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Commons Chamber

Volume 674: debated on Thursday 21 March 1963

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House Of Commons

Thursday, 21st March, 1963

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers To Questions

National Finance

Capital Gains Tax

2.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what his estimate is of the administrative costs incurred in the first half of the fiscal year in implementing the capital gains tax.

I regret that it is not possible to make any precise estimate, but it must be small.

Because the officers who do this work also do a great deal of other related work and it is not possible to separate the cost of their doing one job from doing another.

Does the Chief Secretary think the revenue is likely to exceed the administrative cost?

As I say, it is impossible to give a figure, but it is very small.

Rating And Valuation

4.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, following the analysis of the rating problem which he has instituted, he is now in the position to make a statement.

I cannot now add to what my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government said on this general subject in answer to Questions on 7th and 18th March.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the gravity of this problem will increase in the next five years and that particularly the educational projections are very relevant to it? For certain sections of the community neither the ability to pay nor the use of the services—I am referring to retired people —is particularly relevant. It is very important that a complete statement should be made.

No one underrates the importance of this problem, in respect of which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government made a fairly lengthy statement on the two very recent dates to which I have referred.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that people in all political parties recognise that there is a need for expanding social services but are convinced that the present rating system is thoroughly unjust and thoroughly inequitable? Is it not his duty, as one responsible for taxation, to consider whether he cannot make taxation fairer?

In the first place, this is not my duty but that of the Minister of Housing and Local Government, who made the statements to which I have referred.

Social Services (State Benefits)

5.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the basis of the Report on Revision of the Index of Retail Prices, Command Paper No. 1657, and the figures published by the Central Statistical Office in November, 1962, by how much the value of State benefits received through the social services and in other ways exceeds the payments of tax by a representative family, comprising a married couple and two children of school age, having an income before tax equal to the average of male earnings.

The tables referred to by my hon. Friend show that such a household would in 1959 have been in the income range £616–£712. On average, State benefits then exceeded taxes by £30 for households in this income range consisting of two adults and two children.

May I be made quite clear about this? Can my right hon. Friend say that any family which is currently in this category—say, a husband and wife and two children of school age with an income such as I have described in the Question—is receiving by way of social services and the like £30 a year more than it would be paying in direct and indirect taxes?

My hon. Friend says "currently", but as my main Answer will make clear when he has time to study it, the 1962 tables referred to in the Question deal with such families in 1959, to which my Answer refers. There are no more up-to-date calculations as to the relativities, but he will know that since that date there have been two general increases of social security benefits.

Tax Expenses (Parking Fines)

6.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will introduce legislation to provide that fines for parking offences are not expenses deductible for taxation purposes.

No, Sir. Fines imposed on a taxpayer for such breaches of the law are not deductible as expenses in computing his income for tax purposes.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that I am very grateful for that decision? In some cases there are two standards developing, one for what the individual can afford and another for what companies can afford. Will he ensure that expenses are reduced to a minimum?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, but his gratitude is really at least as much due to the courts whose decision is to the effect that I have already announced.

Inland Revenue Vote (Class I, Vote 7)

7.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why he underestimated the Vote for the Inland Revenue (Class I, Vote 7) by £1,681,000.

Because the original Estimate was submitted before award No. 415 of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal on 5th June, 1962, increased most Civil Service salaries by 4 per ent.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that this increase is 2¾ per cent. on the original, which is more than the "guiding light"? Surely the Inland Revenue of all people ought to have been able to foresee these increases and have included them in the original Estimates?

This, as my main Answer made clear, was the result of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal's ruling. I do not myself think that it is at all a bad indication of efficiency that, against a general salary award of 4 per cent., the actual increased financial provision is only 2¾ per cent.

Earned And Unearned Income

9.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the administrative cost to his department involved in making a distinction between earned and unearned income for fiscal purposes.

I am afraid I cannot, because again this is work which is undertaken as part of the general work of officers of the Inland Revenue. It is quite unrealistic to try to say that this particular one of their functions costs a specific amount of their salaries.

In that case, will my right hon. Friend introduce modern costing methods into his rather overworked machine?

I think that our costing methods are extremely efficient, but none the less that does not enable us to split the atom.

Small Savings (Tax)

10.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what recent instructions have been issued to district tax inspectors to reassess the Income Tax liability of persons with small savings in co-operative societies and trustee savings banks, going back up to 20 years, with a view to collecting small amounts of tax due on interest receipts.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that hundreds of small savers are being grilled by tax inspectors with a view to recovering a few £s or shillings of tax said to be due on interest receipts which most of these people innocently believed to be not liable to tax? Could not the overworked Inland Revenue staffs be more effectively, usefully and economically employed on other activities?

I do not think that "grilled" is a fair description of public servants who are doing the duty laid on them by Parliament. I understand there has been some increase in the number of requests for this sort of payment resulting, not as the hon. Gentleman suggests from any specific instruction, but from the fact that the bodies paying the interest in their returns have shown an increased number of these cases.

Expenses Reliefs (Reassessment)

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what recent instructions have been issued to district tax inspectors to reassess the Income Tax liability of persons claiming expenses reliefs, going back up to 20 years, with a view to collecting tax due on expenditure not wholly, exclusively and necessarily incurred in the performance of business or professional duties.

If the Inland Revenue is concerned about collecting not a few £s and shillings but thousands of £s of tax which ought to be paid on undisclosed and unexamined expenses, could not the right hon. Gentleman put the Inland Revenue staffs to investigating the details of expense accounts instead of following the present practice of agreeing a round figure without detailed examination?

This matter has been discussed at great length in the course, among other things, of various Finance Bills. Here again, what the Inland Revenue is doing is to carry out the law as laid down by Parliament.

What is the rough global figure of expense accounts allowed for tax purposes?

Private Sports Grounds (Taxation)

14.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why substantial Income Tax, Schedule A and Schedule B, is payable by private sports ground owner-occupiers and tenant-occupiers at a nominal rent in respect of their fields used for amateur sport; and if he will make a statement.

Under the present law the amounts of Schedule A and Schedule B assessments depend upon the annual value of the property and not on the rent paid. As regards the second part of the Question. I cannot of course anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.

I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Is he aware that a number of amateur bodies are very hard hit by increases in rates and by having to pay substantial sums of money which are not justified? Will he draw the attention of his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to this fact in the hopes that next month something will be done to alleviate the position?

This is within the review which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) promised last year, and at this time of the year perhaps I had better say no more.

Is my right hon. Friend aware what encouragement it would give to youth if Schedule A and Schedule B were abolished on sports grounds?

Unemployment Areas

15.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will consider taking steps to provide a subsidy to those local authorities situated in areas of high unemployment who are prepared to exempt industry in those areas from rates.

Does not my right hon. Friend consider that practical encouragement is needed and that the alleviation of rates for a fixed period of years would accelerate the establishment of businesses in these areas and probably also assist those businesses already established there to expand?

I am very far from lacking sympathy with my hon. Friend's general purpose, but, as he will recall, we are only just coming up at the beginning of next month to the full rerating of industry which the House discussed and considered some time ago. I do not think that there is any case for reversing that process.

23.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what recent steps have been taken to ensure that the placing of contracts by Government Departments is done with full consideration of the needs of areas of high unemployment.

57 and 58.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) what measures are taken to allocate work to firms in development areas;

(2) under what conditions work for Government Departments is offered to firms situated in development areas where such firms have not been successful with their original tender.

All staff concerned continue to be under instruction to give special consideration to firms in development districts. Where competitive tenders are submitted firms in such districts are always given a chance to tender. If the tenders of such firms fail to obtain a substantial part of the order, they are offered 25 per cent. of the contract at a price equivalent to that of the successful tender.

Surely the Minister appreciates that the offer which is then given is such that it is almost impossible for it to be accepted. Will he have a look at the figures of unemployment announced this morning, for they give him no room for complacency? Whatever the right hon. Gentleman thinks is being done, is is not clear that it is not meeting with any considerable success? Is he aware that a recent examination of estimates shows that the Government have a massive power of industrial patronage? Can we not have a more purposeful direction of this work so that it goes to areas like Scotland and the North East where the work is badly needed?

If the hon. Member will study my main Answer—which, I admit, is quite complicated—he will see that very real preference is given in this respect to firms in areas where there is unemployment.

Does the Chief Secretary agree that there is need to channel more work into the development areas? Will he have another look at the system of allocating the share of contracts to see that firms in the development districts are given a fair price in order to carry out their contracts?

This matter is kept under review. On the wider issue to which the hon. Member refers, he will be aware of the number of recent announcements of additional work for these areas which has been authorised.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say what statistics are kept in the various Departments concerning the allocation of contracts, because a week or two ago the Secretary of State for Air was unable to give the details when he was questioned by hon. Members who represent Scotland? If they do not keep these statistics, will the Chief Secretary assure us that they will do so from now on?

I quite agree that we want, as part of the keeping of this under review, to see how this is going. I am not aware of the Answer to which the hon. Member referred and which was given by my right hon. Friend, but there may have been special circumstances.

Does not the recent failure of the Government to place any further substantial contracts with Messrs. Short Bros. and Harland, Belfast, completely cut across the policy which the right hon. Gentleman says the Government are pursuing?

I do not think that an argument based on a particular firm has any significance in the context of the general policy, because it cuts out references to the other contracts to which I have referred and about which announcements have been made in recent weeks concerning firms in these areas.

24.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what recent steps he has taken to ensure that Government spending is used to assist areas of high unemployment.

26.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps he is taking to ensure that the spending of Her Majesty's Government is directed more than at present towards areas of persistently high unemployment.

I would refer the hon. Members to the announcements made in this House on 8th November, 1962, 27th November, 1962, 17th December, 1962, 4th February, 1963 and 14th March, 1963.

In spite of these announcements, would the right hon. Gentleman examine the Answers that have been given to Scottish hon. Members in past months about the extent to which Government spending is being directed towards Scotland? After making that examination, will he make further efforts to see that a greater proportion of the expenditure is directed to areas of highest unemployment?

I think that if the hon. Member will look fairly at the announcements to which I have referred, he will see that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has made a considerable number of announcements of extra additional work for Scotland: for example, in respect of electricity and roads.

Does the Chief Secretary consider the very fact that there is such a concentration of Government spending Departments in London results in a heavy bias in favour of the placing of contracts and orders for Government goods in or near London? Will he do what he can to rectify this heavy bias in favour of this part of the country?

I do not think so, because orders have to be placed where the articles in question can be produced; and much of the heavy industry to which these orders relate is not represented in the London area at all.

Will the right hon. Gentleman have another look at the so-called schemes designed to help local authorities in clearing derelict areas and other schemes for the short-term relief of unemployment? Will he assure himself that this is not just applying to schemes which have already been endorsed and are merely brought forward in the programme? In my constituency I have proof that newer schemes which would come within the ambit of the statement are being refused because they had not been previously authorised.

I am not sure whether the hon. Member is on the point of the general minor works relaxation of control or the question of the clearance of derelict sites, a Question about which I answered a moment ago. On the latter, I have said that a statement has been promised, although I cannot anticipate it today.

Derelict Sites

16.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what increases of grant he is making to local authorities for the reclamation of derelict industrial land.

17.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he is yet in a position to make a statement on the increased scale of financial assistance available to local authorities for the clearing of derelict sites under the terms of the Local Employment Act.

Win the right hon. Gentleman give very serious consideration to making a 100 per cent. grant? Does he not agree that generally the muck which has been left behind which the ratepayers and the taxpayers have to clear up has led to considerable profits by the firms which have left the muck? Is it not, therefore, just that the national taxpayer should pay a very high grant towards relieving local taxpayers?

There is certainly a very serious case to consider for increasing the rate of grant, though I am inclined to differ from the hon. Gentleman as regards 100 per cent. grants, which I think in principle are not generally very sound.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the considerable degree of urgency required here? The Answer I received yesterday to a Question I put to the Secretary of State for Scotland revealed that there are 15,000 acres of derelict sites in the industrial belt of Scotland alone. So far only 11·5 acres have been cleared. This is a trifling attack on the problem. Clearly the grant is wholly inadequate to encourage local authorities to get on with the job.

It is just those matters which my right hon. Friends the Minister of Housing and Local Government and the Secretary of State for Scotland are going into at the moment, and I do not think that there will be very much delay.

Rating Valuations

18.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the proposed rating valuations for 1963-64 will be used as a basis for new future revaluation.

The law prescribes quinquennial rating valuations. For future revaluations, as for that which comes into force shortly, properties are required to be valued by reference to the level of rents then current.

Can I be assured that, in cases where the new rates to be levied show a smaller increase than in many other places, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will count this for efficiency? Where this applies to a small county, as it applies to the County of Rutland, will he have a word with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government and draw his attention to this efficiency?

I always admire the skill and adroitness with which my hon. Friend defends the interests of the County of Rutland.

Fuel Oil Tax (Ayr)

19.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what reply he has sent to the Ayr County Council in reply to their letter of 1st March regarding the continuance of the tax on fuel oil.

The council's letter has been acknowledged. At this time of year, my right hon. Friend cannot say more.

I was expecting that answer. Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that for children getting to school, workers getting to work and older people getting to shopping centres it creates a very heavy charge on the family budget for public transport if this tax is continued?

The point my hon. Friend makes will certainly be most carefully considered.

£5 Banknotes

20.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that eight different types of £5 banknotes, some of them very similar in size and colouring to £1 notes, are in use in Scotland, and are causing inconvenience and disputes between the public, shopkeepers and business houses; and if he will introduce legislation to remedy this.

If the hon. Gentleman will make inquiries he will find that in essence the statement in my Question is correct. Is he not aware that there is between the shopkeeper and the public a growing lack of good faith and that disputations arise because of statements made about certain notes that are handed over being of a higher denomination when, in fact, they are of a smaller denomination? Will not he look into this matter again?

In principle, I am sure that there is very much to be said for having a single set of notes in circulation, but the rights of the Scottish banks to individual note issues are of long standing and we should think very carefully before taking those rights away.

Since the hon. Gentleman agrees with the need to remedy this situation, what steps will he take to have the position put in order?

I am sure that this is not a matter for legislation. I am advised that the Scottish banks are very well aware of the need for co-ordination. As I have said, their rights to issue notes is of long standing, and I am sure that Scottish sentiments in the matter should be paramount.

Economic Research

22.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps he is taking to increase the funds available to support economic research.

Much economic research is undertaken in the universities out of Government grants, and it is for the universities to decide what part of these grants, now greatly increased, should be devoted to this purpose. Economic research directly carried out or commissioned by Government Departments, including the D.S.I.R., the Ministries of Transport, Housing and Local Government and Agriculture, Scottish Development Department and Treasury, has greatly increased in recent years and is still increasing.

Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the report of the Royal Economic Society in which attention is drawn to the inadequacy of the funds available for research? In view of the lip-service which the Government are at present paying to economic planning, does the Chief Secretary not think that more should be done?

I saw the very interesting article to which the hon. Gentleman refers, but I do not think it followed his suggestion that we were paying lip-service to anything.

Is any adequate economic research being done into the problems and evils of inflation?

That would no doubt come within the purview of the various bodies to which I have referred, as I think my hon. Friend knows.

Has the Chief Secretary seen the figures for industrial production for December showing that the original figure of 115 has now had to be reduced to 111? Does not that show that there must be a great inadequacy in Government information in these services?

I do not think that that has any bearing whatever on the question of economic research. The matter to which the hon. Gentleman refers concerns the question of whether the statistical machinery at the disposal of the Government, particularly in regard to provisional figures which the House always wants quickly, is adequate.

Civil Service (Widow's Pension)

3.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much pension, including all increases, is received by a 55-years-old widow of a higher executive officer in the Civil Service who retired in 1958 and died on 3rd November, 1958; and how much it would be if her husband had retired this year and died today, assuming in each case no children and retirement from a London post after maximum service.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the widow of an Army captain in similar circumstances whose husband retired this year and died today would receive much the same pension as the higher executive officer, but, on the other hand, if both husbands died on 3rd November, 1958, the captain's widow would receive £72 less? Does he not agree that that makes nonsense of the argument frequently put forward by the Government that these Service pensions cannot be increased because all public servants must be treated alike?

I have answered the Question my hon. Friend put down in respect of civil servants. He will appreciate that the question of pensions for the widows of members of the Armed Forces is not a matter for me but for my right hon. Friends the Service Ministers

Civil Service (Assistant Principals)

13.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many assistant principals in the Civil Service have degrees in scientific subjects; and what proportion these form of that grade.

Is not this a very low figure? Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that it is desirable to have more scientists and engineers in the Administrative grades? Is he doing anything about this?

I should certainly like to see rather more, although in the Administrative grade what is required is a trained mind and general administrative ability almost regardless of the particular intellectual discipline which the candidate has followed. In fact, in the somewhat higher grades—Under-Secretary and above—the proportion is about double that obtaining in the grade the hon. Gentleman selected for his Question.

Universities (Grants And Places)

25.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is satisfied that the recurrent grant so far awarded will enable the universities to expand sufficiently to cope with the increased demand for places in 1966 and thereafter; and if he will make a statement.

No recurrent grants have been announced for the period after 1966–67 which falls in the next quinquennium. On the position up to 1966, I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary gave to his Question of 12th February and point out that the Government have undertaken to review the level of recurrent grant within two years from March 1962, in the light of expansion achieved and all other relevant factors.

Does my right hon. Friend know whether the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, to whom I originally put down this Question, agrees or disagrees with the unanimous opinion of the University Grants Committee, the Vice-Chancellors and Principals Committee and the Association of University Teachers that the 1966 target cannot possibly be achieved on the present grant? Is he aware that it is of the utmost urgency that he should new announce the recurrent grant for 1963–64 without waiting for Robbins?

I agree with my hon. Friend that the Report of the Robbins Committee, important though it is, is not necessarily decisive in this regard. My hon. Friend will himself be aware that some of the statements to which he has referred were made before the various announcements of expansion, such as the one I made to Parliament earlier this week, in respect of the Government's programme for universities.

Will the right hon. Gentleman make it quite clear that the Government's own target for 1966 does not provide for any increased proportion of university students?

If the hon. Gentleman takes the separate year 1966 by itself— which is, of course, the peak year of the post-war bulge—he is very nearly right, but if he takes any other year before or after that he will find the proportion rising.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman remember that on 24th January he gave me figures that showed a fractional decrease from 1962 to 1966 in the percentage of university students in relation to the age group?

Apart from 1966, the general tendency is upward even when one confines it to university students, but as I made clear in the Answer to which the hon. Gentleman refers, higher education generally, particularly as a result of the big expansion in the colleges of advanced technology, shows an overall improved proportion.

27.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent, in fixing the current level of university grants, he took account of the fact that the present rate of university expansion will not increase the proportion of the relevant age group able to take advantage of university education.

The hon. Member is in error. The present planned rate of university expansion will in fact provide for a higher proportion of the relevant age groups to receive a university education in the next four years of this quinquennium than in the current one. Once the peak of the postwar bulge in the birth rate in 1966–67 is past, planning is for expansion which will further improve this proportion. The main consideration governing the decision last March was the capacity of the universities to expand without loss of standards. The hon. Member will no doubt he aware that during the present quinquennium, current plans provide for an increase in student numbers of 35 per cent. above 1961–62 at universities, and that this is supported by a planned increase of 75 per cent. in students in other institutions providing higher education. This is far the biggest expansion in higher education that this country has ever known.

Will the Minister look again at column 258 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of 24th January, where he told me that in 1962–63 the proportion of the age group able to get university education was 4·59 per cent. and that in 1966–67 it would be 4·57 per cent.—a fractional decrease in the proportion of the age group able to get university education?

That Answer, which I have very much in mind, does not in any way invalidate what I have just said about the upward tendency, with the sole exception of 1966–67.

31.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he expects the clearing house arrangements for applicants to enter universities to be sufficiently advanced to enable him to state the number of qualified students who are unable to obtain university places.

These arrangements are run by the universities themselves and applications in respect of the universities taking part in them are now being put through the Central Office for Admissions for the academic year beginning next October. While these arrangements will certainly give us better figures on the demand for university places than we have now, I do not think they will produce a complete answer to the hon. Member's Question, since, on the one hand, not all applicants will reach the standard acceptable to universities, and, on the other, some applicants will gain admission in subsequent years.

Is the right hon. Gentleman unaware that many of these young people who have passed their entrance examination to universities come to see Members of Parliament and deplore the fact that they cannot obtain a place? Surely to goodness the Government have a responsibility to see that the buildings are expanded and new universities are built so that these men can have the places. Would not this be of great benefit to British society later on?

As for the first part of the supplementary question, I said in reply to an earlier question that we are seeing the development of the biggest increase in universities which this country has ever seen. The allocation of places to individuals has always been thought rightly to be a matter not for the Government but for the universities themselves. I very much hope that their admirable proposal for a central office for admissions, with which most but not all the universities are cooperating, will help to see that placing is carried out perhaps more effectively than it has been in the past.

Has the right hon. Gentleman not seen the estimates made recently in the newspapers by some university staff members showing that about 50 per cent. of fully qualified men and women applicants are failing to find places in the universities?

I have seen all sorts of figures bandied about. They turn to some extent on how one defines "fully qualified" and whether one is concerned with entry in a particular year or over an extended period.

Prestwick Airport (Duty-Free Area)

28.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has yet come to a conclusion regarding the establishment of a duty-free area at Prestwick Airport.

Officials of the Customs and Excise have met representatives of the Ayr County Council and had discussions which both sides agree to have been very useful: both bodies are considering the matter further in the light of the discussions.

Will my hon. Friend continue to bear in mind what I have said before, that this sort of tax-free area would prove a powerful incentive to industrialists, both north and south of the border, to settle in nearby development districts? Will he therefore overcome the technical prejudices that exist, seeing that Shannon has proved such a very good example of what can be done?

I do not think that any technical prejudices exist. The position is that these discussions have taken place, they are likely to continue, and we shall certainly watch them with care. I can assure my hon. Friend that there will be no delay in considering the results of the discussions.

Is the Economic Secretary aware that the representative delegation that recently visited him shares the view that these conversations were very useful? Can he assure the very large public that is vitally interested in this project that sympathetic consideration will continue, and be urgent?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what he has said. I am sure that it must be right that, while the conversations continue, they should be kept confidential. The important point is that there should be no delay in considering what comes out of them, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will have noted what I have already said on that point.

National Incomes Commission (Output Targets)

29.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the evidence of the Economic Adviser to Her Majesty's Government, Professor Cairncross, to the National Incomes Commission to the effect that there was no reason to expect the rate of growth in output per head to reach 3 per cent. per annum in 1966, represented Government policy.

I think that the Economic Adviser has been misreported. What he said was that there was as yet no evidence to show conclusively that the increase in output per head would be as high as 3 per cent. or 3·2 per cent. in 1966. But, as the hon. Member will see from the verbatim report of the proceedings which is available in the Library, he went on to make it clear that the Government considered a higher rate of growth as feasible.

Is it not quite clear from this transcript that the Treasury estimates are far more pessimistic than those of the National Economic Development Council? If gloomy views of that sort are to be expressed before the National Incomes Commission, would it not be much better if the Chancellor of the Exchequer went to the National Incomes Commission and said so himself, on his own responsibility?

I cannot accept either that there is gloom or that the target for growth is not accepted. That is not so.

30.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, in view of the first report of the National Economic Development Council, he will state the specific Government proposals necessary to enable the target for a 4 per cent. increase in output per year to be reached.

The achievement of the 4 per cent. objective accepted by the National Economic Development Council will call for a parallel effort by Government, management and trade unions in which the Government intend to play their full part. The Council, which is still discussing the Director-General's Report, has not yet set out its conclusions.

Will the Economic Secretary realise that speed is really the element that is required, and will he do his best to get the matter speeded up so that there can be a proper plan and we can know what it is?

We certainly would agree that speed is important, but so, also, is careful consideration.

Have the Government accepted this first Report—including the 4 per cent. target—as Government policy?

We have accepted the Report in general but not necessarily in every particular.

Will the hon. Gentleman indicate when he expects the final Report of the National Economic Development Council? Is he aware that the whole House and the country agree that, although speed is essential, a very full investigation is necessary? Will he therefore say when he hopes the National Economic Development Council to submit a real, fundamental Report, because that is so important to the welfare of the nation?

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what he has said about the need for careful consideration. That is absolutely true. It is too early yet to give him a precise forecast of the kind for which he asks, as I am sure he will understand.

When the Economic Secretary says that the Government accept the Report in general but not in every particular, what does he mean? We have had a target of 4 per cent. or thereabouts for years, but have never attained it. Do the Government mean that we intend to grow at a rate of 4 per cent. per annum? Is that their fixed intention?

The answer to the second part of the hon. Member's question is a clear "Yes". As to the first part, obviously the National Economic Development Council considered a large number of matters and made a large number of forecasts. I cannot say that each and every one of these is entirely accepted by the Government.

European Economic Community (British Manufacturing Projects)

32.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what information he has about the number of British firms which have proceeded with projects for direct investment in new manufacturing plant in the European Economic Community since the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations; and what sums are involved.

In the period 1st February to 15th March, 1963, Exchange Control consent was given for 15 such projects involving about £4 million.

Is not this a considerable increase on what has gone before? Is it not rather alarming and does it not demonstrate, among other things, complete lack of confidence in the Government? Is it not time that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues made way for a Government which would command the confidence of both industrialists and the nation?

I am sorry that the hon. Member has got it so wrong. The fact is that no increase of any significance whatsoever is apparent. Therefore, if that is the premise the remainder of the hon. Member's suppositions fall with a clang to the ground.

Under-Utilised Resources (Aid To Developing Countries)

33.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer on what date he hopes to announce additional aid of some £7,835,000, forming the balance of the £10 million originally suggested as aid from under-utilised resources in Scotland, north-east England, Merseyside, southwest England and Northern Ireland to developing countries.

Parliament will be informed of these and other proposals involving public expenditure in support of developing countries as arrangements are made.

Since this was mentioned on 5th November, is not the time-scale unsatisfactory?

I do not think so. The proposals are somewhat complicated in that they involve, on the one hand, assessing the needs of certain countries and, on the other, seeing that they can be related to surplus capacity here. The work is going quite well.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say how much of these moneys is to be allocated to north-east Scotland, where there is considerable and increasing unemployment?

I cannot anticipate where the proposals will go until I am in a position to announce the proposals themselves.

Paye (Tax Refunds)

34.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, when making Pay As You Earn Income Tax refunds, he will do so other than by cheque, with a view to avoiding inconvenience to the recipient.

The practice of making Income Tax repayments by crossed cheque has substantial advantages of security and economy. If the hon. Member has in mind any particular case in which difficulty has arisen perhaps he will let me know.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is difficulty here in that where a recipient does not have a bank account the banks will not cash his cheque? Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware that only last week one person visited three banks and still could not have his P.A.Y.E. Income Tax refund cashed? In these circumstances would not the right hon. Gentleman consider sending these refunds by money order and sparing recipients this inconvenience?

The refund can be paid into either a Post Office or a Trustee Savings Bank account. This helps in a great many cases, but if the hon. Member knows of particular cases of difficulty I will gladly look into them and see if anything can be done.

Bicycles, Motor Cycles And Mopeds

35.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the cost of removing Purchase Tax from bicycles, motor cycles, motor scooters and mopeds, respectively.

The annual costs are estimated to be of the order of £1¾million for pedal cycles, £½ million for scooters, £½ million for mopeds, and £1¾ million for other motor bicycles.

In view of that Answer and the fact that I know that the Economic Secretary to the Treasury has seen a deputation from this industry, may I ask whether the hon. Gentleman would see to it that his right hon. Friend knows of the difficulties which are being experienced by the industry at present, and in particular that no fewer than six factories have had to close in the last eighteen months? In view of this, and the fact that the industry is one of our best export industries, exporting no less than £26 million worth last year, is there not a good case for easing up on Purchase Tax on these commodities?

As the hon. Member says, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Sir N. Hulbert) recently brought a deputation to see me. I listened most carefully to all they had to say and reported upon it to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I am sure that my right hon. Friend will bear it in mind.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that to remove or to reduce the Purchase Tax on these forms of vehicle would be of great benefit to those who live in rural areas where they are often denied public transport? Will the hon. Gentleman have a word with the Chancellor of the Exchequer to see whether at least a reduction cannot be made in the Purchase Tax on these vehicles?

I note what the hon. Member has said, but I cannot comment further only thirteen days before the Budget, as I know the hon. Member will understand.

Nuclear Tests

Q1.

asked the Prime Minister if he will now recommend to President Kennedy a fresh British-American initiative to reach agreement on a nuclear tests ban.

Q5.

asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the new deadlock at Geneva, he will now discuss with President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev compromise general disarmament proposals drawn from the best of the United States and Soviet disarmament plans.

I am in frequent communication with President Kennedy on important matters of common concern, and our two delegations at the Geneva Conference are in constant touch. The records of the Conference show the many initiatives we have taken. Our aim is to seek areas of common agreement in which progress might be possible, but this should be done by negotiation at the Conference.

Granted that the Russians' attitude towards tests is very hard to define, may I ask whether the possibility that they would violate an agreement reached on their terms is very much greater in practice than the possibility that they would violate an agreement reached on our terms? Is it necessarily worse for us to run this risk than to run the risk of not reaching agreement at all? Therefore, would the Prime Minister give us an assurance that before he allows these talks to fail he will use all his influence with our American friends to reach a compromise agreement?

I take note of the first part of the supplementary question and I think that it is a relevant consideration. On the other hand, what we hope to reach is an agreement which one would assume would not be violated. The only question is to what extent in number and in character these inspections are necessary. We feel that they are necessary. The Russians have accepted that, and that is an advance. We must now try by every possible means to get agreement both as to numbers and the conditions under which inspection takes place.

Is it not most unlikely that any progress on general disarmament will be made at Geneva as long as there are two major disarmament plans before the conference? Would it not be possible to invite the United Nations Secretary-General to produce a compromise plan drawn from the best of both the United States and the Soviet disarmament plans?

The right hon. Gentleman's proposal would require the agreement of the parties, but I see great merit in what he has suggested and I am quite ready to look into the matter further. What we had rather hoped was that the conference would make a combination of the agreed elements of the two plans, but if there is other machinery for getting it put in a simple form I will certainly look into it and see whether we can proceed in that way.

Is the Prime Minister aware that on Tuesday we had an exchange about the tests ban and the House is content to leave that matter where it was then left for Geneva? On the more long-range general multilateral disarmament question, we have had these two statements from the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Foreign Secretary said in another place a year ago that he thought that it was possible to introduce a compromise draft which would reconcile the various points. Could the Prime Minister say whether Her Majesty's Government have produced a compromise plan which they are prepared to table at Geneva as an alternative to the suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) for leaving it to the Secretary-General of the United Nations?

What my noble Friend said at Geneva on 20th March last year was that the conference, rather than Her Majesty's Government, should select subjects of agreement from the two plans and frame procedures for them. That, unluckily, has not happened, although I think that it ought to be possible. I think that the method suggested by the right hon. Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) is a method of procedure which might commend itself to the conference.

Perhaps the Prime Minister did not quite take my point. Since the Foreign Secretary was quite hopeful in thinking that the gap was not unbridgeable, on which we on this side of the House, after close study of the matter, would agree with him, and since it is a year yesterday since the noble Lord said this, does the right hon. Gentleman not feel that the British Government during that year should have tabled an initiative before the conference so that what the Foreign Secretary said could have been realised? Does the Prime Minister not feel that just occasionally the British Government should take an initiative in disarmament, which, on the whole, they have not done?

It is very easy to take an initiative if one wants to strike an attitude, but I am much more interested in seeing whether we can get this settled. The suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman, which I will study, has the advantage that it appears to come from a neutral source. It has been suggested that if the Secretary-General could not do it, perhaps the eight neutral countries themselves, which have a kind of middle position, could do it. I am only anxious to take whatever course is most likely to promote the ultimate agreement.

Q6.

asked the Prime Minister what recent information he has received from the United States Government about the effects of the high-altitude tests conducted from Johnston Island; and to what extent the United States Government have, following the statement made by him on 8th May, 1962, kept the British Government and British scientists fully informed on the matter.

As I told the House on 24th January, a considerable number of reports have been received from the United States Government. Exchanges of this kind are part of a continuing process. In addition the United States Government and other observers have now published a great deal of information about the effects of those tests, as can be seen from recent scientific literature, and more can probably be expected as studies of the observations continue.

Does not that reply conceal the fact that the latest information from the United States is that it was Sir Bernard Lovell in his country who was right on the effects of the high altitude tests and that most of the scientists in America and the Government's own advisers have been proved wrong? Is it not also a fact that Dr. Van Allen, whom the Prime Minister cited on his side when he gave the reply on the date mentioned in the Question, has now changed his opinion and accepts the view of Sir Bernard Lovell? Does not the Prime Minister think that it would be gracious if he paid a compliment to a British scientist for his superior knowledge in this matter?

It is true, as I understand it, that Dr. Van Allen has somewhat changed his view from that which he expressed before, which shows the great complexity of this problem. What we are dealing with is not tests which are made from Christmas Island or over which we have any control. They are tests made by the United States Government in Johnston Island and on which, by courtesy, we have been consulted and informed as to the probable effects and the actual results.

The right hon. Gentleman really must not dodge this. Is he aware that all the Questions on which he stalled in answering last year were based on our knowledge that the rainbow tests were from American territory, not Christmas Island, and therefore we asked him to look into the scientific effects. Everybody knew that it was not Christmas Island.

Is the Prime Minister aware that Professor Van Allen has not "somewhat" changed his attitude; he has admitted that he was totally wrong, which is a different thing. We on this side of the House asked the Prime Minister a year ago whether he was satisfied about this and quoted against him a number of eminent British scientists, and the right hon. Gentleman on that occasion sided with Professor Van Allen and against the British scientists. Will the Prime Minister now have the same grace as Professor Van Allen and admit that he was wrong?

I admit that I have to weigh the information that is given to me. Sir Bernard Lovell took a certain view which has proved to be correct in this respect, which I gladly accept. Dr. Van Allen changed his view. Professor Fred Hoyle's view is given in an article which states:

"In predicting the effects of space explosions you had to solve four equations "—
and this is Professor Hoyle's remark—
"'but they cannot be solved unless you simplify them'. If you simplified them wrongly your predictions would be wrong".
It seems to me that that is what has happened. In fairness to the American Government, I should say that as soon as they discovered that the first test on 9th July had a greater radiation than was predicted the subsequent tests were changed and were made at lower altitudes and had lower yields.

Whilst I appreciate that we cannot undo what has been done, would my right hon. Friend now consider asking the President that before the Americans consider carrying out any further experiments of this nature they should at least consult, perhaps, Sir Bernard Lovell and some other British scientists as well and put them in touch with the American scientists who advise the President?

Yes, Sir. I feel sure that I could give that undertaking. I am quite sure that the United States authorities would be very willing to receive all the information they could. What one hopes is that there will not be these further tests—there certainly cannot be for a considerable time, because we all know that even if the worst happened there is a long period while one series is being evaluated and another planned. What I should like to concentrate upon is somehow to find, as I believe is the wish of the House, a way in which certainly these atmospheric tests and, I hope, all tests can be done away with altogether.

Is the Prime Minister aware that the whole House will agree with what he has just said about our hope that all tests, whether American, Russian or anyone else's, will now be done away with altogether and that this is the most important question? Since, however, it is possible for eminent scientists, and even Prime Ministers, to get their four equations wrong, as has been proved—

All of us must try to get our four equations right—may I ask the Prime Minister whether he could consider and, perhaps, report to the House later upon the advice which he now has about the extent of the duration of the disturbance of the upper atmospere? It is obviously much longer than some experts and the Prime Minister thought a year ago. Has he an estimate to make of how long it will remain deranged?

Without apologising more than I ought to do for any misstatement which I may have made—because these are very difficult matters to deal with, except with the advice which I have to draw upon, which is that of the official advisers to the Government—I would say that there is an immensely complicated series of questions. As I understood him, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) thought that whichever of my colleagues should succeed me as Prime Minister might suffer from the same disadvantage. Meanwhile, however, if the right hon. Gentleman will give me notice of the precise question or put it down, I will do my best to get the best answer I can.

Department Of Disarmament

Q2.

asked the Prime Minister if he will take steps to set up a Department of Disarmament with a senior Minister in charge of it.

No, Sir. Disarmament is closely linked with the fundamental responsibilities of the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence. My hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs already has special responsibility, under the Foreign Secretary, for disarmament and devotes a very large part of his time to it.

Is the Prime Minister aware that, arising from the recent exchanges on this subject, there is a great deal of feeling among independent observers at Geneva that the British Government are failing to take an adequate lead in bringing the two sides together? Would it not help towards this end to change the governmental arrangements here and to treat disarmament as a separate subject and give it a powerful voice of its own inside the Cabinet?

I do not think it is a question of a voice inside the Cabinet. The problem which I have to try to solve is how best to get an agreement, whether on a test ban or on disarmament. That depends, as we know, on getting a move which is acceptable to the two greatest of the nuclear Powers, and, in my view, that depends largely on the personal decision made by the Chairman of the Soviet Union.

Cigarette Smoking

Q3.

asked the Prime Minister what decision has been taken by Her Majesty's Government on the recommendation of the Royal College of Physicians' report 12 months ago in regard to cigarette advertising being prohibited on television.

Q4.

asked the Prime Minister which other Government Departments or official bodies in addition to the Medical Research Council, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Education are concerned with the problem of the dangers to health of cigarette smoking; what are their functions in this connection; and what resources they are afforded by the Government.

As regards television advertising, the Government do not propose, for the time being at any rate, to go beyond the rules which have been introduced in independent television restricting cigarette advertising until after about 9 p.m., and banning certain methods of advertising for cigarettes.

As regards departmental responsibility, in addition to the Medical Research Council, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, the Home Office is concerned in relation to the administration of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933; the Post Office in relation to tobacco advertising on television; and the Scottish Office in relation to home, health and education functions in Scotland. The Central Office of Information provides publicity material and services required by Departments.

It is not possible to identify separately the total expenditure incurred for these purposes by these Departments.

Does the Prime Minister really believe that young men and women cease viewing at nine o'clock at night? Why is it that, although the Prime Minister last summer said three times in the House that the Government were considering the matter as a whole, no announcement of their decision has been made to the House apart from this agreement between the I.T.A. and the advertisers?

This is one of the methods—there are many others recommended—which are being produced by the various authorities concerned.

Is the Prime Minister aware that the medical profession is deeply distressed at the total inadequacy of Government measures to bring the dangers connected with cigarette smoking to the attention of the public? By the time Question Time has finished today, three people will have died of lung cancer, apart from the disease and deaths caused by other effects of cigarette smoking. Will not the right hon. Gentleman give us an assurance that the Government will take some effective action to bring these dangers to the attention of the public?

While the Royal College of Physicians recommended that tobacco advertisements should be restricted, it also recorded a doubt as to whether advertisements did much to initiate the smoking habit. Therefore, although I think that this is a good arrangement to be made about restricting television advertisements, the chief work is in the way of general propaganda by all the various means which I have on this occasion and on others described.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that members of the medical profession are among the heaviest smokers in the country?

Does the Prime Minister realise that the people of Britain have been smoking tobacco for 360 years and that the population of 360 years ago was five million and is now 50 million? It would therefore appear that it has not done a lot of harm to this nation. May I seriously ask the right. hon Gentleman whether he will ask the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for the Home Department to publish statistics showing the number of deaths that are known to be due to lung cancer through smoking and the number of deaths on our roads due to drunken driving so that we may get the situation into relative proportion?

I would not attempt—it would be foolish of me or of anyone to do so—to try to go behind the decision and views expressed by the Medical Research Council. I am sure that the members of the Council are the right judges. Nevertheless, nobody suggests in this free country that people should be prevented from smoking. What is suggested is that the views of the doctors and the dangers concerned should be made known to the people by a government in a free country. That is our duty, and nothing more.

Business Of The House

May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business of the House for next week.

Yes, Sir. The business far next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 25TH MARCH—Third Reading of the Weights and Measures Bill.

Motions relating to the Post Office.

TUESDAY, 26TH MARCH—Committee and remaining stages of the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill, which if the House agrees, will be taken formally to allow debate on an Opposition Motion on School Building and Teacher Shortage.

Motion on the Housing (Payments for Well-Maintained Houses) Order.

WEDNESDAY, 27TH MARCH—Remaining stages of the Protection of Depositors Bill, and of the British Museum Bill.

THURSDAY, 28TH MARCH—Debate on House of Lords reform, which will arise on a Government Motion to take note of the Report of the Joint Select Committee.

Motion on the Location of Offices Bureau.

FRIDAY, 29TH MARcH—Private Members' Motions.

MONDAY, 1ST APRIL, and TUESDAY, 2ND APRIL—The proposed business will be: Remaining stages of the London Government Bill.

In view of the widespread Press reports about the publication of the reorganisation scheme of the railway authorities, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether, in addition to our confident expectation that we shall read the whole scheme in the Sunday Times or the Sunday Telegrpah this weekend, the House will be given a statement on the day of publication of this reorganisation scheme?

Yes, Sir. My right hon. Friend the Minister will make a statement in the House at 3.30 next Wednesday, and we are arranging, which, I think, will be for the convenience of hon. Members, who might like to know it now, that copies of the Report will be available in the Vote Office at 12 noon; that is, a few hours before the Minister makes his statement.

Is the Leader of the House aware that that will almost certainly meet the convenience of the House, because on this occasion at least, and, perhaps, on other occasions, it would be helpful to have a detailed report available to us before the Ministerial statement is made? In view of a lot of Press comments and statements about this matter, will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the White Paper which is to be published at 12 noon on Wednesday represents the full report submitted by Dr. Botching to the Minister, or an amended version of it?

It is the Report, absolutely and in full, without a single word altered, as it has been presented to us.

Shall we have an opportunity to debate the Agricultural Price Review before Easter?

No, Sir. As my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has made clear, in recent years, when it has been debated, it has usually been taken on Supply.

Concerning the London Government Bill, will the right hon. Gentleman consider inviting the House to revise its former decision about the amount of time to be available for the Bill in view of certain embarrassments experienced by the Government this morning in Standing Committee F?

On the Floor of the House, we have no official notice of what happens upstairs.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Lord Privy Seal was pressed fairly closely yesterday, from both sides of the House, on the question of a multilateral and multinational nuclear force? Can he give us an undertaking that there will be at least one day, and perhaps two, to debate any conclusions that the Government may come to on this matter?

No, Sir, I cannot give an undertaking about a debate. If my hon. Friend studies what I have said, he will see that I have announced the business until Tuesday, 2nd April. We all know that the Budget is to be presented on the following day and virtually, therefore, I have announced the business until the Recess. I am, however, aware of the importance which the House attaches to this matter, which was raised yesterday by the Leader of the Opposition, and on an early day next week—on Monday, or, more likely, Tuesday—my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal, in this House, and my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, in another place, will make a statement on these matters.

Will the Leader of the House kindly say whether the debate on school buildings which is to take place on Tuesday will be sufficiently wide to deal with the closure of existing schools in Aberdeen, about which I have written to the Minister?

I dare say that if the hon. and learned Member catches the eye of the Chair, he can make that point.

Now that it has been decided to put before the Select Committee on Procedure the question of the Committee stage of the Finance Bill, will my right hon. Friend say when there will be an opportunity to debate further reforms and the future programme for the Select Committee?

Let us take one thing at a time. The Select Committee will meet at an early date and will, of course, report to the House on this year's Finance Bill as soon as we have seen it. After that, there are a number of subjects which have been put to me for consideration.

In his reply to the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. P. Williams), the right hon. Gentleman said that he could not afford facilities for an early debate on the subject of the proposed multilateral and multinational forces. Is he, however, aware that his right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal, in reply to Questions yesterday, agreed that the matter of a debate was one for the Leader of the House and gave an assurance that the matter would not be finally disposed of until the House had had an opportunity of debating it? Can the right hon. Gentleman repeat that assurance?

I have have had some discussion on this with my right hon. Friend and, naturally, I heard most of yesterday's exchanges in the House. My understanding of the assurance was that I, being responsible for arranging business, would consider the question of a debate. As I have said, however, although there is not an available Government day before Easter we have arranged for a statement—on which, no doubt, Questions will be asked in the usual way—by my right hon. Friend on Monday or Tuesday next week.

Is it now proposed to publish the statement made by the Foreign Secretary at the N.A.T.O. Council meeting yesterday, in view of the widespread publicity it has already received as a result of most of it being revealed by members of the Foreign Office News Department?

There is an analogy in the long series of statements on the Common Market negotiations which were made, at appropriate times, by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal. I think that the speech by my noble Friend yesterday would be better covered by the statement we envisage for next Monday or Tuesday, but I will certainly put to my right hon. Friend the hon. Gentleman's suggestion for a White Paper in addition, if the hon. Gentleman wishes to press me on that.

I am sorry to press the right hon. Gentleman on this, bat he will recall that a similar incident arose during the Brussels negotiations, when a so-called secret speech by the Lord Privy Seal received wide publicity in Europe before being made available to hon. Members of this House. In view of that precedent, will the right hon. Gentleman seek to publish, or to lay on the Table, the speech made yesterday by the Foreign Secretary, which is already receiving publicity without being made available for study by right hon. and hon. Members?

I am aware of the precedent that the hon. Gentleman has, quite rightly, mentioned. But there were a number of other occasions on which no such action was taken. However, I will discuss with my right hon. Friend the full coverage of my noble Friend's speech.

As the Chancellor of the Exchequer is taking the unusual course of opening his Budget on a Wednesday, how many days will be devoted to the debate on this occasion?

The usual four days, which will take us into the beginning of the last week before Easter.

On a recent Thursday, did not the right hon. Gentleman say that we might expect a debate on the Rochdale Report before Easter? Is this now likely?

It cannot take place before Easter. I do not think that I ever indicated any particular time for this debate. I have said clearly that the Rochdale Report will be debated, but it will not be before Easter.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of us on this side of the House, and doubtless many hon. Members opposite, enjoyed his all-too-short debate with my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) on television last night? Is it possible for us to have a debate in this House on industrial relations, a subject which is highly important for the country?

This subject is highly important. But there are a number of claims on business between now and Easter. There can be no conceivable prospect of such a debate in that time.

Surely the Foreign Secretary's speech yesterday in Paris represents a major departure, whether we agree with it or not, in British defence policy. It was not mentioned in the White Paper on Defence. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that during the Brussels negotiations there were debates in this House. It is very difficult to believe that there is so much important Government between now and Easter that this major matter cannot be debated in what has recently been called the main forum of the nation. There can be few more important matters than the defence of the Western world.

The right hon. Gentleman is somewhat telescoping an argument. There were not debates on every occasion that my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal made a statement during the Brussels negotiations, but only on a selected number of occasions. I agree that some aspects of the Foreign Secretary's statement are new. Since the White Paper, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, there have been visits by American leaders, for example, and communiqués issued as a result. I suggest that we might await the statement which my right hon. Friend will make next week.

In view of his statement that he had to await a decision in the courts on the Jordan case before he could give a reply to my request for facilities for the Racial Discrimination and Incitement Bill, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Government have now reached a decision on the implications of the case and whether they will facilitate the passage of the Bill?

I think that any such statement would be made by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. As the hon. Gentleman knows, my right hon. Friend is considering the implications of the decision of the Divisional Court in the case of Jordan and, naturally, we shall fulfil the undertaking to make a statement in the House.

The hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks. (Mr. Kitson) asked about a debate on agriculture. Why are th Government relying upon the Opposition to provide time for an agricultural debate? Is not this an industry in which the Government themselves nave sufficient interest to provide time for a debate? There was no debate last year on this vital industry's Price Review. Is that precedent to be followed this year?

If the hon. Gentleman carries his researches a little further back, he will find that it is comparatively rare for the Government themselves to find time for a debate on this subject.

I am sorry. I thought that the hon. Gentleman understood how these matters were arranged in the House. This is, fundamentally, a matter of Supply. That being so, it is normally taken in Opposition time. This has been a well-established custom over very many years.

Yesterday, the House granted me permission to introduce a Bill to indemnify the Secretary of State for Scotland against any penal consequences of his failure to lay certain reports before the House. Will time be provided to put that Bill through further stages? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Secretary of State is such an asset to this side of the House that we do not want to lose him?

The hon. Gentleman should not be so pointed in his observations. If he wants to indemnify Secretaries of State going back to 1889, there is a right hon. Gentleman within a few feet of him on whom he would have to start.

Before fixing the dates of the Easter Recess, will the right hon. Gentleman try to find time for further progress on the National Insurance Act, 1957 (Amendment) Bill? It is a very small Measure, but one of great importance to diseased, injured and disabled soldiers. It is supported by hon. Members on both sides and I had the unanimous leave of the House to present it. As far as I know, it is mainly opposed by the hon. and learned Member for Surrey, East (Mr. Doughty) on the ground that my name is on the Bill and that he opposes any Bill which has my name on it.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this Bill has caused the greatest interest in the Colne Valley of yorkshire—rather more interest, indeed, than his belated announcement that the snow had stopped?

The House gave the hon. Gentleman leave to introduce the Bill. It has not reached the stage of Second Reading. There are many Private Members' Bills in exactly that position and it would be wholly wrong for me to issue, as it were, a ranking list between them.

Since the latest figures confirm that some parts of the Midlands are being seriously affected by long-term structural unemployment, will the right hon. Gentleman now put high on his list of priorities a debate on the economic problems of the Midlands?

No, Sir. If we were to debate employment and unemployment on a regional basis, there are, as the hon. Member will recognise, many regions with higher claims than his.

