We are now at the beginning of a two day debate on foreign affairs. This covers, of course, a very wide range of problems—most of them, alas, not resolved—in Germany, in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East, in North Africa, in Indonesia, and elsewhere. All those separate issues will, no doubt, be discussed, yet they are all dominatd by the main question which preoccupies us all and overshadows them all. That is the main question in all our minds, the relations between the Communist countries and the West.

I do not want to go into the way in which the present position has come about. The conflict of ideas was, of course, caused when the Communist ideology was born, but it has only come to dominate our lives since the last world war and now, varying from time to time in intensity, it has lasted for twelve years. I do not think that with all our characteristic of self-depreciation we can blame ourselves for the sharpening of this position. Indeed, after the war, the British people, of all parties and all sections, had the warmest feelings of affection and admiration for the Russian people, who had resisted so bravely and fought so loyally against Hitlerism. In fact, we did our best, I think, to overlook and explain away some of the earlier incidents which caused anxiety and alarm to many. However, we must look at the position as it is today, and so far as possible, objectively.

On both sides groupings and alliances of nations have taken place with the result that the two sides face each other with daily increasing power and continual reinforcement of their arms by novel and terrible weapons. I hope that the House will not expect me today to discuss the character and location of these armaments. That would be more suitable to our debates on defence. What I am now pointing out is something with which I think everyone will agree, that there is a continual growth of these great forces, more and more strongly armed, using more and more skill and technique and productive resources in the construction of the instruments of destruction.

So, at the very time when man's control over matter has reached the highest point in the history of civilisation, the world is confronted with the uncontrolled accumulation of more and more powerful armaments. What could be the greatest era of progress seems to many to be perpetually threatened with something like self-destruction. All this has, very naturally, created a sort of disillusion and a sense, even, of despair among many. I have felt, on my return to England and on my journeys during the last few weeks. a growing anxiety and a readiness to grasp at almost any plan that may seem to offer a way out.

I am also conscious of another feature at home. The older ones among us who remember the period before the last war may be, perhaps, too much obsessed by the danger of falling into the same errors which misled us in the 'thirties, when we preferred to avert our eyes from the threat rather than to face it boldly. But a long time has passed since then and it is understandable that a younger generation are worried by the dreary prospect which seems to lie ahead if this state of tension continues unabated and the conflicting pressures grow year by year.

Somehow, we must strike a balance between these two moods. We shall certainly need, during the years that lie ahead, courage and faith, but it is right that we should try to fortify these with hope. Alongside the great division between the Communist countries and the West there has also been all the turmoil and confusion caused throughout the world, in many parts of the world, especially Asia and Africa, as a result of the last war. Out of this has emerged the tremendous acceleration of nationalist aspirations.

All this has its dangers; nevertheless, it is welcome for it has, indeed, been the deliberate British policy for over a century to encourage these movements. The rise of national consciousness in Asia and Africa is in itself a good thing, although it may very easily be exploited for evil purposes. There are many difficulties and dangers, but, taken as a whole, I am sure that the balance is on the right side. These pains are growing pains, signs not of decay, but of progress.

There is one feature of this development which I felt particularly during my Commonwealth tour. Some of those countries in the East and the Far East, long asleep, in their new awakening have been captured by Communism. Thus, China has fallen to Communism, both in theory and in practice. In other cases, totalitarianism has come about in one form or another whether through personal dictatorship or Communist theory, but this has happened only, or at least mainly, in the countries where there was no development of sound constitutional progress before. These were the countries where in all the post-war confusion there was nothing solid to build on. There is, however, stretching right round the world, one institution which stands as something sound, solid and unique. I mean, of course, the Commonwealth.

I do not intend to detain the House today with an account of the journey from which I have recently returned, but, at the same time, I find it impossible to exaggerate the impression that has been made upon me by the experience of visiting five countries in as many weeks. Of course, in the old Commonwealth countries—Australia and New Zealand—one knew of the strength of their loyalty to the Crown and of their friendship for the old country and their devotion to our constitutional tradition. Even so, I am bound to confess that I did not fully realise the fervour of these feelings. These do not detract from but rather enhance the pride of these countries in their own achievements, especially in their agricultural development and, more recently, in their great industrial development which, in the last few years has been on a scale which is hardly understood here.

There is something else, too. I have been deeply impressed by their earnest hope that it will be from British sources that their populations will be increased and by British capital that their industries will grow. Perhaps in our day-to-day life we are not sufficiently conscious of what the old Commonwealth countries mean and feel about us. At all events, I felt a sense of exhilaration, so great was the demonstration of fervent devotion to the causes which Britain and the British people have served and will continue to serve throughout the world. And, of course, what I saw in Australia and New Zealand is equally true of Canada.

But what was perhaps even more remarkable—and I wish specially to bring it to the attention of the House—were the feelings which I found in the new Commonwealth countries, if I may call them that—those who have only recently joined the ranks of that free partnership. I wish I could paint to the House a picture of the thousands of people gathered in Shah Jehan's great courtyard in the Red Fort. Here, there was something more than the traditional courtesy of the Indian people. I felt both then and in the meetings which I had with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, and his colleagues, a real sense of partnership in the truest sense of the word.

Mr. Nehru used a phrase, in receiving me, about the unique relations between Britain and India, and, indeed, this is true. We can leave to the judgment of history the precise evaluation of every incident in the long story or the praise or blame for this or that action of British Governments in India, but I am quite certain of this: that it is no way to win the sympathy of Indians today to denigrate the achievements of individual men and women of British blood in India.

They know, as we know, how much they owe to these men who for many generations have gone out from many modest homes, often from the rectory or the manse and have given their lives to India. They know and they take pride in the creation of the Indian Civil Service, which, before the transfer of power, was largely Indianised and by which alone the orderly transference of power became possible. They cherish the principle of municipal and parliamentary government. They believe in individual freedom, the right of every man to think what he likes and to say what he likes, and within the law to do what he likes.

In this great world issue, therefore, India—and the same is true of Pakistan and Ceylon—stands with us against the Communist philosophy, for this is based upon a material view of life which is totally abhorrent to these people who, above all, cling to the spiritual foundation of their lives.

There are, of course, differences, even big differences, of emphasis and approach. The Indian Government and the Ceylonese, for instance, are against the various military groupings. Pakistan is not. After all, there are some differences of approach even in our own country to these questions. These are what I would call tactical differences. The strategic objective of all the Commonwealth countries is the same—to maintain peace and to build up the prosperity of the whole upon a basis of individual freedom and parliamentary government and not upon a basis of totalitarian control.

I must say that I found it profoundly moving to feel that these great countries, with their immense populations, so different in creed, colour, tradition and history, should now be free and willing partners with the old Commonwealth countries, anxious to work with them for the mutual benefit of themselves and of the world as a whole.

Here, therefore, extending right across the globe, we have a powerful instrument for strengthening the principles of the free world. There are some who may have thought that the passing of the old British Empire marked a decline similar to that which has been the fate of other great empires in the past. Here, however, I am sure that something unique in history has taken place, and that the best of the old empire is continuing into the new Commonwealth.

