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Commons Chamber

Volume 569: debated on Friday 10 May 1957

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House Of Commons

Friday, 10th May, 1957

The House met at Eleven o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

New Writs

For Hornsey, in the room of Sir Leonard David Gammans, baronet, deceased.—[ Mr. Edward Heath.]

For East Ham, North, in the room of Percy Daines, esquire, deceased.—[ Mr. Bowden.]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (COUNTY OF BERKS (CONSENT TO LETTING))

Bill to confirm a Provisional Order of the Minister of Housing and Local Government relating to certain land in the county of Berks, presented by Mr. H. Brooke; read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills and to be printed. [Bill 82.]

Orders Of The Day

Maintenance Agreements Bill

Not amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Clause 1.—(VALIDITY AND ALTERATION BY COURT OF MAINTENANCE AGREEMENTS.)

11.6 a.m.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 5, to leave out from the beginning to "agreement" in line 6 and insert, "This section applies to any".

I should like to have your guidance about these Amendments in my name on the Paper, Mr. Speaker. There are three which could conveniently be taken together if that course would be satisfactory to the House.

The first, which I am moving, and that in page 1, to leave out lines 17 and 18; and that in line 19, to leave out "the agreement" and insert:

"an agreement to which this section applies".

The House may well have the impression that discussing these Amendments is rather an "Alice Through the Looking Glass" affair, for the Second Reading of the Bill was obtained "on the nod" and its consideration in Standing Committee was achieved in the well-nigh record time of about thirteen minutes, and yet now I have to propose a number of detailed Amendments to the Bill. If for the moment my remarks seem not to make sense, I hope that hon. Members will bear with me. It will be because the Bill has not been discussed in the House yet. I hope to be able, on Third Reading, to say a few words in general about the principles of the Bill.

As at present drafted, Clause 1 neither validates Bennett v. Bennett agreements under subsection (2) nor makes them variable by the court under subsection (3) unless the parties to it
" are for the time being both domiciled or both resident in England."
Lines 17 and 18 in page 1 of the Bill insert that qualification.

It is now thought that that is not an appropriate form for the Bill to take, and I therefore propose to take it out, but it will be introduced into the Bill again later in Clause 1. I think that is logical because there is no reason, in considering the question whether an agreement should be validated or not, why there should be any domicile qualification or residence qualification attached to the validation.

I think there is very good reason why such qualification should be attached to the question whether an agreement should. under the provisions of subsection (3), be varied, but it is not logical to have this provision in its present position. That is the reason for the Amendment to leave out lines 17 and 18. The other two Amendments now being discussed, although one comes before and the other after that one, are really consequential upon it.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move, in page 1. line 12. at the end to insert:

(b) an agreement containing financial arrangements, whenever made, such that, but for the next following subsection, it would be void or unenforceable in whole or in part by reason of including such a provision as is mentioned in that subsection; or.
At present, Clause 1 (1, a) excludes from the Bill agreements made more than six months after the dissolution or annulment of a marriage. The obvious reason is that, after the divorce or annulment has taken place, the rights and liabilities between the parties should be left to the parties themselves. When the parties are man and ex-wife, they should be allowed to contract without the interference of any further legislation. Therefore, the six months' time-limit after dissolution or annulment was put into the Bill as originally drafted.

In those circumstances, quite clearly the parties should be entitled to enter freely into any bargain about maintenance. The reason for the Amendment is that some of the agreements made will be governed by the rule in Bennett and Bennett, and I do not see why the Bennett and Bennett agreements should not have the benefit of validation given under subsection (2) to an agreement made before six months have elapsed.

All this may be very difficult for those who have no knowledge of the case of Bennett and Bennett to understand. That was a case where a man and wife entered into a maintenance agreement in contemplation of divorce proceedings rather than rely on their right to go to court and apply for an order of the court. The only consideration moving from the wife was that she bound herself not to apply to the court for maintenance. When that case came for judicial consideration, the whole agreement was void because it was an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court. This has had the effect in a number of cases, where the husband has later died, of leaving the wife destitute, having relied on an agreement subsequently invalidated.

In the normal course of events the Bennett and Bennett type of agreement is made within six months, but it is possible for that type of agreement to be made a long time after divorce in certain circumstances. It is quite possible for a wife in divorce proceedings to obtain an order of the court in the normal course of events and ten years later she might desire to apply to the court for a variation of that order, perhaps on the ground that the children have grown up and because of the increased cost of their education it is necessary for her to obtain more money for maintenance purposes. She might approach her ex-husband and say, "I am applying to the court for increased maintenance under the original order made in the divorce courts." He may say, "Don't bother to do that. We will enter into an agreement."

The agreement would be guided by the rule in Bennett and Bennett. She would contract not to apply to the court for a variation and he would contract to pay increased maintenance. If the husband were to die, the agreement would be invalid. The executors would have to take that view of the matter and the wife would not have the increased maintenance to which she would have been entitled if she had applied to the court in the first place. The proposed Amendment seeks to remove from the Bennett and Bennett type of agreement the six months' limitation on maintenance agreements in general, with the result that the circumstances which I have just described would not arise. Whilst the Amendment gives the benefit of validation, it will be observed that a later Amendment does not make the agreement variable under the provisions of Clause 1 (3).

Could my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Keegan) explain one provision in subsection (2), which is linked with the Amendment and which states:

" If the agreement includes a provision purporting to restrict any right to apply to a court for an order containing financial arrangements, that provision shall be void but any other financial arrangements contained in the agreement shall not thereby be rendered void…"
What about arrangements which are not financial arrangements? The Amendment seems to pick out financial arrangements only and does not deal with such things as agreements dealing with undertakings not to molest and living apart. Ought they not to be covered?

11.15 a.m.

The answer is that subsection (2) validates the Bennett and Bennett type of agreement which, under the decision in that case, are now invalid as my hon. and learned Friend will, of course, realise. All other sorts of maintenance agreements are not invalid and there is no necessity to validate them by virtue of the Bill. What the Bill seeks to do with the other agreements is simply to make them variable.

In view of the conflict on the other side of the House, could the Solicitor-General give us any guidance as to whether in his view and that of the Government the Amendment should be accepted?

It gives me great pleasure invariably to accede to the charming invitations of the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) to talk. I understand that the basis of this is that there are lots of little Bennetts and Bennetts about, if I may put it that way. It was a common form of agreement set out in the encyclopaedia, and distinguished practitioners used to copy it word for word, for their own profit no doubt. But I do not think that there is any difficulty between my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Keegan) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. P. Bell). The Clause takes out of that type of agreement the invalidity resulting from this single vice, and the single vice once having been rejected the rest of the agreement automatically stands.

There is one question I should like to ask. Subsection (2) applies to agreements and it contains a proviso at the end that no right or liability is to attach in respect of a period falling before the commencement of the Bill as an Act. It has not escaped my attention that there is another Amendment on the matter on the Order Paper. Is it the position that the intention and effect of the subsection is to validate agreements which were illegal when they were made, that is to say, before the commencement of the Act?

I wonder if the hon. Gentleman responsible for the Bill, or the Solicitor-General, can tell us if that is so, and if they will give us their views on what appears to be a piece of retrospective legislation.

The answer to the question of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) is that the Bill seeks to validate the agreements contained in the definition of agreements in Clause 1 (1) retrospectively, but it is retrospective only in the sense of validation. In other words, it validates them whenever they were made but, as the hon. and learned Gentleman has remarked, it validates them without making the covenantor under the agreement liable for any arrears of maintenance during the period when the agreement had not been valid.

In other words, to look at a practical case, suppose an agreement which has been declared invalid by virtue of the decision of Bennett and Bennett were made, say, ten years ago, that agreement is validated retrospectively in the sense that it is a ten-year-old agreement declared invalid and now validated by the Bill. But, of course, the person who had the right to the maintenance under that agreement cannot take proceedings for ten years' arrears of maintenance. Therefore, it is retrospective only in the sense that it validates retrospectively. It does not seek to give any right to sue for arrears under what has been an invalid agreement.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: In page 1, leave out lines 17 and 18.

In line 19, leave out "the agreement" and insert "an agreement to which this section applies".—[ Mr. Keegan.]

I beg to move, in page 2, line 4, after "that," to insert:

  • (a) where the party chargeable under the agreement has died before the date of the commencement of this Act—
  • (i) this subsection shall not apply to that agreement unless there remain undistributed at that date assets of that party's estate (apart from any property in which he had only a life interest) representing not less than four-fifths of the value of that estate for probate after providing for the discharge of the funeral, testamentary and administrative expenses, debts and liabilities payable thereout (other than any liability arising by virtue of this subsection); and
  • (ii) nothing in this subsection shall render liable to recovery, or impose any liability upon the personal representatives of that party in respect of, any part of that party's estate which has been distributed before that date;
  • ( b).This is perhaps the most complicated Amendment on the Order Paper today, and I will give the reasons for it.

    It Will be observed that, as drafted, the Bill does not validate agreements where either party has died before it comes into force since it could not be said in such a case that the parties were both either domiciled or both resident in England. As drafted, the Bill states in lines 17 and 18 on page 1 that for the agreements to be included in the Bill the parties thereto are—

    "… for the time being either both domiciled or both resident in England."

    So it is clear that if they had died it could not be said that they were either both domiciled or both resident in this country.

    The Amendment to Clause 1 (1) which, by omitting lines 17 and 18, removes that qualification would, if there were no further Amendment, apply the Bill whether or not one of the parties were dead before the Act comes into force, and regardless of what had previously been done by way of distributing his estate. In other words, by the removal of that residence qualification it would leave wide open the question of what would happen in the case of where a covenantor had died and his estate had been distributed through the executors to the beneficiaries. Clearly that would not be satisfactory because rights which have vested many years ago ought not to be upset retrospectively to the prejudice of those who have spent their legacies or ordered their affairs on what was then a correct interpretation of the existing law.

    The difficulty which presented itself was this. It would be easy to exclude altogether cases where one of the parties is already dead, and this would have the advantage of avoiding retrospective legislation, but it would cause in some cases an avoidable hardship, particularly where the husband had recently died immediately before the passing of this Bill, and there are funds in the hands of the executors which would be amply sufficient to honour the agreement but which they cannot so use because it would have been a breach of trust. Clearly they cannot pay out under an invalid agreement.

    The intention is always perfectly clear in Bennett v. Bennett agreements, namely, to benefit the wife. For the reasons we have discussed—the case of Bennett v. Bennett—declared those agreements void by the counts. This has given what is, in effect, an uncovenanted benefit to many estates because when the covenantor has died and the executors take the point of view that the agreement is invalid, the estate may gain by the capital sum represented by the income that would have been paid to the wife. It was the intention of the husband to benefit the wife for her life, and it is only by this decision that that has not been done.

    Certainly a compromise is needed on this point. To include all cases where the estate had not been completely distributed, however, would have been equally difficult. Take the case of a partial distribution. Suppose there had been a wife's interests under the agreement of, say, £500 a year, and the estate had been three-quarters distributed at the time this Act comes into force. It would have meant that the quarter interest, if sufficient to bear the wife's life interest, would then have been applied for the benefit of the wife by virtue of this Act. But it would have fallen entirely upon those beneficiaries who had not been fortunate enough to have been paid out by the executors in the first place, and of course that would have created an unnecessary and unwarrantable distortion in the administration of the estate. It is likely that it may well have fallen upon one infants' fund which had not been distributed.

    I think the reasons why it cannot be said in the Bill that all estates which are not completely distributed would have to bear the burden of paying the wife are these. It is always difficult to say, first, at what moment the distribution is complete or, secondly, that where a partial distribution has taken place—and this is the one I have been talking about—it is unfair on these beneficiaries who are last in the list to be paid out, because executors very often, when they have money in hand, pay the pecuniary legacies first, and some complicated trusts—infants' funds and so on—are retained until the last. It would be manifestly unjust to make those retained assets bear the whole of the burden of the wife's maintenance.

    There is also this to be considered and it is the third reason. The beneficiaries entitled to the income of a trust fund may well have altered their positions. After all when one comes into money under a will one is entitled to take the law just as one finds it, and is entitled to base one's expectations on that. It would be most upsetting in many cases if beneficiaries had made arrangements on the basis of receiving a legacy only to find that, by virtue of this Measure, the legacy would not come to them until the wife's life interest had been satisfied.

    An alternative solution would have been to exclude altogether from the Bill cases where any part of the estate had been distributed, but there are objections to this as well. One objection is that in the case of large estates small pecuniary legacies are often paid out almost immediately on the grant of representation, and it would be absurd to exclude from the Bill an agreement for the payment of substantial maintenance merely because out of the net estate of, say, £100,000 a pecuniary legacy of £50 had already been paid, because then there would be a substantial balance.

    It is perhaps an exaggerated case, but where there is a substantial fund still left in existence, it would be wrong not to pay out the wife's life interest, as was the intention of the covenantor. The provision that where any part of the estate had not been distributed the agreement should not be honoured would put executors in a very invidious position because executors ready to pay such a legacy might defeat the surviving ex-spouse's intention. An executor who paid a pecuniary legacy immediately would be in a difficult position if, by paying it, it would defeat the wife's life interest.

    11.30 a.m.

    The only compromise that appeared to be possible in this difficult matter has been to reduce it to a question largely of arithmetic. The Amendment seeks to include in the Bill only those cases where distribution has proceeded to such a limited extent—one-fifth—that any retrospective effect would be unlikely either to throw an unfair burden on one section of the beneficiaries or divest them of their rights in the case of those who have altered their position on well-founded expectations.

    It may seem strange to decide the question as to whether an agreement of this sort should be valid retrospectively or not on the question of how much of the estate has been distributed, but I think that from what has been said it is clear that there are objections to any other course. I think the compromise has erred on the right side. It ensures that there is still a very substantial portion of the estate undistributed, so that the wife's interest will not throw an unfair burden upon any particular beneficiary. This is the solution adopted by the Amendment.

    The precise moment at which beneficiaries may alter their position or the fund retained become insufficient to honour the agreement without injustice will vary from case to case. The Amendment errs on the side of caution in providing if more than one-fifth of the estate has been distributed, the agreement will not be validated by the Bill.

    The Amendment can be summarised as follows. If more than one-fifth of the net estate, after the deduction of duty, debts, etc., has been distributed before the day on which the Bill comes into force—one month after it is passed—the Bill will not operate to validate the agreement. If not more than one-fifth has been distributed, the agreement will be validated, but its validation will not affect any part of the estate which has been distributed or impose any liability on the executors in respect of that part.

    How seasonable is the casual reference of the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Keegan) to estates of £100,000. The Finance Bill is coming shortly. As to his Amendment, it seems to me to be rough justice of the "justice under the village tree" order, and will no doubt relieve a number of trustees faced with a choice between being legal cads and perfect gentlemen acting in breach of trust.

    I do not want to make it awkward for my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Keegan), but there seems to be one case not covered by the Amendment. Suppose a beneficiary, forced by the high level of taxation, has gone to his bank to raise money on his expectation thinking that he could pledge his share in the residue in order to raise an overdraft. He might then find that, as a result of this Measure, he cannot get his share because it is to be retained, and he may put himself in a position of liability. Distribution is not the only test of money having changed hands. If a beneficiary charges his interest, from his point of view it is the same as if it has really been distributed to him. Can any help be offered in this respect?

    I realise the difficulties. I am not altogether out of sympathy with the statement that this is rough justice —I think it is—but what must be remembered is that by virtue of the decision in the case of Bennett v. Bennett these estates have realy been given an un-covenanted benefit. It is clear that in equity the agreement ought to prevail. It is nearly always the prior right of a wife to maintenance which is under consideration.

    Although I have sympathy with the beneficiary who obtains credit on the basis of his expectations, there is a prior moral claim, that of the deserted wife who would be left destitute if the agreement were not validated. It is a very fine balance indeed, but on the whole I believe that the Amendment is right and that it should err on the side of paying the wife's interest, for it was clearly the intention of the agreement to do so.

    To give estates the uncovenanted benefit they will get if the agreements are not validated would be worse than to put beneficiaries in the difficult position of having borrowed money on their expectations. It must also be remembered that the interests of the wife are, after all, only life interests, and while beneficiaries may suffer some postponement of their legacies, they will get them in due course.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move, in page 2, line 8, after "Where", to insert:

    " an agreement to which this section applies otherwise than by virtue only of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) thereof is for the time being subsisting and the parties thereto are for the time being either both domiciled or both resident in England and ".
    The Amendment is consequential to that to Clause 1 to delete lines 17 and 18, and I referred to this Amendment when we discussed the earlier one.

    The effects of the Amendment will be that, although validated under Clause 1 (2), the Bennett v. Bennett agreements will not be variable by the court under Clause 1 (3) in the following cases: where the agreement was made more than six months after the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, or where at the time variation is sought the parties are not both domiciled or resident in England. The domicile and residence test has been brought back into the Bill where it belongs, and it gives the court jurisdiction to hear the question as to whether the agreements ought to be varied or not.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move, in page 3, line 9, to leave out "the agreement" and to insert:

    "an agreement to which this section applies".
    This is a drafting Amendment consequential upon the Amendments made to Clause 1 (1).

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 2.—(ALTERATION OF MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT AFTER DEATH OF ONE PARTY.)

    I beg to move, in page 3, line 30, to leave out from "agreement" to "provides" in line 31 and to insert:

    " to which the foregoing section applies".
    This Amendment is consequential.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move, in page 3, line 33, after "dies", to insert:

    " after the commencement of this Act".
    Clause 2 refers to the right to vary agreements after the death of one of the parties, and I hope to say a few words about that at a later stage. The Amendment makes it abundantly clear that Clause 2 does not apply where one of the parties has died before the Bill comes into force. In other words, it applies only after the Bill comes into force where one of the parties to an agreement then dies. I think it is already implicit in the Clause, but the Amendment makes it clear beyond per-adventure that where one of the parties to the agreement has died before the Bill comes into force, the agreement can be varied afterwards. To apply the Clause to deaths before the Bill would mean the introduction of retrospective legislation where there is no need for it, as opposed to where, I believe, there was a need for it in Clause 1.

    Amendment agreed to.

    11.41 a.m.

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

    I now have an opportunity to say a few words about the Bill as now amended. First. I should like to thank those Members who so very kindly came to the Standing Committee which considered the Bill, a stage which, as I have already said, took place in record time upstairs, the reason being that a quorum would certainly not have been kept on a day when there were few other duties in the House of Commons. There was, therefore, no opportunity to speak about the Clauses on the Motion, " That the Clause stand part of the Bill". for fear of losing a quorum.

    The scope and reason for the Bill are, as I think has become explicit in the short discussion that we have had today, to validate certain types of maintenance agreements and to give the courts a jurisdiction which they have not had before to vary maintenance agreements when the circumstances are right. We have not said anything about that because there were no Amendments to that part of the Bill.