British Museum Money No 2

[ Queen's Recommendation signified]

Considered in Committee under Standing Order No. 84 (Money Committees).

[Sir WILLIAM ANSTRUTHER-GRAY in the Chair]

Resolved,

That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to alter the composition of the Trustees of the British Museum, to provide for the separation from the British Museum of the British Museum (Natural History), to make new provision with respect to the regulation of the two Museums and their collections in place of that made by the British Museum Act 1753 and enactments amending or supplementing that Act, and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, it is expedient to authorise the making of any payment out of moneys provided by Parliament or out of the Consolidated Fund which falls to be so made in consequence of any provisions of the said Act of the present Session relating to the staff of the British Museum or the British Museum (Natural History).—[Mr. H. Brooke.]

Resolution to be reported.

Report to be received Tomorrow.

Orders Of The Day

Consolidated Fund (No 2) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Chief Enahoro

3.51 p.m.

We are taking this occasion today to raise a case which has caused much concern not only in the House, on both sides of the House, but outside, among all sections of the community. It is the case of Mr. Enahoro, a Nigerian, an ex-Minister in the Western Region of Nigeria, who is now in this country, who has been in Brixton Prison since November, and who is under threat of being deported back to Nigeria by order of the Home Secretary.

To many people this seems to be a grave matter. I should like to make it clear that from my point of view the gravity does not lie in the interests of Mr. Enahoro, or in Nigeria's natural and understandable pride and concern for her own standing in the world. I do not speak today as a spokesman for Mr. Enahoro, and do not in any sense stand as a contender against Nigeria. The gravity of this case arises because of our own British tradition, our treasured heritage, and the harm which the Home Secretary seems to be in danger of doing to traditions of which we are justifiably very proud.

We must say from the outset to Nigeria, and to any other member of the British Commonwealth of free and independent sovereign nations, that they must understand that this nation, too, has its traditions and its heritage of which we are tremendously proud. They must try to understand us and the things we care about, just as much as we try to understand them and the new rôle which they are trying to play.

I have seen nothing which has disturbed me quite so much about this case as the leading article which appeared in the Daily Mirror this morning and which supports some earlier references to the attitude of the Commonwealth Relations Office. The attitude of this lead- ing article, an attitude which other people have taken, is that because Nigeria is an independent member of the Commonwealth: and because she has demanded the return of Mr. Enahoro and would be hurt and upset if he were not returned, it is our business to return him.

That is a case which could be made against anybody accused of a political offence, anybody from Spain, or Russia, or Portugal, or France, or anywhere else. There is no difference in that case from all those which we have always resisted for hundreds of years. Merely to argue that someone will misunderstand us if we do not send him back is to argue that we should end the tradition of political asylum which we have always been willing to concede. That we cannot do. We cannot decide this case on the basis of whether we will be misunderstood in Nigeria, and I have a suspicion that if we explained it very carefully to the Nigerians we would not be misunderstood.

I welcome, as most of us do, I imagine, the transition of our Commonwealth to an association of free, sovereign Powers. Having accepted that, let us drop that habit into which some people are falling, that of paying lip-service to the idea that we are an association of free, sovereign and equal Powers but are, at the same time, trying to apply a special set of values to some members.

I do not believe that any of the newer African States, or any of the other new States of the Commonwealth, want to be treated differently from the rest of us. I do not think that they want us to apply to them judgments which we would not apply to others. They resent criticism which implies that they are undemocratic, that they are tyrannical, or that they do not have free or fair courts. It is not part of my case that any of those things are true of Nigeria, and I well understand that the Nigerians resent allegations of the sort which are so easily made.

But I do not believe that they should seek to decide our attitude to political asylum in this country. I think that they understand our traditions. Most of their leaders have been educated in them and I believe that so long as we make it plain to them that what we are talking about is no reflection on the courts in Nigeria, or elsewhere, is not a reflection on the democratic processes in Nigeria or elsewhere, but is part of our British tradition, the Nigerians will perfectly well understand any decision which we take in this matter.

Let me make it perfectly plain that it is not necessary to our case to impute any unworthy conduct or unworthy motives to the Nigerian judiciary or court processes. There is no reason to think that Nigeria's judges are anything other than sturdily independent, or that they do not operate in the best traditions. So far as I know anything of the country, the courts are perfectly good and have a perfectly good procedure and their judges are wholly independent.

But is has never been necessary, in defending a case for political asylum, to prove the contrary. That has nothing whatever to do with it. That must be said in the House, and, through the House, to the Nigerians. The whole case is being muddled with irrelevant allegations, none of which can be proved and none of which may be true. We do not take a decision about extradition on those grounds. Our great heritage is that we accord asylum when a man is accused of an offence which is political. That is all. When it is an issue of a political offence, we do not automatically permit extradition.

There is no valid reason why, in 1963, we should apply a different test in the case of Commonwealth citizens from that which we apply in the case of citizens from elsewhere. Summed up in one sentence, that is the case. Why should we argue a totally different case if it happens to be member of the Commonwealth from that which we argue about a French, or Spanish, or Russian, or any other citizen?

It is that with which the Home Secretary has to deal, because that is what he is doing. He is saying that if, by ill-fortune—and I choose my words carefully and deliberately—someone within the Commonwealth is accused of a political offence he will not be entitled to the protection in Great Britain which for centuries men who were citizens of other countries have been entitled to in similar circumstances. The right hon. Gentleman has to defend the reason why all Commonwealth citizens should have second-class status in the world.

In this argument does the right hon. Gentleman make any difference at all between republican members of the Commonwealth and those members of the Commonwealth who in some way recognise the Crown as the Head of the State?

No. Every member of the Commonwealth recognises the Crown as the Head of the Commonwealth and the symbol of the association. I do not think that there is any difference between one member and another.

The Home Secretary must have a basis for this extraordinary decision, and he tries to find it in the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. Clearly, this Act is at odds with the Extradition Act, and it is under this latter Act that we give force to our normal traditions and feelings. There is a good reason why one Act is at odds with the other. The 1881 Act deals with a time long since passed when there was one Queen, one set of courts, one law, and one ultimate Executive, and all that it was necessary to arrange was that an offender, or an apprehended offender, was dealt with in the most convenient court. That was the only consideration, that the offender was brought before the most convenient court for the purpose of being tried in the quickest and speediest way.

But at that time we were dealing with the Queen's realms, and everything was the same. With great respect, what is the use of our pretending that that is the situation today? We make absolute nonsense of the whole situation by making that pretence today, and, with great respect, what is the use of the Home Secretary behaving like a bureaucrat and saying that we have not amended the Act? Time has amended it. Events have amended it. That Act has no relevance to the situation today, and if we have not brought it into accord with the situation today, the sooner we do so the better.

Nor is it true that the right hon. Gentleman has to follow the courts. Phrases are being used by other Ministers which imply that the courts have considered Mr. Enahoro's case and that the natural thing is for the Home Secretary to follow the courts. This is not true. Even under that Act the Home Secretary has greater discretion than the courts. The Home Secretary has unlimited discretion, and our case is that he should use the discretion which the law allows him in respect of Mr. Enahoro while the Executive consults other Commonwealth Governments and then presents to this House an amendment of the law to bring it into line with reality. In the meantime, by exercising his administrative discretion, he could make sure that we did not do something under this law which we clearly would not do the moment we amended it.

Is it not the case that that part of the Fugitive Offenders Act which reserves an unfettered discretion to the Home Secretary presupposes that the courts have already decided the other way?

That is what I was trying to say, in less well-chosen words. It reserves to the Home Secretary a wide discretion so that he may decide, if he so chooses, contrary to the way in which the courts decide. What I am saying is that he does not have to follow the courts. He can use his discretion, and if, as he said, he believes that the law ought now to be amended, he ought to use his discretion to make sure that there does not occur in the case of Mr. Enahoro something which could not occur once the law was amended. It would be nonsense for him to do to Mr. Enahoro today what he would not be able to do once the law were amended in the way that he thinks it should be.

I am sure that the House is aware that the law has been amended. This law was passed in this House to apply to the whole of what is now the Commonwealth. At that time, there was only one lawmaking institution for the Commonwealth, but now there are a number of law-making bodies in the Commonwealth. Ghana, Cyprus, and some others of whom I am not immediately informed, have amended the law, and a fugitive offender for an alleged political offence could not be extradited from those countries, yet we still retain this out-of-date law. Clearly, therefore, this practice is already eroding in the other legislatures of the Commonwealth. Why, therefore, should the Home Secretary insist on doing in Britain what other members of the Commonwealth have already said they will not do in respect of a political offender from this country?

For all I know, in due course Nigeria may amend the law. We would then have the absurd position that somebody accused of treason in Nigeria would be extradited from here to Nigeria, but somebody accused of treason in Britain would not be extradited from Nigeria here. This is becoming absolute nonsense, and I suggest to the Home Secretary that on that ground, too, we ought to bring ourselves into line. We do not have to lean over backwards all the time, and I do not believe that the Commonwealth countries would expect us to do so.

This is not the first occasion on which this matter has arisen. Last year, we had the case of the two Cypriots whom the Cyprus Government wanted back, not for the sort of offence with which Mr. Enahoro is accused, but for much more serious offences. This meets the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). In that case the courts had found them guilty, and had also rejected their appeals.

The Home Secretary—but, of course, it was a different Home Secretary—was in the same position with regard to the Cypriots as the present Home Secretary is with regard to Mr. Enahoro. The courts decided that there was a reasonable probability that they were guilty of the offences for which they were to be tried, and recommended that they should go back. What did the Home Secretary do? He decided that they should not be sent back. He granted them asylum.

I propose to say something which some hon. Members might find hard to take, but I must say it, because I think that we had better face the position in the worst possible light. Those two Cypriots were British informers. They could be said to be the modern equivalent of the Black and Tans. We decided to keep them here. Does the House really want it to go out that we shall grant asylum to a man who has been acting for the British against his local compatriots and is accused of a political offence, but that we shall refuse it if he is accused of a political offence while working for his compatriots?

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman wants to be fair about this. In general, I support what he says, but in that case surely one of the reasons that guided the Home Secretary was the fear that these men would lose their lives when they got back to Cyprus, not through any act of law on the part of the Cyprus Government, but by others who might feel that they would have to carry out reprisals against them?

I cannot say that Mr. Enahoro will not lose his life—nor can anyone else—if we are considering what may happen outside the courts. We are talking about what might happen to a man as a result of local political passions. How can we say that it will not happen to anyone? In a sense, that is the whole basis for our granting political asylum. It has nothing to do with what might happen in the courts; it is concerned with what might happen outside them.

But we require to understand what will be said outside this country if we make a precedent in the case of people whose political offence was that they supported us when we were a colonial Power while not applying the same test in the case of a person whose offence was that he was in political conflict with his own local Government. We shall make terrible trouble for ourselves, in the terms of the comparison that will be made between the action which the previous Home Secretary took in the case of the Cypriots and the action which the present Home Secretary now proposes to take. There is no difference between the cases, except on political merits.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations laughs, but this is a real danger. Apparently he is deciding the relative political merits of the two cases. I urge on him the argument that this oculd be a terribly dangerous thing to do. We must not seem to pick and choose which are the political cases in respect of which we grant asylum. We never have done so, and we must not do so in the future.

Our forebears stood up for all kinds of bad cases, merely on a question of principle. I urge the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to be careful about this.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Mr. Duncan Sandys)

I was laughing not about that, but be- cause the right hon. Gentleman is mixing up all his facts.

If the right hon. Gentleman first laughs and then accuses me of getting things mixed up, and is not then prepared to say what facts I have got mixed up, he has already wasted the time of the House. If he thinks that I am getting mixed up perhaps he would like to explain how.

The case of the men from Cyprus was not a political one; there was an accusation of murder. The Home Secretary feared that on their return they might be threatened by an enemy gang inside Cyprus. There is no connection between that case and the case of Mr. Enahoro.

That is exactly what I said. The Secretary of State ought not to laugh. I said that those men were accused of a far more serious crime than Mr. Enahoro is accused of, and the right hon. Gentleman is confirming that fact.

Since the Secretary of State has made this point, I may as well deal with it. What he has said emphasises the fact that we gave asylum to men who were not accused of political offences, while we are now denying it to a man who is accused of political offences—and yet the only matters in respect of which the Act says we can provide asylum are political offences. I did not make the point, but I am now prepared to make it. With respect, the Secretary of State was ill-advised to bring that point up, because it illustrates a difference that makes it very difficult for his right hon. Friend to stand by the point that he is apparently seeking to make.

In any case, let us suppose that the argument is being put forward—as I gather is the case—that the reason that we do not need to accord asylum in this case is that the Nigerian courts are fair and just. What conclusion will be drawn in the future if we ever grant asylum again to anybody from the Commonwealth? Let us suppose that a person from Ghana requested asylum, and the Executive thought that we ought to grant it. The immediate conclusion would be that we had decided that the courts in Ghana were not fair.

If we do not establish this principle today, in a case where we are not attacking the courts, it is very difficult to think of any future case where we dare establish it. If we do, it will come about our ears in no uncertain way. I tell the Home Secretary, who is not a Commonwealth Relations Office agent but a protector of our traditions. that he had better consider very carefully what the future consequences will be if he persists in what I understand to be his present attitude.

I now want to put forward one or two points that seem to be absolutely essential if we are to make up our minds properly on this issue. First, we can leave the situation of the courts in Nigeria entirely out of the question, but we cannot leave out of consideration the general political situation in any of the new African States. These are early days for democracy in those countries. Those countries will have to live through terrific strains and pressures before they finally establish democracy.

I hope that we have finally established it here. The hon. Member can declare his own beliefs, but it is established here now, despite anything which the hon. Gentleman seeks to do about it.

I do not declare any beliefs or hopes. I merely question the assumption that any political development is final, so far as human judgment can assert.

That is all right. I am all in favour of the hon. Member going on with his questions. If it is any comfort to him, I can tell him that I shall always stand up for political asylum for him anywhere he likes to claim it.

Until these countries have worked their way to a more settled condition they will have to go through great stresses and strains, as once we did. Therefore, by sending this man back we may be sending him back to a very troubled political situation. We have only to consider the witnesses involved. The witnesses who will be called against him were themselves subject to the very same charges, and we have only to consider the kind of pressures that may be put upon them, and the offers that might be held out to them, to realise that this man has many reasons for fearing the kind of atmosphere in which his trial would be held. Emergency regulations have only just ceased in that country, and there is no assurance that they will not be reimposed.

Nobody can assert that even if Mr. Enahoro is acquitted in the courts he will ever be free to leave the country again. After all, his children are here. I received a telegram today from the staff of the school which his boys attend. I read it out not because it is a powerful argument, but because it is a human addition to our discussion. It says:
"The staff of Yateley Manor Preparatory School appeal on behalf of Kenneth and Eugene to give Their father, Chief Enahoro, political asylum. They will have no protection without him."
The telegram is signed by the principal, the headmaster and the chaplain of the school. This man's children are here, and nobody can be sure that he will be able to get back here if once he is sent home, no matter how fair his trial may be. There could not be a better example of the kind of case that caused us to grant political asylum.

There is an additional point, which I do not want to make too much of. There has been what the Secretary of State calls a genuine misunderstanding on the part of those who inquired on behalf of Mr. Enahoro, when he was in Dublin, as to whether he would be safe from arrest if he came here. When he was in Dublin he asked some of his friends who were over here to ask the Home Office whether, if he came here, he would be safe from arrest and deportation. I gather that there is some debate about exactly what was said, but a very senior official at the Home Office was understood by Mr. Enahoro's friends to say, "Certainly he will be free from arrest." Yet, within hours of his arrival here, he was arrested, and he has been kept in prison ever since.

This casts a very bad reflection upon us. The Home Secretary may say that this was a genuine misunderstanding. Perhaps it was. But there it is; the man came here with what he thought was that assurance, and he is now in prison as a result, and is now subject to deportation. It is an awful thing to deport a man who had reasonable grounds for assuming that we should not do so. He came here at the request of his colleagues who belong to the Action Group Party in the Western Region of Nigeria. He is quite willing to give an undertaking covering the amount of political activity that he could carry out while he is here.

I took steps myself to see him yesterday morning and discussed this very fully with him, by courtesy of the Governor and the Home Secretary, to make sure that he had no misunderstanding about what political asylum meant. So that there should be no misunderstanding, I took steps to see the acting High Commissioner immediately afterwards to make quite sure that he understood the basis on which we were approaching this matter. There is, therefore, no ground for thinking that the man misunderstands what the consequences of political asylum will be.

There are other considerations that should move us in this matter. We have kept Chief Enahoro in prison without bail all these months. I find this a bit surprising. The case which was made, I understand, was that not enough was known about him. Here is a man who had been here many times, as a businessman, an ordinary citizen, and also as a Minister. I understand that the last time he visited Brixton Prison before he was incarcerated was as Minister of Home Security. This is the man of whom we said that we did not know enough to grant him bail, and we kept him in prison from November to March.

This is a terrible reflection upon the administration of these Acts under the present Home Secretary's régime. I do not suggest that he ought to make a decision on that basis, but he ought to take it into account. It certainly makes me feel—as I felt over the previous case of the Jamaican girl—that the present Home Secretary gives far less than enough consideration to what it means when we put people in prison and keep them there for months and far less than enough consideration of the consequences of the Act that he is having to put into effect.

Having said all that, I repeat that the real argument must be the harm we will do to our own British traditions if we refuse asylum in this case. We shall make a breach in something of which we are tremendously and justifiably proud, for no reason at all except that the Commonwealth Relations Office is arguing, as the Daily Mirror does, that it may be misunderstood in Nigeria. I repeat that that case can always be made against giving political asylum to anybody from any friendly country. We have never been willing to accept it, and I see no reason why we should accept it now.

I ask the Home Secretary, seriously, not to act as the agent for the Commonwealth Relations Office in this matter. With great respect, this is what I fear he is doing. He must never act as the agent for the Foreign Office. He has, in this respect, a job that sets him as much apart from other Ministers as a Law Officer's job is supposed to set him apart from other Ministers.

The Home Secretary has to consider matters that are of no concern to the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth Relations Office or the Foreign Secretary. I can well understand that for reasons of convenience, or even of devotion to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Relations Office might well put up these arguments to the Home Secretary. I can see that if one were in his office one would have to receive them and think about them.

I should like to think that, had I the responsibility, I would say to my right hon. Friend, "Yes, I see your point; I see the case and I should hate it if anything that I am going to do would make it more difficult for you to operate within the Commonwealth, but I am bound to say to you that my business, as Home Secretary, is not keeping the Commonwealth together, much as I want to do that. My business, as Home Secretary, is to stay within the traditions of Magna Carta and the ideals of British libertarian outlook".

One may be faced with such a situation, but here I am not sure that one is. I talked to the Nigerian authorities myself and I am not at all sure that they take quite as strong a view about this as the Commonwealth Relations Office is taking. When I was last a member of a Government, I always found that, whether it is the Foreign Office or the Commonwealth Relations Office, they tend to be much more royalist than the king. We tend to get from our Ambassadors and High Commissioners cases much stronger than the politicians of other countries would make themselves. I would say to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, "No, I am sorry, but it is British tradition that I have to uphold. That must take precedence here. Our centuries-old tradition of giving asylum to a man charged with a political offence, if he asks for it, must hold here, and for those reasons I shall give asylum to Chief Enahoro and I rely upon you, as Secretary of State, to explain it in the best possible way to our Nigerian friends. I am sure that if you do that, they will understand it".

If the Home Secretary did that, I am sure that it would be much more in keeping with the traditions of his office than if he obstinately stands by an indefensible decision and sends this man back to Nigeria.

4.27 p.m.

I agree with the first and last passages in the speech of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown). This is a grave matter. It deserves the most thorough and responsible thought that I am capable of giving to it. I agree with what he said at the end, that this is a case where the Home Secretary must not act as the agent of any of his right hon. Friends or anyone else. The law, which we cannot argue out of existence, puts squarely on the Home Secretary the responsibility of deciding what he thinks just; and he must act in accordance with what he thinks just and he must damn the consequences.

I must invite the attention of the House to some mistakes and misconceptions in the right hon. Gentleman's speech. For example, it may be a minor point, but it seemed to me that he was colouring the case against me by insinuating that a better or more broad-minded Home Secretary would have granted Chief Enahoro bail. I have no power to grant bail to a prisoner. That is entirely and exclusively a matter for the courts. I have no knowledge of any case at any time arising either under the Extradition Act or the Fugitive Offenders Act where bail has been granted, but let me say, once again, that it is for the courts and not for me to decide whether, in the circumstances, a prisoner is let out on bail.

No, I cannot give way— Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I think that we all appreciate what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, that the granting of bail is not a matter for him, but for the courts and, of course, he is perfectly right. But can he say whether anybody in the court opposed the application when bail was applied for, and, if the answer is "Yes", on whose instructions was it opposed?

I do not recollect any application having been made for bail. But I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General will deal with the point later in the debate, if he is pressed to do so.

The further and more serious matter where the right hon. Member for Belper was labouring under a misapprehension was when he suggested that it has been the tradition in this country for years, and maybe for centuries, to grant political asylum to anyone who sought it by saying that he wished to stay here because he thought that he might be oppressed in his own country. The tradition of this country is that a person is granted political asylum if, in his own country, he appears to us to be in danger of life or liberty on political grounds, or on grounds of religion or race.

That is a very different matter from what was said by the right hon. Member for Belper. It imposes on all of us the duty to examine and consider the situation in Nigeria, as it would impose on us all, particularly the Home Secretary, in any other case under this Act, the duty of forming a judgment on the situation, and the fairness and justice of the country to which the individual belongs.

In this case, which, as the House will fully realise I am sure, is a hateful and distasteful matter for any Minister to have to pronounce upon—but the duty is placed upon him—Chief Enahoro has been charged in Nigeria with offences of conspiracy and treason; conspiracy to overthrow by unconstitutional means the lawfully constituted Federal Government of Nigeria. He came to this country—and I will deal later in my speech with the point raised by the right hon. Member for Belper about the impression under which he may have been when he came here—and the Nigerian Government took the initiative—the Home Secretary does not come into the matter at all at this stage—and called on the British authorities to apply the provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Act.

This Act, as the House will recognise, affects not ourselves alone, but all the other countries of the Commonwealth, so that we could not disregard it or set it aside without reference to them. Nor, if I may most respectfully say so, can we dismiss it and get it out of the way by saying that time has amended the Act.

The Nigerian Government set the machinery in motion. All that was nothing to do with us. The question does not come to the Home Secretary until it has been before the courts. When we were first discussing this matter, a week ago, it was suggested that the Fugitive Offenders Act was an obscure Statute which was very seldom used, a Statute which had been brought to light only by this case. That is far from the truth. I have taken the trouble to look back over the last ten years, and in that time the British Government have applied to other countries and territories within the Commonwealth under the provisions of the Act for the return of 16 people on various occasions who were charged with various offences in Britain—

I am dealing with whether this is an unknown Act which has suddenly been brought out of its cobwebs.

During those ten years other Commonwealth Governments have applied to the United Kingdom for the return of no fewer than 76 people accused of offences. It is very important that there should be some established procedure for bringing to justice people charged with crimes who have taken refuge outside the country where the crime has been committed. That can hardly be challenged. The essence of the Fugitive Offenders Act and of the Extradition Act, which is older still, is that there must be both a judicial process and a ministerial decision.

Indeed, under the Fugitive Offenders Act, as I have said, the matter does not come before the Home Secretary at all until after all the judicial procedures have been completed. But the Act places the final responsibility wholly on the Home Secretary and on him alone, exactly as the right hon. Member for Belper said. That is one of the very heavy personal responsibilities—I am sure that the House can think of another one—which every Home Secretary has to carry and has to approach in a judicial spirit.

The words of Section 6 of the Fugitive Offenders Act are perfectly clear. The Home Secretary has to decide whether he "thinks it just"—those are the words —that the person concerned should be sent to the country in which he has been accused to stand his trial there. The Home Secretary is absolutely free, under the Act, to say, "Yes" or "No".

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether, in the 76 cases, to which he has referred, where application was made under the Fugitive Offenders Act, there were charges of treason or of political offences?

I do not know of any for treason. I could not say whether any have been for political offences. But that is entirely irrelevant to the point which I was making. I was rebutting the arguments used by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, a week ago, that this was a little-known Act which had been brought out of its pigeon-hole only for use on this occasion. On the contrary, it is a frequently used Act, and one without which, or without some substitute for which, Commonwealth relations could not be maintained.

Let me continue my argument. The duty of the Home Secretary under the Act is, simply and solely, to do what he thinks just. He is in no way compelled to follow what the courts have said, as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to imply. I have never used any phrase to suggest that. Obviously, the Home Secretary must take into consideration the findings of the court. Indeed, that is the point from which he starts. Unless the courts have reached certain findings there is nothing before the Home Secretary for him to consider.

The right hon. Gentleman should not point to the clock when we are debating the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill. There is no end to this debate, except by the consent of the House.

The right hon. Gentleman has said that he locked up the figures of the cases in which the Fugitive Offenders Act has been applied and then I understood him to say to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) that, having looked at the figures to find an argument, he did not look at the merits of the figures at all, or find out what they were about. That is precisely what the right hon. Gentleman said. He told my hon. Friend that he did not know how many political cases there were in respect of the British figures. Was that true, or was it a slip of the tongue? Has he looked at the figures to find out whether there were any political cases—

Order. I hope that the House will remember that the Home Secretary is in the process of making his speech.

I have explained the course of my argument twice. I am not going to do so again even if the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) failed to understand it.

The Home Secretary's duty under the Act is simply and solely to do what he thinks just. He must take into consideration the findings of the courts, because otherwise the case would not come before him at all. If the courts have not found
"a strong or probable presumption"
of guilt—those are the important words in the Act—the case does not reach him.

If the courts have so found, then it is surely obvious that the Home Secretary would need substantial and well-grounded reasons if he were to decide that the fugitive should not be returned, as he is perfectly free to do. But he must cast the net of his thoughts far wider than anything said by magistrates or judges. He must be ready to take into account everything that may have a bearing on the matter, whether it was before the courts or not, and then he must reach his final decision on what is just and say yes or no.

Will my right hon. Friend allow me to interrupt him, because he is very good in allowing interruptions? Will he put the process of the magistrates' court into perspective and say whether the magistrate holds a kind of preliminary trial of the same kind as would be held in this country in the case of a man tried for murder, when he examines the evidence to see whether there is guilt and calls for witnesses, in this case front Nigeria—apart, of course, from a purely official witness furnished perhaps from the Attorney-General's Department in Nigeria?

Let me try to explain, because there is, in fact, a close similarity between the proceedings before the magistrates' courts in cases under the Fugitive Offenders Act, and proceedings before the magistrates when it is a question whether someone in this country should be committed for trial on indictment. The decision of the Bow Street magistrate, that there was "a strong or probable presumption", is not in any way a finding that the charges against the person being sought under the Act have been proved.

In Enahoro's case that is a matter with which only a court in Nigeria can deal. The magistrate's function under Section 5 of the Act is, as I say, very like the function of a magistrate in this country who has to decide whether to commit a person for trial, but to commit a person for trial has never been regarded as pre-judging the outcome of the trial.

All that the magistrate says in such cases is that there is evidence on which, if it is uncontradicted, a reasonable jury could convict. The accused person may be confident that he has a complete answer to the charges against him. If it is a case in this country the man who is committed for trial will have an opportunity at his trial to rebut the evidence against him. In exactly the same way, if Chief Enahoro says that he has a complete answer to all the charges, as I believe he does claim, that is a matter for the courts in Nigeria. It is not the duty of the court here to try the case, still less is it the duty of the Home Secretary to try the case. It would be wholly wrong for me, as Home Secretary, to pronounce either on Chief Enahoro's guilt or innocence. I am not called upon to do that and I have not the slightest intention of doing so.

Order. If the Minister does not give way, he cannot be interrupted.

On a point of order. We are considering the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill. There is no time limit upon our discussions. This is a matter in which personal liberty is involved. Important questions are being raised on that, and the right hon. Gentleman has made a mistake.

Order. I hope that the hon. and learned Member will recollect what is, in fact, a point of order far the Chair to deal with. What the Chair was faced with was the simple matter that two hon. Members may not be on their feet at once. The Chair has to decide which of the two should be allowed to speak and the Chair decided that the right hon. Gentleman who had the Floor was entitled to continue his speech.

In the quarter of an hour in which I have been speaking I have already given way four or five times. I am quite ready to give way again to the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) in a moment, but perhaps he will do me the courtesy of allowing me to come to the end of this part of my argument. When I have developed that, I shall gladly give way to him.

What I was seeking to say was that in a case such as that of Chief Enahoro, the court here having found that there is a case to answer, my function is not to try to decide whether he is guilty or not, but simply and solely to decide whether I think it is just that he should stand his trial and face the charges against him and seek to rebut them in a court in Nigeria.

I am most grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. The point I wanted to raise was that he seemed to be telling us that a magistrate, either proceeding to decide whether a man should face an indictment in our own courts, or that a man should be sent to face an indictment under the Fugitive Offenders Act, could not consider the man's answer to that case. In both cases the magistrate can, and must, consider anything which the defendant has to say and decide, in the light of that, whether there is a reasonable and probable case against him. It certainly is not a matter of simply looking at the prosecution's affidavits and nothing else. It is simply a question of fact. I wished to correct the right hon. Gentleman, because he seemed to be under a delusion.

I think that we can agree that it is on all the evidence before the magistrates. I did not seek to use words to mask that as undoubtedly the principle. Maybe the whole thing will become clearer if I proceed with the course of events. I was diverted temporarily by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir P. Agnew), who asked me a particular question.

I have been dealing with what happened before the magistrates' court. Chief Enahoro then made application for habeas corpus. That came before the Divisional Court, presided over by the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice concluded that it was impossible to say that the magistrate was wrong in holding that a strong or probably presumption of guilt was made out. The Divisional Court also examined—this is a separate point—an application by Chief Enahoro under a separate Section of the 1881 Act for relief on the ground that it would be
"unjust or oppressive or too severe punishment"
—again I am quoting from the Act—to send Chief Enahoro back to Nigeria.

The Divisional Court reached the conclusion that it would be not unjust, not oppressive and not too severe a punishment. The transcript of the Lord Chief Justice's judgment made it quite clear that the court, in reaching that decision, had taken account of whether Chief Enahoro would receive a fair trial in Nigeria, and concluded that he would.

Then Chief Enahoro sought to appeal to the House of Lords. The Appeal Committee of the House of Lords evidently took the same view, because it refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. It would surely have granted leave had it thought that there was risk of injustice or oppression if he were sent to stand his trial in Nigeria. Let me add, because there have been misconceptions and misstatements about this, that there is no question of Chief Enahoro being sent back to stand trial for his life. The offences for which he is charged under Nigerian law do not carry the death penalty.

Up to now I have been simply reciting what happened before the courts. Up to this point the question was not before me at all. When leave to appeal to the House of Lords had been refused, it then came to me. I had, naturally, had nothing to do with any of the courts' proceedings. I say quite bluntly and emphatically to the House that if any case under the Fugitive Offenders Act came to me and I was not satisfied that the person concerned would get a fair trial if I sent him to the country where he was accused, I would refuse to send him there.

The Act imposes no compulsion on me except in that one respect, to do what I think just. I have power to decide either way. To my mind, one of the most important questions a Home Secretary must answer at that stage of events is whether the person will or will not receive a fair trial if he goes. I have no hesitation whatever in believing that the Nigerian courts are fair and unbiased and that a high standard of impartial justice is administered in them. Anyone who attempts to deny that is taking on himself a very grave responsibility. I am aware that the right hon. Member for Belper certainly was not one to deny it.

If it is suggested that the Nigerian courts are under tight political control, how does it come about that four out of those who were accused along with Enahoro of participation in this treason plot, including three members of the Action Group, have just been acquitted in the Nigerian courts? The judge held that there was no case for them to answer.

Do not let us make too much of that. Is it not the case that the prosecution did not offer any evidence in their case, which does not really help the points made by the Minister?

No. The prosecution, I understand, offered evidence, and the court held that there was no case to answer.

I understand that it was the Crown counsel who offered no evidence. It is worth noting that the Crown counsel is, in fact, a political appointment of the Federal Government. Therefore, it reinforces my right hon. Friend's argument.

However it came about, I seem to have won that round. At any rate, I think that it is common knowledge that the reputation and integrity of Nigerian justice has been testified to by Chief Awolowo, who is Chief Enahoro's Parliamentary leader.

If it is suggested that the whole collection of charges against all the accused is some sort of trumped-up political expedient to discredit or get rid of the Opposition—I have heard that alleged —how does it come about that our own Lord Chief Justice has found, in the case of Enahoro, that there is a presumption of guilt?

Considering that the Chief Justice of Nigeria has himself recently been sworn a member of the Privy Council and is thereby entitled to sit in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council here in London, it cannot be seriously maintained that the judicial system in his own country, for which he is directly responsible, is unjust, biased or corrupt. I have no ground whatever for doubting that, if Enahoro is sent back to Nigeria, he will receive a fair trial in the Nigerian courts. On that count, I cannot see how it could be held unjust to return him.

I am aware that it has been argued against sending him back that some of those who are accused along with him in this treason trial have had statements extracted from them by improper means. That argument has been used in their defence in the Nigerian courts. Provided that the Nigerian courts themselves are competent and just, as I believe them to be, it is in court that these allegations should be tested and sifted, in exactly the same way as any similar allegations, if made in a British court of law, are tested and sifted by the court.

It has also been represented to me that I should delay my decision because of two other cases which are pending and not yet decided in Nigeria. I have considered this, but I find that the Divisional Court, under the Lord Chief Justice, considered that also and found that neither of these undecided cases is relevant to the case of Chief Enahoro, and this is so essentially a judicial matter that I must be guided by that.

Then there is the question of legal representation. On this, I explained to the House at some length last week the further inquiries I had made to ensure that there was no possibility of misunderstanding. The law in Nigeria says that a barrister from outside Nigeria cannot appear in a Nigerian court without a certificate from the Chief Justice of Nigeria authorising him to do so. I have already spoken of the high reputation of the holder of that post, but what the Lord Chief Justice and the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords here in London wanted to satisfy themselves on was that, if the Chief Justice granted a certificate for a barrister from England to defend Enahoro, the Government in Nigeria would not prevent that man from appearing.

An undertaking was given to the Divisional Court and repeated to the Appeal Committee that, if the Chief Justice gave his certificate for a named English barrister to appear for Enahoro, the Nigerian Government would not refuse that barrister entry into Nigeria merely because he was going to represent Enahoro. They would not refuse him entry, unless in his particular case there were other and good reasons. That was how the Divisional Court and the Appeal Committee interpreted the undertaking. I took particular trouble when the matter came to me, because it seemed to me of great importance, to check with the Nigerian Government whether this undertaking had been correctly interpreted. I have been assured by the Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria that the undertaking has the meaning and was intended to have the meaning which I have stated.

There have been suggestions in the Press here in London that the present Nigerian Federal Government is a tyrannical regime and that Enahoro, if returned to Nigeria, will be liquidated. I have already explained that the charges he faces do not involve the death penalty. By "liquidation" I suppose that some political action is hinted at. It has been alleged in the newspapers and elsewhere that the Federal Government are bent on suppressing the Action Group Party to which he belongs and that that party and its newspapers are the victims of a campaign of oppression. It is argued on those grounds that there can be no hope of Enahoro receiving a fair trial.

Everybody will recognise that those are grievous charges to make against any member-Government of the Commonwealth, and I hope that everybody concerned, both in the House and outside, will consider carefully what substance there is in accusations of that sort. If I were convinced that there were real substance in those accusations, I should, of course, have been driven to conclude that it would not be just for me to return Enahoro to stand trial, but the facts do not bear it out.

The Federal Government of Nigeria are the democratically elected Government of the country. No one can deny that. As such, I know that they have taken certain steps—the promulgation of emergency regulations, the detention of certain Opposition politicians, the suspension for a time of parliamentary government in the Western Region, steps which it is perfectly legitimate for their opponents or other people to criticise. However, all these measures have, as I understand, been carried out in strict accordance with the Constitution. The Nigerian Government have not attempted to prevent their opponents from challenging the legality of their actions, not only in the Nigerian courts, but by appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The emergency regulations were brought to an end, as it was announced that they would be brought to an end, on 31st December.

I did not know that the Home Secretary had passed from the question of the possibility of Chief Enahoro being represented by a British barrister. This is a matter which puzzled me, because the Home Secretary tells us that he has complete faith in the Nigerian courts. I take his word for that. I am puzzled, though, why he attaches such importance to the fact that a barrister from this country should be able to represent Chief Enahoro. Supposing that this undertaking had not been given, would this have altered the right hon. Gentleman's decision in the matter?

It would certainly have altered my decision if I had had the slightest reason to suspect that, as has happened in certain totalitarian countries, a person who is standing his trial on a serious charge has a tame counsel assigned to him and has no choice in the counsel who shall represent him. That is the reason why I felt it was desirable to clear the matter up, not because I had any knowledge whether Chief Enahoro would desire to have a Nigerian or a British counsel; but, as an undertaking had been given to our courts, and as it appeared from the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice that he attached a good deal of importance to the terms of the undertaking, it seemed incumbent on me to make sure that the undertaking was being correctly interpreted, because it would have been unfortunate had any misunderstanding come to light later.

I had passed on, however, to the situation in Nigeria. The facts there are—I say this in rebuttal of all those who would allege that Nigeria has a tyrannical régime—that no political parties have been suppressed in Nigeria and no newspapers have been closed down. The Action Group Party is certainly very much alive. It continues to form the main opposition in the Federal Parliament.

The Action Group's leading party newspaper which strangely enough bears the name of the Daily Express, is, to put it mildly, vigorous in its criticisms of the Federal Government. Even after the present treason trial involving leading members of the Action Group had opened in Lagos, the Action Group Party won control in the Lagos Town Council elections, and nothing has been done to upset that.

All this seems most unlike a police or tyrannical State. I am sure that we should trust the Nigerian Federal Government to do what is right. Certainly, if I thought that Chief Enahoro would be subjected to oppressive treatment in Nigeria, even if be had been acquitted, I would not think it right to return him.

The right hon. Member for Belper suggested that Chief Enahoro had been given an assurance that if be came to this country he would not be arrested, but could come in and come and go as he pleased. I made it my business to inquire most thoroughly into this matter. I have personally inquired into this and as a result of my inquiries I have no doubt at all of what happened. No such assurance was given to him.

What happened was this. Chief Enahoro, before he came to this country, rang up a friend of his in this country and asked whether it would be safe for him to come to Britain. This friend rang up the Home Office and spoke to an official in the immigration department. It became evident, in the course of that telephone conversation that Chief Enahoro, if he came here, would not have a passport. There was a question, therefore, of whether he would get in. The official went into the matter and assured the person who had telephoned to him that provided Chief Enahoro brought with him some evidence of his identity there was little likelihood of his being refused leave to land.

The friend also asked about freedom from arrest. The official in the department said that to the best of his knowledge the only power under which Nigeria could seek to get him arrested was the Fugitive Offenders Act Everything to do with that Act, he explained over the telephone, could be dealt with not by him—the official—but by someone in a different department of the Home Office; the criminal department. He actually gave to the man on the telephone the name of the official in the criminal department who would be able to give him full information about the Fugitive Offenders Act.

As things turned out, Chief Enahoro's friend did not follow up that suggestion, nor apparently did he seek any legal advice in England. He seems to have thought that he had all the information he required without making further inquiries into the possible implications of the Fugitive Offenders Act. I want to tell the House, because I was determined to satisfy myself on this point, that I have personally seen the friend of Chief Enahoro who rang up the Home Office and the Home Office official with whom he spoke. I am in no doubt that what I have said is what actually happened.

I turn, finally, to the question which I know is in the minds of a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House. It was referred to by the right hon. Member for Belper and it is the question whether the Fugitive Offenders Act is not an outdated Statute, a Statute no longer appropriate to be applied in our dealings with independent Commonwealth countries. It has been suggested in particular that fugitives from independent countries of the Commonwealth should be entitled to political asylum here equally with fugitives from foreign countries and that I should, therefore, act as if political offences excluded from the Extradition Act were equally excluded from the Fugitive Offenders Act.

For any Minister to say that he will disregard an Act of Parliament takes us into very deep waters. Treason, of which Chief Enahoro is accused, is in the very forefront of the offences specifically set out in the Fugitive Offenders Act. I cannot disregard the plain words in that Act in the course of reaching my decision. I have entire discretion, as the right hon. Member for Belper said, and he and I are at one about that. But I cannot read the Act to say anything other than what it does say. I must abide by the law as it stands and not as some others think it should be. I cannot accept the argument that I can do otherwise, nor do I believe that the right hon. Member for Belper would accept that in any other context—or that time has amended the Act and that, therefore, Ministers can disregard its terms.

That is just where time has amended the Fugitive Offenders Act. In 1881, treason meant quite simply treason against the Queen and, therefore, we certainly included it. Now that these countries have become entirely independent, many of them having become Republics, it is no longer treason against the Queen but treason against a foreign country, just in the same way as it might be treason against France. Treason has come to mean, because of time and events, something quite different from what it meant in 1881.

Even if that were true, Nigeria has not become a Republic and the charge against Chief Enahoro is set out as treason against Her Majesty the Queen. But, really, we cannot put—and this is the essential point—our unilateral interpretation on an Act which vitally affects all the countries of the Commonwealth. The Fugitive Offenders Act is one of which it would be strange to say that a British Minister could disregard it or interpret it just as he pleased. It is an Act that does not affect ourselves alone, but the whole of the Commonwealth. It is not an Act that is defunct or moribund, but one which is in frequent use between the Commonwealth countries and we in this country cannot presume to decide the present or future of the Act unilaterally by ourselves.

As I say, the interests of the whole of the Commonwealth are involved. Commonwealth countries as well as ourselves have both rights and obligations under it and we could certainly not lightly scrap all the machinery for ensuring that a criminal does not escape by taking refuge in another part of the Commonwealth without having new or better machinery to put in its place. As I said in the House last week, it may be that the future of the Act should be considered in relation to the future pattern of the Commonwealth and changes that have taken place in its structure in recent years.

That cannot be done without consultation with the Commonwealth. We will have to consider carefully with our partners in the Commonwealth what changes are needed. I am not sure that the solution is as easy as some hon. Members, whose sincerity I fully respect, would consider and I ask the House not to take as axiomatic that there is anything inherently unjust in the surrender by one Commonwealth country to another of a person charged with an offence of a political character, always providing that he will be given a fair and just trial after the surrender.

What has troubled a number of people outside and inside the House is a feeling that the Fugitive Offenders Act and the Extradition Act put alongside one another may be less fair to Commonwealth citizens than to foreigners. I suspect that that feeling has resulted in a Motion which I have seen on the Order Paper. I respect that view, but the true difference is this. Both of those Acts ignore the nationality of the person whose return is sought. Whether or not the person is a British subject, a Nigerian, an American, a Canadian, a United Kingdom citizen or whatever else he might be, under both those Acts that is irrelevant. What is relevant is the country in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. If it is a foreign country the Extradition Act applies. If it is a Commonwealth country the Fugitive Offenders Act applies and that Act covers a wider range of offences than the Extradition Act. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I have no doubt why that is so. It is because the countries of what used to he the British Empire, now the British Commonwealth, are thought—and, I hope, are rightly thought—to have closer links of association, community of purpose and, indeed, community of law than exist outside the Commonwealth.

One may argue whether the wording of the Fugitive Offenders Act is exactly right in relation to the present and future. One may argue, indeed, whether the wording of the Extradition Act is exactly right. Very likely we should look at both of them to see whether either or both of them need amendment for the future, but I would think that, whatever we do, we should always accept that Commonwealth countries should always be specially prepared to help one another to bring to trial people charged with offences—as long as there is always a built-in safeguard against oppression and injustice; that is, as long as the ultimate decision is taken by someone whose duty is not simply to endorse legal findings on, perhaps, a narrow range of facts, but to take all the facts from everywhere into consideration before reaching a final decision on what is just.

This is what I sincerely sought to do in the case of Chief Enahoro. I am intensely proud of the fact that Britain provides—and, I hope, always will provide—political asylum for those who, if they return to their own country, might be brought before unjust or prejudiced courts, or might be subject to political oppression for their beliefs or actions. That does not arise in this case. Nigeria is not a country like that. If I had thought that it was, I would have reached a different decision in the case of Chief Enahoro, and there is nothing whatever in the Fugitive Offenders Act that would have prevented my doing so.

I do not believe that the decision I have reached is challengeable except by those who allege, quite falsely, that Nigeria is a tyrannical State whose justice cannot be trusted or, alternatively, by those who ask the Home Secretary to tear a page out of the Statute Book in the name of justice. I cannot think that that is how we shall uphold our worldwide reputation for law and order and responsible parliamentary government. It is not something that I am prepared to do.

I stand by my decision—a decision for which I have to take full responsibility. That is what the Act requires of me. I am not beholden to anybody—indeed, I am not guided by anybody. I have to do what in all the circumstances I believe to be just, whatever the consequences may be. I can see what has happened in the courts, but that does not determine my action. I have to look at everything that appears to be relevant: to the justice of the courts in the other countries, the state of democracy in the other country. I have satisfied myself on all these points. It is, as I say, a hateful and a distasteful responsibility that is placed on the Home Secretary's shoulders, but I have discharged it to the best of my ability.

5.13 p.m.

The last Parliamentary Question that my late colleague, John Dugdale, put down, on the night he collapsed in this House, was to ask for a statement on the case of Chief Enahoro. John Dugdale took a great and personal interest in this case, and if he were alive today he would be here to fight for this man to be allowed to stay in the country. As a friend and close Parliamentary colleague of John Dugdale, I should like to pay tribute to his lifetime of political work in fighting against injustice, and I can only hope that in this debate we shall achieve what he himself set out to achieve, namely, the right of Chief Enahoro to be allowed to stay here—or, at least, to go to another country—rather than that he should be returned to Nigeria to face charges of a political character.

I am glad that we have escaped from the inhibitions of the 1881 Act. The Home Secretary has himself admitted this afternoon something that was not quite clear a week ago—that he had the absolute discretion to make a decision on this case, and that he was not bound to return this man. The right hon. Gentleman's argument rested considerably on whether or not Chief Enahoro will have a fair trial if he is returned to Nigeria. I want to take up that argument, but first we must appreciate that this man has not yet been tried. Some Press comment has given the impression that Chief Enahoro has already been on trial in this country, has been found guilty, and must therefore be sent back to Nigeria. That is not the case. The courts in this country could not consider all the political aspects of the case. They were not advised that, to some extent, there is political oppression. The Home Secretary may dispute the extent of it, but to some extent there is political oppression in Nigeria.

Our courts here have had to judge on a point of law—the application of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. They were not judging whether or not this man was guilty of the offences of which he is charged, but the application of that Act. The Fugitive Offenders Act was devised at a time when all the far-flung countries of the Empire were under Her Majesty, but Her Majesty advised by the United Kingdom Ministers and not by Ministers in Nigeria or anywhere else. That meant that if a man were returned to a court in one of the Colonial Territories it was possible for the Queen's pardon to be granted on the advice of Ministers in the United Kingdom. In this case, that is not possible. The case will be out of the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom Ministers if Chief Enahoro is sent back.

The extraordinary thing is that probably we should have given political asylum to Georges Bidault if he had applied for it—we could certainly do no less than the Federal Republic has done. We would certainly have considered the application of Georges Bidault for political asylum if it had been made, but apparently we cannot consider political asylum being given to a man who was a very responsible Minister in Nigeria, who was an official guest here in the United Kingdom, and against whom charges were made more than two months after he had left Nigeria. This is an aspect of the case that has not yet been brought out. I want to refer to it at some length, and to go back, not to the date when Chief Enahoro was arrested, but several weeks further back to the date when he was active in Nigeria, and when he left, and what happened after he left, because these facts are significant.

Chief Enahoro was subject to restriction when the purge against the Action Group began. He was subsequently released, and slipped out of Nigeria during September of last year. He went to Ghana, a Commonwealth country, which granted him political asylum and gave him documents to enable him to travel to Britain to see his two sons. He came to England for 48 hours. It is not quite correct to say, as the Home Secretary said, that before coming to England Chief Enahoro first phoned a friend to get permission to come here. He came to England for 48 hours before going on to Eire, from where he phoned a friend mentioned by the Home Secretary. Therefore, in the knowledge of the Home Secretary, he was actually in England for 48 hours before going to Eire.

The main point is that he left Nigeria in September. He was in Accra for some months, and came here in November. During the whole of that time the Nigerian authorities took no steps to issue a warrant for his arrest, nor did they make any allegations about his activities, political or criminal, in Nigeria. They allowed this man to go scot-free because he was in Accra and beyond their reach.

It is interesting that it is only when he is safely in Britain that the Nigerian authorities feel that they can act. He actually arrived in Britain on 22nd November, went on to Ireland on the following evening, and returned the following day after he had had assurances from his friend and contact, who had telephoned the Home Secretary, that he would not be subject to arrest.

It would be of interest if the hon. Member could tell us when the charges were laid against Chief Awolowo and the 30 others who were arrested at the same time.

I am not aware of the exact dates of these proceedings, but I am quite certain that the warrant against Chief Enahoro was issued in Lagos at 10 o'clock on the morning of 27th November and that that very afternoon, between 4.30 and 5 p.m., Chief Enahoro was arrested here. That leads to the very strong suspicion that there was some collusion between the Nigerian authorities and the United Kingdom authorities, and if there is any doubt about this it is a very serious matter indeed. I am not accusing the Home Secretary personally of any abuse of his powers, but I believe that the activities of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in all this business are to be deplored. Then the man is arrested and his case comes before the court and he is refused bail. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said, it is a very sorry state of affairs that this man, who is a political leader of some standing in Nigeria, should have been refused bail for all that time.

