(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if His Majesty's Government will make the offer of a gift of a Speaker's chair and a mace to the Parliament of Ceylon, as a token of the goodwill of this House and of the British people to the Parliament and people of Ceylon on the attainment of full self-government.

Yes, Sir. His Majesty's Government have decided to offer the gift of a motor car to the Government of Ceylon, for the use of their Prime Minister. They have also authorised me to propose to you, Sir, that you should, on behalf of this House, offer to the Parliament of Ceylon the gift of a chair for their Speaker, and of a mace, with our warm congratulations on their attainment of fully responsible self-government, and with our best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of their people.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the pleasure which this graceful gesture will give to the people not only of this country but of the whole Empire? May I further ask whether it will be possible for you, Mr. Speaker, as Speaker of this House, to make that gift in person to the people of Ceylon, and would it be possible for the Speaker's Chair to be made from the oak of Westminster Hall or the "Victory"?

I hope, Mr. Speaker, that you can accede to the request made to you on behalf of the House. I am perfectly sure that this would be welcomed not only by the whole House but by everyone throughout the Empire.

I am afraid that I cannot answer the question put by the hon. Member for Hornsey (Mr. Gammans) but only that put to me by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Naturally, I will gladly make this offer on behalf of the House of Commons. I assume of course that I shall have the warm approval of hon. Members on all sides of the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] It will be necessary to put the matter in regular form and for a Resolution to be passed, as we did in the case of the Caen books, when we reassemble after the Christmas Recess.

I am glad to be able to inform the House that negotiations for the purchase of wheat by the United Kingdom Government from the Australian Government have been successfully completed. The contract is for one year and covers 80 million bushels of wheat. If the total quantity of wheat from the 1947–48 harvest received by the Australian Wheat Board reaches 210 million bushels a further five million bushels, making 85 million bushels in all, will be sold to the United Kingdom. The price is 17s. (Australian currency) per bushel f.o.b. Australian ports. If Australia and the United Kingdom become parties to an International Wheat Agreement, the price of any wheat not yet shipped at that date at which such an Agreement comes into force will be adjusted to conform to the prices prescribed in the Agreement.

I must explain to the House that nothing like the whole of this 80 million bushels will be available for the United Kingdom. Nearly half has been purchased for delivery to the Colonies and other areas for the wheat supplies of which the United Kingdom is at present responsible. Nor will it be possible to ship to the United Kingdom in this crop year more than a comparatively small proportion of that part of the total amount which will eventually reach this country. It is true that a few cargoes have already left Australia but substantial quantities will not be available for shipment until the new year and cannot therefore arrive in this country until next March. Only a comparatively small proportion of the total purchase of 80 million bushels will therefore be available in the United Kingdom in this crop year.

Nevertheless, if the wheat can be delivered to our ships in Australian ports in regular and substantial quantities it will ease those serious anxieties for our bread supply which we have each year experienced in the late Spring. But it cannot do more than this. It should enable us, however, to avoid making any requests for wheat from the United States in this crop year. This has the advantage to us of saving dollars. Moreover it enables us to take the whole British requirement of wheat off the hands of the United States Government which, we realise, is making intense efforts to feed Western Europe and other areas which may be in great need in the remainder of this crop year. His Majesty's Government therefore most warmly welcomes the re-appearance of supplies of Australian wheat in the United Kingdom market after some years of unavoidable interruption.

May I very warmly congratulate the Minister on the success of these negotiations, and ask him on behalf of this House, and indeed of the whole Kingdom, to convey to the Australian Government and the Australian people our deep sense of gratitude for the continued help they are giving us?

Arising out of that very satisfactory statement, will my right hon. Friend consult the Prime Minister in order that he, at this time of the year in particular, shall send a message on behalf of the British people thanking New Zealand, Australia, Canada and South Africa and the whole Commonwealth for the way they have so generously responded to the needs of the old country?

I am sure that will be the sentiment of the whole House, but the Prime Minister has already communicated with both the Australian and Canadian Governments on recent contracts and arrangements, and I am sure he has the same feelings with regard to the New Zealand Government.

Will my right hon. Friend then consult the Prime Minister with a view to considering that at this stage a similar message should be sent to the whole of the Commonwealth?

We will certainly consider that.

I would say at the outset of my remarks that I raise this matter in no party spirit, nor merely for the sake of criticising the Government or the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence. Nor am I raising it because I have changed my mind with regard to the general principle of National Service. I am raising this matter because it is my sincere belief that the existing National Service scheme, if proceeded with, will in 1949 and the years that follow result in a great expenditure of manpower without any appreciable return in terms of increased effectiveness of the Armed Forces, or in terms of increased safety of the Realm. That being my belief, I make no apology for raising so vital a question at this time on the Adjournment of the House, when there is little or no opportunity for a prolonged discussion. My excuse for that is that if it were not raised now, there would be no further opportunity for discussing this matter until we are faced with a Defence White Paper and the three Service Estimates.

The House will recall that when the National Service Bill was first brought in, the period of call-up was 1½ years followed by 5½ years' part-time service. That was altered to one year's call-up and six years' part-time service. There will be no useful purpose served by my going into the reasons for that, alteration now, but I would say in passing that it was done very quickly and without opportunities for full consultation, certainly with either the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. As so often happens when rapid decisions are arrived at without due consideration, the full import of those steps was not apparent until a much later date, and it is only recently that the full import of this sudden alteration has become apparent.

I would like to tell the House the situation today as I see it from the data available to me. To take the Royal Navy first, this highly technical arm has come to the conclusion that the time available, one year, is insufficient in which to train a man properly for that Service. Therefore, the Royal Navy has, I understand, accepted the principle that they will attempt to recruit by voluntary enlistment all their men and that they will, if possible, do away entirely with any use of the National Service scheme as it exists at present. It is true that some 5,000 men may be absorbed by the Marines, but otherwise it is the intention of the Royal Navy to have none of it. I turn now to the Royal Air Force, another highly technical arm. They, again, consider the period insufficient, but their recruitment on form will probably not be adequate to cover their entire needs, as will probably be the case for the Royal Navy. If one takes what seems to be the likely target of Regular recruitment, it seems probable that the Royal Air Force will absorb some 30,000 or 40,000 men per year.

It thus becomes apparent that of a total estimated intake of 200,000 men a year, which is the figure of the Ministry of Labour, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force between them will absorb some 35,000 to 40,000 men a year, maybe more or maybe less; so let us say 50,000 men a year as a round figure. It immediately becomes apparent that if the existing National Service scheme is justified, it is not justified because of the assistance which it gives either to the Royal Navy or to the Royal Air Force. Therefore, I submit to the House that its justification must come from the assistance it gives to the Army, and I propose in some greater detail to consider its implications for the Army. Again, taking the figures available to me of the general trend of recruiting, on the assumption that by 1949 the strength of the Regular Army should be somewhere round about 200,000 men if the rate of recruiting is maintained—it may be a bit more, it may be a bit less, but I suggest that is a fair working figure to take—I would ask the House to consider the tasks of those 200,000 men in 1949 and the succeeding years.

They will have to train an annual intake of 150,000 National Service men. In addition they will eventually have to provide a small cadre for the training of six intakes of those men during their part-time service. In conjunction with the National Service men in the latter period of their call-up, they will have to fulfil all our policing commitments overseas. They will also have to carry out their own formation and unit training in order to be an efficient and well-prepared Force. It is my absolute contention—and I believe in this I shall be backed up by anyone with experience in this matter, even in the Ministries—that the Army cannot carry out all those commitments thoroughly. Something has to be done sketchily. It is unthinkable that they would purposely do sketchily the training of these National Service men, although I am doubtful, even if they concentrate on them, that the job can be done thoroughly and efficiently. I am quite certain that inevitably it will result in the Regular Army being an ill-prepared and inefficient weapon in comparison with any previous Regular Army.

It may be said, "Very well, let us reject a Regular Army because, in return, we shall get an extremely efficient Territorial Army"—indeed, that is the main claim of the National Service scheme now adopted in this country. Let us then, examine this National Service Army. When the right hon. Gentleman brought in the National Service Bill, he advanced certain reasons for it, and I think the one on which he placed most importance was that it would enable us to have a well-prepared reserve ready for rapid mobilisation. These men will have had one year's service, a great deal of which will be spent on policing duties. They will belong to an Army which is becoming increasingly technical, and where the technique changes extremely rapidly and, during their part-time service, they will have only 10 days a year training.

It is my contention that men who have been trained like that, with modern technique changing so rapidly, will not be capable of really rapid mobilisation. Furthermore, let us consider the size of this Force. If we have 150,000 men a year, at the end of the six-year period there will he 900,000 men. I appreciate that some of them will be in reserved occupations, but comparatively few, for they are young in age. Some will be casualties and not available but, taking a modest estimate, there should be some 700,000 or 800,000 men. I cannot believe that in the future war, if it should ever come, with the immense threat of attack on this country of atomic and bacterial warfare, there will be a chance, with its immense movement and equipping problem, to mobilise that immense number of men, nor do I believe they will be required.

It seems to me that this vast number of men in every way exceeds the practical kind of army which will be required under the circumstances. If the right hon. Gentleman really considers that immense number of men is needed, deserved or justified, I say that he is preparing for the next war not in terms of the last, but of the last but one. Hon. Members may well say "That is what you say, but it cannot be so bad as that, because there are experts in the Ministries who know far more than you do, and they would not allow a state of affairs like that to continue." I say to hon. Members on both sides of the House that they are not free agents, and they have been confronted with a situation which was not foreseen when the National Service Act was passed. There is nothing for them to do but to try to alter and ameliorate the impact of the scheme on the three Services, especially the Army. It is as though with a faulty foundation those building the structure were trying to curve the walls in order to make the eventual structure straight. There is only one way out of the impasse. That is to scrap the scheme, think the whole matter out de novo, and get a scheme which fits the needs of the country and the requirements of the Services.

The right hon. Gentleman might ask what can be done, as hon. Members on the other side of the House so often ask what we would do if we were in their places. In order to make my speech not entirely unconstructive, I say that the war of the future as I see it will make three demands. The first demand will be for the three Services to be highly trained, technically up-to-date, capable of rapid mobilisation and having very considerable striking power. Secondly, the speed at which modern invention and modern technology act makes it impossible with only one year and 10 days a year afterwards for six years, to keep a man really up-to-date. Unless we increase the period of National Service all we can realistically aim at is to give the man that basic training common to any man who becomes a good soldier, sailor, or airman. Thirdly, I believe the latent threat in any future war which is most powerful and most to be dreaded is the threat to industry, the civil population and transportation within this country. That demands a Civil Defence organisation far transcending numerically and in skill any organisation which we had even at the worst time of the "blitz."

The right hon. Gentleman may prove me wrong, but in my opinion the right course is now to provide for three Services composed of highly trained specialists and long-term volunteers. If there is any shortage through recruiting, I believe that the money spent in making conditions in the Services sufficiently attractive will be far cheaper than the money spent on the existing scheme, and it would create an immense economy in manpower. I am not certain that I would at present entirely jettison National Service, but I would perhaps call on every man for a short period of, say, six months, or less, in which he would be given the fundamental training common to all three Services, with instructors called from all three Services. That training would be drill, discipline, physical fitness and a certain amount of education. In addition to that, I would give him a thorough grounding in Civil Defence duties. At the end of that period we would have a man who, if he remained in a reserved occupation, or was called up in any Service, would have some useful grounding for his job in war. There are, I know, all sorts of difficulties, including that of policing Germany, which I have not time to go into now. But I believe they would be overcome.

I am not claiming that my ideas are right, but that the present idea is utterly and completely wrong, and that this state of affairs was quite unforeseen at the time the Act was passed. The right hon. Gentleman has one duty which is absolute both to the country and to the economy of its manpower. That is to re-examine the whole matter. There is time, as the Act will not come into effect until 1949. I implore the right hon. Gentleman to put the staffs on the task, not of palliating the present viciousness of this scheme by little alterations, but of examining the whole matter again. If he does that, he will have wiped out many of his past mistakes. But, if he does not, it will be my belief that this scheme is retained not for the vital purpose of saving manpower, but for the far less vital purpose of saving face.

I wish to support my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) in appealing to the Minister of Defence to look again at this situation in the light of the thought he has been able to give to it since the passing of the National Service Act, and also in the light of conversations and discussions he must have had with the Service Chiefs since that time.

In reply to a Question I recently put to the Secretary of State for Air I was informed that on 1st March, 1948, the target for the Royal Air Force was 263,000, of which 50 per cent. would be National Service men. Fifty per cent. is a very large proportion when we consider that of the remaining number of Regulars we must probably have more than half in the training machine, in order to train the National Service men, and to cope with the administrative difficulties in receiving and passing them through the machine. That will mean that far too few Regulars will be preparing themselves for the operational tasks of the Air Force in the case of sudden emergency. The Regulars engaged in training these National Service men will get very much out of touch with operational duties in the Royal Air Force.

I do not suggest that the solution of that difficulty is to increase the size of the Royal Air Force. Such a suggestion at this time would be quite wrong. But the only way to overcome that difficulty is to reduce the number of National Service men to be trained by the available number of Regulars. That can only be done by increasing their length of service from one year to 18 months. I know that is all past history, as the Bill has now become law, but surely it is not too late to go into the matter again? If we can reach the same total number with a third less conscripts to train, we will have a very much more efficient fighting Service. It is quite impossible to train a pilot in one year. He may be taught to take up an aeroplane and bring it down again and the rudimentary aspects of navigation, but when he leaves he has to keep his hand in as a Reservist, which he cannot possibly do under the present arrangements of the Act. Much the best way of doing it is to increase the size of the Auxiliary Air Force. There he is given a far greater opportunity in his own locality to carry on training which he started as a Regular.

This conscription is killing the Auxiliary Air Force. Already the Auxiliary Air Force has dwindled to fantastically small numbers. There are not even enough officers and nothing like enough airmen. There appear to be insuperable difficulties in recruitment as long as young men are waiting to be called up to do their Regular service and then to be passed on to do their ten days a year service for six years. If fewer were called up each year, by the extension of the period of service, I believe that more would go into the Auxiliary Forces, either while they were waiting or when they came out. In that way, they would be kept at a much higher pitch of training than they can possibly be under the new arrangements. I ask the Minister of Defence once more not to close his mind to this suggestion, but to have another look at it, and to let the House know whether there is any chance of the present arrangements being reconsidered.

On a point of Order. May I draw attention to the fact that in this important Debate, affecting all three Services, there is no representative of the Admiralty present?

We all recognise that the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) is particularly well informed on this matter. With the analysis that he has given this morning, I find myself very largely in agreement, though I am certainly not persuaded that, because of the situation which he has analysed, we can make up our minds at this date to depart from the National Service scheme. I think he has evaded the issue which we had to face when the National Service Act was brought forward in this House this year. A majority of Members of this House were then persuaded that if we are to maintain a policy of full employment, and so long as we have a severe manpower shortage in industry, we just shall not get the volunteers so as to be able to maintain our Forces on a voluntary basis. I believe that, at any rate during the next few years, as long as we have got full employment in industry and as long as this manpower shortage exists—and it will probably become more rather than less severe—that is still the position, and that is why we cannot depart from the National Service scheme, scrap it and go back to the voluntary basis from 1949 onwards.

I wish, first, very briefly to say one or two things about why this situation arises. I agree as to the situation which the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton explained. Why are we faced with this situation, and what is to happen during the next 12 months? I am particularly concerned about that, and I desire to put one or two questions to the Minister of Defence. A situation like this arises, firstly, because the Forces, since the war, have had to maintain commitments on a semi-wartime basis and while they were, and still are, doing so, they have been compelled to run down their strength. The Government have planned, or have attempted to maintain, Forces that are too large and economically insupportable. Therefore, on a number of occasions they have been compelled to speed up the process of demobilisation. That can be seen by referring to the Defence White Paper which we had this year, and to the figure to which the Government are now to reduce the Forces by 31st March, 1948. At the same time, the Government first planned too long a period of service for the call-up, and, quite rightly, in the Act that was passed this year, reduced the period to 12 months from 1949 onwards. I do not believe that the nation could afford more than that, and I believe that the Government were right to take that decision.

Inevitably, however, because of the size of the commitments that are still being maintained, and because the Forces are administratively overburdened—they are still bogged down with administrative tasks in connection with masses of surplus stores and all sorts of other questions of that kind—and because of this reduction in the period of service, the Forces are becoming more and more unbalanced in the ratio of trained to untrained men. The Government have now been compelled to reach another compromise for 1948, namely, the postponement of the call-up by three months, introducing a further complication of the situation. It is upon that particular point that I wish to address a question to the Minister of Defence, because I hope that we shall get this situation quite clear.

The hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton mentioned a figure of a call-up annually, in the normal way, under the 1947 National Service Act, of some 200,000 men a year. I believe that to be an over-estimate. The Minister of Labour recently gave a figure of 175,000, but in the first six months of 1948, the Minister of Labour has said, the number of men to be called up will be 75,000. That is to be done for industrial reasons, because of our manpower shortage. It is also to be done because the Forces cannot absorb more than 75,000 in the first six months of next year, because more men are to be released. Does that mean that 100,000 men or more are to be called up in the last six months of 1948, because the situation, so far as training facilities are concerned, will be more difficult in the last six months of next year than in the first six months?

Is there to be a further postponement of the call-up for another three months, and where shall we be in January, 1949, so far as the call-up is concerned? How many men will be called up in 1948 and how is it that the Forces can cope with 100,000 men in the last six months of 1948 when they can absorb only 75,000 in the first six months? By the end of December, 1948, on the basis of the Government's pledge, they will have in the Forces only those men who have been called up during 1947 and 1948; all the pre-January, 1947, men will be released, so the Government have pledged, by the end of December, 1948. Therefore, the number of National Service men remaining will, I calculate, be a maximum of 350,000, and I believe that the maximum of Regulars will be 450,000 at the end of December, 1948, on the basis of the most optimistic present recruiting figures. I think that the most optimistic recruiting figures which have been given by the Minister would give an estimate of 250,000 in January, 1949.

That is the total number of men—800,000—who will be the Armed Forces at the end of December, 1948. Notwith- standing what was said by the then Chancellor in the Debate on the State of the Nation at the beginning of August, that is less than the figure he gave. If these figures are realised, the maximum will be 800,000, and that depends on whether or not there is to be a further postponement in the call-up, introducing a further complication into the administration of the 1947 National Service Act from January, 1949, onwards.

Accordingly, I would like the Minister to tell us, firstly, just how many men it is intended to call up for military service during 1948; secondly, whether the Government are to stick to the age-and-service release programme during 1948, so that all the pre-January, 1947, men will be released by the end of December, 1948, and how, if the full call-up programme is to go through in 1948, they are to maintain the balance in the Forces, and absorb this bigger intake and train them efficiently. It seems to me that, because the Government have continued all along to overestimate the commitments which the Forces are capable of undertaking, and because they have maintained swollen garrisons, and taken on administrative tasks with which they have not been able to cope, they are now in the position of not having enough people efficiently to train the National Service men who are corning in. At the same time, they have not practised sufficiently a policy of economy in administrative employment to overcome this situation.

I recently asked the Minister of Defence what the manpower economy committees were doing in the Service Departments. I received the answer that each committee is working inside each particular Service Department, but there is apparently, no co-ordination in their work and apparently, they are not dealing at all with inter-Services problems. It seems hopeless to deal with a question of manpower economy on a Service-by-Service basis. It can be dealt with only for the Armed Forces as a whole, including the question of call-up, of co-ordination of the Services and administrative tasks between the Services. I hope the Minister will tell us what steps are being taken to get manpower economy on an inter-Services basis.

I think the House will be grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) for raising this important matter. While he has spoken on the subject in general and the Army in particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. G. Ward) has dealt with the Royal Air Force point of view. I therefore think it proper, speaking entirely for myself, that I should attempt to give the House what I think is the naval aspect of this problem.

The problem of manpower cannot really be separated from the main problem of security. It is one variant of the equation whose answer must be national security. It is not, even in this difficult time, the most important variant. The most important is the question of finance. I wish to try to show, so far as the Navy is concerned, that National Service is the most wasteful method of getting what we want—always taking into account that we have only a certain amount of money available. It is useless to build the most enormous ship in the world and find that there is not enough money to pay the men to man her, or to secure two million men and find that we cannot afford to build the ships in which to put them.