I have allowed myself this digression because I wish to examine the forces acting for good or ill on both sides, and it may be that the influence of the Commonwealth which I have just described will be of the greatest value in the ultimate resolution of what seem now to be almost hopelessly divergent concepts.

I must turn from this, however, to the harsh realities of the moment. As I see it, there are certain clear alternatives before us as a people and as a Government. We could, of course, throw in our hand altogether. In other words, we could accept, either from high principle or from less respectable motives, the pacifist solution. We could disarm unilaterally. There have always been some people in this country, by tradition, who support the pacifist view, but I do not think that it would commend itself as a policy to any Government likely to be formed in Britain.

There is a variation of this which is equally dangerous. It is that we could unilaterally abandon nuclear weapons. I think that there are hon. Members who favour this view, and I have certainly drawn this conclusion from the number of letters and resolutions which are sent to me from time to time. But this unilateral nuclear disarmament is not a tenable position, either. For if the British were to abandon this weapon only to shelter under the American nuclear power, this seems to me to have little moral value and it is, indeed, somewhat disingenuous. If, on the other hand, it means that the whole of the West is unilaterally to abandon nuclear defence, then I think we must see that this would put us completely at the mercy of the Soviet.

It has been argued that both sides should abandon nuclear weapons; if the Soviet get rid of theirs, we should get rid of ours. Even here we must be careful, for if this were not accompanied by corresponding reductions in what are called conventional weapons—terrible weapons, as many of us know—it might again put the West at a fatal disadvantage. The reason is simple. There are over 200 Russian and satellite divisions in Europe, facing the West. N.A.T.O. would find it difficult to collect even a quarter of this number over the whole front.

There are vast numbers of conventional Russian bombers that could use very high explosive bombs—still conventional weapons. There are flotillas of surface ships, there are great quantities of submarines, and the military value of these, following the abolition of the nuclear weapons, would immediately double, treble, even quadruple, in a single day, and the position in which Europe and the West would be left would be one of hopeless inferiority.

What, then, can we do? Is there no hope? Are we to live for ever in this sort of twilight between peace and war—a twilight that, in some ways, is more like a nightmare? I am sure that we must try, and I am not without hope that we may succeed, in making at least some progress towards relieving the pressures and tensions upon the world. But we must approach the question practically. At any rate, apart from all the bad, one good thing has developed, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) put it very well, I thought, in the debate that we had before Christmas. He said, in effect. "Both sides have a joint interest in peace."

This is because the balance of power is such that neither side dare attack the other without self-destruction. It is for that reason that I am so anxious that, while the threat of armaments and, indeed, of ever-increasing armaments should be reduced, and the burden lessened, this balance should be preserved.

At present, we are faced, as we were faced last year, with a deadlock in the disarmament discussions. But the Paris Conference made the sugggestion that there should be a meeting of Foreign Secretaries to try to break the deadlock, and this was a proposal in which the British Government took their full share. At that time, and since, there has been quite a lot of correspondence of different kinds between the heads of Government.

I know that there is a feeling that we have been rather slow in answering our letters, but, of course, it is right that we, in the United Kingdom, should not only consult our N.A.T.O. allies, but should also keep the Commonwealth in the picture. This makes letter-writing rather a lengthier process than if one is responsible only to oneself. Nevertheless, I feel that we have made considerable progress in the last exchanges, including the last letters that President Eisenhower and I have written to Mr. Bulganin.

It is very easy to accuse me of dragging my feet on the path to the summit, but I can assure the House that if one is a member of a caravan, it is best to try to keep the whole company moving together. At any rate, I am not ashamed of our share in these recent developments, or of what we have done, at the Paris Conference and since, to bring ourselves and our allies to the present position, and I would like to tell the House just where Ave stand today.

I want a Summit Conference—but I do want it to be successful. Now, of course, there can be conferences of different kinds. It has been suggested that if we cannot agree upon an agenda or a procedure, we should just have a meeting, the purpose of which, I think, is described as trying to break the ice. For those who advocate this, I should like to give the House a picture of what happened at the first Geneva Conference, at which I was present.

What actually happened was this. Each of the four Powers was represented by four or five leading figures in the front row, and supported by 20 or 30—or sometimes more—experts in the rows behind them. We met in an immense room in the old League of Nations building, at a table which, I would guess was roughly the size of about three or four billiard tables put side by side, all equipped with the familiar mechanism of microphones, speakers and translating equipment. There were, in addition, a considerable number of spectators of various kinds, who seemed to be around in the back benches of the hall.

In effect, the members of the conference did not confer. They made a series of speeches to each other, in a strict rotation, each taking the chair for one meeting. These speeches were nominally secret, but immediately at the end of each session, by some mysterious means, the full text of the speeches made by each delegate reached the three or four thousand journalists assembled in Geneva. There were, of course, a good many very pleasant photographs taken, and some agreeable dinners organised. Indeed, it was only at the dinner parties that anything like discussions began to take place, but as they were usually bilateral that also had its limitations on the idea of a conference. There was only one occasion when we did—and I remember it yet—move into a smaller room and something like the kind of conference I would like took place; and this—if I remember aright—was an attempt to break a particular deadlock on procedure that had arisen.

Perhaps this 1955 meeting was not entirely useless. It certainly did not seem so at the time. At least, it produced what we then called the Geneva spirit. I think that there was something genuine there, but there was no concrete result, and a good atmosphere or spirit very soon disappears unless it is accompanied by some result, however small; and what it leaves behind may well be a situation worse than before, because positive disillusionment is more dangerous than the preservation of even the most tenuous expectations. I really do not want to have that again.

Then there is another suggestion—that we should have a conference with an immense agenda of, perhaps, 18 or 20 topics—although we know quite well that the positions of each side are absolutely rigid upon a large number of them, and that there is very little possibility of agreement developing in the course of argument. If we had that, we should have, of course, a very long meeting, but it would not, I think, be a meeting, of real negotiation leading to an improvement.

Then there is the view which, I am sorry to see from his recent speeches, Mr. Khrushchev seems to take: that the agenda should be whatever the Russians want, and that they should have a veto on anyone else's suggestions. I am sure that the House will agree that this is not a reasonable view.

We believe that our best hope lies in some serious preparatory work, for this would have two purposes: first, to lay down a procedure, and to choose an agenda calculated to achieve concrete results on specific issues; and, secondly, to do some preliminary work in disentangling the points of disagreement, and revealing, perhaps, the most promising areas of a possible agreement—and to do this before the heads of Government actually met. I earnestly hope that, on consideration, the Russian leaders will feel that this is the right course.

There has been, in addition, a good deal said about the machinery for this preparation. We originally proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Government appeared to dislike this. I therefore said—for I am sincere in wanting this meeting—that if they did not wish this method I, personally, would be prepared to use ordinary diplomatic channels. This certainly has the advantage that the meetings can go on from day to day without spectacular failure or success on any particular day, which is not true of meetings of heads of Government for four or five days, after which they have to leave. The last letter from the President of the United States has shown that he, also, would accept this method. Of course, the ambassadors would have to refer to their Foreign Secretaries for guidance as the preparatory work proceeded. It is clear, therefore, that we are not making conditions of a purely polemical kind.