    I should like to draw the attention of hon. Members to Clause 1 (3), which sets out the circumstances in which a maintenance agreement may be varied. In fact, they are these:
    " the court may by order make such alterations in the agreement by varying or revoking any financial arrangements contained therein or by inserting therein financial arrangements for the benefit of one of the parties to the agreement or of a child of the marriage as may appear to the court to be just having regard to all the circumstances.…"
    That is a useful provision. It is true that we regard the law of contract as generally sacred and do not like interfering with the law of contract by Act of Parliament, but it must always be remembered that the type of contract or agreement with which the Bill is concerned is a maintenance agreement and that puts it into a very special category. The bonds of maintenance agreements are made between parties where there is a common law right of one to apply for maintenance against the other. The fact that the courts are now given power to vary them should not exercise hon. Members too greatly.

    There are one or two things about the Bill which I want to point out. In the definition subsection of Clause 1 the expression "child of the marriage" is shown to include
    "… any child of both parties to the marriage. whether or not born in lawful wedlock, and any child adopted by both parties to the marriage.…"
    It will be seen that Clause 1 (3) refers to a child of the marriage, so that a variation may be made for children under that definition.

    In the case of a stepchild, where there is no liability on the father to support the stepchild, if he has in fact by the original maintenance agreement contracted to do so, that provision can be varied, but the justices or High Court will have no power to write in a provision in the maintenance agreement for the support of a stepchild, unless it was originally there to begin with. I think that that is right. If the father has taken upon himself the care and support of a stepchild, it is right that the court should be able to vary or revoke that, but it would not be right for the court to impose that, had he not accepted it in the first place.

    Hon. Members will see that Clause 1 (3) gives the High Court jurisdiction, and in certain circumstances the magistrates' court jurisdiction. I think that the provisions dealing with the magistrates' court are perfectly clear and follow the practice now existing, the summary jurisdiction practice. In other words, the magistrates' court may not vary an agreement in excess of the amount of £5 a week maintenance for the wife or other party to the agreement, and in excess of 30s. for each child of the marriage. There is an extra qualification about the jurisdiction of the magistrates' court in that one of the parties must be resident within that petty sessional district. That follows the standard practice of magistrates' court proceedings.

    I want to draw the attention of hon. Members to Clause 1 (5). That has been inserted, as it says, for the avoidance of doubt. It says:
    "… nothing in this section affects any power of the court before which any proceedings between the parties to the agreement are brought under any other enactment to make an order containing financial arrangements or any right of either party to apply for such an order in such proceedings."
    In other words, it emphasises that the Bill does not create any new statutory rights and obligations between man and wife. What it does is to reinforce them and validate them. Those who have great experience in these matters will be glad to find that subsection in the Bill, because it makes it clear that a wife is not bargaining away her power to go to the court, and this clarification will not result in collusive bargaining over maintenance agreements.

    As there have been minor Amendments to Clause 2, perhaps I should say a few words about it. Clause 2 means that where a party to an agreement dies after the passing of the Bill, the other party can apply for a variation of the agreement in the same way that he or she could have done had the deceased party been alive at the date the application was made. It is right that where there is a death of one of the parties to an agreement after the Bill becomes law, the surviving party should have the same rights of the variation against the executors of the estate as he or she would have had if both parties to the agreement were still alive.

    There is not much more that I need to say about the Bill. It fills a very useful function. It is only a small measure of reform, but none the less, a worthwhile one. By virtue of this strange decision of Bennett v. Bennett there can be no doubt that there are many cases of wives who have depended for maintenance on maintenance agreements which they have found sooner or later, and much to their chagrin, to be void by reason of the decision in that case. The Bill seeks to validate those agreements and does so in the circumstances which we have discussed.

    There is no doubt that the husband's liability to support his wife is real and genuine. Although the decision of Bennett v. Bennett may have been clear and logical and although it may have been right and proper for it to have been made, it was unfortunate in the sense that it left a number of wives in an extremely doubtful and difficult position in respect of the validation of their maintenance agreements. The Bill will go a long way towards meeting their needs, and I can certainly recommend it to hon. Members, hoping that when it goes to another place, it will not there be felt necessary to alter it too much.

    11.48 a.m.

    —no debate on the Motion for the Second Reading of the Bill—I am greatly obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for the correction— I did not have an opportunity of doing what one would have wished to have done, namely, to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Keegan) on his good fortune in the Ballot and the use that he has made of it. He has thanked those right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who have helped the passage of the Bill, and I am sure that they would like, as I should like, to thank him.

    The gay way in which the Bill has sailed through the House has been due in no small part to my hon. Friend's swiftness and lucidity in explaining what the Bill was about and what it did. I know that those of us who are members of the Bar have long been concerned with the danger which arises in a number of cases as the result of the existing law, a danger which will be obviated by the Bill. I need not enumerate the type of hardship, because my hon. Friend has referred to it. I am sure that many people will be grateful to him for the way in which he has used his good fortune, and I am glad to be present when the House is about to give, I hope. a Third Reading to the Bill.

    11.50 a.m.

    I should like to join in the expression of good will extended to the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Keegan), who has been fortunate enough to get the Bill through to its present stage. I merely rise to express the hope that the Bill will induce the Government to pay further attention to some of the other recommendations made by the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce. The comparative ease with which the Bill has gone through should, perhaps, persuade the Government to sponsor further legislation in giving effect to some, at any rate, of the recommendations of that Royal Commission. Quite a number of the recommendations represent the unanimous view of the members of the Royal Commission, and I hope that, in the circumstances, further legislation in this connection will not be too long delayed.

    11.51 a.m.

    I wish to associate myself with my right hon. and hon. Friends in the congratulations offered by the Solicitor-General to the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Keegan), who introduced and explained the Bill. It seems to represent a very useful step towards that reconciliation between moral justice, as recognised by the ordinary man, and legal justice which is necessary from time to time, for the law does not always follow as quickly upon the heels of moral justice as it should. In that, I feel sure, I shall have the cautious agreement of the Solicitor-General.

    I take this opportunity of calling the attention of the House to one more matter. There has been no Second Reading discussion of the Bill. It has really not been discussed at all, unless a great deal more was done in a few minutes than I supposed until today could be done; and the Bill, we all hope, is about to become law after a discussion on the Report stage of quite a number of Amendments, some of them of some importance. and a short Third Reading debate.

    I am not complaining that that is happening, but it seems to me rather a commentary on the procedure of the House that it should happen, and I contrast it with what has been happening on another Bill in Committee which has been held up for sitting after sitting. I say no more about that—I should certainly not be in order in doing so—but I feel that what has happened in the case of this Bill is, from an entirely different point of view, also a not wholly satisfactory matter from the point of view of procedure on Private Members' Bills in the House. We are all agreed, I think, about approving this Bill, and in this case no harm has been done. However, it is not quite satisfactory as a matter of procedure.

    11.54 a.m.

    The Bill commands such unanimous support among the lawyers that one must regard it with the greatest suspicion, the more so in view of the opening remarks of the Solicitor-General in which he said that there had been no Second Reading for the Bill. In Committee upstairs on another Bill—one Bill was mentioned by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison)—I heard hon. Members say that it had had no Second Reading. May I take it as established practice that no Bill goes to Committee in this House unless the occupant of the Chair on Second Reading, whether moved formally or in the course of discussion, puts the Question and says, "Those of that opinion say 'Aye', to the contrary 'No'", and then, with that hesitant impartiality which distinguishes occupants of the Chair, says, "I think the Ayes have it," and when nobody contradicts that statement. becomes more positive and dogmatic and says, "The Ayes have it."

    I know of no other way of a Bill getting to Committee, and unless a Bill has had a Second Reading I do not think that it can. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kettering is, I understand, a Member of a Committee considering the procedure of the House. When we were considering a previous Bill, that brought forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Wembley, North (Wing-Commander Bullus) dealing with parish councils, I drew attention to several of the difficulties that arise on procedure with regard to Private Bills. I do not want to say more than this at the moment—

    If my right hon. Friend will allow me, may I point out that he does not mean "Private Bills," but Private Members' Bills?

    I thank my hon. Friend. It is always as well to have a barrister to advise one when one gets within any reasonable distance of legal phraseology. I can only say that I made the same kind of mistake as that made by the Solicitor-General, but I do not get nearly the same salary for making such mistakes.

    I hope that the fact that the Bill today has only been explained to the House on Third Reading, when further amendment of it is impossible, will attract the attention of the Committee on Procedure to some of the difficulties under which we labour in dealing with Private Members Bills. Apart from that, and in the hope that this unanimous opinion of the lawyers in favour of the Bill is entirely disinterested, I hope the Bill will get its Third Reading.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

    Cheques (No 2) Bill

    Considered in Committee.

    [Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

    Clause 1.—(PROTECTION OF BANKERS PAYING UNINDORSED CHEQUES.)

    11.58 a.m.

    I beg to move, in page 1, line 6, after "indorsed". to insert "or is irregularly indorsed".

    I think that this Amendment goes also with the Amendment in page 1, line 8, after "of". to insert "or irregularity in".

    That is so, Sir Charles. Perhaps we might discuss it at the same time.

    Clause 1 deals with the position of the paying banker that is, the banker on whom a cheque is drawn, the drawer's banker. Up to now, the paying banker has required cheques to be endorsed in order that they might be turned into bearer cheques and that he should get the rights which flow from having paid a bearer cheque, and therefore paid it in due course. The Clause provides that an unindorsed cheque shall be deemed to be paid in due course.

    In drafting the Bill, I took the view that if a cheque were incorrectly endorsed, irregularly endorsed, badly endorsed. that, in law, was no endorsement at all, and that to mention in the Clause the absence of endorsement itself included irregular endorsement. My attention has since been called to the case of Arab Bank Limited v. Ross, in 1952, which clearly shows that the courts view a bad endorsement as an endorsement. If that is so, one of the main points of the Clause might be lost if the Amendment were not made.

    The point to which I refer is the saving of the time spent in examination of cheques by the banks. At present the bank official has to turn the cheque over to see whether it is endorsed and, if it is, whether it is correctly endorsed. Unless the banks are relieved of their present responsibility with regard to irregular endorsements their officials may still have to continue to turn cheques over to see whether they are endorsed, and, if so, properly endorsed. The Amendment adds words which would give relief not only in the case of the absence of an endorsement but also in the case of an irregular one.

    12 noon

    During the Second Reading debate, I gave the Bill my wholehearted support. After having glanced through the list of Amendments, I continue to give it my support. The question we are now considering, however, is that of a particular Amendment, and whether certain words should be inserted. Quite frankly, I have some rather grave doubts about it. I appreciate what is in the mind of my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page). He is saying, "If we abolish endorsements altogether and provide that an irregular endorsement is no endorsement, why worry about irregular endorsements? "

    Upon further consideration, I am sure hon. Members will appreciate that the matter is not quite so simple as that. We usually assume that a cheque is honestly drawn, honestly paid through and honestly credited, and that everything is the best in the best of all worlds. In a very small minority of cases, however—although the sums involved are sometimes not as small as all that—people do pay cheques into their account, or into an account, which they should not do, and they do so very often with criminal intentions.

    If a bank negligently allows such a cheque to be paid into the wrong account it may be liable. Very often it is a question of fact whether the bank was negligent in so doing. If there is no endorsement and the cheque is paid in in good faith, the bank has no notice of any irregularity. If, however, there is an endorsement, which is such that it should put the bank upon suspicion—and it is a question of fact whether the endorsement should have had that effect—but the bank still pays the cheque through the account, the situation is different, and I can hardly believe that the Bill was meant to give the bank a complete answer in law, even although it was in fact negligent in the matter.

    That is what the effect of the Amendment would be. We can imagine the case of a person who has not read the Bill or been made aware of its contents making an endorsement which the smallest examination would show bore no relation to the name of the payee, paying it into his own account and thereby obtaining the proceeds. I cannot believe that the Bill is meant to be an indemnity Bill to the bank for having carelessly allowed the cheque to go through the account in that way. That is the effect of the Amendment. I mention this matter only in order that Members may ponder over it and give us the benefit of their views upon it before we agree to the Amendment to the Bill, which in itself has my complete support.

    Perhaps I may answer the points which have been raised. The Clause is merely a permissive one. It provides that the bank does not incur liability if it permits a cheque to be passed through without endorsement. My hon. and learned Friend has said that cases might arise where fraudulent persons wrongly had cheques collected for them and received the money. But banks are already protected in the case of forged endorsements, such as my hon. and learned Friend had in mind. They already have full protection by Statute. In fact, they are better protected in the case of a forged endorsement than if the endorsement is written by the person who ought to write it.

    If anyone is intended to carry out a fraud, I am sure that he would carefully consider the provisions of a Bill like this and take great care not to put his name on a cheque.

    My hon. Friend assumes, not quite correctly, that criminals are always clever people. I am sure that he has not had so much association with criminals as I have had I can assure him that they very often make the most stupid mistakes. To assume that they are clever and that they always look up the law before they commit their crimes, would be an erroneous assumption. They make as many mistakes as honest people. I ask my hon. Friend not to assume the superior cleverness, sagacity and perspicacity of the criminal classes.

    I bow to my hon. and learned Friend's greater knowledge of criminals. I look at the matter from the practical point of view. If bank officials are to be required to look for irregular endorsements the whole purpose of the Clause is defeated. Its idea is to relieve bank officials of the duty of turning cheques over to look for endorsements, and if the Clause does not achieve that object they will still have to continue to carry out that tedious duty. I do not think that there is any real danger in the Amendment.

    From one point of view I am a little uneasy about the Amendment. When is an endorsement not an endorsement? It seems to me to raise some rather curious questions. I think that what happened in the case to which the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) referred was that somebody left out the word "company." These are admittedly niceties, but the position is a little puzzling.

    When we consider the question of forged endorsements we must also remember the question of unauthorised endorsements, which may or may not amount to forgeries. If we were only dependent upon that we should have to consider rather more carefully than we need, having regard to the rest of the Bill, exactly what was being done here, and whether we were not making it too easy either from criminals on one side or bankers on the other, but since, as I understand it, the result of the Bill will be to dispense with certain requirements only in the case of a cheque which is going to be paid to the account of the payee—I hope that the hon. Member will correct me if I am wrong about that, because it is important—I do not see that any harm can be done. If that is the case it is no doubt advisable to make matters doubly clear and to provide that an irregular endorsement may not amount to any endorsement at all.

    It disturbs me considerably that I cannot for the moment remember the case in which somebody asked, "When is something not something? "and the answer was, "When it is something else." Perhaps the hon. Member, whose knowledge of these matters is so wide and general, can supply it. I do not know what views the Financial Secretary to the Treasury has on this Amendment. He always is well informed on any subject he undertakes, and perhaps a few words of counsel and wisdom from him about irregular endorsements would be of real assistance to the Committee.

    It is hardly necessary to accept the hon. and learned Gentleman's invitation, since he has put this Amendment into the correct perspective. In fact, the Clause does give an option to dispense with that endorsement, and it is therefore logical that it should make it clear that that option includes the power to dispense with irregular endorsements.

    As regards the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page), whether this could give protection in the case of a bank negligently paying when, upon the face of it, from the manifest difference between an endorsement and the name of the payee on the cheque the payment was wrongly made, I am advised that this Clause in no way alters the liability for negligence which could be raised in such a case.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move, in page 1, line 6, after "indorsed", to insert:

    " to the credit of an account with such banker or to another banker".
    Perhaps I might explain to the Committee shortly that the point of this Amendment is to remove from the Bill the permission extended to banks not to require endorsements in the case where the cheque is cashed over the counter.

    I make this proposal with less diffidence than usual because it is based on the recommendation in the Mocatta Report, to which I shall refer again in a moment. Unfortunately I was not here on the Second Reading. Had I been here I might have pressed my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page), who has so skilfully piloted this Bill, a little more on the general principle.

    I think it is too late now to see whether we are doing the best thing for all people, but I have little doubt that we are doing a very good thing for the banks by exempting them from what is quite manifestly very often a tedious matter. I did not, however, notice in my hon. Friend's speech, which lasted for about twenty-one minutes, the word "customer". There was a lot of talk about the bank and the bank employees, and of how tedious they found the task of looking at endorsements, but I do not recollect anybody considering the position of the customer.

    Perhaps I might recapitulate a little of the history to Which my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby referred. When cheques were originally introduced, the bank was rather on its mettle. It had got to obey the orders of the drawer and if it did not, it could not debit the account of its customer and, what is more, the right man did not get the money. In fact, he was entitled to go back to the drawer and say "You still have not paid your bill."

    The next step was this. As commerce became more keen, if there was a genuine endorsement and a thief picked up the cheque and handed it to the bank, the bank was then protected because it was a negotiable instrument and the bank had given value for it. The difficulty arose when there was a fraudulent endorsement. In that case the bank had to pay out, although it had been perfectly innocent, and the drawer might well have to pay again. Hence we get the series of Acts ending with Section 60 of the 1882 Act which says that if a bank acted in good faith and in the ordinary course of business, in honouring a cheque, the fact that the endorsement was forged would not place the bank under any liability.

    In view of the Amendment that the Committee has just made, it seems to me that this proposed Amendment as on the Order Paper does not now make sense.

    That might well be so, Sir Charles. Perhaps I may have an opportunity of seeing whether it does make sense and then I can explain it.

    The point is that it does not make sense after the words which the Committee has just inserted.

    I am rather in your hands, Sir Charles. It was intended to insert the words contained in my Amendment after the original "indorsed." Now that the Amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby has been made, the words in my proposed Amendment would have to go in after the second "indorsed".

    12.15 p.m.

    With respect, Sir Charles, the effect is to say:

    "Where a banker in good faith and in the ordinary course of business pays a cheque drawn on him which is not indorsed to the credit of an account with such banker or to another banker."
    I think that if my proposed words were inserted after the word "pays" they would have the right effect. Could I put in a manuscript Amendment to that effect?

    We cannot put them in before the word "indorsed" in line 6. We have gone past that point now.

    Would it be possible to put in a manuscript Amendment so that the Bill would run:

    "… pays a cheque drawn on him which is not indorsed or is irregularly indorsed and pays that cheque to the credit of…"?

    Will the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) give the manuscript Amendment to me in writing?

    I am sorry that this technical point should have arisen, Sir Charles.

    I was saying to the Committee that Section 60 of the 1882 Act protected a bank which acted in good faith and in the ordinary course of business and, in fact, had honoured a cheque which was forged. The banks took a rather odd view of their position. They thought "To protect ourselves we must first of all act according to the existing ordinary course of business." Since before the Act of 1882 they had been requiring cheques to be endorsed, they went on doing it in their own interest. They took the view that this act of requiring all cheques to be endorsed afforded them protection.

    I do not want to enter into a discussion on that matter now, but I think that was a very doubtful point of view. Certainly a number of textbook writers say that that would not make a cheque negotiable but that it was only a form of receipt. There is authority for that. The banks were however in favour of endorsements. They took the view that endorsements made the cheques negotiable and therefore acted as a protection. The whole idea of endorsement originally came from the banks. They thought that the endorsement supported and strengthened their position.

    There is legal doubt about that contention, and my hon. Friend's Amendment will remove that doubt and the banks, at any rate, will not feel that they are under a liability because there has not been an endorsement. There is a good deal to be said for that from the point of view of the customer when the cheque goes through a collecting bank because the customer can check the person who paid it in. It may be a tedious business, but there is no doubt that it is rare that a collecting bank collects for a stranger. It is nearly always for its own customers. Therefore, it was always possible for the drawer of the cheque to find out where the money had gone. When he received the cheque back he would ask his own bank to find out what bank had presented it and from that bank he could find out who got the benefit of the payment.

