I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

This Clause follows upon a discussion in Committee. One of the Amendments made there, with the approval of everyone in that Committee, was to secure that a woman resident for three years in this country should have recourse to the English courts notwithstanding that her husband was domiciled outside the jurisdiction of the English courts. In the Debate during the Committee stage my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir T. Moore) put forward the contention that this facility should be extended to Scotland. The Lord Advocate kindly said that he would give consideration to that proposal.

It is with some temerity that I, an English Member, put forward any proposal to alter the law of Scotland, but I hope that my temerity in this respect will be overlooked and that the Government and indeed the House, will look favourably upon this Clause. It is a considerable extension of the law which might bring benefits to many women who are living, and have for many years lived, in this country, and who have at the moment, unless this change is affected, no possibility of securing their freedom, no matter what matrimonial offences their husbands may have committed, because the husband is outside the jurisdiction of the English and Scottish courts.

I beg to second the Motion.

As the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) has told the House, when the Bill was in Committee a similar Clause was being considered in relation to England when the hon. and gallant Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir T. Moore) raised the question as to whether or not similar provision should be made for Scotland. At that stage I pointed out to the Committee that the question had never been fully considered or discussed by respon- sible bodies in Scotland, and that accordingly, until that procedure had been followed, it was not possible to give any view as to whether or not it was desirable to provide a counterpart to the provisions of the English Clause for Scotland. However, in the interval, I was able to arrange to remit this question to the Standing Committee on Legal Reform in Scotland. They considered the question both from the point of view of the merits, and from the point of view that a provision to this effect was being made in respect of England.

That Committee duly reported to me, pointing out that they felt that if a facility was being given in England for the extension of jurisdiction in relation to divorce on the lines set out in the Clause which was before the Committee it would be most invidious if similar provisions were not made for Scotland, that it would give rise to a great deal of social feeling if a woman in England were able to seek redress in the courts on this ground of jurisdiction, while a woman in similar circumstances in Scotland was excluded because of the existing principles of jurisdiction based solely on the grounds of domicile. They accordingly recommended that a similar provision should be made in respect of Scotland. I communicated that to the hon. and learned Member for Daventry, and the Clause now before us gives effect to that proposal.

May I point out to the House that apart altogether from the consideration to which I have referred, the application of this Clause to Scotland and the extension of this jurisdiction to Scotland eliminates what might have been a very grave difficulty in international law. Questions might have arisen as to whether or not the Scottish courts would have or could have recognised a decree of divorce granted by the English courts on the basis of the jurisdiction now being established if similar jurisdiction did not apply in Scotland. But in respect of the fact that both countries have now accepted this as a ground of jurisdiction, that difficult international problem will not arise; accordingly, decrees granted will, I am sure, be recognised by the courts of both countries as being valid and effective decrees, recognised in the respective countries. For that reason, we are prepared to accept this Clause.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 5, at the beginning to insert:

"The High Court in England shall have jurisdiction."

I think it would be convenient, Mr. Speaker, to take this Amendment with the next one in the same line, to leave out:

"the court shall have jurisdiction."

Both are drafting Amendments, and do not alter the sense of the Clause, though they make a slight improvement in its language.

I beg to second the Amendment.

It might be for the convenience of the House if the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) were to indicate when moving Amendments whether or not they are acceptable to the Government. It has been made clear that this Bill has been drafted in terms acceptable to the Government. It has also been made clear that at some stage or other a pledge was given by certain hon. Members to other hon. Members that no controversial issues of any kind would be raised. However, the majority of hon. Members are at a disadvantage in that they are not parties to this private arrangement. I would respectfully suggest that it would be for the convenience of the House, and for the benefit of hon. Members on this side who are always anxious to support the Government, if the hon. and learned Member would give such an indication.

While I should be only too glad if the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) were able to cross over to this side of the House and speak for the Government, unfortunately his present position does not enable him so to do. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton (Colonel Lipton) may be assured that if the Government are not in agreement with any particular Amendment on the Order Paper I shall indicate that fact to the House. So far, I have seen no reason to disagree with the Amendment which the hon. and learned Member for Daventry has just moved; but I think it right to say that so far as I know there has been no kind of pledge between hon. Members on one side or the other as to the course they might take in regard to this or any other Amendment.

We have discussed some of these matters in Committee; we have considered the implications arising from the Amendments introduced in Committee and I have endeavoured to give such assistance as I was able to the hon. and learned Gentleman in connection with further Amendments standing on the Order Paper. But there is no kind of pledge about the matter, and if the Government are not able to support any of these Amendments, I shall say so when the time comes.

The hon. Member for East Islington (Mr. E. Fletcher) has just put in a manuscript Amendment. This is a very complicated Bill, and I have not had time to note the full effect of it. If it is necessary, I would suggest to the hon. Member that it should be moved in another place, but I am afraid that owing to the shortness of notice I have been unable to ascertain whether it is necessary or not.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 12, to leave out "British Islands," and to insert:

"United Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man."

The point was raised in Committee by the hon. and gallant Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir T. Moore) as to whether the expression "British Islands" might give rise to some confusion owing to the constitution of the Republic of Ireland. On consideration we felt it desirable to avoid any possibility of that, and by this Amendment we seek to take out the words "British Islands" and put in a definition which can give rise to no possible confusion whatsoever. I am un- able to answer the invitation of the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton), because I cannot speak for the Government, but if he will wait he will no doubt hear whether or not this proposal is acceptable to the Government.

Can the hon. and learned Gentleman tell me whether the proposal covers Northern Ireland?

I think the answer to that is in the affirmative.

This Amendment will, I think, make the position clear to all concerned. It shows that "British Islands" was regarded as a geographical expression, whereas the Amendment proposed by my hon. and learned Friend has made the point clear.

May I point out that almost invariably it was always dubbed "United Kingdom and Ireland," and later "United Kingdom and Northern Ireland"? This is a departure from that practice.

This Amendment includes Northern Ireland. My hon. Friend is, with respect, mistaken in thinking we added the words "and Northern Ireland." There may be in particular Bills, a provision that the Bill shall not extend to Northern Ireland, or shall only extend in certain circumstances. But as to whether the United Kingdom includes Northern Ireland there is no doubt whatever.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 12, at the end, to insert:

"(2) Without prejudice to any jurisdiction exercisable by the court apart from this section in proceedings for nullity of marriage, the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to proceedings for nullity of marriage."

This Amendment deals with a point raised in Committee by the right hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir A. Salter) when he put forward the possibility that the Clause as drafted might limit the existing jurisdiction of the High Court in connection with proceedings for nullity. The effect of the Amendment is to make it quite clear that the existing jurisdiction for proceedings for nullity is in no way restricted or cut down by the contents of this Bill.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 13, to leave out "her infant children," and to insert:

"the infant children of the marriage."

This Amendment is put forward in consequence of a point raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Brighton (Mr. Marlowe) on the Committee stage. He pointed out that the word "her," in the phrase, "his wife or her infant children" might have the effect of including children who were not children of the marriage. As by reason of Section 42 (1) of the National Assistance Act, 1948, a man is no longer under any obligation to maintain his stepchildren and consequently cannot be guilty of wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for them, it is desirable to make this Amendment and to show that the wilful neglect referred to in this case can only be neglect in relation to the infant children of the marriage.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 14, to leave out, "then if the Court," and to insert:

"the High Court of England, if it."

This is a purely drafting Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Is this matter affected at all by the Amendment made to bring in Scotland? Does the High Court include the Court of Session? If not, ought the Court of Session to be included?

I do not think the Court of Session is included. Whether it should be included is a matter on which I do not feel competent to speak. I do not know whether the Lord Advocate would give assistance on that point. It is a matter of Scottish law, with which the hon. and learned Gentleman may be more familiar than I am.

I am as ignorant as the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller), but perhaps this is a matter which might be considered elsewhere.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 2, after "proceedings," to insert "in England."

This is an Amendment to the Clause which abolishes in England for the purposes of divorce, the rule which is known as the rule in Russell v. Russell. The Amendment is necessary because that rule was never part of the law of Scotland. Therefore, it is strictly unnecessary to repeal something in Scotland which was never part of the law of Scotland.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 3, after "divorce," to insert "or nullity of marriage."

This is a drafting Amendment, made necessary in view of the later proposal to leave out Clause 7.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 21, to leave out Clause 7.

The contents of this Clause are already covered as a result of the other Amendments we have made.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 26, to leave out "Scotland or."

As the Bill stood, it was provided that it should not extend to Scotland. By reason of the new Clause which this House has agreed this morning, it is obvious that the words "Scotland or" should now be left out.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I think it desirable to make it clear to the House, and particularly to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), that the only part of this Bill which affects Scotland is the new Clause moved this morning. Hitherto, no part of this Bill affected Scotland. The introduction of this new Clause made it necessary to extend the Bill to Scotland only to that limited extent. None of the other Clauses had any application whatever to Scotland. If on reflection we decide that any other Amendments are required to make the position clear, although I do not think that they are, they will have to be made in another place.

I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

I do this with some confidence because to my delight I found that this Bill designed to remove certain anomalies in the law met with support from all sections in the House. This is the second time when, through the luck of the ballot, it has fallen to my lot to introduce a Private Member's Bill in this House. The first occasion was when the last Labour Government were in office I introduced a Bill to remove tolls on bridges and highways. That was not part of the Road Traffic Act, and I thought that it was a necessary reform in the law. When I introduced the Bill I received assistance from the Lord President of the Council, who was then Minister of Transport. After the Bill had been through all its stages in this House, he asked my permission to incorporate it in his Road Traffic Act. I gladly agreed. I hope that this Bill in its further stages will meet with the same support from the Government, that it will be met with the same acclaim when it goes to another place and, finally, that it will reach the Statute Book.

I should like to mention the new Clause put down by the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieutenant-Colonel Lipton) which brought on my head shoals of correspondence——

If the new Clause was not incorporated in the Bill, one must not discuss it.

I accept your Ruling Mr. Speaker. The fact is that I had so much correspondence as a result that I thought I would make my position clear to the hundreds of people who wrote, and that I would say that I could not possibly allow a subject such as divorce——

On a point of Order. I do not want to stop this at all—I would rather encourage it—but if the hon. Member is allowed to say why he does not agree with the suggestion of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton), will the rest of us be allowed to say why we do?

One really should not mention the matter at all.

I wish to thank most sincerely all those who have assisted during the various stages of this Bill, especially the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller), who carried the full burden of the negotiations during the earlier stages of the Bill while I was absent in another part of the Commonwealth. He has shown the utmost skill and tact and has earned the praises of everybody. I want also to thank the Law Officers, who lent their assistance, and the officers of the Lord Chancellor. I am delighted that this Bill has met with the approval of this House, and I hope it will meet with equal success in its further stages. I know from the correspondence I have received that it will remove unhappiness and misery from the lives of hundreds of worthy people throughout this country.

This is a useful little Bill and the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald) who, I think, has just made his first speech upon it, and the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller), who has piloted the Bill through the House and through the Committee stage are, if I may say so, both to be congratulated on the expedition and unanimity which have attended its passage through the House. The Bill does not purport to make any great or dramatic changes in our marriage laws. Whatever criticisms may be made about our laws relating to marriage—and some of them are, no doubt, open to criticism—and whatever hard cases may arise under our existing marriage laws—and there are hard cases—it is manifest that the religious, the social and the political implications of any general changes in the substantive laws relating to marriage are such that the House would not wish to deal with them in a Private Member's Bill in the short space of a Friday Sitting. The existence of hard cases is not a sufficient ground for drastic and inadequately considered Amendments in the general law.

