I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

This new Clause is in the names of my hon. Friends and myself. Perhaps I may say "my hon. Friends," although it includes hon. Members from the other side of the House, because the Bill has received support from both sides. The Bill speaks of a "bailor" and a "bailee," which are of course legal terms. But I propose to refer, as I have done on previous occasions, because I think it is very much simpler, to the bailor as the customer and the bailee as the trader.

This Clause deals with those cases where goods have been accepted by a trader for repair or for other treatment before the date when the Act comes into force, and where the trader does not then know the address of the customer. As amended in Committee the Bill provides a number of safeguards for the customer among which are the requirements that a trader must in order to acquire a right of sale under the Bill have informed the customer that the goods are ready for re-delivery and that, at a later date, he intends to sell them.

A trader can comply with this requirement only if he knows the address of the customer, and the House will realise that while in future he will have to obtain that address before he can take advantage of the Bill, it would be most unreasonable to prevent him from taking advantage of it in those cases, which are numerous and which I would remind the House do cause considerable hardship, where he does not know the address because he never had any reason to take it.

Although the safeguards provided in the Bill for other cases do not apply, the Clause, which I will now explain, does contain other safeguards designed to protect the customer. If we consider subsection (1), for a trader to have the right to sell the goods to which the Clause applies, in the first place he must, within one month of the date when the Act comes into force publish,

"in a newspaper circulating in the locality where the goods were accepted for repair or other treatment a notice complying with the requirements of Subsection (4) of this Section"

In the second place, where the trader has premises which he uses for the purpose of accepting for repair or other treatment goods of the kind he proposes to sell, he must display in those premises a notice to the effect that he proposes to take advantage of the Act for the purpose of selling goods of that kind. This notice must be put up not later than one month after the Act comes into force, and must remain exhibited for a further 12 months or for so long during that period as the premises are used for that purpose. At least 13 months must pass from the date when the Act comes into force before the trader may sell the goods.

Subsection (2) provides that in those cases with which this Clause deals, the goods need not be sold by public auction. In all other cases to which the Bill applies the sale has to be by public auction, unless in his notice of intention to sell the goods the trader has told the customer of the price at which he proposes to sell them. Then he can sell them in other ways for not less than that price. Since, in cases with which this Clause deals, the trader does not know the address of the customer, he obviously cannot give notice of his intention to sell the goods. Therefore, apart from this subsection, he would have to sell them by public auction. Many of the goods are of a kind which it would not only be difficult to sell by public auction, but unreasonably expensive. Therefore this subsection allows him to sell them in other ways.

Subsection (3) alters the procedure before sale. Some of the previous provisions have to be modified to fit in with the new procedure, and this subsection provides for those modifications.

Subsection (4) sets out the information that a trader must put in the notice published in the newspaper. Subsection (5) provides that, if within 13 months of the coming into force of the Act, a dispute arises between the trader and the customer as to whether the charges are excessive or the work has not been properly carried out, this Clause shall no longer apply to the goods, and the trader will have to follow the ordinary procedure provided in the Bill.

If a dispute arises, the trader will be able to find out the address of the customer. There is, therefore, no reason why the Bill should not apply to him in such a case as it applies in any other case where he knows the address of the customer.

I beg to second the Motion.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 5, to leave out from the beginning, to "indicating," in line 10, and to insert:

(a) at all premises used or appropriated by the bailee for accepting for repair or other treatment goods of the class to which the goods accepted belong, there is, at the time of the acceptance (whether or not the goods are accepted at any such premises), conspicuously displayed in the part of the premises so used or appropriated a notice.

The Bill as amended in Committee requires a trader who wishes to sell goods of a particular kind under the Bill and who has premises where he accepts goods of that kind for repair or other treatment to put up a notice on those premises that he intends to take advantage of the Bill in respect of goods of that kind. This Amendment is designed to make it clear that where a trader, such as a cleaning firm, has a number of branches and more than one lot of premises where he accepts, for instance, clothes for cleaning, he must put a notice in all the premises where he accepts the clothes before he can sell any goods accepted by him.

It seemed to us that if a trader were not required to put up a notice in all his branches, and he sought to take advantage of the Bill in respect of goods accepted at one branch but not in respect of goods accepted at another branch— and both branches might be in one street —the customer might be misled to his disadvantage.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I support this Amendment, and though I know that my hon. Friend has conferred with those concerned with this Bill, I cannot let it pass without commenting that there may be circumstances in which traders are undertaking by this Amendment a heavy onus. I think that they should fully realise that. As I understand the Amendment, where there is a concern which covers the whole of the country, it would mean that they would have to give notice in every single branch throughout the country.

I appreciate that it is necessary to make provision where two branches might be in the same town, or indeed in the same street. Obviously, that ought to be covered, but I think that in the case of large concerns with branches all over the country this Amendment places a heavy and unnecessary onus upon traders. I merely mention the point. I may be wrong, but my reading of the Amendment, and my hon. Friend's observations upon it, caused me to think that it might be wise to look at this Clause again.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 29, to leave out "otherwise than by auction," and to insert:

"in a lot in which goods not accepted by him from the bailor are included or to sell them otherwise than by public auction."

This Amendment prohibits a trader who is selling the goods of a customer under the Bill from including in the transaction goods which he has not received from that customer. It also makes it clear that the auction must be public. Otherwise, there might be some doubt, as the words "public auction" are used in many Acts.

It will be appreciated that where a trader has sold goods, the Bill requires him to account to the customer for any surplus after he has deducted his own charges. It also requires him to keep records relating to the sale. If the trader were allowed to include in a sale the goods of more than one customer, it would be difficult to ensure that a customer was fairly treated; nor could the trader keep satisfactory records. We hope that this Amendment will safeguard that position.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 2, line 36, after "by," to insert "public."

This Amendment leaves no doubt that the auction must be held in public. There might otherwise be some doubt, as the words "public auction" are used in many Acts.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 1, leave out from the beginning, to second "if," in line 2, and to insert:

(5) Without prejudice to any other mode of determining a dispute, it shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as having been determined.

The Bill as amended in Committee provides that the only way of determining a dispute for the purposes of the Bill is for a trader to send under Clause 1 (5) a notice to treat the dispute as determined. This Amendment provides that the sending of such notice is to be one way, but not the only way, of determining a dispute. We felt that it would be unreasonable to require a trader who had been successful in proceedings in the courts to send a notice to determine the dispute.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 3, line 8, to leave out "at the expiration of that period."

You have given us your permission, Mr. Speaker, to take the next five amendments together, and I need not take up time on this one. All of them are consequential on the Amendment already made in Clause 1 (5), which provides that the notice to treat a dispute as determined is not the only way of determining a dispute.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 4, to leave out line 34. and to insert:

(c) where the goods are sold by public auction, the name and principal place of business of the auctioneer, and where they are sold otherwise than by public auction and the gross proceeds of the sale thereof are not less than twenty shillings, the name and address of the buyer.

This Amendment provides that, where goods are sold by public auction, the trader must keep a record of the name and principal place of business of the auctioneer, and, where they are sold privately and for more than 20s., the name and address of the buyer.

The Bill, as amended in the Committee, requires the trader to keep the name and address of the buyer in all cases. This provision was designed to enable the customer to be satisfied as to the price received for his goods. Where the goods are sold by auction, it is very difficult for a trader to ascertain the name and address of the buyer, and there is no point in his doing so, since the amount received for the goods will appear in the records of the auctioneer. Where the goods are sold privately, it would be quite unreasonable to expect a trader to obtain the name and address of the buyer where the sum realised is small, and, in such circumstances, the buyer might well object to giving his name and address.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 5, line 10, after "accepted," to insert "by a bailee."

These Amendments are designed to meet the criticism made in the Committee by some of my hon. Friends of the Words "open to public access" on the grounds that the meaning of those words is uncertain, and that there are businesses which would wish to take advantage of the Bill but which have no premises open to public access. This Amendment restricts the Bill to traders who accept goods primarily from private individuals, and excludes those who accept them primarily from industrial concerns.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 5, line 26, to leave out from "therefor," to the end of line 40, and to insert:

"and, in a case where the goods have been sold, the following additional amounts, that is to say—:

(a) a reasonable charge for storing the goods during the period beginning with the date of the giving of the notice that the goods are ready for re-delivery, or, where there has been a dispute between the bailor and bailee, the date on which the dispute was determined, and ending with the date of the sale;

(b) any costs of or in connection with the sale; and

(c) the cost, if any, of insuring the goods."

This Amendment provides that, subject to any agreement between the customer and the trader, the trader shall be entitled to recover storage charges, costs in connection with the sale of the goods and costs of insurance, if any, only where the goods have been sold, and not, as at present, from the time when the trader has given notice of his intention to sell the goods. As the Bill is concerned only with giving traders the right to sell goods, there seems to be no reason why the Bill should entitle him to recover any charges other than those for which he has contracted, unless he has exercised that right and sold the goods.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This matter arose out of a discussion which we had in the Committee stage on the question of the power of charging. I understood that the view of the Committee was in favour of the charge provided that the charges were reasonable and they were properly incurred in the circumstances in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Bill. There was always, of course, the provision that the charges could not be made unless the procedure, and the circumstances contemplated by that procedure, in fact arose.

Therefore, as I understood it, it seemed to the Committee not unreasonable that, in those circumstances, a trader should have the power to charge, even though the goods had not been sold. Certainly, those who are sponsoring the Bill were, during the Committee stage, under the impression that the power of making that charge already existed in the Bill.

I myself take a different view, although with some trepidation on a Bill the drafting of which is as difficult to follow as is this one, but I am not complaining about that. Now, however, I understand that the policy is changed, and that it is no longer a drafting question, but that, as a matter of policy, it is intended that there should be no power to charge unless the goods are sold.

Again, of course, my hon. Friend has been in touch with those whose interest it is to have this Bill carried, and if they are content with that then obviously there can be no objection on the part of anybody. I personally am certainly not raising any objection of substance on that. But I think it should be made clear to all those who were on the Committee and to the House that what is now happening is contrary to what was thought by the sponsors of the Bill when it was before the Committee. If the hon. and learned Gentleman the Parliamentary Secretary who has been so helpful throughout this Bill can throw any further light on that, I am sure we shall all be most grateful to him.

Speaking only from memory at the moment, I thought that in the discussion in Committee on the point that both the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) and I had in mind, it was the desire of all concerned that the meaning of the Bill should be perfectly clear, and that the view I then expressed was the view now made doubly sure by this Amendment. My recollection of what was the general view of policy then expressed differs from that of the hon. and learned Gentleman.

I beg to move, in page 6, to leave out lines 1 to 3, and to insert:

"(4) The powers conferred on a bailee by this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any powers exercisable by him independently of this Act."

This is a purely drafting Amendment, and I wish to move it formally.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

The House has a great deal of business to do and it is not my intention to trespass unduly upon its time, but I think it would be most ungracious if I did not express my very deep appreciation to the Government and to the Parliamentary Secretary for the help they have given throughout these proceedings. I was quite convinced of the justice of this Bill, but I felt some trepidation in that it needed legal knowledge which I did not possess, and I want to pay tribute to the legal officers whom the Government have been so kind as to place at our disposal. I believe that this Bill will right many injustices for traders and, at the same time, safeguard customers. I hope the House will give the Bill an unanimous Third Reading.

I wish to say a few words in recommending the Third Reading of this Bill to the House. In the first place, I want to congratulate the hon. Lady the Member for Coventry, South (Miss Burton) on her persistence in getting this Bill through. I know she had a certain amount of difficulty in the early stages when, perhaps, I may have been of a little assistance in breaking a way through the hedge in front of her.

I think this Bill will be of great assistance to a number of traders in this country. It may be that, generally, people visualise that it will assist the boot and shoe repairers and probably the jewellers, but there are several other tradespeople who have in the past been affected by and lost money as a result of goods being sent to them for repair and never collected. They comprise such people as the bookbinder, the draper, the ironmonger, the leather goods man and the garage proprietor.

A garage proprietor in my constituency told me that last year he had no fewer than 10 spare wheels left with him by people who had asked him to mend a puncture and who promised to call back later. Those wheels still remain uncollected, and at the present moment he is quite unable to dispose of them despite the fact that they are in his way and take up valuable space. Then there is the cycle and wireless and television dealer, the dry cleaner, the tailor, and also the furniture repairer and upholsterer.

In conclusion, I have been asked to include in my congratulations to the hon. Lady those of my hon. Friend the Member for Beverley (Mr. Odey) and my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. Walker-Smith) both of whom are unable to be here today and both of whom, I know, have given a great deal of assistance in the preparation and the passage of this Bill through its various stages.

I do not think I can let these congratulations end without congratulating the hon. Member for Dorset, North (Mr. Crouch) on the very skilful part he played during the Report stage, which must have been of very great assistance to my hon. Friend.

I beg to move in page 3. line 24, to leave out Clause 5.

Just before we concluded our last debate on this Bill we were considering Clause 5, which deals with justification. It is very short and I think it would be for the convenience of the House if I read it first. It provides that

"In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved, if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges."

This Clause was discussed on Second Reading, and it was also discussed very fully in the Committee stage. I suggested on the Second Reading that this Clause should be omitted; I opposed its inclusion in the Bill on the Committee stage, and I am now moving that it should be excluded from the Bill.

I mentioned, on Second Reading, those parts of the Bill which seemed to me to raise substantial questions of importance which should be considered by the sponsors of the Bill before we arrived at the Committee stage so that everybody would have adequate notice of the attitude that would be adopted in the Committee stage. In Committee after a very full discussion, the inclusion of the Clause was carried by nine votes to eight, by a majority of one vote, and I am sure that everybody, whether in support of it or opposed to it, recognises that here there is a substantial question which deserves full consideration, and even though it is accepted by this House I trust that when it goes elsewhere it will have further full consideration, too.

The Clause deals with separate charges and, therefore, it deals with a position where an action can be brought in respect of the separate charges. I am now repeating the argument which I have already put forward on two other occasions and which I am rather tired of repeating. I shall, therefore, try to keep it within as compact an ambit as I possibly can. Those who are interested in the Bill must by this time be extremely familiar with the argument, and I do not propose to rub it in at undue length.

The argument is this. The Clause deals with separate charges, and, therefore, where we have separate charges an action could be brought in respect of the separate charges. It deals with a position where we have separate charges, some of which are justifiable and some of which are unjustifiable. Therefore, the plaintiff could limit himself to the unjustifiable charge only and would be entitled to succeed on the unjustifiable charge, and there would be no answer at all to him.

But if he is so ill-advised as to bring an action on a justifiable charge as well as the unjustifiable charge, then in the circumstances contemplated in Clause 5 the unjustifiable charge would in effect be brushed aside and he would be allowed no redress at all in respect of it. Whether he would succeed or not would depend, in those circumstances, on the procedure which he adopted, which of course would be a ridiculous result.

