On a point of order. In moving the Third Reading of the Bill on 2nd May, my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) was called at six minutes to four o'clock. Although he gave an admirable summary of the Bill, he could not in that time do it justice. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) rose just before four o'clock and his speech, too, was cut short.

Might it not be for the convenience of the House if a more detailed exposition of the Bill were given? My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South has asked me to apologise to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the House, for his absence today on other Parliamentary business and he has asked me, as it were, to take charge of the Bill for him. Would it be convenient if I were to catch your eye and put the case for the Bill in more detail than my hon. Friend was able to do at that time, and to treat the short speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East, as an intervention, so that he could speak later?

The hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) had the Floor of the House when the proceedings were interrupted under the Standing Order, on 2nd May, so he is now entitled to resume his interrupted speech on the adjourned Second Reading debate. As to a further exposition of the merits of the Bill, if the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) rises and tries to catch my eye I shall endeavour to perceive him. I have no doubt that any blanks left by the hon. Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) will be adequately filled in by him.

I would have been quite willing to treat my short observation as an intervention, but the rules are sacred and I should, perhaps, briefly state the objections which I had embarked upon when the House adjourned a fortnight ago. I had started by emphasising that the question of ordering maintenance for what I loosely described as the guilty one was a matter upon which the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce was divided. Thirteen members were in favour of the recommendation and eight were against it. When the House adjourned I was in the course of referring hon. Members to the passage in the Report where the reasons for the objecting members were set out. They will be found on page 138 of the Report, in paragraph 503.

The weight of their objections is stated in this way:

"Six of us think it wrong in principle that a husband or wife should be called upon to maintain a guilty spouse. It is a rule of the common law of England that a husband's liability to maintain his wife during the marriage ends if she commits adultery and is suspended if she deserts him. The statutory deviations from this rule may be explained on the assumption that the legislature wished to ensure that a wife should not be left completely destitute. We doubt whether that could happen nowadays because, even if a woman cannot find employment, she may ask for national assistance. A husband may well preserve some kindly feelings towards the wife he has divorced and, if she has been left destitute, it is open to him voluntarily to make her an allowance. That is quite different from compelling him to provide for her. We consider, therefore, that a spouse who has had a decree or order made against him or her based on the commission of a matrimonial offence should not have any right to apply to the court for maintenance."

They then mentioned the question of incurable insanity and stated that they do not contemplate any change being made.

That was the weight of their reasons, and the House will note that they used the rather interesting and old-fashioned word "principle." The paragraph begins:

"Six of us think it wrong in principle."

The Report sets out why the statutory deviations from the rule exist. The original divorce legislation was by Act of Parliament, as is referred to in paragraph 478. Before 1857, when an Act of Parliament was necessary, only wealthy people could afford that expensive process. Accordingly, when the question of the maintenance of a guilty spouse came up, there was usually a rich husband—indeed, both parties were usually well-established, financially—and it was not unknown even in those days for the passage of legislation of a private nature to be sweetened by the promise of an allowance to the former wife.

The paragraph states that consideration would be given to the fact that

"her defection was accompanied by palliating circumstances."

Therefore, in a certain sense the maintenance of a guilty spouse was an exceptional procedure. The Report points out that the power to order an allowance in favour of a guilty wife has been used sparingly, and in cases where the wife would have suffered great hardship if the order had not been made.

Clause 3 of the Bill enables the guilty wife to make a claim against the estate of her former husband. That provision was one of the successful features of the Intestates' Estates Bill, which my right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General steered through this House on a Friday in 1952.

Clause 3, endeavours to reproduce the recommendations of the Report, substituting only for the word "wife" what I. may call the "ex-wife". Curiously enough, that specific provision adheres in the recommendations of the Report at page 143, and it does not appear on the face of it that there was a minority Report. The paragraph giving the original objections of the minority of members said that they thought it was wrong in principle that a husband or wife should be called upon to maintain a guilty spouse, and I submit that they must have been objecting not only to a claim against an existing husband during his life but also to a claim against his estate after his death—although their disagreement is not specified there.

Clause 3 deals with the mechanics of the situation. I submit that it is clear that it is endeavouring to deal with an exceptional case, and many people think that that is not a very good principle upon which to base legislation. I say that it is an exceptional case because, under subsection (4), the court is directed to have regard to a number of matters, most of which indicate that the court must be rather cautious before allowing the ex-wife to make any claim against the estate. It says:

"the court shall have regard (a) to any past, present or future capital of the applicant and to any income of hers … (b) to her conduct in relation to the deceased and otherwise."

This provision is difficult to reconcile with elementary justice. Just think of the position in the case of a man who had had ample reason for divorcing his wife—she having proved herself to be wholly unworthy and disregarding all the obligations that she had undertaken—and had remarried, leaving after his death his second wife and children. The ex-wife may then make a claim. The husband is not there to give his version of her conduct. He is not there to say, "I had ample grounds to divorce her. It is untrue to say that there were matters which she did not or could not bring up at the divorce action". In fact, to the embarrassment of his second wife and children, she could go before the court and tell the most fantastic stories about his conduct during his life, which she had never mentioned before.

I may well be said that a court would look with suspicion at that sort of evidence, and perhaps disregard it. That may be so, but a great deal of damage would be done, to the feelings of the second wife and children, and to relations generally. Not only that; as experience has shown to some extent, under the Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act, it is a very powerful weapon in the hands of a wife—and certainly an ex-wife—that she can come forward, very often with legal aid, and say, "Unless some maintenance is paid to me I will pursue this matter, and if I fail you still have to pay your costs, and any order made against me is ineffective."

The guilty ex-wife has two strong cards. First, she gives evidence of her conduct in relation to the deceased which he cannot deny, and, next, she is in a position in which, to a certain extent, she can hold up the estate to ransom. It is subsection (4) which indicates that this is an exceptional matter, for it allows the court to take into account

"any other matter or thing which, in the circumstances of the case, the court may consider relevant or material in relation to her, to persons interested in the estate of the deceased, or otherwise."

The effect of this is that, because there might be what is described as a hard case to one of the parties, the whole burden is put on the court to decide not on any question of principle, but on a question entirely of hardship. This is where I think we should get back to the matter of principle. I do not believe myself that hardship is a good guide to right actions. I do not believe that hardship is an excuse for stealing. I do not believe that hardship should outweigh matters of ordinary justice, or, as the minority put in their Report, matters of principle.

There is something to be said—indeed, I think myself that there is a great deal to be said—for treating marriage as an indissoluble act, and one which does not permit remarriage. There is something to be said for accepting a system of divorce where a marriage has broken down. In the first case, where marriage is indissoluble and no remarriage is allowed, it is according to Christian ethics, whatever the wife did for better or worse, that the husband, and, indeed, perhaps his estate, should be liable to support her, not according to the station in which she had been accustomed to live, but to make sure that she is not in penury.

But what is to be said for a form which, first, says that we accept divorce, except all the financial provisions for the wife, and the husband can be released entirely from the obligations which he undertook, but subject only to this—that the guilty wife, or indeed the guilty husband, shall, for purposes of money, still treat the relationship between the parties as having some existence? I find it difficult to accept that compromise on any grounds of principle, and I suggest that principle is a matter of importance.

Let us look at it once more from the general context. Whatever views we may take about divorce—and we are all agreed that marriages, if possible, should continue, and that that is desirable—can it be a good thing that the sense of duty or loyalty of the first wife or ex-wife should have the temptation to say, "It does not very much matter, because I cannot entirely be discarded, and will still have a claim against his estate"? By putting in these words in the Clause, we remove some kind of check upon that complete sense of irresponsibility.

I myself would therefore suggest to the House, without harshness or Philistine savagery, that it is better for the general community that it should treat guilty wives on an entirely different plane from the loyal and devoted wife, and that it is wrong, in these days, at any rate, whatever it may have been before, to confuse the husband and his relations, when they come to deal with his estate, with the possibility of a claim by somebody who has been long forgotten, and, perhaps for twenty years, has had nothing to do with them, because that person finds an opportunity to get some share of the estate. It can only be disruptive to the law of divorce, which should carry out its logical consequences.

If it be right that a marriage should be dissolved, it should be right, also, that it should be dissolved completely and absolutely, and that the community and the State should face the consequences of that decision. This is an attempt to avoid the consequences of the decision on divorce, and I believe that it is the worst of all worlds. For these reasons, I myself would not support a Bill which includes Clause 3.

Finally, may I say that it is a matter of regret to me that I did not take such steps as were open to me to raise these points at an earlier stage. At this late stage, I admit that mistake, and that act of negligence on my part, but I felt that it would be almost discourteous to allow the Bill to go through on the nod without, at any rate, some discussion on the views of the minority as expressed in the Report. For these reasons, I find myself unable to support this Bill with the inclusion of Clause 3 and the Clauses relating thereto.

The whole House will be grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) for having, even at this late stage, as he himself says, raised this interesting point, when the House was, in fact, about to give a Third Reading to the Bill.

I should like to intimate to the House the principles by which I find myself guided in approaching the Third Reading of any Bill, or any Private Member's Bill. When Private Members' Bills are considered in the House, as a good number of them are, it is quite impossible, or at least difficult and perhaps a little irksome, for ordinary back benchers not trained in the law fully to understand all the implications that are involved.

