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Commons Chamber

Volume 680: debated on Tuesday 9 July 1963

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House Of Commons

Tuesday, 9th July, 1963

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]

Private Business

BRITISH RAILWAYS BILL

Lords Amendments considered and agreed to.

LUCAS ESTATE BILL [ Lords]

FACTORY LANE, WARRINGTON (LEVEL CROSSING) BILL [ Lords]

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.

Oral Answers To Questions

Pacific Territories

Nuclear Tests

1.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he is aware of the concern felt in Fiji and other Pacific territories about the effect of nuclear testing on the fish which form part of the islanders'staple diet; and if he will make representations on this matter to the French Government and other Powers contemplating further tests in this area.

I have no evidence of any widespread concern among the populations of Fiji and other Pacific territories about the effect of nuclear testing on fish.

I am advised by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal that discussions will be held with the French Government at an appropriate time.

While I am grateful for the assurance in the latter part of the Answer, may I ask the hon. Gentleman, since he expresses doubt about widespread concern, whether he has seen the very strong statement made a few weeks ago, by the Bishop in Polynesia, who travels constantly about his vast diocese by cargo-boat or catamaran, and who knows the islands at least as well as the hon. Gentleman does?

I did see the Bishop in Polynesia a few days ago and in a very long conversation between us of over an hour on a wide range of subjects he never mentioned this subject at all.

British Guiana

Situation

2.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement on the situation in British Guiana.

I am glad to say that terms for the resumption of work were agreed on 6th July and that most strikers resumed work yesterday. I am sure the whole House will wish me to express our gratitude to Mr. Robert Willis and to the Trade Union Congress for making him available to help in the negotiations. The resumption of work is to no small extent due to his efforts. I hope that incidents of violence will now cease and that the people of British Guiana will work hard and constructively to repair the harm to their country's economy which this prolonged strike has caused. As the House knows, my right hon. Friend left by air for British Guiana this morning.

Whilst appreciating the end of the general strike and wishing to endorse the congratulation of Mr. Willis, may I ask the hon. Gentleman whether it is not the case that the crisis in British Guiana is much more than the general strike? Is it not a matter also of the difficulties between the leaders of political parties, between the races, between the economic conditions of that country and the need to satisfy America before independence? Is the hon. Gentleman thinking in these broader terms towards some solution of the problem of British Guiana?

Yes, we certainly are, of course, but I, like the hon. Gentleman, do not want to minimise the seriousness of the industrial dispute. He is perfectly right in saying that we also have a very acute political and racial conflict here, and we are certainly thinking in the wider terms which he mentioned. That is why my right hon. Friend has gone there. He was never going to mediate in the strike but was always going in the wider context which the hon. Gentleman mentioned.

While wishing to be associated with the tribute to Mr. Robert Willis and the T.U.C., bearing this in mind, would it not have been wiser to have accepted his further guidance that the Secretary of State might have delayed his visit?

I do not think so, for the reason given in the latter part of my Answer to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway). My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was not going out to mediate in the general strike but in the much wider context mentioned by the hon. Gentleman.

While welcoming the news which my hon. Friend has just given the House, may I ask him if he will bear in mind the fact that the life of this Colony is being strangled by hatred and fear; that the hatred is basically racial while the fear is that this country will soon be giving independence to this Colony and so creating on the mainland of South America another Cuba?

This, of course, is one of the additional complications in this very difficult territory. Not only do we have a political and racial difficulty but we also have the genuine fears which my hon. and learned Friend has expressed about the future of the country in the context of Communism and so on. This is another aspect which my right hon. Friend wishes to see for himself.

Strike

6.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what steps he is taking to prevent Russian and Cuban ships carrying fuel and foodstuffs from breaking the strike in British Guiana.

None, Sir. The strike is now over but, in any event, this is a matter which would have fallen within the responsibility of British Guiana Ministers.

In reaching any decision about the future of British Guiana, will my hon. Friend take into account the profound concern which has been felt by those who oppose Communism in British Guiana about the use of Russian and Cuban ships to break the strike and to keep in power an avowed Communist, Dr. Jagan.

Essential services have been safeguarded by the provision of fuel oil by these ships. Indeed, Dr. Jagan, to be fair to him, could not, owing to the trade union position, obtain fuel oil to keep these essential services going except from Cuba.

While welcoming the rather unexpected support of the hon. and learned Member for Billericay (Mr. Gardner) for the principle of the right to strike, and while wishing that it would be extended to other strikes in other parts of the world, may I ask the Under-Secretary to say whether, in the opinion of the Government, there is any sound foundation for preventing anyone's ships from carrying foodstuffs to anywhere in the world?

There may not be any such sound foundation, but if trade unionists do not want to load and unload such ships I do not think that it is for me to criticise them.

7.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what action is being taken by British troops to maintain law and order pending the settlement of the present strike in British Guiana; and if he will make a statement.

As I have said, the strike is now over. Detachments in support of the civil powers are available both in Georgetown and in the rural areas. In Georgetown they are helping the police by providing static guards and street patrols.

Is my hon. Friend aware that during the last few days I have received urgent cables from more than 50 responsible people in British Guiana expressing their despair at the support which they think the British Government have been paying for and giving to a Communist règime in a British Colony?

I, too, have received a good many cables. The troops are in British Guiana to maintain law and order and whatever the complexion of the Government in British Guiana, we traditionally provide this aid; and I think that we should do so.

Constitution

10.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the continuing constitutional and political stalemate in British Guiana, he will now take steps to suspend the constitution and hold a referendum on the future electoral system desired by the majority of the adult inhabitants of all racial derivations.

I am not quite sure whether my hon. Friend's reply of"No, Sir", applies to the whole of the Question or only to part of it. If the Minister finds it objectionable to suspend the Constitution, does he favour holding a referendum on what the majority of the people want, whether this be our system, proportional representation or the single transferable vote? What most of us find quite intolerable is a system continuing in which British bayonets support a Government in power and a Prime Minister supported by less than half of the electorate.

The suspension of the Constitution is one possible course. The institution of proportional representation, as opposed to first past the post, is another. There are many courses we could follow in this very difficult situation, none of them at all attractive, but as my right hon. Friend is now on the way to British Guiana to study the position at first hand, I do not think the House would wish me, or expect me, to anticipate his policy decisions.

Would the Under-Secretary consider suggesting to his right hon. Friend that while he is there he should explore in advance the possibility of renewing constitutional talks in London in the hope that perhaps in a fresh setting there might be a more constructive approach by both sides?

That is another idea, but the atmosphere was not very helpful when the British Guianese leaders were here last autumn, and until we can assume a more hopeful atmosphere it is, perhaps, better not to get them back to London for another conference.

Malta

Emigration

3.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what undertakings have been given to the Government of Malta regarding a modification of the immigration restrictions on its citizens when they wish to come to the United Kingdom.

Has the attention of the hon. Gentleman been drawn to a report to the effect that the Secretary of State made a statement in Malta in which he suggested that there were great possibilities for immigration to this country? If that is the case, and while recognising the needs of the Maltese people, does it not make nonsense of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, since unemployment and the pressure of population is greater in many of the West Indian territories?

My right hon. Friend pointed out that there were some vacant jobs in the south of England and that Maltese would be welcome to fill them. On the West Indian point, the comparable numbers are very small. We have about 1,000 Maltese coming here every year and we propose to try to step that number up to about 2,000. In the West Indian context, it will be within the hon. Member's recollection that Barbados has already a very successful scheme similar to this one—concentrating on recruitment to London Transport—which has been operating for a long time. We are trying to give the Maltese the same facilities.

19.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what proposals he has for extending to other parts of the Commonwealth, other than the United Kingdom, his scheme for planned emigration from Malta.

Plans for emigration are the responsibility of the Malta Government. But we are of course ready to do all we can to assist them.

Butis the hon. Gentleman aware that, while we welcome the offer of emigration facilities given by his right hon. Friend to Malta, we think that Her Majesty's Government have put themselves in the position of appearing to discriminate in immigration in favour of a European Colony and against the coloured Colonies of the West Indies? Is he aware that Malta already has emigration facilities to Australia which are denied to the West Indies, so will he ensure that the West Indies get full and equal treatment with Malta?

There is certainly no question of colour discrimination at all. We are helping the Government of Malta, at their request, with the planned emigration to this country such as has been long adopted by West Indian Governments such as Barbados, and this, of course, will all fall strictly within the terms of the Commonwealth Immigration Act. There is no question of discrimination. Some hon. Members may feel—I certainly do—that as the unemployment situation in Malta is partly, at any rate, due to our defence run-down, we have, perhaps, a special responsibility to Malta.

Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that it is really absurd to encourage any territories, white or coloured, to send population surpluses to this overcrowded island, particularly so when the encouragement is, as in this case, to send them to what are described as jobs in southern England? Is not the whole idea of our policy to decrease the number of people crowding into southern England?

AsI said in reply to an earlier supplementary question, the scale of this encouragement to the Maltese is minimal, putting it up by about 1,000 only, which would not make much difference. We are concerned mainly to help Maltese emigration to other parts of the Commonwealth, such as Australia, which badly need it.

Since the Under-secretary is saying that there is no substantial change in the announcement by his right hon. Friend, and since there is a widespread misunderstanding of the Government's position in the West Indies, may I ask whether he will now tell the West Indies Government that the Government are ready to negotiate with them planned emigration facilities for Barbados similar to those for Malta?

There is no question of negotiation. Malta asked whether we could make facilities available for a retired official from the Ministry of Labour to help to place these people in jobs. We did that and the Ministry of Labour found a very senior and excellent official, now retired from the Ministry, who is working for the Malta Government at the Malta Commission in London. We can certainly arrange this for other territories.

High Commission Territories

Political Refugees

4.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will take steps to ensure that Mr. and Mrs. Hodgson and Mr. Michael Harmel, political refugees from South Africa now resident in Bechuanaland, are not returned to South Africa or deported from the High Commission territories.

Mr. Harmel has recently come to Britain. Mr. and Mrs. Hodgson have temporary permits to reside in Bechuanaland which expire on 31st July. If they do not wish to return to South Africa it is assumed that they likewise will move to Britain or some other country.

Is the Minister aware that Mr. Harmel wishes to return to Bechuanaland, that Mr. and Mrs. Hodgson wish to stay there and to open a chicken farm, but that they have been presented with a sweeping declaration of renunciation of elementary political rights which, they have been told, they must sign in order to stay? Is not this an intolerable imposition on political refugees from South Africa who certainly do not want to engage in Bechuanaland politics, gun-running or any incitement to violence against the South African Government but who merely wish to enjoy the same political rights in Bechuanaland as are enjoyed by the residents there?

I dare say that they would like to go back, but we must consider the interests of the people of Bechuanaland, because they are vulnerable to economic pressures from the Republic of South Africa. The harbouring of political refugees who might abuse the hospitality of the territories—plot against the Republic—might well provoke severe economic sanctions. The inhabitants of these territories are aware of this and are anxious to avoid this risk.

Can the Undersecretary say to what extent the African members of the Executive Council have been consulted and to what extent they agreed to the steps taken in this case?

They have. The Resident Commissioner acted on the advice of his Executive Council which, in Bechuanaland, includes four unofficials, of whom two are Africans. To that extent they have been consulted and have expressed this very definite view; they do not want these people there.

5.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why political refugees from South Africa, including British citizens, are forbidden to take an active part in politics, including speaking, writing or activity in a political association, as a condition of being issued with permits to stay in the High Commission Territories.

I invite the hon. Member's attention to the explanation given to the House by the then Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations on 28th July. 1960.

But is the Under-Secretary aware that we protested then against the imposition of these restrictions on political refugees from South Africa and that we are still protesting against them? Is he not aware that what he has just said in reply to the previous Question amounts to saying that this country has decided to deny political asylum to refugees from South Africa whose only crime is that they have criticised the policies of that Government in the same terms as our own Prime Minister has? [Hon. Members:"Speech."] Is he not aware that the Bechuanaland People's Party has sent official protests to the Resident Commissioner against the imposition of these restrictions, which prevent the refugees from explaining what is going on in this territory?

I have no reason to suppose that any hon. Member is entitled to forget the essential need for us to keep supplementary questions short.

We have, of course, never refused admission to political refugees, as the hon. Lady knows. What we are trying to do is to safeguard the people of these territories against the residence there of the type of political refugee who would stir up trouble for the residents in the Republic of South Africa; and that is a very different thing.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is no evidence to show that these people have stirred up or desire to stir up any kind of political trouble, that they merely want the same political rights as residents in Bechuanaland and that they are backed in this by the Bechuanaland People's Party?

I am sorry to tell the hon. Lady that there is certain evidence to show that the wishes of these people are to take part in political activities in Bechuanaland against South Africa. As the hon. Lady well knows, these people have Communist affiliations.

Hong Kong

Government Servants (Pay And Conditions)

8.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what steps Her Majesty's Government is taking to set up negotiating machinery on pay and conditions for Government servants in Hong Kong.

The Government of Hong Kong are conducting a review of staff relations in the Government service, and ways of improving the machinery for consultation and negotiation with staff associations.

Can the hon. Gentleman be a little more positive by saying that he himself is encouraging the Hong Kong Government in this matter? Does he not agree that the efforts of the Hong Kong Government to get trade unionism on a more regular footing in the Colony as a whole would be more effective if the Government were themselves to put more effort into this with their own employees?

This is probably a matter best left to the Hong Kong Government. I am sure that hon. Members will recognise that Whitleyism, as practised in Britain, may not fit very easily into the different pattern of Hong Kong. There are a number of very real difficulties here.

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that, for instance, representations from married women Government servants in Hong Kong should have to proceed by humble petition? Does not he feel that this is a little archaic?

I think that there is another Question on that matter a little later on the Order Paper.

Women Doctors

18.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will state the conditions of service for married and unmarried women doctors employed in the public service in Hong Kong.

I have asked the Governor for full details, and I will circulate the information in the Official Report.

Will my hon. Friend ask the Governor to consider the differential made between married women in the medical service, and widows and separated women, and alter the categories in the medical service so that married women will be placed on an equal basis with men?

I will certainly consider that point. I know that there are different arrangements for unmarried and married women, and I will certainly go into that as soon as I have the Governor's advice.

Is the Under-Secretary aware that his right hon. Friend received a petition, dated 7th February this year, from married women in Hong Kong, but that they have had no reply? Can he tell us when the Colonial Secretary will reply to this petition?

I am very sorry about that. I knew that we had had a petition, but I did not know that we had not sent a reply, I will try to nave the reply expedited, and will let the hon. Gentleman know as soon as possible.

