, but it followed very closely upon decisions which were taken when I was in this country, and I was apprised of the form of the notice by telegraph before it was issued.

    Empire Collaboration

    58.

    asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the speech at Adelaide by the Prime Minister of Australia recommending that an all-Empire Cabinet should be set up at an early date, he will state the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government in this connection?

    Such spacious issues would be appropriate for an Imperial Conference or for a meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers whenever either of these becomes possible.

    Would His Majesty's Government consider the possibility of sending a Minister to Australia to start preliminary conversations on these matters?

    It has several times been considered, but most of the Ministers who would carry the greatest weight in Australia have a full-time job here and in attendance on the House.

    Has my right hon. Friend in mind the summoning of an Imperial Conference at the earliest practicable moment and, if necessary, before the conclusion of hostilities?

    I have been trying for the last two years to get a meeting of Prime Ministers. I understand that is more likely to be acceptable than an Imperial Conference at this moment, and I have hopes that we shall succeed in having such a meeting early next year. Of course, each of these Dominions has had, or is going to have, an election, and that has hung over the movements of the Prime Ministers. In Australia and New Zealand, particularly, they are very near the war against Japan. There are great difficulties in this matter, but we are patiently endeavouring to solve them. We regard it as an important and immediate objective to procure a meeting of Empire Prime Ministers.

    Italian Armistice Terms (Broadcast)

    64.

    asked the Prime Minister, who was responsible for broadcasting the Armistice terms with Italy before they had been communicated to Members of this House?

    The President and I authorised General Eisenhower to publish the terms of the Armistice signed on 3rd September, leaving it to him to decide the moment of publication in the light of the military situation. Neither Parliament nor the Congress of the United States was in Session at that time.

    Mussolini

    65.

    asked the Prime Minister whether at the time of the Armistice arrangements with the Badoglio Government, Mussolini was then in Italian territory; and what stipulation was made to ensure his being handed over to the United Nations as part of the terms of the Armistice?

    Can the Prime Minister make any further statement as to why the guard failed in instructions given them to shoot this man on his attempt to escape?

    Coal Industry (Discipline)

    67.

    asked the Prime Minister whether in order to get rid of the existing division of responsibility for discipline in the coal industry, he will now take steps to transfer to the Minister of Fuel and Power the duty of taking legal proceedings vested in the Minister of Labour by the Essential Work (Coal Mining Industry) Order?

    No, Sir. I am advised that no good purpose would be served by an alteration in the present arrangements. There is close consultation between the two Departments upon each case that arises.

    Is the Prime Minister satisfied with the results of the present system?

    We were told that all sorts of terrible things would happen last year, but we got through all right. Although I am still very anxious about this year and I should hesitate to say that I was by any means satisfied, still we have good hopes that we shall surmount the difficulty.

    Weekly Wage Earners' Income Tax (Proposed Legislation)

    143.

    asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he has now completed his examination of the problem of paying Income Tax on current earnings; and whether he has any statement to make?

    144.

    asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he has any statement to make as to the possibility of applying the principle of pay-as-you-go to the Income Tax of wage-earners?

    145.

    asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether his inquiries into the question of assessment on wages of workers on current earnings have now been completed; and whether he is in a position to make a statement thereon?

    146.

    asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether, in view of the many difficulties arising from the present method of collecting Income Tax from wage-earners, he is in a position to make any statement upon the adoption of a pay-as-you-go system of collecting such taxes?

    147.

    asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he is in a position to state what progress has been made in working out a practical scheme for the deduction of Income Tax from small earnings on the principle of pay-as-you-go?

    148.

    asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he has now considered alternative suggestions for the payment of Income Tax on a pay-as-you-earn basis; and whether he can make a statement?

    149.

    asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he proposes to introduce a system of pay-as-you-go Income Tax before the next Finance Bill?

    In view of the large number of Questions on this subject, I should like, with Mr. Speaker's permission, to make the following statement: I am glad to be able to inform the House that I am now able to put before them the proposals for a new system for the taxation of weekly wage-earners, which was devised by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer to confer on the wage-earner all the benefits of a pay-as-you-earn basis by regulating the weekly deduction of tax so as to keep in step both with the weekly earnings and the liability for the whole year. A full explanation of the new system will be found in a White Paper presented to-day, which will be available for Members in the Vote Office. It is proposed that the new system shall be brought into force for the Income Tax year 1944–45, commencing 6th April, 1944; and to enable this to be done it will be necessary for legislation to be passed before the end of the present Session. A Bill Will therefore be presented as soon as possible; it is hoped that the drafting will be completed in time for the text to be in the hands of Members in about 10 days' time.

    Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this will give great satisfaction to wage-earners, particularly shipbuilders and engineers?

    As this proposal involves forgiving about six months' Income Tax in the case of all those concerned, is it proposed to extend that to the rest of the taxpayers, so that all shall get equal treatment?

    A full explanation of the scope of the proposals will be given on the Second Reading of the Bill. But I may say now that the scheme outlined in the White Paper is designed to meet those difficulties which have been so constantly raised by Members of the House in respect of wage-earners whose earnings fluctuate and tax is deducted in respect of higher wages in weeks when wages are much lower. There is no such difficulty or disadvantage when the taxpayer's income is constant or is on a rising scale.

    Will the hon. Gentleman consider applying this principle also to the payment of Excess Profits Tax, in view of what happened after the last war, when so much of the Excess Profits Tax was never paid?

    Will the term "workers" include what are generally known as black-coated workers?

    If the hon. Member will study the White Paper to-day, he will find all those questions answered.

    Death Of Sir Kingsley Wood

    I revert to the painful event which was made known yesterday, namely, the sudden death of our Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood. He was a very old Member of the House. He had been here for a quarter of a century. For the last ten years he has been continuously in office amid all the vicissitudes, changes and shocks of that period. Everyone knows how good his work was at the Post Office and the Ministry of Health. He left a mark on the Post Office and made a very great contribution to building up the prestige of the Ministry of Health to the high point it has attained among the great offices of State. Then, before the war, he was taken to a field in which he had not had previous experience. It was thought necessary that his business and administrative efficiency should be applied to our air production and to our Royal Air Force, and he became Air Minister in those critical years. As between the different Services, while avoiding invidious comparisons, I should certainly say that the outlook of the Royal Air Force upon this war was more closely attuned to the circumstances and conditions as they emerged by painful experience than those of either of the other two Services. The great contribution for which Sir Kingsley Wood's administration of the Air Ministry will always be remembered was the founding and development of the Empire Air Training Scheme in Canada, to which pilots from New Zealand and Australia came in great numbers, to which would-be pilots from the United Kingdom have also been sent in large numbers, and which has produced us a ceaseless flow, numbered by tens of thousands, of those extraordinarily competent and daring men to whom we owe so much of the satisfactory position we have now attained. This Empire Air Training Scheme was a work of great imagination, and all who were concerned in it deserve the greatest possible credit. It was not only a war winner but an Empire cementer. I imagine that the friendships and comradeships formed by these young men in the vast training camps of Canada will carry on their beneficent influence long after the older Members of this House have passed away. That was a very great and outstanding act of his administration.

    Then, when I was called upon to form this present Government in the height of the great battle that was raging and which turned out so disastrously, he became Chancellor of the Exchequer. This must be regarded as an historic Chancellorship. It represents by far the greatest financial effort in our history. Nothing like it has been seen before, or anything approaching it, but, of course, all our figures are larger now than at any other time. Sir Kingsley Wood made the fullest contribution which finance can make, with other agencies, to stemming the tide of inflation, which is always driving in upon our breastworks and dykes and, if it ever burst them would he the beginning of untold evils and demoralisation. He produced three Budgets to the House. The first Budget of a Chancellor is often well received, but the third Budget is the most critical of all, because it is the heir of previous decisions, and it is by that time you can see whether the Chancellor is really master of this great and dominant Department of State.

    The last Budget was the most acceptable of all. It was really a triumph, a great personal triumph, not a triumph particularly for the oratorical fireworks, but for the sound lines on which he had been working, which now at this time arrived at fruition and enabled him to make a statement to the House which was regarded here and in the United States as masterly. It was a balanced Budget with these colossal figures, and out of £5,700,000,000, half was raised by taxation, the most severe taxation ever imposed by a Government or loyally accepted by the taxpayers. When I think of the very keen manner in which the late Mr. Bonar Law used to take pride in the proportion of the money he had raised by taxation as opposed to borrowing in the last war, I find the means of measuring the achievement of the late Chancellor, who very nearly succeeded in doubling the proportion raised out of direct taxation. All the greatest economists, John Stuart Mill at their head, have always spoken of the evils of borrowing for the purposes of war and have pointed out that as far as possible posterity should be relieved and that the cost of what is consumed in the war should be met at the time. That is a counsel of perfection, but nobody has ever come nearer to it than the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. The cost of living has been kept within a 30 per cent, increase over pre-war by a most elaborate system which be introduced. The United States have not adopted it but it is looked upon in many quarters there with very considerable admiration. At any rate, this keeping down of the cost of living is one of the pillars on which the whole defence against inflation rests.

    Our rate of borrowing is incredibly low, far lower than it was in the last war. I remember well at the close of the last war that we were urged to subscribe to Government funds under a slogan, "Security and 6 per cent." We have succeeded in borrowing these vast sums in the fifth year of the war at a rate, when the tax is deducted, which does not amount to more than 1½ per cent. I am not comparing quite fairly, because the 6 per cent. was gross and the 1½ per cent. is net. Nevertheless, we have much heavier taxes at the present time, and the fact remains that these vast loans which have been floated do not impose upon posterity the burden of more than 1½ per cent. if you take in the taxation and 3 per cent. if you do not. In all these respects—these large, salient features—no comparison can be made between the finance conducted by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer and any finance of which we have record in periods of great expenditure and confusion.

    At the beginning of the blitz I pressed upon him the vital need of doing something for the poor people whose houses were smashed up and whose businesses were destroyed, and he devised the elaborate insurance scheme, which has come into the fullest possible fruition. At one time, it looked as if the State were taking on a very heavy burden, but trees never grow up to the sky, and, as a matter of fact, not only have individuals been provided for and the loss inflicted by the enemy shared and spread over the shoulders of the whole community, but the scheme has ultimately turned out to be highly profitable to the Exchequer.

    The extension of the Income Tax to the wage-earners was a very remarkable step. That it should have gained the assent of this House, elected on universal suffrage, is also a remarkable fact, showing how extremely closely the wage-earning masses of the country and those who represent them feel associated with the vital issues now being fought out in the field. Undoubtedly, payment in arrear, when the Treasury accounts are made up, being demanded from the wage-earners, produced many cases of very great hardship and tended to cause dissatisfaction with a great principle of taxation which was being so very willingly accepted. The Chancellor had given the closing weeks of his life to a most careful study of the "pay-as-you-go" principle, and he was looking forward, on the very day that he died, to making a statement to the House on the subject. That statement has now been made by the Financial Secretary, and the relevant White Paper will soon be in possession of the House, and it is the last contribution which the late Chancellor has made to our affairs. In addition to this, the recasting of the general form and presentation of the Budget and the nation's accounts which has received the approval of the House and commands the approval of those best qualified to judge, in all quarters of the House, will take a permanent part in our affairs. All these are milestones in our long financial history, and they will be associated with the financial administration of Sir Kingsley Wood.

    One of the most important functions in these last years of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been the relations which he established and maintained with the United States. Our finance is most closely interwoven, and all kinds of questions of the utmost difficulty and delicacy have been arising constantly. We have had the ablest Treasury officials over there, and the Chancellor has always had a series of questions of the utmost complexity to raise and to adjust with his opposite number and colleague, Mr. Morgenthau, the Secretary to the Treasury of the United States. I have received a message which I will read to the House from Mr. Morgenthau this morning:
    "Permit me to express through you to His Majesty's Government and people my deep sense of personal loss in the death of Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose sincere friendliness and co-operative spirit have done so much to advance the common cause of our two countries. We in the United States, who knew of his great abilities as well as fine integrity and personal charm, join with you in mourning his departure."
    Of course, it is a difficult and thankless task to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, especially in time of war. Everyone would like to see a generous attitude adopted in respect of questions affecting the Armed Forces. Everyone feels the extremely severe, almost confiscatory, character of the taxation imposed. At every point, it strikes upon the intimate life of the people. The few comforts or luxuries that are left to them are charged with the most immense burdens of taxation. At every point he has a disagreeable job to do. One cannot at all wonder that the Chancellor of the Exchequer goes through periods of disparagement and criticism, but all that was overcome by the massive success of his financial schemes, and all that was also overcome by his own personal qualities.

    We in this House and still more in the Cabinet were very fond of Kingsley Wood as a man, amiable, experienced, competent, efficient, accessible. He was all that a Minister who is a good House of Commons man should be. He was also a good party man. There is no reason to be ashamed of that, for in many periods of history, democracy expresses itself best through the ebb and flow of parties. He was a good party man in this sense, because these are the qualifications of a good party man—you must know how to put your party before yourself, and you must know the occasions when to put nation before party. In this he fully qualified. We shall not easily fill the gap, and the balance of our affairs is, at the moment, sadly deranged. A new problem and burden is thrown upon me, and I feel that very much. I feel far more the loss of a genial, sincere and faithful friend, with whom I and my colleagues have stood shoulder to shoulder during a period altogether without precedent in our long history. I feel that, in expressing these sentiments, I carry with me the genuine and unaffected acquiescence and even active agreement of Members of all parties, seated in all parts of the House.

    I speak as one who crossed swords with Sir Kingsley Wood more than any other Member of this House. I do not think that the House really appreciates how much the late Chancellor of the Exchequer contributed to the development of that great Department the Ministry of Health. I remember him first as a mere Parliamentary Private Secretary to the first Minister of Health, the present Lord Addison, and how he was in during the early creative days of that Department. He left his mark there and left it there permanently. When he was in office I was generally put up to speak against him; when I was in office, he was too often put up to speak against me. Although we did differ in opinions and although I have, on occasion, said hard things about Sir Kingsley Wood, as he has about me, I have never known an occasion where political differences resulted in any personal bitterness between us. When I was last in office I had to see a great deal of the late Chancellor. We represented opposing political views, but I think I can claim that we did share a genuine common interest in the war situation and all that pertains to it. He was a good party man, and for that, like the Prime Minister, I respected him, but we have, thank God, in this House of Commons never allowed political differences to disturb personal relations, and long may that tradition continue. I feel that I have lost a friend. I feel that the nation has lost a man who has made his mark on the modern history of our people. The country is the poorer. He was a good House of Commons man, a good Parliament man, and this House of Commons is the poorer because his genial smile will never again light this Chamber.

    To be Sir Kingsley Wood's Parliamentary Private Secretary was no sinecure. Every day I had to tell him what people were saying. We would not have remained the close friends we were had I not told him the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. I attribute his success to the great care he took over everything he did, and his ability to get the best out of his team. He would have made a successful Test Match captain—always alert, always cheerful, always efficient, always with a keen eye on his opponents and ever willing to listen to the advice of anyone in the team, and, in consequence, always having very loyal support and affection. Though scrupulously fair to his opponents, he always played for his side. Sir, I have lost the greatest friend I have ever had.

    No one more appropriately could have spoken on the work and service of the late Chancellor than the hon. Baronet the Member for Bromley (Sir E. Campbell). Their relations were remarkable. No Minister ever had a more loyal servant. They really were the relations of David and Jonathan, and it is to the great credit of the Chancellor to have inspired such remarkably devoted service. At the same time we feel sympathy for my hon. Friend in having lost the man he served in many posts so loyally and well. I am in the position of having known Sir Kingsley Wood perhaps almost longer than any Member of this House. I knew him in his early political days on the London County Council, where he won his spurs. He soon got the respect of his colleagues and showed his abilities. A remarkable thing about him is that he rose to his great position without any social influence, purely by hard work, application and industry. I have never forgotten the occasion when he won his first laurels in the great battles over the Health Insurance Act, in which he displayed immense industry, great knowledge and great skill in debate, and soon established his position in this House of Commons as a skilful Parliamentarian. We cannot forget the many years during which he understudied the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain. He had a loyal friend in the hon. Member for Bromley, and Mr. Chamberlain had a splendid colleague for many years, in his conduct of the Ministry of Health, in Sir Kingsley Wood.

    Quite frankly, I feel that when he took on the most difficult and important post of Chancellor of the Exchequer some rather doubted whether, from his training and experience, he would "fill the bill." This year I was able to pay a tribute, a tribute which the whole House was prepared to pay, to his great success in an almost super-human job. He had not great arts of oratory, but he had extraordinary thoroughness in exposition, he always listened to criticism, he had good temper, was never ruffled, was always prepared to learn and, what was very wise, always ready to take sound advice and select wise counsellors in his difficult job. As my right hon. Friend who spoke for the Labour Party said, we all loved Kingsley Wood. He was a universal favourite. The news of his death came to us as a great shock. We liked his genial smile and his lack of pomposity. He never learned the Treasury manner. He was always prepared to regard us all as his friends and colleagues, and I cannot help expressing the sympathy of the whole House with his widow in what must, to her, be a great tragedy.

    I want to pay a tribute to the late Chancellor of the Exchequer from the back benches. The Chancellor of the Exchequer probably knew this House as well as any person did, and I think that was so because he was on such friendly terms with so many individual Members of this House. By his passing, we have all lost something: we have lost a friend. Sir Kingsley Wood never tried to lecture the House. He was always anxious to explain his mind so that all could understand, and if any of us wanted further explanations, he was always willing to welcome us to his room. It did not matter how new to the House or how insignificant a Member might be, Sir Kingsley Wood was always willing to receive him into his room and to do what he could to satisfy his difficulties. His character and individuality will make him extremely hard to replace. None of us in this House will easily forget Sir Kingsley Wood.

    On behalf of my Liberal National colleagues, I should like to join in paying my humble tribute to the memory of Sir Kingsley Wood. I have another reason for doing so, because I was greatly privileged eight years ago in serving under him at the Ministry of Health, where he established a great record for his brilliant administrative gifts. He was one of the shrewdest men in council I ever met. He had a great agility of mind, a perfect genius for disentangling the essential points in any problem, and an infinite capacity for hard work. If ever a man died in harness and on active service, it was Kingsley Wood. But there was another quality, which impressed me as one not belonging to the same party, and that was his quality of tolerance. The Prime Minister and other speakers have said that he was a great party man. He loved political fighting, he loved the surge of conflict, he loved the cut-and-thrust of debate, in which he often killed but never wounded. Although he was a strong party man, with strong beliefs, he was always tolerant of those who held the opposite views. He never disliked criticism or opposition, because it enabled him to retort. He was a son of the manse. Speaking as a son of the manse, I know what a great loss his death will be to the Free Churches, with which he maintained a constant association. The Conservative Party has lost a great party leader, the nation has lost a great administrator, and many of us have lost a personal friend.

    Message From The King (Regency)

    THE PRIME MINISTER ( at the Bar) acquainted the House that he had a Message from His Majesty the King to this House, signed by His Majesty's own hand. And he presented the same to the House, and it was read by Mr. SPEAKER (all the Members of the House being uncovered), and is as followeth:—

    In accordance with recommendations which I made to both Houses of Parliament in the first year of My reign, permanent provision was enacted for the purpose of facilitating the uninterrupted exercise of the Royal Authority during any incapacity of the Sovereign and during the absence of the Sovereign from the Realm, as well as in the event of the minority of the Sovereign on His Accession.

    The Regency Act, 1937, passed for these purposes, provides, among other things, that, in the event of the illness of the Sovereign or of his absence or intended absence from the United Kingdom, certain of the Royal functions may be delegated to persons who are nominated to be Counsellors of State but from among the persons in the line of succession to the Crown who may be nominated to be such Counsellors the Act excludes any who are not of full age.

    The earnest desire of The Queen and Myself that our beloved Daughter, the Princess Elizabeth, should have every opportunity of gaining experience in the duties which would fall upon her in the event of Her Accession to the Throne, leads Me to recommend that you should take into consideration the Amendment of the Act mentioned in such manner as to provide for including among the Counsellors of State the person who is Heir Apparent or Heir Presumptive to the Throne if over the age at which the Accession of a Sovereign does not necessitate a Regency, namely, the age of eighteen.

    Further, it will be within your recollection that when The Queen and I were absent from the United Kingdom in the year 1939 it was necessary, in order that the provisions of the Act should be complied with, that Her Majesty should be included among the Counsellors of State notwithstanding Her absence. This circumstance leads Me to recommend that you should also take into your consideration the Amendment of the Act mentioned in such manner as to enable persons who are absent or intend to be absent from the United Kingdom to be excepted from among the number of Counsellors of State.

    I shall be prepared to concur with you in any measures which may appear to. you to be necessary or expedient for securing the purposes to which I have alluded.

    GEORGE, R.I.

