asked the Minister of Defence if British troops will be withdrawn from Malaya on 31st July when the 12-year state of emergency is to be ended.

asked the Minister of of Defence if he proposes maintaining United Kingdom military forces in Malaya at their present strength after the ending of the emergency on 31st July, 1960.

Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the announcement by the Government of the Federation of Malaya that the state of emergency is formally to end, but this will make no difference to the present arrangements under which, by virtue of the Defence Agreement concluded with the Federation Government in 1957, United Kingdom forces are stationed in their territory.

While I am sure the whole House will agree with the right hon. Gentleman in welcoming the end of the emergency, could he explain the reason for retaining British troops in Malaya? The jungle warfare is over. Is there some other reason? Is it not a fact that Malaya is not a party to the S.E.A.T.O. Agreement? Why should British troops be there?

The answer is quite simple. First of all, there are some border security operations in which the Malayan Government wish to have our help. Also, there is the general problem of the external defence of Malaya, which is covered by the Agreement which I cited.

As the troops are being maintained because of the 1957 Agreement, can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether the 50,000 troops we have now in Malaya was 50,000 in 1957? Was not the figure then less? If it was less, why should we not revert at least to the 1957 number?

The hon. Gentleman knows that one never quotes these numbers—from my point of view anyway. He may have his own views on the subject.

Perhaps I might help the right hon. Gentleman. He is obviously in some difficulty in giving a figure. Is it not true that there are nothing like 50,000 troops there, because we have not go 50,000 troops to go anywhere?

asked the Minister of Defence if he will make a comprehensive statement on British co-operation with the German Federal Republic in the development and production of armaments.

Full statements about co-operation with the German Federal Republic on the development and production of armaments have been made in recent months by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation and myself. There is nothing new to add to these.

Can the right hon. Gentleman state specifically the range of the surface-to-surface missile which is being developed jointly between this country and West Germany, and whether its range comes within the limits laid down for Western Germany in the Brussels Treaty as it stands at present?

I can certainly tell the hon. Gentleman that the Brussels Treaty has been, and will be, fully honoured. As to details about particular weapons, perhaps he will put a Question on the Order Paper.

asked the Minister of Defence whether it is still his policy to terminate conscription by 1962.

Yes, Sir.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say at which target he is aiming—165,000 or 182,000? Even supposing he achieves either figure, which does not look likely because of the fall in recruiting, will he still maintain forces in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and all the other places, plus the necessary reserve in this country? How will he approach the problem if conscription should fail?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking this question because it enables me to say that, as clearly stated in the 1957 White Paper, the target which the Government then set for Army recruitment was 165,000. Equally, it was said that if additional recruits could be obtained, they could build up to the other figure-182,000. present recruiting trends—they are not as good for the Army as I should like, although they are satisfactory for the two other Services—still show that the figure of 165,000, which is the Government's target figure, is clearly within reach. As to the question about how the Army should be disposed about the world, we may have different views on that.

When the figure of 165,000 was originally mentioned, it was suggested that this was the figure we expected to get, not the one which we needed. When the right hon. Gentleman gives an emphatic answer "Yes", does that mean that, whether it is 180,000 or 165,000 or any other figure, regardless of any fresh requirements, we shall make do with what we get?

It means that in the Defence White Paper it was clearly stated that the target required by the Army to meet our commitments was 165,000. What I have just said is that Present recruiting trends still give us that figure at the due date.

asked the Minister of Defence whether the condition laid down in paragraph 48 of the 1957 Defence White Paper, Command Paper No. 124, that if voluntary recruiting fails to produce the numbers required, the country will have to face the need for some form of compulsory service to bridge the gap, still remains the policy of Her Majesty's Government; and whether he will make a statement.

Yes, Sir. We have, however, no plans for the continuance of the call-up after this year.

I did not hear the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's Answer.

It was, "Yes, Sir,"

The undertaking still stands. Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that in an earlier answer today he said he expected to get his targets? Will he give an assurance to the House and to the nation that he expects to get those figures and that he pledges his reputation on getting the numbers for the Army and for the Air Force?

I think that the reputations of all Ministers stand on their doing what they say they will do. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) only gives me a chance again to wish him the best of success with his new defence policy and to hope that he will feel much better when he has got it out of his system. The answer to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) is that I am satisfied that on the present recruiting figures we shall get the 165,000.