It is germane to my argument to try to indicate the task of the Navy in war as I see it. It is a traditional task, and it will always very largely continue to be the same. It is to keep open the trade routes, so that we can obtain vital necessities and raw materials, particularly at the beginning of a war. It has another duty, in conjunction with the Royal Air Force, which is to try to hold the ring while these millions of men in the Army—on paper—are getting ready to attack, or to do whatever they have to do. I do not think anybody would suggest that this great paper Army that we are attempting to create is going to be ready to jump off on the right foot immediately at the outbreak of war. The ring must be held for them by a Royal Navy and a Royal Air Force which are efficient and ready for immediate action until they are ready. It is also quite useless to think that, because new methods of warfare are being introduced—the atomic bomb and various things of that kind—it makes it any less vital to carry out this traditional function of the Navy. There are more ways of being killed than one. The atomic bomb may be one, but defeat can still be brought to this country almost as quickly, and with just as much certainty, by the pressure of blockade and starvation.

Therefore, the problem of National Service, as it affects the Navy is one of reserves, and that is a point on which I wish to obtain some information from the Minister of Defence. I would agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble) that it is very unfortunate that we have not a representative of the Admiralty here today, although I have a certain amount of faith that the Minister of Defence may know something about it.

Every inch an admiral.

This question of reserves is very important, and will be more important in a future war than it has been in the past. I think it is generally recognised that no longer can we call upon the men in the Merchant Service, or a large proportion of them, as we did in the last war. No longer can we make a sweeping grab for all the men employed in the fishing fleets around our shores. We have got to find them somewhere else. The Merchant Navy man is doing just as good a job in his merchant ship as in a destroyer, and we have to recognise that fact. We are, therefore, left with the problem of where the reserves are to come from, if we do not have them in the form of National Service reserves. It would seem that these would not exist because it is generally understood that in about three years' time, the Navy will have recruited sufficient people to bring them up to full strength on a Regular service basis.

Obviously at the moment the main part of our reserves must come, temporarily, from men who have had war service during this last war. For the next few years we shall be right to rely on men who have been serving in the Royal Navy during that period. But as time goes on we shall have to rely on men who have served a term of Regular service which makes it most important that we should be careful in the length of the Regular service and the terms of service available to men joining the Navy. Obviously, if we want to have a big reserve, the length of the term of service must be reduced; but if we want a first class and efficient Navy when a war starts, the term of service must be kept as long as possible. Somewhere between those two points a balance has to be struck, in order that we may have an effective reserve when the next war begins—if it ever does.

At the moment—and this is the point on which I want the Minister of Defence to give me an answer—National Service is making impossible the only other alternative form of reserve. I would like to see, and I think it is the best way, a really efficient and trained Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. It stood us in marvellous stead during the war, and no one can pay a sufficiently high tribute to it. At the moment we have not got that reserve if we do not use National Service men. The problem is to try to create that volunteer reserve without using National Service men, in the Royal Navy. That is the main problem which we have to solve. I disagree with the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Swingler). I think it is absolutely essential that each Service should be treated separately.

The main point is to preserve the security of this country. There is nothing so important as that. I think that we should avoid the blind worship of homogeneity and standardisation which is so dear to the planner when we are considering these problems of manpower in our Services. We stand in grave danger of creating a state of affairs where we think that we are safer than we really are. It is far better to be weak and know it, than to be weak and think that one is strong. If the latter state of affairs ever arises, then this country will be in great jeopardy. The responsibility for that will rest squarely on the shoulders of hon. Members of this House.

It is always a great pleasure to join in any Debate inaugurated by the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head). He is lucid and clear, and his arguments are always illuminated by one or two major fallacies which make it a great pleasure to have an opportunity to reply. He said that the Air Force and the Navy believed that they did not require National Service men. Of course, I have no knowledge of what the Navy or the Air Force think, but those of us on this side of the House who supported conscription did so not because we desired to build up, at this moment, a strong striking force in the Navy or Air Force, but because we believed that by the even division of conscripts between the two Services we would have that balance of trained reserves, even though at this moment we saw that we should have weaker forces than we would have had had we had a permanent long-term force.

The hon. and gallant Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) spoke on the question of co-ordination. I am very glad indeed to see that the Minister of Defence is to reply to this Debate, because I think it is very important that we achieve a co-ordination of the Forces and that my right hon. Friend takes responsibility for all three. He has, after all, a certain knowledge of the Navy. I think it is right that he was First Lord of the Admiralty for a longer period than any First Lord since Anson. I know that he cannot claim the title of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bournemouth (Mr. Bracken) who, in his short period of office in that capacity, was very rightly described as the greatest First Lord since Noah.

The hon. Gentleman has commented on the question of fallacies. I would like him to explain how we are going to have a reserve for the Royal Navy if we use only very few National Service men? How then shall we have a trained reserve? Secondly, how can the reserve be properly trained if it consists of National Service men?

One of the great difficulties of the Services is their entire lack of coordination. It is most extraordinary that in the Navy one-quarter of the personnel are at present engaged, directly or indirectly, in flying duties and yet that there is no clear co-ordination with the Air Force. There are a number of services, for instance the chaplains—I am not so well informed on this particular subject as possibly some hon. and gallant Gentlemen opposite—but I cannot conceive why there should be that spiritual difference which requires each of the three Services to maintain an entirely separate Chaplains' Department. That is only a small example. However important that may be from a general point of view of morale, numerically the numbers concerned are small, but when one gets to such things as supplies, vehicles, weapons and things of that sort, a larger number is concerned. There is need for the utmost co-ordination, and the Admiralty is the worst offender in this matter because it not only fails to coordinate itself with the other Services but it even fails to co-ordinate with the Ministry of Supply. Hon. Members will know that the first report of the Committee on Estimates going into the question of research called particular attention to this failure by the Admiralty on the question of co-ordination.

I now want to deal with one or two points to which I hope the Minister of Defence will reply. First, there is the very important question of manpower and its relations not only to the men that we can afford but to the supplies that we can afford. To give a practical example the number of men going through an R.A.S.C. training unit should be governed not only by the number of instructors, but by the number of vehicles available and the amount of petrol. If only one man can have an hour's driving instruction a day because of shortage of petrol and vehicles, that is just as bad as a shortage of instructors. The question of manpower is also related to civilian supernumeraries. In the Navy alone, for every man in uniform there is directly employed almost one civilian. He is not employed indirectly through the labour pool of the Ministry of Works, but actually directly paid by the Admiralty. The same applies in a number of other cases. It may be an economy in manpower to employ men in this way, but it is wrong, when considering manpower, that we should have no effective statistics of their numbers or of the use to which they are put.

Finally, the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton very rightly said that we shall not have an opportunity of discussing this matter until we come to the Defence White Paper and the Estimates. I think I shall have support from both sides of the House when I say that this question of defence in its effect upon resources is an important matter. There is, for instance, the question of the amount of steel that we can put into defence as compared with that which we can put into export. Before my right hon. Friend finally formulates his policy in the Defence White Paper and in the Estimates, so that we can do nothing but make criticisms which have no real practical effect, we should have a full Debate in this House in which we can deal with the whole question of the Armed Forces in relation to our national economy. I hope the Minister will make representations along those lines. I know that many other hon. Members want to speak, and therefore, I will leave a great number of other points which I would like to discuss. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman, even if he does nothing else, will see that we have an opportunity of discussing, not for an hour but for a whole day, this vital question of defence.

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing), since his speeches can always be relied upon to be well expressed, amusing and, occasionally, right. It is perhaps a matter for regret that this is not one of the occasions upon which he fulfilled all three qualifications. I was really astounded at his remarks that it was a good defence of the present system to say that, while admittedly it would leave us very weak in striking force, there would be the compensation—to use his own phrase—of a balance of trained reserves. If the hon. Member had properly apprehended the case which was put with temperateness, reasonableness and very considerable authority by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head), he would have appreciated that, whatever merits the present system may have, it does not have that particular merit.

My hon. and gallant Friend pointed out—and, of course, we shall await any comments from the Minister of Defence—that substantially the Navy was, as it were, contracting out of the National Service scheme, that the Royal Air Force was treating it with somewhat modified rapture; and that only the Army, was a major consumer. If that is right, or even approximately right, the hon. Member for Hornchurch surely will appreciate that the effect in the case of reserves will be that they will be wholly out of balance. There may or may not be an adequate Army reserve, but undoubtedly there will be no Naval reserves and a wholly inadequate Royal Air Force Reserve. That is why I venture to suggest that the hon. Member for Hornchurch was not up to his usual standard of accuracy on this occasion.

The Minister of Defence will recollect that when my hon. Friends gave him certain not unwelcome assistance in the passage of the National Service Act, we made it abundantly clear that in so doing we were not giving to him, or the Government of which he is a member, a blank cheque over the manpower position. We made it quite clear that we would watch closely the use which he and his colleagues made of that most valuable of all commodities in our present economic difficulties. I hope that we made it clear that, while welcoming the general principle of National Service, in no sense did we mean by that that we would be in any degree whatever committed to wasting manpower in deference to that principle.

As I apprehend it, the point which the Minister should answer today is contained in this question: can he satisfy the House, and the country, that the present scheme, based on a period of service of one year, is really making sufficient use of the manpower which it draws from the country to justify its continuance? Those of us who listened to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exhequer yesterday will recollect the importance which he put upon manpower as a commodity. The Minister of Defence is a very big consumer of that commodity. I think that enough has been said by my hon. and gallant Friend to raise, at any rate, a very serious doubt, as to whether that enormously valuable commodity is being fruitfully and properly used. I re-echo the hope expressed by my hon. and gallant Friend that no question of face-saving, no recollection of the speeches made during consideration of the National Service Bill, will deter the Government from facing frankly the question whether we are getting real value for manpower out of the present system.

In order to satisfy the House that the right hon. Gentleman is getting that value, I think he must deal with the points raised by my hon. and gallant Friend in relation both to the Navy and to the Royal Air Force. Is any real value being obtained from this scheme as it applies to those two Services? I do not pretend to know anything about those two Services and, therefore, I will only pose that question and urge upon the right hon. Gentleman the necessity of answering it.

The only other point I wish to put relates to another aspect. The Minister of Defence will recollect that, on more than one occasion, he and the representatives of the War Office have pointed out that a very large part of the available manpower for the Army will be used in training, during the period of Regular service, and subsequently, as part of the Territorial Army, for the purpose of anti-aircraft defence. I think it is right to say that that will be a very big item of the manpower so used. I should be very grateful if the Minister would indicate what is the answer to the difficulty which occurs to many of us with reference to the use of manpower for that purpose. If, under conditions of modern warfare, our anti-aircraft defences are to be manned, even partially, how is it proposed to face the problem imposed without a degree of mobilisation. Mobilisation may possibly cause an appalling deterioration in the international situation. The right hon. Gentleman will recollect that the very word mobilisation has a depressing sound. Such action taken at a moment of tension might have consequences beyond all calculation. Yet failure to take it would leave the Government virtually defenceless against a sort of aerial Pearl Harbour. Yet in a system which involves that difficulty, we are using a very large part of our manpower, and it surely falls for consideration whether the manpower employed on a Regular basis could not provide us with a very much more efficient system of anti-aircraft defence in this country. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman, in dealing with the general report of his stewardship as to the use he is making of the manpower, will also include some reference to that particular subject.

Finally, we are left in further doubt about the system in view of the delay in call-up, a call-up not under the Act we passed last year, but under the previous Act. The system is substantially the same. If we have, before the National Service Act itself comes into operation, a postponing of the call-up because of the labour situation, and because of the Service situation, it would make all the more legitimate the doubts as to the future of the National Service system which have been put forward so forcibly and so authoritatively by my hon. and gallant Friend.

I welcome this Debate this morning. As one who took the lead in opposition to the introduction of the National Service Act I am glad to see that some of the doubts that I then expressed are being felt by hon. Members opposite. On that occasion they took the opposite view to the fears they now express.

I should like to point out on behalf of my hon. Friends on this side of the House that we were in favour of retaining the period of 18 months' service. When it was taken off, a great many of us, including myself, refrained from voting entirely for the one year.

I appreciate that the hon. and gallant Gentleman has taken up that view, but, nevertheless, in his speech today he has rather asked the Government to scrap the scheme and to go back to the voluntary principle. Surely, that was one of the very strong points that some of us made during those former Debates. We said that there was no evidence that the voluntary system had failed. It was really never tried. When I appealed to the House to defer a decision on this matter in view of the international situation or its possible change, and in view of the difficulties of manpower which were foreshadowed, we got no support from hon. Members opposite. Indeed, I can remember that in the first speech which I made in this House with reference to conscription I expressed surprise that hon. Members opposite, who were supposed to believe in freedom, should support what I believe to be the greatest infringement of freedom. The hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) was almost ready to devour me.

If the hon. Gentleman will permit me again to devour him, may I point out that, in the speech of mine to which I think he is referring, I went out of my way to say that, from this very point of view of personal liberty, I was very unhappy about the matter, that I did not like the idea of handing over a generation to the Ministry of Labour, and that it was with the greatest reluctance, being convinced that the international situation justified it, and only on that ground, that I would support it. I hope that in fairness the hon. Gentleman will recollect that.

I cannot recollect all that the hon. Gentleman said, but I do know that he was ruled out of Order in putting a question to me in rather an aggressive manner. When I moved an Amendment to the Address in 1946, the most important point that I stressed was the manpower situation. I still believe that it was a grievous error of statesmanship, in the situation in which the country found itself, that we should have had this imposition, this strain upon the economy of the nation, perpetrated. When this Act was put upon the Statute Book many of us on this side of the House asked the question, Is this intended to be a permanent scheme? The Government gave us a more or less tacit understanding that they had no idea of its permanence in their mind.

The Secretary of State for War has spoken on several occasions recently. He made a speech in which he foreshadowed the shedding of commitments when it was assumed that there would also come some alteration in the question of National Service. But he made another speech the other day in which he is reported to have said:

"The principle of National Service was a sound one and was likely to endure."

I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether that represents a change of opinion on the part of His Majesty's Government because I believe that in the present situation, the people of this country would never approve a system of National Service which was permanently pinned to the country. Therefore, I ask that there will be reconsideration of this point of view. I accept the suggestion that the whole scheme should be reconsidered in the light of our manpower position and our very serious economic situation, and I hope the Minister will assure us and the country that it is still not the Government's intention that National Service shall be a permanent feature of the life of this country.

I rise to emphasise one point already well made by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland). That is that in the present circumstances the Navy just cannot afford National Service men. The present circumstances to which I refer are, of course, the period of one year service, the manpower shortage and the shortage of money. If more money and more manpower were available, of course the Navy would be able to try to do something with the one year period, but as they are not available, the Navy quite obviously must concentrate on adequate Regulars. If this is the case, I am extremely worried about the future of the Royal Naval Volunter Reserve. If we have the situation described by the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) in which National Service continues and the majority of men go into the Army, how will the Navy recruit its reserves? There is no need for me to emphasise the great part played by the permanent Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve at the beginning of the last war, and many tributes were paid to it from all quarters. How is it going to be replaced?

May I say at once that I welcome very much the tone in which the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) introduced this subject; if it means in the future we might have a little less personal recrimination upon this subject which is dear to every patriot's heart—that is, the security of this country—no one will welcome it more than I will.

I must say I find myself in an extremely difficult situation with regard to timing. The procedure which has been laid down in the White Paper for presentation of the estimates for National Defence to the House of Commons, puts the Minister of Defence very largely into the position very often occupied by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in regard to the Budget. He has to prepare a budget based both upon manpower, and upon estimates of revenue and expenditure in addition to manpower, and he has to make constant endeavour with his professional advisers and civil estimators to assess what the situation is going to be. It is by no means easy in what one might call the military assessment year, to give a forecast of exactly what is going to happen upon any particular question of policy.

I must say, therefore, right away that we find it almost impossible this morning—if I may use some of the language used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on similar occasions—to anticipate the kind of military budgetary policy that His Majesty's Government will approve, in which they may or may not accept all my recommendations, which will be presented in such a comparatively short period. The White Paper on Defence ought to be presented to the House early in February, if it is to be studied before the Debate, in order that we should not fall into the kind of procedure which occurred for various reasons last year and resulted in the White Paper on Defence being debated after a number of the Service Estimates had been discussed.

I want to say at once to my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) that he may take it as absolutely certain that the Government have no desire to burke in any sense or in any degree the fullest possible discussion with the House on these great problems of manpower, supplies and finance under the present economic circumstances. It is only a question of how that can best be achieved in relation to timing. Of course, if there were a large section of the House which felt with the hon. Member for Hornchurch, that they should have a day for debate prior to the presentation of the White Paper, that is certainly a matter on which I could not pronounce. It is a matter for the Leader of the House in relation to the general Business which the Government have to deal with in a certain time. I should have thought, however that, having regard to the situation and to the discussions with the Staff which are going on at the present time, it would have been very much better to await a really full and detailed debate till we have the White Paper presented.

I am sure that Members of the House, like those who have been in the Services and those who have spoken on both sides this morning, will appreciate the difficulties which the Minister of Defence and his professional advisers have had to deal with in the last ten or 12 months. It has been a very difficult position indeed. The decision on National Service, for example, was taken before the end of 1946. There was then every prospect at least of having a much longer period to get a readjustment of national finance and economy in the light of the discussions which had taken place on the American loan—but that loan has run down very much more quickly than anyone on either side of the House expected at that time. We have had, therefore, in connection with the general economic position, to effect during the year while our discussions and considerations on long-term plans were still in progress, immediate adjustments, such as, for example, bringing home earlier than was otherwise proposed certain of our troops and forces overseas, and at the same time increasing the rate of the rundown of the strength of the Forces. The House will remember that, whereas we estimated to have a number of 1,087,000 as the strength to be reached in March, 1948, that has been brought down by two separate steps, first to 1,007,000 and now to 937,000.

I am sure that all those connected with the Services and the Services' administration will understand how difficult it has been for the Departments and for the professional advisers to deal at the same time with the very complex and difficult problem of considering the longer term aspects, in relation to the transitional year 1948–49, which still has to be faced. In the coming year we shall still have large obligations in regard to terminal expenditure, increased demobilisation costs and final payments in respect of wartime contracts and the disposal of stores. It must be apparent to anyone that the effect of these reductions we have had to make in the current financial year because of the economic circumstances, combined with the very large increase in demobilisation—the first estimated run-out from the Forces was about 500,000, and this has now been increased by over 150,000—must necessarily mean a greater state of unbalance in the forces; it must be remembered that the Regulars and those with the longest experience have been coming out first.

Therefore, while we have had to meet our commitments which still remain, and while we have been taking in men for National Service as well as from voluntary recruitment, it has become very much more difficult for the Services to maintain the standard of training. There is no intention on the part of the Government to try to conceal that aspect of the problem from hon. Members interested in this question. That does not mean that the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton can expect me to agree in principle, or in detail, with any of the main propositions he has put forward.

I was not asking for acceptance, but for consideration of the points I have put forward.

With the world in the state in which it is today, with the constant changes in the possibilities as regards the development of new weapons and new threats, with the increase in development of new offensive weapons, and with no corresponding increased development of defensive weapons in sight, any Minister who approached these matters with a fixed, rigid and closed mind ought not to remain long in charge of a Defence Ministry. We have all got to face this constantly changing situation with the proper amount of flexibility and elasticity. Therefore, while I cannot at this stage answer in detail the points which the hon. and gallant Member has put forward, he can take it from me that in all the discussions which are going on in regard to our long-term programme, none of these questions have been absent from our minds. That does not mean that I agree with some of the personal views which he has expressed as being conclusions upon the various points upon which he has touched. I want to assure the House that there is no question of a closed mind.

Will the right hon. Gentleman descend from the metaphysical explanations of military defence and explain to the House exactly who is the enemy against whom we are being called upon to defend ourselves? The answer to that question is fundamental to this whole discussion?

The hon. Member has put a very tempting bait before me, but I do not think that is apposite to this Adjournment Debate.

I would say to my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood (Mr. Yates) that there is no departure from the statements which the Prime Minister and I made earlier in the year to the House about the duration of the National Service scheme. Although I am speaking from memory, I think I am right in saying that he did not quote the whole of what was said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War. I think the Secretary of State was referring to the general principle of National Service as being a sound one. That is not a new statement of principle, although there are a lot of people in the Labour Party who have held the same views as my hon. Friend. We have made it clear in the Act that the period is for five years, or for such shorter period as may be decided upon, and that if the scheme is to be continued, it can only be continued by affirmative decision of the House of Commons.

I have been asked why we brought in National Service in 1946–47. It was brought in because, with the state of the country and the policy of full employment, and the acute manpower shortage, we should have had steadily to expand the inducements, financial and otherwise, if we had relied on voluntary recruitment. This could only have increased the spiral of wages and production costs in industry at a time when we wanted a different approach to our economic problems.

Surely the right hon. Gentleman is now saying that the only people who cannot compete for wages are the conscripts? His argument is that the conscript is cheaper and is, therefore more desirable.