Bermuda

Mrs Joyce Hendrickson (Counsel)

13.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why the Government of Bermuda has refused permission to counsel of Mrs. Joyce Hendrickson's choice to enter the country to act on her behalf.

The Bermuda Board of Immigration, in considering applications for non-Bermudians to engage in gainful occupations in the Islands, is required to take into account the availability of the services of persons already resident there. In this case, permission was refused as the Board was satisfied that local lawyers were competent and available to act for Mrs. Hendrickson.

Is the Under-Secretary aware that the Attorney-General said in this House that a person should have the counsel of his or her own choice, after representations were made to the Nigerian Government to this effect? Bearing in mind that the Board of Immigration is the responsible body for the prosecution and is stopping the lady from having her own counsel, does not this seem unfair?

I must tell the House quite frankly that I am personally not very happy about this case. I have the right hon. Gentleman's point. I saw the Question only this morning for the first time. I at once telegraphed the Governor for his advice, and have asked him to notify Mrs. Hendrickson of her right of appeal against the decision of the Board. She may not know that she has a right of appeal, and that appeal can go to the Governor in Executive Council.

Swaziland

Troops

16.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when he intends to return to Kenya the battalion of troops at present in Swaziland.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that many hon. Members find it repugnant that British troops should be used to break up a strike in which men are claiming that they cannot live on 5s. 4d. a day? May we therefore take it that it is the Government's intention to return these troops at the earliest possible moment? Is it not the fact that the strikes took place in two firms that have so far refused to recognise the trade unions? Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that what is really needed is not troops, but that the two firms should be brought into the twentieth century and give proper recognition to trade unionism?

I recognise that these firms have not recognised the unions. In extenuation, I should, perhaps, point out, that the trade unions in this part of the world are very young—I think they began only about a year ago—so I hope that we shall come to the state of affairs which the hon. Gentleman recommends. We shall naturally withdraw the troops just as soon as we can. Although the position is now quite quiet throughout Swaziland, we cannot very well withdraw the troops until it is perfectly clear that the police can cope unaided with the situation.

Is the Undersecretary aware that this anxiety about using troops on strike breaking in these circumstances is very widely shared? Can he assure the House that positive steps will be taken to encourage trade unionism in Swaziland in order to prevent any recurrence of this most unfortunate situation?

I do not think that the troops were used for strike breaking, but to support the police, if necessary, in preserving law and order. They were not, in fact, used in the way the hon. Gentleman suggests, or on work to break the strike.

Trade Union Activities

21.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many companies in Swaziland prohibit trade union activities among their employees.

None. A recent proclamation prohibits any employer from making it a condition of employment that an employee shall not belong to a trade union.

Can the Under-secretary say how many trade unionists are detained without trial and what encouragement is being given to employers to enable trade unionists to make representations, bearing in mind the appalling conditions in the Territory?

I did not know that any trade unionists were awaiting trial. I will certainly look into the matter and will tell the right hon. Gentleman the result of my researches. I am afraid that some of the larger companies have not encouraged unions—and this point was raised in an earlier Question—but I think that recent events have led to a change of heart and I hope we can make some progress.

Is it not the case that during the recent strike British troops surrounded a compound of workers and the workers were then screened as to whether they were ready to go back to work or wanted to continue the strike? Is it not a fact that those who refused to go back to work were arrested and are being detained in conditions which my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Bottomley) has described as appalling?

I will look into the points which the hon. Member draws to my attention.

In view of the success of Mr. Willis in British Guiana, may I ask whether it would not be a good idea if he or some other representative went out to try and help to obtain a better understanding in Swaziland?

These strikes are now over and therefore it does not arise as an urgent matter, but I am always conscious of the fact that in these territories where unions are just beginning to develop anyone sent out by the T.U.C. is always a very good asset in helping local unions to develop in the right way. I hope that the T.U.C. may bear in mind the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Miss Vickers).

Will the hon. Gentleman undertake to place in the Library copies of the Regulations and Proclamations issued during the state of emergency?

Yes, Sir. I think that I can give that assurance but I have not read them myself. The right hon. Gentleman therefore is putting me in something of a difficulty in asking me to place in the Library things which I have not studied and when I do not know whether or not they are confidential. But I hope to be able to do so.

Wages (Board Of Inquiry)

27.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what examination he is making of the labour problem in Swaziland, following the recent strike; and if he will make a statement.

The report of the Board of Inquiry into the Havelock Mine strike has been received and is being studied. The report of the Inquiry into the Big Bend Sugar Plantation strike in March is expected very shortly.

The Swaziland Government are appointing a Board of Inquiry into wage levels throughout the Territory. My right hon. Friend is trying to find a chairman for this Board from outside the Territory. The Swaziland Government are also setting up a National Joint Industrial Council to establish contact between employers and employees, particularly trade unions. Plans are also in hand to strengthen the Labour Department, following a visit to the Territory by the Colonial Office labour adviser.

In view of our responsibilities as the protecting Power and the particular importance of not continuing to follow the South African pattern of exploiting very low workers'standards, what power will this new Board of Inquiry set up by the Swaziland Government have to recommend an adequate wage structure as part of a comprehensive programme of social advance? Further, can the hon. Gentleman say when it is expected to report?

r: I cannot answer the last part of the hon. Lady's supplementary question. The question of minimum wage rates will certainly be one of the matters which the Board of Inquiry will be considering.

British Honduras

New Capital City

17.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies in view of the fact that a scale model of the new city to be built near mile 50 on the Western Road in British Honduras has now been produced; when it is proposed to begin the building of this city; and what is the estimated cost.

A decision on when the building of a new capital might begin, and an estimate of its cost, depend on the results of an examination of a plan which is now being studied in British Honduras.

Can my hon. Friend possibly hurry up the decision? Does he realise that there was a most devastating hurricane, and that people have been living in most appalling conditions ever since? This capital is most urgently needed, and I hope that the Government will be very generous in the amount of money they give for it.

A report was made to the British Honduras Government, which must consider the matter before we can take any action upon it. We have asked by telegram for their comments to be expedited.

Aden

Franchise

20.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what progress is being made in the discussions in Aden Colony regarding changes in the franchise; and if he will give an assurance that there will be no further postponement of the date of elections beyond the present legal date.

Hon. Members will have learnt with deep regret of the recent death of Mr. Bayoomi, the Chief Minister of Aden. Before his illness Mr. Bayoomi invited representatives of other political groups in Adenincluding the Peoples Socialist Party to participate in a Commission of Inquiry to revise the franchise, which everyone agrees to be unsatisfactory. They have so far refused; and the Aden Council of Ministers is at present considering the problem thus created.

While sharing the hon. Gentleman's regret at the death of the Chief Minister of Aden, may I ask whether the hon. Gentleman will direct his attention to the Question? Will he recall that he gave the House an assurance that elections postponed already for one year in Aden would definitely take place before the end of this year? Is he prepared to honour that assurance to the House?

I hope so. The local difficulty, and the problem to which I drew attention in my original Answer, had arisen subsequent to my statement. It obviously raises a doubt whether in practice the date set for the Constitution can be complied with precisely. I must be frank and tell the House that there is this physical difficulty.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this is an extremely unsatisfactory reply? Is he aware that this matter has now been before us for some years? Is he not prepared to take action from this country to get something done about this?

I do not think that there is any action one can take. This is a purely physical difficulty. Time is needed to revise the franchise. The different political parties, for reasons which I gave, have not discussed together in what way the franchise can be altered. Until that is done and until various ways of revising it can be put in hand, I do not think that there is anything I can do from here to implement the matter.

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Political Offences

24.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many persons are now detained or imprisoned in Aden for political offences; and what offences they have committed.

Does this mean that no prisoners who deem themselves to be political prisoners are in detention at present? On the latter part of the Question, can the hon. Gentleman say whether any advocacy of union between the South Arabian Federation and the Yemen is an offence?

I do not know what these people think about their own status. I merely say that there are no such people whom we consider, and the Government of Aden consider, as guilty of political offences. As far as I know, there is no reason why someone should not say that he is in favour of joining the Yemen.

Can the hon. Gentleman say how many people are in prison in Aden for going on strike, for holding meetings, publishing newspapers or doing other things which are normally regarded as legitimate political activities outside Aden?

Fifteen people, among them three women, due for release on 10th July, are in prison for the sort of offence which the hon. Member mentions—taking part in illegal processions, unlawful assembly, and rioting.

Malaysian Federation

Brunei

23.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what information he has about progress made towards Brunei's entry into the Malaysian Federation.

As the hon. Member will know, the Malaysia Agreement was signed last night without Brunei.

Could the hon. Gentleman give us a little more information? Does this mean that Brunei is permanently out of the Federation? Does it mean that Brunei can come in at any time? Does it mean that negotiations are still proceeding? Could the hon. Gentleman give a little more information about the possibility of Brunei coming into the Federation in the way originally anticipated?

The advice of Her Majesty's Government to the Sultan has always been that it is in the best interests of Brunei to join. That advice still stands. I cannot speak for the Sultan as to his intentions, but there is no reason to suppose that the negotiations cannot be resumed.

On a point of order. Yesterday an Agreement was signed between the Prime Minister of Singapore, the Prime Minister of Malaya, and Sarawak and North Borneo. That agreement has just been reported to the House of Commons in a few phrases. Ought not the House of Commons which is responsible for this matter to have a full statement from the Minister at the end of Questions today?

Is my hon. Friend aware that both sides of the House have welcomed this new agreement and congratulate Tunku Abdul Raman on his statesmanlike ability in arranging this with our Government?

Can the Under-Secretary say whether a statement will be made about the successful conclusion of these talks and whether and when legislation will be introduced?

I am sure that my right hon. Friend would have liked to have made a statement today. He has been engaged on this problem night and day for the past four or five days. I am sure that his inclination would have been to make a statement, but straight from these negotiations he went off early this morning to British Guiana and therefore he could not make one. These Territories do not fall within my responsibilities and therefore I was not present at these discussions on Malaysia. Possibly it would be better for the House to await my right hon. Friend's return than to accept a third-hand statement from me which would not be really satisfactory.

Bechuanaland

Mr Michael Harmel

25.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why Mr. Michael Harmel has been declared a prohibited immigrant in Bechuanaland.

Mr. Michael Harmel was declared a prohibited immigrant under Section 8, paragraph (1), subsection (i), of the Immigration Proclamation on the grounds that he is a person whose presence in the Territory is deemed by the Resident Commissioner, on the advice of his Executive Council, to be or likely to be prejudicial to the peace, order and good government of the Territory or of the people living therein.

Was Mr. Harmel at any time told the actual reasons why he would be declared a prohibited immigrant, was he given any chance to make reply, or is this procedure wholly arbitrary?

He was told what conditions he must observe if he wished to stay in Bechuanaland, and he did not wish to observe them.

Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that Mr. Harmel was given a temporary residence permit despite the fact that he had not been willing to sign these conditions, that the permit was not due to expire until 31st July, and that since then quite arbitrarily it has been cancelled, with no reason given and without his having in any way violated the conditions of it? What has happened? What is this man supposed to have done to warrant this change of action?

It was withdrawn because of the advice the Resident Commissioner received from his Executive Council.

Kenya

Properties (Purchase)

28.

asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what estimate he made of the number of properties likely to be purchased in Kenya under the recently announced plan to provide up to £700,000 for the assistance of those who have compassionate or security grounds for leaving Kenya.

About 100 properties are likely to be purchased, in addition to the 63 cases which have already been dealt with under earlier arrangements.

I appreciate the help which this £700,000 will give, but can my hon. Friend say who will administer the scheme, and will he do what he can to see that these cases are dealt with before Kenya becomes independent?

We are pushing on with it as fast as possible. The Government of Kenya will be responsible for dealing with these cases as part of their land settlement programme.

Will the hon. Gentleman give an assurance that this compensation will be given to those who helped to build up the country of Kenya, not to those who left this country after the war to avoid paying taxes to develop the Welfare State?

It is not really a very good question. I should explain that this particular sum of £700,000 is being put on one side specially to help those who are very old or infirm or who live in very remote properties and are therefore exposed to special security risks. This is a special scheme for that category of people and is not part of any general scheme.

Public Building And Works

Winter Building

29.

asked the Minister of Public Building and Works what progress is being made in the study of methods of weather-proof building, with a view to saving unemployment during the winter when present-day building methods cannot be undertaken.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Public Building and Works
(Mr. Richard Sharples)

My right hon. Friend has appointed a technical committee to examine the problems of winter building and to report before the winter. It will examine techniques for dealing with these problems on the basis of existing knowledge and experience in this country and abroad. The committee has also been asked to advise on which matters further research is required.

Will the hon. Gentleman take steps to ensure that the report comes in good time so that we may cope with the building situation which must of necessity arise in the winter, particularly in view of the fact that a considerable amount of unemployment is created in consequence of it not being possible to proceed with the normal type of building?

The committee has been asked to produce its report as soon as possible, and it will be published.

Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that something more than a saving of unemployment is involved in this? The building industry is not one of the best industries. It has an element of casual labour in it, and it is a very dirty industry. There may be something to be said for giving the people who work in this necessary industry rather more dignity than they have at present.

That is one of the points which my right hon. Friend has been emphasising in his speeches.

Will my hon. Friend draw the attention of local authorities to this report when it is published?

Staff

30.

asked the Minister of Public Building and Works why an extra £425,000 has been allowed in his Department's Estimates for 1963–64 for increase of staff.

When the Service Departments transferred to the Ministry of Public Building and Works the staffs directly engaged in works services, they were unable to transfer all the people concerned in supply services, accounting and other ancillary operations. The latter were occupied for only part of their time with works services. £452,000 was the estimated cost of filling the gaps left in the organisation.

Surely the point of amalgamation was to make more efficient use of staff and to make economies in staff. In that case, would it not have been better to have had a much smaller increase in the Ministry of Works and to use those people in the military Departments later rather than make them redundant?

I do not think any redundancy is involved in this. These are non-industrial staff. This is, in some ways, in the nature of a bookkeeping transaction because any economies will be shown in the Estimates of the Service Departments.

War Office Works Services

31.

asked the Minister of Public Building and Works why no evaluation of the economies to be effected by the merger with his Department of the Works Services of the War Departments was made before that merger took place.

Because the extent of the savings can only emerge as the new organisation is worked out in detail and the successive stages of it are introduced.

Was a proper survey made of the effects of the amalgamation on the military Departments? What sort of consultation did the Parliamentary Secretary have and what advice did he receive, for example, from the Chief Mechanical and Electrical Engineer, the Chief Quantity Surveyor and other heads of departments in the War Office organisation?