But although the Bill does not purport to make any wide-scale or drastic alterations of that kind in the law, it is none the less useful in the procedural reforms which, in fact, it introduces. I will not take up time by commenting in detail upon all of them, but I should like to say that I am particularly glad that Clause 1 of the Bill will enable a married woman, long resident in this country, to petition for divorce in the courts and under the laws of this country, notwithstanding the fact that her husband is domiciled elsewhere outside the British Isles.

The United Kingdom.

It is a little wider than that. We have used a phrase which, in fact, is generally and colloquially given as the British Isles and I am speaking, in this context, colloquially. The fact that a wife has hitherto been deemed to have the same domicile as her husband, is a rule which by no means has been universally recognised either in international law or, indeed, in our own municipal law, even in our law relating to marriage. It was a procedural and in some respects a highly technical and artificial rule and I have no doubt at all that its existence hitherto has caused grave hardship in a number of cases. For instance, a husband, perhaps guilty of some matrimonial offence, may have taken up his domicile in a country where, owing perhaps to the expense involved or to the fact that the laws of that country do not permit divorce at all, the wife has been prevented from petitioning for divorce. She has had to live, although separated from her husband, still in law married to him and unable to rely on the matrimonial offence which he has committed in order to seek a dissolution of her marriage.

I feel quite sure that the amendment of the law which the first Clause introduces in this respect will remedy a real injustice and greatly improve the procedure in this branch of our law. Accordingly, I commend this Bill to the House and I congratulate the hon. and learned Member for Daventry on his pan in introducing it and piloting it through the House.

I, too, should like to congratulate the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald) and the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) on having introduced this most useful Bill. I do not feel that they can in any way be blamed because they have not also included other reforms of this branch of the law which I believe—and I think the hon. and learned Member for Daventry also believes—would be highly desirable. If one draws a not very high place on the list of Private Member's Bills, one has no hope of getting the Bill through if one does not exclude everything which is controversial.

We have included, however, a number of highly useful reforms. We have got rid of the wretched rule in Russell v. Russell and we have got rid of the anomaly that a man, by deserting his wife and going abroad, could not only escape from the obligation to maintain her but could also hold her bound to him by having changed his domicile, so that she could not obtain a divorce in this country. That Clause in the Bill has released a lot of people who are held in most unjust bonds, and I think we should be extremely grateful.

I should, however, add one comment, and it is that I was a little shocked by the Attorney-General's statement that fundamental alterations in our divorce laws were not appropriate to Private Members' legislation. I cannot help feeling that the junior Burgess for Oxford University (Sir A. Herbert) must have felt equally shocked because, after all, it was by Private Members' legislation that we fundamentally altered the whole of the divorce law in this country. I feel that in a position as low in the list as was this Bill, we should only have lost the Bill had we introduced a controversial Clause, however desirable and however manifest, and I can only hope that when we reach another series of Private Members' Bills, somebody who will support these other reforms will draw a very high position.

Before the hon. and learned Member sits down, may I say that I said "a Private Member's Bill on a Friday."

I am not quite clear as to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman means.

If the hon. Member is not clear, perhaps he will allow me to amplify what I said. Fundamental changes in the law of this country may or may not be appropriate to a Private Member's Bill, but it seems to me to be inappropriate that they should be dealt with on a Friday in a House which is not likely to be very largely attended and when there is not much time for adequate discussion. That was not the case on the previous occasion to which the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) referred; in those days we were given rather greater time for the discussion of Private Members' Bills.

I do not quite know how all this arose. The more the right hon. and learned Gentleman explains, the more confusion he seems to create. All Private Members' Bills came in on a Friday and the discussion of the very highly controversial Measure to which the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) referred, took place in every stage on a Friday. However, the right hon. and learned Gentleman is right in saying that it is not the proper thing for a controversial Amendment to be considered on a Report stage on a Friday, but in continuing this discussion I am probably already out of Order. If there are other things that might have been done in this extremely useful Bill, may I humbly venture to give this advice which I have been giving for years past to Private Members and to bodies outside the House about this matter? And that is to put their reforms into compartments, and let the highly controversial proposal have a Bill to itself, so that other useful things are not endangered. That is the right course, I am sure. I hope that nothing that the Attorney-General has said—I am sure innocently—will even seem to detract from the might, power and majesty of Private Members' time, and our right to introduce any reforms whatever, however fundamental they may be, as they have been introduced successfully in the past, and will be, I hope, in the future.

I have only to add my congratulations to that great master of jurisprudence the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald) on the most useful choice he has made of his luck in the ballot, and to acknowledge the learned and distinguished services of the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) to the Bill. Let me add my thanks as a humble backer of the Bill for the great and learned assistance of the Law Officers of the Crown from top to bottom. It seems to me that once again the great institution of Private Members' time has, by this Bill, been strongly and admirably justified.

I should like to express my appreciation of the manner in which the Bill was introduced by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald). I think the whole House welcomes this Bill and joins in congratulating the hon. Member who introduced it. It is a great achievement, in such a controversial sphere of the law as divorce, to have piloted through the House a Measure of this kind, which contains at least six marked improvements in the existing law. One of the difficulties of dealing with divorce has always been to remove certain hardships without creating a fresh crop of hardships, and I think the hon. Member can take credit to himself for the fact that this Bill in its present form, will remove a large number of hardships without, apparently, creating any fresh hardships.

I think it is worth while for the House to spend a little time on the Third Reading of this Bill, if only for the fact that the Bill is in a totally different form from that in which it was when the House considered it on Second Reading. What also, I think, is a significant commentary on the use of Private Members' time is that we gave a Second Reading to a Bill whose provisions then were intended to deal with one or two minor matters, that it went up to a Standing Committee, and that as it came back to the House on Report, we found that it had not only grown to about twice its original size, but contained a number of Clauses that I venture to think are of far greater importance, and make more profound changes in the law, than what was contemplated in the original Bill. It is for that reason that I think the House is justified in spending a few minutes on this Third Reading in considering exactly what the Bill now does and, in particular, what the Clauses do that have been added since Second Reading.

It is significant, I think, that the very first Clause is itself a Clause which was not originally in the Bill but was introduced in the Standing Committee. I think it is now the most important one in the Bill, because it makes a quite radical change in the previous basis of jurisdiction of the High Court in matters of divorce. It does away with the old rule which has existed for centuries, that domicile was the basis on which a spouse could get his or her marriage dissolved. It introduces the provision that a wife who has been deserted and is resident in this country, and whose husband has gone abroad and acquired another domicile, can petition the High Court in this country on the basis of residence. I ventured earlier to seek to move a manuscript Amendment to this Clause, and I must apologise for not having put it down on the Notice Paper. I think it will be in Order to refer to it now; and I think it is of some importance because there will be an opportunity for the language of Clause 1 to be considered in another place.

When this new Clause 1 was introduced in Committee upstairs by, I think, the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) he pointed out that it derived from a recommendation of the Denning Committee. I think the House should consider whether, in its present form, Clause 1 really gives effect to the suggestions that were made by the Denning Committee. The relevant paragraph of the Report of the Denning Committee is paragraph 82, which refers to the existing law and says:

"This rule acts with particular hardship on English women who marry men from the Dominions or from places abroad. A wife by law takes the domicile of her husband. If the marriage breaks down, her natural tendency is to remain with, or return to, her relatives in this country, but nevertheless in order to obtain a divorce, she has to proceed in the courts of the country where her husband is domiciled, and this is so even if they are both resident here."

Then—and this is the operative sentence—the Denning Committee makes this recommendation:

"These modifications do not in our opinion go far enough. In particular, the 1944 Act does not meet the case where an English woman has married a man from overseas and after living with him a short time in his home land is deserted by him and, being left stranded, returns to her relatives in this country. As the law stands at present, she cannot obtain a divorce here but has to go to his country for the purpose."

As I understand the proceedings in the Standing Committee, Clause 1 of the Bill is designed to remove that hardship, but, for some reason which I do not understand, Clause 1, in its present form, has what seems to me to be a quite unnecessary limiting condition. It is operative only if the wife is resident in England and has been ordinarily resident there for a period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings. The question I ask myself, and which I think the House should ask itself, is, why should such a person be required, if her husband has deserted her, and she has come back to this country, her husband having committed, presumably, a matrimonial offence—why should she be condemned to live in England three years prior to the commencement of the proceedings? I should have thought that it was, at least, necessary to add words to make it clear that a wife, in the circumstances supposed, would have the right to petition if she had been ordinarily resident in England immediately before the marriage.

I fail to understand why, in order to remove this cause of hardship on which the Denning Committee reported, and from which Report this Clause is derived, it is necessary to condemn such a woman to wait for three years before she becomes entitled to take proceedings in this country. I can, of course, understand that it may be desirable to have some qualifications to prevent any abuse by a person not domiciled here and not really resident in this country or, who, indeed, never was resident; but I fail to understand why this Clause has crept in because it seems to me a totally unnecessary and unreasonable qualification before an English woman can take divorce proceedings. I would, therefore, venture to hope that the promoters of this Bill and the Attorney-General and the Government, if they are in agreement, as I presume they are, with the basic intention of giving effect to the recommendation of the Denning Committee——

Or some of them.

Yes, or some of them. I hope the promoters will use their influence in another place in the hope that the Clause may undergo a further measure of redrafting before its passage into law. Having said that, I am bound to admit that that is the only piece of constructive criticism I have to make on the Bill in its present form. For the rest of it, I have nothing but praise and, like others who have spoken earlier, I commend it to the House. I would, however, like to support what was said by my hon. Friend the junior Burgess for Oxford University (Sir A. Herbert) with regard to the use of Private Members' time. I also was shocked by the words of the Attorney General about the use of Private Members' time. I hope we shall not get into the habit of thinking that the only appropriate subject as a matter for Private Members is something which is non-controversial.

I hope my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) will forgive me if I strike what I think is perhaps the first discordant note in the proceedings this morning on this Bill. I do it solely to give him points about which to reply, because I know how dull he would find it to reply to a general paean of praise. This Bill is very well intentioned, but I do not think it is quite as good as some hon. Members have declared it to be. I am not certain that it achieves all that it sets out to do. If we look at Clause 1 we find that it represents a departure from the law of domicile, and gives the wife petitioner the right to bring proceedings simply because she is resident in this country. I am not going to say whether one should depart so radically from the law of domicile or not; I think it is probable that one should, but the House should understand that this principle will apply not only to English women, but to French and German women or women from anywhere else who happen to be resident in this country. A French woman can come here and can divorce her husband if she has been domiciled for three years, and has been resident here according to the laws of the country.

It might equally be said that the same advantages should be given to her husband, but a husband petitioner must still be domiciled in this country. There might be a case where the husband is not domiciled here, but is in one of the Dominions, and has been resident there for three years. He would, however, be denied the rights that his wife would have. That seems to me to be a matter which might possibly be put right. In regard to Clause 3, I agree that the High Court should have this new ground for ordering periodical payments. But this is giving a new ground for judicial separation, and is it not already covered by proceedings for restitution? It is true that proceedings for restitution do not allow of a decree of separation afterwards, but the parties live apart anyway and they do obtain what the wife really desires, which is support and maintenance from her husband.