It is not on that ground only that I wish to press my opposition. My other ground is this. The Porter Committee, whose recommendation is, of course, the origin of this Bill—this Bill is conceived to carry out the recommendations of the Porter Committee—gave their reasons for recommending this Clause or something in the nature of it. I would invite the House to examine those reasons, to consider the case in the light of those reasons, and then to come to the conclusion whether a Clause of this kind is necessary at all in order to deal with the reasons which the Porter Committee gave.

The reasons the Porter Committee gave are these. They said that in a libel action a verdict on any one charge carries the costs of the action. We have a position, in other words, where several charges are made in a libel action, the plaintiff fails on substantial charges and he succeeds on one charge, but if he succeeds on one charge nevertheless that decision carries the costs of the action and he is entitled to the costs of the action. He is entitled to those costs whether he succeeds on that charge after trial or on an admission of liability and payment into court. If by one means or another he succeeds on one charge, he is entitled to the general costs of the action.

I agree at once that that is quite an unjustifiable position. I agree that there should be a remedy provided for that state of affairs. But my point is this. Here in Clause 5 the Porter Committee are suggesting, by their recommendation, which is included in Clause 5, an amendment of the substantive law to deal with a procedural defect. My case is that the procedural defect to which they allude as the basis for their recommendation should be met by a procedural remedy and not by an alteration in the substantive law. This procedural remedy, of course, can quite simply and easily be dealt with. It is a question of costs.

If there were need for any amendment of the Rules of Court to deal with it or anything of the kind, that could easily be done without legislation or any alteration in the substantive law, but in any case the remedy is already in the hands of the judges. They have got the power to apportion their costs and they can do so without any difficulty. There is no need for this alteration in the substantive law in order to deal with that difficulty. Therefore, this procedural defect, to which the Porter Committee, if I may say so with respect, rightly called attention, should be met by a procedural remedy which is readily available.

That is the main ground on which the Porter Committee proposed the amendment incorporated in Clause 5. But they also say that where there are a number of charges made and the plaintiff succeeds on one charge and fails on the other charges, his success on the unjustifiable charge might amount to a general whitewashing of the plaintiff, and that might be undesirable.

There are three answers to that. The first is that if the costs are apportioned, as I recognise at once that they ought to be, and that the plaintiff should not be entitled to the general costs of the action because of success on one of the arguments, it makes it extremely difficult for him to say that he succeeded in the general action.

Secondly, if he limited his action to unjustifiable charges only he would obviously succeed on the unjustifiable charges, and, therefore, his position would depend upon the procedure which he adopted. Thirdly, this is a matter of common sense, for, after all, it is the individual citizen who is the defamed person and brings his action against publishers of one kind or another and in particular against newspapers. The publicity is in the hands of the newspapers themselves to a very large extent. The small defendant citizen who is, generally speaking, a plaintiff in actions of this kind are not people with a great command of publicity. I do not think myself that there is very great force in those reasons, and so far as there is substance in them they can be met by the procedural remedy which I have already suggested.

I now leave the Porter Committee reasons and come to more general considerations. There is a strong view among lawyers—and very distinguished lawyers, too—that the defence of justification should be made not easier as this Clause makes it, but more difficult, and justification should only be a defence where it is in the public interest that it should be. In other words, not only has justification to be established, but it has to be established that the statement to be made is in the public interest.

Speaking for myself I do not share that view, but it is a consideration which the House should have in mind when dealing with Clause 5, that there is a substantial body of opinion which considers that the law of justification is not sufficiently stringent, and that the plea of the defendant should be more restricted than it is, in fact, at the moment.

The second general consideration which I should like to bring before the House is that it seems to me dangerous to take a course of action which would enable the Press or any publication to be less careful than they are at present in their statements about people. It means that there will be less restraint upon dressing up a story than there is at the present time, that additional details could be added, and that some more "pep" could be put into the story. It is an extremely dangerous tendency, and it is the duty of Members of Parliament to do everything they can to protect the small person, the ordinary citizen, and if this Clause is carried it means that he is more exposed to defamatory statements than he is at the present time.

It may be that it is a person who has committed some fault which is within Clause 5. I recognise at once that a person coming within the Clause is somebody about whom a defamatory statement can justifiably be made, but I suggest that where a person is the subject of a defamatory statement of that kind, it is important that what is said about him should be severely limited to what can be justifiably said about him, and that he should not be thrown to the wolves. He should not be somebody about whom a "pep" story can be written up with defamatory statements which on the present law would make the publisher liable to damages.

I think, therefore, that it is not desirable as a matter of substance that we should encourage greater laxity in Press accounts or in publications at all whether Press or otherwise about people of whom admittedly some defamatory statement can justifiably be made. There is a dangerous tendency in this Clause and I think the House should reject it.

12.15 p.m.

I will just summarise my reasons. First of all, the result of this Clause will be to make the plaintiff's remedy dependent upon the procedure which he was advised to adopt. Secondly, the Porter Committee reasons for recommending some such Clause as this were procedural reasons which should be made by a procedural remedy, and not by a substantial change in the law. They ought to be made properly by other means than the change in the law as proposed in the new Clause. The tendency of this Clause would be to encourage greater laxity in Press stories and in other publications.

It is for reasons of this kind that a substantial minority in Committee on this Bill voted against this Clause and there is a substantial minority in the House against it. I am glad to see that one of the hon. Members who has put his name to the exclusion of Clause 5 is the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens), whom we all hold in such high respect. It is certainly not a party issue of any kind. It is a matter which cuts across both sides of the House, and I suggest for the reasons which I have ventured to put before this House that the Clause should be rejected.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This Amendment has been moved by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) in a very clear manner. The exposition which he has given of the legal position covers the entire matter, and I have no desire to detain the House by covering the ground which he has already covered.

Looking at it as an outsider and not from the point of view of an experienced practitioner, I think the discussion which took place upstairs and which has been summarised so ably by my hon. and learned Friend turns on two points. First is the technical point which he mentioned, which obviously weighed very considerably with the Porter Committee. I also think that the point he made, that the particular difficulty can be dealt with perfectly well by the rules of procedure, seems to me a conclusive answer to the matter which weighed so heavily with the Porter Committee.

The other fact which entered into the question is a more general and a broader one. It is a point of view which has weighed heavily with those of us who have been rather critical of what have been called the defendant Clauses in this Bill, that it is rather contrary to one's idea of fair play that a man should be hit when he is down. The fact that somebody has a character which does not stand up to the glare of cross-examination in every respect does not mean that his interests should not be considered. Far be it from me who has never been cross-examined by hon. and learned Members of this House to imagine that any one could stand up easily to that kind of treatment.

I see the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for York (Mr. Hylton-Foster), whose cross-examination I have often admired from a safe distance, showing signs of lusting to get at me in the witness box. The fact that the plaintiff's character was not spotless would be no reason why the defendant should be able to ride off on the whole issue and to say: "I have said things about you which are untrue and which have subjected you to ridicule, hatred and contempt, but after all you are no person to complain because you have a pretty spotty character, anyhow." That is not the kind of argument which should appeal to the House, and is one of the good reasons why the House should reject the Clause.

In the debate in Committee it was impressive to note the weight of professional opinion behind this point of view, quite apart from those who looked at the matter from a broader point of view. In fact, the Clause was maintained in the Bill by only one vote. In the minority was my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East who then, as today, presented a conclusive case. He had the support of the hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) and of the hon. and learned Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon), whose views on this matter carry great conviction.

It is clear that there is a very strong weight of the highest possible professional opinion against this Clause on the technical side. Those who look at the matter from a broader point of view need not be terrified or frightened by the fact that those who are practised in the law of defamation in the courts think that the Clause is desirable and necessary. The misgivings which prompted the Porter Committee to recommend a Clause of this kind can be met by procedural Regulations. I ask the House to reject the Clause by carrying the Amendment.

It is with considerable diffidence that I venture to differ from the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas), who has proposed the Amendment, because I would defer to his opinion with great respect on many matters. I could agree entirely with his argument and with the argument of the hon. Member who seconded the Amendment, if it were not for the latter part of the Clause, where I read:

"… if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges."

Those words give to the court the power to protect the rights and the position of the individual. I do not think that the hon. and learned Gentleman was justified in drawing the picture he did of someone who has been defamed being thrown to the wolves and being placed in the position of having bad things written about him. There is much to be said for the charge of laxity in regard to the Clause, but the words I have quoted are quite sufficient to give full protection to the individual. The legal position will not be materially altered to the prejudice of a libelled individual. For that reason I hope that the House will reject the Amendment.

I intervene in regard to what I consider an important reform in Clause 5, very necessary, and long overdue. I do not think there is a case at all for rejecting it. The very reasons that have been given for the Amendment are those which support the proposed reform.

It is useful to look at legal matters from a common-sense point of view and not strictly from the point of view of a lawyer all the time. Every lawyer who practises in this field of the law knows that when he is advising in a libel action he is sometimes met by the fact that most of the words used were well justified; but there may be one small point that cannot be justified. A defence can be presented to show that the person who brings the action is a rogue, yet the action may fail because justification cannot be pleaded with regard to that small point.

Surely a person who goes into print, say in a newspaper, is under an obligation to tell the truth. It is no answer for him to say, "I didn't tell the truth in this small point of minor importance because you are a rogue, anyway." If a writer tells a lie he does so at his peril. That is the position at common law.

The answer to that objection is very simple. When a plaintiff brings an action for damages he is saying to the court, "My character has been defamed and I want damages because of an attack made upon my reputation." If there is no damage to his reputation or no attack has been made, the fact that one small part of the allegation cannot be justified is no reason why he should ask the court to award damages.

For instance, we know how narrow is the line that separates the crime of false pretences from the crime of larceny. Suppose someone publishes a statement saying that a man has committed offences by stealing goods and obtaining goods by false pretences. Suppose it later turns out that although there were cases where he stole goods, strictly speaking, he did not commit the crime of obtaining goods by false pretences. If an attempt were made to justify that libel the plaintiff would be bound to win, because the defendant could not justify the charge. Great injustice might well be done in that way by allowing the plaintiff to get away with something when having regard to his reputation, he clearly ought not to succeed.

Surely, in that example, the person defamed has been convicted. It is alleged that he has been convicted of two crimes whereas in point of fact he has not been found guilty of the second crime of false pretences. The defendant who published the libel ought to have exercised reasonable care and to have ascertained that the man was not guilty of what the defendant had said he was guilty of.

I was about to add before that interruption that if there were any danger it is really dealt with by the words in the last part of the Clause. They are:

"… if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges."

Therefore, when a judge or jury are discussing this matter, all the arguments can be put before them and, if there is material damage done, the plaintiff will have his remedy. Surely, however, it is not right that a plaintiff should be entitled to get damages when it is proved by way of justification that he is a rogue but, because of the failure to justify some small point, he is then entitled to obtain a verdict.

I am sorry to interrupt, but this is important. Would my hon. and learned Friend say that it is a small point to say a man has been guilty of obtaining goods by false pretences?

I did not say that an allegation that a man has obtained goods by false pretences was a small point. What I tried to do by way of illustration was to take a case where a man was a rogue and has stolen goods and had been convicted a number of times, and words were published alleging he was guilty of a number of offences of stealing or obtaining goods by false pretences. There is a narrow line between the two offences and, because of that, I say it would be wrong for a plaintiff to succeed although his reputation had suffered in no way because of the mistake.

It has been said in argument that this is a procedural matter. I venture to suggest that it is not. I suggest that the Rules Committee would have great difficulty in providing a remedy by rules with regard to this matter. I regard the reform put forward in the Clause as long overdue and I hope the Amendment will be rejected.

I want first to acknowledge the clear and restrained way in which the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) has put this matter. As he said, he has put it before, but I think that today he has put it even better. However, he has not convinced me and I want to follow the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney (Mr. Weitzman) in this in saying, strange as it may appear to some who are listening, that we should not emphasise the legal side of it but look at the commonsense point of view.

Hon. Members might like to be reminded that this matter was dealt with by the Porter Report on page 20 under the heading "The Defence of 'Justification'." It starts by saying:

"Under the existing law, it is a good defence in any action for defamation … to prove 'justification,' i.e. that the words complained of are true in substance and in fact."

It goes on to discuss that, and then under a subheading "Substantial Justification" is dealt with. Although the hon. and learned Gentleman regarded it as a minor point in the drafting of the Report, I would venture to suggest to the House that it is not so. It is emphasised in paragraph 80 of the Report that it is very undesirable for a plaintiff to obtain an undeserved whitewashing of his reputation.

It is quite clear from reading this Clause what it is designed to prevent. It says that the defence of justification is not to fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved. As has been pointed out, it does not stop there because, if it did, it would be open to all the objections of the hon. and learned Gentleman and of the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl). The Clause goes on to say:

"… if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges."

Therefore, the matter must be considered as one of substance, and the Porter Report reaches this conclusion in paragraph 81:

"… we think that the existing case law has in the course of its evolution, tended to encourage too close a dissection of each sentence, indeed of each phrase, in a defamatory statement and to overlook the real effect of the statement when read as a whole. Judged by first principles, a plaintiff should not be entitled to recover damages if the defendant proves that the main charge or gist of the libel is true, even though he fails to prove the truth of some minor charge, provided that such minor charge does not add appreciably to the injury to the plaintiffs reputation."

As I understand, this Clause is regarded as being substantially important by those responsible for publishing newspapers. A great deal of the argument here and in Committee against this kind of Clause has been apt to be based on the contrast between the poor little citizen and the great wicked monster paper like the "Daily Horror" or the "Daily Racer."

In fact, it is important to remember that many of those concerned with this Bill are not the monster daily papers at all; they are those responsible for those admirable and most useful local papers which are often most concerned to study the true facts, to draw attention to abuses and generally to ventilate public opinion in their districts. They are often quite small organisations. They are certainly not monster corporations which can ruin those who attack them. Indeed, often in those cases it is the newspaper which is a smaller entity than those who are attacking it. Therefore, we ought to get away from that point of view.

The hon. and learned Gentleman gave three reasons for not accepting the Porter Committee recommendations as regards whitewashing. First, he said it would be difficult for a man to represent he had won if he had been mulcted in costs. With the greatest respect, I suggest that it is a rather legalistic argument because a great many people do not go into the details of these matters. If the man can say he has won his action, that is enough for him to be able to spread about.

Secondly, it was said that he could succeed if he limited the case to that of unjustifiable charges. There again as a matter of law no doubt that is quite correct, but supposing there is something which comes within the second half of this Clause, something which cannot materially injure his reputation, is it likely that he will bring a separate action? That, again, is a matter of common sense.

The third objection was the point about the poor individual citizen. There one has to hold the balance in a fair way. The other argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman was that it might encourage carelessness. There may be some element of truth in that, but, again, it is a question of two sides to the matter and of balancing the one against the other. I suggest to the House that, in accordance with the general idea underlying this Bill, better protection is required for those who are concerned to focus the spotlight of truth on current events and personalities. I therefore suggest that the Clause is justified and should be retained.

I do not want to retraverse ground which has been covered by abler people who have preceded me, but as this matter troubles quite a number of Members of the House, it might be useful to say a few brief general words as to why I regard the Clause, first, as an important one, and second, not as a mere alternative to some procedural alteration.

