asked the Lord Privy Seal what attempts have recently been made by the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council to negotiate the special agreements referred to in Article 43 of the Charter without which the sanctions intended to enable the Security Council to fulfil its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security cannot be enforced; and what are the reasons still preventing the conclusion of these special agreements eighteen years after the Charter was signed.

None, Sir. The Military Staff Committee reached deadlock at an early stage over the general principles that should govern the organisation of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by Member States. Nothing has occurred since to resolve this disagreement.

Could not the Soviet Union be reminded that Chapter 7 of the Charter cannot be brought into operation unless it is so decided by the Security Council, on which the Soviet Union retains its veto? What is the object of holding up the operation of these sanctions?

I will certainly consider my hon. Friend's suggestion, but I am afraid that there is no indication that the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to the implementation of the Military Staff Committee.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the special session of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the financial situation of the United Nations.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what proposals Her Majesty's delegate has laid before the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the budget of the organisation; and whether he will make a statement.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what instructions have been given to the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations in relation to the refusal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to pay her contribution to the United Nations; and if he will make a statement.

asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he will state the policy of Her Majesty's Government with the object of maintaining the solvency of the United Nations Organisation, in view of the continued refusal of a large number of the members of the United Nations Organisation to pay their dues in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

The United Kingdom has not yet formally tabled any proposals at the General Assembly. Our views, however, are well known from the public proposals we put forward in the Working Group of Twenty-One. We are at present engaged in informal discussions with other delegations on the immediate problems of solving the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and the Organisation des Nations tinier au Congo for the remainder of 1963 and of the collection of arrears from defaulting members. The Russian refusal to contribute to the United Nations Emergency Fund and the Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo accounts is one aspect of this problem.

While supporting the views expressed by the hon. Gentleman about the position of the Russians and others, may I ask whether the Government would give further consideration to the proposals put forward by India and certain other countries for voluntary peace-keeping funds? Although this may be an unsatisfactory expedient, less satisfactory than a permanent solution, is it not better to have something like that rather than see the organisation drift into a position in which it can no longer undertake these peace-keeping operations?

We will consider this and other proposals, but our main objective is to see that there is collective financial responsibility.

Is it not the case that the Russians have said that they will contribute only to purposes of which they approve? If that is so, would the Government consider pointing out to them that this will make a complete farce of everything for which the United Nations stands and is simply old imperialism in modern dress?

Yes, Sir. I have seen a report to the effect of what the right hon. Gentleman says about the Russian attitude. It certainly indicates a hardening of the Russian attitude, but at the moment this should not divert us from our main objective, which is to reach agreement with the great majority of the members of the United Nations who sincerely wish to see a solution to the organisation's financial problems.

Has not this parlous financial position of the United Nations become a major political problem? May we have an assurance from the hon. Gentleman that Her Majesty's Government will not participate in any drastic action until after high-level talks have taken place among the four permanent members of the Council, including the Soviet Union?

I agree that this is a major political problem. At the moment we are trying to reach agreement with the majority of the members of the Assembly in this special session, but we will consider the matter raised by the right hon. and learned Gentleman.

Would it not be a good idea if we suggested that those members of the United Nations which had not paid up could not vote?

That is the effect of the advisory opinion of the International Court in relation to Article 19. Perhaps I should say that, although there are 69 members in arrears, only one member is liable to be penalised under Article 19, and I am informed that that member has given notice that it intends to make payment, so that it will not be penalised; so that this matter does not arise at the moment.

Would not the hon. Gentleman tell the House the whole truth, which is that no fewer than 47 members of the United Nations, including members of both the Eastern and Western blocs and of the non-aligned countries, have so far not paid a single penny towards the Congo operations? In view of this situation, is it not absolutely essential that some supplementary means should be found of raising funds for peace-keeping operations? Will not the Government adopt a more sympathetic attitude towards the proposals for a voluntary fund put forward by a number of non-aligned nations?

Yes, Sir. It is true that many countries are in arrears, countries both of West and East, but there are many countries in arrears because of financial difficulties, and I do not think that that obtains in the case of the Communist bloc.

asked the Lord Privy Seal whether the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the relevance of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter to the racial policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa remain as stated by the United Kingdom representative in the Special Political Committee of the United Nations on 31st October, 1961, and 20th October 1962.