If Chief Enahoro is returned to Nigeria it is most unlikely that he will have a fair trial. I say this because all the leading politicians of the Action Group have been arrested in what amounts to a purge of the Opposition, and some of the charges laid against them have the appearance of being—and I use the Home Secretary's words here without apology—trumped up. Therefore, it would be most regrettable to send this man back. Although the judiciary itself may be fair, the evidence brought before the court may be loaded by the Executive. There is strong reason to feel that that may be the case.

I hold in my hand statements made by witnesses and the accused who are involved in the trial which is going on now in Nigeria. Eleven of them make allegations of improper interrogation procedures, threats, prolonged hardships, starvation and violence, all designed to extract confessions or statements from them which are not correct. I believe that these statements mist be considered by the Home Secretary before he makes his final decision to send this man back. I should like to know from the Attorney-General whether these allegations have been subject to full investigation. I should also like to ask whether there has been borne in mind the allegation that one of the judges involved in the case is a political appointee who was closely connected with the N.C.N.C., the political party which is the strongest rival of the Action Group—a certain Judge Sowemimo.

I ask whether these things have been considered, because I believe that the Home Secretary has not had all these points brought to his attention. I think that the right hon. Gentleman has accepted the say-so of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to the extent of accepting that there will be a fair trial in Nigeria. I believe that it is the Home Secretary's duty—since he laid so much emphasis on the importance of a fair trial—to weigh all these questions before Chief Enahoro goes back.

It may please Nigeria, or some people in Nigeria, if Chief Enahoro is sent back, but we should not necessarily accept in the House that it is a good service to the Commonwealth to send him back automatically, because this ruling party in Nigeria is involved in this vendetta, as it is, against the leaders of the Action Group. A great many people in Nigeria would be very concerned if Chief Enahoro is sent back in these circumstances. I submit that it would make not only Ghanaians but a number of others very concerned indeed if he is sent hack to Nigeria, particularly bearing in mind that Ghana itself gave him political asylum and is probably prepared to have him back even today.

I therefore ask the Home Secretary and the Attorney-General to consider before the end of the debate the uncertainties about this case—to put it no higher—the doubt whether there will be a fair trial, and the question whether or not there was an understanding that Chief Enahoro would not be subject to arrest. I understand from Chief Enahoro's friends that the course of events which the Home Secretary described was not quite on the lines on which he described it to the House and that there was a greater degree of understanding that he would not be subject to arrest than the Home Secretary has given us to believe.

Bearing in mind all the doubts about this case, do not we usually in the House and in this country, with all our traditions of fair play, give the prisoner, and particularly a political prisoner, the benefit of the doubt? I believe that that is what we should do on this occasion. If the Home Secretary is not prepared to allow Chief Enahoro to have political asylum in this country, may we ask the right hon. Gentleman to allow him to go to a third country of his choice where he will have that political asylum?

5.27 p.m.

I am sure that, whatever our view of this case, all of us have great sympathy with the Home Secretary in the very difficult nature of the steps which he has had to take. If I approach the matter rather differently from the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) it is because it raises for me matters of great principle.

Where I slightly differ from my right hon. Friend is in his approach to the problem of Section 6 of the Fugitive Offenders Act. Last Thursday, and again today, my right hon. Friend rested his decision on many of these matters on what the Divisional Court had decided. I will quote from what has already appeared in HANSARD rather than from my own notes of what my right hon. Friend said today. If he spoke differently today I hope that he will correct me.

On Thursday my right hon. Friend said:
"If the Divisional Court had thought that Enahoro's return would be unjust, it would have ordered his release; if the Appeal Committee had thought that it would be unjust, it no doubt would have granted leave to appeal. On the information before me, I have no reason to think that Enaharo, if he is returned, will not be given a fair trial."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 1542.]
My right hon. Friend, therefore, is regarding himself as a court of appeal from the Divisional Court and the appeal committee. Surely this is not my right hon. Friend's function.

I should like to refer to the case of Zacharia versus the Republic of Cyprus where Lord Devlin made quite clear what is the function of the Secretary of State under Section 6 when he said:
"Section 6 of the Act provides that within fifteen days after the court has decided, if it does, not to release the fugitive, the Secretary of State may, if he thinks it just, order the return of the fugitive. I have put these words in italics because they make it plain that the discretion given to the Scretary of State is as wide as that given to the court under section 10.…There is a concurrent jurisdiction conferred on the Secretary of State. I cannot suppose that it is intended that he should act as a second tribunal to consider only those matters which a superior court has already pronounced upon. It is plain to me that one reason at least why the provision is there is because there may be considerations of a political or administrative character which go to the justice of the fugitive's return and are better inquired into by the executive."
I listened with close attention to every word used by my right hon. Friend this afternoon in justification of his action. However, having listened to his very cogent arguments, I could not really say that his approach was different from that of the Divisional Court. That. I believe, is the purpose of the Fugitive Offenders Act. Do not let us say that it is old and out of date. It gives the Home Secretary a very wise discretion in these cases.

As I see the problem concerning the return of Chief Enahoro, there are three questions to which this House and the Home Secretary must apply their minds. First, is it just that the right of political asylum which an alien would get should be denied to a Commonwealth citizen? Secondly, is it just that, having entered this country with an assurance of freedom from arrest, he should be sent back in custody? Thirdly, is it just that we should send him back to be subjected to police inquisitorial methods contrary to the methods of police administration in this country?

I want to deal shortly with those three questions. Perhaps here I may be allowed to correct my right hon. Friend. I understand that Chief Enahoro is not charged with treason. He is, in fact, charged with treasonable felony and conspiracy to commit treason. Suppose that Chief Enahoro was not a Nigerian subject but was a citizen of France charged with those offences. Would we or would we not grant him political asylum? As I understand it, the purpose of political asylum is not merely to save someone from oppressive judicial procedure, as my right hon. Friend suggested.

When the subject of the action against an accused, person is of a political character, this country, throughout its history, has always afforded that person asylum. One reason for that is that it is very invidious to go into the question of whether an allied country has right on its side in a political charge. I should have thought that an even greater reason was that when a new Commonwealth country was concerned the last thing we would want to do would be to inquire into the nature of its political charges.

I am satisfied from my knowledge of Nigeria that the accused would receive a perfectly fair trial under the Lord Chief Justice. I have the greatest regard for the judicial procedure there. But that is not the point. Equally, I feel sure that someone charged in France in this way would have a proper and fair trial in France. But, as Chief Enahoro is being charged with a political offence, one difficulty is that any knowledge we have of the evidence against him comes from the political party which is trying to secure his conviction. It is therefore by its nature difficult for us to challenge the nature of that evidence.

What are the facts in this case? The background is that Chief Enahoro occupied in the Regional Government the office which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary occupies in the Government here. The Prime Minister in the Government with him was displaced and. because the Regional Government objected to that party holding—

Yes. The Federal Government put other politicians in the place of the Prime Minister and of the Home Secretary. It is, therefore, hard to imagine a clearer background of a political character to charges of conspiracy. May I give an analogy from this House? Suppose we were in some form of European federation and Professor Hallstein in Brussels turned oust the present Prime Minister and Home Secretary and put in their place the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) and the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade). Suppose there had been a certain amount of shooting and some of the supporters of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in Orkney and Shetland had been shot—as they were in Northern Nigeria. Surely one could not escape the conclusion that, in view of that background, there would be much of a political character in a charge of treasonable felony and conspiracy to commit treason arising out of those circumstances?

The situation is even more confused than that. Again, I challenge my right hon. Friend. There are two appeals pending before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council arising from the background to these charges. It is alleged in one appeal that the emergency powers under which Chief Enahoro was arrested were null and void. In the other the issue is whether the Prime Minister whom he supports is in fact the Prime Minister, or whether the Prime Minister put in by the Federal Government is in fact the Prime Minister. Surely these must be material facts. It is true that, for the limited purposes of Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, the Divisional Court has ruled that this was not material to their judgment. But under Section 6 my right hon. Friend should surely allow these two appeals pending in the House of Lords to be decided first before making a judgment in this case. That is why I believe that Chief Enahoro should not be denied the right of political asylum. Throughout our history in this country we have always granted political asylum—

I have checked my memory on this, and, although I do not claim learning on it, I may say that our law about the right to grant asylum—but not the right of anyone to demand it—dates only from the time of the French Revolution. All this that we have had about ancestral rights being centuries old is really stuff.

Then let me say that the rights which we have enjoyed for the last 150 years should not be denied to Chief Enahoro. I think that that makes my case strong enough.

I turn to the rather difficult question about the assurances which were given to Chief Enahoro before he arrived in this country. I assure the House that I am quoting from a statement which has been in the possession of my right hon. Friend, who, therefore, must have full knowledge of it.

There has been talk about a friend whose aid was invoked. The fact of the matter was that Chief Enahoro, before he came to this country, asked one of the best known firms of public relations consultants to find out whether it would be safe for him to come and whether he would be free from arrest. He made his first statement, as the hon. Member for Wednesbury rightly said, when he was enjoying political asylum in Ghana and it was followed up later when he was enjoying political asylum in the Republic of Ireland. Both countries were giving him political asylum, which he is in process of being denied here.

There can be little doubt that the firm of public relations consultants was anxious to find the facts. There is no doubt that this ex-Home Secretary for the Western Region was determined not to come here if he would face the risk of arrest. Therefore, the inquiry was made of the gentleman in the Home Office, who has been mentioned, to ask whether he would be free from arrest if he came.

The letter states:
"Obviously I was concerned not to give wrong advice and not to put Enahoro's freedom in jeopardy. I talked with Mr. H…,who seemed to me most helpful, and from this conversation I understood that Enahoro would not be arrested. If there had been any doubt about this I would have strongly recommended that Enahoro not come here."
He goes on to say:
"I would like to reiterate the simple but compelling fact that the reason why I talked to the Home Office, at the request of Chief Enahoro, was to determine whether he would or would not be safe from arrest if he came to this country. After I talked with Mr. H.……I was certain in my mind that he would be safe from arrest and I so informed Chief Enahoro, and it is on this basis that he came to this country."
I am quite sure that the officer of the Home Office did what he thought right, but, undoubtedly, the public relations consultant received the impression that Chief Enahoro would be safe from arrest if he came here. This misunderstanding should be taken into account by my right hon. Friend when deciding this matter, especially since it is an officer of his own Department who is involved. He undoubtedly gave, not merely a friend, but a public relations consultant, who is well known in this country and has innumerable contacts with people in Africa, the impression that this Chief would not be arrested when he came here, yet within two or three days he suffered arrest.

My right hon. Friend says that my officials gave that impression. It may have been that the person concerned obtained that impression, but it was certainly not given. Since the date of the letter from which my right hon. Friend has read extracts, I have had both the people concerned together in my room and have discussed the full facts with them. It is not in dispute that the official said that he was not the expert on the Fugitive Offenders Act and that he gave the other person the name of the official from whom he could obtain full information about it. Unfortunately, it was not followed up.

I accept everything that my right hon. Friend has said, there is, however, no issue on this. The impression was definitely given. The public relations consultant would not have put his client in jeopardly if he had not himself received that impression. I at once accept from my right hon. Friend that Mr. H. did not intend that impression to be given. I feel sure, in view of what has happened later, that he would not have given that purposely and then had him arrested two or three days later. I must say, this is a very unfortunate background to the case.

I am a little puzzled about the course of events. First, the chief might have been better advised to consult a firm of solicitors rather than a firm of public relations consultants. Apart from that, if the Home Office official was being asked the plain question, "Is he safe from arrest or not?" and if the Home Office official was answering that the only ground on which he could be arrested might be for an offence under the Fugitive Offenders Act, did there not lie upon that Home Office official to whom the plain question had been asked the obligation, if he did not know it himself, to ascertain whether any such proceedings under the Fugitive Offenders Act were contemplated? Might it not have been in this way that the false impression was given?

I will leave that matter. But it requires further consideration since I think it is a very unfortunate circumstance in this case. This is a man who has been a Minister for Home Affairs in the Western Region of Nigeria who, whether he took the advice of a public relations consultant or a solicitor, thought he was doing the right and proper thing in seeking the ruling from the Home Office. The man to whom he went for advice has a high reputation in Nigeria and he asked for the ruling, not once but twice. That, again, is a point which has not been brought out. The first inquiry was made from Ghana and the second from Dublin. That is an unfortunate circumstance over which I hope my right hon. Friend will ponder.

Thirdly, on the question of police inquisitorial methods, I have sent my right hon. Friend extracts from the transcript of evidence of the procedings in Nigeria. I have also sent extracts from statements made by the accused persons to their solicitors in Nigeria. Whilst nothing takes away from one's confidence in the courts in Nigeria, the extracts show that the police methods in Nigeria are not what we normally would like to see, either in Britain or in any other country.

Let me quote from a statement by one of the accused to show the type of treatment that Enahoro will receive if and when he is sent back by my right hon. Friend. Mr. Sunday Ebietoma, one of the accused, states:
"I was packed away half-naked to the Force Headquarters. And by the time we were descending the steps of the Superintendent of Police Office, this man started his nonsense by pulling a gun from his pocket and saying that if I run he will shoot me….
He then stood up from his chair and pretended to be mad by starting to pour abuses on the Action Group leaders Awolowo, Rewane, Enahoro and others who are now at the enquiry. 'The are all rogues. If you tell me that they sent you to Ghana you are going home tomorrow and if you refuse to tell me I will shoot you and say you were trying to escape'….
Then he said, 'Do you not remember Awolowo, Jakande and Anthony Enahoro'. I replied I had nothing of that kind with them; I do not meet them anywhere.
Then his boss came in…And he told him that I refused to tell him all he wanted me to. There and then the boss replied that I would be dealt with more seriously than now if I refused to say something, and he left. The man with the gun had got another power to deal with me. He gave me a good slap on the left side of my car with all sorts of rough handling, turned round the side of the table and kicked me on my left leg."
That kind of thing makes one feel that there is something very wrong with the methods of police administration in Nigeria. I regard that as a factor which the Home Secretary should take into account. I beg him to reconsider his decision in this case. I know that there has been a great deal of pressure from Nigeria. I do not want this case decided on that issue. I think that the fairest approach is to say, "Is it not right that a man who is a Commonwealth citizen and who is accused of a political offence should be granted asylum here, just as he would be if he were an alien?"

5.51 p.m.

I am not persuaded by the explanation given by the Home Secretary, but I agree with his opening remarks that this is a grave matter. I hope that it is clear that the debate is about the very important legal principles involved and their application to this case. We are not considering, or questioning, the impartiality of the Nigerian judiciary. Surely this country holds the general principle—and has done for 150 years or longer—that no one should be extradited for a political offence. Surely there should not be an exception—again I state this as a general principle—in the case of a Commonwealth citizen.

There appears to be general agreement that the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was put on the Statute Book at a time when circumstances were very different. The Home Secretary himself on 14th March said:
"What I said was that I thought that the Act, which is now 82 years old, was right for reconsideration in view of the drastic changes that have taken place in the nature of the Commonwealth meanwhile."
I think that it is generally agreed that there is need for a change in the law in the light of the altered circumstances. If the right hon. Gentleman is to consider what course to follow, pending this change, great care should be exercised in setting a precedent. Although the right hon. Gentleman is exercising his discretion, in fact each time he does so he is inevitably setting a precedent.

The problem in the situation as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1881, can be illustrated by considering the law in another Commonwealth country—Southern Rhodesia. Let us get away for a moment from Nigeria. I am most anxious not to display any prejudice one way or another in so far as Nigeria is concerned. But let us consider what might happen with some of the offences which might now be committed under the laws of Southern Rhodesia—for example, the Law and Order Maintenance Act, 1960. I will quote only one part of that Act. Section 26 (3) reads:
"Any person who without lawful excuse, the proof whereof lies on him, makes any statement indicating or implying that it would be incumbent or desirable—
  • (a) to do any act or acts likely to lead to the destruction of any property;
  • (b) to do any act or acts or to omit to do any act or acts with the object or which has the effect of defeating the purpose or intention of any law in force in the Colony or in any part thereof;
  • shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years."
    In other words, anyone who says anything against the Southern Rhodesian Government is liable for an offence and might be committed to prison for seven years. Under new legislation which is being introduced, this kind of offence could be committed by a resident either inside or outside Southern Rhodesia. Surely it would be monstrous if a Southern Rhodesian who committed an offence under that legislation while in this country, and who was charged under it, were to be sent back because of the somewhat ancient provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Act.

    The Act was never intended to apply to this kind of situation, where the law is so different as between one part of the Commonwealth and another. That is the point. It was not anticipated in 1881 that there would be these divergencies in the law between one part of the Commonwealth and another. The right hon. Gentleman told us that we must observe the law as it stands. Again I quote from HANSARD. He said:
    "But I and every Minister have to proceed under the law as it stands at present. The law requires me to act as I think just and I have told the House what I believe is the course of Justice in this House."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 1546.]
    Surely the point is that the right hon. Gentleman has an absolute discretion. That is generally agreed. In addition to the factors he has mentioned there are three more—first, that there must be some recognition of the need for change in the law; secondly, that there must be care not to put Commonwealth citizens in a less favourable position than aliens; and, thirdly, if a person, whether a Commonwealth citizen or an alien, is genuinely seeking political asylum, and the Home Secretary is satisfied that he is, then there is surely a duty on the Home Secretary to exercise discretion in that person's favour.

    All this is not a reflection on the Nigerian Government or on the Nigerian judiciary. Despite the precedents, the position is far from clear. We have been told that there have been a considerable number of cases, but the right hon. Gentleman was not able to tell us whether these cases involved charges of a political content and whether the issue of political refuge was involved. I hope that that aspect at least will be clarified.

    The final consideration is the nature of the assurances that were given. The Home Secretary will be aware of the petition of 14th February, 1963. He has already told us of the conversations he has had since then. But, even putting it at its lowest, it seems that as a result of those conversations with officials of the Home Office there was a misunderstanding. It seems clear that this chief came here having been advised that he would be free from arrest. It may well be that there has been some mistake and I do not know where the fault for the misunderstanding lies. Whatever took place in the two conversations—and I agree with the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) that if solicitors had acted the outcome might have been different—it is clear that there was a misunderstanding and that the chief came here believing that he would be free, in the words of the petition:
    "free to enter and depart without risk of arrest"
    That lays some obligation on the Home Secretary if that is what has happened, for it would amount almost to breaking our word if we allowed him to come here and gave the impression that he would be free from arrest.

    Nobody in the Home Office gave that impression, or gave that assurance. I want to make that absolutely clear.

    I heard what the Home Secretary said and I do not want to misinterpret what he said, but I will merely repeat my remarks that somehow or other a misunderstanding arose as a result of two conversations which took place with an official of the Home Office.

    Does the hon. Member think that any man in his senses would deliberately come into a country where he was in danger of arrest if he already had the right of asylum in several other countries?

    That follows from what I have been saying. There may have been a misunderstanding, but the facts are that he was arrested two days after he came here. For our own good name, the Home Secretary must take that into account.

    I should like to develop the subject of consultation with the Commonwealth and my views of what should happen. There should be consultation with apposition parties as well as with Governments, but that is for the future. Here is a situation to be dealt with now and speedily. For the reasons put forward, I believe that we should not be upholding the principles of British justice if this man were sent back.

    6.2 p.m.

    My remarks will be brief, because I have duties elsewhere, and also because I am very conscious of some of the comments made in the debate last Friday and will therefore limit what I have to say. As I have another engagement, I hope that whoever follows me will forgive me if I do not stay throughout his speech.

    Debates of this kind tend to be a lawyers' bean feast. I cannot claim to be a lawyer, but I wish to speak as one who has been in Nigeria fairly recently and who, as a friend of that country, resents some of the remarks made in the last few days about the course of conduct and justice in that country.

    In his opening speech today, the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) set a very different tone. Had that tone been set during some of the exchanges at Question Time last week, the task of my right hon. Friend would have been made very much easier. I happen to agree entirely with my right hon. Friend in this matter, but I should like to place it on record that I was moved by the right hon. Gentleman's speech, which was extremely creditable. I hope that whoever winds up from the Opposition Front Bench will repeat his opinion of the quality of Nigerian justice and dissociate himself from some of the remarks of the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) which were made in an effervescent mood last week and repeated today.

    I feel very strongly that one of the important issues must be the standard of justice in Nigeria. When I was there last year, I was not making my first visit. I accept that in that country there are things to deplore, but there are in any country. 'There is a measure of venality and corruption which extends wider than it should, but I have never heard anyone impugning the High Courts or the Federal Courts or alleging that they were anything but impartial and free from corruption and political bias.

    Although it may seem rather odd to quote this in support of my case, I found that even expatriate opinion, which was not entirely reconciled to some of the changes which had taken place in that country, was absolutely assured of that fact. It is not always true of the district courts and, I understand, of some of the native administration courts. There are cases where political bias prevails. It is of some interest to note that during the emergency in the Western Region the Administrator introduced some extremely important reforms which may eliminate that danger in one part of Nigeria in future.

    It is extremely easy to denigrate another country in this respect. It is extremely difficult to prove the integrity of the courts, but there has been special evidence in Nigeria. There has been the fact that in 1961 the Supreme Court ruled an action of the Federal Government to be unconstitutional, and that was completely and absolutely accepted by the Federal Government. There has been the quite obvious fact that four of the accused have been discharged.

    Although I hesitate to put this forward, in a country where tribalism is still regrettably a dominant factor, it is perhaps most important that the judge trying the case is a Yoruba and also that the Chief Justice is a Yoruba. I am not saying that those are factors which should come into play, but they are marginal notes, so to speak, which might be observed.

    I accept that the ruling about a British barrister was a foolish action by the Nigerian Government. I think that it is regrettable. If I can risk being a little flippant I think that it almost came under the heading of empire-building, since so many Nigerians are engaged in the law and are anxious not to lose briefs to people in this country. I think that the assurance my right hon. Friend has obtained is of the greatest importance. I resent the irresponsible impugning of Nigeria, which is so easy and facile, and which has taken place in so many quarters.

    I fully admire the zeal of my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. D. Smith) in defending the interests of a temporary or transient constituent, if that is the right description, but not his use of the word "liquidation". I hope that he will amplify his reasons for using that word. I happen to have had the privilege of seeing my two hon. Friends on television the other night and I thought that my hon. Friend was not so enthusiastic about the word "liquidation", which carries with it the connotation of countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain and does not apply to Nigeria.

    I deliberately used the word "liquidation" rather than "execution", and the Home Secretary confirmed that there is no ultimate penalty of execution. Chief Enahoro himself has said that he fears liquidation eventually in his own country if he is acquitted of the charges made against him.

    This is rather a different approach from that which my hon. Friend originally emphasised. As he has interested himself in this case, I would have thought that he would have known from the start that this was not a capital charge and, therefore, that liquidation could carry only one connotation, and that is brutal elimination by some other forces. If he is now saying that Chief Enahoro, after his trial, runs the risk of losing his life if he is acquitted, I say to my hon. Friend that surely he will then be free to leave the country.

    I only have Chief Enahoro's word for it, but he sincerely believes that restrictions will be placed on him and that his passport may be taken away.

    His passport may be taken away, but I submit that Nigeria is somewhat conscious of its position in the world, and I cannot believe that my hon. Friend is seriously going to allege that if Chief Enahoro is acquitted the Nigerian Government will remove his passport with the object of having him murdered. I hope that whoever speaks from either Front Bench will make it quite clear that he does not think that Nigeria is that kind of country.

    Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Chief Enahoro's passport was withdrawn from him some months ago, and that when he left the country in September he had to slip away without a passport? Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware that in one constituency alone 150 Action Group supporters were killed, and in another constituency 13 were killed, in political attacks, and that this lends substance to the allegation that the situation in Nigeria is not as cosy as the right hon. Gentleman would have the House believe?

    Order. We are reaching the position of an intervention on an intervention, and that is not good for order.

    I must repeat that I do not think Chief Enahoro is in any danger of liquidation from any responsible authorities in Nigeria.

    There are, and there are some in this country.

    The hon. Member for Wednesbury is carrying on his campaign of slander, but I must, as one who was there fairly recently, say that it bears no relation to the country I saw, or the people I met, including many people in the Action Group. The hon. Gentleman talked about an oppressive political régime in which the opposition party has been banned. Since independence, no political party has been banned or proscribed. I was there when the Lagos Town Council elections were on, when the Action Group had a sensational victory, on which was politically most embarrassing for the party in power. It was a sort of "super-Orpington". The Federal politicians were very embarrassed, but there was no sign of the Action Group being suppressed.

    In the Western Region we met some of the opposition politicians. They were free in their criticisms and comments. They were not suppressed. No newspaper had been suppressed or banned in Nigeria, and, as my right hon. Friend said, the Daily Express in Nigeria flourishes. As to free speech, I cannot imagine any country in which free speech goes further. They are all absolute past-masters of vituperation.

    Is it true that there is one place, at any rate, where it is not possible to exercise free speech, and that is in the Western Region Parliament, because it has been suspended?

    My hon. Friend is out of date. The emergency is over in the Western Region. When the Federal Government suspended the Constitution in the Region, it promised to restore it by December. It has done so, and I think that some credit might be given to Nigeria for the fact that it is able to carry on its politics in an orderly and constitutional manner. Nobody would pretend that it was right or ideal to have to suspend a Government, but India did it. Will anybody say that India has not a democratic Government because they suspended a Provincial Parliament?

    I found it difficult to follow the account of events given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton). The best thing I can say is that it differs very considerably from all that I have read in fairly reliable sources. The reason for this suspension arose entirely from the split in the Action Group Party, and that has now been restored.

    I agree that democracy, and perhaps justice, are rather frail plants in Africa, but I do not think that there is any country in Africa in which there is a better chance of their surviving than in Nigeria. This debate will be very widely studied. Some of the opinions will, understandably, be construed as a censure, but I hope that most hon. Members will let it go forth that we do not believe that the standards of justice in that country are not sufficiently high for my right hon. Friend to exercise his duty as he has.

    6.17 p.m.

    In view of the statement of the right hon. Member for Reigate (Sir J. Vaughan-Morgan) that his obligations elsewhere permit him to make a speech in this important debate, but not to wait for the answer, I hope that he will not think it discourteous of me if I do not attempt to answer it.

    I am not criticising the right hon. Gentleman; I am only apologising for not answering his speech.

    If I had been the Home Secretary—which, I admit, is not very likely—and if I had wanted assurances from the Government of Nigeria which would influence me in the exercise of my discretion whether to agree with the courts that Chief Enahoro should be sent back, or to disagree, I would have been much more interested in obtaining an assurance from the Nigerian Government that if this man were returned to them, were tried and acquitted, he would be allowed to leave Nigeria without let or hindrance on the part of the Nigerian Government.

    If the right hon. Member for Reigate is right, there would have been no difficulty in obtaining such an assurance, and I am at a loss to understand why the request was never made, particularly in view of the fact that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) reminded the House, Chief Enahoro has no passport, so it cannot be withdrawn.

    There is another interesting inquiry which might be made. This gentleman who is to return to Nigeria has two children here. He is not on a capital charge. Would Lloyd's or any other insurance company issue him a life insurance policy?

    As a solicitor, I am no more competent to judge of the policies and practice of insurance companies than was the firm of publicity experts to advise the chief about his legal rights.

    As questions of that kind are being asked, perhaps I could ask another. If Chief Enahoro is found guilty, presumably he will have the right to appeal to the Privy Council. Will there be any change of legislation in Nigeria in the meantime which will prevent that?

    These are realms into which I am not competent to enter, or, at any rate, to express an opinion of any more value than the hon. Member's own. I will not attempt to answer the question, especially since, to my mind, most of these inquiries are irrelevant in any case.

    I concede this to the hon. Member: we are in no way concerned with the state of affairs in Nigeria. That is not our business. We are concerned with the proper exercise of our own laws, and with nothing else. If I could convince myself, as the Home Secretary has convinced himself, that what he proposes to do is in accordance with our own laws and that he has a duty imposed upon him from which he has no escape under our own laws, I would not be making this speech. But I do not believe that. I do not believe that that is a maintainable proposition.

    This is one of those occasions in which small matters of party political differences in the House of Commons have no real bearing. We are all custodians of our own conception of freedom, and what we have to consider is whether we are acting faithfully in accordance with that custodianship or trusteeship, or are betraying it. In my opinion, we are betraying it if we accept the Home Secretary's views. I hope to persuade the House on that point.

    I have had my differences with the Home Secretary in the past, and I will no doubt have my differences with him in the future, but I concede at once his courage and integrity. I have never doubted them, and I do not doubt them now. I am sure that he has conscientiously convinced himself that he is right. But it is because he has been able, in these circumstances, to convince himself that he is right that he has given us one more instance—I am sorry to say this, but I must—of the fact that he is not, by temperament or personality, fitted to discharge this kind of obligation or to exercise this kind of discretion.

    In a sense, the right hon. Gentleman is the victim of his own integrity and honesty. Having made up his own mind, he thinks that he is entitled to act on his own judgment. He talked about his absolute discretion. If by that he meant that he had a discretion entirely independent of the judgment of the court, I agree with him wholeheartedly. But if he meant that what the Statute imposed upon him was to make up his own mind and be responsible only to himself for what he decided, he is wholly and completely mistaken. The Statute reserves discretion to him because it wants to reserve a discretion to the House of Commons, and this was the only way that this could be done.

    This is not the case of a man who is entitled, because he is Home Secretary, to sit in solemn judgment, and to rely on his own judgment, ignoring any other consideration or opinion. In the exercise of his discretion he is responsible to the House of Commons. He is not in the position of being able to say, "Verily, I am the people, and wisdom will die with me". In the last resort it is this House of Commons, and not the Home Secretary, which is entitled to judge these matters on behalf of the people. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will bear that fact in mind if he reconsiders the matter, as I hope he will.

    I want to deal with his argument that he would be tearing a page out of the Statute Book if he exercised his discretion in a way otherwise than according to his announced intention. I appreciate what he means. He is saying—and It is a quite comprehensible notion—that if this man's extradition were demanded by a foreign country, under the Extradition Act, it would not get it. It is conceded that whatever this man has done or has not done, and whether he be guilty or not guilty, the offence charged has a political character and background. In those circumstances, it is common ground that if the only procedure open to Nigeria had been a procedure under the Extradition Act the courts would have been precluded by that Act itself from acceding to Nigeria's request.

    The Home Secretary correctly pointed out that there is no such provision in the Fugitive Offenders Act. He conceded that the Act ought to be amended in this respect, but he said that he had not amended it and that, therefore, he must apply it. He said that for him to introduce into the exercise of his discretion a principle of political asylum which is not included in the Act would be to amend the law on his own authority—and that he is not entitled to do that. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman accepts that as a reasonably fair statement of his reasons for feeling that he is powerless in the matter.

    But he is not powerless in the matter—for that very reason. He said that these matters do not come before him until the courts have dealt with them. That is only part of the truth. They do not come before him until the courts have dealt with them adversely to the applicants—that is to say, adversely to the men whose extradition is being sought. If the courts decide in an applicant's favour the Home Secretary has no power at all. Both the Fugitive Offenders Act and the Extradition Act provide that if and when the courts have decided—and they have very wide grounds—not to grant the application for extradition or removal, that is an end of the matter. It is only if, having heard the arguments within their powers, they decide against an applicant that the discretion of the Home Secretary comes into play.

    Will the Home Secretary bear with me if I point out to him in one sentence the fallacy of his argument? The powers of the courts under the Extradition Act are one thing; their powers under the Fugitive Offenders Act are another. In particular, the courts to which the Home Secretary has repeatedly referred for support never had the power, at any stage, to consider any political aspect of this case, as they would have had under the other Act.

    All that the right hon. Gentleman said on the question of the important bearing which the decision of the courts must have upon the exercise of his own discretion is completely distorted when we remember that the only ground on which it can fairly be said that this man ought not to be sent to Nigeria—namely, the political character of the offence—is the one which the courts have no power to consider at all. If the Home Secretary is right, then it would mean that in any case under the Fugitive Offenders Act all political considerations must be excluded, even whether the man is to be represented by a British counsel.

    I cannot understand why so much importance was attached to this point in the courts, or by the Home Sccretary. If he is quite confident about the supreme fairness and justice of Nigerian procedure, why should not he be content for this man to have a Nigerian counsel? What is the point of insisting. The only point of insisting is if one believes that he has a better chance in Nigeria of being properly defended if he is represented by counsel from this country than if he relies on counsel selected by him in Nigeria under Nigerian law.

    I have been practising the law in this country for only thirty-four years, but it seems to me that that proposition is the exact opposite of the truth. If I were a judge in Nigeria I would think it an offence to my office to give a man a fairer trial because he is represented by foreign counsel than if he were represented by one of my own countrymen. Unless we are saying that he must have a British counsel, otherwise he will not get a fair trial, why say it at all?

    Coming back to the proposition which must follow inevitably and irrefutably from the Home Secretary's explanation, that neither the court nor he in the case of a Commonwealth citizen has the right in these matters to take into consideration any political aspect of the case—being the only one which is material in this case—then he is enunciating a proposition which, I venture to say, will be virtually unanimously rejected by the whole of the adult population of this country and which is in itself contrary to natural justice. If we say that if Nigeria declared its independence tomorrow, or next week, or next month we would then not send Chief Enahoro back because it would not be right to do so, why is it right to say that because Nigeria is in every other respect, with our free approval and support, an independent country, we will send him back?

    The right hon. Gentleman, I think, misled himself about the use of the word "treason" in one Clause of the Fugitive Offenders Act. In any case, it has been pointed out that this man was never charged with treason, but with treasonable felony, which is a different thing. But suppose that it were treason—it was treason in 1881—and that means some offence which would have been regarded as treason against the Queen if it had been committed in Great Britain. Does the right hon. Gentleman say that? Is he saying that the offence with which this man has been charged in Nigeria, the offence of treasonable felony, would be equally indictable in this country, that it is an offence against our laws? I am sure that he is not.

    The whole point of the concept introduced into the Extradition Act of not sending a man back for political offences to another country was precisely that the offence charged was not an offence which, as it were, is commonly accepted by mankind as such. Where there is a political element, a political background, a political motive, then it is taken outside the category of the ordinary criminal law and extradition does not apply to it. The only reason why it was not in the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was because at that time no British subject could be in the position of doing something in one country that was an offence but not an offence at home The whole concept of the thing was different.

    If the right hon. Gentleman concedes, as he most eloquently and movingly did concede, that his duty in the exercise of discretion is to see that justice is done, I challenge him to say on what definition of justice it would be right to send this man back to Nigeria for political offences. If what is truth is a relevant question, what is justice would have been an equally relevant question then. It is a relevant question now, and the right hon. Gentleman must answer it in terms acceptable to the House of Commons, to whom he is responsible for the discretionary and the arbitrary powers he exercises in respect of this and other acts.

    The right hon. Gentleman, for all his virtues and his accepted intelligence, has the unique knack of misleading himself to wrong-headed conclusions whenever an important issue of liberty is at stake. He does not mean to, he does his best according to his lights to avoid doing that. I concede that at once. But his lights are, I would not say dim, but out of focus. He does not come to the right conclusions; he does not see the right things; he does not see them in the right relation to one another.

    The essential point in this matter is that the right hon. Gentleman has absolute discretion subject to his responsibility to the House of Commons. It is a discretion imposed upon him by Statute to do justice and he is proposing to do a manifestly unjust thing against the will of the majority of the House of Commons if it were left to decide for itself. He gets out of this dilemma by saying, injustice be my justice. There is no other way of explaining the right hon. Gentleman's conduct. If he really cannot educate himself into a proper attitude to these matters, I suggest to him in all sincerity and humility that he should go straight to the Prime Minister and ask to be given some other appointment.

    6.40 p.m.

    I feel that the House should have an explanation of how I became involved in this matter. Chief Anthony Enahoro was arrested last November in my constituency and he appealed to me, as a British Member of Parliament, for help through constituents of mine who were friends of his.

    As the House knows, I have been fairly active in this matter over the last week or two and at the same time I have incurred a certain amount of unpopularity. But I deemed it my duty, having had this appeal from the chief, to take action on his behalf and go into the matter very thoroughly. This I have done.

    At the outset, I must say that I began with complete impartiality. I had no brief for the chief and I have no particular brief for him now. But as I investigated the case, I sifted through the evidence, I came more and more to the conclusion that it would be wrong to send this man back to Nigeria to stand trial. All-party interest has been shown in this matter, as has been admitted in this debate. I think that the points which have been made were made with sincerity.

    I was fortunate enough to be able to take an all-party deputation to see my right hon. Friend and I should like publicly to thank him for the courtesy he showed and, if I may say so with respect, the judicial interpretation he revealed when we lobbied him. My right hon. Friend gave us over an hour of his time and I honestly think that he has considered the matter extremely carefully. I come down against him because I think his decision is wrong. But I am quite convinced that his decision has been made sincerely and impartially without prejudice or pressure from anyone.

    I submit that there is still time for my right hon. Friend to change his mind and that there is a case for allowing the chief to remain in this country. It may be made under three main headings. First, the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881 is well out-of-date, as has been shown this afternoon, and anyway the Home Secretary himself has absolute discretion under it, as he admits. It would seem certain that the Act will be changed and, if so, in such a case as this, Chief Enahoro would be allowed to remain. Secondly, if he is sent back to Nigeria, he will receive less fair treatment than would a foreigner in similar circumstances in this country. That point has been underlined several times and I do not need to labour it. Comparable cases have been pointed out, where foreigners would have been allowed to remain in this country.

    Despite all the things said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Sir J. Vaughan-Morgan), in his effective and short speech, there are, thirdly, definite doubts as to whether this man would get a fair trial in Nigeria. I wish to examine the case argued by those who oppose the granting of political asylum to Chief Enahoro—not necessarily that of my right hon. Friend, who put the view of the Government. Some of my hon. Friends believe that this man should be sent back to Nigeria. As I understand it, their argument is that if we believe in the Commonwealth—I am sure we all do—we must support all the systems of justice of the Commonwealth countries whatever private doubts we may have about the way those systems are administered.

    I agree that this is a strong argument. But however grave our doubts, should we, in effect, sacrifice someone who is really a political refugee on the altar of expediency, rather than offend the Government of a country which is a member of the Commonwealth? I say that we should not. Should we have sent Chief Enahoro back had he come from Ghana? I doubt that very much. Ought not we to treat an individual case on its merits and not just express the opinion of a Commonwealth Government?

    In this case, I should have thought, in view of the external circumstances attending it, that we could well take the line that we should allow this man to remain, and take the risk—not a very severe risk, I suggest, in the long run—of offending the Nigerian Government. It is also said by the opponents of political asylum for Chief Enahoro that as the chief has appeared in our courts, and a strong presumption of guilt has been found against him, he should be sent back.

    I am not a lawyer, as many of my hon. Friends know. But the phrase "strong presumption of guilt" seems particularly unfortunate. Was not the court hearing the equivalent of a lower court hearing? In such cases people are taken before British courts and the evidence tested, but that evidence must be taken on its face value. It is obvious that the evidence that has been submitted from Nigeria has not been open to cross-examination or rebuttal and, consequently, I think that our courts—the magistrate at Bow Street and subsequently the Court of Appeal and the Appeals Committee of the House of Lords—had an extremely difficult job not to accept the evidence on its face value, and to give the opinion that was given.

    I should have thought that, were the evidence tainted—there are suspicions that it may be—it is absolutely worthless, and the courts could well have ruled the other way and allowed Chief Enahoro to remain in this country.

    In support of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, may I ask whether he is aware that there is a decision of the House of Lords that the test to be applied is exactly the same as the test in all courts in this country? The magistrate has to decide whether there is a case to answer, that and no more, and the words "strong presumption of guilt" are, in consequence, misleading.

    I am obliged to the hon. Member. I am glad that he is able to support the point.

    Those who advocate that Chief Enahoro should go back to Nigeria also say that the Home Secretary must interpret the law as it stands, whatever he may feel personally about the case. But the Home Secretary admits that the Act is out of date and that he has absolute discretion. Surely, in some ways, this is a parallel with the death sentence. A man may commit a foul murder, for example, and be properly tried and defended in the courts, but is convicted and sentenced to death. He appeals and his appeal goes to the High Court, and is dismissed. It goes to the House of Lords, and is dismissed again. There may be strong public feeling, and almost an outcry, if the public think that the man will not hang. But nevertheless, the Home Secretary has absolute discretion in the exercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy.

    This has been done, perhaps not in the time of my right hon. Friend's period of office, but certainly by some of his predecessors, of both political parties. I should have thought this case an example of "without fear or favour", and that my right hon. Friend should exercise his discretion as he would, if he thought the case merited it, in respect of a death sentence on a British subject.

    Opponents of the granting of political asylum to Chief Enahoro say that the Nigerian judiciary is sound, of high quality and full of integrity. This may well be so. I am not qualified to speak about the Nigerian judiciary. I am not necessarily criticising the Nigerian judges, nor have I ever sought to do so. But one must bear in mind that it is all a question of dealing with the evidence, and that however efficient and worth while, and however full of integrity the judiciary of a country may be, it cannot possibly operate effectively if the evidence placed before it is not of the standard and quality required in this country. As we have heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), there may be grave doubts about the methods used to obtain some of the prosecution evidence in the treason trial going on in Nigeria at present.

    We also know that countries which virtually become totalitarian—this is no criticism of Nigeria—keep the judiciary in power so that in some ways it may be used as a cloak in order that people may operate beneath the surface while presenting an appearance of respectability to the outside world. I consider that the question of an appeal to the Privy Council, in the last resort, if Chief Enahoro is convicted, is something of a "red herring". If I am wrong, my legal friends will correct me. But I understand that there is sometimes a delay of two years before an appeal comes before the Privy Council and that it has to be decided on points of law and evidence submitted at the trial. It is conceivable that were Chief Enahoro wrongly convicted in his own country, the Privy Council would he so bound as not to be able to dismiss the conviction.

    All these points, made against Enahoro, although perfectly relevant and fair to make, do not stand up to close examination. Like the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), I was appalled to see the leading article in the Daily Mirror today, saying that the Home Secretary was right. It is almost the first time in my experience that the Daily Mirror has ever supported the Government, and were I a member of the Government I should be very suspicious about it.

    I must say that I am surprised at the lack of integrity which has been shown by the Daily Mirror in not declaring its interest, because I believe that it has newspaper and business interests in Nigeria at present. I submit that, on examination, the case it puts forward largely falls to the ground. I should have thought that the majority of people outside this House would have thought it was a case of common justice that Chief Enahoro should be allowed to remain and that if a foreigner were received in this country under similar circumstances he would almost certainly and automatically be given political asylum.

    That is why some hon. Friends and myself last night tabled the Motion:

    That this House is of opinion that Chief Anthony Enahoro should, as a Commonwealth citizen, be accorded rights and liberties not less favourable than those granted to an alien seeking political asylum. Chief Enahoro, as a Commonwealth citizen, should at least be granted treatment on a parity with those from other countries who come here with a political past hanging over them. I think that, on the whole, this has been made out to be a political trial which is going on in Nigeria at present. If anyone is a political refugee, surely it is so in his case.

    I agree that the Fugitive Offenders Act must operate in respect of people accused of criminal offences and that they should be sent back to face the music, but politics is in an entirely different category, as all agree, irrespective of the political sides we may take in this House. In this case, there has been enough doubt cast on this treason trial to make us realise that perhaps there is a chance that Enahoro may not have a fair trial. It is not for me to make allegations against anyone connected with Nigeria, because I am not an expert on the Commonwealth. As I explained, I came into this matter only because I felt that common justice should be done to a man who is in trouble. Apart from the fact that I have little Commonwealth knowledge, however, as a Member of Parliament, like all my colleagues on this side and hon. Members opposite, I have had experience of sifting through evidence presented to me to find out if there is a germ of truth in it, or if it is incorrect.

    Here I found that there have been a number of prosecutions of the Press for sedition and making adverse comments against the régime in Nigeria. It has been stated that the hon. and learned Member for Ipswich (Mr. D. Foot), who is a distinguished member of the Bar, was turned out of Nigeria in a case in which he was engaged. It is true that another British Q.C. who was to defend a person taking part in this trial was also refused admittance.

    In this particular matter the undertaking which has been given by the Nigerian Government, sincere as it may be, is open to doubt from the point of view of Chief Enahoro, because he has seen this happen before. It is quite possible chat the immigration authorities could refuse permission to a member of the British Bar to go there and take part in the trial. The Leader of the Opposition in Nigeria, Chief Awolowo, was refused counsel of his own choice and he has been defending himself. I understand that there is no jury in this case and that the hearing is being undertaken by a judge sitting on his own. There have been serious and grave allegations—I say this with deference to my right hon. Friend the Member for Reigate —of brutality, intimidation and coercion.

    I do not accept all this evidence as being true, although I have sifted through great piles of transcripts of the trial, but, if only a quarter of it were true, it throws very great doubt indeed on whether Chief Enahoro would get a fair deal. Illustrations have been given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton and I could quote three or four cases, but time does not allow of that as other hon. Members want to take part in this debate.

    I could say a good deal about certain matters which my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) read out, but those matters are sub judice in Nigeria and we must be careful what we say. I think that all of us must be careful in reaching judgments on matters which are now before the Nigerian courts for judgment there.

    I appreciate the point made by my right hon. Friend. In view of what he has said, I shall not pursue the matter of the evidence. This evidence has been submitted to my right hon. Friend and I believe that he has seen all the documents.

    Yesterday, I went to Brixton Prison and had an hour's interview with Chief Enahoro in the Governor's office. I had not previously been to see him. Deliberately, I had kept away because I did not want to become involved with him on a personal basis, for I wanted to sort out the facts in a judicial way. I was very impressed by this man, by his bearing and the arguments he put to me. That he had held high office in his country was made obvious by the clear thinking he brought to bear on the subject.

    I am following with great interest and almost complete agreement what my hon. Friend is saying, but I wish to refer to an intervention a few moments ago. Would it not be sensible, if it is true that certain matters affecting this matter should not be discussed in this House because something is sub judice, to wait until it is not sub judice?

    Without commenting on the intervention made by my hon. Friend, I say that in this interview I found Chief Enahoro obviously very depressed, as anyone who had been in prison for four months and who was fairly certain that the Home Secretary had come down against him would be. He told me about the matter quite fairly, even allowing for the fact that I was having an interview with him and be would put the best face on his own story, as anyone would in the circumstances.

    I was confident that he was telling me a great deal of truth. He told me that he appreciated, with great respect, the difficulties with which the Home Secretary had been presented, at this long range, in deciding whether he would get a fair trial if he were sent home to Nigeria. He pointed out, however—and. this was very relevant—that fair trials do not begin and end in court and that so much depends on how evidence is obtained.

    The fact that no evidence was offered against the four who have been mentioned may, if the trial were not fair, have been a very clever move on the part of those running the prosecution. This is a matter of opinion, but I think that due attention should be paid to the statements he made and also to the story that he gave me yesterday. He told me of two principal witnesses in the case who had had charges made against them of possessing firearms and that those charges had been outstanding against them since September. Both had been promised that they would be treated very well in return for their evidence.

    Chief Enahoro feels that ways of obtaining objection to his counsel will be found once he has gone back. I think that the most important thing of all is that no assurance will be given to him that if he is acquitted he will be allowed to leave Nigeria to pursue either his personal or business interests. Four leading members of the Action Group not on trial at present have had their passports withdrawn, and they are virtually political prisoners.

    I think that I am right in saying that if Chief Enahoro is acquitted, Section 8 of the Fugitive Offenders Act gives him the right to request from Her Majesty's Government here that he should return to this this country.

    He may do that, but it is another question as to whether he will be able to get out of the country.

    On the "liquidation" question, which I make no apology for raising and would not raise if I did not think that there was a germ of truth in it, Chief Enahoro confirms my view. I thought that the penalty for the treasonable offence with which he was charged was life imprisonment or death, but I have been corrected by the Home Secretary and I accept that correction. I thought the penalty would be hanging. I used the word "liquidation" deliberately because Chief Enahoro thinks that in the state of political turmoil there may well be at the time when he is acquitted—if he is acquitted—he could meet with an "accident," or be shot "while trying to escape", or that in a hundred and one other ways something could befall him. In this political situation he told me that he fears for his life.

    It is a fair point to make, and shows his sincerity, that he says that as a result of pressure exercised in this Parliament and the country at large there has been so much publicity about the case that he now believes he has a better chance of having a fair trial than he originally had and that if he is convicted he will not get an extreme sentence. He may well get off more lightly, but that is not the principal thing to consider.

    Chief Enahoro pointed out—I say this in support of my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton, who was attacked on the question, as, also, was the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse)—that there have been riots in Nigeria. He alleges—I put it no stronger than that—that they have been staged by the Government party and as a result hundreds of pounds worth of damage has been done to houses owned by members of the Action Group and a number of its supporters have been killed, he says, deliberately.

    At one stage he himself, before there was any talk that he was to be arrested, had to have a police guard and was not allowed to visit his own constituency. He says that the emergency regulations, which have been taken off now, could well be reimposed and he could well then be kept in detention without trial, irrespective of the outcome of this issue.

    I think that this man is sincere. He told me yesterday that he is throwing himself on the mercy of the Home Secretary and on the British Parliament, and that he believes in British justice. I have no brief at all for his own political views, or his own political party. I am quite certain that he is in no way a Communist. I believe that his political party approximates to a Left-wing party, something perhaps between the Liberal Party and the Labour Party, but this is impossible to judge, because these people are different people from ourselves.