In spite of the delicate doubt which was cast by my hon. and learned Friend upon the wisdom of maintaining the defence of truth at full strength—although he did not commit himself to any desire to whittle away that defence—it is generally agreed that cruel as it sometimes is if it is misused, the right to print the truth about people is sacred and necessary in the public interest. That right to print the truth is protected, as far as libel actions are concerned in civil courts, by the defence known as justification, which is dealt with by the Clause.

The defence of justification, in English common law and in English good sense, has never meant that one has to prove every comma and dot of what one has spoken or printed. It means that a person has to prove that the defamatory matter is substantially true and that the sting of what he has said about a man is true. There are a number of old cases where people were called rotgut rascals and things of that kind, and it has been held, of course, that nobody was called upon to prove, strictly speaking, that the man was a rotgut rascal, whatever that might have meant at the time it was uttered.

The trouble has been that in the useless over-refinement of legal quibble, a tendency has grown up which has damaged this fundamental and sound principle of the common law defence of justification—namely, that a person must prove the substance of what he has said to be true; not every dot and comma but the substance of it. That defence has been damaged in some degree by the tendency of judges and lawyers to split up sentences and phrases and to treat what ordinary folk would very often regard as one libel, as a whole series of libels, and the defendant has been put to prove every single phrase used in the libel.

Every charge.

"Charge" is used technically in the Bill.

No. "Charge" is a perfectly well recognised term of law. That is why it is used in the Bill. We are dealing not with the gist of the libel, but with separate charges.

The separate charges mean the separate defamatory possibilities of the libel.

Separate statements.

What has been suggested by the unanimous decision of the Porter Committee, and the view I respectfully commend to the House, is that this tendency to chop up phrases and to make out of what any ordinary individual would regard as one charge a whole series of charges, is not a wholesome process and runs contrary to the very sound general principle that a defendant should prove the substantial truth of what he has uttered. That is the defence upon the merits of the need for the Clause, and I just want to say a word or two about the fears, which, coming from my hon. Friends, I respect, about the misuse of the Clause.

I feel that my hon. Friends are not showing enough confidence in the good sense and the sense of justice of British juries, because, as has been already pointed out, it would be for the jury to say whether or not the additional charge was of a kind which did substantial damage to the plaintiff's reputation.

I am most delighted to hear that my hon. Friend is coming out in his defence of the British jury, because in the arguments on unintentional defamation the whole of his case was based on the fact that we could not rely on a jury to see that blackmailers got the treatment they deserved. It is rather odd that in the one case a jury cannot be allowed to remain as the protection against abuse of the law, whereas in this other matter we are expected to rely entirely on the jury.

I doubt whether my hon. Friend would find a word I have ever spoken in my adult years against the British jury. I am a convinced believer in the British jury, in criminal and in civil cases. My hon. Friend will not find a line in any of my argument which is based on a distrust of the jury. The reason why I moved the other Clause about unintentional defamation, which commended itself to the House, is that I think the law as it stood was bad; and that was the universal view of the Porter Committee and the universal view of the Committee of the House which considered it—at any rate, as far as it was expressed by vote. I hope I shall never say anything which casts doubt upon the wisdom of retaining the jury system in civil and in criminal cases, and I have not done so in connection with earlier Clauses.

It is quite untrue to think that the Clause raises the danger for the derelict character—the man who is down—and that people are being encouraged to shoot at him with impunity. My hon. and learned Friend must realise that there is nothing to stop the advocate of the injured man pointing out to the jury, as has so often been pointed out in cases of this kind, that the jury are dealing with a man whose character is defective and that for that reason he may require protection more than a man who is of very strong character.

My hon. and learned Friend should place a little more confidence in the ability of the advocate to draw the attention of the court to these points and in the ability of the juries and judges to see his point for themselves: that defective characters must not be shot at by reckless people anxious to injure them and who think that they can escape liability under the Clause. There is enough good sense and good law in the courts to protect people from those sorts of dangers.

I urge upon my hon. and learned Friend that the real occasion when the Clause would have effect is when, in pursuance of a public duty, some person—not necessarily a newspaper, but very often a newspaper—is exposing a rogue who is preying upon the public. It may be necessary in order to expose that rogue to elaborate 20 or 30 detailed charges of dishonesty, and it may be that at the time of trial only 29 of those 30 charges could be proved.

It is essential that the rogue should not be whitewashed in the action. It is essential that the substantial truth of the allegations printed should act as a defence. In those circumstances we ought to have a care that by over-meticulous and academic regard for the rights of rogues—I am not suggesting that they should be defenceless and should be besmirched recklessly—we do not inhibit a good deal of healthy expositions of them from being published for the protection of the public.

In those circumstances, I urge the House to preserve the Clause, which is a commonsense Clause and which reestablishes with great clarity the fundamental principle of English law as far as the defence of truth is concerned in a libel action—namely, that the substantial truth or sting of the libel should be justified by the defendant—and to prevent that defence from being endangered by over-refinement.

I had not intended to detain the House, but I have thought about the Clause in every way. I have heard the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) state his case against it more than once, and each time with equal attention and enthusiasm. I am left, however, realising that it is a difficult matter, perfectly convinced that it would be an improvement of the law to include the Clause, and for that reason I desire to say now without recapitulating arguments more than is necessary.

I start rather from the same point of view as the hon. and learned Member. I think that the onus is entirely upon the writer to be careful not to abuse any privilege which the law confers upon him. But I do not forget that the gold-digging plaintiff really is a social evil, and we ought not to be having a law which could be used by the person ordinarily called the "gold-digging plaintiff".

When the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) intervened just now, bearing in mind how hard of heart one may become after experience in the office of Home Secretary, I was astonished to think that anyone could imagine for a moment that an accusation that someone had been guilty of the offence of obtaining goods by false pretences, could ever in any circumstances be regarded as anything but a very serious charge against his character. If I thought that by the inclusion of this Clause we were enabling a horrible writer to make accusations of that kind, which he could not justify and yet not have to pay I would vote against its inclusion and should in no sense support the Clause.

The hon. and learned Member will recollect that I intervened because my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) used it as an example of what the Press would be able to say and get away with. That was what horrified me because, having attended quarter sessions sometimes I realise that people—rightly or wrongly— do regard the obtaining of goods by false pretences as a much worse crime than the committing of a simple theft. My hon. and learned Friend says that if the Press had wrongly stated that a man had been guilty of obtaining goods by false pretences this Clause would enable them to get away with it, and that is what I object to.

I hope that my right hon. Friend is not under a misapprehension as to what I said. I was trying to quote an example of where a wrong might be committed. I did not suggest for a moment that if a person accused another person of obtaining goods by false pretences and it was simply a matter of that that he should be able to escape the consequences of making a false allegation. But, if a person wrote about a man that he was a scoundrel and had stolen things and was guilty of a number of crimes and incidentally said, quite wrongly, that he had been guilty of obtaining goods by false pretences, a plaintiff should not be entitled to damages by claiming that he was guilty of all those offences except that of obtaining goods by false pretences, although his reputation was not materially injured.

Everyone is agreed that accusing someone of obtaining goods by false pretences is a serious accusation and whatever that was included with under this Clause it seems to me remarkably unlikely that a British jury would take any other view.

May I present my feeling and impression about this? If there is one thing which infuriates the House more than anything else it is talking Latin to them, but I say that this is an example of the well-known principle of de minimis. I had better translate for the hon. and learned Gentleman, because he and I were at the same educational establishment. If I am right in the view that this is de minimis I do not believe that the Clause would deprive the potential plaintiff of anything of which one would mind depriving him.

I hope that that is right. If the law is not to be used as an instrument for obtaining remedies for trifles, worthless things, in my view all this Clause is securing is that end. No one is entitled, I believe, to obtain any sort of damages, even nominal or contemptuous damages —I do not want to go over the ground about costs—if it is really true to say of his complaint that it is de minimis, a worthless thing.

I believe that the real result of the final words of the Clause is to deprive the plaintiff only if the matter of his complaint is in respect of something of which it is true to say de minimis and on that basis I do not believe that some of the fears of the right hon. Gentleman are well founded.

If it is a trifle and de minimis,there is nothing for the Clause to deal with. It must be attracted to something substantial which is subsidiary to other allegations which are made. Take the case my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) quoted, of larceny and false pretences—I am glad to know that the hon. and learned Member for York (Mr. Hylton-Foster) completely disagrees with my hon. and learned Friend and would consider that a substantial matter. It is difficult to see what the point of the Clause is if the matter is not more than a trifle because, if it is a trifle, it can already be dealt with.

I look at the matter in the way in which it usually arises, namely, when one is advising someone at an early stage whether he has a sound claim in respect of a matter, or the other way round, whether the writer has to pay. It is at that stage that this will arise. Frequently it would be very bold to advise a newspaper that the matter was covered by the naked de minimis principle. It would have to be so very trifling before one could feel safe about that.

I believe that this would improve the position because we would be able to decide as best we may, "Does this or does it not materially injure the plaintiff?" That which does not materially injure—I do not mind whether it is de minimis or not—is something in respect of which one does not want the plaintiff to be seeking damages at law. It does not secure any public advantage. I hope that is the right view because on that basis I wish to support the Clause.

I have already stated what I feel in the interruptions which hon. and learned Members have allowed me to make, but, speaking as a layman, it seems that I am left in a very terrifying position because I have to choose between my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) and the hon. and learned Member for York (Mr. Hylton-Foster) as to what would happen in the hypothetical case which was put up at first with so much assurance by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North.

That, of course, is exactly what the lawyers like; that the law shall be so uncertain that each can advise his client to go on with the action because, no matter who loses, and no matter what happens, they will both win. It seems to me that the case put by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) is the safest one for a layman to pursue, because the further he keeps away from points on which lawyers have contradictory opinions the better for him and for the State.

In view of what I have heard, I wish to support the Amendment moved by the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas). I regret that so few hon. Members on this side of the House should feel as does the hon. and learned Gentleman, but it seems to me that the plea of justification is very important. That this Clause, as the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) put it, does indicate a very dangerous practice. After all, why should a defendant get away with something which is untrue, particularly in the matter of a libel? In a newspaper libel one particular issue may be read by six million or seven million readers. Why should the onus be on the plaintiff to see that his reputation is not smirched?

In the case of slander it is, perhaps, a little different because in most cases of slander proof of special damage is necessary, but, in the case of a libel which has such an enormous circulation as a newspaper libel it seems to me that the onus—as suggested in this Clause— in respect of any matter of libel should not be put on the plaintiff to show that his reputation suffers.

I beg to move, in page 4, line 38, to leave out from the beginning, to "published," in line 39, and to insert "A defamatory statement."

Perhaps, with permission, I might also discuss the following Amendment: In page 4, line 41, at the end, to insert:

shall not be deemed to be published on a privileged occasion on the ground that it is material to a question in issue in the election, whether or not the person by whom it is published is qualified to vote at the election.

If the House is agreeable they can be discussed together.

I shall not occupy the House for more than a few moments, but I am afraid it is necessary to explain the purpose of these Amendments quite briefly. In Committee the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) moved a new Clause, which was agreed to, the effect of which, as stated by the hon. Gentleman, was so that a candidate at an election should not be able to claim some special privilege by reason of the fact that he was a candidate. There was a case in the courts, with which I need not weary the House, which raised that point, and I thought at the time there was no doubt that the hon. Member had the object I have just stated. I am bound to confess—and I apologise for it—that I had to be absent during the discussion and was not present when this matter was dealt with, although I heard the opening remarks of the hon. Gentleman.

That new Clause was accepted in a form which had the effect that, while a candidate who was not an elector in the Division was deprived of any special privilege when he was speaking as a candidate, a candidate who was an elector in the Division would have been able to claim that he was speaking as one elector to another, and therefore, in accordance with settled legal principles, was entitled to some qualified privilege. When the matter was to come before the House again at this stage I put down an Amendment to delete Clause 9.

Having carefully read the debate again, and appreciating that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne had a quite clear idea of what he wanted to effect, I reconsidered the matter with some of my hon. Friends and came to the conclusion that it might be a way of arriving at a peaceful settlement if I were to propose a new Clause in which I would effect the intention that I believed the hon. Gentleman had.

I therefore put down an Amendment which provided in effect, that no candidate at an election should have any special privilege by virtue alone of his being a candidate, and that he should not be able to secure that privilege by a side-wind, as it were, by saying, "Well, as a matter of fact, I am an elector. Therefore when I was speaking on that platform as the candidate at that election I was speaking as one elector to another, and not as a candidate." So I put down that Amendment, and I am very glad to see that my name is followed by that of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, as well as that of the originator of the Bill, and I feel that that is something about which we can all be happy.

In Committee we had some rather lively times, and I think it is just worth while mentioning that the Committee stage of this Private Member's Bill lasted 10 days. I have not the slightest doubt that the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) will be able to give me an example of one taking much longer, but it seemed to me quite a long time. If, now that we come before the House again, I appear perhaps as the villain of the piece, at any rate I am accompanied by two of those hon. Members who engaged in a certain amount of Homeric battle during the Committee stage, and I hope the House will feel it possible to accept these Amendments, thereby making some admirable progress towards the final goal of this Bill.

I am quite certain that the House would not desire the Attorney-General to think that anyone feels that he is the villain of the piece. We all realise that he has been the honest broker, and the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) today shows how successful he has been.

I should like to say how glad I am to see these Amendments on the Order Paper. I appreciate very much that it has been possible to reach a settlement on this question. I think it worth pointing out the implication of the settlement, because it amounts to a departure from the Porter canon. It is interesting to see that, although we were told the Porter canon was sacrosanct and we were not to be allowed to depart from it, that this proposal put forward by my hon. Friend had been considered by the Law Officers and the Lord Chancellor and been turned down, and that therefore there was no point in discussing it any further, it has been possible to reach an agreement and to meet the feelings of both sides on this question.

I only hope that precedent will be followed on one or two other Amendments and proposals before the House on this Bill, because I have not the slightest doubt that the 10 days to which the Attorney-General referred would have been much less than 10 days had it been possible to meet some of the other attempts made to improve the Bill in a rather more reasonable frame of mind than was then shown. I hope the harmonious beginning of our proceedings today means that we shall be able to reach agreement on some of the later matters.

I beg to move, to leave out Clause 10.

I am afraid that here I have not been able to find any way of appeasement. This is rather a tiresome little point which I shall have to explain, I hope not at any length, but I think I must -explain the position in detail. The Clause as it stands says:

"No proceedings for defamation shall be taken against Her Majesty's Stationery Office or against any other publisher or printer who at any time shall be authorised by either House of Parliament to publish or print any proceedings of that House by reason of the fact that such publisher or printer shall have published or printed any extract from the Official Report of either House of Parliament."

As we are all aware, there is no doubt about the privilege which attaches to the OFFICIAL REPORT itself. But this Clause refers to an extract from it, and it is particularly relevant in connection with the practice, indulged in more by some hon. Members than others, of securing extracts from those speeches and sending them round in large numbers to their constituents—grateful or otherwise. The object of this Clause apparently was to secure that the maker of the speech should be able to do that whenever he wished; in other words, to give him almost carte blanche to get those extracts and circulate them. It was on that basis that the Clause appears to have been passed during the Committee.