    That does not apply if the transaction is cash over the counter. That is why in the Report of the Committee on Cheque Endorsement, which was the origin of this Bill, in paragraph 63 made this statement—

    I regret that I do my hon. Friend an injustice. The paragraph states:

    "Where a cheque is collected by a bank it is possible to ascertain the account to which it has been credited and hence the identity of the actual recipient, and this will continue to be so whether the cheque is endorsed or not. Where, however, cash is paid against a cheque the identity of the recipient of the payment cannot afterwards be established by the same process of enquiry and the presence of an endorsing signature is thus a most important link in the chain of evidence. We think that in the absence of such a signature drawers of
    cheques and the banks would be deprived of evidence to prove the facts about the receipt of a payment in cash."
    In paragraph 65 the Committee deals with cases it has known where the bank makes payment to a third party against a cheque drawn by its own customer; to its own customer against a cheque drawn by a third party; to its own customer against a cheque drawn by himself in favour of himself. The paragraph states:
    " Further, in all the three cases distinguished above, we think that the requirement of endorsement would give an added security to those concerned. If payment in cash could be obtained against an unendorsed cheque, the risk of theft and dishonesty by agents would certainly be increased. The continued need for endorsement in these cases would enable payees to hold cheques without special risks of loss until they were about to be cashed."
    The final paragraph states:
    " On grounds of both evidence and security, therefore, we consider that endorsement should continue to be required in all cases of encashment of cheques."
    By the Amendment which I wish to move, and which has been compiled with the help of the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) to whom I am grateful, I am endeavouring to indicate that what I might call the exemption in Clause 1 should not apply where a cheque is cashed over the counter, whichever type of cheque it might be. May I add that, having discussed this, I do not think we need go very much further with the Amendment to Clause 3 which I have on the Notice Paper—namely, in page 1, line 15, after "drawn", to insert "otherwise than in cash"—because it is to the same effect.

    I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to deal with this point. It was an important reservation which was made by the Committee. It is plainly stated there, and it is a matter of surprise to me that during the Second Reading debate no one called the attention of anyone to that reservation. According to the Report of the Committee, it is an important safeguard for the customer. So far this Bill seems to me—quite properly—to have concentrated on relieving banks of what may be thought to be unnecessary work, but this would appear to be one of those cases where the requirement of an endorsement is useful to the customer.

    I am not saying that this alteration would seek to restrain or hold back a bank regarding what it should or should not do. But it would be a pity if under the Clause as it is drafted at the moment the bank could be given a free hand and be able to cash cheques without the additional precaution which an endorsement gives under the reasons given in the Report.

    I understand, Sir Charles, that the manuscript Amendment is now in your hands. I therefore beg to move, in page 1, line 6, after the words last inserted. to insert:
    " and pays that cheque to the credit of an account with such banker or to another banker."

    My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) appeared, in his earlier remarks, to imply that this was a Bill for bankers. I can assure him that if this Bill be accepted there will be as much saving to commerce and industry as to bankers. It is easy to judge the time which would be saved by banks by the absence of endorsements. It is not so easy to make a similar judgment regarding commerce, industry, the professions and private individuals. But undoubtedly this is a Bill which will benefit the recipients of cheques just as much as the banks.

    It is with diffidence that I disagree with my hon. and learned Friend on such a subject as this. I am grateful to him for raising this point because it affords me an opportunity to explain why, although I do not agree with his Amendment, I agree entirely with all his remarks about the security of an endorsement on a cheque which is to be cashed across the counter. My hon. and learned Friend has moved an Amendment to Clause I, and that Clause deals with the paying bank on which a cheque is drawn. As I understand it, my hon. and learned Friend has in mind the case where a cheque is handed across the bank counter and drawn on that bank, and the person handing it across the counter is either a customer drawing the cheque in favour of himself or of some third party. The question is whether that cheque should be endorsed before cash is paid across the counter.

    I am informed that the banks will still require the endorsement of such cheques. When they encash a cheque by paying cash across the counter they will require the cheque to be endorsed for this reason. Taking the matter step by step, if the bank makes a payment over the counter, it needs to secure for itself a good discharge. A bill of exchange, and therefore a cheque, is discharged by payment in due course. That phrase, "payment in due course" is defined by Section 59 (1) of the 1882 Act. It is a payment to a holder. Elsewhere in the Act a "holder" of a bill of exchange is defined. He is either the payee in possession of an order cheque or the bearer of a bearer cheque. He can be one or the other.

    The query arises in the minds of the bankers, when collecting or paying a cheque, "Is the possessor of the cheque the payee named?" The bank cannot be certain of that, and so it has become the practice of banks to say, "We are not going to rely on you handing a cheque across the counter to prove that you are the person named. We want you to turn this cheque into a bearer cheque. You sign on the back of it and we will take it from you as the bearer of a bearer cheque. We are thereby taking it from the holder and making payment in due course, and we are entitled to debit our customer's account."

    The Bill says that bankers shall be deemed to have paid in due course, deemed to have paid to the holder in good faith and without notice of any defect, even if the cheque is not endorsed. But it does not automatically turn the cheque into a bearer cheque, it merely deems that the cheque has been paid to the payee in possession. If the bank pays the payee who is in possession of the cheque and hands the cash across the counter, it requires a good discharge. If it is collecting the cheque for a customer and pays that cheque into the customer's account, then it is as sure as possible that it is dealing with the payee in possession. If, on the other hand, the bank pays the cash across the counter and the cheque is not endorsed, the banker is guessing whether he is paying the payee in possession of the cheque. The payee is not the bearer until he endorses the cheque.

    12.30 p.m.

    I imagine that bankers are not going to guess in that way whether they are getting the benefit of the Clause, and that they will still require the cash recipient to turn himself into the bearer of the cheque by endorsing it. They will, of necessity, or at least in all prudence, do exactly what the Amendment seeks, that is to say, have cheques endorsed if they cash those cheques across the counter.

    My hon. and learned Friend may say, "If that will happen, why not put it into the Clause and so provide for it?". There would be harm in inserting the Amendment because it would produce an anomalous position. It would imply that a banker is not absolved from liability if he is paying an unindorsed cheque over the counter, and yet, by Section 80 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, he is absolved if it is a forged endorsement. That is the anomalous position which would be created if the Amendment were inserted. What my hon. and learned Friend requires will happen of necessity from the Clause as it stands. The banks will require a cheque which they are cashing across the counter to be endorsed by the person receiving the cash from them.

    The view just put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) has been the view taken by the banks, who have always insisted upon endorsement. The danger about Clause 1 is that they will not henceforward always insist upon endorsement, although I respect the view which has been put to us by my hon. Friend.

    I can imagine, if an unindorsed cheque has been accepted across the counter for cash and a mistake has been made, the banker being asked what steps he took to make sure that the person who presented it was actually the payee in possession. The banker may be asked, "What steps did you take to verify the identity of the person who produced the cheque?". The banker will reply, "We asked him his name and where he lived. "To the question," Why did you not get him to write his name down?", the banker could answer,"We are not bound, under Section 1 of the Cheques (No. 2) Act, 1957, to do so". That shows the gap that will exist. The banks have hitherto thought that endorsement was a reasonable precaution to take; I am afraid that they might not think it is a necessary or reasonable precaution in the future.

    The banks have never been bound to require an endorsement, but have done so for their own benefit, to be able to say that they were holders in due course of the cheque. In this case they will still require that endorsement for their own benefit and will continue to require it in paying cash across the counter.

    I think that most hon. Members will agree that the Amendment is rather muddling. Let me begin by trying to see exactly what we want to do.

    When a banker pays a cheque for cash across the counter, it will still be necessary for him to require an endorsement. I shall wait to hear what the Financial Secretary to the Treasury has to say about the Amendment, but I believe it is necessary for words to be inserted in the Bill to protect the banker's position. I have heard what my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) has said about what bankers will do in the future, but I am afraid that his word is not binding upon all bankers. There may be bankers who do not read his words or do not look upon them as law in their own banks. We must preserve the position that endorsement is required in respect of a cheque upon which cash is paid.

    The purpose of the Bill is to obviate, by abolishing endorsement, a large amount of time, work and expense required of those who handle cheques in banks and in large institutions, and it will do so. The number of cheques handed over a counter for cash is extremely small and does not affect the position of people who receive cheques in the course of business, other than banks. The cheques are all paid over in large numbers at the end of the day, or several times a day, and are not handed in for cash.

    It is quite a different situation when a person who has an account at the bank comes in with a cheque of his own or of somebody else and demands cash for it. On Second Reading we had in mind not that position but the saving of time for large institutions dealing with large numbers of cheques. We want to make that saving of time, but we want also to maintain endorsement upon cheques when cash is handed over for them.

    I shall listen with great interest, as I always do, to the words of the Financial Secretary to the Treasury and to anybody who can assist us in deciding whether, if we do not insert these words, it will still be open to the bank to pay cash in respect of an unendorsed cheque.

    I apologise to my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) if he has already dealt with the point which I am going to put, but I am a little puzzled by the suggestion that the banker who pays cash for a cheque which is unendorsed will not be protected by Clause 1. If the banker does not ask for endorsement and pays cash over the counter, he will be

    " deemed to have paid it in due course."
    Therefore, it is merely a precaution by the banker to ask for endorsement. I am not sure whether that is an adequate consideration when we are reshaping the law. I merely put that point forward for my hon. Friend's consideration.

    A cheque would simply say, "Pay John Smith £10". Then the banker should not pay anyone but John Smith. He would certainly be wise to get John Smith's signature on the back of the cheque, but he could not be taken
    " to have paid it in due course"
    unless he were in fact paying John Smith and no one else. Yet it seems that, under Clause 1 as it stands, if William Brown presented the cheque made out to John Smith—not a negotiable instrument, not a bill of exchange—and the bank paid over the cash, it would not be protected.

    I should say once again that all that Clause 1 does is to deem that the cheque has been paid in due course, that is, to the holder as defined by the 1882 Act. The holder is one of two people. He is either the person named on the cheque as payee and possessing the cheque, or he is the bearer of a bearer cheque. When a bank credits the cheque to the account of the customer who, as possessor, has handed it in, the bank will be certain that it is paying it to the first type of holder, the payee in possession. If it does not credit that cheque to the account of the customer but instead pays cash for it, it has to make certain that it is paying it to the bearer. Therefore, it will require endorsement of that cheque.

    I do not think that it is merely a matter of the banks informing me that they intend to go on requiring endorsements of cheques which they are cashing. I think it is a necessity, from the actual wording of the Clause as it stands, that they must have those endorsements if they are to get the protection which they have had up to the present when cashing cheques across the counter.

    Is not the 1882 Act a Bills of Exchange Act? What about the cheque which is not a bill of exchange? What is the position there?

    Amendment negatived.

    Amendment made: In page 1, line 8, after "of", insert "or irregularity in".— [ Mr. Page.]

  • (2) Where a banker in good faith and in the ordinary course of business pays any such instrument as the following, namely—
  • (a) a document issued by a customer of his which. though not a bill of exchange. is intended to enable a person to obtain payment from him of the sum mentioned in the document;
  • (b) a draft payable on demand drawn by him upon himself, whether payable at the head office or some other office of his bank:
  • he does not, in doing so, incur any liability by reason only of the absence of, or irregularity in, endorsement, and the payment discharges the instrument.
  • It would be convenient to discuss this Amendment with the last Amendment on the Notice Paper: In Clause 6, page 2, line 21, to leave out "Sections four and five" and to insert "The foregoing provisions".

    This is a new subsection proposed to Clause 1. Banks collect and pay many instruments which are not strictly cheques. For example, there are dividend and interest warrants. Most dividend and interest warrants are in fact cheques, being unconditional orders to pay, but some are drawn so that they do not come within the definition of cheques in the Bills of Exchange Acts. Bank drafts, also, are not strictly cheques if they are drawn by a banker on himself. If those instruments are not cheques, they are, therefore, not negotiable, and to talk about endorsement of them means nothing, because endorsement is a scientific phrase relating to negotiability.

    It was my thought in drafting this Bill that to speak of endorsement of those instruments which are not cheques was meaningless. Therefore, I left them out of the Bill altogether, but my attention has been drawn to the fact that it is banking practice to require those instruments to be endorsed and that bankers might still have to examine those instruments to see whether they were endorsed or be held negligent for not doing so. From the practical point of view, one can imagine a pile of cheques being paid in by a customer amongst which are dividend warrants, interest warrants and banker's drafts. In the absence of this Amendment, the bank clerk would have to look through that pile of cheques to decide which were cheques and which were not. He would have to see which of the dividend warrants did not come within the definition of a cheque and to extract them to see if they were endorsed.

    12.45 p.m.

    I think it wise to include that type of instrument amongst those for which the payee is relieved from making endorsement and the bank is relieved from considering endorsement. That was the recommendation of the Mocatta Committee, and this subsection is intended to carry out that recommendation. A further good reason for recognising these instruments and exempting them from endorsement is that in previous statutes they have already been assimilated to cheques. In Section 17 of the Revenue Act, 1883, this type of dividend warrant, which is not a cheque, was put on the same footing as crossed cheques. The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, and the amending Act of 1932 did the same for bankers' drafts.

    I am a little uneasy about the banker's draft and should like to know what the Financial Secretary to the Treasury has to say about it. It seems to me that if this goes through in this form a banker's draft drawn by him upon himself can become virtually equivalent to a currency note. It can be cashed without any endorsement, and cashed by anybody. If the Treasury has no objection to that, perhaps it is not for any of us to bother too much about it.

    In a matter of this kind the Treasury can be relied upon to safeguard the public interest and to see that no documents emanating from bankers take the place of ordinary currency notes, but I should like to know what the position is. If the Financial Secretary can assure us that he does not anticipate by reason of this Clause any interference with the currency obligations over which he watches, that will reassure me.

    I can give the assurance that what this Bill will do in relation to endorsement does not one way or the other affect the power of bankers by means of bankers' drafts to create currency.

    I will repeat to my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) the question which I put to him on the previous Amendment in relation to payment in cash over the counter. Let us take the case of an order to pay, as distinct from a bill of exchange—an unconditional order to pay but one which is not a bill of exchange. It is an order to the banker to pay one named person and nobody else. If the banker pays it over the counter to someone else, who presents it, and takes no endorsement, is he deemed to have paid it in due course? If that is right, does it not destroy the whole effect of striking out the words "or Order" on the cheque and making it payable to the payee only?

    The point which I intend to raise has not been dealt with except, of course, by my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) in moving the Amendment. It concerns dividend warrants.

    The Amendment goes far beyond the original intention of the Bill which, as its name implies, is a Bill dealing entirely with cheques. In one sense of the word, a dividend warrant may be a form of cheque, in the sense that it is an order by the drawer to the banker to pay a named person; but in ordinary parlance it is not a cheque.

    With respect to my hon. Friend, I do not agree that there is any great difficulty in the receiving bank or the paying bank having to look through its pile of documents to be credited to a customer's account and to sort out the dividend warrants from the ordinary cheques. Banks will have to look through that pile of documents in any event. They will have to look at the cheques. It is true that they will not have to look at the endorsements, but the work of putting warrants to one side is only a small matter in checking those documents.

    The ordinary dividend warrant—I receive all too few of them—has on the front of it, as a rule, the signature of the payee. Some have the signature on the back. is there any reason why that space on the front should not be filled in by the payee? My hon. Friend referred on Second Reading and again today to the terrible pastime of continually turning over documents to examine the endorsements, but that comment does not apply to dividend warrants at all. Speaking entirely for myself, I can see no reason why a bank which has a dividend warrant should not look at the face of it to see whether the signature of the payee is the same as the signature of the person in whose favour it is drawn, also on the face of it, and why the law should not continue as I understand it to be at present.

    As I said on an earlier Amendment, we do not want by the Bill to make the activities of criminals any easier. Under the Bill anybody who gets hold of a dividend warrant could automatically pay it into an account which he had opened only a few moments before. I foresee considerable difficulty upon this point at any rate, and I should be much obliged if my hon. Friend, with the permission of the House, would deal with it.

    My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Surrey, East (Mr. Doughty) has raised the question of dividend warrants as a whole. Most dividend warrants are in fact cheques, and, as such, we have already dealt with them in the earlier stages of the Bill and have exempted them from endorsement. Perhaps I might read to my hon. and learned Friend paragraph 69 of the Mocatta Report:

    "The great majority of dividend warrants satisfy the statutory definition of a cheque and the changes of the law which we have already recommended would therefore apply to them. Such application was favoured by both the Federation of British Industries and the Committee of London Clearing Bankers. The latter also suggested that similar arrangements should apply to those dividend and interest
    warrants and comparable instruments which do not come within the statutory definition of a cheque but fall within Section 17 of the Revenue Act, 1883. We agree with this view."
    This new subsection endeavours to carry into the Bill this recommendation of the Mocatta Committee. These types of dividend warrant which are not cheques have already received considerable attention in the Statutes. In the Revenue Act, 1883, many of the protective Clauses of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, have been applied to protect bankers when cashing those types of instruments. There is every reason why we should completely assimilate those instruments to cheques in order that bankers may deal with them all at the same time without having to make the distinction which would be necessary if this subsection were not included.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 3.—(UNINDORSED CHEQUES AS EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT.)

    I beg to move, in page 1, line 15, after "drawn", to insert "otherwise than in cash".

    If we first look at Clause 3 we find difficulty with the side-notes. I do not think I can blame my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) for the side-notes, but they do not seem to correspond with the Clause. The Clause reads:
    " An unindorsed cheque which appears to have been paid by the banker on whom it is drawn is evidence of the receipt by the payee of the sum payable by the cheque."
    Light-heartedly, the author of the side-notes has written,
    " Unindorsed cheques as evidence of payment."
    This draws no distinction between payment and receipt. I suggest that the side-note is a little misleading.

    Clause 3 is a remarkable provision. It provides that a cheque, which quite clearly is linked with a bank account, is some evidence of payment; and not merely evidence of payment but evidence that somebody has had it. It is evidence quite apart from having to look at the payee's account. It is evidence of receipt by the payee of the sum; that is, not receipt by anybody else, but receipt by the payee.

    What does the hon. and learned Member mean by the phrase "had it"? That seems to have two meanings in colloquial English today.

    It is the situation which sometimes arises when one is interrupted. Sometimes one has "had it."

    Consider the case of an unendorsed cheque bearing the name of Brown. The mere production of the cheque, which bears some evidence of having been paid by the banker, is to be evidence that Brown got it. Suppose Brown did not get it.

