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Commons Chamber

Volume 461: debated on Monday 14 February 1949

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House Of Commons

Monday, 14th February, 1949

The House met at Half-past Two o'Clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers To Questions

Cardinal Mindszenty (Trial)

1.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what reports he has received from Budapest as to the character of the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty.

Since the Hungarian Government refused permission for an official British representative to attend the Cardinal's trial, His Majesty's Minister has been unable to report his impressions at first hand. He has, however, reached the firm conclusion, with which my right hon. Friend agrees, that the proceedings had no resemblance to a fair trial as the term is understood in this country, particularly since the entire resources of the State were used, before and during the Cardinal's detention, to create prejudice against him.

Does the trial, and the conviction which resulted from it constitute a breach of the Peace Treaty to which Hungary and this country are both signatories?

Is an investigation being prosecuted in relation to the trial and will the fullest information be made available to this House at the earliest possible moment?

Has the Minister received, or made, any representations regarding the Cardinal's associate, Prince Esterhazy, or do we take it that there is one law for the laity and another for the clergy?

Is not the demeanour of these prisoners in all these trials behind the Eastern curtain consistent with the administration of a drug which paralyses all will and all consciousness?

Of course, I would not put my experience and judgment of drugs against the distinguished experience of the hon. Member for Denbigh (Sir H. Morris-Jones), but I would confine myself to saying that certainly the Cardinal's behaviour after arrest and in the court compared most surprisingly with his behaviour before.

What further action are the Government going to take in view of the farcical trial of the Cardinal?

Can my right hon. Friend clarify the differentiation to which he referred just now and say why he is comparatively complaisant about the treatment of Prince Esterhazy, though indignant about the Cardinal?

I am not at all complaisant about any of the seven men, but there seems no doubt that the burden of this propaganda campaign—because it was a propaganda campaign and not a trial—was directed primarily against the Cardinal.

How soon may we expect a White Paper to clear up some of the views put on either side of the House?

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to say that just as soon as our investigations are completed, we will consider the advisability of issuing a White Paper.

12.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what action he has taken since the announcement of the sentence passed on Cardinal Mindszenty; and what further action he proposes to take.

On my right hon. Friend's instructions, His Majesty's Minister at Budapest addressed a Note to the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10th February regarding the Hungarian Government's refusal to permit His Majesty's Legation to observe the trial. The Note informed the Hungarian Government that His Majesty's Government were quite unable to accept the arguments on which the refusal was based; and reaffirmed their right to investigate any and every act by the Hungarian Government which, in their opinion, might contravene the obligations accepted by the Hungarian Government under Articles 2 and 3 of the Peace Treaty of 10th February, 1947.

On 10th February my right hon. Friend also sent for the Hungarian Minister in London and gave him a copy of this Note. He directed the Minister's attention to the strong feeling aroused in this country by the Cardinal's trial, and protested against the offensive terms in which the Hungarian Government had replied to a perfectly proper and reasonable request. I regret that I am unable to state, meantime, what further action may be taken.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman consider that the time has now arrived when the British Government should consider whether they should definitely state that they will oppose the entrance of Hungary into the United Nations or into any international agreements or conferences until Cardinal Mindszenty—

While deprecating the more extreme forms of hysterical propaganda which have been worked up about this matter, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he is aware that many Members on this side of the House would gladly support a reasoned appeal and a reasonable appeal for a reduction of the sentence?

Has a time limit been fixed in this Note which has been addressed by His Majesty's Government? Has His Majesty's Minister asked for a reply within a short time?

Is my right hon. Friend aware that, while many of us view with horror the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, many of us have also viewed with horror trials of Greek trade unionists, and would he make proposals for his Eminence's release based on a reciprocal release of political prisoners?

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether His Majesty's Government are considering withdrawing diplomatic representation from Hungary?

13.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will give an assurance that the veto of the British Government will be used to prevent the election of Hungary to the United Nations until Cardinal Mindszenty is restored to liberty.

The United Kingdom Representative stated, during the recent Session of the United Nations Assembly, that His Majesty's Government will in no circumstances make use of their privileged veto to bar the admission to the United Nations of any State which secures a majority of seven votes in the Security Council. This does not imply that His Majesty's Government consider that Hungary is a State duly qualified for admission to the United Nations, nor that we would necessarily vote for her admission.

Would it not be salutary for the right hon. Gentleman to convey in this way to the Hungarian people the fact that its conduct really puts Hungary outside the comity of civilised States, and that the sooner they change their policy or their Government, the better?

Is it not the case that within the British Empire as well as outside the most ferocious trials are taking place against workers, and never a word has been said; but that when the high and mighty are put into gaol, then it is a different matter for the Tories?

Is it in Order for a Member of the British House of Commons to libel the British Empire?

14.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in protest against the Hungarian Government's treatment of Cardinal Mindszenty and that Government's refusal to receive the note of His Majesty's Government on the exclusion of British observers from the trial, he will break off economic relations with Hungary.

The protest made by His Majesty's Government was against the refusal of the Hungarian Government to allow a British observer to attend the trial and against the language used in the refusal. The Hungarian Government will, no doubt, themselves realise that their behaviour has aroused in this country much indignation which may find many means of expression. His Majesty's Government will naturally consider all courses of possible future action in regard to Hungary and other countries guilty of similar behaviour.

When the right hon. Gentleman says that the Hungarian Government realise this, is he not aware that the Hungarian Government did, in point of fact, reply in terms of the grossest offensiveness to His Majesty's Government?

But the people of Hungary, as well as the Government of Hungary, despite Press censorship, are aware of the reactions and statements in this country and in this House upon this subject.

Is it not the case that the Government still have economic relations with Spain whose Government is guilty of far more offences against decency than even the present Government of Hungary?

Has the right hon. Gentleman observed the statement made publicly by the Dean of Canterbury that he was aware of the charge against the Cardinal before it was published in the Press, and can he state whether the Dean was good enough to inform the Foreign Office of the source of his information and the date on which he received it?

Is my right hon. Friend aware that many hon. Members in this House deplore the exploitation of these personal tragedies, either East or West of the iron curtain, for political and propagandist purposes, and that this tendency could be largely counteracted if the Government themselves would be completely impartial in their protests wherever these horrible things occur?

Since he repudiates every constructive suggestion from these benches, could the Minister state the method of bringing home to the Hungarian Government and Hungarian people the feelings of the British people in this matter, and what sort of steps he visualises that the Government may in time use to bring this matter to the notice of the Hungarian people?

Germany

Control Commission Families (Rations)

4.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware of the dissatisfaction amongst British wives in Germany regarding the quantity, quality and price of food available; and if he will make a statement on the subject.

Complaints have been received from time to time about the rations available to Control Commission families in Germany. The rations have to be imported and are supplied from Army sources as the German economy cannot provide the necessary supplies. The complaints have been carefully looked into by independent nutrition experts and I am assured that both in calorie and protein content the rations are sufficient.

Is it true that, in some respects, our families in Germany are receiving worse rations than the German civilians?

Prisoners Of War, North Africa

6.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the number of German prisoners of war from the camps under British control in the former Italian territories in North Africa which the Egyptian Government have been permitted to enrol for service in their Army.

Gruppenfuhrer Dirlwanger

8.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what grounds S.S. Gruppenfuhrer Dirlwanger, whose name appears on several lists of war criminals was allowed to leave the British zone in Germany to take service with the Arab High Command in Palestine.

No exit permit has been applied for or granted in this name. I have no evidence that he has been in the British zone at any time since the occupation.

Will my right hon. Friend consider taking special steps to make this Question and answer and my previous Question and his answer widely known in the United States, where these baseless statements and other similar statements are doing great harm to our national interests?

I am indebted for the suggestion which my hon. Friend has made. Certainly this ridiculous canard has had a limited circulation in certain propaganda newspapers, but I would hesitate to agree that the circulation had been wide. However, we will do what we can to see that the replies are circulated.

War Criminals (Extradition)

15.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many orders of extradition in respect of alleged war criminals were made against persons detained in the British zone of Germany during 1948; and to which countries they were extradited.

Ninety applications for the extradition of alleged war criminals were granted between the end of January, 1948, when the present arrangements were introduced, and the end of December, 1948: in consequence persons were extradited to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, Holland, Norway and Poland.

Burma

British Subjects (Safety)

5.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the safety of British subjects in Burma.

My right hon. Friend is in close touch with His Majesty's Ambassador at Rangoon regarding the safety of British subjects in Burma, which he has under constant review. There does not at present seem to be any particular danger to British subjects, since none of the insurgent groups is inspired by anti-British or anti-European feeling. Where local danger threatens, arrangements are being made for the evacuation of British subjects who wish to leave; wives and children of members of the British Services Mission were temporarily withdrawn on 5th February from Mingaladon to Rangoon and a similar withdrawal of part of the British community has since been made from Insein.

in view of the fact that this deplorable state of affairs has arisen out of the failure of the Government's policy towards Burma, would it not be advisable to withdraw all these people of ours at once?

Our information does not suggest the necessity for any such course. The Burmese Government have given undertakings, which have been upheld. I cannot for a second accept the suggestion that these consequences flow from the policy of His Majesty's Government.

War Materials

7.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what munitions and military stores have been or will be dispatched this year to the Government of Burma; and how they will be paid for.

The hon. Member will appreciate that I cannot provide the information requested in the first part of the hon. Members Question since it is jointly the property of the Government of Burma. As to the second part of the Question, prepayment is normally required for all war material sold to the Government of Burma.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the British public will be perturbed at the prospect, which his reply does not deny, that British arms will be sent to Burma for use against the Karens, who were the mainspring of the resistance in Burma to Japan?

Such arms as are sent to Burma are sent to the entitled Government of Burma for purposes which they hold to be proper.

North Atlantic Pact

9.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it is intended that the proposed Atlantic Pact shall be a regional security arrangement within the terms and conditions of the arrangements laid down in Articles 52 to 54 of the United Nations Charter.

Although it is not yet certain what form the North Atlantic Pact will eventually take, I can assure my hon. Friend that it will be consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Will my right hon. Friend answer the specific Question which I put down, as to whether it will be a regional arrangement within the terms laid down in the Charter governing regional arrangements; and whether his vagueness today overrules the precise statement he made last Monday that Article 52 was the basis of the proposed Pact?

My hon. Friend does not recapitulate his own Question. I was not asked if it was in conformity with the regional arrangements in the Charter but whether it was in conformity with three of the Articles. My reply is that the Pact is in conformity with the intention and with the relevant Articles of the Charter.

Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that this country will enter into no military commitments under this Pact before similar military commitments are entered into by the United States of America?

Perhaps my hon. Friend will await the opportunity of the draft Pact being made available to the House.

10.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when hon. Members of the British House of Commons will have an opportunity of seeing the draft of the proposed Atlantic Pact which has been shown to leaders of the American Congress.

No final text of the North Atlantic Pact has yet been agreed, but my right hon. Friend is anxious to assure the House that as soon as the state of the negotiations permits hon. Members will be informed of what is proposed.

11.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if Eire is to be invited to join the discussions on the Atlantic Pact.

It is not possible in the present state of negotiations to say which countries will eventually be invited to join the North Atlantic Pact.

Is not the defence of Eire an important item in the defence of Western Europe, and is it the intention of Eire to defend herself unaided?

21.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what proposals have been made by the Government of the United States to His Majesty's Government as to the inclusion in the proposed Atlantic Pact of provisions for military aid; and as to the conditions to be fulfilled before the Pact comes into force.

During the discussions of the proposed North Atlantic Pact, no proposals of the kind described by my hon. Friend have been made, nor has there been any suggestion of conditions to be fulfilled by this country before a Pact may come into force, except of course a general clause applicable to all adherents concerning ratification.

Will the Minister tell us what military commitments have been entered into by His Majesty's Government which have not been entered into by the United States Government?

No Government involved in the discussions, either this Government or any other, have yet committed themselves to any military obligations. If my hon. Friend is afraid that His Majesty's Government will not properly protect the position of this country, he may be assured that they will do it as well as he does.

In view of the many reports which are circulating in the Press on the subject of the proposed Atlantic Pact, and in view of his earlier answer, would the right hon. Gentleman tell us how soon he will be able to give the House some information on this subject, so that hon. Members may be as fully informed as certain Members of Congress?

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not think me unhelpful, but I will do it as quickly as possible. I should not think it would be long, but I could not honestly commit myself to a precise period at this stage.

Is the Minister aware in this connection that there is in this country a widespread admiration for the courageous statesmanship of the Norwegian Government and the Norwegian Labour Party?

China (British Representation)

19.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why he has left an ambassador in Nanking; what is the status of our representative in Canton; and what instructions he has given concerning British subjects who desire to enter China.

Although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Government last month that as from 5th February the seat of Government would be Canton, it seems that many Ministers have not yet arrived in Canton; in particular the Acting President is still in Nanking. His Majesty's Ambassador is therefore remaining in Nanking for the present. A senior member of the Embassy, whose status is that of a Counsellor of Embassy detached for special duties, is already in Canton to maintain contact with the Chinese Ministers there. Male British subjects whose presence in China is not essential and all British women are being advised not to proceed to any part of China until the situation is clearer.

Argentina (Buenos Aires Tramways)

20.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will ensure that the question of the taking-over price of the Buenos Aires Tramways Corporation will be included in rile present trade negotiations with the Argentine as a possible asset belonging to this country and that if no figure is soon forthcoming from the Argentine Government His Majesty's Government will insist on an agreed figure being settled before the trade negotiations are concluded in order to use it as one of our assets.

As I informed the hon. Member on 26th January, the Argentine Government are well aware of the importance attached by His Majesty's Government to fair treatment for the British shareholders in the Buenos Aires Tramways Corporation, and His Majesty's Ambassador has instructions to pursue this matter with the Argentine authorities at every suitable opportunity, such as may arise either in the context of the forthcoming trade negotiations or independently of them. As the House will be aware, these very important negotiations will cover a wide field and it would be premature and unusual to commit our negotiators in advance or to disclose our intentions publicly to the Argentine Government.

While fully realising that there are many other problems in this question, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman to remember that if the friendly Argentine Government were to give the £11 million originally offered it would save us having to send out export machinery and other things to the Argentine, and will he assure the House that if by the time the negotiations for the trade treaty have been concluded nothing has been announced with regard to this compensation, the Foreign Office will continue to press the matter both with the assistance of the Bank of England and the Treasury?

The answer to the second part of the question is "Certainly." As to the first part, the Argentine Government are as well aware of this situation as we are.

Antrycide (Overseas Publicity)

22.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what instructions have been given to the British Information Services under his control as to giving publicity to the discovery of the drug antrycide; and what has been the result of such publicity.

Information officers in foreign countries are under standing instructions to obtain maximum publicity for all important new British inventions and discoveries. Particular care was taken to ensure that wide coverage by the Overseas Press Services of the Central Office of Information was given to the announcement about antrycide, including a one-thousand word feature article on the development of the drug.

Is the Minister aware that the African tsetse belt is four times the size of Argentina, and that following the discovery of this drug a healthy cattle population exceeding 30 million can be anticipated? Having regard to the fact that it will be of particular interest to South America, will he take all the steps open to him to see that the news is fully conveyed?

Vigorous steps were taken, but I must confess that publication was a little patchy. Some of the Argentine Government papers did not seem to publish it as widely as non-Government papers.

Food Supplies

Corned Beef Stocks

24.

asked the Minister of Food what are the stocks of corned beef in this country at the present time; and what were the stocks at the same time in the two previous years.

I regret that it would not be in the public interest to give information as to our stocks of imported foodstuffs.

Fish Prices

25.

asked the Minister of Food what steps are being taken to ensure that the price per pound of fish in fishmongers' shops is plainly marked.

All fishmongers must display maximum price schedules in a conspicuous position where they can be read by customers.

Is the Minister satisfied that that regulation is being generally observed?

Onions

27.

asked the Minister of Food if he will give an assurance that it is his policy for a substantial portion of the onions available next winter to be home produced.

The bulk of the home crop of bulb onions is marketed in the autumn. This year's production is about 16 times pre-war and it will no doubt remain large. But we cannot rely on home production to provide more than a small part of our winter as distinct from our autumn supplies.

In view of the small part which the home production provides, could the right hon. Gentleman explain his failure to provide a market this year?

No, Sir. In the autumn the home production provides a much larger part. It is in the winter, with which the hon. Member's Question deals, that it plays a small part.

In view of the great popularity of the Spanish onion, will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he will do nothing to rob the people of the onion of their choice?

In order not to discourage farmers from growing onions, will the Minister make use of the Market Supplies Committee to give him advice about the import of onions?

Will the right hon. Gentleman say when autumn ends and winter begins for the purpose of the extraordinary argument he has advanced?

For the purpose of this argument, it might be said that it is the day before that on which we prohibit the import of onions.

If the right hon. Gentleman does not want home-grown onions, will be consult with the Minister of Agriculture and ask him to tell the farmers that they are not to produce any onions for the autumn?

Maize (Eire)

28.

asked the Minister of Food what was the purchase price per ton of the maize bought by the United Kingdom and lent to Eire.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the price of the maize with which Eire repaid this country was very much cheaper, and what is the point of subsidising Eire agriculture, from which we get nothing?

There was no question of a penny of subsidy to Eire agriculture in this transaction.

Gift Parcels (France)

29.

asked the Minister of Food why permits are given for parcels containing 4 lb. of coffee to be sent by commercial freight to France, but not by post.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for pointing out this anomaly. As I told the hon. Member on 19th January, we are modifying the regulations for gift parcels, and in addition we have now arranged that in future parcels accompanied by a Board of Trade export licence will also be accepted for dispatch by parcel post.

Can the right hon. Gentleman explain how the Board of Trade came to issue permits for the despatch of 4 lb. of coffee by air at a cost of about two or three times the value of the coffee, while not allowing the coffee to be sent by post?

No, Sir. I could not answer questions on behalt of my right hon. Friend.

Sweet Rationing

31.

asked the Minister of Food whether he can now make a statement in connection with the removal from the rationing of boiled and other sweets, in view of his assurances given towards the end of 1948.

44.

asked the Minister of Food whether he has now reached any further decision in connection with the rationing of sweets.

I am afraid I cannot today add to the answer that I gave to the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) on 2nd February, but I now hope to make a statement at a very early date.

Is the Minister aware that the weight of public opinion is continuous in this matter; further, is he aware of the convincing argument that there is for the removal of the rationing of sweets or sugar because there is a world surplus? Are we to have this trotted out just before the election? Take sugar off the ration now.

Sugar

32.

asked the Minister of Food if, in view of the fact that he has stated that the Government are prepared to purchase sugar from Empire countries, it will be his policy to use this sugar for increasing the ration, or for re-export.

The additional sugar which will, I am sure, become available under the guarantee which we have given to all Commonwealth producers to buy their entire exportable surplus until 1952, will be used both to free the Commonwealth from making any net import of dollar sugar and to increase the ration and the distribution generally in the United Kingdom.

In view of the colossal failure of his administration, as shown by the recent Supplementary Estimates, when will the Minister realise that it is only by stopping bulk purchase and allowing healthy competition to operate that we shall get more and cheaper food?

Perhaps the hon. Member is not aware that the Empire sugar producers are strongly pressing us to continue bulk purchase.

Does not that argument give away the whole of the right hon. Gentleman's case? They can squeeze him when they cannot squeeze Mincing Lane.

Has the right hon. Gentleman discussed this matter with his former colleague, Lord Baldwin?

Groundnuts Scheme

33.

asked the Minister of Food if he is satisfied that the 1949 cropping programme for the groundnuts scheme in East Africa will conserve the fertility of the soil and prevent soil erosion after the bush has been cleared.

Yes, Sir. As the hon. Member knows, comprehensive measures are being taken to prevent soil erosion and maintain fertility.

Will the right hon. Gentleman allow the House to share one of his secrets about the groundnuts scheme, and that is what crops are actually being grown in order to attain this purpose?

This year groundnuts and sunflowers have been planted, but of course the preservation of soil fertility and anti-erosion measures depend upon the crop rotation over a number of years.

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether any lessons can be drawn from the very small area of ground where groundnuts have been grown for two years?

I think that the scientific advisers of the Corporation would say that it was shown that it is safe to grow groundnuts for at least two years in succession, but they would not go further than that.

42.

asked the Minister of Food if he will expedite the publication of the first annual report of the Overseas Food Corporation; and how soon after 31st March the House may expect to see the accounts of the groundnuts scheme in East Africa.

I rely on the Corporation to submit the report and accounts as soon as they reasonably can, having regard to the normal practice of large commercial undertakings in this matter. I cannot commit them to a particular date.

Does that mean that the House may not see the report and accounts until possibly October or November, or even after the General Election?

Oh, no, long before the Election, but I cannot really add to my answer at this stage.

Surely the right hon. Gentleman is aware of the intense public interest in this matter? Is it not possible for him to produce a White Paper or some other document in order to keep the public informed?

I have already stated to the House that I would welcome the Debate which I understood was going to be arranged through hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite on this matter at as early a date as they like.

If the right hon. Gentleman is to supply information to the House during a Debate, will he not make that information available in advance so as to give us an opportunity of studying the position?

I can only repeat what I said on an earlier occasion. I am not willing to ask the Corporation to supply an additional report in the middle of the first year of their operations, as well as their first annual report. Apart from that, I am being asked to publish my speech in writing in advance, which is quite a novel custom for this House.

As the right hon. Gentleman has promised a report, can he say why we should not have it now?

I promised that this information would be ready at any time for a Debate on this subject if hon. Members opposite, through the usual channels, would arrange a date.

43.

asked the Minister of Food if schools are now being provided for the children of workers on the groundnuts scheme in East Africa as part of the welfare activities of the Overseas Food Corporation; what proportion of the children are attending; if there are facilities for adult education; and what is the estimated cost.

34 and 35.

asked the Minister of Food (1) what medical facilities are provided for the Africans employed on the groundnuts scheme at Kongwa; what proportion have received medical attention during the last six convenient months; and what are the most prevalent diseases;

(2) what measures have now been taken at Kongwa to improve the recreational facilities of the Africans employed on the groundnuts scheme.

I have requested the Overseas Food Corporation, who are responsible for these matters, to reply to the hon. Member's Questions direct.

Is it not the responsibility of this House and of the Minister to take particular care of the welfare of the Africans employed on this scheme?

Yes, Sir, it is part of the responsibilities of all of us to do that, but it has been clearly laid down that these Questions, which go into very considerable detail, should be answered direct from the public Corporation; again, all these matters can be arranged in our forthcoming Debate on the subject.

Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that the Overseas Food Corporation is the educational authority for that area?

No, Sir; that shows the width of these Questions, some of which no doubt are the responsibility of the Tanganyika Government, which should be inquired into through my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary.

Is the Minister aware that this morning I have had a most unsatisfactory letter from the Overseas Food Corporation, but that the point really is that this letter will not appear in HANSARD, and that I am the only person who will get that information?

Is my right hon. Friend aware that this is not a satisfactory situation, because many hon. Members on all sides of the House would be interested in this type of information, and it is not practicable for us all to write to the Corporation? If it can be arranged for the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) to have this information, cannot it be made available to all?

If the Question is one which seems to us and to the Chair, with respect to you, Mr. Speaker, to be within the Ruling which has been laid down for the future in Debates on this subject, I do answer it, as I answered the Question put down by the hon. Member just now. As for the kind of Question relating to matters of detail which the public Corporation should answer, the other procedure is taken; but this House can have that information in the forthcoming Debate.

Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that he has said that he is ready to answer questions in Debate and have them included in HANSARD, but that he is not prepared to answer Questions now? How does he differentiate between the two?

I must follow the line agreed to. A Ruling has been given in regard to all the public Corporations, and I cannot deviate from it.

Does my right hon. Friend not remember that this particular matter raised in Question 43 was discussed in Committee, when he promised us very definitely that these schools would be extended as the work of the Corporation proceeded and that children would not have to wait for education? Can he tell us whether that policy has been carried out?

I am perfectly willing to say that educational facilities, provided on the part of the Tanganyika Government and the Corporation, are extending as rapidly as possible.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the Colonial Office has some responsibility, in this matter, and is it necessary that there should be two authorities responsible for education in the Colonies?

That is a question on which the Corporation feels strongly, and wishes these responsibilities to be borne as much as practicable by the Tanganyika Government.

Would my right hon. Friend bear in mind the fact that, when replies are given in the winding-up speech at the end of a Debate to points raised in it, they are often of a general and perfunctory kind, and necessarily so, whereas the particular replies asked for in these Questions would be full and precise? Would he therefore make inquiries from the Corporation himself and circulate the answers which he receives from the Corporation in HANSARD?

On a point of Order. May I appeal to you, Mr. Speaker, to have this matter made clear? These two questions were, in fact, addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I think it would be most helpful if we could have some clear Ruling.

Further to that point of Order. Are we not still awaiting your final Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and a further debate on this matter of Questions regarding the Overseas Food Corporation?

With regard to a further Debate, I have no knowledge. As to a further Ruling, I considered the matter very carefully and I came to the conclusion that there was nothing further to be done, because there was no complaint that any Questions had not been allowed by the Table and that is all I am concerned with. So far they have all been allowed. How Ministers answer Questions is not a matter that concerns me. The Question put down by the hon. Member which he says was transferred was, I presume, transferred by the Table to the right Department, and it was considered that the right Department was the Ministry of Food, and not the Colonial Office. Such Questions are transferred automatically to the right Department by the Table, and that has always been our custom.

With regard to what you have just said, Mr. Speaker, can we take it at least that questions on the lines of those allowed today will continue to be allowed by the Table, so that we can continue to chivy my right hon. Friend if he does not give full and satisfactory answers?

I cannot say what the future attitude to such Questions will be, or whether they will be allowed. Those put down for today have been allowed, but whether any future Questions will be allowed I cannot prophesy.

Surely, this is becoming rather ridiculous. Nobody can seriously declare that education is the business of any Corporation, yet Questions about education are bandied about from one Department to another and hon. Members are being referred to a Corporation which may or may not answer them Surely, some Ruling should be given which would ensure that the hon.

Member who is asking the Question shall know who is responsible and be able to get an answer?

I cannot rule how an answer should be given. All I can say is whether a Question shall be put or not. What the Minister may do, or whether he is going to answer or not, has nothing to do with me at all.

Would it be possible for you to give further consideration to this problem, Mr. Speaker? We are in the position that hon. Members are instructed to write to the Corporation and receive information which would he of interest to a large number of other hon. Members in the House. Would it be practicable for you to give consideration to some means whereby the information made available to one hon. Member could be made available automatically to all hon. Members of the House?

I remember that, on the Christmas Adjournment, the Leader of the House suggested that we might have a further Debate on these matters, and perhaps this is a matter which might he debated. I will certainly give the matter my consideration, but I am not in the position to give instructions to Ministers as to how they must answer Questions; that is not part of the Speaker's duty. Where a Minister thinks the Question is so important that he would like to publish the answer of the Corporation in HANSARD, that is a matter entirely for him, and has nothing to do with me.

Food Office, Winchester

36.

asked the Minister of Food whether local interests were consulted before the decision was taken to transfer the local food office to the Corner House Hotel. Winchester and whether he is aware of the unsuitability of its situation for that purpose.

The Ministry of Works have been trying to get better premises for us in Winchester since 1943 and have at last succeeded. They are a great improvement on the old offices. I understand from my right hon. Friend the Minister of Works that local interests were consulted.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the local council is protesting against the fact that it was not consulted and neither was the Food Control Committee; further is he aware that the premises which have been obtained by the Ministry of Works are unsuitable for a food office since they are situated at a junction of six main roads where there is a very narrow pavement, and women calling at the food office with prams will have no place in which to leave them?

My right hon. Friend, whose responsibility it was, informs me that the local interests, meaning I understand the local council, were consulted. Certainly, from our point of view, these premises are not ideal, but they are a very great improvement.

Will my right hon. Friend go into the matter further before taking occupation of the premises, if I supply him with the facts?

Fish Albumen

37.

asked the Minister of Food what progress has been made in his experiments on the use of fish albumen for the manufacture of many products, including confectionery and ice cream, and for the laundry industry.

A small plant for producing fish albumen has been installed by an association of manufacturers and is undergoing trials. I understand that the stage of commercial production has not yet been reached.

Potatoes

38.

asked the Minister of Food what is the estimated crop of Royal Kidney potatoes in the Wisbech and Boston areas; how much of it has been exported; to which countries has this part gone; and what is being done with the remainder.

The 1948 crop of Royal Kidney potatoes in the Isle of Ely and Holland areas is estimated at 4,200 tons. No ware has been exported—nor is that customary. Four hundred tons of the seed have been sent to Morocco by my Department and licences to export 2,800 tons of English Royal Kidney seed have been issued to private traders. Any remaining stocks may be sold on the home market or offered to my Department for purchase under the guarantee.

In view of the value of the remainder as an export, why is the right hon. Gentleman not taking a little more trouble about them and preventing them from being used for stock feed, which is what is happening?

Private enterprise traders have a perfect right to export them and some have done so, I am glad to say.

39.

asked the Minister of Food why merchants who export potatoes have to pay a charge of £2 per ton exported; and what effect this has had on the export trade.

The charge is made under the Seed Potatoes (Export) (Charges) Order, in order to recover the acreage payment made to potato growers. I am glad to say that our exports now are higher than in the past two or three years.

While not contesting the Minister's suggestion that overall in the whole country, they may be up, is he aware that the Wisbech area has not exported any potatoes for two years now, largely because of this charge which makes it an uneconomic proposition for exporters?

It is doubtful whether my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer could be persuaded to subsidise potatoes for export by the acreage payment. That is what is at issue.

Would it not be cheaper to do that rather than that the Ministry should lose £4 5s. 0d. a ton on exporting ware potatoes?

There is a case there which I am very willing to examine with my right hon. and learned Friend.

Inquiries, Manchester

40.

asked the Minister of Food whether he can now make a statement about the Food Ministry official who entered a Manchester businessman's home on or about 4th February, 1949, particulars of which have been forwarded to him; and whether this was done by his authority or instruction.

The person referred to was not a Ministry of Food official, nor was she acting on behalf of the Ministry. No survey work has been carried out for for us in Didsbury since 1943

Can the Minister tell us whether at the present time, Ministry of Food officials or inspectors are still going round Manchester calling at houses, and whether notice is given to the householder before the inspector calls?

The only form of survey carried on now is the Family Food Survey. which has been going on for eight years, and the housewife is always written to in advance and asked whether she would like to collaborate in the survey or not.

Eire Cattle Exports

41.

asked the Minister of Food how many fat cattle were exported from Eire to Great Britain and the Continent respectively during last year; and how the numbers compare with the previous year.

During 1948, Eire exported 18,621 fat cattle to Great Britain and 47,087 to the Continent. For the previous year the numbers were 49,698 and 57,847 respectively

Is not the Minister aware that, despite the much advertised agricultural agreement with Eire, Eire is exporting a far larger proportion of fat cattle to the Continent and far fewer to this country than before?

That is why we arranged with the Eire Government to limit their exports of cattle, both fat and store, to 10 per cent. of the total exports, beginning on 30th June next.

But is not the Minister aware that things are getting much worse instead of better?

That arrangement only comes into force on 30th June, so they could not very well be getting better now under that arrangement.

Soft Drinks (Sugar Allocation)

26.

asked the Minister of Food what allocation of sugar he has in contemplation for the soft drinks industry during 1949.

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether he intends that this industry shall participate in any future increased distribution which he is able to make?

Before giving consideration to any increase in this direction. Will the Minister pay considerable attention to the need for an increase in the ordinary domestic allowance?