I am bound to say that if, in all this correspondence, people attack you there is rather a temptation to answer back occasionally, but we are not anxious to do that. We are not wedded to any one particular procedure. We are wedded only to one simple thought—that we must have a proper preparation if the summit meeting is to have a fair chance of success.

Then it will be asked: what are the subjects which are most likely to offer a chance of success? This, of course, is just what the diplomatic or any other preparatory method would have to decide. I would rule out nothing in principle; but, in practice, we may find it necessary to concentrate on subjects which seem likely to have a good chance of leading to some success. I must say that the general subject which seems to me to offer this chance of progress is that of disarmament in its widest sense.

Last summer, at the meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, it did look at one time as if some sort of agreement, even a limited one, was not far off. It failed, for reasons which, I think, were not internal to the Committee, but probably developments outside.

At any rate, this is a field in which business may perhaps be done, because it is one of practical arrangements and not theoretical or ideological disputes. It is also one where, if any progress could be made, it would make by far the greatest contribution to the restoration of hope to the peoples of the world. If we could achieve even a modest advance here, an agreement even on quite a small scale, it would open up further possibilities.

Before leaving England, I made a reference in a broadcast speech to one method of trying to relieve tension between the two sides, and that was a solemn pact of non-aggression. I noticed in my travels that this was well received by Commonwealth countries both old and new. At the same time, I must repeat the warning I gave in that same broadcast. The words I used were:

"Peace can't be secured just by words; we need deeds as well."

And this is still true.

We might, in addition, deal with some subjects less polemical in character—trade, individual contacts, interchange of information, and so forth; all of which are of great importance if there is to be some ultimate power of living together between the two sides. Then, perhaps, if we had any success, even a modest success, at the first meeting, further meetings might follow with similar preparation.

I put forward these thoughts in a rather more sanguine tone than perhaps a sceptical or even purely realistic appraisal might justify. I want to make it clear that I do not think that we would gain the slightest degree of relief if we were to return to what used to be called a policy of appeasement. I do not think that we would gain at all by just throwing in our hand or abandoning our duty out of weariness or selfishness. It is because I feel so sure that we should continue with our job that I want to leave nothing undone which would make us all feel in our hearts and minds that we have not taken every chance, or that we have neglected anything; and so that there may be some hope ahead to reward our fortitude and our patience.

The older ones among us who have seen so many sorrows, and lived through them, as well as many triumphs, must have the imagination to realise how heavily all this weighs upon the younger men and women in our country, and all the more, as I have said, because of this fantastic paradox, that men have been forced to make their lives so threatened and precarious when they might make them so secure and happy and full of promise.

Nevertheless, I feel that we must not allow ourselves to be discouraged. If we hold on to our duty, if we can keep a balance of power between rival forces—although, I hope, at an ever descending level, but still a balance—if we maintain the strength and solidity of our alliances, if we continue in our work with the neutral and uncommitted countries, to win them over because of the greater attractiveness of our way of life, then I do not think that we need take too gloomy a view of the future.

We have been fortunate to inherit from our ancesters, from those who went before, the foundations of a new and incomparable instrument for good. That is the Commonwealth as it has now developed. Let us cherish this. We have, I believe, confidence—or we ought to have—in the superior and higher moral basis of our principles. We have, I hope, trust in the spiritual values of our civilisation. And if we have all these things, and believe in them, then we must have confidence that, under Providence, if war is avoided, the principles of Communism, which offend us so, will eventually become blurred, blunted, and, perhaps, softened. In the long run the revolutionary fervour will cool and men and women, reaching an ever-increasing intellectual standard, cease to be content with the crudities of a purely material philosophy.

If we do not believe this, then I am bound to say that neither by force nor by negotiation can we secure the triumph of our own principles. But if we do, if we have faith and courage, I believe, as I have said, that we have a right to add to these—hope.

In welcoming the Prime Minister back from his Commonwealth tour, I should like to say that we are glad that despite the "local difficulties" he went ahead with it. It is quite clear that what he saw and did in the course of these few weeks made a deep impression upon him. He came back with renewed enthusiasm for the Commonwealth, and he came back, certainly so far as international affairs generally are concerned, in a more hopeful and constructive frame of mind. We, for our part, welcome the change.

I think it was particularly valuable that the right hon. Gentleman visited and spent a week or so in India, for there is no doubt that before his visit relations between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India were by no means all that they should have been. I hope that what the Prime Minister has said today about the significance of India in the Commonwealth will not be lost on hon. Members opposite. I have no desire to dwell on the past, but there were occasions when observations from the benches opposite certainly did harm to our relations with India.

We on this side of the House warmly welcome the Prime Minister's affirmation about the significance of the Commonwealth in world affairs. I would certainly agree with what he said. The Commonwealth is not an alliance, nor is it a bloc. It is a group of nations with remarkable diversity who have, all of them, evolved peacefully from colonial status to freedom and independence.

I believe that the very diversity, the very looseness of the association of the Commonwealth, is, in the framework of world affairs, an advantage, because no other country or group of countries can possibly feel threatened by the Commonwealth or desire to form, as it were, a counter bloc.

I would add, however, to what the Prime Minister has said on this subject, that the unity of the Commonwealth, indeed the possibility of its playing a really significant part in the world, depends on the acceptance by all the Governments of the Commonwealth of certain principles or ideals. Some of these have been mentioned by the Prime Minister, and, of course, one would agree wholly with what he said about the belief in freedom, in democracy, in self-government. But that carries with it at least one corollary. We must see to it that the remaining Colonial Territories proceed as fast as practicable to the same freedom, self-government and independence. Any hesitation on our part along that path cannot but do damage to the unity of the Commonwealth.

The second principle which I think we must accept and apply in all our policies within the Commonwealth and outside is that of racial equality, for ours is a multiracial Commonwealth and no other policy in this vital matter can possibly make sense or command assent.

The third principle I put to the Prime Minister is the principle of non-aggression and adherence to the ideals of the United Nations Charter. The fourth principle is that of economic co-operation, including economic aid from richer to poorer countries.

I say these things, having been privileged to take part in the recent Commonwealth Parliamentary Con- ference, in Delhi, and I draw those conclusions from the debates which took place on that occasion. It is essential that our policy here at home should continually be based upon these principles. It is easy to point to exceptions here and there, but the fact remains that the more these exceptions arise the greater the strain upon the Commonwealth, and the more we can adhere to these principles the greater its significance and its power for good in the world.

The existence of these principles is in no way inconsistent with the fact that there are, of course, differences in foreign policy within the Commonwealth. They are well known. There is, for example, the non-alignment policy of India as contrasted with the adherence to N.A.T.O. of the United Kingdom and Canada.

While I was in India I tried to explain to a predominantly Indian audience, or, at any rate, to a largely Indian audience and to other Commonwealth delegates, the reasons why we in this country felt it necessary to support and accept N.A.T.O. Sometimes one is criticised for saying in another country what is not always acceptable to that country, but I think it is right that misunderstandings in India and in other parts of the Commonwealth about the nature of N.A.T.O. countries should, as far as possible, be cleared up. But I also endeavoured to make it plain that while we felt it necessary to belong to N.A.T.O., nevertheless we not only accepted but positively encouraged the non-alignment policy of India.