I am not saying anything of the sort. I am saying that if we had had voluntary recruitment, we should not have been able to get the minimum number required for national security, without constantly offering over and above what the men could get in their ordinary civil employments. That position remains, and we have to watch it exceedingly carefully. There will be different views both outside and inside the Services on how to make the best use of the time during National Service. I am making no final statement on that matter at all. I would not burke any of these issues in the Debate on the Defence White Paper.

I do not accept the view that National Service is of no use to the Royal Navy. I admit that we might not have as well trained a man to go into Reserve after 12 months' training as we should after 18 months. If we are thinking about the other problem which the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble) has in mind, the present scheme will go far to avoid the situation which we had before the last war. Now there is a large number of men trained may be for five or six months on shore and four at sea with a refresher during reserve. That places us in a better position to man the Fleet than I was placed in in 1941 and 1942, where the men called up had only 10, 11 or 12 weeks' training and were then expected to go into action.

My whole argument hangs on how many National Service men the Navy is going to take. Could the right hon. Gentleman tell us that, because that might destroy my argument?

I would not anticipate the general military budget that we shall finally decide upon and present to the House in a few months time, and that is why I made the statement I did at the beginning.

Another factor we have to take into account in this matter is in connection with the extraordinarily smooth run down which we have made. My hon. Friends on this side of the House appreciate as much as anybody that we have made an extraordinarily smooth run down, and in consequence of that, there has been no great cushion of unemployment. During the whole of that period, if we had not been able to continue the National Service at the present time before the coming into operation of the 1947 Act, we could not possibly, in face of our commitments, have released men steadily the way we have done. That enables me to reply to another question as to whether we are sticking to the age and service group scheme of releases. Certainly we are. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour made a statement in the House yesterday showing the shading off of the periods of service of men called up in 1947 and 1948. That is, in itself, support of what I am saying, that we are sticking to the age and service group scheme.

There is, for example, in the Royal Air Force a difference of 14 groups. Is it not desirable to have a somewhat similar disparity introduced into the Army? This would cause no more difficulty than it does in the R.A.F. provided it was correctly explained to the men.

Again I speak from memory but in order to achieve the run down which is planned in the next period, the Army will have to follow to some extent the same kind of principle that has been followed in the Royal Navy, and more in the Royal Navy than in any other, and in that way we hope to speed up certain groups.

I realise that the Minister cannot give a complete forecast of his budget, but there is one question I should like to press if possible, because it concerns the situation of a number of young men next year. It is in regard to the call-up. The Minister of Labour has cancelled the registration and the calling-up of 75,000 men in the first six months of 1948. Will my right hon. Friend tell us whether the balance of 100,000 men for those six months are going to be called up during the rest of 1948 or will they be postponed?

What has been done is that registration has been postponed, but let me set my hon. Friend's mind at rest on this. Having postponed registration, we cannot call up for registration in the rest of the year the large proportion of those postponed in the first part, so what we intend to do is to postpone the registration right through the whole of the year on the same basis, so that we shall have a call-up on the same regular basis as in the past. We could not have a wide disparity in the number of men called up in the second half of the year from the number called up in the first half. This particular question will be dealt with more fully when we come to debate the general position next year.

There is another point which I think I ought to answer, and that was the one put by my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch with regard to the civilian use of manpower by the Services. It is true that we employ a very large number of civilians and always have done so. We have no desire to conceal from Parliament what is the actual amount of manpower so employed. In view of what my hon. Friend has said this morning and also on previous occasions, I have considered carefully what would be the best form in which to bring the details of civilian employees to the notice of the House—whether to put them into the White Paper for the general Debate or whether they should be more amply stated in the particular Departmental Service Estimates. In any event, I think that those Service Estimates will be available in time for the general Debate. I will certainly look at that point.

Does my right hon. Friend realise that this is of considerable importance, because in the Economic Survey these persons are shown as in civilian employment, and are contrasted with the total of persons who are militarily employed?

I must point out that these questions are taking time from some other hon. Member and it is desirable to keep to the time table as far as possible.

I apologise if I have taken up some of the time of other hon. Member in my desire to reply to the questions that have been raised. In view of what has been said by Mr. Speaker, I will draw rapidly to a close.

I would like to leave the House with the note I struck earlier in my remarks—that we are in a very difficult position, which is made much more difficult by the economic situation especially as regards manpower. We shall make a general presentation of the case on the basis of manpower and defence to Parliament next year. We shall complete our examination with the greatest possible care and not with a closed mind, but with the desire to do the very best we can first to secure the main prop in National Defence, and that is the most rapid recovery of our economic stability. Without such recovery we would not be able to face the kind of mobilisation about which the hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) spoke. We have to be certain of our war potential now that modern war has reached its present stage of development.

Secondly, I believe all of us want to do the very best that we possibly can for the security not merely of our country, but of all those countries which love liberty and who seek to turn it into lasting peace. We have not been very much encouraged in the last 12 months since presenting the first White Paper on Defence by the progress which the world has made in that respect. I do not disagree at all with the remarks that have been made about international tension. Nor are we encouraged by the amount of progress so far made by the United Nations organisation, in such matters as progressive and permanent disarmament or in the control of atomic energy. In the light of these things I am quite certain we will be able to rely upon opinion in all parts of the House to support us in doing the very best we can for security and for the maintenance of peace.

I want to raise very briefly a question of very great importance to the inhabitants of the ancient and historic garrison town of Shoeburyness, in my constituency. For over a century the War Department has gradually but with remorseless purpose embraced practically the whole of this south-eastern tip of Essex, and today practically 7,500 acres have come into the possession of various Government Departments. Sweeping right round from Foulness Island into the Borough of Southend, there is an area enclosed and restricted from which the ancient rights and privileges of the people of that area have been withdrawn. All this has been done in the interests of the defence of the Realm. It is not my argument to dispute that much of this acquisition of land has been necessary. Not a single inhabitant of the township of Shoeburyness would dispute that. Nor would anyone dispute that it means a diminution of the rights and freedoms of the people and of their right of access to land taken over by the Government.

There is now contemplated in this area a final assault on the fragment of foreshore left to the people of Shoeburyness. In this barricaded realm of 7,500 acres there is a spot of 45 acres of privately-owned land to which courting couples can go and people can take their kiddies to play. These 45 acres, we are told, are essential for the development of an experimental station at Shoeburyness. Apparently, this development cannot take place within the confines of the 7,500 acres. We are told that it must occur on this very special bit of land. We may, perhaps, be forgiven our suspicions that the planners, administrators and technicians looked up their maps and blueprints, discovered that this untidy bit of 45 acres is not within their empire, and decided that it had better be tidied up. Therefore, this last bit of the ancient rights of Shoeburyness is to be taken into the possession of the Government.

In view of the sacrifices that have been made by the people of Shoeburyness, and as these 45 acres are almost the last bit of land left to them on which they can go with complete freedom, I submit to the House that every alternative should be explored before this injustice is imposed upon the people of Shoeburyness. These 45 acres should go only if it can he proved beyond all shadow of doubt that the land is essential in the defence of the Realm; and it must be proved to the satisfaction of the people of Shoeburyness. The Ministry itself should not be judge and jury in this matter.

These 45 acres of disputed territory are privately-owned land. The late owner, Miss Edith Knapping in her will, wrote chat the trustees should have regard, in the first place, to the interest and development of the town of Shoebury, and when arranging sales or granting leases the trustees' primary concern should be what, in their opinion, was most calculated to benefit the town. In view of that expression of desire by the owner of the land, I confess that I am not a little astonished that the trustees should now apparently, freely negotiate the whole of the land to the Ministry, knowing that it must inevitably be a further restriction on the people whom the late owner desired to benefit.

This land, although privately owned, has always, apart from the war years, when it was under requisition, been open to the public. Even in long past years, when, I understand, there was a brick field there, there were no restrictions on the people who came and went as they desired. The people, therefore, came to regard it as their own. I believe that the late owner desired that. Therefore, I ask the Minister not to argue about its being privately-owned land; and to say there can be no objection to a change of ownership which is freely made. I am not concerned with any of these technical arguments. What I am asking is that there shall be a sane, healthy balancing of the rights of the people of Shoeburyness in this matter. I ask that the Borough of Southend shall, in fact, be allowed possession of these 45 acres of land, that they may develop it in the interest and to the benefit of the people of Shoeburyness. I have no doubt that there must be minor restrictions because of its geographical position, but I am convinced that the people of Shoeburyness have a right to this last remnant of land which has been left to them.

I know that the Minister, in his reply, will tell me that the negotiations have already taken place in this matter. He will tell me certain things of which I am already well aware. He will tell me that in October, 1945, he met a deputation from the Borough of Southend. He will tell me that a compromise was reached on the proposed purchase of the land. He will tell me that this compromise took place in a most friendly atmosphere. He will tell me that out of the 45 acres his Ministry propose to purchase, 10 acres after purchase are to be permitted, at a peppercorn rent, to go to the Southend Corporation. He will tell me that the foreshore running in front of the 45 acres is to be open to the public, apart from the times of firing. I know that this acceptance by the deputation from the borough provides the Minister with a very strong and powerful argument. But I ask him today to look at the facts of the situation as they were in October, 1945, the time when these negotiations were taking place.

The borough council have now freely admitted that there was, to put it as mildly as possible, an error of judgment. They have asked the Minister to reopen the whole matter and discuss it again with them. They have asked him to receive a further deputation. The Minister may argue that the council should rot have made an error of judgment, but he knows, as well as I do, that at that time, only a few months after the cessation of hostilities the area was almost wholly a defence area. Times were quite abnormal. The borough was practically evacuated, this disputed land had been requisitioned throughout the war, and local government was not back in full swing in such areas.

There was probably no vivid awareness of what was actually involved. I know that the Minister cannot be blamed for that, but it is true to say that on the deputation there was no representative of the people of Shoeburyness. By a very understandable and almost justifiable error, if I may put it that way, the Member of Parliament for the constituency of which Shoeburyness is a part was not invited to take part in that deputation. I make no complaint about that, but I still say that it was not a truly representative deputation of the borough. The people of Shoeburyness were in almost complete ignorance of what was going on for about 18 months after October, 1945. When they did become aware of it, a terrible storm broke that must have confused the Borough Council of Southend.

I make an appeal to the Minister not to stand coldly and adamantly behind the tentative agreement arrived at in 1945, and to appreciate that it is in the interests of the people, who have made great sacrifices in this respect, that they should not be penalised for any unfortunate circumstances that arose in abnormal times. I beg of him, even now at this very late hour, to consider the real merits of this case and to understand the disproportionate burden of sacrifice which the people of Shoeburyness are being called upon to bear in this matter by having to give up this land on the foreshore, and to give up their amenities.

I have no doubt that the Minister will say, with some justification, that his Ministry have pursued their plans in conformity with the agreement that was arrived at in 1945, but he knows that no stone has been moved and no timber has been shifted. He knows that there has been no change in physical circumstances. I have no doubt that plans have been drawn up and surveys have been made, but, without any great sacrifice, those plans could be revised and new plans be made to provide for the development of this precious bit of land. I repeat, as vigorously as I can, to the Minister, that, if inconvenience has to be suffered in this matter it is time that the Government Department suffered it. They should not expect the people of Shoeburyness to have further restrictions placed upon them.

Now I will look at the agreement—the unfortunate and unhappy agreement—of 1945, and see what it was. It proposed that the full 45 acres should be purchased by the Ministry of Supply. It is strange that whenever there is talk of the Government buying any land in the Shoeburyness area, suspicions arise of a most justifiable character. It has happened many times before that the Government have bought land in that area. When they did so, privileges have always been afforded to the inhabitants of Shoeburyness. When the purchases took place public feeling has been calmed down, as it were. The public have been assured that they would have access, apart from the times of firing, to stretches of the foreshore and of the land. Somehow, however, the flag that denotes the firing seems to come down with far less frequency as the years go by and, in the end, the so-called privileges have disappeared altogether.

A standing example of this fact is the foreshore to the west of the now disputed territory. Not very long ago the public had full access to the beach, apart from times of firing, notwithstanding the fact that this was Government-owned land. They were allowed to take their kiddies there. Then, some scintillating wit of the Department found that the troops were able to break from barracks by going along the beach and up into the town, and therefore he decided to put up a fence, which has had the effect of keeping the public out. That is how the privilege, once granted, was taken away. One result is that the older inhabitants of Shoeburyness can now have the pleasure of gazing over the fence upon summer evenings and seeing officers, N.C.O's and their ladies, and certain privileged burgesses of Shoeburyness, enjoying themselves in, as it were, uncontaminated isolation. That is part of the experience of the people of Shoeburyness. The Government Department have taken complete possession of that land. That is how our privileges have always tended to disappear.

During the negotiation of the agreement of 1945, it was agreed that 10 acres out of the 45 acres should go to the borough. The 10 acres have a very curious feature. During conversations which I have had with different people on this matter, I have found out that the proposed plans for the 45 acres are shrouded in great mystery. There has always been an air of complete mystery about what the Minister proposes to do with the 45 acres. It appears to be so mysterious and hush-hush that we can never speak about it except with bated breath and without invoking the Official Secrets Act, the Defence of the Realm Act, and the Military Land Act. We only need Sexton Blake and Olga Polowski on the beach at Shoeburyness to have the whole drama quite complete. Then, although there are such secret purposes about the 45 acres, right in the middle of that area, the Ministry is conceeding 10 acres. I do not believe that if there were a development of such a secret character in prospect the Minister could have allowed the public freedom to move in the 10 acres, right inside the larger area.

The Minister ought, therefore, to concede that the proposed de- velopments should not take place, possibly with some inconvenience to his Department, upon the present holding. There is the strongest suspicion in Shoeburyness that the real desire of the authorities is to run a road to connect the borough with the 45 acres. The Ministry have taken very much of this area and the people of Shoeburyness have made a sacrifice by giving up thousands of acres. For the little bit which is now offered to them, I suppose they ought to be thankful, but I feel that the Minister should reconsider this tawdry gesture. Indeed, to the people of Shoeburyness it is an insult which is entirely undeserved, in the light of those past sacrifices.

The Minister has agreed, in pursuance of the agreement, that the foreshore of the 45 acres shall be open to the public, apart from the times of firing. I do not propose to deal with the restrictions in regard to firing, because we all know that the whole area could be closed for scores of years under the Military Land Act. Does the Minister realise, however, what is going to happen? He has previously argued that there is really no restriction on this foreshore but he must have forgotten completely the paddling experiences of his own innocent childhood. Even though the Government own the foreshore, the tide will still come in. The Minister will appreciate that, the beach being somewhat steep, the people and the kiddies upon it will have no opportunity to retreat from the tide. What is to happen? They must evacuate the foreshore completely. That is a very considerable restriction upon our people. They will be unable to take their picnic baskets, buckets and spades on to the foreshore. They must needs get off it when the tide is high. Surely the Minister will concede that that is a serious restriction. There is a further point. From time immemorial the fishermen of Shoeburyness have put their boats during the winter months upon the land abutting upon the foreshore to which the Minister will claim that he has given free access. What are they to do with their boats now? That is a further restriction upon the ancient privileges of the people of Shoeburyness.

I therefore ask the Minister to reconsider this whole matter in order to balance his requirements with the justifiable claims of the people of Shoeburyness. I ask him to reopen the whole matter. I ask him to go back upon his decision of a fortnight ago and to receive a deputation from the borough, as was virtually promised by his predecessor in office. I speak today for the whole of the people of Shoeburyness—for the churches, the political parties, all the amenity societies. It is our earnest hope that, despite the lateness of the hour and the unfortunate circumstances, the Minister will try to satisfy our justifiable desires.

I cannot conclude without thanking the Minister for his courtesy and kindliness during the whole of the discussions that he has had with me on this matter. I ask him to extend that kindliness and courtesy to his consideration of the problem I have put before him, so that the people I represent in Shoeburyness can be relieved of what they consider to be an insulting proposal.

I endorse what the hon. Member for South-Eastern Essex (Mr. Gunter) has said about the apprehensions of the inhabitants of Shoeburyness over this proposition which has long hung fire and caused great heartburning. It is also felt with some indignation that the wishes of the testator have been completely ignored throughout the negotiations. I hope the Minister is aware that, lying next to Shoeburyness—important as Shoeburyness is—is the large and thriving town of Southend, which has a very much larger population. This proposition is equally important to the borough I represent. The people of Southend, particularly in the eastern portion of the constituency, use this foreshore as much as the people of Shoeburyness and look upon it as their own. They share the indignation of the Shoeburyness people and the view that the few remaining amenities are now seriously threatened and that even the suggested compromise does not go very far towards solving the problem.

I hope the Minister will see his way to reconsider the problem. Unfortunately, it came to a head during the war, and the meeting referred to took place very shortly afterwards. In the light of peacetime conditions the Ministry might lend a more indulgent ear to the representations which have already been made. The feeling in the borough of Southend is that this land, which was left by Miss knapping, ought to be lent, leased or sold to the borough of Southend. The corporation itself would make the necessary arrangements. I hope the Minister will be able to promise concessions in addition to those originally indicated two years ago.

I should express gratitude to my hon. Friend the Member for South-Eastern Essex (Mr. Gunter) for having raised this matter, if for no other reason than that I believe that it will be kinder both to him and to his constituents in the long run if I say quite frankly that, with great regret, I am unable to reconsider this matter. My hon. Friend began by suggesting that the Government's need for this land was not genuine and that the claims to it arose out of the desire of some officious civil servant to tidy up an irregularity in the large area of land which the Government own in that part of the world. Later he taunted us by saying that, having staked our claim on the land, we took sufficient account of the desires and wishes of the people of Shoeburyness to carve out of it an area of 10 acres which they might enjoy in perpetuity, I should have thought that that effectively frustrated the idea of any desire to tidy up which might have been the mainspring of the original decision.

My hon. Friend covered most of the background facts and therefore relieved me of the need to make a very long speech. I should like to recapitulate some of the facts and put the whole matter in focus. This is, of course, not some capricious whimsy on the part of a civil servant or Government Department. My hon. Friend knows perfectly well that the establishment located at Shoeburyness is an experimental establishment of the highest importance to our national security and, in certain respects, of a high degree of secrecy. It has become necessary, as a result of the work which that establishment carries out, to acquire this area of 45 acres of land at the southwest end of what are called "the new ranges".

We are perfectly well aware that the acquisition of that land, which my Department regards as essential, is a hardship to the people of Shoeburyness, and the Southend Corporation, which is the responsible local authority, represented to us as long ago as 1945 that we should, if possible, modify or abandon our project. We had discussions with them, and a deputation led by the hon. Member for Southend-on-Sea (Mr. Channon) and the Mayor of Southend attended upon my right hon. Friend's predecessor in October, 1945, and an agreement was reached. As with any other compromise, I do not doubt that neither party to that agreement was wholly satisfied by what they got out of it, but at any rate it was a compromise which both parties accepted and which led to the Ministry of Supply agreeing to carve out of the 45 acres which they required Io acres which it was felt could legitimately be dispensed with and to reserve them in perpetuity for the people of Shoeburyness.

In the light of that fact and that sort of treatment on the part of my Department, I naturally resent the suggestion that no consideration has been given to the needs of the people. My hon. Friend asked for a sane and healthy balancing of the rights of the people of Shoeburyness. What does he call an agreement and compromise of that kind but an attempt to balance as sanely and healthily as we can the rights and needs of the people of Shoeburyness?

The balance at which I would like my hon. Friend to look is that between the over-all acreage and the 10 acres.

I have no doubt of this, hut the balance at which I would like my hon. Friend to look is whether the rights and needs of the people of Shoeburyness can rightly be taken into account in this matter. It is an exceptional situation to get an experimental station of this kind. I or any other Member of the Government must put the needs of national defence in this respect before any local sectarian needs which might conflict with them. The people of Shoeburyness would be the first to resent it if we pursued an irresponsible policy in that respect.

The reason I deprecate to some extent the fact that my hon. Friend has seen fit to raise this today is that he knows as well as I do that neither the Ministry of Supply nor the War Office, nor any other individual Government Department, is the final arbiter in a matter of this kind. The Government have made it plain again and again that when conflicts of interest of this nature arise there is machinery in existence whereby the representations of the parties who consider themselves to be injured can be ventilated and heard. My hon. Friend is well aware that the Inter-Departmental Committee which examines the requirements for Service land has this matter before it at the present moment. My hon. Friend has himself made representations to it, and so have some of his constituents. In the circumstances he will realise that it is quite impossible for me to say either "Yea" or "Nay."