    I beg to move,

    "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty to return to his Majesty the thanks of this House for His Majesty's most gracious Message recommending this House to consider certain contingencies which are not provided for in the Regency Act, 1937: and to assure His Majesty that this House will adopt such Measures as may appear necessary or expedient for securing the purposes to which His Majesty has alluded."
    I need only inform the House that the necessary legislative action—a Bill is required, of course, and can be fully debated—to give effect to His Majesty's wishes will originate in another place and that this House will have its full opportunities in respect of it.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Address to be presented by Privy Councillors or Members of His Majesty's Household.

    Business Of The House

    I wonder whether it would be convenient to the House if an answer could be given to one question which was put yesterday by the Leader of the Labour Party in regard to the future Sittings of this House. At present we are in vacuo. We were told yesterday that the matter would be considered and an announcement made at an early date: would it be possible for a statement to be made today? It is necessary that Members should be able to make their arrangements.

    My noble Friend will appreciate that the third Sitting Day is the normal day for these announcements. I was proposing to make a statement on the next Sitting Day.

    War Situation

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Mr. James Stuart.]

    The House learned yesterday with deep satisfaction from the lips of the Prime Minister of the march of events in the various theatres of war during recent months, and I think that the House recognised in his words and in his attitude a note of calm and steady confidence. Two of his statements I would like to recall with satisfaction. The first is that the Armistice terms with Italy were fully approved of, not only by the United Kingdom and the United States, but by Russia. One regards that as an illustration of a co-operation which we hope will continue. The second statement of the Prime Minister to which I will refer was the announcement of an early meeting between the President, himself, and Mr. Stalin, and the establishment of machinery of co-operation between these three Governments. I believe that there is a sincere desire in all quarters of the House and among all sections of this country that after the war there shall be continued the closest possible relations, ever improving relations, with the Russian Republic. I would hope that the comradeship forged on the anvil of war might become the tempered steel of a new brotherhood between those nations after the war. I realise that great nations engaged in a common war for freedom must have their differences, even under the pressure of that common war, and I appreciate that when the struggle is over there are possibilities of differences arising between. those great countries. Some of them are already apparent. No matter how powerful a nation is to-day, not even if it is the greatest Empire in the world; after this war is over, it will not be able to live unto itself alone. Whatever their ideology is, the great Powers must learn to live together in a spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding and to provide that leadership of the free peoples which the smaller, less powerful nations are now so urgently demanding. They are looking to us now for that lead.

    I wish to confine my remarks to one aspect of the Prime Minister's speech, that part which he developed as a result of an interchange of words across the Floor of the House. On 11th September, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister, in an appeal to the Italians to join in the task of ridding Italy of the Germans, said:
    "The liberating armies of the Western world are coming to your rescue."
    Several times yesterday the Prime Minister used that same term, "The liberation of Italy". That is the language of comradeship, I hope it indicates that it is the intention of the United Nations to honour the pledges given by the free men of the world to their sons and to their sons' sons, to make liberty secure in the world; but it means more than that. We are under a very deep obligation of honour to the men, women and youth of free spirit in other lands who are to-day proving their loyalty to liberty as they have proved it over years of suffering under Nazi and Fascist devilry.

    I go back to the days of Mussolini, who is now a miserable, fleeting shadow, passing to a well-deserved oblivion, on whose direct orders men whom I knew and respected were either murdered or driven abroad. Some, thank God, are still alive and are as true to democratic principles as ever they were. I remember how Mussolini hamstrung every democratic movement in Italy. He destroyed the Social Democrats, the trade union movement and the co-operativ movement. He tried to quench the flame of intellectual liberty by hunting down scholars of distinction. Survivors lived, and some still live, to prove that the spirit of Garibaldi and Mazzini is still contributing to-day to the forward march of the human race. In Germany, the Social-Democratic Party organisation and its influential Press were destroyed. Doktor Ley—a good name for the so-called leader of the labour front in Germany—seized the headquarters, the organisations, the Press and the funds of the trade union movement. The cooperative movement of Germany met a similar fate. The graveyards and concentration camps in Germany were filled with men and women whose only crime was their steadfast support of democratic institutions. We take pride in the unquenchable spirit of our comrades in Poland. They have stood unflinchingly against wholesale murder, torture, exile and slavery. In Norway, humble workers, ministers of religion and teachers have, with conspicuous courage, withstood the foul and bestial onslaughts of the Nazi.

    This story of the heroism of the common peoples is repeated in every land now temporarily under the sway of the Nazi tyranny. From the Mediterranean to the Arctic there are people smarting and suffering under the Nazi lash: from the North Cape to Gibraltar, from France to the tip of Greece, as well as in those countries of Europe which are still neutral, there are millions of people aching for the day when the miasma of dictatorship will be blown away for ever by the breezes of a new freedom. We have watched these things happening over many years. We witnessed with little protest the absorption of Austria into the greater German Reich. We stood idly by while Czechoslovakia, with all its resources and its people imbued with the spirit of freedom, were forced into the Nazi orbit. We watched the dictators sharpening their swords in Spain for further aggressive action elsewhere among a people who were struggling to become free. We saw one, who was called—very properly as it now turns out—a sawdust Caesar, beginning, under our very noses, to rebuild the Roman Empire. We know—the Prime Minister reminded us again yesterday if we need reminding—how Mussolini struck at France, and therefore at Britain, in the dark days of June, 1940. In the minds of people bitter memories live long. Men of honest mind, whoever they may be, business men, professional men, scholars and the overwhelming mass of organised labour in Europe and elsewhere, in every country, now know Nazism for the evil thing that it is. It is true that the United Nations have not yet come to final grips with Hitler, but it is also true, I think, as the Prime Minister made very clear to me in his speech yesterday, that the blood red sun of Nazism is beginning to set. However long, however bitter, however terrible the struggle may yet be, we can reasonably look forward to ultimate success.

    Further territories will be occupied by the United Nations as the war proceeds, and such occupation will throw very heavy responsibilities on the liberators. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—I wish the Foreign Secretary could find a better name for it—which represents a noble ideal but hides itself under a clumsy suit of clothes—[Interruption.]—Somebody ought to alter the name. This organisation has been set up to deal with some of the problems which are beginning now to arise very urgently. The mandate which it is proposed to give to this international United Nations organisation reads as follows, in very fine langauge, in my view:
    "Being determined that immediately upon the liberation of any area by the Armed Forces of the United Nations, the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence, and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparations and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes, for the resumption of agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services, to the end that peoples once freed may be preserved and restored to health and strength for the tasks and opportunities of building anew."
    I say that that is the kind of work that ought to be beginning to-day. It is clear that while any territory is a theatre of war military considerations must be paramount, and nobody could make any claim for interrupting in any way major and important military operations, but as areas are cleared of the enemy—and the Prime Minister spoke with almost a lilt in his voice yesterday when he was referring to the clearance of Italy—then civilising and constructive agencies must get to work to assist the faithful who fought the good fight and who are yearning to take part in the final consummation of their liberation. It will not be possible in the early stages—or indeed until after the Armistice—to carry out the wide range of duties which the leading United Nations have undertaken to fulfil. The question of the return of exiles, for example, is not one we can easily settle until we have also cleared the areas where the exiles live. That is obviously so. It is, however, in my view vital that what can be done should be done to relieve suffering and to begin the restoration of community life.

    On 27th July this year, the Prime Minister told the House:
    "We must be careful not to get ourselves into the kind of position into which the Germans have blundered in so many countries, namely, of having to hold down and administer in detail, from day to day, by a system of gauleiters, the entire life of very large populations, thereby becoming responsible under the hard conditions of this present period for the whole of their upkeep and well-being. Such a course might well, in practice turn the sense of liberation which it may soon be in our power to bestow upon the Italian people, into a sullen discontent against us and all our works. The rescuers might soon, indeed, be regarded as tyrants: they might even be hated by the Italian people as much or almost as much as their German allies. I certainly do not wish in the case of Italy, to tread a path which might lead to execution squads and concentration camps and above all to having to carry on our shoulders a lot of people who ought to be made to carry themselves."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th July, 1943: col. 2399: Vol. 391.]
    With the first part of the Prime Minister's statement I am in complete disagreement. I do not believe that the Germans "blundered" into this technique as the Prime Minister said. I believe it was thought out in cold blood. By deliberate and brutally conceived policy the gauleiter and the Gestapo follow the storm trooper. It is part of a coherent system of conquest and administration. The gauleiters with their Gestapo follow up the military occupation in order to round off the tale of terror and to secure the complete suppression of every element of democratic life by means of the Nazi jack boot. That the United Nations should ever emulate this inhuman technique of murdering human bodies and torturing human spirits, in Italy or elsewhere, is inconceivable. I agree with the Prime Minister that we should not degrade ourselves and betray the trust which statesmen all over the world have repeatedly reaffirmed, for if we did, then we should, as the Prime Minister said:
    "turn the sense of liberation which it may soon be in our power to bestow upon the Italian people, into a solemn discontent against us and all our works."
    The real reason for my speech to-day is to urge, with all the power I possess, that in the case of the United Nations "occupation" must mean "liberation," in violent contrast to the Nazi conception that "occupation" connotes subjection, slaughter, slavery and suffering. These are the things that divide us, these two conceptions of life.

    I believe that the great declarations which have been made during the past three years from the four quarters of the world express the hopes of the vast majority of mankind. I do not believe that mankind will allow those who have spoken with such authority to betray human hopes and aims so deeply held. At the very first moment open to us we must prove our sincerity, and "Liberation" must be enblazoned on the flags of all the nations now advancing against the enemy. Italy, in my view, will be a test case. I cannot bring myself to believe that those who have acquiesced in, and supported, Mussolini's Government can with honest minds work with us for the liberation of the Italian people, those men and women of independent spirit of all walks of life—intellectuals, professionals, workers and peasants. I appreciate that capitulation must be arranged by the United Nations with those in authority in enemy countries. That is obviously so, but I am expressing the fear that is in the minds of many of my hon. Friends and millions of people outside when I say that thereafter, when the territory falls into our possession, cooperation in the task of completely and finally destroying the Fascists and their tools, the near Fascists, seems to me to be impossible and indeed incomprehensible.

    We can and should, and indeed must, co-operate with those scholars and shopkeepers, public servants, workers and peasants who through an agony of years have been true to Italy's democratic history and future hopes. I would like to know from my right hon. Friend, Is this what the Prime Minister had in his mind yesterday? Will the proper influence be used from the United Nations on those who "rubber stamped" the capitulation, accepted it, to press upon them, whomever it may be, Badoglio at present, the absolute necessity of full and frank cooperation with every kind of democratic institution in Italy, those people who have suffered during a score of years, and have proved their loyalty to the cause we espouse to-day before we were brought into bloody conflict, those people who have their finger on the pulse of the Italian people, who know the Fascist vipers in every town and village that ought to be trodden down, and who know the men of influence who can be trusted and who can become in their localities or organisations leaders of the people.

    We have got to re-create somehow a community life again, and it is the community that ought to create it for itself. I think the Prime Minister is right in suggesting what he called an all-Italy Government. I think all men of good-will who declare themselves anti-Fascists and for the United Nations ought to be willing, until we have solved that problem, to work together. Here I am making a plea for the people for whom I have fought all my public life, the Socialists, the trade unionists, the cooperators of Italy and similarly in every other land that we rid of the Nazis. I agree with him that Fascism is denounced by the whole mass of the Italian people. I agree with him about the sufferings that still face the Italians during the coming weeks. I agree with him that they will be pillaged and terrorised. That is all the more reason why, when we have rid them of this nightmare, we should take them to our bosoms and ask them to help in the great task of democracy, both in the rescued countries and in the countries still to be rescued. I cannot forget the peasants of Southern Italy and the workers and the citizens of the towns in both Northern and Southern Italy who in these days are opposing the Nazis with great bravery and determination. They are our allies. These people are facing terrors which we have never had to face. The workers of Milan and Turin are among the heroes of the war to-day. They are the comrades with whom we should work—we the liberators, and they the liberated liberators—to help us in carrying on the common work.

    We have heard very little up to now of the civil agencies which will march on the heels of the victorious military forces in Italy and elsewhere to bring help and succour to the Italian people. We have learned very little about the Sicilian A.M.G.O.T. This House, our people, and the United Nations are entitled to know what our plans and arrangements are. Who are the people to be in charge of the civil organisation which follows upon military occupation? How are they to be recruited? How many of them have been recruited already or will shortly be recruited? On what scale are the United Nations conceiving this gigantic task which faces them? What preparation and training do the people who are going to take over the very responsible work and duties have to fit them for that work, and what are the relations between the U.N.R.R.A.—the thing with the bad name but good intentions—and the great voluntary organisations of the three countries, by which I mean not merely the Red Cross but the co-operative societies, the trade unions, and so on? After the last war—which I am aware is no complete parallel to this war—rehabilitation was for a year and more left to the voluntary agencies. That grave mistake we cannot repeat. The world ought to be satisfied that we are now in process of developing an effective international organisation which will follow on our victorious forces, to release, with the least delay, the sorely-stricken victims from the grip of Nazi torture, and to give them hope of a new life, of which they will share in the building.

    The active restoration of Italian life and health, when Italy is rid of her invaders, will declare two things to the subjected nations of the Continent, if it is well done. First, it will tell those still awaiting release that, following military victory, succour will come speedily to the bruised and punished peoples elsewhere. Secondly, if we can, whatever the difficulties—very great in war circumstances—and however clumsy the results may temporarily be, dispel any idea of a new regime of gauleiters and seek to work with those true and gallant souls who, against incredible odds, have kept alight the torch of freedom in their countries, we can then be sure that the aims of the Atlantic Charter will be fulfilled. Millions of men, women and children in Europe have suffered over years refinements of cruelty unknown at least in modern history. Nevertheless, they still nourish in their hearts the hope and certainty of future freedom. Let us not delay that hour by a moment. Let us, now that the invasion of Europe has begun, determine that wherever our armies may reach in the coming months we shall be welcomed as generous liberators. The Prime Minister yesterday said that it would never lie on his conscience that the war lasted a day longer than it need have done. I would say, Let it never rest on our consciences that we delayed by a single day or a single minute the life-giving work to people who have been under the harrow for so long. After Dunkirk—a dark time—the Prime Minister used these words:
    "Long live the forward march of the common people of all lands towards their just and true inheritance."
    It is in that spirit that I have made this contribution.

    The Debate so far has not revealed any considerable or profound dissent from the views expressed by the Prime Minister yester- day. I think that the eloquent and interesting speech to which the House has just listened does not require me to qualify that statement. One of the things which strikes any member who has listened closely to the Debate is the absence of real disagreement at this moment between the two sides of the House. Certain elements of controversy which were very prominent only a few weeks ago have fallen away, or fallen into the background.

    The hon. Member disagrees with that: doubtless he will interject some element of controversy into the Debate at the right time. I find it not altogether easy to take part in this Debate. But I think it true that, although there is apparently no real difference between the two sides of the House, hon. Members who belong to the Socialist Party do in certain important respects approach the present situation, as opened up by our successful invasion of Italy, from a different point of view than that which some of us take. It is with that particular aspect of the matter that I would like to deal, as briefly as I can. I hope that what I have to offer may tend to reduce the differences between the two sides of the House, though I am not very hopeful about that.

    I agree with very much of what has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood), but he has this in common with some of his friends behind him, that he desires that we should direct our appeal only to certain elements in Italy and in the other European countries which we shall liberate. I notice in his language and in that of some of his friends a concentration alone upon those elements which he describes as democratic. The right hon. Gentleman said something about democratic Government in Italy, and similar phrases were used pretty often yesterday. I cannot help thinking that the interpretation which the Socialist Party in this House place upon democracy and upon democratic government in Italy is too narrow. I do not know why they should seem to suggest that the only elements, or the strongest elements, to which we should appeal in these countries are the extreme Left-wing elements. It really is not true that it is only the extreme Left-wing elements, to which we could appeal. There are other very numerous and important elements in the populations of all these nations, including Right-wing elements, to which we could direct our appeal: but hon. Members seem not to wish us to do so.

    I am not going to produce a long list of names, but they do exist, and they are important. I think there is a great danger that by using that argument hon. Members will antagonise, or at any rate fail to secure the support of, other important elements.

    The hon. Member has complained that we are limiting our appeal to certain elements, and he says that we ought not to be so exclusive. We have told people time after time whom we have in mind. Will he tell us whom he would have us appeal to?

    I will reply to that in a general way. I do not think I should be called upon to mention the names of individuals, as hon. Members have done. I think it is a mistake to mention and discuss in this House the names and characters of individuals in foreign countries. What I think we can refer to are general elements, important in the life of the nation, whether they are political parties or riot. That, I think, is the only proper way. I do not see why I should be called upon to give particulars of individual persons. It is a mistake when hon. Members discuss the personalities and views of persons with whom they find themselves perhaps in agreement in Italy and suggest that they should be brought forward as leaders of the people.

    Will the hon. Member indicate the class of people to whom we might appeal? Who are they: what class?

    If the hon. Member means social classes, "No," because I should certainly say that the determination to get rid of the hated Germans and to restore the liberties of the people is not confined to any one class. It is a question of patriotism and not a question of social classes at all.

    Everybody knows that the working class in Italy is opposed to Mussolini and Fascism, and everybody, therefore, will appreciate that we are right in appealing to them. There is no middle class in Italy. Mussolini has seen to that over the last 20 years. Therefore, the only other class then, are the Royalist. aristocracy or the big industrialists. These are the two bodies of people in Italy who supported Mussolini and created Fascism and maintained it in power for 20 years. Is the hon. Member suggesting that we should appeal to them?

    I entirely disagree with the hon. Member's classification of the Italian people. The middle class may have been wiped out in Germany, and that is one of the most dreadful results of the Nazi system in Germany. It has not been wiped out in Italy. It still performs a very important function both in the social and economic life of Italy. There are other classes in Italy to whom we can and should appeal. There is the aristocracy, which I cannot expect the hon. Member to support, but by far the greatest part of that can be appealed to by us. There is the peasantry, and not only that, but a very large part of the artisan class too, in the towns of Northern Italy—not by any means all of whom belong to the extreme Left-wing parties with which members of the Opposition find themselves in close sympathy. It really is a great delusion to suppose that all the artisan class—if one is to talk in terms of class: I do not very much like the word—that all the artisan elements in the towns of Northern Italy belong to this extreme Left wing in whom hon. Members of the Opposition are interested. That is not so. They are to be found in certain towns, such as Turin and Genoa, but I should like to call the attention of the House to a remarkable thing. Yesterday the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Ivor Thomas) mentioned three parties as having some prominence—the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats. He stated that these were the dominating forces inside Italy since the fall of Fascism. I profoundly disagree with that statement, which is very much in line with the interruptions which have just been made to the remarks I am making.

    What has happened within the last few weeks, since the fall of Mussolini? There were not only these three parties, but some others—about half a dozen altogether—and I have a note of their description. There is the party called the Action Party, there are the Christian Democrats, there is the Liberal Re-construction Party, the Democratic Labour Party, the Proletarian Socialists and the Communists, and, joined together they threatened in unison a general strike unless there was immediate cessation of hostilities, and if the King did not abdicate. But events proved that they were quite unable to make good their threat. Neither of these things happened. The King did not abdicate. At the end of August they had withdrawn their opposition and their demands. They represent certain political elements in certain towns and regions of Northern Italy, but they enjoy no widespread popular support. The basis of the people of Italy to-day remains the peasantry: by far the greatest single element among the whole Italian people is the peasantry. It is certainly not the ideas to which I am referring and of which we hear so much here and in some parts of the English Press, which are popular among the peasantry of Italy. As for the people who live in towns in Italy, I would remind hon. Members that, although there are a good number of towns in Italy, there are not nearly as many large towns as there are in this country. There are something like double the number of towns in this country that have over 100,000 inhabitants compared with what there are in Italy.

    The interesting thing about Italy is that a great many of the townspeople among whom these ideas might be expected to take root live in small towns and not in the great manufacturing towns: they are towns that we should rather regard as provincial, small towns with fairly small populations. Their inhabitants are to this day very close to the soil and are not engaged in manufacture on a large scale. Many of these towns have a very ancient and interesting history, going far back to the Middle Ages, in which their people played an important part in the story of their country and of Italian civilisation. What are the interests of the inhabitants of these towns? They are not politics.

    For the most part the inhabitants of these towns—it may be a defect in the Italian character, and this is going to create many difficulties—are not interested in politics. These people love their country. They are proud of the long history of their country, and proud of the civilisation that Italy has given to the world, but the greater part of them are quite inaccessible—I am sure of that—to the political arguments of which we have heard a great deal in this Debate and of which we heard even more a few weeks ago.

    Does my hon. Friend mean to say—and this is really an important point—that it is utterly impossible to explain to the urban democracy of this country, whether Tory or Socialist, that not only in Italy, but in the whole of Europe, there is a peasant world or democracy which has nothing in common with the ordinary urban dweller of this country?

    I entirely agree with the Noble Lord, and I am very much obliged to him for his interruption. He has clarified an argument which I fear I was not making altogether clear to certain Members of the Opposition.