The remarks in question should be read as references to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative in the Special Political Committee on 5th April, 1961, in which the full views of Her Majesty's Government were given. The text of that statement is contained in the report on the proceedings of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Cmnd. 1456.

asked the Lord Privy Seal whether the United Kingdom representative on the United Nations Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations supported the suggestion in its Report for a voluntary peace-keeping fund.

No, Sir. The current Special Session of the General Assembly is concentrating, in our view rightly, on the more immediate problems of collecting arrears of contributions and of working out arrangements for financing the United Nations Emergency Force and the Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo for the remainder of 1963.

Is the Under-Secretary of State aware that no fewer than seven of the non-aligned countries have already expressed their approval of this voluntary peace-keeping fund? Can he give any real reason why people should not be able to demonstrate their loyalty to the world community in this way if they wish to?

I am aware of the views that have been expressed by the countries to which the hon. and learned Member has referred, but we regard it as extremely important to preserve the basic principle of the collective financial responsibility of the members of the organisation for its activities.

Why should we expect a voluntary peace-keeping fund to be any more effective than the old Kellogg Peace Pact of 1928 which, when it came to the test, was so futile and so useless?

We certainly agree that the suggestion is not a very practical one.

Will the Minister bear in mind that the whole purpose of these operations is to put teeth into what were formerly pious aspirations; that we cannot have teeth without money, and that when people voluntarily pay money for action, they are more likely to be interested in it, and to support it?

The very fact that the hon. Gentleman has said one cannot have teeth without money indicates how very out of date he always is.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what representations he has received from Governments who attended the recent Conference of African States at Addis Ababa about areas of British responsibility in Africa.

Her Majesty's Government have not received representations of such a kind from the Conference. Any other communications on this subject which may be received from Commonwealth or foreign Governments are confidential.

While appreciating the degree of economic co-operation at this Conference, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend would care to comment on the remarks of the Prime Minister of Uganda who is alleged to have offered his country for the training of "freedom fighters" and to have said, "There is going to be war"? What action do the Government take when one Commonwealth country appears to threaten war against another?

I have seen reports of this kind. Naturally, we regret them.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if, in view of the fact that the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation communiqué issued by the United States Information Service of the American Embassy in London on Thursday, 11th April, is the only published information on the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation Council's eighth meeting in Paris from 8th to 10th April, he will make available to Parliament more detailed information about these meetings.

No, Sir. The South-East Asia Treaty Organisation communiqué contains all the information on the confidential proceedings that those participating agreed to release.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that hon. Members on both sides of the House deprecate the growing tendency of the Executive to give less and less information to Parliament about these fundamental treaties and other facts? Will he please now tell the House whether a new convention has arisen that no information is given to hon. Members unless they ask for it? Can he say what is the meaning of the bilateral treaty between Siam and the United States of 6th March in relation to the S.E.A.T.O. Treaty, because of the new doctrine of flexibility in S.E.A.T.O.?

Her Majesty's Government have undertaken no new commitments to S.E.A.T.O. In reply to the first part of the hon. Member's supplementary question, it is, of course, traditional that the proceedings at meetings of this sort, which are confidential, should not be disclosed beyond the communiqué which is released.

But is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that the new doctrine of flexibility reads that

"…action does not depend on the prior agreement of all parties to the Treaty since"—

Order. A verbatim quotation is out of order at Question Time.

I apologise, Mr. Speaker. This Treaty does not necessarily need the united acquiescence of the rest of the signatories; in other words, there is bilateral power to take action.

Positive acceptance of any proposal is still necessary for any commitment.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make available to Parliament a more detailed report of the 11th Central Treaty Organisation meeting at Karachi than the two-page typescript now available in the Library; and what it has cost Britain to date to remain a member of the Central Treaty Organisation.

Copies of the official communiqué and the secretariat's record of the opening session of the 11th Central Treaty Organisation Ministerial meeting in Karachi are now available in the Library, together with various booklets on the Central Treaty Organisation.