In so far as he wants me to modify the claims of my Department, I have to tell him, with the greatest sense of responsibility that I can, that it is quite out of the question for us to do so. The need for his piece of land is acute, and it is required for specific purposes which it would not be in the public interest to discuss in this House, but which I am perfectly prepared to discuss in a general way with him outside. I must, however, maintain our claim. Whether or not we shall be successful in that claim depends on what weight is attached by the Inter-Departmental Committee to the representations made to it. I feel certain that the real reason why the Southend Corporation agreed in the first place to the compromise suggested to them was that they realised that when we put a serious matter of national defence against a local consideration of this kind, ultimately it is in the interest of everybody, including the local inhabitants, that national defence should carry the day. I commend that view to my hon. Friend who has, I know, examined this matter with a sense of responsibility and is actuated only by a desire to help his constituents.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that after reflection over the past 12 months the borough council have an entirely different view?

The Minister has no means of knowing what the borough council have been reflecting on over the past 12 months. I am certainly impressed by the fact that, as the volume of local protest has grown, so the borough council have become less and less enthusiastic about the original compromise. No doubt the hon. Member for Southend shares that waning enthusiasm. The fact remains that the thing was put to them, and as responsible men they accepted the compromise. I have very little doubt that if the matter were again put to them in the same way they would again accept it. We have played fair by the people of Shoeburyness, and I must ask the House to accept that my Department cannot on this occasion withdraw its claim.

Since the idea of raising this matter on the Adjournment was agreed, two things have occurred which might appear to emphasise the need for raising it; first, the statement made by the President of the Board of Trade yesterday in reply to a Question, and then the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday. That statement had as one of its main themes—which was plugged very successfully by the right hon. and learned Gentleman—the vital need for the British Empire and this country to get as many dollars as possible as soon as they can. That reinforces the need to consider the position of rubber which, with tin, is the greatest dollar earner in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade was a modestly worded mea culpa though, as a matter of fact, everybody knows perfectly well that he is not the real culprit.

I should say at this stage that in the traditions of this House I could be thought of as an interested party, for I have been a rubber merchant and dealer most of my life, and still am an active one, but I would like also to say that it is not from any such angle that I raise this point, but that simply, having the requisite knowledge, it may be useful to use that knowledge to bring out into the open a question of real importance. Before coming to the actual occurrences at Geneva and to what has happened since, it would be useful to give a picture of what has happened in the world of raw rubber and synthetic rubber for some time past, because unless there is a complete picture, agreements made there cannot be fully understood. It is a slightly technical matter with a certain amount of figures, but it should be made quite clear.

Before the war about 50 per cent. of the world needs in rubber came from British possessions, and about 50 per cent. from non-British, chiefly in the Far East. Of this a small amount came from Africa, but it is hardly worth mentioning. Germany had developed a large synthetic rubber industry, partly for strategic purposes but partly to save her foreign exchange, she being to some extent in the same position then as many other countries find themselves in at present. After the fall of Malaya at the beginning of 1942, the accumulated stock pile of the United States and other countries, including this country, was totally insufficient for the rapidly expanding war production needs, particularly in America, and the enormous task of creating an entirely new large-scale industry in war time was successfully undertaken and solved by the genius of the American people in under two years.

It really was one of the finest parts of the war effort of the Allies to go from the extremely difficult process of practically pilot plant scale in America up to productions of hundred of thousands of tons of a new material without which the war machine would have stopped to a great extent. It is important that that should be realised because, when the raw rubber interests talk now about the possible harm synthetic rubber may do today, they must bear in mind the great debt of gratitude that this country and the world owes to synthetic rubber, and also because it will assist them in understanding the American point, of view about synthetic rubber plants and their retention, because that must play a great role in all negotiations which have taken place and may take place. The fact also that America consumed more than half the raw rubber of the world and produced no raw rubber before the war, had made of rubber something like political dynamite, and for many years before there had been a great deal of strong feeling about rubber produced by us being held at higher prices than it should have been against America. There was no substance in it, but people whose whole life blood is centred in transport, which is based on rubber, and are not producers of it, are naturally likely to be a little tender on that subject.

Towards the end of the war and after, the problem of natural versus synthetic rubber had to be tackled. After the reconquest of Malaya, the Government production unit handed over to private enterprise the rubber production in Malaya, and in spite of enormous difficulties, such as the high price and lack of rice and transport, and labour difficulties of every sort, with the country still not under complete law and order, remarkable progress was made and, at the end of 1945, 1946 and 1947 infinitely greater amounts of rubber were produced than were anticipated by anybody including Government estimates. It is worth while pointing out that, although that was done, even then the optimum production of rubber in Malaya has not been reached. In spite of those handicaps, rubber production really was extraordinary, but, on the other hand, the continued chaos in the Dutch East Indies and in Indo-China meant that those countries—the producers of about half the world's rubber between them—have not been and are not likely for some time to be as big producers of rubber as they might be, until there is greater inducement at any rate.

Meanwhile, the United States had not made up its mind finally as to the future of synthetic rubber, for many reasons. Synthetic rubber was looked at by them from two angles. First, the strategic. America never again wishes to be in the position she was in in 1942, of finding her whole war economy bogged down because she had not enough rubber. Therefore, rightly I think, she was entitled and wished to maintain a certain level of synthetic rubber production and plants capable of expansion if the need should ever occur, and anybody who argues against that is not facing the realities of the situation.

It is difficult to say what is the correct price of synthetic rubber because it is still, to a great extent, semi-subsidised in the price at which plants were handed over and are still run, but it must be taken as axiomatic that America must retain a certain minimum output potential of synthetic rubber capable of great expansion. I believe the minimum output figure which would give her the opportunity for expansion if necessary should be somewhere near 200,000 tons. That, undoubtedly, might be disputed in America, but all the same I think it is fair and adequate to include strategic needs and improvement in quality.

It is worth while saying that from the strategic point of view, in the new sort of war one can foresee, it may not be the right thing to do, because the well-dispersed stock pile of raw rubber, which keeps much better than synthetic, may be combined with a minimum pilot plant to make the perfect pattern. The stock pile is certainly immediately available and in a war which is likely to be very swift, in many ways what is available may play a greater part than what can be produced, even over a relatively short period. From the economic angle there is no doubt that it is far from being decided yet whether raw or synthetic rubber is better. Synthetic rubber is a young synthetic product and it may take years, if not decades, to get it right. At present it is not as good as real rubber, except from the angle of resistance to oil. It does not last nearly so well, it tends to deteriorate from the time of its manufacture, and it is not very good from the stock pile point of view. It is also much more difficult to work in the factory.

While America is trying to make up its mind as to its policy as between raw and synthetic rubber, there was passed in America what is known as the Crawford Act which was really the basis of the Geneva negotiations. In order to safeguard the synthetic rubber industry, the Crawford Act insisted on American manufacturers using at least one-third of synthetic rubber in everything they produced. That was a dangerous thing to do in a way, because it created an embargo on the import of raw rubber into America to a considerable extent. I have borrowed the word "embargo" from the hon. Gentleman who is at present Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, who used it about six months ago in a speech on this subject. There is no doubt about it that unilaterally at the moment we are seeking for international trade agreements to impose on manufacturers of a county that they must use or not use more than a certain amount of something which has to be imported is exactly the same as if you put on an exclusive tariff. One could understand why it had to be done, because until a decision is made between raw and synthetic rubber America had to protect her synthetic products.

The change for the British Empire was disastrous. American consumption is going up and world demand is, I believe, unlimited—it is only factory potential which limits it. Factories are not fully equipped to chew up rubber and make it into tyres, which use about 70 per cent. of rubber. The public demand is quite enormous, but meanwhile the effects of excluding what would be about a third of the import was disastrous on the rubber market and brought down the price very considerably. For 1947 it cut out something like 100,000 tons of rubber, which would otherwise be imported into America and paid for in dollars, and reduced the price by 3d. a lb.

At present America is consuming 600,000 tons of rubber a year and the prevailing price of 400 dollars a ton means 240 million dollars a year earned by the British Empire, largely by Malaya, who are carrying a large part of the burden. Every effort has to be made to see that the maximum amount is produced without harm to others. What could not be done with that 40 million dollars? It is a very large sum indeed. A further penny a lb. on rubber means £10 a ton or 40 dollars, and on the 600,000 tons now consumed in U.S.A. the difference in each means something like another 40 million dollars.

The quality and price of rubber are going to make a very great difference to the import of foodstuffs, machinery and everything else desirable represented by dollars at the moment. The price question must be dealt with rather carefully. Complaints are made by His Majesty's Government and many other people, and uneasiness is caused everywhere, at the very high prices we have to pay in America and other parts of the world for foodstuffs and other things. That is obviously true, but here is an article produced in the Empire which is vitally necessary in all those countries from which we buy these goods, and, compared with the pre-war price and with prices of other goods, its price is entirely out of line. At present the price of rubber is only about 20 per cent. above its pre-war price, although the costs of production have gone up in exactly the same ratio as for everything else. Tin, the other article which is a parallel, has increased in price to £500 a ton from about £215 before the war and is still low.

Rubber is one of the few articles where the rise in price would be so enormously spread over such a huge public that it could not harm the individual consumer, as in the case of so many other commodities. In tyres 70 per cent. of rubber is used. A set of four tyres for a car can be used for about a year, and a rise of 1d. in the price of rubber would make a difference of about 5s. per annum, as only about 10 lbs. or 12 lbs. go into a tyre, and a greater amount of cotton; and other things. The labour costs, and costs of cotton and so on, are infinitely greater than the cost of rubber in a tyre. The rise in the price of rubber, which I consider is one of the targets at which the Government should aim in the new negotiations, would be perfectly reasonable. It would be of enormous benefit to countries so badly needing dollars, and of no harm to the consumer. The cost in public transportation is infinitesimal and the rises in petrol costs are 10 times as much as in rubber. I believe the United States recognise this, and the United States Government are fully aware that, if properly negotiated, it would be one of the best means of increasing our dollar earnings, and would be a perfectly normal and natural way of bringing one of the articles we produce into line with what we have to pay for what we buy from them.

There is in everyone's mind a sort of mental hazard in regard to a shilling price for rubber. I beg the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, and those who are to start the new negotiations, to bear in mind that there is no economic blessing in a shilling price, or a price of about a shilling. I am not suggesting an absurd price, which could not be justified, but the extra earning of dollars which could result from a rise to 1s. 6d. or 2s. would, I believe, be a great help to both parties in the long run. A 6d. rise would bring in 120 million dollars. That is the picture to some extent as a result of the Crawford Act before the negotiations took place in Geneva, which cut out something like 100,000 tons a year, which would have been imported to America and other places.

When the agreement was signed in Geneva an error was fallen into in this way. Under the Crawford Act the basis of calculation on which the 33 per cent. use of synthetic rubber was made was the total of raw rubber plus what is called "G.R.S.", which is the normal synthetic rubber in America, and did not include reclaimed rubber. Reclaimed rubber is the rubber which after tyres have burst, or come to an end of use, is extracted by a highly scientific process and is still useful in various ways. Into the Geneva agreement has been slipped the use of reclaimed rubber, which made a difference of 280,000 tons a year, and the result was that what was intended by our negotiators to be an improvement, from our point of view, was not an improvement at all, but rather the opposite when altered from 33 per cent. to 25 per cent. On the basis of 280,000 tons of reclaimed, the alteration from 33 per cent. to 25 per cent., makes us not better Off, but worse off. In his very modestly worded statement yesterday the right hon. Gentleman said:

"It is quite true a misunderstanding arose in the last stages of the Geneva negotiations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th December, 1947; Vol. 445, c. 364.]

That word "misunderstanding" is very interesting. I think that in using it the right hon. Gentleman meant, as he is entitled to do, to smooth over what we should call a blunder. The word "misunderstanding" is more correct, because I believe no one there had sufficient understanding of this matter to be able to spot it. The whole statement gives the impression that they suddenly found themselves put into a most difficult position at the last moment, and not able to refer the matter back to anyone who had the requisite knowledge. Therefore, this mistake slipped through. It is the most awful indictment of his own Ministry that he could possibly make. Ministers and their officials, particularly in the Board of Trade, have to deal with the widest possible variety of subjects. They cannot be expected, and it is unreasonable to expect them, to have the competent technical knowledge. This Government are great worshippers of science and technique. These are just as necessary in negotiation and in business knowledge as in production and manufacture

With that in view the Ministry set up a special Rubber Study Group some time ago, with three sides to it—production, consumption and distribution, which was included afterwards. That is a body quite capable of giving advice and supplying answers to questions at any moment. But this particular question of rubber and the Crawford Act had been a matter of Concern to the Government for six months or more. The question of raw rubber versus synthetic rubber has been discussed for two years. When I was that unfortunate hybrid, a temporary Government servant, I was studying this question, and saw what was going on. This is a matter which has been chewed over and gone into, not for months but for years. The Government have at their disposal half a dozen or 20 people in the Rubber Study Group who could have given the answer to this at once. This particular negotiation at Geneva was probably the most important there was. How is it possible that such a mistake, such a misunderstanding, could have arisen, when 20 people, including myself, could have told them the effect of including reclaimed rubber, and that that was something entirely different from what those who were negotiating thought?

I would like to have a specific answer to this question: was there or was there not present at Geneva anyone drawn from the Study Group, which is the machinery which the Government have created for this matter, who could have advised them on the spot? If not, surely this was not negotiated in a matter of hours. A telephone call to London or the sending of a plane to bring someone over could have set this matter right. A serious thought is raised in people's minds, when negotiations about 250 million dollars worth of a product are going on, that it should be handled in such a way that, I use the Minister's own words, a "misunderstanding" arose, and there was—he says "unfortunately"—no attempt made to get the full consultation which he should have had on the drafting of this condition. Surely, the right hon. Gentleman had the draft during these negotiations, which dragged on for some months. Surely, they were not conducted in such a way that this vital aspect was left until the last minute, and, therefore, there was no chance for consultation—that it had to be signed on the dotted line.

How did it happen that there was no one present in order to put this point or give our negotiators the right guidance? I am not blaming the high officials who went there. They were obviously men trying their best in very difficult circumstances towards the end of the Conference. I am not blaming the Minister for not knowing. But the country will want to know if this incident is typical of, the way negotiations are conducted on our behalf. What chance is there of similar mistakes about foodstuffs, raw materials and other commodities? Unless there is full confidence between the Minister and the association of the trade concerned, so that we are able at a moment's notice to get the help of elected advisers—elected by the trade and not selected by the Minister—so that the Government should have available at a moment's notice somebody to put them right, it is a very disturbing thought.

Always in the forefront is the dollar aspect. There is one other aspect on which I desire a reply; that is, how this considerable blunder occurred, and what steps are to be taken in the new negotiations which are now to be undertaken, to see that really competent advice is available. I would remind the Minister that I myself saw his predecessor, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, and also the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, on this matter two or three months ago. I have written memoranda for them, and others have done so also. That makes this mistake, and the apparent vast haste, even more inexplicable.

What is the American attitude? In a most responsible part of the American Press it has been stated quite openly that "they have got something for nothing." I do not for one moment believe that that was the intention of the American Government. I think they behaved quite admirably in this matter. Indeed, the only good thing to come out of it so far is that the honesty of the Minister in coming forward and saying that there has been a misunderstanding, which being translated means that there has been a mistake, the fact that he has "come clean," has created an atmosphere in which the Americans say, "We quite understand; we are not trying to put something on to you which you feel is harsh and inequitable; we will not discuss how it arose." I expect their negotiators went over, and said, "We went so fast over there that it was a push-over so far as London was concerned." I imagine that that is what they reported. Certainly, out of disaster an atmosphere has been created in which I hope that a new and considerably better arrangement can be made.

I would draw attention to one other matter which I hope will be taken up. Every dollar we can get is necessary for us and we should get every dollar which comes from our production in the British Commonwealth. Quite recently Dutch interests—I cannot say whether it is with the agreement of the Dutch Government—have been buying rubber in Singapore, bringing it back to Holland and reshipping it from Holland and Claiming dollars for it. They sell slightly under the New York price. The whole time they sell at a cent or a half cent less in New York than the current price and, therefore, exclude the British shipper from selling. They take dollars out of the pocket of this country which should be coming into it.

It might be said, "Why does not the Exchange Control, which allows the licences for the export of rubber to be given when the Dutch buyer appears, stop it?". Firstly, it is not the business of the Exchange Control to be a police force. For a number of years I have worked with the Exchange Control through the Bank of England and the Treasury, and no more fair-minded or competent body exists. They look at everything put to them with great knowledge and extreme fairness, and they judge a thing on its merits. They have done more to grease the wheels of such international trade as is possible than almost any other international organisation.

If a Dutch buyer says that rubber is wanted for some European country, he is perfectly entitled to export rubber. The Exchange Control position is that if someone comes along they will accept what they say and allow them a licence, but when they see, as in the last two or three weeks, nearly three to four million dollars worth of rubber being taken out of Malaya, earmarked "Shipped to Holland" and then it is re-shipped from Amsterdam or Rotterdam—I checked this on the telephone with America last night, and every word will prove to be correct—I recommend that to the Minister as something which he should set about stopping. It is not only bad because it represents a loss of dollars on a big scale, but because it hits at the root of international working together. What is the use of going to Geneva and getting a modicum of success if all the time countries are going to try to pull too much of the blanket over their side of the bed? That is extremely unfair, and I recommend the right hon. Gentleman to consult with the Chancellor of the Exchequer to see what means can be taken to stop this. It is bad from another point of view. It shows other cats—and there are black cats as well as white ones—the way to the dairy, and if too many cats approach the dairy our share of the milk will be found to be very deficient, and we need it badly.

I think I have let the Minister down very lightly, largely because I dislike appearing to blame somebody who, though he has the technical responsibility, is, as we all know, not personally responsible. I hope that when he approaches the new negotiations he will have in mind, first and foremost, that it is necessary that he should have the right team to carry them out. That can be achieved only if there is an elimination of the suspicion which so frequently arises in the minds of Government Departments that people from trades and industries are grinding their axes the whole time. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to believe that the trade will help him in every possible way. The rubber trade has been allowed, in contradistinction to the cotton trade, to have open markets throughout the world, and has done so with conspicuous success, as the Government Department which looks after them—the Bank of England—will confirm. Everything that has been asked has been provided. If the right hon. Gentleman would show confidence in the body put forward by the rubber growers, he will get the best possible advice, in complete confidence and completely disinterested.

Let him equip himself in that way, and remember what the effect in Malaya of his actions will be. In Malaya there is the greatest unrest and uneasiness. The supply of rice is extremely small—much too small. The Minister of Food himself has said that he is very disquieted about it. Four ounces of rice, supplemented by a certain amount of black market rice, is really insufficient. The cost of everything has gone up, and there is great uneasiness from the political point of view, which I am not going into at the moment, because we must eventually have a Debate on it. If the right hon. Gentleman will realise that the prosperity of Malaya, and the consequent relative political calm there, will arise from a better situation in rubber, he will realise that the target he is aiming at is two-fold, not only the securing of the necessary dollars, but the stabilising effect on the only point which is relatively stable in the Far East. All the rest is chaos.

Let him remember, in pressing for a new agreement, that in the maximum amount of raw rubber used as a constituent with synthetic rubber, 10 per cent. of synthetic rubber would, I believe, be nearer the mark, with the increased consumption in America, than 33⅓ per cent. He will never get that. He will probably have to compromise. When he gets opposite his American colleagues in the negotiations—and they are colleagues as well as people sitting on the other side of the table, as they have shown in the negotiations and in the way they have accepted the request to reopen the matter—let him put forward as part of his theme song—and nobody is better than the right hon. Gentleman in cooing like a turtle dove when it is necessary—the facts and reasons in order to show that more production can come from the Dutch East Indies. A higher price will help to stabilise the Dutch East Indies. Other people require dollars, and we must not be dog-in-the-manger about this.

Let him persuade his American colleagues—and I am making an appeal to the American Government and the American public also—that here is a great opportunity, without any new legislation, without any great change and without the slightest harm being done to a single individual in America, for they will be deprived of nothing, to help to fill our larders and keep our workshops going. Out of evil cometh good. The mistake he has made, and the confession he has made in the most winning terms—which would merit absolution, I feel sure, in another world—has brought with it a very great opportunity for the right hon. Gentleman to come back to the House in a short while and say, "We have made a mistake, through not taking the right advice. We have now done the right thing. We have been met most admirably the whole way through. Machinery, production and distribution have helped us. The American Government and factories have fallen into line. We are now able to present a picture in which we are going to get more dollars and pacify the difficult areas in the Far East." If he does that, I will predict for the right hon. Gentleman a triumph equal to the dire confession of failure which he made yesterday.