Divorce Law (Domicile)

45.

asked the Attorney-General whether it is proposed to introduce legislation to amend the present law so as to permit divorce by British subjects married to foreigners or Empire subjects who are not domiciled in Great Britain.

The difficulties arising from the rule that the wife is assumed by law to have the same domicile as her husband are appreciated. These difficulties are not confined to the law relating to divorce and give rise to somewhat complicated questions. They are receiving consideration but I cannot at present promise legislation.

In view of the hardship and unhappiness caused to many British-born women—of which the right hon. and learned Gentleman is well aware—through this insistence on domicile, will he not try to find some form of legislation which would affect British-born women married to foreigners or Empire subjects only?

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I have that hardship very much in mind.

Would not the right hon. and learned Gentleman consider it possible, perhaps, to put forward some proposal to deal with this point for inclusion in the Bill which received its Second Reading last Friday?

Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept the principle that these women should have the right to retain or resume their British domicile whenever they so wish?

Will my right hon. and learned Friend have a special look at the circumstances regarding marriages with Newfoundlanders, because I understand that in Newfoundland there is no provision at all for divorce, and, consequently, British women married to Newfoundlanders have no remedy at all?

Leasehold Committee (Interim Report)

46.

asked the Attorney-General when it is expected that the Departmental Committee, presided over by Lord Uthwatt, will present its report.

The chairman of the Leasehold Committee has informed my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor that his Committee expect shortly to present an Interim Report dealing with that part of their terms of reference which concerns business premises. I have no information as to when the Committee's Final Report may be expected.

Lynskey Tribunal

47.

asked the Attorney-General if, in view of comments by members of the Lynskey Tribunal, any prosecutions for perjury are contemplated.

No, Sir. I would refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave to the Private Notice Question by the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) on Thursday, 3rd February.

In spite of that answer, may I ask the Attorney-General whether, in view of the fact that the evidence at the Lynskey Tribunal was taken on oath, he will ask the Public Prosecutor to review the evidence with a view to taking proceedings as suggested in my Question?

The Public Prosecutor, who was represented by counsel holding a watching brief at the Tribunal, has already considered this matter with considerable care, but a prosecution for alleged perjury is attended by various technical difficulties, and I apprehend that it would be difficult to select from the welter of conflicting statements one which was not only material to the matters under inquiry and the falsity of which could be established by two witnesses, but which was not contradicted very shortly after it had been made, by the same witness.

Is the House to understand that perjury can be committed before a British tribunal, and the man who commits it can get away with it?

49.

asked the Attorney-General whether his attention has been called to the statements relative to the Lynskey Tribunal made by Mr. George Gibson on a British Movietone newsreel recently released to the public on which grave charges were made against the Tribunal and it was stated that Mr. Gibson was not permitted to, and could not, call witnesses for his defence and that had he been permitted to produce witnesses he could have rebutted the allegations against him; and if he proposes to institute any proceedings in the matter.

Yes, Sir. My attention has been called to the interview in question and in consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions I have given grave consideration to the question whether proceedings ought to be taken in respect of it. British Movietone News withdrew the film from circulation as soon as the matter was brought to their notice and in the circumstances I have decided that no further action is called for. I think it right, however, to take the opportunity of saying that there is no truth in the statement that Mr. Gibson was not permitted to call witnesses. As appears from the Report of the Tribunal, the conclusions against him were based almost entirely on his own evidence and on his letters and it is not easy to see what witnesses he could usefully have called in order to contradict the effect of his own sworn testimony. However that may be, he made no request to the Tribunal, to the Treasury Solicitor or to me that other witnesses should be called, nor did counsel on his behalf make any oral application in court as he would no doubt have done if any request to call witnesses had been improperly neglected or refused, or if he had thought that other relevant evidence existed which in the interests of his client should have been submitted to the Tribunal.

In view of the fact that the Tribunal functioned as a result of a Resolution of this House, is the right hon. and learned Gentleman satisfied that there is a clear method of protecting its members from being scandalised after they have finished performing their duties?

Yes, Sir. Without going at length into the technicalities of the matter, I certainly would not like it to be thought that the existing machinery of the law is powerless to protect judicial Tribunals like this whose proceedings are scandalised without reasonable and probable cause. I think there is machinery which might be made use of in an appropriate case.

In regard to the use of the word "defence" in this Question, is it not a fact that Mr. George Gibson was never charged with any criminal offence whatsoever and surely he has a right to protest against the method of this Tribunal? Will not the Attorney-General give the impression that we are not going to prevent a man from protesting his innocence when he has never been charged with any crime?

Mr. George Gibson thought fit to describe the proceedings of the Tribunal as a travesty of justice on one ground only, which he repeated on three occasions, namely, that he was not permitted to call witnesses, and that, had he been allowed to call them, he could have established his innocence. That ground was entirely untrue; he never applied to call any witnesses at all.

In fairness, and following the question put by the hon. Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn) would the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirm that the words "for my defence" occur in Mr. Gibson's statement?

That is perfectly true; that expression was one Mr. Gibson thought fit to use in public in the interview he gave.

In view of the fact that Mr. Gibson said of a Tribunal set up by this House that it was a travesty of British justice, has he not committed an offence against this House? Should not something be done about that?

That perhaps is not a matter for me, but it often happens that those who are condemned by the law do not retain a good opinion of the law. Perhaps we must not be too hard in proceedings about it.

While acknowledging the fact that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's answer has been conciliatory on the point, may I ask him to bear in mind that no one can know what witnesses to call in his defence if he is not presented with some precise charge against him and that, therefore, there is undoubtedly a sense in which Mr. Gibson's remarks are true?

If I may, I must disabuse the hon. Gentleman's mind of that impression. The allegations against those involved in the Lynskey Tribunal were made abundantly clear in very great detail by me in my opening speech. Fifteen sitting days, or more, went by before Mr. Gibson was called upon to give his evidence.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman says that Movietone News have withdrawn the newsreel. Will he say whether Mr. Gibson has also withdrawn his statement?

I have not heard whether Mr. Gibson has withdrawn his statement or not.

Commission Of The Peace (Sir Maurice Bloch)

48.

asked the Attorney-General why Sir Maurice Bloch's name has been erased from the list of Justices of the Peace for Glasgow.

The name of Sir Maurice Bloch was removed from the Commission of the Peace at the direction of the Lord Chancellor. After considering the Report of the Tribunal presided over by Mr. Justice Lynskey, my noble Friend decided that it would be undesirable for Sir Maurice Bloch to remain a Justice of the Peace.

Is this the only gentleman who has been treated in this way, and is the Attorney-General aware that there is a widespread feeling in Glasgow that this savours of petty persecution; and, further, can he say why the appendix to this gentleman was removed while his prefix was left to him?

Can my right hon. and learned Friend say what supervision is kept by him over the conduct of Justices of the Peace in order to ensure that it remains up to the standard

Division No. 48.]

AYES

[3.32 p.m.

Adams, Richard (Balham)Corbet, Mrs. F. K. (Camb'well, N.W.)Harrison, J
Albu, A. H.Crawley, AHastings, Dr Somerville
Allen, A. C. (Bosworth)Daggar, GHaworth, J
Alpass, J. H.Daines, PHenderson, Rt Hn A (Kingswintord)
Attewell, H. C.Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)Holmes, H E (Hemsworth)
Austin, H. LewisDavies, Ernest (Enfield)Horabin, T L
Austin, H. LewisDavies, Haydn (St Pancras, S.W.)Hoy, J
Awbery, S. S.Davies, R. J. (Westhoughton)Hudson, J. H (Ealing, W)
Ayles, W HDeer, G.Hughes, Emrys (S Ayr)
Ayrton Gould, Mrs. BDodds, N N.Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N)
Bacon, Miss A.Driberg, T. E. NHughes, H D (W'lverh'pton. W)
Balfour, ADumpleton, C. W.Hynd, H (Hackney, C)
Barstow, P G.Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.Hynd, J B. (Attercliffe)
Barton, CEdelman, MIrving, W J. (Tottenham, N.)
Bechervaise, A. E.Edwards, W J (Whitechapel)Janner, B.
Benson, GEvans, Albert (Islington, W)Jeger, G. (Winchester)
Beswick, FEvans, E (Lowestoft)Jeger, Dr. S. W (St. Pancras, S E)
Bing, G H CEvans, John (Ogmore)Jenkins, R. H.
Binns, JEvans, S. N (Wednesbury)Jones, D T (Hartlepool)
Blackburn, A. REwart, RJones, Elwyn (Plaistow)
Blyton, W. RFernyhough, EKeenan, W
Braddock, Mrs. E M.(L'pl. Exch'ge)Fletcher, E G. M (Islington, E.)Key, Rt. Hon. C W
Brook, D. (Halifax)Follick, MKinley, J
Brooks, T. J. (Rothwell)Gallacher, WKirby, B V
Brown, George (Belper)Ganley, Mrs C SLawson, Rt Hon J J
Brown, T. J. (Ince)Glanville, J E (Consett)Leslie, J R
Burden, T W.Gordon-Walker, P CLevy, B W
Butter, H W. (Hackney, S.)Grey, C. FLewis A W J (Upton)
Byers, FrankGriffiths, D. (Rother Valley)Lindsay, K M (Comb'd Eng. Univ.)
Callaghan, JamesGuest, Dr. L. HadenLipson, D L.
Gastle, Mrs. B. AGunter, R. JLipton, Lt.-Col M
Champion, A JGuy W HLongden, F.
Chetwynd, G. RHaire, John E. (Wycombe)McAdam, W.
Cocks, F. SHale, LeslieMcGhee, H. G
Collick, P.Hall, Rt Hon. GlenvilMack, J. D
Collindridge, F.Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. RMackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N.W)
Colman, Miss G. MHardman, D. R. McLeavy, F

appropriate for the effective discharge of their judicial and other duties?

Bill Presented

Social Services (Northern Ireland Agreement) Bill

"to confirm and give effect to an agreement made between the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance for Northern Ireland with a view to assimilating the burdens on the Exchequer of the United Kingdom and the Exchequer of Northern Ireland in respect of certain social and allied services"; presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; supported by Mr Ede and Mr. Glenvil Hall; read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 77.]

Business Of The House

Motion made, and Question put

"That the Proceedings in Committee on the Juries Bill be exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House)."—[Mr. H. Morrison.)

The House divided: Ayes. 196; Noes. 82.

McNeil, Rt. Hon. H.Popplewell, E.Thomas, D E (Aberdare)
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)Porter, G (Leeds)Thurtle, Ernest
Macpherson, T. (Romford)Randall, H. E.Titterington, M F
Mainwaring, W. H.Ranger, J.Tolley, L.
Mallalieu, J P. W. (Huddersfield)Reeves, J.Tomlinson, Rt. Hon G.
Manning, C. (Camberwell, N.)Reid, T (Swindon)Usborne, Henry
Manning, Mrs. L. (Epping)Ridealgh, Mrs. MVernon, Maj W F
Mathers, Rt. Hon. GeorgeRobertson, J. J (Berwick)Viant, S. P
Melfish, R. J.Ross, William (Kilmarnock)Wadsworth, G
Middleton, Mrs. L.Scott-Elliot, WWallace, G D. (Chislehurst)
Mikardo, IanSegal, Dr. S.Warbey, W. N.
Millington, Wing-Comdr. E. RShawcross, Rt. Hn. Sir H. (St. Helens)Webb, M. (Bradford, C.)
Mitchison, G. R.Silverman, J. (Erdington)Wells, P. L. (Faversham)
Moody, A. S.Silverman, S. S. (Nelson)Wells, W. T. (Walsall)
Morris, P. (Swansea, W.)Simmons, C. JWheatley, Rt. Hon. John (Edinb'gh, E.)
Morris, Hopkin (Carmarthen)Skeffington, A. MWhiteley, Rt. Hon. W
Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, E.)Skinnard, F. WWilkins, W. A.
Moyle, A.Smith, C, (Colchester)Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)
Murray, J. D.Smith, H. N. (Nottigham, S.)Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)
Naylor, T. E.Smith, S. H. (Hull, S.W.)Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
Nichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.)Snow, J. W.Williams, Rt. Hon. T (Don Valley)
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P J. (Derby)Solley, L. J.Williams, W R. (Heston)
Oliver, G. H.Stamford, W.Willis, E.
Parker, J.Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)Wills, Mrs. E. A
Paton, Mrs. F. (Rushcliffe)Strachey, Rt. Hon. JYates, V. F.
Paton, J. (Norwich)Summerskill, Rt. Hon. EdithYoung, Sir R. (Newton)
Pearson, A.Swingler, SYounger, Hon Kenneth
Peart, T. F.Sylvester, G. O.
Piratin, P.Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Mr. Hannan and Mr. Bowden.

NOES

Amory, D. HeathcoatGrimston, R. V.Nicholson, G
Assheton, Rt. Hon. R.Hannon, Sir P. (Moseley)Peake, Rt. Hon. O.
Astor, Hon. M.Hare, Hon. J. H. (Woodbridge)Peto, Brig C. H. M
Baldwin, A. E.Hinchingbrooke, ViscountPoole, O. B. S (Oswestry)
Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C. (Wells)Hogg, Hon. Q.Ramsay, Maj. S
Bossom, A. C.Hurd, A.Rayner, Brig R
Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.Jeffreys, General Sir G.Renton, D.
Braithwaite, Lt.-Comdr. J. G.Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.Robertson, Sir D (Streatham)
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.Keeling, E. H.Robinson, Roland
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G T.Lambert, Hon. G.Ropner, Col L.
Butcher, H. W.Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. HRoss, Sir R. D (Londonderry)
Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (S'ffr'n W'ld'n)Lennox-Boyd, A. TShepherd, W. S. (Bucklow)
Challen, C.Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral)Smithers, Sir W
Channon, H.Low, A. R. W.Spearman, A C M
Clifton-Brown, Lt.-Col- G.Lucas-Tooth, Sir H.Strauss, Henry (English Universities)
Conant, Maj R. J. E.MacAndrew, Col. Sir C.Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.Macdonald, Sir P. (I. of Wight)Taylor, Vice-Adm E. A (P'dd't'n, S.)
Crowder, Capt. John E.McKie, J. H. (Galloway)Teeling, William
Cuthbert, W. N.MacLeod, J.Thorp, Brigadier R A F
Darling, Sir W. Y.Macpherson, N. (Dumfries)Touche, G C.
De la Bere, R.Maitland, Comdr. J. W.Vane, W M F
Dodds-Parker, A. D.Manningham-Buller, R. EWalker-Smith, D
Drewe, C.Marlowe, A. A. H.Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)
Eccles, D. M.Marshall, D (Bodmin)Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Erroll, F. JMarshall, S H (Sutton)
Fraser, Sir I. (Lonsdale.)Mellor, Sir J.

TELLERS POR THE NOES:

Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir D. P M.Moore, Lt.-Col. Sir TBrigadier Mackeson and
Glyn, Sir R.Morris-Jones, Sir H.Mr. Wingfield Digby.
Gridley, Sir ANeven-Spence, Sir B.

Hybrid Bills (Committee Procedure)

Ordered:

"That the Report from the Select Committee on Hybrid Bills (Procedure in Committee) be now considered."—[Mr. H. Morrison.]

Report considered accordingly.

3.42 p.m.

I beg to move:

"That the recommendations contained in the Report from the Select Committee on Hybrid Bills (Procedure in Committee) in Session 1947–48 be approved, subject to the qualification that a Bill against which no Petition has been lodged may be committed either to a Committee of the Whole House or to a Standing Committee, as the House may determine."
From time to time we in this House, like people in houses everywhere, have to spare a few minutes to do a bit of spring cleaning. We have to sweep away any dust that has accumulated and tidy out all the corners. That is what the House is respectfully invited to do in relation to this important Report of the Select Committee. The Report which we are inviting the House to approve is really a piece of Parliamentary spring cleaning, and the dusty corner we want to start to sweep out is our procedure for handling hybrid Bills on the Committee stage—that is, those Bills which are public Measures but which also affect private interests in such a way that we apply to them our Standing Orders and procedure relating to private business.

We have had before us in the last few years quite a number of hybrid Bills, some important, some relatively unimportant; and I have no doubt that more will be needed in years to come The House will remember that the Bank of England Bill was a hybrid Bill; so was the Cable and Wireless Bill, in relation to which the Financial Secretary to the Treasury gave evidence at some length before the Select Committee; and so was the Trafalgar Estates Bill; and there have been many others. Among others before the war was the London Passenger Transport Bill which had quite a lengthy hearing before the Select Committee, with a great assembly of learned counsel and expert witnesses. I remember in connection with that Bill, which I introduced as Minister of Transport, that I myself was called out of a Cabinet meeting and required to give evidence on that Bill at the request of its opponents. I am afraid I had very little notice to prepare my case, but it was a most interesting experience for two days, and I think a good time was had by all. Anyway we got the Bill through Committee, and, in the end, it was amended and passed by the National Government that followed in 1933

All these hybrid Bills start in this House in the same way as other public Bills, that is to say, they have a Second Reading, in the course of which we discuss the general policy and principle of whatever is proposed in the Bill. But next, under our present procedure, the Bill is usually committed to a Select Committee, before which anyone whose interests are specially affected may appear and petition against the provisions of the Bill. This is most important, and I think the whole House will agree that we must uphold the right of those individuals, undertakings and public authorities directly concerned to appear and to be heard before the Select Committee. This is all straightforward and sensible.

The part of the procedure which has become untidy is the extent to which the person petitioning against a hybrid Bill m this way may attack the public policy which inspires the Bill. In other words, can someone whose interests are affected contest only its provisions which directly affect him, or can he attack the whole principle upon which the Bill is based and which, of course has by that time had a Second Reading in one of the Houses of Parliament? At the moment, of course, we are dealing with this House. There is another question closely connected with this one. Is it the responsibility of the promoter of the Bill, who is usually, but not always, a Minister of the Crown, to prove to the Select Committee that the Bill as a whole is expedient, or can he rely on the fact that the House has given it a Second Reading and regard this question as closed?

In practice these questions have been largely answered over the last 100 years according to whether or not the Bills have had Preambles—a question which has often depended on no more than a personal preference and the drafting technique of the draftsman. This might not have been a matter of any great importance if it had been merely a question of untidiness, but variations in the procedure, and the uncertainty which they have cast on the whole question of the true functions of these Select Committees, have been a source of difficulty to the Committees themselves and have undoubtedly been unsatisfactory for the House as a whole.

It was as a result of this state of affairs that the House in December, 1947, appointed a Select Committee to go into the whole question of procedure in Select Committee on hybrid bills. I think I shall be speaking for all parts of the House when I say we are grateful to the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benson) and his colleagues on the Select Committee for their labours. They have had to examine in detail the past practice and a wealth of conflicting precedents, and to ferret out from them the principles on which they appear to have been based. The conclusions they reached and the suggestions they made for reforming the procedure are clearly set out in the Report which is now before us. The Government have studied this Report with interest and care, and we think it is a good Report. I hope and expect that the House as a whole will agree that it is a good one. There is one small point to which I shall come in a minute, on which we have a slight further refinement to suggest, but the Report as a whole has our entire approval.

The doctrine on which the Report proceeds must, I think, be agreed by everyone—first, that the functions of a Select Committee are those which the House expressly delegates to it; second, that the purpose of committing a hybrid Bill to a Select Committee is to give an individual whose interests are specially affected a chance to state his case and defend his interests—a right, of course, we wish to preserve. Those are the two basic principles which underlie the recommendations in the Report which we are considering. The first and main recommendation is none the worse, I think, for being a compromise. It is a compromise between two different forms of procedure which we adopt. There is the procedure of public Bills whereby the principle of a Bill is taken to have been affirmed by Second Reading and cannot be questioned in Committee. There is the practice we follow on private Bills when we use the Second Reading merely to convey that there is no serious objection to the Bill on public grounds, leaving the affirmation of the expediency of the Bill to be approved before a Private Bill Committee. The hybrid Bill is somewhere half-way between the ordinary public Bill and the private Bill, and so it is not very surprising that the procedure we recommend the House to adopt lies somewhere half-way between the two forms of practice which I have just described.

What is suggested is that unless the House especially instructs a Committee that it has to investigate and decide on the expediency of a hybrid Bill, the Second Reading is to be taken as conveying the approval of the House to the principle of the Bill, so that the promoters will not be required to prove its expediency to the Select Committee, and an objector will not be allowed to argue against its expediency except as it affects him especially. But if, as may happen in some cases, the House thinks that the Bill ought to be treated more on the lines of a private Bill, then the House can arrange for the procedure to be modified accordingly. This is the main recommendation in the Report, and we commend it to the House as providing a far more certain and logical method of procedure than the present anomalous practices.

I shall not discuss the other recommendations which the Select Committee have made, since these are clearly summarised at the end of the Report, and also, I gather that the chairman of the Committee will hope to do so in the course of this discussion. The slight refinement to which I referred earlier, and which is mentioned in the Motion I have moved, relates to the seventh and last of the Committee's recommendations. The purpose of committing a Bill to a Select Committee is to allow anyone especially affected to prepare and voice his objections. The Report, bearing this in mind, makes what we think is a very sensible recommendation, that if no one petitions against a Bill, the Select Committee stage is unnecessary, and the Bill can go straight on to the next stage. This seems to be sound and reasonable. The Standing Orders relating to private business, providing for the publication of the notice of persons appearing to be specially affected, give them an opportunity to lodge petitions and to be heard if they so wish. Apart from this, the ordinary practices of consulting at an early stage all interests likely to be affected by a hybrid Measure give everyone an ample opportunity to make themselves heard or to seek to be heard.

The refinement which we think may be added is that, in such cases, the House should have the option of committing the Bill either to a Committee of the whole House or to a Standing Committee. When I say "such cases," I mean cases in which no petitions are promoted against the Bill and, therefore, the Bill does not proceed to a Select Committee. We have to consider what is the next stage, and obviously the next stage is the ordinary Committee stage which would apply to a public Bill. We think that the House should be free, according to the nature of the appeal and the wishes of the House, either to take the Bill on the Floor or commit the Bill to a Standing Committee upstairs. There are some Hybrid Bills which could appropriately be considered by Standing Committee, and we feel it would be convenient to the House to have this option. I do not think that this refinement, which aims at keeping the procedure flexible, goes against anything which the Select Committee have in mind. Indeed, on reading their report, I wondered if they had not perhaps intended to make this part of their recommendations.

With this small but, as we thought, useful addition, I invite the House to give the Report its approval. I have spoken quite shortly on the Report of the Select Committee, but I thought it right that a brief statement should be made on a matter of this character, which has some effect upon private rights, and I hope that, with that short explanation and any observations which hon. Members may wish to make, the House will be good enough to agree to the Motion which I have moved.

3.56 p.m.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke as if this were an ordinary spring-cleaning or tidying-up Measure, to use his own words, as the House, by almost universal agreement, was accustomed to indulge in from time to time in order to bring their Measures up to date. I hope that hon. Members of this House who have not read the Report will not be deceived by that statement. This Report, in parts, involves a major change in our machinery, and the dusty corner which the right hon. Gentleman said that we were now engaged in tidying up is one of the few remaining corners where private rights can be preserved, and where the benefit of these private rights to the public interest can also be preserved.

There are some parts of the Report with which we on the Opposition Benches do not quarrel. The right hon. Gentleman made reference to the presence or absence of a Preamble. He referred to the London Passenger Transport Act. I believe that in that case counsel for the Government declared that there was a notional Preamble and commented on it along those lines. But that illustrates that the Preamble has ceased to have the importance which it used to have, and we on these benches do not quarrel with the view that the presence or absence of a Preamble should not affect the procedure in Committee. However in other respects, and in one major respect, there was certainly no unanimity on the Committee.

As the right hon. Gentleman was commending the Report to the House, perhaps it would have been a little better if he had mentioned the fact that there were two Divisions on the Select Committee, and the two Opposition Members, of whom I was one and the hon. Member for South Hendon (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) was the other, supported the minority Amendment. We did not accept the view that this is merely a piece of small administrative machinery. We believe that private rights are going to be seriously curtailed and through these private rights being curtailed the State will suffer. It is a very important proposal indeed, and the Report and this Motion approving it are of considerable Parliamentary importance. Hon. Members who have done us the credit of reading the Report, will notice the evidence of Sir Charles Browne, the very distinguished Parliamentary Agent and, indeed, the Government's own agent. He said:
"If"—
as the result of this Select Committee's activities—
"the terms of the order of reference were altered so as to give a petitioner only a conditional right of opposition, I think that would be a material alteration of the practice of the House."
In our view this is happening. What we are now discussing is a material alteration in the practice of the House.

The Lord President of the Council referred to the London Passenger Transport Bill. As Minister of Transport he had two days in the witness box being cross-examined at very short notice and in great detail on the details of the Bill, and also on the policy behind it, but no one at that time suggested that petitioners should be stopped from challenging the principles of public policy involved in the Bill. Had this Report been accepted by the House before that Bill came before the Hybrid Bills Committee, that procedure would not have been possible, and in all probability the chairman would have ruled that the House had given unconditional approval to the principles of the Bill, and would have limited what any petitioner might say to the area—if I can describe it in that way—of the petitioner's own locus standi.

I quite agree with what the hon. Member is saying; he is quite right. I intervene only to say that from a purely selfish point of view I should have been exceedingly sorry to miss that experience: they were two of the most enjoyable days of my life.

Then in the un-likely event of the right hon. Gentleman's party ever providing Ministers to be cross-examined again, I think it is a little harsh of him to deprive them of such future pleasures.

Since that Bill we have had a further Bill: the Cable and Wireless Act. That was a hybrid Bill; a Bill of enormous importance, of great international significance, the full consequences of which this country has not yet wholly realised. On the Committee stage of that Bill before the Select Committee, while the chairman certainly indicated that he did not require from the promoters detailed evidence in support of the Bill, he made—as the hon. Gentleman who was chairman well remembers himself—no attempt whatever to challenge the petitioners from advancing arguments against the expediency of the Bill. They were allowed to do so, and indeed did so at considerable length. It would no longer be possible to do this, and the freedom allowed to private interests, genuinely believing they were serving the public advantage, could not now take place if a strict interpretation of this Report guides future chairmen of Committees.

The more important of the two Amendments which my hon. Friend and I moved to this Report can be found on page 17. It was our view that a petitioner
"should not be debarred from advancing any argument tending to show: either that the justice done to himself and other particular persons in a similar position to or associated with himself is so great as to outweigh any public advantage,"
or that the alleged public advantage relied upon by the promoters to justify the interference with private rights is insufficient for the purpose, or both of these contentions. It is the view of the Conservative Party that once a petitioner has established his locus standi, there are very few limiting conditions that should be imposed upon what he can say. His petition is lodged "against the Bill"—that is the time-honoured phrase: not against one particular aspect of the Bill, but "against the Bill."

It is, of course, one of our chief criticisms of this proposed change in our machinery that it is unfair to private rights, and a hybrid Bill is a quasi-private Bill. But this is not our only contention. It is our contention, as I have said, that the public interest suffers by curtailing these private rights. The effect of some of the recommendations in this Report is to make rules which will in future prevent petitioners putting forward arguments to protect the public interest. In the case, for example, of the Cables and Wireless Act, to which I have made reference, the company put forward arguments which were not known to the House as a whole, and which it was in the public interest that the House should know; and undisclosed facts emerged before the Committee which might have made many hon. Members question whether the Bill should have had a Second Reading at all.

There is another and a very important point to which my hon. Friends and I attach a great deal of importance. Since the sitting of this Committee, I have read and re-read the Report with great care, and I must confess that I am now seriously concerned with what is the petitioner's right if he wants to claim that he should be excluded from the operations of a future hybrid Bill. Paragraph 19 provides that an opportunity must be afforded for those whose interests have been singled out for treatment to state fully their case for amending the Bill in order to secure their protection or compensation. Those are the important words:
"in order to secure their protection or compensation."
Paragraph 26 repeats those words "protection or compensation," and words of rather similar form were used by the right hon. Gentleman only a few moments ago.

Now, does this emphasis on protection and compensation imply that no petitioner will in future be entitled to contend that he should be excluded from a Bill? Would he be now prevented from claiming that he be excluded from a Bill? If the right hon. Gentleman could give us some guidance on that at this point it would, I think, make the Debate a little more profitable. He has had a little more notice about this Debate today than he had at the time of the London Passenger Transport Bill, and I should be very grateful if he could answer this: would a petitioner be entitled to claim before the Select Committee that he be excluded from the operations of a Bill? After all, in the case of the Iron and Steel Bill he had a little longer to make up his mind; a large number of concerns were, in the Bill itself, excluded from the operations of the Bill. The Iron and Steel Bill was saved only by a last minute Amendment from itself becoming a hybrid Bill and being treated as such. It would, I think, be a little absurd for the Bill to exclude certain firms but for a petitioner to be prevented from moving for his own exclusion when it goes before a Hybrid Bills Committee. Will the right hon. Gentleman answer that question? It would help if we could know at this stage.

As I understand the hon. Gentleman's question, it is whether a petitioner, supposing he has an objection—and he is not the only one who might object; he has rights, but his rights are particular and peculiar to himself—would be permitted to petition so far as he himself is concerned, without others who might be joined with him. I think the answer is: most certainly, if he has locus standi.

And having locus standi, he would be allowed to claim and argue that he be excluded from the operations of the Bill?

I am very glad to hear that. That is of very considerable importance from the point of view of the liberty of the subject. My first question is, Is there any ground on which it can be seriously contended that, where a Private Bill affects the interests of six persons, one of them cannot seek exclusion from the Bill? To that we have had an answer that there is no ground; one of the six can claim exclusion from the Bill. But now, if such a one is entitled to claim exclusion, then it surely is absurd to say that all six, if there were six interests affected, cannot claim exclusion from the Bill because they would be challenging the whole principle of the Bill. So, if all six, assuming six firms were involved, can claim exclusion from the Bill it would then be our contention that if only one interest, one firm, or one individual, is affected by a hybrid Bill, that single firm, or individual, or interest, can itself claim exclusion from the Bill, and therefore argue against the expediency of the Bill.

No. I am speaking on the spur of the moment, of course, as the hon. Gentleman will appreciate. Supposing there is provision in a Bill which affects six undertakings, six businesses—I am giving a quick answer, and I hope I am right—then I should have thought the whole six could appear, or that any one of the six could appear and argue their case. I should have thought that the argument, under the decision I am asking the House to approve, would be in relation to the specific undertaking with which the petitioner was associated; but I do not think that he would be permitted to argue against the expediency of the Bill in the sense of inviting the Select Committee to reject the Bill, because we take the view that the Bill has already been approved by the House on Second Reading, and that it would be wrong to permit a continuing power of the Select Committee in the case of a hybrid Bill to take action which would amount to the rejection of the Bill which the House had passed.

We are now in rather a difficulty. The right hon. Gentleman has told us that if one petitioner asks to be excluded he can argue in favour of his exclusion, and I said that it would surely be monstrously unjust to prevent all six doing that, on the ground that if all six of them did so it would challenge the expediency of the Bill. Now if six interests are allowed to do that, there is no reason why a single interest should not be allowed to do so. This shows the difficulty in which we are landing ourselves, and before the Debate comes to an end some of my hon. Friends will, no doubt, press for further information on this point, because it is of fundamental importance.

I took it that the word "protection," when dealing with paragraph 19 covered the claim of exclusion, but if that is not the case, our agreement to Clause 19 would not have been given. The argument of any petitioner for exclusion must surely amount to an argument that it is not in the public interest that he should be included. We are now told by the Financial Secretary that a single petitioner out of six can claim exclusion from the Bill, on the grounds, presumably, that it is not in the public interest that he should be included.