    It seems to me that my hon. Friend has gone a little further than the Mocatta Report recommended. Paragraph 81 of the Mocatta Report reads, after the first few lines:

    " As a result we have formed the opinion that in the present state of the law a paid endorsed cheque is as good evidence of the payment of money as a simple receipt of the kind printed on the backs of cheques. Both according to the law are only in the nature of prima facie evidence capable of being displaced if contrary facts are proved, such as, for example, a forged endorsement or payment to the wrong person. The change in the law which we have proposed above would only dispense with the need for endorsement when a payee paid a cheque into his own bank (or to an agent thereof) for collection and crediting to his account. After the proposed changes, therefore. a paid unendorsed cheque should not have any less value as evidence of payment than a paid endorsed cheque has now. Moreover, the presence of the collecting banker's crossing stamp should enable its course to be traced with reasonable ease."
    Distinctions are made in respect of a cheque which passes through a collecting bank. There may be some justification for saying that a cheque is some evidence that it was received by the payee because there is the collecting banker's stamp. Where it is a cash transaction, in the absence of a stamp, it seems rather unwise to say that, for the ordinary cheque which has been cashed over the counter. the mere fact that it has been paid is necessarily any sort of evidence that it was paid to the person who was the payee. Undoubtedly that is what it says. It seems to me it is going a little far to make that sort of evidence evidence that the rightful payee has received the money merely because somebody has parted with the money.

    1.0 p.m.

    It is always rather difficult for the debtor in these matters. because ordinarily he has got to pay cash. He pays by a cheque which he sends through the post in the ordinary way and somebody quite apart from him, out of his control, makes off with it. It seems a little hard that he should in a sense have any responsibility at all, and that although the creditor never got the cheque it should be possible to say, "This is evidence of the receipt of it."

    I think, as I rather thought on Clause 1, that this bears a little too harshly against the payee of the cheque. It is a matter of evidence; perhaps, not final; but I cannot see, quite apart from the equity, the necessity for this sort of evidence. Can anyone imagine a case being decided by this statement? It seems to me only a question of shifting the burden of proof and putting the unhappy payee to the necessity of having to go to the court and say, "I never got the money," instead of the person paying it having to prove he has discharged the debt.

    This Clause raises the question of endorsed receipts on cheques, dealt with by the Mocatta Committee's Report. in paragraphs 75 to 82. An endorsement on a cheque is already a good receipt despite the fact that it has become commercial practice to have receipts endorsed on the backs of cheques. I can assure hon. and right hon. Members that there is a perfectly clear case called Egg v. Barnett, in 1800, in which it was decided that an endorsed cheque was a perfectly good receipt or perfectly good evidence of receipt of the money.

    Of course, if the drawer of the cheque requires an additional receipt in some way identifying the payment with an account or requiring it to be accepted in full and final settlement there is some point in putting that form of receipt on the back of a cheque for the payee to sign. It is recorded in the Mocatta Report that the banks have said they will still give service to their customers in examining that type of receipt if a customer so requires.

    The Clause is intended to apply the law relating to the endorsed cheque to the unendorsed cheque and to say that the unendorsed cheque is evidence of receipt of the money.

    I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) for drawing attention to the marginal note. As he knows, a marginal note is not part of a Statute, but it certainly may be misleading, and I think my hon. and learned Friend is quite correct in saying that the word "payment" in the marginal note is misleading. It should be "receipt."

    In resisting this Amendment, I rely again on the fact that it will be necessary for the banks to require the endorsement of cheques paid in cash if they are going to get the same sort of protection as they have at present and that if they do cash cheques across the counter they will require endorsement and thus bring into operation the old case of Egg v. Barnett, and there will be the evidence of receipt.

    If one endeavours to distinguish, though, in this Bill between the cheque which is paid into the customer's account and the cheque which is cashed across the counter, I think we shall get into the greatest difficulties. This Amendment would undoubtedly put a defendant to the most elaborate proof. Under the Clause as it stands, he is entitled to produce the paid cheque and say, "Here is the paid cheque, this is evidence of the receipt of the money." By the Amendment he might be met with the answer, "Yes, but was that paid in cash across the counter or through an account?"

    I think that that defeats the purpose of the Clause, and the purpose of the Clause is to provide only prima facie evidence. Of course, the evidence can be rebutted, but if by this Amendment we try to make a distinction between the cheques which are paid in cash across the counter and those which are paid into an account I think it will raise very great difficulties.

    :I am rather puzzled, not only by the Amendment but by the Clause to which it is an Amendment. I have heard the hon. Gentleman say this morning two things to both of which I attach considerable importance. The first I can hardly say he said, but he nodded assent when I said that I understood the purpose of the Bill was to deal with cheques which would be credited to the accounts of payees. The second statement to which I attached importance was that bankers for their own protection would always require endorsement.

    I can see the point of that in the case of the ordinary cheque to order if the person tendering it to the bank does not endorse it. The bank acquires, as I understand it, in the first place the right of the person tendering it, and secondly the statutory right to have an endorsement. It is not just a question of bankers' convenience. It is the question of what right they acquire on cheques being passed over to them.

    I am sure there is no doubt about it that it is the invariable banking practice to require endorsement even of a cheque to bearer. The hon. Gentleman, who seems well acquainted with banking practice, probably much better than I am, has confirmed that abundantly. Why in those circumstances should special rights in evidence be given in the case of an unendorsed cheque? I do not see the point of it or the need for it. If it is paid in what is from the banking point of view an irregular way without endorsement—I am not saying in an illegal way, but contrary to usual banking practice— then surely the first thing one wants to know is, how did that happen? One begins to be anxious as to what exactly happened.

    Turning to the Amendment, I can see no objection whatever to allowing it to be treated as evidence in the case where it goes to the account of the payee. I do not bother about it in that case. However, if there is a man who goes to the bank with a cheque and asks for it to be paid in cash and that cheque is not then endorsed by the banker I begin to wonder what on earth has happened. I do not see any reason why those circumstances should attract any additional legal protection for anybody.

    I cannot see, from the point of view of bankers, why they should Object to accepting the Amendment. I should have thought it did not do them any harm at all and merely confirmed, as it were, what they actually do. I cannot see why anybody should object to it, either. The one party whom I should have thought ought to be concerned with this kind of thing is the Treasury, because we have to bear in mind that in all these cases where cheques become evidence of a receipt the Treasury has lost 2d. on another receipt, and I do not see why it should go on extending this legal position beyond what it is at present. It is not my Bill and I am not speaking of a matter of any political import at all, but I should hope that the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page), who is in charge of the Bill, could see his way to accept the Amendment. I do not believe that there is any practical harm in it at all, or that it would make any practical inconvenience to anybody, and that in the few cases where it might serve a purpose that purpose will be a doubtful one.

    There is a practical difficulty which might be caused by the insertion of the words. I am advised that it is not always possible readily to distinguish between a cheque which has been paid in cash and a cheque which has been paid into an account. Therefore, the evidential value of the cheque would depend upon the person producing it as evidence being able to say that it had not been paid in cash and had been paid into an account. Since the purpose of the Clause is really only to apply the existing law, having regard to what is done by Clause 1, I suggest that it would be a mistake to put that extra burden upon the person producing the cheque.

    Surely that is a rather unconvincing answer. A cheque has to appear to have been paid by a banker and that, presumably, means to have had the banker's stamp put upon it in the usual way. Some of the stamps, at any rate, have some reference to an account put on them, and it would be perfectly simple to arrange for cheques that passed through an account to be stamped in that way. It merely means altering the rubber stamp. The real point is that if in fact bankers will always have these cheques endorsed, what is the point of giving special evidential rights to an unendorsed cheque, when the absence of endorsement by itself indicates some departure from ordinary bank practice?

    I hope that my hon Friend the Financial Secretary will accept the Amendment. It seems to me that the Clause gives definite value, as evidence, to an unindorsed cheque. If that were not the case, there would be no need for the Clause at all. Without the Clause an endorsed cheque would be some evidence of payment. Parliament is always treated in the courts as not merely frustrating itself and the courts presumably would attach some weight to the fact that we expressly provide that an unindorsed cheque shall be evidence of payment. I do not think that it would be argued on that basis that no weight at all should be attached to the cheque unless the parties seeking to produce it could prove that it was paid into an account.

    I do not think that it follows that the judge should have to say that Parliament has laid down that it means evidence, to some extent prima facie evidence, and that it shifts the burden of proof against the man who says that he has never had the money. Why should we do it in that way? The Financial Secretary says that it will cause some trouble in the banks if they have to discriminate between cheques paid into an account and others paid over the counter in cash. So be it. Why should the man who denies he ever had the money be put at a disadvantage on that account?

    1.15 p.m.

    It is quite practicable to distinguish between cheques paid in cash and cheques paid into an account. At the moment cheques are frequently produced as evidence of payment and receipt. If they are cheques paid into an account it is also possible, of course, to produce the accounts, as a rule. There we have strong evidence. If the cheque is paid in cash there is the signature, the endorsement, and that also could be a matter of weight of evidence. But where a cheque is paid over the counter unindorsed for cash why should that be evidence against anyone?

    If the retort is, "Why should it not be?" my answer, for what it is worth, is, "Certainly, but do not put a special Clause in the Bill about it. Once you put a special Clause in the Bill you must attach a special significance to it." I have expressed disquiet on other occasions about the lack of provision in the Bill for endorsement for payment in cash, and I am afraid that my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) has not satisfied me about that, in so far as he has tried to do so. But when we go further and say that not only is the cheque going to be paid in unindorsed but that it will be some evidence of payment, that is going too far.

    We should not merely regard this Bill as something taking the form agreed by the bankers and think that if they do not find any Amendment acceptable that, unfortunately, is the end. I do not think that that is so at all. We should look after everybody's interests, and my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby should accept the Amendment.

    On the remark of my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell) that this might be merely a Bill agreed by the bankers, I assure him that the bankers are not concerned with Clause 3. This is merely a question of receipt as between the drawer of the cheque and the payee, and the bankers have offered me no comments at all on Clause 3. This is more an accountants' Clause dealing with the question whether the paid cheque is to be accepted by accountants and auditors as a satisfactory receipt. I must inform the Committee that professional associations of accountants have seen no objection to the Clause but I appreciate that there is concern over it on both sides of the Committee.

    If my hon. and learned Friend the hon. Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) sees fit to withdraw the Amendment, I will give an undertaking to consider whether we cannot get over the practical difficulty put forward by the Financial Secretary and allay these anxieties in some way. I do not know whether it will be possible, but I will certainly give that undertaking.

    Does that mean that the hon. Gentleman does not intend to get the Report stage of the Bill today?

    I am bound to say, from looking at the words in Clause 3.

    " the banker on whom it is drawn…"
    that I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) was rather anxious that there should be some evidence in favour of the banker that he had paid the right man, and that, therefore, he was putting in that it is evidence of receipt by the payee of the sum payable.

    I am surprised to hear that the bank is not interested in this matter, and that the only people interested are the creditor and debtor. If that be so, when my hon. Friend is reconsidering this Clause he might consider some such words as "should be evidence as between creditor and debtor and not the banker". I appreciate that this aspect raises a number of points. I welcome the suggestion, and on the understanding that my hon. Friend will direct his mind to these points which are causing anxiety on both sides of the Committee, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.

    On a point of order, Sir Charles, my next Amendment has not been called, namely, page 1, line 15, alter the second "is". to insert "prima facie".

    Will the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) undertake that between now and the Report stage he will consider whether the Clause should be deleted? It seems to me that the arguments of the hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) and of the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell)— whom I am pleased to see here on a Friday, having listened to him so often and at such length on a Wednesday-were directed against the Clause as a whole rather than against the Amendment.

    I will consider anything that falls from the wise lips of the right hon. Gentleman, and in particular whether this Clause is of value or not. I think that it is, but I will consider that.

    May I tell the hon. Gentleman that upon this question we should not regard as sufficient the decision of either a bankers' meeting or a bankers' poll.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 4.—(PROTECTION OF BANKERS COLLECTING PAYMENT OF CHEQUES OR CERTAIN OTHER INSTRUMENTS.)

    I beg to move, in page 2, line 14, at the end to add: (3) A banker is not to be treated for the purposes of this section as having been negligent by reason only of his failure to concern himself with absence of, or irregularity in, indorsement of an instrument.

    Clause 4 is rather separate in principle from the rest of the Bill. It was said in paragraph 105 of the Mocatta Committee" Report that if the question of endorsements were to be dealt with by Statute it would be a useful opportunity to clear up one or two other anomalies; and in particular, on the question of Section 82 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, applying only to crossed cheques, they recommended that that Section could usefully apply to uncrossed cheques and other instruments.

    Section 82 of the 1882 Act has been extended over the years, first by Section 17 of the Revenue Act, 1883, when it was extended to instruments similar to cheques but not cheques themselves, and later, by the 1932 Act, to bankers' drafts. But neither of those amending Acts dealt with uncrossed cheques. What has been done in Clause 4 is to re-enact Section 82 of the 1882 Act, having repealed it by the Schedule, and to include the uncrossed cheque.

    Having said that all the instruments already set out in the Bill do not require endorsement, it was thought proper to make it clear that the failure of the collecting banker to look for the endorsements would not be negligence. I think it unlikely that any court would say that it was negligent on the part of the collecting banker not to look for something which the paying banker did not require, but there is that slight risk, so I think it is proper that it should be stated, as it is stated in this proposed subsection. I assure hon. and right hon. Members that the subsection does not give the banker any additional protection. It is merely making clear that, having re-enacted Section 82 of the 1882 Act, the collecting banker shall not be held responsible for doing something which is not required of him by the paying banker.

    I wonder if the hon. Gentleman could tell me what responsibilities will remain with a banker after this sub- section has been added to the Bill? It seems to me that we have been doing a great deal today to relieve bankers of liabilities, and after this I am not sure what responsibility for cheques remains with the bankers.

    The speech of the hon. Gentleman, in moving this Amendment, was far too brief, in view of the importance of the Amendment. The hon. Gentleman is capable of greater things than anything he has shown us this afternoon. It was not so long ago that he kept us a whole hour on a Friday afternoon dealing with a point far more trivial than this one may be.

    No, I am not tempting the hon. Gentleman. After all, I want to listen to him the next time Standing Committee C proceeds with its business, in order to hear him continue an unfinished speech which has already lasted far longer than all the speeches he has delivered today added together. Therefore, I can assure him that this is not temptation; this is an earnest thirst for knowledge which I hope the hon. Gentleman will adequately assuage.

    The right hon. Gentleman has referred to a speech of mine in a Committee upstairs. Let me assure him that although the Committee has had three sittings, I have spoken for only twenty minutes. It is true that I am in the middle of a speech which has lasted for two days, but I have not yet been able to resume it. However, I am sure I am out of order in referring to that. Sir Charles.

    I will read Section 82 of the 1882 Act:
    " Where a banker in good faith and without negligence receives payment for a customer of a cheque crossed generally or specially to himself, and the customer has no title or a defective title thereto, the banker shall not incur any liability to the true owner of the cheque by reason only of having received such payment."
    So that in respect of crossed cheques the bankers were given this very wide protection as long ago as 1882. In the year following, that protection was extended to instruments similar to cheques, and in 1932 was extended to bankers' drafts. All that we are extending it to today under Clause 4 is to uncrossed cheques.

    By re-enacting Section 82 of the 1882, Act, and all its Amendments over the years, we are making a tidier job of it.

    1.30 p.m.

    That having been done, as recommended by the Mocatta Committee, it was necessary to say that the banker should not be deemed to be negligent, under Section 82 as it was, or under this Clause re-enacting Section 82, if he did not examine the cheque for endorsement. That is all that the proposed subsection does. The recommendations of the Mocatta Committee, to clear up the anomalies of Section 82, having been carried out, Section 82 has to be brought, by the proposed subsection (3), alongside the remainder of the Bill.

    That answers a lot of questions except the question that I asked, which was, what liability is left on the bank?

    The right hon. Gentleman can ascertain what liabilities are left by seeing what liabilities are removed from the bank by Section 82. If I endeavoured to categorise those which are left, I am sure that I should detain the Committee far too long.

    I, too, am not happy about the Clause. It does not seem to me to have very much connection one way or the other with the provisions about endorsement or lack of endorsement. What it does is to extend the crossed cheques protection, as the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) points out, to certain other instruments, the first of which is cheques of any sort and the next a form of document.

    I should like the hon. Gentleman to deal with one form of document which is common nowadays. It is something that at first sight looks like a cheque. It is sent to someone, and by using it he can collect money. He collects the money by signing a receipt on the back of the document. There is usually a printed notice that his signature is also to operate as an endorsement.

    Does this provision mean that if the banker pays no attention to the presence or absence of a proper endorsement, a proper signature, on the back of such a document as that he can nevertheless get a crossed cheque protection for it when it is paid over the counter without being crossed? If so, what is the real reason for it?

    I should have thought that crossed cheque protection had gone on for a very long time and one ought to be a little careful about extending it to the multifarious variety of instruments that secure payment over the counter. It is this element of the wrong person going into a bank and claiming payment on an instrument with or without an endorsement that is beginning to trouble me a little. What we are dealing with here is the banker's duty to the customer. As my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) pointed out, we are, in effect, in one way or another whittling it down little by little in the Bill, and so long as the credit squeeze goes on we do not get a quid pro quo from the bankers.

    I think that the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) is confusing the signature on an instrument which is not a cheque with an endorsement on a cheque. The instruments to which he refers, which are not cheques within the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, are already given protection under the Revenue Act, 1883. They were given that protection without being in the nature of crossed cheques. They are not negotiable instruments. The signatures upon them are not endorsements in any correct sense of the word. If customers still require their banks to look for those signatures before making payment, it is on record in the Mocatto Committee's Report that the banks will continue to supply that service, but to make it incumbent upon them to do so would defeat the objects of the Bill.

    I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. One is always liable to be confused in these matters, but I have the relevant Section of the Revenue Act, 1883, here, and all it does is to apply certain Sections of the 1882 Act to this type of instrument. One of the Sections is Section 82, and Section 82 gives only what I call a crossed cheque protection. I fail to see how the application of that Section could extend to uncrossed documents a protection which it does not apply to uncrossed cheques.

    I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman will find that it has been held to extend the protection of those Sections even to uncrossed instruments of this sort. By means of Clause 4 we are doing the logical thing and applying the provision to uncrossed cheques as well.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 6.—(CONSTRUCTION, SAVING AND REPEAL.)

    Amendment made: In page 2, line 21, to leave out "Sections four and five" and to insert" The foregoing provisions ". —[ Mr. Page.]

    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clauses 7 and 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Schedule agreed to.

    Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended, to be considered upon Friday, 24th May, and to be printed. [Bill 83.]

    National Assistance Act, 1948 (Amendment) Bill

    Order for Second Reading read.

    1.41 p.m.

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

    In proposing that the Bill should be read a Second time, I should at once refer, as I think all hon. Members in the House would wish me to refer, to the fact that but for a serious and protracted illness my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. McLeavy) would have been here today to propose this Motion, having obtained leave to do so under the Ten Minutes Rule some time ago. I know that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen in all parts of the House will wish me to convey to him our good wishes and our hopes for his early and complete recovery and our regrets that he is not here today to bring forward this Measure.

    I am in the happy position today of being able to say with some confidence, not only that this happy and well-intentioned Measure receives the support of hon. Members in all parts of the House, as will be seen from the names which appear on the Bill, but that I have not yet come across any direct opposition to the Bill. Certain questions have been raised which might properly be the subject of discussion in Committee, but the general underlying principle of the Bill rightly receives the commendation of all those who have studied it.