Under Clause 4, power is given to the courts to vary orders for maintenance in the event of re-marriage, and many will agree with that. Of course, it will mean that orders for security will no longer mean what they say, and a wife who re-marries may have them varied. That, to some extent, is a criticism, and perhaps should be considered. In Clause 5 a very desirable object is sought to be achieved. Everyone agrees that the rule in Russell v. Russell should go. I am not at all sure that that is achieved, because if we read the words

"Notwithstanding any rule of law"—

whatever that may mean; I assume it means the decision in Russell v. Russell—

"the evidence of a husband or wife shall be admissible in any proceedings for divorce …"

That really means that it may contravene the rule as to hearsay or anything else, and it will still be admissible provided it is relevant to the proceedings. That is how the matter appears to me, and I should have thought that that was a serious criticism. With great respect to my hon. and learned Friend, I should have thought that the Clause could have been very much better drafted, for instance, in the reverse order, when it would read:

"In any legal proceedings no evidence shall be excluded upon the grounds only that such evidence relates to the fact or absence of sexual intercourse between persons lawfully married to each other, or tends to show that any husband is or is not the father of any child born to his wife."

That deals with the rule in Russell v. Russell, and I do not think the courts would desire to admit all kinds of evidence.

Subsection (2) says:

"Notwithstanding anything in this section or any rule of law, a husband or wife shall not be compellable in such proceedings to give evidence of the matters aforesaid."

It does not say the husband and wife who are concerned in the action, and it could mean that any person who happens to be a husband or wife shall not be compellable. I hope that these will not be considered legalistic objections. It seems to me that in a Bill such as this, where we are dealing with matters of this nature, one should pay particular attention to those things. This criticism is devoted merely to those kind of matters, though I agree with the principle which this Bill seeks to obtain. It may be possible to remedy these things in another place.

Everybody who has so far referred to the point has been of opinion that it was a good thing to abolish the rule in Russell v. Russell. I do not propose to debate the point now. It is far too late, and nothing can be done about it. I do not know whether I am reactionary, retrogressive, or backward, but I am not usually accused of being reluctant to change things. For my own part, I should like to record my own view that the rule in Russell v. Russell was a very good rule, and in so far as it is now proposed to abolish it, I think that is a retrograde and not a progressive step. If children were born during a marriage, and were to be proved illegitimate, it was a good thing that that fact should be proved by evidence other than the evidence of the presumptive parents. I do not know what advantage is supposed to flow from the alteration of that rule.

I did not intervene in this Debate to say that, but to add my congratulations to the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald) and others who have been associated with him in seeking to put on the Statute Book a Bill which does a number of useful and profitable things. I think that the discussion on this point has been valuable. I am quite sure that within its limited scope—and I think it is a very limited scope—the Bill will add to the social laws of this country things that might well have been added long ago. The promoter is entitled, therefore, to congratulate himself on having produced that result.

One of the other reasons why I wanted to intervene in the Debate arises out of the remarks of the Attorney General. The Bill shows in a quite significant way what are the advantages, and to some extent the demerits, of our system of private Members' legislation. I think it is time that some members of the Government acquainted themselves with what the business of the Government is with regard to private legislation. In the old days, the rule was that the Government should interfere as little as possible, and should quite definitely not take sides. That did not mean that the appropriate Minister should not, at an appropriate moment, intervene in the Debate and give the House the benefit of the Government's view, but it did mean that it should not be done in a controversial way, and that it should be done objectively and impartially with no strong lead being given either way. That was the essential difference between legislation introduced by Private Members and legislation introduced by the Government.

In the case of legislation introduced by the Government, there is a duty upon those Members who are pledged to support the Government generally to support the Government's legislation. The Government have a right in that respect and to that extent to lead the House, and to call upon their supporters and friends to agree with them. But that has never been true in the case of legislation introduced on the initiative of Private Members.

On a point of Order. I cannot find anything in the Bill dealing with Private Members' legislation. It seems to be a Bill dealing with reform of our divorce laws. I understand that on Third Reading one can debate only what is in the Bill.

I think the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) was replying to a remark made by the Attorney-General.

Perhaps I may be allowed to say this, as there seems to have been some misunderstanding about a remark I made: what I intended to say was that great changes in the law such as were involved in the new Clause standing on the Order Paper in the name of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton (Lieutenant-Colonel Lipton), were not appropriate to be dealt with on a Private Member's Bill on a Friday—I meant in existing circumstances of Private Members' Bills. The 1937 Measure, which was introduced by the hon. Member for Oxford University (Sir A. Herbert), I think, occupied many Fridays, whereas our existing time-table does not permit that to be done. I was dealing only with the question of the inadequacy of the time available for discussion of the proposal.

I think we all understood that in the first place, if my right hon. and learned Friend will allow me to say so; but we do not necessarily agree with it when we understand it. I am trying to put the other point of view. It used to be thought that the Government should not give a strong lead in regard to Private Members' Bills, but should keep well out of the picture, intervening once and once only, and then very moderately, objectively and impartially, to indicate a view, if they had a view, with some restraint, leaving it to Private Members to exercise their own responsibility whether they agreed with that view or not. On the point whether Private Members' Bills ought or ought not to be controversial, it is quite competent for my right hon. and learned Friend to hold the view that at a particular time there ought not to be a controversial Bill or Amendment, but it is equally competent for others to hold the other view. What my right hon and learned Friend said—and this is where I dissent—was that the House would not wish at this stage to introduce a fundamental or far-reaching change in the law. What he meant by that was that he did not want the House to make a far-reaching change, and that if the opportunity had been there he would have advised the House——

On a point of Order. This is very interesting, but has it anything to do with the Bill? Is there not a danger, if the hon. Member is allowed to develop his argument in this way, of the whole of the afternoon being taken up with a Debate on what should or should not be the Government's attitude to Private Members' Bills? Should he not try to link his remarks to something that is in the Bill, the Third Reading of which we are now considering?

I mentioned that I thought what the hon. Member was saying was in answer to a remark made by the Attorney-General, but I was about to ask the hon. Member not to develop his argument too much as we might then be getting on to another Debate.

May I point out, Sir, that that remark was not made on the Third Reading of this Bill?

I am practically at the close of what I wanted to say on this point. It was only that I wanted to make quite clear that, while what my right hon. and learned Friend said may be his view, and may be the correct view, it cannot be said that the House has one opinion or another, because by reason of a Ruling of the Chair the House has not had an opportunity to decide whether it wishes to introduce a fundamental and far-reaching change or not; no one will ever know, because it was held by the Chair that it was not competent to put the question to the House. What my right hon. and learned Friend said might have been understood by those outside to be an expression on the subject by this House, whereas the House has expressed no opinion whatsoever; as far as I can see from the Order Paper, the probability is that the opinion of the House is on the other side. I will conclude by associating myself with everything that has been said by way of congratulation to those who have been closely concerned with this Bill.

I should like to thank those who have said such kind things about the promoters of this Bill, which has met with a very favourable response generally. There have been just a few criticisms voiced in this Third Reading Debate to which I will endeavour to reply. I think that these criticisms are really on the grounds that the Bill does not go far enough. On that point I should like to say this—I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman really tried to express it, and did express it in somewhat different words. Realising that the Bill had a low place in the Ballot, I think my hon. Friend showed great courage in selecting a Bill to amend the law of divorce, because it would be clear that its title might give rise to discussions involving acute controversy, in which case there would be no prospect of the Bill reaching the Statute Book. It was for that reason that when I moved the Second Reading of the Bill, which contained only three non-controversial Clauses, I indicated quite clearly its non-controversial character.

Before the Committee stage we were able to explore to what extent the proposals could be regarded as non-controversial. As a result of discussions, conversations and inquiries in a number of quarters we were fairly confident that the additions made on the Committee stage would not arouse controversy, but would be generally welcomed. Now we come to the Report stage, on which we have made a number of Amendments. The Bill now covers to the fullest possible extent the changes in divorce law which can be regarded by people of all sections as non-controversial. If any controversial proposal were put forward today, however desirable it might be in the minds of many hon. Members, it could only have one effect, to endanger the passage of the Bill and perhaps to prevent the Bill from reaching the Statute Book. I am sure that no one would want that to happen. I believe that it was for that reason that the right hon. and learned Gentleman said what he did say. I should have deplored the raising of any controversial issue today which might have jeopardised this proposal, which so many people have strongly supported.

In what way?

I should have thought that a calculation of the probable time taken to deal with a controversial issue in the Bill in this place, the time for it to be dealt with in another place and then to come back here would convince the hon. Member that there would be more chances than one, in those circumstances, of the Bill falling by the way.

How could the moving of an additional Clause, under the Rules of this House, possibly have interferred with the completion of the Report stage and of the Third Reading in this House?

I really thought the hon. Member knew the answer to the question he was asking, but if he does not know it, I will give him an indication. I should have thought it quite possible for a Debate upon a controversial issue to last a good deal of today, and then the hon. Member, or anyone else who was strongly opposed to the issue, could have made a very long speech and perhaps have stopped the Bill from getting its Third Reading. Perhaps the hon. Member does not know that Bills are occasionally talked out. That has happened before, and I daresay that the hon. Member has taken some part in talking Bills out.

It is true that I have seen many Bills talked out, but that was when I was on the other side of the House and when the talking out came from hon. Members of the opposite party, then sitting on these benches.

No doubt the hon. Member may be able to do some talking out again, as he has done in the past, when he returns to sitting on these benches—if he is sitting anywhere at all.

The only criticisms of the Bill have come from the hon. Member for East Islington (Mr. E. Fletcher) and from my hon. Friend the Member for South Belfast (Mr. Gage). With regard to the criticism of Clause 1, the Clause is undoubtedly very important and will bring great benefit. I think the hon. Member for East Islington was under a misapprehension in the proposal that he put forward that the Clause should apply to people ordinarily resident in England immediately before their marriage. If that alteration were made it would limit the effect of the Clause, which can be used now by people who did not marry in England and who were not ordinarily resident in England immediately before their marriage. I have no doubt that the hon. Member did not intend to make such a limitation, but the Amendment he proposed would have had a limiting effect. As I understood his argument, the real point of it was that the requirement of residence for three years immediately preceding the commencement of proceedings was unnecessary and too long.

I am sure that the hon. and learned Member misunderstood my argument. My suggestion was that what is provided in Clause 1 should also cover the case of a wife who was ordinarily resident in England immediately prior to her marriage, so that she would not have to wait three years before being able to file a petition.

I will certainly consider that suggestion, but I did not understand it was what the hon. Member suggested in the course of his speech. The mistake was no doubt my fault. At first sight it seems to me that difficulties might arise in proceedings for divorce betweeen parties married for, say 15 or 18 years, in determining whether the petitioner had been ordinarily resident in Great Britain 15 or 18 years previously.

I turn to the criticism of my hon. Friend the Member for South Belfast. It is very desirable that a woman ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom should have the facilities contained in the Clause. I am sorry if he takes a somewhat contrary view. I think he must have misread Clause 3; it does not provide any new ground for judicial separation, but merely gives the court ground for maintenance, without the presentation of a petition. I should have thought that change was desirable.

I would like the hon. and learned Gentleman to deal with the question of aliens coming to this country and obtaining divorce after the qualifying period of three years.

If they come here and reside for three years, becoming ordinarily resident here, they will be able to have recourse to our courts. They will be able now, in view of the changes made today, to live in Edinburgh or Glasgow—if they want to live there—for three years, and will be able to bring proceedings in a Scottish court. In the case of women who have deserted their husbands, I should hardly have thought that even in Scotland they would be likely to succeed as petitioners for divorce on the grounds of desertion by their husbands. They would have to disclose their own matrimonial offences.