There is, in my view, no inconsistency here at all. N.A.T.O. is necessary in Europe, but it is the most natural thing in the world that India should wish, in view of her history and position, to pursue a non-alignment policy. It may be, and, indeed, it has been, very helpful on occasion that a great country which is also a member of the Commonwealth is able as a result of this policy to act as a bridge between East and West, between the Communist bloc and the free countries.

The reasons why we support N.A.T.O. are so well known in this country that there is really no need for me to repeat them in any detail whatever, but since most of my speech will be devoted to the need for trying to reduce tension, to settle disputes and to achieve genuine co-existence, and since bitter experience has led me to realise that when one talks of such things one is so frequently described as an appeaser, or as soft, or as unrealistic, or as opposed to defence, I wish very briefly to emphasise certain facts at the start.

They are these. We support N.A.T.O. and the Atlantic Alliance. We believe it is necessary that the democracies of Western Europe and the United States should act together, should join together to form a regional collective defence pact. There is nothing inconsistent between this and the United Nations Charter—on the contrary. In a sense the Charter itself, because of the veto, because of the difficulty of being sure that one will be defended by United Nations action, makes it inevitable that smaller countries faced with the danger or the threat from outside should join together in this way.

Nor do we believe in neutralism. This must mean, as, indeed, the Prime Minister said, either sheltering behind the United States, or the destruction of N.A.T.O., and neither of these things commends itself to us. However tempting it may be occasionally to think how nice it would be if we could be in the position of Switzerland or Sweden, contracting out of any danger, contracting out, as we would hope, of future wars, and thereby no doubt improving our standard of living, I do not believe that is a possible path for this country.

Nor do I believe in the possibility of a so-called third force or new power bloc. The fact is that very few other countries would be interested in making such a bloc with us, and, quite candidly, I think that it is far more important to build bridges between existing blocs than it is to form new ones.

Nor do we favour unilateral disarmament. At our conference in Brighton last year a resolution asking us to pledge ourselves, the future Labour Government, neither to test, use or make nuclear weapons was defeated overwhelmingly by a vote of eight to one. I say all that simply to get out of the way what is irrelevant, in my opinion, in this debate.

Having said that, however, I want to emphasise with all the strength I can command that, in our opinion, a defen- sive alliance on it own is not enough today. What I described some months ago as the Maginot Line mentality in international politics is wrong and dangerous. Why do I say that? It is necessary. I think, to explain, because there are those, certainly if not here in other countries, who genuinely believe that any move from the present position is dangerous.

To them my answer is, first, that as things are today, despite N.A.T.O. and despite Western defence, there is a very real danger of conflict breaking out. There are still too many unsettled problems and unsettled areas where conflict may arise almost at any moment. The two most obvious are, of course, in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Middle East.

The second reason is this. When one contemplates the possibility of conflict arising, say, in Eastern and Central Europe, it is not enough to reply, "Well, we can rely on the deterrent." It is not enough to say, "Well, we have something which can answer anything the Russians use. If they act we can retaliate." That is not the kind of situation which is likely to arise. The problem is far less an all-out attack from Russia than an outbreak of fighting in a part of the world—may be in Europe or the Middle East—where the very use of the deterrent, the massive retaliation policy, must be called in question. It follows, however, that any conflict of this kind, so long particularly as our policy is principally dependent upon the doctrine of massive retaliation, can lead very easily to a third world war and the destruction of humanity. That is the second reason.

The third is that with every year that passes the danger increases that nuclear weapons may come into the hands of more and more countries and less and less responsible Governments. Next, I would say, even apart from these very grave considerations, if we do nothing, if we simply rest behind our N.A.T.O. Alliance, then we can be sure of one thing: we shall be losing the propaganda battle in the cold war. That kind of attitude will not make any impression on the uncommitted areas of the world.

Finally, we cannot rest as we are, because, if we do, the faith of the Western world in N.A.T.O. will continually be undermined. There is no denying that in the N.A.T.O. countries today widespread dissatisfaction exists and there is a general feeling, not only here, but in Western Europe, that the alliance has failed to achieve either a foreign policy or a defence policy which is clear, sensible, and appropriate to the present state of international relations.

This is well illustrated by the exchange of letters on the Summit Conference in recent weeks. There have been no less than ten such exchanges since the middle of December. Marshal Bulganin has sent three letters, and, I think, we must credit him also with the peace resolution of the Supreme Soviet on the same subject. The Prime Minister has sent two letters, and we can add as a third contribution his broadcast. President Eisenhower has sent two letters and M. Pineau has sent one letter.

We on this side of the House ask the question: why should we not have agreed to summit talks straight away? After all, either the purpose of the Russians was genuine and they really wished to have some kind of alleviation of tension, to reach some kind of agreement, in which case everybody would agree that we should lose no opportunity of discussing the matter with them; or let us assume the worst and that they were purely concerned with propaganda. Do we win the propaganda battle by refusing to go to a Summit Conference? Of course not. We must, I would agree, recognise that there are unquestionably propaganda aspects to what the Russians say. But the method of dealing with them is not to refuse to answer, not to refuse to go, but to recognise them and expose them for what they are, if, indeed, that is the case.

There has also been during these weeks a very regrettable confusion over the purpose of this conference. I ventured to say some weeks ago that there were two possible kinds of Summit Conference. First, there was the conference which was supposed to put the final seal on everything that had been discussed before—the apex type of conference. Of course, if we had that in mind, then there was a strong case for preliminary meetings at official level to start with and then at Foreign Ministers' level before the heads of Government meeting itself.

But it seemed to me fairly clear that the Russians had not that sort of Summit Conference in mind. They had the other kind of conference in mind, which I call—and the Prime Minister referred to it—the ice-breaking type of conference. I do not agree with him that an ice-breaking conference necessarily means something that gets nowhere, but it is a conference which begins rather than ends the process of negotiation.

I was glad to notice from the Prime Minister's speech that he now seems to have accepted in large measure that idea for the conference. He spoke of the need for serious preparatory work. If this means settling where the conference is to be, when it is to be, and who is to be there and what is to be discussed, I would agree. That, of course, must be done. But I do not quite agree with him that we should expect to get far with the discussion of the actual proposals themselves, simply because I do not think that that is the Russian approach to this problem. Nor is it, I believe, necessary, if we take the view that the Summit Conference is an ice-breaking conference and that, as the Prime Minister suggested this afternoon, we have made the same suggestion before. It should be followed, after negotiation at, so to speak, low level, by further Summit Conferences.

Where are we now? We are certainly very much nearer the summit than we were. I hope that we could speedily settle the date. It is important to do this, otherwise there might be almost indefinite delay. We on this side feel that there should certainly be a conference in May or, at the latest, in June. I do not propose to bother to discuss where it should be. That is not really of great importance. The Soviet have suggested Geneva, and probably that is the best place. As to the question of who should be there, I personally feel that it would be a great mistake to have too many countries represented.