The language of lawyers is not easily understood by ordinary mortals, and, consequently, we have to rely to a certain extent upon some other factors to give us guidance in deciding, on Bills of this kind, whether to support them or not. For my own part, I first look at the names of the Members supporting the Bill. If, as in this case, they are the names of hon. Members of repute, whose judgment we have learned to trust over the years, one does not bother to probe too deeply.

Therefore, it is important to pay tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East for drawing our attention to a defect in the Bill, because, as I understand, there has been no real discussion on this Bill at all at any stage. It would seem to me that one of the advantages of our Parliamentary system is that when Measures are introduced into Parliament there is usually a full opportunity for discussion on Second Reading, and later in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading, so that not only hon. Members but the general public have the opportunity, from following the debates in the House and by public and Press comments upon them, to see whether such defects exist, so that pressure can be brought to bear on the interested parties to remedy those defects in the legislation as it goes through.

In this case, there has not been that full and ample discussion, although the opportunity was provided for it. In fact, no discussion of any importance took place. Consequently, that is how this Bill comes to us on Third Reading, and it would undoubtedly have gone through on an earlier occasion but for the fact that my hon. and learned Friend, only a few minutes before 4 o'clock, drew our attention to these provisions, which seem to me such that the House ought to consider them very seriously.

It would be wrong for the House to let it go forth that we believe it is right so to alter the law that a guilty spouse should be able to take proceedings against the estate of her former husband to the detriment, very possibly, of his then wife or widow and surviving children. Nobody wants to see anybody living in hardship, and I thought that the Welfare State had made it certain that the most severe hardship had been taken away from ordinary people; but in this case it would seem that it is possible for a faithless divorced wife to secure, by legal right, permission to proceed in the courts against her former husband. What I object to is that she should have this right to proceed against her former husband's estate conferred upon her by law.

I appreciate that people may be divorced and still retain some limited affection for and some responsibility to look after each other in difficult times, but a decision of that kind should be taken by the innocent party while living, by giving some indication, perhaps in a will, of the desire for some provision to be made in the event of disaster falling upon the former spouse. However, what I believe is unthinkable is that the House should so alter the law as to confer upon the guilty party a right which that party does not possess at this moment, and a right from which the party has been alienated by the divorce proceedings.

For those reasons, I hope that those who are learned in the law—I am not learned in it at all—will be able to explain to ordinary back-bench Members of Parliament who have not the benefit of legal training why they think it right that the law should be altered in this way. The effect will be what I consider to be wrong—the conferment of a legal right upon a guilty person to proceed against the estate of a former spouse.

I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, and so ought the House to be, for the fact that those who are skilled in the law can find time to give us the benefit of their legal experience on these complicated matters which, in the nature of things, must be far beyond the ken of ordinary Members of Parliament.

As hon. Members have said, it is unfortunate that the Bill should have passed through its stages to the Third Reading without any thorough discussion. It is an important Bill. It contains a number of miscellaneous points relating to the relationship of husband and wife. I hope that the House will not consider it merely as a lawyers' Bill. It deals with the relationship of husband and wife, with matrimonial causes, divorce and nullity—matters which perhaps draw us nearer to human problems than any other matter with which we deal in the House. Indeed, such matters raise not only human problems but sociological and religious problems as well.

The Bill does not endeavour to deal with any major principles. In particular, it does not endeavour to deal with the rather major principle which has already been raised by my hon. Friends—the liability to maintain what is called a "guilty" spouse. I hope that the House will not, because the Bill may be controversial on that point, disregard the other valuable matters dealt with in it. I understand from the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) that it is merely the question of the maintenance of the guilty spouse which troubles him. Indeed, if his argument succeeds, it is the guilty spouse for whom the "bell" tolls.

The principle that the court has discretion to order maintenance in favour of the guilty party has been recognised by statutory provision for 100 years. I would be inclined to put "guilty party" in inverted commas, because as time has proceeded it has become more and more difficult in divorce and nullity cases to divide the parties into the "guilty" party and the "innocent" party. Very frequently the petitioner for divorce or nullity files a discretion statement admitting matrimonial offences on his or her part. Again, there is very often on the part of the petitioner himself or herself something which we might consider to be intolerable behaviour which has caused the break-up of the marriage but which itself is not a matrimonial offence.

It is interesting to note that Sir Frederick Burrows, one of the six who dissented from the opinion of the majority of the Royal Commission on this point, made some such remark as that, about the intolerable behaviour of the petitioner in another connection. He summed it up very well. In a dissenting note, when dealing with the question of transfer of tenancy and division of property on divorce or judicial separation, Sir Frederick, on page 343 of the Royal Commission's Report, said:

"The fault does not always lie entirely on the side of the 'guilty' party and it might well occur that the 'innocent' party, by intolerable behaviour, contributes towards the break-up of the marriage and is yet able legally to obtain command of the property of the other spouse."

It is undoubtedly the position at present that the court is given discretion in respect of maintenance, and all that the Bill does is to clear up an anomaly with regard to claims against the estate of a woman's deceased husband. It does not alter the general principle of maintenance for a guilty or an innocent party; it merely applies the existing law to a claim against an estate of a deceased spouse.

The difficulty experienced by my hon. and learned Friend arises from Clause 3, which provides for a claim for maintenance against the estate of a deceased spouse. I repeat that the Clause does not alter any basic rights. It does not introduce any new ideas. It merely allows the former wife to apply to the High Court for an order for maintenance against the estate, and the court has full discretion in dealing with the application.

There are certain limitations on such an application. For example, the wife must be domiciled in England, she must not have remarried, and the marriage must have been dissolved or annulled by the High Court in this country. I think that last point is very relevant to the one taken by my hon. and learned Friend, that the court on an application of this sort might have to hear evidence which could not be rebutted because the person against whom it would be given was already dead. By this provision in Clause 3 (6) of the Bill that the application can be made only in the case of dissolution of marriage or order for nullity in the High Court here, the court would have the record of those former proceedings and would be entitled to refer to it——

Perhaps I did not make the real objection clear. With an ordinary maintenance application which is made when there is a divorce, there is, of course, no third-party interest. The difficulty is that when the first husband is dead, leaving, say, a second wife and children, their interests are brought in.

Clause 3 takes into account, when giving the court discretion, the claims to which the court should have regard. The wife has to satisfy the court that it would have been reasonable for the deceased to make provision for her maintenance and that the court should make such reasonable provision for her maintenance as it sees fit. Clause 3 (4) sets out, as my hon. and learned Friend mentioned, the considerations which the court should take into account.

They are, in general, the considerations which the court takes into account under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, when dealing with an ordinary claim of a widow against the estate of the deceased husband. For instance, the court must take into consideration the capital and income of the applicant,

"… her conduct in relation to the deceased and otherwise … any other matter or thing which, in the circumstances of the case, the court may consider relevant or material in relation to her, to persons interested in the estate of the deceased, or otherwise."

It will be seen that the court can take account all the surrounding circumstances, not only of the property itself—whether or not it would be prudent, for example, to dispose of it or to settle it in any way—but also to the dependants of the deceased other than the applicant, his former wife.

There is one other consideration added to those to which the court would have regard under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, and it is contained in subsection (4, c), which says that the court should take into consideration any application made by the wife during the lifetime of the deceased, and should also take into account—if such be the case—why no such application was made. The court, therefore, is directed to take into account all those points raised by my hon. and learned Friend.

This problem arose in a case—Dipple v. Dipple—just prior to the war. There was a divorce in 1938. There was an interim order for maintenance. There were then negotiations between the two parties as to how much maintenance should be paid, but no final order was made. The husband married again the next year. In the following year the husband died and left an estate worth some £6,000. The wife had no final order for maintenance against him during his life. She could make no claim against his estate. This Clause would entitle her in such circumstances to do so, but she would have to satisfy the court that she really was deserving of its consideration.

Under Clause 4, an application can be made at any time to vary an order; so, again, the question of hardship upon other dependants of the deceased is taken into account. In subsection (2) of Clause 4 there is set out a list of those who can apply for the order to be varied. They include the former wife, and other former wife of the deceased, any dependant of the deceased, any trustee of the property, and any person beneficially entitled under the will or under the intestacy of the deceased.

Although I have spoken of this in relation to a wife surviving her former husband, all this also applies in reverse to the former husband of the deceased wife, as it does under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938——

Does it apply to a guilty husband as well as to a guilty wife?

To a certain extent, yes, but not in the case of settlements. If one goes back to Section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, one finds that a guilty husband has not all the rights of a guilty wife. It is therefore not quite the same position, but generally speaking I think that the answer is yes.

It is subsection (3) of Clause 5 that applies this in reverse, namely, to the former husband of the deceased wife. It needs a little adaptation from the 1938 Act, because the husband is entitled, on a divorce, to maintenance from his wife only under certain circumstances. That is to say, the court can give consideration to whether or not to make an order against the wife to maintain him only in certain circumstances; namely, when he is divorced on grounds of insanity, or when he divorces his wife on grounds of adultery, desertion or cruelty, and when the wife has some property of her own in respect of which the court can make an order for a secured provision, that is, for a settlement of that property.