Will the Minister bear in mind that, in resisting any attempt to continue compulsory military service beyond the agreed date, he will have the support of millions of people who resent and have for a number of years resented compulsory military service?

May I, in the spirit of helpful co-operation, thank the Minister for his advance publicity and ask him whether I heard him correctly? Did he say that on present figures, that is, including the latest we had in April, he is satisfied that the Army will get 165,000 men by the time national conscription is completely ended?

I said, on present trends.

asked the Minister of Defence what was the date upon which the last commitment for work to be earned out on the base in Cyprus was entered into; what was the cost of this commitment; and whether he will undertake that no further commitments are entered into until agreement is reached on the future of the base.

Commitments for work in Cyprus were entered into on 16th and 17th June to a value of about £230,000. Whilst I fully recognise the point my right hon. Friend has in mind, I think it is better to preserve freedom of action about further commitments.

Does my right hon. Friend realise that this is rather like spending money on a house before having even signed a lease, let alone got hold of the freehold? Will he at least give an undertaking that no further commitments will be entered into unless agreement is reached on the future of the bases?

It can be said that the freehold—to follow my right hon. Friend's metaphor—was clearly determined by the agreement between the Greek, Turkish and British Governments, but perhaps he would like to know that these additional commitments which I have just mentioned are contracts which were placed under commitments previously entered into, and, therefore, I think we should complete them.

Is it not a fact that the Services, particularly the Royal Air Force, have spent enormous sums without having security of tenure? Surely it is time that this was seen in the perspective of overseas bases generally and not merely as a little local difficulty—to use another metaphor?

I am not quite sure what the hon. Gentleman means. Does he mean that we should spend no more money in Cyprus or that we should go on with our planned programme?

Whatever the validity of the Minister's reply to his right hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. Thorneycroft), how does it matter if the money is spent on commitments entered into some time previously if in fact we do not know, when we have spent the money, whether we shall be able to make use of the facilities we are building? It is that point that the Minister should answer.

I have already answered it. Our right to the base areas was clearly settled by the Zurich Agreement.

Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that, whatever the outcome of the discussions in Cyprus, the Government will enforce rights which they claim they have? Is he, therefore, announcing to the Cypriots that it does not really matter about these negotiations?

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not want to make difficult negotiations even more difficult. I said that it was in the interests of Cypriot unemployment that we should go on with the programme—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—certainly, and therefore we are implementing the commitments which we have entered into. That is perfectly right.

asked the Minister of Defence what will be the estimated cost of British participation in research in, and development of, the United States Skybolt missile; and what will be the cost of equipping British bombers with the missile.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will make a statement about his recent visit to the United States of America.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will now describe in detail the arrangements he has made for the supply of United States-built Skybolts to the Royal Air Force.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will make a statement on the details of the agreement with the Douglas Aircraft Corporation for the purchase of United States Skybolt ballistic missiles.

asked the Minister of Defence what is the nature of the agreement reached with the United States Government on the purchase of the Sky-bolt; what is the estimated cost; and when the weapons are likely to be delivered.

asked the Minister of Defence how much Skybolt is going to cost.

asked the Minister of Defence whether he will make a statement on the details of the agreement reached for the supply of Skybolt to the British forces.

asked the Minister of Defence (1) what arrangements and commitments he has made in connection with the United States Sky-bolt missile and the Polaris missile; and if he will make a statement;

(2) whether he will make a statement on his recent visit to the United States of America.

My recent visit to North America provided the occasion for a valuable exchange of views and information with my Canadian and American colleagues; I cannot speek too warmly of the great cordiality with which I was received, and of the complete frankness of our discussions. I was also able, following the Prime Minister's understanding with the President, to clear the way for the technical experts to get down to the details over Skybolt. The United States Secretary of Defence and I agreed that if the Skybolt missile is successfully developed, and is compatible with the Mk. 2 V-bombers, Her Majesty's Government will place an order with the United States Government for a number of missiles and their associated equipment. Discussions will start as soon as possible to settle the financial and technical arrangements for cooperation.

Skybolt is a new and very advanced weapon system, but if our forces are to be armed with up-to-date weapons, we must decide in favour of projects that are at a relatively early stage in their development. In the case of Skybolt, my belief in this means of maintaining the deterrent is much reinforced by what I saw during my visit and by the first technical assessment of the project by British experts. Another important consideration is that fact that the techniques necessary to develop Skybolt have already been proven in the course of the development of other missiles such as Snark, Hound Dog and Bold Orion.