The details of the new organisation are still being worked out. We hope to make rapid progress on that, and my right hon. Friend intends to press on as fast as possible with the necessary consultations. The original proposal for the amalgamation was made much more from the point of view of the practical advantages which could be obtained from the merging of the various works organisations than from the point of view of direct economy.

Post Office

Parcel Post, Glasgow

32.

asked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that parcel post deliveries to and from Glasgow, even when additional payment is made for express delivery, are continuing to take from four to seven days, thus causing concern and loss of trade to business in Glasgow; and what steps he proposes to take as a matter of urgency to remedy this situation.

We are aware of, and very much regret, these delays. Action has been taken at Glasgow both at the post office and at the railway station which I hope will bring some improvement; and British Railways are working with us in a special drive to eliminate delays to these parcel mails while in transmit.

Will the hon. Gentleman say what is the nature of these steps, because the delays are still continuing? It is over three months since this matter was first drawn to his attention. Is he aware that business is lost to business houses in Glasgow through these admitted failures of the Post Offices? Will he take even more urgent steps than he appears to be taking at the moment to rectify the situation?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his patience in this matter. We are taking steps to try to solve it. We have increased our staff in the Glasgow sorting office to make certain that we keep things moving there. With regard to the railways, a number of changes have been made in times of trains, and so on. We are definitely doing everything we can to speed up the solution of this problem because we can see that it is affecting the hon. Gentleman's constituents.

Despite the courtesy of the hon. Gentleman's reply, in order to ascertain what steps have been taken, I propose to raise this matter on the Adjournment at an early date.

Parcel Post, Bristol And West Country

33.

asked the Postmaster-General what representations he has received from Bristol and the West Country with regard to the delays in the transmission of parcels to the Midlands and the North; and what steps are being taken to eliminate these delays.

Representations have been made to us from time to time by a number of firms and individuals in Bristol and the West Country. Each complaint has been thoroughly investigated. Most of these delays occur while the mails are in transit, and with British Railways we are doing our best to improve matters. I can assure the hon. Member that we shall not let up.

Is it not a fact that the Chamber of Trade in Bristol has complained on several occasions about these delays? Since these complaints have been received, why has the hon. Gentleman allowed these delays to continue?

I have no information about official complaints being made by the Chamber of Trade. As I have said, we have had complaints and we are still receiving complaints on individual items, but the movement of parcels is a much wider problem throughout the country. We hope that the progress that we are making in the East Anglian experiment will enable us to extend this over other parts of the country so that we can have a more efficient parcel-handling service throughout the country.

Is my hon. Friend aware that he is still receiving many complaints from me on behalf of Weston-super-Mare? Will he incorporate Weston-super-Mare in any improvement which he gives to Bristol?

Is itnot clear from the persistent complaints which have been made that the rate of progress in the joint discussions between the British Transport Commission and the Post Office is not rapid enough? Some very serious principle must be decided upon, otherwise these complaints will continue.

Iagree completely with the hon. Gentleman that it is very much a matter of our being able to reach agreement with British Railways and of trying to come to an arrangement by which we can both do our part efficiently together rather than pull against one another. We are aming at that.

Lord Denning (Inquiry)

Q3.

asked the Prime Minister when he expects Lord Denning to make his report.

I understand that Lord Denning is not yet able to indicate when heexpects to make his report.

As Parliament goes into the long Recess on 2nd August, may I ask whether the Prime Minister would agree that it is vital that this report should be made within the next fortnight since, otherwise, the House will be prevented from demanding or taking any action?

It is for Lord Denning to make his report. I understand that he is devoting his whole time to it.

Has not the Prime Minister indicated that it would be very desirable in the public interest that the Opposition should have an opportunity, if necessary, to take further action to follow up this matter along the lines proposed by my right hon. Friend before the Summer Recess and before next November?

I shall consider that, but, as I say, Lord Denning is giving all his time to the matter and I understand that he is making progress.

King And Queen Of The Hellenes (State Visit)

Q4.

asked the Prime Minister what consideration he has given to the representations forwarded to him by the hon. Member for Barking on the subject of demonstrations in connection with the State visit of the King and Queen of the Hellenes; and if he will make a statement.

I have considered the representationswhich the hon. Member forwarded but I have nothing to add to my reply to the hon. Member's supplementary question on 27th June.

Does the Prime Minister recall that in that reply he appeared to give an assurance to the House on"the ordinary rights of peaceful demonstration"?—[Official Report, 27th June, 1963; Vol. 679, c. 1654.] Since that reply, presumably, represented the collective view of Her Majesty's Government, will he intervene, or ask the Home Secretary to intervene, to preventthe contemptuous ignoring of his statement by the Chief Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, who has suppressed all demonstrations, however peaceful?

It was in the spirit of my reply that, as, no doubt, the hon. Gentleman observed, a march was held in the West End of London on 7th July.

Would it not be most unfortunate if gangs of people were to give this country a bad name by hostile or discourteous behaviour towards the King and Queen of Greece when they are our official guests?

I agree with that, but I understand that the police are making the standard regulations on these occasions.

Can the Prime Minister explain whether these representations throw any light upon this new-found hostility to Greece, since, a few years ago, the very same people who are now so hostile were advocating the handing over of Cyprus to Greece? Is it not a fact that the very same King and Queen of Greece were then in power in Greece, that there was then the very same form of Government, and that the very same Communists were in the same Greek prisons?

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has called attention to these contradictions, which pass my understanding just as they do his.

What does the Prime Minister mean by"these contradictions"? Does not he understand that there are some people who are in favour of protecting the right of demonstration and political freedom in Cyprus, in Greece and in this country?

I beg to give notice that I shall, at the appropriate time, Mr. Speaker, seek your permission to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9.

Lord President Of The Council (Moscow Visit)

Q5.

asked the Prime Minister to what extent the Lord President of the Council, in his visit to Moscow, will be authorised to discuss the question of a non-aggression pact with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Q7.

asked the Prime Minister to what extent it is Her Majesty's Government's policy that a test ban agreement should be dependent on achieving a non-aggression pact or vice versa.

I do not think that it would be helpful for me to discuss these matters in any detail at the present time.

Since the Prime Minister himself was such a strong supporter of the idea of a non-aggression pact, especially when he went to Moscow, does not he think that it would be a retrograde step if the British Government did not support the idea now?

Yes, Sir, but, as I explained in the debate, we all want these negotiations to succeed, and I am sure that it would not be wise at this moment, when they are just about to begin, for me to try to make this point or that or single out this or that issue. It would be much better to let them proceed and hope for a good result.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that just a week ago in East Berlin Mr. Khrushchev took the opportunity of saying that a test ban agreement combined with a simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact would create a new international climate? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree with that sentiment and will he say whether or not these two should stand together or fall together?

No, Sir. I repeat that we are hopeful that these negotiations carried on by the Americans, ourselves and the Russians will succeed, I hope, in the complete ban, or, if that fails, as we said in the debate, in a partial ban. Butit would not be helpful to what we all want if I were to enter into the details of that or make any comments on what has been said.

Is the Prime Minister aware that many of us on this side of the House share his hope that these negotiations will be completely successful?

Will my right hon. Friend assure the Lord President of the Council that all reasonable people of all parties in the country wish him well and hope that he comes back successful?

Colin Jordan (Representations)

Q6.

asked the Prime Minister what was the nature of the representations made to him by Colin Jordan concerning the Vassall case; and whether any question of security was involved.

Mr. Colin Jordan wrote to me saying that he had acquired certain information from Vassall during his detention in Wormwood Scrubs Prison. Mr. Jordan has been interviewed and has disclosed all the information he wishes to offer.

In view of recent happenings, can the Prime Minister give the House an assurance that the interview which one of the security services undertook with this man Jordan did not disclose anything prejudicial to the interests of the State?

This interview has taken place. I am informed that a large number of the allegations to which Mr. Jordan referred were fully investigated at the time of the Radcliffe Inquiry, and, while I do not think that one can take allegations made to a fellow prisoner by a convicted spy as necessarily true, I have thought it right to see that any ones not already dealt with should be passed to Lord Denning.

Does the Prime Minister think it desirable that prisoners such as Vassall and Jordan should be able to communicate with each other while in prison?

I think that that question should be put down to the Home Secretary.

Central Africa (Victoria Falls Conference)

I have only a very short statement to make.

I should like to inform hon. Members that I am laying tomorrow, prior to the debate which will take place on Thursday on the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Bill, a White Paper containing the full report of the conference at Victoria Falls.

I am glad to inform the House that all the Governments concerned reached agreed conclusions on the next steps to be taken in Central Africa not only in respect of the orderly dissolution of the Federation, but for the future collaboration of the territories.

I should like to record my gratitude to all the delegations who took part in the conference for the co-operative spirit in which they considered the difficult problems with which we were concerned. Her Majesty's Government look forward to the continuing assistance of all the Governments in Central Africa in the constructive work of the next six months.

Is the First Secretary aware that we on this side certainly wish to congratulate him on this timely success and on his performance on"Panorama" last night? Is he also aware, however, that his success at the Victoria Falls conference was on the easier part of the problem and that the more difficult part, the future of Southern Rhodesia, still lies ahead of him?

We held the conference to discuss the dissolution of the Federation and there is a great deal of hard work to be done on that and a great many difficulties to overcome during the next six months.

With regard to the other subject raised by the right hon. Gentleman, the situation remains as described in the correspondence which I published on 18th June.

Is the First Secretary aware that nearly everybody is glad to see him back and that we congratulate him on a statement which is not only short, but is a model of clarity? I should like to ask just two questions. Will the White Paper deal with future responsibility for the Federal Army and also Federaldefence?

Yes, Sir. There are chapters dealing with each subject, with defence, with assets and liabilities and with the debt and the many other aspects of our conference.

In making his statement today, and preparing for the debate on Thursday, has the right hon. Gentleman taken into account the note which has been sent by the Government of Ghana protesting against the transference of powers to Southern Rhodesia while that remains an undemocratic country?

I have noted the representations made by the Government of Ghana, but I do not think that they arise on this statement.

I also, should like to offer my congratulations to the right hon. Gentleman on the way he has handled the Victoria Falls conference and for his handling of what, in my opinion, seems to be the prickliest nettle of all—that is, the Federal Army—and the way in which he seems to have got agreement on the apportionment of the three territories.

May I ask, first, when the right hon. Gentleman thinks that the secession of Nyasaland will be completed; how long after that the unscrambling operation of the two Rhodesias will take place; and, in view of the fact that the political over-structure is being dismantled, how long will it be before he can assure the House that economic union will flow as a result?

I shall be explaining, when I speak on Thursday, that I have the agreement of the Nyasaland Government to come into the general dissolution exercise, which means that they will accept the date of 31st December for the dissolution and that that means their secession from the Federation.

With regard to economic union, I refer the hon. Member to the White Paper, which has a chapter on future collaboration between the territories and indicates that there are certain subjects which the Northern Rhodesians are ready to accept immediately and other subjects which will have to be discussed.

New Members Sworn

Maurice Anthony Foley, esquire, for West Bromwich.

John Ernest Silkin, esquire, for Deptford.

King And Queen Of The Hellenes (State Visit)

I beg to ask leave, Mr. Speaker, to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,

"the action of the Chief Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis in taking extraordinary measures to prevent all demonstrations, however peaceful, during the State visit of the King and Queen of the Hellenes and the refusal of the Government to intervene in order to safeguard the ordinary rights of peaceful demonstration."
I should like to make three brief points in support of this submission.

First, the matter is definite. It is not concerned with general policy such as might be covered by the Public Order Bill. It is a specific example of the exercise of powers under the existing law contrary to an assurance given by the Prime Minister to this House.

Secondly, the matter is urgent. The visit referred to is now taking place, but this matter could not have been raised before since the full extent of the police restrictions was announced only last evening.

Thirdly, it is clearly of public importance, except to those who do not think that the right of peaceful demonstration is an important part of our civil liberties; and it is a matter which the Prime Minister himself thought of sufficient importance for him to send a special reminder about it to the Greek Government.

The hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) asks leave to move the adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public important, namely,

"the action of the Chief Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis in taking extraordinary measures to prevent all demonstrations, however peaceful, during the State visit of the King and Queen of the Hellenes and the refusal of the Government to intervene in order to safeguard the ordinary rights of peaceful demonstration."
It is not within my power to leave that to the House. It is not within the Standing Order, in my view.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would you be good enough, for the guidance of the House and for future reference, to indicate the reasons why this falls without the Standing Order? I have already submitted to you that this is definite, that it is urgent and that it is of public importance. I cannot see that it is not all three.

If the hon. Gentleman cannot see it, there is an issue between us. One does not by calling these measures extraordinary make them for the purpose of the Standing Order anything but an instance of the ordinary administration of the law. If the hon. Gentleman refers to Erskine May he will find a case where the police stopped a demonstration going over one of the bridges, and my predecessor dealt with it—I will not bother to give the hon. Gentleman the reference at the moment because he will not want it—exactly on this principle. I do not feel in any doubt about it.

Further to the point of order, Mr. Speaker. When it is said that this is the ordinary administration of the law, is there any distinction to be drawn between the ordinary administration of the law in which the courts may play a part and a purely administrative act of this kind for which the Police Commissioner is directly responsible to the Home Secretary? This surely, with respect, does not come within the definition of the ordinary course of the law so as not to be an administrative act for which this House must take responsibility and in which the rights of this House ought not to be preserved.

Apart from precedent, it might be possible to argue that view, but if the hon. Gentleman looks at page 372 of the current edition of Erskine May he will find a note in these terms:

"The 'ordinary administration of the law' meant in the earliest cases was rather the administration of justice; i.e. trial and punishment."
That is the note contrasting it with the current position, on which I have to stand.

Highways (Straying Animals)

3.42 p.m.

I beg to move.

That leave be given to introduce a Bill to provide for the payment of compensation for injury or damage caused by animals straying on the highways.
My proposed Bill, in the view of myself and very many others, is essential in order to remove an anomaly which has existed for all too long.

Very many people were disturbed when the excellent Bill which was introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdare (Mr. Probert), in March, 1961, was not passed into law by a large majority, if not unanimously. It is now ten years since the Committee on the Law of Civil Liability for Damage done by Animals reported in favour of such a Measure being enacted. I refer to Command Paper 8746. The Standing Joint Committee of the Motoring Organisations has been urging that the Report should be implemented for a very considerable time, as have very many other well-informed bodies and persons, but all to no avail.