    Would not the hon. Member agree that the vital force in Italy in the events which led up to the present situation was that of the industrial workers?

    No, Sir, I profoundly disagree. Really one must join issue here. The industrial workers in the cities as a whole have developed in the course of years a hostility to Fascism, but that sentiment was certainly not confined to industrial workers. It is a profound mistake to base any argument relating to this question on that opinion.

    Personally, I would agree to the description that the hon. Member has given about the attitude of the peasant. If we exclude the industrial workers, what other class is there in Italy to which to appeal? To Badoglio or the King?

    This has gone far beyond a question. It would be just as well to have one speech at a time, and might I suggest to the hon. Member, that he should address the Chair?

    I am sorry if I was at all responsible for straying from the straight path. I was attempting in a purely debating speech to meet a certain issue which had been raised not in a very specific form but is implicit in the argument much used in a Debate a few weeks ago and in this Debate. As to the remark just made by the hon. Member, I dissent from him when he suggests that the industrial workers were responsible for the fall of Mussolini. It is not so. The opposition to Mussolini in recent years was not confined to industrial workers. It was widespread throughout the Italian nation. It was widespread among the bourgeoisie and certainly among the aristocracy, and the, King, when he deposed Mussolini, was faithfully interpreting the wishes of the whole of the people. The answer to the hon. Member is not that I propose to exclude those other elements, but I would not confine my appeal solely to them. That is my point. We must not exaggerate their importance in European countries, which is what Members of the Socialist Party have done. The thing we are apt to do from our own experience of British life is to exaggerate the importance of certain extreme Left-wing elements which flourish almost solely in large manufacturing centres.

    It is the neglect of this principle that leads to the mischievous argument that I am criticising. We are not concerned primarily with the nature of a foreign Government: what we are concerned with is its policy. What primarily concerns foreign Governments is not the political character but the policy of another Government. That is the right principle, and the contrary principle opens the way to a very dangerous argument.

    Some few weeks ago some very unpleasant things were being said about the King of Italy, the House of Savoy, and Marshal Badoglio, as the present head of the Italian Government. I very strongly support the attitude pursued by the Prime Minister yesterday upon this question. The Badoglio Government is the legal and constitutional Government of Italy. It is the only Government with which we have to deal and deserves and requires our support on that ground.

    I only wanted to ask a question. I was wondering what was the Constitution which made Badoglio's Government the constitutional Government of Italy?

    Marshal Badoglio is the man to whom the King of Italy has entrusted the task of administering the affairs of the nation. No one will venture to suggest that the present Government of Italy is not the constitutional Government of that country.

    I mean this: When you have had 20 years of Fascism, when all political forms and discussions have been abolished, when people have been held down by the power of tyranny, it is impossible, when that tyranny has been swept away and a King has been called a near-Fascist, to maintain some kind of law and order and say that that is the constitutional Government of Italy.

    That is absolutely no argument at all. In fact, the hon. Member has refuted himself, because he has pointed out that many institutions have been formally and legally abolished. The old Italian Parliament was abolished by law.

    I repeat that the King of Italy is the head of the State and that the men to whom he has entrusted the powers of administering the affairs of the nation do constitute the constitutional Government of Italy. To-day the House of Savoy, for recent historical reasons, may have lost some of the support it once had among the Italian people, but the plain and simple truth remains that the House of Savoy is not merely the symbol but is the very essence of the unity of Italy. We are a homogeneous people, both in a social and political sense. Remember what the history of Italy has been: how she became a united nation only in 1861. What were the ruling political inflences in the North? They were German influences, the Hapsburg influences. The country was divided. We speak here as a people which has had 700 years' Parliamentary experience. We take these things for granted. When we use any expression relating to democracy we speak against the background of Parliamentary institutions. The idea of democracy is immediately connected in our minds with Parliamentary institutions, but in Italy the word "democracy" has no such affiliations: it suggests no such long-established record of successful democratic practice. On the contrary, it suggests a Parliamentary system which was established quite recently: and a system under which Parliament never gained undisputed strength and authority. In the critical years 1920–, immediately preceding the establishment of Fascism, disorder was spreading throughout Italy: there were great strikes, involving loss of life: the disorder was gradually degenerating into anarchy, and the Italian Parliament showed itself unable to make or maintain a series of stable or effective Governments.

    Democracy to the Italians has a very different meaning from what it has to the English. I do not say that you cannot have democracy, but you must define the term very carefully and must understand what you mean by it. The argument drawn from English Parliamentary experience has for Latin people no comparable meaning or relevance. We shall antagonise many elements among the Italian people if we continue to talk to them of democracy in the way that English Left-Wing politicians do.

    Hon. Members in their discussions on this question are confusing Fascism with patriotism. Many of the things which they criticise in the present situation are not due to Fascism in Italy to-day or to any support by us of Fascism. They are due to patriotism. They are due to qualities which, in similar circumstances, every Englishman would wish every other Englishman to exihibit. They are the qualities of firmness, calmness, discipline—

    How dare the hon. Member introduce a remark like that into this discussion? I am using a serious argument.

    I think my reference to poison gas was entirely relevant. May I ask whether it was patriotism that led Badoglio to employ poison gas in Abyssinia?

    I was describing the kind of qualities which a people, in the. appalling situation the Italian people are in, must exhibit. I was attempting to describe some of the qualities which constitute patriotism, and the hon. Member made an offensive interruption which has no relation to the subject whatsoever. I hold no brief for Marshal Badoglio, and I do not intend to defend every episode in his career, but the fact is that he has been entrusted by the King of Italy with the task of government and we cannot go behind that fact. Let us not confuse Fascism with patriotism. Let us make an effort of imagination and intelligence. The Italian people are among the most intelligent peoples in the world. I do not claim high military qualities for the Italian people as a whole, although it is true, as the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Thomas) said in his courageous speech yesterday, that some Italian units have fought well in this war. However, the Italian people as a whole have not the military qualities of the British or Germans. But among their qualities is that of high, keen intelligence. Let us at this time show our own intelligence, which is no mean one. Let us put ourselves in the place of the Italians and understand what qualities are demanded from patriotic Italians. Remember that if we were in their place, we should make exactly the same kind of appeal that is being made by the present Italian Government to its people. Let us not caricature those qualities by talking as though they had anything to do with Fascism: or condemn, by applying to it that easily-used epithet of abuse, Fascist, a government which in circumstances of appalling difficulty, is attempting to do its duty.

    I, unlike other speakers in many debates that I have heard, shall have pleasure in following the hon. Member who has just spoken. He has made, quite obviously, a perfectly honest speech from the Conservative point of view. He has covered up nothing, he has tried to delude no one, and he has made his position quite clear, and it is about time that we had speeches of that kind showing exactly where the Conservative Party stand. I do not think for a moment that he understands what Fascism is. I do not think he understands what is happening in the war. He does not understand the conflict that is going on all the time between the people on the one hand and property on the other. I will try to make clear to him what the war is really about. In 1922 there was a good deal of industrial upheaval in Italy. That was coincident with an economic crisis. When the employment situation and the trade situation were difficult and the relationship between capital and labour got very difficult property or capital, call it what you like, enforced its rule by adopting a Fascist policy for the enslavement of the people of Italy. The same thing happened in Germany in 1933, which coincided with another economic depression. Every time there is an industrial crisis there is always a tendency for the people who are employers, the people who own capital, those representative of the banking industry and so on, to try by whatever means they can, and as a last resort, Fascism, to enslave the people and make them work for the general good, as they regard it.

    I should like to try to make quite clear why there is this fundamental difference between the hon. Member and us. I think he is quite clearly in favour of the recognition of Badoglio's Government. There was an ominous reference by the Prime Minister that either he or the Foreign Secretary would make some statement towards the end of the week. I want to know if they are going to make the statement that His Majesty's Government are going to recognise the Badoglio Government, because that will show the true nature of the way in which the war is being carried on. This is not a war between this country and Italy or between this country and Germany at all. To use an old cliché, it is a class war. It was only when Fascism got dangerous to British commercial interests that many people ceased to praise it. From 1922 onwards people on the Right were praising Mussolini for doing a great number of things. Lots of publicists, politicians and other people of the Right have seen fit.to praise the actions of Mussolini during the last 21 years. They went through the actions of opposing him, but, nevertheless, they supported his war of aggression against the Abyssinians. It is a question whether the people the hon. Member represents are going to dominate this world or whether the people are, and that is what the war is about.

    Certainly. The Prime Minister's speeches never contain any social encouragement to the people of the world. It is true that he has talked about cherishing Italian liberty for the last 20 years, but I do not understand what that means, because I do not think there has been any Italian liberty, unless it is liberty from anarchy. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) said there were two things that we had to look after. One was to see the people fed, and the other was to prevent anarchy. Anarchy, in his sense, is an uprising of the people to throw over their masters, to try to get free, and it is obvious, as the situation from the military point of view gets better, that those who are anxious to enslave other people are getting stronger and stronger, and that is where the issue lies between my friends on these benches and the other parties in the Coalition Government.

    This raises a very important issue indeed. To listen to the hon. Member one would think that Germany had nothing to do with the war. Does he ignore the historical origin of the war? He is substituting the war of his own political imagination for the real war, responsibility for which rests on Germany alone.

    May I remind the hon. Member of something of the history of the relations between the Conservative Party and Mr. Hitler? It is well that these things should be remembered. You financed Hitler.

    The Government that the hon. Member supported in 1935 allowed Hitler to build up the German Navy. Even within three months of the outbreak of the war the Government were on the verge of granting Hitler a very large loan. It was a question of praising or appeasing Mussolini when he was fighting in Abyssinia or in Spain, and the same thing happened, as far as the Chamberlain Government were concerned, in trying to appease Mussolini and Hitler. There was never a word of condemnation of the way they treated their people. The hon. Member said we were not concerned with the kind of Government other countries had or the way they treated their people but only with the policy they pursued.

    I said that other nations were primarily concerned, not with the nature of a government but with its policy.

    I have always believed that the foreign policy of a Government reflects its home policy and that the nature of a Government is reflected in its policy. The whole trouble is that a Fascist Government has to be aggressive in foreign affairs. It has to expand, to get spheres of influence, colonies and so on. The hon. Member's whole speech has disclosed what I am convinced is the true Conservative mentality, and that mentality is a most frightening thing. I do not think that any Tory is capable of winning this war from a political point of view. That is the real issue, and that is why we are concerned to join in these Debates on the war situation. I am not in a position to criticise its military conduct, but I can test what is going on according to my fundamental principles, and I am very much alarmed at the way things are being handled. I fear most definitely that there will be an announcement this week of the recognition of the next Quisling Government, namely, Badoglio. We have had this happening before. These things are symptomatic of the political outlook of the majority in the Government. I am not speaking purely for myself. I think I am speaking for my friends, and I know that I am speaking for a large number of people in this country who are not at all happy as to the way things are going. Some are beginning to say that politically we are losing the war fast. If you are going to have an instrument like A.M.G.O.T. refusing permission for any political parties to be formed in Sicily at all, it is a complete negation of what we are supposed to be fighting for. Are we going into Italy as liberators? Are we going to restore the freedom that has been taken away from them, or are we going to establish something in its place which may have a different name, which may not be called the Fascist Party, but which is in essence the same thing? That is the issue that we have to face. I have no doubt that hon. Members opposite will come down on one side of the fence, and we shall come down on the other, and although it was for a long time probably desirable, from the point of view of production and the military effort, that we should have this semblance of national unity, it has been a most uneasy arrangement reached between the party mainly represented on this side and the Conservative Party.

    We have known all the time since 1922 what Fascism meant. There has not been a single Member on these benches who.has said a word of praise for Mussolini. By our nature we could not. I am sorry that until Mussolini became a menace, until it was popular to refer to him as a jackal, many Members opposite saw no bad fault in his behaviour towards his own people or the people of Spain or Abyssinia. We knew from the beginning what Fascism meant for the working classes, and so did hon. Members opposite, but they did not dislike it very much. The Prime Minister in one speech said they had shown us the method by which we could rid the world of Leninism and the Bolshevist poison. For 20 years the world has been safe for the landed gentry and the capitalist class. It has, nevertheless, resulted in war, but the war is about the same thing all the time. The right hon. Gentleman opposite smiles. He is largely responsible tor administering pensions to the dependants and widows of those who have lost their lives in the struggle which his political policy has brought upon the world, and I still say he is doing it very ungenerously. I see no reason for smiling at what I hope is a modest analysis of the present situation. We knew perfectly well that the liberties that have been won by the Tolpuddle martyrs, at Peterloo and by the Chartists in this land could very well be lost abroad. They could be lost in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. Hon. Members on the other side of the House were not frightened of Fascism until they thought that their commercial interests were being impinged upon and threatened. Then in May, 1940, we came to this uneasy agreement to work hand in hand because we were fighting for the preservation of the liberties of this country and of the peoples of the world and hon. Members apposite were fighting for the preservation of their Empire and their Colonial interests. Now when the war from the military point of view is getting better we see the cleavage growing clearer day by day. It is not only the people who are workers but those who take a keen political interest in what is really happening in the war at the present time who are most disturbed. I find fhat what men in responsible positions ale really concerned about is what will happen after the war.

    Have the Government made a single proposal for post-war reconstruction? The only thing I have come across is the White Paper on Education. The Minister of Agriculture is forbidden by the War Cabinet to make any statement about post-war agriculture. The Minister without Portfolio is no doubt working hard but he has produced nothing except a promise of two White Papers. There is no drive in the direction we would like. There is no planning. There is nothing, and I believe that the Members of the Conservative Party are hoping to get back to what they regard as the good old world as soon as the war is over. We on this side, on the other hand, are hoping that out of this terrible slaughter, this terrible mess, this world revolution as it really is, something decent' may come for the general body of mankind. If you stand in the way of the real urge of the people and prevent it by your Press, by your B.B.C., by your political lying at elections in order to ensure your own safety and the safety of what you stand for, you will have misled the people and will be completely unworthy of the sufferings which the men and women of this country have gone through not only in the Forces but in the factories. I say with all the sincerity I possess that it is surely possible sometime for right hon. and hon. Members on the other side to see the light of civilisation and to change the views they have held. If they cannot do that they can surely get out and make room for people whose only interest is the welfare of the people of this country and of the world. If they are only interested in vested interests and the continued enslavement of the people of this country and of the world, they are unworthy of the people who have laid down their lives for their country.

    I do not propose to follow the last two hon. Members in their political arguments. I want to deal with what to me is the most important phase of the Prime Minister's speech, namely, the devastation which is being caused in Germany by our bombing. He told us that the almost total systematic destruction of many of the war industries was indescribable. We have seen many of the photographs and have been given information, and what he said is perfectly true. The devastation that has taken place in Hamburg, which has been laid flat, in Essen and in other towns in the Ruhr means that about one-third of Germany's industrial production has been destroyed. What we want to know is, Why cannot we go on and finish the job? Why cannot we go on bombing the rest of Germany, that great belt of Germany which is still producing munitions of war and giving Germany the means to carry on the war? It seems to me that something must have happened. Our bombers and the American bombers have done remarkable work, but what has happened to them? Every time somebody else wants bombers they are taken away and sent here and there. We would be far better engaged in bombing Germany than in bombing Italy or attacking the Balkans. It is no use trying to kill a tree by cutting off its branches one by one: we must get down to the roots. Air bombers that are on operations are doing marvellous work. I understand that we have some planes in one place and do not know what to do with them. Why are they not brought to England for the use of Bomber Command? We have been relying on getting a number of planes from America, but why are they not coming here instead of being sent elsewhere? I see from the paper to-day that 500 pilot crews are coming over. What a pity they do not bring planes with them.

    Give us the bombers, and we can bomb Germany out of existence and finish the war in a few months. If we do not do it Germany's air power will get stronger. We shall miss the opportunity if we do not take it now when we can. I cannot be- lieve that the Germans cannot find an answer to our bombers as we found answers to their U-boats. Of course they can, and we shall probably be faced with an attack in this country. We want the Government to see that planes are not deflected but that they are brought here to this country and turned over to Bomber Command, which has done such wonderful work, and to the American Air Force here, so that they can get on with the job of bombing Germany. If we do not do that, although we shall win the war in the end, it will take much longer. One has only to talk to the men associated with this arm, and they will tell you the same thing. The Prime Minister referred to saturating the German defences. If we get a stronger Air Force, we will saturate them with a much smaller loss than if we have to invade by military arms and a much smaller loss than we had in Sicily. The losses from bombing Germany are microscopical compared with the results obtained. I urge the Government to review their strategy in this connection and to give the Air Force all the bombers they want, so that we can attack the root of the trouble, which is Germany, and do it quickly and much more cheaply in human lives than by any other means.

    I rise to address the House for the first time with a sense of great respect, and I beg hon. Members to forgive any errors I may commit. Our attention during the Debate has been directed to the Mediterranean and Italy, but there are other theatres of operations. The Nazis control a huge coastline from the North Cape to the South of Bordeaux, extending over thousands of miles. Goebbels refers to it as the Western wall, and it is defended and garrisoned by some 100 divisions. It has rarely been assaulted. A few attacks have been made upon it, such as those at Vaagso, St. Nazaire and Dieppe. All have been successful and have taught us many lessons which have been applied in North Africa, Sicily and Salerno. This wall has hem built by the enemy in comparative peace, and he uses the hinterland for rest camps for his divisions. Goebbels in his propaganda which is always erroneous would lead us to believe that Germany's legions are invincible and that this wall is impregnable. I had the good fortune to inspect a portion of this wall. It is strong, but in my view it can be assaulted and breached by a determined, well-organised attack. I lived for a week with an SS division and watched their training. They are pleased to exhibit themselves. I was a well-known figure in their exercises. They are hard, ruthless men trained in war and practised continually in the use of their arms. In my opinion they are not as good as seasoned British troops. The efficiency of the German armies depends on two factors,.great experience of war and an, unlimited amount of ammunition to expend in practice.

    Here in this country we have thousands of men who are straining at the leash to make an assault and are impatient to get to grips with the enemy. When we make our assault on this Western wall we will require all our skill and all our experience. Let us get that skill by seeking out the enemy, by hammering him incessantly, by assaulting him in every direction and playing on his nerves, not only by words but by deeds. The Nazi has very bad nerves. During our assault on St. Nazaire a French officer who lives in that town told me that hundreds of Nazis were giving themselves up to the French in the interior of Brittany. In this officer's opinion 10,000 men could have broken through and pinched out the Brest Peninsula. When I was walking through France I was continually asked questions by working men and women who aided me at the risk not only of their own lives but the lives of their families as well. I was asked, "When is your Prime Minister going to speak to us again? His words hearten us and give us strength to endure." I was asked also, "What do you in Great Britain think of France now? When are you coming to help us?" It may be that I view the war with jaundiced eyes. I have seen many horrors in France. I have spoken to a man whose eyes were put out by the Gestapo because he would not talk and give away his friends.

    I conversed with an Alsatian who was conscripted into the German Army and sent to Russia in the campaign of 1940–41. He served in the military police. There in Russia he saw young women with babies murdered by the Gestapo. He saw 7,000 Jews lined up in front of a trench and mowed down, the dead and dying were thrown into the ditch, which was then filled up and used as a road. I have seen men who were arrested and put in prison in cells where they could neither lie nor stand and were practically in perpetual darkness. I saw food queues of men and women in France lined up to try to get some sustenance which was not available but which could only be bought in the Black Market. Who controls the Black Market but the Nazis? A man in Paris said he purchased three tons of sugar in the Black Market and it was delivered to him in a German Army wagon. Children tottered about the streets starving and emaciated. Thousands of our prisoners would have died but for the Red Cross parcels. Many criticisms have been unjustly levelled at the Red Cross, but I can assure hon. Members that they have saved many thousands of lives.

    I have seen all those things in France, and it was difficult for me to draw the subtle line at where the Nazi stops and the German begins. Here in this country we tend to become complacent. We are fairly secure and comfortable, thanks to the British sailor. We are apt to forget that a few hours' flight away from our coasts are people who are tortured, starved and suffering, people who are crying out to us for help. The heart of France still beats, and it beats stronger every day. The French have been defeated but have never been vanquished. They are still ready and willing to take up the fight. They are crying out to us for help. Are we going to turn a deaf ear to their plea? If the Government will give us the assault forces the faster we will give you the victories.