As to the cost, the cost of the main development of Skybolt is being borne by the United States Government. The development costs which we shall have to bear with regard to modifying V-bombers and our share of the development of the missile will be relatively small. The warheads will be British made, and the cost of the actual missile cannot be firm until it is ready for production and a price negotiated.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say what guarantee he can give that the money and research work put into it by this country will not be wasted through the eventual scrapping of this weapon, as, for example, the Bomarc missile has been scrapped? Would it not be far better if the Government were to give up this costly and vainglorious attempt to achieve peace through the H-bomb?

I shall not follow the hon. Member in the latter part of that supplementary question. His statement about Bomarc is, I understand from the Press, incorrect. We are in partnership with the Americans on this weapon and we shall be a party to all the decisions taken.

While congratulating my right hon. Friend on these arrangements for Skybolt, may I ask if he also studied development of Polaris while in America? Are we being kept fully informed about the development of this weapon, which many people believe may form the best means, as well as the most economical, of using the deterrent in future years?

Yes. The Polaris programme, thanks to the close and cordial relations between the United States and United Kingdom Navies, has had our naval personnel integrated in it almost from its inception. We have, therefore, been fully informed about it. I also took the opportunity while in America of having a full briefing on this weapon system, and I found it very interesting.

Since Skybolt is being developed and produced by the United States under United States control, both legally and physically, is it still described as part of the independent British nuclear deterrent?

The answer to that is that if the weapon is developed and we purchase it without strings, fit it with our own warheads and carry it in our own aircraft, then it is an independent deterrent.

Can the right hon. Gentleman be more specific about cost and say whether it was cost that put him on the side of Skybolt rather than of Polaris? Can he say how effective this weapon can be, in view of the fact that V-bombers and their bases are relatively static and that in four or five years' time they will be able to be pinpointed quite easily by Soviet missiles?

I do not accept the latter part of the hon. Member's supplementary question. The V-bombers are an extremely mobile form of carrier for a missile. The plans we would make for dispersal are such that no aggressor could ever be sure that some at least of these aircraft had not survived his aggression and would thus be able to retaliate.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he has made a very vague and nebulous statement? If he claims in reply to his hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) that he has made a firm agreement with the United States, would he be good enough to put it in writing and include it in the OFFICIAL REPORT SO that we can know what it was? Does he realise that all these ifs and buts about Skybolt's development and cost, in particular whether it could be adapted to V-bombers, are very unsatisfactory? We do not know where we stand.

It is the right hon. Gentleman who says that there has been an agreement. I was careful to say that what I had done was to prepare the way for a technical understanding which would lead to our partnership in the production of this missile. As to the question of its fitting the V-bombers, it is quite certain that it was designed to fit Vulcan bombers as well as the B 52, so there is no question about that.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, by the accident of time I happened to follow him around. Will he assure the House: (a) that there is no such thing as an existing missile called Skybolt; (b) that he has certainly made some tentative arrangements to be associated with some developments, some research work, which he hopes will lead to a missile called Skybolt; and (c) will he tell us how much he has committed Her Majesty's Government to contribute to those developments towards a missile which may never arrive?

I hope the right hon. Gentleman enjoyed his visit as much as I did. I do not know whether he followed me around to the Douglas Company at Los Angeles. If he did, he will realise as clearly as I do that his statement about the state of the Skybolt weapon system is not strictly correct. As to the second and important part of his question, there is no intention of committing the British Government to large expenditure on this missile until we see whether it is a viable and suitable weapon system or not, for the very reason I gave in my original Answer, that the American Government are bearing the total cost of research and development.

Two points arise. If I am wrong in saying that it does not exist—and the Minister says only that strictly speaking I am wrong—will he say at what stage the missile is? Is there such a thing? Secondly, when he says that we are not bearing large costs, will he say what costs we are bearing so that we can judge whether they are large or small?

If the right hon. Gentleman likes to put down a Question—[HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] The right hon. Gentleman has put down two Questions which ask me to make a full statement about my American visit. What I have said is that the British Government are committed only to small development costs.

How much?

I am not in a position to say how much until they have been properly costed. I would only be misleading the right hon. Gentleman and the House if I made a guess at it as this stage. These are all matters which have to be properly worked out and considered, and it would not be right to give the House the details until I am in a position to give them accurately.