Before and since the introduction of my hon. Friend's Bill quite a number of accidents, some fatal, have occurred owing to animals straying on the highways. Judges have been moved to make strong comment on the position. For example, in the case of Gomberg v. Smith it was reported in The Times on 23rd January, 1962, that Lord Justice Davies said:
"The law is in a most unsatisfactory state."
In 1952, a committee was formed by the Lord Chancellor, of which his Lordship was a member, to deal with this very point. It has done so, but, in the usual slack way of the Government, nothing has happened. Had it done, most of the arguments in the present case—this was stated in court—would have been avoided.

In the case of Ellis v. Johnstone reported in The Times on 4th December, 1962, an eminent judge, Lord Justice Donovan, who is well known to us in this House, where he was a Member whose views were highly respected, was reported as saying:
"There had been previous judicial pleas for Parliament to look at the law relating to animals Government time was understandably very crowded"—
It is much more crowded today, perhaps, than it was previously—
"but a private Member's success in the Ballot would perform a public service if he could introduce a Bill to regulate liability for damage by animals. The heart of the new legislation which was required could be found in the Report of Lord Chancellor's Committee published in 1952."
How many deaths and accidents might have been avoided if this legislation had been in force?

Lord Justice Ormerod said:
"It may be that the rule as it stands is repugnant to many people but it is the law of the land and will remain so until such time as Parliament decides to abolish or modify the rule in some way."
I have time, of course, only to deal with the matter in telegraphic terms today, but I hope, nevertheless, that I can make the position sufficiently clear within the time at my disposal to get the consent of the House to my Motion.

The position at present is that an owner of domestic animals, which includes horses, ponies, cattle and sheep, does not owe any duty to users of the highway to prevent such animals from straying from his land on to the highway. For example, if a motorist comes into collision with a domestic animal which has strayed in this way he has no legal remedy whatsoever to recover the damage which he has suffered.

There are only two cases in which the owner of a domestic animal could be held liable for injury. One is where he deliberately brings it on to the highway, in which event he is under a duty to keep it under control. The other is where the injury is due to a vicious tendency of the animal of which the owner has knowledge; for example, where a horse kicks a child. Straying is considered to be not a vicious tendency, but a natural propensity of domestic animals.

In a poignant case which was brought to my notice in my own area, counsel advised that, as the evidence was that the animals strayed from an orchard on to the highway and were not deliberately brought on to it, no duty whatsoever was imposed on the owner to keep his gates closed to prevent them from straying—if, in fact, this was how they escaped. He advised—quite rightly, in my view, as the law stands at present—that even if it could be shown that the ponies had previously escaped and that the owner knew this, he would still not be liable, because straying is a natural propensity.

It may be that an offence under Section 135(1) of the Highways Act, 1959, had been committed, but the maximum fine there is the absurd one of 5s. in respect of each animal found straying, and what is more, the time limit for instituting proceedings is six months from the date of the commission of the offence. This is absurd.

The case to which I am referring was one in which the father of the lady who was killed wrote a letter to me in which he said:
"On the night of l1th February of this year our only child, a daughter aged 23, was killed when the pick-up van in which she was travelling was hit by a stray horse. At the inquest the owner of the horse admitted that this was the second time that same night that his horses, three in all, had escaped on to the public highway. Surely on this evidence and the farmer's statement in court, this is a case of gross negligence, to the extent of loss of human life. Apparently the totally inadequate and antiquated laws regarding domestic animals—i.e. horses—require investigation. This is the third death this year we have read of caused in this way. My wife and I have taken the liberty of writing to you to advise us what approach to make to alter these outdated laws. Nothing can replace our only child, but it may save other lives in future if farmers are made responsible for their stock. Our daughter was a teacher of backward children."
The headmaster of the school in which the lady was teaching writes:
"As the headmaster of this large secondary school I would like to join with Mr. and Mrs. Woodward of Houghton-on-the-Hill, Leicestershire, in protesting to you against the law as it stands with regard to straying animals. Had the law been different it is possible that the late Miss Woodward, who was a member of my teaching staff, would be alive today. In general terms my own view is that with the possible exception of areas such as Dartmoor, where appropriate signs can be erected to warn motorists, and others, the onus of responsibility for accidents and damage caused by animals staying on to roads should be entirely with the owner of the animals."
I have also had letters from others in the surrounding district. A solicitor in Leicester sent me a copy of correspondence relating to a claim put forward by an American airman who consulted him in April, 1961. This solicitor stated:
"To be quite frank I felt some embarrassment in having to advise him that in English law he had no civil claim for damages."
He said that he had written a letter to the farmer concerned, saying:
"I have been consulted by S/Sgt. B. P Jones, of R.A.F. Station, Bruntingthorpe, with regard to an accident which occurred on the 27th January, 1961, on a country lane near Bruntingthorpe Village late in the evening, when his motor car was in collision with a small herd of your cattle which had strayed on to the highway."
The reply was that there was no liability on the farmer. The National Farmers' Union Mutual Insurance Society sent a brief note stating that nothing at all could be done in the matter. The solicitor stated the law in writing to his client. He said:
"There is no obligation on an owner or occupier of a field adjacent to a highway to maintain a fence on the border of the highway. This is founded on our ancient social condition and is in no way related to or liable to be qualified by such matters as the relative levels of fields and highway, the nature of the highway or the amount of traffic on it.
Save in cases of animals fierce by nature there is no general duty on the owner of domestic animals to take steps to prevent them straying on to the highway and so causing risk of accidents to users of the highway.
As there is no liability to have a fence at all, liability does not arise because there is a fence which is not properly maintained or a gate not properly closed."
It is absurd for these provisions to remain as they stand, and I hope that the House will give me leave to introduce a Bill to remedy the position.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Barnett Janner, Mr. Arthur Probert, Dr. Barnett Stross, Mr. Ness Edwards, Mr. Harold Davies, and Dr. Horace King.

HIGHWAYS (STRAYING ANIMALS)

Bill to provide for the payment of compensation for injury or damage caused by animals straying on the highways, presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday next and to be printed. [Bill 134.]

Orders Of The Day

Public Order Bill Lords

Order for Second Reading read.

3.43 p.m.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

In this country, except for a short period last year, we have recently had very little trouble in connection with public order from extremists of any kind, whether Fascists or Communists. For some years, the small Fascist groups have been holding meetings. There are three of these groups at the moment, because they tend to quarrel internally from time to time and then split. Practically nobody went to these meetings and contempt is much the best treatment for their intolerant, malignant and rejected doctrines.

When Fascist candidates stand at elections they never get more than a handful of votes. They do even worse than the Communists, which is saying a lot. They totally misjudge the British people. One of the three little groups, Colin Jordan's group, came out in their paper the other day with a picture of Hitler and an appeal to celebrate his 74th birthday.

The British people loathe Hitler and if they thought fit to celebrate anything about him—which they do not—it would be the day of his destruction. Our people would turn false to their dead before turning Fascist, and there is no risk of their doing either.

There were some happenings a year ago, however, which brought these small Fascist groups into the news for a time. They have gone out of it again since, which is a good thing because, as they cannot hope to gain support, all they can hope is that someone will present them with publicity.

Last year's happenings led the Government to examine anew whether the law governing these matters was severe enough and effective enough. The law is fully effective. Events have now proved that. But it is not severe enough in its penalties. Hence this Bill, because, as the Minister responsible for public order, I intend to see that public order is maintained and that the courts are adequately armed to ensure that those who disturb it do not get off lightly. If anything should ever show that present legislation was not effective the Government would certainly take further steps, but there is no evidence of that up to the present, and I am sure that Parliament ought not to legislate to restrict free speech unless it is proved up to the hilt to be necessary.

As I have said, up to July last year there was no trouble worth mentioning. The Mosleyites were holding meetings, but hardly anybody went to them and there were no complaints against anything said at them. Mosley avowedly had abjured anti-Semitism. I am told that he was bending his advocacy to supporting European unity and the Common Market.

But Jordan, who thought that Mosley had become pusillanimous, announced a meeting of his breakaway group in Trafalgar Square for 1st July last year, a meeting that was to be openly anti-Semitic. Quite a lot of people went, including a group of Communists, nuclear disarmers and others who were determined that there should be no peaceful co-existence.

The speeches lived up to the advance advertising, disorder broke out and a number of people were arrested. It was followed in the few following months by disturbances at several other meetings held by one or other of these small Fascist groups, and the police had to close some of them to stop disorder, even though nothing of an offensive nature was said from the platform. The police advised me that they had no doubt of their ability to stop disorder and that they did not know of any shortcoming or loophole in the law which hampered them in their job of maintaining order and restoring the peace.

Jordan and some of his associates were arrested and charged under the Public Order Act, 1936. They were charged on two separate counts. They were charged under Section 2 with running a quasi-military organisation. Jordan and his assistant, Tyndall, were convicted and sent to prison. They applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence, and that was refused. So they have been serving their sentences of imprisonment.

Quite separately from that, Jordan and Tyndall were charged at Bow Street on 20th August with using, in Trafalgar Square on 1st July, insulting words whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned, contrary to Section 5 of the Act. Both were convicted and both appealed to London Sessions, when Jordan's appeal was allowed. It was this decision on appeal, more than anything, which raised acutely for all of us the question whether the terms of Section 5 were effective to stop the sort of anti-Semitic diatribe in which Jordan had indulged on 1st July.

If this appeal decision was a correct interpretation of the law then it looked as if the law needed altering, but the decision was overturned. The Chairman of London Sessions was asked to state a case for consideration by the Divisional Court, which on 19th March of this year decided that the appeal should not have been allowed and that Jordan had been rightly convicted.

The Lord Chief Justice said, in the course of his judgment, that
"a man was entitled to express his views as strongly as he liked…but he must not threaten, abuse or insult by hitting with words".
So the effect of the law is now established, for Jordan's application in this case, too, to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Jordan was sentenced to one month's imprisonment under Section 5, over and above the sentence of nine months which he received under Section 2. The effectiveness of the law was vindicated.

There have been no complaints since last year of anything said at any public meeting—no material complaints, I mean. Jordan's group has not held any meetings, and the public have wisely ignored most of the meetings held by the other two groups. The meetings have gone on, but at any rate until the day before yesterday nothing has been heard of them. There has been no disorder, and the Press has denied them the publicity they fervently desire. I am told that the maximum attendance at any of these recent meetings has been 200, the average about 50, and the minimum 2. Very different from last year, and no doubt the decisions of the courts have had something to do with it. There was a meeting in Hackney last Sunday evening which attracted a larger crowd. Mostly it was quiet, but it ended with a few scuffles and arrests. The reports that I have received on it indicate that there was no incitement to racial hatred in any of the speeches.

Whatever happens, I am not going to stand for any recrudescence of last year's troubles. The public want peace in the streets and in the squares, and I mean to see that they get it. They are sick and tired of the antics of Fascists, Communists, the Committee of 100 and all other extremists who are out against democratic ways and the right of people to go about in peace and quiet on their lawful occasions. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Public Building and Works has refused permission for several of these extremist bodies to hold meetings in Trafalgar Square.

Last weekend the Commissioner of Police told me that he apprehended disorder if the Mosley group carried out its declared intention of marching in procession through the East End of London. He wanted to use his powers to make an order banning all political processions for 48 hours, and I had no hesitation in giving my consent.

All concerned had better take notice that the Government have no intention whatever of tolerating the abuse of free speech by extremist characters leading to breaches of the peace, nor their processions, nor their banners, nor their distribution of leaflets, nor any of their other devices when they are simply incitements to order. The police have their powers and, in consultation with me where necessary, they will use them. The powers are there in the law all right, but though there is no limit to the penalties on conviction of sedition—and one day a prosecution for sedition may well be brought—the penalties under the Public Order Act and the Public Meetings Act are too small. Hence this Bill.

Section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, reads:
"Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned shall be guilty of an offence."
The present maximum penalty under that Act is a fine of £50 or three months' imprisonment, or both. The Bill will make the new maximum penalties on summary conviction a fine of £100 or three months' imprisonment, or both, and on conviction on indictment a fine of £500, or 12 months'imprisonment, or both. That is to say, the maximum term of imprisonment will be four times as long and the maximum fine ten times as much. This goes far beyond adjusting the 1936 penalties to the change in the value of money. It reflects the determination of the Government that this sort of behaviour is not going to be tolerated.

I strongly hold the view that one way to stop disorder in the streets, whether in Hackney, or Notting Hill, or the Midlands, or anywhere else, is for a court to be able to impose exemplary sentences and then the deterrent does its work. Section 1 of the Public Meetings Act, 1908, also to be affected by the Bill, provides that
"Any person who at a lawful public meeting acts in a disorderly manner for the purpose of preventing the transaction of the business for which the meeting was called together shall be guilty of an offence."
The maximum penalty for that, laid down 55 years ago, is a fine of £5, or one month's imprisonment. The Bill raises these to the same maximum as in the other case: on indictment a fine of £500, or 12 months' imprisonment, or both; and that is right because Section 5 of the 1936 Act deals with the speaker of provocative words while Section 1 of the 1908 Act deals with the wilful breaker-up of meetings.

We have to stop both. We must preserve public order, free speech, and free assembly, against infringement and destruction by thugs, fools and fanatics. And let me repeat the undertaking that I gave to the House on 30th May:
"…if further legislative action be found necessary we shall not hesitate to take it, for we are determined that the law shall be fully adequate to deal with any persons or groups whose words or actions give rise to breaches of the peace."—[Official Report, 30th May, 1963; Vol. 678, c. 1547–8]
I respect the integrity of my hon. Friends the Members for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) and Willesden, East (Mr. Skeet), who have tabled an Amendment and who sincerely believe that we ought now at once to go further. I ask them and others on both sides of the House who may think like that what their evidence is. Let us have that evidence out in public so that it can be examined.

I have studied the Bill of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford? North—the Public Order Act, 1936 (Amendment) Bill—and I find it hard to see what it would have achieved. My hon. Friend wants to make it a specific offence to use words inciting hatred of any racial group of Her Majesty's subjects, conducive to a breach of the peace. I must ask what words likely to be used at a public meeting could incite hatred and yet not be threatening, abusive, or insulting; and if they are threatening, abusive or insulting they are punishable under the law as it stands.

With respect to my hon. Friends, I do not believe in complicating the criminal law with extra words which add nothing to it, just as a kind of gesture. Of course words could be inserted which would widen the scope of the offence, but then we would be biting into freedom of speech, and why do that when, now that we have the Lord Chief Justice's judgment, we know that the present words are effective for the purpose? The extra words which my hon. Friend would like written into the law would not have turned anything that Mosley had said during the last few years into a breach of the law.

