asked the Minister of Defence what progress has been made in standardising small arms ammunition in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

All the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries have agreed to adopt the standard N.A.T.O. 7·62 mm. round for small arms ammunition.

Can my right hon. Friend say when this decision is likely to be fully implemented?

It is practically fully implemented in the British Forces. I cannot speak for other forces, but I understand that very good progress has been made in N.A.T.O.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will make a statement on the prospects of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation equipping their forces with British tanks.

N.A.T.O. discussions on future tank requirements are in progress, but it is too early to forecast whether any other N.A.T.O. country will decide to equip its forces with British tanks. The United States has, however, decided to adopt the British 105 mm. tank gun. At the request of the Minister of Defence of the Federal German Republic, production capacity is also being reserved to meet a German requirement for this gun.

First, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I did not ask him about guns? I asked him about tanks. Secondly, is he aware that in fact every single one of our N.A.T.O. allies regards the tank which we insist on as being something like 10 tons too heavy? Why do we insist on going against the opinion of every one of our allies?

I mentioned the gun because at least it is the business end of the tank, but apart from that, the general tank philosophy in N.A.T.O. at the moment says that what is required are two types of tanks, a very light, fast tank and a heavier cruiser tank. Discussions are still going on between the other N.A.T.O. nations and ourselves to see whether we can agree our philosophy and if we can decide that there are two clear types which are needed.

Would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House how long these discussions have been going on? Is it not the case that our N.A.T.O. allies in Europe have been trying to get the British Government to adopt a particular 40-ton tank for many years but that Britain has consistently refused and is not prepared to do so?

I do not think that is so at all. The facts are that prototype tanks are being produced by several countries, including our own. Till we can have comparative trials of these we shall not come to a final conclusion.

asked the Minister of Defence what are the terminal grant and pension of a major-general under 60 years old, retiring on the 1950 code, and on the 1960 code, respectively.

A major-general who has retired under the 1950 code, that is, before 1st January, 1956, after a full career, received retired pay of £1,200 a year and a terminal grant of £1,000. A major-general retiring today under the 1960 code after 34 years' service would receive retired pay of £1,850 and a terminal grant of £5,550.

I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Is it not true that the same sort of comparison exists for all ranks? Can he say why these apparently identical people should receive very different treatment with regard to their pension?

Because of the general principle that these increases are never made retrospective. That is a very longstanding principle.

asked the Minister of Defence whether he now intends to reduce the number of units in the British Army; and what commitments he intends relinquishing.

asked the Minister of Defence what commitments overseas will have to be curtailed, or abandoned, as a consequence of the failure to achieve or maintain a total manpower in the Forces in excess of 165,000.

asked the Minister of Defence what oversea commitments he intends to abandon, in view of the fact that the Regular Army will not exceed 165,000 all ranks.

No further reductions in the number of Army units is intended. As regards commitments, the 165,000 force has been planned to meet those foreseen after 1962, and I see no reason to believe that it will not do so.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that about 182,000 troops will be necessary to fill up the Army as outlined in the White Paper in July 1957, when there were approximately 60 battalions and ancillary troops?

The guiding White Paper in this matter is the 1959 one, which set out quite clearly the position and said that the minimum numbers required were 165,000. It said that that was the floor, but it was hoped—and I am still confident about it—that we could rise above that, to a ceiling of around 182,000.

If the figure falls to 165,000, is the Minister prepared to give an assurance that Britain can nevertheless maintain her commitments both in Europe and elsewhere overseas?

In my original Answer, which the hon. Member may not have heard, I said that this force was planned to meet commitments as foreseen after 1962. We have to remember that by then civilianisation will have been completed and certain overseas commitments may have changed.

If the Minister now foresees a force of 180,000, and is still hoping for it, what did he mean on 4th November when, at Devizes, he said:

"While the Army might prefer 170,000 or 180,000, a total of 165,000 will be sufficient to meet our world commitments and we shall have to manage."?

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for asking that question. In fact, I was answering a question at Devizes. The questioner quite properly asked whether present recruiting figures would not force a return to National Service. I said, "No", because the minimum target of 165,000 was still clearly in sight, and if we had to we would manage it. But I made it quite plain that 170,000 or 180,000 was still the figure that the Army would like and, as I have said this afternoon, it is one that I hope it will obtain.

Is it not quite irresponsible on the part of the Minister to expect a diminishing number of men to shoulder the same burden of foreseen commitments and, possibly, some commitments which we cannot at the moment foresee? The right hon. Gentleman's policy makes sense only if the major rôle of the Army is to be potato picking, or he is going to sell some of our commitments to Detroit.