I have put down Question No. 25, which reads:

"what arrangements and commitments he has made…"

The Minister began by assuring us that he had not made any commitments. He now says that he cannot tell us what commitments he made. He made commitments. He entered into arrangements. Why should the House and the British public be denied the knowledge? [HON. MEMBERS: "He is not forced to tell us."] The public should know that he is refusing to tell us. Let that be clear.

Order. We have a lot to get through. I hope we can avoid counter-statements and confine ourselves to questions.

May I not press the point? The Minister chose to say, first, that we had not entered into commitments for expenditure. Then he said that they were not large commitments. Now, when I ask how much he has entered into spending, he says that it is a small amount. When we ask how much is small, he says that he cannot tell us because he does not know. With your permission, Mr. Speaker, may I not—[Interruption.] Hon. Members should know by now that that never succeeds. May I ask the Minister, in pursuance of his duty to the House and the duty of the House to the country, to tell us what commitments he made? How much per year does he intend to spend on this missile which does not exist? What commitments did he make? He knows them and I know them. Now let him tell the House.

I think it is highly improbable that the right hon. Gentleman knows them. However, I want to clear his mind of confusion on defence matters as far as I can. He is confusing two issues. First, we are not making any contribution at the moment to any American spending on this missile. Let that be quite plain.

Secondly, we have, of course, to consider—I want to be as helpful as I can to the House—the money we shall have to spend on adapting the Vulcan bomber to carrying the missile, to adapting the computing and calculating equipment in the bomber to guide the missile. We shall have to consider the cost of making the British warhead for the missile. Those are costs which are under our control.

I am perfectly prepared as soon as possible to give the House as much information as I think I should in the public interest. They are matters which we now have to work out. The British experts I was able to take with me have now been able to get a much more precise idea of what we ourselves will have to do.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of the Government's own advisers think that Skybolt is every bit as vulnerable as Blue Streak and that it is quite useless to proceed with it? Does he think his information on this point any better than it was on Blue Streak or on Blue Steel, which he said on 27th April was now being fitted when in fact it will not be ready for some time?

The hon. Gentleman got an answer about Blue Steel from my right hon. Friend, with which I entirely agree. The arguments between Blue Streak and Skybolt were fully dealt with in a long debate in the House. I have not altered my opinion that this is the best possible contribution we can make to the deterrent which is now available.

Is it not extremely important that we should be quite clear about what the Minister has said? I understand that he has told the House that we have no guarantee that this weapon will be developed at all and no guarantee that it will be suitable for our bombers, if it is developed, and that we have no estimate of the cost. Can I now put the 64-dollar question? Is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to stake his reputation on the British Air Force ever being equipped with this weapon at all?

The hon. Gentleman is interpreting my words in a quite different sense. Many hundreds of millions of American dollars have already been spent in the development of this weapon, and, as I have said, the Americans are bearing the cost of development themselves. What we have now agreed in principle with the Americans is that we will go into partnership with them on this weapon because of the close links between our own Bomber Command and Strategic Air Command, which is determined to have this weapon and believes that it is only this weapon which can maintain its efficiency after about 1964–65. That, in my view, is not only a proper arrangement to make, but one which will be to the advantage of this country.

Will the right hon. Gentleman agree that, so far as the House can make out, what he has told us is that he has made an agreement to produce a weapon which does not exist at a cost which he cannot estimate?

I would not agree with that at all. What I would say is that I have been able to get a working arrangement of partnership with the Americans in what might be the most formidable deterrent yet invented by man.

There are three questions which I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman. Did he ask first for Polaris? Did the Americans tell him that he could not have Polaris and that it would be supplied only to N.A.T.O. and that it could he supplied only through N.A.T.O.? Was that because Polaris existed? Has this arrangement been made with the Americans simply because Skybolt does not exist, because it is not going to exist, and because the Americans have not the slightest intention in the world of giving us an independent deterrent?

The simple answer to all the hon. and learned Gentleman's question is "No."

Would it be a fair summary—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—Like the right hon. Gentleman, I am trying to help. Would it be a fair summary of what the right hon. Gentleman has told the House to say that the result of his negotiations in the United States is that what he has really done is to buy a pig in a poke with a blank cheque?

Perhaps I may equally put my interpretation on what the hon. Member has said and say that his help ought perhaps to be addressed more to his own front bench than to me.