Does that figure include our contribution to the infrastructure in the area, and does it include our contribution to building the railway between Mush and the eastern area of the C.E.N.T.O. Treaty obligations? Will he not let Dr. Beeching know about this magnificent railway project in case he plans to close it on strategic or economic grounds?

The figures T have given, from the economic point of view, certainly include things like technical assistance, ports and telecommunication links between the regional capitals.

What about the railway?

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make further representations to the Government of the United Arab Republic about the release of, or payment of compensation for, the property of British nationals resequestrated in October-November, 1961.

Frequent representations have been made in this matter. I regret that the United Arab Republic Government have not yet communicated their decision whether the property of the British nationals concerned is to be released or, if not, how compensation is to be paid. As my right hon. Friend said on 1st May, 1962, however, it seems clear that they will accept the principle of compensation for any property which is not released. Our most recent information is that a decision may he expected comparatively soon.

Would not my hon. Friend agree that there is now no threat from Israel, which was really the excuse for these seizures? Is he aware that some of these properties fall under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Financial Agreement, and will he do his best to reach finality on this matter?

Yes, Sir.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what reply he has made to the official Russian protest against British acceptance of the proposal for a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation force of Polaris-carrying surface ships with West German participation.

Copies of Her Majesty's Government's reply of 18th May to the Soviet Note of 8th April about the proposed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nuclear force have been placed in the Library of the House.

In view of the terms of that reply, and of the American Government's reply, can the right hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance that the American Government have now finally and definitively withdrawn their original proposal that the Polaris missile carriers should be of the cargo type, possessing the advantage of considerable anonymity through being able to count on the identity protection of as many as 4,500 merchant ships operating every day in the waters in which they would operate? Have they withdrawn that proposal and, if so, as this was put forward in order to meet the criticism of vulnerability, what now becomes of the argument of vulnerability?

If the hon. Member has read our Note he will know that the proposed surface vessels would be warships in fact, in name, and in law—and both Notes make that perfectly plain.

Is my right hon. Friend aware of the British protest against British acceptance of any multilateral force—mixed-manned or whatever it may be—and that many of us think that the best thing is a national, sovereign contribution to the defence of the West?

I have over many years taken full note of the individual protests of my hon. Friends. I am fully aware of them.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the official protest made by the West German Foreign Minister against the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to be bound by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation decision on the export of large-diameter steel pipes to the Soviet Union.

The Federal German Government have made known to Her Majesty's Government their views on the export of large-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union on several occasions, though not as an official protest. Likewise, Her Majesty's Government have explained their position to the Federal German authorities, either through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or directly, both before and after the matter was discussed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation last year.

Is the Lord Privy Seal aware that the German Foreign Secretary has twice called him a liar in public by saying that the British Government were bound, and knew that they were bound, by the N.A.T.O. decision? Will he now tell the House the whole truth about this secret decision, which ought never to have been secret? Was it a decision or a recommendation, and did Her Majesty's Government make clear their position that they would not be bound by it when it was made?

The hon. Gentleman is, as usual, completely misrepresenting the views of Herr Schröder; and this matter has been clearly stated to the House on many occasions.

Since West Germany is making strenuous efforts to increase her trade with the Soviets, is it reasonable to allow West Germany to play dog in the manger and prevent us from supplying these oil pipes in view of the fact that if we do not supply them the Soviets will themselves start to make them?

The Federal Republic have stopped, by their own action, the export of this piping to the Soviet Union. The question of increasing trade is, of course, a matter both for ourselves and the Federal German Republic in other matters. On this particular matter of large-diameter piping we have made our position quite clear.

asked the Lord Privy Seal to what extent, in the course of the negotiations for a nuclear test ban agreement, the principal Powers concerned have modified their original estimates of the number of on-site inspections that would be, respectively, the minimum necessary and the maximum acceptable; if, in view of the progressive narrowing of the gap between these figures, he will renew his efforts to secure agreement before either of the Powers makes this more difficult by re-starting tests; and if, meanwhile, in the interest of securing agreement, he will urge both powers to refrain from further testing.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what progress has been made on the submission of proposals concerning the concept and the number of on-site inspections, presented by Her Majesty's Government at Geneva, with a view to agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty; and if he will make a statement.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what scientific advice he has obtained about the number of on-site inspections needed on Soviet territory or elsewhere to provide a satisfactory basis for policing a nuclear test-ban treaty.