No. As I understand it, the grounds of his complaint are that it would be unfair to him; that his private rights are affected by the Bill and therefore, so far as he is concerned, and in so far as his private rights are concerned, he obviously would be at perfect liberty to appear to put his case. But that surely is a different thing from going over the whole policy underlying the expediency of the Bill as it has passed its Second Reading in the House.

It is a little difficult for the right hon. Gentleman and myself to carry this to a satisfactory conclusion by question and answer, but what is right for one petitioner is surely right for all six petitioners, if each has a case as good as the others. If all six are allowed to claim exclusion, what is the position if there is only one firm or individual affected by the Bill, say, Lord Nelson in the case of the Trafalgar Estates Measure? If Lord Nelson had been allowed to claim exclusion from the Bill, would that not be doing something fundamental to the whole principle of the Bill?

I see the point. It is a perfectly fair and logical point. Presumably all these questions as to who is entitled to appear will be a matter for the interpretation of the Standing Orders by the Select Committee concerned. It is not for me to tell the Select Committee what they will have to do. I am merely indicating what is the common sense interpretation of the Motion I am moving. If it be the case that there are six petitioners covering the whole of the undertakings concerned in a Bill, or one petitioner as in the case of Lord Nelson and the Trafalgar Estates Bill, and they disagree, then, if their petition to omit the operative Clause of the Bill is upheld, it will kill the Measure. I do not dissent from that, but I do not wish them to have power under this Motion to challenge the expediency of the Bill. I agree that there may be cases where, if a petitioner were upheld, it would destroy the Bill, and I do not want to interfere with their rights at all.

The tidying up process is being carried a stage further, and I think we are beginning to see some way in which private interests may be more adequately protected in the future. But, in arguing for exclusion, the individual, be he one or six, the individual must be allowed to argue that the public interest which included him has been wrongly assessed and that the damage he is to suffer far outweighs any public interest involved. My hon. Friend and I moved an Amendment to that effect, and if that Amendment had been included in this Report, it might have had a unanimous passage. The majority of the Select Committee say that a petitioner should be allowed to traverse the principle of the Bill only when he can show his locus standi entitles him to do so. It means that the chairmen of Hybrid Bill Committees in future will have to define each particular area of locus for each petitioner. Interminable discussions are likely to take place on this in the future instead of on the merits of the Bill. In an effort to tidy up our machinery we shall have got ourselves into deeper difficulties.

I should like to make one brief point on compensation. There are a great many people who do not value that which they are engaged upon, by monetary considerations. It is of course important that when ruthless things are done by the State proper compensation should be paid—when people see their life's work confiscated and their businesses closed down. If compensation were the only thing that mattered and the only purpose of referring a hybrid Bill to a Select Committee as some people seem to think, then there would be scarcely any reference of hybrid Bills to Select Committees because every hybrid Bill includes provisions for the question of compensation to be referred to the arbitration of an independent tribunal. Therefore, to that extent compensation comes outside the discussion of the Select Committee.

As I have indicated, we cannot accept the Motion as it stands, or the Report as it is finally issued. That is not to say that we did not have a harmonious and friendly discussion in the Committee, which was of the greatest interest to me personally. We differed on a fundamental point, and it is that fundamental point I have been trying to explain today. It is true that this Report is only a guidance for future chairmen, but naturally and properly, they will pay considerable regard to it. They will I hope pay just as much regard to some of the statements that have come from the Government Front Bench in the course of this Debate. Although this Report is only a guidance to chairmen of Select Committees, there is a clear indication running through it that the petitioner should be entitled to challenge the expediency of a Bill only in the most unusual circumstances. The tendency in future will be to weight the scales still further against the private citizen.

As to paragraph 20, against which we divided in the Committee, there was much expert evidence tendered to us against it in the course of our proceedings. The leader of the Parliamentary Bar, speaking, he said, for all of his colleagues, opposed the principle of curtailment of discussion. The first Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury took the same view, as well as the Parliamentary Agent to the Government. There was a very formidable battery of information and experience against what has emerged in paragraph 20.

It is our regretful conclusion that the Report as finally drafted will do a grave injustice, will harm the State, and will leave resentment in the minds of many petitioners who will feel that they have not been allowed to talk. There appears to be a strange refusal to face the view that a Committee can hear evidence without being obliged to listen to it or take it seriously. But if a man is refused permission to give evidence, there is permanent resentment after the hearing is over. It almost looks as if the Government are frightened to allow members of their party to hear evidence because they are uncertain of the conclusions to which those members may come. It may cause Bills that have been finalised to be reversed later on. People will argue that there was no full and frank discussion at the time of the Select Committee. It will cause petitioners undoubtedly to leave the defence of their own private interests and their public duties to another place, where the rules of procedure will be more generous to people who are threatened in their private capacities, or through their private capacity in their possible contribution to the State. Aimed at preventing private rights holding up the national will, it will end by harming both private rights and the national interests.

4.21 p.m.

When the Select Committee met to consider the Procedure on Hybrid Bills they discovered that the origin of hybrid Bills was wrapped in obscurity and that there never had been any attempt either to formulate the purposes for which a Committee on a hybrid Bill was appointed or the procedure that it should adopt. When we came to examine the precedents we found that they were so conflicting, and in certain cases so irrational, that they offered us no guide whatever. In some respects this position simplified our task, for it enabled us to start with a clean sheet in deciding what was the purpose of setting up a Committee on a hybrid Bill, and having decided that, to formulate procedure which should be the most suitable to achieve that purpose.

The purpose of a hybrid Bill is set out in paragraph 19 of our Report, where it is stated:
"Since a Hybrid Bill, by definition, affects particular interests in a manner different from all other interests in the same category, an opportunity must be provided for those interests which have been singled out to state fully their case for amending the Bill in order to secure their protection or compensation."

It does not bring in the point that it is in order to secure their exclusion from the Bill.

The idea of exclusion was never for a moment considered by the Committee because it had not at that moment arisen. It is not for me definitively to interpret this Report, nor is it for the Lord President of the Council. This Report, if accepted by the House, will have to be interpreted by future Select Committees according to the situation which arises. There can be no definitive interpretation. That was the decision of the Committee as to the purpose of a hybrid Bill and that decision was accepted by all Members. There was no Division and, so far as I can remember, there was little or no criticism of paragraph 19.

In order not to give the impression that I supported something on the Committee and afterwards attacked it, perhaps I may say that at the time one assumed that protection covered exclusion from the Bill; and, of course, at the time one was hoping to carry the Government on the side of paragraph 20, which was coming on shortly afterwards. If there are doubts in the minds of the hon. Member, I am reassured by the right hon. Gentleman from the Government Front Bench. who was much more encouraging.

I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman assumed that exclusion was covered by protection, because nobody had thought in terms of exclusion in those days. It was a great piece of foresight on the part of the hon. Gentleman. Certainly, exclusion can be included in protection, but that again is a matter for the Committee considering a particular Bill.

At a later stage in the Report it is specifically stated that with certain types of Bill it would be necessary for the petitioner to ask to be excluded in order to get any protection at all.

I shall deal with the rights of a petitioner in a moment. In fact, I think it follows logically upon our decision as to the purpose of a Committee on a hybrid Bill. We have had a very long discussion on what were the rights of the petitioner, particularly in respect of his right to challenge the basic principle of a Bill. As the hon. Member for Mid-Bedford (Mr. Lennox-Boyd) said, that point arose because we had had, in Cables and Wireless, an example of a Committee on a hybrid Bill being used for little more than a Second Reading Debate. It is true, that as Chairman of the Committee, I did not pull the petitioner up on that occasion, because we have no precedents available to us to prevent it.

The hon. Gentleman should remember that others were serving on that Committee as well as he.

Yes, I know, and I think I said, "We had not," or at least I intended to do so. There were no precedents available to the Committee to say whether that was or was not a correct Procedure on the part of the petitioners.

The Committee as a whole accepted the principle that a hybrid Bill was a public Bill. They accepted also the principle that a Second Reading of a hybrid Bill was an acceptance by the House of the principle of the Bill. I would refer the hon. and learned Gentleman to the Amendment moved by his colleagues, which will be found on page xvii, in which the Movers say, talking of the petitioner:
"He should not in general be allowed to develop a case that the Bill is bad in principle as being contrary to the public interest as such: to do so would be merely to arrogate to himself the proper function of a Member of Parlament."
It goes on to say something which I wholeheartedly commend:
"On the other hand, a petitioner should not be debarred from advancing any argument tending to show…that the injustice or damage done to himself and other particular persons in a similar position to or associated with himself is so great as to outweigh any public advantage."
As a matter of fact that principle is also embodied in the Report of the majority.

Why was an Amendment moved, when the whole principle involved was embodied in the Report? The more one studies the majority Report, if one may so call it, and the Amendment, the more narrow the line between us becomes. If hon. Members will look at paragraph 25 they will find there exactly the same principle embodied in the Report of the Committee. There was little between the Report and the Amendment except perhaps of phraseology.

On both sides of the Committee there was a desire that there should be the right of the Select Committee to give the widest opportunity in certain cases. There are cases where, as the hon. Member for Mid-Bedford has said, compensation does not meet the case. There may be an immensely powerful sentimental association which has been broken. Compensation might not be suitable. There might be the case of a piece of land where severance does very considerable damage, and again compensation might net be suitable. In those cases the petitioner ought to be able to argue that the damage done to him outweighs the advantage to the State, but that is an entirely different thing from saying that every petitioner can come along and challenge the fundamental principle of the Bill and turn the Select Committee stage into a Second Reading Debate as did Cable and Wireless. In view of the guidance which the Report gives future Select Committees, I am certain that if Naboth had had an opportunity of bringing the case of his vineyard before a Select Committee on a hybrid Bill, the very widest facilities would have been given to him to oppose the unfortunate outcome of the proceedings. Save in phraseology the principle in the Report is identical with that in the Amendment.

I want to deal with a point concerning the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Mid-Bedford, and it relates to the question whether a hybrid Bill against which there are no petitioners should or should not be sent to a Select Committee. I want to say in respect of our recommendation that there was no question in the mind of any member of the Committee about whether if we recommended that the Select Committee stage should be dropped, the Bill should go to a Committee of the whole House only. We never considered that point. As a matter of fact, we were not competent to consider it because it was outside our terms of reference which were strictly limited to the procedure of the Select Committee and not subsequent stages of the Bill.

As to the rider added by the Government—that it should be possible to send an unopposed Bill either to a Committee of the whole House or to a Standing Committee—I do not think any of my hon. Friends have any objection to it. Our objection is quite different.

I was only making it clear that I thought the Government looked at the mere summary of our recommendations and not the recommendations themselves on this point.

I hope they did. It seems to me that to drop the Select Committee stage where there are no petitioners is a logical derivation from the purpose which was unanimously accepted by the Committee and that was to give an opportunity for petitioners to state their case. I am prepared to admit that logic is not everything. That equity and justice shall be done is considerably more important. However, I am not sure that the purpose of equity or justice will be served by the retention of a Select Committee stage where there are no petitions. If there are no petitions I do not see what the Select Committee can do. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedford has suggested that the Committee might satisfy themselves that no interest had failed to petition as a result of carelessness, incapacity or expense, but I am not sure how they could find out. There will be the witnesses for the promoters, but I am not sure that the promoters will know why the various interests have failed to petition.

Surely the Unopposed Bill Committee would be in the same difficulty? Yet we do not have that difficulty upstairs.

Exactly. I suggest that if the Select Committee stage of hybrid Bills is maintained when there is no opposition, the Committee has nothing to do. We shall not be able to find out what it is suggested by the Amendment we ought to find out, why the interests have failed to petition against the Bill. The only way the promoters could find out why interests have failed to petition would be to write round to them and say, "You have failed to petition. Please tell us why."

Suppose the interests replied that they did not petition because of carelessness, incapacity or expense and suppose those answers were put before the Select Committee, what would the Select Committee do? It is not in a position to do anything. If the Committee got answers like that they might themselves attempt to represent the interests which had failed to petition. But how? The Committee would not know what questions to ask, and there is no reason to suppose that if they did know the promoters would be able to give them the answers. Even if a Select Committee on a hybrid Bill had power to send for papers and persons, which it has not, in order to enable it to conduct its investigations, immediately there would arise the problem of what papers and what persons should be sent for. The only answer is, "The interests concerned," and in effect the proposal would then be to make attendance before a Select Committee on a hybrid Bill compulsory on all interests affected? Surely that reduces the matter to absurdity?

This is not mere theory. The case has happened. I was on the Committee which dealt with the Wellington Museum Bill. In that case there was no petition and I attempted to ask questions as I thought on behalf of the interests involved. The only thing I succeeded in bringing to light was my own ignorance and ineptitude. I do not remember the proceedings with any great degree of pleasure, but it convinced me when we came to consider the matter in principle that no useful purpose was to be served by maintaining the Select Committee stage of a hybrid Bill where there were no petitions. If justice were served by the Amendment, I would have supported it, but I do not believe it is.

One final point—and in this I can leave the realms of controversy and speak for the Committee as a whole. The Committee were immensely indebted for the amount of research made for us by Mr. Abraham, and also for the constant help he gave us throughout the Sittings. I would also draw the attention of the House to the lucid drafting of the Report, which deals with a complex subject, and for that credit is due to our Clerk. Mr. Bradshaw.

4.41 p.m.

I intervene not to wind up the Debate, but largely in view of what has been said by the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benson). I was a Member, as he was, of the Select Committee which had to consider the Cable and Wireless Bill. I thought I detected running through his speech, and indeed running through part of this Report, in questions he asked in the course of his evidence, the impression that the Committee had acted wrongly in that instance in letting the petitioners take the course they did. If that is his view, I dissent entirely from it and if, instead of this Report, we were to have another similar Bill, it is important in justice and equity, without the promoters having to establish a case of expediency, that the petitioners against the Bill should be allowed precisely the same licence and liberty as they were against that Measure.

This Report has been praised by the hon. Member for Chesterfield for its lucid drafting. but I should have thought that any Select Committee—if this Report is approved by the House, subject to the one qualification contained in the Motion now before the House—would have found it extremely difficult to extract from it any real guiding principle in determining to what extent petitioners against a hybrid Bill could put forward arguments. In the first place, the hon. Gentleman referred to hybrid Bills as being in the nature of public Bills. I do not find that observation anywhere in this Report. They are defined in Erskine May as quasi-private Bills, but that is by the way.

Then the hon. Gentleman went on to say that the Select Committee had to consider what was the real purpose of setting up a Select Committee for a hybrid Bill. He told us that it was set out in paragraph 19, as being to enable petitioners to put forward their case in order to secure their protection or compensation. This is repeated in paragraph 26. He told us that while considering what was the purpose of setting up a Select Committee for a hybrid Bill, it never occurred to him that one purpose might be to enable a petitioner to come forward and say to the Committee, "I have been wrongly included by mistake." There is not one word in this Report to support the view that a petitioner can ask for exclusion, and I welcomed what the Financial Secretary said on that point. However, a great deal follows from that.

As my hon. Friend said, if a number of private interests are affected, all of which have locus standi, then they can all ask for exclusion, and that will challenge the expediency and the principle of the Bill. In fact, each one of them can contend that it is not in the public interest that he should be included. That was the argument in the Cable and Wireless Bill where there was only one private interest affected. It was argued that it was not in the public interest that they should be taken over, and in my view that was a perfectly proper argument for them to put forward.

The hon. Member for Chesterfield seeks to contend that there is no material difference between the Report as it now stands and the Amendment moved in the Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedford (Mr. Lennox-Boyd).

If it was redundant it was certainly clearer than the words now contained in the Report, because the Report would seek to imply that first one must engage in this difficult task of defining a locus standi, defining the area of it, and then relating each argument to that particular area; whereas the Amendment makes it quite clear that the petitioner can, as part of his argument, show that the public interest has been incorrectly assessed, and show that the extent of that injury to him outweighs the alleged advantage of the public interest. It that were in the Report, both sides of the House would welcome it, but it is not, and the indication from the speech and questions of the hon. Gentleman was that there should be a principle that there should not be any right for the petitioner other than the right of obtaining compensation. That one can see in Question 302 which he put. But the hon. Member has gone further today; he has indicated in his speech that the right of claiming exclusion should exist only where compensation could be shown to be insufficient.

The point that the hon. and learned Member has just put to me is merely an extension, of the previous point he raised, the difference between the Amendment and the Report. There is very little difference, and certainly the Amendment does not bear the interpretation which the hon. and learned Gentleman attempted to put on it. It says quite clearly that the petitioner:

"should not in general be allowed to develop a case that the Bill is bad in principle as being contrary to the public interest as such: to do so would be merely to arrogate to himself the proper function of a Member of Parliament."
That Amendment goes on to point out that the case in which a petitioner should be entitled to challenge the principle of the Bill is only where he can establish that the damage to him, apart from compensation, is so great that it outweighs the public interest.

I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for interrupting me, but nothing I have said has contradicted the terms of the Amendment. I entirely agree that in general the petitioner should not be allowed to develop a case that the Bill is bad in principle as being contrary to the public interest as such, but the words which follow are the important words which the hon. Gentleman has completely ignored—

The Amendment says:

"On the other hand, a petitioner should not be debarred from advancing any argument tending to show: either that the injustice or damage done to himself and other particular persons in a similar position to or associated with himself is so great as to outweigh any public advantage; or that the alleged public advantage relied upon by the promoters to justify the particular interference with the rights of a subject belonging to him and others is insufficient for the purpose; or both of these arguments."
That passage is perfectly clear and correctly states what in my belief has been the practice in the past, and in my belief what should be the practice in the future. That passage is not contained, nor is there anything so clear as that passage, in the body of the Report. If the hon. Member says the Report, in other words, is meant to convey precisely the same meaning as that passage, I would not agree with him that the Report is a lucid document worthy of such praise as he gave it. If the view of the Government be that that passage correctly states the position, it is a pity that the majority voted against the inclusion of that passage in the Report.

As I see it, under this Report the rights of petitioners are likely to be most seriously affected, reduced and prejudiced. It may well be that, if the views put forward by the hon. Member for Chesterfield are adopted by a Select Committee, a petitioner would be prevented from putting forward matters peculiarly within his knowledge, and matters which might result in the House taking quite a different view of the question of the public interest. If that happens, in my belief it will be neither to the advantage of the petitioner, nor to the advantage of the public.

4.51 p.m.

There is much which the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) has said with which I disagree, but there is one point that emerged from his speech which reduce this Debate to its bare essentials. That is the question of principle that arises on the Amendment put forward by the hon. Member for South Hendon (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth). Speaking, of course, only for myself, may I say that when we were considering the other Amendments put forward on behalf of the Opposition by the hon. Member for Mid-Bedford (Mr. Lennox-Boyd), I, and I believe other hon. Members of the Committee, who ultimately voted the same way as I did, were genuinely sympathetic towards the motives which, as we understood, inspired the mover of that Amendment.

Speaking entirely for myself, I was convinced by the evidence. I may have been wrong, but I was convinced that there would be no injustice, no hardship, and that every opportunity lay open to members of the public directly affected to make representations and that this was an unnecessary complication. I may have been wrong in that view, but I believe that is purely a question of detail and interpretation of the evidence and that no question of broad principle underlies the issue that divides us. The real issue, I believe the only underlying division between the members of the two sides of the Committee, arose on the second part of the alternatives posed in the Amendment of the hon. Member for South Hendon. That Amendment states:
"On the other hand, a petitioner should not be debarred from advancing any argument tending to show: either that the injustice done to himself and other particular persons in a similar position to or associated with himself is so great as to outweigh any public advantage;"
I will pause there. I think the only difference between the two sides of the Committee was that we would have removed the words after "himself." In other words, we said every member of the public whose own interests are affected by a proposal should be allowed to come before a Committee and make his arguments and have a clear run. But the second alternative was one with which we wholly and entirely dissociated ourselves.

To what does the hon. Member suggest the arguments under the first part of the Amendment should be directed? If they are not directed to what is stated in the Amendment, to what does the hon. Member think they should be directed?

The words with which I should agree would be:

"either that the injustice or damage done to himself is so great as to outweigh any public advantage."
If the sentence had read that way, I should have had no quarrel with it. I am sorry that I failed to make myself clear. The great issue of principle arose on the second part of the Amendment:
"or that the alleged public advantage relied upon by the promoters to justify the particular interference with the rights of a subject belonging to him and others is insufficient for the purpose."
That is the whole core of the difference between the two sides of the Committee. We are wholly unwilling to admit the right of any private person to come before a Select Committee and argue what are in fact questions of policy; that is to say, not questions affecting his own private right, but questions affecting the rights of other people.

It is very interesting to see the line that the Conservative Opposition appear to be taking this afternoon. It is a little difficult to follow the way in which their minds are working. The hon. Member for South Hendon very rightly and properly said in his Amendment that the member of the public
"should not in general be allowed to develop a case that the Bill is bad in principle as being contrary to the public interests as such; to do so would be merely to arrogate to himself the proper function of a Member of Parliament."
If a witness is to be allowed to come before a Committee and argue not only that he is badly, injuriously and wrongly affected by a Bill and that either he ought to be taken out of its scope or, if he is the only person concerned, the Bill should be rejected altogether, that is one thing. But if, in addition, he is to be allowed to say, "Not only am I affected, but my neighbour who is not here but may have quite different views, is affected. Please remember the case of Mr. Jones, who is not represented, and has not bothered to be represented"—what is the position then? We would be allowing a member of the public to come before a Select Committee and constitute himself either as a part-time Member of Parliament raising issues of general policy, or as a kind of unpaid advocate for other people who are not there and have not taken the trouble to put their views forward and whose true views the Committee have no means of ascertaining.

The hon. and learned Member for Daventry referred in his speech, as did other hon. Members, to the Cable and Wireless Bill. He said quite definitely and, I imagine, definitively, on behalf of the Opposition what their attitude would be to a similar Bill in future. I think it was clearly in the minds of the majority of the Members of the Committee and certainly it was clear in my mind, that in no circumstances whatever, in so far as it lay in my power should a repetition of that procedure be tolerated. To my mind it is quite wrong, and almost indecent, that Ministers of the Crown should be brought before a Select Committee and cross-examined on questions of public policy by counsel, who are paid to be there for the purpose. My belief is that the only proper place for a Debate on policy of that kind is the Floor of this House.

Whether it be quite wrong and indecorous for Ministers to be cross-examined before Select Committees, or not, is one question, but the question here under consideration is that to which I endeavoured to address my remarks. It is the liberty given the petitioner, not the necessity for the promoters to establish expediency. The hon. Member's last remarks seemed to be relating purely to the need to establish expediency and not to the rights of the petitioner. If the promoters must establish expediency then, in order to do so under a Bill like Cable and Wireless, they must put the Financial Secretary into the witness box, which is quite a different thing, surely, from saying that the rights of the petitioner should be restricted.

I am sorry that I do not quite follow the hon. and learned Gentleman. The first recommendation of the Report is that subject to any instruction or indication by the House referring the expediency of a hybrid Bill to a Select Committee for investigation and decision, the Second Reading should be considered to remove from the promoters the onus of proving the expediency of the Bill. That, as I understand it, was not controversial. The first 19 paragraphs were agreed to without a Division and the paragraph which covered that particular aspect was paragraph 18.

What the hon. Gentleman was saying was that he objected really to the Financial Secretary having to give evidence on the Select Committee considering the Cable and Wireless Bill. That was done merely because at that time it was the custom of the promoters to try to establish the expediency of the Measure. If my recollection is right, as I think it is, he was called not by the petitioner but by the promoters—the Government. If the hon. Gentleman is saying he would not like that to happen again because he thinks it is indecorous, then no one, on either side, is saying that that part is necessary in future. That, however, is quite apart from the rights of the petitioner.

I may have misapprehended the hon. and learned Member but I understood him to say, on behalf of the Opposition, that the Cable and Wireless precedent would be followed, so far as it lay in the power of the Opposition to follow it, on any future occasion.

I think that that term is still open to ambiguity. The Opposition view, had it been conceded, would have been to discuss before the Committee the whole range of policy of the Cable and Wireless Bill. The occasion for the Financial Secretary's coming would, of course, have been different. He would not have been one of the witnesses who were called at the start, but probably would have had to be called in reply. It is perfectly clear that, whilst one allows this wide range of Debate before a Select Committee, it must almost inevitably follow that the Minister who is responsible for the public policy must come and explain his public policy before the Committee and will be subject to such cross-examination. It is that possibility against which I, at least, wished to insure.

The hon. and learned Gentleman criticised the drafting of the Report. It is no part of my business here to defend that, but I think that if there were any fault in drafting it lay entirely with the Members of the Committee, of whom I am one, and not with the Clerk, who gave us such valuable help. So far as it lay within his power, this document is a model of what a Select Committee report should be.

I believe there is only this one issue of principle between the two parties. Both sides want the individual who is affected to be able to make his own case clearly and in an untrammelled way. It is only when we come to the question of the making of other people's cases that there is any difference between the two sides of the House.

In one respect the hon. and learned Member for Daventry did less than justice to the Report, in that he appeared to have overlooked paragraph 25, which was not, I think, a disputed paragraph. It states:
"Nor do your Committee apprehend that, if a petitioner is permitted to traverse the principle of the Bill where his locus standi entitles him to do so, any great complication will arise if his case is upheld."

I think it would be proper if I said that the reason why paragraph 25 was not traversed was that the whole question of principle in this issue arose on the earlier Amendment. When that Amendment had been carried, against the minority on the Committee, obviously it would have been ridiculous to try to amend the rest of the Report to make it conflict with paragraph 20.

I accept that entirely. I will, if I may, complete the paragraph:

"In such a case the Select Committee have power to make a special report stating that, in their view, the hardship inflicted on the petitioner outweighs the advantage likely to accrue to the public if the Bill becomes law, leaving the House to take what action it deems fit."
The recommendation of the majority—and, indeed, of the Committee—leaves the Committee free to refer a Bill back to the House if satisfied on evidence that it is impracticable or injurious to the individuals concerned. For my part, I believe that the difficulties anticipated by the other side, in deciding how far in each case the words "locus standi" are to be interpretated, are exaggerated. In practice the commonsense of Members and the experience of the staff of the House will provide a solution. I hope that the House will approve the Report, which was based on evidence collected from a great number of distinguished and learned authorities.

5.8 p.m.

The House has had the advantage of hearing three hon. Members who sat upon the Select Committee. Speaking as one of the few hon. Members who are intervening who did not sit on that Committee, I should like to express my indebtedness to the Select Committee for their labours and to assure them that I treat with respect any conclusions to which they have come.

I think that the difference between the two sides is on a comparatively narrow field but that it is of great importance. I should like, if I may, to try to explain to the hon. Member for Walsall (Mr. W. Wells) the reasons that make me question certain conclusions to which the Select Committee came. The matters to which I shall invite the attention of the House are those summarised by the Committee in paragraph 34 (3) and (4). I am perfectly certain that the majority of the Committee think that by these recommendations they have shortened the proceedings on hybrid Bills and avoided waste of time. Although that was their intention they have not, in my view, achieved it. What they have done will, in fact, cause considerable difficulties both to the Committees which sit and to petitioners and their professional advisers.

In order to make clear the point which I wish to bring before the House, let me state clearly what is a perfectly simple but vital distinction, that is the distinction between questions of who should be allowed to be heard at all, who, that is to say, shall be allowed to appear as a petitioner, and questions of what arguments such a petitioner shall be entitled to advance. On the first question, I make no quarrel with the conclusion of the Committee. I agree, of course, that a petitioner must have a locus standi, but, though we limit those who have a locus standi, it does not in the least follow that we are either shortening the proceedings or serving any useful purpose, if we also seek to limit the arguments which they may seek to bring forward.

In contrast to the hon. Member for Walsall I find nothing derogatory to the dignity of the House or to any Committee that expert argument should be addressed to it. On the precise wording of the Amendment moved in the Committee by my hon. Friend, who is to speak later, it is quite obvious that it would be more appropriate for him to speak than for me, but I wish to say first what I think is wrong in the two principles of the Summary of Recommendations to which I have drawn attention, and then to make quite a short statement of what I believe is the correct principle.

What I object to in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) is the mention of arguments which "do not exceed his locus standi," and "the limits of the locus standi." These are very difficult conceptions indeed, and will lead to endless argument and waste of time. It is comparatively easy for lawyers and others to decide whether a man has a locus standi or not, but, once it is decided that he has a locus standi, I regard discussion of the extent of his locus standi as a time-wasting affair. It is a difficult legal conception. I am sure that Members opposite will agree with me that those arguments will raise before Committees very difficult questions of what is and what is not admissible evidence.

Now let me state quite clearly, and in far better language than I could choose, what I believe is the right principle which the Select Committee should have adopted. I do not believe that it differs greatly from what they had in mind as to the working of the Committees, but I am afraid that it differs a good deal from the way in which their recommendations will work in fact. I believe that the true principle is stated in page 106 of the Report we are considering, in the Further Memorandum submitted by Mr. Craig Henderson, K.C. If hon. Members will look at the penultimate paragraph on that page they will see what I believe is the right principle, which I should like to read to the House and adopt as my own argument. He stated:
"I humbly submit that Parliament, on matters between the State and subjects should never close the door against admission of evidence from those whose interests are directly affected, which is directed to prove facts, and put forward arguments on them, which throw light on the expediency or otherwise of accepting the proposals in a Bill."
I will not read the remaining sentence of that paragraph, although I equally agree with it.

May I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to look at page 17 of the Report, and then tell the House whether or not he accepts the view. attributed to Mr. Pelham, as far back as 1753. Mr. Pelham says—I quote from Question 73:

"In matters of public concern no body of men, how respectable soever, have a right to come here and tell us what we ought or what we ought not to do: to attempt it is an attack upon the dignity of Parliament."

Speaking quite ex tempore, and without looking at that quotation, I should say that it is directed to the persons who have the right to come and speak. If I am wrong, I crave leave not to answer such a question without notice.

What I am saying is that I am not in the least criticising the suggestion as to who shall be allowed to be petitioners. My point is that once a man has been allowed to be a petitioner we should not try to create quite new and extremely difficult rules of evidence which will both hamper petitioners in preparing and presenting their case, and, in my view, will greatly embarrass Committees, which will, I know, be most anxious to do justice. I believe that the attempt which is summarised in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) of paragraph 34 is really an attempt to shorten proceedings which will prove unavailing, and I hold the view that the adoption of the words of Mr. Craig Henderson, which I have quoted, would avoid that difficulty.

In spite of what I said a moment or two ago, possibly it would be as well for me to complete that paragraph of Mr. Craig Henderson's Memorandum, which I quoted. It ends
"Where the Bill is, in the true sense, a public Bill, the interests affected are so wide that it is impracticable to hear individual objectors, and the debate must be completed on the floor of the House, but on Hybrid Bills this is not the case, and that difference is at the root of the difference in procedure."
With that statement by one who is admittedly a master of this branch of the law, I respectfully associate myself, and commend the wisdom of it to the House. I am grateful to the House for allowing me, as one who did not sit on the Committee, and who appreciates their labour, to express my views. I regret very much that the Government have not found it possible to get what I believe would be unanimity by modifying sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) of paragraph 34 on the basis of Mr. Craig Henderson's Memorandum.

5.19 p.m.