In view not only of the unsatisfactory but grossly misleading nature of the Minister's replies, may I make it plain—

I am afraid there are various objections to what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. I have more than once asked that hon. Members should adhere to the traditional formula when wishing to raise matters on the Adjournment.

I was aware of that. Mr. Speaker, but I was not giving personal notice that I would raise the matter on the Adjournment. I was saying that, arising out of this series of Questions and answers, in view not only of the unsatisfactory nature of the Minister's replies—in the ordinary limited term which one uses when giving notice that one will raise the matter on the Adjournment—but the grossly misleading nature of those replies—in terms of the House as a whole—we, the Opposition, will seek occasion to debate this issue.

I shall be delighted, Mr. Speaker, and perhaps at the same time we shall be able to debate the Opposition's defence policy.

On a point of order. In view of the numerous questions asked by hon. Members opposite and the fact that I had a particularly important question to ask the Defence Minister, may I now be allowed to ask that question?

No. I have called Question No. 8.

May I have an answer to Question No. 26?

I understood that the Minister answered Question No. 26 in that numerous group of Questions with which we were troubled.

Question No. 26 has nothing to do with Skybolt. I thought I heard the Minister mention Question No. 26, but I thought it must have been a misnomer. The Minister discussed many other Questions other than Skybolt, and it was the other Questions which I was giving him a chance to answer.

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman did not hear the first part of my Answer in which I dealt with the matter.

asked the Minister of Defence to what extent, in deciding to buy Skybolt rockets for use from British-based aircraft, he took into account the resultant increased likelihood of the United Kingdom being destroyed by counter-attack whether they are used by design or accident.

The purpose of these weapons is to deter potential aggressors from resorting to war, and our possession of them will reduce the risk of war. The United Kingdom would not use these or any other weapons by accident.

Is it not certain that if the Skybolt were ever used there would inevitably be immediate retaliation? If and when it is produced, would it not therefore be a suicide weapon?

The hon. Member's views and mine do not agree, but at least I am glad to hear that he accepts, as I do, that Skybolt is a very powerful weapon.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will make a statement on the destructive power of the Skybolt ballistic missile, and the purposes for which he proposes to purchase it.

Skybolt missiles with British nuclear warheads will be carried in Mk. II V-bombers as a strategic deterrent. It would not be in the public interest to disclose the destructive power of the warheads.

Is the Minister aware of the cynicism of the answers he is giving on this matter? Does not he bear a serious responsibility for having for years deluded the British public that he was developing a British deliverable nuclear missile, and is he now trying to delude the public into believing that he is buying an American deliverable nuclear missile which does not even exist?

That is not what the hon. Member asked. He seemed to be worried about the destructive power of this missile.

asked the Minister of Defence whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been consulted about the purchase of Skybolt; what communication has been made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Council to Defence Ministers of other allied countries; and what arrangements have been made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to equip other member countries with these weapons.

It would not have been appropriate to consult N.A.T.O. about the purchase of Skybolt. This weapon is being acquired for the equipment of Vulcans and possibly Victors. None of this type of V-bomber, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, is assigned to N.A.T.O. As for the second and third parts of the Question, the proceedings of the North Atlantic Council are confidential.

Is not this what might be called unilateral action? Why do not we consult N.A.T.O. on matters of this sort? What is the use of talking about co-ordination unless we occasionally consult N.A.T.O.?

The answer is that some of the Valiant V-bombers are assigned to N.A.T.O., but they are not the bombers which will carry this missile. Therefore, it would not have been appropriate to consult N.A.T.O. about the purchase of this weapon.

asked the Minister of Defence what parts of British industry and what research organisations, are to take part in the development of Skybolt.

The present intention is that Skybolt will be developed in the United States. British industry, assisted by Government research establishments, will undertake the modification of Mark II V-bombers and their missile equipment to enable them to carry Skybolt.

Does that mean we shall have no say in the development of the actual programme and the question of whether it goes on or is stopped, but that we shall come into it only after the missile has been fully developed?

No, because as I said earlier it has been agreed that we do this together. Therefore, we shall be fully consulted about all policy decisions in the general progressing of the weapon.

asked the Minister of Defence whether he will make a statement on the military future of the Vickers VC10 in relation to the use of Skybolt.

No decision has been taken to use the VC10 to carry Skybolt.

In view of the limited range and the life of the V-bombers, which will end probably in 1965, is not it high time some arrangement was made if we are to have any use for these weapons at all?