Clause 6 contains provisions supplementary to Clauses 3 and 4, and these are much the same as under the 1938 Act. They protect the personal representatives who distribute the estate without notice of any claim of this sort; they allow a former spouse to obtain a grant if necessary, to the estate of the deceased former husband or wife, as the case may be, and the Clause also provides for the forms of orders to be made on an application of this sort. So much for claims against the deceased spouse's estate, and so much, I think, for the controversial parts of the Bill.

Clause 2 is important, as it applies the well-known bankruptcy laws against fraudulent disposition of property to defeat creditors, to fraudulent disposition of property to defeat a wife's right to maintenance. This, I fear, is going to be one more thing for conveyancers to endeavour to find in titles to property. When I started conveyancing some years ago we had little work to do and we earned large fees for doing very little. Now we earn very small fees for doing a great deal because Parliament has imposed on us more and more duties in searching titles, and this will be one more. Nevertheless, this is a very valuable provision.

The difficulty arose in a case of Burmester v. Burmester. There was a divorce in 1912. There was no order for maintenance, but there was a petition for maintenance in the following year. The wife making that petition heard that her husband, who had then gone to Vancouver, had become quite a wealthy land agent there. More than that, he had become engaged to a lady there and he was threatening to settle all his property on his new wife, as soon as they were married, or even before the mariage, as a marriage settlement. The former wife applied to the court here for an injunction to prevent him doing that while her petition for maintenance was pending. It was held that the court had no power to grant such an injunction.

Therefore, it is the case that a spiteful husband can dispose of his property with the intention of defeating his former wife's claim to maintenance and, as the law stands, she can do nothing about that. The Royal Commission advised strongly that the law should be put right in this respect and that the wife should be given the right, subject to the court's discretion and subject to satisfying the court that she deserves such maintenance as it may order, to apply to the court for that order.

The Royal Commission's recommendations were not quite the same as appear in Clause 2. The Royal Commission recommended that she should be able to make this application within one year after the maintenance order, and that the court should then be able to set aside any disposition which took place within three years before the order. That would have put any such disposition at risk for a period of four years. The Clause as drafted puts it at risk for only three years; the court can set aside such a transaction if it occurred within three years before the date of the application.

Of course, this does not affect a purchaser for value—that is, a person who has acquired any property from the former husband for valuable consideration, in good faith and without any notice of his intention to defeat his wife's claim. It does not affect any disposition by him by will, but it does affect a disposition by means of a marriage settlement, because in subsection (8) of Clause 2 "valuable consideration" does not include marriage. That goes a little further than the bankruptcy laws, but it seems to fit the case here because the case which one wants to meet is that of the husband who, getting married a second time, settles his property on his second wife in order to defeat the claims of his first wife. It seems that in those circumstances the Clause is meeting something which may be a possible injustice, and it certainly carries out the recommendations of the Royal Commission in this respect. So much for Clause 2.

Now I turn to practically the end of the Bill where there is a rather similar provision to Clause 2 to enable the courts to deal better with cases which come before them under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, involving disputes between husband and wife concerning property. There is, as the House will know, a summary form of procedure under Section 17 of the 1882 Act which enables the husband and wife to come before the court to settle disputes about property.

But there has been this difficulty in such proceedings, that the court has no power to make any order if the property itself has gone, if it cannot be traced. Nor has it any power to order a money judgment. So that, if, for example, the husband has disposed of the property and if it is not possible to trace that property into any other property or into any money, then the court is powerless to make any order. Clause 7 gives the court power to make orders in such a case. If the wife can show that her husband has had in his possession any money or property to which she was beneficially entitled, the power of the court is extended by the Clause to the making of an order for a money payment to the wife.

This difficulty clearly arose in the case of Tunstall v. Tunstall in 1950. In this case, to give an example of how the law stood and why it should now be amended, a house was purchased in 1927 for £720 by the husband and wife. In 1950 it was sold for £2,350 and the husband pocketed the money. There was no property and, there were no identifiable proceeds of sale and the court could make no order. It was quite powerless to make any order in favour of the wife. Under this Clause the court would have power to make an order for a money payment to the wife in such circumstances.

In subsection (7) of Clause 7 a further important point is dealt with, inasmuch as the court will have power to order a sale of property. Where the property is still in existence, one would have thought that the reasonable way of settling a dispute between husband and wife would be to say, "Sell the property and divide the proceeds." But the court had not got that power, as was shown in the case of Cobb v. Cobb.

A house at Wisbech was purchased jointly in the names of the husband and wife. The wife's parents came to stay in the house and that caused difficulties between the husband and wife, as it so frequently does, but they both continued to live in the house, as indeed did the parents. Nevertheless the husband took out a summons under Section 17 of the 1882 Act for a settlement of this dispute. His idea was to get the in-laws out by selling the house over their heads—perhaps a very wise idea. But, in fact, the court had no power to order a sale in those circumstances, and he failed. Subsection (7) of this Clause gives the court that power.

Finally, may I turn to the beginning of the Bill, to Clause 1 which clears up a rather ridiculous technical point. It is a point which is related to the time at which a maintenance order may be made. Under Section 19 of the 1950 Act, the court can make a maintenance order if the application is made "on" the making of any decree of dissolution or nullity of the marriage. The word "on" has been interpreted by the courts to mean at the time of what I would call the major decree or a reasonable time, a short time, afterwards. In the case of Scott v. Scott, when this problem was raised very acutely, the court held that seven years afterwards was too long and it could not make an order for maintenance in the circumstances.

The difficulty is usually overcome, in practice, by a wife who, although at the time of divorce she does not require a maintenance order, nevertheless includes an application for it in her petition. The court may then grant her a nominal order of, say, 1s. a month. If the wife is properly advised, that is the way she deals with it. But there have been cases in which the wife says that she really does not wish to make any claim against her husband for maintenance. She makes no claim at the time she lodges her petition for divorce, but afterwards her circumstances change and she does require maintenance from her husband. If she has left it too long, the court has no power to grant it. That technicality is removed by Clause 1 of the Bill. The court will have power to make a maintenance order no matter how long after the decree for dissolution or nullity the application for maintenance is made. Of course, the court must have regard to any delay on the part of the wife in making her application. That is provided for in Clause 1 (5).

I am sure that the House will also give consideration to the delay which I have caused it in being so long over the explanation of this Bill. I am very grateful to hon. Members for bearing with me for this length of time.

I am sure that hon. Members on both sides would like me to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) on the very clear way in which he has explained the Bill, having been called upon at very short notice to do so. I do not agree with all the views he expressed, but he put the matter clearly and, if I may say so, he has been extremely helpful to the House.

The Bill has reached its final stage virtually with no discussion on it. In my view, it is a distinctly controversial Measure, and it brings about very considerable changes in the law. The fact that it has reached this stage shows how important it is for back benchers—I take full responsibility in the House on these matters—to exercise their right to make sure that Private Members' Bills are not allowed to slip through with virtually no discussion. I have, on many occasions, taken appropriate action to prevent this happening, and I very much regret my omission in not doing so in regard to this Bill.

It is said in favour of the Bill that it has the support of the findings of the Royal Commission, although some of the findings were not, I believe, unanimous. It seems to me that nowadays we are getting very near the stage when it is said that any Bill which follows the recommendations of a Royal Commission, which are treated as sacrosanct, should automatically be passed quickly through the House. I profoundly disagree. The recent Report of the Wolfenden Commission supports my argument. A great many of its recommendations I profoundly disagree with, and I would oppose any legislation introduced in the House to carry them out.

From necessity, my intervention has to be extremely brief. Except for Clause 3, I do not object to any Clause in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Crosby suggested that Clause 3 did not really introduce a new principle. I disagree with that view. Clause 3 enables a guilty wife in any circumstances to deprive an innocent husband's estate of part of its assets, possibly in some cases to the detriment of the children of a second marriage. I cannot believe that that is right or in accordance with our principles of British justice. That is my only real objection to the Bill. I hope very much that when it reaches another place careful consideration will be given to it to see that what is, in my view, a cause for very serious reproach can be taken out of the Bill and so that it will not become the law of the land.

It is said—my hon. Friend's argument was extremely impressive—that of course we must not overlook the fact that all these matters and all proceedings to be taken against the estate of a deceased innocent spouse are in the discretion of the court. That is perfectly true, and I should be the last to criticise how High Court judges and other judges exercise their discretion. But there is always a great difficulty about a judge having discretion in matters such as this, because, by and large, if a judge does make a mistake in exercising his discretion, it is very difficult to persuade the Court of Appeal to overrule him.

I do not criticise the Court of Appeal for this, but it is almost always said, in cases concerning maintenance orders, children, or, indeed, property, that these are matters in the discretion of the judge. The court does not think that it should intervene because the judge had had all the evidence before him and made his mind up on the facts. I am always nervous, therefore, when in matters like this discretion is left with the judge, although, of course, in saying that, I do not in any way criticise the judges. This matter should not, in my view, be left to the discretion of the judge, although it is quite correct to say that it did have the limited support of the Royal Commission.

I hold very strongly the view I have expressed about Clause 3. It needs very much more careful thought than has been given to it until now, and I hope that, when the Bill reaches another place, consideration will be given to the comments I have made about it.

Broadly speaking, the Bill is entirely acceptable to the House and, speaking personally, I would entirely support it. Three hon. Gentlemen, however, have spoken about Clause 3, and I intervene particularly because the House may desire to hear the view of an Opposition lawyer. Indeed, the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden) expressed a wish to hear it.