The Western draft treaty of 1961 provided for a quota of 20 on-site inspections a year. Shortly afterwards, the Western delegations offered to substitute a variable quota of between 12 and 20 inspections, depending on the number of unidentified seismic events on the territory of the other side. As a result of an intensive seismic research programme, the Western Powers were subsequently able to reduce their requirements to between eight and ten, and, last March, to seven, provided that the conditions under which these inspections were made were satisfactory. This takes full account of all the latest scientific advice available to us.

Has the right hon. Gentleman noted, and welcomed, the statement given in evidence before a Senatorial Committee by a senior expert at the Pentagon that he would now be content with six or seven; but has he also noted the rather unfortunate coincidence that, on the very day on which President Kennedy said that a new round of testing would be a great disaster, the resumption of testing in Nevada was announced by the Atomic Energy Commission, including what appear to be some atmospheric tests, though the word is disguised under the euphemism of "surface" testing?

I have seen many such reports.

Mr. Dempsey.

Cannot the Lord Privy Seal make any comment?

Order.

Will the Lord Privy Seal say what offer was made in the recent statement at Geneva—delivered, I understand, to the Soviet Ambassador—to try to bridge the gap between the Russians' suggested three on-site inspections and the West's seven inspections? Furthermore, can he say what effort has been made in this declaration to try to solve the problem of the concept of an inspection? Will not he agree that it is essential that we should try to arrive at some compromise between East and West to solve this problem?

I think that the very full Answer I have given demonstrates absolutely clearly to the House what steps the Western Powers have taken to move towards the Soviet Union's position while, at the same time, the Soviet Union has not moved in any way from the position it took in 1960. This is absolutely clear. From the point of view of dealing with the concept of inspection, we have on many occasions offered to have a full exchange of scientific information with the Soviet Union, which it has never accepted. We have offered on many occasions to discuss with the Russians their fear that inspection would lead to espionage, without the invitation being accepted by them. I think, therefore, that the House will agree that the Western Powers have made a very large number of moves towards the Soviet position, and have offered many opportunities for the Soviet Union to clarify the rest, which have not been accepted.

Does the Lord Privy Seal recall that on Tuesday the Prime Minister stated that he was, in a day or two, expecting to agree some new initiative with President Kennedy? Can he give any information about this, and whether statements will be made?

I cannot give any information at present.

How far does the right hon. Gentleman think that the present very narrow gap between the two sides is due to political reasons and how far to a different assessment of the scientific and technical date? If the latter is the explanation, is there not now a lot to be said for pushing the recent suggestion of Her Majesty's Government for the scientists of the two sides to meet, and should not that suggestion be renewed before there is another series of tests?

That invitation has been constantly made by both my hon. Friend the Minister of State and the American representative at Geneva, and it is an open invitation, but always the Soviet Government have made it perfectly clear that their view at the moment is that it is a purely political demonstration, and not based on scientific evidence.

Is it not reasonable to ask hon. Members opposite to be as persuasive with the Russians in order to try to get them to effect a compromise as they are with the Government?

While fully accepting most of what the right hon. Gentleman said, and while urging him to be as persuasive with the Russians as with the Americans, may I also respectfully ask him not to brush aside contemptuously a perfectly serious question about the new round of tests in Nevada?

I am not brushing it aside. The hon. Gentleman made a number of statements of fact, and I said that I noted the comments to which he drew my attention.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will publish a White Paper setting out the reasoning on which the Western demand for seven on-site inspections is based, including an analysis of the seismic events which have occurred within the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in recent years, showing the statistical connection between the number of events of doubtful origin and the number of inspections demanded assuming various numbers of unmanned seismic stations and differing selection procedures for the events to be inspected.

No, Sir. The demand for a particular number of inspections is based on a number of factors and data, not only scientific. Moreover, the scientific data cannot readily be presented in the form of a White Paper.