Again I have to apologise for not having been there at the time. I can only say, in mitigation, that I was concerned in a case dealing with the liberty of the subject in the High Court and that that does take precedence, of course, over everything else. I read the debate carefully and I venture to think that there is some misunderstanding about this matter. It was first said that the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, had altered the position; that before the Crown Proceedings Act this would have been done, this extract could have been published, even though it contained something alleged to be defamatory.

With respect to those who put forward that argument. I think they were unintentionally misleading the Committee. It was the fact that before the Crown Proceedings Act the King's Printer was liable to an action. Compensation would be paid, if it had to be paid, on his behalf by the Crown no doubt, but the King's Printer was liable to an action, and in 1947 the Crown Proceedings Act did not alter the position.

The position was that in every case the Stationery Office took it upon itself to decide whether there was anything objectionable in the extract, and I am informed that that is exactly the same position today after the Crown Proceedings Act; and that it would be exactly the same position if this Clause was passed. The Treasury, who is responsible, would instruct the Stationery Office that they should always scrutinise an extract, and if there were something really undesirable in it they should exercise the right they undoubtedly have, and indeed the duty they feel they have, not to allow it to be circulated.

I venture to think that that does very materially alter the situation as it appeared in Committee, because this Clause, if it is passed, will not give any kind of vested right in every case. The Stationery Office will consider that it is bound—and I venture to think hon. Members will think it ought to consider itself bound—not to say, "We can circulate anything," but to look at it on its merits. Those are the instructions they have, which is not what the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) said, or was understood to say.

I think I am not doing him an injustice, I sincerely hope I am not, if I say that he said the Stationery Office wanted it. I would hate to quarrel with the hon. Member at any time, and particularly today, after what we both were doing during the early hours of the morning, but I think that he misunderstood. It may be that at some time someone informed him that the Stationery Office wanted it. All I can say is that my instructions are that today they do not want it.

In those circumstances is it really a desirable thing that we should pass this Clause giving this added privilege which is not wanted, and which will have no useful effect at all? I do not think I can add anything to that. I will take it on the broad line that this Clause was inserted under a misapprehension in the Committee stage, and my advice to the House is to exclude it.

I wish to raise a point which was not originally raised by me, but by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield, Neep-send (Sir F. Soskice) who, unfortunately, is not here today. It is a point on which I would be grateful if the Attorney-General could enlighten us.

I appreciate what he says about the Crown Proceedings Act, and the position of the Stationery Office before the passing of that Act, and since. Obviously, what he has said completely changes the whole atmosphere in which the debate took place in Committee. The difficulty is that I do not know how often it has occurred in the past. We are, in this Clause, dealing with a case where a Member of Parliament wishes his speech or an extract from his speech to be published by the Stationery Office or by the Queen's Printer or whoever it is.

The question may then arise whether or not, apart from this Clause, there is any defamation contained in the speech and whether it should be published. I understand that in the past the printers have taken an option on that. What my right hon. and learned Friend was deeply concerned about was that that case for opinion should find its way to the Law Officers of the Crown, and if it should that they would be in an extremely invidious position. If that position can arise, it is obviously one of extreme difficulty. It would mean that the Law Officers would, in effect, have to decide that a speech made in the House of Commons by another Member of Parliament should not be published.

There may be some cases where defamation, admittedly, would be so clear that no question could arise and there would be no difficulty. But suppose the problem arose over a matter of acute political controversy, and the Law Officer in question had to advise on the publication of a speech made by an hon. Member on the opposite side of the House on a matter on which there was great party controversy and on which it might not be too clear that there was, in fact, a defamation, although the Law Officer held the view that there was.

If that position can arise, or is likely to arise, as things are now it is a matter to which the House should give its consideration. In those circumstances there would be a great deal in favour of this Clause. I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows of this point and that what he has to say on it will be listened to with great interest.

I should like to comment on what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said. I am sure he will realise that this is rather an embarrassing sort of subject to discuss. As he has asked me the question I must answer it. I should like to suggest this point to the Committee. As the hon. and learned Gentleman knows from personal experience, there are often difficult and delicate questions which have to be decided by the Law Officers. They manage to do that, I believe, without any terrible consequences.

It is always possible for them to take a second opinion on the subject from an expert. I admit that I can do that profitably on some occasions. If one was considering whether or not a matter was defamatory, much the best course to take would be to get the assistance, to which we are always entitled and on which we rely very strongly, of someone who was an expert in that branch of the law.

I should have thought that there was not much difficulty about that. If allegations or criticisms are made on political grounds, our backs must be broad enough to carry them. The proper thing to do is to decide according to our conscience and according to our legal views and knowledge, and not to mind very much what people say about it.

One has to weigh one consideration against another. We have to put in the balance that awkwardness and difficulty which sometimes arises and, on the other side, the consideration that this idea of publishing extracts from one Member's speech is one that does not deserve a great deal of stretching of points to support. It is highly desirable that the general public should read what an hon. Member says in the setting in which it was said, not only that they should read the whole of his speech—which this does not require—but also that they should read the rest of the debate.

Therefore, I feel that one should not have a great deal of sympathy with someone who wants to take one sentence out of his speech and get 40,000 copies of it printed and spread all over the place. That may give a totally misleading impression. One needs to have a sense of proportion in this matter.

I moved this Clause in Committee. I am sure that the whole House shares my regret today that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) is not with us because he would have added to our debate, as this was his proposal. I should like to tell the House, in confidence, just what happened. My hon. and learned Friend was engaged in one of those private meetings of Members in another part of the House which are fully and accurately reported in the Press. He handed his notes to me and asked me to move the Clause.

It was moved to help the Stationery Office. They do not want to be helped. In those circumstances, I do not see why I should worry about it for very much longer. Had the Attorney-General moved this Amendment on that ground, I should have left it at that. But he made some observations on the law which he ought to know is a very dangerous thing to do. We have had a classic example today that there is an important point here. I am glad to see that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Horn-church has been able to join us.

It will be remembered that in Committee I quoted the case of Lord Barnard, who quarrelled with his solicitor —a fatal thing to do—and decided to say the rudest things he could about his solicitor in a speech in the House of Lords which, of course, was absolutely privileged and which was a new form of being rude to one's lawyer.

Unfortunately, he then decided to disseminate the statement. In respect of that dissemination he was prosecuted, convicted and, I believe, fined £100 and sentenced to three months imprisonment. That was what I would call a happy ending to an interesting story. This morning my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) voiced similar statements about the legal profession. Heaven knows where it may end if he pursues these observations. I have it in mind that my right hon. Friend's principal contacts have been with Law Officers and with ex-Law Officers, and he may necessarily have a somewhat jaundiced view.

And solicitors.

If the Stationery Office do not want to be protected, then so far as I am concerned I am prepared to let this matter pass, so that we can dispose of the Bill.

I must apologise for not arriving earlier to deal with this Amendment. As far as I am concerned this Clause has had an unfortunate Parliamentary history. It was moved in my absence and now I understand that consent to its deletion has been given in my absence by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale). It would not be proper for any of us to seek the opinion of the Stationery Office permanent officials. What I did was to secure the opinion of my right hon. and learned Friend the former Attorney-General and my right hon. Friend the former Financial Secretary to the Treasury. I did not feel in the least inclined to accept the point of view of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West.

This is a most important matter. It means that every hon. Member's speech is, or can be, submitted to the Attorney-General for censorship if the Stationery Office so desire. That has, in fact, taken place. I hesitate to mention it in his absence, but I understand that one hon. Member opposite at one time was refused the reprint of a speech on an important public matter on the ground that it might contain reflections on hon. Members on this side of the House. Well and good. Let the hon. Members who are affected take their own remedy.

The object of this Clause is to prevent the submission of Members' speeches to the Attorney-General for the purpose of his expressing a view on them one way or the other. It really is absurd that the Attorney-General should defend that point of view. If he is prepared to say, "I will give instructions that the Treasury Solicitor will not be advised to examine any hon. Member's speech" then, in view of the indemnity form contained on the form which is filled in by hon. Members when they ask for their speeches to be reprinted, it would be right and proper for the House to agree to this Amendment. Otherwise, I should never agree to this Clause being removed.

The legal position is simple and obvious. Every Member is responsible and can be proceeded against for libel for his speeches in this House. It was once thought by an ingenious Member of the House of Lords that it was possible to make a speech in Parliament and to send it to the newspapers for the purpose of general dissemination and, in that way, to escape the dangers of a libel action. He had had some quarrel with his solicitor—probably justified I should think, in view of the speech just now by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West. He thought fit to make a speech about this gentleman's conduct in the House of Lords and to send it to the newspapers for publication.

The solicitor, like my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West, being not only inclined occasionally perhaps to overemphasise his own point of view and that of his hon. Friends, was also an extremely good solicitor. He immediately took libel proceedings and it was held that the speech was not privileged. The same situation arose in the case of Mr. Creevey, the diarist, who was in a worse position. His speech was misreported. He sent out a corrected version and was, therefore, proceeded against for libel on the corrected version though the uncorrected one might have been protected.

1.30 p.m.

As a result of that, the legal situation was that, until now, under the orders of this House, hon. Members could secure reprints of their speeches. If they did that, of course, they were—and they still will be, if the Bill is left as it is—liable for any libel which occurs in that speech. They will be personally liable. Of course, the copyright of that speech resides in the reporters who take it down—the OFFICIAL REPORT—and, therefore, in order to reproduce the speech textually in that way, the hon. Member has to secure the permission of the OFFICIAL REPORT. What the OFFICIAL REPORT says is that the speech will be reprinted by them if the hon. Member will fill in a form, and it can be reprinted quite cheaply, because the type is already set up.

This matter first came to my attention in the days of the late Administration, when I had occasion to make a speech on the rather technical matter of street planning in my constituency. I used various material provided for me by a local source of the highest repute, which was afterwards published in the minutes of the Hornchurch Urban Council, though it had not been published at the time that I used it.

Somebody, quite properly, looking at that speech said, "It might be libellous on somebody; supposing these things are not true?". He proceeded to submit the speech to the Treasury Solicitor. I said that I understood that everything in the speech was true, and that I would be very pleased to see the Treasury Solicitor, bearing all the authority in the matter, and prove that I was correct, but the answer I got was that it would be improper for me to see the Treasury Solicitor. I prepared it on the advice of someone not personally concerned at all.

This is the position at the moment. As I understand it, so difficult and so unfair did the former Attorney-General find the position that he consulted with Mr. Speaker, and it was suggested that this task of deciding whether hon. Members should or should not have their speeches reprinted should be left to Mr. Speaker, but Mr. Speaker and his Committee refused to undertake this task. That is the present position; let us be quite clear about it.

Now that we have the Financial Secretary to the Treasury here, perhaps he can tell us. He is the responsible officer for the Stationery Office. Does he or does he not want to be in the position of having to censor the speeches of hon. Members? It is a most invidious position and a stupid one, because if an hon. Member wishes to circulate his speech, all that he needs to do is to buy a number of copies of HANSARD and send them round. If he is poor, or if he wants to give it a wider circulation, if he gets his speech reprinted, he has not got the same freedom of circulating his speech in reprint form as in HANSARD.

The matter is even worse than that, because, in the particular case in which I desired to circulate my speech, I also had secured the permission of the Minister to circulate his answer, and that, in fact, comprised the whole debate, so that this was a fair, accurate and complete report of the whole debate. Yet I was prohibited from circulating the whole of that debate, not because there was anything libellous in it, but because the Treasury Solicitor could say that he was not prepared, in those circumstances, to consult or make any further inquiries whatever.

That is a most unsatisfactory position, and I cannot possibly see how the Attorney-General can come to the House and defend his right to censor an hon. Member's speech without even consulting the hon. Member concerned, but that is the present position. It is no good saying that the Stationery Office would like to have this power. This is political power which does not. exist always on the opposite side of the House.

Normally, a Minister is held to be responsible for his Department, and the Minister who should answer is the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. If an hon. Member does not get a speech reprinted, presumably, he ought to be entitled to ask the Financial Secretary to the Treasury why it was not reprinted, but the answer that he will get is that the Stationery Office were advised by the Treasury Solicitor that the matter was libellous, and, when they are asked whose opinion they took, the answer will be that they took the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, and yet the only person whom the Law Officers of the Crown do not consult at that time is the hon. Member concerned.

In these circumstances, an hon. Member is in the position in which he really cannot have his speech reprinted at all. The Attorney-General tries to make a joke of this, but it is not a joke at all.

I was merely saying that, on some occasions, it might be an advantage if the speech was not reprinted.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) did not tell me that he was going to take half a day off today, and I have had to make the best case I could in his absence. I presented it in the best way I possibly could but, because the Attorney-General has written me a personal note on a point of substance which I only received this morning, I could not therefore deal with it. I could not delegate delegatus non potest delegare, It was a question of taste, and the hon. Member knows de gustibus non est disputandum, and, on the whole, I came to the conclusion that it was a case of de minimis non curat lex.

In these circumstances, I am quite prepared, in view of what my hon. Friend has said, to clear him personally.

I did not intervene, much as I would have liked to have done, during the whole day which we spent on this matter on the last occasion, but I wanted to urge on the Committee the importance of trying to meet this particular Amendment, and I do not see why, in those circumstances, I should abandon that attempt now, despite the intervention of my hon. Friend.

This really is a very serious point, and the Attorney-General has said quite rightly that, while, obviously, the speeches of some hon. Members would be better not printed, the speech that is probably of value is the one that deals with a local issue and some important local matter which, owing to the shortage af newsprint, is not fully reported in the local newspaper. This Bill will do a great deal for local newspapers in making it more difficult for someone, faced with a difficulty in misreporting, to get the matter corrected. My hon. Friend says not; I do not know, but this Bill does a great deal for the newspapers.

In these circumstances, I hope that the Attorney-General will allow the continuation of a Clause the purpose of which is merely to protect the right of an hon. Member to circulate his speech, if he so desires. In fact, it does much more for the other side of the House than for us here. It would be unfair to give examples which I have discovered of speeches which have not been circulated for various reasons, but it does place an hon. Member in a very difficult position.

Let us suppose that he has a point of great local importance, and that he goes to the Stationery Office and invites them to reprint his speech. They take advice of the Treasury Solicitor without consulting the hon. Member at all, and they merely tell him that they consider that there is something libellous in his speech. If he goes to any other printer, what is he to say? In all honesty he must say that he tried to get the speech printed and that the Treasury Solicitor said there was something libellous in it. "All right," says the printer, "cut out the libellous part." "Oh," says the unfortunate Member, "I do not know what it is, because the Treasury Solicitor will not tell me what he considers libellous." Therefore, the position is that an honest Member is not only unable to get his speech reprinted by the Stationery Office, but also reprinted by anybody else.