The subject raised by the hon. Member for Bury (Mr. W. Fletcher) is one of immense importance. I do recognise that he has not raised it in y sense from the personal angle, but from the national angle. I can certainly confirm, if confirmation be necessary, that in all our dealings with him and with the industry we have always had the very closest co-operation and help in anything affecting the national life either in war or in peace.

The hon. Member covered a very wide range of subjects. I am in agreement with a very large part of what he said, and I hope that the value of what he said will not be confined to the few who have been here listening to him or, necessarily, to this country. I hope that the points he has made will be understood in every place and in every country before the negotiations begin. We agree with him about the importance of this subject, not only in its effect on the economy of Malaya and Ceylon, but also as an important and integral part of the sterling area balance with the dollar area. That has been uppermost in our minds throughout the recent negotiations, and will be in the negotiations that are to take place.

As he says, the synthetic rubber industry in the United States was built up very successfully and speedily to meet the military requirements of the Allies immediately after the fall of Malaya. I agree that the view taken by the United States administration on this matter today is far more closely bound up with strategic sites than economic sites, and the decisions which have to be taken must clearly rest with the United States Government and people and Congress, in the light of their feelings about those strategic sites involved. But we ourselves have a direct interest in these decisions, because they will affect the level of consumption of natural rubber in the United States, which accounts for about half of the total world consumption at the present time.

The consumption of G.R.S. is at present maintained through specification controls established in a series of Rubber Orders issued under the President's emergency wartime powers which have been so far extended to the present time. On various occasions, such as the Rubber Study Group meeting in Paris last July, we have taken the opportunity of pressing the United States to reduce their consumption of G.R.S. to the minimum which they consider compatible with their national security. Partly as a result of this pressure the compulsory minimum amounts of G.R.S. to be consumed have been steadily reduced from 55 per cent. of the total of G.R.S. plus natural rubber, in April, to the present level of 33⅓ per cent.

I cannot accept the kind suggestion of the hon. Gentleman that I was not the culprit in so far as there has been a misunderstanding—and there has been. I must take the responsibility, and I do so gladly for what happened at Geneva. Let me at once repudiate the suggestion made in certain quarters that we have had a fast one pulled over us. It was a misunderstanding from start to finish. Quite frankly, we felt that it was difficult to reconcile with the general basis of a multilateral non-discriminatory trade agreement that state of affairs in the field of world rubber consumption. We recognised that, as the hon. Member said, strategic considerations were paramount in this matter. At the same time, we felt that it was fully in accordance with the spirit of the negotiations taking place at Geneva on quotas and all such questions, that we should press for a reduction in the synthetic rubber percentage. We also felt—perhaps this was even more in our minds—that with the gathering dollar crisis it was essential to press hard to get something done there. Throughout the summer we had pressed for a reduction in this percentage. We pressed for a reduction from 33⅓ per cent. to the lowest practicable figure we could get. Indeed, we pressed for the complete withdrawal of the mixing regulations though, as the hon. Gentleman said I doubt whether that was really a starter because of strategic considerations.

Figures such as 10 per cent., 15 per cent., and 20 per cent. have been very much to the fore in the discussions during the summer. I need hardly say that, particularly in the early stages, our, pressure on this was strongly resisted from the American side. In the concluding stages, when certain difficulties had arisen, as the House knows—I shall be making a fuller statement on this after the Recess—on the question of tariffs and preferences, we proposed to the United States Government some limited concessions in return for guaranteed reductions in the American statutory rubber percentage. On this occasion we made it clear, and the point was understood and taken on the other side, that the change we proposed from 33⅓ per cent. to 25 per cent. was on a strictly comparable basis. That point was taken. But, at the same time, the proposal was not acceptable to the United States apparently because of the constitutional difficulty that their Administration could not commit Congress on future legislation. This was a matter requiring legislation.

Some days later, following what seemed to be a deadlock on the tariff versus preference issue, new proposals were worked out literally at the very last minute, and these included a new offer on Colonial preferences from our side. In order to meet the constitutional difficulty to which I have referred, we said that this would be implemented only when the synthetic rubber percentage fell to 25 per cent. and that it would be maintained only for as long as that synthetic rubber percentage was maintained at a. figure not higher than 25 per cent. Naturally, our negotiators put this forward on the assumption that the same definition was being used as had been used up to that time. It was, literally, not until the last minute that these proposals were made. It was not possible to check a form of words with the industry——

How long before the signature was the draft containing the word "reclaimed" put forward? That is the hub of the whole position. A draft was put forward which the Minister said he thought was on a comparable basis to that which they had already discussed. For the first time appear these words including the word "reclaimed." How long was that before the end of the negotiations and, therefore, what opportunity, if the requisite advice had been there, was there for the thing to be put right?

I think that I would want notice of that question, but speaking from memory I think it was in the last two days of the Conference. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman realises that the thing was very much complicated by the fact that, for printing and other reasons, the whole thing was set against a deadline, as the Americans would say, and the thing had to be put in literally in a matter of hours.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether there were rubber experts on the team at Geneva. The answer is that they had been there for most of the summer and then, when the thing had been dropped, they had been withdrawn. The American side at Geneva were also under a genuine misunderstanding on this matter. Using a formula supplied by Washington and based on total rubber consumption, they did not realise that this was different from what we had intended. I would like to stress that this Geneva Agreement, if it had been carried out, would not have led automatically to a decrease in the consumption of natural rubber. What it removes is the hope of the increase for which we were striving.

Also, I would deny that it is a useless Agreement. I think, in itself, it would have been quite valuable. It would have provided a useful insurance against any fall in United States rubber consumption to prewar levels. If ever we are going to see a slump in the United States taking back rubber consumption to anything like, say, the 1939 consumption, then I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would agree that if the American Administration were to insist on an absolute minimum consumption in terms of tonnage—such as, for instance, the 250,000 tons recommended in the Batt Report—that would have a most devasatating effect on the export of natural rubber from Malaya and elsewhere. To the extent that we safeguarded the position against that, it was a definite and useful gain. But that was not what we were hoping to get as a result of these negotiations.

We have taken up the matter with the United States Government and, as I said yesterday, they have been extremely helpful in their approach to the matter. They have stated that they would prefer that the operation of an undertaking based on a misunderstanding should be suspended. Therefore, both concessions on our side and on theirs are to be held over pending the re-negotiation. At present, of course, hearings are being held in Congress on the question of the proposed permanent legislation to govern the future level of synthetic consumption after the Emergency Powers expire in March, 1948. While those hearings are going on, it would be inappropriate for me to say too much in public. We must see how these hearings go, and then proceed to the resumed negotiations to which the hon. Gentleman has referred.

I can assure him that on these resumed negotiations we shall be extremely careful to see that all technical points are fully covered. In fact, I can tell him that as soon as this business arose after the signing of the Agreement at Geneva, I made an offer to the United States Government that we would send over representatives from the Government, including rubber experts, go into the whole business to see whether the difficulties could be smoothed out. Now that the United States Government have agreed to resume negotiations, my proposal to send skilled technicians still stands.

I should also add—because it takes up what I think was the main point of the hon. Gentleman's remarks—that in our most recent approaches to the United States Government we have stressed that there is no single thing that could make a bigger difference to the balance of payments with the dollar area than an extended United States consumption of natural rubber, or, shall we say, extended United States imports of natural rubber whether for the purpose of consumption, stock piling, or anything else. I have noted what the hon. Gentleman said about price. I must confess myself to be in agreement with much of what he said. We have to consider, of course, the comparison between natural rubber prices and the price or cost of producing synthetic rubber; but I think that the points he made are points of great validity.

Finally, to come to the matter that he mentioned about what is going on with the Dutch in the matter of buying up Malayan rubber and selling it in the circumstances which he has described, I must say that I take a very poor view of what has been going on. We have been aware that these transactions have been taking place. We have taken the opportunity of the current discussions with the Netherlands Government to raise the matter with them. I am glad to say that the Netherlands Government agree with our point of view in this matter. I understand that they have already taken steps to put a stop to this trade. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that that is the best way of dealing with this matter rather than attempting to set up the Exchange Control as a policeman, which is not entirely appropriate.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising the matter in so friendly a way. I have given the assurance he asks for in relation to the Dutch transactions and also in relation to the renewed negotiations. I can assure him and through him the rubber growers and the rubber industry that we have this matter very much in our minds both as a means of helping to rebuild the war-shattered Eastern economy and as a means of making an important contribution to the sterling area balance of payments with the dollar area.

I am very glad to have this opportunity of raising this question. I raised it on 2nd December in the form of a Parliamentary Question, but the point which I then pressed I realise now cannot be debated today. On the subject, however, of postwar credits, it became clear from the supplementary questions and answers that the Treasury had not grasped one of the points I was trying to make, and that was in regard to the amount of confusion that exists in the country about the actual position of these postwar credits. I raise the point on behalf of a large number of people from different parts of the country because I have had a considerable correspondence inquiring as to the position of the postwar credits. They are certainly getting the impression from the local taxation officers that they will never be able in any circumstances to draw these credits until they reach the age of 65, or in the case of women 60.

Strangely enough from three different parts of the country I have received letters in almost similar terms stating that the father has died at 62 and his postwar credits have been transferred to the son or daughter. They have made inquiries about the position of those credits, and have been told they cannot draw them until they are 65. This means if they die at 62, 63 or 64 the credits will have to be transferred to their heirs and successors and so on throughout history until one of them survives to 65. I know that that is a completely wrong impression, but it is an impression gained by a large number of people. I hope the Financial Secre- tary will at least make sure that the instructions given to local taxation officers will be sufficiently clear to ensure that these people are able to understand precisely what the position is, because this misunderstanding is giving rise to a great deal of confusion and distress.

There are a large number of people in difficult circumstances from time to time who have big postwar credits standing in their names. I could give many dozens of examples, but I will content myself with one or two. There is one case of a gentleman who has retired from work following a serious operation in 1947, during which time, while he was in hospital, his wife drew nothing more than 18s. a week from the son's wages. The son eventually met with an accident and lost the use of his hands. The wife drew every penny she had in savings to set up a small business. Now the wife has fallen seriously ill, and because of lack of funds has had to close down the business. Another case is that of a gentleman who retired at 59 years of age with no use of his hands following an accident. He now requires special treatment and, having no money to undergo that treatment, he applied to the local taxation officer, and he has come away with the impression that in no circumstances can he draw the postwar credit standing in his name until he or one of his heirs survives beyond 65.

There are other cases of sons coming out of the Army and wanting special educational courses which the parents cannot afford. There are a surprisingly large number of people who have undergone amputations of legs who find the cost of an artificial leg in the region of £30 or £40. The approved society can only give them £7 or £10 towards it, and they do not know where the rest of the money is coming from. They think, "What about the postwar credit I have got of £30 or £40?" They are told they cannot touch that until they are 65, and we can easily imagine the reaction of those people in those circumstances. There are people who have to face large funeral costs and inherit postwar credits. They find that they cannot afford to pay for the funeral and they think they should be able to use the postwar credit for that purpose.

There is one case of a lady whose husband died leaving no assets except his postwar credits, which were for a small sum of £2 or £3. When she asked the position she was told she will have to take out letters of administration to get the money transferred to her, and she then found that the cost of letters of administration were almost as much as the postwar credits and would only leave her a few shillings.

The general position from all the correspondence I have had from persons with low incomes might be summed up as follows: "I am struggling to keep my family on public assistance or a small pension of some kind and just cannot do it. I have postwar credits lying in my name. Why can't I use them?" Apart from these cases there are the special cases of people who are suddenly met with the necessity of a considerable expenditure which they cannot possibly face or cannot meet from any other source. They think they should be entitled to these postwar credits. One of my correspondents sent me a letter which he had from the Inspector of Taxes at Taunton, and I want to read this to the House, because this shows that some Income Tax inspectors try to convey the correct impression to these people. This letter says:

"I much regret that I have no authority to make payment of postwar credit to you. His Majesty's Government have so far made provision for the payments to be made only to women who have reached the age of 60 years and to men of 65 years. I am not permitted to make an exception to this rule."

This inspector says:

"His Majesty's Government have so far made provision …"

That is not the general procedure followed in these letters, but even this letter could have been elaborated a little more to make the position clear to those people and tell them that as soon as the financial position permits, it is the intention of the Government that these credits shall be released in a wider scheme.

There is one other point which should be made clear, in a statement which I hope will be given sufficient publicity—that is, that it is impossible in present financial circumstances to release the whole of the money that would have to be released to meet these postwar credits. I think the figures run into thousands of millions of pounds. When we recollect the enthusiasm and excitement that was caused a few days ago by the Americans deciding to release £100 million of the American credits to this country, and put that in contrast with the thousands of millions of pounds which will be required eventually to pay these postwar credits, one can see something of the enormity of the commitments which the Government have to face at some stage. I do not want to discuss here whether or not it was a sensible thing at the time to establish the system of postwar credits. Certainly, the Government are going to have a serious burden to meet as a result of it.

In view of the restrictions placed upon a discussion on the Adjournment in this House, I am prevented from making any representations to the Chancellor of the Exchequer or to the Financial Secretary in connection with extending the scope of the releases of these credits, but the Government did make a concession some time ago in regard to old age pensioners, which was very much welcomed, though that concession was a discriminatory one made in respect of old people, who might in normal circumstances have little hope of drawing their credits. It left the position that many old age pensioners drew those credits and transferred them immediately to the bank, whereas the fellow next door who was up against it financially found that he could do nothing at all about it.

I would urge upon the Financial Secretary that at least he should see that the position is made perfectly clear to everybody concerned, that it is not a question of waiting until one has reached 65 before there are any credit releases. That is the main point, but I hope he will also give serious consideration to those poor people who, with postwar credits in their name, are from time to time faced with tremendous financial problems, and also that when the time comes for new legislation to be introduced, he will be in a receptive frame of mind.

I do not often find myself in agreement with the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), but on this occasion I want to reinforce from the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield what he has said. I have had instances of the difficulties that arise when aged men die having postwar credits due to them. Indeed, I have a case that has been with the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for nearly a month now, and to which I have not yet had a reply. I should like to take this opportunity of putting the case before him. I would refer him to Section 26 of the Finance Act, 1946, to show that there is no need for an alteration of any law on this subject, so that it can be raised on the Adjournment.

The case concerns a daughter whose father, having some postwar credits due to him, died at the age of 71. Her mother then also died, at the age of 77. The daughter is in very straitened circumstances and is very much in need of the credits. It seems to me that under Section 26 of the Finance Act, 1946, where an application has been made by an old man, it should be possible for his daughter to have his credits. If I am right in that, if that is the proper interpretation of the law, then it seems to me that the Treasury should in this case I have mentioned—and in others like it—see that the postwar credits are paid. The credits were due to the father who died, became due to his widow, who also died, and should now be paid to the daughter. The family's name is Robinson. I hope the Financial Secretary will recollect the case, and that he will give an assurance that in this case, and in others like it, where the person to whom postwar credit is owed has died, it is possible for payment to be made, not through any expensive method—through the payment of fees to solicitors or charges of administration—but by Government prescription through Statutory Rules and Orders, for which provision is made in the Act, saying that payment should be made wherever a case of hardship is made out.

I am sure that if the Government were to accede to this request, it would relieve the anxieties and some of the hardships of a large number of dependants of people to whom postwar credits are due, and would remove any cause for the misapprehension which people have that a recipient of a postwar credit must have reached the age of 65. I do hope that today we shall have from the Financial Secretary to the Treasury an undertaking that this case, and others like it, will receive the sympathetic consideration of the Treasury.

I want to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) on raising this matter today. I want to approach the matter in the spirit in which it has already been approached—the spirit of sympathy with the people concerned and of understanding of the difficulty which faces the Treasury. When money is held in trust, and it has been taken by compulsion, there is an understandable irritation on the part of people who fall on evil days and know that they have these invisible assets. I believe the Treasury could render a very useful service at the present time by giving a little more publicity to their future possible course of action in this regard. There are people who, as my hon. Friend has pointed out, have fallen on evil days. Some of them have fallen on evil days since the war. There are people who have been stricken with blindness; there are people who, due to accidents at work, are crippled; there are people who have lost their hearing. There can scarcely be a Member of this House who has not met or heard of a number of such cases. They are all people with postwar credits.

If the Financial Secretary will issue a general statement that in the near future he hopes to look at these cases, it will be of great help to hon. Members, and will indeed give comfort of mind, if not a more satisfactory remedy, to the people who are in distress. I entirely agree about what has been said from both sides of the House about the passing on of money when the person to whom it is due dies. I have received an example from my own constituency of a person who died leaving a fair amount in postwar credit, but whose heir, or the person who is to administer the estate, unfortunately has to carry all the responsibilities and debts of the deceased without being able to get at his assets. It seems to me absolutely unfair. It is unjust. I hope that the Financial Secretary, when he replies, will hold out a promise that these anomalies which are being revealed in the administration of his work will be wiped away. There can be no excuse, having seen the anomalies, for not removing them.

I think hon. Members on all sides of the House must be grateful to the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) for raising this matter. We are in one little difficulty, that whereas when the postwar credit system was introduced we had as wide a discussion as possible, since then we have had Finance Acts laying down the age at which releases can be made. It is, therefore, a little difficult to discuss the matter now without breaking the rule governing Adjournment Debates, that we must not get on to matters involving legislation. I believe, however, it is possible under Statutory Rules and Orders for some action to be taken in the matter, and it is that point I wish to bring to the Financial Secretary today.

When the postwar credit system was introduced, it so happened that I was one of the Members of the House who were somewhat sceptical about what would be likely to happen after the war. I remember asking whether we should have the credits set off against Income Tax arrears: I said I thought that in many cases we could never succeed in touching the cash. That was repudiated by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury at that time, my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gains-borough (Captain Crookshank). We were assured that none of these nefarious practices would happen. But they are happening now under the present Administration. Already officers who have claims made upon them of debts arising out of their war service are being told that they can be set off against postwar credits. That is already beginning to arise in the Departmental Claims Branch, which I believe is situated in the constituency of the hon. Member for Central Cardiff (Mr. G. Thomas). That is by the way.

What the hon. Member for Attercliffe wants, I gather, is more flexible administration—that it should be not so much a matter of age as that these credits should be released on grounds of hardship. It is surprising how often we get back to this subject in Parliamentary discussion, for what we are really getting at once again is a test of need in these matters. If Lord Nuffield passes the allotted span he can draw his postwar credit, whereas a man of 55 years of age suffering from some grave disability—not incurred originally, perhaps, through hostilities—is unable to draw his postwar credit.

I am a great believer in getting back to first principles. The whole conception of postwar credits was that they were a nest egg for use in the very period through which we are now passing, the period of postwar reconstruction, but a nest egg is not much good if you cannot take advantage of it when you are most hardly pressed financially. The right hon. Gentleman will be in the same difficulty as we are in discussing legislation, but it would be in Order for him to say that he will examine the machinery which is open to him, that is Statutory Rules and Orders. That is a system which we have often been criticising, but it is a system which we might take advantage of this afternoon. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will convey to the Chancellor of the Exchequer the unanimous opinion which has been expressed on both sides of the House that this matter should be re-examined. In view of the season which is now approaching, this would be a very suitable occasion for the Treasury to take a more charitable view of these cases of hardship among our constituents which are brought to the attention of the Department by their representatives in this House.

I also wish to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) for having raised this interesting and important question. I am certain, from the correspondence I have received, that there is a good deal of confusion in the mind of the public in regard to the principles which operate in the payment of these credits. I am sure that this Debate and the reply from the Financial Secretary will help a large number of us to understand a little more clearly what are the conditions of payment, and what are the possibilities of payment, in the difficult cases which have been mentioned from all sides this afternoon. I have had a good deal of correspondence, like other hon. Members, on this subject. Many people are assuming that no one at any time will be paid their postwar credits until the age of 65 in the case of men, and 70 in the case of women. Constituents of mine have been writing to me asking why they should have to wait 10 or 20 years before being able to enjoy their own savings.

The general reason for non-payment of postwar credits is certainly appreciated by all hon. Members. It is agreed that it would be very stupid economically to release large slices of purchasing power until there are far more consumer goods on the home market. To pay now would merely add considerably to the inflationary pressure, and it would force up prices. At least that would be the effect unless price control was extended to many fields not now covered. That is understood in this House. But if there is one failure in connection with Government Departments, it is on the public relations side. I should have thought that it would have been possible to state from time to time in the Press the reasons why it would be undesirable to make general payments of postwar credits. If people understood the reasons, they would be a little better able to bear the hardship and put up with the inconvenience of non-payment of postwar credits. That would deal with general principles now we have the cases of acute hardship.