With regard to the abolition of the rule in Russell v. Russell, I think the fears which my hon. Friend put forward are unfounded, though consideration will be given to his point. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) is almost unique in being one of the very few people who are in favour of the retention of that rule. If he will look at the Denning Report he will see ranged very strongly there the arguments for its abolition. In a document with which he is perhaps more familiar, the report of the Law Society, the hon. Member will find that his colleagues express the opinion very strongly that the rule should be rescinded. In this matter he has shown himself not progressive; I should hesitate to attach to him any other label.

The Bill, although non-controversial, makes great and important changes. The value of those changes is not to be assessed by the lack of controversy. The provisions with regard to the wards of court is of great importance. I hope that as a result of our Debate today people of this country will have their attention drawn to the changes contained in this Measure. I conclude by expressing my thanks to those responsible for the Denning Report, which was most valuable in formulating these proposals; my thanks not only to right hon. and learned Gentlemen opposite for the great help they have given me, but also to the Parliamentary draftsmen and others who have helped in framing this rather complicated Measure; and my thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight for having given us the opportunity of making these much-needed changes in the law.

After listening with great interest to the variety of expert legal knowledge in support of the Bill, I intervene on one point with a great deal of diffidence. In Clause I there is the underlying assumption that the aggrieved party is always the wife. It may well be that there are hundreds and possibly thousands of wives whose husbands are abroad, and for whom a divorce is very necessary and desirable. The point I am about to put to the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) may already be covered by the law—I am ignorant of it—but the fact remains that if there is a large category of women who have been deserted in this way, there may equally well be a very small proportion of husbands in this country who have been done an injustice by their wives going abroad. I am certain that the hon. and learned Gentleman will not resent this effort to improve the Bill slightly. I hope he will look at this point and establish justice and equity for what may be a very small number of husbands who have been similarly treated by wives who are now abroad.

I hope I may be forgiven if I disturb for a moment or two the harmony of these pleasant proceedings this afternoon, but I really must say how much I regret the continued extension in this country of facilities for divorce. I am sorry that the junior Burgess for Oxford University (Sir A. Herbert) is not present, because I wanted to tell him of the deplorable results of the Bill which he brought before this House one Friday in 1937.

The courts today are flooded with divorce cases, and I think it is a great pity that from time to time so much thought and attention is given in this House to breaking up the family life of the country. In all the circumstances I am sure that it is lowering the moral level of our people. The facilities for divorce which now exist must give foreign communities a very poor impression of the spiritual level of this country. I daresay that there are great and abounding grievances which the provisions of the Bill will remove, but in relation to the broad principle of maintaining the vitality of our people and the sacred character of the homes of our people, this extension of the divorce law must have a most deplorable effect.

I am sorry if I appear not to join in the grateful expressions directed towards my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald); I regret that, following the example of the junior Burgess for Oxford University, he has taken a course in legislation in this House which will not redound to his high reputation in the future. I enter my protest at the continued expansion of divorce facilities in this country through the procedure of this House.

It grieves me very deeply to have to disagree with my good and hon. Friend the Member for Moseley (Sir P. Hannon), but I believe that the promoters of the Bill have rendered a great service to many people who have suffered great hardship and sorrow during many years of their lives. The Bill will give hope of happiness to many who are in a union which has brought them nothing but misery.

If it will be of any comfort to my hon. Friend the Member for Moseley I will tell him of a case—I could tell him many cases—in which I was interested. It concerns a Scotswoman—that is why I am so glad the Bill applies to Scotland—who married a Newfoundland soldier in 1919. The man deserted her and went back to Newfoundland, where he married again and had six children. This Scotswoman had to live with her parents here. A childhood friend of hers wanted to marry her, but she could not get a divorce because she could make no application here and there is no divorce in Newfoundland. She was thus condemned to live alone for 30 years. I brought her case to the notice of every Law Officer of the Crown during the last 25 years. In every instance the implied advice was that the only relief she could have was to live in sin. That was the advice given me by Law Officers of the Crown——

For record purposes I want to point out that, while I cannot speak for my predecessors, that certainly was not the advice which the hon. and gallant Gentleman got from me.

I hope that I did not imply that I had consulted the hon. and learned Gentleman himself. He has not been long enough in office for me to have done so. I certainly did refer it to the Attorney-General, and to many others.

During the Committee stage my hon. and gallant Friend did not say that that advice was given to him by a Law Officer, but that it was the advice which he himself gave the woman.

Naturally, any advice I gave I should base on something far stronger than my own personal opinion, and I, therefore, based it on the advice given me by the Law Officers. I do not say that it was in so many words, but that was the implied advice. The Bill will now give that woman and many other women similarly placed an opportunity of enjoying comradeship and companionship hitherto denied them under the law——

But the Bill does not apply to Scotland, or to Northern Ireland?

I really give up the hon. Member.

Read the Bill.

It has been amended.

I am sorry to have to be dragged into this sort of controversy with someone who obviously does not understand what the Bill as amended seeks to do. I cannot spare the blushes of my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald). He has conducted the Bill with marked skill, tact and devotion, ably assisted now and again by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller). Both of them deserve the thanks of the House and of all women who are, or will be, affected by the Bill.

Like the hon. Member for Moseley (Sir P. Hannon), I cannot join with unrestrained enthusiasm the congratulations which are being offered to the promoters of the Bill. I hasten to say that my reasons for modified enthusiasm are quite different from his: his views are entitled to respect, but I believe that they represent the feelings of a minority.

The problem which always faces us in devising any amendment of the law of divorce is that any amendment must inevitably make divorce easier for certain people who are hardly treated under the existing law. That is inevitable, and the promoters of this Bill are to be congratulated to this extent, that they have brought forward a Bill the avowed object of which is to amend the law relating to divorce without incurring that measure of controversy which normally arises when the subject of divorce is raised in this House. It may well be that they have obviated a certain amount of controversy by designating the Bill the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, which, of course, does not convey anything to the public. It would have been less disingenuous on the part of the promoters if this Bill had been called the Divorce Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill.

The hon. and gallant Member will see, if he reads the whole Bill, that it deals not only with divorce but also with the law relating to wards of court. It would be difficult to call it a divorce law reform Bill since it deals with children as well.

The only Clause in the Bill which does not necessarily, although it may, affect the law relating to divorce is Clause 6, to which the hon. and learned Member has referred. In other words, seven out of the eight Clauses in the Bill amend the law relating to divorce, so the question of wards of court is only incidental. The main object is to provide facilities to men and women, who are denied them at present, for securing release from a matrimonial tie which would otherwise be indissoluble.

The hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General have both been far too modest about the nature and the scope of the Bill. They have endeavoured to persuade the House that it is of limited scope, and that no drastic changes are involved. The fact is, however, that the Bill introduces important changes in the law of divorce, and to that extent it must be welcomed by all those who take an interest in this serious social problem.

I will not involve myself in the argument which took place between hon. Members and the Attorney-General on the use of Private Member's time, or the extent to which controversial issues may or may not be raised. I will only say that I prefer to accept the view of the hon. Members who objected to his interpretation, because they have long experience and speak with greater knowledge of that aspect of our Parliamentary procedure than my right hon. and learned Friend can possibly have acquired. I congratulate the promoters of the Bill on the extent to which they have made divorce easier for what is bound to be a fair number of people, because otherwise it would not have been worth while bringing in this Bill at all. Now that the country has probably realised that the Bill introduces changes in our divorce law and makes it easier for unfortunate victims to obtain their release, I hope that artificial opposition will not be whipped up outside by those who object to divorce in principle, whatever the grounds may be.

For reasons to which I cannot refer I, like the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald), have received a large number of letters from people associated with the Bill to which, like him, because of their very numbers, it has been quite impossible for me to reply. What has taken place clearly indicates that a substantial majority of people and a large number of hon. Members of the House are interested in divorce law reform. They want to see changes brought about in the divorce law and they will welcome the extent to which this Bill makes divorce easier for unfortunate men and women. I hope, too, that it will persuade the authorities concerned in the matter that a Bill of this limited scope does not go anywhere near solving the problem. I trust that the discussion which has taken place on this Bill will have convinced the authorities concerned that the sooner a Royal Commission is appointed to go into the whole problem the better it will be, instead of dealing with this difficult subject in the piecemeal way in which this House has been compelled to deal with it during recent months. At present, the law of divorce in this country is such a mixture of humbug and inhumanity that even the modest proposals contained in this Bill will be welcomed.

In the interests of international amity, and in order to preserve the balance of power, the voice of Scotland should at least be heard in this Debate because, by virtue of an Amendment which was carried this morning, I should point out for the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Western Renfrew (Mr. Scollan) that the Bill applies to a limited extent to Scotland, although it does not apply to Northern Ireland. It applies in toto to England and also to the Isle of Wight which, no doubt, will increase the attraction of that place as a holiday resort.

There are one or two misconceptions which it is desirable should be removed. Although I speak particularly from the point of view of Scotland, I shall deal first with the general position and then with a misconception which the hon. Member for Moseley (Sir P. Hannon) revealed in his speech, and I am sure he will be glad to hear the explanation I have to give in that respect. The extension of the grounds of jurisdiction, which forms the first Clause of this Bill, applied in the first instance only to England and, as I said during the discussion on the Amendment, it had to be considered in relation to Scotland.

Whatever views may be held in Scotland on the merits of that Clause—and there may be different views—I think there will be an almost unanimous opinion that if the extent of jurisdiction is increased in England, it would be anomalous if that increase were not also extended to Scotland. Again, as I pointed out during the discussion on the Amendment, it would have led to serious repercussions and difficulties in international law as between two countries, and might well have resulted in the Scottish courts not being able to recognise a decree of divorce granted under circumstances in which the case had been brought into court under the provisions of Clause 1 of this Bill. So, manifestly, it was not only socially but legally desirable that we should have uniformity.

The hon. Member for Moseley deprecated this introduction of further extension of grounds of divorce. I would point out quite seriously that there is no extension of the grounds of divorce in this Bill. What the promoters of the Bill have done is to extend the grounds of jurisdiction, but the grounds of divorce remain identically the same as they were prior to the introduction of the Bill. The Bill merely makes it possible for women in certain circumstances to have recourse to the courts both in England and in Scotland for divorce, but their grounds for divorce must be exactly the same as those which appertained heretofore.

Would the Lord Advocate not agree that the extension of jurisdiction must, inevitably, extend the facilities?

I think that the hon. Gentleman is confusing the two points: namely, the extension of jurisdiction and the extension of the grounds of divorce. I concede that it will be possible for people to have recourse to courts in this country for divorce who would not hitherto have had that advantage and who might have had to go elsewhere to seek their remedy. But there has been no extension of the grounds on which divorce can be granted. That is an important distinction.

Moreover, there is nothing novel in this departure, because, as the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) would, I am sure, agree, this is merely an extension of a principle that has been recognised in our law hitherto. In England, by the 1937 Act, the ordinary rule of jurisdiction based on domicile was departed from in the cases of desertion; and in Scotland, although it did not form part of any statutory law, the common law of jurisdiction was exactly the same. Although a woman had been deserted by her husband, say, in Scotland, and her husband had gone abroad and acquired a new domicile, she was able to bring her action for divorce in the Scottish courts on the ground of desertion because the husband had been domiciled in Scotland at the date of the commencement of the matrimonial offence.