    This is no light matter. I am certain that my right hon. Friend has approached this in his usual impartial and sincere way. As he said today, it is a distasteful task, and I think that we would all concur with him about that. Nevertheless, very important principles are involved in this case, principles of common justice, of humanity, and of integrity; the integrity of the British Parliament and the integrity of this country. One day this man, if the political régime changes in his country—it could well change—might return here as its Foreign Secretary. This is something we must contend with in making our decision.

    The Home Secretary may well fear that if he changes his mind now he will be criticised. I reject utterly much of the unfair criticism which has been levelled against my right hon. Friend by some members of the Opposition and also in the British Press. I reject it because I think that it is unfair. I think that the Home Secretary is a very able and sincere man. Nevertheless, he may feel that, if he does change his mind, he will be criticised. I say, on the contrary, that if he does change his mind he will not be criticised but applauded. He will be applauded not only by many Members of the House, but in the country outside, because he will have made, I submit, a courageous, a very wise and a very humane decision.

    7.2 p.m.

    We have heard a most remarkable speech from an hon. Member whose sincerity and ability impressed us all. May I make this one point on it? It is perhaps curious that the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. D. Smith) should be supporting the case for this chief under the impression that he belongs to a Left-wing party, whereas I from the Left find myself supporting the chief under the impression that he belongs to an extreme Right-wing party.

    I had not intended to speak in the debate and do so only because the Home Secretary impressed me so strongly that he had misunderstood his function. It is for that reason that I wish to try to talk, perhaps a little drily, as a lawyer on this problem. The right hon. Gentleman has to interpret this Act as it is. "As it is" are the important words, not as it was in 1881. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) put it, time amends Acts in so far as the words used in Acts change with time. The word "treason" as used in 1881 means something quite different from the word "treason" or the words "treason felony" as used in Nigeria today. Treasury in 1881 was quite simply treason according to our law, a conspiracy against the Queen here, a conspiracy against the Queen as Queen of the United Kingdom, the colonial Power. When treason was included in the Act in 1881, nobody here remotely contemplated treason against the Government of Nigeria as at present constituted, free and independent, or treason against the Government of Ghana, or indeed treason as amended by the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

    After all, in 1881 we alone within the Commonwealth, or the Empire, as it then was, had the power to change the word "treason" and give it a different meaning. Canada is a possible exception, but even Canada in 1881 could do so only with the consent of a Governor-General responsible to the Government here. "Treason" as included in 1881 means something quite different from the "treason" which we are now considering in Nigeria.

    It is for the courts to decide under the Fugitive Offenders Act, first whether there is a prima facie case, and, secondly, under Section 10 whether it would be oppressive to return the applicant, or whoever it may be—the person charged—because, amongst other reasons, he would have an unfair trial. These two matters were decided by the courts. It is quite clear to my mind that, when the Home Secretary came to consider this matter under Section 6, he thought that what he was deciding was precisely what the courts had already decided. When he made his statement to the House, he made that quite plain. He said:
    "If the Divisional Court had thought that Enahoro's return would be unjust, it would have ordered his release; if the Appeal Committee had thought that it would be unjust, it no doubt would have granted leave to appeal.
    On the information before me, I have no reason to think that Enahoro, if he is returned, will not be given a fair trial."—[OFFICIAL.REPORT, 14th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 1542.]
    It is quite clear from the statement as a whole that at the time he made it the Home Secretary was applying his mind to that and substantially to nothing else. True, under cross-examination later he conceded that there were wider matters, but it is quite clear that in the initial stage when he came to this decision first he came to the decision on wrong grounds.

    When a decision has been reached on wrong grounds in the first place, it somewhat disqualifies one from considering the matter impartially again upon different grounds. It is only today that the Home Secretary has admitted and had it pointed out to him that in fact what he has to consider are quite different grounds. He does not have to act as a court of appeal on the question whether there is a prima facie case or whether there is the probability of a fair trial in the homeland. All that has been decided by the courts, and he is perfectly entitled to take their decision. He has to decide on quite other matters, and those other matters he did not consider at all when he first made his decision.

    And believed that he could not. Now I come to what those other matters are. It is only when the courts have come to the decision on the two matters to which I have referred that the right hon. Gentleman's discretion arises under Section 6. It is only then that he begins to decide, and he then begins to decide quite different matters. Amongst those matters which he could consider—I put them in the reverse order of importance as I see them—first is the question of misunderstanding which was brought out in a very effective and powerful speech by the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton).

    We are considering what is just. When a man under a misunderstanding—and I am not going to apportion the blame for that misunderstanding—comes here and believes that he has been assured of his safety, is there not something to be said for the proposition of telling him, "In that case you must go back to where you came from?" Is it not just, in that case, to say—since there has been a misunderstanding, "Back to Ireland you go?" That seems to be the matter to be considered by the Home Secretary, although he obviously has not considered it.

    The next question must concern the political situation in Nigeria. I want to distinguish very clearly between the state of the courts and the state of the country, because that can be a vastly different matter. What we are not concerned with—because the courts have decided this—is whether Chief Enahoro will get a fair trial. We are not even concerned with the question of whether or not he will get an acquittal. We are concerned solely with how likely he is to survive an acquittal.

    Perhaps I can put it this way, for this is the sort of matter I am putting to the right hon. Gentleman for his serious consideration. I recall that on one occasion I was invited by an hon. Member opposite to fly to Africa as a pair on a private 'plane. It seemed an attractive invitation and before I accepted I telephoned Lloyds to inquire about insurance rates. When I was told that they were the normal rates I was delighted to accept the invitation, and I enjoyed the journey very much. Bearing that in mind, let us consider the case of Enahoro. The experts on risks are insurance companies. The experts on risks of all sorts are perhaps Lloyds underwriters. If one sent Enahoro back to Africa—and let us remember that he is not on a capital charge—I wonder what the premium would be to insure his life. Chief Enahoro has two little boys in school here and insurance on his life might be extremely important to him. This is the sort of thing that the Home Secretary should consider, for what kind of risk is one sending this man back to?

    Another consideration arises from an intervention made a short while ago by the Home Secretary when one of his hon. Friends was speaking. The right hon. Gentleman said that there were various matters affecting this man's safety in the political situation which he could not refer to because they were being decided in the courts of Nigeria and were, therefore, sub judice. When one considers the question of discretion one finds another reason for not returning this man, at least until those relevant things are decided; things which the right hon. Gentleman says he cannot discuss because they have not yet been decided. Surely that is a reason why the right hon. Gentleman should consider waiting until those relevant things have been decided?

    Basically, far and away the most important of all the considerations—and we are still dealing with considerations which, on the right hon. Gentleman's own submission, he has not considered—is the fact that the Home Secretary is entrusted with the Queen's mercy and honour. It is on that that the principle of political asylum is based. One hon. Member opposite stated that this was something that had happened only since the French Revolution. "It is contrary to the Queen's honour to send away those who crave her protection for life, limb or liberty." Those were the words of the first Elizabeth. They were the words used when the King of Spain demanded the surrender of the sea beggars from Holland.

    We have granted political asylum from the early days. We granted it to the Princes Maurice and Rupert, from the German Emperor, and to the Huguenots who fled from Cardinal Richelieu. I have never heard such nonsense as the remark that it all arose from the French Revolution. It arose from far earlier times and from a conception of the Queen's mercy and honour. The idea was this—and it had nothing at all to do with the question of whether or not anyone would get a fair trial; it was contrary to the honour of a prince, as conceived by Queen Elizabeth I and followed through, to surrender those who craved her protection for political, religious or racial offences. We have always felt that way and it has become part of our extradition laws.

    The fact that there may be danger to life, limb or liberty for political reasons is no reflection on any country. There is danger to the liberty of Maclean and Burgess in this country. It is a danger which arises from their political activities, and any country which has our conception would have to refuse to hand those men over to us. In the same way there was reason why General Benedict Arnold, for instance, should have feared for his life, limb and liberty had he been returned to America; and, therefore, we granted him asylum. One can quote many examples, including M. Bidault. As I say, it is not reflection on any country seeking the person and it is equally no reflection on the other country.

    We have reached the point when, unlike 1881, we are not dealing with political offences against us here at home, against the Queen and Parliament in this country, as we know it, or against a colonial Power as we conceived and controlled it at that time. This is not a political offence described in the Act of 1881 and it does not refer to such on any true interpretation of the situation.

    Treason against Ghana is not treason as referred to in the Act of 1881, any more than treason against de Gaulle or Franco is treason as referred to in that Act. It was treason against our colonial Power Government—not against new independent nations—and, therefore, the old principle of justice as it being contrary to the Queen's honour to surrender those who ask her protection applies just as effectively to Nigeria or India or any of these great independent nations which have arisen as it does to France or America or any of those great nations bound with us in our great alliance. The position is the same, and that is the justice which the right hon. Gentleman must consider. When he came to the House he had plainly not considered that.

    Much has been said about the Home Secretary. I have often felt that, amongst other things, he is a very stubborn man. None the less, when he is entrusted with justice, when he is probably entrusted with another's life, when his interpretation of what is just is at variance with that of every hon. Member who has so far spoken—and I do not even exclude the right hon. Member for Reigate (Sir J. Vaughan-Morgan), because he was not talking about justice but about not offending Nigeria; not about the honour of the Queen, about justice as it appears to every hon. Member who has spoken—and when the right hon. Gentleman is the condemner, surely it is not right for him to prefer his definition of justice to that of every hon. Member who has pleaded with him today.

    7.21 p.m.

    I must congratulate the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) on a most remarkable and sincere speech. In one sense, he anticipated me because I care I hope as much as anybody in this House about justice, and I support and defend the Home Secretary's decision on that ground.

    The hon. and learned Member made out a most convincing case for changing, or at least reviewing, the Fugitive Offenders Act. He pointed out, as is perfectly true, that the nature of the offence of treason as first defined in that Measure has changed as a result of the granting of independence to a number of different Commonwealth countries. That, in itself, could quite properly lead to our inviting the other countries of the Commonwealth to review this Act with us to see whether Amendments were justified and required—

    Cyprus, Ghana and India have already amended it independently. All I ask is that it should be interpreted as I believe they do.

    I was well aware that Cyprus and Ghana had done so, but I was not aware that India had done so. It seems to me that this is something on which we should not act unilaterally. But, whether or not this Measure requires reviewing, to proceed from there and say that time has amended the Act seems to invoke wholly unconstitutional principles. The only thing that can amend an Act passed by this Parliament is another Act passed by this Parliament. I cannot for one second concede that any other alteration is constitutionally possible. The fact that this is the law as it stands must be taken into account.

    The Home Secretary's discretion has been referred to continually throughout the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. D. Smith) referred to his discretion in cases like this, and compared it with his discretion in the matter of the death penalty. There is some comparison between the two. In the case of the death penalty, as in the case of the Fugitive Offenders Act, I do not believe that the Home Secretary would be making a proper use of his discretion if he made a decision merely because he did not happen to like the law as it stood—

    Justice is something which transcends the law. If it is the consensus of opinion that the law is out of date and should be changed, and is likely to be changed, those are certainly relevant circumstances for the Home Secretary to take into account in considering what is just.

    But he must also quite clearly pay due regard to the law as it stands. Suppose, for example, that as a result of a Gallup poll it was discovered that 60 per cent, of the people of this country favoured the total abolition of the death penalty. It would be quite wrong if, merely as a result of public opinion, the Home Secretary were to ignore the law and reprieve every murderer just because he did not happen to like the law—

    Let me finish what I am saying, and then I will give way at once. When the Home Secretary uses his discretion, he must take into account the special factors relating to a particular case. It would be wrong for him to override the law as it stands.

    I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. My intervention is on the actual point of fact in which, by analogy, he was interested; namely, what the Home Secretary should do in certain circumstances. The circumstances that happened were not quite those of which the hon. Gentleman spoke, but they were near enough to point the moral. In 1948, on a free vote of the House, the House of Commons added to the Criminal Justice Bill a Clause suspending for five years the operation of the death penalty. It was some time before the House of Lords reinserted the Clause—the debate went on for some months—and my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary at that time got himself into a good deal of trouble in some quarters by making a declaration of intention in the House of Commons. I express no opinion about that, but he never got into any trouble about what he actually did, which was to reprieve every convicted murderer from that date until the date when the Clause was reinserted in the Bill.

    I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that little piece of history. I was not wholly unfamiliar with it, because I have long been a supporter of the campaign for the abolition of capital punishment. However, what happened in 1948 plainly has no very great relevance to this case because if a new Fugitive Offenders Bill had gone through this House and was now being considered in the Lords, and if one of its Clauses repealed the offending Section in this Act, and had been passed, the Home Secretary would clearly have to take into account the legislative processes that would follow. We have not even considered possible Amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Act. That being the case, we must consider the Act as it stands.

    The whole point of my submission is that the Home Secretary in using his discretion must take into account any special circumstances in a particular case, but he must not be allowed, as a deliberate act of policy, to frustrate the law as it stands just because he does not happen to like the law. That is why I believe that the only relevant consideration now before us is whether, if Chief Enahoro is sent back to Nigeria, he will get a fair trial. It does not seem to me that any other consideration has any relevance whatever.

    I quite agree, and I think that we all agree, that the Act as it stands places an unfair burden upon the Home Secretary. What an appalling position to be in, for example, if the Government of Ghana were to ask us to send back Mr. Gbedemah if he had been in this country, not back to trial but back to preventive detention without trial. I have no doubt whatever that it would be perfectly proper that the Home Secretary in those circumstances, despite the fact that he would doubtless incur the displeasure of the Ghana Government, would be quite right to refuse to do so. Quite properly he would say that the only relevant consideration was whether the treatment would be fair. I have great admiration for Ghana, but nobody who is in touch with Ghana could fail to have certain doubts about the fairness of any judicial proceedings which were entered into there on political charges.

    The Home Secretary would never have to decide that. The courts would have to decide it under Section 10. The question of fair trial is decided by the court and it never gets to the Home Secretary.

    My impression after reading the Section with some care is that an offender can be sent back without any mention of a trial at all.

    If I had a copy of the Act with me I would look at it. Unfortunately, I have not. Anyway, this does not remove my main point which is that the only relevant question we have to ask ourselves is whether the trial will be fair.

    Section 10 of the Fugitive Offences Act, 1881, refers to the justice of the application for the return and states that it is up to the superior court to discharge the fugitive or the order made for his return if it considers that the application is

    "…not being made in good faith in the interests of justice or otherwise.…"

    This still does not vitiate the main argument that the only question in the circumstances of the Act as it stands is whether he would have a fair trial.

    We have heard a great deal earlier in the debate about the extraordinarily anomalous position that a Commonwealth citizen is being much less favourably treated than an alien. It seems to me wholly wrong and inaccurate to seize upon one aspect of Commonwealth citizenship or one aspect of regulations governing aliens and then attempt to evaluate who gets off the better.

    Commonwealth citizens are British subjects. They have all manner of rights and privileges which are denied to aliens. They have the right to vote in this country, to stand for Parliament, to be members of the Cabinet, to be judges, and to hold commissions in the Armed Forces. Indeed, before the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which was not my favourite piece of legislation last year, their rights in this country were indistinguishable from those of citizens of the United Kingdom. Nothing at present can put them in the position of being aliens. This is something which we ought to recognise.

    When we talk about citizens of the Commonwealth coming out badly on this, I would regard Commonwealth cooperation as being co-operation between Commonwealth Governments. It would not seem to me to be particularly in the interest of Commonwealth co-operation if we use as one yardstick what happens Ito somebody who has been accused of engaging in conspiratorial activities in his own country. The yardstick all the time must be whether or not if he goes back, as is normally the case under the present law, he will be fairly treated when he gets there.

    Various hon. Members have cast some serious aspersions against the Nigerian courts and also against the Nigerian Government and people. I cannot help thinking that the use of the word "liquidated" by my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick was most extraordinarily offensive and unjustified. There is not the slightest shred of evidence that if he were to go back to Nigeria Chief Enahoro would face liquidiation. "Liquidation" does not even mean the judicial death penalty, which, as we all know, is anyway not the penalty for this crime. My hon. Friend was trying to imply that the conditions in Nigeria were such that Chief Enahoro would be the victim of assassination. I do not think that there is the slightest evidence to show that this is likely.

    The right hon. Gentleman the Deputy Leader of the Opposition said that he would like to leave the courts out of it, but he had some reservations about the political situation in Nigeria. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman meant that he had no complaints against the quality of the Nigerian courts. Certainly in my experience they have proved themselves in the two and a half years of Nigerian independence to be strikingly independent in character, and on many occasions to have caused considerable irritation to the Government. I think it is relevant, however—if I may expand on the point made by the Home Secretary—to consider who these four people are who have now been discharged from the case. First, there is Mr. Rewane, political secretary to Chief Awolowo, a principal figure in Action Group politics. I should have thought that if this trial had assumed the political character which some hon Members have given it, Mr. Rewane would be the last person who would have been discharged.

    Equally, one would assume that if being an Action Group politician was really so dangerous an occupation that a released politician would be assassinated, Mr. Rewane would be undergoing a certain amount of personal danger at present, but there is no evidence to show that that is so. There is the case of Mr. Adegbenro, who was for a short time the Action Group Premier in the Western Region. He is at the moment in the middle of an appeal to the Privy Council to establish the fact, as he hopes, that he was wrongly dismissed from the Premiership. As far as we know, he is not under any threat of assassination. It would not be wise for hon. Members to build up a picture of lurid danger of a thoroughly unreal kind. I do not believe that conditions are like this, and I do not think that any of us help the situation if we try to make a political set-up appear to be more hazardous than it is.

    There is the case of Dr. Chike Obi who was in the car at the time when Chief Enahoro made his escape through the back regions into Ghana. Dr. Chike Obi gave himself up at that stage. He returned and was tried and he was dismissed from the case. He was the leader of the Dynamic Party.

    Yes, Dr. Chike Obi has also been discharged from the case though he is the leader of a small but, as he no doubt hopes, a growing party, and not a member of the Action Group. Therefore, this creates a totally different picture from the one which the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr, Stone-house) has been building up. He and I have so frequently agreed on African matters that I find it distressing that we should be so out of touch with each other on Nigeria. However, anyone who followed the enquiry into the National Bank and the subsequent very stern strictures which the court passed on the Federal Prime Minister and other members of the Government for wholly unconstitutional action could be in no doubt whatever that the Nigerian judiciary was markedly independent of the Government.

    As the hon. and learned Member for Ipswich (Mr. D. Foot) is here, and as he was mentioned in his absence, I should like to say that here was one passage in the speech of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) with which I agreed. Those of us who believe, as I do, that the quality of Nigerian justice is of a very high level will not be too worried about getting a British counsel out to Lagos to defend Chief Enahoro. Certainly the barristers and members of the judiciary in Lagos whom I have met are people of the highest quality who would be perfectly capable of putting up a very good defence for the chief.

    I cannot help feeling—I hope that this will not be resented—that certain British members of the Nigerian bar have, from time to time, behaved with a certain lack of sensitivity and understanding about Nigerian susceptibilities. One cannot remove the British Governor-General and all the governors, chief secretaries, district commissioners, and so on, and suddenly see a gaggle of British Q.C.s turning up in the courts of Nigeria. That looks like neocolonialism at its worst. If one stacks the defence with British Q.C.s in a treason trial of all things, nothing is more likely to raise the hostility of the Nigerian public. I personally would not pursue that particular guarantee because I do not honestly believe it to be tremendously important.

    The main point which I have tried to make is that, if we are satisfied that the trial will be fair, I believe that the Home Secretary had no alternative but to take the action which he has taken.

    The hon. Gentleman has not heard me develop my argument because he was out of the Chamber for most of the time.

    The hon. Gentleman was outside for a great deal of the time and therefore may have missed the more convincing passages in my speech.

    Then I am sure that in that 40 seconds he must have missed most of the convincing passages, because the hon. Gentleman was shaking his head most firmly.

    It seems to me that it is extremely difficult for an African territory to do the right thing in British eyes. Four years ago, a great many people in this country, and particularly the Daily Express and the Daily Telegraph—and no newspaper has done more to destroy the whole concept of the Commonwealth than the Daily Express—were saying, when Dr. Nkrumah locked up certain members of the Opposition in Ghana, that what Dr. Nkrumah ought to do was to hold a public trial of these people. Many leaders appeared in both the Daily Express and the Daily Telegraph, and many speeches were made in this House, saying that if there were offences against the State they should be brought out into the open and that there should be a public trial.

    The Government of Nigeria are trying to do just that in this case. As far as I know, there is not a single person in Nigeria who is in preventive detention without having had a trial. Everyone in gaol has either been sentenced or is there without bail, having been charged, awaiting trial. They have appointed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Sir J. Vaughan-Morgan) said, a distinguished Yoruba judge to be the judge in this treason trial, thus avoiding, as they hope, tribal complications. The trial has been fully publicised in all the Nigerian newspapers.

    I do not disagree with much of what the hon. Gentleman has fairly said. I went to Nigeria as the guest of Dr. Azikwe, a former client, and as an old friend. I am a little shocked to hear the argument that the nomination by the Government of the judge who is to try a political case can be done with a desire to ensure justice. I should have thought that every example in our history of a nominee judge appointed by the Government was a specific example of something to be deplored.

    I should have made myself clearer. The judge was nominated by the Chief Justice, and I have no doubt that he was chosen because he is a Yoruba and it was felt to be of great importance that tribal complications should not arise. It seems to me that this is a wholly sensible and reasonable point of view.

    The hon. Gentleman earlier pronounced the name so much better than I could do. Perhaps he would like to give it again.

    We are agreed on the name. Is it not the case that this man was very active in the N.C.N.C.? Chief Enahoro told us yesterday that he would be judging this case on political and not judicial grounds. Is it not the case that there is very strong objection to this judge?

    I was not aware that he ever played a very active part in politics. Certainly I think that his conduct of the case so far has betrayed no political bias. I referred earlier to the release of Mr. Rewane, which, I should have thought, was not the sort of action which would have been taken by someone who was going to judge a case on its political merits only.

    Is my hon. Friend aware of the transcript of the Lagos trial, which puts an entirely different complexion on the evidence given by the witnesses? Also may I ask my hon. Friend whether he has any interest, financial or otherwise, in Nigeria?

    I am very thankful to say that I have no financial interest in Nigeria at all. I am rather surprised that my hon. Friend should have thought fit to ask that question. It is a most unusual question to ask. I can assure him that I have no financial interest there whatever.

    I believe in Nigeria. The Government there are attempting to maintain Parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. It does not make it any easier for this to be done if hon. Members in this House make wild criticisms, many of which cannot be substantiated and all of which are resented. I personally—I can only speak for myself—have faith in Nigerian justice. I have faith in the Nigerian people, and I therefore support the decision of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary.

    7.49 p.m.

    We have had a most interesting and heartening debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell), who was so keen last week that this House should remain the great forum of the nation, should be heartened by today's debate.

    We are debating, it seems to me, two issues. One is the Fugitive Offenders Act and whether it is still appropriate to present-day conditions, and the other is the case of Chief Enahoro. These two issues cannot be separated, they are intertwined at every point, yet must be considered to some extent separately, because both of them raise matters of the gravest importance for the House to decide.

    I should like to say a word or two, first, about the question of the Fugitive Offenders Act. It is easier to consider that Act by comparing and contrasting it with the Extradition Act. It is not really a question, as the Home Secretary suggested, whether the Fugitive Offenders Act is an obscure Act, whether it is often used, or whether it is not used quite properly and fairly frequently to deport criminals who are accused of ordinary criminal offences without any political question.

    Nobody is worrying about that and nobody questions it. What we are questioning here—and this is the whole issue on this part of the case—is the tremendous difference between the Fugitive Offenders Act and the Extradition Act in that the former includes within its scope political offences and the Extradition Act excludes them. This is the simple point at issue. It is brought out and illustrated graphically by the present case, because there is the simple fact, which no one can doubt, that if Chief Enahoro had been an alien he would not be being deported now. There would be no question that he would be receiving political asylum in this country.

    That is why I could not follow the Home Secretary's argument which he went on to use that we ought to treat Commonwealth citizens better than aliens. We all feel that there is great force in that argument. In many cases, there should be special treatment for Commonwealth citizens. That is not, however, an argument for treating Commonwealth citizens worse than aliens, which is what we are doing today. The Commonwealth citizen will not thank us if the special treatment which we give him turns out to be much more severe than he would get as as alien. That is the preposterous position which we have reached today and which the Enahoro case has highlighted for us. Because of the Act becoming an anachronism, we have got to the position that we treat these Commonwealth citizens far more severely than we would ever treat an alien.

    That is why all the talk—and there has been a good deal ofit—of offending the Nigerian Government is utterly irrelevant and unworthy of this House. We have to do the right thing in these cases. We can illustrate that when we see what happens, not only in this country, but in all the highly-developed countries, in the case of political offenders.

    The case of M. Bidault has been referred to. It throws a good deal of light on these matters. Nobody could have been accused of a more serious offence than M. Bidault. He is, in effect, accused by the French Government of levying war against them. I do not know whether the word "treason" is used, but it certainly is the most serious political offence that one can imagine. When he goes to Germany, however, and is discovered there, the German Government, quite properly in my opinion, unhesitatingly refuse to extradite him and to send him back to France.

    What is more striking still, the French Government make no complaint against this. They take it as a matter of course that the German Government would not extradite him. I am sure that they would have done exactly the same had the case lain before the British Government to make the same decision. Therefore, far too little stress has been laid on tile profound difference between ordinary criminal offences and political offences. Everything turns on that. If, however, one depends upon that argument, one must establish that it is a political offence with which Chief Enahoro is charged.

    I am, perhaps, in a position to say a word or two about that and about the issue which has been brought into the debate—I think wrongly—of the character of Nigerian justice, because it so happens that I had the opportunity at the end of last year to attend in Lagos some part of the Awolowo trial. I say at once that my impression of it was a good one. I was impressed with Nigerian justice and with the procedure. During the time I was there, the defence was dominating the court. There was no question of the defence not being given an effective showing and there was no question of the defence lawyers not being able and effective counsel. Chief Davis was taking an active part that day. He was a most effective counsel. Chief Awolowo was defending himself and he took no mean part in the proceedings. My impression was that that great treason trial in Lagos was being conducted very well indeed.

    That, however, is totally irrelevant to the case that we are considering today. It is not for me either to praise or to criticise Nigerian justice. It would be out of place for me to do so and I deplore the criticisms which have been made of Nigerian justice, from both sides of the House, in this debate, because they are at best irrelevant.

    I say to the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley), with whom I very often agree in African matters, that the point is exactly the opposite one. The hon. Member said that the whole question was whether we had confidence in Nigerian justice. That is not the question at all. It has nothing to do with it. The point is whether this was a political charge or trial, however well conducted. I do not think that five minutes in the Lagos court could fail to convince every Member of this House that it was a political trial. How can a treason trial ever be anything else than a political trial? It was an eminently political trial.

    The accused realised that, the court realised it and the prosecution realised it. A treason trial must be that. A treason trial is a very terrible thing. If the Government have occasion to accuse some of their citizens—some of their most prominent citizens—of planning a coup d'etat, one cannot imagine a more serious charge or a more political charge.

    To illustrate the point, all this may be tested if one makes the assumption that Chiefs Awolowo and Enahoro and all the rest of them were guilty as charged. Let us make that assumption for the sake of argument. In my submission, that should make not the slightest difference to the question of whether Chief Enahoro is deported, because this turns on the issue of whether we ought to deport Commonwealth citizens on political charges when, since the French Revolution at least—so we were instructed by the professional historian—we have never deported aliens on these charges.

    The remedy here is, as many hon. Members have suggested, to amend the Fugitive Offenders Act. The right hon. Gentleman said that we could not do that on our own and I believe that he is right. If we are to amend, repeal or revise the Act, it can only be done in consultation with the other Commonwealth Governments. No one doubts that. But there was not very much substance in that point. Of course consultations would be undertaken.

    I put it strongly to him and to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations that the sooner those consultations are begun the better, because this case ought to have shown us, if it has shown nothing else, the quite impossible situation which we shall get into if we leave the Act as it is now that the Commonwealth has developed into an entirely different stage from what it was in 1881.

    I re-echo the phrase used by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown)—that time has amended the Act. Of course, he did not mean that an amending Statute has been passed—that is what we complain of. He meant that time has rendered the Act an anachronism and a most dangerous one today.

    One can quote two cases of Commonwealth countries which might lead this House and the Government into an intolerable position if the Act is unamended. I have here a Bill—I think that it became an Act within the last few days—introduced by the Southern Rhodesian Government. It is called the
    "Preservation of Constitutional Government Act, 1963".
    It puts in peril of twenty years' imprisonment anyone, whether inside Southern Rhodesia or outside it—in this country, for instance—who is
    "… employed by, or is or has been or holds himself out as a member of a political organisation which exists or has existed in Southern Rhodesia, or promotes the objects or propagates the opinions of such an organisation …"
    if the Southern Rhodesian Government holds that that organisation is, amongst other things,
    "… attempting to coerce the Government."
    That is a very widely drawn phrase.

    Many people might be in trouble over that and be in peril of twenty years' imprisonment. We might at any moment, under the Fugitive Offenders Act, be asked to send back any man or woman charged under this Southern Rhodesian Act. But that is not the only Act of its nature in Southern Rhodesia. There is another which makes the death penalty mandatory on someone who may have burned a haystack.

    Supposing that someone is accused of an act of arson of that sort in Southern Rhodesia, but escapes and comes here. Under the Fugitive Offenders Act, and under the Home Secretary's interpretation of it, it would be mandatory on the authorities to send the man back to Southern Rhodesia, where he would, no doubt, receive a fair trial under that Act but under which he would, if found guilty, have to be executed. The court would have no discretion.

    These illustrations emphasise the urgency of the question. Of course, Southern Rhodesia is not the only Commonwealth Government which has—shall we say?—very different laws from ours. Ghana, as has been pointed out several time, has different laws and different usages from ours. It is not for us to judge on them, but it is our right to regard the right of asylum which we have given to citizens of foreign countries as being applicable in these cases.

    It is not a question of suggesting that these Commonwealth Governments are inferior in their systems of justice to foreign Governments, but it is surely carrying things too far to suggest that M every case the legal systems, usages and practices of all Commonwealth countries are innately superior to those of all foreign countries. But that is what the Fugitive Offenders Act makes us do.

    I am not a legal authority and cannot suggest exactly how the Act should be amended. But I think that probably the simplest proposition would be to make it similar to the Extradition Act in that it would exclude political offences. If that were done, the whole operation of extradition and deportation would be immensely improved and the Home Secretary would be taken out of an intolerable situation.

    Now I turn to the case itself. I do not want to say much about the question of the assurances which Chief Enahoro may or may not have been given. I think that we were all very impressed—I certainly was—by the speech of the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) on this question. But there can be no doubt that there was the most tragic misunderstanding between Chief Enahoro and the Home Office. There can be no doubt about the fact that he believed that if he came to this country he would not be put into peril of deportation to Nigeria. We can be sure of that because he would not have come otherwise. It might not alter the legal situation—I do not think that it does—but to my layman's mind it makes the situation far more tragic.

    The Home Secretary suggested that we were asking him to treat this man as if the Act had already been amended as I suggest that most hon. Members by now are convinced that it must be amended, although the right hon. Gentleman has given no assurance that it will be so amended. But, taking the Act as it is, we are not asking him to contravene it.

    With an unusual departure from his somewhat pedestrian style, he told us that we were asking him to tear a page from the Statute Book. We are asking nothing of the sort, and it is nonsense to talk like that. Again and again he said that he had complete discretion not to send this man back. The right hon. Gentleman simply has to say that he has come to the conclusion that it would not be a just act to deport Chief Enahoro. There is nothing more which prevents him doing that. If Parliament had not intended to give him that power, these words would not have been included in Section 6 of the Act.

    We cannot see any reason, in law or in equity, why the right hon. Gentleman should not exercise that discretion. We are, therefore, bound to say that we are profoundly dissatisfied with the answer of the Government so far. We realise, of course, that the House cannot come to a decision tonight for procedural reasons, but in view of the attitude of the Home Secretary we certainly feel that it is our duty to give the House an opportunity to come to a decision on this matter at the earliest possible date. This is not a party matter and we trust that hon. Members who have spoken so strongly on this will see to it that they back their words with their actions when we come to this decision, because we cannot let the matter rest as it is today.

    What we demand tonight, and demand very strongly, of the Attorney-General is a stay of execution until the House has had an opportunity to come to a decision. That is the very least we can demand, and we trust that the Attorney-General will give it unequivocally.

    8.10 p.m.

    The debate today has ranged widely over deep issues of policy, over the Extradition of Offenders Act and rendition of offenders within the Com- monwealth, and also over the personal problems and case of Chief Enahoro.

    I have bean asked many questions during the course of the debate and I will endeavour to do my best to assist the House. The Home Secretary himself would have liked to reply to the debate, because it is a matter which is entirely within his personal responsibility. It is only because the next matter to be discussed requires a reply from him that he felt that he could scarcely ask the leave of the House to speak three times on the Consolidated Fund Bill, and it is for that reason alone that he has not assumed responsibility for replying to all the matters which have been raised during the course of the debate.

    I entirely agree with the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) that there are two quite separate questions which have been discussed. The first is what ought my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to do in the circumstances of today in the case of the application by the Government of Nigeria for the return of Chief Enahoro under the Fugitive Offenders Act. The second and much wider question is whether the Fugitive Offenders Act is satisfactory and whether, in future, it ought to be reviewed and discussed and perhaps amended.

    Unlike the extradition treaties, which are bilateral, the Fugitive Offenders Act is a multilateral system for the exchange of fugitives from justice throughout the whole of what was the Empire and is now the Commonwealth. Everyone will agree that before that system is interfered with there must be discussions with other members of the Commonwealth and that there must be some other arrangement for the exchange of fugitives if justice is to be carried out.

    At the moment the Act imposes mutual rights and mutual duties between all the countries of the Commonwealth, not only between this country and other members of the Commonwealth, but also between members of the Commonwealth inter se. Therefore, any interference with it requires considerable cogitation and cannot be lightly undertaken.

    Surely the Attorney-General cannot seriously suggest that Nigeria was ever a party to the Fugitive Offenders Act.

    It was the law of Nigeria on independence. It became the law of Nigeria upon its independence. While all the independent countries of the Commonwealth have the power to change the Fugitive Offenders Act, only two have directly altered it, Ghana and India. Cyprus has altered it by the amendment of its Constitution, not for all persons within Cyprus, but only for citizens of Cyprus. The Fugitive Offenders Act still applies to Cyprus for persons who are not citizens of Cyprus.

    Two main questions have arisen. The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and the right hon. Member for Dundee, West both raised the substantial issue that in dealing with the exchange of fugitives from justice within the Commonwealth, the same rule ought to be applied as in cases of extradition with foreign countries. It is not correct to say that this is a question which affects Commonwealth citizens. If Nigeria required the return of a French, or Belgian, or German citizen, it could obtain it under the Fugitive Offenders Act. Equally, it is true that if Germany, or France, or the United States of America, or any other country, required the return of a Commonwealth citizen or British subject from this country, that would be controlled by the Extradition Act.

    Therefore, it is not a question of the treatment of Commonwealth citizens, on the one hand, and aliens, on the other. It is a question of the mutual rights and duties between this country, on the one hand, with foreign States, and, on the other, with members of the Commonwealth and Colonies

    The hon. and learned Gentleman said that it did not affect Commonwealth citizens. Surely he would not hold to that. It affects the position of every Commonwealth citizen in this country and, as we submit, affects it profoundly for the worse.

    It might affect an alien, or a British subject, or a subject of the Colonies, or a Commonwealth citizen, who happened to be in this country and who had committed an offence elsewhere. Such a person would be equally at risk under the Extradition Act if he had committed an offence in a foreign country which was seeking his extradition under the Extradition Act.

    Therefore, one has to ask oneself whether the right hon. Member for Belper and the right hon. Member for Dundee. West were right to say that within the Commonwealth one ought to apply as between the countries of the Commonwealth—not the citizens—the same standards when one is dealing with fugitives from justice. Most civilised countries would regard it as right and correct that one should return citizens, any citizens, who are fugitives from justice in order that they may stand their trial, provided that we are not returning persons in such circumstances that it would be oppressive so to do.

    It is true that under the Extradition Act we reserve the absolute right against a foreign country when an offender has committed an offence of a political character to say how he shall be dealt with, because the country concerned does not have an absolute right to the return of such an offender. But that does not mean that the individual himself has a right of asylum in this country.

    I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not want to mislead the House. He is arguing as though the right of a person against whom extradition proceedings have been started in this country not to be handed back if the offence had a political import was a discretionary right, that we could decide whether to send him back or let him stay in this country. That is not right. If a man is able to satisfy a court that the offence for which the foreign country wants him back was political, he has an absolute right to be set at liberty then and there by the court. We are saying that the same principle should apply to all countries, including members of the British Commonwealth.

    If the hon. Member had allowed me, I would have completed what I was trying to explain.

    I was trying to make the point that the origin of the right and duty of our courts to set free a person who is sought under the Extradition Act and who has committed an offence of a political character is to retain within the hands of this country the decision whether to give that person asylum. It does not follow that a person in respect of whom another country has been refused extradition because the offence was of a political character is entitled to asylum in this country.

    There are two separate stages. The first is the right of the foreign country to seek for extradition, and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) rightly said that it cannot insist on that right if it is an offence of a political character. But, even assuming that it has been held to be such an offence, the next question is whether the Home Secretary will, or will not, grant asylum within this country to such a foreigner.

    There are many cases where it is decided that the person who has come here, and who would not be extraditable, is, nevertheless not granted asylum in this country. It has for a long time been the policy of Her Majesty's Government that an alien is not allowed to remain here permanently unless he is granted political asylum; and political asylum is only granted to someone whose life or liberty would be in danger on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, if asylum were refused. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the Extradition Act is dealing with questions of asylum in this country. They are quite separate and different questions.

    If a Commonwealth citizen is in this country, if he is not returned under rendition proceedings to a foreign country, or to a country of the Commonwealth, he is entitled, so long as he commits no offence in this country, to remain here because there is no power to decide whether to grant him asylum or not. The position, and I submit to the House that it is right and proper, as between this country and the countries of the Commonwealth, and Empire in the past, is that, as a civilised country, one normally enforces the rule of law in the hope that fellow members are both allies and are following democratic processes.

    One returns to them persons who are fugitives from justice, but one reserves to the Home Secretary what is plainly right that he should have, namely, a discretion not to return those for whom it would be oppressive if he were to return them. I submit to the House that the Home Secretary ought in this case to apply the same principles as he does when deciding whether a person should have political asylum—is the fugitive a person whose life or liberty would be in danger on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, if he were refused asylum?

    The Home Secretary has, I think, made it clear, and he repeated it today, that in exercising his discretion he is not concerned with the narrow question whether there is a case against him, or simply with the circumstances which are the concern of the courts alone. I can only repeat my right hon. Friend's words earlier today, that he must cast the net of his thoughts wider than anything said by any magistrate or judge. He must be ready to take into account everything that may have a bearing on the matter, whether it was before the court or not, and then must reach his final decision on what is just, yes or no.

    One of the first considerations he must always bear in mind is whether it would be oppressive in the circumstances of the case, and all the circumstances of the case, to return this person to a country which is a fellow-member of the Commonwealth.

    The right hon. Member for Dundee, West, and. I think, also the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West drew the attention of the House to legislation in Southern Rhodesia. There are as well countries—I think Ghana was mentioned—in which there is a right of detention without trial. I cannot speak on behalf of the Home Secretary, and it would be fatal to try to argue hypothetical cases, but those are, are they not, exactly the sort of considerations which the Home Secretary ought to bear in mind when he is considering whether he should exercise the power to return a person who is a fugitive from justice?

    The fundamental question is: Is he not only a fugitive from justice, but also a fugitive from oppression? This country has always believed that it ought to grant sanctuary from oppression, and it is that principle which my right hon. Friend has endeavoured to apply in this case, and will endeavour to apply in all other cases under the Fugitive Offenders Act. But if there is no oppression, if there will be a fair trial, if the person is not at risk outside the courts of justice, in those circumstances I respectfully submit that in would be right, because of the comity that exists between the countries of the Commonwealth, to return him to stand his trial.

    Consider it the other way round. Suppose Vassall, charged with espionage, a non-extraditable offence, had escaped to Australia or Canada. Would it be right in those circumstances that the country concerned should say, "We are very sorry. We are not returning him to you. This is an offence of a political character, and you ought not to have him back."

    Perhaps we can wait for the Report of the Tribunal to see how pleased they would or would not have been. I think that that was an irrelevancy.

    Those are the sort of problems that exist between the countries who have a comity between themselves in maintaining as far as possible the rule of law and a system of law which is similar to, and based on, British justice. This is the greatest blessing that this country has brought to all the other countries who were originally part of the Empire.

    As a layman, I have tried to follow the Attorney-General's lucid and interesting legal exposition. I thought I understood him to say that as regards foreigners there were two possibilities. We did not extradite a foreigner for a political offence, but we did not necessarily give him asylum here, and that many of them left these shores for other places. Would the Attorney-General be willing to apply the same principle in respect of Chief Enahoro? Could we have two possibilities there? If, for reasons which the Attorney-General has given, we do not want to give him asylum here, could he be allowed to return to the country from which he came, which is willing to take him?

    This is the distinction between the Commonwealth and other countries.

    There may be exceptions, but I am saying that, in general, the right way as between friends who are members together of the Commonwealth is to leave in the hands of the Ministers of each of those countries, and of the Home Secretary in this country, a discretion to see that those who are fugitives from justice should return to stand their trial, subject only to this, that if there is oppression, or risk of oppression, that person should be protected and given sanctuary. With Commonwealth citizens, whether they are given asylum or not, if they are not returned to their own countries, they have a right to stay in this country. There is no question—as there is in the case of a foreign country—of sending a man back to a country other than that which is demanding him.

    The Attorney-General has referred to the comity of nations, but is not the doctrine of asylum—which is based upon the Commonwealth, and antedates both the Extradition Act and the Fugitive Offenders Act—based on the principle that in respect of political offences, even in civilised countries where the comity of nations applies, we cannot be sure that there will be a fair trial? Ought not that same doctrine to be applied to Commonwealth countries? How does the question of comity enter into the matter?

    With great respect, that is not so. From earliest times all international lawyers have taken the view that there was a duty upon all countries either to punish a fugitive from justice or to return him, without any regard to whether or not a political offence had been committed.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn) was right in saying that only since 1842—the date of the treaty with America—has there been any provision under which a political offender can be treated separately. I am saying that when we are in such close association with the other countries of the Commonwealth it is reasonable to apply a different principle, which we would expect to be applied by those other countries of the Commonwealth in a case like that of Vassall or any other treasonable person who had endeavoured to compass the Queen's death or subvert the realm by force.

    We would surely find it unacceptable that one of the other Commonwealth nations should give such a person sanctuary merely because he had committed a political offence in this country, although we would not expect them to return a person—or at any rate, we could not complain if it did not return him—if they took the view that it would be oppressive to do so.

    A short time ago the Attorney-General said that one condition should be that the person concerned should not be in danger from anybody other than the courts. In view of the evidence that we have heard, especially from the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), can the hon. and learned Gentleman seriously suggest that this man is not in danger from anybody other than the courts?

    That is the second part of my argument, and I shall come to it in due course.

    I want to emphasise that it was just that circumstance which persuaded my right hon. Friend's predecessor not to send back to Cyprus Mr. Zacharia, in the case that occurred last year. In that case it would have been oppressive to return him, because he would have been at risk. I will come to the facts of this case when I have dealt with the next stage of my argument.

    Apart from the Statutes—and I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to forget the difference between the two Statutes to which we have referred and assume that he is not inhibited by the fact that the Extradition Act provides for exemption in the case of political offences whereas the other Act does not—will he explain to the House on what ground he can argue that it is a good principle in the case of a foreign country, but not a good principle in the case of a fellow member of the Commonwealth, to refrain from returning the person concerned to the place of trial on a political charge?

    The only principle contained in the Extradition Act is that the other country concerned cannot ask for extradition as of right. This country reserves its right to decide how it will deal with a fugitive offender, and whether it will or will not grant him asylum. In the case of either Act the Home Secretary is exercising a discretion in deciding whether it is proper or right to grant asylum, upon the principles that I have read out.

    The first argument put forward by the Opposition Front Bench was that the Fugitive Offenders Act ought to be amended in order to make it exactly equivalent to the Extradition Act, and that in any event the Home Secretary ought now to apply the Fugitive Offenders Act as though it read the same as the Extradition Act, and should never grant rendition to a Commonwealth country in the case of a political offence.

    All I am saying is that it is not in accordance with the law. It is quite plain that the Fugitive Offenders Act deals with political offenders, such as treason—which is expressly mentioned in it. In my submission, the Home Secretary was entirely correct in saying that if he acted in the way suggested by the hon. Member he would be tearing up the Act, and would be applying instead the Extradition Act, which does not apply to the case.

    This is a very important point. Have we not a precedent, in the practice adopted by the Government when this House passed a Resolution in favour of the abolition of capital punishment? The law remained as it was before—that murderers were liable to capital punishment—but after the passing of the Resolution our practice was based on the will of this House, as evidenced by that Resolution, until the matter had been put to the test by my hon. Friend's Bill, which so nearly succeeded.

    Are not we now in a comparable position? There has been a very clear expression of feeling by hon. Members on both sides of the House that the Act is out of date, and ought to be changed. Is not that a matter which, very properly, and in accordance with that precedent, ought to be taken into account by the Government and the Home Secretary, in terms of an alteration in practice pending a clear decision of the House whether or not to amend the Act?

    I take the point, but when we were considering the Homicide Act we were concerned only with the citizens, the Parliament and the Government of this country. The Fugitive Offenders Act concerns mutual rights and duties of Commonwealth countries, and if we did as the hon. Member suggests we would be putting a unilateral interpretation upon the operation of that Act without having had any discussions about it with the other countries of the Commonwealth. Whatever may be the situation in respect of three Commonwealth countries, it is binding as between all the others.

    May I ask one more question on this point. I promise that it will be the last? Can we illustrate the difficulties that many of us feel on this part of the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument in this way? If the court's concern with a case arising out of the Fugitive Offenders Act were on the ground that that Act was obsolete or obsolescent to apply a political test to a particular case, that, no doubt, would be unlawful. That might fairly be described as tearing a page out of the Statute Book. But is it so clear thus that is equally true if the Home Secretary does it in the exercise of what is by Statute an absolute discretion?

    The basis upon which my right hon. Friend is now being asked to follow the practice of exercising his discretion is that he should not render back to other Commonwealth countries any political offenders, even somebody charged with treason, although treason is one of the offences for which he can be returned under the Act.

    All that I am submitting is that he can, of course, it is perfectly within his discretion, but the question that has to be asked is, is it right that he should make this change in practice, at this stage, without the consultation and agreement of the rest of the Commonwealth, or is not it right that, at any rate at the moment, Her Majesty's Government should continue to apply this Act and the discretion of the Home Secretary in precisely the same way that it always has been, and is it not sufficient for the principles of liberty, which everyone in this House and this country is anxious to preserve, that the Home Secretary should conceive it as his duty that the test that he has to apply is whether there would be oppression in returning a person to one or other of the countries of the Commonwealth?

    Because the courts have to consider, first, whether there is sufficient evidence. Then there must always be, to a certain extent, a political decision. There must be somebody who can look at the whole of the circumstances, including the political circumstances, the actual circumstances overseas, and all the other matters, the whole of the matters that have to be considered—I use the word "political" in the widest possible sense—the risk of sending him back, every single circumstance; and it is right that that decision should be taken by a Minister and that is why the Act imposes it upon him.

    The only subject of dispute on this aspect of the matter is on what principle should he exercise that discretion. Should he do it upon the basis which he has done and has told the House, "I considered whether this would be a precedent. I applied the principles that I would apply to the asylum of a person from another country and if I thought that these were oppressive I would not order a return"? Or ought he to take the rigid test applicable in the courts under the Extradition Act to prevent another country claiming a man and say, "Because this is a political offence, whatever its implications, whatever might be the consequences to us of not returning him to another country or of another country not returning him to us, nevertheless I will never return a person who has ever committed a political offence of any nature, although it might bring down the Commonwealth and lead to the triumph of Communism"? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] This is, of course, an extreme case, I concede that. But these are some of the matters which have to be considered.

    I turn, then, to the second point. I respectfully agree that if one is not to exercise one's discretion, which is not a discretion at all, and say, "Is this a political offence or not? If it is I will not return the man"—that is what is suggested but, as I have submitted, the Home Secretary ought not to do that, and is right in not having done it in this case—the second question does arise. On that I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley) that the only question then is: will there be any risk of unfairness in the trial of this chief if he is returned to Nigeria?

    I know that the right hon. Member for Belper does not regard this as relevant. On the other hand, there have been opinions from both sides of the House on this aspect. I submit that this is a matter on which the House has to be satisfied that it is fair and would not be oppressive of this chief were returned to Nigeria. The first matter one has to consider is whether there would be any unfairness in the courts. The House, I think, is almost universal in the opinion that the Nigerian courts are to be trusted; that they are independent; that they are not under the thumb of the Executive; that the Chief Justice is a person of great stature and of great independence, and that one could not in any way suggest that the chief, if he is returned, would not have a fair trial.