I assume that the Treasury know full well about these difficult cases, but it is the duty of back benchers constantly to bring them to the notice of the Government so that they are not overlooked, or it is thought that Members are satisfied to let the matter drop. Several widowed ladies have written to me on the subject. They feel that they are entitled to the savings of their husbands to meet the extra commitments which result from the death of their husbands. There is one case—a constituent of mine—of a widowed lady of 57 years of age, who has little to live on except the few savings of her husband. At that age she cannot go out to work, having left industry over 30 years ago. If she could obtain part payment of the fairly substantial savings of her husband, it would make a great difference. I have another case of a man of 58 whose health suddenly deteriorated. He was engaged in business on his own account, and therefore, he was not covered by adequate insurance. Owing to the fairly prosperous nature of his business, he accumulated a fairly substantial amount of postwar credit savings.

If something could be done to meet these types of cases, it would give relief to these very deserving people. It should not add to our general inflationary difficulties, because the number of cases cannot be very large. I am sure that if payment were made in these cases, it would not upset our plans in regard to our economic affairs. It would be out of Order for me to suggest how these matters can be overcome, but as a member of two great Departments of State during the war, I learned that there were few regulations which could not be intelligently interpreted—I will not say "got round." We know that the benign exterior of the Financial Secretary is matched with a benign heart. We know how deeply he feels about these questions. With the goodwill of the Treasury officials, I am certain that some way can be found to meet these difficult cases.

The Financial Secretary will remember that I raised this question in March, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer told me that an opportunity would be given at a later date for discussing this matter. That later date was on the Finance Bill, when my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble) and myself put down an Amendment. That Amendment was not called, but we discussed the matter on Clause II standing part of the Bill. The general impression was that notice was going to be taken of the views we expressed. It is quite obvious that, some action should be taken to meet these cases of hardship. A case has been brought to my notice of a man who died at the age of 64. His estate consisted only of his postwar credits, and these fell to his daughter who was not in very good financial circumstances. Notwithstanding the costs of the funeral, this woman has to wait until she attains the age of 60 years before she can draw these postwar credits. I think I am right in saying that if a man dies at the age of 64, his beneficiaries are not entitled to draw the postwar credit until the age of 60, if a woman, and 65, if a man. It is unfair for the State to keep this money for 20 or 30 years, and the very least the State should do is to pay interest on the credits outstanding. I hope that, in view of what has been said, the Financial Secretary will have some good news to tell us which we can take back to those constituents of ours who are suffering under this disability.

I intervene for two minutes to support the plea of hon. Members who have made out this case for the revision of postwar credits. I wish to stress the fact that I represent a constituency where workers in two particular industries—namely, the ship repair workers and dock workers—worked at the fullest pitch throughout the war. They were of the ages of 55 to 60 and they have now reached 62, 63 or 64; many of them have now fallen by the wayside or are ill. I would like to see the return of their postwar credits because I feel it would be very pleasing to them on this occasion. If my right hon. Friend can convey to the Minister a message in order to get him to understand the position, the Government may come to some arrangement whereby these postwar credits can be returned in special cases. This is a season of peace on earth and goodwill towards all men. I would like to ask my right hon. Friend if he will take these facts into consideration and see what can possibly be done.

I believe that there has been some doubt as to whether the subject introduced by the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. Hynd) is in Order. I would like to compliment him and other hon. Members on the way they have apparently got around the rule over and over again, in order to get over the point which has obviously been worrying Members. I am very well aware of their case. Each week I receive a large number of letters on the subject. The hon. Member for Attercliffe gave no real evidence, if I may say so, to support his contention that people do not generally understand that, because at the moment under the law only a woman who has reached the age of 60 or a man who has reached the age of 65 can get their credits——

The only reason I did not give evidence was the time factor, but I have in my hand many letters.

From the one letter he did quote, it is evident that the inspector made the matter quite plain by use of the words "so far." That payment can, at present, only be made to old people is, of course, the rule. Indeed, it is the law. It is not fixed by Statutory Rule and Order, it is fixed by Act of Par- liament. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has no authority whatever to pay postwar credits to any woman under the age of 60, or to any man under the age of 65. That does not mean to say—and I think that the Chancellor and I have explained this on various occasions when discussing the Finance Bill—that people will have to wait until that age. It is our hope, and I trust more than a hope, that in due time we shall work down the age scale until everybody has had his postwar credits paid to him, not because he has reached the age of 65 but because he has reached the age laid down at that particular time.

If the right hon. Gentleman will refer to Section 26 of the Finance Act of 1946 he will see it says:

"Written application made in such a form as the Commissioners may require."

That means it is not laid down in the Act. Under Subsection (5) the Treasury may make regulations to carry this regulation into effect and may say that the application should be in writing by a man who is due to it over the age of 65, and that would be sufficient to entitle him to receive the credits whether he dies or lives.

That is exactly what happens. Regulations have been made and rules laid down as to the form in which the application should be made. The Treasury is acting on these words. It is definitely laid down that the form in which the application is to be made is a printed form which can be obtained from the Post Office. May I, at this juncture, deal with the case of Miss Robinson, which was raised, I think, by the hon. Member for Ecclesall (Mr. P. Roberts)? I take it that the case did come to me, and not to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, whom he mentioned. If so, I can assure him that if the father or the mother, both of whom I gather are now dead, made application, their postwar credit will be paid to the daughter, whatever her age may be. But if they did not actually physically apply for it and if Miss Robinson is not at the moment 60 years old, she will not receive it until her turn comes round. The application must have been made and, if has not been made, it falls into the estate and cannot be drawn at the moment. We cannot go beyond that at this juncture.

What is the reason for all this? There are—as I think the hon. and gallant Member for Holderness (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) said—something like £800 million due to those entitled to postwar credits. That is a pretty considerable sum and I may say in passing to my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe, the fact that we were all delighted when the last £100 million of the dollar loan was liberated is not really relative to this particular matter. There we are dealing with a dollar shortage. Here we are dealing with something entirely different.

I was merely quoting that figure to show the enormity of the Government's commitments because of the hundreds of million pounds involved.

Eight hundred million pounds is a large sum and there are three reasons why it cannot all be liberated at once. First, it would lead to the sort of inflationary pressure to which we have referred. Secondly, the Inland Revenue Department have not sufficient staff at this moment to deal with the volume of work that would occur in distributing such an amount at once to the millions who are entitled to it. Therefore the question of the method of repayment arose during 1946. A good deal of pressure was brought to bear on my right hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) who was then Chancellor of the Ex-chequer, and the following reasonable argument was raised: "If all the money cannot be liberated, cannot we do something for those who are not likely to live to enjoy this money, if payment is not made until some years to come?" It was on these grounds alone and not on grounds of hardship that it seemed right to repay credits to old people. Therefore, the then Chancellor said "All right. We will pay old age pensioners, women of over 60 and men of over 65. Let them have it now."

He began by giving them postwar credits for three years. In the last Finance Bill, the final years were added. Old age pensioners are now in the process of receiving the whole of the credits due to them. It may be for the Chancellor of the Exchequer next year, or in future years, to consider whether he can move down the age scale and perhaps pay people between 55 and 60 or even between 50 and 60—I do not know. It seems to me that it would be best to work down the scale so that the staff are not overloaded and so that we can keep down the inflationary pressure. The Inland Revenue will then be able to cope with it.

May I ask this question, which is very important? Are we to understand that the Government are firmly wedded to the criterion of age in this matter and that matters of hardship or personal circumstances are not entering into consideration?

I was coming to that. I began by saying that most of the speeches have considered this problem on hardship grounds. The hon. Member for Attercliffe said that there was great misunderstanding on the part of people as to whether they had to wait till the age of 60 or 65 to get their postwar credits. He went on to deal almost exclusively with cases of hardship. The question of hardship was put over and over again during the Debates on the Finance Bill. It was then said by me and by the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer that the difficulty of paying postwar credit on hardship grounds was to decide what is hardship. How hard has hardship to be, before one can decide that it is hard enough to give a particular person his or her postwar credit? Who is to decide? If it is left—as it would have to be, so it seems to me—to an official to decide, what official is to make the decision? How would we deal with the thousands of cases that would immediately come forward? Should we, in all cases, pay postwar credit because some one had died and the money was wanted to meet the funeral expenses? Should we pay it if a man or wife fell ill and had to go into hospital and incur certain expenses? Should we pay it if the wife of a man was expecting another child and there was financial stringency?

On what grounds should we judge hardship? That is the difficulty which the Treasury is up against in this matter. We realise, none better, how people feel about this. They know that they have the money due to them, but they do not know when they will receive it. They say, "If I had that money, now I could open a shop or pay a doctors bill, or do this, or do that." We realise how they feel, but we cannot legislate for feelings. Most of us are hard up at some time or another. Most of us want to draw money which we feel is ours, and we make efforts to get hold of it. When we come to distribute money set aside during the war as a nest egg for more normal times, we have to lay down rules and regulations which can be easily applied and do not create more anomalies than we are trying to cure.

What objection is there to realising upon postwar credits in the case of a person who has to rely upon public assistance? There we have the machinery set up which measures the need.

Why should we pick out those people and no one else?

My right hon. Friend asked for a test of hardship.

If we gave way to the pressure exerted and met cases on grounds of hardship in addition to age, the anomalies we should create, and the dissatisfaction caused, would, I think, be very great. Many people would have a natural feeling that they had been badly used. When we are dealing with public money or are distributing from the public purse money withheld at some earlier time, we must do it on a system that is simple and reasonable, and which all people will accept as being fair in the circumstances.

The right hon. Gentleman shook his head when I suggested that a beneficiary had to wait until she or he became 60 or 65 before being entitled to draw postwar credit. I mentioned the case where a holder of postwar credit dies at 64 and his daughter has to wait 30 years before she can draw the money.

The point made is if a man of 64 dies, his daughter who is 30 should be allowed to draw his postwar credit purely on the grounds that he was only one year off being able to draw it himself. The whole point of paying postwar credit to people of 65 or 60 was on the grounds of age. Therefore, it is the beneficiary we should look at when we come to decide what should or should not be paid out at this juncture. There is no reason why a woman of 30 should receive a postwar credit, which would have come to her father had he lived, be- cause of the accident that her father happened to die. There is no reason why one person of 30 should get it and not another. There might be a reason for a person of 30 getting it on the grounds of hardship, if a test for hardship could be found; but no ground exists for giving it to such a person merely because the father or mother had died and would have got a postwar credit if he or she had lived a year longer.

I hope that the House will realise the difficulty of my right hon. Friend in this matter. Next April, we shall probably be able to discuss this matter again. As the law stands, postwar credit is paid to a woman of over 60 and to a man of over 65. It is our view, and I think it is a reasonable one, that we should judge this by no other test, and issue no regulations which would permit these credits to be paid on hardship grounds. This would lead us into very great difficulties; and, instead of finding that the House was satisfied, we should find hon. Members in all quarters would be coming to us with case after case in which, in their view, great hardship had occurred.

The right hon. Gentleman is not the Father Christmas we hoped he was going to be.

The subject which I have the opportunity of raising this afternoon is one which I intended to bring forward in August last, before we left for the Summer Recess, but owing to the absence at that time of the Secretary of State for War on duty overseas, I was not able to do so.

The subject concerns deserters, but I need not touch on more than one particular aspect of desertion. To illustrate my point, I will give a particular case from my own constituency. There was a private soldier in a Highland Regiment, whose name I will not mention, because he is dead, and the parents would not wish undue publicity. It is the principle that matters. This man was tried by a court martial during the war for desertion. He was found guilty and sentenced, and, under the existing regulations, if a man is found guilty of desertion, he forfeits his right to pension and gratuity, unless he can do six months' exemplary service, and thereby regain those privileges. In this case, the boy did three months of the necessary six months' exemplary service, and was then killed in action in Normandy. When the question of his gratuity arose, his parents were informed, very curtly, that, as their son was a deserter and had not carried out six months' exemplary service, they were not entitled to his gratuity. It seems almost impossible to believe that such a statement could be put forward by a Government Department. What it amounts to is that, in the opinion of the Treasury—and it is purely a Treasury matter——

No.

The right hon. Gentleman says "No," but if the Treasury does not deal with the money, I do not know who does. Ultimately, we know that it is "F" branch in the War Office which makes this decision, and "F" branch is an offshoot of the Treasury. I have served long enough at the War Office to know what "F" branch is like. The point is this: In the opinion—to save argument I will say—of those competent to decide, six months' exemplary service in barracks at home is of greater importance than a man laying down his life for his country. That is the effect of this decision. I am sorry that the Financial Secretary has gone out. The responsibility is still that of his Department, because it is a matter of the pay warrant. In the interests of justice and fair human decency, I want him to put this man back upon what we might call the roll of honour.

At the moment, the family of this man feel it very keenly that the slur of deserter has been put upon their son. I hold no brief for deserters, but this fellow was not the type of deserter who is now hiding in thousands in London and other big cities. He had his opportunity to redeem himself completely and he took it. He went out to Normandy and was killed in face of the enemy. I beg that this matter may be given proper consideration. The former Secretary of State for War said he had given instructions that the Treasury should be immediately approached. He was hoping that the point which I raised would be met immediately. That was in August last.

I am not trying to intimidate the Minister in any way or to make it awkward for him, by recalling what happened. The point I have in mind could be very quickly settled. It could have been settled long before December. I want it to be clearly established that the Government admit that a great mistake has been made and that a man who has died for his country in war, has done as much as a man who has carried out six months' exemplary service in barracks at home. After all, that is the real test of this matter. If I may put it this way, I want it to be laid down that, while restrictions such as forfeiture of service and rights relating to pension and gratuity are no doubt justified, where a man is unable, because of his death in action, to complete the necessary six months, it shall be automatically agreed that he has redeemed himself and shall be entitled to restoration of all his rights under the regulations. His family would at least know that their son, in this case having made the supreme sacrifice, no longer had the slur of deserter upon him.

I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Perth (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) on raising this matter and on doing so in such moving and human terms. It is a very real problem. It appears that some restitution ought to be made by the War Office to the memory of this man who tried to redeem himself, and to his family, who must be suffering a great deal of distress because of the stigma still attached to the name of the dead man. That man is still listed as a deserter.

Might I interrupt my hon. Friend on that point? The man is not listed as a deserter. The case which has been raised by the hon. and gallant Member opposite is of a man who has purged his sentence, because he did punishment, and then died on active service.

Do I understand that he is not officially and technically regarded as a deserter?

Perhaps I might say that this is a case of suspended sentence. The man is still regarded as a deserter and that is the reason his parents are not given the gratuity. I am afraid that the slur is still there.

I will deal with the point later.

I hope that the Financial Secretary will try to clarify the matter. It appears from his interjection that he is sympathetic and does not think that a man who has died for his country should still have the slur of deserter attached to him. It seems to be indicated that in my hon. Friend's Department and in the Service Departments generally, a certain amount of human understanding and feeling must be lacking. Nobody denies that disciplinary considerations must be borne in mind at all times, but when I look at the general subject of deserters, I feel that some committee ought to be set up by the Service Departments, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence or somebody whom he cares to nominate, to look anew into the whole question from every possible aspect.

I hope the House will not object to my broaching the general subject of deserters. It is one upon which I have been most anxious for over a year. I have approached the Minister of Defence about it on numerous occasions. Perhaps it is not altogether inappropriate that the Under-Secretary of State for War is present today. In the main, because of the numbers in that Service, the deserters come mostly from the Army. I hope later to quote from King's Regulations and the Army Act on this matter. The main objections on the general subject seem to he, as far as I can summarise them, that any relaxation of treatment to men listed as deserters would be unfair to men who are serving and unfair to the country at large, and that such a relaxation of treatment would be resented. I submit that if that is the view of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence or of the Under-Secretary, it shows that those Ministers do not correctly read the reaction of the public at large.

I have already alluded to the disciplinary considerations. Nobody can deny that we should maintain discipline. For that reason I have never yet asked for a complete amnesty. In view of the considerations which arise out of the Minister's objections, I would like to break the matter down into detail, quite briefly. If there is an objection on the ground that the discipline and morale of serving men would be affected, I would reply that discipline and morale can never be maintained simply by penal methods. Obviously, with the present figure of 690 desertions per month, the figure which was given me by the Minister of Defence, the problem has not yet been solved by the punitive and harsh outlook which we have known in the past.

Secondly, if the argument is advanced that to grant relaxation now would be unfair to those who have already been punished for desertion, I say that it is fantastic. The parallel would be for those hon. Members who are engaged in Committee upon the Criminal Justice Bill to argue that abolition of the death penalty would be unfair to those who have already been hanged. Soldiers who are already serving their sentences, or carrying out their full-time obligations in the Forces, are, I am sure, cognisant of the hardship which is caused to men who are deserters and who have sometimes been forced to become deserters through no fault of their own. There is no ill-feeling or vindictiveness among the men. They would be very happy and relieved if their wartime mates and colleagues were given less severe sentences or treatment.

A third reason which is advanced is that relaxation of treatment of deserters would be unfair to men who have not yet finished their time of service. I am not asking for that kind of thing. I am only asking that deserters should be allowed to return to the Service and fulfil their obligation upon the age and service basis and not be made to stand their trial and then be sent to prison, as a pre-condition of completion of service. If it is said that on moral grounds deserters should not receive preferential treatment over other offenders, there is every moral ground why no chance should be lost of getting men back to a normal life instead of a life of crime. There is a great opportunity here for the Government to make some gesture to this body of men who, after all, comprise a very small minority of the numbers who served in the Forces. Indeed, there is a moral obligation on the Government to make this gesture.

When I raised this matter in an Adjournment Debate in May, I mentioned that Canada had granted a complete amnesty to "hostilities only" personnel. I have since written to the authorities in Canada—I have not yet had a reply—inquiring as to the effect of that amnesty on current discipline, and any other considerations they might offer. I have since learned that an amnesty has been granted to personnel in South Africa and India. I am not asking for an amnesty, but a relaxation. If there were a relaxation we should surely avoid the difficulties which are bound to be created as time goes on? Men who are living by their wits are bound to be forced into a life of crime. I referred earlier to the Report of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and the fact that 9 per cent. of indictable crime could be traced to deserters. No mention was made of the amount of crime not traced to anybody because the criminal offenders have not been detected.

Here is the solution I suggest. I recently asked the Minister of Defence whether a sentence of imprisonment imposed on a man could be suspended subject to his good behaviour if he fulfils his obligations under the age and service scheme, but when the Minister of Defence categorically replied, "No," I went back to some researches I had earlier made into King's Regulations. I must again refer to them. King's Regulations 636–640 would allow ample discretion to be used by the competent military authority to do away with a trial and to allow a man back into the Service to fulfil his military obligations. Having to stand trial is a deterrent to most men who might at the moment be "on the run." Section 73 (1) of the Army Act says:

"Where a soldier signs a confession that he has been guilty of desertion or fraudulent enlistment, a competent military authority may, by the order dispensing with his trial by a court-martial, or by any subsequent order, award the same forfeitures and the same deductions from pay (if any) as a court-martial could award for the said offence, or as are consequential upon conviction by a court-martial for the said offence, except such of them as may be mentioned in the order."

It will be noticed that the operative word is "may" not "shall" and therefore it would be within the discretion of the competent military authority to impose either forfeitures or other penalties on the man or not. My researches lead me to believe that this was the method used after the last war when Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, then Secretary of State for War, referred to this method and to King's Regulations. I believe that this is the only way in which we can solve the problem of deserters. I hope that my words will lead to further inquiries in the Service Departments, particularly the War Office, which is in the main concerned with the problem of deserters. I ask that at this Christmas season of good will towards all men, those of us who are going home to our Christmas table should spare a thought for some of the men who may have to creep stealthily home to rejoin their loved ones. It may be that these grounds of sentiment are not those calculated to appeal to my hon. Friend, but this is a really vital problem. I hope to press this matter again, and I hope that my hon. Friend, although he cannot reply to me on this issue and must deal with that raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Perth, will have the matter investigated in his Department, possibly in co-operation with other Departments, so that ultimately some radical solution may be arrived at.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stretford (Mr. Austin) has ranged over the whole field of the treatment of deserters and he will appreciate that if I am to do justice to the point raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Perth (Colonel Gomme-Duncan), I can only make a few brief remarks on the general position he has disclosed. On that, I should not accept his general view that the War Office or the Service Departments generally have been inclined to take a harsh and unyielding view of this problem. Indeed, at various times successive concessions have been made with regard to the treatment of deserters.

When there is the actual question of trial and imposition of penalty, a genuine attempt is made to consider the circumstances that led to the desertion for, as we know, a deserter may be a person who has no sense of his obligation to the community and has no intention of performing his duty if he can avoid it, or he may be somebody driven by circumstances, perhaps of extreme domestic hardship, to forget the strict letter of his obligation to the State. So we attempt, in procedure of trial and court martial and in the consideration of sentence, to discriminate between the different types of deserter. There is, further, the procedure for the periodic review of sentence, for the suspending and remission of sentence, all of which are aimed at trying to get a humane and just solution to this problem and, on the question of laying down the conditions under which forfeited service may be restored, there have also been successive concessions.