The hon. Member did not listen to my original Answer. This is not a new thing. It was clearly foreshadowed in the 1957 White Paper, and reaffirmed in the 1959 White Paper, that there is no change in the general plan. As I have said, a most careful and detailed examination took place before this figure was set as being a realistic floor on which the Army, if it had to, could meet its commitments.

If the strength of an all-Regular Army does not exceed 165,000, is the Minister quite sure that he will be able to maintain the existing commitments, including the commitment of 55,000 to the N.A.T.O. forces, without either reducing the number of units or, alternatively, reducing the strength of units for operational efficiency?

That is quite a different matter. I think it arises on a later Question.

Does it not arise out of the Minister's previous answer? He said that, in deciding that this number was enough, account had been taken of the fact that civilianisation would have gone further and that commitments after 1962 might change. May we, therefore, press the right hon. Gentleman to tell us which commitments he has assumed will change and which commitments he assumes we will be giving up?

I will give the right hon. Gentleman one example which has already taken place, and that is Cyprus.

Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that an expert committee was set up by the War Office, under the supervision of Lieutenant-General Hull, which reported that the minimum requirement for the Army should be 200,000 men? How does that square with the figure of 165,000?

I have no doubt that at various times various committees have set various figures. I have to deal with the figure that is approved and recommended to me by my military advisers, and one which has been in front of this House for something over three years.

asked the Minister of Defence what considerations he took into account in arriving at his estimate of an Army of 165,000; and if he will make a statement.

An all-Regular Army of 165,000 has been an integral part of our defence policy since 1957. I am satisfied that it will meet our needs.

Does that mean that the regiments and so on mentioned in the White Paper will be kept up to full operational strength with an Army of only 165,000?

Obviously the difference in the bracket between 165,000 and 180,000, or thereabouts, represents at the lower figure a certain amount of under-strength and at the upper figure a little elbow room that we shall need.

If the Minister is now saying that he prefers 180,000, will he explain what the Leader of the House meant on Monday last when he answered a Question by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who asked whether it is the Government's policy

"that the Army must manage to meet our world commitments on a strength of 160,000 or below."

"Yes, Sir."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th November, 1960; Vol. 630, c. 31.]

The fact is that the number of units remains the same, whether we have the 165,000 or the 180,000 figure. It does not alter the number of units at all. So that we have this quite plain, what I said was that the Army can fulfil its commitments on the floor figure of 165,000. I shall be very pleased if it can get the upper figure. What I said was that I remained confident that it would achieve it.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will give an assurance that whatever recruiting figures to the Regular Army are now, or turn out to be at the time when compulsory military service ends, no formation will be called upon to carry out rôles which, unless specified minimum establishments are fully meet, would be incapable of effective achievement.

I can assure my hon. Friend that it is no part of our plans to allocate rôles to formations which are incapable of carrying them out, whether for manpower or any other reasons.

Whilst appreciating that there must be a total number of men available at one time or another, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he does not agree that the real significance of the future Regular Army is going to be the number of effective formations and whether those formations are each fully up to strength? Can we have an assurance that, so far as the brigade group is concerned, it is not going to have a battalion extracted and brought back into strategic reserve and then be expected to carry out the rôle overseas without that battalion?

In general, I think I can give my hon. Friend that assurance, because a brigade group must act as a proper functioning unit and it cannot do that if it has a detached battalion.

asked the Minister of Defence what is the size of the Army now aimed at by Her Majesty's Government; whether he is satisfied that this number will be achieved by 1963; and whether recruiting is up to schedule.

The aim is an all-Regular Army with a minimum strength of 165,000. We are making steady progress in the build-up of the regular strength, and I am confident that we shall have the numbers we need by 1963.

First, in view of the right hon. Gentleman's reply, all this talk about extra inducements in recruiting is unnecessary. Secondly, is he satisfied that if we achieve this strength we shall have an Army which can perform its normal liabilities with conventional weapons and will not become more and more dependent on tactical nuclear weapons?

If we were to have an Army which did not rely in any sense on nuclear weapons of any kind, it would certainly have to be a very much larger Army than this.

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman need worry about that. He said that he thought that we would reach the figure of 165,000 in 1963. On Monday, in answer to the question whether it would be reached by 1st January, the Leader of the House said, "Yes, Sir" Does the Minister support that statement?

I quite accept that the right hon. Gentleman is as keen as I am to get recruitment going. I am not going to be pinned down to particular dates in particular years which are two years away. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I have not finished yet. My right hon. Friend was perfectly correct in saying that all our plans were made on the basis that we shall reach that target on 1st January.

On a point of order. The right hon. Gentleman has completely repudiated what his right hon. Friend said. In that case, I give notice that this matter will certainly have to be raised again. It cannot be left like that.