There is another objection to my hon. Friend's ideas for amending Section 5 of the 1936 Act. His Bill would introduce into our law the concept of race, a concept which is quite alien to the law as it stands, and, I would say, long may it remain so. The law now is equal in its application to all men. It knows no distinction of race between one citizen and another. I have no desire to be the Home Secretary who first introduces into our law the concept that some of my fellow citizens are to be singled out for special protection or distinction from others because of the race to which they belong.

I ask my hon. Friends in the Jewish community and elsewhere to think out carefully whether a sort of racial division within society is what they really desire. And perhaps I might remind the House that I represent an area of London with a large Jewish population whom I greatly respect, so that in my constituency I am not remote from the kind of issues which we are discussing today.

I have great sympathy with the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North, although I do not agree with him. I have no sympathy with those, unlike him, who would make incitement to race hatred a punishable offence in all circumstances, regardless of the question whether a breach of the peace was likely to follow. It would be quite wrong to make the police, with their powers of arrest, act as arbiters of the limits of free speech in circumstances when there was no threat at all to public order. The police are keepers of order, and not censors of speech. I trust that Parliament will hesitate long before penalising words spoken in public in the course of controversy on matters of religion, colour or race, when there is no risk at all to public order. That way danger lies. We should not control opinions: what we should do is to maintain the Queen's peace. If at any time there is a threat to public order, the present legislation comes into play.

These are momentous issues, charged with deep emotion when the mind turns to the rise of Nazianti-Semitism which led to the murder of 6 million Jews; yet they are issues also going into the heart of British history, with its historic tradition of tolerance and its fights for the rights of free speech. Because we who are Christians should be sure that we see all this through Jewish eyes, I ask leave to read to the House a leading article in the Jewish Chronicle of 7th June—a month ago. It is quite short.

I want to read it not because I agree with it all, as the House will see, but because it breathes a spirit of fairness which makes it a near-perfect introduction to today's debate. It says:
"The Home Secretary's proposal to increase penalties under the Public Order Act shows that the Government intends to tackle the question of racialist incitement seriously. But the question is bound to be raised whether these proposals go far enough. Why, it is reasonable to ask, should not the Public Order Act itself be stretched to include incitement to hatred, irrespective of whether it can be shown to provoke breaches of the peace? And should the laws at present in operation against oral incitement not be extended to the written word, too? There are arguments for and against. Some favour reliance on the British legal tradition of applying and adapting existing law, while others insist that this is a qualitatively new problem. There are reasonable men on both sides and the answer, in this case, will probably lie with practice. If the new provisions prove satisfactory the pressure for further legislation will doubtless diminish. If, on the other hand, experience shows the present proposals are still no effective bar to racial incitement, then the case of the maxima lists will be strengthened beyond rebuttal. Meanwhile, the dialogue is bound to continue, and provided that it remains within the bounds of good faith and tolerance on the part of both schools it will all be to the good."
It is a very natural instinct to feel that the spreading of these odious pagan doctrines of race hatred, extending even to the adulation of Hitler, should be prohibited by law. It looks safe. It looks strong. But is it? Freedom of thought and freedom of speech are liberties that we fought the last war to guard. The more that I study all that has happened the more I am convinced that we are right in linking the law on all this to the preservation of public order. We can rely upon utter detestation by public opinion to keep Fascism in its place.

What we are not going to tolerate here is disorder in public places or racial clashes. The police need no extra powers in the law for dealing with them, except the deterrent power of these new penalties in the Bill. If, at any future time, there should be clear evidence of need for further powers, the Government would not hesitate to come to Parliament for them. But at present there is no such evidence at all. That being so, instead of compromising free speech we should vigorously enforce the law as it stands. The Bill will make the penalties formidable and deter the extremists on either side from imagining that they can flout the law.

4.15 p.m.

I am sure that it would be the view of everybody who heard him that the Home Secretary has just made a very impressive and sincere speech—one well in tune with the mood not only of the House at this time, but with that of many people outside who are very worried about the situation. I hope that in what I have to say I shall be regarded as at least as moderate and sincere—because, frankly, I disagree with the conclusion to which the right hon. Gentleman has come on the major issue.

On the Bill itself I have one reservation only, relating to the penalties, which I shall come to later. Nobody will dispute that, quite apart from anything else that we may wish to discuss, bringing these penalties into line not only with present-day conditions but to a point where they really will be a deterrent is a tremendously important thing to do. Therefore, so far as the Bill goes, and subject to the one reservation which I have mentioned, there is nothing that I would wish to do to obstruct its passage.

I take issue with the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon on the question of the approach that lies behind this question. I do not agree that it is only a matter of public order. I cannot accept that we should tie this simply to the question of public order. Unless the police have some clear guide lines on which to proceed, what is almost certain to happen when they begin exercising their powers to preserve public order? We have all had experience of this—all those of us who have grown up in the hurly-burly of public argument and disputation. What tends to happen is that those on the platform who are uttering the words which, in the end, lead to an abuse of public order are the ones who are protected, while those who react to what is said on the platform are inevitably the ones against whom the police, in the end, have to move.

This fact leads to a tremendous degree of irritation, bad temper and abuse of the police, together with a total distortion of the whole question. On occasions in the 1930s I became extremely angry with the police when I felt that I was being pushed around by them and when I was sure that I was only expressing a decent man's reaction to some very indecent things said by people on the platform. It is not sufficient merely to deal with that end of the question.

I now turn to something in which I may be expressing a more fundamental disagreement. I do not think that at this stage in the development of our society we can simply say that we have no interest in the use to which freedom of speech is put; that we have no interest in what people say, but are concerned solely—as the Home Secretary said, in some very tough language—to ensure that there shall be peace in our streets and that people can move about freely on their way of business.

In the light of what has happened since the early 1930s this seems to be an untenable position. We have an obligation to see that free speech is not abused. Indeed, we already do this. The Home Secretary spoke as though freedom of speech was an absolute, but it is not. He spoke about the undesirability of the police, with their powers of arrest, acting as censors or arbiters on the question of what free speech should be used to say, but to some extent the police are already censors.

Obscenity and blasphemy are offences, and the police can already move against them. I do not know to what extent they move simply because they think that such utterances may lead to a breach of the peace, but they are entitled to move against them per se, just because people are saying obscene and blasphemous things. That part of the Home Secretary's case was erected on a weak foundation.

What we have to look at is whether uttering words of race hatred of one race or one group or another should be put in the same category as obscenity and blasphemy—as things which we ought not to do. I was a little amused at another part of the Home Secretary's speech in which he suggested that all had settled down a good deal since last year. He suggested that people were holding meetings which had an attendance from a minimum of two to a maximum of 200 and that all is well. As far as I can see, the only way in which it differs from the Conservative Party in recent by-election meetings is that the Conservatives have had a minimum of two, without, as far as I know, having the maximum of 200. It did not seem to me, therefore, that we could accept that analogy.

More seriously, it does not seem to me that to say that the meetings are within such limits is in itself a great reason for complacency. Of course, there are arguments on both sides. I well appreciate the passage which the Home Secretary read from the Jewish Chronicle, but the arguments, it seemed to me, are much stronger in favour of amending the law now than the Home Secretary suggested. I am sure that all hon. Members in the House agree that organisations which exist to exercise freedom of speech and the right of free association to destroy it do not deserve a great deal of consideration from us.

After all, freedom of speech is not something of which we should merely be proud, not something simply to honour in respect of hundreds of years of tradition. It is something which we must fight to preserve for those who come after us. If, to preserve effective freedom of speech and effective right of free assembly, one has to impose some limitation, it does not seem to me that one should run away from that. I feel that as things stand we are in danger of allowing a steady growth of the activity of those who would destroy this valuable freedom unless we move against them.

The Home Secretary asked,"What sort of words would constitute an offence?" I do not propose to give them publicity, but I have here a document, issued by one of the organisations, which for sheer, unbelievable bestial reference to various groups in this community is very hard to beat. I have no doubt that if these things are written, they are said by the same people. There is no holding back here. The reference is not merely to Jews, or Asians, or Africans, but to every minority group.

The degree to which they are prepared to say in headlines that Hitler showed the way, the extent to which they are willing to laud what he did as a great upsurge of vitality—these are evil words and evil thoughts in themselves. These are words which do tremendous harm. Recently, in Deptford, during the by-election, I saw consequences which some of these words can have and the extent to which they can bite into all kinds of decent people's propaganda. Things were said and done and written at Deptford by people who would say that they totally abhor anything of this kind; but they were said, written and done under just such an influence as this.

Appeals were made about housing for white people which, however subconsciously, are the product of the insidious influence of such words. The words exist. They can be examined. I suggest that the Attorney-General, if he is to reply to the debate, owes us rather more examination of them and more reason why we should not make these words an offence.

I wonder whether the words which the hon. Member has in mind are not in themselves abusive. It seemed to me that the type of word he had in that document would be abusive.

I must refer to my own experience, and that suggests that what the hon. Member said is not sufficient answer.

The Home Secretary carefully explained to us that the police do not take action because words are abusive. He emphasised again and again that the police are moving because there is a threat to public order. If there is no threat to public order, he said, then the police should not intervene. If it were said, therefore, that these words were caught under the provisions of the law, and under the general reference to"abusive or offensive", the fact is that as the law operates, and will operate, the police do not move on those grounds. Nor do I think that they will move unless we make it clear that we are getting at this kind of language, hitting at this kind of approach and aiming at this kind of speech.

I repeat that many examples make me think that we ought to adopt this view. The argument is that it is too dangerous to do it, that it means yet another encroachment on free speech, and that it makes a very fine distinction. I can only say that I simply am not persuaded about that. Even if it were true, I repeat—the bastions may have to be moved in order more effectively to protect the real body of our rights of free speech.

The Home Secretary said that he did not want to be the Home Secretary who introduced into our law the concept of race, and he appealed to his Jewish friends, in particular, when he said that he did not want to single them out as being specially in need of protection. When he said that, two emotions hit me. This is the sort of phrase—I know that the right hon. Gentleman did not use it in this way, but it has been so used—which one can use if one does not want to protect those groups. It has been used by people who were suffering from an anti-Semitic or anti-special group feeling.

But the point is that the right hon. Gentleman is not asked to do that. There is no reason to bring the Jewish, or the Irish or the coloured people into this at all. What the right hon. Gentleman is asked to consider doing is to guarantee all Her Majesty's subjects, of whatever race, crced or colour, against this kind of attack. It may be that at some period the Jews suffer from it. I had an Irish ancestry, and I well remember that when I was very young it was the Irish who suffered from it in the part of London in which I lived. At some period the Roman Catholics have suffered from it, and in other places Protestants suffer from it.

In some places coloured people may be grossly abused and insulted, but, equally, especially as things have developed recently, in some places white people would be grossly abused and insulted. It seems to me that there is no reason to oppose this suggestion on the ground that it is specially designed for a particular group. It is specially designed to protect us all against this kind of abuse, insult and offensive attack. I therefore think that that part of the Home Secretary's argument did not stand up to examination.

It also seems to me that the case which some of us are making that this should be an offence in itself, simply because it is wrong, simply because it has been associated with tremendous evil in the world, has not been dealt with either by the Home Secretary today or by the Lord Chancellor in his speech in another place. The Lord Chancellor—the Home Secretary did not say this today, but it has been argued—asked, if we put some words like these into the law, would the law be enforceable? I believe that it would be enforceable.

Frankly, I think that the police are quite well able to understand this sort of thing when they hear it, as they understand other language which is an offence. But even if it were proved to me—as I do not believe it can be—that it is questionable whether we could enforce it in every case, nevertheless I believe that even the declaration enshrined in our law would in itself be a good thing.

I do not accept the view that it is totally wrong to have declaratory passages in our law. Nobody has yet dealt with the question put to the Lord Chancellor in another place—why do we customarily write this kind of declaration into the constitutions which we write, or cause to be written, for the emergent territories of the Commonwealth if we believe that there is no virtue in such a declaration? We have no constitution into which it could be written outside the statement of our laws. What we are asking the Home Secretary to do is to write in the only appropriate place in British law the declaration which the Government have been busily engaged in writing into constitutions provided for the new sovereign States of the Commonwealth during the last few years.

I do not believe that that is answered by saying that such a statement would be merely declaratory; nor do I believe that it would be only declaratory. In many cases it would bite and, even if it were only declaratory, it would be worth while. The Home Secretary may say that such a statement would be a matter of definition and judgment, but everything of this kind is. Even if the police made an arrest, the decision would still lie with the courts. It does not follow that every time the police make an arrest they have to be 100 per cent. certain of the court's verdict. It is not the case now. The decision would still be made in the place where we like decisions in this country to be taken. The position at present is worse than that, because at the moment the decision does not get as far as the courts, unless there is a question of abuse of public order or peaceful passage of citizens.

The Home Secretary spoke in very tough and strong words. The Fascists, the Communists and the thugs come into those words. But if, because the law is not sufficiently selective and does not state the offence clearly enough, we are driven to shutting down all freedom of speech, we shall have reached a worse position. The Home Secretary says that to put this statement into the law would be an infringement of free speech, but it would not be half the infringement of free speech which would come if the Commissioner of Police declared all assemblies and all processions and all demonstrations out of order.

When the right hon. Gentleman said that he would be really strong and would back the police to see that nothing occurred which could cause a breach of the peace, I was very worried. He said that there was one thing that he did not want to do as Home Secretary. As Home Secretary, I would not want to be the one who, to preserve the rights of peaceful passage, clamped down on all meetings and demonstrations and processions simply because the law was not sufficiently selective to bite and because I was concerned only about peace and order and not about the doctrine of free speech. Therefore, far from being better than the present situation, as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to think, in some ways the new position would be worse.

A word or two about the police would not be out of order. I said just now how I used to feel. I remember many an occasion when I got into tremendous conflict, not always being the unemotional man I now like to think myself, with the police and how very angry I used to get. But, after all, the police have a most unpleasant job to do in this respect and there is no reason why we should so easily put them into this position if we can help them by giving them a better weapon.

As things now stand, because they do not want to shut down meetings if they can help it, the police wait until trouble shows up and passions are aroused. They then not only have to face a most unpleasant situation themselves, at the risk of a good deal of maltreatment to themselves, but, to deal with it quickly, they must themselves use a good deal of force. People who are out of sympathy with the police assume that they are naturally on the side of the Fascists or thugs or whoever it is who is the cause of the provocation. They are not. They are ordinary men and women like us, with the same differences of opinion and the same differences of approach and the same differences of temperament. But they are pushed into this position, which gives another reason for amending the law so as to avoid that state of affairs. I trust that I am not overstating the case. I do not believe that all the dangers and difficulties would be removed by this amendment of the law, but the situation would be eased.