    It addresses itself to Section 31 of the National Assistance Act, 1948, and seeks to amend that section. Section 31 of the National Assistance Act, 1948, a very short section, reads:
    " A local authority may make contributions to the funds of any voluntary organisation whose activities consist in or include the provision of recreation or meals for old people."
    I cannot think of anybody, even in these days of controversy and political tension, who would disagree with that section.

    I pay tribute to the voluntary organisations who have done so much and are doing so much for old people in this matter. The Bill in no way detracts from the great work which is being done by voluntary organisations, but, despite the work they are doing, there is so much distressing evidence of cases in areas where voluntary organisations are not functioning that something should be done to help old people. We do not suggest that the work of voluntary organisations should in any way be prejudiced by our proposals.

    In fact, we specifically say in the Bill that local authorities may have power to do certain things through a voluntary organisation or otherwise, so that we underline not only our support of the principle laid down in Section 31 of the Act of 1948, but give a clear indication of our approval of what has been done and our feeling that it should be even further extended. In other words, our approach to voluntary organisations is not only friendly but seeks further and closer co-operation. We say to voluntary organisations, "More power to your elbow; we will give you all the help we can, and this is one of the ways in which we can do it."

    I say that with the object of eliminating at the outset any possibility of it being suggested with any force that the Bill would take away the influence or powers or authority of voluntary organisations. They are doing a good job. We want an even better job to be done. However, when the voluntary organisations have done all they can, there are still large areas where there are old people living in the most distressing circumstances who will not be helped by voluntary organisations because the voluntary organisations simply are not there.

    How can the local authorities act? At the moment they can act only by making a grant to the voluntary organisations doing this type of work. They have no power themselves to do the work. We seek to give them that power. We seek to empower local authorities to make their own arrangements to enable old people to have meals and domiciliary service and recreational facilities in their own homes. I should have thought that everybody, whatever his political views, would be strongly in favour of that.

    I do not propose to give detailed illustrations of cases, but I must put one to the House. We have all read of cases where an elderly person has been found dead in his home, having been dead for several day before the body was discovered. I am sure that we all feel a sense of shame and shock when that occurs. It does not need much imagination to realise what has happened in that home. In each case one can see that through the years it may have been the happiest of homes and then, as the elderly person got on in years and his friends died and the members of the family went to other parts of the country, his sense of independence would, in effect, turn out to be his enemy, because there would be a period of loneliness and a sense of not being wanted, a feeling that nobody cared, and ultimately there would be a lonely death.

    Those things need not be if we, with the ample powers which we have, give power to the local authorities to see that certain things are done. If in these cases there had been adequate schemes under which the elderly persons concerned had at least one good meal a day provided, not only would that have been a tremendous difference to the elderly person, but it would have given him a sense of being wanted, a sense of being cared for by the law itself, a sense of having a service as of right. There is nothing in the nature of charity in the Bill at all. It seeks to provide something as a legal right once it is established on the basis of a scheme. It does not impose upon any local authority the legal duty to enter into the arrangements contemplated, but it gives them the power to do so.

    It seems to me that it would be very difficult to find any arguments at all against the proposition, and I hope that today we shall not only have a favourable reception of the Bill from the Minister, but that, if he can give us any help on certain points which are troubling us in the Bill, we shall have his enthusiastic support. I mention that because it is my duty, I think, in introducing the Bill to draw attention to certain possible objections that might be taken, not to the underlying principle of the Bill, but to certain points which we have been obliged to insert in it because of the rules of the House.

    I wish to draw attention particularly to Clause 2 which has given the impression in the country that we should be imposing a substantial financial obligation upon local authorities. In fact, that is not our intention. We have inserted Clause 2 because some provision has to be made for expenditure. We wish that it could be dealt with under the Equalisation Fund, but were we to put that into the Bill we should at once be faced under the rules of the House with the necessity of introducing a Money Resolution, and, that being so, we should not be able to proceed any further without the consent of the Government.

    I put it to the Minister that it is not because we have any enthusiasm for the idea of imposing expenditure. We do not think that the expenditure involved will be very great, but we feel that it would be better if even the small expenditure envisaged could come from the Exchequer. With a little good will it could be done, and it would have the approval of hon. Members of all parties in the House. Therefore, I invite the Minister to look favourably at that aspect of the Bill and thus make it an even better Bill than we have tried to do.

    I think it is also my duty to draw attention to the only other suggestion I have received. I will not call it an objection; it has not been put as forcibly as that. I have been told that, in considering the future of the schemes contemplated under the authority of the Bill, should the local authorities exercise their power, one should bear in mind that great strides are at the moment being made in connection with the complete reorganisation of local government. I have been asked to bear that in mind and to see what effect it has.

    My submission to the Minister is that the Bill should not be held up pending a complete reorganisation of local government. That would take a considerable time, and, in the meantime, the elderly people would be suffering. That, surely, is something which none of us wants. We all know that as far as the claims of the old people to increases in pensions are concerned, that is a subject of great political controversy and pressure at the the present time. The Bill does not affect that at all. Indeed, if every old-age pensioner in the country received every increase in pension that he seeks, and got it tomorrow, he could still not afford to employ a cook. Old people could not guarantee, whatever their income, that they would be provided with a properly cooked, solid meal every day. That is something which can only be done if specific provision is made for it. There would still be the necessity for this provision to be made.

    I am most indebted to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East for bringing forward the idea contained in the Bill. I am delighted that the Bill has received the full support of the House, and I commend it to the House with all my heart and hope that we shall hear the Minister say something of the same kind in the course of his observations.

    1.56 p.m.

    I am very glad to be able to support the eloquent and moving speech of the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams) in moving the Second Reading of the Bill. We on this side of the House very much regret that the hon. Member for Bradford, East (Mr. McLeavy) is unwell and has been in hospital for a considerable time, because we well remember his courage in bringing forward the Bill under the Ten Minutes Rule. The House was so impressed by his speech on that occasion that it unanimously agreed that the Bill should receive a Second Reading.

    I think that Members must be very grateful to the hon. Member for Bradford, East for the fact that he has, more or less, waived his right to wait until he can personally move the Second Reading of the Bill. It shows his high ideals and the real and genuine desire he has for the old people that he has allowed his colleagues who are his co-sponsors of the Bill to bring it forward in his absence. I hope that if the Bill receives a Second Reading today that fact will encourage the hon. Gentleman to make a quick and complete recovery.

    I support what the hon. Member for Wigan has said, that the Bill is in no way a criticism of any work done by the voluntary organisations. We are very anxious to enlarge the scope of the activities on behalf of the old people, but the 1948 Act lays it down very strongly that the funds can only be given for voluntary organisations and that their activities should consist of the provision of recreation and meals for old people. Section 31 of the Act says:
    " provide meals, domiciliary and other facilities for old people."
    I am particularly interested today to extend the other facilities for old people.

    The difference between the position at the time of the 1948 Act and now is shown by the need for this Bill. If there were sufficient voluntary organisations all over the country to meet the needs of old people, there would be no necessity to bring the Bill before the House today. I suggest that considerable changes can be affected in the welfare of old people if the Bill receives a Second Reading.

    We should all, I am sure, wish to pay tribute to the various voluntary organisations. I will not mention many of them this afternoon, because I want particularly to make reference to local Councils of Social Service, to the many Old People's Welfare Committees, to the Women's Voluntary Service, the British Red Cross and the many church organisations, of all denominations, which play such a leading part in this work. I should like, to give an example of how, perhaps, extra work can be handled if the Bill receives a Second Reading today.

    One of the schemes which deserves support was mentioned by me in our debate on the National Health Contributions, namely, the scheme for boarding out old people. The hon. Member for Wigan would probably agree that the visitation of old people by regular visiting officers employed by local authorities is a very necessary provision if we are to avoid the sort of tragedy which the hon. Member mentioned.

    Recently, in the City of Plymouth-part of which I have the honour to represent—powers have been given to a voluntary organisation to board out people. These old people are boarded out in the same way as young people. This scheme has been a great success, and at the moment over 100 old people are boarded out. This scheme entailed a lot of work. The local authority was fortunate in having a very good Council of Social Service, which was able to do this work. In order to carry out the scheme a special committee has been set up and the scheme had to be passed through the Council under what was called the "Boarding out Scheme for Old People."

    In order to operate the scheme it was necessary to make four provisions—the first giving power to the Council of Social Service to set up a committee to operate the scheme; the second providing that all the accounts relating to the operation of the scheme were to be examined by the City Treasurer; the third providing that the Medical Officer of Health was to be given facilities to supervise the scheme; and the fourth providing that the operation should be subject to annual review.

    It was fortunate that a voluntary body was found to undertake the work once it has been agreed to by the council. Many local authorities have no such organisation to undertake this work. This is a reason why I support the Bill. It will give local authorities, where necessary, powers to board out old people themselves, to have them visited and to supervise their general welfare.

    It does not cost local authorities any more money, because most of these people are old-age pensioners, who contribute £2 of their pensions. At present they are supplemented by National Assistance. It usually costs £3 in all, and the National Assistance Board pays the other £1. The old-age pensioner has a little pocket money from National Assistance. If the work is to be done satisfactorily there must be somebody available to supervise it.

    Since 1948 the number of old people has increased. This is due to their living longer because of the many new drugs which we are able to give them to prolong their life and maintain their health. I am thinking in particular of the great number of old people who used to die from pneumonia. Thanks to the new medical services, this does not happen with such frequency. In fact, in this last winter, which was a fine one, without any smog, 1,000 fewer old people died in London and the surrounding districts than died last year.

    With the aid of these new drugs many of these old men and women can remain in their own homes, where they can be visited by doctors. It is no longer necessary for them to go to hospital to be treated. In view of their age, however, they need extra domiciliary care. They can also be extremely lonely; in many cases their immediate friends, with whom they were brought up, have died. I want facilities provided—especially clubs—in order that they may make new friends even in their old age.

    At the moment it is possible for voluntary organisations to run these clubs, but it is not possible for local authorities to give direct assistance. In these days of full employment many more people go out to work, and have less time to devote to voluntary work. Also, many more women take up professional work and. whereas when their families grew up they used to turn to voluntary work during the day, they now take another job. For economic reasons, also, many women who did not previously want to work now take a paid job. If we are to provide these services, therefore, it will become necessary to pay the people to do the work, which is not always possible through voluntary organisations.

    The hon. Member for Wigan mentioned the question of hot meals and "meals on wheels." I agree that it is very beneficial that these people should have regular meals, and meals can be provided very much more cheaply when they are cooked for a lot of people than when they are cooked for just one. That is another reason why I want to see more of these clubs for old people. They can then go to these clubs for a meal. They will have to pay for the meal, but they will pay very much less than if they cook for themselves. In this way, too, they will be sure of getting a hot meal, which they would probably not bother to cook for themselves. When one gets older one finds it excessively tiring and troublesome to have to cook for oneself.

    I should also like to see an increase in the number of home helps. This could be brought about if the home helps service for old people were brought directly under the control of the local authority, as is the service for mothers and children. At the moment, most local authorities have to ask voluntary organisations to provide these home helps. A chiropody service should be provided within the list of domiciliary services, because it is badly needed.

    Furthermore, in order to keep their limbs supple and their minds occupied, handicraft work should be provided. Once old persons have been given some idea of the type of work they can do and which is within their physical capability, it is surprising how quickly they pick it up—whether they do it in their own homes or are able to go to one of the clubs—and what remarkable progress they make. Only the other day in Plymouth there was a demonstration in a public hall. It was called "Skilled Hands", and all the exhibits had been made by old people who had gone to various clubs or had been taught in their own homes. This service should be enlarged and carried out in many more places, especially in the rural areas.

    The old people pay something towards the cost of providing this service and in return they benefit from the sale of their work, which encourages them to go on. Since they also contribute towards the cost of their meals it can be seen that we are not asking for enormous sums of money to extend these services. What we want are better facilities, to enable this work to go ahead.

    The Local Government Act of 1948 says:
    " The Minister shall… estimate the aggregate of so much of the expenditure incurred by the council of the county or county borough or, in the case of a county, by any other local authority in the county … in providing' services which it will be the duty of the Minister to provide under Part II of the National Health Service Act, 1946."
    It should therefore be possible to make the necessary grants in this case. The whole matter is based upon the fact that the local authority should be able to make the grant and not merely have power to authorise voluntary organisations to do the work.

    I agree with the hon. Member for Wigan that we may well get some answer from the Minister on this point, that is a fact that local government finance is about to be reorganised. I believe that one of the suggestions is that there shall be a block grant to local authorities. It would therefore be better to start this scheme straight away, because any authority which takes advantage of it now will be able more accurately to estimate its needs for the future, and it will also be able to make a good start with the work.

    I am quite sure that we shall have many discussions on the Bill before it is passed, and I do not want to see the work delayed.

    I suggest also that it is much better to keep the old people in their homes instead of taking them to hospital or to special homes. I am certain that old people are much happier, even if they only have a bed sitting room, to continue to live in their own surroundings, in a neighbourhood in which they have probably lived most of their lives and with their personal belongings which mean so much to them. That is far better than any type of home or hospital, however excellent they may be. We must realise that there are many proud old people who do not wish to go to a home or a hospital. For one thing, they may not have many relations to call upon them.

    I am visualising that the future may be very different for a lot of old people. I am not certain that we are not beginning to build too many homes for old people, in view of the different type of life that the present generation is having. We realise that many old people today, those over 60, have had an extremely hard life. Most of them have been brought up in very hard and difficult circumstances. We sometimes hear about the "good old days" but I think those days were for the very small minority and not for the people really in need of attention today.

    I believe the present generation will have an easier old age. Many of them will not have had such a hard life. They will have had better feeding, with school meals and so on, and have better medical attention. They will also have, we hope, the benefits of automation and so on so they will not have to work so hard physically. Therefore, they will be in a better state to look after themselves in their old age.

    I should like there to be an extension of domiciliary work rather than an extension of the system of putting people into homes. We all want to make the life of old people happier and easier, and this can be achieved by means of domiciliary work through the local authorities if this Bill is accepted. If we can help these pepole in their own homes in the ways that I have suggested, it will not be necessary for them to go to hospital or to special homes. I am certain that if this Bill gets a Second Reading, although it is only a three Clause Bill, it will be of infinite benefit to the people concerned.

    2.14 p.m.

    I am very pleased to support this Bill amending the National Assistance Act, 1948, which was moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams) in his usual sincere and kindly way. Both he and the hon. Lady the Member for Devon-port (Miss Vickers) have stressed fully the very human elements involved in this Bill, and, therefore, my speech will be very brief.

    This Bill aims at enlarging the scope of the voluntary organisations. I am sure we are all agreed on the excellence of the work done by the voluntary organisations in almost every district. In the Feltham urban district we have a very good Council of Social Service which is performing the work to which the hon. Member for Devonport referred, namely, the provision of meals and of friendship for old people.

    We have very limited financial resources in Feltham for this social service, the funds being raised from voluntary organisations, in addition to a grant from the local urban district council, but we manage to give the old people one hot meal a week at a cost of Is. Cards are issued through the Council of Social Service so that the old people are able to get one hot meal once a week in a restraurant where special arrangements are made for 1s. Although at present this is done on a very limited scale, I know from personal contacts with the old people that this service is much appreciated, and I would like to see it extended in other parts' of my constituency.

    What we really want—and I know the Minister takes a kindly interest in these matters—is the voluntary organisation scope to be enlarged to provide a hot "meals-on-wheels" service. Owing to the size of some of these districts, it is not possible for an old person living in an outlying estate to journey to the centre of a town where there is a restaurant where arrangements have been made for this service. There is the cost of the bus fare to be borne in mind, and in addition some people may not be fit enough to make the journey. A hot "meals-on-wheels" service would enable hot meals to be taken to the people; so that we can be sure that old people will get a hot midday meal.

    In Feltham, we are endeavouring to raise £1,000 for this purpose. We have, of course, difficulty in raising voluntary funds. Therefore, if this Bill gives an opportunity to local authorities that assist in this matter, it will be of enormous help, though I would pay a tribute to the financial help local organisations have given us.

    I should like to make another suggestion. In Feltham, through the Council of Social Service, there is a card system to meet points to which the hon. Member for Devonport referred. The Minister may have heard of this scheme before. Old people often become lonely and sick. If they require help, they put one of these cards in the window, and a member of the committee, seeing the card, reports the matter and arrangements are made for a visit to the person concerned. That is not an expensive scheme, and if the Minister could give some attention to it, it would operate with great success throughout the country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan has said, old people have died before anyone has known, and I am sure we have all heard of cases in which the only indication of a sad death having taken place has been the accumulation of milk bottles on the doorstep after several days. This card system could be of great help in these circumstances and would bring aid to old people who are ill.

    Another asset would be the provision of club rooms where the old people could meet for a game of cards, dominoes or darts and buy a cup of tea and biscuits at a reasonable price. This is already done by the Darby and Joan clubs and by many branches of the National Federation of Old Age Pensioners. All that we can do to extend this work will be of great value. An over sixty club on these lines operates with great success in Hounslow.

    The hon. Member for Devonport said —and I am sure we all agree with her— that the majority of the old people today have lived through rough times. But nowadays people are living much longer. This is no doubt due to many causes, such as advances in medical science, medical services, improved hospital facilities and, above all, the ever-raising standard of life in this country, which must continue. I believe that today people live from ten to fifteen years longer than they did at the turn of the last century, so that now we have millions of old-age pensioners in need of the services I have mentioned. We must pay great attention to this problem, so that the latter years of their lives are bright and happy.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Wigan said that this Bill did not deal with the question of increasing old-age pensions. That is a matter both he and I strongly support, as do all hon. Members on this side of the House. However, this Measure will do something for our old people. It may ensure that they get a hot meal every day. Probably we can then enlarge the restaurant service and hot "meals-on-wheels." We may be able to go forward with the provision of old people's clubrooms and the scheme for S.O.S. cards for old people. It is a small Bill in Clauses but it deals with human problems and its implementation will mean very much to the old people. I hope, therefore. that the Minister will be able to give it his blessing, and so open prospects for welfare and friendliness for the Old Folk in the evening of their lives.

    2.21 p.m.

    I am glad of the opportunity to give my support to this Bill and to express the hope that it will receive a Second Reading and full consideration during the Committee stage. I am particularly glad to support it, because its provisions are in line with a resolution moved by representatives of my constituency, Central Ayrshire, at the Scottish Unionist Conference and carried. The resolution commenced by stating that the conference was concerned that the needs of many retirement and old-age pensioners were not being adequately catered for, and it is interesting to note that it was moved by the younger supporters of my party. It is clear that today young people appreciate the needs of the old people.

    This Bill can do something to help many of the really old people. It is those of 75 and over who suffer most. My hon. Friend the Member for Devon-port (Miss Vickers) referred to the need to arrange for visitors for the old people. If the provisions contained in this Bill are to have their full effect, we must tackle the problem of ensuring that old people are visited regularly. In the Municipal Journal of 19th April, there appeared a report of a survey among old people in Salfbrd which was said to be the first of its kind. The survey lasted over a period of five years and disclosed financial and other problems affecting over 17,000 people.