I think that there is much in what the Prime Minister said about an almost interminable round of formal speeches. If the Russians desire, as they well may, to have equal numbers on their side so that if Britain, America and France are on one side, then they wish to have, say, Poland and Czechoslovakia, I hope very much that no opposition whatever will be raised to this proposal. There is much to be said for it. It would make it necessary for even the Soviet Union to do a little consultation. We are sometimes handicapped by the amount of consultation that we have to do.

I would also not object, if this is put forward, to the idea of having, say, one uncommitted State present. If that is felt to be desirable, the country that I would like to see present would be India. I think that India's presence in the conference on Indo-China, for instance, at Geneva in 1954, was extremely valuable.

I now turn to the question of the agenda. The Prime Minister said that what Mr. Khrushchev had been saying recently implied that the Russians insisted that they alone should determine the agenda. Frankly, if that were the case, we agree that it would create an almost impossible position. But I cannot see in anything published on this subject any reason why we should draw that conclusion.

President Eisenhower, in his recent letter, said:

"… if there were to be a top-level meeting, I would be willing to discuss your proposals in good faith if you would so discuss mine. Your answer is that I must be prepared to discuss your proposals, but that as regards mine there must, you said, 'be unanimous agreement of all participants as to the necessity for considering such proposals.' In other words, you demand the right to veto discussion of the matters I believe to be vital to peace".

I have looked up the relevant letter from Marshal Bulganin. It might perhaps be interpreted in that way, but, candidly, I do not think that it is the correct interpretation. This is what Marshal Bulganin said after describing the possible subjects from their side for the agenda:

"Moreover, the meeting could discuss—as noted in the proposals of the Soviet Government of January 8th—the other constructive proposals designed to halt the 'cold war' that might be tabled by other parties to the talks. It goes without saying that all participants should be in full accord as to the necessity of considering such proposals".

It is a matter of opinion as to whether the word "such" refers only to proposals by other countries or includes the Soviet proposals. I think we should assume that the latter is much more likely than the former.

May I say something specifically about the agenda? It seems to me that Marshal Bulganin's original proposals, which were put to the United Nations and subse- quently to the countries concerned, are really not a bad list. He proposed discussing the suspension of nuclear tests, a nuclear free zone in Europe, a non-aggression pact, the renunciation of the use of force in the Middle East, and what he called cultural collaboration.

I would venture to say that we could easily re-word these proposals and pick out four subjects which seem to me to dominate the international situation today. For the first, I would say not just the suspension of hydrogen bomb tests, but breaking the disarmament deadlock. I do not see how the Russians could refuse to accept discussion of that. Secondly, I would say not just a nuclear-free zone in Europe, but disengagement in Europe. Thirdly, I would say peace and security in the Middle East, not just the renunciation of force. As to cultural collaboration, it is harmless and it might be of some value as a subject of discussion.

What, then, should our attitude be on these various subjects? So far as non-aggression pacts are concerned, we must accept that the Prime Minister made a faint advance in putting the suggestion forward, but let us be clear that a nonaggression pact is only of value in changing the atmosphere, leading the way to other agreements. In itself, frankly, it has little or no value whatever. All of us who lived through the pre-war period, which is still relevant in this connection, would agree, I think, on that particular point.

The Prime Minister said nothing about the Middle East, but I wish to make a few remarks on one aspect. We have recently had the union of Syria and Egypt, on one side, and of Jordan and Iraq, on the other. For my part, I think that we should accept these unions of Arab States as conforming, naturally, with the desires of the Arab peoples. We should be hopeful that they will lead not to any aggression or excessive nationalism, but rather that this degree of unity will bring about speedier and more successful economic development and, perhaps, in the case of Jordan and Iraq, bring rather nearer a solution of the Arab refugee problem.

For the Summit Conference itself, I venture to say that there are three things which we could discuss there with the Russians, which I should like to have discussed—and let us not underestimate the danger of an outbreak m the Middle East. The first thing I would suggest as a suitable topic for discussion is a guarantee of the existing frontiers between Israel and the Arab States a guarantee in which not only the three Western Powers but the Soviet Union, also, should be invited to participate. Here, I confess that I found quite astonishing the remarks of the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Gosford, in another place, about Her Majesty's Government's attitude on this matter of the frontiers. On 29th January, he said in another place that the Government still stood by the Guildhall speech of Sir Anthony Eden on 9th November, 1955.

The House will recall that, in this speech, Sir Anthony Eden was proposing that the frontiers should be adjusted or altered so as to be somewhere between the 1947 United Nations' Resolution proposals and the existing frontier. There was at the time considerable agitation on this side of the House about the whole matter. Frankly, I find it astonishing that after all that has happened in the last eighteen months, Her Majesty's Government should go back to that. It is, of course, out of the question for Israel to accept this proposal.

What, then, is the purpose of raising the hopes of Arab nations that they will, nevertheless, get this sort of settlement? It can only do harm. There is, no doubt, room for mutually agreed adjustments between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. [An HON. MEMBER: "That is what he said."] With respect, he did not. He said quite specifically that it should be somewhere between the 1947 United Nations' Resolution and the existing situation. That is not at all the same thing as adjustments agreed between Israel and the Arab States. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will deal with this matter when he speaks tomorrow and clear up what certainly has been, to put it mildly, a source of confusion in Israel and the Arab States.

Secondly, there should be discussion of an arms embargo or, at least, the control of the delivery of arms to the area. Heaven knows, it is difficult enough for us to do much to prevent an outbreak in this part of the world, but that is one thing which could be done. I would add merely that any such agreement or discussions must, of course, be on the basis that the balance of security between Israel and the Arab States is not impaired.

The third thing which I think we should discuss with the Russians is an economic development plan for the area as a whole. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) has, on a number of occasions, suggested that there might be contributions from the oil revenues of the various Arab States which receive them, together with contributions from the oil companies, paid into a fund for the use of the whole area. I would very much like to see that idea followed up.

I turn now to disarmament. I was very glad that the Prime Minister was comparatively optimistic on this subject. The problem, of course, is how to break the deadlock. But he did not give us any indication of how that was to be done. I venture to put to him this proposal. We should, surely, try to break the deadlock by taking the point at which the difference between Soviet Russia and the West is smallest. There is really no doubt about what that is. It is on the suspension of thermo-nuclear tests. After all, the Russians have offered suspension for two or three years. They repeated it in Marshal Bulganin's first note proposing a Summit Conference. They have agreed to controls to ensure that there are no such tests.

We, also, have said that we are prepared to suspend tests, but we insisted on linking this with something else. We insisted on linking it with "other provisions of a first stage disarmament agreement" and, in particular, acceptance in principle by the Russians that there should be a cessation of the use of fissionable material for military purposes or, as it is commonly called, the cut-off.

That is, of course, to put it mildly, desirable; it is not only desirable but, in the long run, essential, but it was a great tactical error—to put it no higher—to refuse to accept the Russian proposal and insist, as a matter of form, upon their accepting the further stage in principle. What did we get out of it? Even if they had accepted it, should we really have been any nearer a subsequent agreement? From this side of the House, I press the Government very strongly that they should come out now and say that they are prepared to accept the Russian proposals for the suspension of tests for two or three years, under proper controls.