The traditional formula seems to be becoming a little expanded.

asked the Minister of Defence whether it is now Government policy to restrict the size of the Army to 165,000.

No, Sir. As was announced in the Defence White Paper for 1959 the War Office remains free to recruit up to a ceiling of about 180,000.

Will the Minister of Defence consult the Leader of the House and ask his right hon. Friend what he meant when he confirmed the statement that the Army must manage to meet our world commitments on a strength of 165,000 or below? Does not this represent a grave division of opinion on the Government Front Bench—in this case, above the Gangway?

This is a serious issue. My right hon. Friend was saying exactly what I said at Devizes, and it was this. If we have to manage on 165,000, we can do so. That is a very important point. If we can get more, we need them to give us rather more elbow room, a balance that would help to reinforce units overseas and, generally, a sensible margin that would give the Army a little to play with. I wish to say again, however, as I said myself, that if we have to manage on 165,000 we can do so.

The Minister surely must have noticed that that was not what the Leader of the House said. He said, not that we might or could manage on this figure, but that we must manage on 165,000 or below. The discrepancy is just as bad as ever, however much the Minister goes on trying to explain it away.

There is no question involved in that. It is all assertion. Mr. Strachey.

If we can manage on 165,000—

Order. I called the next Question. The right hon. Gentleman cannot have heard me.

asked the Minister of Defence what agreements have been reached with the West German Federal Government, either through N.A.T.O. or bilaterally, for the provision of tactical atomic and nuclear weapons.

I have nothing to add to the reply given to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal on 26th October, 1960.

Why should hon. Members be kept in the dark about the facilities provided for the West German Federal Government in respect of tactical atomic and nuclear weapons? Ought we not to know what the position is in West Germany? Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that West Germany is becoming the predominant military power in Europe outside Soviet Russia? Does that not constitute a menace to this country and to the world at large?

The House was not kept in the dark. My right hon. Friend said then, and it has been said a good many times before, that tactical nuclear weapons are only in Germany in fulfilment of N.A.T.O. requirements and obligations; those weapons come under strict N.A.T.O. control, as I made plain in the House when we had a debate a little while ago, and the warheads come under American custody.

Whilst the right hon. Gentleman gave certain particulars in a Written Answer to a Question by me, may I ask him whether he is aware of the very great concern that many of us feel about any nuclear arming of Western Germany, even under the auspices of N.A.T.O.?

The hon. Gentleman has his own views on this, and so have a great number of other people. I merely have to state the facts. The facts are that Germany only acts in this matter under N.A.T.O. requirements, which she is required to fulfil. The safeguards are that these weapons remain under N.A.T.O. control, and, indeed, more closely than that, under the direct control of Saceur himself. The warheads remain under direct United States control.

asked the Minister of Defence whether nuclear weapons and warheads are now stocked at the military bases in Kenya.

As the hon. Member knows, it is the practice not to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at particular sites.

Is the Minister aware that that reply, which does not deny a much-quoted report which appeared in the Express, will be received with some dismay in Kenya, in view of the fact that the people of Kenya want to be assured that they are being consulted in this matter of life and death? Wild he ensure that before any decision is made about the stocking of nuclear weapons in Kenya there will be the fullest possible consultation with representatives of local opinion?

I must make plain what I said, and that is that it is a longstanding practice in this House not to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons.

Whether the right hon. Gentleman confirms or denies this, will he tell us that he is taking every step to distribute our deterrent as widely as possible? Is he aware that for the last ten years I have urged that this island is an unsuitable base for the deterrent and that it should be dispersed throughout the Commonwealth?

I think the hon. and learned Gentleman's supplementary question is quite happily accommodated with the previous answer I gave.

On a point of order. In view of the Minister's failure to answer the second part of my supplementary and to give an assurance on the question of consultation——

Order. I have repeatedly asked hon. Members to confine themselves to the traditional formula.

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek leave to raise this question on the Adjournment.

asked the Minister of Defence whether, in view of the establishment of the Clyde base for United States Polaris submarines, he will authorise the immediate laying down, or acquisition, of a submarine of this type for the Royal Navy, so that the earliest opportunity can be taken to gain experience of them in co-operation with the United States Navy.

The Royal Navy will obtain experience of nuclear-propelled submarines from "Dreadnought" and from the second submarine of this type which has been ordered. The Government's plans for the British contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent are based mainly on the V-bombers for the period of the 1960s. There is no need to decide at present whether we shall require a Polaris-type submarine.

Is there not increasing evidence that this is both a very efficient way of delivering the deterrent—which we hope will never be delivered—and also the least subject to surprise attack? Should not an island nation like ours give high priority to a naval development of this importance?