    The House will, I am sure, join with me in congratulating the hon. and gallant Member for Aston (Commander Prior) on a very successful and eloquent maiden speech, all the more impressive because it brings into our inevitably rather remote political discussions a breath of the reality of the war outside. I am sure the House will agree that we shall all look forward with great interest and lively expectations to the hon. and gallant Member's further contributions to our Debates. He will appreciate that it is no discourtesy to him if I do not follow him in those few parts of his speech that are capable of controversy, but that is no lack of respect to his argument or opinions but is the limitation imposed upon the speaker who follows a maiden speech. There can be little doubt, listening to the Prime Minis- ter's speech yesterday, that however short or long the time may yet be before the end of the war Hitler has lost the war as irrevocably as Mussolini has lost it. The doubt that is in many of our minds is whether Fascism has lost the war. All over Europe, in countries occupied by the enemy and in countries that have been held down by Fascist tyranny for many years, there are millions of humble folk who have lived through all those years in the hope that some day, somehow, such a day as this would dawn. For a great part of that 20 years the prospect of such a day must have seemed remote indeed. During all the years between 1923 and 1939, when our country, our Government, was lending all the support it could to the Governments that were holding these nations down I wonder how many of those people thought with any optimism that the day would come, and come so soon, when the end of that evil thing was in sight. Very few. When the day came when Mussolini fell and the chance seemed miraculously in their hands to reconstruct civilisation, it was a very great surprise to all of us to see how much was left of Italian civilisation, how much had survived after 20 years of that tyranny.

    When the opposition to Fascism no longer had to be underground, when its opponents came out in thousands on the streets of the great cities of northern Italy, what would be the thought uppermost in their minds? They would be waiting to hear some message of encouragement and welcome from the leaders of the United Nations, some invitation to them to come in at long last and take their rightful place by our side in the struggle for the civilisation of the world. What did they get? They got a speech from the Prime Minister of this country which must have belied all their hopes. What was there in that speech to lend any encouragement to all those people who for 20 years had resisted Mussolini while we were supporting him? The only policy he had to offer was "Let them stew in their own juice and let us heat up the fires." That is still his mood-in his long elaborate explanation yesterday of the negotiations with Badoglio. What was he afraid of? What are they still afraid of?

    What has become the fashionable key word to explain Allied policy in Europe in the process of liberation? The key word is "We must preserve them from anarchy." It is a strange comment on the Prime Minister's speech yesterday about preserving Italy from anarchy to read in the papers this morning of what has just happened in Naples. Are we really relieving Italy from anarchy? War is anarchy. Our appeal to all the countries in Europe still held down by the enemy is to rise and revolt. Our appeal to the guerilla bands in Greece and Yugoslavia is an appeal for sabotage. Is all that in the interests of law and order? It is not anarchy that they fear. Anarchy has become the fashionable description of it, because they are afraid to say "Communism" in case Russia is offended.

    Does the hon. Member really think this country wants Communism in Europe, or here in England?

    The Noble Lady will forgive me for thinking that the people of Europe may prefer to decide for themselves, and if they decide to have something which the people of this country, even if the Noble Lady were right, would rather they should not have they would still be entitled to have it.

    It remains true, whether the Noble Lady likes it or not, that in Europe to-day the only forces that either desire to resist Fascism or are capable of it are the forces of social revolution. That must plainly be so. What other force is there to oppose to Fascism in. Italy? Is it Badoglio? My hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Bowles) asked in a speech that the Foreign Secretary did not hear whether the announcement to be made towards the end of the week would be that the Government of this country or the Governments of the United Nations propose to recognise the Badoglio Government as the legitimate Government de jure of Italy. I hope the Foreign Secretary will give us a clear assurance that that is not the intention of the Government. Until it is realised that this war is what my hon. Friend described it as, a world-wide civil war in which the issue is whether the people or property shall win, they will not understand the war and they will not be able to win it.

    Was I not? And Communism too. They are exactly the same as far as the freedom of the people is concerned, to our democratic way of thinking.

    The Noble Lady is entitled to her view, and I hope she will take an opportunity of expressing it. The only point I desire to make is to call attention to that part of the Prime Minister's speech yesterday in which he seemed to throw over any attempt to maintain national unity. His line was perfectly clear. He was no': going to have anarchy in Italy. He was not going to appeal to the only forces which some of us believe could assist in the overthrow of Fascism in Italy and the recreation of civilised Italian society. He recognised that not everybody in the country, not everybody in the House, and perhaps not everybody in his Government, share his view, and he said that that did not matter. He said:

    "We propose to do that and we are not going to be put off that action by any fear that perhaps we should not have complete unanimity on the subject. Parliament does not rest on unanimity, democratic assemblies do not act on unanimity. They act by majorities. That is the way they act, and I have not the slightest hesitation or doubt as to what will be the view of the House and what will be the view of the country in respect of the policy which I am announcing and which we are determined to carry through with the utmost vigour."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st September, 1943; col. 95, Vol. 392.]
    It may well be that rule by majority is the democratic way, provided that you have first taken care to see that you really have a majority for the views you represent, the policy you adopt and the action you propose to take. Although majorities may determine democratic action they ought not to determine the actions of coalitions. If the Government are determined to act by majorities, the case for coalition disappears. They have a House of Commons in which they hold some 400 seats and that gives them a majority for their views.

    The House of Commons was elected in 1935 in different times, on different issues and in different circumstances. The National Government were formed in order to maintain national unity. When the Government were pressed time after time to formulate their peace aims, the Prime Minister's reply always was that they could not do that "because we are not completely agreed about them, and we must maintain national unity." Now, when they think that they are out of the wood, the claims of national unity disappear. The Prime Minister falls back on his reactionary compact majority of people, who, for the last eight years—or at any rate for the first four of them—did all they could to maintain Fascism in Europe. This is of a pattern with the Government's home policy. They no more intend to lead this country to a new way of life internally than they intend to lead the world along the paths of progress which alone would ensure the cessation of our troubles.

    I would like to ask my Friends who are in the Government whether the time has not come when they should accept the Prime Minister's challenge before it is too late, before they are irretrievably tarred and compromised by this Government, before they are so implicated. in the Government's anti-social tendencies and refusal to recognise the signs or the needs of the times as to be incapable of leading the people along new paths. It is clear from the Prime Minister's recent speeches that his acceptance two years ago of the leadership of the Tory party was not an accidental or temporary mental aberration or a momentary lack of judgment, but really did reveal his mind, and that he deliberately decided, when he might have led the world, that he would lead the Tory party instead—lead them back into the old ways and the old policies, the outworn social, economic and political forms, the very attempt to maintain which made world war inevitable. We have done our share as a party. We have made our contribution to military victory. [Interrwption.] Let nobody deny it. Does the Noble Lady deny that the Labour Party in this House and in the country have made their contribution to military victory?

    Of course not, but the Labour Party are not talking in the country in the way that the hon. Member is talking in this House. The Labour Party are not fighting for Communism. Make no mistake about that.

    I thought the Noble Lady was denying the statement I had made. If she was not, I am not interested in the rest of her intervention.

    If the Labour Party had been composed of people thinking the way the hon. Gentleman does, they probably would never have come into the Government. I am certain that the hon. Gentleman does not represent the Labour Party. He does not represent anybody but a very small number, a very few chosen people.

    The Noble Lady is quite mistaken as to the facts, as she normally is. On the occasion when the Labour Party at the Annual Conference in Bournemouth, in 1940, had to determine whether it would go into the Government or not, I spoke and voted in favour of the Labour Party going into the Government. It seemed to me that we had no option and that it would be quite wrong for the Labour Party in those conditions to sit back and criticise the others in the dangers and difficulties which then confronted us. It seemed that we had to go in and take our share of responsibility at the moment when defeat was on our very doorstep..1 think we were right to do that and we have done it. I think we have made our contribution, I put it no higher than that, to the resurgence of strength in this country and to the military victory that is now inevitable. It is true that I thought the Labour Pary ought to have made conditions. If you are a party of 150 or 160 going into coalition with 350 because you agree with them on one point, it would be wise to make terms and conditions about domestic policies on which you do not agree with your partners; but it may well have been that the times were then too desperate and that we could not have got round a table to argue about the terms and conditions on which to take our share of responsibility.

    The condition of coalition was that the policy of the Government would not be determined by majorities but that the Government would seek at all points, irrespective of majorities and minorities in the House, and when we could not have a General Election, to preserve unity. I am entitled to say, and I think it is a reasonable argument to address to the House, that if the Prime Minister says that the maintenance of national unity is no longer the policy of the Government which is now to be determined by majorities, by which be must mean majorities in this House, then the essential condition on which we agreed to go into Coalition with the Tories has been broken and we ought to come out. [Laughter.] The Noble Lady has a sense of humour which I find myself unable to follow. Fortunately she has not to determine the questions to which I am addressing myself. I say that the time has come when, by the declarations of the Prime Minister, it has become exceedingly doubtful whether the Tory Party and the Labour Party are fighting in the same war at all, and that if we are to go by majorities then let the minority be represented on these benches by their own leaders. Let the views which we represent in the country find their natural expression in the elected leaders from these benches. There is no reason in the world now why they should be silent inside a coalition Government who are no longer going to maintain national unity but are going to use them merely as hostages and are seeking to pursue a policy of dictating by the majorities they use in this House.

    No one doubts two things, one of which is that unless military victory is secure there is no hope for the future of civilisation in this part of the world. The second is that there is little hope for the future unless, when victory is won, some attempt is made to remove from our ways of living those forces that make war and poverty endemic. I quite understand in one sense the Government's policy of unconditional surrender, which, however, is not an answer to problems but is the beginning of them. Rather, it is the refusal to answer them, or the decision only to postpone them. It cannot be a policy. Unconditional surrender of the Fascists, yes, but when you have the unconditional surrender, the problems will be there. The problems will still have to be solved. We want them solved in a new way, on the basis of a realisation of their true nature. It is not the fault of some of us that we find ourselves on the threshold of victory with no peace aims or peace plans. We, a small group, have for two years begged the Government not to be caught napping in this way, not to be left, at the very moment when decisions have to be taken and plans put into operation, with no decisions taken and no plans made, so that all that you can do is to cloak the, lack of policy by the parrot like repetition of the words "unconditional surrender." Unconditional surrender of the Fascists, the armies and the armed forces of every kind, yes, and unconditional surrender of all those who stand in the way of human progress in order that proper plans may be made and proper plans developed; but do not go on repeating the words in order to postpone for ever the solution of questions that may involve differences. If you do, the very force of inertia will lead you to make the wrong decisions, and the common people of the world, by whom and for whom this war has been won, will be as badly betrayed as they were in 1918.

    I have listened to this Debate, or the greater part of it, with considerable interest, because it illustrates the attitude of mind of certain Members in this House which causes me some concern. We are engaged in a very great war. We are by no means at the end of that war. We have a very stiff passage ahead of us, and yet I listen to hon. Members who tell me that this is a class war, that it is a war in which we are engaged in a class contest, presumably, I do not know with whom; but that we must think of nothing now except reconstructing tae world on a basis which they do not explain. Sometimes I feel that this unreality is almost dangerous. It is leading people to suggest that this Government, for instance, which represents all the parties in the House, is a Fascist concern, or is interested in preserving the Nazis or is not interested in the future welfare of the people of this country.

    We in this House are entrusted by the people of this country with their destiny, and we are responsible for the conduct of this war, and we are united behind the Government, which represents us all. And yet I hear hon. Gentleman opposite suggesting that the time has come when the Labour Party should break away from the rest of us and presumably run its own course. A very good example of this is provided by the collapse of Mussolini in Italy. We are told that that has been brought about by underground forces of a progressive nature that have not submitted to Fascism. Everyone knows that it was brought about by the King. The people could not bring about the fall of Mussolini. It was done by what we should call, if we were discussing the history of Russia before the revolution, a Palace revolution. The King and the Army leaders turned out Mussolini and that was the result of no great effort of the populace.

    There is nothing I have said that is not perfectly true and I do not know what the hon. Member wants to ask his question about. We are told by hon. Gentlemen opposite that this country must not recognise the present Government in Italy under Marshal Badoglio. We are not to recognise it because it does not represent the people. Who says that? My impression of Italy certainly just before the war was that the Monarchy was really the solid background of the regime. The King was the person whom the bulk of the Italian people regarded as their leader, and although Mussolini was a tremendous power in Italy he could never get rid of the King whereas the King has got rid of Mussolini. [An HOY, MEMBER: "And the British Army."] And the British Army. We are now in Italy. We have invaded the country and we have yet got to turn the Germans out of it. During that period when an army is advancing through a country, whether it is a so-called enemy country or a country we have come to liberate, during tint period when the fighting is going on it is absolutely essential to have some form of Government, civil Government, helping the army. That is why this body has been formed called A.M.G.O.T. My only complaint against it is its name. When it gets to Germany A.M.G.O.T. may sound rather a curious name. But when anyone has any knowledge whatsoever of the way in which British military men run the civilian population in an occupied country they realise that that is by far the best form of government that can be adopted by this country in the days that are to come.

    It may not be exactly the same position when we get into allied countries which are occupied by the enemy. It may be best in such countries to establish as soon as possible the governments which are now in this country. Presumably the Allied military leaders will arrange with the various governments what form of civil government will be best to set up as soon as the actual fighting is over. We are not concerned, in any way, with what particular government any country may choose to adopt. We have always been far too much inclined to meddle in the affairs of other countries. What has been pointed out by some speakers in the Debate is true, that we have often formed entirely wrong judgments on Parliamentary affairs in other countries because we entirely based them an our own ideas in this country. We have had long years of political Parliamentary experience. We have grown up with our Parliamentary institutions. It is a mistake to think that Parliamentary government must be as successful in other countries as it is with us. You would not have had Fascism or Nazism if Parliamentary government had been successful on the Continent. We must be very careful, when this war does come to an end, not to try and persuade everybody else to be democratic. If other nations prefer different fowls of government to ours, that is their affair; if they decide to set up a form of government which resembles our own, so much the better for them. If they do not, if they decide to have some other system, whatever we may think of it, it is not for us to interfere. What we have to do is to see that there shall be no repetition of this war. The Germans should not again have the chance of attacking. That is not to be achieved merely by telling them that they are to have a republic and to get rid of Hitler.

    We have a heavy task ahead of us, a tremendous task, and the best way it can be embarked upon is not to quarrel among ourselves now, not to suggest as some hon. Gentlemen do on the other side of the House that we on this side of the House are entirely opposed to democratic liberty or to the social improvement of the people. Such an assertion is not true; it is merely what is called politics and it is unworthy of Members of this House at a time like this. Let us do all we can to support the armies in the field and remember that the war has still to be won. Let us hold together at this period and not suspect each other of every imaginable crime against society. If we have anything to be ashamed of in this war it is not the fact that such and such men held such and such views before the war but that we have not always and at all times put our full energy into the war when it once began. That is what we have to remember. We must not let the people of this country suspect for one moment that the danger is over. We must all put our whole minds to winning the war and never cease from working for that.

    I shall venture for a short time to bring the House back to the Debate initiated by the Prime Minister, and the great victories—I emphasise that —the great victories of our Armies in Sicily and on the Italian toe. If anything, the Prime Minister was too modest in his statement. If the Germans had achieved a victory of such importance, Berlin would have been befiagged. If the Russians had achieved a victory of such strategic importance, there would have been volleys of guns, rightly and properly, in Moscow, and I say that this is an occasion when we should pay tribute to our generals and our soldiers, our airmen and our Navy. We are inclined—perhaps it is a good quality—to depreciate our victories when we do win a battle. Instead of praising our generals and leaders, we make little of our enemy. Take North Africa. We are liable, in our jeers and sneers at the Italian enemy, to forget quite entirely that the Italians were within a hair's breadth of getting into Egypt. I remember there were many who thought that the occupation of Egypt was inevitable. It was the skill of our generals and the bravery, pluck and courage of our soldiers that drove them across the difficult terrain of North Africa and finally achieved the occupation of Sicily.

    I have heard people say, "After all, it is only a little island." I heard one man in the streeet saying that it was like occupying the Isle of Wight. Sicily is not only of strategic importance; it is a territory about the size of and very much similar in character to, Wales, full of difficulties, presenting many difficult problems of organisation and of movement, and I think we ought on this occasion to pay tribute. General Eisenhower, General Alexander and General Montgomery, and above all that amateur Army composed of men 99 per cent. of whom three years ago were in civilian life with no ambition to become fighters, have shown themselves not only superior to the much despised Italians but have defeated some of the most skilful professional soldiers in the world, the German General Staff, the most highly organised and efficient military machine in the world. So far as I am concerned, I would have liked to see a Resolution of this House thanking our brave men for what they have done. That particularly applies to the Navy. I think our Russian Allies, not being a sea Power on any large scale, fail to appreciate the big part we have played as an island State. The Navy remains the silent Service. It does little boasting and has little publicity. But it is a remarkable achievement that, with all the landings it made, we have been able to keep open far-distant territories, in Africa and in Sicily. I think our Russian allies fail to realise the difficulty that a narrow strip of Channel makes when it is a matter of not only landing a large Army but of maintaining its supplies.

    I want to pay a special tribute to the Prime Minister for his journey to the United States. There are many critics who do not like to see the head of the State being absent for seven weeks from this country at the most serious period of the war. I have some sympathy with them. Everybody says that the Prime Minister is indispensable, but somehow in his absence the country carries on. I think that if we are going to have many more of these journeys—and I am in favour of them—the responsibility of carrying on the war must be more clearly defined. I have not a word to say against the Deputy Prime Minister, but there was a Question only to-day about a decision on an important home affair. I think that the time the Prime Minister spent in America was well spent. The more contact there is between the United States and ourselves, and, above all, the more personal contact there is between the President and our Prime Minister, the better it will be not only for our war effort but for the future of the world. I recently had an opportunity to visit the United States. The influence of the Prime Minister there is greater even than it is in this country. The President has his enemies, and he has difficulties far larger than those of our Prime Minister. He has to encounter personal antipathies and political differences owing to the Constitution of the United States and the fact that there cannot be a national Government. The Prime Minister is a great influence with the President, and probably the President is the only man who can speak to our Prime Minister as an equal in discussing war problems. The more often these two great war personalities meet together and exchange opinions and views, the better for our civilisation. There is always, between Allies, especially when important problems of strategy have to be worked out, a danger of misunderstanding. There have undoubtedly been misunderstandings between the American Executive and our own, and they have sometimes been at cross-purposes. When the Prime Minister and the President are together, those misunderstandings are short-circuited.

    I want, in conclusion, to refer to two other matters. The first is the position of France. The French have been going through three appalling years. I do not think that we appreciate the humiliation of the French people when their country is being occupied by Germany. It has been said above the Gangway that the breaking of the chains will come only by a revolutionary movement. Believe me, go per cent. of the common people of France are waiting for the day, and they are growing in strength. That is my information, and the hon. and gallant Member opposite, who made such an interesting maiden speech, was of the same opinion. I think it is most important that the Provisional Committee should get every encouragement. They have quite a considerable Army, but I am informed that they have been short of equipment. It was a great piece of news to every Frenchman that the occupation of Corsica was to be carried through by a French Army. Quite rightly, the French Committee cannot have the status of a Government: unfortunately, Frenchmen are inclined to quarrel on policies; but it is most important that, through the French Committee, the French people should be encouraged to feel that we are determined that in any reconstitution of Europe France again will be a great nation and a power in affairs. I was glad that the Prime Minister was able to state that France would be represented on the Mediterranean Committee. That will do much to hearten the French people in these appalling months of trial when they are waiting for the army of liberation.

    Finally, there is the difficult question of the form of government in Italy. The hon. Gentleman above the Gangway, in his interesting speech, was very scathing about the negotiations with Marshal Badoglio and the Italian King. For the life of me, I cannot understand what other organised forces the British Government could negotiate with. Seventy-five per cent. of Italian territory is occupied by the Germans, and is likely to be for some time. I think the Government would have been guilty of mad folly if, when there were responsible people prepared to risk their lives and throw over a dictator, they had not done their best to encourage them, by opening up negotiations, to lay down their arms. When Italy is free—I am afraid that will not be for some time yet—by all means insist that Italians who are exiled shall be allowed to return to their native land—such as Count Sforza and other Italian patriots who have been exiled by Mussolini. But in the middle of a great war like this how can we ascertain the feelings of the Italian people? We cannot have even a general election in this country. [Interruption]. It may be, but we have not done it yet, and there was no great protest against the renewal of the life of Parliament. How can we expect that, with the greater part of Italy in the hands of Germany, we should have negotiations only with a Government representing the Italian people. I believe that when the test comes there will be, after 21 years' experience of Fascism, a great uprising of the people, and that they will return to the great liberal traditions of the past. [Interruption.] The liberal traditions, I mean, which existed until Mussolini suppressed them. I say that some of these criticisms are unreal. Our business is to get an undertaking from the Government that those of the left who are prepared to go back to Italy to help on the cause of liberation shall be permited to do so. We have had such an undertaking from the Prime Minister—I hope that is a fair interpretation of his statement. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will make that point clear.

    I did not understand that that was so. I think the phrase which was used was that both people of liberal opinion and people of the Left would be encouraged to go, provided that they were prepared to help in the war for liberation. I am not ashamed to congratulate the Government on the great achievements of our Forces, both in Sicily and in the toe of Italy.