I do not accept that the V-bombers have a limited life. The time scale we are considering with regard to the VC10 is the period from the mid-1960s until early in 1970, and the V-bombers are certainly capable of carrying out their task in that period.

Is not part of the difficulty in this matter the fact that no one knows whether the next Administration will actually ratify the arrangements made by the present Administration in the United States? After the Presidential election, cannot the Administration legally change its mind about the whole or a part of any of these working arrangements?

There are always views about the degree to which one Administration can bind another. The American Strategic Air Command will remain, or at least I hope it will remain, and it is the American Strategic Air Command which wants this missile and is determined to have it, and we are in partnership with the Command in getting it.

Can the Minister say how long before 1965 the V-bombers will be equipped with Blue Steel, because he untruthfully told the House—

Order. The hon. Member must reframe his question or withdraw that allegation.

Will not the Minister say how long—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] I am trying to reframe the question. Can the Minister say how long before 1965 the V-bombers will be fitted with Blue Steel, because he misled the House on 27th April by informing us that the Blue Steel bomb was now being fitted, when in fact it will not be ready for some time, and this was part of the argument used when we were going to drop Blue Streak?

Perhaps the Opposition will feel better when they have given birth to their new defence policy. This supplementary question has no relation to the Question on the Order Paper, but, as the hon. Gentleman has accused me of misleading the House, perhaps I may reply to him shortly. The answer is that I said in the defence debate that the Mark II V-bombers now coming into service were being fitted with Blue Steel flying bombs, and that is a true statement.

asked the Minister of Defence what proposals he has for replacing obsolete amphibious warfare ships and craft.

I am not yet in a position to make a statement on this matter.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a need for a modern assault ship to operate with the Commando carrier, and will he make a statement before the Summer Recess?

I hope to be able to make a statement before long, but I cannot guarantee that it will be before the Recess.

asked the Minister of Defence how many men between 18 and 30 years of age, previously employed as miners in Scotland, have joined the Armed Forces in each of the last three years, and in the first five months of 1960; and what proportion the Scottish figure represents of the total recruitment from the mines for Great Britain as a whole.

The only figures readily available in respect of the first part of the Question are those given in reply to the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. Pentland) on 11th May. They relate to enlistments of men from the coalmining industry as a whole between the ages of 18 and 25 up to 31st March, 1960, only. On this basis recruitment from the Scottish division represents 16·3 per cent., 14·7 per cent., 20·8 per cent. and 26·3 per cent., respectively, of total recruitment in each of the four periods concerned.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that this is an unduly high proportion of recruits from Scotland—largely because of unemployment there? If, as the Government hope, their unemployment policy is to succeed, will not these recruitment figures fall even further, so that the right hon. Gentleman will be in further difficulties with his recruiting policy? Although we all hope that unemployment will decline, what steps will the Minister take in that event to step up his recruiting?

I do not agree that this is an unduly high proportion, but I think that the hon. Member would agree at least that these very fine men are very welcome in Her Majesty's Forces and will be a very great addition to them.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will make a statement on his recent discussions with Mr. Gates on a worldwide 24-hours-aday joint patrol by United States and United Kingdom aircraft carrying hydrogen bombs.

asked the Minister of Defence, in view of the dangers arising from accidents or miscalculations, if he will reconsider the policy of Her Majesty's Government regarding participation in round-the-world hydrogen-bomb-carrying patrol flights.

I do not contemplate any change in the present policy for the British bomber force. Flexibility and dispersal are, of course, very important and the pattern of disposition of the force is, therefore, variable. It would not be in the public interest to explain exactly what our arrangements are, but some of the suggestions in the hon. Members' Questions are wide of the mark.

If the Minister's object is dispersal and flexibility, what is the value of his plan if these aircraft do not frequently carry the hydrogen bomb? Will he give the House an undertaking that this will not be done either by British or American aircraft, in view of the enormously increased danger of an irretrievable mistake being made through the misinterpretation of a signal or a situation?

The question of the carriage of British nuclear weapons in British bombers has been clearly explained to this House several times before by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, and I have nothing to add to what they said. I want to make it plain that I did not discuss with Mr. Gates the question of a "round-the-world alert", as I have seen stated in some quarters. What we are undertaking is a steady development of the policy of the random movement of bombers, thus making them more invulnerable to surprise attack.