I should like to say how much I agree with what has been said by the hon. and learned Member for the Combined English Universities (Mr. H. Strauss), my hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benson) and others, in appreciation of the work which has been done in connection with this Report. Both those who gave evidence and those who served on the Committee have performed a public service for which the House should be grateful. As my hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield has said, before the Select Committee was set up, there was no regular procedure so far as Hybrid Bills were concerned. In fact, the Committee was set up to advise the House as to what that procedure should be.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has apparently forgotten that the Report is practically unanimous. On only one paragraph does the written document indicate that there was any real difference of opinion.

May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman? I think it is unfair to allow him to proceed on this line. We did put down an Amendment at the first place where a substantial difference of opinion arose. That Amendment was carried against us. Thereafter it would have been necessary to put down. a whole string of other Amendments, in fact to recast the Report. It would have been ridiculous to do that, as the essential Amendment had been carried against us, but it must not be accepted that the rest of the Report was in accordance with the views of my hon. Friend and myself, because it was not.

I must, of course, accept what the hon. Member says. But I have only the Report to go by. I have read it with some care over the weekend and I have noticed that paragraphs 1 to 19 were accepted. without any Amendments being moved and that paragraphs 21, certainly as far as 31, were likewise accepted. Perhaps I may refer to that again, because I would like to make some observations on something which was raised by the hon. Member for Mid-Bedford (Mr. Lennox-Boyd).

The hon. Member had some hard things to say about the Government's acceptance of this Report. Among other things, he said that private rights would be seriously curtailed by the recommendations in the Report, which the Government have accepted with one small modification. He also said that a petitioner could only challenge a Bill in the most unusual circumstances and that a man might be refused the right to give evidence. Does the Report bear out these strictures? Is it a fact that the Motion, if accepted, will cause unfairness to private petitioners? I think that the Lord President showed clearly in his speech that no one on this side of the House would desire to prevent any petitioner who feels aggrieved by a hybrid Bill from putting his case with the utmost force and freedom before the appropriate Committee. But I must say that some Select Committee proceedings have been in the nature of a "Roman Holiday." From the evidence of the Report, I suspect that both the hon. Gentlemen opposite who served on that Committee also agreed that a good deal that happened when the Cable and Wireless Select Committee was sitting should not have been allowed to happen.

Will the right hon. Gentleman be more precise about that? There were two things. One was that the promoter sought to justify the expediency of the Bill. That we are agreed is unnecessary, at least in the future, and also that it was unnecessary then, although it was not declared to be so, because this Report had not been made. Is he saying that Cable and Wireless should not have been entitled to pursue the course they did in petitioning against the Bill?

Yes, Sir, that is my view. I have a fairly lively recollection of what happened then and I am of the view that a great deal was said and a great number of questions put in the course of the Select Committees proceedings which were in a sense usurping the functions of this House. It is obvious that both the hon. Gentlemen shared that view, because they voiced that complaint, by implication at any rate, in the Amendment to paragraph 20 of the Report. If there were time, I could develop this case at greater length.

The criticism that has been levelled against this Motion can be concentrated within very narrow limits, as the hon. and learned Member for the Combined English Universities observed. There is only one particular point—and I am not quarrelling with this—which the Opposition fears may curtail the rights of a petitioner. We think that this is due to a misapprehension and that, on a proper reading of these recommendations. it will be seen that when a hybrid Bill is being discussed upstairs, petitioners will have no fewer rights than they had before, except that they will be unable to go outside their own interests.

On their own showing, both the hon. Gentlemen who were parties to this Report agree that that right of petitioners to traverse the world, if they are so minded, should be curtailed. That is the only real change which the acceptance of these recommendations makes. In proof of that, let me refer to the recommendations themselves. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedford asked a very pertinent question which he also put to the Lord President. At different times he was good enough to give way, so that one or other of us could give the assurances he wanted. I am here to repeat those assurances, which seem implicit in the recommendations made by the Committee and set forth on page xiii. Quite obviously, if a petitioner can show that he has a separate special interest, he is entitled under a hybrid Bill to ask if he can come and put his grievance to the Select Committee. There is nothing in these recommendations which robs him of that right. In fact, in more than one paragraph, that right is established and underlined.

May I ask if there is only one interest affected, can that one interest petition to be excluded from the Bill?

That is what I am saying. But I would put one question to the hon. Member. Did this right exist under the old system? If it did, it will continue. As I read these recommendations, the only right that will be taken away is the right of any petitioner to go outside his own immediate interests. Again, as I read the Report, and both hon. Gentlemen opposite agree, the petitioner should not be allowed to go right round the world. An ordinary member of the public has no right to come here and put forward his views on matters under discussion. Why then should a petitioner, when he appears before a Select Committee on a hybrid Bill, be allowed that right? Surely his interest is only concerned with the effect that the Bill will have on his property or his life or something in which he personally has a special interest. That right is preserved.

I am trying to follow what the right hon. Gentleman has said. In the first place he said he thought that on the Cable and Wireless Bill the petitioners went outside their proper limits. Now he has said, and I agree, that petitioners, even if they are the only petitioners in the Bill. can do anything proper to protect their own interests. In what respects does he say that Cable and Wireless, who after all do cover a great deal of the world, went outside the protection of their own interests?

I have no wish to turn this into a debate on what happened in the Select Committee proceedings on the Cable and Wireless Bill. I do not think it would be profitable. It is old history. The promoters of that Bill had to establish the expediency of the Measure. Among others, I was put into the witness box. That occasion gave the petitioners against the Measure the opportunity to go well outside the actual interests affected.

It is possible for a man to find out whether or not he is allowed to be a petitioner. Assuming that he is allowed to be a petitioner, can the right hon. Gentleman tell me any means by which he and his advisors can discover the meaning of the words:

"arguments which do not exceed his locus standi."
Have such words, or anything like them, appeared in these Rules before?

There are various points at which a hybrid Bill comes before the House. We have not discussed them today because the point has not arisen; but there are Examiners of these Bills, who are under certain obligations to let the interests who are or may be affected know what is proposed. I think that this point can safely be left to that stage of the proceedings. If any petitioner has a locus standi, I see no likelihood of his being unaware of it.

The right hon. Gentleman inadvertently, I am certain, completely misunderstands me. I agree with what he has just said about his being able to appear if he has a locus standi, and I do not criticise it. The only point I criticised in my speech—and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will deal with it—is the restriction of the arguments that he is allowed to put forward when he does appear. He must not put forward arguments which exceed his locus standi.

At present on private Bills, he is so confined to his locus standi. If that does not satisfy the hon. Gentleman, may I draw his attention to the fact that when the petitioner appears and puts his case, as he will have every right to do, it will be for the Select Committee to tell him then whether what he is saying, either in person or through counsel, is or is not in order in the light of the existing circumstances? It will be perfectly easy, generally speaking, for the locus standi of any single petitioner to be established. I see no difficulty in that direction.

I should like to indicate why the Government feel that a petitioner need have no fear of these recommendations, if they are accepted. The first recommendation, which apparently was accepted by hon. Gentlemen opposite without any serious objection, states that:
"Subject to any instruction or indication by the House …"—
which makes it very elastic—
"… referring the expediency of a hybrid Bill to a Select Committee for investigation and decision, the Second Reading should be considered to remove from the promoters the onus of proving the expediency of the Bill."
It has been generally agreed that, once this House has agreed by a majority on the expediency of a Bill, the Government themselves should not have to go once more over the whole of that ground before a Select Committee upstairs. Subparagraph (3) recommends:
"Provided that his arguments do not exceed his locus standi, a petitioner may traverse the principle of the Bill."
In those words, I can find no limitation. Provided he has the right to be there and has a case to present, he can traverse the principle of the Bill. He has had that right up to now and we do not propose to take it from him. As far as I know, neither of the representatives of the Opposition on the Committee objected. In fact, they approved of that wording. In proof of that, I turn to the Debate in the Select Committee on paragraph 20 and to the Amendment which was moved by them and defeated. I have taken the trouble to analyse the wording which they desired to be inserted and the wording which was accepted. There is no great difference between the two versions. I find that they said this:
"In the case of a hybrid bill, Your Committee are of opinion that the limits to which a petitioner should be allowed to go in the course of his arguments and evidence should be the same as those permitted in the case of a private bill."
To what extent can a petitioner go in the case of a Private Bill? In paragraph 20 are the words:
"Even in the case of private bills, it is competent to a committee to restrict petitioners as to the topics they may bring forward."
Therefore, even if we permit the full licence and liberty which may obtain when a private Bill is before a Select Committee, in these recommendations we are not limiting a petitioner more than that. In fact, he gets here what he gets on a Private Bill which, by general consent, is considered to be as wide a latitude as anyone should be allowed.

The hon. Member for Mid-Bedford asked whether a petitioner would be confined in his petition to the question whether the compensation payable to him was or was not sufficient. I can assure him that he need have no fears and that a petitioner will not be so confined. If he has a grievance or a claim in any other direction, he will be able to put it freely. He will not be bound to limit what he has to say or any claim he has to make, solely to the question of compensation.

I think I have answered most of the points that have been made. In summing up, I should like to say that it is our view that these recommendations are reasonable; that the fears which have been expressed by hon. Gentlemen opposite have no substance in fact; and that under these recommendations petitioners will be just as free as they always have been, and in some directions more free, to put their point of view, if they have locus standi. The acceptance of the recommendations will do two things. It will regularise the proceedings which is something that I think we all desire. It is high time that this was done.

Secondly, it will cut out what I would describe for want of a better phrase as a lot of dead wood. It is quite obvious that, if there are no petitioners against the Bill, it is absurd to waste time by setting up a Select Committee and sending the Bill to it. I think I carry hon. Gentlemen on the other side with me when I say that it is not right that, when Parliament has decided on the principle of a Bill, the whole of its principles and the whole expediency of the Bill should be traversed again in a Committee upstairs by individuals who have no locus standi on many parts of the Bill. They should be confined to the parts of the Bill which affect them personally or in groups. That being so, I hope that the House, without a Division, will accept the Motion which has been moved by my right hon. Friend the Lord President.

5.41 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury has paid a graceful tribute to those persons outside hon. Members of this House who assisted in preparing this Report. My hon. Friend and I who served on the Committee, would like to be associated with the right hon. Gentleman in that tribute, and would like to thank those who were of very great assistance to us.

When I have said that, I am going to say that I find that the Report itself is self-contradictory, and I do not wish to suggest that that is in any sense the fault of the draftsmen or of any hon. Member who assisted in preparing it. The reason why the Report conflicts with itself is that the majority of hon. Members who supported the Report tried to draw a line which I believe it was impossible to draw. I think they tried to do something which simply could not be done at all, and I hope I may be able to indicate why that is so.

First, I think it is fair to say that, for practical purposes, it is the summary of the Report in paragraph 34 which is important. It is to that summary that the chairman of the Select Committee on a hybrid Bill will normally turn for guidance, and, therefore, it is convenient to deal with our objections to the Report as objections to that paragraph of the summary. The first paragraph is acceptable in all parts of the House, but I think it is important to notice that what it does is to lay down that, when a hybrid Bill has received a Second Reading, the effect of that Second Reading is to shift the onus of proving the expediency of the Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman who opened this Debate and several hon. Members on the other side have said quite rightly that the Second Reading of a Bill by this House approves the principle of the Bill. May I remind hon. Members opposite that there is some difference between principle and expediency, a thing which they are sometimes apt to forget in other connections? It may well be that the policy which gives rise to a hybrid Bill is acceptable to a majority of the House, but it does not mean to say that, if that policy would inflict too great hardship on sections of the community, it ought to be persisted in, even though it is the right policy, and it is exactly that question which the Select Committee on hybrid Bills has to determine. It is for that reason that we fully accept this first paragraph, and think that it is right that it calls attention to expediency and not principle.

Secondly, perhaps I should point out that there is a certain importance in the use of the word "onus." When we speak of the Government having to discharge the onus of proving something, we do not mean to say that it is conclusively and finally proved. All that they have done is to say that they have discharged the onus which lay upon them to show a prima facie case, and it is then for those who oppose the Bill, the petitioners, to show that, in fact, although that onus has been shifted to them, there is a case against the Bill which would throw the onus back against the Government. I think those who support the Motion before the House do not realise that what this paragraph does is to shift the onus of proof of expediency, and to leave it open to the other side, the petitioners, to disprove expediency and so object to the whole of the Bill.

Paragraphs (5) and (6) of the summary are really consequential on the first paragraph. Paragraph (5) is consequential in that it merely lays down the general rule that, where the onus has been shifted from the promoters to the petitioner, it should be for the petitioner to open against the promoters before the Select Committee. May I draw the attention of the House to these words:
"(5) The onus of proving expediency having been removed from the promoters, the petitioner should open to the committee, calling such evidence as he wishes."
By implication, that means that it is even here laid down that there should be a right on the part of the petitioner to call evidence to disprove that of which the onus has laid on him; in other words, the expediency of the Measure.

Would the hon. Gentleman allow me? He has missed out paragraph (2), in which it is laid down that the petitioner cannot argue on matters which cannot give him a locus standi, and that is really the essential thing in this Report.

That is exactly the point to which I am coming. I am saying that paragraphs (1) and (5) are in conflict with paragraph (2); that (1) and (5) indicate that it is open to the petitioner to oppose the expediency of the Measure, and that, in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4), we find that it is not. Therefore, what has happened is that those who support the Report tried to do something which they found it physically impossible to do, and, when they came to summarise the recommendations in the body of the Report, it was necessary to set conflicting principles side by side.

Paragraph (2) of the summary states that the petitioner is not to argue on the bare grounds of public policy I have no quarrel with that, and I think it would be wholly wrong if a petitioner were to appear before the Select Committee and argue, for example, against the general principle of nationalisation I think that would be wholly wrong, and I do not think that that conception would have support on the other side of the House. I do not think that a petitioner should arrogate to himself a duty which is clearly the duty of a Member of Parliament, but, of course, paragraph (2) has to be read alongside paragraphs (3) and (4). In that connection, we find that the position is wholly different, because whereas paragraph (2) merely says that a petitioner against a hybrid Bill cannot argue on matters which cannot give him a locus standi, in paragraph (3) it is stated:
"Provided that his arguments do not exceed his locus standi, a petitioner may traverse the principle of the Bill."
Again, in paragraph (4) it is stated:
"The limits of the locus standi, of each petitioner and, therefore, of the arguments which he may properly adduce should be decided, where necessary, by the select committee"
It will be seen, therefore, that paragraph (2) does not merely prevent a petitioner from arguing various or general questions, but prevents him from arguing special questions unless they are questions regarding his own personal interest in the subject matter of the Bill We on this side of the House think that is too narrow.

I will, if I may, give the House an example showing how, in a particular case, the recommendation is too narrow. I think it would preclude an employer from giving any evidence or from arguing about damage done to his employees or customers. In the case of a hybrid Bill which takes over an industrial concern, the recommendation as set out in these paragraphs would prevent that concern from using any argument to show that the taking over of its business would cause a hardship to those employed by it or to those who had relied upon it in the past for their necessities. Paragraph 22 on page X of the Report dealing with the case of Cable and Wireless says:
"They would have been entitled to make a full statement of the damage done to their interests and of the hardship inflicted upon them; and they could have challenged the terms of compensation, or sought protection for any of their servants or employees, which was in fact made the subject of a special report by the Select Committee."
I do not think that either side of the House would wish to prevent a petitioner calling in aid and pointing out to the House the particular hardship which might be inflicted on its employees or upon the customers' minds. That was certainly not the intention of the majority of the Select Committee, as is clear from the paragraphs I have just quoted. It is necessary to refer to paragraph 20 on page IX—these were the specific words we sought to delete—which says:
"So in the case of hybrid Bills, your Committee cannot see that any injustice is done to a petitioner, who is allowed to be heard only because his property or interest are affected by restraining him from urging objections which, if they were the only ones he had to urge, would not entitle him to be heard."
In other words, it would be impossible for an industrial concern to put forward any case founded on hardship done to its employees. The great mass of wage earners of industrial concerns would have no means whatever of having their case put before a Select Committee if this recommendation were accepted. I do not think that was the intention of those who signed the Report, or of this House.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedford (Mr. Lennox-Boyd) drew attention to the ridiculous position where two or three concerns in a similar position were objecting to the provisions of a hybrid Bill. In paragraph 23, on page X we find this passage:
"Before a select committee therefore a petitioner's plea that the injury to his personal interests outweighs the benefit which the whole community will derive from the proposed Bill, assumes an altogether different importance relative to the public issues at stake."
That means a wholly different importance from the other type of case referred to in this paragraph, namely, the hybrid Bill for taking over a particular piece of land. It is rather surprising to find that this paragraph implies that where we are concerned only with a smaller public interest, then we should have regard to the private interest, but that where a substantial public interest is concerned, then any private interest can be overridden

Is there not an excellent precedent in Mr. Speaker's Ruling that where a whole industry is nationalised the question of hybrid Bills does not arise?

At the moment we are dealing only with hybrid Bills. The principle laid down here is that if one man's land is taken away from him that man is entitled to object on the ground that it causes hardship, but where two men's land is taken away, those two are not entitled to object because the amount of damage done—

I do not accept that as being the interpretation of the paragraph at all. As I read it, what was in the minds of the Committee was that where there was damage—it may be between a dozen individuals who are concerned in a hybrid Bill—if that individual damage outweighs the advantage to the community, then they would have a right to establish. If it were a matter outside the possibility of compensation involving simply sentiment, that would be very different from taking over a great industry like Cable and Wireless where the main interest is purely a shareholding interest.

It seems to me that the real distinction is that if what is intended to be done is done in pursuance of a political policy, then it must be clear that if it is part of the ordinary course of Government administration there should be a right to object.

Surely, the hon. Gentleman is being unfair to the Report. The fact is that a hybrid Bill is not left to the Select Committee; in a sense it reaches its "hybridity" by stages long before it reaches this House.

I am not certain that I follow the relevance of the right hon. Gentleman's interruption, but I agree, of course, that the views of the Select Committee are not final; all they can do is to make a report to the House.

The Government do not decide whether it is to be a hybrid Bill; another authority decides that. If it is a hybrid Bill, then these regulations will apply, and the fact that it is one man, two men or a dozen who may be interested in it has nothing to do with the matter at all.

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman has not followed my argument, which is, where you take one man's land he has a right to object whereas I say the Report reads that if you take two men's land then those two men are each precluded from objecting on the ground that they cannot argue the other's case. I am quite certain that the effect of the Report is that if you take a large number of men's land in pursuance of a broad policy, whatever that policy may be, you say to that large number of men, "You shall not object because it is wrong that you should object to the policy of the Government of the day."

Surely the difference is this: If you take away the land from a large number of men you are there involved in a very large measure of public policy. It is the weighing of the individual damage against the whole public policy of the Bill which is involved in this question and it can only be where very small public interest is involved that private damage can outweigh that small public interest.

As the Financial Secretary pointed out just now, all the Committee has to do is to receive evidence. I should have thought that, even holding the views of the hon. Member for Chesterfield, it is still most desirable not to curtail any evidence. If the evidence is considered by the Committee, and the Select Committee report that they feel the case shown is so strong that it is at least doubtful whether the Bill should be proceeded with, having regard to the alleged public advantages, it will be for the Government of the day to make up their mind. I am not questioning that. What I say is that it is wholly wrong to deprive these individuals whose rights are affected by the particular action of the Government from at least offering evidence to show why those rights should not be affected or should be treated in a different way. I believe this is another example of the axe at the root of the tree of liberty. I agree it is not taking out a very large piece—it is a relatively small chip—but all the same, it is a chip and I think this House ought not to allow it to be done.

May I turn to another aspect? Here again there was a difference between two sections of the Select Committee. It has been pointed out already in the course of the Debate that we considered the possibility of a Bill failing to be opposed on account of poverty or absence. Perhaps, again, I might put a concrete case to the House. We might find a case, such as the Trafalgar Estates case, where an annuity for some public benefit was given to a particular family to descend generation after generation, and it may be a question of terminating or otherwise dealing with that annuity. Very often the annuity will be vested in some living person and the next person entitled to it will not yet have been born. The interests of the person at present entitled are obviously in sharp conflict with the interests of the successor. That may very easily happen. The successor in title not having been born, he cannot be served with any notice of the Bill and he cannot possibly petition the Committee. There is a case in point which may easily arise and it is a case which is arising almost every day in the Law Courts. Wherever a question arises concerning a settlement and where there are unborn children who may be interested in the capital of their settlements, the courts always insist that there shall be someone before them who is able to argue on behalf of those unborn children.

It has been suggested here that the only thing petitioners can do against a hybrid Bill is to bring forward evidence. That is not so. The petitioners can not only bring forward evidence but can put their case and, very often, having regard to their own particular circumstances, putting their case is extremely valuable. It seems to me that it is vitally important that this House should make certain that before it affects individual interests that there has always been an opportunity to put a case.

Perhaps I may refer the House to Question No. 503 on page 61. Sir Charles Browne is answering certain questions. I asked him a question in connection with proof being tendered before the Committee on Unopposed Bills, and I said:
"The proof is only formal unless the Committee require definite proof in the light of what has been said—is not that so?"
Sir Charles Browne replied:
"I think Mr. Abraham would support me in saying that I believe there are cases in which the Committee on Unopposed Bills has rejected an unopposed Bill."
The report continues with the hon. Member for Mid-Bedford asking:
"Having asked a question of the petitioners and got no answer?—Yes.
It has the value of eliciting something of which even the promoters are ignorant?—Yes."
The Chairman then asked:
"Has it ever happened in the case of a House of Commons Bill?—I cannot say it has happened in my experience but I believe there is on record (Mr. Abraham can confirm it) a case where the Unopposed Bills Committee have rejected an unopposed Bill."
By "a House of Commons Bill," I think is meant a hybrid Bill.

Division No. 49.]

AYES

[6.10 pm.

Adams, Richard (Balham)Evans, John (Ogmore)McEntee, V. La T.
Albu, A. H.Evans, S. N. (Wednesbury)McGhee, H. G.
Allen, A C (Bosworth)Ewart, R.Mack, J. D.
Attewell, H. C.Fernyhough, E.Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N.W.)
Austin, H. LewisFollick, M.McLeavy, F.
Awbery, S. S.Gallacher, WMacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Ayles, W. H.Ganley, Mrs. C S.MacPherson, T. (Romford)
Ayrton Gould, Mrs. BGibson, C. W.Mainwaring, W. H.
Balfour, AGlanville, J. E. (Consett)Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield)
Barstow, P. G.Gordon-Walker, P. C.Manning, Mrs. L. (Epping)
Barton, C.Grey, C. FMathers, Rt. Hon. George
Battley, J. R.Griffiths, D. (Rother Valley)Mellish, R. J.
Bechervaise, A. E.Guest, Dr. L. HadenMesser, F.
Benson, GGunter, R. J.Middleton, Mrs. L.
Berry, HGuy. W. H.Millington, Wing-Comdr. E. R
Beswick, FHale, LeslieMitchison, G. R.
Binns, JHall, Rt. Hon. GlenvilMoody, A. S.
Blackburn, A. R.Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. R.Morgan, Dr. H. B.
Blyton, W. R.Hardman, D. R.Morris, P. (Swansea, W.)
Bowden, Flg. Offr. H. W.Harrison, J.Moyle, A.
Braddock, Mrs E. M. (L'pl. Exch'ge)Haworth, J.Mulvey, A.
Brook, D. (Halifax)Hewitson, Capt. MNaylor, T. E.
Brooks, T J (Rothwell)Hobson, C. R.Nichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.)
Brown, T. J. (Ince)Holman, P.Nicholls, H. R. (Stratford)
Brown, W J. (Rugby)Holmes, H. E. (Hemsworth)Oliver, G. H.
Bruce, Maj D. W. T.Horabin, T. L.Paget, R. T.
Burden, T. W.Hoy, JPalmer, A. M. F.
Gastle, Mrs. B. A.Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.)Parker, J.
Champion, A. J.Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayr)Parkin, B. T.
Chater, D.Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)Paton, Mrs. F. (Rushcliffe)
Chetwynd, G. R.Hughes, H. D (W'lverh'pton, W.)Paton, J. (Norwich)
Cobb, F AHynd, H (Hackney, C.)Pearson, A.
Cocks, F SIrvine, A J. (Liverpool)Piratin, P.
Colman, Miss G. M.Irving, W J. (Tottenham, N.)Popplewell, E.
Cooper, GIsaacs, Rt. Hon. G. APorter, E. (Warrington)
Cove, W G.Jeger, G. (Winchester)Porter, G. (Leeds)
Crawley, AJeger, Dr. S. W. (St. Pancras, S. E.)Pritt, D. N.
Daggar, GJenkins, R. H.Prootor, W. T
Daines, PJones, D. T. (Hartlepool)Pursey, Comdr. H.
Davies, Ernest (Enfield)Jones, P. Asterley (Hitchin)Randall, H. E.
Davies, Haydn (St. Pancras, S. W.)Keenan, WRanger, J.
Davies, R. J. (Westhoughton)Kenyon, C.Reeves, J.
Deer, G.Kinghorn, Sqn.-Ldr. E.Reid, T (Swindon)
Debbie, WKinley, J.Ridealgh, Mrs. M.
Dodds, N. NKirby, B. VRoberts, Emrys (Merioneth)
Driberg, T. E. N.Leslie, J. R.Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)
Dumpleton, C W.Levy, B. W.Rogers, G. H. R.
Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.Lewis, A. W. J. (Upton)Ross, William (Kilmarnock)
Edwards, John (Blackburn)Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.Royle, C.
Edwards, Rt Hon. N. (Caerphilly)Longden, FSargood, R.
Evans, Albert (Islington, W.)Lyne, A. W.Scott-Elliot, W
Evans, E. (Lowestoft)McAdam, W.Shawcross, Rt. Hn. Sir H. (St. Heletts)

That will show that even where there was no opposition at all, a Select Committee, after considering a Bill, saw good reason for saying, "This Bill should not go forward at all." That is much stronger than saying it should be amended in the interest of parties who for some reason or another have been precluded from coming forward. That is not a point of wide importance; I regard it as a relatively small matter, but it is another small chip from the trunk of the tree of liberty. Hon. Members opposite may smile. They may think it is not important. We think every chip means that the tree is less strong, and for that reason we oppose the Motion before the House.

Question put.

The House divided: Ayes, 204; Noes, 89.

Silkin, Rt. Hon. L.Tolley, L.Wilcock, Group-Capt. C. A. B
Silverman, J. (Erdington)Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)
Simmons, C. JTurner-Samuels, M.Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)
Skinnard, F. W.Ungoed-Thomas, L.Williams, J. L. (Kelvingrove)
Smith, C. (Colchester)Usborne, HenryWilliams, Ronald (Wigan)
Smith, H. N. (Nottingham, S.)Vernon, Maj. W. F.Williams, W. R. (Heston)
Smith, S. H. (Hull, S. W.)Viant, S. P.Willis, E.
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir FrankWallace, G. D. (Chislehurst)Wills, Mrs. E. A
Sparks, J. A.Wallace, H W. (Walthamstow, E.)Woodburn, Rt. Hon A
Stamford, W.Warbey, W. N.Woods, G. S.
Sylvester, G. O.Webb, M. (Bradford, C.)Yates, V F.
Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)Weitzman, D.Young, Sir R (Newton)
Taylor, Dr. S. (Barnet)Wells, P. L. (Faversham)Youngar, Hon. Kenneth
Thomas, D. E. (Aberdare)Wells, W T (Walsall)Zilliacus, K
Thomas, I. O. (Wrekin)Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J. T. (Edinb'gh, E.)
Thurtle, ErnestWhiteley, Rt. Hon. W.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Titterington, M. FWigg, GeorgeMr. Hannan and Mr. Wilkins.

NOES

Amory, D. HeathcoatHannon, Sir P. (Moseley)Peake, Rt. Hon. O.
Assheton, Rt. Hon. R.Hare, Hon. J. H. (Woodbridge)Peto, Brig. C. H. M
Astor, Hon. M.Head, Brig. A. H.Pickthorn, K.
Baldwin, A. E.Hinchingbrooke, ViscoumPitman, I. J.
Baxter, A. B.Hogg, Hon. Q.Prescott, Stanley
Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C. (Wells)Hollis, M. CPrior-Palmer, Brig. O
Bossom, A. C.Howard, Hon. A.Raikes, H. V.
Bower, N.Hurd, A.Ramsay, Maj. S
Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.Keeling, E. H.Renton, D
Bracken, Rt. Hon. BrendanLambert, Hon. G.Robertson, Sir D. (Streatham)
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. WLancaster, Col. C. G.Ropner, Col L.
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.Shepherd, W S. (Bucklow)
Butcher, H. W.Lennox-Boyd, A. T.Smithers, Sir W.
Carson, E.Linstead, H. N.Spearman, A. C. M.
Challen, CLipson, D. L.Stanley, Rt. Hon. O.
Channon, H.Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral)Strauss, Henry (English Universities)
Clarke, Col. R. S.Low, A. R. W.Studholme, H. G.
Clifton-Brown, Lt.-Col. GLucas-Tooth, Sir H.Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (P'dd't'n, S.)
Conant, Maj. R. J. E.Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.Teeling, William
Crowder, Capt. John E.MacAndrew, Col. Sir C.Thomas, Ivor (Keighley)
Cuthbert, W. N.McKie, J. H. (Galloway)Thornton-Kemsley, C. N
Darling, Sir W. Y.Macpherson, N. (Dumfries)Touche, G. C.
Digby, S. WMaitland, Comdr J. W.Vane, W. M. F.
Dodds-Parker, A. D.Manningham-Buller, R. EWalker-Smith, D.
Drewe, C.Marlowe, A. A. H.Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)
Erroll, F. J.Marshall, D. (Bodmin)Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Fraser, H. C. P. (Stone)Marshall, S. H. (Sutton)
Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir D. P. M.Mellor, Sir J.
Gage, C.Morris-Jones, Sir H.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Gridley, Sir A.Nicholson, G.Brigadier Mackeson and
Grimston, R. V.Orr-Ewing, I. L.Colonel Wheatley.

Resolved:

"That the recommendations contained in the Report from the Select Committee on Hybrid Bills (Procedure in Committee) in Session 1947–48 be approved, subject to the qualification that a Bill against which no Petition has been lodged may be committed either to a Committee of the whole House or to a Standing Committee, as the House may determine."

Orders Of The Day

Juries Money

Resolution reported:

"That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to provide for the making of payments in respect of jury service in Great Britain, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of—
  • (a) expenses incurred by way of the making of payments to persons who serve, or attend for service, as jurors, other than payments attributable to—
  • (i) the transaction of criminal business at a court held by virtue of a commission of assize, a commission of oyer and terminer and a commission of gaol delivery or any of them;
  • (ii) service, or attendance for service, at the Central Criminal Court, a court of quarter sessions, a court (other than a county court or, in Scotland, a sheriff court) exercising local civil jurisdiction or a coroner's court; or
  • (iii) service, or attendance for service, for the purposes of an inquiry under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, or the Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act, 1845; and
  • (b) any increase attributable to the passing of the said Act of the present Session in the sums which, under Part I of the Local Government Act, 1948, are payable out of moneys so provided."
  • Resolution agreed to.

    Juries Bill

    Considered in Committee.

    [Mr. BOWLES in the Chair]

    Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 2—(Person By Whom The Amount Of A Payment Is To Be Ascertained)

    6.18 p.m.

    I beg to move, in page 3, line 25, at the end, to add:

    "Provided that where, in a case falling within paragraph (m) of this subsection, the jury was summoned from a franchise in circumstances in which the bailiff thereof is charged with the duty of summoning jurors, that bailiff shall be the appropriate officer."
    Almost every Amendment standing in the Home Secretary's name on the Notice Paper today is either a drafting or a machinery Amendment. This little Amendment in my right hon. Friend's name is a machinery one which is self-explanatory.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clauses 3 and 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 5—(Reimbursement Of Local Authorities Of Payments Attributable To Civil Business At Assizes)

    Amendment made: In page 4, line 39, after the first "assize," to insert:

    "(other than the Central Criminal Court or a court held by virtue of a special commission)."—[The Attorney-General.]