I do not share the doubts expressed about Clause 3. The hon. Member for Southend, East spoke as if the Clause conferred a right. It does not confer a right; it confers only a discretionary claim. It seems to me that, inasmuch as the wife has to establish that, in the first place, it is reasonable, and that, in hearing her claim, the court has to consider her conduct, her own assets and all the circumstances, even if one takes the extreme and rigid view of the guilty spouse taken by the hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell), nevertheless the Clause is justified. It merely extends the existing law to the estate of a deceased husband.

Speaking for myself, I do not approach the matter in the same way as the hon. and learned Member for Bolton. East approaches it. I feel that his rigid division of spouses into those who are guilty and those who are not guilty is somewhat too arbitrary and does not correspond with the facts. One has to have a much more flexible approach, and the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) exactly expressed my own feelings about it. Speaking from this side of the House, therefore, I do not share the doubts about Clause 3, and I hope that the Bill may be given a Third Reading.

Am I to understand that what you are saying is that this is a discretionary claim, but——

I have said nothing.

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that this is a discretionary claim? Am I to understand that this is a claim that does not exist at the moment? Is there an alteration in the law or not?

May I assist my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden), in answering his question to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice), because I think that it is best to answer the points as we go along. If my hon. Friend will look at the terms of Clause 3, he will see that what it does is to confer a power to make an order upon an application, but there is nothing whatsoever to compel the court to make an order. It confers a right on an applicant to make an application for an order in the circumstances there indicated. That is all it does.

I am very glad to hear that everyone who has spoken, with the possible exception of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell), does not oppose the Third Reading of the Bill. One is driven inevitably to the conclusion that it would be an outstanding pity if the House were to deny a Third Reading to the Bill because it objects to the provisions of only one Clause in the Bill. I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) did the House great service in drawing attention to what was done by other Clauses.

The reason why we have reached Third Reading without the sign of slightest opposition to any provision in the Bill is that all the provisions in the Bill, with the possible exception of Clause 3, are heartily welcome to hon. Members on both sides and it would clearly be the greatest pity to lose the advantage of the other provisions simply because Clause 3 has been allowed to reach this rather, if I may say without impertinence, strained Third Reading debate without anybody succeeding in getting on to the Order Paper at any stage anything that would raise a debate on Clause 3.

It is easy to understand that some people feel that it is always wrong that the so-called innocent party to the divorce should be required to pay maintenance to the so-called guilty spouse. But, of course, the discussion is not about that point. That has been part of our law for a long time and will remain part of our law when the Bill is enacted. There is a distinction between a power in the court to make the so-called innocent spouse support the so-called guilty spouse during life and a power which is new under the Bill to permit the court to make an order against the estate of the so-called innocent spouse.

I hope that my hon. Friends who have objected to that conception will bear in mind how difficult it would be to justify a different principle after death from what can be done during the life of the spouse. The sole difference that anyone can suggest is that developed by my hon. Friends, namely, that after his death a man may not be able to defend himself against the assaults upon his estate of the guilty ex-wife. Of course, that is true. I do not think there is necessarily a distinction, as one of my hon. Friends suggested, that after death the children of a second marriage may be interested in the estate. They are very often present during life, because the second marriage occurs during life and the question of making provision for the guilty first wife may arise during life in the same way.

I hope that the House will take the view—and I speak on behalf of the Government in saying this—that sufficient power is provided for the court to take into account every consideration of that kind, namely, the needs of other persons interested in the estate of the deceased, and that there is sufficient provision to enable a wise judge to take into account all those factors before he thinks of making provision out of the estate for the guilty spouse. The existing power to make provision during the life of the innocent party has been used very sparingly indeed and I think that the power to make provision out of the estate would be used even more sparingly in the altogether exceptional case.

On the other hand, the fact that that is altogether exceptional is not, in our belief, a reason for not making an enactment to deal with it. It is true that this was supported by a majority recommendation of the Royal Commission, but it is right to point out that the minority desired to put an end to the existing power to make provision for a guilty spouse during the life of the innocent spouse. If we follow the existing law, and do not change it, as is clearly the intention of those who oppose Clause 3, because they made no attempt during the passage of the Bill to effect that change, it does seem an extreme position to take up, namely, that one must not deal with the position after death on the same principle as the law deals with the position during life.

I hope that my hon. Friends who are opposed to the principle see how narrow is the extension made by the Bill in this field and do not feel that their opposition to Clause 3 as it stands could in any way justify depriving the public of the valuable provisions contained in the rest of the Bill, particularly those provisions that will put an end to what I might call ex-spouses' stripping.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

I would thank the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the help and advice which he gave to the House during the Second Reading debate and in Committee.

The previous Bill, to which we have just given a Third Reading, affected arrangements which were made nearly a hundred years ago. This Bill concerns things which were fixed 120 years ago. It is time a change were made. The Bill touches a specific matter, threatening and insulting behaviour, concerning which a penalty of 40s. was fixed for the Metropolitan Area 120 years ago, a sum which seems inadequate when judged by modern standards.

I was glad to have the assurance of the Joint Under-Secretary of State on Second Reading that, possibly as a result of the introduction of the Bill, the whole question of penalties for offences specified in Section LIV of the 1839 Act was being reconsidered by the Home Office. Those offences range widely, from persons accused of the offence that they did

"expose for Show or Sale (except in a Market lawfully appointed for that Purpose,) or feed or fodder any Horse or other Animal,"

down to every person

"who shall fly any Kite or play al any Game to Annoyance of the Inhabitants or Passengers."

Those are occupations with which hon. Members of the House are not now familiar, but which were evidently regarded as dangerous then.

The Bill is small, but it has wide implications. It has been welcomed from both sides of the House and I hope that the House will this afternoon give it a unanimous Third Reading.

I beg to second the Motion.

I believe that in doing so I have the support of the vast majority of people in the country, who are extremely perturbed at the goings on of Teddy boy gangs. These gangs disturb the peace of the country, not only by their bad crimes but by their insulting behaviour. I hope that this Bill will curb their activities.

When we talk about punishment, what do we really mean? We do not punish people just for the sake of it. We punish for one reason, and that reason is to produce a deterrent. If a punishment does deter people from committing crimes or from recommitting crimes—and there are many who are recommitting crimes—it is a step in the right direction. For a punishment to be a deterrent it must be felt.

At the present, we see increased wage claims being made throughout the country to bring people's pay up to the value of the £ at present. In exactly the same way fines, if they are to be a deterrent, should be increased. For example, if when these penalties were first brought in it was intended that they should take two or three weeks' wages to pay them, it makes a mockery of the whole system if the amounts of the fines can be earned in a few hours. I think it is perfectly right that these fines should be increased.

However, there is one question which worries me, and it is this. How can we be certain that the youths I am referring to who commit these crimes really pay the fines themselves? I raised this subject in this House quite recently. I believe it is true that in many cases the parents pay these fines. I believe it is also true that in many cases the parents are themselves to blame. The fact remains, however, that the perpetrators of the crimes themselves should be made to pay and to suffer the punishment.

I wonder whether, when this Bill goes to another place, that question will be considered. I wonder whether it would be possible to have the amount of the fines stopped from the pay packets of the offenders. I hope some method could be found to ensure that these fines are paid by the criminals themselves. Would it be possible to impound the Teddy boys' suits until they do pay the fines?—because they are pretty revolting at the present moment. Further to that, I wonder if it would be possible to cut off the Teddy boys' curls and to continue cutting them off until the Teddy boys pay their fines.

I believe it was Gilbert in the "Mikardo" who said

"Make the punishment fit the crime."

I believe that is just what we have to do at the present moment. I am quite certain that much of the punishment at present is far too lenient. I suggest to magistrates that if we were to have a little less binding over and a little more bending over we might get a certain amount of improvement in their behaviour and a more effective deterrent for these young, stupid men.

I support the Bill because I think it goes a certain way to strengthen the deterrent against crime. I do not think it goes far enough, and I hope that when it goes to another place these few points I have put forward will be seriously considered.

I intervene for only a moment to speak in support of this Bill. I agree with all that has been said about the desirability of bringing up to date the punishments for the offences which are so rife today, and I entirely agree with my hon. Friends in what they have said about the desirability of bringing the fines more in line with the modern earning capacity of some of those who are guilty of this insulting and gross behaviour.

I am, however, forced, in the interests of my constituency, to utter just one word of warning. As I understand it, this Bill applies only to the Metropolitan Police area. Apparently, those who commit these acts of insulting behaviour in the Metropolitan Police area will, when the Bill becomes law, be subjected to heavier fines for such behaviour than they would if they were to commit that same insulting behaviour outside the Metropolitan Police District.

Outside the Metropolitan Police area the maximum fines are fixed by the local authorities, and local authorities outside the Metropolitan Police area have authority to inflict penalties up to £100. If they have not done so, I think it is largely due to the fact that in London, the centre of the United Kingdom, the maximum has been 40s., and for that reason in the provinces the fines have tended to be rather on the low side. It is my hope, of course, that when the provinces see what London is now doing, as I hope it will do today, they may be encouraged to increase the penalties accordingly.