But as in answer to an earlier Question the Lord Privy Seal said that this was the very type of information that we had already offered to exchange with the Soviet Union, can he give any valid reason for refusing to do this on a unilateral basis? Does he appreciate that most ordinary people find it impossible to follow the niceties of the argument about whether there should be three or seven inspections, and that many of us believe that if the information were made available we should see that the insistence on seven inspections was unnecessary?

I cannot accept the hon. Gentleman's conclusion in his supplementary question at all. Certainly, the scientific data are immensely complex. Naturally, when we made the offer to the Soviet Union it was for an exchange of scientists to be able to discuss these aspects of the matter which are of concern to them.

Would the Lord Privy Seal at least say whether it is true, as reported in the Press on Sunday, that one of the reasons for the Government's attitude is that Soviet Russia is developing an anti-missile missile which can be tested only by means of underground experiments and that that is the reason why the Government want these inspections?

Order. It is out of order to ask Ministers to comment on, confirm or deny propositions in the Press for which they are not responsible.

I appreciate that the scientific reasons for the demand for a certain number of inspections are extremely complex, but does not the right hon. Gentleman know that Members of the House of Commons and members of the public are just as capable of judging the reasoning as are members of the Cabinet or of the Government negotiating team? Why should we not be given this information?

I am fully ready to agree with the hon. Member. All I said was that the information was not readily available or appropriate to be published in the form of a White Paper.

asked the Lord Privy Seal whether, in order to make it easier to reach agreement on a nuclear test-ban treaty, he will propose that the negotiating Powers should compose their remaining differences on the basis of the principle that a treaty banning all tests with imperfect means of monitoring minor underground explosions is a lesser evil than the continuation of tests.

No, Sir.

I am not astonished at the reply. Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the real reason for the difficulties caused by these apparently narrow differences on issues of detail and technical matters both as regards nuclear tests and as regards disarmament stems from the underlying fear and suspicion? So long as both sides remain prisoners of military logic, each believing that the other will attack if it has the chance, I do not think that we shall ever get agreement. Should not we take the initiative in trying to break the psychological deadlock by drawing attention to the basic fact that minor underground tests can be detected if there is more than one of them and that the slight uncertainty about isolated explosions is a much smaller risk than the risk of having no nuclear test ban treaty at all?

If the hon. Gentleman is right that the trouble here is suspicion between the two sides, perhaps the Soviet Government will accept our invitation to discuss the scientific aspects of this question together with any questions they care to raise about the possibility of espionage, so that we may put their fears at rest.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what proposals Her Majesty's Government will place before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for implementing Resolution 327 of the Assembly of the Council, which calls for increased contacts, under the auspices of the Council, between the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe.

I assume that the hon. Gentleman is referring to Recommendation 357. As he is aware, Her Majesty's Government are already taking steps to stimulate contacts with the peoples of Eastern Europe, to which they attach great importance. They welcome the interest shown in such contacts by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and will consider sympathetically in the Committee of Ministers any proposals which would enable the Council usefully to supplement work being done in this field by individual member States.

Whilst I welcome that statement, and recognise that in this respect Britain is ahead of other members of the Council of Europe, may I ask whether we can have an undertaking that, on the Committee of Ministers, the British Government will not let this Recommendation just be noted or approved, but will press for specific action in the terms of the Recommendation in order to get something done?

Her Majesty's Government are certainly extremely interested in this matter, as the hon. Gentleman knows, but I am not at present in a position to state what proposals, if any, Her Majesty's Government intend to place before the Committee of Ministers in this matter.

Can hon. Members be advised how best to get into this "closed club" of delegates to the Council of Europe?

I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should consult his Whip, if he has one.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what special privileges are exercised by Her Majesty's Government in Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial States; at what dates these privileges were acquired; and what steps are being taken to modernise relationships with these sheikdoms.

Since the reply to the first two parts of this Question is long, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT. As for the third part, I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave to the hon. Gentleman on 25th March.