That seems to me to be an unfortunate position. The Attorney-General has been courteous over this, but I do not think he appreciates the point. In the last Parliament—and I think my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) would back me in this—I took the opportunity of consulting both my right hon. and learned Friends who held the offices of Attorney-General and Solicitor-General respectively. Both agreed with me that the present position of the law was bad and wrong, and both agreed that this was a result of a condition that nobody expected to occur from the Crown Proceedings Act, and that we should take the opportunity of correcting the matter when we could.

This Bill is going from us to another place, and it will have the opportunity of expert legal scrutiny there. I appeal to the Attorney-General to leave this Clause in the Bill and to leave the matter to the judgment of the other place. If, after letting the noble Lords there see what the arguments are, he is proved right and I am proved wrong, then let it be struck out there. But if I am right, let us take this opportunity of putting right a small though an extremely aggravating difficulty in which hon. Members can be placed.

At a critical time in General Elections or local elections it may often be of great value to an hon. Member to get a quick reprint of a speech and to circulate it in his constituency. But, as matters stand at the moment, he is prevented from doing that not only by the Stationery Office, but by any other printer as well. In those circumstances, I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will fall in with the suggestion I have made.

I would not generally be in favour of this House relying on a decision taken elsewhere. Having heard my explanation, I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will agree to that view. In these circumstances, I would certainly press for the retention of the Clause, which was put in by the Committee. As I say, I apologise to the House for my absence, but I suppose that I have to get some sleep some time.

Why?

Because I do not want to be like a late Member who always used to dream that he was addressing the House, looked around, saw all the Members yawning, and then woke up to find that he was.

In these circumstances, I apologise for being late. As I understand, the only argument adduced was that the Stationery Office have not offered an opinion. It would, of course, be improper for me to canvass the views of the permanent officials of these bodies, and I hope that in the circumstances the Attorney-General will reconsider the Amendment and leave the Clause in the Bill.

It is with very great reluctance that I differ from the views just expressed by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) but I must differ from him on the fundamental position he has adopted, that a Member has the right to have his speech reprinted by the Stationery Office. I think that is a privilege; I do not think it is a right.

Neither do I think it would be right that a person who happened to be libelled or defamed in a speech reprinted in those circumstances should not have the usual right of a defamed person to proceed against the printer, the publisher and the author, but only against the author, because it may very well be that the author might be a person against whom any remedy normally obtained in the court might, in fact, be unenforceable. That is something of which I think we should not lose sight.

Of course, Members are sometimes challenged—I have not heard it much in recent years, but it was a practice some years ago when debates were far more personal—to repeat outside the House a statement made in the House because it might very well be that while it was privileged in the House it would not be privileged outside. The person defamed might then have the opportunity of proving before the courts that the statement made about him was, in fact, a defamation of his character. I think we ought to preserve that position as much as we possibly can. I dissent entirely from the view that a Member has the right to have his speeches reprinted by the Stationery Office as if it were something which attaches to membership of the House.

When I made my maiden speech, a relative of mine who owned a local newspaper published it in full, with, of course, the necessary embellishments of loud cheers and laugher which, after all, make a speech far more readable than a mere reprint from HANSARD. I paid for several hundred copies of that report to be reprinted and circulated to people whom I thought might be duly impressed when they received it. It was not until afterwards that I discovered that it is cheaper to get one's speech reprinted from HANSARD, although I do not happen to have had a speech reprinted for the last 17 years. My style of oratory has deteriorated during that period.

I share the view expressed by the Attorney-General that it would be a mistake to continue this Clause in the Bill, and although my hon. and learned Friend apologised for it I must say that I always view with misgiving anyone on this side of the House thinking that right will be done in another place when he has not managed to secure it here, because I have no trust in the other place at all.

As I say, I regret having to differ from my hon. and learned Friend, and I would not have spoken but for the fact that he claimed this reprinting as a right. In my view it is only a privilege, and I think it right that legal opinion should be taken as to whether the proposed reprint is, in fact, defamatory before it is printed and published by the Stationery Office. If the Stationery Office reprint something that is defamatory, I can see no reason why they should be put in a privileged position as compared with other printers and publishers who could be sued if they published a defamatory article.

Would my right hon. Friend just deal with this point, which is the real essence of this matter? I would be prepared to agree with a great deal of what he said. I think that it is wrong to say that an hon. Member has the right to have his speech reprinted. But surely my right hon. Friend will agree that what is undesirable is that without any consultation with the Member there should be forced on the Law Officers a task, which they no doubt do not desire, of deciding, without ever going to the source, what might or might not be defamatory.

That is a course which is not adopted by the printer, but here it is done in this quite different way without any reference to the Member, without his being told which passage it is alleged to be defamatory, on advice which he cannot question. If my right hon. Friend would devise some means of getting over that I would be prepared to withdraw my opposition.

I do not accept the position my hon. and learned Friend has stated. My experience of printers and publishers is that they go to a solicitor whom they regard as skilled in dealing with these matters. I am only dealing now with the small newspaper. They ask him whether he thinks it would be safe to publish and they rely on his advice and not on what the author proposes to tell them. I understand that big newspapers retain a person skilled in the law of libel who examines almost everything that goes in the paper.

I recollect that a very serious slip was made once during my period as Home Secretary and that a journalist got into trouble over it. I was told that on that particular day the tame solicitor kept in the office happened to be an holiday. I do not accept the view that printers and publishers consult the author very much. They rely more on the solicitor.

With permission, I should like to say one or two words out of courtesy to the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing), who was not here when I spoke earlier. First of all, I should like to correct the misapprehension on his part. The fact that he did not hear me no doubt explains why he did not get this matter quite right. He rather suggested that I had said that this matter was dependent upon the views of the permanent officials in the Stationery Office and elsewhere, and that I said that the Stationery Office did not want this task. These matters are not decided by permanent officials but by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and what I said was that it was not wanted by the Government, as represented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I hope that that is plain.

It would be rather impertinent for me to add anything on the rest of this matter after what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) has said. But there is one point. The hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch said that the proper thing to do would be to leave this Clause in the Bill and, if necessary, take it out in another place. Another way would be to take it out now, and if anyone wanted to do so it could be put back again in another place. If it turns out that the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch is not Athanasuis contra mundum he might find someone in another place to put the Clause back.

There were some things which the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing) said which rather differed from my recollection. Can the Attorney-General say who is the actual possessor of the copyright of Members' speeches? The hon. and learned Member said that it was the Official Reporter. Is it the Official Reporter as an individual or as a representative of the House of Commons?

I have not gone into research on that matter, but, prima facie, the copyright of the speech is the Member's. Then the speech may be reproduced by someone else. Another person may have intervened in the reproduction and again that reproduction may be tinkered with or improved. In each case there may be an additional copyright.

In that case I am not going to give advice. As the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch has said that it is very dangerous for Law Officers to give an opinion in certain matters, I think I will follow his advice here as well.

I beg to move, in page 5, line 4, to leave out Clause 11.

Here again I am afraid a little explanation is required. One of the difficulties on this Clause has arisen from the side note which states:

"Defamation of undefined groups."

I cannot help thinking that some people, if I may use the word without disrespect, got rather excited about this, because they thought it had something to do with the interesting subject of group libel which was discussed in the Committee at some length. It has nothing to do with that at all. It has to do with a case where a statement is made which can be regarded as being applicable to one or more of a number of people, and the question is in what circumstances they have the right to proceed.

I think it has no relation to the main subject of discussion in Committee, which was whether it was possible in fact for a group as such to have a right of action. The original reason given by the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) for moving this Clause was:

"… the really gross libel which can apply to two or three different people, and it is impossible for anyone to establish that it was intended particularly to apply to him."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1952; Vol. 495, c. 549.]

He may also have had in mind the fact that in the famous case of Braddock v. Bevins the Court of Appeal held that certain associates of the hon. Lady had no right of action in respect of a libel contained in an election address which referred to her and her friends, the reason given being that the words were not in law capable of referring otherwise than to the hon. Lady. It seems, apart from the objections to the Clause as it stands about which I shall have something to say later, there is no real ground for saying that the existing law is defective in this respect.

I will not worry the House with references to it, but certainly the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) will know very well that the law on this subject was recently considered by the House of Lords in the case of Knupffer v. London Express Newspapers. In the House of Lords it was held that it is an essential element of an action of defamation that the words complained of should be published of the plaintiff and the question is what does "of the plaintiff" mean.

Where the plaintiff is not named the test appears to be where the words would reasonably lead those who may be acquainted with the plaintiff to the conclusion that he was the person actually referred to, and the question whether the words did so in fact does not arise and cannot arise if they cannot be regarded in law as capable of referring to him.

Therefore in a case, such as I was referring to just now, one may well find that the actual inquiry as to the fact never arises at all. Where there are some outside circumstances which may point to one or more or some of the groups they can sue and no difficulty arises.

A case comes to mind where one says of police officers that they beat up the Communists and uphold the Fascists. Inquiries are made and there is found to have been present say one sergeant and four constables. Not one of them can sue where there has been a collective and most damaging libel.

In the case that the hon. Member has mentioned, that may be so. That may be another question as to the general underlying policy. All I was trying to show was what the law is as it stands. I do not think that the hon. Member would question what I have already said, that where there is an outside circumstance which points to one or several members of the group, then no difficulty arises. I think the hon. Member was rather jumping ahead and was considering a case where that was not applicable. Where there is such an indication or clue as that, if a defamatory statement made about a group can reasonably be understood to refer to the members of that group, they have an individual cause of action.

There was a case a long time ago in 1877 in which the Court of Appeal held that each of eight trustees was entitled to recover in respect of a libel concerning their administration of certain charities in which they were referred to as the trustees. There was another case which referred to the Roman Catholic religious authorities in Queenstown. That was held to be capable of referring to one of the bishops and, I think, the six clergy resident in Queenstown.

There is the other slightly different case where the defamatory statement is made about two or three people in the alternative. That is dealt with by the editor of the well known textbook, Salmon on Torts, and perhaps I might read a sentence from that book. It says:

"If the defendant says in writing that his horse has been stolen either by A or B, he knows not which, then both A and B will have an action against him, for both are thereby brought under suspicion and defamed. But here also the class must not be so large that the charge ceases to affect the reputation of any individual member of it."

There is no modern authority so far as I know—there is an old case of 1713—and in the absence of any modern cases on the subject I think it is rather significant and suggests, at any rate, that no serious hardship has arisen because of that particular point in the law. The view is taken, and we suggest the view to the House, that far more harm than good would be done by any attempt to alter the law which is really quite capable of taking care of all the normal cases that arise.

May I say one word with regard to the Clause itself? Without any disrespect to the hon. Gentleman, I suggest that it is really misconceived because he has used some words at the end which might have a surprising result. He says that it shall not be a defence to plead that it was not the intention of the defamatory statement to refer to the plaintiff if the court is satisfied that the reasonable inference to be drawn from such statement is damaging to the plaintiff. That really narrows the law as it stands. It is not necessary to show that it is damaging in the sense that it is causing some kind of special damage. All that has to be shown is that it is defamatory and, therefore, capable of causing damage.

Therefore, unintentionally, I think—or it may be that he has some reasons which he has not disclosed—the hon. Member is introducing a rather strange provision whereby in that case a plaintiff can only recover if he proves special damage, and it seems that that would not be a very helpful provision to include in the Bill. I think that one is justified in expressing the view that if the Clause were passed it might introduce just that very evil which the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) so rightly referred to—the advancement of the interests of the legal profession.

I hope that the House will not accede to the very plausible appeal—and the very genteel way in which the Attorney-General referred to the Clause. I have the highest respect for him, but I do not think he is justified in imagining —I do not know whether I am permitted to speak on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale)— that my hon. Friend was so naive as not to expect this Clause would cover a wider field than the Attorney-General had in mind.

The Clause as it stands says:

"It shall not be a defence to an action brought by any person in respect of a defamatory statement made in relation to more than one person to plead that it was not the intention of the defamatory statement to refer to the plaintiff if the Court is satisfied that the reasonable inference to be drawn from such statement is damaging to the plaintiff."

That means that if a person viciously attacks a group, and if in consequence of that attack a particular person suffers damage or it can reasonably be inferred that he will suffer damage, that person shall have the right of taking action against the individual who uttered or published the libel or the slander as the case may be.

I was very pleased that this Clause was introduced and was accepted by the Committee as it stands at present. I do not think the Committee had any doubt about what it meant.

None of us did.

I think we all realised when we passed this Clause unanimously that it was giving an opportunity for redress to individuals who are attacked, as they can be attacked by vicious people who will not name them or who will not point the direct finger at the individual but whose intention is to attack every single individual in that group and to defame them.

I cannot see what other inference can be drawn from the Clause as it stands. All that it says is that there can be a reasonable inference drawn from such a statement that it is damaging to the individual concerned. I for my part am not prepared to allow this very important Clause to be eliminated from the Bill if I can possibly help it. It is well known that men who wish to cause almost irreparable damage to individuals who happen to belong to a particular group do it today indiscriminately and without the slightest hesitation because they know very well that the law as it stands does not in any sense place them in a position to be attacked in the law courts.

I know this very well because I have been dealing with this particular problem for many years. There is, for example, the brutal type of attack that is directed against every and each member of the Jewish community, where allegations are made that they use the blood of Christian children for ritual purposes. It is so obviously wrong, ridiculous and monstrous a charge that the average man would normally treat it with contempt.

Of course, we know very well that the minds of ordinary people can be so influenced by propaganda the like of which was utilised in and from Germany prior to the last war and during the war by a machine which had at its disposal unlimited resources. This continually turned out day after day vicious attacks upon the Jewish community in Germany and elsewhere, and that machine was able to persuade vast numbers of people that statements similar to those to which I have referred were accurate. The effect of that was that not only in war but in times of so-called peace some six million men, women and children were deliberately slaughtered by the most violent and inhuman methods. And millions of people in Germany must have known what was happening in their own country yet they stood by and did nothing.

Was not each of those individuals who happened to be of Jewish persuasion being directly attacked when these defamatory statements were published? It is clear that each of those individuals would suffer damage, and is it not a fact that not only did they suffer damage by their possessions being stolen from them but also they were tortured and millions forfeited their lives?

It is not impossible to imagine that those who today in our own country are publishing the type of libel that we find so frequently circulated by a small number of very vicious people, are influencing members of the community who are thus led to believe that even that type of policy is one which might be accepted. I do not want to give many illustrations, but I could quote hundreds of instances where the policy of Hitler even in this direction has been lauded and approved by men who send publications throughout the length and breadth of this land, and unashamedly continue to publish that kind of libel.

It can surely be said that if a libel of that nature is published an individual member of the group which is libelled must suffer damages in consequence of the libel. For example, if it is circulated in a particular district where there are members of that group or race, surely they are entitled to say that damage is being caused to them. It is true that the publishers will not use individual names because they know that such individuals are protected by law. They will not mention the names of even a small group of four or five and make accusations against them because they know that action could be taken by such persons to protect themselves. But they will circulate within a small area such libels as these, even in towns where there may be say half a dozen members of the Jewish faith. It can be argued in law as it stands today that those libels are not directed against the individuals in that small group, but the members of that group suffer. Equally is it so in towns and villages where there may be only one member of the particular sect concerned.