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. I think that is something which ought to be brought out in consideration of this Bill. I imagine that a number of the local authorities are not aware of this power they have. Alternatively, they have not chosen to act upon it. It gives me some consolation to know that they can.

I must confess that when I first heard that the penalties for this insulting behaviour were to be increased in London I had some fear, in view of the fact that I represent a constituency quite close to London, that there might be some migration of the lads who are indulging in this insulting behaviour from London to my constituency in the hope that they might get away with that behaviour there on the cheap. I am glad to hear that that is not the case.

I hope that the Council of the County Borough of Southend, if it is the body responsible for the administration of fines for offences of this character, will take heart from the fact that the House of Commons has decided, as I hope it is about to do, that these penalties shall be increased in the Metropolitan Police area, and I hope it will be encouraged to take quite drastic action to increase the fines for similar offences there, should they ever occur there, although, of course, that is unlikely in normal circumstances, for riotous and insulting behaviour is unlikely at Southend, which is well known to be one of the leading and best conducted seaside resorts of this country.

However, were this Measure to result in driving the perpetrators of these offences from London to Southend in the hope of committing their offences more cheapily it might have serious consequences. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us that local authorities outside London have power to forestall them. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the Bill, and I am sure the people of Southend will be, also.

I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State, who, I hope, will intervene in the debate, will make it clear that the attention of local authorities outside London will be drawn to the power which they possess with a view to securing that there shall be some uniformity in practice throughout the whole of the country in this matter.

If I understood my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden) rightly, he was suggesting that a Government circular might be sent to local authorities, other than those in the Metropolitan Police area, suggesting that they should bring their byelaws into line with the provisions of the Bill. I speak without having had the opportunity of considering the point, but I think it is a matter which might be attended by certain difficulties. However, I will at least consider it and will write to my hon. Friend about it.

I am sure the House and all who live in the Metropolitan area are grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Lang-stone (Mr. Stevens) for his initiative in introducing the Bill, which, although very narrow in its terms, does cover an important point. Teddy boys have been mentioned, but they are not the only people against whom the police have to proceed in the Metropolitan area for using insulting words and behaviour.

Let it not be thought that this Bill will prevent serious crime, but it will assist the police very greatly indeed to be able to prosecute people who are a nuisance, or exhibitionists, and who sometimes move on from that condition into being criminals, in the knowledge that the courts will have power to award sufficiently large fines to affect the offenders' pockets.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Dance) asked whether these fines really are paid. I have not the figures with me, although I produced them for the House on another occasion recently. It is interesting to note that an extremely large percentage of all the fines awarded in this country are paid. There are very few ultimate bad debts, and the percentage of people who have to be sent to prison in default of payment of fine is in these days very small.

The question whether the offenders themselves, if they are Teddy boys, will pay the fines, or whether their parents will do so, was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove. It is a difficult question to answer and, candidly, in the case of very young offenders I do not think it is a terribly important one. As my hon. Friend himself rightly pointed out, the parents have some responsibility in this matter, and the good conduct of the youths must be to some extent a matter of proper control and understanding by the parents of their children. The great thing, however, is that if young people indulge in insulting words and behaviour they can now be more heavily fined, and either they or their parents, or both, will feel the consequences more severely.

I might be out of order if I attempted to answer the various other interesting points that have been raised, but we shall not forget them.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

I am moving this Motion in the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Summers), the promoter of the Bill.

This Bill deals with a comparatively narrow point. As will be well known, local authorities now have power to make gifts to certain organisations concerned with physical training and recreation. However, under the existing law, as I understand it, they do not have the power to make loans to these organisations.

The purpose of this excellent Bill, which was considered in Committee and amended, is to confer on local authorities the power to make loans to such voluntary organisations for various types of activities—towards the expense of providing and maintaining gymnasiums, playing fields, swimming baths and other facilities. It also includes power for a local authority to make a loan to a voluntary organisation for meeting any expenses of the organisation, being expenses towards which the local authority could make a contribution under Clause 1. In other words, whereas formerly local authorities have had the power to make gifts, and gifts only, the Bill proposes that they shall now have power, if it is thought desirable by the local authority, to make loans for similar excellent purposes.

There must be many towns and villages throughout this country where there exist hard-working, voluntary organisations which are doing a great deal of useful, desirable and necessary work. It has been a handicap in the past that although they have been capable of planning some scheme, such as those outlined in this Bill, which they are capable of themselves financing in the long run, in the short run they are unable to provide the necessary capital for launching the project. It would seem to be altogether praiseworthy that the local authorities should be able to make loans to organisations which can be repaid from the income they will derive from such schemes in subsequent years, rather than local authorities should be confined to having the power only to make gifts.

This seems to me to be a commendable step forward and one which all sides of the House will, I hope, welcome, because all of us are familiar with the great deal of useful work done by voluntary organisations in our own constituencies and elsewhere. For instance, in my own constituency there is a crying need for an indoor swimming pool. We have now only a small one which is run by a private school in the area. Some hon. Members might wonder why we want an indoor pool in view of the great facilities for bathing which exist in Southend at least twice in every twenty-four hours—not all the time, but when the tide comes in. We have an excellent open air pool, but there is this demand in my constituency, as I do not doubt there is in the constituencies of other hon. Members, for the provision of an indoor pool. If a body of interested people could be banded together, prepared to undertake such a project, and the local authority were in a position, not to provide all the money but to make a loan to start them on the process of the provision of this facility, it would be much welcomed by my constituents.

I do not doubt that hon. Members on both sides of the House will be able to think of many desirable projects in their own constituencies which would come to fruition as a result of the passage of this Measure; not as a result of increasing the burden on the ratepayers by the council paying the whole cost, but by the council making a loan to these voluntary bodies to enable them to carry out this excellent and desirable work of improving the physical training and recreation of the people of Great Britain.

In the absence of my hon. Friend, I have every confidence in commending this Measure to the House. I hope it will find a ready acceptance from those who are interested in the important work of encouraging voluntary organisations to provide these amenities with the assistance of local authorities through loans, instead of restricting them, as hitherto to gifts from local authorities.

I wish to support this Bill. I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden) in his wish for an indoor swimming pool for his constituency, despite its existing amenities, but I submit that this Bill will serve an even more useful purpose for many small authorities throughout the country who have not the amenities enjoyed by Southend.

I congratulate the promoter and sponsors of the Bill, and I would like to have seen it go even further. Nevertheless, it is an advance, since until now local authorities have been prohibited from making loans or interesting themselves financially in projects which this Bill covers. So it is an important Measure and one to which, I think, we should all give our loyal support.

On a point of order, Sir Charles. May I draw your attention to the fact that there is not a quorum present?

I am sorry, but a count cannot be called before one o'clock.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

This Bill has been described by its opponents as being the thin end of the wedge. It is nothing of the kind. It is a simple Measure, designed to implement some of the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and its origin does not lie in any conspiracy against the bookmaking profession but in a debate in this House on 9th March, 1956. On that day, unfortunately, having spoken, I had to leave before the Minister replied, but in my speech I said that I would believe that any Government, be it Conservative or Labour, would implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission only when I saw it. I went further and said that I did not believe that any Government would have the guts to tackle this very difficult problem.

After I had left the House, the Minister, with the authority of the Home Secretary, accepted the recommendations of the Royal Commission and indicated that the Government intended to introduce comprehensive legislation. Indeed, he was kind enough to refer to me in his remarks in order to deny my somewhat pessimistic view. That was two years ago; we still have not had that legislation, and I believe that two years from now, whatever may be the Administration, we still shall not have had a comprehensive Measure.

In the course of my speech in 1956, I said that I sailed under the flag of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede). Like him, I am a reformer. When dealing with problems of this kind, even when great social evils are involved, I do not believe that one should try to box the compass in a short space of time. It is our national tradition when a wrong has been discovered and a remedy is indicated to go into it very gradually and then, step by step, to seek a solution in accordance with the mood and needs of the times.

There is no doubt whatever that the betting laws relating to horse racing are every day flouted from John o'Groats to Land's End. When that happens, it not only brings the betting law into disrepute, but the corruption and the complicity that that breeds spreads throughout the whole of the community. I am sure that my right hon. Friend was influenced, when he formed his opinion on these matters, by the fact that wherever one finds major corruption amongst the police it stems, in the first instance, from the abuse of the betting law.

This is not to say that every policeman or bookmaker is seeking the one to corrupt the other. I do not believe that. But no hon. Member in any part of the House, whatever may be his views about this Bill can deny that in his constituency the betting laws every day—even as I speak—are flouted. That is not only wrong in law but it reveals a great social evil that should be put right. A problem of such magnitude, however, cannot be tackled by a private Member. It is a job for the Executive. That is one of the reasons for my belief that the present Administration have failed in their duty in not bringing forward the promised comprehensive legislation.

Having said that, I go back to my speech of March, 1956, and say that there are some things that a private Member can do and ought to try to do. Racing, and the betting connected with it, is an industry that brings pleasure to thousands. Indeed, I think that during the war it was actively tied to the maintenance of morale. Many a man will work a little harder because he is waiting for the result of the 4.30, or will work harder during the week with the prospect of a day's racing at the end of it. If he has enough money, he has access to as many accounts as he wants with as many starting price bookmakers as he wants.