    I have been told by one or two people that the atmosphere in which the Prime Minister spoke yesterday and that which prevails to-day is not conducive to any extended criticism of the Government's position. I confess that there is a great deal of force in that contention. The Prime Minister had a tale to tell of uninterrupted success; and to the extent that the Government have such a story to unfold, their critics must necessarily work very much in an atmosphere less conducive to popular esteem. All I can say is that I hope the Government will always be in that position. I would much prefer to suffer under that disability. It is an extremely agreeable situation to find that whatever criticism it may be our duty to offer is a criticism on matters which do not imperil our fundamental position. But there are Members who say that when things are going very badly we ought not to criticise because it would rock the boat to do so, and that when things are going well we ought not to criticise because there is nothing to criticise.

    Such an attitude, carried to its logical conclusion, would mean the disbanding of Parliament, and an entire absence of scrutiny by the Government's critics. If that happened, my hon. Friend' would not have an opportunity to carve out the successful career on which he has already embarked. Perhaps I should have his gratitude in preserving the robustness of Parliamentary criticism. We are entitled to congratulate ourselves as a whole and not only the Government upon an improvement of one aspect of our administration which is extremely remarkable. The amphibian operations which have been carried out in the Mediterranean recently have shown that a very marked improvement indeed has taken place in our tactical use of the modern methods of war. It is a very long way from the humiliation of Singapore to the Tunisian campaign and the conquest of Pantellaria and Sicily and the attack on the mainland. I do not for a moment under-estimate the complexity, dangers and difficulties of these amphibian operations. The Prime Minister had no opportunity of telling us but such information as I have been able to obtain, very largely from American Service papers—because we are very much more diffident on this side of the Atlantic than they are there—shows how extremely complex and massive these amphibian undertakings are.

    I understand that the shipment of a United States armoured division abroad and putting it into action calls for shipping accommodation for about 3,700 tactical support planes, about 200 anti-tank guns, about 100 pieces of artillery, 80 mortars, 2,600 machine-guns, 1,803 tractors, 477 trailers, 10 locomotives, 250 railway waggons, 400 tanks, Loco feet of pontoon bridge, 200 motor-cycles, 925 combat cars, 133 field kitchens and many tons of food, 750 tons of ammunition, 275 tons of miscellaneous appliances, telephone and radio equipment, 15,000 combat troops, plus 1,300 men for ambulances, repair shops and so forth. That is a very formidable division to move about. The House should take advantage of this opportunity of complimenting both the American and British officers who have carried out these operations with such skill. I understand that it requires about 25 or 35 ships, on an American calculation, and about 7,000 tons of shipping, on our calculation, to carry one infantry division. Therefore, the materials that we have to set aside and the shipping space we have to provide for these amphibian operations are very considerable indeed, largely because they call into operation all the services—the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. They call for technical co-operation on the highest military level. Therefore I do not—and I wish hon. Members in all parts of the House to appreciate this fact—for a moment under-estimate the complexities, the dangers or the difficulties of undertaking operations of this kind. I say this because I resent one or two things the Prime Minister said. He thinks that some of us always think of throwing men ashore. If we had two hours in which to speak, we also could put in all the qualifying phrases and could begin our speeches with all the urbanities and generous tributes which fall so easily and, characteristically from my right hon. Friend the member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris).

    There seems to have been a sort of time pulse in the planning of these campaigns in the Mediterranean. They seem, all of them, to take about five months. The plans for the invasion of North-West Africa were laid in June, 1942, at the Anglo-American Staff Conference in Washington and the invasion took place five months later, in November. The conquest of Tunisia was planned at Casablanca in January, 1943, and the Axis Army surrendered in May, five months later. Al the same time we also decided the assault on Sicily, and that, I suppose, is the explanation of the Prime Minister's nine months' hint. Finally, the conquest of Italy was planned in Washington in May of this year, again five months later, to begin on 15th September. That is how the time schedules have worked out so far. It would appear that the planning of these operations and the assembly of the material to carry them out fall within that sort of period of military gestation. It is precisely to that narrow point that I want to address most of what I have to say. I want to examine the Prime Minister's time-table, and I want to do it in no spirit of hyper-criticism but to try and show to the House that our approach to Italy might form the pattern of our approach to other countries in Europe. I would also ask the House to bear in mind that everywhere we go in Europe we are likely to find much the same set of domestic conditions as exist in Italy. We are not going to approach unfriendly territories but territories occupied very largely by populations sympathetic to ourselves. I want, therefore, to examine how far our plans were affected by what might be described as the subjective parts of the Italian population. We have at our disposal, so the Germans say—in these matters we have to depend for information upon American and German sources —the Eighth Army, the Fifth Army and the Seventh Army, which between them make up a total of something like 24 Allied divisions, excluding any French troops that may be in the area.

    Our attack upon Pantellaria occupied rather less time than we expected it would take. Many people in this country drew the conclusion that the fall of Pantellaria was due equally or rather more to the efficacy of our bombing than to the unreadiness of the Italian garrison to resist us. So the first piece of evidence as to the attitude of the Italian population was ignored. The first red signal, the first important indication of the sort of reception that our troops might get on their approach to Sicily or the Italian mainland was not sufficiently taken notice of and we went on trying out our plans. Then came the invasion of Sicily. The shores held by the Italians were neither passively nor positively defended. The Italian troops and units surrendered without firing a shot and the Government's estimates of the number of prisoners are a perfect example of hyperbole. The Italians could not be regarded in any sense as captured prisoners of war. They were already appearing as Allies. The populations provided a ready welcome. All this happened during the first ten days of the second period which had been scheduled to precede the landing on the mainland. That is the second red light.

    Pantellaria and then Sicily are warning signals already given of a momentous and pregnant character to our military leaders and to those in charge of the advanced strategy of the attitude of the Italian population, but, nevertheless, we proceeded as if nothing at all had happened. Two events took place of very great importance. One was military. Our fight on Sicily shows, what we shall experience over and over again, that a few well-trained assault troops in a terrain like that surrounding Catania were very much more effective than heavy shell fire, bombing or batteries. We lost a good many troops in main assaults, whereas a few highly organised attack units, well-trained and used to the country, were able to take positions which did not yield to heavy shell fire or bombardment. The first lesson, therefore, we ought to derive is that, in static warfare, fire-power is of the utmost importance but that in mobile warfare fire-power is less important than highly trained mobility. I do not want to make that a major point, but it is one of some significance. We shall, unless we are very careful, fail to take advantage of some opportunities that are going to offer if we attach more importance to the assembly of heavy fire-power than to taking advantage of the local situation by troops trained for the purpose.

    But in the political sphere the signs were even more significant, and the lessons were very much more important. The workers of Milan and Turin struck, revolted and drove Mussolini from power. One hon. Gentleman who spoke from the opposite benches talked complete nonsense when he said that King Victor Emanuel dismissed Mussolini. The fact was that Mussolini's administration had lost all sanctions among the Italian people.

    No one would suggest for a moment that the revolt of the Italian people was a spontaneous affair which had nothing to do with the war. The Italian people recognised in the British and American troops approaching them their Allies. We ought, therefore, to see Allies in the Italian people. But we shall see how much we saw them as Allies. Let the hon. Member contain himself. It was, I think, on 25th July that Mussolini was removed. There were seven weeks to go. Apparently, from the Prime Minister's own speech yesterday, the significance of the risings in Milan and Turin was entirely lost upon the British Government. As a matter of fact, according to the Prime Minister's speech, he did not understand what was happening in Italy. The Government did not know the nature of the Badoglio régime. Political myopia could not be greater. Three weeks after the fall of Mussolini the Badoglio Government, according to the Prime Minister, were surrounded, inter-penetrated and overlaid by the Germans. This was the excuse for the Badoglio Government in the later stages not being able to implement the terms of the Armistice. But three weeks before the Italian workers in Milan and Turin, although overlaid by the Germans, struck, armed themselves and occupied all the towns. Three weeks afterwards, two days before the envoy reached us at Madrid from Rome, we bombed Milan. We bombed Milan on three separate occasions after the fall of Mussolini. Why? We on this side of the House want to know why, when already overtures had been made by the Badoglio Government, when it was known that the Governor of Milan, although appointed by Badoglio, was already arming the Italian workers, we bombed Milan and Turin. This is a very serious matter, and I warn the Foreign Secretary that there are men in the Air Force who will not be used for that dirty work. [An HON. MEMBER: "Shame."] We must have an explanation.

    Parliament must have an explanation. I want the House to keep its mind on the dates, because they are extremely important. Why was it necessary after Mussolini had been driven from power by the revolt of the Italian people to bomb the centres of Italian revolution three weeks afterwards? [Interruption.] Hon. Members must not behave with such frivolity in this matter, because the country is watching this very carefully. Speakinr, very earnestly and very seriously, I say that it would be a very sad thing indeed if men recruited into the Fighting Services ever got it into their heads fiat they were being used for any other purpose than—

    You could find all over Great Britain at the time of the bombing of Milan, in every club, "pub" and household—

    No, that is why the Noble Lady is so ignorant. She need not worry; Plymouth will deal with her all right. The fact is that this is not something which evilly disposed politicians put into the heads of innocent people. This is a question which workers have been asking all over the country. Many of us, including myself, thought at the time of making a great public protest about this, but we were restrained by this thought—that perhaps it was necessary to do this to force Badoglio to make up his mind. Some of my hon. Friends and I were very disturbed by this situation, but we said, "Let us be quiet, because we do not know everything that is happening. Leave it alone, because Badoglio may be hanging fire." Now we know the opposite. We know that the Armistice was being kept back to fit in with other plans. General Eisenhower said so; he said that the arrangements with the Badoglio Government were being held up at that time. Look at the Prime Minister's speech, and you will see that overtures had been received from Italy before the envoy reached Rome so that during the time of the bombing of Milan indications had been received by the British Government that the Italian Government were anxious to discuss peace terms. The Prime Minister said yesterday in precise terms that they were not particularly anxious to expedite the Armistice because it •had to fit in with our time schedule [An HON. MEMBER: "You have it wrong."] Well, the Foreign Secretary will have an opportunity of righting it. The Prime Minister said yesterday that it was not right to say that our military plans were influenced by political considerations. On the contrary, our military plans were, in fact, fixed. The Armistice had to be fitted into them. But there was this modification, a modification which reads seriously on examination. The Prime Minister sent a telegram to General Alexander on 18th August. That is to say, on 15th August the envoy was received from Rome. On 25th July Mussolini had fallen. So we had to wait from 25th July to 18th August before the political significance of what was happening in Rome had been realised.

    The situation in Sicily had already revealed the disposition of the Italian people. General Alexander put forward the date of the invasion of the Italian mainland by one week, from the 15th to the 8th. Putting forward the date by one week was a very remarkable achievement. No one will under-estimate that, but if at that time General Alexander could put the date of the invasion forward by one week, what could not he have done seven weeks before if our military plans had begun to adapt themselves to a realistic appreciation of the political situation inside Italy? In other words, I suggest that all along our military plans have been inelastic, and as a reply to the Prime Minister's taunt that he will not sacrifice British lives for political considerations may I say that British lives are now being sacrificed in Italy through the failure on the part of the British and American Governments to appreciate the revolutionary nature of the Italian rising? At the time of our attack in Sicily there were 10 German divisions right throughout the Italian mainland and in Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. Now I suppose there are nearer 20. If we had immediately recognised the situation on the Italian mainland and expedited our affairs as they should have been earlier, we should have been on the Italian mainland long ago, and many British lives would have been saved. [An HON. MEMBER: "Tut, tut."] It is no good the hon. Member saying, "Tut, tut"; he will find that this is a point of view held in the highest military quarters. I think the figures and dates go to show that the approach to Europe, prepared in accordance with every condition of approach to enemy territory, has failed to adapt itself to the political circumstances which we are likely to find. I am not trying to put this on a hypercritical level, but a serious objective examination of these dates shows that our approach reveals too little resilience and ought to take much more account of the assistance we are likely to have of sympathetic native populations when we are approaching Europe. Furthermore, I believe, also, that in our approach to Italy our position has been largely influenced by an unreadiness on the part of the Conservative mind to stir up local conditions too much. I may as well say these things here and now, because they are felt throughout the country. There is a tendency, which has been reinforced in speeches in this House, to *lake sure that we must approach and occupy Europe with the least disturbance of its political and social structure. If we had desired to stir up things in Italy, we could have done it far more effectively than by sending bombers to Milan and Turin. There were Italian anti-Fascists in America and London who were offering their services.

    Now I come to another question that I want to ask the Foreign Secretary. Will he inform the House what information was collected by the Foreign Office, long before the attack on Pantellaria, about the situation in Italy? Is it not true to say that there was in the possession of the Foreign Office detailed information of the political situation inside Italy? Was that information passed on, and, if so, what was done with it? My information is that the Foreign Office was kept fully informed of the possibilities of the, Italian situation long before the Sicilian campaign, and, if our military plans had been based on a proper sympathetic estimate of the situation inside Italy, our plans would have been entirely altered, and Italy might now have been occupied with very little loss of life. If the Foreign Secretary is unable to give the information, it would be as well if the House made the inquiry why it was that the information was not sent forward, or, if it was, what use was made of it. It is all very well for the Prime Minister to win cheers from docile and well-trained Members, but he has not only to carry the House of Commons with him. He has to carry the country, and, as we are approaching Europe more and more, there is growing in the country a suspicion that the political preoccupations of hon. Members opposite are beginning to overlay our military operations, to use the Prime Minister's own words.

    Yesterday the Prime Minister said, in connection with this approach to Europe, that the Government had made up their mind to co-operate every time with all the elements that would come together for the purpose of assisting our troops. He was going to economise British lives by co-operating with whatever elements would co-operate with us. I suggest quite seriously that we ought not to try to justify our military operations just now in the West, or in the Mediterranean, solely on the ground that they are saving lives. It is a nice demagogic argument, but it sounds nasty in Russian ears. You can easily save lives and stop the war. If a military or political operation is going to be justified merely on the ground that it saves lives, the best way of saving life is to stop the war at once. The Russians do not like that sort of argument. If you read some of the literature that is circulating inside the Soviet Union, you will see what sort of reaction that argument is having on Russian psychology at present. I have never suggested that a second front in Europe should be based on any other than military considerations, and I deplore rushing the Government into precipitate military action by political agitation. But neither should the possibility of effective military action in the West be inhibited by political considerations on that side of the House, and the suspicion is growing that that is the case. We are reaching a very serious stage of the war. The Prime Minister indicated that yesterday. As a matter of fact, his speech was an entire departure from any speech that he has made before. He said that from now on the Government were going to consider ruling by majority. That, after all, is a proper democratic principle. In a democratic community it is not unanimity that is sought but majority decisions, and the Government must rest their authority upon the majority they are able to obtain.

    I will ask the Prime Minister to consider the implications of that statement. Up till now the Government have been governing the country by a very large degree of unanimity and co-operation of all political parties. The Prime Minister must not convey the impression to the nation that, now that the possibility of German military victory is receding, he is more careless of national unity and is ready to rest his authority more and more upon the majority of Tory Members, because, when that happens, if he begins to get his authority in the Division Lobby from Tory majorities, the political truce is dead. We are not going to go to the constituencies to recruit Members to vote against us. Hon. Members must realise that they do not represent the country. The country is not behind them and has not been behind them since the war. You have only to look at the by-elections. Do not make any mistake about that. Hon. Members opposite are retaining scats by the grace of this side. Over and over again even Independents have sometimes stood against the combined authority of all the party leaders in the Government and on a bad register, and the Government have only been able to maintain their majority in some cases by very insignificant numbers.

    I say, therefore, to hon. Members, "Do not push matters too far," and I say to the Prime Minister that he must not exaggerate his authority, because at the moment, although these great successes are received with rejoicings throughout the country, the Government's authority has not gone up with them. If he believes it has, let him go to the mining areas or the industrial districts. It is necessary that the House should listen to these unpleasant things and that Members should see their significance. The country believes at present that the policy of the Government is beginning to veer away from what it was when we entered the Government in 1941. It believes that the Government are becoming irresponsible as the possibility of German victory recedes. It believes that the reactionary policies believed in by hon. Members opposite are obtaining ascendancy in the counsels of the Government, and, when that happens, British national unity comes to an end. I therefore warn the Govern- ment and urge them, in the interests of the nation, to watch their course very carefully. The nation is watching, and the nation will have its revenge unless the Government adapt their policy to the wishes of the nation.

    The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. A. Bevan) was critical of the speed of our operations in the Mediterranean. I am no expert on naval affairs, but surely the common-sense answer is that the average speed of a convoy is seven to nine knots, and the lack of storage space makes not one but several journeys necessary. Very different is the problem of the land commander. The moment that his aircraft and intelligence report that his enemies have landed, he can rush his tanks and mechanised divisions 24 hours of the day and night to the danger spot. That is surely why the evidence of the past has always shown how vitally important it is that during the first few critical days of a landing we should have ample supplies and above all air support. Hence the apparent delay in our preparations in the Mediterranean. The hon. Member also criticised our bombing of Milan during the progress of the Armistice negotiations. Surely common sense says that, so long as the enemy is still in arms against you, it is essential to strike at his sources of power, and remember that all the time German divisions are in occupation of the Valley of the Po those workers in Milan and Turin, though unwilling, may be made to work against us just as those in the Renault works in Paris were.

    All the evidence shows that the workers were already in possession of those works and were arming themselves, and in many cases they had expelled the German garrisons.

    However well intentioned, and although armed, they cannot stand against 10 or 12 mechanised divisions which will occupy their works and use the guns and rifles to kill our own men landing on the beaches of Italy. Some hon. Members opposite have likewise been critical of the fact that the Government negotiated with General Badoglio, but surely General Eisenhower's problem is a twin problem. He has to deal a damaging blow at Germany and at the same time to divert as many divisions as possible from the Russian front. When he considers this problem he must consider 3 factors, the speed with which he can carry out his operations, the strength of the armies at his disposal, and the amount of casualties that he is likely to incur. Had the Italian envoy gone back from Madrid and informed Marshal Badoglio that General Eisenhower would on no account be willing to treat with his Government, it is very likely that Marshal Badoglio and the King would have said, "Our enemies do not wish to destroy Fascism. They wish to destroy Italy and, whether we wish it or not, we must struggle on in partnership with our hated German ally."

    On the other hand, the immediate result of the Armistice is that Germany is now compelled to replace some 60 Italian divisions which have gone out of the war, the Italian fleet has sailed into Malta, the Italian airfields will be at our disposal, and throughout the Balkans, Dalmatia, Italy and Central Europe the German position is materially weaker. I believe that General Eisenhower was amply justified in treating with the King and Marshal Badoglio.

    The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale made the point that it does not sound nice in Russian ears that we do not wish to incur casualties, but surely the situation is that the attack on Italy was an essential preliminary to the main attack upon Europe. The position of the Italian airfields will allow American Fortresses and Liberators by day, and Stirlings, Lancasters and Halifaxes by night, to batter the remaining sources of German power, as they have already battered the Ruhr and Hamburg. When the time comes that Silesia, the Skoda munition works at Pilsen and the oil refineries at Ploesti are as shattered as the Ruhr is now, then will be the moment to attack Europe, when the Germans cannot rely on sufficient aircraft and artillery. In Spain, I believe, those who follow the bull fight divide the contest into three phases, the first, Levontado, when the bull canters into the arena and carries all before him. The second, Podado, when the bull is already wounded and begins to take stock of his enemies. The third, Applomado, when his body feels as heavy as lead and the arena begins to dance in front of his eyes. It is that final stage that I would liken to our second front in Europe with German industry, already shattered by air bombardment, unable to sustain the ground forces defending the coasts. I am certain at the present moment that the German High Command hopes to fight a holding war on three defensive lines—on the Channel, on the River Po and on the River Dnieper, and they hope that, they will inflict upon us a second Passchendaele and bleed us white so that through war weariness or despair or division among ourselves we may be inclined to contemplate an armistice with them.

    I am concerned about the future, and of one thing I am certain. It is that the German Government never will forget the classic doctrine of Bismarck, namely, to divide the East from the West, and Russia from her Allies. While Germany is still fighting, therefore, it is possible that she may make various diplomatic moves to try and split the Allies. The first possible move is when the German Ambassador to Turkey walks into the Turkish Foreign Office and asks Turkish diplomats to transfer a message to Russia to the effect that Germany will be willing to evacuate the territories she has occupied and seek a separate peace with Russia. This obviously in the eyes of the German General Staff would relieve 100 divisions or more to go West to face the Anglo-American Forces in Europe. There is a second possibility which might take place in Madrid. The Spanish Foreign Minister will go to our representative and say that the German High Command realise that the war is lost and that they will open the coasts of Europe to Britain and America while maintaining their armed forces in the East. They would invite the Anglo-American Forces to hold their country while they held off Russia. There is third alternative that they might fight on to the end. In that case we may have to agree with Russia on where the dividing line between our own and Russian influence is to be. Therefore, I was particularly pleased that the Prime Minister announced that a conference is shortly to take place between representatives of Russia, ourselves and the United States. It is not a moment too soon to try to judge and assess some of the problems that lie before us.