Before turning to the Bill itself—I want to leave plenty of time, because many of my hon. Friends have a tremendous title to be heard on this subject—I want to put a question to the Home Secretary. He spoke very fairly and I hope that I have responded in a similar vein. This is a matter about which there can be argument and different views which may be canvassed and discussed. However, as the Long Title of the Bill is now drafted, we shall not be able to deal with this matter at any subsequent stage of the Bill. We do not get amendments of the law of this kind all that often, and one does not want to go through a running sore with all kinds of devious means being used to raise an issue in a way not conducive to dignified or orderly debate.

It would be better if the Government amended the Long Title so that an appropriate Amendment could be moved in Committee and so that we could have a genuine and effective debate. The Government would give nothing away by doing that, but they would enable hon. Members to get at the issue and we could then see how people felt about it. We have a perfect right to press the Government to help us in this way.

With one reservation, I would not wish to hold up the Bill. The one reservation refers to something I mentioned earlier—the fact that the penalties for those provoked are being brought into line with the new and increased penalties for those who do the provoking. Correspondingly, that means a higher penalty for those provoked than for the provoker. That seems to be the oddest thing to do.

I have myself been the victim at a rather famous May Day meeting and I know quite well that people go out to break up a meeting without provocation. When people do that, there is no reason, especially when they are trying to brain me with a flagpole, why I should want to see them freed from very stiff penalties. But let us be clear; that is not the way it usually happens. What mostly happens is that there is an audience response, either to what is said, or to the advertisements put out in advance of the meeting about what is to be said.

I cannot believe that it is in accordance with our sense of justice or reality that people who react to provocation should be punished as heavily as those who do the provoking. If the Bill is not amended, such people will be punished, whereas the provokers will be escorted away by the police and no charge will lie against them. That seems to be wrong and I hope that the Home Secretary will open his mind to the idea of an Amendment—which could obviously be drafted in a number of ways—to make the penalty for provocation very much heavier than the penalty falling on those who, however foolishly, allow themselves to be provoked.

We shall try very hard to amend the Bill in that way, I trust with some support from hon. Members on the back benches opposite, and, I hope, from the Government Front Bench as well, as there cannot be an issue of principle on this. I was not persuaded on the principle by what the Home Secretary said, nor by what was said by the Government spokesman in another place. I hope that we shall be allowed by the Government to seek to amend the Bill in that way.

4.40 p.m.

Perhaps it would be for the convenience of the House if, in calling the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger), I make it quite clear that the Amendment in his name is not selected for debate.

I am obliged to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and accept that and will frame my remarks in that light.

The House has listened to two closely and very moderately argued speeches. I thank my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary for his sympathetic words, and I personally recognise the sincerity and integrity of his argument. It is a closely balanced argument, but I am bound to say, if my right hon. Friend will forgive me, that in this matter of opinion I thought the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) had the better part on the main question which, if I may say so without attempting to infringe the rules of order, is the aspect of the consideration of this Bill to which I tried to call attention in the Amendment which has not been called.

I welcome this Bill, naturally, as far as it goes. I think its worst defect is the fact that it is so narrowly drawn in the Title that it is not possible to table Amendments to it in the way which I think most important. I regret that, because it will give the impression that the Government do not want this matter debated and taken to a Division. The Government may be right or wrong, but it seems a great pity that they should not have allowed the House to take the matter to an issue.

I shall not detain the House in expanding on the virtues of the Bill beyond remarking that I welcome the fact that insulting words such as"Hitler was right" have been punished by the courts and are now regarded by the Government as being such an infringement and abuse of freedom of speech as to merit a greater punishment in cash than in 1936 and even greater punishment in imprisonment. I regret, however, that the opportunity has been missed in presenting this Bill of clarifying Section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936. I note the Government's willingness to legislate if they consider it necessary, but I think it a pity that they should have to take"two bites at the cherry".

I have explained my reasons for wanting this clarification and wanting it now. Hon. Members will remember that I explained this on 1st August last year, as reported at c. 638 of the Official Report for that day. I shall not detain the House by repeating now what I said then, but I stand by the argument I then used. I have had no reason since, except in the one detail I shall mention, to modify the strong view I had formed then. I still think the amendment I want to see made represents the highest common factor of reasonable public opinion on the matter. I still think such an amendment is the minimum expression of public feeling as reflected in the legislative Acts of this House that public decency demands.

In spite of the decision against Jordan in the High Court, I still think the wording of the Section should be clarified in the interests of precision and the maintenance of public order in future because a decided case is not so clear and firm a guide as words written into an Act of Parliament. The amendment I want, and which I regret this Bill does not make, is as follows. Section 5 reads:
"Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour"—
Then I want to insert:
"or words inciting hatred of any section of the public"—
The Section continues:
"with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence."
This differs from the Amendment I proposed last year in that I have substituted"any section of the public" for the words"any racial group of Her Majesty's subjects". I think this may be an improvement, but my mind is not closed on the point and the merits of the various alternatives cannot usefully be debated here and now.

It may be right or wrong to specify race or religion, but the point is that whatever words one plays with, or whatever words one puts in or leaves out, the word"hatred" and the act of incitement must be put on the Statute Book. If anyone defends the right of free men to indulge in incitement to hatred on the grounds of freedom of speech and on the grounds of liberty, he must defend the pathological murderer likewise on the grounds of liberty.

Hatred is a manifestation of a pathological condition personally, emotionally, socially and politically, and those who wish to defend it do so at their own risk. But to call the principles of liberty in aid is just sickening humbug. From letters I have received, I think that that particular humbug reveals some rather nasty urges and stresses deep in the minds of those who practise it.

I want to make clear that my amendment to Section 5 of the Public Order Act does not enlarge the ambit of that Section as some hon. Members might be tempted to think, and some might be tempted to desire. When I specify incitement to hatred as an offence, I am not taking it outside the sphere of provocation of a public disorder. It would be desirable certainly to eliminate hatred from the world altogether and to prevent even private incitement, but I doubt whether that is legislatively practicable. What I want to do amounts to no more than this. I want to clarify and define"abusive" and to make it certain that incitement to hatred is, and is known by all to be,"abuse" within the meaning of the Act. I am not as deeply opposed as my right hon. Friend is to what might be called declaratory legislation. On the contrary, I am sure that this declaration is one that it would be desirable to make.

I have heard it argued in objection to my proposal that"incitement to hatred" is something too difficult for the police to apprehend and recognise and that it should not therefore be specified. But is"incitement to hatred" more difficult to recognise than"abuse"? If"abuse" is acceptable in the Act, why should"incitement to hatred" be unacceptable as an amendment in clarification? This objection is a specious and a"dodgy" one. I reject it. Anyone who objects to my proposal on these grounds should come out into the open and promote a Bill to repeal Section 5 of the Public OrderAct, 1936, altogether and legislate to modify the common law misdemeanour of sedition. Those who object—I am again referring to letters I have received—ought frankly to say what is in their hearts," I hate Jews and niggers and good luck to all my fellow haters". Then at least we should all know where we stood. I say frankly that I stand against them, though I believe that the true solution to their problem of hatred is not a political one; it is a medical one, one of mental health and I wish that it could be solved.

I do not want to be unjust to or lacking in sympathy for the man who says,
"The stranger within my gate…I cannot feel his mind".
There are deep and tragically difficult adjustments to be made especially in accommodating ourselves to coloured immigrants. I can sympathise with the idea:
"Let the corn be all one sheaf—
And the grapes be all one vine,
Ere our children's teeth are set on edge
By bitter bread and wine."
These are difficult adjustments. But they have to be made without hatred and without the pathological outbursts that wound human hearts and human minds. Our laws should make this clear even though that does mean declaratory acts of legislation.

I think it is desirable to amend the Act simply in the interests of public order. I think it is very desirable in the interests of political integrity and decency, quite apart from the practical object. I am on the side of the traditions of tolerance and humanity in which our people have always taken pride. Equally, I am against—if one would like to look round for an example—Mr. Khrushchev, who is the prime persecutor of the Jews in the world at the present time. I am against the Klu Klux Klan; for example, and the wretched, doomed Afrikaaners. I am against the Black Muslims, who also preach race hatred, against the whites, in America. I think that all who are on the same side, and there are two sides in Armageddon, should now stand and be counted, because the world is watching, and watching this country as it always watches British Governments on issues of this kind. I hope that the Government will think again in the light of what I have said and at least give the House an opportunity to discuss the Amendment upon which many of us would like to make our allegiance clear.

4.52 p.m.

A few weeks ago the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) and I had the rather tragic privilege of speaking at a vast meeting in London held to mark the 20th anniversary of the massacre in the Warsaw Ghetto. I think that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that his views and mine on this issue are broadly the same, although we may vary as to the exact method of achieving our objectives.

As one of the non-Jewish constituents of the Home Secretary, I wish to say that I fully appreciate the sensitiveness which the right hon. Gentleman has always shown upon matters of this kind. For some years he and I have been fellow vice-presidents of the Hampstead Council of Christians and Jews and we have appreciated the help which the right hon. Gentleman has given on a number of occasions. But there I am afraid the kissing has to stop.

I wish to express my regret that the Home Secretary has lost the opportunity of consolidating and codifying the law on this subject in a way which would have had the support of all the members of the Labour Party, the Liberal Party and many members or the Conservative Party as well. I think it worth reminding the House at this point that when towards the end of last year we presented in this House a Petition calling for legislation against racial discrimination signed by 500,000 citizens, it was sponsored jointly by the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock), the hon. Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Tiley) on behalf of the Conservative Party and by myself as a Labour Member of Parliament.

I am sorry that the Home Secretary should, as it were, be fobbing us off with a Measure which I think would be much more appropriately called, the"Fines (Compensation for Inflation) Bill". I am disappointed on a number of counts. I am disappointed because I believe that there is a good deal of obscurity in the law as it stands. I entirely agree with the view put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown). The history of the Jordan case itself shows the obscurity which prevails at the present time. The fact that it had to go from the magistrates to London Sessions and from there to the Court of Appeal shows that the law was very far from clear and the truth is that, as the law stands, the public does not know what is the law any more than Mr. Seaton does. It might be worth a little research on the part of the right hon. Gentleman to discover the number of judgments by Mr. Seaton which have been overturned by a higher court. There is this confusion and members of the public do not know what are their rights.

I think it wrong to place such an onus on the police, and I particularly welcome the remarks made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper upon that score. The general attitude of the police in matters of this kind is quite unexceptionable, but unless constables are Jewish or coloured—and we know there is at any rate an unofficial ban on the employment of coloured men in the police force, although the Home Secretary disclaims any official ban—they would be less than human if they were not more provoked by those members of the public who are trying to break through a police cordon than by the men and women on the platform who are actually doing the provoking. There is no doubt, moreover, that the atmosphere of a demonstration, with all the excitement attached to it, is not conducive to detached, unemotional appraisal of a situation or of the niceties of the law.

I think it a great pity, too, that in such situations the decisions should often have to be made not by a judicial authority, not by the Home Secretary, but by the Minister of Public Building and Works who has had put upon him a duty which is quite remote from the proper duties attaching to that office. It is left to the Minister of Public Building and Works to decide whether a public meeting in Trafalgar Square should or should not take place. On at least two occasions I have been to see the Minister of Public Building and Works on this issue. On the last occasion we put to the right hon. Gentleman not only the demonstration that was banned last Sunday but also a proposal by the Movement for Colonial Freedom to hold a demonstration on 21st July in favour of the right to demonstrate. I understand that at any rate up to yesterday's date the Movement for Colonial Freedom had not received a reply. It would be much fairer to the public as a whole that they should know exactly what is the law on the subject and where they stand. The public should know its rights and it should not be left to the decision of the Minister of Public Building and Works to decide what is a proper demonstration.

I believe, too, that there are many gaps in the present law, and I hope that when he replies to the debate the learned Attorney-General will deal with one or two of the points I wish to put to him. From my reading of the law, I am not at all certain whether the Public Order Act applies at present only to spoken words or whether it applies also to written words. My memory, if correct, tells me that on the occasion of the Colin Jordan meeting there was a banner exhibited on the plinth, the theme of which was that we must free Great Britain from Jewish domination. I do not know whether that comes within the scope of the Public Order Act. As I understand it at present, it does not. But it seems to me just as objectionable that a banner should be displayed in large lettering on a public monument containing sentiments of that kind as to have an insignificant ruffian like Colin Jordan voicing the same sentiments.

There is another doubt in my mind. It is to what extent the law on sedition applies in matters of this kind. I listened with interest to what the hon. Member for Ilford, North had to say. Frankly, I hope that the law on sedition does not apply. I am hoping that the Government will not rely too heavily on the law on sedition because I understand that it is technically seditious for a person:
"to excite ill will between different classes of the Sovereign's subjects or to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or the Government, the laws or constitution of the realm".
That seems to go pretty wide and cover a lot of things which many of us have been saying about the Government during the last few months. It will certainly not inhibit me from expressing my condemnation of acts like the Street Offences Act, and I have no doubt at all that if an unscrupulous Government were to rely too heavily on the law on sedition it could be a very dangerous threat to civil liberty.

As to the law on sedition, I also understand that, if there is an attack on grounds of religion, the religion has to be religion by law established, which presumably precludes from the law against seditious attacks attacks upon Roman. Catholicism and the Jewish religion. I also understand that if the complaint is on racial grounds it can be prosecuted effectively only if it is directed against people who live in this country.

Therefore, there are inadequacies in the law and, even if the Government do not feel the same as I do about these inadequacies, I am sure that it would be right to make the law explicit in an Act of Parliament. That is why I agree so strongly with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper and with the hon. Member for Ilford, North. It is done in other parts of the Commonwealth. It is done in other parts of the world. It is one of the basic laws of West Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. I believe that we should let the public know what the law is and we should relieve the police of a responsibility which should not properly be theirs.

I turn to the question of fines. I do not think that increasing fines in this way is either effective or equitable. In so far as the Bill amends the Public Meeting Act, 1908, the Government propose to increase the fine on summary conviction twenty times and the period of imprisonment on summary conviction twelve times. In the case of the Public Order Act, the Government propose to increase the fine only twofold and provide for the same period of imprisonment. Taking into account the fact that the value of the £is today only three-tenths of what is was in 1936, the Government are proposing to impose a smaller financial penalty for offences under the Public Order Act than was the case in 1936.

I am not sure whether the Government full understand the intensity and vicious-ness of racial propaganda. This afternoon we welcomed to the House my hon. Friend the Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin), who is taking the place of a Member—Sir Leslie Plummer—who was much loved on both sides of the House and who was one of the pioneers of the move in the House to introduce legislation of the kind that we ask for today. For a long period Sir Leslie was the victim of sustained attacks by Fascists and members of the so-called National Socialist Movement. After Sir Leslie died and his widow returned to London, she was almost immediately telephoned by Fascists to say how pleased they were that her husband had died.