In general, I do not disagree with anything my hon. Friend has said. This is a very good weapon for the very reason that it preserves the right of retaliation; but at the same time the essential basis on which we hope to stop war starting—that is the task to which we are devoted—is that one must have a very great diversity in the means of delivering nuclear weapons. We must play our part in adding to that diversity.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Prime Minister's estimate for this vessel was between £50 million and £60 million, about twice the cost of the Cunarder and approximately the cost of more than 20,000 houses in the west of Scotland? Will the right hon. Gentleman consider seriously the fact that this country needs houses before a Polaris submarine?

I confirm that this is a very expensive weapon system.

In view of the enthusiasm which the Prime Minister showed for this weapon as a means of delivering the deterrent, is the Minister of Defence now saying that it was the financial cost which led us to decide that the only two atomic submarines we are building should be so built that they could not carry it?

Not at all. The first thing to do is to remember that the answer to the submarine menace in general, which, after all, is of considerable concern to our country as an island, faced with the immense number of Russian submarines now available, is this kind of nuclear hunter-killer submarine. These submarines, therefore, are rightly built as part of our main antisubmarine defences, and as such they have a vital rôle to play.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will lay on the Table of the House an official paper setting out the terms of the agreement between the British and United States Governments on the establishment of Polaris submarine bases in British waters.

I would refer the hon. Member to replies by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 8th November.

As the Minister has admitted in a Written Answer to me that the submarine tender will be able to store nuclear missiles with warheads without any limit and that this may mean as much as 150 million tons of nuclear blast power concentrated in one spot at any one time, is he really saying that the Government are not prepared to lay the agreement for establishing a nuclear powder magazine in the Clyde before the House for debate and approval or disapproval?

I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman's expansion of the Written Answer I gave him. I can only say that this matter has been fully debated and discussed in the House, and I have nothing to add to what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said.

asked the Minister of Defence what consultations the United States Government have had with the United Kingdom Government about the construction of a Polaris submarine base or bases in Great Britain, in addition to the Holy Loch project.

None, Sir.

Are we to understand that there is no truth in the rumour and statements which have been conveyed to me that there have been consultations on the possibility of constructing a site at Portland near Weymouth in the south of England?

The answer to that, if I may say so to the right hon. Gentleman, is that, of course, before Holy Loch was finally selected a great many possible sites were examined. For all I know, Portland was among them.

Are we to understand that this is to be the only site?

Certainly; at present.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will give the reasons for the selection of the Holy Loch as the base for the Polaris submarines.

asked the Minister of Defence what are the reasons for selecting the Holy Loch as the base for the United States submarines carrying the Polaris missiles.

asked the Minister of Defence whether alternative sites for the Polaris submarine base were offered to the United States for their consideration; and what were the factors which determined the siting now agreed on.

asked the Minister of Defence how many Scottish lochs were considered for the Polaris base, before deciding on the Holy Loch.

The choice of a site for these facilities depended upon a number of technical and other considerations. Other sites were considered, but Holy Loch was found to be the most suitable.

Does the Minister realise that that is a most unsatisfactory Answer and that it certainly will not satisfy the very many people who are concerned about establishing this site alongside the biggest concentration of population in Scotland? Can he not give some more definite and clear reasons why the place has to be here?

Yes, I am only too pleased to give a few more reasons. It is a very good sheltered anchorage. It is already a submarine operating base for the Royal Navy. It gives very good access to deep water exercise areas. There are good communications. I say to the hon. Gentleman, as I did a moment ago to the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), that a great many sites were most carefully examined throughout the whole country and that this site was the one which most nearly filled the very exacting requirements.

Is the Minister aware that the whole Clydeside area suffered very severely from bombing during the last war and that there has been a natural reaction of anxiety among the people of Clydeside about siting the base there? Were those fears and anxieties taken into account when the decision was made? If so, in view of the need to take the population with him in his desire to safeguard the freedom of our country, why was not it possible for some more isolated loch to be selected?

I quite understand that. I was there myself for a certain time and know only too well what the Clyde went through during the war. It is very natural that people should remember.

Were other sites in Scotland, apart from the Holy Loch, considered? Can the Minister deny or confirm the rumour that one of the reasons why the Holy Loch was chosen was that the American families concerned wanted to be near a populated area, particularly a city? If that was one of the reasons, is it not scandalous that it should have swayed the issue one way or another?

I can confirm that several other lochs and harbours and areas in Scotland were very carefully examined. To my knowledge, they were all rejected on purely operational requirements.

Will the Minister say who rejected them and whether the Americans or the Minister chose Holy Loch? Is he aware of the statement in today's news from Washington that this submarine has as much destructive power as all the bombs dropped in the last war, and that there is and will be great anxiety in Scotland if the thing is put in any loch in Scotland?