Therefore, I would not accept my hon. Friend's apparent suggestion that the Service Departments have been harsh and unyielding over this question, and although my hon. Friend is correct in saying that discipline cannot be maintained solely by punitive measures, we must also accept the position that it cannot be maintained at all without the help of punitive measures, and that there must normally be some penalty for the crime of desertion, although we have endeavoured to mitigate that penalty and to moderate it in view of the circumstances Which may have led to desertion, in the case of each individual. For the rest, I will bring my hon. Friend's observations on the question of desertion to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence.

Now if I may take up the problem raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Perth, there was, if he will allow me to say so, one small inaccuracy in his statement of the position. He referred on several occasions to a period of six months. It should have been 12 months. If I may describe the position by example, it will be clear to the House, I think. In order to get a gratuity at all, a man must have at least six months reckonable service within the relevant period, that is to say, the period from the beginning of the war to August, 1946. Let us suppose that a man serves for two years, then deserts, is caught, is tried, is sentenced, serves his sentence or, possibly, has some part of it suspended or remitted and comes out again to begin his service afresh. His two years' service prior to the desertion is forfeited and, when he comes out, he has no reckonable service to his credit. If he then does less than six months service, he is not entitled to any war gratuity. If he does more than six months, but less than 12 months, he will be entitled to gratuity for such service as he rendered after he came out, but he will not have had his forfeited service restored. In order to get his forfeited service restored, he must have 12 months' service after he has served his sentence, or detention. It is not balancing up with the man who has been killed or a man serving six months in barracks at home; it is 12 months.

The hon. and gallant Member mentioned a particular case which was the subject of Question and answer in the House, on which naturally he said he did not wish to mention the name of the person involved. The case is well known to him, and to me. Regret has already been expressed for the unfortunate manner in which the information was conveyed to the parents, and on behalf of the War Office I wish to repeat and emphasise that regret. I wish to turn to the way in which the War Office approached the question, following representations made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman arising from this case. We were sufficiently impressed with the arguments adduced by the hon. and gallant Gentleman to feel that we ought to consult with the other Service Departments on the matter, but I am obliged to tell the House that after consultation and after the most careful consideration of the issues involved, we felt it would not be right to press for this further concession.

My right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury was quite correct in saying that this problem should not be laid at his door. It was felt by the Service Departments that we could not put responsibility on the Treasury for a case of this kind. Few Government Departments would not secretly like to lay responsibility for this, that, or the other complaint at the door of the Treasury, but I am bound to say that in this case it was a decision reached after full consideration by the three Service Departments.

Let us consider the difficulties involved. We were being asked to say that forfeited service—service done before the crime of desertion was committed—should be restored in the event of the death of the man in a way attributable to his war service, if the death occurred before he had had time to do the 12 months' exemplary service and get his previous service restored. We were asked to do that so that the previous service might count for gratuity. If we were to make this concession, the result would be that in certain cases a gratuity would become payable to the heirs of the Service man, which is not at present payable.

Does the hon. Gentleman draw a distinction between killed in action, or died of wounds received in action, and death on active service? There is a distinction.

We considered whether a distinction should properly be drawn, and came to the conclusion that one of the reasons against the concession would be the extreme difficulty in drawing a line between death caused by the enemy, or by wounds, and death on active service. At all events, it is the experience of the Ministry of Pensions that this question of the degree of attributability of death is one of the most vexed and difficult questions. I will return to that point in a moment.

What we are saying is that we do not feel that this service ought to be restored for the purposes of gratuity. We are not attempting to pronounce any moral judgment on a man who may be killed in those circumstances. What we were obliged to say in the particular case to which the hon. and gallant Member has referred, was that, in fact, this man had been a deserter, had been sentenced, that the sentence had been suspended and that not long after that he was killed. It was not for the War Office, or, in my view, for anyone to pronounce any moral judgment on that man or upon others in a similar position. We were only stating the inevitable facts as they had occurred. The decision to grant the concession which is now asked for would not alter the moral situation. It would not be any fresh judgment on the guilt or merit of any particular man; it would be solely a decision on a financial matter as to the circumstances in which certain service could be counted for the purposes of gratuity.

I said that I would mention the obstacles and difficulties which we would come up against if we tried to grant this concession. It is suggested that we should say that if a man is killed in action against the enemy, or dies of wounds, and death is directly attributable to his active service, we ought then to restore the forfeited service. But what of the position of a man who is seriously injured in action against the enemy, and is invalided out of the Service before he can complete the 12 months' exemplary service? Are we to say, "If you had been wounded and subsequently died, your heirs would have got a gratuity, but as you were wounded and invalided out before the 12 months were completed, you do not get that gratuity"? If we did that we should be creating an even greater anomaly than that which exists at present. We must notice that throughout this matter, and in all similar matters, the problem is the vexed one of where to draw the line, of what rules or regulations to make which will create the minimum number of anomalies.

I would admit that the regulation, as it stands at present, is bound to give rise to a certain number of cases which we cannot but look at with distress and regret, but it is my contention that if we altered the regulation in the way suggested, the number of such cases would not be decreased but increased. We should, for example, as I said, have the case of the man invalided out of the Service who might, after he had come out after serving a sentence for desertion, have served honorably and creditably, and been wounded and invalided out of the Service, being for that reason unable to complete the 12 months.

There is the point to which I have referred in reply to an intervention, that if we say that service is to be restored when death is directly caused by active service, as in the case of being killed on the battlefield or dying from wounds, but that we shall not restore it where the man simply dies during the period of service, we open the door to all those difficult arguments about the degree of attributability of death to war service. That, in my view, is likely to give us even more arguable cases and even more distressing situations than are likely to arise at the present time.

Then, further, let us consider the position of the man who comes out, after serving his sentence for desertion, and does not have an exemplary record to begin with, and, possibly goes on for 12 months or more with a record chequered with offences of several kinds. Then he has, say, three months' good service, and at the end of that three months he is killed. Are we to say that, in that case, the gratuity is to be restored? There is also the case of men who have never had an opportunity of completing six months' service, because they were killed in the first six months of their service. Such cases are not very common, but we must remember that the total number of men with whom we are dealing in this problem is not very great.

There has been from time to time pressure that we should grant a gratuity where a man was killed before he had had time to complete six months' service at all. If we grant that concession, it seems to me the case for granting the other concession is made a great deal stronger. There are some unhappy cases where, in the opinion of the Service Department, the man is a deserter, but where his relatives are strongly convinced that, as he has never since appeared, he has, in fact, been killed. All those cases would be again re-opened if these concessions were made. Moreover, we are, in any case, only able to grant those concessions in cases where the matter is taken up by the relatives, or brought to our notice, and we could not hope to deal with the whole of the problem. We did consider all the obstacles and difficulties, and we came to the conclusion that, in the first place, we have not been unreasonable about this question of restoring forfeited service. We had, indeed, already mitigated the circumstances under which forfeited service may he restored, on more than one occasion. We were being asked to make a further mitigation which would create more anomalies and injustices than it would cure. It was also a concession which would not benefit the Service man himself.

The final consideration that weighed with us was that the primary purpose of a gratuity is to enable an ex-Service man to resettle himself in civilian life. Since this is a concession asked in cases where a Service man has been killed, it cannot he said that he would benefit, and the gratuity would not serve the primary purpose for which gratuities were intended. It could only be a payment to a family. We were being asked, therefore, to pay to the heirs of a Service man an award to which he was not, in fact, entitled at the time of death, and in doing so, to open the door to any number of conflicting claims and actually to increase the number of anomalies and injustices that might arise. I would ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman therefore to believe that it was not hurriedly but after the most careful consideration of all the issues involved that we came, with genuine regret, to the conclusion that it would not be wise or just, or in the public interest, to make this concession.

This is really a very disturbing reply. I ask the Minister whether he realises that this slur of desertion—apart from the actual cash—still exists, in writing, from the War Office? Does he still wish this slur of desertion to stay on with the lad, and his family, apart from the money? Secondly, I ask whether this is not an action which is in compliance with the principle of administrative convenience as opposed to justice? It seems to me that it is.

On that last point of administrative convenience as opposed to justice, I would say that we are being asked here not for strict justice, but for a concession of clemency and mercy. I think that should be remembered. Indeed, there is every reason why we should be asked. The claim cannot be put forward as one of strict justice and nothing more. We are being asked to go further along the path of concession and compassion. We should be glad to do so if we believed that it would result in fairer treatment all round.

I think that there is something more in it than administrative convenience. What is involved is the soundness of administrative principle, the desire to see, that we proceed on solid principles and not in a casual manner which might lead to favouritism. On the point of the slur, I am not quite clear. If it were said in the letter that this man was a deserter; then I would agree, but it is, perhaps, a question of the grammar and the mere tense of the verb. It is true that the man was a deserter. Nothing can alter that fact. But we certainly admit that this man returned to service when the sentence was suspended, served honourably, and died in the service of his country. I will very gladly consider any action that we might take which might make that more clear to the parents. I am sorry that we cannot make the financial concession. I believe that the reasons we cannot make it are sound. I will certainly look into the matter to see if there is any action we might take which would remove any suggestion from the minds of the parents that we are not fully appreciative of the ultimate high service rendered by this man to his country.

The question I wish to raise is that of the importance and efficiency of the foreign broadcasts of the B.B.C. with special reference to the Central European service, which covers Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to the Eastern European service, including Russia, which also covers Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. I hope that hon. Members will agree that this is an extremely important question of a non-party nature. Significance is added to this question by the breakdown of the Four-Power Conference and by the current rumour, which started as a whisper and which is now developing into a shout, that the already inadequate Treasury grant to the B.B.C. is likely to be cut by an arbitrary 10 per cent.

The first question that I wish to ask the Minister of State is whether or not a cut is contemplated. Does the Foreign Office accept the fact that the efficiency of these services very seriously affects British foreign policy? The present Treasury grant for all the overseas services of the B.B.C. is £4,400,000, of which £1,400,000 is devoted to the European service itself. Those who have recent contacts with the B.B.C. will agree that financially it is at rock bottom and that its efficiency would be gravely impaired by lack of funds were this 10 per cent. cut to be made.

The next question I wish to ask is whether the Minister will give the House a fuller explanation of the extent to which the B.B.C. does not enjoy its full revenue under the licence granted to it by this House. To put it another way, how does it some about that out of every £1 granted to the B.B.C., a certain proportion gets, so to speak, lost in the post between the Treasury and the B.B.C. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth (Mr. Bracken) drew most pointed attention to this matter last February during the Debate on the B.B.C. Will the Minister say whether the Foreign Office is satisfied that this is a sensible arrangement?

I also wish to say a few words about the value of these broadcasts to foreign countries. During the last 18 months I have had the opportunity of visiting Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and other countries. I came back fully convinced that the habit of listening to these broadcasts which grew up during the war is a habit which has stuck. Not only do people listen to them but they pass on the news to their friends in a very short space of time. I was recently reading the "New York Herald-Tribune" and I saw what I believe to be a reliable figure that there are in the neighbourhood of 2,342,000 short-wave receivers in Eastern Europe at this particular moment. That seems to discount stories put about that very small numbers of people ever hear these broadcasts.

I should like to make it quite clear that the criticisms I propose to make do not in any way detract from the fact that I am well aware of the very high quality in general of these broadcasts, and of the hard work which goes into producing them. But mistakes have been made, and one of them is fundamental to this whole issue. Since VE-Day the huge Communist-controlled network of radio stations has sent out a torrent of anti-British, or, if it is preferred, anti-democratic abuse and propaganda apparently on the principle that the bigger the lie the better, and the more often it is told the better. Radio for the Russians has been one of the chief means by which they have sought to spread the principles and ambitions of international Communism with its undisguised plan for world revolution, resulting in the destruction of the Christian way of life.

The B.B.C. in contrast has deliberately avoided taking sides. It has been most careful not, in its own words, "to interfere in the internal workings of any of those countries" to which it directs its broadcasts. This means they have not faced up to the facts which are staring them in the face, and those facts which are staring them in the face have surely been underlined by the recent establishments of the tactical headquarters of international Communism in the shape of Cominform in Belgrade. There are several sections in Cominform, of which the fourth is the propaganda section, whose object in life is to co-ordinate and make more efficient the whole propaganda output of international Communism through the means of the radio and the Press.

The B.B.C. and the Voice of America—which is the equivalent of the B.B.C. foreign broadcasts, only put out, of course, from the United States—are the only sources of truth—I wish to emphasise this—the only sources of truth for the inhabitants of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. That is emphasised by the fact that in those countries there is a violent Press censorship which ensures that only Communist news and Communist views are read by the populations of those regions; and by the fact, so far as the radio is concerned, that in most villages in those countries—and I have been to many of them, as I have said—loudspeakers are installed in the villages, which ensures that, whether the inhabitants of those villages do or do not wish to hear Communist propaganda, they in fact do hear it.

I am not advocating that the B.B.C. should necessarily imitate the activities of the Voice of America, of which, in certain respects, I am definitely critical; but I shall not go into detail about that. Nor am I advocating, and nobody advocates, that the B.B.C. should indulge in vituperation or abuse. I am simply advocating that, acting on Foreign Office advice, the B.B.C. should accept the fact that Russia has never abandoned political warfare, and that this fact has contributed as much as any other to the unexampled growth of the Russian empire in Europe. I do not want the B.B.C. either to raise false hopes or to exaggerate in any way. I simply want them to provide their listeners abroad with unbiased, up to the minute news on local and international events; and by local events I mean local so far as the recipients are concerned. That is the first and fundamental mistake.

The second mistake is the question of accuracy—or inaccuracy, I should say. The inaccuracies which have crept into some of the foreign broadcasts of the B.B.C. are undoubtedly in large part due to the lack of funds and the consequent shortage of staff. I have many examples which I would gladly quote to the Minister of State afterwards, but there is no time now to give more than one, which is typical of other mistakes which have been made. In a recent broadcast to Hungary the B.B.C. referred to the Smallholder Prime Minister of that country, M. Dinnyes, as a general of 64. Every Hungarian knows that he never rose above the rank of sergeant—which is no discredit to him—and that he is a man of considerably less than 50 years of age. If a broadcast from Hungary to this country referred to our Prime Minister as a man of 85 who was a squadron-leader in the Great War we should think it rather curious, and we might begin to lose faith, to some extent, in the broadcasts to which we were listening. I mention this one example only to emphasise the point that, if inaccuracies of this nature are to creep in, people will begin to stop listening to the B.B.C.

Was that in the news or in an individual's talk?

I am not certain. I am almost positive it was in the news, but I should not like to say so definitely. There are, however, inaccuracies of that type, and I ask the House to believe me when I say so.

Oh, yes, they are important.

The third mistake concerns the internal administration of the foreign service. The point I want to put to the Minister of State in this connection is that there is a feeling among those with recent connections with the B.B.C. that there is a serious degree of over-centralisation resulting in unnecessary rigidity. I quote one example. The evening broadcasts which go out to those countries in Eastern Europe, and to other countries in Europe, are usually of half an hour's duration, and a hard and fast rule is laid down—an inflexible rule, I believe—that of the half an hour, ten minutes shall be taken up with news and 20 minutes with other programmes. It does not matter how important the news may be, or that the subsequent programme may be a violin solo, or what you will, the news must not intrude upon that programme. I cannot believe that that is right at this time. Is the right hon. Gentleman in a position to give the House any information regarding the allocation of funds by countries? If he is not, can we look forward in February to having more information on this important matter?

I want to refer briefly to the relations between the Foreign Office and the B.B.C., which are governed very largely by paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Seventh Report of the Select Committee on Estimates. Both paragraphs are woolly, and the sentence to which I refer is particularly woolly. It is this:

"The Foreign Office will be responsible for specifying the scope of the service required for reception in foreign countries, and for offering to the Corporation information regarding conditions in and the policies of His Majesty's Government.…"

The words I should like to emphasise are "for specifying the scope of the service." Those words seem to me to be very woolly and very general, and it seems quite clear that some amplification is desirable.

My last major point—and it is an extremely serious one—is to stress the vital importance of the non-party nature of these transmissions. I am sure that, as a generalisation, the Minister of State will agree with me that there have been many complaints of Left Wing bias in the B.B.C. If they are only generalisations, I think it is unfortunate that they should be made. I propose to give one or two examples. Some of the accusations have undoubtedly been unfounded and exaggerated, but others are undoubtedly true, as I hope the cases I shall quote will show.

There are many methods by which a partisan approach can be achieved in the presentation of news. One, of course, is by inflection of the voice, but the cardinal sin is surely the suppression of news. I have here a number of examples I wish to give to the House. On 15th December, in the news broadcast to Russia, 10 items were included. On that day, Mr. Deakin had made what the whole House will agree was one of the most important speeches of the month. His speech was not mentioned, although his speech was mentioned in the foreign broadcasts to other countries, when it was given considerable prominence. Who was responsible for excluding that extremely important news item from the broadcast to Russia? Is it possible that the individual who excluded it had Communist sympathies of some sort?

On 16th December, there was a news item in the Russian broadcast on the breakdown of the Four-Power Conference. It consisted of 21 lines, and out of those lines, only two, that is less than 10 per cent., were in any way critical of the attitude of M. Molotov at the Conference, and of the degree of responsibility he should bear for its breakdown. There was an extract from an editorial in the "Daily Telegraph," which was extremely outspoken, the extract being:

"There is no common measure of agreement for a unified control of Germany."

I can only describe that as a deliberate distortion of the tone and attitude of the editorial in the "Daily Telegraph." I should like to know whether the man responsible for this had Communist sympathies.

On 13th December, in the broadcast to Russia, 32 lines were devoted to the speech of the Lord President of the Council to the nation. I make no complaint about that. It was an extremely important broadcast; nor am I going to raise the question of how many lines might have been_ devoted to an equally important speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden). In those 32 lines in that broadcast, not one reference was made to the important part of the speech which referred to Communists in Europe, whereas one-third of the broadcast to France was devoted to that part of the speech. The words I am referring to are these:

"The Communists, who slavishly take their orders from outside their own country, have embarked on reckless and violent policies, which might well provoke the triumph of some sort of fascism. Still, I have the feeling that democracy in France and Italy will win through."

The gentleman who prepared that broadcast was a certain Mr. Dean. I wonder if it could be that he has distinct Communist sympathies. On 7th September, there was a broadcast by an employee of the B.B.C., which referred to the Grimethorpe strike. The gentleman concerned was Mr. Pickles. He said that the miners were suspicious even when he offered them the microphone:

"Although I showed them my Labour Party membership card."

This, mark you, is an employee of the British Broadcasting Corporation, and to me that is a distinctly partisan approach, and is typical of other broadcasts made by the same gentleman.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the same sort of criticism can be laid from the very opposite direction and that, in fact, there are people who say there has been too much bias in these broadcasts in his favour?

I would say that is equally undesirable. My object is that there should be no bias of any kind at all.

Why has the hon. and gallant Gentleman then presented one aspect?

I am trying to be quite unpartisan in what I am saying, and that is why I have deliberately quoted the speech of the Lord President. In my opinion, any party bias is equally undesirable. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the interruption. I am sure that any partisan broadcast is thoroughly undesirable. I have two other points and I apologise to the House for taking so much time, but I think it is really important.

There is one particular way in which one can draw attention to an important news item, and that is by the position which that item occupies in the news broadcasts. There is what one calls the "lead," which is, of course, the first item. During this year there have been three large conferences—the Conservative Party Conference, the Labour Party Conference and the Trade Union Congress Conference. The Conservative Party Conference, within the one or two days of taking place, had the "lead" twice. The Labour Party Conference had the "lead" 11 times and the T.U.C. had the "lead" nine times. Is that not distinctly partisan and, if it is, is it not thoroughly undesirable?

My last point before I conclude is perhaps most serious of all. Twice daily from the B.B.C. there is issued a production called "Evening Notes." I have an original here and will gladly give it to the Minister. It is circulated twice daily from the Director of the European News Division to regions for guidance in compiling news. It is from these "Evening Notes" that I quote these words:

"It must be emphasised that personal antipathies should not obscure the fact that the Royal Wedding is a major story and must be treated as such."

Nauseating.

As my hon. and gallant Friend said, that is quite nauseating, and I suggest it discloses an extremely serious state of affairs.