We go further than that. We believe that it would improve the atmosphere at present that we ourselves should, unilaterally—this is one respect where we do favour, if it can be called that, unilateral action—offer, in order to improve the atmosphere, to suspend our tests also for a limited period. We hope that this also will be said by the Government.

This brings me to one other matter in respect of which I believe that a gesture on our part could be helpful in present circumstances, that is on the question of missile bases. The White Paper on the subject has not yet been published, and we cannot very well discuss the matter in detail, but I would say that these things seem, at any rate, to be clear. First, while it can readily be argued, with cogency, that there is no essential physical difference between the launching of missiles which do not have to be manned and the launching of bombers with hydrogen bombs which have to be manned, nevertheless the fact remains that, at this moment, when the United States is asking us for missile bases, we are entitled to take into account the whole international situation at the time.

We believe that this presents an opportunity for negotiating a fresh agreement, apart from the original agreement on the bomber bases. I think it fair to say that we can bear in mind that owing to the recent Russian discoveries the United States is perhaps rather more dependent upon us at the moment for the establishment of these bases as compared with our dependence upon her.

We believe, therefore, that at least two conditions should be laid down: first, the British Government must have effective control over, and an effective veto over, the use of these missile bases, without any possible misunderstanding; secondly, we must go further than that, and the view of my hon. Friends and myself is that the Government should say that they will not go ahead with any physical preparations for establishing these missile bases until we have talked with the Russians, until after the Summit conference. I cannot see that we should be suffering any very grave military disadvantage if we were to make this gesture, but surely it is something which might very well help towards the conclusion of the disarmament agreement about which the Prime Minister was so hopeful.

I turn, finally, to the third and, to my mind, most important subject of all, that of disengagement in Europe. The Prime Minister may be right in hoping that in disarmament the greatest opportunities now arise. I venture to believe that it is certainly just as likely that progress can be made in the sphere of European disengagement. For over a year the Opposition have pressed for a plan of disengagement, for a plan for European security involving the reunification of Germany. As long ago as February, 1957, the Foreign Secretary told us that a working party was set up to study again the problem of European security and reunification and was expected to report back to N.A.T.O.; but no progress appears to have been made. I must say that whenever we have mentioned these proposals, they have received, to put it mildly, the frostiest answer from the Government; but the case for disengagement in Europe, is, in my opinion, overwhelmingly strong and I venture to spell it out this afternoon.

First, let us not forget that there remains on both sides of the frontier between East and West Germany very substantial pressure for reunification. Anybody who has been either to West Germany or to East Germany must know that that is the case. Further, that being so, we cannot rule out the possibility that at some future time the East German people, infuriated perhaps by the Communist Government, which appears ow to be becoming much tougher than before, may do what they did in 1953—may, in fact, stage a riot, a minor revolution against the existing régime.

If that were to happen today or next year, when West Germany has forces of her own, the danger of the situation must surely be apparent to everybody, not only to us but to the Russians as well, because it would be extremely difficult, I think, for any West German Government to restrain their forces from going to the help of their comrades on the other side of the frontier.

There is also the possibility—one cannot altogether regret it—that there may be further movements within the satellite States, among the Hungarian, or Polish or Czech people. We certainly wish them to have greater freedom, though I think we must recognise that so far as foreign policy is concerned they will probably be closely associated with Soviet Russia for some time to come.

Nevertheless, nobody can say that in that part of the world there is stability. Yet if there were to be another Hungarian rising or another Polish revolution, can we say that that is not without its dangers? Do we wish again to go through the appalling dilemma that we faced in the autumn of 1956, when we had to choose between what seemed to be an inevitable third world war or leaving the Hungarians to their fate?

I would go further than this. If trouble were to break out in Central and Eastern Europe, what shall we be faced with unless something is done to stop the existing trend? We shall be faced with troops on either side armed not only with conventional weapons, but with nuclear weapons. We are confronted with a White Paper which informs us, or implies, as I see it, that we are to rely on massive retaliation for almost anything that happens. At least, there is no indication in the White Paper of what we do in the case of minor incidents.

It is not surprising that, faced with the dangers of an outbreak giving rise to this chain of circumstances—first a conventional clash, then nuclear weapons, and then the ultimate weapons—Mr. Kennan, for instance, should have fallen back on the idea, with which I do not at all agree, of just having a lot of Home Guards in Europe. I think that the answer is not Home Guards in Europe, but disengagement in Europe; and the key to disengagement in Europe, the most important thing of all, is the withdrawal of foreign forces both from Western Germany and from Eastern Germany, and, I would also say, from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

We must recognise one thing at the start. It really is no good going on thinking in terms of any European settlement unless it involves a neutral zone or belt and the agreement on the part of Germany, in the event of such a plan succeeding, to withdraw from N.A.T.O. There is not the slightest hope of the Russians agreeing to any such plan except on those conditions. Why should they, because the only consequences would be simply to advance the Western forces further towards the Soviet Union?

More recently we have had the plan of the Polish Prime Minister, the Rapacki Plan. I should like to say a word or two about it. In my view, this involves some advance. For the first time, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as East Germany, are equated with West Germany. It has at least one other merit in that it involves a pilot scheme for local disarmament, at any rate of nuclear weapons.

But I recognise that there are powerful arguments against it. We should certainly be at a disadvantage because of the point made by the Prime Minister, that the Russians would be superior in conventional weapons, though I attach very little importance to this in the context of the plan, because I do not think we can assume that if there is no such plan the Russians will not have nuclear weapons. Secondly, it may well be said that there are technical difficulties about distinguishing between nuclear and conventional weapons.

But I think that the major argument against the plan is that it does not involve real disengagement, and it does involve our giving away the threat of Germany being armed with nuclear weapons—something that none of us wishes to see, but it is a threat to the Russians. The plan involves our giving away this valuable bargaining counter for far too little in exchange. Finally, I regret the exclusion of Hungary.

But I would say that the Rapacki Plan should be regarded as the start and the basis for discussion. It really is not good enough just to say that we see difficulties about it. What we should do, and should have done long ago, is to put forward our own proposals for disengagement. I must briefly spell them out, because experience has led me to realise that if one does not spell them out one is open to grave misunderstanding. Here is what we should like to see done. First, there should be a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. [HON. MEMBERS: "Before reunification?"] I am putting these points in order; if I am pressed I would say withdrawal of foreign forces before reunification, though there must be an agreement negotiated as a whole.

Secondly, there must be an agreement to limit and control the conventional forces—and no nuclear weapons—permitted to the nations covered by the agreement. Thirdly, German reunification. Fourthly, a security pact underwritten by the great Powers and guaranteeing the frontiers of the countries in this neutral zone. Finally, and if everything else is agreed, an agreement for Germany to withdraw from N.A.T.O., and for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.