Its great power of destruction is part of the deterrent which we hope will stop a war starting before we can achieve disarmament. On the general considerations, as I have said, the decision was taken jointly by the United States and British Navies, as far as I am aware, on purely technical considerations.

Whilst appreciating the right hon. Gentleman's point that probably the siting of the base does not affect the question of devastation, which would be overall and widespread, does not he appreciate the importance of the psychological factor, which is appreciated in America? A great many American commentators appreciate that it was very unfortunate to locate this base where it would creat great feeling among the local population. Will not the right hon. Gentleman consider a more isolated site, even if it is less convenient?

All those things were considered. I want to make it plain that I do not disagree with the right hon. Gentleman's first statement. This was a difficult decision to take, but I must say again that, in this balance of terror in which we have to live until we can get proper disarmament, we must see that an aggressor has not the slightest doubt of the retribution which will fall upon him. We are all in this thing together.

Does not my right hon. Friend agree that anything which is likely to add to the operational effectiveness of the United States naval forces is also likely to add to our own security?

Certainly. I agree entirely.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that that is not the point? If the base would be operationally as efficient at Scapa Flow or Loch Ewe, why choose a site on the Clyde which psychologically has an enormous effect and which. I should have thought, from the point of view of defence also has enormous effect? Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us why those two places which I have mentioned were rejected?

I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I thought that I had answered his point when I said that a very large number of possible anchorages were considered up and down the West Coast and were rejected on operational grounds. For example, the depot ship must be in absolutely still water for certain purposes connected with the loading and unloading of missiles.

In view of the profoundly unsatisfactory nature of the Minister's answers, I give notice that I will raise the matter at the earliest possible opportunity.

asked the Minister of Defence what consultations took place with the local authorities concerned before agreement was reached with the United States of America on the siting of the Polaris submarine base.

None, Sir.

Does the right hon. Gentleman recollect that, in his speech a week last Friday, he said that there was no time for consultation and that if we were to fit in with the timetable we had to get on without consultation? I think that that was the gist of his remarks. Is be aware that, in a Written Answer in the House yesterday to my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), the Prime Minister said that this matter was raised during the meeting at Camp David in March this year? In view of the fact that these discussions quite clearly have been going on for some months, is there any rhyme or reason why local authorities in the area should not have been consulted before the decision was taken?

I think that the hon. Gentleman has misquoted me. It was because there was not time. We made the announcement when we did because there was a considerable leak in the daily Press. On the question why prior consultation did not take place, I dealt with that in my speech. I said that until some agreement had been reached there could not be public consultation.

asked the Minister of Defence if he is aware of the widespread discontent among National Service men over their pay; what steps he proposes to remedy this grievance; and if he will reduce their period of conscription.

I am sorry that the Government cannot in present circumstances contemplate an increase in the pay of National Service men. I can assure the hon. Member that the decision not to increase their pay at the time of the last pay review was only taken after the most careful consideration. National Service men who have civil commitments which continue on call-up are, of course, eligible for National Service Grants. I do not intend to reduce the period of conscription.

Is it not utterly unfair that a conscript's basic rate is only 31s. 6d. a week as compared with 87s. 6d. a week for a Regular doing the same job alongside him? Should not the Minister relieve the hardship of those in the last batch to be caught in the net, sometimes only by a few days, by reducing the two-year period, particularly since the Forces are to be cut in any case?

The hon. Gentleman is ignoring the fact that only comparatively recently the upper limit of the hardship grant was raised to £7 a week and to £9 in cases of special hardship, and that the cost of these grants during the coming financial year will approximate to £2 million.

asked the Minister of Defence whether he is satisfied that there is a sufficient mobile reserve to enable the country to discharge its commitments; and what study is being made of those commitments.

I am satisfied that our plans will provide us with an adequate mobile reserve. As to commitments, a review has recently been completed. This has taken into account, among other things, constitutional developments that have already taken place in our dependent territories and likely changes in our responsibilities in the future.

Are we to have a statement on the results of this review? It seems puzzling to many of us that units which are notoriously far under strength are now apparently expected to fulfil the same commitments as they would if they were up to strength.

I do not accept that for a moment.

asked the Minister of Defence what steps he is taking to satisfy himself that the Armed Forces are drawing adequate benefit from the lead possessed by the United Kingdom in the application of infra-red techniques for detection and tracking, and that there is satisfactory liaison between the departments concerned in this matter.

The Armed Forces are benefiting from the pioneer work done by the Royal Radar Establishment in this field. In particular, these techniques are being applied to air-to-air guided weapons for the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. We have the Firestreak missile in service which is the best weapon of its kind in service today. There is close contact between all the departments concerned. We also have full liaison with the United States and our two countries are deriving benefit from each other's work.

asked the Minister of defence what defence rôle the T.S.R.2 aircraft is intended to fill.