In conclusion, can I have an assurance, an absolute assurance, from the Minister of State that in future the British Broadcasting Corporation will be British in its approach to putting news out to foreign countries and that these very grave charges which I have made will be fully investigated. Many people in the Conservative Party, and I hope and believe in the Socialist Party and the Liberal Party, hold the opinion most strongly that at this particular moment any cut in the Treasury grant to the overseas services of the B.B.C. would be a false economy. I feel I should make clear to the Minister that those who hold these views, and particularly those on this side of the House, will pursue this matter further at the earliest opportunity.

We are indebted to the hon. and gallant Member for raising this subject. I cannot pretend that I agree with his analysis throughout, nor am I at all sure that the information upon which he has based his case is accurate or, indeed, impartial. I should perhaps deal first of all with some of the factual questions which the hon. Gentleman raised. He asked me if a cut was contemplated. It is true that an overall cut of 10 per cent. in our information services has been agreed upon. My right hon. Friend was naturally reluctant to accept any cut. We know how important our information services are just now. We know it may be true, even, that these radio services may be the only instruments which we could use to penetrate certain areas.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman asked me why we should cut them. It would be equally relevant to ask why we should ration bread. The reply is that we have to cut our expenditure. Perhaps I may be permitted to say this however. We have impressed upon the B.B.C.—and we have their co-operation in this matter—that these cuts should be made in such a fashion that the efficiency of the European broadcasts should be as little impaired as possible. We have been looking at figures. I think I can satisfy the hon. and gallant Gentleman that in terms of time, the cut is practically negligible. I think I could also convince him that although we are achieving this 10 per cent. cut, it is taking place on the frills and not the essentials. He asked me if I could indicate the breakdown of our expenditure, in terms of European countries, but I am afraid I cannot. I could, however, offer as a rough guide the amount of time we spent, which is a fairly good indication as to how our expenditure is apportioned.

We broadcast to Germany five hours a day; to Austria one; to Poland 1½; to Czechoslovakia one; to Hungary one; to Roumania one; to Yugoslavia 1¼; to Bulgaria one; and to Russia 1¼. That is not quite a complete calculation. In addition, there are the English and French transmissions, English for 6½ hours and French for 3¾ hours. Those are the European services. We know that these services have a considerable audience in countries of Central and South Eastern Europe, so the total for English transmissions which is given to the European service is slightly misleading, since some English programmes are broadcast in more than one way simultaneously. But that would be a fair estimate of this breakdown in time to arrive at a correct indication of how we apportion our expenditure over the various countries.

Is it proposed to keep that particular allocation of time when the cut of 10 per cent. has been made?

My recollection is that we have cut 14 hours and these figures were operative on 1st December, so the estimate is substantially right.

Would the Minister give an assurance that if a cut is contemplated or carried out it will not affect the news service, although it may affect the frills?

I would not like to pretend it will not have any effect on the news services. We have tried to save the European services. Cuts have been made, for example, much more drastically in the South American service than the European service. I can give an assurance that if we cut the programmes it will be the frills that are cut rather than the substantial part of our service, and the least cuts will be visited upon the European service.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman also asked me if the B.B.C. had its full revenue. I cannot quite see the relevance of the question. At any rate, I do not pretend to understand it. As I see it, the distinction between the European service and the home service, is that in the home service, the B.B.C. receive revenue from their licences, but in the overseas service in toto there is no revenue—there is a grant-in-aid, which the hon. Member quoted. If he is asking me about the grant-in-aid, I say, without qualification, that the full vote is used in the dissemination of this service. There is no question of revenue, as we normally use the word, being applicable to this service.

The hon. Gentleman then went on to deal with our technique. He suggested that the B.B.C. were jeopardising by inaccuracies our wartime reputation which, I am sure, the whole House will agree, was very high. I cannot lightly accept that suggestion. I know the hon. Gentleman offered to supply me with some examples of the inaccuracies, but if the inaccuracies are no worse than the one he quoted, I would not worry in the least. The inaccuracy he quoted was one referring to the Hungarian leader. He was stated to be a gentleman of some 60 years. My recollection is that the B.B.C., in their European service, made it plain that they were quoting an agency report. Several British newspapers followed that agency report, including one of the staunch Conservative journals from which the hon. Member frequently quotes. The B.B.C. made an apology as quickly as possible, and gave the correction.

Where there is a new service, and the essence of the service must be rapidity, they cannot escape from occasional inaccuracies. The reputation and value of the news service are not jeopardised by calling a sergeant a general or, once in a lifetime calling a man of 45 a gentleman of 60. The reputation of the service will rest upon its selection and its handling of news. The B.B.C. built up a reputation of reliability and quickness during the war, and to that reputation we still are holding on by the same methods. I repudiate quite sharply any suggestion that the B.B.C. is inaccurate.

I did not want to make any general charges. I said that inaccuracies had crept in, that the main reason was shortage of funds resulting in lack of staff. There have been minor inaccuracies, and it might be possible to do away with them if there was more money, but the position may now be worse, because of the 10 per cent. cut.

My limited professional experience, which may be more than that of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, convinces me that money is no substitute for time. If there is to be rapidity, there will be slight inaccuracies. The reputation of the service will not suffer. I must admit that I was slightly alarmed by the example which the hon. and gallant Gentleman gave about the selection of news, and I promise him that I will look into those matters. He mulled his own argument. I thought his fear was, from the selection he took of Soviet news, that there was a mass of Communism inside this European service, distorting and misusing it. When the hon. and gallant Member quoted the instruction, I thought his inference was that while we have Communists misusing the opportunity on the one side, in the other case he was complaining, because the director of the service took some pains to see that the——

The Minister does not seem to appreciate exactly that point. The fact that the instruction had to be issued, indicated that that senior officer appreciated that there was a matter which had to be dealt with.

Then it is plain that the hon. and gallant Member does not object to these instructions?

I object to the necessity for them to be issued.

Counsel which should be urged upon every one is that they should be utterly impartial and unbiased in the selection of news——

It is a counsel which will never be achieved. I have no reason to believe that there are any unreliable people in this service. I can assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman and the House that the Controller is constantly surveying news and he is in the closest liaison with the Foreign Office, and every facility is provided to check up against background. I will investigate the examples the hon. and gallant Gentleman has given, but I am fairly certain from the response we received from Russia and Central and Eastern Europe that our service is well cared for, steadily listened to and does a great job which could not be undertaken in any other way for this country.

I am grateful for the opportunity of raising the question of the allocation of steel to the motor industry. This is a subject which is of great importance in my own constituency, but it is of equal importance to the country as a whole. It is important to Coventry because it affects the whole prospect of employment during 1948; it is important to the country because the motor industry is likely to be decisive in the export trade. My hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Cross-man), who is unable to be present this afternoon, wishes to be associated with the main theme of what I have to say.

I would not have thought it necessary to raise this subject this afternoon in view of an enlightening reply which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply gave last week on the future of steel allocations to the industry, but I feel it necessary to do so in view of the fortnight of confusing statements which preceded it. On 4th December one of the principal motor manufacturers, who is also a member of the National Advisory Council for the motor industry, made an announcement which received wide publicity, that the motor industry would have its steel allocation cut for the first six months of 1948. Because of the consternation which that statement created amongst managements and workers in the industry I feel it necessary to put three questions to my right hon. Friend in order to obtain clarification.

This is my first query. How much steel will the industry have during 1948? Will it be sufficient to reach the target for the industry and will it be enough to maintain full employment throughout the industry generally and in particular in my constituency? I would then like to ask, arising out of the statement, which was distributed after that industrialist had made his announcement, that the number of cars to be produced would be something like 260,000 only, whether during 1946 and 1947 a substantial amount of steel reached the motor industry but not by means of the machinery of allocation which my right hon. Friend and his predecessor have established? My third question is, will those firms who are specifically concerned with export and are enterprising and active in promoting the export trade, receive any degree of preferential treatment in their quotas?

The period of confusion and doubt to which I have referred began on 4th December when a leading industrialist in the motor industry held a Press conference, after which it went out to the whole country—his statement received very wide publicity—that there would be radical cuts in the allocation of steel. More than that, there were headlines which suggested that my right hon Friend was killing the industry's export trade. The figure of 260,000 cars to be produced as a rate of production, though not given by the industrialist himself, received extremely wide circulation. The consequence of that was the widespread belief, which still has not been entirely contradicted, that the motor industry in 1948 would enter a period of depression. My right hon. Friend promptly issued a denial of these statements and indicated that the level of production would be in excess of 310,000 cars per annum, the rate at which the industry is running today.

Here were two entirely contradictory statements, and the contradiction is all the more marked because the industrialist who put out the original statement, being a member of the National Advisory Council with which, my right hon. Friend had stated on 1st December, he was already in consultation, holds such a prominent position in the industry. Consternation and dismay were aroused by his words throughout the country. But even after my right hon. Friend has issued his denial, I regret to say that a highly respectable trade journal in the motor industry, wrote on 12th December:

"Last week's difference of opinion would seem to be the first warning that the Ministry of Supply, with characteristic slipperiness, is going to try to put the blame on the shoulders of private enterprise."

I do not appear to have seen any apology on this matter either from the industrialist, or from those journals which gave this wholly erroneous statement such extremely wide publicity, and I would ask my right hon. Friend this afternoon to state the circumstances in which this extraordinary contradiction between the views of his Department and those of this member of the National Advisory Council arose, because we had always been led to believe that there was the closest consultation and communication of views between my right hon. Friend's Department and this Council; and that ought to be cleared up.

The second matter which arises out of that is how, if this motor manufacturer thought that the rate of production was to be only 260,000 per annum, the industry with only a small increase of steel over 1946–47 is due to reach a figure of 340,000 by mid-1948. The implication would appear to be that although the formal allocation of steel to the motor industry was for only a little more than 260,000, in point of fact substantial quantities of steel were reaching the industry through unauthorised channels. The expression "unauthorised channels" is a euphemism. When a housewife buys a pound of butter through unauthorised channels, it is normally described as the black market.

I do not want to suggest that anything of that kind has been going on in the industry, but I would suggest that arrangements have been made directly between the steel industry and certain motor manufacturers which have bypassed the allocation system and methods of my right hon. Friend's Department. If, in the coming year, we are not to have a breakdown of the allocation system, it is of vital importance that my right hon. Friend this afternoon should state quite categorically and definitely that he intends his system of allocation to be maintained in the industry, and that the recipients of steel should only obtain it when that steel is part of their quota.

Finally, I would like to speak of what happens to the steel once it has been allocated to the industry. We know the industry, which did magnificently last year and which we all believe will be able to play a high part in the export drive in the coming year, is doing its best to help the Government to restore the balance of payments. But, within the industry itself, different firms and organisations have different degrees of competence in obtaining export orders, and in fulfilling them. I wish to ask whether in making his allocation to the steel industry my right hon. Friend does in fact take into account the part which the individual firm is willing and able to play in helping the export drive.

As an illustration, I mention a section of the industry which should be encouraged, that part of the industry which deals with the manufacture of heavy lorries. We need heavy lorries at home; abroad they are in considerable demand; but the number of heavy lorries produced has been restricted because of the relatively small share which the manufacturers of these lorries have been obtaining from the steel quota. I hope that in announcing the principle, my right hon. Friend will give additional allocations to those industries which show themselves capable of playing an important role in the export trade, and will bear in mind the case of the heavy lorries as an example of a part of the industry which should be helped.

I urge that the maximum amount of steel should be made available to the industry consistent with the national interest. But, in order that this objective may be achieved, it is essential that my right hon. Friend should clarify the situation, so that everyone knows what they are to get, that he states the method of allocation, and, having stated it, sees that that method is rigidly and accurately enforced in the coming months.

My hon. Friend the Member for West Coventry (Mr. Edelman) is to be congratulated on having raised this important matter, and I hope that when the Minister replies it will be seen that there is more smoke than fire—not in what my hon. Friend has said, but in the matters to which he referred—because so far as I am aware relations between the Minister and the industry are extremely close and good, too good to my way of thinking in relation to one particular matter, to which I shall refer later. I should like to add two or three points to what my hon. Friend has said, although he did raise one aspect of one of them.

A system should be established whereby those manufacturers who are exporting cars which bring in more hard currency per ton of steel would be given extra steel, if they need it, even at the expense of others whose exports earn less per ton. This is a matter of simple arithmetic, not too simple I hope, but if it is, perhaps the House will excuse me. It can be illustrated in this way. It is better to export a car weighing two tons which brings us 4,000 dollars than one weighing one ton, which brings in only 2,000 dollars. I am aware of the arrangements which I understand exist, or will shortly be put into force, for reducing the amount of steel given to manufacturers unable to sell abroad a due proportion of their output, but that in itself is not enough. In addition, we need a notional pool of extra steel to be given, when needed, to those manufacturers who can prove that their cars bring in a higher rate of hard currency per ton than the others. I hope the Minister will seriously consider that proposal.

Apart from the factor of higher conversion value, I suggest that it is of great importance that the Government should encourage the continued production of high quality cars in this country. These cars are not necessarily luxuries. If it were not for the extra Purchase Tax they often represent better value for money to the buyer, especially to the buyer who uses his car every day and who must have a highly reliable vehicle. They have a longer life, cost less in maintenance, etc. I would ask the Minister to consider, he having already done what has been published in relation to the production of a British motor racing car, if he would not also consider whether the development of some of these high quality cars, which the manufacturers may not be able to continue to produce, or may not be able to develop into the most modern form, without assistance, should not be assisted in some way by the Government, in order to maintain and increase that great reputation which we have earned in that field.

The second point which I would like the Minister to consider is whether he could not do more than he has done, and in that I am not sure whether he has yet done quite so much as his predecessor did, towards persuading the industry, not necessarily by means of the control of steel, to achieve a higher degree of rationalisation and standardisation. I know that this has been fully dealt with in the recently published report of the Motor Industry Advisory Council, which in many respects is already out of date. That report also deals with the equally important question of getting the industry to produce the right kind of car for export.

I suggest that standardisation has not yet gone nearly far enough. I would urge my right hon. Friend to see if he cannot, along the lines already accepted by it as shown in that report, persuade the industry to go farther and faster, because when we look at the existing facts today—not what is said in the report but the facts as they appear in the catalogues for export—they are that the five big concerns in this country capable of anything like mass production are producing no fewer than 29 different models.

The second illustration is also a recent one of new models produced by some of these big five. One of these models is being made in two forms—one with two doors and the other with four. There is no other difference. Surely that represents an extraordinary development of the principle which the industry has agreed upon in that report. Another new model recently produced by another of the big five, although it has up-to-date features such as steering column gear change, which seems of doubtful value in that there is not room to seat three people in front, still retains the old-fashioned form of fixed axle front springing.

I would like finally to express again the opinion which I wrote in a letter to "The Times" and which has never yet been contradicted, that the highest degree of rationalisation and standardisation which we must have, will never be achieved unless there is some kind of merger of at least three of the existing big five concerns. We shall never get, by any other means, anything like the proportion of rationalisation and standardisation that exists in the American industry, which, with 10 times the output of our own, has less than twice the number of separate models. Whilst congratulating the Minister on everything he has done—and knowing that he is thinking closely and carefully about this—and especially congratulating him on the help which for the first time has been given by any Government—this Socialist Government—in the production of a British racing car. I ask him to consider this as an urgent matter. I am convinced that unless that degree of rationalisation and the production of the right type of model are more quickly achieved, we shall one day wake up to find that we can no longer export cars in anything like the quantity now contemplated. If that time comes, it will be a disaster. I hope that it never will.

I am sure that all sections of the motor industry will be grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for West Coventry (Mr. Edelman) for raising this point and I am certainly grateful in that it gives me the opportunity to clarify some of the confusion which was created in the minds of many people by contradictory statements issued by Sir Reginald Rootes and my Department. Those statements must have caused a certain amount of anxiety in the minds of the operatives in the motor car industry, as much as in the minds of the employers. My hon. Friend asked me to explain how those two statements came to be made, and what was the cause of the confusion. I think I can tell him very shortly. Very good relations exist between my Department and the motor industry.

It is the custom of my Department to consider with a small informal subcommittee of the Motor Advisory Council the future allocations of steel to the motor industry before those allocations are finally made. One of those informal discussions took place early in December. They are, of course, entirely confidential, and we were rather surprised to find the next day that a statement had been made by Sir Reginald Rootes—who had been present at the informal discussions—giving certain facts and figures, and expressing opinions which were really quite misleading to the public, and which had little relationship to the facts as disclosed at the meeting. Perhaps I can put it this way, that there had been an obvious misunderstanding by Sir Reginald Rootes about the facts which have been disclosed by my Department. That combined with a possible exaggeration in the interpretation given to the statement by the reporters in the papers, gave a wholly false impression to the motor industry of what exactly were the proposals made by my Department. I regret very much that that statement was made, particularly in view of the confidential nature of the discussion, but I am not suggesting for a moment that Sir Reginald, in making it, was motivated by anything but the best intentions. He obviously thought he was giving information to the industry which it should have.

The moment I saw that statement in the papers I issued instructions that a correction should be given to the Press, stating the true facts. This statement was issued on the same day. That is how the conflict arose. I stated the true situation in a reply to my hon. Friend the Member for West Coventry (Mr. Edelman) in a reply to a Question which he put to me on 15th December, and I would like to repeat the essential part of that answer. I stated that in their view, that is, the view of the National Advisory Council for the motor manufacturing industry,

"the allocation of steel which is being made to the motor manufacturing industry for the first six months of 1948 and which represents an increase on the allocation for this quarter, should enable the industry to approach the mid-1948 target for cars. On commercial vehicles there might be a short fall on the target, the amount of which cannot yet be assessed."

That statement of the National Advisory Council for the motor industry was endorsed by Sir Reginald Rootes, who is himself a member of the council. So much for the statement which that gentleman issued, and the explanation which I made immediately to the Press, and in answer to my hon. Friend. I hope there will be no doubt in the mind of anybody that, first of all, there will be an increase in the allocation of steel to the motor car industry during the first two quarters of next year above the allocation during the present quarter. That is just contrary to what Sir Reginald Rootes said. In point of fact, we have no doubt that, on that allocation, the export figures for cars should either be achieved, or very nearly achieved.

The hon. Member for West Coventry asked a number of questions and I would like to answer them but I will naturally, have to be brief, particularly as I wish to deal with one or two points raised by the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. Shawcross). He asked how much the steel industry would get in 1948. I cannot give him the exact figures of the total of the allocation, either for the six months or for the year. For the second part of the year of course we cannot say what the allocation will be. But, so far as I can foresee the future of the industry during the coming year I do not think that anyone working in the industry needs to fear that he will suffer unemployment. Naturally, I cannot guarantee that in every individual firm, particularly every small firm, redundancy may not arise, but broadly speaking there should not be unemployment in the motorcar industry.

Secondly, the hon. Member asked whether steel has reached the motor industry through unauthorised means. It is possible that in the past some steel has reached some sections of the industry above the allocation to which particular firms were entitled, due partly to certain difficulties with the allocation machinery, which have arisen since the war, and which have been explained many times in the House. However, I have no evidence to suggest that at the moment any firm is getting anything more than its allocation, and it will be our purpose to see that during the coming year that only the proper allocations are received. Then I was asked whether allocations will take into account the success of a particular firm in exporting its cars. My hon. Friend the Member for Widnes further added to the point and referred particularly to exports to hard currency countries. He asked whether the conversion factor would be taken into account. My answer is that the number of cars exported by particular firms, and the success with which certain firms can export to hard currency countries, are factors taken into account in making allocations. They will be applied even more strictly in the latter part of the year.

The hon. Member for Widnes also raised the general question of the standardisation of cars. That rather broadened our discussion, as I had understood from my hon. Friend the Member for West Coventry that the Debate was to be on the narrow question of the conflict of the statements. But as the point was raised, I would like to say that there has been a large measure of standardisation in the industry and concentration on certain models. I am speaking from memory, but I think that there has been a con- centration representing about two-thirds of the models which existed before the war. We are as a result now producing about one-third of the prewar models. I am very doubtful whether any further concentration would be in the national interest at the moment. In the long run, it is highly desirable, but if we try to reduce further the number of models now it could only be done at the expense of the production, of cars. At present we want to produce as many cars as possible, particularly for export purposes, and I would not therefore advocate any intensification of the move towards standardisation at this stage.

The hon. Member for Widnes also made a small point about the number of doors on a car. At first sight that seems to be an unnecessary refinement, but I would like to stress that it is a special export requirement for some markets and that is why it is undertaken. We realise to the full the important part which the motorcar industry plays in our export drive. Motorcars are a ready export. There are still very big markets for cars, and the industry is doing as much as any part of British industry to help us to achieve success. We in the Ministry of Supply will continue to give the industry every help and encouragement that we can to see that it plays a maximum part in helping us through the present economic difficulties.