Would not the Lord Privy Seal agree that it may well be easier to maintain our interests in the Gulf, which are of great value to the people there, if our relations with the sheikdoms are brought more up to date and, if possible, made rather less obtrusive and dominating? How long do we intend to maintain British jurisdiction in this area, how long are our representatives to have the name and status of political agents, and how long do we intend to insist on monopolising all the foreign diplomatic contacts of those countries?

We are always ready to discuss changes in our relationship with the Rulers, as we did in the case of Kuwait, which led to the exchange of letters of 19th June, 1961, but no question has been raised by the other Rulers in the Gulf to alter their arrangements. As to jurisdiction, a process of hand-over is going on as their juridical processes are established. From the point of view of the remainder of the supplementary question, as long as the relationship is desired, and Her Majesty's Government feel it valuable to maintain it, these other matters will remain.

asked the Lord Privy Seal how much of the North Sea bed comes within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom under the Continental Shelf provisions of the 1958 Geneva conventions on the Law of the Sea; whether the sea-bed frontiers have been agreed with other North Sea riparian States; and what arrangements for royalties are being made in the event of oil deposits being found in the North Sea.

Demarcation of areas of the bed of the North Sea is governed by the provisions of Articles 1 and 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which has not yet entered into force. It is not possible at this stage to say how much of the bed of the North Sea would be regarded as appertaining to the United Kingdom. There has been no argeement with other North Sea riparian States on these matters. The answer to the last part of the Question is: None, Sir; arrangements will be made as and when necessary.

Can the Lord Privy Seal say on what basis an American company which is supposed to be searching for oil in the North Sea is likely to be able to exploit its findings, and if an American company can exploit findings of oil on the Continental Shelf in the North Sea, will not the Soviet Union equally be able to go into the Irish Sea and do the same? Would it not be a good thing if the United Nations were made the trustees for all these rights of exploitation by way of bringing in revenue to the United Nations and also in order to minimise the likelihood of disputes?

As I said, arrangements will have to be made as and when necessary. At the moment, however, we are awaiting ratification by the necessary number of countries—22—of the Geneva Convention. Eighteen countries have so far ratified it. When the requisite number is reached, the Convention will come into force and govern these maters.

As a prominent European and, indeed, a Charlemagne Prizewinner, the right hon. Gentleman will be familiar with the system of udal law, and he will no doubt be aware that this system has an important bearing on rights over the bed of the sea and was guaranteed to Orkney and Shetland when they became part of Scotland. Can he explain how this matter will be affected by udal law?

No doubt it will be replaced by the 1958 Geneva Convention when it is fully ratified.

asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he will state the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the latest official Soviet Government proposal for the establishment of the Mediterranean as a nuclear-free zone.

Her Majesty's Government have no objection in principle to the formation of nuclear-free zones in certain areas, so long as such zones are set up voluntarily by the States concerned and the existing military balance is not disturbed. In the Mediterranean neither of these conditions would be met.

Would it not be more realistic if we sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries bordering on the Mediterranean sea rather than to declare the Mediterranean sea itself a non-nuclear zone? Will Her Majesty's Government intimate to the Soviet Government that they would willingly co-operate in seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries like Israel and the Arab States in that part of the Mediterranean?

It has long been our policy that we should try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in this way and particularly in the Middle East. I will certainly bear in mind what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said in considering the reply to the Soviet Note.

Would my right hon. Friend also bear in mind perhaps drawing to the attention of the Soviet Government in this context the potential nuclear capacity of Soviet warships lent to the United Arab Republic?

Yes, Sir.

asked the Lord Privy Seal what changes in the possession and control of nuclear weapons and forces will result from the agreements to which Her Majesty's Government consented at the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Ministerial meeting; and what the effect of these will be on Her Majesty's Government's policy of opposing German control, or participation in control, of nuclear weapons and forces.

As stated in the communiqué, the North Atlantic Ministerial Council approved

"arrangements for broader participation by officers of the North Atlantic Treat Organisation member countries in nuclear activities in Allied Command Europe and in co-ocrdination of operational planning at Omaha".