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

    There is one question I should like to ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman about this Clause. Under this Clause the clerk of assize has to apportion the payments in respect of jury service between payments in respect of criminal work and payments in respect of civil work. On what basis has that apportionment to be made in cases, for instance, where there are jurors waiting from the commencement of the criminal work at an assize, who do not, in fact, serve as jurors until the criminal work is over and who serve as jurors in a civil action? The time during which they are waiting to act as jurors, is time for which they will now be remunerated. Will that time count against the Exchequer in respect of service on a civil jury, or will the time they are waiting count against the rates, if the jurors are waiting in criminal cases? There ought to be some principle laid down, otherwise it appears that clerks of assizes will be placed in considerable difficulty in making the correct apportionment.

    This Clause and the preceding Clause will place additional burdens on the clerks of assizes, who in these days are pretty busy people. Can the Attorney-General say that, where the Government are satisfied the pressure is great, they will see that additional assistance is made available?

    I wish to reinforce what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) has just said. On a circuit not altogether unknown to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the work is becoming very heavy indeed, and any further burden will be the final straw. I suggest that serious steps should be taken to strengthen and increase the staff that is available.

    The answer to the last point raised might perhaps be found in solvitur ambulando. The circumstances in different circuits may be very different, but I give the assurance that the position will be watched. If it is necessary to reinforce the clerks of assizes of any or all of the areas, it will be done as may be required. I agree that the first point raised is a matter of importance. We shall certainly look at it. It is a matter that ought to be covered, and can be covered, by administrative instructions, so that there is a proper allocation as between criminal and civil work and the rates and the Exchequer.

    During the Second Reading Debate I referred to the methods adopted for the selection of juries. Has any consideration been given to the comments I made?

    The Clause relates to the payment of jurors and not to the method of selecting juries.

    A question has just been asked about the work of clerks of assizes, and I wanted to ask whether anything is to be done to ease their responsibilities in regard to selecting juries, by the adoption of some other procedure that has been suggested.

    I wish to thank the Attorney-General for the reply he has given and to ask him to make known, during the later stages of our discussion, the principle to be applied so that, if need be, we can comment or express our agreement upon it.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clauses 6 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 11—(Reimbursement Of Sheriffs)

    Amendment made: In page 8, line 1, after "sheriff," insert "or the bailiff of a franchise."—[ The Attorney-General.]

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clauses 12 and 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 14—(Exclusion Of Certain Juries)

    Amendment made: In page 8, line 34, leave out "(other than the Salford Hundred Court of Record)," and insert "which is not a court of record."—[ The Attorney-General.]

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 16—(Operation Of Foregoing Sections)

    Amendment made: In page 9, line 9, at end, add:

    "Provided that subsection (4) of section one and section eight of this Act shall come into operation on the passing thereof."—[The Attorney-General.]

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 17—(Abolition Of Special Juries)

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

    We wish to have a discussion on this Clause on the general question of special juries.

    I think it will be for the convenience of the Committee if the Debate also covers Clause 26, which deals with the same point in reference to Scotland.

    On the question of special juries, I take as the test that which was propounded by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg), namely, whether the results of the change will be satisfactory from the point of view of justice to the parties. I do not think any Member can object to that as a criterion, although different answers may be given to the question. The question appears to raise two subsidiary questions; first, whether the advocates of the change have shown any type of case where injustice may be done by the system of special juries, and secondly, whether there can be said to be any social evil in the fact that a distinction is made at all. I have read with great care all the speeches that were made on this subject during the Second Reading Debate, and the only class of case that has been seriously argued is where a person of extreme Left Wing views has brought an action for defamation against a person whose views are further to the Right, or a newspaper. It seems to me that that is a bad example from two points of view. Even if there were substance in the suggestion that wrong verdicts had been given—and I do not think there is—it would not be right for us to legislate for extreme cases.

    I have used the argument as often as most people of Mr. Easy's maidservant, who it will be remembered was the lady who gave the well-worn and well-known excuse for her baby: "But it is only a little one." If my memory is right, the right hon. Gentleman has used the argument with equal force when he was in Opposition and the Government of the day were seeking to perpetrate what he thought was an injustice on the ground that it affected only a small number of persons. That can be a formidable argument, especially in the mouth of the Home Secretary; but I suggest that the converse does demand our attention. There is no reason to dispense with something which is beneficial, and which works well in the vast majority of cases, if there can be found only one extremely limited class of case in which it can be shown not to work.

    6.30 p.m.

    But I go further than that and say that the arguments against the jury system based on its working on a class basis are really unworthy of this House and not in accordance with either the facts or the experience of any unbiased person. The hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith (Mr. Pritt) suggested that as a general proposition in his Second Reading speech. He said:
    "We never see a working class jury. It just does not happen. Every case in which the working classes are involved—which means some of the civil cases and nine-tenths of the criminal cases, because your criminal lawyer is a middle-class man—is a case in which one side is trying the other."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1949; Vol. 460, c. 1552.]
    I am sorry to say this in the absence of the hon. and learned Member; but he did speak on Second Reading and that is why I felt that I was entitled to refer to it here, because I thought he would be with us. I respectfully suggest that what he said is complete nonsense. For anyone who has had experience of jury trials to say that a British jury of either type deals with a case involving a working man on the basis that one side—and by that the hon. and learned Gentleman was referring to the middle class against the working class—is trying the other, is simply a travesty of what takes place in our courts. I do not believe that any hon. and learned Gentlemen opposite who have had great experience—and I see many of them here—in cases where workmen have been the plaintiffs have ever had that feeling in their minds for a moment, whether they have been dealing with a common jury or a special jury. I certainly have appeared for hundreds, if not thousands, of workmen in my time at the Bar and I have never felt that, and I have never had that put to me by one colleague in the course of a period which is now longer than I care to think about.

    I was just about to quote the hon. and learned Member, so perhaps he will defer his interruption until I have done so. I will, of course, give way willingly, but I should prefer to make my point, and then I will answer whatever he has to ask. This quotation from the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) is most interesting; he will see the point that I am making. Referring to people who draw the distinction between the common jury and the special jury he says:

    "Personally, I think they are wrong. I believe that the real hard core of reaction lies in the sort of property class from which the common jury is called. But most people think that a special jury provides a political advantage and justice does not appear to be done."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1949; Vol. 460, c. 1572.]
    I am very glad to have the hon. and learned Member on my side in rejecting this Clause. However, I should, with respect to him, deny that I had found that reactionary quality in common juries which I have seen functioning, and I should be surprised if he found many people who shared his experience on that point.

    I do not think that the point made by the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith (Mr. Pritt) is quite that which was being put into his mouth. Whether the jury trying a case concerning a workman who has been injured be a middle-class jury or a working-class jury, I think that the reaction is very much the same: "The insurance company ought to pay." Personally, I think that is a proper reaction; that is a typical jury reaction, from whichever class it comes. But in a criminal case dealing with political agitation, my own view is—and I say this advisedly—that one gets a fair trial from a rural Tory bench because they are so careful about their prejudices; but I do not think one gets a fair trial in those circumstances from a common jury.

    I should like to point out to the Committee that this Clause deals with the abolition of special juries, and as special juries do not apply to criminal courts I think that the discussion is getting rather wide.

    I agree, Mr. Bowles, and I shall not pursue that line any further. The time may come when the hon. and learned Member and I can debate the second point he made. You will realise, Mr. Bowles, that the reason I referred to the hon. and learned Member's Second Reading speech was that it does help on the point I am now making; he was differentiating rather in favour of the special jury as opposed to the other group.

    I put it to all hon. Gentlemen opposite that the suggestion that juries function on a class basis is one which they ought seriously to reconsider before making it the basis of an argument in this Committee or elsewhere. I could not but be impressed, as I always am, by the speeches of the Lord President of the Council when I read them in the Press; and when I heard his almost pathetic cri de coeur to the middle class to stand by him, I could not help contrasting it with the extremely poor opinion expressed as to the probity and judgment of the middle class by those who are today basing this change on that view. I simply do not believe that verdicts are arrived at as a result of prejudice. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) is not here, because on Second Reading he gave us a very quick and summary reasoning on his own mental processes in deciding whether or not to apply for a special jury. I do not believe and I do not accept that a case can be made out on the ground that any type of case receives an unfair hearing because it is tried by a special jury.

    I now come to the other point, which I have termed: "Is there any social evil?" I think hon. Members will understand what I mean by that. I mean the broad question of continuing the distinction and whether it is on reflection to be considered a social evil. I believe that experience is an advantage in exercising judicial functions. I mean experience of occupation, of business, of calling and of life generally. I am not referring to education in the academic sense at all; that may or may not be helpful on this point. I think that is arguable. What is, I submit, beyond argument is that experience, in the broad sense which I have endeavoured to define, is a useful adjunct to performing this service. One function of a jury in practically every case is that of valuation. That function comes into ordinary accident cases when one gets on to the question of damages. I think that the Committee will agree with me that valuation is one of the most difficult functions of a special jury in a serious case of personal injury.

    Suppose the range of damages which might appeal to one jury or another or one judge or another were somewhere between £2,000 and £5,000. I ask the Committee to remember the way in which it was put by the hon. Member for Oldham. He said that if he had a case about which he was perfectly satisfied as to liability, he then applied for a special jury in order to try to get bigger damages. I ask the Committee to note that that is not a piece of cynicism by the hon. Member for Oldham, but because he thinks that he will get a better assessment of damages from a special jury and a more accurate assessment of damages—

    I am not taking such a poor view of the hon. Member for Oldham as the hon. Member who interrupts. I was developing this because it is a sound point. The hon. Member for Oldham, I am sure, believes that a special jury will give a more accurate assessment of the damages, and believes that the higher damages are the more accurate assessment.

    I will give way in two minutes. It is not because I do not want to give way, but unless one can develop one's argument for about five minutes without interruption, it is very difficult to get it across.

    May I come back to the point which I was making, because this is material? I see that the hon. Member for Oldham has now come into the Chamber, so I shall tell him to what I was referring. I expressed my regret that he was not here. I had drawn attention to what the hon. Member had said on Second Reading, that when he had a certain case of liability he applied for a special jury because he thought that he would get higher damages. I was defending that point of view against the implied reproach of cynicism from hon. Members behind him, and defending him on the lines that he not only wanted to get higher damages because they were higher, but because they were, in his view, a more accurate assessment of the damages to which his client was entitled.

    6.45 p.m.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman expressed his regret at my absence but had he let me know he required my presence. I should, of course, have been here. My recollection of the remarks which I made on Second Reading is this: I think that I was talking about the general practice and if I applied the general practice, it must have been one of the very rare occasions on which I did so. I said that, generally speaking, when the whole question was one of damages, if one's case was certain, then one anticipated higher damages from a special jury than from a common jury. If, on the other hand, one had a case where a pedestrian was battling with a motorist, a special jury which was a motorist jury, was most unfair to the pedestrian.

    I think that I quoted the first part of the hon. Gentleman's remarks perfectly correctly. I was taking the case where the range of damages which might appeal to one judge would be £2,000 and to another judge £5,000, or similarly in the case of juries. What are the factors that have to be considered? There are the interest rates and what the plaintiff is likely to get if he invests the sum he recovers. There is the amount of the annuity he gets if he wants to buy one. There is also the likelihood of his investing the sum in a business of his own. That is the awful problem which we have all had to consider on so many occasions. They are all points which we have discussed, if not ad nauseam, at very great length when we have been considering lump sum settlements in the old days concerning workmen's compensation. All those points, together with the changes in the value of money, have to be borne in mind.

    There is a very real difficulty—and I put this without any offence to the Committee—if people have not had to consider largish sums of money before, because they have not got it themselves, or for the reason that their daily life does not take them into fields where they have to consider large sums of money. When one gets up to £2,000 it appears to them to be such a large sum that they disregard other important factors which, if considered, would bring one up to £5,000 or somewhere near it. I put that argument forward in all seriousness because I suggest that it is a point which has to be met.

    I remember that in the days when I was in Liverpool and one had special juries and common juries, the fact that one saw on a special jury a surveyor, or someone used to valuation, was a real help on the question of damages, and it was also of assistance if there were people on the jury who were accustomed to considering questions involving large sums in connection with their businesses. There is a value in having a man who has to consider his capital position or the capital position of the business in which he is engaged. I submit that the same qualities are an advantage in dealing with complicated facts. There is also the advantage that the system is well-tried, and that it has worked well. In ordinary cases, I have not found a serious complaint of injustice between plaintiffs and defendants.

    I now come to the second point of the argument of the hon. Member for Oldham. It is true that a special jury in the case of a pedestrian and a motorist may contain some motorists and, therefore, they may be able to consider the difficulty of the motorists more accurately. I think that, on the other hand, if he goes over his results broadly in his mind, his experience will not prove to be very different from mine, or probably that of the learned Attorney-General, that plaintiffs have succeeded in at least three-quarters of the special jury cases with which one has had to deal. I do not think that hon. Gentlemen will contradict that if they really go through their experience and endeavour to make the assessment.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman is putting an argument of substance and importance, but I do not think he is addressing his mind to the present position in which either side can peremptorily demand a special jury, if it suits their purpose. That is a very material point.

    I shall come to that point, and put forward a suggestion which I am sure the hon. Member will consider. I hope that he will consider it favourably. I will not forget the point. I was saying that that is my experience, which I think no one with considerable experience would contradict. I am told that the tendency is not to have juries very often in running-down and personal injury cases today, and that the number of cases with a jury is getting smaller than it was in earlier days. The cases in which one can get a jury, apart from defamation, are, of course, fraud, where either party is entitled in effect almost to demand a jury.

    What are the cases of fraud which actually come into our courts? Again, in my experience they are largely of two kinds. They are either fraud in the sale of a business or fraud in the sale of a motorcar. There are other cases, but I am being realistic. My experience on the Northern Circuit was that the vast majority of fraud cases were fraud in the sale of businesses. I do not think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman would contradict me, unless the situation changed very much when I did not cover the Northern Circuit so often. On that kind of case you have to consider exactly the same range and kind of fact. You need to have somebody who has experience in business and who knows the run of takings, and the proportion of profits to takings, and the like. It is an advantage to have someone who has some business experience and who is able to bring that in.

    Now perhaps I may come to the point which the hon. Member for Oldham was good enough to put to me. I think the hon. Member would agree that where those parties want a special jury, it is somewhat difficult to argue convincingly that they should not have it. If we take the point which the hon. Member put, where one party says that he does not want a special jury, I suggest that it ought then to be left to the judge to decide with the guidance which my hon. Friends and I have endeavoured to put forward in the two Amendments, namely, by reason of the technical or complex nature of the issues or questions involved. It would be for the party who wanted the special jury to show that the issues were so complex, difficult or involved that the court would be helped by experience of the type that I have tried to define, and to show that the case was within that category. That is a point well worthy of consideration. Unless that could be shown and demonstrated, and the kind of background which I have indicated was required, the party would not get the special jury.

    On that basis, I do not think there is unfairness. The Attorney-General put the matter attractively in his speech introducing the Bill, when he said that the jury should be a cross-section He made answer to me that with the jury list amalgamated, the people I have mentioned would be in the jury list somewhere. I do not think that any hon. Gentlemen who share my experience in this matter would say that that answer met my point. If we fix a limit however rough-and-ready, people who come from houses above that limit will include the types I have mentioned, namely, surveyors and business people with experience, who will be able to give help in trying the cases.

    I am sure that few hon. and right hon. Gentlemen would really seek to put this problem on a crude, class basis. I am sure that they would all desire, as I desire, to try to find out what will do justice for the litigant. I am sure they want to approach it in that way. Therefore I ask them to think again over the points I have ventured to put forward and to say whether, having considered those points, they think it is right to do away with a well-tried system which is working so efficiently.

    Whatever else one may say about the politics of the right hon. and learned Member for West Derby (Major Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe), nobody can doubt that he possesses courage, and that is one of the most important of the political virtues. I say that here, because advocacy of the continued retention of this well-tried judicial anachronism certainly requires courage rather than discrimination.

    I was glad when, in his closing remarks, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said that he thought one should not approach this matter from a political point of view or on any kind of—I think the words were—class basis. I shall certainly not approach it from any such point of view. I think it has been thought in the past—this is perhaps only a matter of historical interest—that special juries often inclined to have Conservative tendencies in those cases in which, directly or indirectly, political issues arose at all. In the period between 1906 and 1914, I think, the Liberal Party very often said that the special jury was composed either of Conservatives or of publicans, and they seemed to take an equal objection to both. I shall certainly not approach the matter from any political point of view. I hope that the Committee will not for a moment allow itself to be divided about this matter on political lines. I do not think that it is a political problem.

    7.0 p.m.

    Nor do I think, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman rather tended to say, that this is in any sense a new problem or one which has been affected by the view which some people may have formed about the decisions of special juries in recent libel cases involving some kind of political complexion. So far from that being the case, in 1913 the whole question of jury law and practice was made the subject of inquiry by a Departmental Committee and much evidence was given at that time in favour of the view that special juries should be completely abolished. That view was not accepted by the Departmental Committee at the time but the Committee recommended quite a considerable number of alterations in the law relating to juries and to special juries, including the abolition of a number of the qualifications on which the special jury list is now founded, and the alteration of the remaining qualifications for that list.

    I want to refer to one or two paragraphs of that Committee's Report because I want to put it quite out of our discussion that there is any suggestion of political difference about this or that this is a matter which has only recently arisen because of the decisions of certain special juries in particular cases. This is what the Committee said in paragraphs 178–9 of their Report:
    "In connection with this question of the competency of the jury in commercial cases"—
    They were dealing here with the most technical of all the cases—
    "we have been much struck by the poor opinion that clearly prevails in certain quarters with respect to the capacity of the modern special jury. In theory, a special jury is particularly fitted for the trial of cases such as those we have mentioned, but in London at any rate, and perhaps elsewhere, we are faced with two facts that are bound to influence any estimate of the value of the special jury. There appears to be a widespread feeling that the special jury panel usually includes an undue proportion of licensed victuallers, in consequence no doubt of the higher rateable value assigned to licensed premises as compared with that of other property, and it would also seem that the qualifications of 'banker, merchant or esquire' (see paragraph 52 above) have now become so meaningless as to result in the bestowal of the rank of special juror on a variety of small tradesmen and others, for whom it is hardly probable it was originally intended. Whether for these or other reasons, the quality of most special juries has, it is represented, shown of late years a marked tendency to deteriorate. Several of the witnesses commented on this fact, but we may point out that this degeneracy has been observed more particularly in the special juries that appear in the High Court in London."
    I was glad to see this, coming from the Northern Circuit—
    "There is reason to believe that in the provinces the special juries have escaped this tendency."
    Then the Report said this:
    "Against this apparent deterioration in the quality of the special jury it is satisfactory to be able to set some evidence of a decided improvement in the standard of common juries. We have been informed, indeed, that in London at least, though not, it would seem, elsewhere, a common jury is sometimes not merely as good as, but even superior to a special jury, and in one respect at any rate there are many who would prefer the common jury's verdict, if it be tree, as we are told, that special juries 'think in larger sums.'"
    These ideas were not novel to those who spoke in the Second Reading Debate in this House. The Committee went on to express their conclusions about all this, and in paragraph 214 they said that they did not think that in all the circumstances, although there was a difference of view about this, they would be justified at present in advising any interference with the existing division of juries into two classes, and they explained their reasons:
    "Our principal justification, however, lies in the expectation that several of the recommendations made in this Report will be found to meet the most important of the objections that have been taken to the special jury. To begin with we propose considerable restrictions on the present almost absolute right to trial by jury. We believe that henceforth not only will trials by any kind of jury be far less numerous, but that if the mode of trial and the kind of jury to be used are left, as we have suggested, to be determined by the judge"—
    That is rather what the right hon. and learned Gentleman suggested might be done but what has not in fact been done in any class of case in which a jury is available at present—
    "the abuse, if any, of the special jury will effectually be prevented. This innovation gives the very best possible guarantee that henceforth a special jury will only be used when it is really required. Similarly, we are confident that our proposals for revision of the qualifications required for special jurors will make the special jury far more representative by considerably enlarging the area from which special jurors may be drawn. We believe that we have ensured the inclusion of classes whose exclusion under the present system has been one of the chief causes for dissatisfaction."
    Again—this is a matter which will interest the hon. Member for Liverpool, Exchange (Mrs. Braddock) because it is still a matter which has not been settled—the Report states:
    "Lastly, we would point out that if, as we have recommended below, some uniform and purely mechanical system is adopted for the selection of jurors from the jury book, much uneasiness will be removed by the certainty that every special jury panel has been fairly and impartially chosen."
    That is what was recommended as long ago as 1913, and not one of those recom- mendations has been carried out. That was a Departmental Committee which came to the conclusion that there were obviously grave objections to the special jury system as it existed at that time but that it might be made tolerable if quite radical changes were made in the practice in regard to it and if the qualifications for service upon it were very considerably widened. That was not done, and now the matter has come before the House and we have to review the whole situation in the light of existing circumstances, one of which, hon. Members on both sides will agree, is that in the intervening 36 years the standard of general education over the country as a whole has very materially improved. I mention the history of the matter in order to try to destroy the impression which seems to have arisen in some quarters that this is in any sense a political matter, and I hope very much that in future hon. Members opposite will not lend themselves to the rather partisan propagandist suggestion that the case against special juries is based on any political prejudice on this side of the House. That is not so. These matters were very fully considered before and exactly the same objections were raised as are being raised to the special jury today.

    The real question—here I largely agree with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said—is whether on the whole—and I add an additional test to the one he posed—justice is not only the better administered in fact but also has the manifest appearance of being the better administered when we have these two classes of juries, this division based upon a property qualification between the different jurors. That is a very important consideration to be borne in mind. It is well recognised now, and I am not going to repeat what was said about it by the late Lord Chief Justice Hewart, that it is really important not only that we should have what is in fact an efficient and satisfactory system for the administration of justice but also that everybody should be satisfied that it is manifestly in its appearance a satisfactory system.

    Whatever one may say, in applying the first of these two tests to the existing jury system with its division based upon a property qualification, I do not think anyone in this House would be bold enough to say—courageous as hon. Members opposite often are in putting forward surprising propositions—that the appearance of justice is in any way assisted by having two different classes of jury, the distinction between which is based solely and exclusively upon either a property title or the right to call one's self a banker or an esquire, or to use some other title which has now become completely meaningless.

    Now I go back to the first test. Everybody would like to ensure that juries were adequately experienced and intelligent. I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman that, when one refers to the desirability of a jury being intelligent, one does not mean simply that they are well-lettered, full of book learning, or familiar with the classical languages; what one wants to find in a jury is not so'much that they are specialists in regard to any field of experience, but that they have native shrewdness and intelligence and are good judges of men. Because that largely is their ultimate function in court, to decide between the different witnesses on the different sides which is the more reliable.

    If anybody could suggest—and nobody has yet suggested—any form of intelligence test or experience test which might be applied to juries that was not based upon a property qualification, I would be not unwilling to consider it. Certainly, I would not attempt to defend for a moment the property qualification, whether for a special jury or for a common jury. It may be that we shall have an opportunity of discussing that aspect of the matter later, and that we shall be able to say how else the jury list might be composed, but I must not anticipate the discussion which may take place on a later part of our Order Paper.

    However desirable it might be to try to evolve some new test in order to secure the best possible jury, it is a little late in the day to suggest that the rateable value of a man's house is any longer, if it ever was, a reliable guide as to the occupier's qualities of shrewdness and intelligence. The rateable value of a man's house is not based upon the intelligence of the occupier. Of course, there may be occasional exceptions to that. I once occupied a cottage which was rated at £18 per year, and immediately after I had become the occupier and had gone down on the list, the rateable value was put up to £100 for no reason at all, so far as I was able to judge, except that I had become the occupier. Fortunately that is not a practice which usually guides the actions of valuation committees; they do not base the assessment either on the intelligence or the experience of the occupier, in whatever field it may be.

    I put this to the Committee quite seriously as a view that I have formed on such experience as I have had of appearing in cases before juries in the civil and criminal courts; on the whole I would have thought that the best probability of securing the existence of these qualities of intelligence and experience on a jury is to make sure that the jury represents a good cross-section of the community. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman pointed out in the course of his remarks, nobody suggests that the abolition of the special jury list will in any way abolish the obligations of those gentlemen now upon it to sit upon juries. They will remain on the jury list, they will be called from time to time, and they will be sitting along with their colleagues who do not happen to enjoy the same property qualifications.

    7.15 p.m.

    That is how we have empanelled juries in both civil and criminal courts for a long time past, and although juries, like judges, occasionally make mistakes, I would have thought on the whole that they have turned out to be an exceedingly satisfactory tribunal. I know there are two views about it. The hon. Member who represents the city of Oxford (Mr. Hogg) said that he thought juries were perverse—

    —sometimes perverse, and he went on to cite one or two particular cases on which he based his general argument.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman is not reporting me correctly. If he will study the Debate on the Second Reading he will see that I was answering an argument by the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself to the effect that special juries did not operate in criminal cases, and I pointed to certain cases in criminal matters which I said would have been much better tried by a special jury, and that was the limit of my remarks.

    I read the hon. Gentleman's speech this morning in order to refresh my memory, and I think he will find, if he imposes upon himself the melancholy task of reading it later on, that my recollection of it is a little more accurate than his own. He made some rather sweeping generalisations, based on a reference to one or two cases, that juries are perverse. However, he was followed by a view expressed by the hon. and learned Member for Brighton (Mr. Marlowe) who said that almost always the jury is fundamentally right. Of the two views, I think that is perhaps the better one. One often comes away from court with the feeling that the jury has behaved disgracefully but, on thinking it over and after calming down a bit, one frequently comes to the conclusion that fundamentally the jury was probably right, taking a broad view, in the decision to which it came.

    Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman say in what sense he is using the word "right"?

    That it came to a conclusion which, broadly, accorded with the requirements of justice. I think that is a fair way of putting it. Juries often overlook technical niceties and generally they are quite right in doing so. They come to a broad conclusion on the merits, and although they sometimes make mistakes, just as other courts do—there are four Divisions of the Court of Appeal working hard at the moment to correct mistakes made—on the whole they are generally a satisfactory tribunal. This was what the Departmental Committee said about them a long time ago:

    "We may say at the outset that, as regards intelligence, we have nowhere met with any traces of a feeling that an ordinary jury of today is not as a rule a competent tribunal."
    Then they referred to the position in Wales where there are special difficulties because of the language question, and continued:
    "If, however, as we imagine to be the case the amount of education to be found among all classes is steadily and progressively increasing, it is obviously permissible to anticipate a corresponding advance in the standard of intelligence of the average juror."
    And on the whole they say, quite rightly, that the jury is a satisfactory tribunal. I would have thought that it would be difficult to find, and that one cannot find in the jurisprudence of any other country, a better tribunal than the ordinary, common jury instructed by a trained High Court judge.

    Whilst I take that view, and I put it forward with some confidence, I also put forward with complete conviction the view that the possibility of insisting upon the empanelling of a special jury, whose only qualification is the rateable value of the house they live in—and that is the only question before us now, because no other qualification has been suggested—is wholly inimical both to the fact and to the appearance of justice. Let me develop that by reference to two particular classes of case. I want to do so, Mr. Bowles, without transgressing your Ruling earlier in our discussions about criminal cases, and I think I can do so. Some of the most difficult cases—the right hon. Gentleman referred to one class of case—long-firm frauds, cases which sometimes last for many weeks in the courts; some of the cases of criminal conspiracy, complicated issues as to commercial transactions involving some illegal element; cases of that kind are commonly tried, and on the whole, I think, quite efficiently tried, by the ordinary petty jury in the criminal court.

    I think it is a valid argument, when one is considering both the actuality and the appearance of justice, to say that if that tribunal is efficient, satisfactory and just where questions of life and liberty are at stake. It is most difficult to understand how it can possibly be said that they are an inefficient tribunal in the comparatively small number of comparatively simple human issues which alone remain triable nowadays in the civil courts as of right by juries.

    The point which was advanced on Second Reading by the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale), on the attitude of a litigant's legal adviser when a question as to the right of trial by jury arises, was one of the very greatest importance. I am coming to the limited number of cases in which juries are at present available as of right. In those cases where they are available, the litigant's adviser immediately asks himself, "What sort of a jury shall we have? If we are rocky on liability, then we will have a common jury, because it is commonly supposed that common juries are inclined to be more sympathetic towards plaintiffs. If we want very high damages, and we are quite sure of getting home, then we will have a special jury, because special juries think in rather higher figures. If we are being sued by a pedestrian who has been run down on a pedestrian crossing, then we will have a special jury, because we will get more motorists on that than on a common jury." And so on.

    In every case in which a legal adviser has to consider what he is going to do, where a jury has been asked for or demanded by the other side, he has regard to considerations of that kind. I really find it extraordinarily difficult to justify that situation. We have got now to put an end to this juggling with justice, this tampering with tribunals, this gerrymandering with justice. What would be the reaction if parties were to say, "We will not be tried by Mr. Justice So-and-so. We do not like the way he deals with this type of case. We will insist on being tried by another Mr. Justice So-and-so"? That is what they cannot say.

    That may be, but hon. Members opposite would be ill-advised to attempt to discriminate between His Majesty's judges in the way I have suggested. They have no right to do so. They have to take, one way or the other, the judge who comes along to a particular assize. They cannot choose, they cannot say, "We will have this one because he will do better for us from one point of view, and we will avoid that one because we think he has some special bias in another direction." Each side must accept the same standard of justice administered by the same tribunal, and a distinction such as has existed heretofore, based on these property grounds, which are both antiquated and illusory, ought now to be swept completely away.

    Finally, I want to point out this, which is in relation to the last point made by the right hon. Gentleman. It was said that there are some cases of special difficulty, cases involving technical matters of one kind or another, which are particularly suitable for trial by special jury; that the facts are complicated and people of experience are more likely to be able to deal with them properly, and that the judge ought to have discretion whether or not to order a special jury in such a case. I am not quite sure what that proposal is and whether it involves enlarging the existing right to trial by jury. It it were, one would have to consider it from that point of view.

    But what, I think, has not been sufficiently recognised, if I may say so, in the course of our discussions, is that the present right to trial by jury—in civil cases, of course—is an exceedingly limited right. The judge can order a jury in other cases but, the only cases, in fact, in which there is any right to trial by jury are not those with complicated and technical issues of fact but cases in which there is some broad human issue in regard to which witnesses on one side or the other are, perhaps, less likely to be speaking the truth than in the ordinary run of litigation. Those cases are fraud, libel and slander, false imprisonment, seduction and breach of promise of marriage. I attach great importance to technical knowledge and experience and it may be—I do not know—that technical problems are involved in cases of seduction and breach of promise of marriage and that, possibly, experience has something to do with these cases; but I really do not see that matters of that kind are necessarily better dealt with by the special jury empanelled in the way that is appropriate now than by a common jury.

    It is wholly beside the point to say that special juries are better for dealing with cases of complication and technical difficulties, because it is not in those cases that the right to a jury exists at all. If in those complicated, long and difficult cases the learned judge, on appeal from the Master, comes to the conclusion that a common jury—the only kind of jury which will be available if the House accepts the Bill—would not be a proper tribunal to try the case, he will not order a common jury. But under the law as it stands today, and as it will remain, the only cases in which there is a right to a jury are these simple, human issues arising in the cases I have just mentioned; and in those cases, I venture to submit, the common jury is just as well qualified to reach a just and sensible decision as one whose property qualifications may be slightly higher.