    The question was raised whether it was right that the judge at present trying the treason trial now proceeding should try the other case. I have no information and nobody knows whether, in fact, that judge will be assigned to the trial of the chief. It must be the responsibility of the Chief Justice of Nigeria to decide who should he the person to undertake the trial of the chief on his return.

    We know that the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria has always shown its independence. There is a British member of the court still there. But the members of the Federal Supreme Court have the highest status.

    There is a right of appeal from Nigeria to the Privy Council and while it is perfectly true that before one can get leave to appeal, one has to show that there has been a serious miscarriage of justice—it is not an automatic appeal—nevertheless the Privy Council frequently interferes in criminal matters where it is clear that the course of justice has been perverted. It is being said in this House that a trial in Nigeria will be wholly and absolutely unsatisfactory. One hon. Gentleman suggested that an appeal to the Privy Council would take about two years. But I can assure him that in criminal matters that is not so.

    The other matter that was raised is, that apart from and outside the courts of justice, there will be interference with the preparation of the prosecution and in the way in which the witnesses are dealt with and I must deal with those matters separately. The prosecution is, of course, under the control and under the authority of the Attorney-General of Nigeria. Anyone who has known him must know of his stature. He is a lecturer on law at Manchester University, a Fellow and lecturer of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at Oxford; a visiting Professor at Delhi University; a Research Fellow at U.N.E.S.C.O. and, in November, 1961, he was elected a member of the International Law Commission. That is the type of person who is the Law Officer who is responsible for the conduct of this prosecution.

    I am sure that he would greatly resent some of the suggestions which have been made in this House about the way in which the prosecution is being conducted. The Solicitor-General is Chief Omolulu, whom some hon. Members may have had the advantage of meeting when he was in this country recently. He is a graduate of Dublin and has wide experience of many parts of the world. I am sure that everyone would regard him as an honourable and an honest man.

    A point was raised about whether it is a good or a bad thing that the Chief should be represented by a British Q.C. at his trial. The only interest of Her Majesty's Government in that was not in securing that a British Q.C. should represent him, but that they should be assured that he should have the counsel of his choice from all those qualified to appear. It was thought necessary to secure that to see that he would have the counsel of his choice. Her Majesty's Government had no interest at all in seeing whether he had a Nigerian or a British Q.C. It is entirely a matter for him to choose by whom he prefers to be represented. For that reason alone, the Home Secretary thought it necessary to clarify that matter with the Nigerian Government.

    Allegations have been made about the way in which the investigations have been made, that they have been improper and that persons have been forced to give evidence and to make admissions by force, by improper methods and pressure. It is not unusual in the experience of those who deal with criminal cases to find such allegations made when defendants have made admissions which they find embarrassing at a later stage and the consequences of which they wish to avoid. I think that everyone must concede that it would be impossible for the Home Secretary to try that issue. He has of course considered it, but he cannot determine it finally. Such information as he has had from our representatives in Nigeria is that the allegations of brutality are untrue, but even that cannot be an assurance which gives any guarantee.

    The only way in which that matter can be left is that it must be a matter which can be determined by the courts of Nigeria. This is exactly the sort of issue which arises in the courts of this country when a person alleges that he has been beaten up and that that was the only reason why he made a statement. This is linked with the question of the capacity of the Nigerian courts to deal with a matter of this sort.

    Is it not a material factor for the Home Secretary to take into consideration that the police witness against whom the allegations are made is not available to give evidence in the courts and that he has disappeared?

    No one can say whether that would be the position when Chief Enahoro returned. No one can know whether he is available at the moment because the chief's trial has not yet begun.

    I apologise for interrupting. Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that in the evidence which has been submitted in connection with the allegations about ill-treatment the person to whom my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton referred, the interrogator in chief, is mentioned by most of the people and most of the allegations are made against him personally?

    Of course, that must cause the Home Secretary anxiety and it is one of the matters he must consider, but we have to take a broad view of the whole of the aspects. As far as I know, there is no reason to suppose that any allegations of brutality which Chief Enahoro wishes to make will not be fully and properly investigated by the courts and that the court itself, if it finds that a material witness is missing, would not take the ordinary step in the trial and draw the attention of those who have to decide the facts to the absence of a material witness on an issue of this sort.

    If we lose a witness here we still get a conviction. This witness is alleged to be material to the defence, whereas in the other case the witness was material to the prosecution, which decided to go on without the witness.

    Another allegation with which I must deal is the question of the misunderstanding between the chief's representative and the Home Office official. The hon. and learned Member fog Northampton (Mr. Paget) brushed this aside by saying, "I am not prepared to apportion blame one way or the other". That is exactly what one must do. If there had been the slightest blame attaching to the official of the Home Office, if there had been the slightest reason to consider that anything that he said had in any way misled the Chief or his advisers, there would have been a very different aspect indeed upon the matter.

    As the House has been told, my right hon. Friend was careful to interview both the persons who took part in that telephone conversation and to see exactly what was said. There is no dispute on the facts that unhappily a mistake was made, but it was not either made by or attributable to anything said by the official at the Home Office.

    That is going very far. I did not want to raise this. I heard what the Home Secretary said. I was quite prepared to leave the matter where it was. In view of what the hon. and learned Gentleman has now said, which puts an additional gloss on the Home Secretary's words, may I ask him whether it is not true that at the meeting the Home Secretary had with Mr. Hyde, I think it is, of his office—he is the official concerned—and the solicitor for Mr. Enahoro, at which was present the friend who made the inquiry, the Home Secretary said that clearly a genuine misunderstanding had arisen? If the Home Secretary at that meeting used the words "a genuine misunderstanding", is not that quite different from the words the Attorney-General has now used?

    I will certainly deal with this point. The Home Secretary takes the view that it was a genuine misunderstanding, but that it was on the part of the friend. All I was saying was that it would be very different indeed if the position were that the Home Office had contributed in any way, shape or form to such a misunderstanding. It may be very unfortunate that that mistake was made, but the Home Office certainly cannot bear any part of the blame for it.

    I am sorry if I have detained the House for too long. These are important issues. The principal and first issue must be whether it is right that one should apply the same principles precisely under the Fugitive Offenders Act for the rendition of fugitive offenders within the Commonwealth, or whether it is right that the Home Secretary should have his discretion and should see that no return was oppressive. That is the principle which he has applied, and I respectively submit to the House that he has, in all the circumstances of this case, rightly applied that principle and that it is correct to return the Chief.

    There is one question which the Attorney-General has left open. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) intimated that, if the Attorney-General's reply was not markedly more in accordance with the feeling exhibited on both sides of the House than that of the Home Secretary, we would feel that we would have to table a Motion which would bring the House to a Division on this matter so that, because of its gravity, the House should express a view. That Motion will now clearly have to go down, because the Attorney-General's speech, if anything, was below the standard of the Home Secretary's.

    My right hon. Friend then asked him for an assurance that there will be a stay of execution—that is, of sending Mr. Enahoro away—pending the decision by the House on the Motion we shall table later tonight. I understand that there may be a short delay, because of Government business, before it can be dealt with. That is a matter which the Government will decide. As the Government have this in their control, may I now press the Attorney-General to give us the assurance that there will be no execution of the deportation warrant until the House has been able to express its will in a Division?

    If I may have leave to speak again, this is my responsibility. I unhesitatingly give that assurance, provided that the matter can be brought to an early decision.

    Journalists (Imprisonment)

    8.55 p.m.

    I should hate it to be thought that there is any sort of vendetta going on against my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary tonight. This is certainly not so from my point of view and it is an unfortunate accident, as I am sure my right hon. Friend would agree, that two particular cases have, as it were, come into constellation at this time and that the case I wish to raise with him also concerns the Home Department.

    The case I wish to raise concerns the imprisonment of Mr. Reginald Foster and Mr. Brendan Mulholland following their conviction for contempt of court and the sentences of three months' and six months' imprisonment respectively. In saying what I have to say, I should like to make my own personal position plain because I would not claim to be in any way unbiassed on this subject. As a professional journalist I have a considerable interest in this matter.

    The two gentlemen we are discussing are not only members of my union but are members of my branch of that union. One of them is a personal friend of mine. For that reason I will not conceal to the House where my sympathies lie. On the other hand, I hope that I will be able to discuss this problem reasonably soberly and, in so doing, I want to make it plain that my object in initiating this short debate is to secure the release of these two gentlemen.

    In deploying the case it will be necessary for me to trespass on somewhat wider ground, but I do not wish to go into the whole question of whether the tribunal is a suitable form of instrument for carrying out inquiries in this type of case; least of all do I wish to trespass on the matter which may come up when the Report of the Vassall Tribunal is published. The only reason I raise the subject tonight is that if we wait until that Report is published the two gentlemen concerned will have been in prison for so long that there will be little point in raising the question of their release because they will be due to be released fairly soon.

    As I think the whole country now knows, these two men have been imprisoned because they refused to reply to certain questions put to them by the Vassall Tribunal. Though I do not want to go into the substance of the questions put to them, I hope that I may be allowed to make one or two observations on this aspect, for it is a point on which I have, to my surprise, still an open mind. I am not sure whether or not it is right that a privilege of refusing to answer when required by a court of law is justified. I can see that there are certain areas—indeed, certain professions—where such a privilege could be claimed to be within the public interest.

    An obvious example of this is the relationship between a solicitor and his client—which is, in fact, protected by law—while another example which most of us would agree is valid in this case is the relationship between a doctor and his patient or a priest and a penitent; and possibly between a journalist and his source. The difficult situation which arises now is that whereas the one case is protected by the law, in that the courts recognise a confidential relationship between a solicitor and his client, none of the other three are.

    Attempts have been made occasionally, by the Church of England and the Church of Rome, to secure the same kind of statutory protection for the relationship between a priest and a penitent, but those attempts have all been abandoned long before reaching the Parliamentary stage, the reason being that it was felt that Parliament would never tolerate such a privilege being given. As far as I know, there has never been any attempt to apply a legal privilege of this kind between a doctor and his patient.

    I am endeavouring to follow the hon. Member's argument, but I do not think that it is strictly analogous to cite the relationship of a priest and a penitent or a doctor and his patient alongside that of a journalist and his source, because in the first two cases the information is kept, strictly to the persons concerned, whereas a journalist's information is blazoned to the world.

    I think that it is analogous in this respect—I am not riding this very fast, but only trying to sketch the general position—in that the information about the source is kept strictly confidential in the third case as well. That is the point that worries people.

    As I say, I am now trying to sketch the general picture. I do not claim any particular privilege—my mind is still very much open on the point—but there is here a difficulty, and I think anyone who pretends that there is not a difficulty has a very difficult case to make—

    But would not the hon. Gentleman agree that in all four cases the test is the same: what is required in the interest of justice? The privilege of a client giving confidential information to his solicitor is privileged because the interests of justice so require. For the same reason, there is no privilege in the case of the priest, the doctor or the journalist.

    If I may say so, that is not strictly fair, because it depends precisely on what one means by justice. In one case, justice lays down that justice is privileged, if one may call it that. In the other three cases it lays down that they are not quite so privileged. The same thing does not apply, and there is a danger, to which I shall refer later, in carrying this argument about justice too far. I am giving only the general picture. I do not advocate privilege one way or the other, but I do say that if there is privilege it should be for all four cases, and if there is no privilege that should apply also to all four.

    The point is that the issue from which the imprisonment of these two gentlemen arose can be debated one way or the other, with a certain amount of justice on both sides. I think that the hon. Gentlemen will agree with me as far as that. If one carries it to extremes, on the one hand, in favour of privilege, one gets to the ludicrous position where nothing can be disclosed and, on the other hand, against privilege, one gets to the point of what I might call the rather remarkable obiter dicta of the Lord Chief Justice that the interests of the State must prevail. Both of those extreme positions are difficult to take up. I stress this point at the moment because I wish to show that the imprisonment of these two men arises from a position that cannot be regarded in black and white by anyone, arid I hope to carry the House that far by what I shall subsequently say.

    If one accepts that there is an arguable proposition, either way, about the disclosure of information to courts of law, one would hope that the argument, such as it is, could be carried on on that basis, but one of the things that has worried me very much—not only as a journalist but as a Member of this House—is that a lot of the argument has been argument against the Press as such rather than against these two men.

    I do not stand here to defend the British Press—in a lot of cases it is absolutely abominable—but it is an in-justice if the entire sins of the British Press are to be visited on two journalists who happen to be in gaol at the time. That is the position we are beginning to get into: because the Press does in some cases print sensational and scandalous stuff, that is enough, in the eyes of some people—not necessarily in the eyes of hon. Members but certainly in the eyes of some of the writers of letters to The Times and the Daily Telegraph—for condemnation. That is a very dangerous argument indeed. As I say, I do not defend the Press, but, since the Shawcross Committee's Report, negotiations have been going on for the establishment of a much more effective Press Council than we now have, and if these negotiations are successful, it is before that Council that we should fight things out, and not as in this unhappy case.

    I come now specifically to the case of Mr. Mulholland and Mr. Foster. The case I want to put to the Home Secretary is that in view of the difficult position, which I think we would all accept—the arguable position—about the disclosure of information, the sentences passed on these two gentlemen were out of all proportion to the offences, and should be remitted.

    I say this very firmly because I believe that, whatever one may think of what they did, there can be no doubt about their motives in doing it. It was not to protect themselves. It was to protect somebody else, out of the tradition which has existed in my profession as long as that profession has itself existed. I should like to think that I and any other journalist would have the courage to do what they have done. However, having said that, one must look at any comparable cases one can find. Although I have not gone very far back in my researches, there are two cases since the end of the war which may be germane to this point.

    There is the case of contempt of court by the Daily Mirror in 1959 when it published a story highly prejudicial to the character of a man who was then in custody on a capital charge, John George Haigh. The editor of the Daily Mirror was actually brought before Lord Chief Justice Goddard and accused of contempt of court. Lord Goddard had this to say about the case:
    "In the history of this class of case there has never been a case of such a scandalous and wicked character. It is of the utmost importance that this court should vindicate the common principles of justice and, in the public interest, see that condign punishment is meted our to persons guilty of such conduct."
    This was on 25th March, 1949. After phrases like that one would have expected that transportation for life was virtually the only punishment. Although a swingeing fine was imposed on the paper, which would please the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) if nobody else, the editor who was responsible for this monstrous contempt of court—and it was monstrous—was given three months' imprisonment.

    I am sure that the hon. Member would not want to confuse the House. The reason why the sentence was not greater than it was and why three months was regarded as a very severe sentence for contempt was that it was passed for the first time, in my lifetime at any rate, on an editor who was not directly and personally responsible for the publication of the contempt. He was only responsible in his capacity as editor, and the sentence was then thought to be, as the Lord Chief Justice rightly described it, condign punishment of an editor for failing in his supervisory capacity as editor and therefore being responsible for the contempt. This was quite a different matter from the personal guilt of a journalist. I am not saying that the hon. Member's argument is right or wrong. I am merely saying that he must not confuse it with a case of that kind.

    I think that it is a fair parallel. The editor is responsible in law for everything that goes into the paper and for this offence a three months' sentence was regarded as adequate, but for the two journalists who have committed the present contempt, as no doubt they have in law, but which I am sure the hon. Member would agree is not of the same character as the type to which I referred, three months in one case and six months in the other are regarded as the requisite sentences. I raised the point because it was the only case that I could find since the war of contempt reflecting on a newspaper where a gaol sentence had been imposed.

    The only other case which seemed to bear in any way on this point was one affecting a predecessor of mine as the Member for Gravesend when two journalists refused to answer questions about their sources of information before the Committee of Privilege and they were saved from any action which the House may have taken because the sources themselves came forward.

    This brings me to my second point—that this whole procedure is a kind of lottery. At the Vassall Tribunal three journalists were certified to the High Court as being in contempt. Two are in gaol and one is free not because he has gone back on his contempt in any way but because his source came forward and the sources of the others did not. This seems to me to be an absurd situation. It is not justice when the difference between a man going to gaol or not does not depend on anything that he does, because Mr. Clough, the first journalist, as far as I know, never said who his source was until his source said that be indeed was that man. It is not justice when it depends not on anything that the journalist says but on whether somebody else comes forward and gives evidence as it is his clear duty to do. This seems to me to be a matter of very real concern.

    In 1938, there was a case in which a fine was imposed on a journalist for refusing to disclose information, but the last case of this kind which appears to have come forward is that of Mr. Maxse, in 1912, at the time of the Marconi incident. Mr. Maxse had refused to give information to a Committee of this House which could have committed him to contempt, and the House and the Committee decided to proceed no further against him. This case was the first, as far as I know, under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act and was, in a sense, a test case.

    I do not believe it right that in a case of this kind there should be a sentence of imprisonment. It is perfectly fair to mark what the law is or should be on this point, but I think that if at the end of the day two men are left in gaol because two people did not come forward to give evidence and one man is not in gaol because another person did creates a situation which is unjust. The sentences were extremely harsh, and I hope that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, in his wisdom, will see his way of remitting some part of them.

    9.11 p.m.

    I should like to support the plea of the hon. Member for Gravesend (Mr. Kirk). As he said, we are concerned with a comparatively narrow issue. This is not the time to discuss the general conduct and standards of the Press, nor to consider whether any changes in the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act are desirable. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] Because those are matters which, no doubt, we shall discuss, and, I hope, fully discuss, when we receive the Report of the Vassall Tribunal.

    Out of 12 tribunals I think that seven reports have not been debated.

    I do not think that the hon. Member and I differ. I entirely agree that the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act should be discussed. I hope that we shall have a very searching debate, because I have always thought that there was a very strong objection to a procedure under which indivduals who are, in effect, on trial and the results of which may be very serious indeed for them, do not have the ordinary protection accorded in a court of law and do not have the right of appeal.

    I understand that the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act is a subject allocated by Mr. Speaker for discussion today and is No. 4 in the list posted in the Lobby.

    I do not wish to anticipate that discussion. The discussion initiated by the hon. Member for Gravesend seems to me to raise a much narrower issue. We are concerned primarily with the two journalists who are in prison. It is true that the law extends no protection to journalists or to their informants. Whether it should do so or not is a matter which we may want to discuss later.

    Although that be the state of the law, it has been recognised for many years that journalists, and, I think, more especially political journalists, do not generally disclose confidential sources and should not do so. Of course, that is true to some extent of anyone who receives confidential information under a pledge of secrecy, but we should all realise that the problem particularly arises in relation to the journalistic profession I think that the obligation of professional secrecy on journalists has been generally recognised by the House. In writing for a Sunday newspaper the other day, I ventured to refer to a case in 1887, when The Times published a series of articles under the heading "Parnellism and Crime". It was proposed in this House that there should be a Select Committee to inquire into the contents of those articles. At that time the Government was advised by Sir Edward Clarke, who was the Solicitor-General, and he persuaded his fellow Ministers and the House that it would be wrong to appoint a Select Committee because it would inevitably summon the editor of The Times to the Bar of the House.

    The editor of The Times would be asked to reveal the name of his informant and, said the Solicitor-General of that day, he would certainly refuse. It was upon that ground that the Government, and, indeed, the House, did not set up a Select Committee. There was a tacit recognition at least that there was a duty of secrecy in regard to his sources imposed upon the editor of a newspaper.

    The hon. Member for Gravesend referred to the case of Mr. Maxse. When Mr. Maxse appeared before a Committee of this House, he was asked why he would not reveal his sources and this is what he said:
    "The reason is because the position of an editor depends upon his inspiring confidence in the people with whom he has confidential communications and it would be quite impossible for me to carry on my business if anyone had reason to suspect the communications made to me would be repeated either before a Committee of the House of Commons or any other body."
    Mr. Maxse was quite clearly in contempt of the Committee and in contempt of the House. Indeed, he was reported to the House by the Chairman of the Select Committee. The House, however, took no action. It was advised by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, who gave a reply which I commend to the Home Secretary as the perfect example of Ministerial stonewalling. This is what Mr. Asquith said:
    "In the circumstances, and having regard to the stage of the Session we have reached"—
    this, I may say, was in March—
    "and of the importance, as all experience shows, of proceeding in matters of this kind only after full opportunity of consideration and deliberation, I am not prepared to assume the responsibility of advising the House to take any immediate action."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th February, 1913; Vol. XLVIII, c. 1224.]
    It was a reply which was a model of its kind. The House did not take any action in spite of Mr. Maxse's refusal to answer.

    The hon. Member for Gravesend referred to the case of Mr. Lewis, which I very well remember, which came before the House during the 1930s. Mr. Lewis was interrogated by a police officer under the powers contained in the Official Secrets Act. Some of us in those days were a good deal concerned because when the powers of interrogation, which are unique in our law, had first been enacted, an assurance had been given by Sir Gordon Hewart, when Attorney-General, that those powers would not be used against the Press.

    I brought in a Private Member's Bill under the Ten Minutes Rule procedure to amend the law. There were other amending Bills and eventually the law was amended in 1940. It was not amended specifically with reference to journalists, but the reason why the House, and hon. Members on both sides, were concerned and why we got the law amended was that hon. Members recognised that a particular responsibility rested upon journalists and we thought that the journalist in that case who had refused to disclose the sources of his information had behaved perfectly correctly.

    We in this House are all conscious of the imperfections of the Press. I suppose that there is no one of us here who cannot recollect some occasion when a leader writer, a columnist, or a Parliamentary reporter has done us what we considered to be rather less than justice. After all, however, it is the business of the Press—and it is, perhaps, one of the principal functions of the Press in a democratic society—to probe, to investigate and to reveal as far as it can cases of oppression, corruption or incompetence. That is what the Press has to do.

    There have been many famous cases when that function has been carried out with great benefit to the country concerned. The most famous of all was Zola's article J'Accuse, which led to the inquiry into the Dreyfus case. A very famous case of this century is that of Henry Nevinson, who went to the Congo and exposed the rule of King Leopold.

    One can imagine all sorts of cases arising now when it would be entirely wrong for a journalist to reveal the source of his information. Let me give a case which might conceivably arise. Suppose that a journalist had been to an Iron Curtain country, or to South Africa, and wrote a factual account of what was going on there. Suppose that in any proceedings before a tribunal, or in a court, he were asked to give the names of his informants. If he did, it would lead to their liquidation. In such cases, the journalist would clearly be right to refuse, even though in doing so he might he in breach of the law.

    I am not seeking to make a debating point, but suppose, in that example, that the journalist did not make a factual report, that the circumstances as he reported them were open to question. Surely, if that journalist had the right for which the hon. and learned Gentleman is pleading, there would be no opportunity for any other agency to see whether the sources of his report could be checked.

    I should have thought that that raised no difficulty at all. It is quite possible for a journalist from some other newspaper to go to the country concerned and see whether his impressions are the same.

    At the moment, I am not asking that there should be a legal right. I am arguing that there must be cases in which journalists are justified in refusing to give their sources of information even though in doing so they may come into collision with the law. That is the proposition I put.

    Mr. Foster and Mr. Mullholland did not behave differently from other journalists before the Tribunal. There was a common standard. They refused to give names, as did their colleagues. But in the other cases—particularly the one to which the hon. Member for Gravesend referred—the Tribunal had alternative means of finding out what it wanted to know. In the case of Foster and Mulholland, it was not able to do that. Their informants did not come forward and the Tribunal had no other way of finding out the answers to the questions which were put to these two newspaper men.

    It is for that entirely fortuitous reason that these two men went to prison when others of their professional colleagues did not. It is not in any way for us to try over again cases which have been heard in court. That is something which I hope we shall never attempt to do. But, after all, sentences are always necessarily a matter of discretion.

    We all know that sentences vary from one court or one judge to another. In dealing with one class of offence one judge will impose a heavy sentence and another judge will impose a much lighter one. If we in this House feel in any case that the sentence is unduly severe, there is no conceivable reason why we should not say so. A great many hon. Members felt that the sentence imposed on Miss Barbara Fell was unduly severe in the circumstances of her case.

    When we come to the case of Mr. Foster and Mr. Mulholland, obviously they are in a very singular position. They are certainly not criminals and their purpose was not to set the law at defiance. They were acting in accordance with what they believed to be their own code of professional ethics. In those wholly exceptional circumstances, this is a case in which the right hon. Gentleman might advise Her Majesty to exercise the Royal Prerogative and, at any rate, to reduce the sentences which have been imposed.

    9.25 p.m.

    On 4th December, last year, I asked the Prime Minister:

    "Is try right hon. Friend satisfied that the Tribunal—"
    that is to say, the Vassall Tribunal—
    "will do nothing to upset the relationships which exist between the Lobby and Members of this House which are based on trust and mutual confidence?"
    The Prime Minister answered:
    "Yes, Sir."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th December, 1962; Vol. 668, c. 1136.]
    I have attempted to elucidate from the Prime Minister by Question whether he is now satisfied that that answer was correct and that there has been no upset of the relationship between the Lobby correspondents in the House and hon. Members. I have been unsuccessful in getting that sort of Question put to him.

    It is perfectly clear to me that if he had answered that there had been no upset as a result of the Tribunal and as a direct result of these two journalists being sent to prison, he would have been alone in not having noticed it.

    The hon. Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell) may not be aware that I put this precise Question to the Minister without Portfolio on Monday and that he said that in his opinion—and he ought to know—the imprisonment of these two journalists had not in any way affected the relationship between Ministers and the Lobby.

    If it had no effect on the relationship between Ministers and the Lobby, I can only think that the relationship between Ministers and the Lobby must have been pretty shocking beforehand. Nobody can seriously suggest that there has been no upset as a result of that Tribunal. Hon. Members must make up their own minds on this, but that is my view and I think that it is the view of many hon. Members.

    I have the greatest sympathy with the Prime Minister in this regard for he was hoisted with the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, which was rushed through the House in an unseemly manner and was turned from a Measure to set up a tribunal for a specific purpose into a Measure to cover all future tribunals which might be set up by both Houses of Parliament.

    Hon. Members complained bitterly at the time of the speed with which the Bill was pushed through the House of Commons. It was made a permanent feature of our legislation as an afterthought. I hope that those legal minds among us this evening will bear with me while I talk about this matter, which is hedged round with all sorts of legal difficulties. I apologise for having the temerity to do so.

    A very few paints were raised as the Bill went through this House and it is not surprising that very few were raised in the Lords, because at that time the Lord Chancellor was none other than Lord Birkenhead. Lord Muir-Mackenzie kicked up a great fuss about certain aspects of the Bill, at any rate according to HANSARD. I looked him up in Dod's Parliamentary Companion of the year 1921 and also in the Who's Who of that time and found that he died in 1919, so apparently it was only his ghost who had gone to defend the House of Lords against the great Lord Birkenhead.

    One of the points raised was the protection of witnesses. Mr. Acland said:
    "It was desired that there shall be real protection for the witnesses who come before the body which is to be set up. That condition is also met."
    There were very few Members who even bothered to be present; but then the Bill was rushed through at 11 o'clock at night. Mr. Rawlinson then said:
    "It means giving very great power to a Government Department, and I cannot believe that it was intended to give such great powers as are provided in the Bill. A Minister of the Crown, in answer to a private Member, may give an undertaking to set up a Committee to inquire into a matter of urgent public importance. The Minister has the sole discretion, without any resolution of the House"—
    that was later amended, but it shows how badly the Bill was drafted when originally presented—
    "or without any discussion, to give an undertaking to set up the Tribunal, and the House would have no power to interfere. Directly that Minister of the Crown says he will set up the tribunal, he can set it up, and vest it with remarkable powers. I have had the honour of being set up as a tribunal to conduct inquiries, but I should be very surprised if I were allowed the powers that are given to a tribunal under this Bill. When the tribunal is set up it has all the powers of a High Court Judge to call for documents, and to compel witnesses to attend. A witness can be compelled to attend not upon an ordinary subpoena, but upon a document to be signed by any one member of the tribunal …".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1921; Vol. 139, c. 190–191.]
    Mr. Rawlinson tried to make as strong an indictment of the Bill as he could.

    The next question was that of contempt. When this was debated in another place, Lord Muir-Mackenzie, that ghostly gentleman, said:
    "I see that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Shandon, has an Amendment down with regard to this question of contempt. I would say, if the course which he suggests commends itself to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, that in point of technical form it is right; but I confess to thinking that your Lordships might have some feeling that it ought not to be necessary for either House, or a Tribunal appointed by either House, to have to seek assistance from the Courts, and that it would be better to lay down in the Bill, not in the form in which it appears now, what the limits of those powers should be. It is quite easy to put in an Amendment which would limit the power"—
    I doubt this—
    "of committing for contempt to such things as the production of documents and the enforcement of the attendance of witnesses, without running the general danger, which appears on the face of the Bill, of giving power to that unknown Tribunal to proceed against people by way of contempt and to commit them to prison."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 22nd March, 1921; Vol. 44, c. 754.]
    I have quoted those passages because it is remarkable that in this short debate in both Houses that was one of the few occasions on which these sort of matters were discussed. The whole Bill was passed through Parliament in the most unseemly hurry. It is true that in the House of Lords the great figure of Lord Birkenhead may have made the other peers tremble, and not question too much what he said, but there was no such fear on the part of the Members of the House of Commons. It is therefore surprising that so little thought was given to a Bill which was to have such important repercussions on the future of all tribunals.

    Not only was this Bill ill-discussed and rushed through the House; it was not even wanted. Even the then AttorneyGeneral—Sir Gordan Hewart—said:
    "We did not want this Bill; we did not ask for this Bill."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th March, 1921; Vol. 139, c. 2818.]
    That was the Attorney-General, who was rushing the Bill through for the Government. In fact, the Opposition had asked for the Bill. A member of the Opposi- tion had asked for a tribunal to be set up to inquire into the munitions scandal, but he did not ask that a Bill should be introduced which would govern the sittings of tribunals for all time. There were other statements from Members on both sides of the House to the effect that this was an unwanted Bill, especially in the form in which it was presented.

    I ask the Ministers concerned whether they will confer in order to see whether they cannot repeal—

    I have listened with great interest to what the hon. Member has been saying, and I have not yet been able to observe that it does not either invite repeal or amending legislation. Either topic would be out of order in this debate.

    I am in some trouble here, Mr. Speaker. I was most careful to ask Mr. Deputy-Speaker whether it would be in order to mention this in the debate, and I understood his answer to be in the affirmative.

    I naturally bow to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. I was merely mentioning the trouble that I have been to in order to find out the facts. Then, may I ask the Government seriously to reconsider the Act of 1921?

    No. That is quite out of order, and contrary to the Ruling that I have just given.

    On a point of order, would it not be in order, Mr. Speaker, for hon. Members to invite the Government never to operate the Act of 1921, as opposed to inviting them to consider its repeal?

    I dare say that when we reach it the latter part of the hon. Member's suggestion will be as much out of order as it is now. At the moment I prefer not to rule on any hypothetical situation. I merely rule out of order that which I have ruled out of order.

    I pass to my next point, and here I hope that I shall not be out of order. The Lord Chief Justice recently said, in connection with this case:

    "The remedy of the Press, and I think they have a remedy"—
    and I thought that that was a very significant remark—
    "is to get Parliament to grant them special privileges which they have already granted in other respects. That is the best course."
    I should have thought that that bears out the suggestion that the House and the Government ought to be thinking about the whole effect of the Rent Tribunals Act—

    I assume that that was a verbal slip on the part of the hon. Member. He referred to the Rent Tribunals Act. I do not wish to be frivolous about the matter, but his present suggestion would involve legislation. I do not see how it could be otherwise. In that case we are back in the same difficulty.

    I am, of course, Mr. Speaker, in considerable difficulty because I am trying to put a serious argument for an alteration in the way the House conducts its affairs. I am trying to put that in suggestions which might lead the Government to believe that the only way they can carry them out would be by legislation. I am studiously trying to avoid the suggestion that there should be legislation in order to carry out what, I hope, will be the will of the Government.

    I find myself somewhat circumscribed by getting into trouble with your Rulings Mr. Speaker, but may I talk about the need for a free Press? It seems to me that we are really at the beginning of democracy. Democracy is very youthful and has not had a chance to grow up. What is certainly true is that the contempt of court procedure was initiated a very long time before this country had grown up to its present form of democracy and a long time before we had a wide Press in this country at all.

    This is one of the reasons I put a Motion on the Order Paper, which I dare not dare read out in view of your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. We have the situation where these two journalists were sent to prison for contempt of a tribunal or contempt of court. I claim that there is a difference between the contempt of journalists in the manner in which they commit it and normal contempt of court, which was initiated in this country some hundreds of years ago. There are those who say, "Well, the Press deserve what they get on occasion, because, after all, they are not purer than driven snow". But then democracy is not perfect and never will be. The moment we take the step of forcing journalists to give sources of information, to break their confidence with their sources of information, we destroy the freedom of the Press in Britain. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish."] Someone challenges me by saying "Rubbish". Let us look at this for a moment. From where is the Press to get its information once all sources are frightened that they may be ratted on at some future date? Obviously, the sources will dry up and the whole character of our free Press will change. Some hon. Members want that. Some hon. Members may think it would be a good thing if the Press were thoroughly circumscribed and were not able to get hold of all sorts of information. I believe that it would be a tragic thing for the country. There are many occasions when the Press has the effect of dampening down the enthusiasm of those who would enforce rigidity in this country and those who would build up a stronger bureaucracy.

    Obviously the hon. Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell) is deeply stirred by his own words. Would he be good enough to tell the House at what point he became converted? I read with interest the debate on 14th November when I tried—but was prevented by your Ruling, Mr. Speaker—to amend the original Motion setting up the Tribunal. With other hon. Members I forced a debate, against some opposition from both Front Benches. But I do not remember hearing the hon. Member join in that protest.

    On many occasions I have tried to speak in this House. But one is not always called, nor can every hon. Member expect to be called. I cannot remember what I was doing on that occasion. Naturally, the hon. Member remembers all about it, because he spoke in that debate. I did not, and no doubt there was a good reason.

    Does the hon. Gentleman realise that this whole difficulty arises out of the setting up of a tribunal which is, by Statute, exempt from applying the rules of evidence, and that in the ordinary case no journalist, nor anyone else, would ever be allowed to give evidence about who told him what in the absence of the accused person? The whole trouble does not arise out of any privilege of journalists but out of the abnormal situation created by the Tribunal.

    Of course I realise that, and that is why, if the hon. Gentleman will recall, earlier I got into trouble with Mr. Speaker because I was trying to raise the matter by suggesting that new legislation was needed.

    I do not wish to get out of order or to keep the House for more than a moment or so longer. But I feel very strongly that there is a case for looking at the question of contempt, as far as it affects journalists, in a new light, and recognising that the Press depends for its freedom upon its ability to respect sources of information. The moment that confidence is broken the freedom of the Press of this country is finished. We have to come up to date about some of these things and rethink our approach to these problems.

    My appeal is that the Government will think very deeply about the effects which have resulted so far from this one tribunal, let alone what may be the result of future tribunals.

    9.47 p.m.

    I feel a great deal of sympathy for the hon. Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell). To me, it appears difficult to divorce the question under discussion from the issues which the hon. Gentleman started to raise until he was proscribed by the rules of order. One could go even wider than did the hon. Gentleman. This case seems to me part of a general pattern to which The Times drew attention in a leading article on 18th March, under the heading "it is happening here". This case is part of the enfringement of the fundamental liberties of the British people, which I do not think should be treated lightly by this House.

    How did this arise? It puzzles me, because I am not a lawyer but merely a humble engineer. I find it difficult to understand why these journalists have gone to prison for refusing to divulge the source of their information when, in another case, a journalist who also refused to divulge his source of information is at present free. I am not suggesting that this is not strictly in accordance with the law; I am quite certain that it is. I am merely saying that it is very difficult for the outsider to understand how this situation can arise.

    I understand from my reading of the newspapers that in this third case the information that was given to that journalist was subsequently verified from another source. Therefore, it seems important to look at the allegations that were made by the two journalists who have gone to prison and to see whether the Tribunal had verified from another source the information which they gave. Mr. Foster said that Mr. Vassall had bought women's Clothing. That was subsequently verified by evidence given to the tribunal by Vassall himself during the public open session of the Tribunal. That I find very difficult to understand.

    As to the case of Mr. Mulholland, I understand that evidence was given to the tribunal which was not disclosed to the public, but which had been received by the Treasury Solicitors and had been considered, which tallied with the information that was given by Mr. Mulholland. So in both these cases I cannot see that there is any difference from this third case I quoted where the journalist did not go to prison. I believe my impression of this situation tallies very much with that of the general public as a whole. I say again that the law is obviously right, but it is something which ordinary laymen find very difficult to understand.

    The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) says, "It is not right". He is a lawyer and knows much more about it than I do. I am, naturally, assuming, because of what everyone who is more expert in the law than I am has said, that it is so.

    Before coming into the Chamber I was looking up a very interesting parallel to the case we are considering. That is the amendment made to the Official Secrets Act in 1939. I looked up the debate which took place on that occasion in another place, when the Lord Chancellor, Lord Maughan, said, when talking about the Section of the Official Secrets Act, 1920, which was then being repealed:
    "It is in fact the only provision in English criminal law which subjects to a penalty persons who refuse to give information to the police."
    It may well be contended that this is not a parallel case with the one we are discussing, but I think that it arises from the same principle which was subsequently enunciated in the same debate by the late Lord Samuel, when he said:
    "The power to demand from journalists who have published something which is inconvenient, the source of their information, is a most dangerous and indeed an improper power."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 23rd February, 1939; Vol. 111 cc. 918, 924.]
    If that were true in regard to the amendment of the Official Secrets Act, 1920, the same principle must apply to the case we are discussing now. This is the basis on which I make my appeal that these two journalists should be released.

    I think that everyone in the House, whatever view he takes of this case, is anxious about the principles of liberty which we hold so dear—not only everyone here, but in the country as a whole. There is great dissatisfaction with the operation of these tribunals of inquiry. I am sure we shall not rest quiet on that until we have gone into the whole question of the operation of these tribunals. Meanwhile, we should demand that Mr. Foster and Mr. Mulholland should be released.

    9.54 p.m.

    I do not think that this case has very much to do with freedom of the Press. I do not agree—I do not fully agree, at any rate—with some of the observations made about this, or the suggestion that a journalist, if he likes, can make up a story and refuse to supply any source for it and claim that that is a question of freedom of the Press.

    On the other hand, the more I hear this matter discussed the more I feel doubts and the more unhappy I am about the whole thing. When one looks at the particular example we are discussing tonight, the whole thing seems a deplorable mismanagement and an astonishing trial.

    A fortnight or so ago we were celebrating the bicentenary of William Cobbett, the first Member for Oldham. He had many other claims to fame. In 1803, when he was publishing one of his journals, he received a series of anonymous letters from Ireland signed "Juverna", which contained serious allegations against the Government of the day. It is fair to say that the Castlereagh Government had a lot of serious allegations made against them constantly and were rather inured to that sort of thing. Cobbett published them. So far as we know, he published them—one cannot say in good faith, because much of it was general and rather abusive criticism, but he published them at least feeling that the motive of the letters was a decent one.

    Cobbett had already had his troubles in the courts. He had spent some time in prison. Those who care to go to the exhibition at Farnham can see letters written by him in prison to his son. Cobbett was prosecuted civilly and criminally. He was sued for damages civilly, and £500 damages was awarded, a fairly substantial sum in those days. He was prosecuted criminally for a criminal libel by Plunket. He was finally convicted.

    In the end, the great William Cobbett handed over the letters, which were anonymous and were signed only with a nom de plume, but the Government had little difficulty in tracing the author, because they had, in accordance with their promises at the time of the Union, created six worthless barristers as High Court judges in Ireland. They only had to run through the six and identify the handwriting. All of the six were known to be corrupt, and their conduct had been the subject of debate in the House of Commons. They finally identified Mr. Justice Johnson as the writer of the manuscripts and his motive for writing, because he had not received judicial preferment and promotion after the first appointment which was made in reward for his vote on the Union.

    Then they tried to get him over here. He was defended by Curran, who took proceedings to protect him in all three courts—or was it all four courts?—simultaneously, losing generally by a majority of one. The unhappy and rather wretched Mr. Justice Johnson was finally brought to trial in England, but he was never brought to conviction. On promising to be a good lad, he was given a pension equal to his salary and sent over to France. That was before the days of General de Gaulle. They would probably have sent him somewhere else today.

    The relevance and importance of this matter is that in 1803, whatever Cobbett's motives—and there were some reasonable motives about it; he had been rather deluded by the correspondence—he was heavily punished. The great Cobbett's reputation suffered lamentably, because he had broken what even then was recognised as an obligation of honour.

    Professional obligations of honour often conflict with the public interest. I belong to a profession which has many rules and many forms of eitquette. When I was a young solicitor of 21, I always used to say that most of them were designed to prevent me from getting any business. Many people would argue that the consideration of professional rules by professional bodies, in the main, cannot always take the fullest account of the public interest. No one disputes for a moment that it is an established code of the journalist's profession that he shall not disclose the source of information given to him privately or secretly.

    There have been breaches The observation is, with respect to my hon. Friend, a little irrelevant, anyhow.

    I cannot understand this reiteration of this alleged code of journalists, since not one single journalist refused to give any information which was asked of him in the Budget leak Tribunal. They all disclosed sources.

    I think that I remember the one, but there was not a Budget leak tribunal under the special Tribunals Act. There was, in fact, a Select Committee of the House of Commons; of course, with totally different powers.

    I beg my hon. Friend's pardon. I think that he is talking about an old alleged Budget leak, the Thomas one. I was thinking of a more recent one, when I was a member of the Select Committee in a case which involved the then Chancellor of the Exchequer. I take it that my hon. Friend must be referring to somewhat ancient history and a case which occurred in, at a guess, 1933 or 1934; in which case I cannot quite remember the facts. I cannot refresh my memory standing on my feet, although I have some doubts about that matter.

    I believe that the allegations of leakage were to the effect that a Minister of the Crown, the late Mr. Thomas, had made a communication to a Conservative hon. Member. There was, in fact, no suggestion of any leakage to the Press or the question of information having been given to the Press.

    I think that his hon. Friend was actually referring to the recent Budget leak inquiry, the Bank Rate inquiry, when the present editor of The Times and others disclosed their sources without raising any kind of objection.

    That is simply not true, although I do not, in saying that, mean any discourtesy to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I would never do that. This is what I was going to say I understood to be the circumstances, although I thought I saw the Attorney-General nod to indicate that I was on the wrong Budget leak. I was a member of the Select Committee. It was not a special inquiry and this is what precisely happened. At about 4 p.m. on the afternoon the then Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in what was, in fact, not a Budget statement but an amending Budget—a secondary, subsidiary Budget —a few proposals. About half an hour after making his announcement it was observed that the late news column of the Star had a fairly full report of those proposals. There was then a great deal of argument as to whether or not anyone had made any statements to the Press.

    A Private Notice Question was tabled for the following day and the matter was that morning brought to the notice of the late Hugh Dalton who, I must say, behaved in a most honourable way, for he at once said, "Yes, I did. I had a word with John Carve], but I never dreamt of this. I just passed a hint as I was going into the Chamber." And after that there was no obligation of secrecy upon Carvel I am speaking from the clear memory of the evidence which I heard.

    I think that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) and the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) were referring to the 1957 Bank Rate leakage Tribunal presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, at which Mr. Bareau, editor of the Economist, and one other editor were asked for their sources. Both asked, "Do I have to answer?" and being told that they had to, they did, in fact, disclose.

    That just goes to show the perspicacity of the Attorney-General. I did not know that my hon. Friend meant that Budget leak when he referred to the Bank Rate. Had I known that I could have confined myself to the observations I originally intended to make; that is, that the presence of scabs in a union does not invalidate the value of trade unionism.

    This is so, but I have the gravest doubts when I consider the sort of confidences that sometimes pass in this House. But so long as they do pass it is not for the individual Lobby correspondent to be the judge of the propriety of the rules of his profession. Everyone understands that, whether or not he signs anything, when a Lobby correspondent comes to this House he does so with sc7upulous integrity, understanding that he should not reveal matters which come to him and which are not for publication; that he should not reveal the sources of matters which may have been given to him for publication under a seal of privacy about the source of the information. That may be a good thing or a bad thing. As I said in opening, I do not think that this is really a question of the freedom of the Press at all, but a question of the rules of an honourable profession—but they are important rules.

    Let me put quite bluntly one of the main points about this matter. There is no more sacred relation of secrecy than that of the Catholic priest in the confessional. Everyone respects that relation. If there is one thing more than any other that inspires admiration for the Catholic Church it is the secrecy that is observed. It is inconceivable that if a Catholic priest were put in the witness box, and a question were addressed to him about the secrecy of the confessional—the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) shakes his head. I am not sure that there is anything in it, but what does he mean? And my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire. West says that it is not the same thing. I did not say that it was the same thing. I am quoting an example, and an example is never the same thing.

    The law gives no protection to a Catholic priest. Indeed, in some ways, the law does not recognise a Catholic priest. There were days just before the incident I quoted when, as sport, Catholic priests were hunted with dogs in Ireland. Today, the Catholic priest is a respected member of the community, ministering to a very large section of people who hold these beliefs as saored things, and the secrecy of the confessional is such that I do not believe that a member of any faith, or one of no faith, would suggest that the courts should make a priest reveal what is said to him in the confessional—

    I listened to the arguments that took place at the Tribunal on this point. As my hon. Friend knows, I am not a lawyer, but one of the things that impressed me was the case of a Catholic priest who was asked questions about someone stealing a watch, and the court required him to tell the truth. It seems to me that my hon. Friend cannot have taken that precedent into account, if my recollection is right.

    Such is the respect of my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) for authority that he always assumes that the courts are speaking with wisdom. No court will ask a Catholic priest to violate the secrecy of the confessional. The question has arisen time after time. I have spent many years on this subject, and have been rushing round the Library today trying to find reliable authorities—I found only three books of my own—

    Perhaps my hon. Friend would help me, because I searched my conscience, for I opposed the setting up of the Tribunal and listened to its proceedings. My hon. Friend has said that he was a member of the Select Committee which considered the case of Mr. Dalton. I advocated that the case should have gone to a tribunal and not to a Select Committee. If my hon. Friend had been a member of such a Select Committee, and had asked the question which the Vassall Tribunal asked, and the witness had refused to answer, what would he have done?

    I should have said what the Lord Chief Justice said to start with; that it was a reputable action by a very reputable man, and that everyone felt sympathy for him in the position in which he was placed—

    The hon. Gentleman does not answer the question, any more than the witness did.

    I say "And then what?"—and then nothing. I say that our law of contempt of court is a disgrace, and I am on record in one of my books as saying that the judges have extended that law until now it is a method of enforcing all sorts of piffling orders. We announced that the House of Commons had abolished imprisonment for debt, but people are still put into prison for debts, whether or not they can pay, because of non-compliance with orders made by county courts. People are still being sent to prison in surprisingly large numbers, and it is time that this matter was fully considered.

    I say that the law ought to consider itself impotent in a great many directions. At the moment the law demands the right to ask a medical man, "Did this man consult you because he has venereal disease?" and use that as evidence to enable his wife to get a divorce. How far does the House say that should go? This House in recent years has passed laws to force a bank manager to disclose the bank book of his customer. How much farther are we going along that road? This is the road that imperils freedom, and it is the House that imperils freedom.

    The freedom of the Press is a question of the Press being free to criticise the Executive. That is the vital thing, and it is as well that the House should remember that any limitation of the freedom of the Press—and I am in favour of a good many—always has the inherent danger that once Parliament starts to legislate for the Press it may be using an Act of Parliament to suppress freedom of criticism of the Executive.

    Everybody knows that, whether one is being governed by Dr. Nkrumah or Mr. Huey Long, running independent news- papers is a perilous sort of process and that we ought to think very carefully before we put limitations on the Press. I have permitted myself to be diverted by the cursory information from hon. Members on both sides of the House when I wanted to come to the important case. I quote that of Mr. Clough because it has a certain significance which some of the others do not have. This was a special case in which finally the evidence was forthcoming and the sentence was not served.

    It is reported in the All England Law Reports under the title "Attorney-General versus Clough". I have gone on record previously as suggesting that a more appropriate title might have been "Ex parte Hobson versus Hobson, Hobson intervening, in re Clough". I am on record as having raised more than once the position of the Attorney-General in this matter, and I certainly do not criticise him personally. I have great respect for him. The hon. and learned Gentleman is the adviser of Her Majesty's Government and may well have been consulted as to whether the powers of the Special Tribunals Act should be used.

    I do not say that he was, but the hon. and learned Gentleman could well have been consulted about the membership of the Vassall Tribunal, and earlier today we said that once a Government start to nominate the judges in advance they sap public confidence a little, however excellent the nominations. I think that the Tribunal has behaved very well and that Lord Radcliffe comes out of it with great distinction. When I put down a Bill to repeal the Special Tribunals Act I did it while the Tribunal was still sitting so that it would not be taken as discussing its Report. I set the Bill down for a time after the Tribunal was expected to have reported so that the matter would not be sub judice, and I withdrew it when it was found that the Tribunal would take longer than expected to report.

    I do not suppose that the House remembers any oration of mine, but I spoke on the Bank Rate Tribunal and on the Belcher Tribunal and expressed similar sentiments when the House decided to set up a special tribunal to determine whether the police had kicked a lad's bottom north of the Caledonian Canal. I said in the circumstances in which the Motion was before the House that the policemen had been wantonly attacked and had no opportunity of defending themselves, and that perhaps in that trivial case we might use the procedure but I hoped that it would never be used again, and I blame the Government for not having done anything about it.