These are the proposals which we have put forward. They have been criticised, they have been brushed aside, and very frequently with totally different arguments. For instance, we are told that they are dangerous for the West, on the one side, and that there is no chance of the Russians accepting them, on the other. Both these criticisms are very unlikely to be true. Of course, in an absolute sense, there is a weakening of N.A.T.O., but it is no use judging these things on an absolute basis. The question is whether the balance of security is affected, and I say that, provided that, as I have always maintained, American and British forces should remain in Europe, there is no reason whatever to fear that the balance of security would be altered.

There are, after all, immense gains from a plan of this kind. The danger, first, of a nuclear clash is greatly reduced. We should have achieved German reunification, we should have achieved the prospect at least of greater freedom for the satellite countries, and we should have introduced an experiment in controlled disarmament which is probably the best in this field that we can hope for at the moment. Finally, we should perhaps have prevented—I do not say for a moment an outright attack, because nothing will do that except complete disarmament, elaborate controls, and so on—but we should have enormously diminished the danger of outbreaks of friction in that part of the world, because, fundamentally, we should have solved the problems and dangers that exist at present.

As for the Russian attitude, I think that there is a fair prospect that, with one exception, and I agree that it is an exception, there is quite a chance of the Poles and the Russians going with us. The one exception to the five proposals is that, at present, they are not ready to consider German reunification. I admit that. Mr. Gomulko made that quite plain in an interview with The Times lately.

I ask the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, however, to bear in mind that we are at the beginning, as I hope, of a negotiating stage. We are at the beginning of bargaining, and it is very unlikely that we shall get agreement at first. We have to go to the conference table and see where we get. I myself believe that there is at least this powerful argument to put to the Polish Government and people—that if foreign forces are to be withdrawn nothing will really stop the unification of East and West Germany, and that it is far better that this should come about in an agreed manner and under proper controls, and together, as part of it—because I think that will be necessary—a settlement of the eastern frontier of Germany on the basis of the Oder-Neisse line. It is far better that it should be done that way than in circumstances which might themselves give rise to serious anxiety, and even to the danger of war.

We may be told that this is all very hopeful, but that the Russians are not likely to agree to it. My answer to that is quite simple. It is no use talking in these terms until and unless we try. It does not really lie in the mouth of the Foreign Secretary, who has always turned down this proposal, to say that the Russians will not agree, until he has first discussed it with them. It may take a very long time to negotiate any agreement of this kind—it took ten years to negotiate the Austrian agreement—but that is no reason for not starting immediately.

These, then, are the immediate proposals which the Opposition, constructively, we hope, put forward for discussion at the Summit Conference. We are well aware of the difficulties of reaching agreement, but we dare not, any of us, refuse to try. If it be said that this is all very well, but we must consult our allies, and they are very difficult, I would say "Yes, we must consult our allies, but consultation must not be allowed to produce or justify paralysis." We stand by the alliance but not as satellites, but as partners. After all, the whole case for our possessing thermo-nuclear weapons as restated in the Defence White Paper, is to give us influence and prestige and a measure of independence vis-à-vis the United States.

It is up to our Government to exercise that influence. They claim that the effects of Suez are over and that, once again, they are on good terms with the United States. Let them show the country that they really are and that they can speak out freely on what they feel. We believe, and so do many millions here and in Western Europe, that chance after chance of taking the initiative for peace has been missed. We say, "Let us delay it no longer. Let the Government come out boldly and give the lead for which the whole world is waiting."

I have listened with very close attention to the speech which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has just made. I think that we on these benches can appreciate the dilemma in which he found himself. He was anxious to make the sort of speech which he ought to make as Leader of the Opposition, in which, to some extent, he succeeded, and he was anxious, at the same time, not to incur too much criticism from certain sections of his own party.

I will follow up later in the course of my remarks one or two of the points which the right hon. Gentleman made, but I would say to him now that a suspension of nuclear tests by itself is not disarmament. It does not make the world safer, unless it is accompanied by a cessation of production of fissionable materials for war purposes and the control of existing stocks. It does not even prevent the entry of a fourth nation into the magic nuclear circle.

No doubt, our principal attention in the course of this two days' debate will, quite rightly, be focused upon the summit talks, to what extent they are likely to succeed, what sort of subjects are likely to be discussed and the varying degrees of success likely to be achieved, according to the different opinions held on both sides of the House. Sometimes I wonder to what extent we in the Western world are in danger of becoming almost the victims of our own phraseology. We use certain phrases so often that perhaps we give them a meaning quite accidentally which we do not really intend them to convey.

Let us take a phrase which has been used very often already in this debate—"reduction of tension." Of course, there is tension—tension on the Continent, tension in the world. It would be very stupid indeed to pretend that it was otherwise, but, at the same time, I wonder whether we are not in danger of giving the impression that the tension on the Continent of Europe is a very great deal more dangerous and a very great deal more acute than it is. I do not suggest for a moment that the situation is anywhere near stable, but I do not believe that the tension on the Continent of Europe is any worse now than it was seven or eight years ago. Indeed, I think the situation in some respects is probably better. At any rate, under this so-called tension there is today a very great deal of prosperity in Western Europe, and, moreover, we are witnessing Western Europe engaged in an extraordinary political, social and economic experiment almost unprecedented in history. All this has happened under a state of tension.

I agree with the Leader of the Opposition that there is a great deal of tension in the Middle East. One of the things which worry me most about the situation in the Middle East is that if we were to allow the whole of our attention to be deflected to the Continent of Europe and ignore what is happening in the Middle East the tension would become very much worse. In my view, the Middle East is in danger of becoming very much the same as Europe was in the 1930s. Country after country might easily be sucked into the Communist orbit, and nobody knows exactly what will be the reaction of the Western Powers at any given stage.

The second thing that ought to be said much more often and which has not been said nearly enough is that it is not we and it is not N.A.T.O. who have created the tension. It is not N.A.T.O. which is holding down Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries. The third thing which we should remember is that the one constant factor in Soviet tactics since the creation of N.A.T.O. has been attempts by one means or another, and sometimes by a combination of different methods, to break up N.A.T.O. That has been Russia's objective No. 1.

Let me in this context look for a moment at the background of the present phase in the war of nerves. First, we had the Sputniks. Then we had the testing of the inter-continental ballistic missile, or whatever it is called. Next we had the deliberate increasing of the tension in the Middle East by the Soviet Union accusing the United States of America of being behind an alleged Turkish threat to Syria. Both those threats were quite absurd. Then we had the usual suggestion that there should be talks to reduce the very tension which the Soviet Union a few weeks earlier had itself largely created. Then we had the proposal of the atom-free zone, with various other proposals from Poland and elsewhere about disengagement, and now we have had the proposal for the summit talks.

On thing is clear from the speech made by Marshal Bulganin before the Supreme Soviet on 21st December—and this ought to be mentioned. He made it clear that his condition for the summit talks was that the Western Powers must recognise what he called the status quo in Europe.

An atom-free zone plus recognition of the status quo would seem to me to give the Soviet Union, were we to agree, the maximum military advantage with the minimum political risk. It is in that context that I wish to say a word about the theory of disengagement and to take up one or two points made by the Leader of the Opposition. I may be wrong, but my view is that the Soviet Union would not agree to withdraw its troops from the satellite countries into the Soviet territory unless it was certain of two conditions: that when the Red Army had withdrawn, the satellite countries would continue to be Communist in their régime or, alternatively, that if any of the satellite countries—or, worse still, two or more of them at the same time—began to choose freedom, the Russians would be able to come back with the Red Army and do another "Budapest" without the Western Powers intervening.