    Disarming as the Attorney-General has been in his plea for us not to make the charge that there is a political issue involved in this question, I do not myself intend to be beguiled by his request. In spite of what he has said, I still adhere to my original view that this is a political ramp, and I believe it is the consequence of the experiences which some people have had in the courts in the last few years. Since the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Derby made such a devastatingly powerful defence of the special jury there is little more for us to say.

    Let me say, in fairness to the hon. Member for Derby, that the hon. and learned Gentleman is referring. I think, to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe).

    7.30 p.m.

    I am much obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I cannot help feeling that this matter has to be approached in this way. The right hon. and learned Gentleman and those who sit with him are making out a case for the abolition of the special jury and, as I said on Second Reading, the onus is on them. Is it, or is it not, suggested that special juries have been guilty of injustice? That is the fundamental point to which we have to address ourselves. If hon. Members opposite are prepared to say that and to establish it by producing cases showing that special juries have been guilty of in justice, that would go a long way towards discharging the burden of proof. If they cannot establish such a case, what is the reason for what I assert to be the truth, that it is a vindictive Measure as a result of actions being lost before special juries?

    If, on the other hand, any hon. Member opposite is prepared to bring forward a case in which he says that a special jury has done an injustice, of course I should be glad to hear of it. If any hon. Member does so he will be relying on those political cases and thereby substantiating the very charge I am making. The hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale), in an interruption a little earlier in the Debate, gave voice to the opinion that the special jury in the case, for instance, between the pedestrian and the motorist, was unfair to the pedestrian. That was the sense of what he said and I think those were the very words he used.

    They were certainly not my very words. I said that in a case between a pedestrian and a motorist the insurance company would prefer to have a motoring jury. I did not say it was unfair to prefer that but that it was bad that either side should select which jury they wished.

    The hon. Member used words to the effect that in such a case a special jury were likely to be unfair. I accept his correction, if he says he did not say anything of the kind, but I understood that to be the case. I understood his case to be that a special jury would be more likely to find in favour of the motorist. That assumes that all motorists are now people of great wealth who are vindictive towards pedestrians, but that is not so at all. Nowadays, while a great number of people may be pedestrians and not motorists, the vast majority of motorists are pedestrians also. The hon. Member is living a long way in the past and putting forward a policy which is rather like his party's policy on nationalisation which has roots back in the past, but which bears no relation to the present.

    The truth is that in the great majority of cases tried by juries of any kind in this country they have no political flavour at all. I suppose 99 per cent. could be put into that category. The case that hon. Members opposite do not like to be tried by a special jury is a case where they think the special jury is more likely to have the political flavour of the Opposition rather than that of the Government side. That is the view they are supporting. I have not yet known them make out a case for it, except that the Attorney-General rather indicated how his mind had worked when he referred to the 1913 Report, which, he said, accepted that there was a tendency for a special jury to be composed of publicans and small tradesmen. It has become manifest, of course, in the last few weeks that the party opposite is not friendlily disposed towards publicans as they have been proceeding with a Licensing Bill and it has been well known for many years that they are not in favour of small tradesmen—

    I can well understand that these remarks are not causing very much interest to the Chair, but are references to publicans, small tradesmen and the attitude of a party to nationalisation completely relevant to the question of the abolition of special juries?

    I do not think you, Major Milner, were in the Chair when the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General referred to the 1913 Report, in which he dealt with the manner in which special juries were made up at that date and the classes from which it was the tendency to draw them. In that Report those were the precise words which were used. I was praying in aid what the Attorney-General said and pointing out that that reinforced my argument that the party opposite are against special juries, not for the work they do in a court, but because of the people who go to make them up. If it is right—and I have found no proof of it at all—that one political party find that by reason of a special jury the dice are loaded against them or they think they are, what is the argument? Is it suggested that if, say, a Socialist is proceeding against a Conservative a special jury is more likely to find for the Conservative? Is the argument that if special juries were abolished there would only be a common jury and that a common jury is more likely to find for the Socialist? I cannot believe that hon. Members really put forward such an argument.

    Yes and I cannot believe that hon. Members opposite would put it forward. But if not, what is the case for putting the common jury in the place of the special jury? What will be the result if the special jury is abolished. If there is any case at all for cutting down the extent to which a special jury is used, what is the objection to meeting that by making new rules for their employment? What is the objection to adopting some such procedure as that suggested by an Amendment on the Order Paper for putting the matter in the control of a judge to determine whether a special jury should be employed or not?

    I shall put a case which I think hon. Members opposite would find very difficult to contest. Suppose both parties want a special jury. Is there any reason why they should not have it? If this Bill proceeds, in the case in which two parties want a special jury they will be precluded from having it. What is the justice in that? In another case where one party wants a special jury and another wants a common jury, there would be nothing to prevent rules being made that any person insisting on having a common jury could have a common jury. That would take away any peremptory right to a special jury. I cannot help feeling that it would be better to deal with these things in a practical way and if there is any case for a reform, let it be dealt with by making the necessary rules, so that special juries are not used where they are not desirable, but are available when they are required.

    It certainly is a very remarkable thing—I do not know whether hon. Members opposite realise it—that by taking away the right of the special jury they are taking away something to which, in spite of the experiences some of them have had in the courts, they themselves have resorted. I understand that in the Laski case, Professor Laski himself applied for a special jury. He evidently believed that that was the jury which would give him most substantial justice.

    I understood that it was so. I was so instructed, but if the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) tells me it was not so, I accept his correction. I was so informed. I am sure there have been political cases in which that situation has arisen and the special jury has been at the instance of the plaintiff. Of course, if the hon. and learned Gentleman tells me that was not so in that case, I accept it and I was obviously misinformed. But it does not affect the argument at all. The point is that there should be such a jury available for those who want it, and I cannot see why because these experiences have been undergone by hon. Members opposite they should deprive others who may take quite a different view and believe themselves entitled to a special jury, from having one. It would surely be best, if there is any case at all for modification of the system, to modify it by making the necessary rules, and not by proceeding in this way to sweep away an old and well-tried institution, and preventing special juries from being available to those who want them.

    There are four possible explanations of the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Brighton (Mr. Marlowe) with reference to the interjection which I made. I find it impossible to adjudicate or select between them. The first is that the hon. Member was not present when I made the interjection. The second is that he was present but failed to hear my words accurately. The third is that he heard them accurately and failed to understand them. The fourth is that he heard them accurately, understood them but deliberately misrepresented them. I find it impossible to adjudicate between those explanations. I do not propose to make any other observation on the very garbled account of my interjection which the hon. and learned Member gave.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) made a perfectly constructive, perfectly moderate observation upon this matter, in which he introduced certain things which I had said, and represented them perfectly fairly.

    Will the hon. Member allow me to say that if I misunderstood him, I assure him I certainly did not intend to misrepresent him? I was only repeating the spirit of what the hon. Member said on Second Reading, when he stated that one asked for a special jury in a case in which a pedestrian was concerned against a motorist. He said:

    "It is quite a standard line for them to take, that for thirteen guineas they can get a jury of motorists who will strongly disapprove of a pedestrian walking across a pedestrian crossing at night without wearing a rear light."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1949; Vol. 460. c. 1564–5.]
    That was how the hon. Gentleman, I think humorously, expressed himself on the previous occasion upon which we discussed this Bill, and I think that I was only conveying to the House the sense of what he said then.

    I am much obliged to the hon. and learned Member. I would repeat what I said then. It is precisely what I say now. When the hon. and learned Member interrupts me to say that he did not intend to misrepresent me I accept that, but he must have the melancholy reflection that by exculpating his honesty, he reflects upon his intelligence.

    7.45 p.m.

    I was dealing with the right hon. and learned Member for West Derby. I wish to make my position clear. I believe that tonight we are reaching the culmination of a great and very important historical and constitutional process. I appreciate that the proceedings today are somewhat desultory, almost informal, but I could wish that the ghosts of many of those who suffered in the cause of juridical liberty in the years that have gone by were here watching our proceedings tonight. I believe that we have come near to the end. I hope that in an hour or two, when the Government accept a later Amendment, which it would be out of Order for me to refer to now, we shall come completely to the end of that process.

    Lord Brougham was a great law reformer in spite of the many eccentricities which he undoubtedly had. He said that one could summarise the whole of the constitutional struggle, the whole of our libertarianism, by saying that when we got twelve good men and true in the box we got the fundamental of the whole thing. I believe it. I referred to this struggle when I intervened in the Second Reading Debate. I referred to the battles of the juries to be judges of fact and to be able to record their decisions. The trials of Nicholas Throcmorton and William Penn were great battles in our constitutional history. Then there came the second battle, which curiously enough had to do with libel cases. I do not know how libel has got into the mind of the hon. and learned Member for Brighton. I do not recollect the case to which he refers, but there was a much more important case—that of the Dean of St. Asaph—where Erskine had his famous and historical battle with his old chief, Mr. Justice Buller, to establish the fact that juries were the judges of fact.

    Now we come to the end of this important democratic constitutional process. We want to have a jury which is a jury for everybody, without consideration of money, purse or power. We want to have a man tried by his peers. The hon. and learned Member for Brighton said that the onus of proof was upon us but this battle was fought out and won at Runnymede. We are now merely carrying out the end of the process after so many years of Tory Government in which these things have been ignored. The matters which we are discussing today are of great and real importance. I had not intended to intervene. I have tried in a purely non-controversial way to put simply what I feel about this matter, and to try to show that we are discussing something of importance. I hope that we shall not hear any more speeches like that of the hon. and learned Member for Brighton but that we shall approach this matter as one of fundamental importance to the democratic tradition, deal with the matter on that basis, pass this Clause, and come to the more important one which we are to consider later.

    I have no complaint to make about the approach of the Attorney-General to this matter, but I rather agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Brighton (Mr. Marlowe) that it did not lie in the mouth of the right hon. and learned Gentleman to impute in this matter political prejudice to our side of the Committee. That was rather borne out by the interjection of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), when he asked for a definition of the word "right." I do not think that class prejudice really enters into this matter. From my own experience of trials, when one of the parties has tried to introduce class prejudice into a trial it has usually not been to the advantage of that party, but if neither of the parties has sought to bring class prejudice into the matter, the jury has certainly not done so. That applies equally to a special and a common jury.

    I sometimes have difficulty in deciding, in the case of the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale), whether his head is ruling his heart or his heart his head. I think that his sentimental intervention tonight was one of the instances when clearly his heart was ruling his head. We have to approach this matter from a practical point of view, each of us in the light of his own experience. I believe in trial by jury. I should confess to the Committee that I have only attempted to direct a jury on two occasions and on each occasion the jury has disagreed. Therefore, I think that I can at least claim not to have indicated any undue bias. The Attorney-General was rather naive when he talked as though only juries could be perverse. With all respect to the Bench, judges do vary. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that it was quite impossible to avoid a particular judge. I do not think that his memory could have gone back very far. Certainly, in regard to circuits it is easy to avoid setting down a case for trial if one does not want a particular judge to try it.

    The practical point is what we believe to be the most suitable instrument to try a particular sort of case, in other words, whether there shall be grade 1 and grade 2 juries. I concede at once that it may be necessary to amend the practice. It may be that the method of selection and the circumstances under which the right to have a special jury arises, require amendment. It may be that the qualifications should be altered. This Clause, however, deals with the total abolition of special juries. I am not for a moment putting it forward as my opinion that the present system of selecting special juries is 100 per cent. right, but I do not think that, as a matter of practical justice, they should be totally abolished. The case which has not been met at all, that there are certain cases which require special experience and special knowledge, which at the same time it is desirable should be tried by jury, was put forward by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe). The hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) talked about the plaintiff in a running-down case whose adviser thought his chances of establishing liability were rocky, and advised him to have a common jury. That in itself is a condemnation. That shows that in a case of rocky liability he is going to sacrifice the accurate and just estimate of damages which he would get from a special jury. So far from advancing the point of the hon. Member in the argument, I consider that it directly confirms that in a serious case, a special jury is the better tribunal.

    It was the Attorney-General who spoke of common juries having dealt very successfully with long and complicated criminal cases. It is difficult in a criminal case to know exactly what the jury is thinking. I should have thought, however, that the impression formed by those of us who have appeared in long and complicated criminal cases, dealing with commercial matters, was that the great majority of common juries have been completely at sea throughout almost the whole of the case; that it would have been better and in the interests of justice that there should have been persons trying the case capable of dealing with the complicated matters presented, and doing justice to the issues involved. Therefore I take the point of the Attorney-General about justice appearing to be done and I say that there is a class of case in which justice would be done, and would appear to be done, if it was tried by a rather specialist class of jury, and I support my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby in refusing to agree to the total abolition of special juries.

    I was very interested in the argument just advanced, and I should like to extend it a little further. If it be true that there are certain types of cases where a special jury—because its members are supposed to be better equipped with knowledge and experience than members of a common jury—are likely to be more adequate to deal with a particular case, we cannot stop there. There are many other cases in which a special jury is at least as inadequate, by comparison with a judge, as a common jury is with a special jury. If the logic of the argument which has been advanced is that we are to relate the mechanism to the character of the case, there are many cases where we ought to abolish the jury altogether and rest the decision with the judge.

    That may be, but the logic of the argument would ultimately lead us to the situation where we only had judges and no jury at all.

    I beg the pardon of the hon. Member, but it is not the situation that we have now, otherwise this Debate would not be going on at all.

    I take the view that whether we have a common jury or a special jury we do not eliminate political prejudice. It is idle to suppose that a special juryman or a common juryman, when he goes into the jury box, immediately becomes com- pletely impersonal, forgetting the whole of his past, his associations, his politics and everything else.

    No, I do not think that is true. It does not apply only to political cases. Our political outlook affects our outlook on every kind of thing. I think it was Cardinal Manning who once said that all human differences were ultimately religious ones. In other words, one's mental background in considering any question produces an effect. I cannot say that that is true in the case of the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels), but I think that it is broadly true of most of us that our backgrounds do affect our attitude to political cases. Therefore we cannot abolish political prejudice. But we can, or we can try, to ensure that one political prejudice cancels out another. We can try to ensure that we shall not construct juries in such a way that their whole composition is of such a kind that they are likely collectively to lean one way rather than another.

    If we have a common jury nobody knows what the twelve good men and true will consist of when we have them in the box. It is likely that they will be a fairly mixed bag. They are not likely to be drawn from one social strata. They will probably be mixed in politics, mixed in income and mixed in social outlook, Therefore it is more likely that one political prejudice will cancel out another. That is less likely to be so where the composition of the jury is so devised as to eliminate certain income brackets and only to include income brackets up to a given level. For that reason I think that the Government are right and that the Opposition are wrong.

    I apologise for quoting a truism, which has been quoted before, that it is not enough that justice should be done; it should manifestly appear to be done. There is no doubt at all that any workman believes that he is likely to get a squarer deal from a jury composed entirely of people of different income brackets and social outlook. He does not believe that he is so likely to get a just verdict from a special jury as he is from a jury taken out of a hat. I agree with the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) that this is the logical culmination of Runnymede. The right was established there for the barons that they should be tried by their peers.

    They were the most effective organisation of vested interest at the time, and like all vested interests, they brought pressure to bear in what they thought was the proper quarter. It has been broadened down now until this is the last anomaly left, and I think it ought to go. I hope we shall stand by the Government in this matter, and resist any effort to preserve a piece of legal mechanism which, in my view, belongs to a social past in a Britain which is gone.

    In general the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. W. J. Brown) is always plausible, but not always very well informed. I could not help thinking that much of what he has just said would not have been said if, in addition to his very lively intelligence, he had brought to bear a little experience on this matter. His first point was that the logical conclusion of the argument presented by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) was that we should eliminate juries in a large proportion of cases. But that is precisely what has happened to our judicial system over the last 35 years.

    I am loth to interrupt the hon. Member, but what I said was that the logical conclusion of the argument advanced by the hon. and learned Member for Wirral was that ultimately we should have no juries at all, and that is what we have in Russia.

    I heard the hon. Gentleman the first time and I do not think he has improved it the second time. In fact that is what has happened to our civil juries over the last 35 years. I could not help feeling that the mind of the hon. Gentleman, like that of the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) was unconciously drifting into the idea that we were here discussing the right of the subject to be tried by a jury of his peers in criminal cases. That, at any rate, was very manifest in the case of the hon. Member for Oldham, who discussed a long line of precedents, every one of which was a precedent in a criminal case. What we are discussing here is not the right of the subject to be tried by a jury of his peers, but the right of a litigant to have his rights determined by the civil courts. The question which has to be considered is what type of tribunal amongst those available is the most suitable for the purpose of determining his rights.

    8.0 p.m.

    The hon. Member for Rugby, not for the first time in this Debate, misquoted the well-known remark of the late Lord Hewart to the effect that it was desirable not merely that justice should be done but that justice should be seen to be done. The trouble is that those of us who oppose the proposal of the Government on this occasion, whatever we may think about the question whether justice would be seen to be done if the special jury was abolished, are quite certain that in a number of cases justice would not be done. When I hear hon. Members opposite and the hon. Member for Rugby quoting the old saw, I am perfectly sure what they have got in their minds is not what the late Lord Hewart said. They really do not think it matters very much whether justice is done or not, so long as justice is thought to be done. That is a very different question in civil litigation. My judgment has always been that the special jury in the limited number of cases where it is ordered, is a useful instrument of justice, one which ought to be retained and one as to which only one or two legitimate criticisms can be levelled in practice, most of which can be easily dealt with.

    The Attorney-General was anxious to prove that this was not a political Measure. I do not know what the Attorney-General thought about it, but he cannot have listened to the speeches made in support of this proposal either on the Second Reading or on this occasion. Whatever else those speeches have established beyond doubt, they have established that this measure is supported by everybody else except the Attorney-General, on strongly political grounds. I am prepared to believe that the Attorney-General, if he so assures me, was actuated solely by motives of a judicial or juridical character. If so, he was the only Member on his side of the Committee who has even pretended to that degree of impartiality. The speakers on Second Reading included the hon. and learned Member for North Hammersmith (Mr. Pritt) and the hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing), both of whom frankly asserted their desire that cases should be decided, in part, upon political grounds. They thought, and they told us that they thought, that everybody is subject to political prejudice and, therefore, it was much better that people should try cases who had political prejudices similar to their own. The hon. Member for the Exchange Division of Liverpool (Mrs. Braddock) complained of a jury which had convicted her husband, and the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) complained of a jury which had convicted him—

    I am satisfied that the hon. Gentleman would have his objections to such a jury. It is not for me to say whether it was right or wrong, but no one pretends that these reasons are either impartial or objective. Apart from the legal advisers to the hon. Member for the Exchange Division, Liverpool, I know of no one other than the Law Officers who spoke from the opposite side of the House during that Second Reading Debate. That rather tends to speak for itself. This proposal is supported on political grounds by those who have strong personal reasons for disliking the special jury system.

    The Attorney-General on each occasion made very strong play with the existing qualification. Nobody will pretend that the existing qualification can be supported as an ideal qualification for any tribunal. Nobody has sought to support it on those grounds. What is said by those of us on this side of the Committee who earn our living in the courts is that as a rule of thumb, it has turned out, and is turning out, tribunals which are doing justice more satisfactorily in a limited class of case than either a judge alone or a common jury. If there were a question before the Committee as to whether the qualification could be improved or modified, the right hon. and learned Gentleman certainly would not find me opposing him. But that is not what it offered. What is offered is the total abolition of this instrument of justice, and it is that to which we are opposed.

    The hon. Member for Rugby appeared to be unduly perturbed lest juries should be influenced by political motives. He said with that air of omniscience which only he knows how to command—

    Nobody is less capable of pretending omniscience than I. The hon. Member for Rugby said with that air of omniscience which only he knows how to command, that none of us can rid ourselves of our political or social background. I could not help thinking that he was suffering from the handicap not of want of intelligence but of a certain want of experience in the courts. There may be cases where the political prejudices of the tribunal stand in some danger of influencing the result, but in the main that is not so. The ordinary business of the courts is far removed from any question of political prejudice and from any type of case in which political prejudice could be the dominant chance of a miscarriage of justice.

    Again I hate to interrupt, but the hon. Gentleman is imputing to me a lack of experience in this matter. Perhaps I am entitled to say that on the only occasion when I appeared in the High Court on a charge of libel it was before a special jury, and it was only the circumstance that I defended myself and was not defended by a lawyer, which enabled me to get away so well.

    Now I see why the hon. Gentleman intervened in this Debate. He comes into the category of those who have grudges against juries—

    The truth of this matter is that the main obstacle to justice in contested litigation is the danger that the wrong party should be believed. In litigation of the kind which juries try, the main danger to justice is that they should not find out the truth. The danger that, having discovered the truth, they should then come to a wrong decision on political grounds, is, relatively speaking a remote one. The real difficulty is how to get at the truth and the question of what tribunal is most likely to do it. I have absolutely no doubt that a special jury is a better instrument for that purpose in a certain limited class of case than the common jury.

    When I find hon. Gentlemen opposite not answering my arguments on any opinion based on experience, even when they do it like the hon. Member for Oldham, but giving us a long rigmarole about Runnymede and Throcmorton and Fox, and asking us to come to the conclusion on democratic political grounds that this is a proposal which ought to be passed, then my heart sinks because I know that this case is not being tried by an impartial tribunal. As long as I have any force in me to oppose a proposal which is actuated, as far as I can see, solely by motives of political prejudice, I shall continue to do so on grounds which I conceive to be objective. That is why those of us on this side of the House propose to vote against the inclusion of this Clause in the Bill.

    I am sure the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) will not think me discourteous if I do not deal immediately with the argument which he put forward, but, since the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) is here, I should like to apologise to him in case he thought I was discourteous in going out when he was speaking, but I had to do so.

    It appeared to me that, in the preliminary remarks which the right hon. and learned Gentleman made, he did not refer to what is the classic authority on questions of juries and special juries, and that is "The Elements of the Art of Packing As Applied to Special Juries," which is a familiar book by Jeremy Bentham. It may be that the right hon. and learned Gentleman had not had the opportunity of consulting that work, because, although we are fortunate in possessing here a first edition, the pages remain uncut. I had to decide between the difficult task of refuting his argument and destroying what might be the collector's value of the book in the Library. However, I have been fortunate in securing a part of the passage which is referred to in another work, and I think that in a few words it disposes completely of the argument which has been put forward from the other side of the House. Bentham's book is by an old law reformer and takes the form of a dialogue between people who may be taken to be representatives of a special jury and of a common jury. The Gentleman on the special jury says:
    "We are in possession of having a jury of our own sort at pleasure; that possession we claim to have preserved to us."
    That is the argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. Then, Yeoman says:
    "More shame for you. On no principle either of natural justice, or of the English constitution, can we defend this so recently usurped advantage. … On your side is the superiority of intellectual force in all its shapes; knowledge, address, habit of taking the lead. On your side is the whole force of that influence which exerts itself on the understanding. On your side is every element of what is called respectability: education, opulence, power, rank, connexions. On no other occasion does this your superiority ever find you backward in the assertion of it; asserting it on every other occasion, and to every other purpose—on this occasion alone, to this purpose alone, you will not surely take upon you to deny it."
    This argument against the use of special juries was put forward 120 years ago. Is it not time that we in this House put into force a reform which was put forward and advocated by one of the greatest law reformers of the nineteenth century?

    The hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) dealt with the position of special juries under enactments which were repealed long before anything was passed which this Bill proposes to repeal.

    I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman would not like to mislead the Committee. It is quite true that this was before the Juries Act, 1825; the principal provisions are dealt with later, but he will see that Bentham mentioned just the same arguments against the Act of 1825.

    8.15 p.m.

    I think it is more relevant to consider the position today than anything which was dealt with by Jeremy Bentham at that time. Nearly everything that I wished to say has already been said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) and so I shall be extremely brief. I should like to apologise for my absence, which I could not avoid, during the speeches of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) and the right hon. and learned Attorney-General, and, if I do not give sufficient force to their arguments, I apologise to the Committee.

    I can understand the position of those hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who think that there should be no property qualification for juries at all. I do not say that I agree with them, but I understand them. That proposal is the subject of a later Amendment which I cannot discuss now, but, for the purpose of discussing the present Amendment, we must take the Bill as it stands at present that is to say, that there are still to be property qualifications of juries in civil cases, and, therefore, the question is solely whether or not we should abolish the special jury. I can see no case at all for abolishing special juries forever and in all cases for, as we know in many cases, both parties to civil litigation desire that their cases shall be tried by special juries. It would be wrong even to suggest any conscious prejudice in the Bench, but there may be at times unconscious prejudice in the Bench, and it may be that both parties will think that a special jury may be the best tribunal for standing up to a judge whom they would not like to try their case alone or with a less qualified jury.

    It is sometimes assumed by hon. Members who have spoken in this Debate that there has been no case in which a working man, if there were to be a jury at all, would want his case to be tried by a special jury. I honestly do not think that they are right. I can think of many cases in which, if a jury is to be allowed at all, the professional advisers of a plaintiff, who, we will say, has lost his earning power and has been very seriously injured, would prefer a special jury to any other. What the Committee has to consider is not the present qualifications of special jurors, on which it is quite possible to cast ridicule, but whether there are any cases in which the sort of people who are in fact empanelled on a special jury will help in the administration of justice.

    The name of Mr. Harold Laski has been mentioned as a litigant. I am not going to mention him as a litigant, but I remember once going into a very interesting case and seeing Mr. Laski as foreman of the jury, and, if my memory is correct, he was the foreman of a special jury in a very celebrated case.

    It was the O'Dwyer case, which was tried by the late Mr. Justice McCardie.

    Was the verdict in that case upset on the grounds of being perverse?

    No, the verdict stood. I do not suggest that where special juries are set up political prejudice can never be there, but I do suggest that they are at least not liable to show political prejudice when properly directed. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) that the difficulties which juries have is found where there is a conflict of evidence and they have to decide where the truth resides. Of course, I would never make the claim that any tribunal of any kind is incapable of prejudice in its task of arriving at the truth. I am only saying that, in my experience of the courts, such as it is, that has not been the trouble. I am speaking of well-known facts which anybody can establish for himself. There are cases where both parties to civil litigation desire a special jury. There is no denying that. They both desire a special jury because they believe that it will procure justice. They think that the case tried by a judge and special jury will have a better result than if it is tried by a judge alone, or by a judge and a common jury.

    Limiting oneself to that class of case alone, is one to say that, notwithstanding the wishes of both parties and the belief that it will lead to justice, they shall not have the tribunal they want? I cannot see what good purpose is served by that. I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) and with my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford that various other reforms may be desirable. I aim a believer in the jury as judge of fact. There may be reforms desirable in the details of property qualifications, but I confine myself to the simple fact that no good reason has been shown for the total abolition of the special jury.

    We have heard quite a number of prominent lawyers opposite who have endeavoured to put forward a case against the abolition of the special jury. One complaint made by the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) was that we on this side had put our case for the abolition of the special jury on political grounds only. As far as one has been able to gather from the speeches, hon. Members opposite have not put their case on any grounds whatever. I would point out to the hon. Member for Oxford that he made a very sweeping statement when he said that everyone on this side of the Committee had advanced political reasons for not retaining the special jury. I also spoke in the Second Reading Debate, and I did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, I was very careful to point out that I thought it was rather unfortunate that personal reminiscences and certain cases to which we listened were brought forward in the Debate at all.

    When I made that statement, I did not have the hon. and learned Member in mind; I had in mind those hon. Members to whose speeches referred.

    I, of course, accept that explanation. There are one or two matters to which I wish to refer, in particular one point mentioned by the right hon. and learned Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe). His contribution was undoubtedly a very careful and reasoned one. He began his observations by saying that the test which he applied was whether the retention of the special jury was going to be better for the administration of justice or not. Of course, the decision on this matter should rest, and rest alone, on the test whether by retaining the special jury the administration of justice is going to be strengthened or whether, by taking it away, it is going to be weakened.

    The position in the first case is clearly that, as far back as 1913, although there was a Departmental Committee on the question the special jury was retained, but there was nevertheless no one who attempted to say a word in its defence. Anyone who reads the Report of the Departmental Committee will see that fact is made very plain indeed. On the other hand, the Chief Master of the King's Bench made it very clear that the function of the special jury was having one effect, and one effect only, namely, that it was working an injustice because it was based on class distinction. In my submission, we have heard nothing that justifies the retention of that class distinction, and unless there were a very strong case indeed to show that the application of that class basis contributed to betterment in the administration of justice, then there could be no justification for retaining it in those circumstances.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman gave an example which I should like to examine because it is not right that it should get abroad that there is any validity in the point at all. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that the main function or, at all events, one of the main functions of a jury was the question of making a "valuation." I quite agree, of course, that that is a function which a jury has to perform. He then said that because that was so, it was essential, in all cases where the principle of making a valuation applied, that there should be a special jury because the character of the constituent elements in that special jury gave them a certain qualification which a common jury did not possess, and that, therefore, they could do their work better.

    That cannot be a valid point for this reason. First of all, the judge who is trying the case has the function of directing the jury. It is immaterial whether the jury is specially qualified, expert, special or common jury; it is essentially the function of the judge to direct the jury on matters of valuation, and on all other matters connected with the case. It is the duty of the jury to listen to the judge and to follow him so far as they consider that the direction given by him is sound.

    There is another element which the jury has to take into consideration. If it is a substantial matter of valuation, then there will be usually expert evidence. The idea that merely because someone on that jury happens to be a surveyor or has special qualifications that juryman can go off on a frolic of his own and decide the issue solely in that way is quite wrong and not in accordance with practice or the administration of justice. There is a further point which defeats the case that the right hon. and learned Gentleman was trying to make under this head. He said that if there were a surveyor or a business man on the jury there was more advantage of getting the benefit of such a person's qualification to bear on the decision reached. But the qualification of a special juror is not only that of a business man or a surveyor; it is based upon rateable value, and really means administering justice on a rateable value basis. There may, however, be a man who is an esquire, but who is not a surveyor at all and who does not understand a thing about business or valuation. There may, for instance, be a special jury whose complexion is based purely on a property qualification or their social status and which has none of the qualification to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman referred. Therefore, that does not accomplish the end which he put forward as being the ground upon which the special jury ought to be retained.

    It was said by the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) that this matter had been settled as far back as Runnymede. One or two people have tried to scoff at that, but, in my submission, there is great force in that statement, and for this reason. Until 1825 there was very real doubt whether the High Court had power to empanel a special jury at all. It was because of that that the Jury Act of 1925 was passed. The Statute itself said expressly that, doubts having been expressed about the power of the Court to empanel special juries, Parliament was asked to pass that Act. I do not want to go into the full history of the matter but the reason why that Act was passed was that at the time there were a lot of industrial strikes. Another Act was in fact passed with it at the time restricting the power of combination on the part of working men. There is no doubt about it that The Juries Act of 1925 was deliberately introduced in order to restrict and hold down demands of the working class of this country at that time.

    This question of the right to a special jury is, therefore, surrounded with considerable dubiety. It is very doubtful indeed whether it is something which should ever have been allowed in the administration of justice. I do not want to keep the Committee longer but I felt that that should be said. I think the case is undeniable that the special jury should be abolished and that the Bill in its present form to secure that result should be accepted.

    8.30. P.m.

    We have had today another exhibition of shadow boxing by heavyweight legal luminaries and it seemed to be far too polite for me. As the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) has referred to me, perhaps I may give my own experience of a special jury and, as I happened to be the defendant, I can look upon the matter objectively.