    The Attorney-General can advise on the tribunal. He then appears as counsel —and, after all, some of the allegations made were about the Government. He had at least, in a sense, a certain guilt by association if nothing more, if the people concerned were guilty. He cross-examines the witnesses and decides whether or not to ask the vital question. He then raises with the court the question of whether proceedings should be taken, and I am bound to say that I found it difficult to understand—and I make no allegations here; one of the people involved is a personal friend of mine—who were the sheep, who were the goats, why some were involved and some were not and what was the precise relevance or great importance of one and not the other.

    Then the Attorney-General attends before the court and prosecutes the offender for failing to answer the question which he put to him, and then the Attorney-General may well decide to appeal to a higher court if a conviction or an order is not made. It seems to me a not uncircumscribed rule, at any rate.

    The Vassall Tribunal reported the matter to the Lord Chief Justice, who listened to it sympathetically. Some facts came out which were extremely relevant and important, and I confess that, although I have been a practising lawyer for some time, I did not know them. The first is that the courts have already recognised—and the Lord Chief Justice is on record as having said that he does not think it will ever be abrogated by the courts—that in interlocutory proceedings one does not ask the journalist to give his source of information. In talking about interlocutory proceedings, I refer mainly to the discovery of documents and to the notice in which one is entitled in civil proceedings to say, "We want notice of all the documents that you propose to produce at the trial". It is perfectly proper that one should have the evidence and the facts which will be relied on. The Lord Chief Justice recognised that in interlocutory proceedings it is no longer the practice to order a journalist to produce a document disclosing a source of information, and that has now become an established principle.

    The second important rule was decided in the case of Bardell v. Pickwick, and that is that what the soldier said is not evidence. Hearsay evidence is not normally a part of our procedure at all. Of course, there are exceptions, but no one has ever said that this is the sort of exception which has any particular validity. As my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Collie (Mr. S. Silverman) said, while one can always quote academic examples in any legal proceedings of unusual circumstances which produce new rules or bring unusual circumstances into play, this sort of question could never have been put, in the main, to a journalist in any of our courts.

    Why does my hon. Friend say that what someone tells a witness is hearsay? Why does he say that one cannot ask a witness in court, "Who told you that so-and-so was wearing a red tie?" Is my hon. Friend seriously saying that to ask a witness who told hint a particular thing or who gave him particular information involves the question of hearsay?

    Certainly. Of course, my hon. Friend does not quote the precise example. The precise example is, "What source of information prompted you to think that the arrival of Russian trawlers "—

    Order. I think that it would be better if the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) were to address his remarks to the Chair.

    I always respect the Chair and your Rulings, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I have never been in more fervent agreement with a Ruling before. I shall have to stop giving way.

    What happened in this case was that the journalist said that the information did come from a Whitehall source. The inference was—and the fact came out later—that it had come from someone who told him that he understood—he did not know—

    My hon. Friend and I will have to compare notes of our practical experience To the best of my understanding, knowledge and belief, that is hearsay and could not be given. One could not call a witness to say—and this is the test—"I understood from the general line of the thing and gave a statement in confidence to suggest that there was some connection between the arrival of the Russian trawlers and the Grand Fleet". Of course it is hearsay and it is also irrelevant. It is not something to be excluded.

    At least, the Lord Chief Justice started by saying that everyone sympathised with the situation in which Mr. Clough was found. I have only the words of the judgment with me, but I noted down a quotation or two from the report of The Times. I hope that the House will permit me to say that I am speaking partly because of a telegram I received this morning from the National Union of Journalists in Oldham, for whom I have a very great respect. They are so kind to me generally that had they known I was speaking in Colne Valley at 10 o'clock last night and motoring back through the night, I do not believe that they would have asked me to speak. Indeed they might have been wiser not to do so.

    The Lord Chief Justice certainly said in so many words, "This is a very unfortunate situation. I appreciate that he is a reputable man and is obeying what he believes to be the rules of his profession". And, of course, they are. "He does not lay them down. These are really the obligations upon which he accepts his position."

    I am not saying that all journalists are models of virtue. Some of them behave in the most scandalous way and there are gross and wicked invasions of privacy. But all of us know that there are many journalists and most of them whom we know associated with this place, if not all of them, are men of scrupulous integrity. They behave with scrupulous integrity and serve a noble profession with dignity, ability and zeal.

    The position of the correspondent of The Times is a position of high learning and great dignity. I can well understand sometimes that he might feel that a general reference to some journals is a little derogating from his high status. The Times correspondents traditionally for 150 years have had consultations with the Prime Minister and have had information from the Government. There was a time when Lord Chancellors used to write the leading articles criticising their colleagues. It is very difficult for the editor of The Times to come forward to a tribunal and say, "I got my information from Lord Brougham", who, in fact, wrote every word of it.

    The Lord Chief Justice disclosed that in interlocutory proceedings one cannot ask this question or for these documents to be produced. He then went a shade further and said that a search of all the authorities disclosed that there was no authority on the subject in this country. The point has been mentioned before and discussed in various ways. Of course, there is a whole list of cases, but the Lord Chief Justice himself said that there was really no precedent for a decision on this point in this country.

    He then said that there was one in Australia, made by a very strong court. It was a case in which a special tribunal in Australia was considering whether bribes were being accepted by Members of Parliament. The only method was to demand that the journalists who published those allegations should disclose the names of the persons, presumably Members of Parliament themselves, who had given the information. The journalists refused.

    We now come to the point when I can conveniently and chronologically answer the question, reiterated in all corners of the House, "So what?"

    The strange thing is that the Lord Chief Justice, while expressing the utmost confidence in the Australian court, its ability, judgment and statement of the law, and describing it as a very strong court which he felt quite able to respect, does not seem to have paid much attention to its decision on the penalty. All that happened in that case was that the journalist was fined £15 or £25—I have forgotten the exact sum—which was presumably paid by the proprietor, and that was the end of the affair. That is the answer to the question, "So what?". I do not know why the Lord Chief Justice, despite all the respect he paid to this Australian court, did not pay more regard to the punishment it imposed.

    The object of punishment is the relevant question of this debate. Why are these two men being punished? What hope is there in punishing them unless it be to serve some curious, remote nineteenth century figment of the dignity of the courts which cannot have their will resisted for a moment by any personal rules or any personal obstinacy?

    What does this punishment secure? We may get to know more about penal reform when they have served their sentence. We may be told what is happening in our prisons. We may get more knowledgeable articles about prisons, although the Guardian has been doing pretty well in the past week or two. I can think of no other purpose. Does the Attorney-General say that the punishment means that next time such a situation arises before a tribunal journalists will give information and earn the contempt of their fellows?

    If the Government are trying to punish anyone who operates rules, then surely the proprietors of these newspapers are the persons who should be charged with doing something prejudicial to the security of the State—if anyone takes that view, as the Lord Chief Justice rather surprisingly did. According to The Times report, Mr. Clough's counsel, Mr. Cusack, said that Mr. Clough's attitude was that whatever advice he received from any court, he would not disclose the source of his information. The Lord Chief Justice's answer to this was:
    "How far can I say this is a purely honest man to whom I ought to give just a nominal punishment to show he has committed an offence?"
    Later, in passing sentence, he said that if the Tribunal were to get the requisite information from any other source, or the respondent relented, a review of the sentence would be justified—"re-consideration" is the word he used. If the respondent, within a period of 10 days, revealed the source of his information to the Tribunal the writ would not be enforced.

    The Attorney-General has properly argued that this was a single offence which must be dealt with as a single offence. Now we get a new conception in our criminal justice. Apparently, we can say to a journalist, "We know that you are doing what you think to be honourable, but it is a breach of the law. If you do what you think is honourable we shall punish you." That sort of pronouncement was put by Pontius Pilate at a very much more sacred, more vital trial— "Will you confess? Will you withdraw? Will you say that you did not mean it?"

    It seems to me that it is not the business of a court of law to say to a man, "You have committed an offence with the best motive in the world, but if you now behave like a scab 'we will let you off more lightly". That is what the attitude of the Government means.

    But this matter went on to a much more remarkable and a much more interesting phase. When Mr. Clough said that he thought that to reveal his sources would be dishonourable, the Lord Chief Justice made the following observation:
    "How can you say that there is any dishonour on you if you do what is your duty. in the ordinary way as a citizen, to put the interests of the State above everything?"
    It is strange that, setting up a Tribunal because we had a Communist somewhere, we find him behind the ermine of the Lord Chief Justice. It is strange that the first Communist statement in this country since the days of Jeffreys or Scroggs should come from the Lord Chief Justice in a case like this. It is not perhaps remarkable, because I value the law, its traditions and its rules, and once we throw them over, as we do when we appoint these bastard tribunals, we present ourselves with the dilemma that we have to find new principles and new definitions on the spur of the moment.

    How could one think it dishonourable not to put the State above every other principle, above everything? This was the question that was asked of Cardinal Mindszenty. He said, "There are two things that I put first. One is my God, and the other is His Holiness the Pope". Who will say he was wrong? This is the question that has been put through the ages. It was put to John Hampden. It has been put all the time. We start off with In re Hobson, Hobson v. Hobson, Hobson intervening, and we finish up with the Lord Chief Justice of England citing the obiter dicta of Stalin, J. v. Hitler, J. I read it with bitter regret. It was said on the first day of the proceedings. I think I am right in saying that something similar was said in a later trial—"Your duty is to put the interests of the State above everything". The duty of a man is to put his conscience above everything. It may be that the State will find it necessary to impose some punishment upon a man for doing so if his conscience is such that it takes him into these curious and diverse paths. But that is his duty.

    Does anyone doubt that these men are doing what they think it right to do? It may be that they are doing what their colleagues think it right for them to do. There is no doubt that they have had consultations. No doubt, their action will be supported by the Press to which they belong, and I think it is right that it should. There is nothing improper about that. They are doing what the generality of the members of this honourable profession think it right and proper to do in the circumstances. I agree with the argument that it would be extremely dangerous to impugn this rule without a great deal of careful thought and consideration.

    The rule as stated is rather indefensible. It is almost impossible that the courts could say that a journalist should have absolute security whether he has faked the story or not. Certainly I would not put the journalist in the priority consideration before a Catholic priest or any other priest who takes the view that a confessional, voluntary or otherwise, is absolutely sanctified and sacramental. But having said that, what purpose is it now suggested is served by the imposition of such a punishment upon these two honourable men? In the Clough case the information came forward. There is no suggestion that a lot of it was made up. In the Clough case the evidence established the fact that Mr. Clough had really got the information from a distinguished civil servant, and he might well have thought that he would ruin the career of that civil servant had he given the information. That is the conduct of an honourable man.

    I gather that no one has seriously suggested—and in the Mulholland case it has been virtually established—that whatever was said was not said on clear authority. There is no possible reason to impugn the integrity of the two men whose cases we are discussing tonight. If that is so, what possible useful purpose do these sentences serve?

    We have had a campaign by all the people on penal reform who say that a sentence of three months is a minor brutality of a wholly useless kind which clutters up prisons with people who should never be there, which provides no room for any treatment, and is the sort of sentence which should never be imposed. Day after day we see the courts taking very lenient views of some serious crime whenever they can, and I am glad to see it. What sense can there be in sending an honourable man to a penal prison to serve in convict's uniform for six months because he has honourably carried out the duties of his profession and not ratted on a colleague whose privacy he thinks he ought to protect?

    The law has been laid down, and it stands until it is altered. It has been laid down by the highest tribunal in the land on appeal, and the House of Lords has confirmed it. That law stands. What use, therefore, to perpetuate this vicious little sentence, this unnecessary sentence, this sentence which can serve no useful purpose unless it is felt that it is in defence of someone's face?

    I urge the right hon. Gentleman to reconsider this matter. It may be innappropriate to say that honour is satisfied, but I urge the right hon. Gentleman to say that he has come to the conclusion that, judgment having been given, and the law having been declared with the certitude that attaches to a decision of the highest tribunal in the land, no possible useful purpose would be served by keeping these men in confinement for a moment longer, that no one's interests would suffer, that good relations would be helped and preserved, and a generous and understanding attitude taken if the rest of these sentences were remitted forthwith.

    10.37 p.m.

    My lion. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Mr. Kirk), in opening the debate, was at pains to suggest to the House that he felt that he should confine his case to considering the question of the remission of the sentences being served by the two journalists. The hon. and learned Member for Ipswich (Mr. D. Foot) echoed what my hon. Friend said in general terms. He was followed by my hon. Friend the Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell), and then we heard the speech of the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale). I hope that I need not apologise to the House if I do not seek to follow the hon. Member for Oldham, West, nor indeed my hon. Friend the Member for Yarmouth, for if I followed him accurately I suspect that I should be largely out of order.

    I should like to limit myself to the narrow point on which my hon. Friend opened the debate. As the burden of the view expressed so far would seem to be that the two men in question should have their sentences remitted, I feel that it would be inappropriate if we concluded this debate without another point of view being heard. I am conscious that anyone who takes a contrary view throws himself open to the criticism that he is insensitive, that he is vindictive, and that he is unconscious of what must be endured by these two men in these circumstances. I am aware of that danger, but I do not think that that releases me from the responsibility of expressing my point of view.

    I want to ask myself and the House the question which I believe is being asked by the general public. Would the cause of freedom be better served if this unique release from responsibility were granted to journalists? Would the freedom of individuals, the freedom of the Press, the freedom which we tend to take for granted, be damaged if we continued to take the view which has been represented by the sentences upon these two men?

    I do not see that this has affected the freedoms to which I have referred and the immensely valuable freedom of the Press. I should have thought that we had long ago accepted that while there are certain disagreeable features which come with the freedom which the Press enjoys, and which we have for so long taken for granted, it is a hundred times better than the other thing. Over many centuries we have come to accept that the Press, in criticising everything and everybody and bringing attention to a wide range of subjects which would otherwise pass unnoticed, is performing a service which, overall, brings great benefits to society. What has disturbed me very much in the last few weeks, however, is the avalanche of propaganda which has suggested that by this decision some fundamental damage has been done to those freedoms.

    At Question Time recently my hon. and learned Friend pointed out that there had been six or seven such cases in the last 80 years. It seems to me that, however one looks at this issue, the occasions when a man may be required to disclose the sources of his information will be so rare and so remote as not materially to affect in any way the general freedom which the Press must enjoy, and which undoubtedly is reflected in the freedom which the public requires.

    Surely, in the overwhelming majority of cases the source of information used by journalists never conies into question at all; it arises only in those unique cases where it is considered that it is necessary in the interests of the State that the source shall be disclosed—and the very fact that such wide interest has arisen concerning this case is wholly due to the rarity with which these circumstances arise.

    I am sure that many of us who are not lawyers—and I am somewhat overawed by the presence of so many legal Members, both among my hon. Friends and among hon. Members opposite are asking whether it is right that journalists should have a special privilege in this sense. We cannot honestly confront this problem without also asking ourselves whether, on balance, the nation would be better served, the community would continue to be properly informed, and the rights of individuals would be better respected, by granting journalists this unique privilege or by withholding it from them.

    There is another aspect, which again I hesitate to mention but which ought to be mentioned. Although it is the duty of journalists to make disclosures—and while it is in the interests of the community as a whole that there shall be disclosures—we must also recognise that journalists, no more and no less than other individuals, are not wholly and exclusively activated by a sense of duty. Therefore, in pleading a special case for journalists it is not right that their sense of duty to the community should be assumed to be greater than that exercised and felt by other people.

    One reason, at least, why a journalist will not disclose the source of his information, is that, should he so do, that source will not be open to him again. Clearly, if an undertaking has been given not to do so, it is a breach of faith if the source is revealed, but this is understood, presumably, by the source and the journalist. The source requires the journalist to give an undertaking of secrecy only because the source is unwilling to become known. I should have thought it was an insecure structure to build a case on the principle, which I think is generally despised amongst ordinary people, of "All right, I would like you to publish this, but don't tell anybody I told you". I find it unacceptable that the Press, who rely upon disclosure and serve the community in an invaluable way in many cases by disclosure, should take up the position that all should be disclosed, that hole and corner methods should be despised, and that it is their job to ferret out what may be embarrassing to the Executive and so on, and that this applies to everything and everybody but not—exclusively not—to the source of their information.

    If it is followed by a claim that this is done primarily out of a sense of duty, I find myself tempted to ask is there not also an element of self-interest? Is it not perhaps reasonable to suggest an element of hypocrisy when the claim of duty is somewhat over-stressed? I feel that in the course of the last week or two in which a great deal of consideration has been given to this issue, the self-interest element in this matter has been somewhat overlooked.

    Therefore. I hope that when my hon. and learned Friend speaks he will take the view that while it is clearly unpleasant that two men—in cold blood, so to speak—should be taken into custody, those two men were nevertheless guilty of contempt of court in special circumstances and that some sentence was at any rate appropriate. I feel that, however unpopular that point of view may be in the context of the discussion we have had this evening, it at least should be expressed.

    10.48 p.m.

    I need not remind the House that I am not a lawyer. My approach to this problem is that of a plain man. I look upon this debate not as an academic exercise, but as a discussion of reality.

    How did this Tribunal come to be set up? It goes back to events about two years ago. Following the Lonsdale trial and the conviction of that man and Miss Gee and Mr. Houghton, there was a debate in this House. Anyone who had taken the trouble, not to rely on the Press, but to go to the trial at the Old Bailey, could not but be conscious that it was crystal clear that there was someone else operating besides Mr. Houghton and Miss Gee. Mr. Lonsdale was a Russian officer, a man of great courage serving causes to which I am in opposition, but doing his duty.

    I wonder whether it could be argued that he ought not to have gone to prison if he was a man of integrity, doing his duty, and obeying the code of his country.

    It may well be. I am just giving the account of how he struck me. There were two other people. There was evidence to show that the antiquarian bookshop in Ruislip was not operating for the sake of Mr. Houghton and Miss Gee. Any charge that I have against Lord Carrington, which I hope to deploy later, is not the charge that he knew. My charge against him is that he is incompetent because he did not know. I said to the House two years ago that in fact there was somebody operating in this situation.

    Then we had all the rumour, all the stories, and the build-up about blondes and gigolos and all the sensationalism. Let us be clear about this. It did not start with the Press. We had pretty hefty contributions from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty. Then the Tribunal was set up. The Motion was tabled overnight. My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) and I tried to amend the Motion. We wanted the House to be in a position to do its job. It cannot do its job unless it can establish the facts. It is clearly impossible for 630 people to establish the facts in such cases. Therefore, the House cannot do the job itself. It must authorise somebody else to do the job for it. I tabled an Amendment to the Motion which, for some reason which I do not understand, the Chair refused to accept, although it admitted that it was in order. I wanted a Select Committee meeting behind closed doors, doing the job the House had delegated it to do, asking all the questions which needed to be asked, and returning to the House with a report so that the House could take action.

    We are not now dealing with any academic question. We are dealing with the security of the State, I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale), who has now left us, was a little unfair in placing the emphasis he did on the words of the Lord Chief Justice. Of course, taken out of their context and taken away from the particular problems being dealt with, they are totalitarian in character. My hon. Friend said that the problem we are dealing with went back to Pilate. I would not go back as far as that. I am not an authority upon biblical studies, It is enough for me that I have read what went on in the seventeenth century between Cromwell and the King, that I have read with great interest the Putney debates, and that I have seen the arguments that Cromwell employed. He was an earnest, God-fearing man according to his lights. He was trying to establish the authority of the State against the powers of chaos. That is why I recognise that what my hon. Friend was advocating—I have a great affection for him—was basically the powers of anarchy.

    Of course, I want to preserve those things, but not too many of them, because one could not run a tripe shop on the basis of my hon. Friend's philosophy. It just would not work. He is the avant-garde of ideas, and people like me come along behind him and tidy it up so that the weak can be defended against the strong.

    In this the beneficent State also has to have an established position. It must be able to do its job, otherwise there is anarchy. There is a partnership in the functioning of democracy between the House of Commons, on the one hand, and a free Press on the other. However, I hold the view that neither the House of Commons nor the Press can function satisfactorily unless there is present in both a respect for factual integrity, and that is my charge against a section of the Press.

    I am told that I must defend the freedom of the Press—the freedom of the Press to buy Mr. Vassall's memoirs for £7,000'? Am I asked to defend that, because I will not? The Press has here gone over to sensationalism; not that sensationalism has not got its place, but it must have regard to the millions of people who at General Elections and the like have to take their democratic decisions on very limited evidence. The only source of evidence open to them is the B.B.C., the I.T.V., or the popular Press. What chance have they got if all three sources are polluted? In one's desire here to make a case for the Press, we must not forget the E.B.C. and the I.T.V. In the course of the defence debates I gave several instances of gross distortion of the facts by the B.B.C.

    There was another case last Sunday night and I must confess that I am surprised that the Attorney-General has not done something about it. Four young soldiers had been arrested and charges had been preferred against them under the Army Act. Despite this, they were allowed to appear on television and to be questioned in such terms as for the interview to be denigratory of the Army and their regiments. Not a word was said about their records or the fact that they were waiting to face serious civil charges and charges under the Army Act.

    I just do not understand this. It may be that this medium of communication has outgrown our Parliamentary institutions and even the law itself. Unless we can bring this into line, what will perish? It will not be a matter of the inconvenience of the rights of two journalists but a question of the whole of democracy and the way of life in this country which all hon. Members have come to regard as the highest and most civilised form the world has seen. Democracy cannot possibly continue to operate unless some method can be found by which the ordinary man and woman can be given basic information which is free from deliberate pollution on the part of those who merely seek to make money out of it.

    I echo what the hon. Member is saying. Would he not go further and agree that this constitutes a veritable blind spot in our society? The Press and, to a certain extent, television—as he has pointed out—are quite right in performing the task of criticising everything and everyone. but the one thing one cannot get is effective criticism of the Press itself? This is a specific blind spot in our society because everything is open to criticism, except the Press—partly, I suppose, because dog will not eat dog and one newspaper will not criticise another. And, of course, we cannot get any effective criticism except in the newspapers.

    I believe that among the great body of journalists the overwhelming majority of them share the views I am expressing tonight. I believe that to be true, and in the last few days I have talked to a good many journalists about the Motion I have tabled which demands the end of adventurous sensationalism and the emergence of a Press which pays regard to factual integrity and the public good.

    I do not want to make wholesale charges against the Press. I believe that it is a job for a Press Council, for the wisdom of both sides of the House and the members of that great profession to find the solution. I am trying to make it clear that the Press can exercise freedom over its criticism of the Executive, the Opposition and hon. Members—but it should do it in such a way that it should have regard to the public good.

    What I am always concerned about is not the fault that lies in the other fellow, but the fault that lies in ourselves. Had the House of Commons done its job in relation to security from the time of the Lonsdale trial we should not have found it necessary to set up the Vassall Tribunal. When Mr. Lonsdale, Mr. Houghton and Miss Gee were arrested the arrests were announced on the B.B.C. I am making no new charges, for I said it all two years ago. As I said then, it was as plain as a pikestaff that there was someone in the warrant office in Bow Street, or somewhere else, when the warrants were issued who tipped off the Press. The announcement was made and within a matter of hours a number of birds had flown. I asked for an inquiry at that time. There was not one. It was brushed off.

    In the course of the later debate one asked questions, but nothing happened. So we come to the Tribunal itself, and what happened? Both Front Benches, after the most cursory debate, had agreed to the setting up of the Tribunal.

    Again, I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington and to my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East. With their support, we at least forced a debate. We had a memo-able speech from the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot)—a moving speech. He did infinitely better than I could—I could only do some of his homework for him. He pointed out that in every major inquiry held under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, there had been a major injustice because this was—as people had foreseen 40 years earlier—the Court of Star Chamber all over again. Charges were being made in such a way as to make injustice inevitable.

    I went to the Vassall Tribunal with some prejudice, for I was in favour of a Select Committee as against this particular form of inquiry. I listened to the proceedings, and I must say that the fact that the Tribunal did the job it did was due to a peculiarly English set of circumstances. In my opinion, the instrument was a bad one, but Lord Radcliffe and his two colleagues are wise and good men. They leant over backwards in their treatment of men who were in a very difficult position. They treated those men as kindly as was possible—and, of course, it goes without saying that they treated them courteously. But they had a job to do. They were not there in order to bring the mailed fist of totalitarianism into it, but to do a job that the House of Commons had by unanimous Resolution authorised them to do. If hon. Members now grumble about the results, I ask them where they were on 14th November, when we were raising our voices against this particular form of tribunal.

    So far, so good. Here was a set of rumours that gained and gained in strength, consumed men's reputations—might, in fact, have destroyed them—and which here infringed on the security of the State. But are we quite sure that the same thing is not happening again? There is not an hon. Member in the House, nor a journalist in the Press Gallery, nor do I believe there is a person in the Public Gallery who, in the last few days has not heard rumour upon rumour involving a member of the Government Front Bench. The Press has got as near as it could—it has shown itself willing to wound but afraid to strike. This all comes about because of the Vassall Tribunal. In actual fact, these great Press lords, these men who control great instruments of public opinion and of power, do not have the guts to discharge the duty that they are now claiming for themselves.

    That being the case, I rightly use the Privilege of the House of Commons—that is what it is given to me for—to ask the Home Secretary, who is the senior member of the Government on the Treasury Bench now, to go to the Dispatch Box—he knows that the rumour to which I refer relates to Miss Christine Keeler and Miss Davies and a shooting by a West Indian—and, on behalf of the Government, categorically deny the truth of these rumours. On the other hand, if there is anything in them, I urge him to ask the Prime Minister to do what was not done in the Vassall case—set up a Select Committee so that these things can be dissipated, and the honour of the Minister concerned freed from the imputations and innuendoes that are being spread at the present time.

    It is no good for a democratic State that rumours of this kind should spread and be inflated, and go on. Everyone knows what I am referring to, but up to now nobody has brought the matter into the open. I believe that the Vassall Tribunal need never have been set up had the nettle been firmly grasped much earlier on. We have lost some time, and I plead with the Home Secretary to use that Dispatch Box to clear up all the mystery and speculation over this particular case.

    11.5 p.m.

    I should like to support very much what my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has been saying about the Vassall Tribunal and also about the machinery of the 1921 Act. I can express my feeling on this in two principles. Firstly, I do not think that freedom of the Press in any way requires special protection for journalists to be passed by law. The more I have reflected on this the more I think, as a journalist, that no case has been made that as a result of the present case there is any evidence that extra protection for journalists is needed.

    On the other hand, what has come out of the present case is that the freedom of everyone in the country is endangered by the 1921 Act. The issue was not that the men were journalists. It did not matter whether they were or not. Sometimes it is a Belcher and sometimes an Alfred Butt, but every single time that machinery is used it outrageously treats some innocent individual. It is not a question of journalists but of citizens hauled before a tribunal and being outrageously treated.

    These two men were outrageously treated, and they ought not to be in gaol. I do not blame the judges who put these men in gaol. The reason for the injustice is the nature of the Tribunal.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley said quite rightly that the Press in a society of our sort must have standards of integrity. But if our society is to work, the Executive must have standards of honesty too. The real problem is that we are faced with a Press corrupted by trivialities and an Executive corrupted by power into suppressing truth on a scale unrivalled in any country. Hon. Members have pointed out on the Estimates debates time after time that we are the least well-informed assembly in the world, so we have a systematic conspiracy by the Executive to deny and suppress the truth, and suppress it purely to its own political advantage if necessary, and on the other hand we have a tradition of journalism which has ceased to investigate thoroughly. That is why the freedom of the country is in jeopardy.

    What was wrong with the Tribunal was that it was very blatantly employed by the Government for their own political purposes. They introduced it quite blatantly because they wanted to cover up certain activities which they did not want to come into the open. To introduce a tribunal for semi-judicial proceedings purely for party political reasons is a gross infringement of liberty.

    Now we seem to be movng into another situation of a similar kind. By this evening a Paris newspaper may have published in full the rumours which have run round this House and the country and are touched upon day by day in the Press. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley that it would have been infinitely wiser if we had established a Select Committee 10 days ago to go into the rumours and that if we have a 1921 tribunal again we shall not have what we want.

    My hon. Friend keeps on referring to rumours of this sort and rather deploring what the Press is doing. I should have thought that this was using a privileged occasion greatly to enlarge those rumours. What do the rumours amount to? They amount to the fact that a Minister is said to be acquainted with an extremely pretty girl. As far as I am concerned, I should have thought that that was a matter for congratulation rather than inquiry.

    That is a very interesting way of spreading a rumour, but I will continue my argument, which is about the effect of the Tribunal proceedings and of the Executive trying to suppress information. When there are dangerous things happening, we need a free Press to expose them. We are considering how to get a decent Press attitude and a decent Government attitude to news. We must admit that on neither side have we had much success in the last six months.

    The danger to the freedom of the Press does not arise from the imprisonment of journalists nor does it arise only from the nature of the Tribunal. Above all it arises from the hostility to the Press which has been revealed in letters written as a result of the Tribunal. The Press ought to take this hostility extremely seriously, because it reveals a resentment and a suspicion which to some extent is justified. But it also prevents ordinary citizens from seeing the necessity for the Press to protect its sources. I have been horrified to find in the correspondence in The Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian the ignorance of ordinary people of the serious problems of a responsible Press.

    I thought that there was a certain hypocrisy when the hon. Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Leavey) solemnly said that he could not understand why sources had to be protected. How is it that any hon. Member who talks to the Lobby cannot understand the responsibilities of a journalist to his source? Every one of us makes himself a source of this kind to the Lobby correspondent. Every one of us trusts the Lobby correspondent not to reveal his source if we wish it not to be revealed. /n those circumstances it seems to me hypocritical in the extreme for hon. Members not to feel it their duty to expound to the public outside the need for a responsible Press to protect its sources.

    It is impossible to have a responsible Press which cannot have off-the-record relations. It is essential to have sources who will give the journalist information, who will talk to him freely provided that he does not quote them. It is not a question of leaking or secret information, for if a man is to be a responsible journalist, then in all relations with Government Departments or anyone else he must have an understanding with people that they will talk to him provided that they are not quoted. Who would say that we should have any truth brought out in this modern world without confidence being established between responsible journalists and their sources of information?

    I come to the second question: given that fact, must I have a legal guarantee that I suffer no damages by protecting my source? I do not think so. This is a case in which the Press must be prepared in the last resort to do the honourable thing, which is to suffer the penalty of imprisonment to protect their source. It does not prove that the law is wrong if the Press in the last resort have to go to prison for the sake of protecting their source. In the last resort there is a conflict between the security of the State, on the one side, and the freedom of the Press, on the other. It rarely comes to the point in such a conflict that a Pressman has to go to prison, but a good Pressman should always realise the existence of this possibility.

    What has surprised me in this case is not that two Pressman have refused to reveal their sources. Of course they were prepared to go to prison to protect them. What has surprised me is that two relatively junior reporters were allowed to go to prison without any senior member of a newspaper staff being prepared to come forward and to say, "I gave them orders. I was responsible. If these men go to prison, then I should go to prison, too." The Press would have looked far better in the public eye if, instead of it being left to these junior members of the staff to be picked on by the Tribunal, we had had a couple of Press proprietors and a couple of editors claiming that they were jointly responsible for what had happened and saying that if their junior staff went to prison, then they insisted on going to prison with them. If that had been done, there might have been a healthier situation.

    It is equally wrong that the Tribunal was not responsible to the House. If a tribunal which we set up to investigate something finds that someone refuses to tell it what it wants to know, then it is the tribunal's job to report these witnesses to the House.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman shakes his head. Why not? If we tell somebody to investigate on our behalf and those who investigate on our behalf then find that somebody refuses information, the proper course is that we should decide what to do with the people who refuse us information. That is what would have happened had there been a Select Committee.

    In the case of the Marconi scandal, the editor of the Spectator refused to give evidence to the Select Committee and expose his source. Was he put into prison? He could not be, because the Select Committee had to report him to the House of Commons, in which case he should have appeared at the Bar of the House. But the House would have shirked putting him in the Tower, and did nothing.

    I see two aspects of the case. If we have an adequate, proper and responsible procedure for investigation, we should insist, not on a semi-judicial procedure, but that those witnesses who do not give their sources of information should be reported too. Had that happened in this case, I very much doubt whether the two men would have been ordered to prison by the House of Commons.

    I come, therefore, to the final conclusion. I do not think that there is any grave issue of principle involved in the Pressmen being sent to prison. It can happen to the Press occasionally. There are, however, grave issues of principle involved in the form of tribunal which we have established, and grave threats are involved to the freedom of the Press in the present relationship between public opinion and its lack of confidence in the Press.

    Here I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley. The Press should cure that lack of confidence by organising itself. We are a profession, like lawyers and doctors. All the other professions have a code of conduct, and impose it upon themselves and expel members of the profession who break the code of conduct. It is time that we in the Press had our code of conduct. We have our Press Council, which was empowered to enforce a code of conduct.

    Let me give a couple of examples to indicate what I mean. Take the question of whether it is proper to pay criminals large sums of money after they have been convicted for their reminiscences. As long as there is no collective decision by the Press on that matter, every newspaper in a competitive world will find itself irresistibly tempted to outbid the others for the story of Vassals or whoever it may be. If, however, we had a real Press Council, which decided that this was against the ethics of the Press, it would be quite easy to stop the practice straight away and altogether.

    Take a more serious case. Is it in order for the Press to pay its sources of information? For instance, we know that it is not in order to bribe Members of Parliament—we had a case of that; but is it in order for papers with a lot of money to pay their sources in Whitehall? This is a subject which the Press must argue out itself in its own Press Council and lay down a code of ethics. If there were a collective code of ethics, the Press might be deterred from that kind of practice.

    As long as we do not have collective wisdom and a professional etiquette in the Press, with the Press working together and working out these codes of conduct, with a Council with a chairman who counts for something and with enough money and a budget to enable it to enforce these things, we cannot be surprised that in a highly competitive world each newspaper is corrupted by competition into having to instruct its reporters to carry on their profession according to degrading practices which they do not really want to do.

    If out of this episode, out of the resentment against the Press—in my view, the ill-informed resentment—revealed by the public, the Press decides to put its own house in order and to have this collective wisdom to enforce a code of honour, then the two journalists can feel that they have not been entirely wasting their time in prison to achieve this.

    Equally, I hope that this House will realise that if the journalists are to do this for themselves we have to stop the Executive from deliberately refusing to provide information and so therefore provoking the presentation as hard news of half-boiled rumours. That is what is inevitably imposed on the Press by the restrictions and silences of the Government.

    11.20 p.m.

    I find it a little difficult to follow the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) in his argument that the Vassall Tribunal was set up by the Government with inquisitorial power in order to conceal something and for purely party political ends. The hon. Gentleman did not explain or elaborate that remark, and I felt that it was the only incursion into party politics in this debate, and a regrettable one.

    The hon. Member went on to say that some of these problems would not arise if the Press had a code of ethics so that, for example, newspapers would not pay criminals for their memoirs or sources for their information. But how would one enforce such a code? How would one decide whether an article was based on information supplied by a criminal or came from sources for which payment had been made, unless one compelled the newspaper concerned to disclose its source? That is the difficulty which we cannot get away from.

    I agree that the hon. Gentleman said that in the last resort it could be right that a journalist ought to go to prison. But what better example of a last resort can one get than a tribunal set up under this Act by both Houses of Parliament declaring that there should be an inquiry with this inquisitorial power into a definite matter of urgent public importance?

    I thought that I had made it clear that, in my view, once the Tribunal had been set up, I could not find it wrong that the journalists should be sent to prison for contempt of court. What I objected to was the setting up of the Tribunal.

    I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for clarifying that. I did not understand that that was the point he was making. I am, therefore, able to agree with him that once a tribunal is set up by Parliament it clearly becomes the duty of anyone called before it to answer questions which it regards as essential to its task in the public interest.

    If a journalist does not answer the questions, it is right—and the hon. Gentleman agrees that it is right—that he should be committed to prison. That, of course, is a regrettable state of affairs and, indeed, everybody does regret it. But it would not be different if the inquiry were carried out by a Select Committee of this House. A witness who refused to answer a question by the Committee would be reported to the House, which would then be faced with exactly the same problem and would presumably decide, as the hon. Gentleman himself has decided in this case, that the journalists should be sent to prison.

    I believe I am right in thinking that, in the case of the Garry Allighan inquiry by a Select Committee, the House did in fact compel the disclosure of information of this character.

    My hon. Friend is not right in his recollection. I quoted that case in opening the debate. The House could not compel the journalists to disclose the source. They refused to answer. The information was not disclosed by them until the Member of this House concerned admitted that he was the source.

    As I remember it, there was an occasion when the House compelled the editor of the Evening News to divulge the information.

    That was after the Member of this House concerned had disclosed the information.

    Then I was obviously right in my recollection, after all. Whether the information was too late or not has nothing to do with it. The journalists were compelled by this House to give it.

    The editor refused to disclose it until after the Member concerned disclosed it.

    Order. There are great difficulties attached to interventions upon interventions.

    I wanted to give way, Mr. Speaker, only because I had not checked my facts on this case. I knew I might not be entirely right. But my recollection is that the House required the editor to disclose his sources of information.

    Anyway, the point is—let us keep to the point—that the House would then have to make the decision whether to compel the witness to make disclosure or not. I submit that this is a matter of opinion. The hon. Member for Coventry, East thinks that the House would not have done so. I think that the House would.

    I have been looking at the history. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman will find an example where a refusal to give evidence to a Select Committee has ever caused the House to order anybody to go to prison. The striking fact is that the last case known was the Marconi scandal. The House, when faced with the fact that the editor of the Spectator refused to give his source, discreetly avoided either calling him to the Bar or forcing him to do so. That is the last case that we know which is comparable with what we are discussing now.

    I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. We have not had such cases since because we passed the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, and since then matters of this kind have gone before what is a more suitable tribunal. I am not talking about the tribunal in the 1921 Act, but the issue of contempt of the tribunal now goes to the High Court, which I think is a more appropriate tribunal. That is what I mean. That is why the House has not had this difficult question before it. But if we had to deal with such a case and were not able to remit it to the High Court, I do not think we could avoid coming to very much the same conclusion unless we were prepared to allow a coach and horses to be driven through the inquiry which we ourselves had ordered.

    Much has been said about the etiquette of journalists. It seems to be that not just a journalist but any man can bind himself in personal honour not to do something which it might later become his legal duty to do. If he does that, he has got himself into a mess. He may feel that it is his duty to hold to his personal bond and go to prison. That does not prove that the law is wrong. It just proves that sometimes in life people, not even being particularly careless, may make bargains which are awkward. I happen to believe that when people make bargains which are awkward, they ought on the whole to keep them and not grumble about the consequences, and that we might all be happier if we all kept our bargains a little more scrupulously.

    There are also, of course, some bargains which are by their nature not of an absolute character. The hon. Member mentioned our own relations with the Lobby. I should think that if in the Lobby one said to a journalist something which one did not want ascribed to oneself—and one, of course, talks to Lobby journalists upon the accepted basis that things are not by name ascribed to oneself—one would not think of that special relation as enduring if the matter in question came to be inquired into either by a Select Committee or by a tribunal under the 1921 Act. I do not think so. I think that one would accept that this was merely a day-to-day understanding, and that if there was something of overriding importance, like a Resolution of this House saying that this matter had to be probed to the bottom and the sources discovered and disclosed in the public interest, then one would rightly think that the journalist was entitled to say, "Well, it was the hon. Member for so-and-so who told me", because one is not thinking when one talks to a journalist of the last resort and of some exceptional inquiry of this character.

    Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that in that circumstance what one would expect is that the journalist would come to one and ask one to release him from his obligation? This is what I should expect to happen. One might say that he could or that he could not be released. What one would normally expect is that the journalist would appeal to one to be released from it before he mentioned the source.

    He would want to, but normally when speaking in the Lobby to a journalist there is no special bargain made. It is merely a general understanding that he does not divulge his source of information. But if the House, by Resolution, were to order the journalist to divulge it, I think it would create a special circumstance.

    I should like to ask one question, for my information. This is my dilemma. I understand what the hon. Member says. But would he apply the same rule to members of the Government Front Bench who often use the Lobby, quite honourably and legitimately, as a method of making Government policy known?

    Yes, I would apply the rule unhesitatingly to any hon. Member of this House if the House ordered that there was to be such a special inquiry. I think the personal interests of Members would have to be subordinated to the public interest as declared by the House.

    I do not wish to be disobliging, but in the interests of everybody I do not think I ought to give way after every few sentences.

    That is the narrow issue on which this matter has been decided, that this was a case of last resort—a very rare and special one. In my view, it makes the position quite clear as regards these two gentlemen.

    I should like to make one or two general remarks. I agree very much with what the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) said. I think that some of these things need saying. There is public interest in the free obtaining of news, but I feel very unhappy about some of the ways in which news is obtained. I think that the Press, we and the public have got to look at this matter very carefully at some time in the future. I am thinking primarily of payment of sources, which an hon. Member has mentioned. It cannot be in the public interest that so many people in so many branches of the public service should be corrupted as they are being corrupted, day by day and week by week, by the Press in this country. It is really a shocking thing.

    I should like to tell the House of one example which brought this situation to my notice some years ago. I had a constituent who is a rather well-known prisoner and who used to escape fairly often to protest his innocence. He used TO present memorials to me, to be presented to the Home Secretary. The House will know who the prisoner was, I am sure. He used to write to me when he was on the run—which made it more awkward. On one occasion he sent to me a memorial asking me to present it to the Home Secretary. I thought it was my duty to do so. I telephoned the Home Secretary's private office at 4 o'clock one Friday afternoon from this building. This was some years ago. I spoke to the private office and arranged to see the Home Secretary at 6 o'clock on the following Tuesday.

    About 50 minutes later I received a telephone message asking me to ring a certain national newspaper. I did so, and I was asked if I was seeing the Home Secretary at 6 o'clock the follow-Tuesday. I was extremely puzzled, and I said, "I arranged this only about three-quarters of an hour ago and I have not spoken to anyone about it. How do you know?". The answer that I got was, "It was information which we received from one of those people who send us bits of information for a couple of guineas, but the source was not good enough to use it without referring to you first." I said, "I do not mind anybody knowing that I am going to do so." Hon. Members will realise that that information could not have reached that national newspaper without a gross breach of confidence on the part of somebody. I do not know who, and it would be wrong even to suggest anybody, but somebody in a public position somewhere sold that information to the newspaper for a couple of guineas. Is it in the public interest that this should go on under the cloak of the phrase the public has a right to know?"

    I think that the public has a right to know what goes on in this way, and I hope that we shall do something about this and not acquiesce in this corruption of public morals for which the Press more than anybody else is responsible at the present time. I say that because I think that the imprisonment of these two journalists and the Vassall Tribunal at last bring all these matters up to the surface of public attention, and before they sink again some useful and constructive action must be taken.

    11.35 p.m.

    We are not here tonight trying to define what should le the exact limits of the legal privileges of the Press. We are here for the specific purpose of pressing for the remission of the sentences in two particular cases. I am the last person in the House to hold an unqualified brief for the Press. As a member of the National Union of Journalists, I think that as a Member of Parliament I have suffered at the hands of the Press just about as much as anyone in this Chamber tonight. I have been pursued by them; I might also say persecuted by them on innumerable occasions, including Cyprus, and in respect of many other matters.

    I have not come here tonight to put the Press in a white sheet. By all means let us put teeth into the Press Council. By all means let us do everything in our power to encourage higher standards of self-discipline inside the Press. I do not believe that the Press can be given unqualified privileges. Unlike the hon. Member for Gravesend (Mr. Kirk), I have made up my mind on this point. I am satisfied that we cannot do that, because the whole basis of our demo-racy lies in a system of checks and balances, and if we give absolute power of that kind to any section of the community we upset that very delicate system of checks and balances.

    Having said all that, I think that we are in grave danger tonight of suffering from an overdose of hypocrisy. We hear a lot about the distortions that appear in the Press, the power of distortion in the Press, and the power of withholding the truth from the public as a result of the selection of news by the Press. I suggest that that power is nowhere near as great as the power of distortion that lies in the hands of the Government, or the power to withhold the truth that lies in the hands of the Government.

    I suggest that by showing a rather qualified enthusiasm for seeking to get a remission of the sentences on these two men we are in very grave danger of upsetting that delicate system of checks and balances. We cannot put the Press in a white sheet, and we cannot put ourselves in a white sheet either. That is the principle for which I stand tonight, and it is on that basis that I return to the kernel of the debate, which is to ask the Home Secretary to remit the sentences on these two men. I do this because it is a matter of concern that at this moment in a free country two honourable journalists, admitted by all concerned to be honourable journalists, are in gaol.

    Without going into the wider questions that have been argued much more ably than I can argue them by all those who have spoken—questions concerning the law regarding the setting up of tribunals, the alteration of the law, and of giving the Press certain privileges—I suggest to the Home Secretary that there are three practical grounds upon which he has an obligation to exercise his discretion favourably to these two men. The first ground is that we all know that the Government take advantage of this aspect of the journalists' code when it suits their purposes, and they benefit enormously from the operation of that code, and from their knowledge that they can rely on journalists not to disclose the sources of information given under it.

    My answer to the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), who said that he thought that any Lobby correspondent ought to be relieved of that obligation if a decision were taken by this House, is that that will not worry the Government very much, because the Government, by definition, are the representatives of the majority party, and we can be pretty sure that they will have a majority vote to protect their majority interests. The code of secrecy becomes important when we find ourselves fighting for the minority—for the system of checks and balances upon a powerful Executive.

    The second ground on which the right hon. Gentleman has a duty to remit these sentences is that there is a widespread suspicion that the Tribunal which has led these journalists into this difficulty was set up for the primary purpose of putting the Press on trial, and not for the primary purpose of finding the best way of examining whether or not the security system of this country is adequate to protect its people; that it was set up as a punishment to the Press for having spread certain rumours and allegations. I suggest that the Home Secretary gave the game away in a verbal lapse during Question Time. He made a Freudian slip when we were discussing the question whether or not witnesses who appeared before the Tribunal should have their expenses paid. The right hon. Gentleman wanted to qualify this right according to whether the character of the individual who had appeared turned out to be of a high enough standard to warrant this. He said that the tribunal
    "may pass reflections on certain individuals … of such a character that nobody would say that those individuals should have their expenses paid out of public funds".
    My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) pointed out that we did not make this kind of moral distinction where legal aid was involved, to which the right hon. Gentleman replied—without thinking of the implications of what he was saying—that according to his information,
    "legal aid in cases of libel is not available".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th November, 1962; Vol. 668, c. 663·4.]
    Who was talking about libel? We were talking about the setting up of a tribunal, for the purposes of probing the state of our security system. This suspicion, which has been widely held, is one which has gravely poisoned the relationships between Parliament and the Press. That is a very strong reason why the Home Secretary should remove some of that poison by the exercise of his discretion.

    The third ground on which I urge it is that there is also widespread belief that these two men are being punished for the failings of the Press as a whole, that these men's sentences are being accepted very calmly in some quarters because, as my hon. Friends have pointed out, public opinion in this country has been allowed to hold the Press in increasing contempt. A lot of scathing things have been said about the Press in this Chamber tonight. I repeat that I am not holding any brief for the Press, or attempting to put it in a white sheet, but I see serious dangers when we start to condemn the pursuit of what my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), in his Amendment to the Motion on the Order Paper, calls "adventurous sensationalism". He suggests that the proprietors of newspapers might be punished by the imposition of severe financial penalties when they
    "consistently indulge in adventurous sensationalism with little regard to the public good."
    Who is to decide what is the public good?

    If it is to be a piece of internal self-policing, it is a different matter, but I do not know if it can be done by legislation. In this Chamber tonight he has rightly referred to a current piece of sensationalism in which the Press is indulging at the moment over the case to which he referred. It would suit the book of many people no doubt to deplore the avidity with which the Press is at this moment pursuing the question of where Miss Christine Keeler has gone, the missing "call girl", the vanished witness. Is it the pursuit of sensationalism for its own sake, or could it be that there is public interest at the back of the agitation by the Press? My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said that if it is just a case of a Minister having been found with a pretty girl, good luck to him, but what if there is something else of much greater importance? What if it is a question of the perversion of justice that is at stake? The Clerk of the Central Criminal Court, Mr. Leslie Boyd, is reported in The Times today as saying that:

    "If any member of the public did know where Miss Keeler was it is his or her duty to inform the police."
    If accusations are made that there are people in high places who do know and who are not informing the police, is it not a matter of public interest?

    I am making this claim that these accusations are spreading and the point is that, on the one hand, in pursuing them the Press could be condemned for pure sensation-mongering and, on the other, it might be that the public interest is involved. I hope that the truth will come out about this.

    I am suggesting that there has been sufficient rumour to warrant the complete probing of this matter, in the interests of everybody. I am saying that this is a case in which, if these facts are established, this particular piece of sensation-mongering was in the public interest. It is very difficult to distinguish where the line may have to be drawn and where good taste may not in fact merge into a conspiracy of silence which is convenient for some people but is not in the public interest.

    Therefore, I suggest that we in politics are not in a position to pass judgment on the Press without ourselves on occasion meriting to stand in the dock. We, whether as individual M.P.s or as a Government, are not always motivated by the purest and most undiluted of motives. Do we never do any circulation promotion of our own? Do we never cadge for votes?

    What I am saying is merely this. The Press has its faults. So have we. The Press has its rôle. So have we. The Press commits scandals. So do the Government. Therefore, our duty in this debate is not in a pious mood of self-righteous judgment on the Press to say, "These two men have got as good as they deserved. It will not hurt them to go to gaol. This is the sort of price they have to pay." I suggest that we should rise above that, we of all people who suffer sometimes more than anybody from the probings and persecution of the Press. I repeat that I have suffered from that. That is one of the risks one has to take in public life. It is better that some of us should suffer unfairly than that the essential watchdog of democracy should be muzzled in the name of good taste. These balances must be maintained. It is for us to see that they are.