In 1944, the Matrimonial Causes Act gave to the wives of foreigners the right of access to the courts in this country under certain conditions, albeit that their husbands were not domiciled in this country. Accordingly, there has been a historical departure in England, at least, since 1937, and in Scotland prior to that date, from the old rule that domicile, and domicile alone, provided jurisdiction in our courts. Therefore, the Bill is merely extending to certain other people in, perhaps, circumstances as equally difficult as those we have already recognised in our law hitherto, the right of access to the court, but the grounds of action must remain exactly the same.

It may be thought, as the result of the introduction of this extended jurisdiction to England and the consequential consideration of the matter in relation to Scotland, that people in Scotland, who will welcome this provision, owe a debt of gratitude to the English people who had introduced this Measure. It is not for me to try to prevent any flow of that international concordat between the two countries or any expression of gratitude, but in case it may be thought to be rather one-sided, may I point out that, by virtue of Clause 5 of the Bill, England is now adopting by statutory enactment what has always been the common law of Scotland. As I pointed out to the hon. and learned Gentleman when we were considering this matter upstairs, I appreciate that very much; it is very encouraging, because I am quite sure that if the people skilled in jurisprudence south of the Border are sufficiently careful and industrious and care to look further into this matter, there are many other improvements which they could make in the law of England by a further study of the law of Scotland. I hope this is merely an indication of the great missionary work we may be able to carry out.

I deeply agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I am sure there are many Members of this House who wish that he would direct his obvious abilities and energies towards persuading his Socialist colleagues to spend more time on improving the law of England in the manner he suggests instead of spoiling it in the manner in which they are doing.

As Confucius once said, it is a question of perspective and ethics. Confucius said many other things, but hon. Members will pardon me if I do not refer to them in the House. By following the Scottish principle, therefore, whatever may be our views of the merits, I think there is a recognition that by our joint efforts we may improve the law of the corresponding countries.

I must take up a point which was raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir T. Moore). I do not know exactly what he meant, but it is rather unfortunate if he conveyed the impression that any Law Officers give advice to people to live in sin. My recollection is the same as that of the hon. and learned Member for Daventry, that when the hon. and gallant Member referred to this matter upstairs he said that that was his own personal advice to the client. It is something which he should not wish to publicise too much. But he tried to qualify it by an expression which I did not quite understand—I do not know how one lives in sin, although not in so many words. That is exactly the manner in which he put it, but I am not inviting him to explain it further. It seemed rather strange advice that he was giving to his client.

There is one further point I should like to mention. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) is no longer present. It relates to the point raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General in connection with Private Members' Bills. I think he made it quite clear in his intervention exactly what he meant and that he was in no way denigrating the right of the House or of Private Members to put forward their Bills in whatever manner they wished; but he was pointing out that in the time remaining at our disposal in the time-table for these Bills, to introduce any matter of a deep constitutional, legal, social and moral implication was something to which justice could not be given in the time available under our present time-table. Without going into any of the merits of the case, I am quite sure that the particular matter which gave rise to that discussion, arising out of an Amendment which was not called, is merely typical of the thing to which he was referring. An Amendment of that nature, involving as it does not only legal, but social and moral, repercussions, would have given rise to long, passionate and involved Debates which could not possibly have run within the time-table at our disposal.

What the Attorney-General said, I think, was that the House would not wish to have a controversial issue of that kind discussed in the circumstances to which my right hon. and learned Friend has Just referred, and it was then pointed out to him that the House had had no opportunity of expressing a view on that particular statement.

Obviously, the reason why my right hon. and learned Friend said that was because the House is very jealous of the powers which it possesses and would not lightly introduce into legislation any fundamental changes of the nature contemplated without full and adequate consideration. My right hon. and learned Friend felt, as I think, a lot of us felt, that matters of that nature could not be given adequate consideration by the House at its various stages in the time allotted to us under the existing procedure, because—it was obvious from the Debate this morning—there are many people who would have taken conflicting views about this. Even some of the people who were prepared to accept, and do accept, the extension of jurisdiction contained in the Bill, might very well oppose wholeheartedly and bitterly any extension of the grounds of divorce, which is an entirely different matter. Accordingly, I feel that the matter was enlarged completely out of its proper perspective and that a great deal attributed to my right hon. and learned Friend was not justified in its context.

I wish to make one answer to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne. He stated categorically that it was not usual for the Government to put on the Whips on a Private Member's Bill, and that the Government were not in the habit of taking sides or giving a lead or directions. That is not so, because I have had researches made and I find that in the Betting (Juvenile Messengers) (Scotland) Bill, 1928, the Government Whips were put on at the Report stage, and perhaps some of the older Members will have a recollection of that. Accordingly, I should not like it to go unchallenged that the Government do not reserve the right to put on the Whips, or the Opposition do not reserve the right to put on the Whips, in relation to a Private Member's Bill, particularly, in the case of the Government, if they feel that the purposes of the Bill are adverse to the public interest. The Government must always preserve that right, because, if they do not, they are denying themselves the right, the duty and the obligation to be responsible for the proper administration of and legislation in this country.

I am very much obliged for the commentary which the right hon. and learned Gentleman made on my protest, but that does not modify my attitude in the slightest degree.

That is quite understandable, if I may say so. As I said, had we gone on to the wider question, many divergent views might have been heard from both sides, but, in so far as we are concerned with the contents of this Bill and the limited extension of jurisdiction, so far as I am concerned as a Law Officer for Scotland, it is something which has more or less received universal acceptance upstairs, in this House, and in the Committee of Legal Reform to which I remitted the matter.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 27, at the beginning, to insert:

"In order to remove doubts it is hereby declared that."

I do not think that at this stage we need take a great deal of time in considering this Amendment, but I have to move it again as a pure technicality, if I may so describe the Rules of the House. The House had a fairly full discussion on it when we met last Friday. Perhaps it would be for the convenience of the House to discuss at the same time the third of the Amendments standing in the names of my hon. Friends the Member for North Islington (Dr. Guest) and the Member for Coatbridge (Mrs. Mann) and myself, in page 2, line 30, to leave out "shall be," and to insert "is." The object of the Amendment, which we canvassed at some length on the last occasion on which this Bill was before us, is to make certain that the law is made apparent and that there is no question that there has been any illegal activity by a midwife in administering analgesia prior to the passing of this Bill, supposing that the House gives it its Third Reading.

The course of our proceedings has shown how wise were those of us who insisted last week on investigating these matters thoroughly. I do not object to the fact that some of my hon. Friends felt that I should perhaps speak rather longer than I had intended on the matter, but as we canvassed it so thoroughly last week, I will not say any more now.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 28, to leave out from the beginning to "by" in line 29 and to insert, "the manner approved."

It may be convenient at the same time to consider the Amendment in line 31, to leave out from "accordance" to the end of line 33, and to insert "therewith."

I hope the House will not think I am delaying matters if I say a word or two upon this Amendment, which raises a rather different point from any discussed last week. As the hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft) will appreciate, the difficulty of the Clause as drafted is that if a midwife has been instructed in one form of analgesia, she is then entitled to administer any form. That is clearly not what the hon. Gentleman intended. Now we have removed that in the first Clause by the Amendment with reference to the rules; and it is most undesirable that this Clause should deal with any certified midwife who has received instruction in accordance with the rules. It may well be that the Board would secure the training of a midwife in these matters by methods other than by rules. We have heard criticisms from hon. Member opposite about working to rules, but they would appear to wish to make it a statutory duty for midwives at any rate to work to rules. We propose in this case to leave out all reference to midwives working to rules, so that the Clause would now read:

"In order to remove doubts it is hereby declared that any certified midwife who has received instruction in the manner approved by the Board in the administration of analgesia to women in childbirth shall be entitled to administer analgesia in accordance therewith."

I hope that the House will accept this Amendment without very long discussion so that we can be in a position to deal with the whole issue of the Third Reading, on which more serious points do arise.

I beg to second the Amendment. I would refer also to the Amendment in page 2, line 30, to leave out "shall be" and to insert "is." so that the Clause would read:

"… women in childbirth is entitled …"

I was reading the Clause without prejudging the decision of the House in regard to that Amendment.

I think they are all consequential and minor Amendments.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 30, to leave out "shall be," and to insert "is."

This is consequential on the Amendment to line 27 which the House has already made.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 31, to leave out from "accordance," to the end of line 33, and to insert "therewith."

This Amendment is consequential on the Amendment to page 2, line 28, which the House has already accepted.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 2, to leave out lines 42 and 43.

This is a drafting Amendment. It is no longer necessary to define the local health authority, as there is no reference to the local health authority left in the Bill.

I beg to second the Amendment.

Before we part with this Amendment, I should like to call attention to the fact that originally this was a Bill to deal with local authorities. That was the Bill to which, in the main, the House gave its Second reading. It is now, to say the least of it, in a slightly odd position. We have now reached the stage of leaving out the definition of a local authority, so little have the powers of the local authority to do with the matter. I think that the attention of the House should be called to the great alterations which have taken place in the Bill and of which this Amendment is, so to speak, a visible sign.

May I point out that this is precisely the point to which I called attention on Second Reading, but the definition is now being taken out on the Motion of the hon. Member opposite.

I hesitated to rise to speak first, because I naturally expected that the hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft) would take the opportunity of saying a few words as to why we should accept the Bill in its present condition. He has perhaps thought the position is not defensible and has hesitated to do so.

I suggest that the House should refuse to pass this Bill on three grounds. The first of those grounds is that it is based on a legal misapprehension as to what is the law, or, indeed, what was the law. It is also based on an incomplete study of what the leading Members of the party of the hon. Member for Monmouth said on the same matter when considering it on a previous occasion. Secondly, I suggest this Bill should not be accepted because it was carried through Committee and advocated in this House on arguments which can be shown not to be correct and by allegations which were completely unfounded. In view of the fact that in one particular case a hospital has been blackguarded in the public Press, I hope that the House will permit me to deal in some detail with the type of arguments which the hon. Gentleman saw fit to put before the House. The third ground is that it would hinder rather than help the administration of analgesia.

I should like to make an appeal to my hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning). I hope that she will consider my arguments. As I said in Committee, I always feel that if I find myself going into the same Lobby as hon. Members opposite, perhaps I am doing something wrong, but if I do not find myself going into the same Lobby as my hon. Friend the Member for Epping I am also in doubt as to my political attitude. I hope that she will not put anyone into a difficulty so that we shall have to choose between her view and the contrary, if the House does not accept the argument which I am about to advance without going to a Division.

Before I come to deal with the argument, perhaps I might be in Order in making one general remark. There has been a concerted attack made throughout the Press of the country on the political honesty of hon. Members who oppose this Bill. There is no reason why the point of view of those who oppose this Bill should not be properly considered. I should like to give the House one example of this kind of irresponsible attack. I know that the hon. Member for Monmouth always takes the view, and I am sure that he sincerely holds it, that he did not introduce this Measure for any party purpose. He thought, "Here is a wrong, and I am the man to set it right." I am certain that that is the position. But what has happened is that he has allowed himself to be used for purely party purposes. I will give one example. Mr. A. J. Cummings, who is usually a reasonably fair critic, so misunderstands the matter, and indeed our Parliamentary procedure, that last Tuesday he wrote:

"So Mr. Peter Thorneycroft's valuable and inexpensive Analgesia in Childbirth Bill has been talked out.…

Of course, that is perfectly untrue. It was not talked out. The House took a reasonable time for its consideration and we are now entering on Third Reading with a reasonable time in which to consider the matter. Mr. Cummings said:

"So Mr. Peter Thorneycroft's valuable and inexpensive Analgesia in Childbirth Bill has been talked out, though it had the support originally of members of all parties and the majority of the House."