    It was discovered that there were over a hundred of them who did not realise that they were eligible to be registered as blind or partially blind, and that there were a large number who needed medical and hospital treatment. Some of these old people did not even know that they could apply for National Assistance. Therefore, while I support this Bill, I do not think that it will achieve its full purpose unless county councils, district councils and voluntary organisations can combine to work out some way to ensure that old-age pensioners are visited, and that those of 75 and 80 are never left to find out for themselves the benefits to which they are entitled. There should always be someone who is prepared to solve their problems for these people. I hope that the Bill will receive a Second Reading and that, during the Committee stage discussions, we shall be able to improve it.

    2.25 p.m.

    This is a small but extremely important Bill. Its importance cannot be gauged by its size. The House will be indebted to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. McLeavy), who was responsible for this Measure but who, unfortunately, is not able to be present today, and to my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams), who introduced it. Particularly will the House be indebted to the hon. Lady the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers) for her endeavours to obtain as much support as possible for the Bill. We do not always see eye to eye with the hon. Lady, but it is a great pleasure to me to know that on this occasion we do.

    I hope that the Minister will not tell us that the difficulties which exist, and which give rise to the need for a Bill of this nature, will be put right in due course, and that therefore there is no need for the Bill. Time runs against these old people. By this Bill we are trying to provide some kind of relief for them, and every day counts. Even though the provisions of the Bill may not cover anything like all the problems involved and even though the Minister may intend to deal with them in the future, that should not prevent the right hon. Gentleman from accepting this Measure.

    In my own constituency there are many people who take part in the voluntary services rendered to old people. From time to time it is a pleasure to see how these old people, who otherwise would be entirely neglected, are enjoying themselves in the company of each other. They meet in clubs and other places provided by good-hearted voluntary workers, and old men and women well advanced in years enjoy, not only the ordinary amenities of sedentary recreation, but dances as well. I have danced with a lady aged 85 who proved to be an extremely good dancer—much better than many girls of 20 or 30 or even "teen-agers."

    The fact that these old people can meet together to enjoy the facilities available to them helps to prevent them from becoming lonely. We should do all we can to relieve people from a sense of loneliness, particularly aged people who feel that they have done their work in the world. Naturally, they are losing friends by death almost day by day. Very often their relatives are loth to come near them, or cannot do so because of the vicissitudes of everyday life.

    We must look at this question against its great background of the desire of everybody in the country to make the old persons feel less old and give them the feeling of still being members of the society in which they live. I have often raised in the House the question of the aged sick. Today, they are benefiting by geriatric treatment to keep them out of hospital and to train them to become useful, not in the sense of making productive efforts but in the sense of becoming part and parcel of a happy community.

    Nowadays we can regard our people as a community, as a family. It is very good that we have reached the stage where we can regard every individual as a part of that family and not as somebody who we need not bother ourselves about. Geriatric treatment is a success, because it enables people to carry on their lives without having to remain in a hospital bed, at considerable cost to the community, for the rest of their lives; but once they are out of hospital they depend on others to make their lives enjoyable.

    Great praise is due to the voluntary organisations for what they do in that direction, but we all know that there is a hiatus. When one visits old people, one often finds that they have been neglected, in the sense that nobody has come to see them, and that they are only too delighted to have a visitor because it means somebody to talk to. It relieves the monotony of a lonely life pervaded by a sense of being neglected. They often feel, "It doesn't really matter about me. All I have to wait for now is to pass out." The Minister knows that I am not referring to isolated cases, and that this is the kind of thing that happens.

    We have been told that younger people are now beginning to realise their obligations to the old, but I am not sure about that. I remember the days when the family was so united that its old people were kept within the home, and were warmly loved and looked after. That feeling still exists, but the constant pressure of life causes the younger people to be out of their homes and in different places, whereas years ago they would have spent much more time in their homes and would have been able to look after their old folk.

    What answer is there to the changed conditions? If old people are not getting the meals that they should have, meals must be provided. Who can deny that? We know that in many cases old people are not getting sufficient to keep body and soul together. I am not making a political point at the moment. There is considerable anxiety about the people who are not able to meet their needs, even with National Assistance, and who do not get the minimum necessary for physical and mental comfort.

    It is not simply a matter of gauging the absolute minimum necessary to make people physically and mentally comfortable, or of a scientific calculation. Each individual has different requirements. It may cost more to provide for one individual than for another. All these subjects are glibly discussed by us and are calculated by statistics; but the human problem is there, which is that in many cases the old people have not the means to provide them with what they really need.

    There are many people who have warm hearts and are prepared to do voluntary work. There is a great store of good will in the country. We must get these people moving together, with interest in the work. It is not always easy to get things organised. There are many places where the local authority should be compelled, in a sense, to direct its attention towards the kind of work that the voluntary organisations are doing, so that the work can be co-ordinated. Local authorities consist of men and women who are devoting themselves to public life, and everybody is grateful to them. They would not regard it as an imposition, but as a privilege, if asked to add this service to what they are already doing.

    In the circumstances I hope not only that the Minister will recommend the Second Reading of the Bill but will not leave to the promoters the task of removing any difficulties that it contains. Let the Minister say, "I accept the Bill in principle, although it may require modification". The skill of the draftsman can be exercised to make those modifications; much depends upon the Minister's directions to the draftsman. He knows as well as I do that he can tell the draftsman, "I want this Measure through, so please remove whatever difficulties there are in it". The skill and ingenuity of the draftsman will then put the Bill right.

    If the Minister does not want the Bill he can—far be it from me to suggest that he would—give no such indications to the draftsman, which might result in the Bill becoming difficult to operate. I want wholehearted acceptance of the Bill. It is not an essential Measure, but the Minister should not push it aside to await some other kind of action. The elderly people should have as many facilities as possible. Volunteers will come forward, and it will be an inducement to them if the Minister now gives the Bill his warmhearted support. He will in that way earn the gratitude of the old people, as well as of the community in general.

    2.40 p.m.

    I intervene at this stage, not to terminate this debate, but to give the point of view of the Government on the Bill. Before doing that, I should like to join with, I think every, hon. Member who has spoken in expressing sympathy with the hon. Member for Bradford, East (Mr. McLeavy), who ran the hazards of introducing this Bill as a Ten Minute Rule Bill and who has unfortunately been prevented from seeing it through its subsequent stages. I hope that the speeches which have been made today may be of some help in aiding his recovery.

    Perhaps this assurance will come to the notice of the hon. Member. I wish to assure him that, despite his absence, the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams), my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers) and, I think, all the hon. Members for Bradford have, in his absence, done everything possible to ensure that the Bill goes forward as he would have wished. I did not share the pessimism of his hon. Friends that this Bill would never receive a Second Reading. It has much to commend it in principle. To that extent I can go the whole way with the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner), but I think he realised that it raises a few difficulties.

    For that reason, I expressed to hon. Members who sponsored the Bill the opinion that a short debate on Second Reading was essential, in the first place to obtain an expression of views by hon. Members and, secondly, to ensure that the difficulties underlying the Bill were understood by the House before further stages were commenced. The Bill deals with something which matters greatly to me. A great deal of time and effort and money must be spent on the hospital service, but, as was well said by the hon. Member for Tottenham (Sir F. Messer) in the House a few days ago, our object should be to prevent people from getting into hospital. I hope that the Bill will extend and develop the preventive services.

    The extension of welfare services, particularly the domiciliary services, is something with which the Parliamentary Secretary and I are much concerned. I realise that every major local authority is very proud of its old people's homes. I have no doubt that there will be an extension of old people's homes, but it must be my aim and, I hope, the local authorities' aim, so far as possible to prevent old people from having to go into old people's homes and to enable them to stay in their own homes. I am glad to say—because I have had one or two discussions about it—that there is a growing realisation to that effect. Many and, I hope, an increasing number of organisations and individuals are contributing to that.

    I have in mind that very excellent organisation, which must be known to almost every hon. Member, the National Old People's Welfare Council and all its committees. I appreciate very much the point put by the hon. Member for Feltham (Mr. Hunter), who spoke about the importance of visiting old people. I am associated with an enterprise in my constituency which does that work. I fully realise that the provision made in this Bill for "meals on wheels" is a vital element in helping old people to stay in their own homes, and as such I welcome that and some of the other provisions. That is not in any way in dispute. The difficulty is the question of who should do that work and, possibly, when they should do it.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Devonport and the hon. Member for Wigan made the statutory position reasonably clear, but I hope that the House will forgive me if I repeat it as a preface to what I intend to say about the Bill. Section 31 of the National Assistance Act, 1948, which the Bill seeks to amend, empowers a local authority to
    "make contributions to the funds of any voluntary organisation whose activities consist in or include the provision of recreation or meals for old people."
    In this context—this is important— "local authorities" means counties, county boroughs, county districts and Metropolitan boroughs; but in the remainder of Part III of the 1948 Act, dealing with the provision of accommodation and services by local authorities, it means counties and county boroughs only. It would seem, therefore, that this Bill departs from the existing provisions in two respects. First, it empowers local authorities, as opposed to voluntary organisations, themselves to provide meals and recreational facilities; and, secondly, in the remaining provisions of the Bill, it empowers local authorities other than county and county borough councils to provide domiciliary and other services.

    I propose to deal with those points separately. Dealing first with "meals on wheels" and recreational facilities, I join in the tribute paid by many hon. Members in praise of the voluntary organisations which undertake that work. I think we are all agreed that that work must develop, and that it is work particularly suitable for voluntary organisations. I should be sorry if anything resulting from this Bill had the opposite effect. However, I do not think that it would have. I had a letter from the National Old People's Welfare Council, which I think is in general support of the Bill, expressing the hope that, if the Bill received the assent of the House, the local authority would, whenever possible, use a local voluntary organisation as its agent. Therefore, I would hope that local voluntary organisations might play the major part.

    We have not had examples of where needs are not being met by voluntary organisations, but I accept the argument that there are gaps in the existing services. If local authorities can provide certain services through a third party it seems not unreasonable that they should be able to provide them directly, as is proposed by the Bill.

    It is also noteworthy—I am surprised that it has not been mentioned—that similar powers have been sought by individual local authorities, and granted to them by this House in approving Private Bills. Preston is one such authority. The hon. Member for Leicester, North-West was entirely altruistic, because I believe his local authority has all these powers with the possible exception of one; Leeds and Huddersfield have also received similar powers in the last five years. In addition, two or three Bills are before the House seeking these powers for other local authorities. It may be argued by those who follow me that as the powers have been granted to certain local authorities—and, so far as I know, are exercised successfully—they could be generally extended.

    I understand, but I cannot be certain because I do not speak for them, that the local authority associations would in general be glad to have these additional powers. That is an added reason for approving the principles of the Bill. I also understand, however, that one local authority association does not support the Bill so long as Clause 2 remains part of it. If, therefore, on the first part of the Bill hon. Members are convinced that there are areas where voluntary effort cannot fill the gap and at the same time feel reasonably certain that the extension of the powers of local authorities would not discourage voluntary effort, they will be in favour of that part of the Bill in principle; but I propose to say a word or two later on the question of timing.

    I am not quite so happy about what I consider as the second part of the Bill, even in principle. It consists in the provision of domiciliary services by local authorities other than county boroughs and county councils. As I understand the Bill—perhaps this can be explained at a later stage—it seems to envisage the employment of visitors for the rendering of domiciliary services by smaller local authorities. As the Bill applies to all local authorities, there might be a very large number of employing authorities. That contrasts with the present position under which domiciliary workers are employed only by county and county borough councils, so that well co-ordinated domiciliary teams can be built up

    Giving these extended powers to all local authorities might to some extent lead to the fragmentation of those services, which would be a pity. The White Paper which is at present before the House, and which I imagine is shortly to be discussed, deals with that very point. In that White Paper we envisage that the welfare services should be delegated to the larger district councils with a population of 60,000 or more, but it is again emphasised that, whatever happens, the domiciliary health and welfare services must be kept together as a group. It appears that the Bill as it stands is a departure from that generally agreed principle, and that therefore that is a point which requires further consideration.

    In the absence of further explanation, I am also a little doubtful about what is intended by the words "other facilities", which occur in Clause 1. No doubt these are points which can be considered in due course.

    It is because the whole future of local government is at the moment under consideration that I am hesitant about the Bill proceeding further at this stage. Not only is the White Paper awaiting discussion by the House but, as right hon. and hon. Members know, the whole question of local government finance is under discussion outside the House at the moment and is, I understand, shortly to be the occasion for a White Paper to be laid before the House. At the moment, of course, the welfare services generally do not attract grant from the Government, but if a general grant were to be introduced presumably they would benefit. It seems to me, therefore, that we must consider what effect the introduction of this Bill would have on other local authority services.

    Surely it is the case, is it not, that if a local authority made a contribution to a voluntary organisation under Section 31 of the National Assistance Act, that contribution would rank for Exchequer equalisation grant?

    It would rank for equalisation grant. It was proposed by the Guillebaud Committee on the Health Service that welfare expenditure should rank for grant from the Ministry of Health. That is not the case at the moment, but a general grant, were it introduced, could have a similar effect.

    For that and other reasons, I am not agreeable to the point made persuasively by the hon. Member for Wigan that I should be prepared to authorise a Money Resolution in place of the provisions of Clause 2. I do not think that that would be a practical proposition as long as the general question of local government finance is likely to come before the House in the near future. It is for those reasons—the matter of timing and the possible fragmentation of the domiciliary services—that I am a little hesitant about accepting the terms of the Bill at present.

    It is, however, evident from hon. Members who have spoken in the debate that they are in favour of the principle and also in favour of the terms of the Bill. Although I think it would be wiser at least to await the completion of the review of local government reorganisation and finance, I will not ask hon. Members on either side of the House to oppose the Bill. My purpose has been to put before the House the views of the Government. Generally, they are in favour of the principle but are rather hesitant about the timing.

    I do not altogether share the view of the hon. Member for Wigan that the delay caused by deferring the Bill pending consideration of the reorganisation of the functions and finance of local Government would cause much hardship. While I have indicated that there are substantial advantages in my opinion in letting the matter stand over, if the House wishes to give the Bill a Second Reading today I shall not advise my hon. Friends to oppose it, but I shall do my best to improve the Bill in Committee.

    2.57 p.m.

    May I first associate my hon. Friends and myself with the kind and well-deserved words which the right hon. Gentleman spoke about my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. McLeavy)? We sympathise with my hon. Friend. We are very glad indeed that his Bill has reached as far as this, we are very sorry that he is not with us at the moment and we all feel that in his absence his task has been very well supplemented by others.

    I have not very much to say about the merits of the Bill. This seems to me to be another case of a social service, which, as so often in the history of this country, has been begun by voluntary effort, has been found a "bit much" for voluntary effort alone, has been recognised as good and necessary by the community and has been subsequently developed by a combination in various proportions of voluntary effort and the work of the local or some central authority. Before holding his present office the right hon. Gentleman was Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education, and I am sure he will agree that that, broadly, has been the history of education in this country and that what we are seeing here today is something of the same sort in a smaller but very important matter.

    After all, the proper sympathetic help which it can give to old folk not only appeals to us individually but on any showing is one of the most important functions of any civilised community— and I am not certain whether it is even necessary to add the word "civilised".

    On Clause 1, I would simply say that the points raised seem to be Committee points. Even the question of which authority is, I should have thought, a Committee point. In substance, this is a tolerably simple Bill. There is nothing about it which need take a very long time. If it were restricted a little beyond the original intentions of those who moved it, I should be sorry, for personally I do not think they go too far, but there would still be room for very much to be done, and very much which, as hon. Members have said, is urgent.

    We have to remember that we are dealing with the old people who have perhaps not very many years to live and who find a delay in this sort of thing, particularly when it has attracted a certain amount of attention, very difficult indeed to bear. One approaches the question of time and money with that in mind.

    I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would himself feel that if he could get the Bill through without making it contingent on other matters, he would wish to do so. I assume that he looks at it in that way and that he is more concerned with the human and social value of what we are trying to do than with any question of simultaneous tidiness in the legislative programme.

    Looking at the matter in that light, is there any reason why this Bill should wait upon the reorganisation of local government finance? The right hon. Gentleman is well aware—I think it has been stated in the House—'that there is no prospect of legislation about local government functions and finance until the next Session of Parliament. When that legislation is introduced it will obviously involve questions which will need the most careful and the most detailed consideration. The passing of any legislation about it by the House is therefore not likely to occur until next year.

    Then, in addition to that, when we are dealing with matters of this kind, we have to have regard to the financial years of local authorities and, possibly in this matter, to the rating difficulty that house property in this country is at present rated on a 1939 basis and is due in a comparatively short time to be rated on the current basis unless the law is changed. All that makes it probable that the effectual reorganisation of local government finance is a long way ahead. Ought it really to be necessary to wait for this Bill to go through until that can be done?

    There are two matters. The first is the recommendation of a direct grant—the Guillebaud recommendation, I think it was. Of course, I do see that that possibly does raise some difficulty. I should not have thought it a very large one, because the sum involved must be quite small, but there is, of course, and can be no provision in the Bill for that purpose. That would certainly require a Money Resolution.

    The other matter is this. Clause 2 provides in effect that the payments by local authorities shall not rank for Exchequer equalisation grant. That is the effect of it. That will mean that if the Bill goes through in that form financially the payments will have to be made entirely out of the rates. I noticed when the right hon. Gentleman was speaking, and when other Members were speaking, too, that there was a considerable measure of national co-ordination among voluntary organisations which have been dealing with this. That seems to me rather inevitable. If we are to try to deal with this form of assistance to old folk purely on a local basis we shall have the usual difficulty of dealing with what is really a national problem on a local basis, that the places where most is needed are very often the least able to deal with it. Of course, it is the general purpose of the Exchequer equalisation grant to deal with that sort of question in a variety of matters. Surely it ought to be applied here?

    There is in my own constituency a town which, I think, has about the youngest population in the country—Corby. There are other towns which have the oldest population in the country. As a rule those with the oldest population, as one would expect, are those which have not very prosperous local government finance. They may be cases of whole towns having become centres of retirement where that would not apply so much, but by and large it is true to say at any rate that there are a great many places with a high proportion of old people and with singularly little by way of financial resources to deal with them.

    Broadly speaking, it cannot be right that the amount of help which can be given in those cases should depend on the rates. It really is not, I feel sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree, right in principle that that should be done. I would beg the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, to do what he alone can do, and that is to take the necessary steps by way of a Money Resolution to enable Clause 2 to be dropped out of the Bill. It is not the same thing as the Guillebaud Report, but I ask him this, and I tell him it is not one of those rhetorical questions. I really do not know the answer.

    Provision under Section 31 of the 1948 Act must rank for Exchequer equalisation grant. It is pretty illogical if that expenditure is to rank for Exchequer equalisation grant and this expenditure is not to rank for Exchequer equalisation grant. That is indefensible, I think, in practice, but there is one further possibility.

    Suppose that a county borough—he gave us instances—has taken power to do this sort of thing itself. Am I wrong in thinking that would rank for Exchequer grants? It would, would it not?

    The real reason why I was hesitant on that point is that the whole future of the general grant and, indeed, of the Exchequer equalisation grant is at present under consideration.