    Surely the hon. Lady should tell us from whom and where the rumour has come other than from herself—and from herself it will appear in every newspaper tomorrow—that people in high places have been in any way responsible for the disappearance of Miss Keeler. I have seen that stated in no newspaper. I have seen it suggested nowhere until this evening.

    All I can say is that my hon. and learned Friend must be the only person in the House who has not heard it mentioned.

    Will my hon. Friend please tell us from where the rumour has come, because this really requires to be stated? This is a source to which the public is entitled. Will my hon. Friend tell us where it is from?

    11.53 p.m.

    It is quite clear from the debate that very mixed views are held about the Press. It is guilty of the crime of disclosing too much and too little. As my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) said, the Press has its faults and the House has its faults. We have done our best this evening to demonstrate our part of the bargain.

    I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) has returned to the House, because I confess that some of the historical parallels he drew with the two journalists affected by this discussion did not seem to me to be altogether in point. Some of the tragic and some of the less tragic parallels were not very exact. We ought to rid ourselves of some of the debris which has accumulated in the course of the debate. One piece of debris which has accumulated round the argument is as to the severity of the sentences.

    I do not think that anyone can say that, assuming that the Tribunal was justified and assuming that the information was of vital importance to the Tribunal—after having waited patiently, through the machinery of the High Court—excessive sentences were imposed. No one can really say that the sentences imposed on these two journalists were savage.

    A substantive Motion would be required if the hon. Member intends to criticise the sentences imposed by the court.

    The hon. Member is saying that he assumes that the matters were of importance to the Tribunal. Does he think that that was so in regard to the allegations about women's clothing?

    I said that, based on those assumptions, the sentences were moderate. As to the suggestion that the Lord Chief Justice, before passing sentence, disclosed himself as being Britain's No. 1 Communist because he said that he would not pass sentence if the witnesses felt able to answer the question which the court had put, that is ludicrous hyperbole.

    I will give way to my hon. Friend in a moment, at least once, because he gave way that number of times to me. I was saying that the Lord Chief Justice, in his anxiety not to sentence two men of good character to prison, offered them time in which to reflect, drew their attention to their public duty in words which were not excessive or extravagant and pointed out that they had to consider, as well as their understandable professional feelings, other things. To say that, in those circumstances, the Lord Chief Justice disclosed himself as being Britain's No. 1 Communist is such ludicrous hyperbole as to be almost contemptible.

    My hon. Friend is quite right, but, whatever he says about ludicrous hyperbole, to suggest that I said that the Lord Chief Justice disclosed himself as Britain's No. 1 Communist means that my hon. Friend has either not understood what I was saying or he is grossly misrepresenting my words. I said that his submission that a man had a duty to the State higher than any duty to his conscience, higher than any other loyalty, higher than a duty to God and higher than a duty to faith, was a classic example of a Stalinist case.

    What my hon. Friend has said with such passion and conviction would have been absolutely justified had the Lord Chief Justice said anything of the kind.

    As he did not, I do not think that we need trouble any further about my hon. Friend's outburst.

    The Lord Chief Justice's conduct in this matter was in accord with the type of conduct one would wish to see applied if this difficult situation had to be arrived at.

    The claim that journalists are entitled, because over a long period they have come to the habit of keeping to themselves, to keep their sources of information to themselves in all circumstances—and that, thereby, that habit should be incorporated into the law—is too absurd a claim to be argued. One might humorise that riposte by pointing out that judges—because of a sort of habit they have when people do not answer questions in court—have got into the habit of sending people to prison for contempt. I suppose that it is just as justifiable to say that since the professional habits of the judges entitle them to send people to prison, so the professional habits of journalists entitle them to refuse to answer questions in court.

    No profession, no individual can, by custom, incorporate into the general law a privilege for himself. If the general law were to give him such a privilege it would have to be done by legislation in this House so that it was made clear just what were the rights of the citizen. Clearly, no House of Commons, in contemplation, would think to give a journalist any statutory or legal backing for the habits of his profession, in so far as they exist, to entitle him to refuse in court to disclose his sources of information.

    I also think that the argument that some 36 other journalists, or more, went free after refusing to disclose their sources of information impugns the principle I have just enunciated shows the great and immaculate good sense of the Tribunal in its anxiety not to precipitate a clash between the interests of the State and the interests of the journalistic profession in this matter. It is commendable, not reprehensible, that many other journalists were not proceeded against by the Tribunal, and not returned to the High Court, notwithstanding the fact that they, too, refused to disclose their source. As long as the Tribunal felt able to say that their non-disclosure was not such as to affect the proceedings of the Tribunal and did not impose on the Tribunal a duty to prosecute them, the Tribunal felt able to overlook it, and let it go at that. It is absolutely pointless to say that these men should go free, or that a new rule was established for journalists, because some journalists did not go to prison on this occasion.

    I should now like to venture a reason why these men should be released as soon as possible by endorsing the argument advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) who, in my respectful submission, is absolutely right when he says that the House should not have left this matter to the courts. If the journalists, or any of them, refused to answer questions, it was this House that should have decided what further action, if any, ought to be taken, and I shall proceed briefly to argue that reason.

    Once we have eliminated the concept of special privilege for any citizen to set up rules of his own about what may or may not be given in evidence, and consider the whole case dispassionately, we find ourselves in the presence of the conflict of public interest. It is in the public interest that, in certain circumstances, the State should be able to make inquiries and to ask questions. The State, of course, can never ask questions which compel a breach of legal professional confidence, but it can compel a breach of journalistic confidence.

    If I briefly examine why a lawyer and his client have this privilege, it will be the best answer to those who claim the privilege by professional habit. The reason why lawyers are given it, and excep- tionally given it, is that if we wish to have any kind of democratic freedom in a modern, complex society, with complex legal rules, every citizen must have free access to a lawyer who can explain his rights and his position. He must have free access, and such access would not be free unless every citizen was certain that when he went to his solicitor his discussions with and disclosures to his lawyer were absolutely privileged in all circumstances. It is a paramount public interest, over-riding all other public interest, that if we are to preserve any kind of democratic life in the country, people must be in a position to get to know their legal rights, to learn from their lawyer what those rights are, and speak with unfettered freedom in the presence of their lawyer.

    No such claim can be made for the journalist. It is quite unarguable that the safety and interest of the public require that when people are in consultation with a journalist they shall, in all circumstances, be satisfied that the journalist's professional integrity will never be attacked by the law, and that the law will never require the journalist, in any circumstances, to reveal what has been said to him in confidence—

    There is no obligation on anyone to talk to a journalist if he does not want to, is there?

    With respect to my hon. Friend, I do not put the case on that ground. The sharp difference between lawyer and journalist is this. The law gives an unrestricted privilege to the lawyer for the sake of the citizen. In a modern society, the citizen can have no safety or security unless he can have professional advice as to his legal rights. If his intercourse with his lawyer is not to be absolutely privileged and protected, no citizen would get to know what his legal rights are. The law therefore recognises, as an over-riding public interest in a democratic society with a fundamental belief in freedom, that that relationship shall be the subject of absolute privilege.

    In the case of the journalist, it is not because one is not obliged to go to the journalist but because the public interest does not require that in all circumstances nobody shall be entitled to compel a breach of the confidence existing between a citizen and a journalist. Although it is desirable, as pointed out by many hon. Members, that there should be a free flow of communication between the public and the journalist, there is no overwhelming public interest which requires that in all circumstances that free flow should not be the subject of judicial inquiry as in the case of the relationship with the lawyer.

    The long-term interest of the public, nevertheless, is that there should be this free flow of news and, having established the clear position that there is no intention of according a special privilege to journalists to protect their sources of information, I should have thought that the House might then usefully ask itself how it is that this is the first occasion in the history of the country, as far as I am aware, on which a journalist has been sent to prison for refusing to disclose his sources of information?

    It is fairly obvious that over a long period of time we have recognised that the free flow of news requires that the journalist should not be treated in this sort of way. While we have a general principle that in certain circumstances a journalist ought to be compelled to disclose sources of information, we are forced to see from our own history that those circumstances practically never ought to occur. The reason that they occurred was that the Government decided to set up a roving inquiry of this kind for an inadequate and insufficient reason.

    Some hon. Members said that the Government set up the inquiry from base and unworthy motives. I have a charitable disposition and I never attribute to guile and dishonest cunning on the part of the Government what can be more readily attributed to stupidity and folly. The bad tempered and ill-considered way in which the Tribunal was set up is quite enough to condemn the circumstances of its origin without having, as frankly we have not, satisfactory evidence about ulterior motives on the part of the Government.

    The whole circumstances of the inquiry show why we are placed in embarrassment about having to judge between a conflict of public interest which on the one hand requires that the flow of news shall be as free as possible and, on the other hand, requires that the safety of the State shall entitle us to inquire be- hind the confidences given to jounralists. The whole mischief arises from the fact that the Tribunal was set up without adequate reason or consideration of where it would lead. The safety of the State is not truly involved. On the other hand, the long-term interest of having freedom of the Press is put in jeopardy because for the first time in our history we have gaoled journalists for refusing to answer questions about their sources.

    This case has revealed widespread hostility to the Press, and some of it is justified, but I am by no means sympathetic to the general hostility displayed tonight towards the Press. It has been rightly said that a Press Council with effective powers should be brought into existence. This is long overdue. I understand that the newspapers have been very reluctant to have outsiders involved with the disciplining of the profession. That understanding was deepened when I listened to the observations made tonight with complete lack of understanding of how newspapers work and of how the public is the beneficiary of a great deal of their work. But I remind the Press that there have been two Royal Commissions both of which have demanded that there should be an independent chairman of a Press Council set up to discipline and establish a high code of conduct universally among newspaper men.

    I hope that the Press will take heed of the rising criticism of its failure to achieve this standard of self-judgment and that we shall see action to set up an effective Press Council. I do not think that the Press Council's activities should by any means be despised. Bearing in mind that it was experimental and bearing in mind the difficulties arising from the complex of voluntary people banded together, the Council has done a great deal of useful work, but the time has arrived when the Press must make up its mind to yield to the wish of Parliament as expressed through two Royal Commissions and to have an independent Chairman of the Press Council.

    Having said that, I wish to dissociate myself from those who fail to see that the democracy which we have in this country would not work if the Press were to be constricted by a feeling that tribunals were to be set up for inadequate reasons and that newspaper editors were supposed to write their stories under the continuous threat that they might be forced to disclose the sources of their information or go to prison.

    I wish also to attack the humbug which lies behind a good deal of the criticism or lack of reflection involved. It is all very well to say that we want a Press which will be free provided that it does nothing improper and is not sensational and maintains standards of propriety which would commend themselves to the majority of hon. Members. If we have a Press of that kind, whatever else it will be, it will not be a free Press. We must be realistic about it. Newspapers must go out and be active in getting information, sometimes improperly. I say without hesitation that anybody who confines the newspapers to getting strictly proper information in all circumstances is denying the public the right to information which they have had traditionally over a long period. However unpleasant it is for individuals, however little I admire some of the people who give the information to the Press, I am forced to the sophisticated reality that our freedoms in this country would not exist to the extent that they do but for the vigilance of the newspaper Press and but for the fact that sometimes they receive improper information which ought not to be imparted to them.

    I will give two simple examples of a totally different kind. Let us suppose that the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) in his campaign before the war to alert the public to the menace of German rearmament and the inadequacies of British rearmament had not been satisfactorily supplied with information by serving officers of high rank. He would have been confined to a great number of windy generalisations, undocumented and unconvincing in their impact. The Government would have been the sole repository of the accurate information and the Opposition and the Press would not have been able to bring to the notice of the public a great many things on which perhaps turned the safety of the realm. Had we had the kind of spirit sometimes evinced in the course of this debate we might well have found that this kind of improper information would not have been given and the country would have been gravely the loser by that fact.

    Surely in recalling that example my hon. Friend has overlooked the fact that the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations was taken behind the Chair in the room of the Secretary of State for War and asked to give the information which he had obtained from serving officers—and to his great honour he told him to go to hell.

    That is a curious intervention if it seeks to contradict my argument; in fact, it supports it. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations was himself the recipient of improper information which he tried to use in the public interest, and when asked to disclose his source he relied on his Parliamentary privilege. I hope that the intervention was intended to corroborate my argument, as in fact it does. I am reminded that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations before the war received information which he ought not to have had and which was improperly communicated to him in his position as an officer. He made use of it, as he thought, and as I believe, for the public good.

    Was it not the case that my right hon. Friend, to whom the hon. Member is referring, was not in receipt of information improperly gathered, but had the information about the state of the air defence of London because he was a Territorial Army officer and knew about it as a Territorial Army officer and was threatened by the Secretary of State for War with the Official Secrets Act?

    He could have been threatened with it only if he was likely to communicate it to somebody else, and, of course, he did communicate it to somebody else. One knows the marked reticence normally existing between father-in-law and son-in-law and it is not wholly to be supposed that the right hon. Member for Woodford was not one of the persons whom the Government had in mind when they threatened the right hon. Gentleman with the Official Secrets Act.

    That is a classic case, but there are many others where the safety of the realm—we might as well face this and not, as it were, put our heads into a cloud of sentimental Sunday-school attitude in which we do not honestly believe—and the free flow of information for the country often depends upon improper disclosures. It is not always admirable when it happens. We do not always have to admire people who break their faith or duty in giving this information to the Press. Nevertheless, over the long run, in our lifetime the country has benefited greatly by the fact that sometimes people have given to the Press information which, strictly speaking, they ought not to have given.

    Another example, which pleases me very much, in the way of improper information is the reports of party meetings. There has been a lamentable tendency, which has been much criticised by hon. Members, on both sides, for too many of the decisions of this House to be made in party caucuses. Whether it is the party caucus of hon. Members on this side or of hon. Members on the Government side, it is still lamentable.

    It is very much to the public advantage that some hon. Members, on both sides, appear to furnish, and promptly, too, for those Members who are not able to attend these meetings, a full and detailed account of what takes place. I do not consider this a public disadvantage. Let me say that I do not admire the Members, on either side, who break faith with their colleagues by giving the information. They are not the most admirable members of their parties. They may be doing it for the most sordid reasons, including cash—I do not know. I do not know why they do it. It may be vanity, or all sorts of reasons. Whatever their motives, the ultimate result has been very much to the public advantage. It has prevented a most unpleasing development reaching a peak of great menace to the public safety and to the democracy of our Parliamentary institutions.

    There is another example. I give these two disparate examples to show that we must not be prissy about this. We must not say that in all circumstances an improper communication to the Press is to be deplored and that we must see that whatever else the Press does, it does not pay anybody—heaven forfend—for giving information and does not commit impropriety to get information.

    Of course, there are limits.

    Of course there are. It is easy to guy the practical standpoint which I have adopted by taking it to extremes. I am not suggesting, for example, that the Press would be justified in, for example, bribing members of the Cabinet to reveal Cabinet—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] Those hon. Members who say "Why not?" are revealing a lamentable lack of sense of proportion. I can give those hon. Members an argument, but I cannot give them good judgment. Hon. Members did not dissent when I said that it was a splendid thing that the right hon. Member for Woodford was able to get a useful tip-off here and there, because we all know that because he managed to conduct some sort of campaign it perhaps tipped the scales just enough to enable us to survive the Battle of Britain in 1940.

    I suspect that most hon. Members on both sides are grateful to those colleagues who leak to the Press the decisions of Parliamentary party meetings. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I do not say that all hon. Members do, but this is a free country and this is a particularly free part of it, where differing views are held. I believe that the public interest has been served by such improper disclosures.

    The hon. Member knows perfectly well that the anger against most of these disclosures is not that they are inaccurate but that they are too accurate. The fact is that the powers-that-be on both sides of the House—the party managers and the caucuses—wish to enslave us for their own ends. They have the best of intentions when depriving us of our democratic rights. They want to see us more orderly and advantaged by their administration. But the fact remains that they have little devotion to the Parliamentary system as it should be. I do not think that the reports on these party meetings are inaccurate. They are as a rule very accurate, and it is very useful that such things come to light.

    I shall not bore the House by giving more illustrations. But I say that no one has the right to sit here and lecture people about the kind of newspapers they should read. I have heard a great deal of talk about sensationalism. There is nothing wrong with being sensational on certain subjects.

    Incidentally, as this is a free country, if someone wants to present the subject of, for example, a film star's decision to have a protracted love affair with someone else's husband, it is a matter of taste. One can read about it in the discreet columns of The Times or the sensational stories of the popular Press, and there is nothing improper in reading the latter.

    If newspapers had followed the guidance of their critics, they would have something like 3 per cent. of the circulation they now enjoy. I know that some people would think that an improvement. The newspapers have never been popular. In certain quarters they have always been regarded as unnecessary interventions in the "club room" of the country, whereby the populace could poke their vulgar noses into affairs which were best left to their betters. I have never subscribed to that view, and if the Press did it would be as dull and lifeless as some of its critics think it ought to be but which would not be in the public interest.

    I want to see a strong Press Council, but I think that within reason the newspapers are entitled to be readable and, on appropriate subjects, are entitled to be sensational. If I had to choose between the Press as it is—raucous, crude, often untruthful—and the disciplined, genteel mockery of a free Press that we are invited to bring about, I would rather have our Press with all its faults.

    I am certain that this House should do and say nothing that would in any way show that the zeal for a free Press and the recognition of its value in our kind of society is in any way diminished here. Quite clearly, the Press, by many sins against the public, has created a great deal of anger and a great deal of justified criticism. The climate is to ignore the need for the rights of a free Press and to trample them down. The House has always, on mature reflection, realised that the long-term public interest is in the preservation of a free Press.

    I think the House of Commons is right to insist that the Press should put its house in order. I think the House is right to insist that no profession can set itself above the law or incorporate into the law automatically privileges of its own choosing. On the other hand, I think that the House of Commons would be failing in its traditional rôle as the watchdog of our freedoms if it denied to its own ally in performing that function—a free Press—the right to the necessities of its existence.

    I therefore want to come to the final point, which is the two journalists in question. They have been sent to prison by the High Court. Their real defence was the kind of defence which I have attempted to make for the Press as a whole tonight, namely, that there is a long-term public interest in preserving a free communication between the newspaper Press and the public on the one hand and protecting as far as possible the sources of information given to journalists on the other.

    Had we done what my hon. Friends the Members for Coventry, East and Dudley (Mr. Wigg) recommended, and insisted that we brought the journalists back here to decide their fate, I think that the House would have been the right tribunal, because the defence of the journalists is a political defence, not a legal one. The attempt to make out a legal defence for them or to criticise their prosecutors has utterly failed in the eyes of any commonsense person. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley about that. He made the case, I think, very succinctly, demolishing much sentimental nonsense urged previously.

    The case for the journalists on a legal basis absolutely fails. There is, however, a very important political case to be made on their behalf, namely, that they are cogs in a larger mechanism of infinite and long-term value to the public interest and to the service of a free and democratic community. It is here in this House that political defences should be made and heard.

    I could not be more emphatic in clearing for my part any charge of severity or unfairness or impropriety on the part of either the Lord Chief Justice or the Tribunal. I think that they behaved with immense fairness, and, indeed, with great kindness and great humanity, in both cases. I think it is now for the Home Secretary to say that, the court having been put in a position where it had no alternative but to pass sentences of this kind because it is not open to receive the political defence of these gentlemen, it is he who is bound to hear it, and he should hear it and harken to it and harken to it in the public interest and the interest of the free society which we are all so anxious to preserve and defend.

    12.29 a.m.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Cheetham (Mr. H. Lever) always makes an interesting speech on these occasions. If time permitted, I should have preferred to have discussed with him some of the interesting points that he raised, with most of which I agree, but on one or two of which I differ from him. In view of the hour, I propose to confine myself to a few brief remarks on what seem to me to be the salient points that arise in this debate.

    I think we should all agree—there seems to be general agreement—that the tribunal procedure under the 1921 Act is very unsatisfactory. Every time there has been occasion to resort to that Act difficulties, anomalies and inconveniences have been thrown up. I agree with every hon. Member who has spoken on the subject that it is high time that the whole operation of the 1921 Act was reviewed and that we found some far more satisfactory procedure to put in its place. I hope that on some future occasion the House will have an opportunity, as we have often been promised, of considering the general operation of that Act.

    Secondly, I agree with what my hon. Friend said. I think that opinions will, and do, differ as to the severity or otherwise of the sentences that were passed on these two journalists. I should think that it may be necessary to await the full Report of the Vassall Tribunal before we can see in its full perspective what was the real effect of the refusal of those two journalists to answer questions and what effect it may have had on the Tribunal's Report.

    What has emerged most clearly, as my hon. Friend indicated, is that apart from the organs of the Press and apart from journalists, we all recognise that there has not been any widespread sympathy with the journalists themselves. In fact, the episode of sending these two journalists to prison has thrown into relief the very widespread hostility and concern on the part of the public about our Press today.

    I think that there has been a great deal of exaggeration as to the possible consequences that will result from the imprisonment of these two journalists. Speaking for myself, I do not believe that it will in any way affect the freedom of the Press as we know it, or will affect the flow of information to responsible organs of the Press, or, as the Minister without Portfolio said the other day, the practice that has grown up over a long period of confidential, intimate exchanges between Ministers and Members with Lobby correspondents. After all, that system has existed for many years without interruption, and it is only when we get some quite anomalous and extraordinary event such as the tribunal procedure produces, that any occasion arises on which a journalist can be called upon to disclose the sources of his information.

    Since the issue has been raised, I would hope that we should not contemplate extending or recognising in any way a claim on the part of journalists to have some rights above the law, which are denied to other citizens, to conceal sources of information if their disclosure is required. As my hon. Friend pointed out, there is a distinction in the case of the absolute privilege to withhold disclosure of discussions between a solicitor and his client. That privilege is required in the interests of justice, because if that privilege did not exist nobody would be free to take legal advice about his rights. Our whole criminal procedure would be disrupted because the result would be that nobody accused of any offence would be able in absolute confidence to take advice as to his legal position.

    But there cannot be any principle of justice that requires the extension of that privilege to a journalist or, indeed, to a doctor or to a priest. It seems to me that it would be quite impossible to extend the privilege to a journalist without considering all the other related cases in which a claim to privilege might appropriately be made. One does not confine it to the doctor and the priest. One would have to consider the probation officer, the marriage guidance counsellor, the welfare officer and a whole variety of people. The reason I think that there cannot be any justification for extending the privilege to journalists is that if it were so extended we should find ourselves back in a position far worse than that of the common informer days, because the public would have no defence against an informer being able to talk to some quite irresponsible journalist, and give him information of a totally inaccurate character with complete impunity.

    There is the law of libel, which has sometimes been forgotten in the discussions which have taken place tonight.

    But, if the privilege were conceded, a journalist would be protected from disclosing his source of information.

    Maybe not, but it would prevent the court from ascertaining the truth and make it much more difficult for the court to administer justice.

    They have gone to prison for contempt of court. It is as a result of a tribunal of this kind that these circumstances are likely to arise. Experience shows that in cases of defamation and libel over the years no similar circumstance has arisen. I therefore say that the most important net result of this discussion tonight is to emphasise, as so many hon. Members have done, the great concern that is felt in the public mind about our national Press today. Nobody wants to do anything to weaken the freedom of our democratic Press. The public are concerned to see that the information they get is accurate. They are concerned to see that the Press Council takes more energetic steps to put its house in order, and if that results from this discussion, then I think that some good will have come out of it.

    12.38 a.m.

    It is only by leave of the House that I can speak again, because about eight hours ago I delivered a speech on another aspect of the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill. If I have that leave, I think that the House would wish me to speak, though briefly, in winding up this interesting debate.

    I do not propose to comment on rumours which have been raised under the cloak of Privilege and safe from any action at law. The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) should seek other means of making these insinuations if they are prepared to substantiate them.

    The debate on the Press has ranged widely, and I submit to the House that many of the topics which have been raised cannot be adequately debated or grappled with until we have the Report of the Radcliffe Tribunal, when it is known that there will be opportunity for full Parliamentary debate. At the moment we are rather like the ghost without Hamlet for there is no substance that we can give to our debates on those matters.

    I think that my principal task is to come back to the beginning of the debate and answer the questions raised, quite properly, by my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Mr. Kirk), and pursued immediately thereafter by the hon. and learned Member for Ipswich (Mr. D. Foot), and taken up later by the hon. Member for Blackburn.

    For the record, I must very briefly run over the facts. They are known to most hon. Members, but I cannot properly reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend unless I put the matter which he has raised into perspective.

    The Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act provides that
    "Where it has been resolved … by both Houses of Parliament that it is expedient that a tribunal be established for inquiring into a definite matter described in the Resolution as of urgent public importance, and in pursuance of the Resolution a tribunal is appointed for the purpose … the tribunal shall have all such powers, rights, and privileges as are vested in the High Court … in respect of … enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them … and compelling the production of documents."
    It goes on to provide that the chairman of the tribunal may certify to the High Court that a witness has refused to answer a question to which the tribunal may legally require an answer, and the court after inquiring into the alleged offence, and after hearing any witnesses and any statement that may be offered in defence, may
    "punish … that person in like manner as if he had been guilty of contempt of the court."
    It was under those provisions, and in pursuance of certificates by the Chairman of the Tribunal set up by a Resolution of both Houses to inquiry into the Vassall case, that Mr. Foster and Mr. Mulholland were brought before the High Court. There was a two-day hearing, and at the end they were sentenced to three months' and six months' imprisonment respectively for contempt of court. The court said that should the journalists reveal the sources of their information, or should the information reach the Tribunal from some other source, this would change the situation and might provide means for reviewing the sentences of the court. The two journalists did not take the opportunity given to them by the court to reveal the sources of their information. I will return later to the question whether any further information that is relevant has come to the notice of the Tribunal subsequently.

    The Court of Appeal dismissed the journalists' appeals, and the House of Lords refused leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, they were committed to prison on 7th March—a fortnight ago. The truth of the matter is that there has been a direct collision between the interests of the journalists and the ordinary rules of evidence, applicable in all our courts, upon which depend the administration of justice. There has not been a dispute between the Executive and the journalists, or the journalistic profession; there has been a direct collision, as a result of which two men with whom we probably all personally sympathise, find themselves in prison.

    I take up the point made by the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) and the hon. Member for Manchester, Cheetham (Mr. H. Lever) about the privileges of lawyers and journalists. As I understand it, the lawyer in isolation has no privilege; the privilege belongs not to him but to his client. The foundation of that privilege with regard to disclosure is that, as was said, professional legal advice and assistance is essential at times in the interests of justice, and without the existence of that protection it could not be obtained safely or effec- tively. The foundation of that privilege, therefore, lies in the administration of justice, and it is that which alone justifies it.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend appealed to me to make a recommendation to the Queen for the exercise of the Prerogative of mercy. That is now the only way in which the sentences passed upon these journalists could be remitted. They have exhausted their rights of appeal to the courts.

    I should make quite clear to the House how there are long-established principles governing the exercise of the Prerogative of mercy. Briefly these principles are that where a sentence has been lawfully passed by a court—and, of course, most especially where that sentence has been upheld on appeal—it is not the function of the Home Secretary to re-try the case. It is not his function to attempt to re-try the case on the facts which were before the courts. It is not his function to set his judgment against that of the courts or to say that if he had been the judge he might have thought it right to impose a different or a lesser penalty, or perhaps no penalty at all.

    There is a fundamental constitutional principle, which we must all recognise and uphold, that the Executive, save in the most exceptional circumstances, must not interfere with or overrule the lawful decisions of the judiciary. It flows from that that the Home Secretary does not advise the exercise of the Prerogative unless one or more of the following considerations arises.

    If since the sentence some material facts or considerations have come to light which were not before the court, then it might become a question of the exercise of the Prerogative. In this particular regard the main contentions that have been made to me in this case in favour of the exercise of the Prerogative are the importance to the freedom of the Press, of respect for the confidentiality of journalist's sources of information, and the argument that journalists should not be punished for a conscientious adherence to that principle. Both those contentions were fully—and, if I may say so, most ably—argued before the court by counsel for the journalists. It is quite clear that the courts were fully seized of them when they reached their decision. They have not in any way come to light for the first time since the sentences were passed and confirmed.

    It has also been represented to me that there is a further consideration, and a new consideration. It is said that until these particular cases were decided it was the common belief of journalists that they could not be compelled to answer questions of the kind that were put to them by the Tribunal. It is argued that, now that the law has been clarified by these decisions and has received the widest publicity, journalists will in future know clearly how they stand. The argument goes on that, this being so, the law has been sufficiently vindicated and it is unnecessary—it might even be wrong—to punish the two journalists in the way they have been punished.

    I say two things on this point. First, it appears from the reports of the proceedings that counsel for the journalists put forward a contention that was very much on these lines to the Court of Appeal. To that extent, therefore, it is not a new argument. But in any case, if the argument is that the law has been clarified and journalists will in future know what they have to do to comply with it, I must say that it seems not unfair to suggest that the conclusion to be drawn from this is that remission of the sentences would be justified if the two journalists complied with the law. This, of course, is the view that has been taken all along by the courts. It is one on which I would immediately act if the circumstances arose.

    The courts have from the very beginning contemplated that there would be a case for remission if the information which the Tribunal requires were to reach it from another sources, even though the journalists remained silent. Here again, I would be ready at any time to take that into account. As I said in an Answer I gave a couple of days ago to the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shin-well), the Tribunal has not in fact so far received any information such as to alter the situation in this respect. Lord Radcliffe himself authorised me to say that.

    It is also contended that public opinion has formulated itself and expressed itself since the enforcement of the sentences. It is contended that the public as a whole, not merely the Press, is shocked at the sentences and that this is a new factor I ought to take into account. The strength of this factor, the extent to which public opinion as a whole is shocked, is something which each right hon. and hon. Member must judge for himself. I can simply report to the House my own experience, both as Home Secretary and as a constituency Member. As Home Secretary naturally I received a good many representations from the National Union of Journalists and their branches. From ordinary members of the public who have communicated with me up till yesterday, and disregarding the anonymous letters which we all disregard, I have received 51 communications in favour of remission of the sentences and 15 urging no interference. That is in my capacity as Home Secretary. In my constituency I have received two letters from organisations and none at all from individuals.

    The Royal Prerogative may also be exercised in the light of compassionate circumstances which have arisen since the passing of the sentence. But these are essentially circumstances special to the prisoner, not circumstances relating to the nature of his conviction or the reason for his conviction. To give examples, they might be exceptional compelling circumstances of a family nature like the death of the prisoner's wife or husband or the fact that until the prisoner is released there is no one to look after small children. Those may be compassionate reasons for the exercise of the Prerogative. In the present cases the criteria for remission on compassionate grounds do not seem to apply. From one point of view I am sorry to say that. From another, I am glad to say it.

    Finally, it is urged that, regardless of all other considerations, I should consider advising the exercise of the Prerogative on the ground that the judge was too severe and that the sentences were excessive. Attention was called by my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend to the Daily Mirror case of 1949. It is for the courts to consider these matters. It is not for the Home Secretary to seek to align one set of sentences with another set of sentences. There is no reason whatever why the courts should not have been as fully informed as anybody in the House about sentences which had been passed in similar or related cases in previous years.

    I want to tell the House that during the last war certain sentences imposed by magistrates' courts under Defence Regulations were afterwards mitigated by the Prerogative for special reasons. There have also been a few cases, most of them war-time cases, where the Court of Criminal Appeal actually represented to the Home Secretary that, while the court did not feel able itself to interfere with the sentence, it thought that there was some case for remission, and remission was granted. But, apart from a very few special cases like these, none of them occurring in recent years, it has never been the practice on grounds of excessive severity of a sentence to use the Prerogative to reduce sentences imposed by the higher courts and upheld on appeal.

    I have given the best thought I can to all these matters. These, again, are heavy personal responsibilities on a Home Secretary. It certainly gives me no pleasure to know that these two men are in prison because they feel unable to give answers to certain questions, but I am afraid that my conclusion must be that, on the information at present before me, I can find no grounds for recommending the exercise of the Prerogative. I hope I have made it perfectly clear that I am perfectly ready at any time to give the fullest consideration to any new material evidence or developments, but on the information at present before me that must be my conclusion.

    12.56 a.m.

    I had not intended to intervene in this debate, one good reason being that I have not heard much of it. Having noted the names of the hon. Members who have spoken, I think I can form a fairly clear view of what must have been said, and I am sure that the House will understand that, having listened to the speech of the Home Secretary, one has a great temptation—an irresistible one for me—to get to one's feet and say a few words.

    The right hon. Gentleman has spoken with great sincerity on the issue that has been debated tonight, and we always expect that from him. We also understand that he has been on duty for a long time today and we understand the difficulties he is having. Thus we appreciate the fact that he is still with us.

    However, I cannot feel that his speech has dealt adequately with the subject before us. I have heard many attacks made on the Home Secretary in the past few months, many of them fair and some of them perhaps unfair. He has been accused of many things. I have a great personal regard for the right hon. Gentleman, as I am sure have all hon. Members, but one of the things he has never been accused of is recognising a principle when he sees it. I think it fair to say—and his speech tonight is proof of this—that however broad or vital a principle may be we can trust the Home Secretary to reduce it to a narrower issue.

    That is what has happened tonight. We have had a fair statement of the principles which a Home Secretary must follow before recommending the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. With great respect to him, that is not the issue principally before the House now. Hon. Members have spoken on the principle and I do not intend to go into its details. I am sure, however, that all hon. Members take the view that we need to debate this matter with very great seriousness when we have the Report of the Radcliffe Tribunal before us, whenever that may be.

    That will raise some big issues and the principal one, despite the rather extraordinary reversal of priorities in the terms of reference which the Prime Minister proposed to us, is the security of the State. That was not the principal issue in the Prime Minister's speech when we debated the establishment of the Tribunal. Other issues will obviously also be before us, but one can say, on the basis of Press reports of the Tribunal—and it would be wrong to prejudge anything until we have had the full Report—that they will include the behaviour of individual members of the Press and a whole series of other questions which we will need to debate with the utmost seriousness; assuming that that Report will come before us, and we have had no guarantee of that.

    I have made it clear that my hon. Friends and I are withholding our final judgment on some of these issues until that Report is before us. Until then we cannot judge whether the security of the State is involved in the refusal of journalists to give their sources of particular items of information.

    I do not think that the House as a whole can decide whether the refusal to give this information was vital to the security of the State. All we have is the decision of the Tribunal itself that, in its judgment, that was the position. Following that certification, the High Court has made certain judgments about the responsibility of these journalists who are now, as the Home Secretary has said—and we accept from him that he does not find pleasure in it—in gaol as a result.

    If we can widen the whole issue from the very narrow consideration he put before us, I want to put it to him that we in the House of Commons are responsible for those two men being in prison tonight. That is what we have to recognise. I think that I recall hearing the Attorney-General, whom we are glad to see with us even at this late hour, saying in the House a few days ago that this sort of problem has not arisen in the ordinary conduct of the courts of justice but has arisen either in relation to certain Select Committees, for example, the Marconi scandal, and things of that kind, or in relation to investigations by tribunals. I hope that I have not misrepresented the Attorney-General.

    There is something very odd about that. It means that our courts of justice have functioned for several hundred years without this question being raised as a question of principle at all, so it is very odd that it should be raised either when we have a Select Committee or a tribunal established under the special procedures of this House. This, I should have thought, would suggest to all hon. Members that we have some very hard thinking to do.

    The first thing we have to think of is whether the whole tribunal procedure is right. This aspect was raised by my hon. Friends in the debate on the Motion establishing the Radcliffe Tribunal, and it was argued very cogently by them. Perhaps many of us have not had occasion to call the procedure in question, and the Act of 1921 is certainly in force, but after some of the experiences of the past few months—perhaps I should say over the past few years—some of us are begining to won- der whether it is not time for the House to set up a full-dress investigation into whether we should have these tribunals at all, or whether some other form of inquiry is desirable.

    Second, if there are to be tribunals, we must ask ourselves whether it is right that this House should delegate to judges the duty of deciding on certain issues where there is a prima facie clash between questions of security, on the one hand and, on the other, the tradition of the journalistic profession. I am not sure whether that is a question that ought to be left to judges—not at all sure.

    This House has always had a great respect for our judges—after all, we pass Measures practically every week of the year, and put enormous jobs on the High Court judges in interpreting the sometimes rather obscure verbiage we incorporate into Acts of Parliament, and none of us would underestimate their job. In the main, when the decision is not on a justiciable issue—I keep hearing my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Cheetham (Mr. H. Lever) murmuring "Hear, hear" so often as to to suggest that he must have said all this before I came in, in which case I apologise—but a matter of construing the public interest, then, with great respect for Her Majesty's judges, it should be a decision by this House and not by the judges.

    I have always had the very greatest doubt whether the House was right in the question of restrictive practices to refer the question of public interest to the Restrictive Practices Court. Many of us expressed that view in our debates on the legislation about the Restrictive Practices Court. We laid down some ideas about what the national interest is, and we then left the judges to construe it. That was wrong. Major decisions on economic policy and on where the national interest lies are not for the judges but for this House, and this House should not run away from the responsibility of deciding. That may be true, and I think it is, and I am raising this no more than as a query whether judges, in the last resort, should have to decide this question of public interest in relation to the conduct of tribunals.

    We have experience of Select Committees. Until last week or the week before I was chairman of one of the most powerful and certainly one of the oldest Select Committees of the House, the Committee of Public Accounts. I shall always remember my three years as Chairman of that important Committee. That Committee could not function unless we had power to get the evidence and information required by the Committee for examining the conduct of public expenditure as recorded in the Appropriation Account. There was one moment of time during my chairmanship when there was some doubt whether we were going to obtain that information. I referred to the circumstances in the debate on the Committee of Public Accounts on, I think, 30th November, 1961, but my memory is notoriously unsure on these points. It will be in HANSARD anyway.

    On that occasion I said that if we could not get that information we would have no hesitation as a Committee in asking the House to give us the powers to obtain it. But the essence of that point was that where a Select Committee appointed by the House could not get the information and the Committee was not given the power to require it, the Committee was required to ask the House for those powers. If that is considered right by the House in relation to a Select Committee, a fortiori when we delegate powers to establish facts and give powers to a judicial tribunal, where there is a clash between the discovery of truth on the one hand and the scruples, conscience, principles or whatever phrase we may use, of witnesses before the tribunal on the other, and where the tribunal is unable to establish the facts, we ought to have a procedure under which the tribunal concerned would ask the House for instructions. I am suggesting this and putting it forward very tentatively only because I do not think that any of us can have final views on this until we have the Tribunal's Report.

    I suggest, therefore, that just as a Select Committee thwarted in its search for truth, as it might well be by the refusal of witnesses to give information, has to ask the House for powers, this might well be the right answer in relation to a tribunal which cannot get information from witnesses before it. As for the question of the liberties of the Press, I do not think that any hon. Member will be tempted to underwrite the importance of this principle to the freedom of the Press. I know that there are different views about this and there is a temptation after reading newspaper reports of some of the evidence before the Tribunal to decide perhaps rather hastily about the conduct of the Press. None of us is in a position or is entitled to judge the Press until we have the Report of the Tribunal and the whole of the evidence is published. I am sure that the Attorney-General agrees.

    Whatever our views and our prejudices may be, I would feel that the House as a whole probably takes the view that while we respect the principles which have always animated members of the journalistic profession, all of us think here with deep sympathy of the right hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) who is sitting on the Government Front Bench. I do not know what his job is. Is it Minister without Portfolio? Whatever it is, he is the propaganda officer for the Government. All of us understand the difficulties with which he is labouring in these circumstances and we have sympathy for him.

    All of us feel that the approach of the Press to this problem is sincere and important, and none of us feels that Press privilege in this matter could ever be absolute. I cannot think of any journalist I know who, for example, if involved in a murder trial where his silence might mean the condemnation of an innocent man would remain silent. None of us would accept, and no journalist would expect, insistence on a refusal of sources if the result of refusing to give a source meant that an innocent man would be executed. This principle, therefore, cannot be absolute; it is a question of degree and of decision in each individual case.

    What I am suggesting to the Home Secretary—and I am taking a broader point than the rather narrow canvas on which he disported himself a moment ago—is that the House has a duty to consider the broad principles which are involved. All of us recognise that the public interest must be paramount. This point was made by the Attorney-General at Question Time. But it is we as a House who are responsible, first of all, for the Tribunals of Inquiry Act. Admittedly it is the law of the land, but the fact that the law has not been changed is the responsibility of the House if there is something wrong with it. Secondly, the establishment of an individual tribunal is the responsibility of the House. No tribunal could even sit if the House had not passed a Resolution requiring it to sit. Thirdly, the terms of reference of any trbiunal are laid down by the House. Sometimes very dubious terms of reference are laid before us. We are not in a position to amend them. They are laid before us and we have to accept them.

    Since we have this treble responsibility and it is under that treble responsibility that two journalists are in prison tonight, we have a duty to consider whether this responsibility should not be exercised in a different manner. I come back to the point which I have made and which I hope the Home Secretary and the Attorney-General, who has been listening to the debate, will consider seriously after we have the Report of the Radcliffe Tribunal—whether we should recognise that if the House lays this responsibility on a tribunal of seeking the truth, then any failure of the tribunal to reach the truth should be referred back to the House.

    In practical terms this would mean that we should not have journalists or any recalcitrant witness sentenced while the tribunal was sitting. That is what is wrong with the present procedure. We must look at it again. None of us can judge—those who have spoken tonight are not in a position to judge—whether Lord Radcliffe and his colleagues were right to certify that this evidence was required in the conduct of their inquiry. We have every confidence in Lord Radcliffe and in the Tribunal, but in the last resort the House should judge whether the decision is right. We cannot judge that until we have before the House the Report and the evidence of the Tribunal. We ought, therefore, to consider the proposal that where the Tribunal in the course of its inquiry finds that some witness refuses information considered to be germane to the inquiry, then when the final Report is available, and only then, this House should judge whether an offence has been committed.

    We delineate the offence. It has nothing to do with the ordinary law; it does not happen in the ordinary courts of justice, as the Attorney-General said. We have laid down procedures under which the High Court is required to commit for contempt journalists or any other recalcitrant witnesses in advance of the Report of the Tribunal being presented to the House. When we received that Report the House could fairly judge; it could read the evidence and the Report and could say at the end of the day, "The tribunal was right. It has been frustrated in its task by the refusal of this witness, and we as a House hereby resolve that that has occurred." Then, and in my view only then, should the proceedings for committal be introduced.

    There is another alternative. I recognise that if we did as I have suggested, certain inquiries might be broken off in the middle because they could not get at the truth. One could imagine a tribunal reaching a stage, half-way through its work, at which one vital piece of evidence was required for the tribunal to pursue a whole chain of evidence, and at which that vital piece of evidence was withheld because of a recalcitrant witness. We have found the same thing happening in Select Committees. We were very near it on the Public Accounts Committee in relation to pharmaceutical expenditure and the withholding of information by certain American subsidiaries 18 months ago. If the Public Accounts Committee had been held up half-way through its work, it would have stopped its work and come back to the House to ask for instructions and for the recalcitrant witnesses to be dealt with so that it could get on with its job.

    There might be a case for saying that where a tribunal, in its wisdom, cannot complete its inquiry because it is obstructed by a witness, it should stop its inquiry and make an interim report to this House, which originally established it and endowed it with its powers. Then, it would be for the House to say whether, in all the circumstances, on the basis of the interim report, there was a case for proceedings being instituted.

    This House should be very jealous of delegating powers of punishment in a case where the inquiry has been established by this House. There is essentially something cowardly about this procedure, under which we set up the tribunal, determine its terms of reference and then leave to an unfortunate tribunal the job of deciding whether there has been recalcitrance, and handing it over to the court, almost as an automatic matter—the Lord Privy Seal would describe it as a matter of automacity—for the High Court then to commit these journalists or other recalcitrant witnesses to prison. There is something fundamentally wrong about this and I hope that when we get the Report, we shall be able to consider it.

    Every week that passes means that these men are in prison without, apparently, any means of securing their relief from this punishment, for which I, as one Member of the House, feel a deep sense of responsibility. I hope that before the publication of the Report, the Government will consider as a matter of urgency, first, whether the tribunal procedure is right; secondly, whether this House can really hand over to judges and other legal members of a tribunal these non-justiciable issues about the public interest which, in the last resort, should be a decision for elected Members of Parliament and not for judges; and, thirdly, whether, if a tribunal set up by this House to inquire into the truth on a matter of vital national interest is frustrated by a refusal of evidence, the right course is not for that tribunal to suspend its activities, to report to this House and to require an affirmative Resolution of this House that the public interest is being interfered with before committal proceedings can be instituted.

    These are, at least, my first thoughts on this issue. None of us can have final thoughts until we have seen the Tribunal's Report, but I should not like this debate to end without thought being given and awareness being shown on the part of the Government that these vital issues are to be considered before the House has to take a final judgment, which we shall have to take when the Report of the Radcliffe Tribunal is before us.

    Prisoner, Pentonville (Deportation)

    1.22 a.m.

    I rise to continue this debate by raising a matter which also concerns the Home Office. Since, as the Home Office knows, this is an individual case, I can hardly complain if the Home Secretary now leaves it to the Joint Under-Secretary to sit in and continue to listen to complaints of hon. Members.

    There is a tradition that no back-bench Member of this House is ever reproached for using this occasion, however late the hour, however narrow the issue or however insignificant the individual concerned may be, if the Member thinks that injustice is involved. I hope that the case which I now raise will receive from the Home Office the same consideration that it has been giving to the wider issues of policy which have been debated earlier today.

    The essence of my complaint is not that I want to use this occasion to plead this particular case, but that I am obliged to use this occasion to call attention to a matter which cannot fairly or properly be dealt with on the Floor of the House or by any of the procedure of this House which involves publicity.

    I will return to that in a moment after giving details of the story. The hon. Gentleman who is to reply is familiar with it. But, of course, I cannot give either names or details, although many of them are already in his possession. The story started with a green card being sent in to me here. I found a young man waiting for me in the Lobby to ask, as he thought, his Member for help because his prospective brother-in-law, an Irishman in Pentonville Gaol, and who expected to he released on the following Friday and to be married the same day, was due to be deported to Ireland, since the Home Secretary had confirmed the recommendation of the court which had sent the man to prison.

    Now obviously the case presented difficulties. The very name Pentonville indicated that this was not the first time the young man had been in trouble. I listened to his case as presented by his prospective brother-in-law. The young man came to this country five years ago as a lad of 17. He had been described by a priest who knew him as a "light weight tear-away", and he got into various kinds of trouble. Until he met the girl he was to marry, he showed no great disposition to settle down. He lived in the wrong part of London for that sort of thing to happen to him.

    The wedding had been arranged for the day he was due to be released. It was in no sense a shot-gun wedding, although his fiancee was pregnant. The girl's brother had visited the man in prison and had assured himself that the couple could be happy together and that the man would rehabilitate himself. Those who were acquainted with the case were of the same opinion.

    It seemed to me that there was a formidable array of witnesses who would say that here in England there was an opportunity for a home in new surroundings, away from the old influences and with a job and a family to look after, and that under these circumstances the young man had the best chance of rehabilitation.

    On the other hand, there was no hope for him if he were sent back to Ireland, since neither his family nor the girl's would accept them because of the difficulties of the wedding in these circumstances. Neither was there any hope of work being obtained there, nor of a home being found.

    That story as presented to me seemed to be worthy of investigation and I took immediate steps next morning to raise the matter with the Home Office. I asked for two things—first, that the marriage should take place on the Friday, which was something which had to be arranged administratively because, instead of being released, the young man was being transferred to Brixton Gaol, and, secondly, that the deportation should be postponed until the Home Secretary had had an opportunity to listen to representations and consider them.

    At the same time I discovered what was not clear to me at the time I first took up the case. This was that the address on the green card sent in to me was actually about 10 yards inside the boundary of the constituency of the hon. Member for Paddington South (Mr. R. Allan), who was good enough to endorse the action I had taken and who took some steps on his own to confirm the information I had laid before the Home Secretary.

    My main point, however, is that this really is not the place to plead the case. In the first place, it is not fair on hon. Members that they should have to put all the facts in a case of this kind with names and details, because people hesitate to come to us for help if there is a risk not only of their case being lost but of a great deal of undesirable publicity for them as a result. So a Member of Parliament's own useful work in cases of this kind is hampered unless there can be some other way.

    Secondly, the particular people would have been damaged in this case if details had been published, and there can be no question of uttering in public the names, the authorities and the details of the sort of representations that would be made by welfare workers, prison authorities and a priest who had visited the man in prison, and so on, because in all cases—and here there is a strange echo of a previous debate in this House—the work of a professional case-worker must certainly not be endangered by the feeling that the confidences and the details of the case would be made public. So it seemed the right thing to do to ask that the case should be deferred until the Home Secretary, who was out of the country at the time on Parliamentary business, but was due to return at the weekend, was back in his office on the Monday.

    The hon. Member for Paddington, South had followed up my representations to the Home Office with the results of his further investigation of the case. I was told that what I had asked for was granted—first of all, that arrangements would be made for the wedding to take place. I had made it clear that it was not merely a question of the wedding taking place and of the man not being sent away but that the wedding was sought only as a first step in the rehabilitation process, which could not take place if he were deported. Secondly, I was told that deportation had been postponed to the Monday, which was the day the Home Secretary would be back in his office. I have rather to underline this point because of what happened later.