When a libel of the nature to which I am referring is widely distributed amongst the population in a community, who can possibly say that it is not the intention of the libellers to attack the individual who is a member of that group, and who can easily be recognised as such member? Yet if action were taken, even in a case of that sort, the defendants would succeed in that the libel was a group libel under the law as it stands at present, and there is no remedy against that type of publication.

It is a great pity that other special provisions which were suggested by my hon. Friends and myself were not accepted. Why should we omit this particular Clause? Who is going to suffer as a result? The man who issues a libel which he must know causes damage to individuals is not entitled in my opinion to enjoy the protection of the law, yet that is the position as the law stands at present. Such group libels can incite the people either to ridicule or have contempt for individuals of a special sect.

I have given a few illustrations to show the extent of the problem. I should not imagine there is anybody in the country who has not at one time or another received these filthy publications containing almost unmentionable kinds of charges. Time after time they have proved to be nothing more than mere fabrications prepared for anti-Semitic purposes. Such stories as that of the children's blood for Jewish ritual purposes and a hundred and one other stories have been put out by malicious people who are actuated by despicable motives.

The hon. Gentleman has used his illustration once already, and he should not pursue the matter any further.

I am obliged to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I feel very strongly about this. I hope the House will regard this as being an important matter. We should take means to stop these libels and scandals. The Attorney-General himself has sympathetically referred to the question of stopping them if it could possibly be done. What he says is it is difficult to find the right kind of wording or phrasing to deal with the question, but if there is a mischief that mischief should be adequately dealt with. There have been several cases taken under the Acts which stand at present. They have not been successful, although it was perfectly obvious that on a reasonable ground the actions should have succeeded even as the law stands. This does not only apply to the group with which I am associated. It applies to other religious bodies, to groupings of race or colour or even to a grouping in a hospital——

Or in the House of Commons.

Yes, in the House of Commons. I hope that this matter will not be regarded as trivial, but as something which requires the attention of the House, and I hope we will not accept the Attorney-General's suggested Amendment deleting this Clause from the Bill.

It is right that I should draw the attention of the House to the fact that much of the moving eloquence of my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) is not relevant to the Clause. He appears to be under the impression that the Clause contains a new remedy for anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish propaganda. The Clause does not contain such a new remedy. It makes provision in respect of a certain kind of defence in actions where more than one person is concerned, but it does not contain any new remedy for group libel.

I shall not express any views about group libel, which was discussed for two or three hours in the Committee. I think everyone would desire that if that innovation is to be brought about in the law it should be done by a Clause which openly purports to do so.

Clause 11 was introduced in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale), with all the charm of argument with which this House is familiar, usually at a time different from that at which he exercised it in Committee. He proposed it as a simple, non-controversial Clause, and I sympathise with the object he had in mind.

I just got up and made a speech, and the Clause was passed in 10 minutes almost without discussion. Why is my hon. Friend making all these observations about it?

I am telling the House that it is not a Clause dealing with group libel on racial or religious groups, which highly-controversial matter was debated in the Committee for two or three Sittings and on which a very keen vote was taken. Clause 11 was introduced with much amiability and persuasion by my hon. Friend as a simple and non-controversial matter.

I beg my hon. Friend to read the Clause, when he will find that what I said was relevant. What was intended by the mover of the Clause is beside the point. The author of it can speak for himself. If the Clause remains in the Bill the person to whom I refer would have a right of action.

It has often been said that detailed discussion of legal principle is not advisable when one wants to make progress on the Floor of the House. I must adhere to the view which I have given, that the Clause does not create any new right of action but merely removes a certain ground for defence. I am not criticising either my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West or his Clause, but I believe that the purposes which he had in mind in proposing it are not achieved by the Clause as drafted.

In the circumstances I urge him to agree that he would serve a very desirable purpose if he would agree to the deletion of the Clause. I hope I have said nothing in criticism of him when I have been trying to point out that the matters raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West are not relevant to the Clause. It may be that the Law Lords may exercise a beneficient influence on the Bill and that some useful suggestions will crop up there. I am bound to urge my hon. Friend to realise that the Clause does not meet the objects which he had in view.

I came to the House with the intention of seeking at the earliest possible moment a clear exposition about this Clause and if necessary of withdrawing the Clause to permit the Bill to go through. I do not know that I am helped by the different expositions of the meaning of the Clause that have been given and it is now a little difficult for me to act as gracefully as I hoped to do.

I am very humble about these matters. I am only an amateur in law who has appeared in a little over 10,000 cases. and I am frequently left in complete mystification of what the law means in almost any case under the sun. I did not do much legal reading to pass my examinations, and I have tried to do very little since.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheet-ham (Mr. N. H. Lever) has talked with clarity and persuasiveness about the meaning of the Clause, and as though I had been rather gullible in proposing it. It rather hurt my feelings. It was as though I had deceived all the legal experts in the Committee into passing the Clause virtually on the nod. I understood that the Clause would be all right in its application and that it covered by implication the two preceding Clauses which had been discussed in the Committee for 14 hours.

I hope that the Attorney-General will acquit me of any such intentions. He has made it quite clear that he cannot accept the Clause and that if it remained in the Bill facilities might not be available for the Bill to pass. I have to face that fact. and to plead "Guilty" at once, in the face of such brilliant legal experts. It cannot be denied that the Clause lacks some measure of precision.

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) that behind this Clause is a very definite issue of principle about something in which very many men passionately believe. If this were an occasion on which the House was discussing ordinary public business and we had the time at our disposal, I would argue this matter and I would press for the Clause to be passed exactly as drafted. I would press this principle to a Division without any hesitation whatever and with complete sincerity, because I agree with everything that my hon. Friend said on the general merits of the Clause on the issue of group libel.

I am anxious that the Bill should go through, and I do not want to interrupt my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) unduly. I appreciate what he says about the Clause. I only agree to his accepting the deletion of the Clause on the ground that I believe the remaining provisions of the Bill are sufficiently important to be passed. They stand considerably to the credit of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheetham (Mr. N. H. Lever), who introduced the Bill in the first place, and I do not want to wreck the Bill by any action on my part.

I am grateful and I agree. That is my standpoint. Having made it quite clear that we assert the principle and would have maintained the principle had it been practicable, I do not want to jeopardise the passage of this important Bill, for which it has been alleged against me that I have a certain measure of paternity. I am prepared, therefore, in those circumstances to let the Clause go.

I beg to move, in line 36, to leave out"(Amendment)."

This Amendment seeks to give the Bill a civilised title.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 7, line 8, to leave out from "Britain," to the end of line 9.

This Amendment refers back to Clause 6. I ought to draw the attention of the House to the provisions of Clause 6, because it is difficult to appreciate the scope of the Schedule unless hon. Members have in mind what the Clause says. The Clause is a repetition of the existing statute law. It provides that publication in a newspaper of certain reports is privileged unless the publication is proved to be made with malice. That is the substance of subsection (1). Subsection (3), which is a limitation of the Clause, says that:

"Nothing in this section shall be construed as protecting the publication of any matter the publication of which is prohibited by law, or of any matter which is not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit."

The protection given to newspapers for their reports is limited by the fact that it must be a matter of public concern and that it must be a publication which is for the public benefit.

The Schedule gives two lists of statements which are to be protected under that Clause. The first group are statements which are protected without any need to publish an explanation or a contradiction of what has been said. The second group are only privileged if the newspaper is ready to publish an explanation or a contradiction by somebody who has been defamed.

The part of the Schedule with which my Amendment deals is the first part. Line 8 begins:

"A fair and accurate report of any proceedings in public of the legislature of any part of Her Majesty's dominions outside Great Britain or of any foreign country or province or state of a foreign country."

In other words, the position is that up to date the statutory protection given to a newspaper has not included the proceedings of any legislature outside Great Britain.

Statements made in this Legislature are not covered. We have discussed them at some length on the Amendment dealing with the reprinting of Parliamentary reports. This Schedule deals with legislatures outside Great Britain, and the purpose of my Amendment is to limit the protection to those legislatures in the Commonwealth and not to include reports from foreign legislatures.

There is one interesting point to which I want to draw the attention of the House. In the case of reports of the proceedings of foreign courts that distinction is drawn. There is no statutory protection for reports of proceedings of foreign law courts, but this Schedule is proposing to introduce protection for the proceedings of foreign legislatures, and that would seem to be an entirely contradictory thing to do. The question was discussed by the Porter Committee, and the reason for this distinction arises from the views taken by that Committee. They say, in paragraph 108 of their Report:

"Had not the practical difficulties proved insuperable, we should have desired to add to the list of reports entitled to qualified privilege, reports of proceedings in some foreign courts. But the legal system of the different countries of the world vary considerably and drastic changes in the character of their judicial tribunals may occur with little prevous warning. Legal proceedings may be of a political character, and may take place in absentia.We have found it impossible to put forward any criterion of general application which could be adopted to limit and define such foreign courts as maintain a standard of justice and a method of procedure which would justify our recommending that reports of their proceedings should be entitled to qualified privilege without any droit de reponse on the part of the person defamed."

That is a clear statement of the difficulty of the problem: that one cannot look at all the courts of the world, with their manifold procedures, different legal bases, and so on, and be sure that a fair report of those proceedings is a fair report of what is in general a court according to recognised rules which civilised countries would accept. Therefore, the Porter Committee were forced to suggest, against the general trend of their views, that it was not possible to extend this protection to foreign courts.

I am suggesting that if it is not possible to extend it to foreign courts it is an extraordinary situation to extend it to foreign legislatures, because if one cannot be sure in the case of a court that they give the person a right of reply to any personal attack made on him, if one cannot be sure that they may come to a decision without giving someone due notice of the allegations to be made, if one cannot be sure that they maintain a standard of justice and a method of procedure which would justify our recommending them to have the protection—all those criteria may apply even more strongly to a foreign legislature.

It seems to me that if we cannot extend the protection to a court—which, at any rate, goes through the forms of having some kind of just procedure regulating the proceedings—it is quite absurd to extend the protection to every legislature in each totalitarian country, to every country behind the Iron Curtain, to every obscure legislature in the obscure State of some federation, with all those manifold and varied bodies, many of them sharing none of our ideas of fair play and justice.

Is not the distinction, briefly, this: that in the first case—the legislatures—the public know that they are getting the report of a debate, and in the second case—the courts abroad— where the public may think, and wrongly think, as far as some countries' courts are concerned, that they are getting reports of judicial proceedings, and those reports cannot be admitted because there is a danger of the public being misled into thinking that they are having actually judicially found facts reported to them? In the case of the legislature, the public realise that they are debates of foreign countries' Parliaments, and in the other case, judgments of a supposedly impartial court.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that assistance. I was about to deal with the explanation given by the Attorney-General, which differs some- what from that of my hon. Friend. When I asked this question in Committee, the hon. and learned Gentleman was good enough to say:

"The argument is that it is in the public interest that an account should be given of the proceedings in legislatures, but there is no need for the public to have an account of what goes on in law courts. Therefore, these two things are on quite different footings."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee B, 25th March, 1952; c. 440.]

I do not think that the Attorney-General was necessarily adopting that argument; he was saying that that was the argument that was behind it. In a way, it quite contradicts the suggestion put forward by my hon. Friend, because it implies that law courts are to some extent a private affair, a matter between the State and the individual, and not a matter of general public interest, while the proceedings of public legislatures are matters of general public interest.

I should have thought, on the contrary, that if a person was going to make a defamatory statement about somebody, it was a good deal better that it should be made in the proceedings of a court, where it could be tested by cross-examination, than as an allegation in a legislature, where it may not be tested in that way.

We know here that if I was to make an allegation against my hon. Friend, or if I was to take advantage of the protection given to these proceedings to make an allegation against some political opponent of mine, some enemy of mine outside the House, Mr. Speaker would at once pull me up and point out that I was not right to do that, that I was abusing the privilege given to me if I was taking advantage of my position to make defamatory attacks on people which were not germane to the issues under discussion.

That is because we are a civilised legislative assembly. We have generally recognised democratic proceedings, which we obey and which give a protection to people's characters. Therefore, it is reasonable that newspapers should have protection when they report our proceedings. But that is not true of a great many legislative assemblies, and it is quite impossible for the public to know of which legislative assemblies it is true and of which it is not true.

It seems to me that the principle or what we are trying to do in the Bill, and what my hon. Friend the Attorney-General have time and again both said they were trying to do, is to prevent the abuse of the law of defamation by unscrupulous people being able to bring blackmailing actions in which newspapers, for example—small local newspapers, with inadequate capital behind them—might find themselves involved in crippling legal actions.

If that is the grounds for bringing forward the Bill, why take the opportunity to extend the protection which is given under it to lying statements which are repeated all over the world? What real mischief is caused, what real interference is there in the liberty of the Press to report matters of genuine concern to people in this country, if they are to be told that slanderous and libellous statements made in foreign legislatures are not to be taken on their face value, and that if they are wounding to people's characters, they are not to be repeated except at the risk of being tested in the courts? It seems to me to be a reasonable safeguard to make and no interference with the reasonable discretion of the newspaper to give fair reports of political and legislative proceedings.

2.45 p.m.

Therefore, what my Amendment proposes to do is to extend the protection to legislatures of the Commonwealth. I recognise that a very arguable case can be put forward. These legislatures, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) reminded us in Committee upstairs, are the Queen's legislatures. They are subject to more or less the same kind of protection for the individual and for the character of the individual that our own proceedings have. We obviously have a common interest with the people of the Commonwealth in knowing what is going on, because we are members of one community. Therefore, I am not being exaggerated in my claims. I am not asking that there should be no protection given, but I am suggesting that the line should be drawn for legislatures as it is drawn for courts.

We are accepting the principle, as did the Porter Committee, that in the case of courts we have to look at the nature of the proceedings and to limit our protection to that area in which we could be sure that the proceedings were fair. Therefore, there is no reason at all why we should not apply the same test to the reports of legislative proceedings.

My hon. Friend pulled me up and said that in one case people were listening to the cut and thrust of debate. But that is not always so. It is 'a reasonable assumption that if I said that my hon. Friend was a corrupt and incompetent member of the Bar, he would reply in similar language; and the readers of newspapers would be able to form their own opinions of our comparative credibility. But there are legislative assemblies where minorities cannot be allowed to speak at all, and where motions may be passed and allegations or statements of fact made about people accusing them of all sorts of personal immoralities which have nothing to do with the matter under discussion; they would be under no protection and they would not be able to make any reply. They would have much less chance, probably, of making a reply than if the allegations were being made in a court of law in a great many countries.

We are anxious to reach an agreed Bill. We are anxious to defeat a mischief of which many hon. Members are very conscious. This part of the Schedule is not really necessary at all—it is an unnecessary extension. There may be some Members who feel that it is desirable, but there are many others who feel that it is undesirable; and I put forward the arguments which upstairs led to the Committee tieing on this question—the voting was equal. Therefore, I suggest that it is not an unreasonable thing to say that this part should be dropped because it does not affect the substance of the Bill; it does not affect the real mischief against which the Bill is levelled. Therefore, it is something which might reasonably be dropped without any serious interference with its general effect.