Is the Minister's reply intended to be a categorical repudiation of the report which appeared in the Press—which, according to him, was wrongly attributed to the United States Defence Department—that there was an Anglo-American "round-the-world" nuclear bomb-carrying patrol flight developing? Is his answer a repudiation of that statement, or is he suggesting that this is being developed?

I do not wish to add anything to what I have said. I think it is quite clear.

As the right hon. Gentleman has told the House that he does not wish to change the arrangements previously agreed to, does it mean that Her Majesty's Government will not allow any other forces to have an alert involving Britain without prior knowledge and approval by the British Government?

That is quite a different question.

asked the Minister of Defence what visits to Africa, and for what purpose, the Chief of the Defence Staff proposes to make this year.

Lord Mountbatten will be visiting British units in East Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland towards the end of September this year to discuss local military problems with Commanders on the spot.

Can we take it that there is no intention of entering into defence discussions about new bases?

Yes, I think that is perfectly correct. Lord Mountbatten's visit, as the hon. Gentleman knows, is to see our forces dispersed in Kenya and their accommodation and the things which generally the Chief of the Defence Staff inspects.

Will the Minister convey to the Chief of the Defence Staff what he may already know, that in view of our experience in other parts of the world, if we are to have a long-term defence arrangement in Africa which is of any value to Britain, we must carry African opinion with us in the arrangements which are made?

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I think that the Nigerian Defence Agreement, which is in course of production, shows clearly that that is our wish.

Can the House take it that the right hon. Gentleman's statement that the visit is not concerned with new bases now excludes the proposal that British troops should be sent to the Cameroons in the near future? Is he aware that it is nearly 100 years since British infantry of the line were required to serve in West Africa, and does this now exclude that proposal?

I was dealing with the question of the visit by Lord Mountbatten to our forces and base installations in Africa. I have said that is the main purpose of his visit. I do not wish to add anything to my Answer.

asked the Minister of Defence what plans he has for the establishment of a long-term base in Kenya.

We plan to station in Kenya the main elements of an infantry brigade group together with supporting R.A.F. personnel.

Do we understand from the answer given to a supplementary question to Question No. 19 that there is no question of the bases in Kenya being developed unless with the full support of the people of Kenya?

As I think the hon. Gentleman knows, a great deal of building is going on at the moment for British forces in Kenya in order to give them proper living standards for that kind of job. That is perfectly right. There is no conflict, as I myself found recently when I was in Kenya, between what we are doing and local opinion.

Will the Minister bear in mind before any money is wasted that the balance of power in Kenya may well change further and, before we spend too much money, it is vitally important that he should have an assurance from those in the Government who will be in power that they support the defence arrangements?

I accept that we should be most unwise—indeed, it would not be right—to show by our actions in building bases that we thought we had the right to be there for ever and a day. We are not doing that.

Is there any evidence to show that the people of the three races in Kenya would not wish to make their contribution to Commonwealth defence?

As I said, I found in Kenya not long ago no objection to what we are doing, which is of great economic advantage to Kenya.

asked the Minister of Defence when Her Majesty's Government intend to introduce legislation revising the Reserve Forces Acts; and whether he will make a statement.

No changes in Reserve Force Legislation are intended in this Session.

My Question to the right hon. Gentleman related to legislation not necessarily in this Session but in any Session. The most recently joined hon. Member of this House would know that it is not possible to do it in this Session. I am asking what proposals the Government have under consideration to cover this and the next Session.

It is not customary to disclose the business for the next Session.

Does the right hon. Gentleman read the defence debates? According to the report of the defence debate, the Under-Secretary of State was kind enough to say that this matter was under consideration. Has there been a change of policy, or is it in fact the case that the Government have something to hide?

I am not saying this is not under consideration. I am only saying that at present the Government are not in a position to make any statement.

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

It will be for the convenience of the Committee to discuss with this new Clause the new Clause in the name of the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) and other hon. Members—Relief from Income Tax on investment income.

The purpose of the Clause is to extend the Income Tax concession given in 1956 to certain Savings Bank interest to interest on Co-operative shares and Penny Bank accounts. It is not proposed to ask that the concession should be extended to Co-operative loan capital, because there is a statutory limit on Co-operative shares of £500 and of £50 in Penny Bank accounts. There is none on loan capital, and for this reason no special treatment is asked for.

At the moment, the first £15 of interest on savings in the Post Office Savings Bank and in the ordinary departments of Trustee Savings banks is exempted from tax. It is specifically provided for this purpose that a man and wife should be treated separately. Therefore, it is possible for a married couple to hold £1,200 without paying Income Tax on interest.