The theory of disengagement is extremely attractive superficially, but it bristles with snags. Let me put this to the Leader of the Opposition. Suppose that the N.A.T.O. Powers were to withdraw altogether from Germany in return for Soviet agreement to withdraw into Soviet territory and that for the neutral bloc so created there were to be presumably, some kind of agreement that there should be no attempted coup from outside to upset the Government of the countries concerned. Then in the event of an attempted Communist coup from Eastern Germany upon the Western zone of Berlin, under any new so-called agreement it would be offside, to use a football expression. But would it be offside and who would blow the whistle if a future Hungarian or Polish Government were faced with serious anti-Communist riots, which had nothing whatever to do with N.A.T.O., any more than had the events of November fifteen months ago, and the Communist Government in Warsaw or Budapest asked the Soviet Union to come back with troops to help to restore order? What would be the position then of the N.A.T.O. Powers? We should either have to accept the coup lying down, or we should have to resort to the ultimate deterrent.

It may sound curious to the Leader of the Opposition, but at least the advantage of the present position is that there is no neutral zone. The forces of East and West are poised on a line and everybody knows that at the moment one side goes over the line it is bound to get into trouble. So long as there is a single British soldier or American G.I. in Berlin, the Soviet Union knows perfectly well that an attempted coup would automatically involve Great Britain and the United States. That is the advantage of the present situation. I am not saying that there are not disadvantages—of course there are.

But I do not like the idea of getting into a position in which there is a neutral zone which can easily become a kind of Tom Tiddler's ground, with the Western Powers either being unable to do anything at all or else obliged to resort to the nuclear deterrent, in which event there would be every kind of speculation as to the kind of circumstances in which that would happen. That degree of uncertainty would be very dangerous indeed, much more dangerous than the present situation.

Nor do I believe that we should for one moment contemplate making any kind of agreement with the Soviet Union which formally, so to speak, wrote off the satellite countries in perpetuity behind the Iron Curtain by recognising what is now called the status quo. That would be morally and absolutely indefensible.

Incidentally, the whole disengagement theory which we have had so far from the Leader of the Opposition and others has completely begged the main issue of the problem of Germany. We cannot try to ease the tension on the Continent of Europe unless we deal with Germany. To agree to disengage but at the same time to leave out the whole question of East Germany would lead nowhere. Nor can we make concessions in any future negotiation with the Soviet Union unless Russia for its part is prepared to make some concession over the unification of Germany.

I want now to turn to one other phrase which by frequent use has been rather misunderstood. I refer to the phrase "taking a fresh initiative". From time to time, the Western Powers have put out very reasonable proposals—notably the disarmament proposals of last summer, which obtained 57 votes in the United Nations, with nobody except the Communist bloc voting against them. That was an almost incredible degree of unanimity in an assembly which is divided on almost everything else. When the Russians blocked those proposals, we were at once told that we must take the initiative and break the deadlock.

What does "taking the initiative" mean if the Russians continue to say "No"? It means making a fresh concession. I repeat that we cannot make any further concessions on the Continent unless the Russians for their part are prepared to include something about the unification of Germany. This is what I call the "gold watch" trick, and the Russians are very good at it. They take somebody's watch, and when he asks for it back, they say, "In return for giving you back your watch, we demand a corresponding concession from you", quite irrespective of the fact that they should not have taken the watch in the first place.

The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) put this argument much better than I can put it myself in an address he gave which was published in International Affairs in January, 1956. I am sure that the hon. Member will not mind my paying him the compliment of reading a short sentence from it, because it is so very well put. He said:

"In Europe at least the West cannot afford to surrender anything—it has no cards to throw away, while Russia has a number of inessential positions which she can sacrifice for the sake of public approval or gains elsewhere. Public memory is so short that few people see the irony of a situation in which the burglar offers to return a small part of his loot only on condition that he receives something of the same value in exchange."

I compliment and congratulate the hon. Member upon putting it so well. No doubt when he speaks this evening we shall see whether or not his views since those halcyon days of January. 1956, have changed.

I agree with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that there must be adequate preparation for summit talks. To go to summit talks with all the build-up of publicity but without careful preparation would not be a good plan at all. If the least little dividend comes out, of course, the talks are worth while. I still think that it would be worth while to make the effort even if nothing happens, but I am anxious that the British public, and the public the world over, should not be bluffed into believing, merely because summit talks take place and four, five or six major Powers are represented, that inevitably a rabbit must be produced out of the hat, that there must inevitably be enormous dividends, and that all these problems of the world, which are pretty tortuous, will be solved. That attitude could be very dangerous.

One thing that can be emphasised with great advantage, not only here and in Europe but among the uncommitted nations—and it can be best done by summit talks, whatever their outcome—is that we are using words that do not mean the same thing on both sides of the Iron Curtain. "Peaceful co-existence", for example, on this side means "Live and let live" but on the other side it still means the cold war.

As to the missile bases, I could not fit together the two parts of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. In the first part he was extremely emphatic and definite about the need for N.A.T.O. defence, but later he began to veer off on missile bases. It seems to me strange that members of the party opposite, who in the old days were great internationalists, always assume when they talk about mutual defence that the obligation for mutual defence is a one-way traffic. It is always the other nation. It was the same case in the 1930s. Collective security for the Labour Party meant that somebody else provided the security. Now it means that somebody else must provide the missile bases.

Does the Labour Party believe in the nuclear deterrent? If it does, where are the bases to be? If it does not, then of course the answer is that many other N.A.T.O. countries do; and if we disclaim our responsibility and say, "Include Britain out; no missile bases for us," are we any safer? We cannot be neutral in our geographical and political position at the centre of the Commonwealth. We are either in it or we are not. It is no good our saying that we can make our own terms with the Soviet Union about missile basis or anything else and that we should leave out the United States.

The hon. Member is a little confused about our attitude. What we are saying is that since we have to negotiate an agreement about missile bases with the United States we should take the opportunity to secure two things: firstly, that control over these bases is with us, that is to say, we have the absolute veto, and, secondly—and I am quite frank about this—that if they want us to have missile bases, and I agree that we have the other bases anyhow, they should agree to certain things that we want, in particular summit talks first.

I cannot understand why the right hon. Gentleman wants summit talks first, before there is agreement on the missile bases, unless his idea is that we should go into summit talks under the protection of American nuclear power and then, if he thinks that there is some political dividend to be made out of the talks, discard American nuclear protection.

We cannot do a "dicky" deal with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is not in the least interested in any disarmament agreement which does not include the United States. Therefore, I believe that on missile bases, on the general question of defence, on the cold war and, above all, in the approach to summit talks, we must stand together with our allies. If we do, there is a good chance of avoiding a hot war. Certainly we ought not to lose the cold war. If we fall apart now, we shall certainly lose the cold war, and in so doing we may well provoke a hot one.