    I quite realise that, but it is not intended that the block grant should be any substitute for the Exchequer equalisation grant. The opposite is intended, and any change made in the equalisation grant cannot possibly hinder the treatment of occasional items of local government expenditure. Apart from legislation, occasions for expenditure on particular matters are happening from day to day, and if we are to be told in relation to every measure of social well-being that we must wait until the whole future of local government finance is settled, we are letting ourselves be dominated by the machinery, and letting our social duties be subordinated to the form of the proceedings in the House and the fragrance of legislation. The substance of the matter is that there is really no earthly reason why that Clause should be allowed to remain in the Bill and this burden put entirely on the rates.

    If I have not said much about the substance of the Bill it is because it has been said so very well already by my hon. Friends and the hon. Lady the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers) who spoke in its support. It is obviously a thoroughly good Measure. I would not wish to take up the time of the House with any criticism of detail today, but I hope that the Minister, who told us so very clearly that his heart was in the right place in the matter, will not let his heart be displaced by the Government's tight purse.

    3.7 p.m.

    I did not anticipate a few days ago that it would fall to my lot to wind up this very important debate on the Bill for which my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. McLeavy) obtained a First Reading some weeks ago. I am sure that my hon. Friend will be very much impressed by the sympathy expressed in the House in reference to his absence today. Although he left hospital only yesterday, I am glad to say that he is getting very much better.

    This is a very useful Bill. After the debate, it would be best if I pointed out what I think is its principal feature and described what Clause 1 seeks to do. The words, amending Section 31 of the National Assistance Act, 1948, are:
    " and shall have power to make such arrangements as the authority may from time to time determine for providing (through a voluntary organisation or otherwise) old people ordinarily residing in the area of the authority with meals, domiciliary services and recreational and other facilities in their own homes or elsewhere…"
    That is most important. It is within the knowledge of many people that with better medical services, and therefore more efficient treatment, people are living longer.

    The Minister is of the opinion that old people should have such services as will enable them to stay in their own homes and not have to go into old people's homes. I understand that the Minister has had to leave to keep a pressing appointment, but the Parliamentary Secretary is here, and I want to say at this stage how much I appreciate many of the remarks which the right hon. Gentleman made about the Bill of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East.

    I feel sure that we can now look much deeper into this matter, and I am certain that the concern expressed about domiciliary facilities and on the financial aspect of the Bill are points which can be dealt with easily in Committee, together with other minor matters. The Bill is supported by the three hon. Members representing Bradford, West (Mr. Tiley), East and South, and we know from contacts in this House that a number of hon. Members on both sides also give it their support.

    Old people become less able to perform their domestic functions and to keep themselves fit in advancing years. We have known through local authority contacts that one of the great difficulties to be overcome concerns old people who have to cook for and feed themselves. They do not seem able to do that. They are far too casual in cooking meals and in looking after that important aspect of health, so that in that respect there is an important service which we could give them. If we can get the "meals on wheels" service there will be less demand by people to go into old people's homes. Here we are trying by Act of Parliament, to enable local authorities to set up the necessary machinery and to make use of the local authority associations of which we have heard so much in this debate.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. R. Williams) gave stronger and broader reasons for supporting the Bill. He mentioned two important and sad points, and referred to people being found dead in their homes, perhaps two or three days after their death, because they had not been visited. Another important point is that of loneliness. Therefore, it is important to give power to the local authorities to supply these necessary services in localities where there is a demand for them.

    I would also refer to the most interesting and delightful speech of the hon. Lady the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers). She paid a very special tribute to the many voluntary organisations such as the British Red Cross Society and the Church organisations, making it clear that the Bill in no way seeks to interfere with their work. That was very much in the mind of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East when I spoke to him about the Bill a fortnight ago, when he said that we must make all possible use of voluntary bodies.

    The hon. Lady also spoke about extra-domiciliary care, and made a special plea for more clubs. It has today been stated that many people up to the age of about 75 are capable of looking after themselves. Many retired people can go to clubs in the neighbourhood and interest themselves in what goes on there.

    The hon. Lady also mentioned handicraft work, and that is very important. The most important thing for us all to do is to take an intelligent interest in something or other. We ought to go more deeply into the ways in which we can help old people to interest themselves in the many aspects of social life which they are still capable of following.

    We heard an interesting speech by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Nairn), who referred to matters which are worth emphasising—the need to visit old people in their homes and the need to provide meals. I think he felt that what was most important of all was that the old people should be visited, and I believe that we ought to do all that we possibly can to help in that way. These people have worked hard for the State and for society for upwards of fifty years, and during their last ten or fifteen years facilities ought to be provided to enable them to enjoy their well-earned retirement. I do not think that the financial aspects of the problem are quite so large as they appear to be and as the Minister posed them.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) made a valuable contribution to the debate which made apparent the human qualities that he possesses and the human feeling and understanding that we ought to have in respect of our old people who have done so much for society.

    I was very gratified that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) made one of his usual interesting and clever speeches. He talked about the timing and money points and the effect of direct grants. Those are the considerations which this afternoon have prevented the Minister from giving an all-out "Yes" to the Bill. Notwithstanding that, we have had a first-class debate.

    We have had a most interesting reply from the Minister himself, and in the talks which I and my colleagues have had with him we have felt that he has the right approach to the matter. I hope that he will be able to play a very large part in Committee in making it possible for us to have this amendment of the 1948 Act, so that we may be able to extend this special provision to old people. I have the greatest pleasure in commending the Bill to the House.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill accordingly read a Second time.

    Bill committed to a Standing Committee pursuant to Standing Order No. 38 (Committal of Bills).

    Racial Discrimination Bill

    Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [29th March], That the Bill be now read a Second time.

    Question again proposed.

    3.22 p.m.

    I think the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell) was in possession of the House when the debate adjourned.

    On a point of order. On the last occasion, the debate began at one minute to Four o'clock. I moved the Second Reading of the Bill and, in those circumstances, I naturally concluded my speech very rapidly indeed. In the last seconds the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell) made an intervention, but I should have hoped that there would be an opportunity for me to put my point of view in this debate.

    I can quite understand the motives which made the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Fenner Brock-way) shorten his speech to that extent, but the fact remains that the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South was actually in possession of the House when the debate was adjourned. I have no doubt that, if time permits on this or some other occasion, the hon. Member for Eton and Slough may, if he asks for it, get the indulgence of the House to speak a second time.

    3.23 p.m.

    Speaking for myself and probably for most of my hon. Friends, I am sure that if the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Fenner Brockway), either today or on some other occasion, should ask the leave of the House to make a second speech, I certainly would not object, and I do not think that any of my friends would.

    It is desirable in the rather short time at our disposal this afternoon that we should hear a little of the case against the Bill. I hope that in the short time available of which I will not take too much, my hon. Friends and I will be able to put forward some considerations which the House has not hitherto heard in discussing the Bill. It is not only that in this Session the hon. Member for Eton and Slough introduced the Bill in a one-minute speech. I think that, although such a Measure has been before us before, we have not had a full debate upon it.

    The hon. Member says that we have had the opportunity, but, of course, we did not have the opportunity or we should have had a debate.

    I introduced the Bill under the Ten Minutes Rule. It was not opposed. I suggest that if there had been opposition it could have been expressed.

    The hon. Member is making a confusion, which is quite common, between a Motion for leave to introduce a Bill and a Bill itself. My own practice on these occasions has often been to vote in favour of leave to introduce a Bill, partly because one thinks that if a Member feels strongly about his subject he should have the right to have his Bill printed to let us see it, and also because one may feel that the matter can profitably be debated. Voting in favour of the Motion or not opposing a Motion for leave to introduce a Bill in no way expresses approval of the principle of the Bill or its details when printed. Of course, we have had no debate on the Bill as printed at all.

    I find that when I began my speech on the Bill, I uttered only one sentence. I said that I was sorry to have to oppose the Bill. I am afraid that those words were spoken rather under the pressure of the moment, because, in fact, I am very glad to have this opportunity of opposing a Bill which I believe to be bad in principle, bad in intention, bad in method and bad in detail.

    As the hon. Gentleman says, in other respects it is good.

    It is a wholly deplorable Measure. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough holds strong views about the treatment of coloured people, and he is quite entitled to hold those views. Indeed, my strongest feeling in approaching the subject is that everybody is entitled to have his own views about it. I am very sorry to see any attempt made by legislation to try to stop that and to ram the views of the hon. Member for Eton and Slough by Statute down the throats of other people.

    It is quite easy for those who take an interest in particular aspects of the matter of the treatment of coloured peoples to build up for themselves and in the minds of others a belief that there is something specific, definable and wicked in a colour bar. It may be that in some parts of the world there is something so definable and specific, but this Bill relates to the United Kingdom, and there is certainly nothing of that kind in this country.

    This is not a Bill to sweep away legal disadvantages and legal disabilities. It is a Bill to create for the first time in the law of England a colour law, and more than that, a law relating not only to colour, but to race and religion. There is probably no country in the world where there is less feeling on account of race than in Britain. The Jews have lived here happily at peace and enjoying full equality under the law for many generations. There is no country in the world where there is less feeling against them as a community than there is in Britain.

    Is not that position due to the very fact that we have had the wisdom not to make specific laws enforcing that attitude on the part of our people because it is just the natural reaction which our temperament has, in fact, produced? How foolish it would be to try to formulate that in the terms of a Statute, to bring people to court for infractions of that law, and to fine them. What more effective way would there be than that to create exactly the kind of feeling which has never existed before in this country?

    Is the hon. and learned Gentleman satisfied, then, that it is perfectly reasonable and proper that Jews should be refused admission to voluntary organisations, like golf clubs, and should be refused accommodation in hotels? Is he happy that hotels should say that Jews are not admitted at any time? Does he think that system should be continued?

    The hon. Member is confused in at least two ways. The main purport of what I have been saying is that in these respects there is no happier land than this, and, secondly, that if we try to formulate that attitude into a law we shall create exactly the kind of feeling that is now so little in evidence in this country.

    Following on this point, is it not a fact that the law as it stands at the moment provides that hotel-keepers are under a legal obligation to provide accommodation to all? This question has already been thrashed out in the House, seven or eight years ago, when the Attorney-General of the Government of the party opposite was questioned about it. He made it absolutely clear that the legal duties falling upon an innkeeper—which includes a hotel-keeper— are not affected by the colour of the traveller, which presumably also means the race and religion of the traveller.

    I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That is quite true, and I was coming to that point. At present, the keeper of an inn according to the custom of England—and that term covers the keeper of the ordinary public hotel-must offer refreshment and accommodation, if it is normally provided, to a traveller regardless of his race, colour or religion, if room is available. If he fails to do so he is guilty of an offence.

    That matter was not only thrashed out in this House but was established in the courts, in the case of Constantine. The duty is not based upon race, colour or religion; it is the ordinary right of everyone to be put up if accommodation is available. That is as it should be. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough, however, is trying to alter that position. He is saying, "We will not rely upon your plain duty to all Her Majesty's subjects to give them refreshment if you can take them in. We will punish you specifically upon the ground that you have refused it to a coloured man or to a person on account of his race or religion.

    It makes no difference whether he is one of Her Majesty's subjects or not.

    The only effect of the hon. Member's proposal in relation to hotels would be to change the ground upon which the action or the prosecution was brought, from the ordinary one with which we in England have been familiar for 600 years —that there was accommodation and that it should not have been refused—to this special one, that racial discrimination was exercised. 1 would regard that as thoroughly retrograde.

    One of the strongest arguments against the proposal is that it is so artificial. It is bound to be so, since it proceeds by interfering in the ordinary daily lives of the people. Any attempt to do that is likely to defeat itself because of the complexity of the methods which would be necessary.

    Clause 1 says that:
    "… a person exercises discrimination where he refuses, withholds from or denies to any other person facilities or advantages …"
    That is an extraordinary doctrine to introduce into our law—that anyone should be guilty of discrimination within the meaning of the Bill if he refuses some advantage to a person on the ground of his race, colour or religion.

    Clause 2 says:
    " No person shall be entitled to exercise racia! discrimination in pursuance of any of the following occupations: (a)
    Innkeeper."
    That is a very strange proposal. Apart from the argument which I have just mentioned, why should it be right for an innkeeper to exercise discrimination upon the ground of colour or religion, and an offence to exercise it on the ground of race? What sense does it make? That is what the hon. Member seems to be proposing. I should have thought from what I know of the hon. Member that he would be more concerned to prevent discrimination on the ground of colour, but for some reason or other when dealing with innkeepers he picks out racial discrimination as the only one which shall be an offence under the Bill.

    The Clause then goes on to refer to a
    " Keeper of a common lodging house."
    Of course, the keeper of a common lodging house at present may not be under the obligation to which we were referring just now. I wonder whether it is right for Parliament to intervene and prescribe the social attitudes of all people in the country. How do we know what is right as yet? The world is still young. We do not know to what extent it is right or not right to discriminate against people on those or other grounds. It may well be argued that a wise man discriminates on as many grounds as he can; that the peculiarly human quality is that of discriminating, and that what we want is more discrimination and not less.

    All these matters are wide open. Everybody has got his view. One can set out in declarations standards of conduct in matters like this which one or the other person or perhaps the majority of the whole nation might think ought to be observed, but the enforcement of such standards by the criminal law should be reserved for those matters which are necessary to hold the community together—not as a method of clamping the ideas even of the majority upon their fellow countrymen and compelling them to carry out those ideas in the ordinary practice of their daily lives.

    The Clause then refers to:
    " Keeper of a restaurant, cafe or other place kept or used for the sale of food or drink to the public.
    Keeper of any place kept or used for public dancing, singing, music or any public entertainment of the like kind."
    What right have we by Statute to impose a particular attitude? Even were the views of the hon. Member for Eton and Slough held by the majority of the House, that still would not mean that Parliament would be right to put this proposal into coercive legislation.

    Clause 3 states
    '' Any covenant or provision in any lease or agreement for or in consideration of or collateral to a lease… forbidding or tending to forbid the use or occupation of any premises on any such ground as aforesaid…"
    —that is on the ground of colour, race or religion—shall be void. Why is that? Suppose that somebody wanted to grant a lease on premises with the provision that for twenty years the premises shall be used solely by Scotsmen for the purpose of Scottish cultural activities. Would that be a criminal offence? Of course, that would forbid or tend to forbid the use or occupation of those premises on the ground of race or possibly colour. I suppose Scots do have a distinctive colour.

    There are so many examples that one can think of. Why must we put the whole community upon this bed of Procrustes merely because someone possibly in some other part of the world is behaving towards coloured people in a way of which we do not approve? I do not think it happens here. The case mentioned by the hon. Member for Deptford (Sir L. Plummer) about the golf club is not covered by the Bill. I should have thought that if there were one sphere of human life where this kind of thing is permissible, it would be in a private club, whether for golf or some other purpose. Surely someone can found and maintain a club with almost any discrimination. There are many clubs for bachelors. Is that wicked?

    There could certainly be any number of private clubs founded upon a racial basis, and there are plenty of religious clubs. Why should there not be? Why should not someone start a Protestant club or a Catholic club? There are hundreds of them. I know that this is not referred to in the Bill, but the hon. Member for Deptford who intervened obviously wanted that. He should think again because there would be a gross and unreasonable—

    There are two points in the matter with which the hon. Member is dealing upon which I should like to know his views. He said this does not happen here. But let us take the question of leases. As a lawyer, the hon. Member knows very well that there are leases which contain a covenant specifically excluding assignments to coloured people. What is his view about that?

    The other point is that not so very far from here, at Southend, the Westcliff Golf Club, which was using public property at Southend, tried to restrict membership from people of the Jewish persuasion. Why is the hon. Member not prepared to give a Second Reading to a Bill and provide an opportunity to improve it in the Committee stage, but not to oppose the whole Bill on principle?

    I will take the second point first. As I have said, clubs are not covered by the Bill, and that has nothing to do with giving a Second Reading to this Bill. I would never in any context approve of such a restriction as this on private clubs, and not even the hon. Member for Eton and Slough is willing to press for that.

    If they are using public property, it may be a matter for the Corporation and ratepayers of Southend, and that would be the right way to deal with it.

    Regarding leases, as I say, I do not see why people should not do it if they want to. It may be conduct that I would not approve of, but there are hundreds of things of which I do not approve, but which I would consider totally unsuitable for punishment by the criminal law. Like so many other people, the hon. Gentleman thinks that it is good enough if there is something which is disapproved of by the majority of people; that once that has been established, a case has been made out for passing legislation. But there is a great gulf between things which may be disapproved of and things which may bring people into conflict with the law.

    Clause 4 of the Bill is a very good example of this nonsense. It states:
    "No person who employs fifty or more persons… shall be entitled "—
    on one of these grounds—
    " to refuse to employ or to promote or to terminate the employment or promotion of any person —"
    I suppose that means to refuse to terminate the promotion of any person, I do not know what that really means. Anybody on the ground of colour, race or religion shall be entitled to refuse to terminate promotion—" entitled to refuse to terminate the promotion of any person ". Well, there be it—
    "… to refuse to consent to such employment or promotion or to terminate the same."
    So therefore, we have that no one who employs fifty or more persons is to be entitled to refuse to consent to terminate promotion.

    I do not want to teach the hon. Member English, but the phrase here is:

    " No person… shall be entitled on any such ground … to act in consort to refuse to consent to such employment"
    or to
    " refuse to consent … to promotion"
    or
    " shall be entitled … to terminate the same."

    I am reading from Clause 4 of the Bill, which does not say anything about people acting in concert. It says, " act in consort." Presumably this means act in concert. I do not know what acting in consort is. The Bill says:

    ",No person who employs fifty or more persons in any industry, trade or business shall be entitled on any such ground as aforesaid to refuse to employ."
    Then we get the next alternative which is:
    " or to terminate the employment or promotion of any person."
    What all that means I do not know, but I suspect it means the opposite of what the hon. Gentleman thinks it means. This is the kind of length to which we have to go in a Bill in order to ram these ideas down people's throats, in connection with all the multifarious activities of their ordinary life. Have we to proliferate provisions like these to try to cover everything? If that is the object of the Bill, I very much prefer our present method of getting along. It causes a great deal less offence and. what is more to the point, it causes a great deal less colour, race or religious feeling than this Bill would stir up if it became law.

    I should be extremely sorry if the Bill were given a Second Reading. There is much more I could say, but I will give way to some of my hon. Friends, who are anxious to speak.

    3.47 p.m.

    I rise to oppose the Bill on much the same grounds as have been stated by my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell).

    On a point of order. I fully realise, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that the selection of speakers is entirely in your hands, but is it not customary in the House to select speakers alternatively from the various sides of the House? I observed that some of my hon. Friends rose.

    I beg pardon. I made a mistake when I called the hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine). Who rose?

    On a point of order. May I point out that I had already started to address the House. I should have thought—

    I apologise to the House. I made a mistake. I will call the hon. Gentleman next. Sir Leslie Plummer.

    With great respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and further to my point of order. I realise the difficulty in which this situation places you, and I wish in no way to be discourteous. May I point out that I rose to my feet, that you did me the honour to call me and that I started to address the House. The hon. Member for Deptford (Sir L. Plummer) rose to his feet after I had opened my mouth.

    I can explain the position perfectly clearly. I saw three hon. Members rise, but I did not catch anyone on the Opposition side of the House. If I had, I would have called one. I am doing so now. I apologise for it. I cannot do more than that. Sir Leslie Plummer.