The T.S.R.2 is intended, first, for tactical strike, including attack with nuclear weapons, and, second, for reconnaissance, including battlefield surveillance. It will also be possible to use it in the strategic rôle.

Can my right hon. Friend give us any idea when we are likely to see this aircraft in squadron use?

The firms concerned and the Ministry of Aviation set out a fairly clear programme of the progress of this weapon system, and I think that I am right in saying that the first aircraft will come forward for test and flying purposes about the mid-'sixties.

Can the right hon. Gentleman inform the House what is the estimated cost of the development of the T.S.R.2 and how much would have been saved if the Royal Air Force had accepted a modified version of the NA39?

The question of cost must be put down to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation. With regard to comparison with the NA39, these two aircraft were designed in different time scales and for quite different purposes.

The Minister has not answered his hon. Friend's supplementary question. Will he try again? By what date does he think that this aeroplane will be in squadron service? Does he think that it will be before 1970—in other words, before it is out of date?

Yes, I do.

asked the Minister of Defence when the next White Paper on Defence will be published.

Early next year.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the very grave disquiet in well informed and responsible quarters over the appalling muddle in our defences? With so many confusing and contradictory statements by the Minister himself, should not the White Paper on Defence be issued much earlier? Perhaps he might even consider issuing a quarterly White Paper so that he can keep pace with all the wobblings in Government policy.

If I tried to keep pace with the wobblings of hon. Members below the Gangway, I should have to issue it once a week.

Before the White Paper on Defence is published, will the right hon. Gentleman consult the Leader of the House in order to reconcile their differences?

The right hon. Gentleman must not try to plant on us the differences from which he suffers in his own party.

When my right hon. Friend publishes the White Paper, will he include in it some paragraphs dealing with the possibility of recruiting manpower from the Commonwealth and other dependent territories on the lines at present followed in the Gurkha Brigades? Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is ample manpower to be recruited from these spheres if sufficient originality and drive are devoted to the matter?

That is a very useful suggestion. I will certainly look into it very carefully.

asked the Minister of Defence what plans he has to make effective the mobility of the forces.

The forces already have a high degree of mobility. An example of this is that by the end of this year R.A.F. Transport Command will be able to fly 150 million passenger miles per month, nearly double the capacity before the Britannias were delivered. It will continue to be an essential feature of our planning to increase the mobility of all three Services.

Surely, the Minister realises that if we are to have a minimum size Army there will be greater need for mobility, not only in the transport of troops but for transporting heavy equipment? Will the right hon. Gentleman tell me exactly what aircraft we have that will do this for our strategic needs, and in what numbers do we have this aircraft?

If the hon. Member wants further details, he must put down another Question. At the moment, however, the heavy carrier is the Beverley, with the Britannic to follow.

We hear about how many man miles a month. How many tank or heavy gun miles a month can we do at the moment?

I shall be happy to answer that question if the right hon. Gentleman puts it down.

The Question asks the Minister,

"what plans he has to make effective the mobility of the forces."

I thought I told the right hon. Gentleman that I should be delighted to answer, but perhaps he will have the courtesy to put it on the Order Paper.

It is already there.

asked the Minister of Defence whether he is satisfied with the weight limit division of responsibility between the Army and the Royal Air Force for aircraft operation, in view of the development of steep-take-off aircraft.

As my predecessor indicated in his reply given on 3rd June, 1959, the weight limit is not rigidly interpreted.

Is there not now grave danger that the weight limit having been set when conventional aircraft were being dealt with, however vaguely the definition is interpreted, the Army will be encouraged to rely on obsolete aircraft in spite of these new developments in order to keep safely on the side of the division?

I do not think so. That is why I do not want to make a rigid division. If we were to do so, it would encourage that tendency. I am anxious that the Army should have the right modern type of aircraft for its needs. I think we shall get it better if we do not make a rigid weight limit division.

asked the Minister of Defence what he is doing to improve the co-ordination of the requirements of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for aircraft.

Machinery exists in the Ministry of Defence to ensure that when either Service is considering the need for a new type of aircraft of a kind which both use, the requirement is examined to see whether the needs of both Services can be met by a single basic type. In the case of some helicopters this has been achieved, and we are trying to apply the principle generally.

Is the Minister aware that there has been great difficulty in finding overseas buyers for the NA39 and that if it had been possible to co-ordinate the requirements of the two Services for this aircraft, we might well have had a profitable export trade in it to our N.A.T.O. allies?