Of course, there was a majority of the House in favour of the principle of analgesia. Indeed, the work done by the Minister of Health in that field shows that, but as it can be seen by the votes in the Standing Committee against rather dubious legal proposals contained in this Bill, the Bill has not that support. Mr. Cummings continued:

"But Mr. Bevan, a victim of stubborn party prejudice, and jealous of his own authority, would not have the Bill at any price. He had little support in the Press, apart from one of his cronies who nearly burst his blood vessels in defence of the Minister. This has been an unpleasant business, which women in general are not likely to forget."

Such is the party appeal made against this Government who have done more for analgesia than any other Government. Fortunately, I think that the majority of hon. Members realised that their duty is, as Burke said, to give to their constituents not only their diligence—if one looks round the Chamber today, there are perhaps some hon. Members who interpret that in a rather liberal sense—but their judgment as well. I appeal to hon. Members to consider this Bill in its actual realities and not on the basis of any possible misrepresentation of their actions which may appear in the Press if they oppose it.

I come to my first point, which is that this Bill was, and is, based on a complete legal misapprehension. The hon. Member for Monmouth came to the conclusion that the Minister of Health was acting illegally in arranging for the administration of analgesia. In order to bolster his position he obtained counsel's opinion. Not only did he obtain the opinion of an English counsel, but he obtained the opinion of a Scottish counsel as well. Both these eminent legal authorities gave to the hon. Member for Monmouth the opinion that what had been done to relieve women in childbirth was quite wrong and improper. If the hon. Member for Monmouth has such a great devotion for the law, he ought to take proceedings and have the procedure prohibited by the Minister. That was not the view of his own party. In both the English and Scottish National Health Acts, in Part III, there is a description of the duties of local health authorities.

On a point of Order. I do not wish to curtail the observations of the hon. Gentleman, but could he say in what part of the Bill these references to the law relating to local health authorities are made? As far as I know, there is no reference to local health authorities in the Bill.

I do not think that that is a point of Order. The hon. Gentleman may make the references if he cares to.

If I might reply to that point, I would say that one has some difficulty in dealing with this Bill at all. It was commended to the House for a certain set of reasons, and now the hon. Member for Monmouth says that the arguments put forward, the reasons given and the documents adduced do not refer to the Bill now, because all the matters they referred to have been removed from it. Perhaps I might continue on this line——

Might I seek your guidance, Mr. Deputy-Speaker? I think it might help us in our later discussions. As I understand the rules of Order relating to the Third Reading of a Bill, one must direct one's remarks to what is in the Bill and not to what has been cut out or what one thinks ought to have been put in.

That is true, but the hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing), as far as I understand him, is saying that what is in the Bill is not necessary and he is proceeding to give his reasons.

I am not seeking to curtail discussion in any way but, if I might refer to what has been cut out, there was an important Clause in the Bill which dealt with the duties of a local health authority. It is perfectly true, as the hon. Gentleman said, that counsel's opinion was taken. The Clause was argued about in two Committees upstairs, but it is no longer in the Bill. There is no reference to it anywhere. If we were all to embark upon a long discussion as to whether I was right or wrong in the views I expressed upstairs about a Clause which is no longer in the Bill, I think that we should get very wide of a Third Reading Debate.

I will listen very carefully to what the hon. Member for Hornchurch says.

I do not want to take up too much time on what is a technical point, but in the main this Bill has three Clauses, one of which merely declares the law, that the midwife is entitled to administer analgesia. The second deals with hospitals other than hospitals in the control of the Minister, and when one deals with Clause 1 one is involved in the whole business of the Minister's powers. One can see where the Minister stands from subsection (3)—one of the subsections which we did not remove. There it is stated:

"The Minister may after consultation with the Board made before the expiry of the period of four years mentioned in subsection (1) of this section extend that period for such further period or periods as he thinks fit."

If I am wrong, I will leave the point but, as I understood it, the argument of the hon. Member for Monmouth—and he was fortified by the opinion of counsel—was that up till now the Minister did not possess the powers. I thought that we would not be asked to include such a provision if, in the opinion of the hon. Gentleman, the Minister already had the powers.

The whole discussion about these powers took place on an entirely different matter, which was the giving by the local health authorities of the apparatus, the transport and the drugs to domiciliary midwives. I think it is most regrettable that that Clause was not carried, but at any rate we cannot debate it now. The Clause to which the hon. Member for Hornchurch is referring deals with an entirely different matter, which is a matter which could be argued—the question of training for midwives.

I do not want to delay the House unnecessarily and, therefore, if it is to be argued that the powers given to the Minister in subsection (3) of Clause 1 are powers which he already possesses, if it is to be said that that is the argument, then I will leave it at that point. It seems to me to be a strong argument against Clause 1, for Clause 1 is unnecessary if the Minister already possesses those powers. If the hon. Member for Monmouth says that he took counsel's opinion, and counsel agreed with him, on a matter which has now been taken out of the Bill, but that he is not fortified by the counsel's opinion on this matter, then I think he has a very poor case for this Clause on its merits. If he could not secure the same opinion from the same counsel who was so definite on the one matter, then I think that is an argument against this Clause. I do not want to detain the House on this Clause because I think—and the hon. Member would probably admit it—that, as it stands, it means very little indeed and the real point of the Bill and the real Clause with which we have to deal is Clause 2.

Perhaps I may, therefore, leave this Clause and turn to deal with Clause 2, with the Bill generally and with the methods by which the Bill was supported. The Bill was supported in this House on Second Reading, and particularly in Committee and when we discussed the matter in regard to other possible amend- ments to the Health Service Acts, by arguments in detail, put forward by the hon. Member for Monmouth, which he could have discovered were not in accordance with the facts but which he, in a perfectly reckless way, failed to check in any form whatever.

I will not weary the House with a long description of this, but I will take one argument in detail—that which the hon. Member presented to the Committee upstairs in favour of Clause 2 and of the Bill; and I will compare that argument with the actual facts. The hon. Member read a letter and after he had read it he said:

"That is one of the reasons the sponsors had in mind for putting forward a Bill of this kind."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee E, 28th June, 1949; c. 118.]

He used the letter to justify this Clause. I will read the letter to the House and I will then give the House what I believe to be the true facts in this matter. The letter purported to have come from a lady who had been a patient in a hospital, and it said——

I am sorry to interrupt again, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but the letter which the hon. Member is now about to read and my statement—which he reads quite correctly, and I do not quarrel with his wish to do so—referred to something which has nothing whatever to do with anything now in the Bill. It dealt with the question of the supply of apparatus at one of the Minister's hospitals. I shall not argue whether it was right or wrong, but the House took the view that the Minister's hospitals should be cut right out of the Bill. Therefore, as I understand the Rules of Order, we can no longer discuss the merits of whether they ought to be in the Bill or whether they ought to be out of the Bill. I think I am right when I say we have to restrict ourselves to what is in the Bill. There has been a certain amount of controversy, and I feel that we should now restrict ourselves to what is the Bill—the training of midwives and the supply of apparatus at non-Ministry hospitals.

Up to the time of the interruption, the hon. Member for Hornchurch had not indicated at all that he was not referring to what was in the Clause. If the hon. Member for Monmouth is right on the facts, he is also right on the matter of Order.

With great respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I urge with some force that that is an absolutely monstrous point of Order. The hon. Member for Monmouth never once referred to this hospital as being a Ministry hospital. He knows perfectly well, or he should have done, that the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Linstead), who sat in the same Committee, was the chairman of the management board of that hospital. He referred to hospitals as a whole.

On a point of Order. The hon. Member for Horn-church has now worked in the statement that some hospital of which I made some criticism was a hospital of which my hon. Friend the Member for Putney was chairman. The same point was tried upstairs in Committee and was there ruled out of Order. I can give the hon. Member for Hornchurch an assurance that it refers to a Ministry hospital—and I think he will accept that—and therefore any reference to it is plainly out of Order. I ask for a clear Ruling, otherwise we shall be involved in a long discussion on side issues.

I have already given a Ruling along those lines. If the hon. Member's letter referred to a Ministry hospital it does not refer to Clause 2. I ask the hon. Member for Hornchurch whether that is so or not.

Perhaps I may refer to what was said by the hon. Member for Monmouth in the Debate immediately after he quoted this letter. He said:

"That is one of the reasons the sponsors had in mind for putting forward a Bill of this kind. Her case is countered by someone who is given analgesia. I think every hospital in the country ought to be under an obligation to have the necessary apparatus and under an obligation to have that apparatus in working order."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee E, 28th June, 1949, c. 118.]

The hon. Member said, "every hospital in the country." It is quite true that we have excluded hospitals run by the Ministry, but this letter was put forward not as an argument that the Ministry's hospitals should have them but, in the words of the hon. Member himself, that "every hospital in the country ought to … have the necessary apparatus." That was reported in the Press. I will not trouble the House at length, because if I made the point of Order in full I should be compelled to read the whole Debate of the Committee. I hope the House will take it from me that I am not trying to make an unfair point when I say that this was a discussion on a Clause which was dealing with——

Was it related to the Clause in the Bill or not?

Yes, with great respect, it was.

Perhaps I put the question wrongly. I should have said, is it referring to a Clause which is in the Bill as it now stands before the House on Third Reading?

With great respect, I think it is. It was concerning an Amendment which was, in fact, dealing with the whole question of this Clause. The hon. Member for Monmouth was discussing the possible effects of leaving out maternity homes and discussing the definition of hospitals as contained in this Clause. It seems to me, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, with great respect, that it was, in fact, the only argument adduced in Committee which dealt with hospitals. Although this is not strictly relevant to the Debate, if we look at the Second Reading of the Bill to amend the National Health Service Act, we find that the same letter was there quoted to justify a somewhat similar Amendment with somewhat similar provisions.

I feel that if this Clause is said to be necessary because there is something wrong with every hospital in the country, then the letter which was read by the hon. Member and used to defend the argument dealing with every hospital in the country, and saying they ought to be provided with this apparatus, surely is relevant, particularly, if I may say so, when it was one of the few concrete arguments put forward by the hon. Member for Monmouth to sustain his case. Let me proceed now to read the letter.

On a point of Order. The Clause as it originally stood applied to all hospitals—that is, the great majority of them, because now, under the National Health Service, they are Ministry hospitals. The Clause was amended to apply to hospitals other than hospitals in the control of the Minister. Originally, naturally, most of the arguments were directed to Ministry hospitals, because they formed the larger part of the field. I submit, with great respect, that now we could not possibly start adducing all over again all the arguments, with all the figures of apparatus and of analgesia, about Ministry hospitals, and that we should not seek to discuss any particular one. The field is now a much narrower one. The Bill applies now only to what one may call small private maternity homes. They form the field now. I suggest, with great respect, that if we once start to cover all the hospitals again, we shall be treating something not in the Bill.

I think that the hon. Gentleman is wrong in taking this technical point of view. The private hospitals outside the control of the Minister, such as he was speaking of, deal with a large number of different things. They may be dealing with invalid children, they may be dealing with the mentally defective, they may be dealing with foreign seamen. I think the point is much wider than the hon. Gentleman suggests.