This is indeed something, as the Home Secretary said, which defies understanding by ordinary and rational people. In the past six weeks since a speech that I made in the House I have had something of the experience which the late Sir Leslie Plummer had. It is an experience which is common to a number of hon. Members. I have constant nuisance telephone calls. I have threats made by telephone to my house. On one occasion they announced that they were coming that evening to carve us up. Last Sunday they telephoned to convey the invitation that they would get me in the end. No hon. Member who is worth his salt would be deflected from doing what he believes to be his public duty by threats from the squalid sub-human dregs of the population. Nevertheless, it is, to put it in the most moderate way, a distasteful experience even for somebody nurtured in our traditions who has confidence in the ability of the police to stop the carrying out of threats of that kind.

But I think that the House ought to look at it not in terms of Members of the House but from the point of view of the coloured immigrant, for example. What a terrifying experience it must be for a coloured immigrant to have a telephone call of that kind, living here with all the insecurity that he almost inevitably feels. What a grievous experience it must be for anybody who was himself a refugee from Fascism and who perhaps lost most of his family in the gas chambers during the Hitler régime.

I believe that laws are not enough in this matter and that public opinion must make itself felt. I was interested when the Home Secretary said that he was relying on the detestation of public opinion to keep the Fascists in their place. I am sure that public opinion has its part to play. Education, propaganda, the work of organisationslike the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen, the National Council for Civil Liberties, and the Council of Christians and Jews, all have their part to play. However, I believe that it is absolutely essential that the State itself, that the Parliament of the Realm, should set its seal of approval upon the campaign against racial hatred and racial incitement by passing legislation which would make that intolerance and discrimination clearly illegal under the laws of Great Britain.

Therefore, I regret that the Government have not gone further and I hope that it will be possible for them to accede to my right hon. Friend's suggestion and amend the Long Title of the Bill so as to give us an opportunity to make suitable Amendments at a later stage.

5.5 p.m.

A good deal of water has flowed under London Bridge since the time about a year ago when this question was brought so violently to our attention because of the Fascist rally in Trafalgar Square. I think there was a genuine shock of horror to all decent people in the country when they saw photographs of Trafalgar Square with the filthy Fascist emblems displayed on the plinth of Nelson's Column.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on the very great improvement that we have had in the climate of opinion and behaviour since then, without any legislative changes at all. I remember being in contact with my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Pentlands (Lord John Hope), who was then the Minister of Works, who seemed to feel that it was beyond his power to prevent this meeting taking place. This is obviously a question of emphasis, because no statutory powers have changed in any way but these disgusting meetings no longer take place. This is already a sign that what the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Greenwood) refers to as the force of public opinion is in fact a good deal stronger than law in these matters and that the emphasis which is now placed, and rightly placed, not only in my opinion but in the opinion of all hon. Members and of the public as a whole, on the extirpation of these doctrines is being successful.

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Rossendale and to my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) for the enormous attention they have given to this matter. Curiously enough, it is rather a good counter-argument to the plea of Jewish domination that I am the first Jewish speaker to take part in this debate and that the concern in this matter is not merely a Jewish matter but is shared by hon. Members on both sides of the House.

The hon. Member for Rossendale referred to Colin Jordan as an insignificant ruffian. I do not think there will be many amongst us who would care to differ very much from that description. Jordan personally did not matter. It was, in fact, the ideas for which he appeared to be a mouthpiece. More than that, it was the Fascist movements in other countries which were pleased to support in this country movements that they would not support in their own. This is very important, because if there is to be a standing platform in England for anti-Jewish, anti-coloured, anti-minority views, those movements will have the support of people all over the world who have those feelings but who prefer not to voice them within their own shores.

I entirely support the approach of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. I listened with the greatest possible interest to the words of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), but at the end of the road I still did not think that it would be possible to frame legislation to carry into action the totally laudable sentiments that he expressed. The hon. Member for Rossendale rather bore me out by saying that laws are not enough.

I give one example of this. Twice in my short period in Parliament I and the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) have come into contact with a very severe anti-Jewish manifestation, which has been an attempt to stop the sale of Jewish killed beef. This came to both ofus. It was brought up in this House once and in another place. In both those cases this was brought up by people of the highest moral standard, actuated by the highest motives, who relied on information, nearly all misleading, provided for them, with amplepropaganda funds behind them, by people who, I can say with my hand on my heart, were not very much concerned about the welfare of animals but were greatly concerned about the ill-welfare of Jews. I would be willing to testify this outside the House. That is no imputation whatsoever upon the good faith of those people who brought those measures forward. This is the sort of covert attack which no amount of legislation will ever prevent and which makes it perfectly clear that we cannot make people good by law. This is one reason why I personally find myself in agreement with what I would call the pragmatic approach of the Home Secretary.

My right hon. Friend takes the view that higher penalties are necessary. I would not differ from him in any way on that, but I do not think that we should spend a great deal of time debating and passing resolutions which tend to make people good by Act of Parliament or tend to stop them having evil thoughts by Act of Parliament, because that we cannot do.

We value our tradition of free speech. What is free speech? Not everybody who exercises free speech is preaching brotherly love. If they were preaching exclusively brotherly love they would get a very small audience indeed. When people are exercising free speech they are in fact attacking institutions and people whom they think deserve attacking. We do not want to stop them doing it, but equally it is no good pretending that the exercise of free speech is anything but an exercise in antagonism. I believe that free speech has brought us enormous benefits, and I think that many people who are anxious to curtail free speech in this connection would find it very disagreeable if it were ever curtailed in other directions.

My balanced view on this is that I wholeheartedly share my right hon. Friend's pragmatic approach, that this is a thing that has to be dealt with by the views not only of the Government and of the police but of public opinion and that if we keep public opinion on our side in this matter this Measure is exactly what is needed.

5.13 p.m.

I am a little alarmed, but not because I in any way doubt the excellent intentions of the Home Secretary. On the contrary, I think that he realises and sympathises with the point of view that we should preserve not only order but decency in the community in this country. I believe that he honestly believes that the Measure he is introducing now will meet the situation, but I know that he will equally respect the point of view which indicates that we cannot deal with this situation quite as complacently, and I do not use the word in any offensive sense.

We are not dealing with a situation which has happened before the advent of National Socialism. We are dealing with a situation in which the complete horror of the atrocities which were committed in the name of a so-called political organisation are well known to us. I think that we have to approach the situation with the full knowledge and understanding of what happened and not merely take it for granted that that kind of thing cannot happen again with people who are similarly inclined to those who advocated the Nazi doctrines in Germany at that time. We cannot ignore the fact that the very arguments from time to time used here, in the interests of the preservation of the freedom of speech, are similar to arguments which were used by those who introduced the Nazi régimein Germany, before they came into power, and who abused all civilised ideas when they took over the State.

The Nazis started in a very similar way, with a very small following, and the ultimate result was a tragedy for the world. Therefore, I know that no one will misunderstand me when I say that it is extremely difficult, if at all possible, for me to speak on this subject without some kind of emotion. Unfortunately, I know too well what happens under the Hitler policy, diabolically put into effect in accordance with the full approval of the National Socialist Party in Germany.

Every strategem was used to gain its own ends. It began with the deliberate abuse of the right of freedom of speech, a freedom which afterwards was openly declared by that party when it got into power to be absolutely contrary to its views. Their fellow men were deceived by a pretence that they were promoting a political creed, and that is what I should like to draw to the attention of the House.

We are at present not dealing with the promotion of political creeds. We are dealing with something which is a crime against humanity, whether it is advocated on the street corner, by means of banners, or by means of slogans. When people are in a position to be able to declare openly in our streets that Hitler was right, we have come to a stage when we ought to examine how we are to deal with the situation.

I remember the time when we used to read the publications of that party. I was in the House. There were very few of us at that time who appreciated what lay behind all that was being written and said. One of them was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), who spoke openly about the situation at a time when similar pleas about freedom of speech were being put forward by the Nazis in Germany in the same way as the National Socialists are putting them forward here.

Many a time men who had been sent here to this country by the Nazis under their well-known blackmailing methods told with heartbreaking emotion what was happening in Germany. The wives and children of those emissaries were kept as hostages, and the emissaries would only speak when they were satisfied that their confidence would not be betrayed, as they knew the threats against their near and dear ones in Ger- many would be carried out with all the subhuman violence of the Nazis' fury, the fang and claw directed towards the violation of every moral code. Yet the very same Nazis were sending out books to Members of the House, and many of us received them, books in which they were talking about their right to freedom of speech. They complained that the results of this so-called freedom of speech of theirs were being wrongly interpreted in other countries.

Today, a circular is being issued by British citizens. It is in German. It is being distributed in Germany. The name of the organisation I do not propose to publicise here. This is what the circular says. I give a translation, for it is written in German:
"We in Great Britain salute the heroic victory of thirty years ago under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and the monumental achievements of the National Socialist movement. National Socialist manifestations are most severely punished in Germany."
I am paraphrasing some of this.
"In the world outside a new movement exists. The National Socialist revival has begun. We have united with the National Socialist movements in the United States of America and in other countries. The day will come when the swastika flag will fly again. We shall win. Sieg heil. Germany, awake!"
This is being distributed in the name of an organisation which is asking for permission to hold meetings in this country to advocate its policy.

I agree mainly with what has been said by the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger), and certainly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown). I ask the House to take another look at what the United Nations decided about incitement to racial hatred. When we consider what was decided after the facts had been most carefully gone into and examined by the United Nations, of which we are members, we see that they do not find any difficulty in condemning racial distinctions. Not at all.

I should have said that we do not, because we are parties to the Declaration of Human Rights and we were also amongst those who unanimously accepted the Declaration on Genocide, which, unhappily, for reasons which I cannot understand, we have not yet been prepared to accede to in so far as the acceptance of the Covenant is concerned. The answer we get is that our law is sufficient to provide for all this.

This year, throughout the world, the fifteenth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is being observed. The foundations of this Declaration were laid down in the solemn Charter of the United Nations which not only affirmed faith in human rights but required the United Nations and its members to promote them. The promulgation of this Declaration was stimulated by the revulsion of all decent men at the enormities perpetrated by the Nazis, as is implied by the Preamble to the Declaration:
"Where recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace will prevail in the world."
This Declaration was adopted not many years ago and we have to consider in the light of that Declaration any legislation which we pass. The Declaration itself in specific terms says that
"everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration"—
It uses words similar to those which the hon. Member for Ilford, North used—
"Without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion…."
All these inalienable rights are specified more clearly in later Articles which refer to some of the barbarities of the Nazi philosophy. I could proceed from that to the question of genocide, which has been dealt with by the United Nations, too.

But how are we to interpret the position as it stands at present? I listened to the whole debate on this Bill in another place. I heard the Lord Chancellor at one time say—I interpret it in this way—that incitement to racial hatred was within the terms of the Bill itself. In other words—and I think that the Home Secretary said it today—we need not bother about introducing words of that nature because incitement to racial hatred would immediately, under our law as it stands, constitute an offence.

But I ask: why leave so much to the police? After all, it is not fair on the police. Why leave it to a policeman to decide at a meeting, or prior to a meeting, that the kind of policy being preached, or to be preached, constitutes an offence against the Bill? Why should it not be clear in the Bill itself that incitement to racial hatred is an offence, and why should not those words be used? That is all that is being asked. I do not think that that comes outside the terms of this Bill at all.

I appeal to the House. I see no reason at all why in Committee an Amendment similar to the one proposed in another place should not be introduced here. None at all. I should like the Attorney-General to reply to this question: is it a fact, or is it not, that if a person openly advocates that Hitler was right, which includes all the worst bestialities that can be perpetuated against any set of people, that in itself is sufficient to be interpreted as part and parcel of an incitement to a breach of the law?

As I said before, I cannot speak very calmly about this, knowing what I know, and having seen what I have seen—having seen even the initial forms of this which, unhappily, the democratic Government in Germany thought was all right at first. They thought that those people should be given their head. Having seen the effect of that, I think that we have to be extremely careful in this age, and at this stage, to see that any legislation which we pass makes it clear beyond any doubt whatsoever that incitement to hatred of groups on grounds of religion, race or colour, is something which will not be tolerated and which is outside the law.

Therefore, whilst welcoming the extension of the penalties in some cases, this Bill, however, fails because of the wrong image that is created. There is an image created here, by the penalties being increased against the inciter and incitee in a similar way. Whatever the merits or demerits of it may be, it creates the image that we are regarding the two offences as being of the same gravity. I know that the answer will probably be,"But you are not bound to impose the maximum penalty."

Is the Bill not creating an image whereby people will believe that a person inciting to this sort of crime either at a meeting, or prior to a meeting, is no more guilty of an offence against the law than a person who, unhappily, may have been interned in a concentration camp and who, because he goes to a meeting and finds himself unable to listen quietly to what he has heard in Germany before. and consequently, becomes irate or enraged at what he hears?

I do not want anyone to misunderstand the situation as far as I personally am concerned in relation to the efforts being made by the Home Secretary. I think, as I said before, that he is endeavouring to deal with the situation and that, to some extent, he will be dealing with the situation, but I know that he will respect the view, very carefully thought out by many people who, also, have given careful thought to this matter, that the law as it stands is not sufficiently strong or clear.

I would say, in conclusion, that the very fact that the right hon. Gentleman says that we are to try the Bill out to see whether anything else is necessary indicates that he still has a doubt in his mind. Why not resolve the doubt by putting an Act on the Statute Book which will enable those who are viciously attacked in the ways described to have no further cause for anxiety?

5.34 p.m.

I wish to start by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on the admirable speech with which he introduced the Bill. It is not always that I agree with every word of a speech made from the Government Front Bench, but on this occasion I was able to do so, and I should like to thank my right hon. Friend for the extremely moderate and relaxed way in which he presented the Measure to the House.

When these disorderly occasions occurred during the past 12 months I was quite sure about my own attitude towards them. It may have seemed a little contradictory at times in that while I was in favour of freedom of speech—I have always agreed with that—at the same time I asked the Minister of Works to prohibit meetings in Trafalgar Square and other public places over which he had control.

I think that there is a valid distinction here. I do not see why people should make themselves a nuisance to the general public. I can imagine that it would be very offensive to people, as the hon. Member for Leicester, North West (Sir B. Janner) has just been saying, to hear certain things said which the general public might accept calmly but which they, by reason of their special experience, might take muchless calmly. They might well say that they had not sought out the occasion of hearing these things, and that they were passing on their lawful occasions through frequented places.