I finish by saying one thing to my hon. Friend. Upstairs, he made this comment about what I have said:

"While I recognise that he" —

that is, myself—

"is perfectly right to be vigilant on behalf of those who may suffer some inconvenience, he must remember that we also have the good sense of the people of this country, and the fairness of at any rate, some sections of the Press."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee B, 27th March, 1952; c. 449.]

It is that kind of attitude towards the Bill by my hon. Friend which has led to so much acrimony and has taken so much time in the discussions. He has always had the feeling that people who claimed about being libelled and who wanted to protect their characters were those who suffered only a slight inconvenience, which could not be balanced against the enormous advantages of allowing the Press to print what they like, and when and where they like.

I put it to my hon. Friend in this way: that it is really a test of the spirit with which he is tackling the Bill. If he really is anxious to reach a Bill which is to be fair as between plaintiff and defendant, which is to give reasonable freedom to the Press but not unnecessarily to run the risk of injuring people possibly in a very grievous manner, this is a case where he might well accept the Amendment without in any way harming his Bill and its effectiveness and the contribution that he is so anxious to make to the reform of the law of libel.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I am sure the House is grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) for the very full and extremely able exposition he has given in opposition to this provision. It is one which troubles me very much, and I very much hope that it will be possible for my hon. Friend the Member for Cheetham (Mr. N. H. Lever) and the Attorney-General to do something to meet us on this matter.

The position in regard to the legislatures of the Dominions is, of course, entirely different from that of other countries. All recognise at once that there are other countries to which this extension could be made in the same way as to the legislatures of the Dominions. I do not suggest for a moment that all foreign legislature are open to the kind of objections to which I personally think many of those which would be included in this provision are. What we are doing here is to give the advantage of the defence of privilege to repeating what is said in a foreign legislature—in a foreign legislature of any foreign country, or puppet state of a foreign country.

I am sure that my legal hon. Friends have considerable knowledge of the exercise of foreign jurisdiction and what happens in foreign courts. One knows that while large numbers of them are immaculately conducted in every possible way, there are others the whole of whose attitude is very different from that of the attitude we, fortunately, have in this country.

Similarly, in regard to the legislatures the whole attitude and sense of responsibility in a number of foreign legislatures is entirely different from that which we have in this country and in the Dominions. In our country and in the Dominions we have a sense of inherent responsibility which is brought to bear, and to all Members of Parliament here and in the Dominions it of itself provides some guarantee. So far as the Dominions and ourselves are concerned we are all members of one community, with one attitude of mind. I recognise that it is not only not objectionable, but most desirable that this extension to the Dominions should be made in this Schedule. But the position of foreign countries is entirely different.

The one point to which I wish to address myself is the provision which my hon. Friend read in Clause 6 (3) and the reliance which may be placed on that Clause by those who support the Schedule as it stands:

"Nothing in this section shall be construed as protecting the publication of any matter the publication of which is prohibited by law, or of any matter which is not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit."

That might be quoted as a kind of omnibus provision which should be sufficient to provide protection for the individual subject to libel. We start on the footing that this is a libel; otherwise there is no point in it. Here is an individual who is being libelled. Then it is said that if it is by repetition of what is said in a foreign legislature it is all right if it is of public concern or for the public benefit. No one in this House suggests that where a libel is published on an individual otherwise than in a foreign legislature it should be a defence to say that it is for the public concern or for the public benefit.

We are not proposing that public concern and public benefit should override the right of the individual to have his honour immune from defamation. No one suggests that, yet it is proposed in the case of a foreign legislature, if the libel is repeated in the foreign legislature —a foreign legislature whose conceptions of justice, of fair play and everything else, are entirely different from those of our country—it is a defence in that case to say that it is for the public benefit and the public concern.

If anyone looks at it in that way it will be seen as a monstrous proposal which cannot possibly commend itself to any fair-minded person. In dealing with this we have to assume that there is a libel and that we in the House of Commons do not believe in the public benefit and the matter of public concern overriding the honour and freedom from defamation of the individual. I suggest that in these circumstances the House should not accept the inclusion of such a proposal in the Bill.

I am as concerned as my hon. Friend that we should finish the Bill in time today, and I hope it will be possible for him and the Attorney-General to give us some really satisfactory assurance on this important matter.

I hope that my hon. Friends who moved and seconded this Amendment will believe me when I say that I sincerely respect the fears that they have expressed but cannot share them. I feel that my hon. Friend, however unwittingly, has been somewhat less than fair in quoting a snatch of what I said in Committee when I spoke after the Attorney-General had spoken at some length about the Clause and he had given reasons which I also adopted. I said on that occasion words which precede those which my hon. Friend has quoted: I then said:

"I understand the fears which have been expressed and I do not dismiss them lightly, but it really comes back to this: Either the public of this country are to be reasonably informed about what goes on in the world or they are not, and there are some moments when the inconvenience caused to private citizens, or which may even be caused to the Attorney-General, by such publication must be borne in order that some reasonable flow of information about what goes on in the world shall be available to the British public."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee B, 27th March, 1952.]

This is exactly the argument to which I addressed myself. If that is my hon. Friend's proposal, it follows inevitably from what he said that he is in favour of matters of public concern and public benefit overriding the immunity of the individual from defamation. Why, therefore, limit it even to foreign legislatures. The principles he is now advocating as justifying extension to foreign legislatures would involve public concern and public benefit overriding the immunity of the individual from defamation in every single case, whether it is from a foreign legislature or not, and to my mind, and I think to that of every responsible Member, that is utterly intolerable.

With great respect to my hon. and learned Friend, because I am advocating that in certain cases the public interest should override private convenience is no authority for tagging me with the belief that in all cases the fact that a matter is of public interest means it shall override the private man's right to protect his reputation. It has long been an established principle of the English common law that there are cases where, in the public interest, private convenience and the desirability of being able to protect one's reputation has to yield to the public right to have information. One example is our own Parliament, which has already been quoted.

There are many other instances where the public need to have information about what is going on in the world overrides the sacred right of a man to have his reputation protected. If in the course of this or any other debate it became necessary to attack the reputation of a private citizen of this or any other country, that attack is privileged, and the report is privileged, and we all agree it is right that it should be.

My hon. and learned Friend has got himself into a somewhat extreme position and has rather overstated his case in supposing that it is a monstrous proposition to defend the Schedule as it now stands. As it now stands the Schedule is approved unanimously by the Porter Committee. I have never said that the Porter Report was sacrosanct. All I said —and I venture to repeat it—was that where the Porter Committee, consisting of some of our leading writers, lawyers and judges, have unanimously been of a certain opinion it would at any rate be wise to suppose that what they proposed was not monstrous; that what they proposed was not altogether a complete wrecking of the principles of our libel laws. They may be wrong. I have often disagreed, very respectfully, with the Porter Committee myself, but I have never supposed that any of their recommendations were imbecile, monstrous or calculated to wreck the fundamental principles of our law.

Nor have I suggested anything of the kind, and my hon. Friend really must not suggest that I have. I made it perfectly clear that, not only in the case of the Dominions but in the case of a number of foreign legislatures, as I mentioned in my speech, I accept that it would be perfectly fair, right and proper. But one remembers, having served on committees, that committees deal merely with the general principles, by and large, and this Schedule is drafted in such a way as to include every foreign legislature of every State in any part of the world, however completely contrary its ideas are to those of this country.

That is what was recommended unanimously by the Porter Committee.

Oh, no.

But that is the fact. The Porter Report is there, and that is the explicit recommendation of the Porter Committee. I think it is right that the newspapers of this country should be privileged from libel action if in good faith and in the public interest they report the debates of foreign legislatures. I do not think we can place upon newspaper editors in this country the burden of analysing all these reports that come through in the heat of the day purporting to report what goes on in foreign legislatures. We cannot put upon them the burden of examining those reports to see whether they libel someone, any more than we can put on them the burden of doing that with the reports of our own legislature. It is vital that the public should have these reports. It is impossible to have them printed as fully and frequently as they should be if they are to be subject to libel proceedings.

I ask my hon. Friends to believe that, while I am not anxious that anybody should have his reputation impugned lightly, I am as firm in my own mind as they are in theirs to the contrary view that it is honestly of public interest that we should encourage the free and privileged reporting of what goes on in Parliaments of foreign countries, even when those Parliaments are not constituted according to our tastes.

My hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) misunderstood me when I ventured to interject. I did not say that the distinction between a foreign court and a foreign Parliament was necessarily that the foreign Parliament represented the bona fide cut and thrust of debate. What I said was that the good sense of the British public reading the report would tell them that what they were reading was a debate in a foreign Parliament, the value of which they could assess for themselves. They would not think that they were reading something which had been impartially and judicially established. They would know that what they were reading was an allegation made in debate.

In those circumstances, it seems impossible that we should not in modern times give to newspapers the right to report foreign Parliaments. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) seemed to think that if we drew up a list of Parliaments it would be better. It is a little difficult to know whether we should include, for example, the United States and exclude another country. What my hon. and learned Friend wants to do is to exclude all foreign Parliaments.

As we always have done.

As we always have done. But, as the Porter Committee said, and as I think the House agreed in general, the law which governs this subject, the 1888 Act, was apt for the conditions of that time. But the time and opinions have changed, and there is a different sense in 1951 as to what subjects should enjoy immunity of reporting given to a limited class of matters. In those circumstances—

Surely the Porter Committee addressed itself to this problem of distinguishing between foreign countries when dealing with the courts in the passage I quoted and tried to make a distinction between what we might call civilised courts and other courts. They cut out foreign courts and make the distinction, is it a Queen's Court or is it not? Surely it is logical, sensible and consistent with principle that precisely the same criterion should be applied, is it Queen's legislature or not? It is not a question of whether it is American legislature or something else because that is something we cannot go into.

I will accept the point that it is the logical thing to do, but it is one thing to exclude court proceedings from the protection of this Bill and it is quite another to exclude any foreign legislature; because the Amendment proposed by my hon. Friend involves whether it is the legislature of France, or the United States, or Belgium and many other—

Only of course with regard to defamation. It does not prevent reports being published. It only means that newspapers have to take care that no defamation is published.

That is so. But in practice a burden is imposed on those publishing these reports as they come which, in my submission, is calculated to make it difficult to have the free reporting desired by the Porter Committee which is reasonable and fair. I do not think this is a case where my hon. Friends can say there is a real danger of malicious defamation of a country.

All that is involved is the reporting of what takes place in foreign parliaments, but my hon. Friends have made up their minds that they would rather extract the reports than have the risk of defamation uttered in these foreign parliaments being reported to the public of this country. I rely upon the good sense of the British people to know that they are reading debates of foreign parliaments, and to know that those debates can often contain wild inaccuracies. I feel this is a step forward in providing more up-to-date provisions so far as qualified privilege is concerned and that it would be wrong to accept the Amendment.

It is quite obvious from what my hon. Friend has said that no amount of argument, even were it to extend from now until four o'clock, would persuade him, and therefore I do not propose to take up the time of the House for more than a few minutes.

I say most earnestly to the Attorney-General, who has a responsibility in this matter, as have the promoters of the Bill, that he should find an opportunity after this House has parted with the Bill, before it goes to another place, to consider this matter again. I hope he will feel able, at the end of the argument, to say that, at any rate, he proposes to do so. My hon. Friend may not be satisfied with the arguments advanced to the House in reply to the points raised against this Amendment. I hope that he will not think I am offensive. I sometimes have a habit of convincing people that I am offensive when I am only trying to be helpful.

I hope he will not think I am seeking to say anything that could in any way impugn his personal reaction to these matters or his conduct of the case if I say, very sincerely indeed, that I am sure his argument does not convince the majority of those most qualified to judge this kind of argument. I doubt very much indeed, whether, when the heat of the debate has passed, when he has got his Bill and it is on the Statute Book, the argument he has advanced today would continue to convince him either.

It is an astonishing thing which the Porter Committee has recommended. It is true that if they recommend something, and especially if they recommend it unanimously, we ought to approach the matter from the point of view that there must be something to be said for it and that there is probably a reasonable prima facie case in its favour. But that is all. It does not go beyond that. It does not excuse us as a House of Commons from refusing to examine it anew for ourselves, giving full weight to all the arguments advanced which influenced the Porter Committee, and any other arguments as well, but not regarding ourselves as bound by them if in the end in our consciencies we are not convinced.

How can we be convinced by this? It is suggested that there is an overriding public interest which is that the newspapers of this country shall be allowed to publish any piece of defamation in the world, no matter how gross, no matter how malicious or how unfounded, provided only that some member of some foreign legislature should have been indiscreet enough, or malicious or dishonest enough, to have said it.

Provided that it is in the public interest.

My hon. Friend is wrong. There is not a single word about public interest.

Look at Clause 6.

I am reading the Schedule.

Clause 6 governs the Schedule.

Clause 6 says:

"Subject to the provisions of this section.…"

Does my hon. Friend mean that it is a qualified privilege?

Yes.

That only means that the matter concerned shall be a matter of interest to the public and that the newspaper which publishes it shall not itself be guilty of malice. That is all; but that is not inconsistent with what I said. Provided that a member of some foreign legislature is reckless enough or dishonest or malicious enough to say it, then any newspaper in this country, provided that it is not itself malicious and provided that the matter is one in which people generally are interested—it goes no more than that—may publish it, and the man defamed has no remedy of any kind.

Provided that it is of public benefit.

I do not think that that is any qualification of what I am saying.

The whole argument on which Clause 6 was presented was that it is for the public benefit to publish news of what has happened in these foreign legislatures. It is always put forward on that ground. A newspaper is not likely to publish it unless it is a matter of interest to a great number of people about something which is of some importance in the world. That is what gives its news value—provided that it has some news value.

We are doing that in circumstances in which we do not give the same protection—and the Porter Committee expressly decided not to give the same protection —to reports of proceedings in a court of law. I cannot understand any more than my hon. Friend can understand on what basis the Porter Committee recommended the protection for legislatures and not for the courts.

One would have thought that if we were to make a distinction it would be in favour of the court against the legislature. In the courts there are presumably no politics connected with the matter. Theirs is a judicial proceeding. It might be said that many of these courts would not be recognised as judicial, but neither would many legislatures be regarded as legislatures as we accept them.

3.15 p.m.

May I just say, in concluding, that the reason, I would have thought—though I do not think there is any judicial authority for it; it is only common sense— why the proceedings of this House have an absolute privilege, and why the proceedings of a local government authority have a qualified privilege, is because, some day, somewhere, we are each one of us answerable to somebody for what we do or what we say.

Anyone whom we defame is not wholly without remedy. He has not got the ordinary remedy in the courts, because it is right that we should be free here to say what we think it right to say, and that the public should know what it is that we are doing and saying. So there is that absolute privilege for us here, and absolute privilege for reporting what we are doing and saying.