I hope that this point of Order is not to be taken any further. We have to consider, if I may say so to hon. Gentlemen opposite, that we must not use our great powers as Members of Parliament to frighten the people of this country, particularly the mothers of this country, and particularly mothers in childbirth in this country, by suggesting that they will be treated in an improper way when they go into hospital. The argument for this Bill is that they will be so treated. To justify that argument the hon. Gentleman quoted a letter alleging some such ill treatment had happened, and went on to say in very positive language, "I think every hospital in the country ought to be under the obligation—" and so on. He has now brought in a Bill in which he says he means only to put in some hospitals. I wish to deal with the argument he used in regard to that hospital. Rather than let me do so, he seeks to insist on a technical point of Order. It may result in its going out from this House that there was some little substance in the reckless charges the hon. Gentleman made against hospitals both privately owned and publicly. Let me deal with the charges. They were these. The hon. Gentleman read this letter from a paper. If he had wanted to do so, he could have got up and interrupted in Committee, but he did not, and nor did the hon. Member for Putney indicate that he was the chairman of the Committee. This letters runs:

"I was in St. James's Hospital, Balham, and was kept in Ward S, where waiting mothers are, until 10 minutes before baby came. By the time I was directed to the labour ward and given the machine the baby was born after one more pain. This means that I was in labour until——"

May I ask the hon. Gentleman whether this hospital is a Ministry hospital or not?

It is under the Ministry. If the argument was put forward by the hon. Gentleman without disclosing that it was a Ministry hospital, and if he used that argument to condemn hospitals——

The reason I did not stop the hon. Gentleman before was that I did not know what the letter contained. I heard his quotations from another hon. Gentleman's speech, namely, that all hospitals in the country ought to be covered. The hon. Gentleman cannot now quote a letter specifically referring to St. James's Hospital, Balham, which is, he now informs me, a Ministry hospital.

The point I was going to put was that the facts in this letter are all untrue—all of them.

That may be so or not. Of course, I know nothing about that. However, that letter refers to a Ministry hospital, and so it cannot be quoted any further, for it would be out of Order.

Without transgressing your Ruling, Sir, may I continue the argument in this form? This just shows the utter recklessness of the hon. Gentleman opposite, who proceeds to use an argument directed against a Ministry hospital and takes advantage of a point of Order to prevent the counter argument being made.

I would point out to my hon. Friend that he knows very well that, as the Clause stood at that time, it referred to all hospitals, and that, therefore, there was no obligation on the hon. Gentleman who introduced this Bill to say whether the hospital was a Ministry hospital or whether it was a private hospital, because all hospitals were then covered by the Clause. My hon. Friend knows that very well.

In that case, perhaps, Sir, you would reconsider the Ruling which you gave, because if that was so—and we are told so by a leading Member of the Committee—surely this Clause was being considered——

Not at all. That Clause is not in the Bill now. It was then.

Perhaps, it may be looked at from another point or view. The Amendment which dealt with this particular matter was on the Paper. Indeed, I think it was discussed.

That does not arise on the Third Reading of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman must confine himself to the Clauses as they are in the Bill. I understand he is dealing with Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 seriatim, and he must confine himself to the argument whether he likes those Clauses or not.

I accept that Ruling, of course. I was only trying to answer a rather confused point.

Not very successfully, if I may say so.

I will leave that matter for the moment. Perhaps, I may just say this. There is no evidence adduced at all in regard to private hospitals—no evidence adduced by the hon. Gentleman with regard to them at all. If there is any impression in the public mind that there is anything wrong with the hospitals, it is induced by evidence brought forward to deal with a Government hospital—evidence which hon. Members on the opposite side took no occasion to deal with, when it was open to them to do so.

The hon. Gentleman must not go along this line any further.

On a point of Order. As I am, by inference, expressly challenged by the last remark of the hon. Gentleman, let me say that I did make an attempt to take part in the discussion on this point in Committee, and was ruled out of Order by the Chairman of the Committee for the reason, Sir, that you are ruling this to be out of Order in this House today.

I think the hon. Member for Hornchurch now understands the limitations on the Debate.

I appreciate that, and do not want to appear to be challenging any Ruling. However, I think I am entitled to say in general that it was a most unfortunate way in which the case for this was put.

The hon. Gentleman has said that quite often now, and must not repeat himself.

He has said it since the beginning of the Bill.

Let me turn now to the way in which Clause 2, which, I think, is the only operative Clause in the Measure, works. The House can see that it is to be the duty

"… of every person having the control or management of a hospital within the meaning of the National Health Service Act, 1946, other than a hospital vested in the Minister to secure—

(a) that sufficient apparatus of a type approved by the Board …"

is at all times available therein in a state of efficiency for the supply of analgesia to women who desire it in childbirth and are accommodated in the hospital. In other words, every hospital which is controlled by the Ministry must have analgesia apparatus of a type approved by the Ministry, and have it ready for use in case the hospital accommodates any women who may be in childbirth.

The only thing that the Clause does not make absolutely clear is what is a hospital within the meaning of the National Health Service Act. I ought to tell the House what is a hospital within the meaning of that Act. The Act says a hospital is

"any institution for the reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness or mental defectiveness, any maternity home, and any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or persons requiring medical rehabilitation, and includes clinics, dispensaries, and out-patient departments maintained in connection with any such institution or home as aforesaid, and 'hospital accommodation' shall be construed accordingly."

What this House is saying is that, in the name of humanity, we should enact that the comparatively limited supply of analgesia apparatus shall be distributed over a large number of institutions, which do not require it. I have been looking into some of the hospitals. I find that very properly the Roman Catholic Church maintains a hospital for aged priests, who are infirm. It is to help the mothers of this country that the hon. Gentleman and his Friends demand that we should send a supply of analgesia apparatus—and not a museum type but a type approved by the Minister—to such places, and it shall be constantly ready for any miracle that might occur.

I am loath to interrupt the hon. Gentleman's brilliant wit, but has he correctly read this particular Clause? He will see that if he omits certain words that the apparatus is:

"for the administration of analgesia to women who … are accommodated in the hospital."

The hospital with which my hon. Friend is dealing, would not be included in that since women are not accommodated in it, and the purposes for which it would be required therefore would be nil.

Might I suggest that there would be nurses in such a hospital, and they would need accommodation when they are sick.

That again illustrates the difficulties we are continually up against in this Bill. The wording of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Monmouth is so obscure that possibly it may mean what he thinks, but that is the farthest that one could possibly go. If one looks at it from the strictly legal point of view, the Clause is governed by the opening words, and all the other words must be construed in accordance with them. The opening words are:

"It shall be the duty of every person having the control or management of a hospital within the meaning of the National Health Service Act, 1946 …"

There are no exceptions to that. My hon. Friends know how very difficult it has been to frame an Amendment to deal with this problem. It is impossible to cure it in an effective way by altering the definition of a hospital. The principle has been decided by the Committee and I hope, after all this, that we are not going back on what the Committee decided in relation to the Clause. The Clause lays down an absolute duty on persons having control of hospitals. It is quite clear that they are not compelled once the apparatus has been secured, to make it available to anyone else but a mother in childbirth. That is reasonable, but it does not prevent all institutions from having the apparatus always there.

I agree that there is an absolute duty, but an absolute duty to do what? It is:

"to secure … a sufficient supply … of analgesia to women … who are accommodated in the hospital."

If no women are accommodated in the hospital then "sufficient apparatus" is not necessary.

With great respect, I do not want to be engaged in long arguments with hon. Members and so delay unnecessarily a decision on this matter, but we cannot interpret this obligation imposed by an Act of Parliament so as not to supply any apparatus at all. If an absolute obligation is enforced on everyone it must mean that there must be some apparatus. It may be said that in the particular home which I have mentioned the need for it will not be as great as say as in Queen Charlotte's, but the obligation remains. The position is really an absurd one.

I do not know if the hon. Gentleman the Member for Monmouth is going to give an undertaking that if the Bill receives a Third Reading this will be altered in another place, or whether it is possible to make out what is the real object of this Clause, because, of course, the Clause goes a great deal further than that. It also says that not only must there be a sufficient supply of apparatus but that it must be of a type approved by the Board. The type of apparatus approved by the Board is very simple, and is designed for use by midwives without a doctor being present.

There are privately-run maternity homes, and we all know that some women go there because they do not have sufficient faith in the National Health Service, and so that they can be attended by their own physicians. These are many gynaecologists who have an infinitely varied apparatus for the administration of analgesia, anaesthetic or anything of that sort. If I might use a phrase which would readily spring to the lips of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels), ex hypothesi, that apparatus is a type which is far more complicated than the apparatus approved by the Board. The latter apparatus is very simple, because if it were not it would not be possible for an unqualified person to administer it. People go to maternity homes so as to avoid analgesia from that type of apparatus. They think that that is not sufficient in their particular case.

What would be the effect of this Amendment? Not only would it lock away a great quantity of apparatus in homes run for clergymen and for children, in foot clinics and places of that sort, but it would also be available in such places where women are constantly in childbirth, such as maternity homes. That is one place where it would not be needed, because those homes are run on the basis that they do not use the National Health Service apparatus, but use something which is special to their own doctors and which they believe is far superior, as possibly it might be. So it must be remembered that under the Bill as it now stands, this apparatus would be sent to maternity homes which do not require it, and to other places where, ex hypothesi, it is not needed.

The hon. Gentleman has developed his point at such length and with great accomplishment, and perhaps he will help me with another point, because I do not think he has finished with the position as it arises here. It is a well-known fact that analgesia apparatus is commonly used for other purposes than childbirth. It is very helpful if used for opening a superficial abscess and for setting a simple fracture in the case of the aged—in the case of greenstick fractures in particular.

The hon. Member seems to be making a speech.

I will come immediately to the question I wish to ask my hon. Friend. Does he believe it is an argument against the Clause that none of this type of apparatus will be refused because of the inherent other diverse uses I have mentioned?

The difficulty of this Clause is that when there is a comparatively limited amount of analgesia apparatus, it is provided that it shall be distributed in places where it may not be needed. I should have thought the first priority was that it should be available for mothers in childbirth. It indi- cates that this Bill, with whatever good intentions it was introduced, will result in less apparatus being available in the places where it is needed.

When we look at the Clause further, we find that a heavy penalty of £10 is imposed for each day of failure to comply with its provisions. Suppose there is a small maternity home with five or six beds run by a retired matron. She may have a physician who arranges to attend her private maternity home from which she makes a small competence. What is the position of a woman of that sort who has always used the apparatus belonging to the physician, if someone comes down and suddenly discovers after a year or so that she has not the apparatus of the type approved by the Ministry of Health? She will be liable to a fine of over £3,000, not for not providing adequate analgesia, but merely for not having an inferior type in her opinion and the opinion of her medical adviser who runs the home. The House should not be asked to pass legislation of that sort.

It is a great mistake that the hon. Member for Monmouth, in the week which has elapsed, did not take the opportunity to set down an Amendment to deal with this position. This is really an impossible Clause, and it is the only Clause which matters in the Bill. It imposes on people doing a good job of work, the small maternity home and places of that sort, a quite unjustifiable burden, and it does not do one piece of good to a mother. If put into effect, it will merely mean that a lot of analgesia apparatus is put in places where it is not needed.

Perhaps I may now turn to Clause 3. All it does is to declare what the law is. We do not need an Act of Parliament for that, because the only person who has raised any doubts about it is the hon. Member and his friends. They are the only people who have said that a midwife is not allowed to administer analgesia. It is perfectly absurd to say that it is necessary for this House and another place with other grave matters to consider, to spend time in discussing whether we ought to declare now that there is no legal obstacle to a midwife administering analgesia, when she has already been doing it up and down the country under the provisions of the National Health Act.