    What sort of Europe do we want to see after the war? It seems to me that there are two alternatives. The first is spheres of influence—a Russian sphere of influence in the East and an English sphere of influence in the West. I am against such a solution. I believe that it would tend to rivalry and that Germany with her acute diplomacy would seek to set one against the other. I would much rather, if it were possible, see an agreed policy between ourselves and Russia upon the future of Europe, a policy based upon the independence and freedom of the small nations. I am one of those who firmly believe that the future peace of Europe lies in co-operation with the Soviet Union. But I feel that many people in this country have a wrong conception of co-operation with the Soviet Union. The great and powerful Soviet Union is a realist Power and it seeks as its allies other Powers equally strong. If we are to retain the respect and the partnership of Russia we must remain strong after the war. We shall win the respect of Russia if we keep our military service and keep our armed forces at a level sufficient to police the distracted portions of the world. I believe that, given that, we shall work well with Russia. On the other hand, Russia as she has every right to do considers first of all her security and the first thing which would tempt her to go over her own frontiers would be the weakness and desolation of Europe. That can only be avoided by a strong British policy in Europe. I hope that we shall see British and American leadership in many parts of Europe. Events seem to be moving fast at the present moment and who can tell when the end of the war will come? Whenever that time may come it is time now to be considering these problems with our Allies so that should peace come unexpectedly, as it did in the last war, we shall not be as unprepared for it as we were for war.

    I was rather interested to hear the line of argument that was being put before the House by the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Kerr), because I believe that, apart from the military activity of the war at the moment, there never was a time when political activity was going on in the background as it is just now. There are all the possibilities in this situation of some tremendous and dramatic changes taking place in the war. I would not lay it down in any dogmatic manner, but have attempted to assess the situation and have searched almost all the newspapers avail- able and made all the contacts possible with regard to the critical political development. We see Germany surrendering not small portions of territory, but great amounts of territory, and I have wondered whether, as the hon. Member mentioned, the Germans may have the idea that they might be prepared to surrender the whole of their Russian territory and attempt to make a separate peace with Russia. On the other hand, there is undoubtedly a great amount of public opinion in this country, whether real or not, which believes that America and this country for political reasons have allowed Russia to bear the great burden of the struggle in the East. They say that it is undoubtedly true that if Russia had not been in the war, Great Britain and America would have required to do a great deal more in the military field than they have done up to the moment.

    The feeling, at any rate, is that this country would have been defeated. All these political antagonisms are there, and we must not close our eyes or our ears in the world of to-day to the developments that are going on. It is an uneasy partnership between Russia and America and Great Britain. In the call for a second front that front is always stressed as being in France. This call is made by the Communists and you cannot divorce the Communists from Russia for they are only the spokesmen of Russian desires. I cannot see why there should be this insistence of a second front in France. Would not a second front in Italy be a desirable thing if it were broad enough and had tremendous power and force behind it? One is driven to the conclusion that Russia wants a second front in France because she does not want Britain and America going into the Balkans and probably making their way into either Germany or Central Europe because they would attempt to stabilise their sphere of influence there in the way they are doing to-day in Italy by A.M.G.O.T. A.M.G.O.T. after all is a peculiar name for the bankers' and bondholders' battalion which is being sent in behind the military in order to make the world safe for capitalism. Never mind the opinions one has with regard to capitalism; I am attempting to analyse the position to show the difficulties that exist.

    One sees the desire of America and Great Britain to consolidate their positions in every occupied country that they free. Free from what? When the Prime Minister talks about liberating Italy, what does he mean they are being liberated from? Are they being liberated from Mussolini to be handed over to Badoglio and King Victor Emanuel? Does the Prime Minister think us so simple as to believe that that will free Italy from Fascism? I would advise the Prime Minister and some of his supporters to read the speech made by the Secretary of State for Scotland last Saturday, when he referred to Badoglio as one of the greatest bloody scoundrels the world has ever known. They will see how the Secretary of State is stabbing the Prime Minister in the back by making a speech of this kind about the Prime Minister's nominee. Badoglio was guilty of using poison gas in Abyssinia, and he is one of the greatest criminals in the Fascist world. If the Prime Minister is prepared to march along with Badoglio and negotiate with him, is he prepared to negotiate with Goering? What is the difference? Why did he not negotiate with Hess? He is no better or worse than Badoglio. This bankers' and bondholders' battalion is going to consolidate its position in every country that they enter and make it secure. We have seen the trouble that is taking place in London.

    Take the Polish situation to begin with. We know that in Blackpool a Polish officer went into a shop and said, "If you do not take that photo of Stalin out of the window, I will kick in your window." Stalin has set up in Russia a Polish Committee for the purpose of handing over Poland to it. He is training them as a Government. He has troops fighting alongside the Soviet battalions, and he is sovietising all the troops and all those who are going into that part of the world. In Russia attacks are continually being made on the gang of runaway generals and capitalists who are sitting in London, this cowardly gang who ran away and, left the workers to their fate. Russia is not expecting that this bunch will go back to Poland to run Poland on behalf of the old feudal barons and capitalists.

    The struggle between Russia and this country goes on behind the scenes continually. In the other direction we see demands in this country that Russia shall be invited to Quebec, to Casablanca and to the various conferences that are being held, but we are told that Roosevelt and the Prime Minister do not want them there. But that is not a complete picture of the truth. Stalin does not want to be at those conferences because the discussions will deal in part with Japan, and Joe Stalin is at peace with Japan. His Ambassador is sitting in Tokio, and the Japanese Ambassador is sitting in Kuibishev, and it would be an unfriendly act if he were to be in the room when political discussions were taking place concerning Japan. The Secretary of State for Air could probably tell us more of this, but about a week ago the Press stated that the bombing crew of an American Liberator had landed on Soviet territory after having bombed some islands belonging to Japan, and the Soviet promptly interned the American crew. What a farce; what a commentary!

    And there was a demand from Russia that we should declare war on Rumania, on Hungary and on Finland, and it was done much against the will of a large and powerful section of the Tory Party of this country. We declared war to please Joe, but Joe does not declare war on Japan to please Winston. This struggle goes on continually behind the scenes, and the man in the street or the Member of this House who believes that there is a real identity of interests between all these sections is living in a fool's paradise. If that is the state of things now, what will it be after the war? I see the possibility—I put it no higher—of the Prussians and the Nazis attempting a try-out, because Stalin has said that he wants only to liberate Russian territory. If the Nazis retreat gradually out of Russia and attempt to make peace with the Russians in the way they attempted to get this country involved into giving them permission to wage war on Russia—if that peace should take place, what position would America and Great Britain be in?

    When I analyse the situation, I do it by asking what should be the position of a cold-blooded revolutionary anxious to produce a world revolution. If I were a Russian and were concerned only with producing a revolutionary upheaval throughout the world and ending the capitalist system—which might produce anarchy and disorder—I should say "Just as we made a compact with the Nazis in order to allow France and Bel- gium and Holland and the Balkans to be overrun in the hope of producing world upheaval, let us, now that the Gentians are becoming weaker, make peace with Germany, and let us throw America and Britain, as being the dominating capitalist countries in this war—too strong and too powerful for Russia at the moment—into an inevitable world struggle, long and protracted, with Germany, in which Germany would get certain advantages and which might give Russia a free hand in Poland and in parts of the Balkans."

    That is not just the picture of an imbecile. It is the picture of one who believes that a cold-blooded analysis can be made by some men of how to produce the maximum amount of warfare in the world with the idea of eliminating the capitalist system by brute force. We do not believe in that. We believe in ushering in a new order by reason, because we believe that a change in the mental processes of mankind is more powerful for good in the end than letting loose the forces of evil and disorder in the world. I have seen statements made by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). I know he cannot mean it, but he speaks in amazement about the bombing of Turin and about the attempt to consolidate the capitalist: and the Monarchical position in Italy by using brute force. What is there amazing in that? Have not the forces of property and finance always been prepared to use the maximum amount of brute force, if necessary, in order to ensure the continuation of this system of plunder? In a miners' lock-out they said "Starve the miners into subjection." If it was the railway men, they proposed to starve them into subjection. If there were to be a revolt in this country or France or anywhere else, they would use the maximum amount of force, regretfully but remorselessly, against the people in order to ensure the continuation of this system of private property and finance. When we find the Tory party, which is the overwhelming party in this House, prepared to use brute force for the continuation of its order, what is there amazing about that? I as a Socialist never believed any other position could arise. I believed from the beginning that the war was a struggle betwen rival sections of gangsters in order to ensure the continuation of property, finance and Colonial plunder. When the system was menaced they resorted to arms, though using. all the fine phrases that the people in the Labour movement, the trade unions and the co-operative societies believe in. The man in the street hates brute force, hates war and the idea of dictatorship and concentration camps, and therefore he is told these stories. The Ministry of Information puts them over. We get them from the pulpit, the cinema, the Press and the public platform. It is done to rouse the mass of the people to indignation. against this thing that is called Fascism and Nazism. Fascism and Nazism are the extreme expressions of capitalist private ownership. That is all.

    The Prime Minister spent two hours yesterday in giving us a superficial picture. He could spend ten hours if he would tell us all that is going on behind the scenes, because there never was a time when there was more double-crossing among the nations than there is to-day. There is not one of them which is not engaged in it. We are told that we are out to liberate Italy from Fascism.,To-day I met in the Lobby a man who is an Italian refugee. He left Italy when Fascism came into power, and he thought that all he had to do now would be to apply to the Home Secretary and he would be given permission to go to Sicily to help to build up the Socialist order there. All the answer he got was a letter from the Home Office to say how sorry they were that they could not allow him to go back to Sicily. That is the attitude. They will use the Italian working class, as they use the Labour Party, to keep the men in possession in power. They could not be the men in possession to-day if the Labour Party were active and went to the country. Mr. Curtin refused a National Government in Australia, refused to sink the identity of his party, and he swept Australia. A large number of people who supported the war because it was a war for freedom are now beginning to discover that it is a war waged for the same old reason as the last war. The same old "dope" is being put across the public by paid "hacks" on the platforms of the Ministry of Information and by bogus refugees, men who were too cowardly to remain behind to fight the Nazis but ran away when they was danger.

    Since it appears that Germany, Britain and America are all fighting for exactly the same thing, which is the survival of the private enterprise system, why do they not get together now? What are we fighting for? The hon. Member is attributing to capitalists a singular lack of acumen if he says they are insisting on destroying one another.

    I can only say that the same question is asked about the Churches and why they do not all get together. They are all working for the same end, but they run separate shows. It is the same with political parties. If all of us here stood for the benefit of the great mass of the people, then one political party would do. When there are interests in rubber or in oil, or in tin, the bond-holding interests naturally get into the Carlton Club and the Tory Party and expect the Tory Party to maintain their rule. If the German bond-holding interests do not get a share of the swag, they behave as the gangsters do in New York, they fight over the question of who is to exploit these natural resources. There might come a day when you had Germany and Britain and American together in the struggle. That is a possibility. You could get to the state when there was international capitalism and the complete slave State with its paid army. The Germans were the nearest approach to it. A time comes when the competition between rival gangsters is so acute that they cannot agree to share their interests, and they go to war.

    In Italy we have demanded that there should be unconditional surrender. The Italians were prepared to throw down their arms end to come out of the war, and they would have had peace if Britain and America had given a guarantee that their territory would not be a jumping-off ground for making war on other countries. It was possible to take Italy out of the war.

    It would have been no interest of the Germans in that case to have divisions there.

    Does the hon. Member suppose that Germany would have stopped making war on us from Italy?

    Italy could have been at peace at this moment and would not have been used as the battleground for other nations. Italy is discovering that it was one thing to get into the war and another thing to get out of it, and that she is getting the worst of two worlds. Italy would have been well advised to have remained in the war on the side of Germany, because the position would have been Less acute. You would not have had Mussolini appealing to one section and Badoglio appealing to another, while great masses of the people did not know which side would have the most power and were afraid to support either in the internal struggle which is now going on. In the Northern towns there is a proletariat which is able to form a better opinion, but the people with whom the Government are making peace were the active supporters of Mussolini. Those supporters were not the great mass of the working class but the bankers, landowners and capitalists, who were behind King Victor Emmanuel, who was behind Mussolini.

    A few days previous to the war I made a speech here, when I came back from Italy. I said that the Italian people had a tremendous contempt for Mussolini and his method of life and that I was convinced that Mussolini would take Italy into the war but somebody else would take Italy out of the war. I said that in every place I went to I sought expressions of opinion and that there was a tremendous indignation about Mussolini that did not exist in Germany towards Hitler, because the two personalities were quite different in their private lives. There has never been an attempt to get the common people in the occupied territories and the enemy countries to revolt against their rulers. One of the most disgraceful episodes, which was the key to a whole policy, was to recognise Darlan. After the people of the world had been encouraged to sabotage, a young man came out and shot Darlan. Instead of being given the George Cross, he was led out to a firing squad, and his body was buried in quicklime. No information was given about him, just as there was no information about Hess. All the information one got was when some Ministers from this House got into foreign countries and, probably after a very good dinner, began to tell us over their brandy and cigars why Hess came here and why this was done and why that was done.

    When Darlan was selected as the representative of Eisenhower and Roosevelt, and Badoglio was selected in Italy, and when Prince Paul was flown to the millionaire's castle in Africa, and his wife, the Princess Olga, came here with the head of the Fleet, Lord Louis Mountbatten in London and moved about in society circles while the patriots in her country were fighting on the hills, one can understand the feeling that there must have been among the people of Yugoslavia and among the people of liberal opinions at all those developments. They must have been asking themselves what kind of war of liberation this was. The greatest cheer during the Prime Minister's speech came when he said that the Italian Empire was irretrievably lost. One could almost hear in that cheer the enthusiasm of people who saw new fields of investment. Is Great Britain I o take over the running of this irretrievably lost' Empire? Are the slaves in the Colonial territories always to be used as pawns in the game of the bondholders in every country? Is South Africa being consulted about the Mediterranean commitments? Is there to be a real liberation committee? Why are not the people of Italy being consulted? Why are King Victor Emanuel, who was Mussolini's Man Friday, and other people, being consulted about running the country? It is because the Tory Party here are determined to use the masses of the people for their war.

    There are two wars going on, one in the minds of the working class of the world that this is a war to destroy Fascism, and the other in the minds of the Tory Party, the bankers and the bondholders, that this is a war to liberate them from the yoke of foreign competitors and to give them fields of exploitation hitherto denied to them. It is beginning to dawn on the minds of some members of the Labour Party that the war is changing its character. Without being antagonistic or insulting to them, I would say that it is the same old war as before. Modern economic wars are not for the liberation of subject peoples and slaves and to destroy evil powers, but are to change the masters, to change the rule from one side to the other. We are entering into a period of struggle to-day when the ideologies of the various countries are becoming more open than they were in bygone days. All the menace is there of Russia and Germany making a separate peace and throwing the rest of the world into a tremendous struggle of war and brutality. I cannot look upon that possibility with any feelings of glee.

    We look upon this as a tragedy that is gradually and remorselessly working its way out, and in which brute force is being used in an increasing degree. Bombing planes are now going over, with no excuse or defence that they are going to bomb military objectives. It is stated that they are dropping 50 tons of bombs on houses, and we are told that even schools and almshouses are eliminated. We are eliminating towns and making terror on the peoples because, we cannot win the military struggle on the battlefields. The Allies are bound to get the mastery, and they say they must get it by any means in their power. I say that the Hamburg doctor and Belgian engineer have more in common with me than I have with Roosevelt and Churchill. I recognise that they are at one with me and mine in their class point of view. They may be held down in tyranny in Germany. They should have worked their way out of it, but they were led by false leaders as in this country. I say to the Government: Go on with your war. If you should win in the end, after the tremendous, bloody struggle that the Prime Minister talks of, you will discover that the troubles of your war period will have been as nothing to the troubles of the peace. The accumulated antagonisms will mean civil war, in which you will be compelled to use against the rising multitudes of conscious people throughout the world the very weapons that you have used against your commercial enemies. The only solution is not to be found through the Darlans, the Eisenhowers, the Badoglios and the King. Victor Emmanuels, but through the large mass of the people at the bottom, when they make their mind and will known and rise and sweep away the evil things that are the cause of war—rent, interest and profit.

    I was under the impression that this was to be a Debate on the conduct of the war, but the hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) has rather disabused me of that idea. None the less, I propose, for whatever time remains to me, to make a few remarks concerning the strategy of the war and the conduct of the war generally. To do so intelligently, it is necessary to have information as to the available forces, resources and morale both of the Allies and of the enemy, and also as to the general disposition of their forces. As to some of these matters, we may surmise what they are, and as to some there have been Press reports, but surmise and Press reports are no substitutes for definite knowledge, and still less' are wishful thinking or personal opinions such as we have heard, I venture to say, in this Debate. It is, I think, regrettable that many people, in the Press and in public and in private life, and I would add in this honourable Douse, criticise and urge courses of action without having the knowledge to qualify them to do so and endowed with no other qualification than the pen of a ready writer or the tongue of a ready talker, in the case of some hon. Members of this House.

    But some things we do know about, and the things we know about do give us something, some peg, on which to hang intelligent criticism. We do know that immense damage has been done to Germany by our bombing; we do know that our shipping position is much improved; we do know that in North-West Europe—this is a point of great importance, I would say—only a few weeks' more good weather, remain before us whether for landing operations or for a war of rapid movement, which is what I think we should aim at as our object if we are to finish this war in a not very long time. There are circumstantial reports also to which we may give some credence. One is that, due to lessened confidence in the Nazi system and in the Nazi leaders, and due also to the effects of the Allied bombing, the German morale at home has been shaken and is being further shaken daily. There are also reports that recent German drafts in certain cases have been of inferior quality and training, and immature. I only say reports. I have tried to differentiate particularly between what we may say we know and what we may surmise or what is currently reported. It makes a very great difference if one wishes to make any intelligent criticism on strategy.

    I do believe that a new expeditionary force to a nearby part of North-West Europe is very desirable indeed, and I cannot help feeling it was that class of course that the Prime Minister was referring to when he said there would be a second front when the time was judged to be right. I think we must content ourselves with that statement, which I personally welcome, but I believe that it is—and I repeat it—most desirable that we should have a new expeditionary force, I will not put it more particularly than in North-West Europe, where air cover from home-based fighters is possible, and where the sea communications are short, and also a part of the world whence we can most quickly and most effectively strike at Germany. But for such an expedition adequate forces, equipment and shipping are absolutely essential. No small force is sufficient. There must be one which can operate on a broad front and look after is own flanks in these days of rapid movement and mechanised warfare. Only the Government can say whether such forces and whether the Necessary shipping are available. I do not know, I do not pretend to know; I can do no more than many others do—surmise on the subject.

    It must not be forgotten that landings on a hostile coast are always hazardous operations. I think that is very often forgotten in this country. People talk glibly and freely about moving large forces by sea without considering the means of doing it or the risks that are undoubtedly run. They are hazardous, and all the more so if the weather is doubtful, as the weather is likely to be in the not far distant future. In Sicily we had the advantage of surprise and lukewarm opposition at best on the part of the Italians, and not least of all a certain measure of good luck, and I believe that good luck is an important element in military operations. Salerno, on the other hand, is an equally good example of what I have been endeavouring to say, that these landing operations are very hazardous, and at Salerno, when there was no surprise, and there was a strong and vigilant enemy, I think we ran a very close thing, for failure, possibly, certainly for a very qualified success.

    There are too many in this House and out of it who talk glibly of second fronts as if we had no other fronts and who think that landings on a hostile coast are as simple perhaps as a peace-time trip from Dover to Calais. Perhaps it is natural that Russia, which is a great land Power, and which thinks in terms of land power and land frontiers and land communications, should not realise or appreciate the difficulties and the hazards of these amphibious operations by a much smaller Power confined by the sea on every side, but I do think it is shocking that so many Britons, and there are many, do not realise both the risks and the enormous amount of shipping involved in any such operation. Nor do they realise, I think, the organisation which is necessary and the number of men, over and above the actual fighting troops, who will be required at the bases, at the aerodromes, on the beaches, and for manning the ships, and who are absolutely essential if a landing operation on a big scale is to be carried out successfully. The Prime Minister told us yesterday that some 2,700 ships were used for the Sicilian landing. Possibly—again I do not know—that was to carry something like 12 divisions. How many ships would be necessary to carry double or treble that number of divisions, and how many men would be necessary at the bases, the beaches and so forth?

    The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. A. Bevan), in his remarkable speech on strategy, talked, among other things, of the number of ships and the tonnage required to carry troops. Possibly he did not realise that the tonnage required depends very largely on the distances that those ships have to go. If they have to carry troops and equipment and all that is required a long distance, the tonnage must be greater than if the distance is short. Once or twice I wondered, when I was listening to the hon. Member, whether he was under the impression that as it was a short distance to the fronts which he was envisaging, the surplus men might swim. Some people in this country surely contemplate that when they talk about shipping these great expeditions overseas. For these reasons—the time required, the preparation and assembly of shipping, and the meticulous arrangements which are necessary for loading, unloading, convoying and air cover—all the arguments which we have heard in this Debate to the effect that there was undue delay in the landing at Salerno, fall to the ground. I cannot see that in his long dissertation on that subject the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale put up any case to be answered. It would have been criminal as well as foolish to undertake such an expedition without the fullest preparation and the most meticulous arrangements.