But that does not mean that everything we do remains subject to no check or remedy at all, because our position and our public reputations and our fate here ultimately depends on that, and no man could keep his place for long in the British House of Commons if he used that privilege here so as to defame recklessly and maliciously a whole group of people who were defamed outside.

It is because there is another remedy that we are given privilege here, and the same privilege ought reasonably to extend to any other of Her Majesty's legislatures in any part of Her Majesty's Dominions. But, if we extend it to all the other countries in the world, we are exposing people, who cannot defend themselves at all, to an absolutely unlimited opportunity for defamation which it may be of the greatest possible public importance that it should be denied and disproved, but we are denying those people the opportunity to do that.

I am reminded that these statements are statements that are to be privileged, without explanation or contradiction, so that the man defamed has not got the right that we are giving in this Bill to the victims of unintentional defamation. We are saying to a defendant, "It may be right that you should be excused from paying damages in these circumstances, but you must put the damage right." There is no provision of that kind in this Clause.

We are giving an unlimited and completely free licence to every foreign legislature and every member of it, no matter how constituted and no matter what kind of authority they have, to say anything at all, about anybody in the world, with or without any degree of justification, and taking from that person any possibility at all of protecting his reputation in any way. I am sure it is wrong, and I hope that, if we do not think so, another place will.

I should like to help in this matter if I can. I rather feel that we may be in danger of getting things slightly out of perspective. Some of us have been in this Chamber for 12 hours out of the last 18; I certainly have, and I am prepared to admit that I may not be seeing quite as straight as I did last night.

I wonder whether sufficient weight has been paid to subsection (3) of Clause 6, because, with the greatest respect, the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said just now that there was completely free licence to publish anything, no matter how offensive it was or who said it, said in a foreign legislature. Let me read the words of the subsection:

"…any matter which is not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit."

To get this protection, we have to show these two things—that it has news value and is of public concern, and that publication is for the public benefit. I wonder whether that has really been fully appreciated.

I want to make this appeal. We have got through today without any Division, and I am quite prepared to say— although as the House knows very well, I have absolutely no power or right to say what will be done anywhere else; and, therefore, I must be careful what I say— that I will do all I can to see that if and when this Bill is considered in another place this subject is raised. There will be at least one eminent member of the Porter Committee, and there will be other people present. It may well be that some of them will not have considered the argument put forward so strongly this afternoon, but would it not be possible to allow this to go to another place as it stands and to let it be raised and dealt with there?

I am rather disappointed in the attitude adopted by the Attorney-General. I thought, listening to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman), that his arguments were quite conclusive on this point, and I should have thought that the hon. Member for Cheetham (Mr. N. H. Lever) and the promoters of the Bill would have been well advised to accept this Amendment for the reasons given by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas).

There is a great distinction between what is said in our Legislature or in any other legislature of Her Majesty's Dominions, on the one hand, and what is said in a foreign legislature on the other. As my hon. Friend pointed out, all of us who speak here, and all who speak in any British legislature, are ultimately responsible for what we say. I think it right that anything said in this Legislature or anywhere else throughout the Dominions may be republished in a newspaper with the immunity which this Bill will give.

I can see no reason why, in the public interest, that immunity should be extended to words spoken in some foreign legislature set up under a different Constitution, where people are able to speak quite irresponsibly, and, if they wish, to defame British subjects. I can see no reason, in the public interest, why newspapers should, with impunity, be able to repeat and publish such statements in the Press of this country.

I have the greatest respect for the Report of the Porter Committee, but I find it very difficult to see on what logical basis that Committee felt able to extend this immunity to a foreign Legislature while denying the same immunity to a foreign court of law. As my hon. Friend said, I think there is something to be said for enabling British newspapers to publish what appears in judicial proceedings abroad, because prima facie,they are judicial proceedings and the publication of such proceedings may well be of public interest.

But one knows of a multitude of examples where all kinds of completely reckless and irresponsible statements may be made in legislatures abroad, and I see no reason why British newspapers should be able to publish in the British Press defamatory statements spoken in foreign legislatures. I should have thought that any newspaper that felt obliged to publish such statements in the belief that their publication was in the public interest should have imposed upon it the ordinary duty to make inquiries, and, before allowing publication, to satisfy itself that no injury would be done to any individual.

I hope, therefore, that we shall not allow this matter to be left for a quite arbitrary review in another place. This is a very important matter in which we have the duty to the British public to see that the subject of this Amendment is dealt with here in the British House of Commons. I hope that, in view of the speeches made, the promoters of the Bill will feel able to accept this Amendment.

It would be a great misfortune if they tried to get into this Bill far more than they are reasonably entitled to have; and for all these reasons I hope very much that, after consideration, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheetham (Mr. N. H. Lever) will accept this or, if he does not that the House will accept the Amendment.

Would the hon. Member be good enough to direct his attention to Clause 6 (3) which he has completely ignored in his argument? In accusing me of being unreasonable I think he might at any rate address reasonable arguments to the House on a relevant point.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheetham (Mr. N. H. Lever) said that I had misquoted him. I quoted from the OFFICIAL REPORT and he asked me for the page from which I quoted. I gave him the page number and he looked it up and read out a further passage which enabled him to put in its right context what I have quoted. That is Parliamentary procedure, fair play in a legislature, something to which we are so used that we take it as a matter of course. What he has to appreciate is that that is something which he cannot rely upon to happen in every legislature, and that is why it is necessary to consider this definition.

Let me give a practical and concrete instance of what might happen. Suppose a paper in this country published a statement that in the Ruritanian House of Assembly the Minister of the Interior, justifying his refusal to allow the Socialist Member for Widnes to visit the country, said, "We must protect our women. This politician is well-known to have polluted their morals and to have a mistress in every country which he visits." That would be a matter of immense public concern to the people of Widnes, and the sales of the newspapers would go up enormously during that week. No one can deny that it would be a matter of public interest and public concern.

And for the public benefit.

It is obviously highly desirable that the facts should be disclosed.

Will my hon. Friend be careful? His electors are not possessed of a sense of humour and they may get his speech wrong.

Were it not for the fact that I know that the people of Widnes have a particularly acute sense of humour I would not have taken the risk. But I agree with my hon. Friend that even my saying this as an illustration is a risk. It might start seeping round that the hon. Member for Widnes is not all that he should be.

Under the Schedule of the Bill as it stands the report I have mentioned can be published, and there is a complete defence without any need to publish a statement from me that I have never been to Ruritania or even crossed the Channel. No statement or denial or explanation is required. The protection is there; it is a fair report of what the Minister of the Interior said and of the reasons he gave. And as it affects a public representative in this country it is a matter of public concern. I quote that merely as a concrete example.

I should have liked very much to have met my hon. Friend the Member for Cheetham on this point. We had a debate on it upstairs, we divided equally on it and for that reason we have an opportunity of taking the opinion of the House. We have given in on a number of points. We have not pressed a number of Amendments previously; we have even allowed the Government to take out Clauses which were already in the Bill, and we are prepared to accept a decision. In those circumstances, if there had been the slightest sign from my hon. Friend that he was prepared to meet us, there would have been a

I beg to move, in page 8——

On a point of order. Do I understand. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that you are not calling my second Amendment, in page 7, line 25, to leave out from "Kingdom" to the end of line 26?

The other Amendments have not been selected.

I am entirely in your hands, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I am in

Mr. Speaker has not selected any other Amendments. I am bound by his selection.

If you will be so good, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, as to look at Part I of the Schedule, paragraph 5, you will find——

I cannot hear any argument upon that point. The selection is in the hands of Mr. Speaker, and I am bound by that selection.

I am suggesting that, in a large measure, the proposed Amendment is, in substance, consequential upon that which has been carried, and I hope, therefore, that it will come within the spirit of Mr. Speaker's indication. I would like just to make my point, and you can say whether it is a valid one or not. In Part I of the Schedule, paragraph 5——

Forgive me. This is arguing the selection.

I am not arguing the selection now at all. I am merely suggesting that, by reason of the selection, the proposed Amendment should be called because it is consequential, in substance, upon the other. It is for that reason, and to bring it within the direction, that I am addressing my observations upon paragraph 5. That paragraph, on page 7——

I am sorry, but I cannot accept the observations. Once the selection is made, Mr. Speaker's selection, I am bound by it and I cannot hear arguments addressed to me for taking Amendments which he has not selected.

I appreciate that, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but perhaps I might take the case a little further. An Amendment which had been called has been carried, and an admittedly consequential Amendment has not been selected. If the consequential Amendment is not called its absence will make complete nonsense of the Bill. I am suggesting that the proposed Amendment is consequential.

I appreciate the argument that the proposed Amendment is consequential. There may be other methods of addressing that argument, but at the moment I am bound by Mr. Speaker's selection.

This is an important issue. You say, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that you are bound, a previous selection having been made by Mr. Speaker. I will address this argument to you on that point. As I understand the position, the selection of any particular Amendment must depend upon the decision of the House upon any previous Amendment. The position at the moment is that the House has accepted an Amendment contrary to the advice of the Attorney-General and presumably against what Mr. Speaker imagined would be the case. Surely the moment for deciding whether or not the proposed Amendment should be selected or not is now. That question can only be decided in the light of the decision of the House.

The moment for that selection is not now. Under the Standing Orders, the selection is in the hands of the Chair—of Mr. Speaker— exclusively. Mr. Speaker has made his selection and by that selection I am bound.

Surely what is contemplated by the Standing Orders is that Mr. Speaker should make his selection at the moment the time comes for calling an Amendment, and not on some previous occasion without regard to what has happened in debate. Surely what is contemplated is that Mr. Speaker, or whoever is in the Chair, should, in fact. make the selection.

May I put this point shortly, Mr. Deputy-Speaker? We have to do our best to make our procedure work reasonably. Therefore, we must look at the reasons which prompt the selection of Amendments. I should have thought it would be obvious that the reason which made Mr. Speaker select the first of these two Amendments——

Order. The hon. Member is inquiring into the reasons why Mr. Speaker selects. That is what I am saying cannot be done.

With great respect, I am only pointing out that in all probability there has been a change of circumstance since the selection was made. It is obvious that we do not have two debates on exactly the same point and the same point exactly is raised by these two Amendments. If the Amendment which the House has just been voting upon had been rejected, then it would obviously be logical that the House would not want to waste time debating the same point on Clause 5.

But that is not now the situation. The House has accepted the first Amendment, so that the second Amendment becomes virtually consequential upon it. If the original selection makes it impossible to move a consequential Amendment, then surely the original selection ought to be capable of revision. If only Mr. Speaker can do it, perhaps Mr. Speaker ought to come and do it.

These Amendments, I understand, were discussed separately in Committee——

indicated dissent.

Therefore, this one is not selected. In any event, whatever may be the reason for the non-selection, Mr. Speaker has exercised the discretion which the Standing Order vests in him.

Would you accept a Motion for the adjournment of the debate, Mr. Deputy-Speaker? It is quite obvious that you are in a difficult position and I am certain that the logic of the situation is with my hon. Friends who are pressing that this Amendment should now be brought before the House.

I cannot help thinking that, when the selection of Amendments is made, it is sometimes done on the assumption that a certain course will be followed by the House on one of the early Amendments. For instance, if it is a Government Bill, the general assumption is that the Government will have its way—in the present circumstances that is not a doctrine which appeals to me very much.

Let us assume that you had been in the Chair when a series of such Amendments was before the House and the first one, if carried, would involve consequential Amendments being put in the Bill or the Bill being left in a state of complete nonsense. Surely then it would have been your duty, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, in the interests of the proper conduct of the debate and of the House not making itself foolish, for you then to have put other Amendments which might not have been selected in the belief that the first would not be accepted by the House.

I suggest that the House cannot make itself foolish. I regret having to suggest this course, but the only thing we can do in the circumstances is to adjourn the debate. We cannot deal with the matter now, and I am quite certain that my hon. Friends will not desire to prevent the Bill going through the House. It is desirable that the Bill should leave us in a thoroughly workmanlike state and we cannot do that now unless we adjourn the debate.

I therefore beg to move, "That further consideration of the Bill be now adjourned."

I accept that Motion from the right hon. Gentleman.

I most sincerely hope that this Motion will not be persisted in. The Bill will be wrecked if the debate is adjourned.

Why?

I ask hon. Members to reconsider their decision. Time after time during the progress of the Bill through the House, the same thing has re-appeared—a desire to destroy the Bill—and I ask hon. Members to think twice before they do this.

It is not true to say that the carrying of this Amendment will make nonsense of the Bill. There is an inconsistency which can be removed in another place. I ask hon. Members to pause before they consider doing this. It may be that you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, will find it possible to deal with this matter. I sincerely hope that that will be the case. Surely it would be better to let the Bill go through with the slight inconsistency in it, which can be remedied in another place, rather than destroy it and deprive the Press of a benefit that every reasonable person in the House decides that they ought to have.

I sincerely hope that hon. Members opposite will realise what they are doing. I do not suggest for one moment that the right hon. Gentleman has done this purposely, but one hon. Member did come into the House recently, quite clearly, with the intention of obstructing business.

Oh.

The House is in some difficulty, Mr. Speaker, because an Amendment was carried which' put a rather new turn on the Bill. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, quite rightly, felt that he was bound by your selection in not putting an Amendment which to several of my hon. Friends, who had voted in the majority, appeared almost to be consequential. That created a difficulty, and I have moved the adjournment of the debate so that the matter may be considered after you had had a further opportunity of doing so. Now that you are in the Chair, Mr. Speaker, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion, so that you can consider the situation that has arisen.

I am afraid that the fault is entirely mine. I have said that the second Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl), in page 7, line 25, to leave out from "Kingdom," to end of line 26, seemed to me to follow the same sort of argument as we had on the first point. It was really on the assumption that the first Amendment would be defeated that I decided it would be a waste of the time of the House to take the second one. I failed to make that sufficiently clear to Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and I think the fault is mine.

Now that the first Amendment to the Schedule has been carried, I shall ask Mr. MacColl to move the Amendment in page 7, line 25, if he can do so briefly.

In view of the explanation which you, Mr. Speaker, have been generous enough to give to the House, would it be proper to ask the Attorney-General to withdraw the extremely offensive remark which he has made?

My remark was not intended to be offensive. I expressed a view which I am not going to persist in now, and I withdraw what I said and am sorry if I have offended anyone.

I beg to move, in page 7, line 25, to leave out from "Kingdom," to the end of line 26.

It would have been understandable, Mr. Speaker, if you had under-estimated my eloquence in moving the previous Amendment. This Amendment is a stronger case——

Just move the Amendment formally.

If, without assistance from the touch-line, I might be allowed to move the Amendment formally, that is what I was trying to do. This Amendment makes the position on all fours following the previous Amendment.

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 8, line 47 after "authority," to insert "or."

This is to remove from paragraph 12 the qualified privilege given to the board, executive committee, or other body of a nationalised industry. The intention is to prevent an addition being made to those bodies which at present have qualified privileges. If this provision remains in it would allow a public relations officer of a nationalised board or an organisation of that kind to have qualified privileges and in Committee it was generally agreed that that should not be the case.