At the end of 1958 savings in the Co-operative movement amounted to £301 million. This included £251 million in share capital. But these savings, although large in total, are, in effect, the small savings of 12½ million members of the Co-operative movement with an average shareholding of £20.

Both the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and his predecessor, in 1956, were and are anxious to encourage small savings, but this discrimination against Co-operative investment in the matter of Income Tax concessions not only places a handicap on the Co-operative movement, but—which is worse—it may well cause a transfer of past savings to savings banks. We believe that this is not what either the Chancellor or his predecessor intended.

The present system is unjust, because it discriminates against certain types of small savings. There is already a further discrimination against Co-operative members, in that when a person applies for a supplementary old-age pension, or for National Assistance, only the first £125 of Co-operative investment is counted as an exemption for assessment of means, whereas for investment in the Post Office and in Trustee Savings banks this sum is £375.

The Bill raises the limit of holdings of the Tenth Issue of National Savings certificates from £750 to £900, from 1,000 units to 1,200 units. It was pointed out that, in addition to these holdings, a person may have as much as £2,175 in earlier issues of National Savings certificates. This form of investment is tax free.

An interesting analysis was made for the Radcliffe Committee. It showed that there were 10 million live holdings in National Savings certificates in 1957 and that the average holding was £189, but 42 per cent. of the total amount was in holdings of more than 1,000 units. National Savings certificates, if held for the whole period of seven years, have a yield of roughly 4½ per cent. tax-free. If they are held by people paying the standard rate of tax, this is the equivalent to a true cost to the Government of 6⅞ per cent. and for people paying Surtax the yield is equivalent to 37·3 per cent.

What rate of Surtax?

That is the top rate.

Therefore, under the present law a person with £20 in Co-operative shares will have to pay tax on the interest up to £15, while a wealthy person with thousands of pounds invested may get off scot-free in this respect.

For over 100 years co-operative societies have encouraged thrift, have canalised the small savings of the working class, and have followed the practice of investing their capital surplus to trading requirements in Government securities. At the moment, nearly 30 per cent. of Co-operative investment is in Government securities.

The Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income had something to say about this problem, and recognised the two points I have made. In paragraph 67, page 21, it says:

"We do not see our problem, therefore, as that of deciding whether there should be any relief for personal saving if there cannot be relief for all such saving. It seems to us rather that we should consider how far the present reliefs are justified as a departure from a general equitable principle. At any rate, we can take as our starting point the view that the tax system, if it does give relief for saving, should aim at securing that whatever reliefs are given should be carefully controlled, so as to avoid the risk of relief for what is really delusive saving—"

in talking of "delusive saving", the Royal Commission obviously had in mind this kind of transfer saving—

"and should be available to as wide a range of taxpayers as possible, so as to minimise unfairness in the distribution of the benefit of the relief."

The Royal Commission was obviously concerned that there should be fairness in the incidence of this tax or relief from it.

The Co-operative Congress, in 1956, had a prolonged debate on this matter, and speakers from all parts of the country deplored the action of the Chancellor in excluding Co-operative share capital. The Congress unanimously passed the following resolution:

"That this Congress deeply regrets the failure of the Government to include Co-op share interest in the Budget concession exempting from Income Tax the first £15 of interest on deposits in the Post Office and in ordinary departments of trustee savings banks. We feel that it is wrong in principle to introduce further discrimination between different forms of saving which will result in the transfer of savings rather than the encouragement of new savings."

The congress went on to deplore this discrimination, and urged the Government to include in this concession Cooperative share capital and, indeed, the Penny Bank savings account because it said, in particular, that the interest was limited and a holding of such share capital was limited to £500.

Co-operative societies continue to play an important part in promoting thrift. The amount returned in dividend in 1958 amounted to £59 million, and over the last fifty years or so the amount returned by way of dividend on purchases has run to over £1,000 million. Apart from that contribution, 760 retail societies maintain small savings departments, and in 1958 the total amount of small savings was £7·8 million—quite a remarkable contribution.

In many cases, this capital has been painstakingly accumulated, year by year, from the dividend on purchases, and in our view there is a very strong case for extending this tax concession to Cooperative share capital and to the Penny Bank account. We hope that the Chancellor, who is a fair man, will be able to accept the new Clause, and so end an injustice that co-operators have suffered since 1956.