    In my letter to the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Depart- ment, I thanked him for his instant action in response to my preliminary inquiries. I thanked him:
    "for arranging that his wedding can take place next Friday and the deportation order be deferred till Monday. This gives an opportunity to make the representations which I and others with knowledge of the case feel should be laid before the Home Secretary."
    The hon. Member for Paddington, South was good enough to send me a copy of the letter which he sent. His relationship with the Home Office is obviously a little more intimate than mine. The concluding phrase of his letter, if he will allow me to read it, is:
    "I would be most grateful if you and Henry could consider this sympathetically."
    I do not think there can be any doubt about the meaning of these two letters or of the messages which we received.

    To my dismay, I received a letter on the Saturday saying that, on further looking into the case, the Joint Under-Secretary had come to the conclusion that the arrangements must stand. The Joint Under-Secretary mentioned that on further examination of the case he had discovered that the offences that had led to the young man being sent to Pentonville were of a different nature from those supposed.

    This would be an occasion, no doubt, to debate the principles on which the working of deportation orders under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act operates, but I do not want to open that sort of debate. It would be possible for me to say that there is something wrong with the situation where if one thought that a man was merely in prison for knocking about fellow-Irishmen, for being a bit handy with his fists or a knife, one could laugh that off and say "Youth will have its fling and he will be rehabilitated," and then when it is discovered that he had been convicted of breaking and entering—and the interesting thing is that he was never accused of stealing; he was very amateur and unsuccessful at breaking in—this suddenly puts a different complexion on the case.

    One could argue on principle that this is not a very good way of categorising the matter, to say that offences against the person are not as bad as offences against property. But surely in this case it is obvious that if there were doubts as to the stability of the man's character and doubts as to his liability to break out in violence, there would be more hesitation about recommending a wedding than if the man had committed some other offences from which he could be taught to desist if he had a more useful way of life open to him. But I do not want to discuss that principle.

    I want to emphasise that each case of this kind must surely be considered individually on its merits. There must be a way of making private representations to the Home Secretary, if there are opinions and judgments which are entitled to respect, which combine together to indicate that this is a case for reconsideration of a deportation order. Therefore, it is on that basis that I am raising the case tonight.

    It may be imagined what an immense disappointment it was to me to find in the end that the operation had so worked itself out that the man was put on the aeroplane before it would have been possible for the Home Secretary on his return to duty to see the papers on his desk. I should have thought that there was no very high issue of principle involved. I should have thought that it was almost normal in most trivial cases that if a Member of Parliament had asked for consideration, executive action would be postponed until a communication between the Minister and the Member had been completed. But when two hon. Members from opposite sides of the House have joined in making representations of this kind, it is very bewildering to find that something has happened along the lines that I have described.

    I am not giving way to outbursts of indignation about this matter at the moment. I am asking that it should be looked at calmly. I am asking for two assurances—first, that this really should not be allowed to happen in this way again. We ought not to feel that we have got to find a device to argue out a case of this kind on the Floor of the House and with the possible publicity that might ensue. We ought, as Members of Parliament, to feel secure that we have access to the office of the Minister in special cases of this kind.

    Secondly, I ask that even now the Home Secretary should look again at this case. I am not saying that he is not an easy man to plead with. I am not saying that if we had been able to see him, or if the hon. Member for Paddington, South had pleaded with him, his eloquence would have influenced and persuaded the Home Secretary. But I would have felt that the young man had had a fair chance of having the case discussed in private.

    I would hope that the Home Secretary could find a way to test the case and consider the representations. As the Home Office must know, this is the most difficult part of the Act to implement, and what we are faced with is this: either that young man gets a chance of getting his marriage started properly—because his wife has not followed him to Ireland; or he stays in Ireland and tries to find some kind of living or other, though it is extremely unlikely that he would be able to do so, and certainly would not be able to maintain his wife there in the foreseeable future; or, what is most likely, he is under an irresistable temptation to come back here under another name—and this would be a tragedy—instead of going back to the influences which are ready to rescue him and will drift back, inevitably, into another kind of offence which will land him once more in gaol and add to the despair of the welfare workers, the priests and all those who are trying to help him.

    I hope that the Home Secretary will bear that in mind and see whether there is any way of testing the validity of the representations which we still hope can be made. The Home Secretary must, surely, be interested in checking one by one the effect of the cases where he endorses or does not endorse the recommendations of the magistrates' court. There must be in the background of the operational principles of the Home Office some notion that it is there for the purpose of redeeming the breakdowns and the failures of society, and I should have thought that that should apply in this case.

    I am grateful to the Joint Under-Secretary of State for being good enough to listen again to material which he has heard before. I know of no other way of calling attention to the difficulties we have experienced, and I still hope for some promising answer which will influence the future operation of this Act, and this case in particular.

    1.37 a.m.

    The hon. Member for Paddington, North (Mr. Parkin) has explained how the two of us became involved in this case. The man whom we are discussing was a constituent of mine. He first applied to the hon. Gentleman, and he, behaving with his usual courtesy towards me, invited me to associate myself with this case.

    There are really two aspects of it. First, the merits of the case itself, and, secondly, the way in which it was handled. The hon. Gentleman is really raising the case in the way he has done on this occasion because he wishes to emphasise the handling aspect of it. I attach more importance to the merits of the case, but perhaps I might first say a word about the handling of it.

    I do not doubt that the hon. Gentleman was quite clear in his own mind that deportation had been postponed until the Home Secretary's return on the Monday morning. He told me this, and I accepted it from him, and indeed throughout I worked on that assumption, as is shown by my letter which the hon. Gentleman quoted. But in fairness to my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State, I think that I must make it clear that he never gave me any promise, of even an expression of hope, that the deportation would be postponed in this way.

    On the other hand, there is no doubt that the arrangements for the wedding were gravely mismanaged, causing a good deal of anxiety and confusion to a number of people. Nor do I think that the Home Office gave itself enough time to consider the verbal and written representations which the hon. Gentleman and I made to it. Even though the priest with whom we were in touch had visited the Home Office, in view of the interpretation which the hon. Gentleman and I put on the information that he gave us, the priest should have been interviewed again.

    As to the merits of the case, unlike the hon. Gentleman, I was a strong supporter of the Act which gave the Home Secretary the powers which he used in this case. I am not, therefore, in principle opposed to deportation of this sort. But in my view this was a case where the Home Secretary might have refused to act on the recommendation of the court. The man concerned was obviously a shiftless man, but he was ready to—and, in fact, he did—marry a decent girl who was going to have a baby by him. For private and domestic reasons which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary knows about, it is virtually impossible for the couple to go to Ireland and settle down and lead a normal life. On the other hand, as the hon. Member for Paddington, North said, both accommodation and work were available for him in this country, together with friends who had his interests very much at heart.

    The best hope of turning this man into a decent citizen would have been to let him stay and work here and settle down with his wife and baby. This course has been rejected; the man is now unemployed in Ireland and the wife is being cared for by her brother, at great inconvenience to him. It is a very sad story. Could it have had a happier ending if more time and consideration had been given to the representations made to the Home Office?

    The other point particularly stressed by the hon. Member is the question whether this matter necessitated the personal consideration of the Home Secretary. This is the question behind this useful debate which the hon. Member has raised, and I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to give a good answer to that and the other questions raised.

    1.42 a.m.

    The public might easily be misled by some accounts of debates in this House—although the hon. Member for Paddington, North (Mr. Parkin) has not contributed to any such misleading impression—into thinking that the sole function of the Home Office consists of arbitrary and oppressive activities against the rights of individuals. It is only fair to point out that normally it is only when a case ends in an adverse decision that this House hears anything about it. It hears nothing about the more numerous cases—even the borderline cases—where a final favourable decision can be arrived at. That is a fair point to make, in justice to the Home Office.

    As I have referred to borderline cases it is only right to stress emphatically that this was not a borderline case; it was nowhere near the borderline. The hon. Member has named no names and given no details, and I will follow his excellent example, although both hon. Members who have spoken are familiar with the names and details. But I must, at the risk of exposing details, repeat what I said privately before, that the case, when I examined it, turned out to be a good deal more serious than the impression I had gained from the hon. Member.

    The reason why I had not examined it previously was that I took over responsibility in that department of Home Office work only after the deportation order in this case was signed, and I therefore first heard of the case, as the hon. Member knows, from himself and from my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South (Mr. R. Allan) before I had had any opportunity to study the facts.

    The hon. Member for Paddington, North said that the young man in question had shown no great disposition to settle dawn on his arrival in this country. That is a fairly considerable understatement of the young man's record. He had in fact been convicted four times in the courts. He had committed four offences all involving breaking and entering and more than one of them, contrary to the hon. Member's information, involving theft of goods—in one case goods to the value of nearly £500.

    I shall not go further into the details of the case, because I think I have said enough to show that this is not a minor case and certainly not a first offence. It was a serious case of a man who had served three terms of imprisonment and had on one occasion broken the terms on which he had been bound over in an effort to give him another chance.

    The fact that this man had a fiancée who was pregnant by him was one of the matters before the Home Secretary when he addressed himself to the deportation recommendation which was made by the last court which tried him. So also were the views and representations of the brother of the girl whom he was going to marry and of the Roman Catholic priest to whom both hon. Members referred, their representations being to the effect that the man was capable of rehabilitation if allowed to remain here.

    I mention these points in order to stress that the information in the letter which my hon. Friend sent to me about this case was not new. These were facts which were already known to us and which had been taken into consideration. My right hon. Friend felt at the time in the light of the man's record of serious and persistent criminal offences that he could not regard an intended marriage with an Irish girl, a fellow national of the man who was living in this country, as a sufficient compassionate circumstance for not acting on the committee's recommendation. That is not to say that compassionate circumstances are not taken into account. In a borderline case they might well be decisive, but, as I have said, this was very far from being a borderline case.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South reminded me that for domestic reasons it was impossible for the couple to settle down to normal ilfe in Ireland. I am of course familiar with the domestic reasons, but they apply to the family home in Ireland, and only there. My right hon. Friend, of course, had it in mind at the time when he approved the deportation order that it would be possible for the girl—if the marriage took place, as it did—to go with her husband, or to follow her husband, and to do so at public expense. He accordingly signed the deportation order on 14th February with the intention that it should be put into effect on 22nd February, which was the day of the man's release. Meanwhile, as the hon. Member for Paddington, North has told the House, the hon. Member let it be known by telephone that he wished to make representations on this man's behalf and he specifically requested that the couple should be allowed to get married on 22nd February, a Friday, and the deportation should be deferred until the following Monday.

    He was told by an official—and I have carefully investigated this and questioned the official to whom he spoke—that it had been agreed to postpone the execution of the order until Monday so that in the first place the wedding could take place and, in the second place, so that his fresh representations could be considered. The hon. Member has made a point in his speech tonight as in his letter that what he desired was that it should be postponed until the Home Secretary had had an opportunity to listen to representations and to consider them, but I must emphasise that neither in that telephone conversation nor at any other time was a promise given to him that the Home Secretary personally would review the case. The hon. Member followed his representation with a letter to me on 20th February and my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South did the same with a letter on 22nd February. In those letters the two hon. Members assured me on behalf of the fiancée and her relatives that, if only the couple could be allowed to stay in this country, the man would, under the influence of his wife, his friends and his chaplain, have the chance to rehabilitate himself, which would be entirely lost if his departure to Ireland were enforced.

    I should like to assure the hon. Gentleman that this was not a decision taken by officials. I gave the most careful consideration to those letters myself and, as I was new to this responsibility, I think I gave them more careful and more prolonged consideration than I have to any other subject since I came to the Home Office. I came to the conclusion, which had already been reached by my right hon. Friend, that there were no new factors brought out in the two letters I had received and that the sympathy which one naturally felt for the fiancée and her family could not be allowed to outweigh the considerations which had led to the decision that the man must not be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom.

    I repeat that if this had been a borderline case another decision might have been possible, but it was very far from being so. I therefore informed the two hon. Members in writing on Friday, 22nd February, of the conclusion which I had reached. This was the same day on which the man himself, under arrangements made by the Prison Governor, was temporarily released in order that the marriage could take place.

    I should like to acknowledge quite frankly to my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, South that those arrangements were not made as smoothly and as efficiently as I would have wished. There was unfortunately a failure of communication between Pentonville Prison, in which he had served his sentence, and Brixton Prison, to which in the normal course of events he had been transferred for the execution of the deportation order. As a result, the authorities at Brixton Prison were not aware that it was the intention to allow the marriage to take place that Friday. This was brought to the notice of the Home Office by a telephone message on the Friday morning and urgent action was immediately taken, as a result of which the man was at once escorted to the church. It is the fact that he arrived a little late for the ceremony, and I certainly regret this. I would like to express this regret which I know is shared by everybody concerned in the administration, to both the boy and the girl. It was an unfortunate mistake, and I have no hesitation in taking responsibility and apologising for it. But it does not affect the substance of the case. As soon as the wedding was over, since the sentence was already complete, the arrangements for deportation were, as I have indicated, allowed to proceed and he was sent to the Irish Republic on 25th February.

    Among the matters to which I gave careful consideration were the suggestions which the hon. Gentlemen put to me in their letters—first, that the deportation order should be suspended until it could be seen whether the man would reform, or, secondly, that he should be put on probation. I think that the latter suggestion came from the priest who had interested himself in the case. As I explained in writing to the hon. Gentleman, neither of these courses was legally open to the Home Office. First, my right hon. Friend has no legal power to suspend a deportation order in those terms for, so to speak, a trial period. Secondly, probation is a form of sentence available to a court as an alternative to other arrangements, and it cannot be imposed administratively by my right hon. Friend, and still less can it be imposed, even by a court, after a senence has been served. The Home Secretary's discretion is simply to decide whether or not to act on a deportation recommendation made by a competent court, and in the case we have under consideration my right hon. Friend has no doubt that the correct decision was reached, and inescapably reached. But I can assure the hon. Members who have spoken in the debate that deportation orders are naturally subject to review from time to time, normally only after a period of years, but they are not final if new circumstances come to light, though no new circumstances have so far come to light in this case.

    I should like in conclusion to refer briefly to the hon. Gentleman's argument about access to the Home Secretary personally. My right hon. Friend tries to make himself available to hon. Members who wish to take up such cases and he is willing to postpone executive action for a reasonable time while representations are made. But in cases where, as in this one, the sentence of the court has expired, my right hon. Friend seeks to avoid holding people in detention under the Act for longer than is necessary and the representations made by the two hon. Members were considered in the Home Office and by myself personally on behalf of my right hon. Friend with the utmost despatch, as I think the dates on the correspondence show. There was no good reason, after I had replied to them, why the action should not be put in band.

    The hon. Member for Paddington, North complained that his representations were not put before the Home Secretary on his return. I would make two points on this aspect. Firstly, although the Home Secretary carefully studies the relevant papers in every such case before signing a deportation order, it would be his normal practice to ask me, as Under-Secretary, to receive in the first instance any fresh representations on his behalf. I had done this, both in person and in writing, before the order was carried out. Secondly, the Home Secretary, who was abroad during the week in question, immediately re-examined the papers personally on his return and he has confirmed that the action taken had his approval.

    The hon. Member will correct me if I have misunderstood him, but I think he was suggesting that representations made by hon. Members on what they believe to be new evidence should automatically lead to the suspension of a deportation order until the Home Secretary is personally able to reconsider the case. I can only say, in all sincerity, that the hon. Member did not succeed in making me understand at the time that that was the principle he was asserting, and certainly no promise was given that the order would be deferred until the Home Secretary had himself reviewed it.

    The principle is new to me, although I will certainly draw the attention of my right hon. Friend to that argument. If the case had been a borderline one I would certainly have referred it to my right hon. Friend again on the basis of those representations, but, as I have said, it was very far from the borderline. Even had I referred it again to the Home Secretary, whether as a matter of principle or on my own discretion, it is quite certain that no difference would have been made to the outcome of the case because my right hon. Friend has confirmed that he would not have changed his decision.

    I hope that I have shown—and I have been at great pains to study this case—that the case was properly handled, that the outcome was the only appropriate one and that, if there was a misunderstanding between the Home Office and the hon. Member, I do not think that the fault lay on our side. I will, however, gladly communicate the views expressed to my right hon. Friend, but I cannot on my own responsibility indicate any likelihood that the procedure followed in this case would be varied in any similar case in future.

    School Building, Leicestershire

    2.0 a.m.

    It says a great deal for the determination of hon. Members on both sides to see fair play done that today, when we are debating the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill and hon. Members are privileged to speak on a wide variety of subjects, the subjects so far discussed have been matters that have in one form or another aroused disquiet to the sense of justice that hon. Members possess. At the beginning of our day, some nine or ten hours ago, we debated the possible deportation of a Nigerian chief. Then we discussed the imprisonment of the two journalists connected with the Vassall case, and latterly we have listened to the case of the Irishman who was deported to Ireland, as described by the hon. Members for Paddington, North (Mr. Parkin) and Paddington, South (Mr. R. Allan).

    In a sense, I am continuing the debate in a fairly similar strain, in as much as I am anxious to bring to the attention of the House what I consider to be a matter of some injustice to the County of Leicestershire in connection with the annual average allocation that has been made to the county for use in major projects of educational work in recent years. I am delighted to see my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary here, and I confidently expect that by the time I have ended my remarks I shall have convinced him and hon. Members that for many years Leicestershire has, to use an appropriate metaphor, only received a few crumbs of the annual cake allocated for major school projects throughout the country.

    For 1964–65 there has been allocated for major school building projects throughout England and Wales a sum of £55 million, and that sum—

    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education
    (Mr. Christopher Chataway)

    Perhaps I may correct my hon. Friend there, because this is rather important. It is not an allocation. The sum he mentions is for starts in 1964–65.

    I am obliged to my hon. Friend. As he says, the sum proposed for new starts is £55 million for England and Wales. That total has to be divided among a goodly number of education authorities. There are 146 separate local education authorities in England and Wales, so that it can be seen that if this cake is to be divided equally, the slice to each local education authority is liable to be rather a small one. It is a goodly-sized cake, but there are a lot of hungry people round it with goodly appetites.

    I would remind my hon. Friend that the German philosopher, Schiller, with some of whose works I am quite certain he is conversant, has referred to equality as the holy law of humanity. I hope to prove to my hon. Friend that Leicestershire is not receiving, and has not received for many years, her proper and equal share of this annual sum that is earmarked for major school building projects, and I seek for Leicestershire no more and no less than its fair and proper share.

    Hon. Members on both sides of the House will have heard of, and I am quite certain that a number will be quite familiar with, the Leicestershire plan for education. It is a plan that is called by many people the "Mason Plan," after the able and active director of education for the county. Some of the highlights of this exciting new plan, which has provided many new features in secondary education, are that the 11-plus examination is abolished, and that every pupil who goes to any secondary school is entitled to go on to a grammar school.

    Pupils leave the primary schools and go to a high school at 10 years of age or in some cases at 11 years. They spend about three years in the high school and then, provided that their parents give an undertaking that they will continue at a grammar school for at least two full years, they are by right entitled to go on to a grammar school. Swept away are the fears and inexactitudes which are tied up with the 11-plus examination. I feel that with these chief features—no 11-plus examination and every child entitled to go to a grammar school—the Leicestershire plan really has something. I have been round most of the Leicestershire plan high schools and grammar schools and I make no secret of the fact that after what I have been shown at these schools I am an ardent supporter of the plan. I should like to see it considerably extended and adopted as a basis of secondary education throughout the country.

    I do not ask hon. Members to take my word alone for the plan. A short time ago the Gartree High School was opened in Leicestershire for secondary education. Even before the school was opened education experts from no fewer than five continents travelled to be shown round it and, after examining it, evinced the most lively interest.

    Some months ago the Local Government Boundaries Commission proposed that a large proportion of Leicestershire, including about 20,000 of my own electorate, should be transferred to the city of Leicester. I received over 5,000 letters from people who did not want to go into Leicester city and were content with their lot within the county. The startling fact is the reason which over 1,000 of these people who took the trouble to write to me gave as their chief cause for concern. They did not want to go into the city, but, even more, they did not want their children to lose the chance of being educated under the Leicestershire plan for education. It can be seen, therefore, that both nationally and internationally acclaim has been accorded to the Leicestershire plan.

    It is a new plan which has endless possibilities, but I should not be fair if I did not say to my hon. Friend that I feel that the expansion of the plan is in real danger of being stinted by the miserly attitude which has been adopted by the Ministry of Education. I am not asking for special consideration for Leicestershire because it happens to have a plan for education which I think is second to none. I simply ask that Leicestershire should have a fair proportion of the moneys available. I will make quite clear to my hon. Friend, with an example, that that has not been happening. I should make no secret to him, because he is probably aware of it, that I have a vast number of examples which I could produce, which I will not quote in view of the very late hour. I assure him that they add up to the same thing and show quite clearly that for years Leicestershire has been starved.

    The first argument is what I would call the "N.O.R." argument, or the numbers on the roll. Briefly, this emphasises particularly the long-term starvation which Leicestershire suffered in her allocations for major school building projects between the years 1957 and 1962. For this purpose, 12 other local education authorities in England, all county education authorities and very similar in make-up to the Leicestershire education authority, were considered, together with Leicestershire. As hon. Members would expect, over the years 1957–62 all those local education authorities, which include such authorities as Cumberland, Derbyshire, East Sussex, Gloucestershire, Huntingdonshire, Kesteven, Lindsey, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland, Staffordshire and Warwickshire—most of them neighbouring counties with similar problems—showed a substantial increase in the numbers of pupils on the rolls. All, including Leicestershire, showed a substantial increase during those five years. The highest increase which is shown is 13,835 and the next highest is 7,951. Leicestershire is next with an increase of 6,727.

    By virtue of the sums allocated to them for major projects, every one of those 13 local education authorities, except one, has been able to provide more new places than the extra number of school children which it has had on roll. All except one—which is Leicestershire. Many of them have been able to build extra school places far beyond the increase in the numbers of children on their rolls. For instance, between 1957 and 1962 the local education authority which had its N.O.R. increased by 13.835 managed to build 15,620 new school places. The local education authority with an increase of 7,951 in N.O.R. was allocated sufficient money for major projects to build no fewer than 26,790 new school places in those years. Another of those local education authorities, where the N.O.R. increased by only 302, was enabled to build 12,839 new places between 1957 and 1962.

    Each of those 13 local education authorities except Leicestershire was allocated sufficient money to build considerably more new school places than the increase in number of pupils on the roll warranted—and this is right, because unless local education authorities can provide more new school places than the number of new pupils, there will never be any rehousing of pupils from old, dilapidated, outworn buildings.

    Leicestershire is a veritable museum of mediaeval school buildings. The number of pupils has risen since the war by no less than 58 per cent. compared with a national rise of 39 per cent. in England and Wales. The sums allocated to Leicestershire between 1957 and 1962 were not even sufficient to enable the county to build sufficient school places to keep up with the additional children on roll. With the moneys they received, they were able to provide only 5,805 new school places against an increase of 6,727 in the N.O.R. over the same period. In other words, 1,000 fewer new school places were built than new children came along. The building of school places has not been sufficient even to keep pace with the growth in the school population.

    How can such a figure be related to the local education authority to which I have referred, which during those five years had an N.O.R. increase of only 302 and yet during the same period had 12,839 new places provided? I think I can safely say that Leicestershire is the only local education authority which has had more new schoolchildren coming on the scene than new places were built. It is probably the only county where the position is regularly and steadily deteriorating.

    We have heard that in Lancashire, for instance, by 1964 every secondary-school child will be being educated in a post-war building. In my constituency of Harborough, which is a large portion of southern Leicestershire, we have places in the county like, for instance, the Hanbury School, Church Langton; Kibworth Grammar School; Welland Park Modern School, Market Harborough; the Grammar School, Market Harborough; the Modern School, Lutterworth, and the Grammar School, Lutterworth, all of which are major schools, but not one of these six schools has a separate gymnasium, not one of them has a separate assembly hall and the single dual-purpose room does not exceed 1,800 sq. ft., whereas a modern school hall and a modern gymnasium would each be at least 2,800 sq. ft.: that is to say, 1,800 sq. ft. as against at least 5,600 sq. ft.

    In the County of Leicester generally, the same serious and appalling position is repeated. For instance, at the Stone-hill High School, Birstall—I warn my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, despite the lateness of the hour—an extremely dangerous position is developing. This school at Birstall was constructed to house 450 pupils. Today, it is housing 666 and by 1968 the figure will be over 700. It is managing to struggle along from day to day only by being able to use some of the buildings from the adjacent grammar school, but those borrowed buildings have to be returned in September and I am told by the county director of education that only the immediate provision of £100,000 will enable education to be carried on at all at the Stonehill High School, Birstall.

    I have already referred to the Welland Park Modern School, Market Harborough. I should like to give my hon. Friend an alarming fact concerning this school. It now accommodates no fewer than 510 pupils in 14,000 sq. ft. of available teaching space, which is 10,000 sq. ft. less than the 24,000 sq. ft. which a school with that number of pupils should be allocated.

    At Birstall, again, the Leicestershire education authority and its county director are seriously concerned because they have no idea how they will cope in the Longslade Grammar School with the children from the Hamilton High School, Scraptoft, for whom places must shortly be found.

    Most hon. Members will agree that these statistics depict a very strange anomaly in education. It would appear that the startling growth of population which has been a largely unnoticed aspect of Leicestershire in recent years seems also to have escaped the attention of the Ministry. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary was very good to me two or three months ago when he courteously gave a good deal of his time to discussing some of these problems with me.

    I make no secret of the fact that after I had seen him I felt a great deal better and I felt quite certain that, with his well known perspicacity and commonsense, we should soon see a rapid increase in the sums allocated to the county for major school projects. I felt certain that he would see that Leicestershire got a fair crack of the whip and that this new deal would probably begin in the major projects allocation for 1964–65.

    What happened? I now learn that out of a total application made by the county director of education, amounting to £2,224,000 for urgently needed major works, we have only been allocated £431,000–19 per cent. of what is required. That was why I felt constrained to bring this matter up at the earliest opportunity in the House.

    Can he tell me why the percentage of proposals allowed for Leicestershire has steadily declined since 1960? In 1960–61, the county proposed projects costing £437,000 and the allocation was £279,000–64 per cent. I will not trouble the House with figures for the following years except to say that whereas the percentage of proposed works approved in 1960–61 was 64 per cent., it dropped the next year to 54 per cent., the following year to 49 per cent., last year to 29 per cent., and this year, in the allocation for 1964–65, to 19 per cent.

    I hope that my hon. Friend will tell me when this rapid decline is to be halted. It has been steady for five or six years. Can he also say why it is that throughout the country the national average of allocations approved is some 22·6 per cent. whereas in Leicestershire it is only 19 per cent., despite the country's desperate position?

    Many hon. Members might think that Leicestershire has been proposing an unusually large programme of school building. That is a reasonable supposition; people might be excused for thinking that one of the reasons why such a vast proportion of what it applies for is turned down is that it is applying for an unnaturally high allocation. But that is not the case, as my hon. Friend will confirm. For instance, in respect of 1964–65 no fewer than 24 local education authorities applied for greater allocations.

    Can my hon. Friend tell me why in the last five years, although about 0·92 per cent. of the school children in England and Wales have been the responsibility of the Leicestershire education authority, the average allocation to Leicestershire of money for major projects has been only 0·62 per cent.? Consistently and regularly, on average for the past five years, it has been 50 per cent. below what the allocation ought to have been in proportion to the number of children for which the county is responsible.

    I think it fair to assume that if a county has roughly 1 per cent. of the school children of the country, it should receive, subject to variations in connection with specific cases, roughly over the years 1 per cent. of the sums available for new school building, and certainly not consistently less. My hon. Friend shook his head just now when I said that in the last five years Leicestershire had received less than a proper proportion of the money due to it for major school projects if it were worked out on a per capita basis. I can only say that in the past five years on average nearly 1 per cent. of the school children of England and Wales have been the responsibility of the Leicestershire education authority, and yet during that time, as shown in a table which I received in answer to Question No. 22 on 18th March, only slightly over ½ per cent. of the sums allocated for major primary and secondary school building programmes have been allocated to Leicestershire.

    Another Question which my right hon. Friend was good enough to answer for me recently was in connection with the number of new school places being provided in England and Wales at the moment. He told me that at 31st December, 1962, there were 2,480 new school places being built in Leicestershire out of a total number of new school places being built in England and Wales of 364,000. That is still about 0·60 or 0·61 per cent. compared with 0·91 or 0·95 per cent. of the school children of the country who are the responsibility of the Leicestershire education authority. So the sums allocated are consistently 50 per cent. below what they should be according to the national average.

    I hope that my hon. Friend will not say that one of the reasons why Leicestershire has been receiving so little may he the fine modern school buildings that it has. He must not say that. If he does, I shall insist on his coming and spending a day or two with me there. I shall entertain him quite well and show him some really historic old buildings crammed with pupils and in a most dangerous state, buildings which I consider should—and, for all I know, may—be registered with the registrar of buildings of ancient and historic interest because they are so old.

    Finally I should like him to give the lie to something that I have heard said more and more often recently. It is being said that one of the reasons that Leicestershire is not getting a fair crack of the whip is that the Leicestershire plan for education does not meet with the approval of the education authorities in Whitehall. I have told everybody who has said that to me that that is nonsense. I have reminded people time and time again that the Government's declaration, which has been repeated quite often by my right hon. Friend and his predecessor, is that the Government are anxious to see a variety of educational systems developed in the country. We are not dedicated to one or the other. We want to see a variety flourish, and we want to select that which, by trial and error, proves to be the most efficient for the rest of the country. I think that the Leicestershire plan might well, one of these days, be recognised as one of the most efficient systems of education.

    I have every confidence in my right hon. Friend the Minister of Education and in my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, in that, having heard my remarks, my hon. Friend will give me an assurance that what I have said will be looked into, and possibly he will be a little more forthcoming and will tell me that the meagre allocation of £430,000 for Leicestershire in 1964–65, which is not nearly good enough, will be considerably increased.

    2.32 a.m.

    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education
    (Mr. Christopher Chataway)

    My hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) has had to show considerable patience in order to get the opportunity of raising the question of Leicestershire school building. Patience, too, has been demanded of the House by the lateness of the hour.

    Although my hon. Friend has deployed his case very fully and with care, I hope that I may be able to satisfy him that the arguments that he has adduced have been very carefully considered, and that I may be able so to satisfy him without detaining the House too long.

    First—and this is no more than a repetition—there is no question that the Leicestershire plan is viewed with disfavour by my right hon. Friend, or that that is in any way relevant to the building allocations that he makes. The Leicestershire plan is followed with great interest. I had the good fortune the other day to discuss it with the director of education, and I can assure my hon. Friend that there is no truth in that allegation.

    When my hon. Friend came to see me a few months ago he adduced some of the arguments that he has put to the House tonight. I tried to persuade him then that the yardsticks that he was using were really irrelevant. May I take one instance? He has told the House that the proportion of Leicestershire's proposals which are approved by my right hon. Friend have declined over the last five years. This is a most extraordinary way in which to present the facts. In 1960–61, the authority proposed projects worth £437,000. This year the authority proposed projects worth £2,224,000. Is my hon. Friend really suggesting that the former figure for 1960–61 is put forward on exactly the same basis as the latter figure for 1964–65, which is five times its size?

    Clearly, the latter figure must contain many jobs which are not of such high priority as the relatively few jobs which were proposed for 1960–61. One cannot get any measure of an authority's success in the building programme by this device of taking a percentage of the proposals which are approved. The percentage of proposals approved will depend largely on the size of the proposals made by an authority. Some authorities will put forward a very large proposal; others will pare their proposals down to what they consider to be the bare minimum.

    My hon. Friend has made one or two remarks about the Leicestershire proposal. Is he suggesting that the proposal by the Leicestershire education authority for 1964–65 is not work that is essential and needed at once?

    I am saying that if five times as much is put forward this year as in 1960–61 a less stringent yardstick is being used by the authority this year than was used five years ago. I think that this obviously follows, and would not be contested by the director of education or the education committee, and I do not complain that the Authority has put forward larger proposals, because it enables my right hon. Friend to have a broader picture of Leicestershire's needs, and some years ago there was a suggestion that Leicestershire was not putting forward large enough proposals.

    So far from a decline over the five years which my hon. Friend's presentation would seem to suggest, the facts are that the estimated cost of projects approved has risen from £279,000 in 1960–61 to £392.000 in 1962–63, and to £431,000 for 1964–65.

    My hon. Friend devoted a good deal of time to the tables which have been prepared by the Leicestershire education committee and which both he and I have studied. But, again, I must say that one cannot take any fair comparison between authorities purely on the basis of the number on the roll or of the increase in the school population, for this reason. My hon. Friend talked about equality. If he believes that we should aim for equality of provision in local education authorities throughout the country, he must agree that we have to take account of the differing starting points of authorities.

    We could not achieve a steady educational advance over the country if we were to ignore the fact that many areas start with a far greater backlog and a far worse heritage a old schools. Some areas start with more spare places than others. Some start with more all-age schools than others. I cannot therefore concede that in the tables to which my hon. Friend has referred there is any valid basis for the sort of deductions that he has been making.

    I remind my hon. Friend that we are making the allocations for 1965. We are making the last allocations for the £300 million building programme which is to run from 1960 to 1965, and these allocations have been made according to the priorities laid down in the 1958 White Paper "Secondary Education for All." Those priorities are as follows: first, that we should provide roofs overhead, or schools, in those areas where children would not otherwise have a school to go to; secondly, that we should finish the reorganisation of the all-age schools—I am glad to say that that reorganisation will be finished in 1964–65—and, thirdly, that we should improve or replace deficient secondary schools.

    My right hon. Friend is well aware that Leicestershire has had an increase of population above that of the national average, but it is equally true that progressive authorities like Leicestershire, which built secondary schools before the war, start with an advantage as compared with many other authorities. It is significant that in the whole of the last five programmes only one small project has been needed to complete the reorganisation of all-age schools in Leicestershire. That is a measure of the advantage that the county has had over some other areas.

    For 1964–65 careful consideration of the proposals submitted by the authority has produced a programme totalling £431,000—higher than for any of the earlier four years, and including four primary and two secondary school projects in growing areas, a new junior school in my hon. Friend's constituency at Market Harborough, and a project to improve and extend the rooms in a crowded grammar school. I am aware that many improvements and extension projects that were desired could not be included, but the fact that this last programme is higher than any of the others, in a year when many authorities have had to be given totals lower than previously, illustrates that Leicestershire's needs have been given very full consideration. I assure my hon. Friend that they will continue to be given that consideration.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

    Committee this day.

    Employment, Weston-Supermare

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. I. Fraser.]

    2.42 a.m.

    Tonight, I wish to raise the problem of unemployment in Weston-super-Mare. In January of this year the unemployment rate rose to the high figure of 6·3 per cent. It did this abruptly, and then increased to 6·7 per cent. in February. That represented a total of 1,189 people, of whom 871 were men, 219 women and—a tragic thing—54 boys and 45 girls.

    It is encouraging to note that the new figures announced today, for this month, show a percentage of 4·6 per cent., totalling 805 people. Of these, 567 are men, 186 women, 23 boys and 29 girls. There are indications that the worst is over in relation to the short-term problem. But this is not a short-term problem alone. There is a long-term problem that for many years has been pertinent to Weston-super-Mare.

    Two Government factories were built a considerable time ago. They are both excellent factories, and it is with the employment provided by those factories that I am concerned tonight. We learn that the War Office contract, under which the firm of Henly is working in one of the factories—employing 450 people—is being run down over a period of three months. There is a similar situation with Westlands, at the other factory, but I wish to concentrate upon Henly's. We must appreciate that these factories were built with State aid, some time ago, and that when they become empty the problem that arises will not only be a long-term one, but one that may involve considerable finance before they are once again filled. For this reason I welcome the presence here tonight of my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Board of Trade, because one has to be very selective as to whom one addresses this very complicated problem.

    This is a War Office contract which has also sub-contracted a certain element of Air Ministry work. It is done in a factory controlled by the Ministry of Aviation as trustees of the taxpayer. The Ministry of Labour is involved and the Board of Trade. There is also the possibility of the Ministry of Public Building and Works being involved, and, in the last resort, there would be the involvement of the Treasury. I have put down Questions to a number of these Departments and have visited four of them. I much appreciate the courtesy which I have received from my hon. Friends the Under-Secretaries and Parliamentary Secretaries of the Departments concerned. To those Departments which I have not yet visited, I should say that I hope they will not feel neglected, because in due course I shall be making visitations to them if I am not soon satisfied on this matter.

    There is a close chronological order of importance here. This is a War Office contract in a factory controlled by the Ministry of Aviation, a War Office contract administered by the only central factory with engine repair and maintenance workshops. Much is made of the fact that work has been moved up to the north of the country, to Scotland, Liverpool and Doncaster, but it is clear that when we have a seasonal figure of unemployment of 6·7 per cent., that area needs work and it needs a stabilising influence upon it through that work.

    In the case of a Weston-super-Mare there is no reason for saying that it is a black spot or a neglected area. It is only three hours by rail from London and has excellent communications with the Midlands and London by road and rail with the possibility—or strong prospect—of motorways connecting up both areas to Weston-super-Mare. It has excellent dock facilities at Avonmouth and every attraction for the industrialist. We are not saying that we are an area which is a black spot, but a most attractive area to which we can easily encourage industrialists to come.

    The War Office has decided to contract within three months the factory for the repair of vehicles. I ask, first, that the contract should be extended and a longer period of grace given. Henly's, for fifteen years, with the assistance of good workpeople and excellent labour relations, has given good service to the taxpayer. As a member of the Estimates Committee, I am bound to say that if we are to leave this factory—an asset which I guess is worth £1 million—without employment, Government assets are not adequately employed. That is a double reason why emphasis should be placed on spinning out this contract.

    In conjunction with extension of the period of grace, or surplus to it, I ask for a relaxation of the exclusive nature of the War Office contract. Last summer, when it became evident that both Henly's and Westlands would have a reduction of the business carried on at the site in Weston-super-Mare, I visited both managements, Westlands at Yeovil and Henly's on its site, and discussed the problem. As a result of our consultation I made representations to the Under Secretary of State for War and as a consequence the contract was extended beyond the direct type of Government contract. The strict contract involves Government contracts for Government Departments. We sought to get this extended to local government and services of other countries, such as the United States Air Force, and even into the nationalised industries, so that this company should be able to use the benefit of this Government controlled asset and good labour relations to carry out this work. As a result of this, there was some relaxation. I am most thankful that this happened this year, when we had the extreme rigours of winter, which greatly added to the unemployment figure in Weston-super-Mare.

    What I would now like is this. Either in conjunction with the relaxation, the slowing down process, or separate from it, this exclusiveness should now be dropped. The management is most progressive. It is going ahead and trying to find orders. But, until the relaxation of the contract is given, it cannot sign any other contract for this type of work. I ask my hon. Friend to urge his hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War, as I have urged him this week, that this question should be looked into most urgently. I appreciate the Government's point, or the point of the administrators of public money, that this company should not be seen to be getting the best of both worlds. We appreciate that these contracts are at present on a cost-plus basis and while being run down will be most costly per unit. Therefore, it could he said that it could be one or the other.

    However, this is a case in which one should temper the wind to the lamb to be shorn. I ask that this be done. My hon. Friend knows that his Department gives three forms of aid under the Local Employment Act: first, the building of advance factories; secondly, finance for the building of factories and, thirdly, finance for current account. We do not need factories. We have them. It would therefore, be a fair economy if something were done to make a lenient interpretation of the lease or the holding lease to be negotiated with the Ministry of Aviation, otherwise there may be considerable expense involved in bringing other people to the area.

    I understand that we are at present at the stage when the district valuer is making his assessment. Let us hope that the valuation will be one that the company will find acceptable and that no inhibitions will then be placed on it having other contracts.

    I appreciate that, if the company were to stand out and say that the terms were excessive, because of the expense of heating and lighting the factory, especially heating it, the Treasury would be called in. I understand this to be a matter of commercial prudence as well. I fully appreciate that the Ministry of Aviation would wish the lease or the heads of agreement of the holding lease, for, say, fifteen months, to be signed before it would say to the company that it would extend its contract so that it could take on non-direct departmental governmental work. Let us hope that we can press the company, which has good relations in Weston-super-Mare, to make a commercial decision to stay there. I hope that the terms will be appropriate.

    Let us be realistic. If there is no agreement on this aspect, let us hope, first, that the company and also the Ministry of Public Building and Works go on from there, because there is a great deal of pressure now to prefabricate constructional work. I fully appreciate that this can be taken too far and can almost be made a gimmick, but with high transport costs a prefabricated component is not an economic proposition. On the other hand, in the West Country, particularly near Bristol, a considerable amount of new building, and, I think, public building, is going up, and it would be appropriate if that type of work were carried out in this type of factory. This is another thing on which the company could make approaches, and, indeed, has made approaches, to the Ministry of Public Building and Works. I hope that these approaches will be successful.

    My hon. Friend is probably wondering where the Board of Trade comes into this. I appreciate that this subject was originally put down for the War Office. Then my hon. Friend had the great fortune to draw it himself for three o'clock this morning. The subject I want to raise with him is the problem of the industrial development certificates. We have been in the process of building up the Birmingham overspill arrangements and these have been going satisfactorily. This has been applauded by Weston-super-Mare and Birmingham businessmen. However, there was a complication about a year ago concerning the granting of industrial development certificates.

    As most hon. Members know, the commercial world can be quite small. Once it gets about in a city like Birmingham that Weston-super-Mare is a difficult area in which to get I.D.C.s the poison has been spilled and will spread rapidly. I hope, therefore, that my hon. Friend will assure the House that no difficulty will be placed in the way of I.D.C.s being granted. This is a particularly important topic for Weston-super-Mare, for it is not basically a heavy industrial area. On the other hand, if we were to lose the industries we have it would be detrimental to the social structure of the whole area served by the Weston-super-Mare Employment Exchange.

    If the factories close and we lose our skilled and semi-skilled labour to other places there would be great difficulty in getting them hack and I cannot think that such a development would lead to the health of the area. In this connection, there is the deep human problem which would be caused by unemployment. A little generosity would avert a great deal of human misery. I stress, as a member of the Estimates Committee, the importance of the Government being generous because this would save the expenditure of a considerable amount of public money in the future.

    For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to give us all the help and assurances that he can.

    2.57 a.m.

    In associating myself with the remarks of the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster), I would point out the great degree of co-operation which exists among all sections of the community in this area.

    A number of hon. Members have received representations from local trades councils and similar bodies. I urge the Minister to do something constructive about the question of I.D.C.s in view of the situation in which the town now finds itself. I am referring not only to the existing unemployment figures, but to the possibility of further unemployment as a result of the running down of Henly's and Westlands. I urge him to ask his right hon. Friend to speed up, for example, the project of the technical college and to consider the possibility of replacing the two hump-back bridges. Work of this kind would avoid the possibility of higher unemployment figures.

    Although the number of unemployed may appear small at the moment, a genuine fear exists in the South-West that the concentration of effort being made to reduce unemployment in the North-East, Scotland and elsewhere may mean that unless the Government are careful they may be stopping up holes in some areas and creating others in places such as the one under discussion.

    2.59 a.m.

    I accept at once the premise of my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster) that his constituency is an attractive place. He has put the case for this town in a persuasive way and has rightly said that a number of Departments are involved, I will try, in my turn, to deal logically and in sequence with the points he raised.

    I know that the War Office much regrets the need to reduce its workshop capacity as a result of its contract policy in regard to Henly's, in Weston-super-Mare. As my hon. Friend knows, the War Office vehicle repair workshops have catered mainly for the overhaul of vehicles on a strip-and-rebuild basis, and since this type of work has been reduced considerably it has been necessary to reduce total workshop capacity. Of the six workshops concerned, three are closing down and three are to be retained. We have to argue from the general down to the particular.

    My hon. Friend will also understand, I am sure, that many technical factors, on which I am not competent to speak, had to be taken into account by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War in deciding which workshops would have to be given up. I should like to make it clear, however, that this is not a case of a Government decision to transfer work from the South to the North as part of the Government's general measures to relieve unemployment in the North. In deciding which workshops would have to be given up, my right hon. Friend took into account the relevant factors, including the most economical way in which the remaining work could be done, and Weston happens to be a large one with a high economic work load. I am sure that my hon. Friend, with his knowledge of the town, knows this.

    My hon. Friend wishes to seek an extended period of grace for the turndown of Henly's War Office contract, and no doubt he will be taking this up direct—if he has not already done so, and I rather suspect that he has—with the Secretary of State for War, but perhaps I should say that I understand that my right hon. Friend would find it very difficult to agree to a longer period of turn-down at the Government's—that is, at the taxpayers'—expense.

    We all realise that redundancies are likely to occur, not only amongst Henly's workers, but as a result of the gradual run-down of employment by Westland Aircraft. I understand that, although the firm's intentions are not altogether clear, Westlands is concentrating its main activities on Yeovil, Hayes and Cowes, and plans to reduce its direct labour force at Weston to about 300 in this year. That is a melancholy fact, but it is right that we should face it and see what can be done about it.

    Unemployment in Weston as a holiday resort—

    Before the Minister leaves that point, is it not true that Westlands is running down to 200, not 300, during this year?

    I cannot possibly, I think, give any such definite forecast. I can only give what I understand, and cannot pretend that I am absolutely a perfect prophet. I understand that the intention is to reduce the labour force to about 300 during the course of this year, but I cannot give an absolutely definite statement, and hope that I shall not be expected to do so.

    Unemployment in Weston, as a holiday resort, is subject to considerable seasonal fluctuations, and I know that my hon. Friend does not expect me to change the seasons, because this would hurt the town as a whole. Hitherto, Weston's unemployment, although above the national average, has not been acutely serious. I know that the figures have shown a considerable increase during the first months of this year, but that is in line with the national trend, which has been affected by the severe weather and, as my hon. Friend has pointed out, there has been a welcome improvement in March—with the coming of the first snowdrops. This is true nationally, as well as locally.

    My hon. Friend raised the point about the acceptance of further contracts by Henly's as long as the War Office contract remains in force. I understand that the general policy of the War Office, which is in accordance with the legal position as defined in its operating licences, has been that Government-owned workshops should be run solely for work on Government vehicles, but, exceptionally, in certain cases, the War Office has permitted contractors to undertake certain semi-public work—for example, in Weston, work provided by the South Western Gas Board—and will be discussing any proposals the firm wishes to make for taking on private work while the War Office contract is being run down. I hope that that meets one of my hon. Friends detailed points.

    Any space that may be thrown up as a result of, the contraction of Henly's and Westlands is likely to prove attractive to firms that might not be able to expand in Birmingham itself, or in Bristol itself.

    I understand that the Ministry of Aviation which owns this factory will be glad to agree to any reasonable proposals for sub-letting space and, subject to what I have already said about the need to give priority to steering new industry to development districts, we shall not stand in the way of such suitable firms that may be interested in taking over available space.

    My hon. Friend has pointed out the many advantages offered by Weston-super-Mare to industrialists. He has also asked the Board of Trade to be generous in considering the unemployment which might be expected to arise if Henly's is obliged to give up operations and if Westlands carried through its intentions of a substantial rundown in manpower this year. To this I must answer, as I think my hon. Friend appreciates, that it is yet too soon to be sure that there will be serious long-term unemployment in the town.

    I must not encourage fears, if the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) will permit me to say that.

    We know that Henly's, which has shown much initiative in its efforts to secure new private contracts, has already shown an interest in the possibility of continuing the lease of its premises from the Ministry of Aviation, and we hope that it might find it possible to obtain new work and continue to employ at any rate a proportion of its existing labour force. I assure my hon. Friend that I understand the balance of skills which matters in any existing industrial undertaking or complex.

    I understand that Henly's proposes to make prefabricated buildings and building components, and that my hon. Friend has already heard from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Public Building and Works that it is interested in this proposal. This is where the complication of having various Departments continues to come in. I understand, also, that the firm's particulars have been noted by the Director-General of Research and Development. This is as yet in its early stages, but as soon as possible the offer made by Henly's will be followed up. In addition, the Ministry of Labour will do everything in its power to find suitable employment far those workers who become redundant from Henly's or West-lands, and as the economic climate improves and industrial expansion continues we hope that many of these men will find new jobs without too much delay.

    The Board of Trade for its part will be keeping a careful watch—and this is not an idle phrase—on the position in Weston-super-Mare. We hope and believe that during the next few months it will prove that the employment problems of Weston-super-Mare are not as intractable as may be feared at present. While our first obligation must still be to try to find suitable new industry for development districts where high and persistent unemployment exists, and I am sure that the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West, with his wide national sympathies, will not dispute that, I assure my hon. Friend that we shall deal sympathetically with applications for industrial development certificates in Weston-super-Mare by firms willing to move there and which are not able to go to any of the development districts.

    My hon. Friend mentioned a case where there was delay in granting an i.d.c. to a Birmingham firm which was proposing to move to Weston-super-Mare under the overspill scheme. This firm made two applications. The first made two years ago was rejected. A later, revised, application was granted without any undue delay. I assure my hon. Friend that we are well aware of the importance of dealing with these applications as quickly as possible. I am sure that he, in his turn, will understand that while "No" can be said very quickly, "Yes" often involves making a number of inquiries, because one wants to be sure. As for the movement of firms from Birmingham to Weston-super-Mare, generally our first consideration in dealing with expansion proposals by firms, whether from Birmingham or elsewhere, is to try to steer them into development districts. I am sure that I have the sympathy of the House in this.

    Subject to this overriding priority we shall be prepared to issue industrial development certificates for Weston in all suitable cases. I am told that we have not refused any i.d.c. for Birmingham firms wishing to go to Weston.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Adjourned accordingly at ten minutes past Three o'clock a.m.