    We have had a great deal of argument in this Debate that special juries are better qualified to assess the valuation of damages than the ordinary juror. I do not understand how the hon. Member for Oxford came to that conclusion. After all, although I am prepared to agree that the Attorney-General looked at this from the point of view of purely legal detachment, when we come to think in terms of the law of libel, we cannot dismiss the idea of political prejudice. When a gentleman like Mr. Harold Laski appears before a special jury I think it is quite obvious that weight is very much against anyone who has occupied such a prominent part in Socialist politics as he has.

    I turn to the point about valuation. I was the unfortunate defendant in a libel action before a special jury in the City of London. As I pointed out to the House on Second Reading, I had a special judge as well and, of course, there was a special verdict. This case might help the House to form a judgment as to how far special jurors, selected by property qualification from the City of London, are able to assess damages in a libel action. I was accused of writing an article libelling a gentleman who had written an article describing Zinoviev's Arctic prison. This particular article appeared in the "Daily Express" and was a vivid description of Zinoviev's Arctic prison.

    He had originally submitted this script to the B.B.C. and for some reason or other the B.B.C. had turned it down. It appeared in the "Daily Express" the next day and the following week I made certain comments which this journalist argued were dangerous to his reputation as a journalist. I was brought before a special jury in the City of London because the solicitors for this particular newspaper knew very well that if the case were tried in Scotland before a Scottish court, the damages would have been very insignificant indeed. The solicitors, I believe, deliberately gambled on the fact that this case would be tried in the City of London before a special jury composed overwhelmingly of anti-Socialists and that they would stand a far better chance of getting a favourable verdict if tilt case were heard before a special jury.

    Ultimately, without a very great deal of discussion, damages amounting to £600 were given to the journalist I criticised on the grounds that his reputation as a contributor to the "Daily Express" had been damaged. I had never seen an article published by that gentleman in any paper before and I have never seen one published in any paper since. Yet that special jury came to the conclusion that his journalistic reputation was worth £600. I fail to see how they arrived at that decision. It was purely an arbitrary decision by people whose outlook was dictated, frankly, by class and political prejudice. If that case had been tried in Scotland, that gentleman would have been lucky if he had got £6, instead of £600. I need hardly say he did not get the £600.

    My considered judgment as a result of coming before a special jury of the City of London was that one simply cannot escape the conclusion that they were definitely actuated by political prejudice and that any jury whose qualifications must be that of licensed victuallers, esquires, or bankers, should be abolished. I suggest that the Government are taking a very wise step in inserting this Clause in the Bill, and I for one shall support them very enthusiastically in the Lobby.

    I hope the Committee will soon come to a conclusion. Mr. Manningham-Buller.

    I agree with the view you have just put before the Committee, Major Milner, but before the Committee comes to a conclusion, I would like to say a few words upon this matter which has now been the subject of discussion for some little time. It was said by the Attorney-General, in reply to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe), that the question of the abolition of the special jury was in no sense a political matter. I should have thought that he had not to wait long before he heard the answer to that observation in the speeches of his own supporters who have made it abundantly clear, both on this occasion and on Second Reading, that this is indeed a political matter.

    I have listened, I think, to most of the speeches which have been made in this Debate and in my view the case has certainly not been made out that the abolition of the special jury will result in better justice. It is true, in my belief, that there had been little it any public criticism of the actions of special jurors, apart from that coming from the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), dating in time at any rate since I have been practising in the legal profession, before two libel actions which have occurred since 1945.

    The criticism that we have heard seems to be based upon a proposition that because of the property qualifications there is some difference in political flavour of a special jury as opposed to a common jury. It is true that there is a little difference in the property qualifications, but there is little force in that contention, in view of the recent observations of the hon. Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Webb) when, I understand, he drew attention in a newspaper to the wealth and so, presumably, to the property qualifications of members of the Socialist Party. That fallacy and that argument seemed to be shared by the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. W. J. Brown), who thought that the views of members of a jury depended upon their income brackets.

    In my belief, it is quite wrong to say that in the vast majority of cases any regard is had to political views by any member serving upon a jury. Politics enter into very few cases. We have heard a bit, of course, about political cases today, quite naturally perhaps because Members of Parliament have certain experiences of that type of case. I do not believe it to be true, as the hon. Member for Rugby said, that no workman believes that he is likely to get justice from a special jury. I am sure that is not true. I am sure that on many occasions a special jury has been applied for by the workman on the advice which he has received.

    We on this side do nor defend the existing qualifications of a special jury, but the fact that the qualifications can be attacked, is no reason for abolishing the special jury. It is rather a reason for considering what the qualifications should be, and I should have thought that was a reason for referring that matter to one of the committees now considering kindred legal matters. I believe that there is a real need for special juries. Indeed, in my opinion, the right hon. Gentleman in his Second Reading speech, when moving, "That the Bill be read a Second time," really gave away the case for the abolition of special juries in his argument in favour of the retention of a City of London special jury. He said that to deal with the commercial cases arising out of the transactions of merchants and traders it was desirable that these matters should be dealt with by jurors who had special technical qualifications. Once we admit that, then the case for the abolition of special juries is completely destroyed.

    Would the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) help the Committee by suggesting what technical qualifications would be appropriate for a special jury in a case of seduction, which is one of the other cases in which there is a right for trial by jury?

    I was dealing with a particular class of case—commercial cases arising out of the transaction of merchants and traders. I am not saying that in every case of seduction the right to have a special jury should be preserved. That again should be considered. Because a special jury may not be desirable in a case of seduction in future, that is no argument for saying that if both parties to the litigation want a special jury they should be deprived of having one. That will be the effect of the abolition of the special jury.

    8.45 p.m.

    Going back to the question of commercial cases arising out of transactions of merchants and traders, it is by no means every case of that kind which is entered in the commercial list. We may

    Division No. 50.]

    AYES

    [8. 48p. m.

    Adams, Richard (Balham)Barstow, P. GBlyton, W. R.
    Albu, A. H.Barton, C.Boardman, H.
    Allen, A C. (Bosworth)Battley, J. R. Bowden, Flg. Offr. H. W.
    Attewell, H C.Bechervaise, A. EBraddock, Mrs. E. M. (L'pl. Exch'ge)
    Austin, H. LewisBenson, G.Brook, D.(Halifax)
    Awbery, S. S.Berry, H.Brooks, T. J. (Rothwell)
    Ayles, W. HBeswick, FBrown, George (Belper)
    Ayrton Gould, Mrs. BBing, G. H. C.Brown, T. J. (Ince)
    Bacon, Miss A.Blackburn, A. RBruce, Maj. D. W. T.
    Balfour, ABlenkinsop, A.Burden, T. W.

    have actions against stockbrokers for fraud and then, in the words of the right hon. Gentleman, there will be simple human issues to be determined; actions against doctors or surgeons for negligence. In all such cases it is surely right to preserve the desirability at least of determining all difficult questions of fact by a special jury. The abolition of the special jury is not, it is quite clear, put forward by the Government with the object of improving the administration of justice, but solely to satisfy political prejudice, and for that reason we on our side will certainly vote against the abolition.

    There is one point which I wish to make and which. in my submission, is a conclusive one, showing that this distinction is out of date. It has long been out of date because a special juror may serve on a common jury. If that is so, it shows that the distinction which is sought to be made by the Opposition in maintaining the special jury as against the common jury is an artificial one and completely out of date. In order to make my point clear, I will read the rule, which is very brief:

    "No person is exempted from serving on a common jury by reason of his being marked as a special juror in a juror's book, or being qualified to serve as a grand juror, and it is the duty of the sheriff or summoning officer to extract a panel of common jurors indiscriminately from the juror's book."
    The grand jury has long been abolished. The special jury has become diminished in value and in effect and, in my submission, this Bill is bringing into legislative effect what has long been the tendency in legal affairs. I had a number of other points to put, but I shall content myself with that, because it has not been put by anyone else in the Debate and it seems to me to be a conclusive argument

    Question put, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

    The Committee divided: Ayes, 200; Noes, 59.

    Butler, H. W. (Hackney, S.)Hughes, H. D. (W'lverh'pton, W.)Reeves, J.
    Cobb, F A.Hutchinson, H L. (Rusholme)Reid, T. (Swindon)
    Cocks, F. S.Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)Richards, R.
    Collindridge, F.Irving, W. J. (Tottenham, N.)Ridealgh, Mrs. M.
    Colman, Miss G. M.Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)
    Cooper, G.Jenkins, R. H.Rogers, G. H. R.
    Corbet, Mrs. F. K. (Camb'well, N. W.)Jones, Elwyn (Plaistow)Ross, William (Kilmarnock)
    Cove, W. GJones, P. Asterley (Hitchin)Royle, C.
    Crawley, A.Keenan, W.Scott-Elliot, W.
    Daggar, G.Kenyon, C.Shawcross, C. N. (Widnes)
    Daines, P.Kinghorn, Sqn.-Ldr. E.Shawcross, Rt. Hn. Sir H. (St. Helens)
    Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)Kinley, J.Silverman, J. (Erdington)
    Davies, Harold (Leek)Kirby, B. V.Simmons, C. J
    Davies, R. J. (Westhoughton)Leslie, J. R.Skinnard, F. W.
    Deer, G.Levy, B. W.Smith, S. H. (Hull, S. W.)
    de Freitas, GeoffreyLindgren, G. S.Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
    Delargy, H. J.Longden, F.Sparks, J. A.
    Diamond, J.Lyne, A. W.Stamford, W.
    Dobbie, W.McAdam, W.Steele, T.
    Dodds, N. N.McEntee, V. La T.Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.
    Donovan, T.Mack, J. D.Sylvester, G. O.
    Driberg, T. E. N.Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N. W.)Symonds, A. L.
    Dumpleton, C. W.McLeavy, F.Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)
    Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)Thomas, D. E. (Aberdare)
    Edwards, Rt. Hon. N. (Caerphilly)Mainwaring, W. H.Thomas, I. O. (Wrekin)
    Edwards, W. J. (Whitechapel)Manning, Mrs. L.(Epping)Titterington, M F
    Evans, E. (Lowestoft)Mathers, Rt. Hon. GeorgeTolley, L.
    Evans, John (Ogmore)Messer, F.Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.
    Evans, S. N. (Wednesbury)Middleton, Mrs. L.Turner-Samuels, M.
    Fernyhough, E.Millington, Wing-Comdr. E. R.Ungoed-Thomas, L.
    Follick, M.Morgan, Dr. H. B.Vernon, Maj. W. F.
    Foot, M. M.Morris, P. (Swansea, W.)Warbey, W. N.
    Freeman, J. (Watford)Moyle, A.Webb, M. (Bradford, C)
    Ganley, Mrs. C. SMurray, J. D.Weitzman, D.
    Gibbins, J.Naylor, T. E.Wells, P. L. (Faversham)
    Gibson, C. W.Nichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.)Wells, W. T.(Walsall)
    Glanville, J. E. (Consett)Noel-Baker, Capt. F. E. (Brentford)Wheatley, Rt. Hn. John (Edinb'gh, E.)
    Grey, C. F.Oliver, G. H.Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.
    Grierson, E.Paget R. T.Wigg, George
    Griffiths, D. (Rother Valley)Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Wentworth)Wilkes, L.
    Gunter, R J.Paling, W. T. (Dewsbury)Wilkins, W. A.
    Guy, W. H.Pargiter, G. A.Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)
    Hale, LeslieParker, J.Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)
    Hall, Rt. Hon. GlenvilParkin B. T,Willams J. L. (Kelvingrove)
    Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. R.Paton, Mrs. F. (Rushcliffe)Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
    Hannan, W. (Maryhill)Paton, J. (Norwich)Williams, W. R. (Heston)
    Harrison, J.Pearson, A.Willis, E.
    Hastings, Dr. SomervillePeart, T. F.Wills, Mrs. E. A.
    Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)Piratin P.Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
    Hewitson, Capt. MPopplewell, E.Woods, G. S.
    Hobson, C. R.Porter, E. (Warrington)Yates, V. F.
    Holman, P.Porter, G. (Leeds)Young, Sir R. (Newton)
    Holmes, H. E. (Hemsworth)Pritt, D. NYounger, Hon. Kenneth
    Horabin, T L.Proctor, W T.Zilliacus, K.
    Hoy, J.Pursey, Comdr. H.
    Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.)Randall, H. E.

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayr)Ranger, J.M. Snow and Mr. George Wallace.
    Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)Rees-Williams, D. R.

    NOES

    Boles, Lt.-Col. D. C.(Wells)Hogg, Hon. Q.Pitman, I, J.
    Bossom, A. C.Howard, Hon A.Ponsonby, Col. C. E.
    Bower, N.Hulbert, Wing-Cdr. N. J.Poole, O. B. S. (Oswestry)
    Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.Hurd, A.Prior-Palmer, Brig. O.
    Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Keeling, E. H.Raikes, H. V.
    Carson, E.Lancaster, Col. C. G.Ropner, Col. L.
    Challen, C. Lennox-Boyd, A. T.Smithers, Sir W.
    Channon, H.Linstead, H. N.Spearman, A. C. M.
    Clarke, Col. R. S.Lipson, D. L.Stanley, Rt. Hon. O.
    Conant, Maj. R. J. E.Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral)Strauss, Henry (English Universities)
    Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.Lucas-Tooth, Sir H.Sutcliffe, H.
    Crowder, Capt. John E.Mackeson, Brig. H. R.Touche, G. C.
    Darling, Sir W. Y.Manningham-Buller, R. E.Vane W. M. F.
    Digby, S. W.Marlowe, A. A. H.Walker-Smith, D.
    Dodds-Parker, A. D.Marshall, D. (Bodmin)Wheatley, Colonel M. J. (Dorset, E)
    Drewe, C.Morrison, Maj. J. G. (Salisbury)Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)
    Erroll, F. J.Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
    Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir D. P. M.Nicholson, G.
    Gage, C.Orr-Ewing, I. L.

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Grimston, R. V.Peto, Brig. C. H. M.Mr. Studholme and
    Hannon, Sir P. (Moseley)Pickthorn, K.Lieut-Colonel Bromley-Davenport.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 18—(Saving For City Of London Special Juries In Commercial Causes)

    I beg to move, in page 10, line 23, to leave out from "persons" to "whose," in line 24.

    This Amendment and the subsequent one are drafting Amendments. The subsection to which they apply does not accurately define the City of London special jury. It is the marking of the names that determines liability to serve and not the mere qualifications. A person might be qualified but not marked.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Further Amendment made: In page 10, line 25, after "London," insert:

    "and marked therein as being the names of persons qualified to serve as special jurors."—[Mr. Ede.]

    I beg to move, in page 10, line 27, at the end, to add:

    "4. Subsection (1) of the last foregoing Section shall not apply to the trial of an issue within any place or district within which His Majesty shall, by commission of assize or any other commission, either general or special, assign to such judges of the High Court or other persons as are named therein the duty of trying and determining any causes or matters, or any questions or issues of fact, or of law or partly of fact and partly of law which by reason of the technical or complex nature of the questions or issues involved, require trial by a special jury."
    The Clause provides for City of London jurors in commercial causes. Under the Amendment, instead of a party having the right to require a special jury, it is left to the pudge to decide whether, in consequence of the technical or complex nature of the questions or issues involved, trial by special jury is required. In addition to that particular point we have the intention, although I must admit that it is not fully expressed in the Amendment as it stands and we shall seek to put it right upon the Report stage, to provide for the equivalent of a City of London special jury in other big commercial assize towns, like Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham.

    Although special juries are now abolished, there is a case, which the Attorney-General made out, for the retention of a special jury of that character and for the provision of them—not the retention because those towns have not had them before—in places such as I have mentioned. The Amendment is intended to pave the way for that being done, as well as to ensure that the decision as to whether there shall be a jury or not should not rest with the party to the litigation but with the judge of assize, or whoever is in charge of the particular list.

    I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will say that he will give favourable consideration to the Amendment, with a view to securing that facilities which are now and will remain available to London litigants will be extended to Birmingham on the Midland Circuit and to other places of perhaps minor significance on the Northern Circuit.

    9.0 p.m.

    I think that, at any rate in the form in which it is at present drafted, this Amendment is completely misconceived. Under the existing arrangements, as the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) knows, a commercial cause list has been established in the City of London. All the cases in it are complicated cases, transactions involving difficult question of commercial intercourse and usually also troublesome questions of commercial law. Those cases are tried by a judge who is specially experienced in the trial of commercial cases, and in the vast majority of cases that judge tries the cases alone.

    I think it is right to say that in fact special juries of the City of London are only asked for in one or two cases a year, and it follows therefore that in the great majority of the cases in the list the parties prefer to have their litigation settled by a judge alone. Where a special jury is empanelled for the purposes of a case on that list, it is a jury of persons who not only possess special property qualifications, which is common to all special jurors, but who also have or are deemed to have a special commercial or trading qualification of one kind or another. That is a method of trial which, although very rarely used, is traditional, occasionally useful and not, we think, open to any of the serious objections that may be raised to the special jury in the ordinary class of cases.

    That is the City of London special jury. In theory I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman that it might be convenient to have an arrangement of that kind on circuit in some of the more important towns such as in Liverpool where commercial transactions take place on a large scale, and in Manchester, and conceivably even in Birmingham on the Midland circuit. However, although that may be the theory of the position, in practice there is really not the slightest demand for either a commercial cause list or the right of trial by the special commercial type of jury that may be empanelled in London.

    The hon. and learned Gentleman will at once see the practical difficulty of establishing any such practice on circuit. In London in charge of the commercial cause list and trying the commercial cases is a judge with special commercial experience. The great advantage of establishing that list—indeed that is the real purpose of having the commercial list—is that we have a judge who has been appointed from among those members of the Bar who specialise in commercial cases and who in the course of the time that he is on the Bench specialises in that type of case.

    If one were to extend the City of London practice to circuit towns, it would mean that to gain the advantages of it, one would have to have a judge of commercial experience travelling the circuits, and that would be quite impracticable unless one greatly increased the number of His Majesty's judges and at the same time denuded the commercial Bar. Even if that difficulty did not exist, the setting up in the provinces of this very elaborate and rather expensive machinery with a right to a special jury of commercial qualifications would be wholly unjustified by the number of cases in which the litigants would be likely to require the services of that kind of tribunal.

    In any event—this is the error into which the Amendment falls—the Amendment does not provide for any such arrangement at all. It does not provide for the establishment of a commercial list at the assize towns, it does not provide that a judge with special commercial experience should travel the circuits, and it does not provide that these special juries should be limited to those cases in which the technical difficulties are difficulties of a commercial nature. All that the Amendment—one has to deal with the Amendment in its present form—would provide is that a special jury would be made available in cases which would be tried by an ordinary judge and would be available in those cases where under the existing law an ordinary jury can already be claimed. In other words, it would re-establish in the circuits the existing special jury system and it would not translate in the slightest degree the special arrangements which now exist and which will be maintained in the City of London.

    On a previous Amendment I mentioned the cases in which that jury can be claimed. They include fraud, libel, slander, false imprisonment, seduction and breach of promise of marriage. I am all in favour of having technical tribunals to discuss technical problems, but why jurors selected from the special jury list should form a better technical tribunal for the settlement of technical disputes in relation to seduction and breach of promise of marriage, I cannot see. It seems to me that they would be no more advantageous on the Midland circuit than on the Northern circuit or than they would be anywhere else. I am afraid that we cannot accept the Amendment.

    I am not altogether satisfied with the right hon. and learned Gentleman's reply, and there are two reasons for that dissatisfaction. During the Second Reading Debate the Attorney-General said:

    "The one exception which we propose to make is that which relates to the special jury for the City of London. We think it may be useful to retain that special jury in the trial of cases in the commercial court of the King's Bench Division. As hon. Members may know, it is the practice of the King's Bench to maintain a special cause list for commercial cases arising out of the transactions of merchants and traders, and these cases are heard by a judge who has special commercial experience; and when a jury is required—which in practice is very infrequently now—that jury may be summoned from persons in the City of London who have experience and knowledge of commercial matters. These are technical matters and we have felt, and the House will probably agree, that it may be convenient that they should be dealt with by jurors who have special technical experience."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1949; Vol. 460. c. 1529.]
    There is a reference in that passage to the trial of causes in the commercial court.

    I can recollect, and I have no doubt the right hon. and learned Gentleman can recollect, the time when cases in the Liverpool cause list used to be marked as being in the commercial list. I see no reason at all why this doctrine which has grown up that London is the only fit and proper place for a commercial case to be tried should be continuously given support. There are other great commercial centres and some of us may think that these are greater commercial centres in fact than London. We think that the practice of trying commercial cases on circuit should again be encouraged. Bringing a commercial case to London very often means that the expert witnesses and others have to come all the way to this place and spend a lot of time away from their proper habitation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman says that there will be a difficulty about the judge because most of His Majesty's judges are not fit to try a commercial case—

    The hon. and learned Gentleman must not put those words into my mouth. I am always getting into trouble and I must avoid having him push me into trouble. I did not say anything of the kind. I said that the advantage of the commercial list was that we had a judge who specialised during the whole time he was on the bench in commercial cases and he was probably recruited from the commercial Bar.

    I apologise to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I was not seeking to give an inaccurate representation of what he said. I was putting it colloquially. What he said was that there were some of His Majesty's judges who were more fitted to try commercial cases than others.

    In practice, usually one. We have known instances when the judge has not been a person who has practised solely in the commercial court. However that may be, what we are putting forward is the necessity for having a jury of experts. It seems to me that if the judge were fortified by the presence of a jury of people of great knowledge and experience in these matters possibly the ordinary King's Bench Division might claim to be able to try a commercial case. If there is a case in which a jury of a commercial nature is an advantage, one would have thought it would not be necessary to have trying it a judge who had always practised in the commercial court. If, as the right hon. Gentleman conceded, in the passage I quoted, there is a possibility that in some cases a jury would be advisable, I should have thought that an ordinary judge, if fortified by the assistance of this jury of specialists, could be trusted to dispose of that litigation in a fit and proper manner. I hope that in the interests of the prestige of these other commercial centres, the right hon. and learned Gentleman will look at this matter again.

    I want to reinforce the appeal of my hon. and learned Friend that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will look at this matter again. The fundamental fallacy amongst the premises on which he approached the matter was that the commercial list could not be dealt with on circuit. If he recasts his memory, he will find that my hon. and learned Friend was right. It is certainly my recollection that the commercial cases could be put into the list at Liverpool Assizes. What we have sought to do by this Amendment is to take the essential first step, that is, that in assize towns where civil business is dealt with, the judge should be given the discretion of deciding whether the case should be dealt with by a special jury.

    I agree with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, that we have not at this stage gone into the details as to how what corresponds to a City of London special jury can be chosen at Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Newcastle, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham and the other great commercial centres in the country. Obviously, however, from the wording of Clause 18 it would not be a difficult matter to find similar qualifications which would allow those with these qualifications to take part in the trial where it is necessary to have a commercial jury. The right hon. and learned Gentleman himself laid down the test in the course of his Second Reading speech when he said:
    "That jury may be summoned from persons in the City of London who have experience and knowledge of commercial matters."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1949; Vol. 460, c. 1529.]
    I say, and my hon. Friend feels strongly with me in this matter, that these people will be found, especially in Liverpool, where there is that experience of shipping and marine insurance which has been the basis of the commercial list in London. We believe that if the Government will only meet us by allowing this discretion of the judge to select cases for a special jury to be applied in the assize towns, there will not be the least difficulty in the world in finding the people in our great commercial centres.

    9.15 p.m.

    Later, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said:
    "The point of having that City of London special jury is to get the expert knowledge of commercial matters, which is lacking in any special jury one may get on assize."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1949; Vol. 460, c. 1534.]
    This is the point in the thesis of the Attorney-General where we join issue with him; that there is lacking in any special jury obtained in Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Birmingham, Sheffield, or the other towns I have mentioned, that expert knowledge of commercial matters which can be got in London. It is because we hold that the principle is so important, and that one should attempt to get this decentralisation and to call in aid in the administration of justice that knowledge of commercial matters which is found in these great provincial centres, that we must ask the Committee to divide on the Amendment in order to make clear that some of us here believe that these qualities exist in Liverpool and the other places which the Attorney-General seems to find so much difficulty in believing.

    I can only hope that if the right hon. and learned Gentleman does divide the Committee, he will be able to secure for his Lobby a somewhat larger number than those who went into it on the last occasion. It will do the Tory Party very little credit in Liverpool or Manchester if the most they can summon in support of the propositions they are seeking to put before the Committee is a miserable 59.

    This I must make quite clear: I did not say, either in my Second Reading speech or today, that it would be impossible to empanel in Liverpool or Manchester a jury having the special commercial qualifications possessed by the City of London special jury. What I said was that under the existing law, no such jury can be empanelled in Liverpool or Manchester or anywhere else than in the City of London. That is because it is in the City of London, and in that alone, that in addition to the property qualification for special jurors, there must be a commercial qualification. That is not so in Liverpool, it is not so in Manchester, it is not even so in Birmingham. One can have a special jury there, but whether on that special jury there is one individual with the slightest commercial experience is a matter of chance. One may. Equally one may get such persons on a common jury, but there is no machinery under the existing law for summoning a commercial jury in Liverpool, in Manchester, in Birmingham, or in any of the other assize towns. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has failed to do justice to my speech or to his own knowledge of the law and practice in these matters.

    Nor am I saying that it might not be possible under the existing statutory rules to establish or to re-establish a commercial list of assize. What I am saying, and what nobody has attempted to controvert, is that the commercial community of this country in Liverpool, in Manchester, in Birmingham, in Bristol, and in any of the other towns that my right hon. and learned Friend reeled so readily off his tongue, has not shown the slightest desire for a commercial list at the assize towns. They have preferred not to mix up their commercial cases with the already overburdened list at the assize towns, with the running-down cases and the fraud cases and the seduction cases and the breach of promise of marriage cases; they have preferred to set their cases down in the commercial list in London because they knew that in that list they would be tried by the commercial judge having experience of that type of case.

    They have shown, by their practice of setting down their cases in the commercial list in London, in preference to the assize lists, that they prefer to have the special commercial judge in London without a jury rather than the jury without the special commercial judge. Even in these cases in London, where they have the possible advantage of both the special commercial judge and the special commercial jury, it is only once or twice a year that they ask for a jury. My experience in this type of case in the past 20 years is that the commercial community in this country infinitely prefer to have these complicated commercial cases tried by an experienced commercial judge; and that they get, and can only get, under existing arrangements by setting down their cases in the commercial list in London.

    To attempt, as does the Amendment, to enable the judge on assize to select an ordinary special jury—not a commercial special jury, but an ordinary special jury which may not contain one individual of commercial experience—in

    Division No. 51.]

    AYES

    [9.24 p.m.

    Baldwin, A E.Grimston, R. V.Pitman, I. J.
    Boles, Li.-Col. D. C. (Wells)Hannon, Sir P. (Moseley)Ponsonby, Col. C. E.
    Bossom, A. C.Hogg, Hon. Q.Poole, O. B. S. (Oswestry)
    Bower, N.Howard, Hon. APrior-Palmer, Brig. O.
    Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.Hurd, A.Raikes, H. V.
    Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.Keeling, E. H.Ropner, Col. L.
    Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Lennox-Boyd, A. T.Smithers, Sir W.
    Carson, E.Linstead, H. N,Spearman, A. C. M.
    Challen, CLipson, D. L.Stanley, Rt. Hon. O.
    Clarke, Col R. S.Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral)Strauss, Henry (English Universities)
    Corbett, Lieut.-Col. U. (Ludlow)Lucas, Major Sir J.Sutcliffe, H.
    Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.Lucas-Tooth, Sir H.Touche, G. C.
    Crowder, Capt. John E.Mackeson, Brig. H. R.Vane, W M. F.
    Darling, Sir W Y.McKie, J. H. (Galloway)Walker-Smith, D
    Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)Manningham-Buller, R. EWheatley, Col. M. J. (Dorset, E.)
    Digby, S. WMarlowe, A. A. H.Williams, General (Tonbridge)
    Dodds-Parkar, A. DMarshall, D. (Bodmin)Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
    Drewe, C.Morrison, Maj. J. G. (Salisbury)
    Foster, J. C. (Northwich)Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir D. P. M.Nicholson, G.Mr. Studholme and
    Gage, C.Orr-Ewing, I. LMajor Conant.

    NOES

    Adams, Richard (Balham)Deer, G.Horabin, T. L
    Albu, A. H.de Freitas, GeoffreyHoy, J.
    Allen A. C. (Bosworth)Delargy, H. J.Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.)
    Attewell, H. C.Diamond, J.Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayr)
    Austin, H. LewisDobbie, W.Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
    Awbery, S. S.Dodds, N. NHughes, H. D. (W'lverh'pton, W.)
    Ayles, W. H.Donovan, T.Hutchinson, H. L. (Rusholme)
    Ayrton Gould, Mrs. BDriberg, T. E. NIrving, W. J. (Tottenham, N.)
    Bacon, Miss A.Dumpleton, C. W.Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
    Baird, J,Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.Jenkins, R. H.
    Balfour, A.Edwards, Rt. Hon. N. (Caerphilly)Jones, Elwyn (Plaistow)
    Barstow, P. G.Edwards, W. J. (Whitechapel)Jones, P. Asterley (Hitchin)
    Barton, C.Evans, E. (Lowestoft)Keenan, W.
    Battley, J. R.Evans, John (Ogmore)Kenyon, C.
    Bechervaise, A. E.Evans, S. N. (Wednesbury)Kinghorn, Sqn.-Ldr. E
    Berry, H.Fairhurst, F.Kinley, J.
    Beswick, F.Fernyhough, E.Leslie, J. R.
    Bing, G. H C.Fletcher, E. G. M. (Istington, E.)Levy, B. W.
    Blackburn, A. R.Follick, M.Lindgren, G. S.
    Blenkinsop, A.Foot, M. M.Longden, F.
    Blyton, W. R.Freeman, J. (Watford)Lyne, A. W.
    Boardman, H.Ganley, Mrs. C. SMcAdam, W.
    Bowden, Flg. Offr. H. W.Gibbins, J.McEntee, V La T.
    Braddock, Mrs. E. M. (L'pl. Exch'ge)Gibson, C. W.Mack, J. D.
    Brook, D. (Halifax)Glanville, J. E. (Consett)Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N.W)
    Brooks, T. J. (Rothwell)Grey, C. FMcLeavy, F.
    Brown, T. J. (Ince)Grierson, E.MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
    Bruce, Maj. D. W. T.Griffiths, D. (Rother Valley)Macpherson, T. (Romford)
    Burden, T W.Gunter, R J.Manning, Mrs. L, (Epping)
    Buffer, H. W. (Hackney, S.)Guy, W. H.Mathers, Rt. Hon. George
    Cobb, F A.Hale, LeslieMiddleton, Mrs. L.
    Cocks, F. SHall, Rt. Hon. GlenvilMillington, Wing-Comdr. E. R
    Collindridge, F.Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. R.Morgan, Dr. H. B.
    Colman, Miss G. M.Hannan, W. (Maryhill)Morris, P (Swansea, W.)
    Cooper, G.Harrison, J.Moyle, A.
    Corbet, Mrs. F. K. (Camb'well, N.W.)Hastings, Dr. SomervilleMurray, J. D.
    Crawley, A.Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)Naylor, T. E.
    Daggar, GHewitson, Capt. MNichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.)
    Daines, P.Hobson, C. R.Noel-Baker, Capt. F. E. (Brentford)
    Davies, Harold (Leek)Holman, P.Oliver, G. H.
    Davies, R. J. (Westhoughton)Holmes, H. E. (Hemsworth)Paget, R.T.

    order to try commercial cases which in practice are not set down in assize at all nowadays and which, even in London, result in a demand for only one or two special juries a year, is wholly futile and illusory.