When we look at Clause 4, we find that all it does is to reverse the decision which the House took when it considered the Bill on Second Reading. When the House considered the Bill on Second Reading, there was a Clause expressly asking for money to be paid by Parliament, which required a Financial Resolution. If the House was then asked to pass this Bill on the understanding that it would require additional expenditure, it is a little difficult for the hon. Member for Monmouth to come back and say we should pass it now even though it does not require any public money. I do not think there is any harm in passing Clauses 5 and 6, which are copied out of other Measures. I am sorry I have detained the House a little longer than I intended.

What about Northern Ireland?

Northern Ireland, as in so many cases, is omitted.

Northern Ireland is referred to in Clause 7.

It says that the Bill does not apply to Northern Ireland. That is a point it is perhaps not quite fair to argue at this time, although it could be argued that this House should assert its right to legislate for Northern Ireland. We do not want to get away from the strict point that, although we may laugh at the foolishness of some of the provisions, there has been a great campaign throughout the country which has led people to believe that analgesia is not available.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Monmouth on having so constructed his case that within the Rules of Order, when any Members who is equipped with the facts tries to give the necessary information, it is out of Order. But it does not do away with the harm which has been done in the country, and Members of this House take this opportunity to point out the foolishness and harm which will be caused to analgesia by passing a Measure of this sort. Members should not allow themselves to be dragooned and pass a Measure which will not do one thing for one mother in any part of the country, which, if applied, would result in our limited analgesia apparatus being dissipated into hundreds of thousands of homes and institutions where it will never be required.

The hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) has addressed the House, as he is entitled to, at some length. He has at least made his position perfectly plain. He is a whole-hearted opponent of this Bill, and he has proposed some curious reasons for opposing it. He started off by saying that the Bill was a piece of party politics, and he cited Mr. A. J. Cummings as a Tory Party hack——

The hon. Member must be fair to Mr. Cummings. He is not a conscious Tory; he supports the Liberals.

Mr. Cummings has spent a good deal of his time castigating the Conservative Party. He would have been a most extraordinary person to choose if one were out to make it a party political manœuvre. I am not sure that the hon. Member, in making that quotation from that particular newspaper and writer, did not demonstrate that this is something which cuts across party, and that there is no need to introduce party politics of that kind. The only point I understood him to make, in his reference to Clause 2, was when he tried to argue that it could apply to cats' homes or almost anything else.

The hon. Member must be referring to himself.

No. The hon. Member made a long speech, and he mentioned that it applied to almost any kind of institution. He tried to adduce the same argument before. I have taken what legal advice I can on the matter, and I am told that there is no substance in what he said, as might have been apparent to anybody who read the Clause. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to spend a long time answering the hon. Member for Hornchurch.

I am glad that we have an opportunity for a Debate this afternoon upon this subject. It is right that people should come out into the open, and say whether they are for or against the Bill. The opponents of the Bill, of whom the hon. Member for Hornchurch is one, can probably defeat us in the Division Lobby or by talking the Bill out. At any rate, let us have it out in the open, and see who is trying to get this reform through and who is opposing it.

Does the hon. Gentleman call the Bill a reform?

That is what we are discussing this afternoon. I propose to say what are the reforms contained in the Measure. Plenty of people say that analgesia is bad. The hon. Lady the Member for Coatbridge (Mrs. Mann) is one of them; she regards the whole idea as third-rate, and has constantly maintained that women in Scotland do not mind the first and second stages of labour. She is entitled to that view. Anybody is entitled to say that analgesia is bad, but I do not like people who say they are supporting analgesia but oppose the very Measure designed to make more of it available.

I am sure the hon. Gentleman does not want to misrepresent my hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge (Mrs. Mann). I listened carefully to what she said, and I believe she is anxious only to safeguard the present position of anaesthesia and not to have analgesia brought in as a substitute.

One of the classic ways of opposing a reform is to say, "It does not go far enough. We want a kind of Utopia, and we refuse to take an elementary and sensible step which would ease the position." That is the classical argument of the reactionary throughout the ages. Let us have it plain whether people want to have more or less analgesia given to women.

I would like the hon. Member to make it clear to the House how the Measure will make any more analgesia available than is being made available by the Ministry at present.

The answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is that that is the whole reason why I have risen in this Debate. I am making it clear now that more women would get relief from pain if the Bill were passed than would otherwise be the case. I want to make it absolutely plain that those who vote against the Bill, or talk it out, will, by their actions or votes, remove the prospect of relief from pain being given in a considerable number of cases. It is better that these issues be plain. They are not party issues, or anything to do with party politics. They are concerned with the benefits of one branch of medical science, so that the skill and devotion of midwives using it could be made available to would-be mothers.

It can be said, and it has been said, that the Bill is not all that the promoters would like it to be because things are missing from it. We cannot debate that point on the Third Reading, but I say that what is left in the Bill is a very valuable contribution in this sphere of medicine. The first thing with which the Bill deals, in Clause 1, is the training of midwives. That is not unimportant. If we put first things first, surely the first thing to do is to make certain that every midwife attending a birth professionally has received training in the relief of pain, assuming that some apparatus is given to her for the purpose.

Does the hon. Gentleman suggest——

I cannot give way again to the hon. Gentleman; I have given way twice. The hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity of making his own speech. The position about training is shown in figures which I can give to the House on the authority of the Central Midwives Board, who are always in consultation with officials of the Ministry of Health. I had them checked recently, and I have every reason to suppose that they are accurate. The Board inform me that in England and Wales 10,000 midwives are employed in domiciliary midwifery. New entrants are trained, because nobody enters that profession without being trained, in the administration of analgesia, but there is a backlog of midwives who have not been trained. The position about those who are trained is that 4,100 out of 10,000 were trained by January, 1948. By the end of that year the number had increased by 1,400 to a total of 5,500. These are the Ministry's own figures. At that rate, it would take approximately three years to train the lot.

In Scotland, there are 1,289 domiciliary midwives, of whom only 368 are trained, and there are 921 untrained in the administration of analgesia. I have been using the words "trained" and "untrained." I want to make it plain that I am talking only about analgesia. Obviously, skilled midwives have had very careful training in their job of midwifery.

Are the midwives to whom the hon. Member has referred actually practising as midwives, or are they maternity nurses doing midwifery under the supervision of a doctor?

They are midwives who are in practice as midwives. There has been some misunderstanding about the position in Scotland, where, we understand, at least 27,000 births take place annually attended by a midwife only, and not a midwife acting as a maternity nurse in the presence of a doctor. I hope that that information answers the point raised by the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Hastings).

Yes, it was perfectly plain.

That is the position over the whole country. I always think that when we take figures for the whole country they may not be very reliable, and what I want to do is to look at individual cases. I have the figures for Scotland, but I cannot quote them for England because the Minister of Health has not given them to me. In the county of Angus there are 13 midwives, only two of whom are trained, and there is not a single gas and air apparatus available for use, so that there will not be much training in Angus unless something is done about it. In Perth there are 48 midwives, and not one of them is trained in this form of relief from pain and no apparatus is available or on order. We cannot expect these midwives to be trained unless the House of Commons does something about it. In Coatbridge, there are 11 midwives, only one of whom is trained, and there is now one gas and air machine. It will take the united efforts of the training people to forward training in those areas at a speed which will complete it within the four years laid down by the Bill.

I have been informed by all the medical officers of health and all the supervisors of midwifery training with whom I have spoken that if a Clause such as Clause 1 is passed, and Parliament lays down a date by the end of which, broadly speaking, all midwives will have had to complete that training, this will speed up training in the backward areas considerably.

How is it possible, by this Bill, to achieve the training of more midwives and the provision of more apparatus without spending more money, which is apparently specifically denied in the Bill?

It is competent for the Minister or local health authorities to make arrangements to train midwives under existing legislation. What is required is the necessary impetus to ensure that existing powers are carried out.

rose—

I have already answered the hon. Member's point, and I cannot give way again. The situation is plain. I have been informed that that is the case, and those with whom I have been in touch are the experts on this subject. They want to get on with the training, and they ask for these powers to be made available. If they are made available we shall have taken the first step, which is to see that every midwife in the country has the necessary training to deal with the relief of pain.

I now come to the second main point. Clause 2 lays down that in every hospital other than a Ministry hospital which caters for women in childbirth suitable apparatus for administering analgesia approved by the Board—that does not necessarily mean the simplest apparatus; the Board makes its own rules in consultation with the obstetricians and gynaecologists as to what apparatus can be used and on what terms, and it can have better and more complicated apparatus—must be provided and be in working order. Surely that is a reasonable provision at this day and age. Surely if we are to have an establishment which caters for women in childbirth the House of Commons will say that it shall have available and in working order the apparatus for relieving pain. I shall be amazed if any hon. Member will get up and really contest that position, or try to defeat a Bill which is seeking to secure that end.

Naturally, I have had a great many letters on that subject, and I am going to quote one which is about not a Ministry hospital but a private maternity home. This lady writes to thank me and those associated with me for putting forward the Bill. She says:

"How in this enlightened age men can still contemplate the suffering which women have to endure and be prepared to accept it is something to astound one. Not only do local authorities fail to make use of the apparatus available but all the small so-called nursing homes grudge spending the extra money for the relief of pain and will continue to do so until compulsion is used. In my own district—"

This is in Ardrossan, Ayrshire—

"there is a small privately-owned home which I myself attended which boasts of no equipment, and the nursing staff consider it sufficient to time the call to the doctor as late as possible, so that the whole event is generally over before he arrives. I was relieved when I could leave as the heartrending groans of the women in labour not only make one ache in sympathy but burn with anger at the sheer callous outlook which makes it necessary. If there is anything which I, in my humble way, can do to further your case I will spare no effort."

That was signed by a Mrs. Savage. It is typical of many messages which those who have supported this reform have had——

rose—

I cannot give way for a moment. I do not know what Mrs. Savage can do in her humble way; perhaps her letter will influence some hon. Members to think again before they oppose this Measure.

As I have said, I am not concerned with party politics in this matter. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I do not mind party politics. If both parties were competing today as to which one could claim greater credit for putting forward this Bill, I should not mind at all, but it does not seem to me that party politics enter into this. I cannot understand on what grounds the objections to the Bill are put forward. What good is done in trying to kill this Measure? What object is attained? Here is something which is asked for by every reputable women's organisation in the country; it is something for which people have struggled and fought. Why turn it down? Here is an opportunity for the House of Commons, on a Private Bill supported not from one side of the House but from all sides, to do something to relieve women in childbirth. Let us do it this afternoon.

The hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft) has spoken with a certain amount of passion. I am sure that he is sincere in his desire to do the utmost possible to help, but the objection to the Bill is the very simple one that it is no longer necessary. However good the propaganda was in the first instance—and it was quite good—since then, in the Committee stage of the National Health (Amendment) Bill, a Clause was moved covering the whole range of services necessary in midwifery. If I am not out of Order in quoting from the Proceedings of the Committee, I will read the answer given by the Minister of Health to a question of mine about the Clause containing the necessary powers for the removal of doubt about analgesia and everything else. I asked the Minister:

"Does not that Clause include analgesia and everything else?"

The Minister of Health answered:

"It includes the whole range of services which at any moment may be regarded as clinically necessary—not only analgesia, but all services."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee B, 5th July, 1949, c. 136.]

There is not the slightest doubt that the National Health (Amendment) Bill in its present form, with the Clause added to which I have referred, does everything which this Bill sets out to do, and so this Bill is no longer necessary.

On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker, can we discuss the Bill to which the hon. Gentleman has made reference, since it is still before the Committee?

If the Bill has not been reported to this House, we cannot discuss it in detail, but presumably the Clause is public property and can be referred to.