I am not sure that those are the reasons why certain N.A.T.O. countries have decided that the NA39 does not meet their needs. It is a great pity that that is so, but I do not think that it has anything to do with the possible amalgamation of an R.A.F. and a naval type of aircraft.

asked the Minister of Defence whether he will give an assurance that the British Army of the Rhine will not be further reduced in strength.

asked the Minister of Defence whether Her Majesty's Government propose to continue to maintain 55,000 troops in Germany.

I would remind the hon. Members of the Answer I gave to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) on 13th April last. I then said that we would maintain the strength in the British Army of the Rhine at seven brigade groups as long as it seems necessary for us to do so. I have nothing to add to that Answer.

Cannot the Minister go further than that? As we understand it, the present nominal 55,000 in the British Army of the Rhine is not maintained. Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that to fall below that figure, for whatever reason, would be a bad example to the whole of the N.A.T.O. allies and would prejudice the whole position of maintaining adequate conventional forces in Europe, which is of such enormous importance?

The full establishment—seven brigade groups plus all supporting forces—would be well over 55,000. Therefore, the position is, and will be, that during the period of Army reorganisation which is now taking place, it is inevitable that sometimes units will be under strength from time to time. That is why we may not always hit exactly the 55,000.

When the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor, after, as the right hon. Gentleman told us, elaborate inquiries, decided on the figure of 165,000, he was then basing it upon reducing the forces in Germany to 45,000. The right hon. Gentleman now assures us, and I am very glad to hear it, that at least 55,000, and almost certainly more, will be retained in Germany. What is the other commitment amounting to 10,000-plus which is to be cut?

The right hon. Gentleman must not misquote what I said. I said that the full establishment of the seven brigade groups with supporting arms, which we are hoping to keep in Germany as long as we think it necessary, would be over 55,000 men. I did not give a pledge that we would keep over 55,000 men there.

Will my right hon. Friend agree that the number of men in a fighting force is by no means the only yardstick of its strength? For that reason, is it not foolish and unwise to enter into any precise commitments with regard to maintaining a particular number of men anywhere?

I think that hon. Members who have been to N.A.T.O. recently would be fair enough to say that when we said we would contribute this level of forces to N.A.T.O., we were regarded as making a generous contribution and playing our full part.

asked the Minister of Defence if he will set up a board of inquiry to investigate the present use of Service land and to see if it is possible to release requisitioned land more quickly and to a greater extent than at present planned.

No, Sir.

Does my right hon. Friend not realise that there is considerable feeling in the country near to London that the Armed Forces are not getting rid of land which is urgently needed for building as fast as they might, that with the rundown in the Army they are not accelerating their release of land, and that something from outside the Service Departments is needed to make them get a move on?

I have promised my hon. Friend that I would have another look at this matter, and I shall do so, but I do not think that it needs a special inquiry.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will enter into negotiations for an extension of the revised Brussels Treaty, so as to cover the manufacture or sale of gas centrifuge units for extracting fissile uranium by West Germany.

No, Sir.

Does it not make a mockery of the Treaty to say they forbid nuclear weapons but not fissile material? Will not the Lord Privy Seal take immediate steps to prevent this breach? Otherwise will not cheap H-bombs spread not only to West Germany but to more and more nations, and get completely out of control?

Under the Brussels Treaty the German Federal Republic is permitted to produce atomic material for peaceful civilian purposes. In addition, under the Brussels Treaty there is an undertaking from the German Federal Republic that atomic weapons will not be manufactured within its territory. Together those two facts cover the situation.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give us a White Paper about this new process, so as to show its real significance both for warlike and for peaceful uses?

I will certainly look into that question. It is not in fact a new process. The idea has been known for some time. It is the first attempt to develop the process.

asked the Lord Privy Seal, in view of the German generals' memorandum on nuclear weapons for Germany, and the recent discovery by German scientists of the process known as gas centrifuge, if he will make a statement on Her Majesty's Government's policy on the nuclear arming of Germany.

Germany's rearmament under the North Atlantic Treaty Organition is today a firm requirement of Western defence and has the full support of Her Majesty's Government.

Would the right hon. Gentleman take note that this Question refers solely to the question of nuclear armaments? Is he aware that many people are disturbed about certain developments in Germany, namely, the revelations about the research into new and cheaper methods of producing atomic weapons and the German generals' demand for atomic weapons in Germany, and Dr. Adenauer's reported statement that the German army must possess the most modern atomic weapons? Has the Foreign Office taken note of those developments and what is the Government's attitude towards them?