    As regards the future of the Italian campaign, we ought to remember that the German communications are very long, and that if the Italians refuse to work the railways and the essential services, and, better still, if the Italians carry out sabotage and active or passive opposition against the Germans, many German troops will have to be engaged on lines-of-communication work and various jobs of keeping down the Italian population, and this may make a substantial difference in the number of their fighting troops. The German plan may be to fall back northward, fighting rearguard actions it may be, but at the same time shortening their lengthy communications and concentrating their forces. The criticisms we have heard about allowing the escape of Mussolini are so ridiculous that they hardly need answering. I wonder why some hon. Members have not criticised the Government for not arresting Hitler. That is not much more ridiculous than the idea that we could arrest Mussolini in his own country before we had any footing in that country, let alone any authority to carry out arrests. I think that the criticism of our dealings with the Badoglio Government rests on no sounder foundation either. These are military operations, and from a military point of view it is essential that there should be a Government which can be recognised and which can function in the country, and with which the military commander can deal. It does not matter, from the military point of view, what the colour of the Government is, or what their opinions are, provided that they can exercise the necesesary authority and function as a Government. It is when peace comes that the Italian people, and we hope many other peoples, will have the opportunity of choosing their own Government and saying what form of Government they wish to have.

    Similarly, A.M.G.O.T. is essential, especially for the carrying out of local government in occupied territories. We may compare it to the military government of the Rhineland which we found it necessary to set up after the Armistice following the last war, and which relieved the military commander, as A.M.G.O.T. will relieve military commanders, from the responsibility of dealing with civil affairs, of preserving law and order and preventing crime, and generally keeping the population in a quiet and, as far as possible, peaceful state. Have we in this war no controls in this country which, for military reasons, interfere with the liberty of the subject to do as he likes? Of course we have. Still more are such controls necessary in an occupied country where war is still actually going on. I propose to say only two things about the Far East. Do not let us under-estimate the Japanese, and do not let us under-estimate the difficulties, the distances and the shipping requirements which will be necessary to deal with them. Let me return to the war in Europe for one moment.

    In order to gain complete victory, we —that is the Allies—must, in the first place, defeat the German armies, east and west, and, secondly, we must break the will to resist and the morale of the German people. To this end, they must be continuously attacked both in the East and in the West, and the air bombing of Germany must be intensified. As I have said, I hope we shall attack in North-West Europe as wall as in Italy, but if the Government do not do that I am sure they will have good reasons, based on facts of which they are in possession and we are not. None the less, I am emboldened to think that some operation of the kind will develop, from the words used by the Prime Minister yesterday. I hope that that second front which the Prime Minister said would be opened when the time is judged to.be ripe, will come before the winter weather, which would handicap both the landing and the operations very seriously indeed.

    I hope also that we shall not make the mistake of attacking in too many parts of the world at once and perhaps not be strong enough in any one of these parts. The Germans are said to have some 50 Divisions in North-West Europe. These must be very widely scattered. There can be no question that some probably are tied to coast defence and some probably to keep down subject peoples and any considerable number of them would take a long time to concentrate. We know that the Continental railways, which were in none too good order even at the beginning of the war, have been strained to the utmost, and seriously damaged, in certain parts at any rate, by some of our air attacks. With these conditions, it would take a very long time to concentrate any considerable number of German Divisions in the West. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that a very large part of the Luftwaffe, which the Prime Minister told us—and we were very glad to hear it confirmed—has been weakening as compared with our Air Force and is definitely weaker now, can be concentrated very quickly indeed.

    In these circumstances which I have tried to outline—defeats in East and West and the air bombing at home, not forgetting the hardships of winter, which can be very severe indeed in Germany, the lowered morale both of the civilians and of the Forces, and certainly the shortage of some materials, possibly of oil and even of equipment—all these factors taken together might yet bring about a German collapse even before the end of the winter. Personally, I would not bank or count on it, but I cannot help thinking that there is an outside chance of it. I will not put it higher than that. I hope that this may be so, but, anyhow, I take a view in contradistinction to the hon. Member for Shettleston and the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale that the Government, and especially the Prime Minister, are very much to be congratulated on the results of the past year's conduct of the war.

    They are very much to be congratulated. It is human to make mistakes. I dare say mistakes have been made but I do not think they have been very evident mistakes to most of us. I would remind the House that Napoleon, who was no mean judge, said that the most successful commander was he who made the fewest mistakes. Certainly, I think that a few mistakes have been made in the last 12 months in very complicated operations involving the co-operation of Allies who however cordial are bound to have, in some respects, different points of view and different ideas. Besides the Government, the leaders and all ranks ashore, afloat, and in the air have done the most magnificent work and are very much entitled to the thanks and the gratitude of this House and of the nation.

    I wish to refer to two points. The first of them is A.M.G.O.T. The hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fulham (Mr. Astor) made most interesting observations on the difficulty of occupying territories and the difficulties involved in getting municipal services to run again, the hard task of the Army and how important it was that they should advance quickly. I agree with that. I agree entirely that military considerations must come first. In territories that are just being occupied and are immediately behind the front line, by all means let A.M.G.O.T. rapidly improvise an organisation, but what' about the territories further behind? No one could say, as the hon. Member suggested, that it is possible to hold a general election in Naples. Nobody wants to hold a general election in Naples, but it is possible for some degree of normal life to start again now in Sicily, and it will be possible, no doubt, within a comparatively short time for it to start in Sardinia. If the advance in Italy goes along with some speed, it may be possible to start normal life further on there behind the lines. But some of us are afraid that military expediency may be used for keeping on this kind of rule long after it is necessary.

    I would like to ask a few questions about the method of the training of the people who have joined A.M.G.O.T. Are they taught anything of the Italian language? I understand that a large number of them are altogether ignorant of it. Are they taught Italian history, particularly that of the democratic movements that existed in Italy? Are they told anything about Garibaldi? I do not know; I hope they are. At one course which took place not long ago one of the students asked what should be their attitude to the organisation called Ovra? Were they to be friendly with Ovra, what were they to do? Considering that Ovra is comparable to the Gestapo it would be well if these men were given some knowledge of how to deal with it. I hope that they are getting that knowledge. The anxieties that I have had about A.M.G.O.T. are of no importance whatever but anxieties when voiced by the Russian Government are of considerable importance. The paper called "Moscow Review of War and Working Classes" stated that
    "The theory and practice of A.M.G.O.T. are liable to lead to apprehension among all who understand the political significance of the task of destroying Fascism in the liberated countries. The work of restoration is for the people themselves."
    We have been told that the Russians are to participate in the new Mediterranean conference or set-up that has been envisaged by the Prime Minister. Will the Russians be allowed to send officers to take part in the organisation of A.M.G.O.T.? Will Russian officers work side by side with our officers in A.M.G.O.T. in the occupied territories in the Mediterranean? Will they be part of the organisation? I hope they will. I would like to ask another question which is of some importance. A statement was made emanating I think from Quebec that A.M.G.O.T. rule only applied to ex-enemy territory. I understand that the teaching given to people who are going out to work for A.M.G.O.T. provides for instruction on how to run other territories such as France, Belgium and Holland. If in fact A.M.G.O.T. is only going to run ex-enemy territories is its teaching of how to run Allied territories to be continued?

    I pass to the other point I want to raise. It is one which has been raised by many other people before and it is a point of supreme importance in this Debate. It is the Prime Minister's statement about the British and American Governments' attitude towards the King of Italy and Badoglio. The Prime Minister gave us to understand that he was so concerned that the King of Italy and Badoglio should, I understand, be given some form of recognition, that he was willing to depart even from the principle which he himself has always encouraged us to follow, namely, the principle of unanimity in this House. He said:
    " We propose to do that, and we are not going to be put off that action by any fear that perhaps we should not have complete unanimity on the subject."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st September, 1943; col. 95, Vol. 392.]
    We all know the sorry story of Darlan. We were only saved from Darlan by the bravery of a very great man. That man suffered an ignominious death, and there may not be such another man to arise in Italy to save us from the King of Italy and Badoglio. After the treatment which was meted out to the man who saved us from Darlan it is hardly likely that another man will arise to do the same in Italy.

    Is the hon. Member justifying the doctrine of political assassination?

    I think it is very much better to kill the men responsible for the war than to kill innocent men, women and children who have been dragged into the war by them. If anybody assassinated Hitler to-morrow I should be surprised if the hon. Member who has just interrupted me did not show some signs of rejoicing.

    I regard assassination as such a detestable crime that I would regard the assassin of Hitler as a detestable person. If the hon. Member has a little time to spare, he might like to prosecute his inquiries into a little book called "Killing No Murder."

    I do not propose to pursue this interesting controversy any further except to say once again that it is worse to kill innocent victims of a war than to kill the men who started it. However, that is a matter of opinion, and the hon. Member is entitled to his. Some people are only too ready to recognise Badoglio and the King of Italy. I noticed that the hon. and gallant Member for North Newcastle. (Lieut.-Colonel Headlam) called the King of Italy "the greatest solid plank" on which Italy rested. I do not know if that is the view of the party opposite, but if the Tory party rests on planks like that it will come to grief. In the speech of the hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern), with much of which I was in very strong disagreement, there was one remark which did appeal to me. He said, "If Badoglio, why not Goering in Germany?" An eminent journalist once said to me, when I asked him what kind of a man Goering was," Oh he is the good swashbuckling type like Sir Francis Drake or Sir Walter Raleigh." That man is working for one of the leading Conservative newspapers, a paper which has a circulation about as large as that of the "Daily Herald" and which never at any time has claimed to have views other than Conservative. I want to know why it is the policy of this Government to encourage one after another in each country recognition of those people who have done their utmost to bring about war and attack democracy.? This policy if it is pursued cannot possibly do anything but harm. The Prime Minister made out that for the sake of the troops, in order to save lives, he was willing to buy certain people, Badoglio, the King of Italy, Darlan or anybody else. He made out that the people who did not agree with that kind of policy would sacrifice the lives of troops and that it was not for us to talk about sacrificing their lives. I agree that none of us has the right to send other people to their deaths unless we are willing to go ourselves, but those who are fighting in Italy to-day will agree with me when I say that it is time we realised that we can buy people and even victory at much too dear a price if, in buying them, we sacrifice the cause for which our men are giving their lives.

    The last speaker from this side of the House spoke of his intention of bringing the Debate back to the conduct of the war and seemed, I thought, to make a distinction between that topic and the topic of international relations. I find it difficult myself to believe that such a distinction is valid and the more I have listened to this Debate—and I have listened to nearly all of it—the more I have become convinced of a doctrine which may be unwelcome to the Government Front Bench and unwelcome to many of my own friends, namely, that we are overdue in this House for Debates upon foreign policy. I am a very bad historian; I am a professional historian and I think that makes one worse at it in some respects. If one is an amateur historian one knows the bits one knows, or one thinks one knows them, and they are at the top of one's head all the time, so that one is always able to pull them out readily. I am never quite sure of even such simple things as dates. But exactly too years ago—and I know this date because I saw it in "'The Times' 100 Years Ago" paragraph—Disraeli spoke in this House and was extremely cross with the Government Front Bench because of the long interval which, he said, had elapsed since there had been any full discussion of foreign policy. The length of the interval of which he complained was seven months. I do not really remember exactly what the world was like in 1843, and I have not had time to look it up, but I think it will be agreed that that was a generation after Waterloo and rather a long half-generation before the Crimea; so that compared with anything that my lifetime has seen, that may be called a time of settled peace. If in those times of comparative tranquillity Mr. Disraeli thought it a scandalous charge against the Government that they should have allowed seven months to elapse without instructing the country about foreign policy by Debates in this House, I ask hon. Members to think how long it is since we have debated foreign policy?

    I do not know, but it is a very long time, and I am more and more coming to the conclusion that disagreeable as it may be to the Government and to many of my own political friends and much as I should myself resent many of the things which would be said if there were frequent Debates on international relations, there ought to be more frequent Debates on international relations, and the participation in them should be much more widely shared than it is at present. Incidentally, not that I wish to make any complaint about the speech of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan)—his speeches are always doubly enjoyable; parts of them are generally amusing, and parts very solemn, and parts of them are both. To-day he was pretty well up to form but he was a little unjust to me when I ventured upon a timid interruption—hardly that, in fact not more than thinking aloud; but he insisted upon calling me to my feet and then rebuked me for incontinence. As one who inserts himself so frequently in our Debates, and generally at precisely the point at which I should have wished to enter, he really was rather like King Solomon recommending self-control to the Queen of Sheba's eunuch. I was saying that I think there should be much more frequent and much wider debating of foreign affairs. One reason is that it is very much too widely assumed in the House, and if the world judges our country by this House, as we should all wish the world to do, it must be beginning to be assumed in the world, that almost everyone in this country regards the war as a great opportunity for using force to impose upon the world those politics which we desired in the days when we used to say we would not again fight for our King and country. It may be true that that is what most of the people of this country think; I do not believe it, and I am quite certain it is not in the interests of this country or of Europe that that should be believed; at any rate there cannot really be any doubt about the undesirability of such an assumption. There is another assumption about whose undesirability as an assumption I think no doubt can be felt: that is, that on the whale Europe looks to this country for a push or a nudge at the convenient moment towards the Left: that may be true; again, I do not believe it is true. I do not believe it is true upon a consideration of antecedent probabilities and upon a consideration of what Europe thought and felt after each of the last great upheavals which it has suffered—after Waterloo, for instance, after the great dynastic and territorial wars of the mid 18th century, after the Thirty Years War, after the Hundred Years War, Europe after those times did not think that what was wanted, having had 30 years or whatever it might be of bloody war, was 30 years of bloody revolution. That is not how things happened, and on the balance of previous knowledge and antecedent probabilities, which hon. Members opposite may dismiss as mere prejudice, we should do well to question the assumption that what Europe is looking to this country for is a push or a nudge to the Left here and there, and a kick somewhere else, where there may be a recalcitrant country with its heart still on the Right. It may be true, but it is extremely foolish to assume it to be true; if you wish it to be acted upon as a fact, you must first demonstrate it.

    There is another reason for thinking so, the reason of what little we can know about what is happening in Europe now. This is one of those mysterious matters: the song that the sirens sang and the name that Achilles bore when he hid among the women—these things indeed are not beyond the possibilities of conjecture. I forget what it was which in that connection was beyond the possibility of conjecture; but one of the things which, strictly speaking, are beyond the possibility of conjecture is, what is happening inside people's heads in Europe at the moment; and therefore it is one of the main subjects which are most frequently expounded from the other side of the House, and hardly ever from this side. But lest one good custom should corrupt the world, I venture, from this side for once, to explain it to the House. Just before we broke up for the summer holiday I remember that one of the prin- cipal things recommended to us was that whatever we did we must not think of accepting any kind of help or co-operation from the Carabinieri: that would be too awful, it would bust the whole show. We have recently read the warmest encomiums of the Carabinieri from the people who have had to do the work and have been responsible for the soldiers' lives, and that emboldens me to think that my explanation of Europe may not be more obviously explosible immediately after than those explanations to which we have been accustomed: But of course it is very difficult to get very much evidence of what Europe thinks.

    I have always wished to make things easy for hon. Members opposite, especially for those whose particular pleasure is in not very articulate derision, so I will put it in the plainest and most blimpish terms: I conceive that what Europe wants of us is that we should play with a straight bat. [Interruption.] I am rather disappointed at those encouraging cheers from my hon. Friends; I had hoped to get cat calls from hon. Members opposite. Perhaps the wrong ones happen to be in at the moment. If I had had the cat calls, I should have proceeded as follows, and I now will. I should have recommended to those more intellectual members of the party opposite who generally instruct their trade union friends about foreign affairs to read the reports of the Trades Union Congress of the last three or four years. I do not know if they remember that very moving appeal in which the hon. Member for Motherwell (Mr. Walker) painted a picture of the horrors that would come to our country if we were defeated in war, our homes laid flat, our factories burned, our fields infertile, our children sold into slavery, and the swastika flying over the pavilion at Lords. Something like that, and anyway that was his climax. On a similar occasion later Mr. Wolstoncroft made the speech about the Prime Minister coming in when the wickets were falling fast; so that if the people of Europe are inclined to look to us for a straight bat, and have the sort of feeling about us that we are the chaps who do the traditional thing and play the game by the rules, it is not necessarily because the people of Europe are as blimpish as I am. It may be that that is because the people of Europe have the same opinion about our country as those two Presidents of the Trades Union Congress had. Anyone who looks at the papers of Europe will find this borne out. It is very difficult now to see many foreign newspapers, but I have one or two quotations which seem to me impressive. This is on 10th September, in the Swiss "National Zeitung":
    "England's prestige and credit in the world depend largely on her respect for accepted rules."
    They go on to say how this has been much enhanced by our treatment of Eire, and add:
    "It would be grotesque if it were from England that the neutrals were reproached for their support of the existing international law which contains the generally accepted rules of neutrality."
    That was apropos of the business of trying war criminals to which I will return in a minute. Then, on 8th September, a Turkish newspaper said:
    "If international law approves of asylum for war criminals and the Allies try to make the neutrals adopt an attitude contrary to international law, this is in contradiction of the principles for which the Allies are fighting. The Allied note put all friendly neutral countries in a difficult position."
    This is from a Portuguese newspaper on 12th September:
    "England entered this war only to fulfil a pledge. … Even so it might have been said that all was lost save honour. England's honour and trustworthiness will become vitally important when the war ends."
    There was a moment when the whole world thought we had lost all but honour, and it will be one of the great tragedies of history if when we have won everything we should not have won, or should not have appeared to have won honour as well. The best chance of anything like agreement and tranquillity in Europe that any of us can foresee is that all European States should look to this country as having a higher standard in respect to its pledged word and its continuing intentions than any other country in Europe.

    It may be late for me to put this to the House of Commons; I would have put it any time within the last three years if I had had the chance, but I have never had the chance before: I beg that there should be consideration of the wisdom of what is called the trial of war criminals. I beg the House to believe me that it is not from any tenderness for any war criminals that I take that line. Hon. Members who are old enough to remember and young enough riot to have forgotten the last war may remember that it was in the first months of the war and it was from the Left, from the "Daily News", the "Daily Chronicle" and the "New Statesman" that these inventions were made of "Hang the Kaiser", "Germany must be made to pay heavily", and "The war to end war". [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I have the dates and the whole thing docketed. There is not the least doubt that those slogans were invented at the beginning of the last war from the Left. What happened when the war was over? The same people who had swung fastest and furthest in that direction at the beginning of the war, were the people who after the war swung fastest and furthest the other way, and told us that these were mere inventions of the Tories and bond holders and all that curious medieval superstition which even contemporary Marxists have dropped—but the dropping has not yet reached Glasgow. These were the people who spent the 1920's and most of the 1930's in persuading the world that we were not ever going to fight for our country again, and so we had another war.

    I have one other thing to say. This is a thing which perhaps ought not to be said here; I am riot quite sure, but on the whole I think it ought to be said. We have had a fair amount of talk to-day and yesterday about our relations with Russia. If I thought international relations ought to be dictated by matters of personal likes and dislikes, which I am far from thinking, I should be as pro-Russian as any man; but if I thought, as I do think, that my country's affairs should be directed upon the basis that everything which is of vital interest to my country should be fought for, that nothing else should be fought for, that we should have no commitments for which we have not calculated the forces to defend, that among such forces are alliances that can be trusted with other powerful States—if that be the true basis of foreign policy, as I think it is, then no man in this House or anywhere else is more anxious than I am for cooperation with Russia. I have never been in the least bit anti-Russian from first to last. Let me draw the attention of the House to one or two things that have been said in the House. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said that we must not use the argument about saving British lives because the Russians do not like it. The hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. J. Dugdale) said that he and the Russians welcome Russian participation of A.M.G.O.T. in the Mediterranean. The hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) referred to our local Communists as the spokesmen of Russian desires. All these three things are possibly true, and I would add them up with this reflection. The first is that we have as much right to be interested in the Baltic as the Russians have in the Mediterranean. Another reflection I would make is this. The hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) had something to say about Russia and said that you cannot have co-operation without confidence. That is true; it is rather unfortunate that it is what the stranger in the Strand always says to you just after his pal drops the pearl necklace; but apart from that context, the generalisation is in the main acceptable. What is the difficulty about co-operation between this country and Russia. In my judgment there is no vital interest which clashes between the two. I do not believe that any intelligent Russian statesman need think that there is anything of vital interest to his country where this country cuts athwart him, and so from our end.