I am not, however, seeking to indulge in wholesale reform of the law relating to bookmakers. By this Bill, I have sought to extend very modestly the powers of the Racecourse Betting Control Board. That Board operates in the interest of the public and of good racing. Bats are placed with the Tote, and from deductions from the bets which are made considerable sums of money are syphoned back into racing in a variety of ways. It is non-profit making. The bigger its turnover the more money it makes, the more efficiently it is run, and the more money there will be for racing.

Whatever may be Members' views about my Bill or about betting on moral grounds, there is no doubt that a crisis has come to English racing. There was a time when the English thoroughbred was the best in the world. It established its pre-eminence by the only test that matters—the test of the race course. When challengers came across from France and tried to win the Derby they were not very successful. Now they come here to all our more valuable races and it is quite an event for English horses to do well. Our best stallions and some of our best mares are being exported. I hope my hon. Friends will not regard this as a tip, but there is more than a chance that the first, second and third places in the Derby and, indeed, in the Oaks will be filled by horses from across the Channel. That is not good either for the bloodstock industry or for national prestige.

The reason for this—and I am not throwing any bricks—is that the most powerful single interest in racing is not the Jockey Club but the bookmaking profession. That is the most powerful and, indeed, the most woeful influence. I should like to see racing, as an industry and as a pastime, so organise itself that the arrangements between the Jockey Club and the bookmaker, or the bookmaker and the backer, are established on a basis which takes into account all the interests involved. That is the ideal way. But there is no sign of the bookmaking profession or of racing as a whole putting its house in order.

I am not unmindful of an announcement in the Press today that the stewards of the Jockey Club have said that the starting price bookmakers are at last considering a scheme whereby some money may be given to racing. About time, too. It may be that this little Bill, which created quite a disturbance in the bookmaking profession, causing millions of slanderous leaflets to be printed and distributed up and down the country, has begun to work already and has hastened the announcement of this reform. But it does not go far enough.

Let me repeat, in the hope that my words may reach some quarters which seem to be oblivious to rational argument, that I am not seeking wholesale reform. I am seeking a modest first step in the right direction of making the Racecourse Betting Control Board a more economic and efficient instrument. By this method, I hope it will be able to reduce its overheads and make a greater contribution to racing.

What does this Bill set out to do in detail? First, it implements two of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. It empowers the Board to accept bets on credit and, by cash, through the post. That is not a revolutionary proposal, and I emphasise that there is nothing in this which will legalise the setting up of betting shops. It will not be possible under this Bill for any person to resort to any premises for the purpose of making a bet. The bet must be made by post, and it can be made on credit, or by cash, and to that extent it puts the Racecourse Betting Control Board on all fours with the starting price bookmakers. There may be some hon. Gentlemen who are worried——

Will the hon. Gentleman make it clear that not only may the bets be made by post but—I think it is right—that they can also be made by telephone?

That, I would think, is a detail. If they can be communicated by the written word I would have thought it would follow that they could be communicated by the spoken word. The point I am dealing with is the thought which may exist in some Members' minds that this may be the thin end of the wedge towards the setting up of betting shops. I should have thought that there were two words already in the Bill which make it just possible for confusion to arise. If the Bill reaches the Committee stage I shall be prepared to move to delete the words "for cash" in Clause 1 (3). That would remove all possible doubt on this point and would establish that bets will be on credit only and that it will only be possible to carry out transactions by post. If any hon. Member is worried about this, as I say, I shall be prepared to consider an Amendment; but I would have thought that it is a matter not of principle but of convenience. I should have thought that if it is done by post there would be no objection to it being done by telephone.

If bets are going to be made on credit, and if they are going to be made in any way in which there is a time lag between the decision to make a bet and the arrival of the bet at the Racecourse Betting Control Board, it follows that the successful punter will want his or her money. It may well be that, through delays in the post, a bet may arrive so late as not to be included in the pool. Therefore, under Clause 1 (2, b) power is given to the Board to act as a bookmaker and to pay the winning bet even though it is not included in the pool. That will guard against a breakdown in communications or a delay in the post.

Another important thing that Clause 1 does is to enable the Board to instal electronic computing machinery at a central place—let us say in London—to which place the bets would be fed back by telephone, the computing machine doing the donkey work. The Tote would have this machine permanently installed in a central place, and it would only be necessary to transport from racecourse to racecourse the actual selling machinery. I should think no hon. Member could object to that. It would lessen the administrative costs and, therefore, would help the Racecourse Betting Control Board to do its job more cheaply.

It seems to me that the controversial part of the Bill is in Clause 2. It implements a recommendation of the Royal Commission in that it prohibits any person other than the Board from carrying on pari-mutuel or pool betting on horse races or from accepting any bet save with the Board's permission. In the literature which has been put out by the less informed section of the bookmaking profession, this is regarded as limiting the power of the bookmaker and as the thin end of the wedge towards a Tote monopoly. My answer is that that is arrant nonsense. The Tote cannot lay starting price bets. Why, then, should a bookmaker be able to lay Tote prices and not make any contribution to the means whereby those prices are assessed? The Tote board, be it noted, is not out to make a profit; it is concerned with siphoning money back into racing. Therefore, to give the Tote board the right to have a monopoly only so far as the running of totes and pools is concerned seems to me eminently reasonable.

If it be that some people, who are not very financially ambitious and who are not likely to affect the Tote turnover may want to run a totalisator. They may do so, provided that they get the Tote board's permission. I do not believe that permission would be unreasonably withheld. The board would, of course, want to be satisfied that a contribution or a percentage from the private tote found its way back into the Tote fund, as by so doing the private tote would then be making a contribution to racing.

The hon. Gentleman says that some other unambitious or, indeed, ambitious body which wanted to run a tote would apply to the Racecourse Betting Control Board, as I understand it, and could get a licence. Would such people be subject to the 30 per cent. pools betting duty, whereas the Tote is not?

The Bill is not an annex to the Finance Act. It is not the servant of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If the hon. Gentleman is upset by the idea that bookmakers who want to run pools should be subject to the law of the land, I am not shocked by it. That is the fact. If they run pools under this arrangement, they would need a licence from the Racecourse Betting Control Board, and, of course, they would be subject to the ordinary provisions of the Finance Act, as is any other citizen.

Not the Tote.

The Racecourse Betting Control Board is a public body, nonprofit making, set up to serve the interests of racing and not the private interests of the bookmaker. The House, in its wisdom, has decided that it should not pay. In any case, if the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that this is a grievous fault, I hope he will look with some care—I am sure that he has—at the vast sums which are made by starting price bookmakers, every penny of which goes into their pockets. There is no check of any kind on that. The fact that a person who wants to run a pool or a tote should have to obtain permission from the Racecourse Betting Control Board and then have to pay tax to the Treasury seems to me to be in no sense a hardship. With great respect to the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden), I do not think that he puts it forward as a serious point which he really wants me to answer. He knows the answer perfectly well.

The next point which may be regarded as controversial, though I should not regard it so, is that my Bill gives the Racecourse Batting Control Board the copyright in its prices. I do not want to send anybody to prison or see anybody fined. I should have thought that one of the simplest ways of clearing up this situation was to vest the copyright, be it in starting prices or Tote prices, in those who create them. The question of copyright in the starting price is a matter for the bookmaking profession. That is its business. The Tote price will cost a great deal of money to establish. The price quoted is, therefore, the property of the Racecourse Betting Control Board. If the Board limits the use of that price to those to whom it has given permission, that again would seem to me to be absolutely straightforward. I should have thought that it would have appealed to hon. Gentlemen opposite with overwhelming force, because it is a protection for the rights of property.

To my hon. Friends I should have thought the Bill would appeal, for quite different reasons. Here is a public board, with a non-profit making motive, seeking to administer funds obtained from the public in the public good. At one time, such sentiments were tied up with the socialist faith of my hon. and right hon. Friends. I should have thought that this would be regarded as a practical application of it.

However, when people have to meet the kind of propaganda to which I have referred, they are led into difficulties. When knowledge of the Bill is confined to what can be gained from literature of the kind circulated by the bookmakers, obviously people's judgment is affected. We saw an example of that today, when an attempt was made to count the House out earlier by hon. Gentlemen who, I have no doubt, were not seeking to stop the Drainage Bill. They wanted to stop the Betting Bill. I would say to them and to the interests for whom they speak that if they wanted to count the House out and obstruct my Bill, they ought to have taken the trouble to understand the Standing Orders of the House. If, in future, they ever want to do it—perhaps, I should hope, in a better cause than the one they chose today—and they come to me, I will give them some assistance. Perhaps we shall be a little more successful on such an occasion than they were today.

I think I should make it clear to the House that I made a mistake. A count was called at one minute to one o'clock. After a lapse of two minutes, I could have counted the House, which would have brought it after one o'clock. I think that it was my mistake in not allowing it. I apologise.

I had perceived that, too, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I was fully aware that it was your mistake in acting in contravention of Standing Order No. 27, the operative factor being not whether the count is called two minutes before one o'clock but whether the count is actually taken after one o'clock.

There is nothing in the Standing Order about two minutes.