    Question put, "That those words be there added."

    The Committee divided: Ayes. 59; Noes, 188.

    Paling, W. T. (Dewsbury)Shawcross, C. N. (Widnes)Wells, P. L. (Faversham)
    Pargiter, G A.Shawcross, Rt. Hn. Sir H. (St. Helens)Wells, W T. (Walsall)
    Parker, J.Silverman, J. (Erdington)Wheatley, Rt. Hn. John (Edinb'gh, E.)
    Paton, Mrs F. (Rushcliffe)Simmons, C JWhiteley, Rt. Hon. W.
    Paton, J. (Norwich)Skinnard, F. W.Wigg, George
    Pearson, A.Smith, S. H (Hull, S.W.)Wilkes, L.
    Peart, T. F.Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir FrankWilkins, W. A.
    Popplewell, E.Sparks, J. A.Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)
    Porter, E. (Warrington)Stamford, W.Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)
    Porter, G. (Leeds)Steele, T.Williams, J. L. (Kelvingrove)
    Pritt, D. N.Sylvester, G. O.Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
    Proctor, W. T.Symonds, A. L.Williams, W. R. (Heston)
    Pursey, Comdr. H.Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)Willis, E.
    Randall, H. E.Thomas, D. E. (Aberdare)Wills, Mrs. E. A.
    Ranger, J.Thomas, I. O. (Wrekin)Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
    Rees-Williams, D. R.Titterington, M. F.Woods, G S.
    Reeves, J.Tolley, L.Young, Sir R. (Newton)
    Reid, T. (Swindon)Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.Younger, Hon. Kenneth
    Richards, R.Turner-Samuels, MZilliacus, K.
    Ridealgh, Mrs. M.Ungoed-Thomas, L.
    Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)Vernon, Maj. W. F.

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Ross, William (Kilmarnock)Warbey, W. N.Mr. Snow and
    Royle, C.Weitzman, D.Mr. George Wallace.

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 20—(Interpretation Of Part I)

    Amendments made: In page 10, line 41, leave out from "1925," to the end of line 42.

    In page 11, line 6, at the end, insert:

    "franchise ' means a franchise within the meaning of the Sheriffs Act, 1887."

    In line 8, at the end, insert:

    "(2) Any reference in this Part of this Act to a sheriff shall be construed as including a reference to the Secondary of the City of London and any reference in this Part of this Act to the bailiff of a franchise shall be construed as including a reference to the deputy bailiff thereof."—[The Attorney-General.]

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 22—(Payments In Respect Of Jury Service In Scotland)

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

    9.30 p.m.

    Would I be in Order, Major Milner, in moving that Part II, which refers to Scotland, should be referred to the Scottish Grand Committee. You will be aware that by a recent Amendment to Standing Orders—

    I am afraid that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would not be in Order. He should have moved that Motion in the House. It is not permissible in Committee. It is a matter which the House only can decide.

    I wish to point out that when I raised the question of whether this purely Scottish business should be referred to the Scottish Grand Committee we had promise of sympathetic consideration, but the sympathy seems to have evaporated and now I find that this Business is not to be relegated to the Scottish Grand Committee, as the House intended when the special Amendments relative to Standing Orders affecting Scottish legislation were passed.

    However, that is not the point I wish to raise. I wish to raise a point relating to lines 32 to 36 in which the expenses of jurors attending Scottish juries are outlined. While I recognise that the Government have taken a great step forward to rectify an anomaly which has long been grievous in Scotland, I very much regret that when this historic change is taking place relating to the law of Scotland, there are only two Conservative Members gracing us with their presence—

    Are my hon. Friends who are present invisible men?

    They are not Scottish Members. I was making the point that although they claim to have a great respect for the law of Scotland we who are suspected of not having so great a concern for the law of Scotland have to put forward this rectification. In the subsection there is a direct grievance. The subsection says:

    "where the said period of time is more than four hours, the sum of twenty shillings"
    shall be paid.

    I wish to point out that there is a deep-seated grievance in Scotland, especially among miners, and that the sum of 20s. does not reimburse a miner who has to serve on a jury and lose his bonus shift for the week. I wish the Government had been generous in meeting the Miners' Union, who rightly argued that when they attend juries or local authorities miners should not be asked to lose earnings available to them in the ordinary course of their work. I wish the Clause had been more generous, but otherwise it represents a great step forward in Scotland. All I with to express regret about is that this was not referred to the Scottish Grand Committee. I hope that this will not be taken as a precedent, and that, the point so far as Scotland is concerned having been gained, similar legislation will not be dealt with in this way.

    The superior court is always more important than a committee, and the House itself, sitting in Committee, is always a much more important body than a Committee of the House, sitting upstairs. Therefore, it is no indignity to Scotland for matters to be dealt with on the Floor of the House of Commons. I appreciate the point which my hon. Friend makes about the miners, but it is not a matter which can be dealt with here. The miners must obviously deal with the National Coal Board and put forward their claim to the Board. It has been decided that that is an industrial question and not a matter which concerns the House.

    I was rather surprised to hear the Secretary of State for Scotland answering the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) in the rather curt way he did about the question of referring Part II of this Bill to the Scottish Grand Committee. The right hon. Gentleman said that this is a superior court—

    I am sorry, that we cannot have that matter argued here. It was mentioned, and I permitted an answer to be given, but this is not the appropriate place to argue that point. It is out of Order.

    With great respect, Major Milner, I at once accept your Ruling. I was going to deal with the point which the hon. Member for South Ayrshire made about the loss in wages and in weekly earnings of the miners. I was delighted to hear the right hon. Gentleman answer the hon. Member in the curt way he did on that point because the hon. Member completely missed the mark regarding miners sitting on juries when he suggested that there may be—indeed there certainly will be—loss of wages or weekly earnings. He completely fails to see the point that great honour is conferred upon anybody who is empanelled to sit on a jury in Scotland or anywhere else. For that reason I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman answered the hon. Member in the way he did. Apart from those remarks. I have no further criticisms to make.

    It is with reluctance that I ever address the Committee, but I feel that there is something to be said about this Clause. It is either too much or too little. Jury service is an honour and should be discharged as one of the rights, duties and responsibilities of a citizen. It is common knowledge that in Scotland, as elsewhere, many have discharged this duty without hire or reward and would be willing to continue to do so. But the Government, having decided to pay a subsistence allowance and compensation for loss of earnings, must adequately and realistically face the facts. If I were invited to become a juryman, I should not consider my remuneration at the rate of 20s. a day to be adequate for the loss of earnings which I should sustain, and I am not the only person of modest prosperity in the happy land of Scotland.

    The point which was raised by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) is a very proper one. We are not able to give any considerable attention to this Clause because there are only five Scottish supporters of the Government here, whereas there are two Members on these benches. That is not representation of the people in the sense which I would like. Scotland desires to be represented by rather more than seven persons. Having made this demurrer and associated myself with the hon. Member for South Ayrshire and the hon. Member for Galloway (Mr. McKie). I resume my seat, protesting against the hard-heartedness of the Government in not being prepared either to make an appeal for public service without reward or adequately to reimburse those who take the opposite view.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 24—(Fee Payable By Party Applying For Jury Trial In Civil Cause)

    I beg to move, in page 12, line 27, to leave out "dismiss the action," and to insert "recall the order."

    This is a minor Amendment to rectify something which was rather drastic in the Clause as originally framed. The Clause provided that if the applicant for jury trial failed to pay the fee prescribed by the Act of Sederunt, the court might dismiss the action. We felt that was too drastic and this Amendment is designed to provide that on the failure to pay the fee the applicant will simply lose his right to jury trial.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clauses 25 to 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 28—(Commencement Of Part Ii)

    Amendment made: In page 13, line 10, at beginning, insert "The foregoing provisions of."—[ Mr. Wheatley.]

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clauses 29 to 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 32—(Short Title, Citation And Repeal)

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

    I take it that it will be in Order to discuss the Schedules with Clause 32, as the Schedules are considered here with Clause 32?

    In so far as the Schedules are referred to in Clause 32 it may be proper to refer to them.

    As I understand it, the object of this Bill and this Clause is to implement what has been referred to as the Runnymede principle, that is to say, that people shall be tried by their peers, that a jury shall be representative, that it shall be drawn from people who have the same customs and habits, and the same ways of thinking as the people who appear before that jury. I do not feel that the repeal of various previous Juries Acts provided for in this Clause are adequate to provide for that purpose. I have a new Clause down in my name, which I understand will be ruled out of Order. That was also devoted to broadly similar objects. But the repeal Clause here seems to me to be altogether inadequate because, even subject to the repeals set out in this Clause, the operation of what is left of this Act results in the fact that of the electorate only 2 or 3 per cent. appear on the jury books. One is not being tried by one's peers on a broad average but by a specially selected 2 or 3 per cent.—

    I do not think that the hon. and learned Gentleman can argue his new Clause on this Clause. Quite clearly a matter which is not within the scope of the Bill when put down as a new Clause, is not within the scope of one of the Clauses of the Bill.

    I certainly would not dream of arguing that. I am simply arguing the same matter which would have been dealt with in a far wider and more general manner by my proposed new Clause. There are certain Sections of the 1825 Act which, doubtless by an oversight, have been left in, and I propose to deal with that. I am explaining why I feel that it must be in Order—

    9.45 p.m.

    The hon. and learned Gentleman would not be in Order in adopting the course he has suggested. This Clause appears to deal with matters of repeal whereas the hon. and learned Gentleman, if I understand him correctly, is dealing with matters which are not repealed and which, therefore, are not mentioned in the Schedule.

    This deals with the repeal of certain parts of the Act of 1825. I am arguing that it should deal with the repeal of certain other parts of that Act. The repeals in this Clause are inadequate to achieve the object of the Bill and to give effect to the principles which it is sought to make law. With very great respect, surely that must be in Order. As you observed, Major Milner, this is a repealing Clause. It is designed to repeal the old law which must be repealed in order to bring into effect the new principles of this Bill. I submit that the repeals so far effected by Clause 32 are inadequate to bring into operation the principles of this Bill and, therefore, they must be extended.

    I am afraid I cannot accept that argument as being either correct or giving the hon. and learned Gentleman the right to discuss a matter which clearly is not within the scope of the Bill.

    On a point of Order. For example, the first Section of the Juries Act, 1825, provides that one shall be a juror who occupies a house containing not less than 15 windows. With great respect, would we not be in Order in arguing that the Second Schedule should be used for altering and removing provisions of that sort which in the view of some of us are obsolete?

    The hon. Member is arguing a matter of merit with which I may have sympathy, but that is not my function. I cannot allow merit to influence my decision. I have to decide what is appropriate to discussion within the scope of the Bill and what is not. The question raised by the hon. Gentleman and that raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) are not within the scope of the Bill and must not be discussed further.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    New Clause—(Fees In County Courts For Trials With Juries)

    Orders may be made under section one hundred and sixty-seven of the County Courts Act, 1934, with respect to the payment of fees in respect of the trial with a jury in a county court of proceedings ordered after the end of the month of September, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, to be tried with a jury, and accordingly subsection (4) of section ninety-three of that Act (which provides that the amount to be paid to the registrar for payment of a jury shall be eight shillings) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of that month except in relation to proceedings ordered before the end of that month to be so tried.—[The Attorney-General.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

    This new Clause deals with machinery and is, I think, self-explanatory.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    First Schedule agreed to.

    Second Schedule—(English Enactments Repealed)

    Amendment made: In page 17, line 50, at end, add:

    "24 & 25 Geo. 5. c. 53.The County Courts Act, 1934.In section ninety-three subsection (4) except in relation to proceedings ordered before the end of the month of September, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, to be tried with a jury"—[The Attorney-General.]

    Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

    Third Schedule agreed to.

    Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended, to be considered Tomorrow and to be printed [Bill 78].

    North Borneo And Sarawak

    Motion made, and Question proposed. "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Mr. Snow.]

    9,51 p.m.

    There is no doubt that recent unfortunate events in Malaya have tended to overshadow happenings in other neighbouring British territories, and I believe that a necessary public service will be performed tonight if we turn our attention to the economic position existing in the Colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak. It seems to me that, when we consider these territories in South-East Asia, we should carefully adjust any considerations we may make to the general changing background which at the present time exists in the Far East. Future policy in British Borneo must be influenced by recent happenings in China, the potentialities in French Indo-China the Dutch East Indies and Burma, and that the significance of the recent Asian Conference held in Delhi must be borne in mind.

    The Colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak are the latest additions to the British Colonial Empire, or, at any rate, the latest additional responsibilities of the Colonial Office, having come under their jurisdiction only since the end of the late war. Prior to this arrangement, North Borneo was administered by a chartered company. While constitutional matters are not the subject of this Debate, it is interesting to note that, despite great pressure, Tory Governments were opposed to accepting responsibilities in Borneo, and it was left to a Liberal Government to accept that measure of British interests in that island. To say that they accepted that responsibility in a manner that might have proved disastrous is borne out by the fact that, immediately, they handed over responsibility to a private concern. While a chartered company was responsible for North Borneo, Sarawak was an independent State under the rule of a Rajah.

    During the recent war, the whole of the island of Borneo was overrun by the Japanese, with all that such an occupation meant, and particularly was this the case in British North Borneo. After liberation, both Sarawak and North Borneo were under a military administration, and came under the Colonial Office in June, 1946. This is a comparatively short time, and also a time of unusual difficulty, which must be taken into consideration.

    My chief object tonight is to ask the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies for an account of his Department's stewardship, to ask what economic progress these two Colonies have made, and also, what is equally important, what plans of development have been prepared for the future of these Colonies? To be precise, we should speak of the Colony of North Borneo, which includes British North Borneo of the chartered company, Sarawak and the Island of Labuan, which was formerly part of the Straits Settlements. Together, they have a total area of 30,000 square miles, a sizable area, but with a population of only 330,000. Most of these people live in the coastal belt, leaving the interior of the island largely undeveloped, uninhabited jungle. I might say in passing that the hinterland contains very few of the dangers of the time when stories were told of the wild men of Borneo.

    In assessing the possibilities of any country, the state of its communication services are very important. It must be said that even before the late war such services in Borneo were very poor. A small gauge railway ran along the west coast and there was also a short branch line of some 20 miles. In addition to these rail facilities, there were about 103 miles of metalled roads serving the main towns and estates, and a further 100 miles of gravelled roads. This, in total, does not amount to much in the way of modern transport facilities, and most of the territory was served by bridle paths and canoes only. With such scant communication services it is not surprising that no thorough survey of the territory has been undertaken.

    Only coal among the minerals was mined commercially, and those operations ceased in 1931. The economy of the whole area was entirely agriculture. For the most part the native populations are very primitive people, though the most important local tribe, the Dusuns, are rather intelligent folk. Prior to the war, Chinese immigrants comprised one-sixth to one-fifth of the population and provided most of the artisans, shopkeepers, clerks and technical subordinates employed by the Government and commercial firms.

    To this undeveloped country the war brought many untold disasters only revealed after its liberation. Most of the chief towns and villages have been destroyed. Of the 890 Government buildings in North Borneo and Labuan, 614 were completely destroyed and 266 badly damaged. The native peoples were dispersed, while the Chinese suffered severely, many of them being killed by the Japanese. This applies particularly to the Chinese who were in Government service. The railways were extensively damaged, rolling stock was destroyed and the main bridges blown up. As for the roads, they required re-metalling and the gravel roads re-laying. One could expect under such conditions that the harbours and ports would also suffer, which was the case at Sandakan and Jesselton, whilst in Labuan the port of Victoria practically ceased to exist.

    I am sure it would be of general interest if the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies would give us some information as to the steps taken to both rehabilitate and develop this valuable Colony. For a territory which is situated in the tropics, it is one of the most healthy for white folk to live in. The widely spread mountains and hills permit the development of temperate climatic resorts. Another feature of great importance is that the region is situated below the typhoon area. As its native name implies, it is "The Land Below the Wind." One important consideration, when considering the Colony's development, is the establishment of regular communications with the outside world. Before the war, the Straits Steamship Company ran a regular weekly service between Singapore and the local ports. There was also a steamer service to Hong Kong, Japan, and the Dutch East Indies, whilst a local service operated along the coast.

    Here are a few questions I wish to ask the Under-Secretary of State tonight. Have regular steamship services been resumed, and on what scale? Has it been possible to provide an air service? What steps have been taken to re-open the ports and improve them? Have the roads been repaired? Have steps been taken to widen and improve the roads and also to build new ones? There is a strong local opinion that in immediate importance new roads would be more advantageous than new railways. What steps have been taken to re-build the towns?

    It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[ Mr. G. Wallace.]

    Is it intended to plan the new buildings carefully to avoid some of the mistakes that have been reported recently in the case of Singapore? Whilst it can be assumed that the towns will be re-built in the main on the old sites, have the authorities enlisted the aid of experienced town planners?

    Most of the questions I have put to the Minister up to the present are concerned with rehabilitation. I want to proceed to matters concerning potential developments for I feel that I am right in assuming that the transfer of the territories from the Chartered Company was to permit a more reliable expansion of the economy of the Colony. In the two and a half years that the colony has been the responsibility of the Colonial Office I feel that, notwithstanding the difficulties, tentative plans should be in existence for agricultural and industrial developments there.

    Could the Minister tell us if steps have been taken for a geological survey of the Colony to discover any mineral resources that might be suitable for commercial exploitation? I understand that the Powell, Duffryn Company have examined the coal resources. Have they reported yet and is the report available and, also, is it intended to resume mining operations? It is not difficult to imagine what a valuable contribution to the future of the Colony a local coal supply would be. I trust that the Minister will not consider my inquiries too numerous, for it would be a good thing if we could arrange for this Debate to reflect a comprehensive picture of the Colony's affairs.

    To turn to agriculture and forestry. Before the war the export trade was predominantly based on rubber. Timber came a poor second and other products exported were comparatively few. Have steps been taken to re-organise the rubber industry? What of the timber trade, in view of the vast forest resources that exist there? Are any plans in hand to develop a more diversified agricultural economy? These are quite numerous questions, but I trust time will permit the Under-Secretary to reply to some of them, if not to all of them. Dr. Cheesman, in a recent report, suggested large-scale cocoa production in Malaya, Borneo and Sarawak. Have the initial experiments in this direction been conducted?

    One of the unusual features of pre-war North Borneo was the fact that, whilst the Colony had one of the lowest densities of population in the Far East and, in addition, was totally an agricultural economy it was dependent on imported foodstuffs. In view of the comparative shortage of rice, can the Minister say if the question of increased rice production has been considered, both the wet and dry production, and also the mechanised production of this valuable food? I stress the mechanised production because of the shortage of reasonably skilled labour.

    What educational facilities have the authorities in view for the local inhabitants? One of the most important questions that I can ask the Minister is, what is the attitude of the Government to the question of introducing immigrant workers. By that I do not mean indentured workers. I cannot imagine that idea being adopted.

    I am sure the Government will do their best to answer at least 49 of them. If they have not the opportunity to reply to some of the questions in this Debate I hope they will do so at some other time. I understand that there is a decided objection by the local inhabitants to the idea of accepting unlimited Chinese immigrants, for to permit the native peoples to prosper and develop a careful limitation of Chinese immigrants will be necessary. The Chinese with their greater experience would make progress very difficult for the native populations. We have had many unfortunate experiences recently of the difficulties of plural societies, but has any other source been found to supply the necessary clerks, technical subordinates and shopkeepers? What about the teeming millions of Malays living in that part of the world? Are they a possibility in that direction?

    My final question concerns the Colonial Development and Welfare Schemes. The allocation to North Borneo under the 1945 Act was £623,370. From a copy of the "Board of Trade Journal" of 5th February, we are told that the local government have drawn up a 10 year plan of economic development of the colony. Has the Colonial Office approved this plan?

    To Sarawak I have devoted little time and considerably less than to North Borneo, for one reason that the devastations of the Japanese were not so great there as in North Borneo, although many of the conditions that exist in North Borneo are to be found also in Sarawak—an undeveloped hinterland, a low density of population, lack of adequate geological information, large untapped forest resources and some dependency upon imported foodstuffs. In answering specific questions concerning Borneo, I should like the Minister to relate his replies to comparable problems in Sarawak.

    I am fully aware of the fact that I have asked the Minister many questions in the short time I have taken up, but I do impress upon him the really great need for him to consider these questions and, if he cannot deal with them all tonight, I trust that he will deem them of sufficient importance to make known on some other occasion, publicly and widely, some of the Government's reaction to them.

    10.8 p.m.

    In the few minutes left, I should like to put one or two points more to the Under-Secretary in addition to the 50 questions already asked. In doing so, may I point out that we are approaching the ideal which I hoped we would attain when I last raised this topic and which was that in this Parliament we should at least spend half an hour every day, in discussing Colonial questions?

    One sees from a study of North Borneo one remarkable fact that, despite the depredations while the island was in the hands of the Japanese, there has been a most remarkable recovery. A great deal of credit for that is due, I think, to the Military Government organisation which was hastily got together in this country about the time when we were considering a Military Government organisation for Europe. They have done a good job of work, and the people in their administration of that country have now something upon which to build. It is heartening to know that there is one part of our territory where there are no housing problems. There seems to be no shortage of houses there. The people have so many houses at their disposal that within seven or eight years they can knock them down and build them again.

    One of the dangerous aspects of affairs in North Borneo is that touched upon by the hon. Member for East Nottingham (Mr. Harrison)—that a country situated in a wonderful climate in the Inner Antipodes should be importing food. A rice-eating population needs to import rice. That is nothing new, unfortunately. I see from the figures of 1938 that they were doing the same thing then.

    I should like to ask the Under-Secretary whether it is not time we made a big drive to ensure that native populations, especially in Africa, are given every means at our disposal for increasing their capacity to produce their own food. The position in the Colonial territories is reaching almost a crisis. Countries like Borneo which fed themselves before the war, are being so pressed into producing commercial products, groundnuts and that kind of thing, that many of them are rapidly leaving their villages and are not producing the food that they should produce to keep themselves and their families, as they did in 1938.

    One sees that Borneo is roughly about the size of Ireland, whose basic industry is that of producing food, not only for itself but for export. I hope that we can get into Borneo modern machinery and the modern technical ideas which have been developed in this country and Australia by research. There should be a drive to send these ideas and machinery to that small country, to ensure not only that it shall be able to feed itself, but that the country shall join in the world scramble for the production of primary products. For many years, the problem of this country and the rest of Europe will be to secure primary products from those areas.

    In this connection it is heartening to find from the report for the last year that an eatable commodity was exported from North Borneo, and that was dried and salted fish. Representing as I do a fishing port in this country, I know that Borneo is therefore our competitor, but I know also that there is such a shortage of these eatables in the world, that none of the people in North Borneo or Yarmouth will suffer if there is an increase in the export of commodities of this kind. Could not this export be linked up with some planned scheme applied to North Borneo? It is a small country which would probably lend itself to experiment, although not at the expense of the population. The experiment would be of benefit to the area, and to all the people in the Colonial Empire and in the world at large, and it should be concerned with the importation of machinery. Perhaps we should be able to learn a lot, which could be transmitted to other territories, especially in East Africa, and probably the West Indies.

    Another question is that of communications. While the Japanese were in North Borneo, they did quite an amount of good work in certain respects. They constructed airfields and landing strips which, before their arrival, did not exist in the island at all. We can see that the island is quite well placed. It is about 1,200 miles from Hong Kong and 1,500 miles from Australia. There might be a useful development not only in air traffic, but in the use of the very good harbours in commercial development in that part of the world.

    From our point of view, as administrators of Colonial Territories, the aspect of defence should not be forgotten. I do not talk as an expert, but it seems to me that we should build up a peaceful defence system. As I see the matter with the few facts at my disposal, I think that North Borneo would perhaps lend itself to defence purposes for Australia and other parts of the world which come under our rule. It would be interesting if we could know something about that from the Under-Secretary.

    This is one of many Debates on Colonial subjects which we have had recently. We shall have many more short Debates on these various parts of our magnificent far-flung territories. At home we get answers to Questions from the Government Front Bench and it can be seen that a great interest is taken in those Questions, especially from this side of the House. However, that is not the way to tackle this problem. What we need for our Colonial Empire is a great economic council interlinked with the Commonwealth, so that we can proceed with the bringing out of these primary products to the industrial nations of the world and increase the products of industry on the spot where the minerals can be obtained. That cannot be done piecemeal. The day has gone by when an individual could go out and do some- thing of that kind. We must now have a great central council possessing great drive, and the only place where that can be set up is in this country, with the help of the Dominions and the Colonial Empire.

    10.16 p.m.

    I am sure that the House is obliged to the hon. Member for East Nottingham (Mr. Harrison) and the hon. and gallant Member for Great Yarmouth (Squadron-Leader Kinghorn) for raising and supporting this subject. I am very glad that the hon. and gallant Member for Great Yarmouth paid a tribute to those members of the Military Government who went into Borneo and Sarawak at the end of the Japanese occupation, because they did a great work and we are very grateful to them for what they have done. We are also very grateful to the civil administration which took over from the military administration not long afterwards. Most of them had been imprisoned by the Japanese and many of them were suffering from years of malnutrition and disease contracted during their imprisonment, and yet in many cases they refused to take leave and carried straight on with their work, thus bridging a gap which might otherwise have occurred in the administration of these territories. This is about the first occasion on which we have had an opportunity of saying that, and I am sure that the House will join with me in expressing our gratitude to those officers of the administration who did such good service in those difficult times.

    I have been asked to give some account of our stewardship in those territories, territories which have come into the Colonial Empire during the last three years. It is quite impossible to do so fully in 13 minutes, but I shall tell the House some of the more salient facts which arise. First of all, it must be remembered—the hon. Member for East Nottingham brought this point out—that both territories are primarily agricultural. They depend on rubber and other agricultural products for their export trade. In fact, North Borneo depends on rubber to the extent of 60 per cent., and both of them import about half the rice they require. It might be thought curious that countries like North Borneo, which is the size of Scotland, and Sarawak, which is the size of England and Wales, the former with a population of some 330,000 and the later with a population of 500,000, have to import one half of their staple diet, but that is due to the fact that the territories are relatively undeveloped.

    In fact, 90 per cent. of the area of North Borneo is forest and a large percentage of Sarawak is either forest, mountain or swamp, so that actually the population lives to a large extent around the coast, and that is where development has taken place. The mineral resources in North Borneo have been very little explored. The same conditions apply here as throughout the rest of the Empire. The Tories with the great interest that they professed in the Empire did not seem to have much interest in finding out what was there.

    I cannot let that pass. Is the hon. Gentleman aware the only economy in the Supplementary Estimates issued last week is an economy on the Colonial Survey. In every other way the Government have overspent what was voted to them.

    That is partly due to the educational policy of the hon. Gentleman and his friends before the war, when they did not train enough surveyors.

    As to Borneo, the mineral resources there are thought not to be great; the timber resources are excellent and will be exploited in due course in accordance with the best timber and forestry requirements. So far as Sarawak is concerned, the oil resources which at one time were thought to be considerable, are believed to be of little consequence. However, in the small territory of Brunei, which lies between Sarawak and North Borneo, there is a considerable amount of oil, and at the present moment that little territory is providing more oil than Trinidad. It also provides a curious nut which provides the cream for much of the chocolate creams which we eat—

    And is also used in cosmetics. Well, when we do get it, it is not cream but a curious nut called the Illipe. I mention that because that is the sort of thing that Tories would like to develop and did, in fact, develop.

    What is our policy in these territories? It is to develop them for, and with the co-operation of, the people. As the hon. Member for East Nottingham said, we have to repair the devastation of the war. Ninety per cent. of the buildings in the towns of North Borneo were destroyed, and we have to make up for much of this destruction and also for the neglect during the war years to repair what needed to be repaired. We have to investigate the material resources, and the hon. Gentleman will be glad to hear that the geological survey is about to begin, and that there is a soil survey and forestry research scheme in Sarawak.

    We also want to develop the human resources. The history in both Colonies is one of backwardness and lack of educational facilities, and we have large development plans which will be put into hand to remedy this state of affairs. We want to reduce the reliance upon imported foodstuffs so that more rice can be grown. We hope to experiment with the mechanised production of rice, and there is already in North Borneo a plan for an irrigation scheme for wet rice such as my hon. Friend mentioned. We want also to reduce the dependence on rubber as the main cash crop, and so diversify the economy of these territories.

    That is our general economic policy, and now I will turn to some of the specific questions. In shipping I cannot claim that there is a very frequent service operating between these territories and Singapore or elsewhere. There is, however, a steamship service between the main ports and Singapore fortnightly, and with Hong Kong, Australia and the Philippines at less regular intervals. So far as the air is concerned, there is one air service operating weekly on the route Singapore—Kuching—Labuan— Jesselton, that is, running up the coast nearest the mainland of China between Singapore and the North part of the Island of Borneo. There is an airfield at Kuching, and also one at Labuan, and with the assistance of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund we propose to make both of them into airfields which come up to the international airport standard.

    The North Borneo railway suffered severe damage as to track, bridges and rolling stock during the Japanese occupation, and we are therefore trying to bring it into service again. Of course it is already in operation, but not in full operation. That is largely a question of getting the locomotives and rolling stock out there. The gauge is a narrow one and it is difficult to persuade manufacturers here to supply that type of equipment, for it means supplying something which is not generally used. They are not as keen on supplying locomotives and wagons for the narrow gauges as for the more common gauges. We are, however, taking this matter up with manufacturers. We are stepping up the progress of road construction and it is expected that the rehabilitation of all the roads in North Borneo will he completed in 1950. There and in Sarawak we are building new roads with a view to opening up the interior and extending the road systems on both West and East Coasts, in order to tap the agricultural areas and to link up the centres of population.

    I was asked about town planning. I am glad to say we have now been able to obtain the services of a town planner, and he has been appointed. We had to wait for some time until we could get the right type of man. He is now busily engaged in planning the towns of North Borneo. We thought it better to have these plans properly prepared before starting to spend a lot of money on reconstructing the towns and villages, so that in future they would he laid out in accordance with the best modern methods. We are having a geological survey prepared of the two colonies and have a combined geological survey department for them, with the chief geological surveyor stationed in Kuching and an assistant geologist in each of the territories.

    We feel that in the past too much of the Colonies' economy has depended upon rubber. To a large extent, of course, it is still the mainstay of those areas, therefore we have taken every possible step to bring the best types of rubber tree into production. For this purpose we have established in North Borneo a clonal seed nursery and a bud-wood plantation, again out of the resources of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. So far as timber is concerned, we have taken considerable steps to secure the opening up of the forests and to see that the best possible timber and forestry practice is maintained. We are looking into Dr. Cheeseman's Report on cocoa. It is possible that in North Borneo there may be some prospect of producing this commodity, but there is not likely to be much probability of it in Sarawak in the near future for the soil is not really suitable.

    Altogether, I feel that we can give a good account even in the short time of our stewardship. Under the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and other funds we have approved expenditure of some £6 million in North Borneo and a lesser sum in Sarawak, because that area, of course, was not damaged to anything like the same extent as North Borneo. These sums will be of considerable assistance and will enable the Colonies, with their own local resources, to provide a much higher standard of living for the people than ever before. I have not time now to go into details of our educational and health policies. They, too, are in accord with our general economic plans and will march side by side with them. With all these plans in operation the House will, I think, realise that our stewardship is one of which it can be indeed proud.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-nine Minutes past Ten o'Clock.