    3.48 p.m.

    The hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell) has made a speech that would have done credit to a Southern senator. He expressed a racial point of view which is held only by a minority of the people of this country.

    I distinctly heard my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell) say that we ought to take pride in this House and in this country from the fact that this sort of issue rarely arose in this country at all. He would not have said that if he had wanted to play the role of a Southern senator.

    Whether he wanted to play that part or not, in my view he did play the part of a Southern senator without the accent. He went further even than that. He advanced the absolutely novel point of view that if the majority of people in this country want something and ask Parliament to produce it it should be the duty of Parliament to refuse to produce it. I must suggest that the hon. Member should read HANSARD tomorrow. He will find there an expression of a political philosophy in which he argued that because a majority of people want something that is no reason why Parliament should produce it.

    This is a gross misrepresentation of what I said. What I said was that a majority of people might happen to disapprove of some practice but it would not necessarily follow that that practice should be then forbidden by this House.

    I must recommend the hon. Member to read his own words. I think they will produce for him a sense of shame when in cold blood he reads them. As an hon. Member who has expressed an interest in the affairs and happiness of colonial peoples, he will find that—whether deliberately or not—he has now suggested, by inference, that those people should be treated differently from other citizens of the British Commonwealth because he does not want them to have certain laws to protect them.

    I suggest that the hon. Member has a look at HANSARD tomorrow and that the whole purpose of his speech—[Interruption.]—

    I was hoping that, having caught the eye of Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and having made this monstrous charge, the hon. Member would permit me a few moments in order to answer it.

    I am quite prepared to consider any suggestion of that kind from the hon. Member, provided he undertakes not to talk the Bill out. If he proposes to do what his hon. Friend did on the last occasion and to use his Parliamentary rights and privileges to talk the Bill out, under no circumstances will I surrender my privilege to continue to address you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.

    The Bill my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough has introduced is born out of necessity. The fact is that there is racial and colour discrimination being practised against our fellow citizens in this country to an extent which demands that Parliament should now come to the protection of people who are to a very great degree unable to help themselves. The hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South has said that this country leads all other countries in the freedom which is granted to people of different colour and different race from the majority of the population. Why should we be so particularly proud of that? Is it not our responsibility and our duty, is it not part of our pride that we lead the world in colonial and racial liberty and freedom? This is a purely negative argument—

    The hon. Member may shake his head in a state of almost juvenile hysteria. All I am saying is that what is happening is that we are now performing the functions which are our functions and which ought to be performed. We ought not to stop there. When we see an injustice being done to people we ought not to say, "This injustice must continue because we are better than other people". Surely our responsibility, because we are better than other people, is to take the necessary steps to see that that injustice ceases, and ceases immediately. The hon. Member is satisfied with the present position and doubtless supports the racialism expressed this afternoon. He does not want to see us progressing in the development of a better and more humane attitude to people who, because of religion or race or colour, which they cannot help, are subject to a great many social and economic disabilities which other people do not suffer.

    The hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South said there was no necessity for this Bill because there was, in fact, no significant evidence that racial discrimination existed in this country. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) quoted the golf club. I want to quote the case of colonial students who could not get into a club in Waterloo Road or in Victoria.

    I am not arguing this from a political attitude. When a trade union says that it does not want a man in the union because of the colour of his skin, I believe that trade union is guilty of as gross a piece of inhumanity, as is the hon. Member who argues that everything in this country today is perfectly all right. Whether it comes from the hon. Member or from a trade union, I object to discrimination being made. I object to it whether it comes from a trade union, from an employer, from a society or from an hotel.

    I have not enough time to give way, for I want to leave a little time for the hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine). I shall be interested to hear a denunciation of racialism by him if he is fortunate enough, Mr. Speaker, to catch your eye.

    Many people in this country who are suffering the disabilities which this Bill is designed to review are victims of the most gross and horrible tyranny which has taken place in the world in the last 2,000 years. They have been driven out of their own land and they have come to this country. They have benefitted this country by their contribution to our economy, our science, our literature and our music. It is intolerable that, because they are refugees and because they happen to be Jews, these people are denied access to hotels and to social gatherings of people in this land.

    In addition, there are coloured people from our Colonies Who are driven here because of the lack of economic development of the countries in which they live and who, because they are coloured, are treated in restaurants and hotels here in a way which this Bill opposes. I had hoped that the conscience of the House would be outraged into supporting the Bill not only by the conditions in this country but also by the speech of the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South.

    3.58 p.m.

    I oppose this Bill but not on the grounds which have been adduced by the hon. Member for Deptford (Sir L. Plummer). I oppose it not because I am in favour of any kind of racial or religious discrimination. I think that I can speak for all my hon. Friends when I say that we hate every form of racial and religious intolerance. I judge a man not by the colour of his skin, not by his race or religion, but by the quality of his manhood. The British Commonwealth would have no meaning unless we accepted that.

    I oppose the Bill because it goes the wrong way about dealing with a situation which I frankly admit exists. The Bill is half-baked. It nibbles at the problem. In some respects it makes provisions for which existing laws already provide.

    This is a Bill to make an offence certain behaviour which is offensive to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway). It is a badly drafted Bill. It is a Bill entitled,
    " To make illegal discrimination to the detriment of any person on the grounds of colour, race and religion in the United Kingdom."
    In fact, it goes much further than that. Clause I gives what purports to be a definition of discrimination. It reads,
    " For the purpose of this Act, a person exercises discrimination where he refuses. withholds from or denies to any other person facilities or advantages on the ground of the colour, race or religion of that other person."
    What is meant by the words "facilities or advantages"? How are these to be defined?

    The next Clause deals with innkeepers and keepers of common lodging houses. As my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell) said in his most interesting speech, "innkeepers," a term which includes hotel keepers, are under a legal obligation to feed and provide accommodation for travellers. That point has been raised in the House before, as hon. Members will see if they turn to HANSARD of 16th May, 1949. They will see from Vol. 465, c. 2, that the Attorney-General of the day said that—

    It being Four o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

    Debate to be resumed upon Friday next.

    Mental Hospital Patients (Visits)

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Mr. Barber.]

    4.1 p.m.

    This debate arises from the many unsatisfactory replies that I have received to the many requests which I have made to be allowed to visit a patient in a mental hospital in accordance with the wishes of that patient and the foster parents of that patient. In this debate I am not dealing with the case of the patient but with the attitude of the Minister and officials to my request to visit the patient, which, I submit, reveals a disturbing state of affairs suggesting a deterioration in the safeguards affecting the liberty of the individual under our mental laws.

    Early in February I wrote to the Minister of Health asking for permission to. visit a patient in a mental hospital, and he replied stating that he had no power to grant me permission and suggesting that I should write to the medical superintendent. I accept that the Minister has no authority to give me permission, but I feel that his attitude could have been more helpful. What I contest, and what surprises me, is the Minister's suggestion in his reply that I should write to the medical superintendent of the hospital and put forward my request to him. In all my experience here this is the first time I have known a Minister of Health, whether in a Labour or a Tory Government, to refer a Member of this House to an official of a hospital and to suggest that the Member should write to an official upon a matter.

    However, I followed the advice, only to get a very curt reply. It was fairly evident from the nature of that reply that I should not make any progress there. Therefore, I had no alternative to taking up the matter by means of Questions in the House. Time after time I was told that the final decision rested with the medical superintendent. That, I submit, is completely wrong under the Regulations laid down by Parliament and quoted by the Minister in his replies to me. I cannot claim the credit for finding this out. It was brought to my notice by several experts in this law. I can assure whoever is to reply for the Government today that this time the official attitude will be on trial. At Question Time it may on occasion be difficult, in answering supplementary questions, to give a correct answer, but on this occasion notice has been given that this matter will be raised.

    I refer now to that Answer which has resulted in this debate. It was in reply to Question No. 42 on 15th April, in which I asked the Minister of Health
    " under which of the Mental Deficiency Regulations, 1943, it is laid down that the decision as to who can visit a patient apart from the special rights of adult relatives or guardians rests with the medical superintendent."
    The Parliamentary Secretary replied:
    " Regulation 47 (1) provides that visits may be paid at such times as the superintendent may direct."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th April, 1957; Vol. 568, c. 1552.]
    That is correct only up to a point.

    One of the Regulations, which was quoted by the Parliamentary Secretary, reads as follows:
    " Subject to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, visits to a patient may be paid at such times as the superintendent may direct, but the interval between any two visits by the nearest adult relative or guardian of a patient shall not be fixed at more than one month, and the special consent of the superintendent shall be obtained before any patient is visited by any person in connection with business transactions."
    That is what the Parliamentary Secretary quoted but there is paragraph (2) which says:
    " If there is reasonable ground for suspecting that any person visiting a patient is exercising a bad influence on him or encouraging him to break the rules or any special directions given by the superintendent he may be removed from the premises.
    The superintendent may report the circumstances of any such removal to the Board, and if the Board on any such report consider that further visits by the person so removed would be contrary to the interests of the patient they may suspend the person's right to visit the patient."
    But I also asked, in Question No. 36, on 15th April, whether the
    " medical superintendent of the St. Margaret's Mental Hospital, Birmingham, has yet approved the application by the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford to visit a patient…"
    I followed that line because of what the Minister had told me, namely, that the final decision was with the medical superintendent. The Parliamentary Secretary replied that he did not know. I suggest that that was a strange Answer to give, because it was up to the Minister at least to find out what was the answer, as has been done so many times by his predecessors. I have paid tribute to the Minister's predecessor for the way in which he dealt with difficult matters of this kind.

    The Parliamentary Secretary then quoted Regulation 48 (1), which is one of the two Regulations dealing with visits by the public. It says:
    "The Board may at any time grant permission in writing for the admission of any person to visit a patient either on a single occasion or for a limited number of times or generally at all reasonable times and with or without restriction as to the presence of an attendant or otherwise."
    That is the Board of Control.

    Then there is the important part of the Regulation which says:
    " (2) If the superintendent refuses,"—
    that is the medical superintendent—
    " prevents, or obstructs the admission of any person duly authorised by the Board to visit a patient he shall for every offence be liable to a fine not exceeding £20."
    I suggest that if there is an authority to whom a Member or a Minister can go, it is the Board of Control. That Board, if it so desires, can give an instruction that a person is allowed to pay a visit and if the superintendent then refuses to agree he can be fined £20.

    To show that for some period I was not getting what I should have expected under the Regulations, I have to say that, having learned that the Board of Control could be brought into the picture, after weeks of asking questions, I put a Question down for Written Answer on 2nd May, in which I asked that the matter be raised with the Board of Control. I received the answer that I expected, which leads me to another facet of these slapdash mental laws about which I have complained on so many occasions.

    The Answer, in part, reads:
    "The Board has informed my right hon. Friend that very careful consideration has been given to the case, but, in view of the opinion of the medical superintendent in charge of the case that a visit at the present time would not be in the patient's interest, the Board feels unable to grant permission… "—(OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd May, 1957; Vol. 569, c. 27.]
    Why was I not informed earlier that the Board of Control had an interest in this matter?

    That leads me to another very important aspect. I said at the beginning of my speech that all this indicates that there has been a deterioration in the safeguards for the liberty of the individual. I wonder why I have had not hitherto been informed that in the last few years, for reasons that need to be explained, the Board of Control has ceased to be the instrument, which it was intended to be when it was set up, for safeguarding the liberty of the individual.

    I am greatly indebted, in this matter, to evidence put before the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, and I want to quote from the evidence of the Ministry of Health and the Board of Control, given in page 9:
    "The Chairman of the Board is appointed by the Minister of Health. At present the members of the Board also hold appointments on the staff of the Ministry of Health."
    The hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlisle (Dr. D. Johnson) and I have complained previously that the Board of Control has ceased to be the instrument which it was set up to be, namely, to safeguard the liberty of the individual. We have complained that the Board of Control has not only moved into the Ministry of Health building but, as the report states, its members hold appointments on the staff of the Ministry of Health. It also stated:
    " The National Health Service Act, 1946, rearranged the functions of the Minister and the Board so as to provide that broadly speaking the administration of hospitals, responsibility for the care and treatment given therein, and supervision of the work of the local health authorities should rest with the Ministry of Health, and the functions of the Board of Control should fee broadly concerned with matters relating to the liberty of the subject, i.e. safeguards against ill-treatment or wrongful detention; "
    Those are thrown overboard according to the evidence given by the Institute of Hospital Administrators:
    " We regret the tendency in recent years for the Board of Control to become much more closely identified with the Ministry of Health so that the mental health division of the Ministry and the Board of Control are virtually indistinguishable. We consider the Board should be independent of the Ministry and that the Commissioners, Inspectors and secretariat should be exclusively concerned with the work of the Board. Because of the Board's proper concern that the liberty of the subject
    and the confidence its oversight of the conduct of mental hospitals and mental deficiency institutions affords, we should be very sorry if any suggestion to cease the appointment of Legal Commissioners were adopted. Finally, as regards the work of the Board. we think that the old system of visits to hospitals and institutions without prior notice is preferable and should be restored."
    If I had the time, I could give other evidence, but I want to sit down at a quarter-past four so that on this occasion the Minister will not think that I have taken more than my fair share of time for the Adjournment debate. However, there is the evidence of Dr. Walk, of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association, which in part states:
    "… from the patients' point of view certain of them feel now that they have no appeal to anybody other than the person running the hospital."
    That leads me to the question, should there be an independent body? I submit that there should be. I wish I had time to quote more from the evidence given before the Royal Commission because it includes evidence, which if challenged I will give, to show that there are many people retained in mental institutions for no other reason than that their labour is vital to the running of the institutions. As regards any payment to these people, the top rate is about 6s. a week or 2 oz. of tobacco.

    I should have liked to quote from the evidence given by the municipal corporations and by the Magistrates' Association, but I will read only the last few words:
    " There is evidence to support that. The patients are really there for keeps, and the better their behaviour, the harder they work, the quieter they are and the less trouble they give, then the more likelihood there is that they stay put."
    Finally, I say how much most of us are looking forward to the Report of the Royal Commission, which we hope will be out soon. I believe that that Report will justify some of the things which have been said. I forecast that the Commission will make it crystal clear that thousands—not hundreds, but thousands—of people now in mental institutions should not be there at all.

    4.15 p.m.

    The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Dodds) has been very courteous in giving me notice of the points that he would raise. The subject of the Adjournment debate is really, I understand, the legal rights of the authorities concerned with regard to an individual visiting a patient in a mental hospital.

    I do not propose to follow the hon. Member or to argue or discuss with him whether or not in its years of existence the Board of Control has done its job rightly and well. As the hon. Gentleman said, we have not very long to wait for the Report of the Royal Commission, and I think that at this late stage it would be better to reserve further comments of the nature of those of the hon. Member until we see what the Report has to say.

    What I want to do is to set out the legal position as it exists today. As the hon. Member was, or should have been, aware, I am not in a position, because of the nature of the debate, to hint at any change that might be possible. The hon. Member is not a lawyer and neither am I. I will not say that it is quite a case of the blind leading the blind, but he will have to excuse occasionally a rather amateurish way of interpreting the law.

    The position, very simply, is that the Board of Control still retains the duties that were originally held by the Board of Control and by the Commissioners in Lunacy in respect of the liberty of the subject. The Board is an independent body constituted by the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913. It was reorganised in 1930, and in 1948 certain functions were taken from it, but it retained the residual duties that it previously had.

    Apart from the power to make statutory regulations under Section 25 (1) of the 1913 Act, which is the administrative part, and the power to direct the Chairman of the Board as to the arrangements for the administrative business of the Board, there is no statutory provision whatever which gives the Minister power in any way to control the Board in the performance of its statutory duties. Therefore, let me make clear at once that, even if the Board is in the same office, my right hon. Friend has no right to direct it in any way to do anything that he may think fit.

    With regard to the relationship between my right hon. Friend and the medical superintendent, the position is that the medical superintendent is employed by the regional hospital board. I suppose that under the terms of the National Health Service Act my right hon. Friend could indirectly via the Board issue a direction to him on any subject, but— I must be quite frank about this point —I really do not think that, whatever the legal position may be, any Minister would for a moment consider directing a medical superintendent on any matter such as this when that medical superintendent was primarily responsible for the health and welfare of a patient. I believe that such a precedent would, very rightly, meet wide objection.

    With regard to visits to patients detained in mental deficiency hospitals, these are dealt with in the rather complicated provisions of the Regulations of 1948. The point there is that, subject to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, a visit to a patient may be paid at such times as the superintendent may direct. The point where the hon. Member has not interpreted the rules quite correctly is that if the superintendent does not direct, no visit can be paid. In other words, it is entirely his responsibility, but there are separate powers as regards visits by the parents and the nearest adult relation.

    Then there are the further powers, to which the hon. Member has referred, by which the Board of Control can overrule the superintendent.

    Many people are interested in this subject. The Board may at any time grant permission in writing for the admission of any person to visit a patient.

    The Board of Control may. The Board of Control can over-ride the medical superintendent about visits to a patient, but my right hon. Friend cannot direct or over-rule the Board of Control. I do not see what the difference between us is.

    I wrote as a Member of Parliament to the Minister as political head of a Department. If he cannot direct somebody, he can get in touch with the person accorded the powers by Act of Parliament. The Board of Control was not brought in until later, as 1 discovered. That is my complaint.

    If the hon. Member is complaining only of that, he is being a little unreasonable. To put it courteously to the hon. Member, it is not my right hon. Friend's function to act as a post office. The hon. Member is very well acquainted with these rules and regulations and has made himself very learned in them. If he did not discover that he has a right, as has any citizen, to write to the Board of Control—

    —then my right hon. Friend has nothing to answer. There may be a little confusion in the hon. Member's mind, but I do not consider it part of my right hon. Friend's duty to do what the hon. Member has suggested.

    I thought that the hon. Member was under the impression that there was a conflict between the original Act and the Regulations. At one time I thought so myself, but there is no conflict. The hon. Member said that no Government would be "barmy" enough—not a very elegant word—to leave this matter entirely to the medical superintendent. In fact, it is very carefully laid down in the 1948 Regulations. I was not a Member of Parliament at the time, but the hon. Member was. I do not necessarily accept his standard of what is in the Regulations.

    If the hon. Member feels that he has been hardly done by in this matter and that he has other questions to raise, I shall be only too willing to discuss them with him to see if I can help him in any way. I do not think that he has raised any important administrative point. In the long run, it is a question of legal interpretation, and that must be a matter for the courts. I am always willing to discuss that with the hon. Member and to help him with his questions. I do not necessarily say that he will like the answers, that is not for me to say. However, I do not think that he has today put forward a case which we must seriously answer.

    It would help hon. Members in dealing with these cases if the Parliamentary Secretary would answer one or two questions. The Board has the power to permit visit whether the medical superintendent is favour of those visits or not. To extent is that power exercised by the Board, and in how many cases has the Board granted permission in writing irrespective of the wishes, instructions or advice of the medical superintendent?

    I am afraid that I really could not answer that question without notice. That is obviously one of the functions of the Board. I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that it is only reasonable that I should have notice of the question. If he tables it, no doubt the answer will be forthcoming.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Adjourned accordingly at twenty-five minutes past Four o'clock.