    That is not the difficulty. I think the greatest difficulty is if Debates in this House, articles in the Press, and other demonstrations give any considerable opinion in the world the impression that one of Russia's sources of strength is support for Russia's policy even against British policy on the part of any considerable section of British people. If any considerable number of people were persuaded to believe that nonsense, as sure as day follows night there would be the greatest possible difficulty in co-operation between this country and Russia.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn), who has just made a speech which has those rare qualities of being as illuminating as it was witty, wound up with some observations about Russia, and I propose towards the end of my remarks also to address myself to our relations with that country, because I think that on the eve of my departure on a mission where I meet' Russian representatives it is right that I should tell the House what is in my mind about those relations. My hon. Friend also said that he would like more foreign affairs Debates. I do not want to quarrel with that, but, of course, the question is, "What is a foreign affairs Debate?" The day before the House adjourned we had a Debate on the general course of the war in which he and the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. A. Bevan) both made speeches which were almost exclusively upon foreign affairs, and throughout to-day the speeches have been mainly or largely concerned with foreign affairs. The truth is that' in wartime military and foreign affairs are so intermingled that it is difficult to deal with the one without including the other. But if there is a feeling on the part of my hon. Friend or anybody else that there should be more, opportunity for these discussions I shall be only too happy to do what I can about it when the House comes back.

    I have one or two comments to make, and perhaps it will facilitate business if I deal with the Debate from the point since the Prime Minister sat down. A certain number of questions have been asked about the state of occupied Europe and the possibility of relief, and I propose to deal with them first. Then I should like to speak for a few minutes about the military position in Sicily and A.M.G.O.T. and deal with some questions about that. Then I wish to deal with our relations with Italy itself and the criticisms of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale and one or two others, and finally to make some observations on the work I have to do in Russia. If that programme commends itself to the House I will embark upon it by starting with the question of relief to occupied Europe.

    The right hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) said that he had received representations, as other hon. Members no doubt have received representations, about the state of nutrition among our friends in occupied Europe. He asked, without wishing to press it unduly, whether the Government have examined this matter and whether there was anything they could do to alleviate the suffering in the coming winter. The Government have looked into the matter and tried to see whether we could not send some small measures of relief to try to allay this suffering to some extent, if only in some countries, but I frankly tell the House that the truth is that when you embark on anything of this kind, you cannot find the point at which you can stop. If you start to supply one country you are certain of a similar demand from other countries who are suffering and who say their conditions are the same or worse. Once you start with one category, you are certain to be pressed to go on to another category, and before you know where you are your whole system of blockade crumbles. We should find ourselves charged with burdens we simply could not carry if we are to continue our military operations for the freeing of occupied Europe. We should find ourselves relieving the Germans of what is their obligation as the Power in occupation of those territories. I should like the House to believe that this matter has been looked at by the War Cabinet many times. We have tried to find schemes if they could be found. Reluctantly we have come to the conclusion that the only thing that can be done is to speed the final victory, freeing them in that way instead of giving little bits of help here and there which would not be of real assistance unless they were a help to the enemy as well.

    I come to the military situation and in particular to the work which has been done by the Allied Military Government in Sicily. As I listened to this Debate I thought some hon. Members did not seem to have a very clear picture of what this organisation is and what its officers have to do. Their charge in the first instance is not in the main a political one but a practical one. They come into cities utterly devastated, cities which have been subjected to aerial bombardment, which are probably without either light or water, with the dead lying about the streets and without food, probably, even for the next day. Their task is to try to restore something in the nature of normal life to those cities, to try to get transport going again—and when two armies have passed through a town there is not very much transport left—to try to get food in from neighbouring countries, to try to prevent the outbreak of epidemics of typhus and other diseases. It is an immensely difficult task of organisation. Those have been the main tasks upon which this military government has concentrated. I have watched its work with great care. I have had sent to me at the Foreign Office the reports of the work of this organisation, and I can tell the House that they have done very fine work there.

    Now I come to one of the criticisms that have been made. First it is said that we have created this organisation to maintain Fascist officials in office. That is not so. Let me give Sicily as an example, and here let me say that in Sicily Fascism has never been a really popular creed. Fascism has been imported into Sicily; most of the senior officials in Sicily were imports from the North. Its senior officials have almost without exception been removed from the moment of our possession of the territory. Sicily is divided into nine areas, what the French would call prefectures, under prefects. All of these were under Fascists, all of whom have been got rid of. They either fled or were removed after we arrived—most of them fled. In more than 50 per cent. of them the local mayors, the podesti, have also been changed from the moment of our arrival; the organisation has done what it could to choose a mayor who had a certain amount of popular backing and who was generally acceptable—not of course by the process of holding an election, but by a sounding of the population —to take the place of the Fascist official. A number of Fascists have, of course, been arrested. I have not the exact figures, but the latest report is that about 1,000 prominent Fascists in Sicily remained behind and are at present interned.

    I come to another criticism, that of those who have asked, Why use the Carabinieri? The House knows that they are not an organisation of exclusively Fascist traditions. On the contrary, they existed in Italy a very long time before the Fascist régime. The bad organisation, the organisation which we may call sinister in its influence, that corresponds to the Gestapo is Ovra, the secret police that Mussolini and the Fascists used to employ. That organisation has been completely broken up and destroyed in Italy, and the Fascist Party organisation with it, and all the members of Ovra and all the Fascist political officials in Sicily have been arrested, though many of them fled before they could be arrested. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we had not used the Carabinieri. What should we have had to do? We should have had to employ at least 10,000 British troops to do their job—not so well—and that would have taken men from the fighting forces. We discussed all this before we went into Sicily and I am absolutely certain that our system is right.

    I come to the next criticism—Why do you put a ban on political activities? That is a perfectly fair question. It would have been very much more popular, I have no doubt, with many in Sicily if from the moment of our landing and before the island was clear we had had a bit of "free for all" political strife of the kind we enjoy in this country. We just felt that we could not enjoy that luxury at this stage. I am coming to the time-table in a moment. Many hon. Members probably know Sicily much better than I do. If they do, they know that it is an island of intensely active rival political factions. Perhaps the strongest party of all in Sicily is the party that stands for separation from the Italian mainland altogether. Then there is the clerical party and there is the party of the extreme Left, all in violent divergence. [Interruption.] I think I am talking sense. These matters have been studied with some little care.

    Would the right hon. Gentleman allow me to say this? It is agreed, I think, among Italians that there is no separatist movement in Sicily. There is a desire for regional freedom but no desire for separation, and I am afraid that if the right hon. Gentleman says that the strongest party in Sicily is the separatist party, it will encourage the idea that Great Britain intends to annex the island.

    My hon. Friend should not dive too deep in attributing motives to everything that is said. We have not the least intention of annexing the island, nor should we, at any time. The report I have from our officers on the spot is that the Sicily independence movement is extremely strong. There is nothing in the least new in that. Really, the hon. Gentleman is not the only person who knows something about this matter. It is a perfectly well-known movement. What shade of independence it requires, whether it be a form of home rule, as the agitation used to be here, or for complete separation, is another matter; but there is a movement—if you like to call it a home rule movement you can, but it is a matter of common knowledge—for separa- tion. I do not want to take up time on this point, which does not affect my argument, which is simply that there are these parties in Sicily, violently antagonistic. Some want one thing and some want another. My hon. Friend may think I have described the position wrongly, but I am sure that he will not disagree with my statement that these parties disagree with one another with very great vehemence. In the existing military situation, and while we were using this island for the preparation of the advance upon Naples, it was impossible to allow free rein to these various political parties. The hon. Gentleman can well ask—[An HON. MEMBER: "Is there freedom of political discussion?"] Of course there is. These regulations are not at all tightly applied. There is a great deal of political discussion. There is freedom of the Press to say what they like about each other, and even about A.M.G.O.T. I am informed, that after 20 years of Fascist rule, the Press are not in the least happy at being told that they can say what they like. They have been so used to having a directive that they do not quite like it when they do not get it. [Interruption.] It is so. After 20 years of not being allowed to express your opinions and of having to say exactly what the Government tell you, a week after you are released you are liable to be a bit puzzled. I have no doubt that they will very soon discover it and that we shall very soon have criticisms of the work we are doing, just as we have it in this House.

    I want to deal with one other point of this kind. It has been said that the exchange rate was very unfairly fixed by this organisation. In fairness to the organisation and to the officers concerned, I wish to make it quite plain that they had no responsibility in this matter. The fixing of the rate was done on the responsibility of the two Governments principally concerned and not by this organisation. Whether the decision was right or wrong, it was not the fault of that organisation. Let me deal with the point whether the organisation shall continue. It is not, of course, intended to be permanent. It is bound up with the future of Italy herself, about which I am going to say something in a moment. We do not want to have these burdens of administration on our hands. The sooner we can find an Italian administration that can take these burdens off our hands the better we shall be pleased. We do not want to re-enter Italy, or even Europe, on the basis that we are going to be the people who will administer and run the countries. We want, as soon as we can, that the people shall run the country for themselves.

    On the lines that they wish to. Now I come to the cognate question about which I have been asked, and I am obliged to the hon. Member who raised this matter. What is our policy in respect of friendly countries? There we do not propose to apply the same principles, of course; we have never intended to do so. We have already entered into conversations with the various Governments concerned.

    It being the hour appointed for the interruption of Business, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question, put:

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Mr. James Stuart.]

    It is our intention from the earliest possible moment after the landing when the military position allows that the administration shall be turned over to the friendly Government, the liberated Government with whom we are in relation, or to some authority representing that country. That applies to all of them, and we are in discussion as to how to do it. Even at the very beginning, when the Commander in Chief must have full powers, when the battle is in progress, we want to use native officials of the friendly liberated countries and not apply a system of military government as we have done in Sicily. This matter is being cleared up. It is one of the subjects we shall discuss when we have the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries so that the matter may be cleared beyond any shadow of doubt.

    Certainly, at the earliest moment, though it is more complicated in the case of France, as the hon. Member will realise. The French people shall express their own view, but we shall do what we can to use French officials and French people.

    Of course we shall. We are in relation with the Committee, it is they who have sent the troops to Ajaccio, where they are fighting. It is an instance of what is going to happen. It is an experiment. We shall see how it works. I should like to offer my congratulations to the hon. and gallant Member for Aston (Commander Prior) for the very remarkable account he gave of his experiences in occupied Europe.

    Having dealt with that, I want to come to the criticism we have had, and in particular to the speeches of the hon. Members for Ebbw Vale and Nelson and Come (Mr. Silverman). Both appeared to suggest that the policy the Government were now pursuing was one upon which we were not even as a Government united. I should like to tell the House that every phase of these negotiations in these complicated weeks has been decided in the Cabinet with complete unanimity. There is no question at all, so far as I can recollect, at any time of any serious difference between us as to how to handle these things. When the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne talks about our being near final victory, I think, if I may say so, he is quite wrong. [interruption.] The expression the hon. Member used, if I remember aright, was that we are at the threshold of victory.

    I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not wish to misinterpret me. I said that the impression we had all derived from the Prime Minister's speech was that, however short or long the fight may be, Hitler had lost the war.

    I am sorry: I maintain that the impression which the hon. Gentleman gave me is such as I have described to the House. However that may be, I do not accept it as the position that we are on the threshold of victory. There is still a long, hard struggle. I am astonished that the hon. Gentleman should suggest to his hon. Friends on those benches that co-operation with the National Government should cease. It would be impertinent for me to suggest what the Labour party should do or should not do, but I do say that we have ahead of us in these next months as difficult and exacting a period as we have ever known. If there was any reason to form a National Government in 1940, there is as strong a reason to hold that Government together to-day.

    Let me deal with actual criticisms which have been made. We were told by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale that our military plans had been inelastic, and that we ought to have been able to speed them up more. In particular, he said to me, "Have you any information at the Foreign Office "—pointing his finger extremely threateningly—" and if you have any information, what do you do with that information?" I began to be extremely uncomfortable, because I had not the least idea what was worrying him. Of course we had information day by day. All the information which comes in to the Foreign Office is given to the military authorities for their help and guidance. In addition, there is in constant session a Committee, composed of staff officers of all three Services and presided over by an extremely efficient official of the Foreign Office. The Committee receive information and coordinate it, and on the basis of it they give us advice and appreciations as to conditions in enemy countries and other such matters. I submit that our information on these matters has been extremely accurate, as is shown by what happened. Suppose we had misjudged the state of Italian resistance when we attacked Sicily. It all looks quite easy and simple now, but one of the matters which was long debated by us in the Foreign Office and was difficult to weigh, was this. We knew how the Italians had fought in North Africa, but who could be sure that when an enemy landed on their own territory, whatever their own feelings, they would not turn and fight? All that had to be weighed and taken into estimation.

    Does the hon. Member not understand that if the Italians had fought hard in Sicily—

    I say that we had the information, and we had to judge it; and we judged it right. We judged that the Italians would not fight, and our judgment was right. It was not an easy judg- ment to make. It is quite different now. I myself had grave doubts whether the Italians, unwarlike as they are, would not fight when we approached their own country.

    Perhaps I may be allowed to answer the next criticism by the hon. Member. In connection with the attack on Salerno, he said, "Could you not appreciate what the position of the Italians was?" Of course we appreciated it. We knew, owing to the state of our Armistice negotiations, that it was possible to advance that date, possible to take that risk. The danger at Salerno at a later phase was not the Italians, but the Germans. The German forces were there, and remain there, and we had to be in a position to land with a sufficient force to be able to defeat the German forces on our landing.

    The right hon. Gentleman refers to Salerno. My argument was addressed to the fact that Mussolini was overthrown on 25th July and that the Prime Minister's letter to General Alexander was dated 18th August. I mentioned that after that General Alexander had advanced his date by one week. Why was it not possible for the Prime Minister to have adapted himself to the situation which had been revealed by 25th July? Why the delay?

    There was no delay. The problem was to muster a sufficient force in Sicily to deal with the Germans at Salerno. That was the problem at that stage, to deal with the Germans who were there. We could, of course, have gone at an earlier date but had we gone at an earlier date we should have gone at a greater risk, and, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, the risk was as fine-run as it could be.

    I have another criticism with which to deal. The hon. Member said some very taunting things about the attitude of the Government, particularly in respect of the bombing of Northern Italy. One of the accusations made was, Why, when you had begun your armistice negotiations and when there was any chance of Italy surrendering, did you go on bombing northern cities? And the suggestion was, as far as I understand it, one of pure political prejudice. What is the position? The hon. Gentleman's facts are all wrong. He shakes his head. I will give him the dates. I wish this to be cleared up. The first Italian Envoy arrived in Madrid on 15th August. We first received a telegram about it on 16th August. He arrived in Lisbon on 17th August. Our negotiations began on 18th and 19th August. The 18th and 19th August were the days on which negotiations began—the first day that we knew there were people who at any rate had some credentials to negotiate with us.

    The last occasion on which we bombed Milan was the night of the 15–16th and the last occasion we bombed Turin was the night of the 16–17th. In other words, from the very first moment that we knew there was, at least a chance, that there would be an armistice we laid off that bombing. I want to explain this to the House because I have been in this business and the hon. Gentleman has not. We discussed these matters round the Cabinet table. We applied our minds to what was the earliest moment we could stop. Does he think that I, or anyone of us, likes dropping bombs on towns any where?

    I have given the dates. Let the House judge. I want to turn to our policy towards Italy and towards the new Italian Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) asked me a question which I would like to answer because I think it would meet many of the anxieties hon. Members have at this time. He asked me, Did we understand the necessity for full and frank co-operation—I think I got it down right—with all the democratic organisations in Italy, or, I would add, outside it? What sort of Government do we want to see in Italy? The kind of Government we want to see is one as broadly based as possible and including all parties that are anti-Fascist in character. We shall do our best to bring that about bit by bit. Count Sforza's name was mentioned—and he might be one—and anyone who will help in that work or assist us in the battle with Hitler, will be welcome. Harsh words have been said about Marshal Badoglio and the King and so on. The delivery of the Fleet—and I think this must be said in fairness—was honestly, and even courageously, carried out. There are boats and ships coming from the Italian Navy, and merchant ships, not only to ports in the Mediterranean but all over the world in the last few hours. At this moment in Corsica, French troops and Italians are fighting together, and successfully, against the Germans.

    Before I close, if the House will bear with me, I want to turn to a rather different note, less controversial perhaps. I want to say something about Russia and our policy with Russia. I have listened to this Debate and I have heard many speeches on the subject of Russia. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield and some others have urged upon us that we should seek the closest collaboration with the Soviet Government. I agree absolutely and entirely. That is our policy and we shall persist in it, in the letter of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty which we signed last year. But when the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher)—I am sorry he is not here—said that there can be no co-operation if it is not based on confidence, I agree but I must remind him and the House that confidence cannot be created by one side alone. Each side has to make its contribution.

    I have surveyed as honestly and as impartially as I can the work which we have sought to do with the Soviet Government since the Treaty was signed last year and I can fairly say that we do not feel that we have anything to reproach ourselves with in our efforts to give effect to that Treaty. We have constant consultation and, if there has not been as much personal exchange between the leading persons of the two Governments as we would have liked, it is fair to say that we have made more than our share of efforts to travel to meet our Allies. That applies to all our Allies. It is in that spirit that we shall approach our problems in the future. If we are to understand one another, we must be frank with one another. There has been too much past history of misundertsanding, and, let it be admitted, too much suspicion, of pretending that differences of interpretation do not exist if they, in fact, do exist.

    Sometimes my Russian friends say to me that we do not understand their point of view. On those occasions they express themselves clearly, even forcibly. I make no complaint about that, but there are occasions, also, when we feel that they do not understand our point of view, and I believe it to be in the ultimate interests of our good relations that we should speak about it on these occasions. I am going to give the House an example of what I mean. An article appeared in a Soviet paper, which has been already mentioned, called "War and the Working Class," as recently as 19th September last. It dealt with the Trades Union Congress meeting and it should be said that these publications do not appear in Soviet Russia if they run strongly counter to the views of the Government. That article I want to quote from because I think it right and fair that these things should be said here in public. This is what was said:
    "Even in the first stage of the present world war, in 1939 and 1940, before the character of the war was definitely established, wide masses of English workmen maintained a more or less critical waiting attitude towards the war and defended in the factories only their immediate interests. But after Hitler had extended his ruffianly aggression to the U.S.S.R., and the Anglo-Soviet military alliance had been concluded, English workmen began to support the English war effort, placing in the foreground the interests of the war against Fascist Germany and its accomplices."
    When I read that, there came to my mind the very familiar story of the Duke of Wellington, how somebody came up to him in Birdcage Walk one day, took off his hat and said, "Mr. Smith I believe?" to which the Duke turned round and said, "Sir, if you believe that you will believe anything." Those were my sentiments when I read that article. It does not represent or understand the spirit there was in this country at the time of the Battle of Britain and in 1940 and it is fair and right that I should say so in this British House of Commons. It does not capture anything of the spirit there was in this country. It was only true of that small section of this country represented by the Communist Party. There can be no bigger mistake than to try to give that, the importance it does not deserve. I have always believed, and believed intensely, indeed, in the closest and intimate relations between this country and Russia. I believe them to be essential to the defeat of the enemy and essential to a lasting peace when this struggle is over. It is in that spirit that I want to make these concluding observations.

    We shall have our differing points of view, but, broadly, the interests of this country, of the British Commonwealth, of the United States, of the U.S.S.R. and of China are the same, for the reason that my hon. Friend gave earlier in his speech, because, broadly, our interests do not clash and all our interests are in peace. We want to build up a peace system which will endure, a peace system backed by the necessary authority to prevent a recurrence of these scourging wars from which we stiffer. In a very few weeks now I shall, I hope, be going to meet my opposite numbers. I shall go with a determination to do everything I can to reach a generous measure of understanding of all the problems that confront us, so that we can prepare the way for a greater event—the meeting of President Stalin, President Roosevelt and our own Prime Minister. If we approach the meeting in that spirt of understanding for each other's point of view and with the candour which I have used to-day, I believe we shall thus best prepare for a final understanding. Now and again it happens that, as the pages of history unfold, there come opportunities in man's progress through the world. I believe that in the next few months there is such an opportunity for us, for Russia and for the United States to reach a lasting under- standing. If we can do that, even the horrors of this war will not have been in vain. It is to that work that we have to set our hand.

    May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to explain this? According to the statement that I made, the last bombing of Milan was on 13th August. The right hon. Gentleman has made the situation much worse by saying that the last bombing was on 15th and 16th August. According to the Prime Minister's statement yesterday, the envoy was met on the 15th. Does the right hon. Gentleman adhere to the statement that we bombed Milan on 15th and 16th August, when the envoy was met on the 15th, despite the fact that, by the Prime Minister's own statement, unofficial representations had already been made for weeks before? In order that there may be no misunderstanding, can we have the dates right?

    There is no misunderstanding at all. The envoy arrived in Madrid on the 15th. We received a telegram from the Ambassador on the 16th. The first meeting at which his credentials could be checked, and were checked, was in Lisbon on the 18th if I remember rightly. From the very moment that we were convinced that there was a chance of negotiations which would lead to an Armistice, we called off the bombing of the north of Italy.

    Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.