The question of nuclear armaments for Germany is, of course, included in the wider subject which I have already mentioned. I have seen no evidence of German research into cheaper atomic weapons. If the hon. Gentleman has such evidence perhaps he will let me have it. As far as the German generals' memorandum is concerned, that, of course, had the approval of the political authorities. It was not merely a military memorandum, and it asked for nothing more than the existing situation under which Germany has atomic tactical weapons under N.A.T.O. under the command of the Supreme Commander, and with the arrangement that the nuclear warheads are under the control of the Americans.

asked the Lord Privy Seal why the United Kingdom delegate voted for continuing the moratorium on the discussion of Chinese representation at the recent meeting of the United Nations General Assembly.

asked the Lord Privy Seal how the British delegate to the United Nations voted on the motion that the membership of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic should be placed on the agenda; and which delegates voted in favour, which against, and which abstained.

asked the Lord Privy Seal why the British delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation voted to ban the question of Chinese representation from the Assembly agenda.

I have nothing to add to what I said on this subject during the debate on 4th November. The complete list of countries and how they voted is available in the Provisional Record of the General Assembly for that day, a copy of which is in the Library of the House.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that in his speech he was unable to produce a single sensible reason for voting for the continued exclusion of China from the United Nations and that Britain this year was unable to carry a very large number of countries, including countries of the Commonwealth, with her in this foolish resistance? Will he not now give an undertaking that as soon as practicable we shall enter into negotiations with the new American Administration with a view to having a realistic policy for bringing China into the United Nations?

The debate in the United Nations was not on the exclusion of China; it was on the question whether the matter should be discussed and whether the moratorium should be continued. The Government continue to hold the view which they held previously, that the division between the countries at the United Nations on this subject was so great that at this moment it was not advisable to debate the matter.

Is not this subservience to the American view, rather than acting in the interests of the peace of the world? How can we possibly have an international authority which excludes one-sixth of the population of the earth from the United Nations?

I am not here concerned with arguing the merits or the demerits of the case. I am arguing about the situation at the United Nations. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will recall that there are still 45 nations in the United Nations which recognise the authorities in Formosa and have very strong feelings about the matter.

Surely the right hon. Gentleman realises that this has nothing to do with the attitude which this Government declare in the House? When are they going to stop dancing upon this subject like a hen on a hot griddle? Does the right hon. Gentleman not realise that they are saying things in the House which they oppose in America when they go to vote at the United Nations? When is that type of subservience to America going to stop?

The views of the other nations have this to do with it, that they affect the manner in which it should be handled in the United Nations, if a solution is to be found which does not create more difficulties than it removes.

Is it not the case that a very large number of countries at present opposing the discussion of this question are taking their lead from the Government, and has not the time now come, since we have a new Administration in the United States, many of whose supporters are known to have different views from those of the old Administration, for the Government to announce that they propose to support the admission of the Peking Government at the next session, and to initiate immediate discussions with their allies to discuss contingent problems such as the future of Formosa?

There does not seem to be a great deal of point in initiating discussions with one's allies, if one announces before the discussions what one's policy is going to be. We shall carry on policy discussions with the United States Administration in due course on a very wide range of subjects.

The Lord Privy Seal will recollect, if he tries, that I suggested we should discuss not the admission of the Peking Government, on which I should have thought the position of this country could have been made clear long ago, but the solution of the contingent problems such as the enlargement of the Security Council and the future of the territory of Taiwan.

Those are wider questions than the Questions on the Order Paper.

asked the Lord Privy Seal how the British delegate on the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations voted on the resolution sponsored by India and 14 Afro-Asian states and Bolivia calling on countries with overseas territories to rescind racial discrimination immediately; and which delegations voted in favour, which against, and which abstained.

The resolution, which did not relate solely to legisation involving discrimination, was adopted by 74 votes to none with two abstentions (Australia and the United Kingdom). Full details of the voting on the resolution are contained in United Nations document A/C.4/SR. 1028 of 31st October, a copy of which is in the Library.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman regard it as disgraceful that the vote of the United Kingdom should have been one in a minority of two against 70 on this issue of racial discrimination? What in the world is the use of the Prime Minister going to Cape Town to criticise the system in the Union of South Africa if the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends support this policy in the United Nations.

Far from it being disgraceful, I regard it as regrettable that the hon. Member has not read the speech of the British delegate at the United Nations.

I have.

Or the full content of the resolution. In his speech the British delegate made it absolutely plain that, of course, we are opposed to racial discrimination. [HON. MEMBERS: "And vote against."] What the British delegate objected to, or the reason that he gave why we could not vote for the resolution, was that it called for the immediate introduction of universal adult suffrage, and that is not the policy which has been followed by either party in the House as far as multi-racial territories are concerned. Secondly, it called for an immediate rejection of all discriminatory legislation, and this would include discriminatory legislation in British Territories which is there in favour of the local indigenous population.