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether this is a policy of deliberately spreading the control of nuclear forces and weapons to countries which at the moment have not got nuclear forces and weapons; and, in particular, is not this a departure from the policy that he has stated at the Dispatch Box several times, that Her Majesty's Government would not agree to any West German participation in control of nuclear weapons and forces? Is it not involved in this policy that we shall concede German participation in control of nuclear weapons and forces?

I said in the substantive answer that the arrangements for ownership and political control of nuclear weapons within the alliance remain as before.

Would the right hon. Gentleman then say what is the essence of this policy? What is the meaning to be attached, therefore, to this communiqué and all the talk about multilateral or multi-national forces—a N.A.T.O. deterrent?

Because, first of all, in the staff organisation of SACEUR there will be changes in which the international spread of the officers taking part under the Nuclear Deputy Commander will have greater participation. Secondly, because the countries of the alliance, through, we hope, an extension of the consultative arrangements created at Athens a year ago will have greater information and, therefore, participation in the arrangements for this control.

asked the Lord Privy Seal why the Government have now decided to become a party to the German-United States agreement about setting up a mixed-manned multilateral surface fleet armed with Polaris missiles.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if, in the proposed mixed-manned seaborne Polaris fleet, it is the intention that the supporting members will have the right of veto in the same way as the active members.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement about the announcement made by the Foreign Secretary at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation conference at Ottawa that the United Kingdom accepts the principle of a mixed-manned force

The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards a mixed-manned North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nuclear force remains as previously stated to the House, namely we have given a general welcome to the concept but no agreement has been reached to establish such a force. No decisions have therefore been taken on particular questions such as its political control.

Why have the Government, who originally took the same view of the military merits of this proposal as that so forcefully expressed by Lord Montgomery in another place, gone half way to yield to American political pressure exerted in order to appease the German desire for nuclear weapons? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in Bonn this concession is regarded as a first step to the achievement of equal rights in nuclear weapons? In view of what happened last time when we encouraged and connived at the rearmament and territorial ambitions of German nationalism and militarism in order to use Germany as a bulwark against Communism, will he please reconsider his position?

I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's interpretation of history, either ancient or modern. When this proposal was first put forward, my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary made a statement saying that we welcomed the concept, which enables the countries of the alliance to work more closely together; but the whole concept must be examined for its military, financial and economic implications. That is the Government's position.

The right hon. Gentleman will have noted that in my Question I ask what is his intention. Does he approve of the idea of a crew on board a vessel, which will, in the event, continually be in danger, not having equal rights? Should not the supporting members on the vessel have the same rights of decision as the active members, since they will be engaged in the same venture and their lives will be at the same hazard?

I answered the hon. Gentleman's Question by saying that, as no agreement has yet been reached to establish such a force, no decisions have been taken about particular points regarding control such as he raises.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that his reference to the N.A.T.O. countries working more closely together in the military sphere is quite irrelevant to this new concept which has been welcomed by the Foreign Secretary? The N.A.T.O. countries work together at present. This concept is something quite different. Did the Foreign Secretary, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, before accepting this new concept in principle, consider its practicability and the expense which is likely to be entailed? May we have an assurance that, before the principle is adopted in practice, the House will be fully consulted?

The form in which statements were made at the time not only in the other place but to this House expressed our views about the concept. I still maintain that it is a concept which allows these countries to work more closely together. We have said specifically that the next step is for all the implications to be examined, and this process is going on. The House will, of course, be kept informed about it.

Will my right hon. Friend note that some of us on this side of the House are highly alarmed at the prospects of this arrangement? Will he take into account that in any discussions there must be no question of paying lip-service but we must be absolutely frank on this unpractical proposition?

Yes, Sir; I am sure that my hon. Friend, as he always does, will wish to consider the matter fully and carefully and form a balanced judgment when all the information is available.

In view of the great concern on both sides of the House about this and the fact that no decisions have been taken on almost all the important questions of control, cost and practicability, is it not a little early to invite over here a naval mission headed by the United States vice-chief of naval operations?

No, Sir; I should have thought that that was exactly what was required at this moment so that the details of the matter could be discussed. It is, after all, an American proposal on which the American Administration have been working. It is, therefore, natural that we should wish to discuss all the details with them before any decisions can possibly be reached.