No, Sir, but it is a question of before or after, and if I had been in the hon. Gentleman's place I should have called your attention to the fact that you were in error. That is my charge against those hon. Members concerned, that they came here, first of all, not having read my Bill, and secondly, that they had not read the Standing Orders. Therefore, I should think that they would probably serve their interest much better——

Who is my hon. Friend referring to as "them"? If there are any "thems", I should like to know who they are.

I would reply by using the old saying, "If the cap fits, wear it." If my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Mr. D. Griffiths) had wanted to call attention to the point at the time, perhaps he could have borrowed the hat and explained that very truth. My allusion is particularly apt.

I want, if I may, to deal now with Clause 3, which might be overlooked. Clause 3 gives certain additional powers to the Board. In the past, the Board has been faced with the difficulty of being unable to carry through schemes of which it wholeheartedly approved but which the terms of the present law prevented it from handling. For example, the Board has been asked to provide finance for the purpose of effecting a scheme for the centralisation of racing. It has been asked to make advances to racecourses to enable them to rebuild their stands. It has been asked to provide financial help for the Equine Research Station of the Animal Health Trust, and it has been asked to assume responsibility for the finance and operation of the National Stud.

I will not comment on whether those proposals are worthwhile or not. All I say is that, under the law as it at present stands, the Racecourse Betting Control Board would be unable to consider any schemes of that kind. My Bill seeks to widen the powers of the Board, through Section 3, so that it may give practical thought to schemes which otherwise would be debarred to it.

I hope that the Bill will receive a Second Reading on its merits. Although it is late in the Session, I wonder whether the Government may find some means whereby it could be given facilities to find its way to the Statute Book. I deny absolutely the suggestion that it is the thin end of the wedge or that the Bill goes one single step further than I have indicated. It is a simple, limited step in the direction in which one hopes that, one day, some Government will go in order to rationalise the betting laws of this country.

I say now, as I said two years ago, that I am by all my instincts a reformer. I see life in terms of jobs to be done. Betting is a social problem that has got out of hand. As I have already said, we have only to consider the repeated cases of corruption among the police. This is caused not because they are bad men; it is because they are faced with temptations which they ought not to be faced with, and because they come in contact with them day after day they eventually end up in wrongdoing.

The Bill takes only the first step in the direction of getting this evil put right. I believe it would be for the good of the Racecourse Betting Control Board. I believe that it would benefit the bookmaking profession, much as some of them are against it. I also believe that it would be for the good of this House, for it would add to its reputation by facing one of the problems of our times. It seeks in a limited way to put right something that has been crying out for a long time to be done.

I rise to support this limited and modest Bill. As this is a Second Reading debate, I hope that I will remain in order if I ask the House to consider the Bill against the general background of the betting laws. I hope that those who are against the Bill will be able to reconcile their interests, whatever they may be, with this modest Bill. The debates on betting assume the same sort of pattern year after year, and I will try to be brief.

The first point that I want to make is that the present laws are obviously not only unfair, but unenforceable. In my opinion, they are ridiculous and make ridiculous a Government that allows them to continue. I think that the shame for these present laws lies on the shoulders of all of us in this Chamber, because we are tolerating something which is nonsense. I accept the fact that the present laws are unfair and unenforceable. This Bill seeks to extend the scope of the Tote, which does have a method of helping racing.

I have to declare an interest in racing. When hon. Members declare an interest I always imagine that they are declaring something profitable. I can only say that I am declaring an interest, but a loss, in racing. The plutocratic approach attributed to those connected with racing suggests that the interests are profitable, but I can honestly say that that is not strictly true in most cases.

If help is to be given to racing there must be some evidence that it is necessary from the public point of view as well as from the point of view of those who promote an entertainment that according to the Royal Commission gives entertainment to up to 4 million people a day, and on big race days up to 20 million people. If the people who provide this entertainment are losing millions of pounds each year, something should be done about it, if possible.

I do not want to bore the House with figures, but I have made a comparison with British racing and French racing, which is so simple I feel that anyone can understand it. For better or worse, in France there is a Tote monopoly. I do not think that this is a good idea and it certainly would not suit England.

In France, the production of thoroughbred racehorses was one-third of ours before the war. It is now one-half. Their production is increasing. The measure of France's success in our major race, the Derby, for the twelve years before the war was one winner. For the twelve years after the war it is five. Therefore, they are five times as successful as before the war in our major race.

The French entries in the Derby, before the war, amounted to 15 per cent. Just after the war it was 25 per cent. and now it is 35 per cent. I give these figures to show that our greatest rival is increasing production and increasing the excellence of its whole racing industry. The figure of our production of horses is now static. It is the same as before the war. It increased slightly after the war, but it is now roughly the same.

Our success in our own big races is lamentable. We have managed to win only six of the Derbys which have been run in the twelve years after the war. One winner was really American bred and five winners were French.

On the other hand, our exports have doubled in volume. That does not matter but what does matter is the quality which we are now having to export. Any hon. Member who has had anything to do with breeding must accept the fact that if one exports the very best in one's garden or farmyard, or anything like that, inevitably one's own stock must decline. Hitherto, we have always exported the second best. May I give this simile? We are exporting plant. Suppose we had to export our dockyards. How would we then be able to export ships? It is as if we are exporting factories instead of the plant, or the goose instead of the golden egg.

This is the condition of racing at present. I do not think that any hon. Member who knows anything about racing will deny this. I have said it myself in the racing Press and it has never been seriously contended. There is need for help in this industry. Regarding exports, someone has published in the Press that we import £6 million worth of bloodstock and export only £5 million worth. What this person does not realise is the way that the Government work. The Government work in very peculiar ways, but a no more peculiar way than in assessing the export and importation of bloodstock. If one sends a mare to France and while, in France, it has a foal, it then comes back to this country weeks later as an import. The figures that the Government are able to give make no sense at all. They classify horses that come into this country to be eaten and those that come in to be ridden on the same lines.

Can the hon. Member tell us what is the net export of bloodstock?

All exported horses have at some stage to go through an agency. If one does a deal with a foreigner the horse has to be insured, transported and sold. The agencies agree, largely speaking, that the figure is probably between £1½ million to £2 million a year.

I wonder whether the hon. Member could give us the ratio between bloodstock and all horses?

I cannot give the ratio in numbers, but the cash value of the horses exported that are not thoroughbred is very small. One has only to export one throughbred horse worth £25,000 or so, which does happen each year, to offset hundreds of the other sorts of horses exported which average about £60, £70, £80, £90 or £100 each. If one exports a cob or carthorse it may be worth £200, but it does not compare in cash value to bloodstock. I do not think that anyone can give the exact figures.

I suggest, and everyone agrees, that there should be some association with the volume of money gambled and those people who promote the entertainment. There is unreality in many people's minds when they talk about gambling legislation. The first kind of unreality lies in the mind of the Government. All our discussion will amount to nothing unless the Government mean to do what they have said they would do. I must call attention to the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes), when he was speaking for the Government, more than two years ago. He said:

"I wish to make it quite clear that it is the Government's intention to deal with this matter as soon as opportunity presents itself by introducing a Bill to implement the main lines of the Royal Commission's recommendations … It is being prepared for introduction at the earliest practicable opportunity."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1956: Vol. 549, c. 2555.]

Will my hon. Friend read the other extract from the same speech, where my hon. Friend said that we had reached the end of Private Members' legislation on the subject.

My hon. Friend has been able to catch Mr. Speaker's eye more than once today already, and I have no doubt that he will have an opportunity to do so again later, when he can raise that point. I have not the reference at my fingertips at the moment to do what he has asked.

The Government have virtually promised to do something about betting. I am not convinced that an alternative Government could do anything at all, although hon. Members opposite may say they would. There is such a thing as passing laws for the sake of good government. No one could conceivably support the laws as they are. It is alleged that if nothing is done about the betting laws it is because the Government do not think there are votes to be won, but I submit that that is not true. A lot of legislation passes through this House regardless of whether there are no votes to be won or lost. It is just good government that has prompted it. The only people who would be conscious of this sort of Bill are those who take part in betting and who all know that the laws ought to be remedied, and a very small minority of people who think that betting is morally wrong. I do not suggest that they reflect the great proportion of the people.

I only hope that the Government will implement their promise. If they do not, the kindest thing that we might say is that the Government are feeble. The unkindest thing is that they are somewhat misleading. Having said what they have said, it might be construed as being misleading if nothing happens. They have plenty of time to mend their ways, and I only hope that they do.

The second stratum of unreality is that as soon as one talks about betting people say, "You want a Tote monopoly". I believe that that is the view of hon. Members who are opposing the Bill. There is no question of wanting a Tote monopoly in this country. It has been proved that whatever practical advantages there may be in such an idea there is no advantage to the public.

The third unreality is that it has been reported in the Press that the racing authorities would only support a Bill into which were written some guarantee that a proportion of off-course money would go back to racing. I wish I thought that were possible, but I cannot see that the idea is realistic. I do not think that that will ever come.

What, then, is the objective? The first objective should be to legalise betting as such. The second should be to help those bookmakers who are trying to help themselves, and help the racing industry. Very rough things are said about bookmakers. One cannot judge any profession by the least worthy members of it. In this honourable House some hon. Members might be considered as more honourable than other hon. Members. It is unfair to judge the bookmaking profession by some of its worst elements.

We are informed that those who represent bookmakers are trying to get the bookmakers a legal status. This would be admirable. It is intolerable for people to be asked to contribute something to an industry or an entertainment when their own profession is not legal. One can agree with the efforts of bookmakers to put their house in order. This fits in with the general aim of the Bill.

The best argument against the Bill is that it is piecemeal legislation. I accept that argument, but can anyone speak against piecemeal legislation? Would hon. Members have voted against National Assistance because there was not at that time a comprehensive National Health Insurance scheme? I think that we would be glad to get an element of public assistance even if we could not cover the whole field. To attack the Bill as piecemeal legislation means that a lot of other Bills which go through the House must be attacked for the same reason. I accept that it is piecemeal legislation.

There are three major points for the Bill. The first concerns copyright, and has been explained to the House already. It is difficult to argue against it. The second main point is that it would permit the tote to accept bets by post. I understand that bookmakers are allowed to accept bets by post in Scotland but not in England. There is postal order betting with bookmakers in England through Scottish offices, but not English ones. I agree that the Bill would make betting by post legal in England as well for the Tote. If the Bill were passed, it would strengthen the case for bookmakers to have postal bets made legal for themselves. It is in a way the thin end of the wedge to help bookmakers.

Whether the Bill passes or not, I hope that from the discussion two things will emerge. I hope we can make it clear to the Government that they are in honour bound to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming, and that they are honour bound to find the time. The second is that here is an opportunity for all interested to put forward constructive ideas to help the Turf in general.

Mr. Speaker, I am exceedingly glad to have caught your eye on this important occasion. I will concentrate at the outset on the remarks of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I was very interested in, and I cannot say I disagreed with, his preamble in which he talked about comprehensive legislation. I was interested in the latter part of his speech, when he referred to the attempted counting out of the House. In between those points, however, I could not see that he gave us any explanation of the merits or otherwise of this Bill. Indeed, he did not really explain this Bill quite as thoroughly as I personally should have liked.

He described it in general terms as a simple little Measure. I say this Bill may be a simple Measure, but in my opinion it may have quite far-reaching effects. Anything I say now I should not like to prejudice in any way my approach to a comprehensive Measure, because my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. J. J. Astor) said that this was in the nature of piecemeal legislation. I agree with him there.

I refer to the Report of the Royal Commission on Betting and Lotteries and Gaming of 1951, Chapter 6, paragraph 266, which says:

"We have concluded that illegal betting off the course cannot me prevented, either by increasing penalties or by a limited extension of the permitted forms of betting, for example, by making cash betting by post legal. We see no object in an amendment of the law which would not enable the extent of illegal betting to be greatly reduced."

I shall seek to show that this Bill will not decrease the volume of illegal betting.

I come to my main arguments against the Bill. My main arguments I divide into four groups. I regard it as paving legislation for a totalisator monopoly; secondly, I maintain that the Bill unfairly discriminates against bookmakers; thirdly, that it may be undesirable if the volume of betting is to be substantially increased in this country; and fourthly that it extends unreasonably the powers of the Racecourse Betting Control Board.

To deal with my first point, the fact that it is paving legislation for a totalisator monopoly. Here I would refer to the remarks of Lord Astor who, speaking in another place comparatively recently, said in general terms that he advocated a totalisator monopoly——

On a point of order. Is it in order to quote a speech made in another place?

This is a paraphrase.

I was referring to the speech in general terms.

It is a speech made in another place in this Session.

I did not understand the hon. Gentleman to do that. It is in order to quote Ministerial speeches in another place about policy, but not to refer to speeches by other noble Lords made in the same Session.

If that is out of order, Mr. Speaker——

Paraphrase.

—I accept your Ruling, but I was referring in general terms to what was said.

If the hon. Member is going to quote he must quote—or refer—correctly. He will see, if he looks again, that what was indicated was that a Tote monopoly is not practicable in this country.

I could not entirely agree with my hon. Friend about that matter.

What I am saying is that I am against a totalisator monopoly. Because who is to benefit by this monopoly? The racehorse owners, we are told, in order to improve the bloodstock of our country. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton, when I asked him a question about the net export of racehorses, said the figure was approximately £1½ million. I do not consider that this is a very great figure when one takes into consideration the volume of imports of racehorses. I believe myself that if this is paving legislation for a totalisator monopoly, which is what I suspect it is, it will be in no way wanted by the public. I submit that it would be unfair competition with the bookmakers.

My second main point is that this Bill unfairly discriminates against bookmakers. Here I refer particularly to Clause 1 (4), where permission is given for the Racecourse Betting Control Board to carry on postal cash betting. I believe that unless this facility were a universal facility it certainly would not be understood by the public. I understand from the hon. Member for Dudley and my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton that this would favour universal cash betting by post. I accept that fact, but I cannot accept that this piecemeal approach would be misunderstood throughout our land.

My hon. Friend says that exports were not very significant compared with imports. Can he tell the House what were the imports?

The only figure which I have got I quote from the Daily Mail of 13th May this year, that imports were £6,200,000.

Nonsense.

I am quoting the Daily Mail. It may be rubbish, but it was in the Daily Mail of that date. What I will admit is that these figures may be vitiated to a certain extent by the factors which were explained by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton in his speech.

I come to Clause 1 (5). I readily accept the explanation of the hon. Member for Dudley when he says that there is no intention by him or his friends of introducing credit betting shops, but I would point out to him that it would appear to me that Clause 1 (5), read in conjunction with subsections (3) and (4) of the Clause, would permit the Racecourse Betting Control Board to open these credit betting shops. If I am right in that, and even if I am wrong in that, I would say that in my opinion the opening of betting shops of any description in our country would be a detrimental feature.

I have a reasonable knowledge of the Irish Republic, and I have observed the exterior of betting shops in that country, and I feel that it would certainly be a tragedy if betting shops were permitted to be opened in our main thoroughfares. If one admits that, and betting shops were permitted in our lesser thoroughfares, one might find oneself in the position of a certain authority—and it is doubtful as to what authority is to do the licensing of betting shops—being an authority responsible for permitting betting shops to be in our lesser thoroughfares. It would mean that they might be situated contiguous with good class property and would lower the whole status of the property of the areas in which they were situated.

If the hon. Member has any doubt still about this, after taking the advice he could upon the point, I give him the assurance that I will accept any form of words which will satisfy him and his advisers in order to safeguard against that possibility.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I did say that I accepted what he said in the first instance. I finish my argument on the betting shops by saying that I am sure that for his part that is so, but I submit that under the Bill as drafted there is a possibility of a loophole which may not have occurred to him. May I say in conclusion on this point that in my opinion betting shops if they are sordid and unattractive are not wanted, and if they are attractive they will be seductive and conducive to further and more extensive betting in our country.

Under Clause 2 there is, as the hon. Member for Dudley admitted, a new departure in the betting at fixed odds by the Racecourse Betting Control Board. In subsection (1) of Clause 2 of this Bill a monopoly would be created in this respect. Here I mention in passing that for many years since the first introduction of the Tote it has been possible for bookmakers to offer to their clients a facility for betting at Tote odds. This facility has not been used to any significant extent, but it would be wrong to take it away from the general bookmaking fraternity and create a copyright—the word used by the hon. Member for Dudley for the Racecourse Betting Control Board in the using of these Tote odds for betting at fixed prices.

I cannot quite follow the hon. Gentleman. He said my explanation was not clear, but his argument is difficult to follow. First he says this facility is not used to any great extent, and then he complains because it is to be taken away.

I think I am reasonably consistent there. It will not advantage anyone very much if it is taken away, but I think it is unreasonable to take it away and create a monopoly. However small, I am against monopolies, and I think I can rely on the remarks of the hon. Member for Sutton who agreed that he was against monopolies as well; and this is the creation of a monopoly.

If my hon. Friend is against a monopoly in Tote prices, is he not against the bookmakers' monopoly?

As far as I know there is no monopoly or copyright of bookmakers' prices. As we have already heard, the bookmaking fraternity are not licensed and I have never heard of any bookmaker refusing to accept bets. This opens up a serious avenue. A statutory body, the Racecourse Betting Control Board, will be able to make large losses. Tote investors are an associate body of the R.B.C.B., and I think I am correctly quoting that they advertise "Winning accounts welcomed". If they are going to welcome winning accounts at fixed odds, they must be going to pay out more money than they are taking in.

Really.

There is no doubt that small pools could be, shall I say, influenced by large investments to make very large dividends payable on a certain horse in a certain race. If the R.B.C.B. were accepting bets at fixed odds, they might be assuming very large liabilities, and they would find themselves in a difficult position as a statutory body in closing people's accounts. It is quite a different thing for a private bookmaker or a private individual to write to a certain person saying that his account is closed for various reasons, but I do not see how a statutory body, such as the R.B.C.B., could write to its individual clients saying that just because the client is winning money it is going to close his account.

A bookmaker does that.

There is a difference. A bookmaker is not a statutory body. Clause 2 (2) refers to the creation of offences against this copyright, and these offences can be created both by the layer and the backer. I can understand that the bookmaking fraternity have a comprehensive knowledge of the betting laws, but the backer will put himself in a position under Clause 2 (2) of being liable to create an offence, with penalties ranging up to a maximum of £500 in certain instances, and going further than that to £750. I would think it wrong that both those parties should be liable to the creation of these new and heavy penalties.