I do as I did the other day, Mr. Speaker, that is, I announce that, failing an official debate on this subject, I intend to raise the matter at the earliest opportunity on the Adjournment.

asked the Lord Privy Seal why, despite assurances that President Tshombe would continue to be protected by the Katanga gendarmerie, United Nations forces assisted Central Congolese troops to disarm the President's bodyguard.

Mr. Tshombe's palace guards have been replaced by 15 Katanga civil police, who will be armed when on duty.

Why were two British consular cars interfered with in the course of this operation and one British subject arrested?

I regret that I have no information about that at the moment. I will find out about it and let my hon. Friend know.

asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he will make a statement about the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council, with particular reference to the United States proposal for a multilateral or mixed-manned Polaris surface fleet.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement about the North Atlantic Council meeting at Ottawa.

asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the decisions reached at the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The main result of the Meeting was that the Council approved the steps taken to organise the nuclear forces of the Alliance, on the lines foreshadowed in paragraph 6 of the Nassau communiqué. This means in practice the creation of an inter-allied nuclear force, to include the British V-bomber force, whose formal assignment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was notified during the meeting, and three United States Polaris submarines as well as other nuclear delivery units already assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Was it at this conference that a general welcome was accorded to the proposed multilateral surface force? Would it not be franker and better for Anglo-American relations if Her Majesty's Government now withdrew this general welcome to something which we cannot afford, which cannot work, and which is detrimental to Her Majesty's Government's own policy with regard to the independent nuclear deterrent? Further, was any proposal of this kind ever envisaged at the Bahamas Conference?

The subject discussed at the N.A.T.O. meeting in Ottawa was the inter-allied nuclear force. There was no full discussion of the multilateral force, because that was not the purpose of the meeting, it still being under examination by the various countries concerned. I hope that my hon. Friend, too, will be prepared to form his judgment when the examinations have been completed.

Will the Government undertake to publish the details in a White Paper? Is it not true that Bonn has offered to contribute 40 per cent. of the cost and of crews of this fleet? Does not this eagerness spread from the belief in West Germany that this will be a major step towards its becoming a nuclear Power?

I am not sure for what details the hon. Gentleman is asking. The details which were agreed on at Ottawa have already been published in the N.A.T.O. communiqué. As regards the multilateral force, I understand that the German Government have indicated their general support, but any question of the total of their contribution is a matter to be negotiated.

In the report, the Ministers welcomed the measures taken at Ottawa to increase the effectiveness of nuclear capability. Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the United States already has an over-kill capacity which absolutely baffles human imagination? Does not he think that, if the Ministers were to reconsider that paragraph, they could also think of the point they might be expected to reach when they could say that they were thinking in terms of a reduction instead of a further increase?

I should have thought that our efforts at Geneva to reach an agreement on disarmament were sufficient proof of our interest in the desirability of a reduction in armaments.

Would not it have been much wiser if the British Government had voiced the obvious technical objection to this proposal before it went to Ottawa and so avoided putting us in a position where a N.A.T.O. decision has been made and we have to make our own separate decision afterwards?

I do not think my hon. and gallant Friend has quite understood the position. No decision was taken at Ottawa about the multilateral force. The decision taken was about the inter-allied force, which was the result of paragraph 6 of the Nassau Agreement. General agreement was reached between the members of the alliance on this point. There was no decision—and it was not a major item of the discussion—about the multilateral or mixed-manned force. That is still being investigated by those countries which are interested.

In their thinking about the multilateral force, are the Government considering this as an alternative or as an addition to the British independent nuclear deterrent? Also, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Government are considering whether it could be controlled by anyone else except the Americans ultimately?

It is being considered as an addition to the existing nuclear arrangements. The matters of control still remain to be discussed both with the American Administration and with the other Governments which are interested.

Will my right hon. Friend convey to the Prime Minister the warning from this side of the House that he should not go too quickly in this matter?

If I understand my hon. Friend aright, as I have sometimes tried to do in the past, she means that we should give it most careful consideration and a full examination. I assure her that we will do that, but I have sometimes noted in the past that her emphasis is rather more on haste than on delay.