It has seemed to me that the introduction of loud speakers and amplification in these public places, which seems to be allowed by the authorities, must bring a new element into our attitude towards meetings in public places. I have a great deal of sympathy for the view that a man who is a Jew or a coloured man should not be expected to listen quietly and calmly while rather extreme views about his group are shrieked across large expanses of London's streets.

In my view, the time has come when controversial meetings of this kind should not be held in places like Trafalgar Square. But when it comes to the matter of holding meetings in private places, then one can legitimately say that a person who has gone specially to that place to hear what is said should impose upon himself at least the average discipline of restraint and silence. I have not a great deal of sympathy with those who go to such meetings, who seek out the occasion, and then break them up in disorder, or try to do so. I have, for myself, made this division, and I hope it will commend itself to others.

I think that my right hon. Friend is right to resist the pressures brought upon him. I realise that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) and the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) have strong views upon particular aspects of this matter because of their political beliefs in respect of them, but if we were to give expression to their views on matters of race relations and colour attitudes we should, in principle, be taking a significant step.

Up to now, the law of England has, with some exceptions which I will mention later, punished not the expression of particular views but the manner in which they are expressed, that is to say, words which incite disorder or, in the words of the Public Order Act, 1936, which are"insulting, threatening, or abusive"—even though the opinions which are being expressed may be mild opinions, if the manner in which they are being expressed is of that character, then an offence is committed.

The exceptions from that general rule are, of course, first treason or sedition, about which one need say no more. Blasphemy was referred to by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), but it is, I think, a bad example in this context. I regard that as a hang-over from old times. I am perfectly willing to let men stand up, as they do, at the corner of Hyde Park and utter continuous blasphemies for quite a considerable period of time, not merely denying a particular denominational view of the Deity but denying his existence altogether and preaching atheism and agnosticism.

The right hon. Gentleman says"The bishops of the Church of England". That was in a book.

I am quite sure that that is a freedom which a mature society ought to allow. When my right hon. Friend brings forward a Bill abolishing the offence of blasphemy, if conducted in an orderly and courteous way, it will have my full support.

A further exception is obscenity. When the House was discussing the Obscene Publications Bill I took an extreme view about it, as hon. Members may remember. I am not, on the whole, in favour of punishing obscene publications unless they are inflicted on people's attention. One is not doing a good thing in an adult society by trying to wrap people up in this way. The right attitude in the middle of the twentieth century is, I believe, what is now generally enshrined in the criminal law; that one lets people express what opinions they like, providing that they do it in a grave and serious manner. If they do it in a threatening, abusive or insulting way then they should be punished.

The change proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North would represent the first breach in that general principle. My hon. Friend wants to say, in effect, that if words are spoken which the court would not hold to be abusive, threatening or insulting, nevertheless they shall be declared to be within the offending category if they incite to hatred of any section of the public. I use the phrase"any section of the public" because it was used earlier by my hon. Friend. I cannot but think that that would be wrong. I agree that it represents only one encroachment; but it picks out the emotion of hatred and outlaws it.

Is it to be an offence, ipso facto, without the use of any safeguard whatever regarding offensive words, to incite hatred of capitalists—for they represent a section of the public? What about landlords? Why should we isolate hatred for this venom? There are other deadly sins. Is it to be an offence to incite to envy or lechery or to the other kinds of conduct which we would all join in reprobating?

I join with the Home Secretary in agreeing that we should not embark on this sea except in accordance with the very good English rule of the pragmatic approach. If it must be done because public order is being subverted, then one must do it. It is unfortunate if one must do it, and only if one is forced by contemporary, practical considerations should one embark on an operation of that character. And I am sure that the test should be the maintenance of public order.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North, if I may be permitted to say this, was almost inciting to hatred in his speech against that section of the population which did not agree with his Bill.

I thought that I was well within Section 5 of the 1936 Act because my words did not provoke public disorder, which is an element my hon. Friend appears to be overlooking.

In my hon. Friend's recitation of Section 5 it seemed that he stopped short of the material phrase.

I did not. I said that I would not continue with the rest of the Section because I did not wish to delay the House. However, the entire Section as it stands is included and I am adding words to it and not eliminating any. I was at great pains to point this out at the time.

I am merely pointing out that my hon. Friend's speech stopped short of the material part of Section 5.

As the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) has again pointed out, he was inserting words and not attempting to delete them.

Nevertheless, the words which follow in Section 5 are important, for they state:

"Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence."
The material words are:
"…or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned…"
because that throws the matter back on to the audience and raises a very big constitutional principle indeed.

Hon. Members will be familiar with the case of Beatty and Gillbanks and the controversy as to how far one can take that principle. It is an important principle; that we should not in England allow the disorder of the crowd or the audience to limit the freedom of expression and speech when the speaker is not using words which are not in themselves provocative. That is the most important principle in relation to Section 5. It must be remembered that if one short circuits the requirement that the words must be threatening, abusive or insulting by inserting reference to a particular view, then one makes the audience the arbiter as to whether or not there will be disorder because it could be argued that the audience was in a roaring mood and that the words used might cause a breach of the peace. It is for this reason that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North is not on a good point.

It is important that we in this country should maintain our traditional and wide freedom of speech. Let us remember that anything we provide in relation to Fascists must be provided equally in relation to the opposite extreme of the political range. If we are going to proscribe Fascist views, we must proscribe Communist ones. And as my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North fairly said, there is no greater Jew baiter in the modern world than Khrushchev. That is largely true. The Communists do not believe in freedom of speech or the system of democracy in which we believe.

For example, it would be absolutely wrong if we were to proscribe the Communist Part in Britain, as has been done in other countries, including the United States. It should have full freedom and enjoy the freedom of speech we have and be free to use it to attack the institution of freedom of speech. That must be right. Equally, I would give that freedom to the extremists of the Right. Let them, too, attack the institution of freedom of speech or any other institution—provided they do it seriously and not by the violent or provocative use of words.

The hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Greenwood) referred to things like threatening telephone calls. This kind of activity, about which he felt something should be done, is outside the scope of the Bill. Threatening telephone calls and things of that kind are no part of the law of public meetings.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale(Mr. Greenwood) mentioned threatening telephone calls in an endeavour to make certain that the Government realise the mentality of the kind of people with whom we are dealing. He did not think that such things should be included in the Bill.

I thought he was suggesting that some further legal provision was needed to deal with them. The point is that we should be careful about this business of the state of mind of people. My hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North used some alarming expressions in this context because he implied that people who took views on race and colour relations with which he did not agree—and he included among those the Afrikaaners of the Republic of South Africa, with their policy of apartheid—were suffering from difficulties of a medical order. I make allowance for his strong feelings on the subject, but these are dangerous attitudes and dangerous words. I find it a little reminiscent of some of the things said in Germany between 1933 and 1939, and some of the things done there, such as the sterilisation of people for political views.

We must be very careful about becoming intolerant of views, and saying that people who hold views that we cannot understand and do not like are pathological cases whose difficultyis medical. Let us have a very wide tolerance, remembering that the whole purpose of freedom of speech is that people shall be able to say things that may be disliked by and incomprehensible to many of their contemporaries, but things which must be said if the whole range of controversy is to be enjoyed in this country.

My impression from reading of the past is that the vigour of controversy, and the abusive character of controversy, both inside and outside this House is very much milder now than in the time of preceding generations. We have become very moderate in our expressions. What strikes us now as extreme and provocative would, in earlier times, have been taken as being very much in the course of events, and expressions that were freely accepted in this House 100 years ago would be regarded as unparliamentary now. We have, therefore, made great progress towards mildness in political utterance, and I should be very unhappy if the criminal law were to be used so harshly in this respect as has been suggested this afternoon.

In a leading article on 25th August last, The Times newspaper expressed views with which I entirely identify myself, and used a phrase which, in concluding, I repeat,
"It is no function of the criminal law to articulate the conscience of society."

5.52 p.m.

On 3rd August of last year I had the privilege of raising on the Adjournment the subject of free speech and the question of disturbances at public meetings. I hope that the House will forgive me if I refer to one or two of the points I then made because, in a sense, they are the basis of the argument I now desire to make.

I said then that I recognised how important was our right to free speech, but that events had occurred that were clearly an abuse of that right and a negation of free speech. I tried in some detail to deal with the remedies available in the existing law. I referred to the power to close meetings, the offence of speaking seditious words, and the misdemeanour of unlawful assembly. I said that the existing law provided sufficient safeguards to enable the situation to be dealt with—if the law was applied. I emphasised those last words.

It will be remembered that Jordan was subsequently convicted of an offence under Section 5 of the Public Order Act, that he appealed to quarter sessions, and that the appeal was allowed. Hon. Members will remember that at that stage the Home Secretary promised to increase the penalties and to review the position when the Divisional Court had dealt with the case stated from Jordan's successful appeal.

We now have this Bill. When it was introduced in another place, the Lord Chancellor referred to the fact that, having deferred a decision on the need for legislation until those cases were no longer sub judice, the Government concluded that, since the eventual result showed that the court took the view that infringements of the Public Order Act had taken place, the adequacy of the law to deal with the activities of Fascist and neo-Fascist bodies had been demonstrated. The practical question is: are the Government right in taking that view?

This Bill may be satisfactory as far as it goes, but it is disquieting that the Government should take the view that it is not necessary to do anything more than introduce these provisions. There was here an opportunity to examine the problem of incitement to hatred of any section of the public, and to see what could be done. Speaking as a lawyer, I have no doubt that if the remedies now existing in our law could be applied there are ample safeguards.

The difficulty lies in applying the existing law. For example, there is no doubt that words
"…inciting hatred of any racial group of Her Majesty's subjects…"
would come within the crime of speaking seditious words. The Attorney-General, who I am glad to see in his place, will recognise the truth of what I say in this criticism. This, after all, is an old remedy that covers a wide range of possible offences. It has fallen rather into disuse, as is shown by the fact that very rarely, in this century at any rate, has that course of action been applied. Rarely has there been any indictment for that offence. So wide are the words used to cover that crime that there clearly are dangers to free speech in seeking to apply it.

It is said further, particularly by reason of the decision of the Divisional Court—and the Home Secretary based the whole of his speech upon that—that it is unnecessary to add the words proposed by the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) in his Bill:
"…or words inciting hatred of any racial group of Her Majesty's subjects…"
The right hon. Gentleman said that it is unnecessary to use them because, if such words were uttered with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned, they would come within the provisions of Section 5 of the Public Order Act.

I appreciate that it will be argued that that is the position, but when the chairman of quarter sessions dealt with Jordan's appeal he appeared to take a different view, and I should like here to quote some words from the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in the Divisional Court case. I quote from page 1047 of the Weekly Law Reports. The Lord Chief Justice said:
"Speaking for myself, I had great difficulty in understanding what quarter sessions were intending to convey. It seems to me, however, that what they had in mind was a hypothetical audience of ordinary, respectable citizens, whatever their creed, faith, race or political views might be. In other words, they were eliminating from the audience anybody who was intent, for instance, on breaking up the meeting, whatever words the speaker used.
It may be that that is what quarter sessions had in mind, but, even if that be so, I cannot myself, having read the speech, imagine any reasonable citizen, certainly one who was a Jew, not being provoked beyond endurance, and not only a Jew but a coloured man, and quite a number of people of this country who were told that they were merely tools of the Jews, and that they had fought in the war on the wrong side, and matters of that sort."
These words show clearly, whatever may be said now about the adequacy of the law and the position being perfectly clear, that at any rate the chairman of quarter sessions, who was the judge dealing with this matter, held that words of this kind did not constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 5 of the Public Order Act. One must remember that these offences are summary offences dealt with by magistrates as the law now stands. I do not suggest for a moment that magistrates are other than perfectly competent people, but the position would be made perfectly clear by inserting the provision proposed by the hon. Member for Ilford, North that the words
"inciting hatred of any racial group of Her Majesty's subjects"
be added. Those words would remove the possibility of doubt.

I know it is often said that by inserting words there is a danger because one might make the law uncertain, but there is no danger whatever of that occurring here. The words inserted will be there for the guidance of magistrates and judges on whether an offence is committed against the words of the Section. I appreciate the arguments that can be put that if we leave out those words it can still be shown that an offence has been committed, but I point out that there was doubt about this matter. The chairman of quarter sessions was in an important position, dealing with appeals from magistrates, and he chose to take a certain view of the matter. The Divisional Court said that he was wrong.

Let us suppose that a magistrate has a case before him where something of this kind occurs and he seeks to take the same sort of view as the chairman of quarter sessions. If we had words of this kind in the Section then, firstly, they could not possibly do any harm, and, secondly, they would make it abundantly clear that when there was the sort of thing that occurred in the case to which we are referring an offence had been committed. This is why I think that a strong argument can be made for inserting these words, and why I think that it is not right to say that the decision in the Divisional Court has recognised the adequacy of the law and that there is no need to do anything further.

There is another point about the Bill which I wish to make. I agree very much with the criticism made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) when he dealt with the fact that these penalties applied not only to offences under Section 5 of the Public Order Act but also to offences under the Public Meeting Act. It seems to me that those offences may often be on an entirely different footing.

It was recognised in the provisions of the Public Meeting Act that if someone came along who might disturb a meeting it might be a fairly nominal offence. The punishment meted out was £5 or one month. There was no question of its being an indictable offence. I ask the Home Secretary to think of some of the cases which have come before the courts as a result of recent meetings. There were many cases where persons who had been charged with offences pointed out that they were refugees and had come along to the meeting and heard what had been said and as a result had been grievously provoked and had done something which was wrong and which offended against the criminal law. How does that compare as an offence with the offence of uttering words of this kind at a public meeting so as to provoke a breach of the peace? How can it be said that the punishment meted out for the one offence ought to be the punishment meted out for the other? I hope that in Committee the Home Secretary will think again about this matter.

I join also in the criticism made that by virtue of the Long Title we may not be able to discuss what ought to be the main point of discussion. My complaint is that the Government have not taken the opportunity of dealing with the real problem. It is idle to say that, after all, there is only a small number of these people, perhaps 200 or even two, at a meeting of some kind, and to try to argue from that that there is no real danger. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) referred to this point. I know the Home Secretary's sympathetic approach and I appreciate the way he dealt with this matter in his opening speech, but I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will recognise that there was only a small number in Germany when National Socialism began to rear its head.

We know that the advice given in Germany on many occasions was,"Let people keep away from the meetings. This is only a small movement. Treat it with contempt. It cannot grow in any way." Many people kept away and treated the movement with contempt, but we know what followed. There is therefore a real danger in that argument. In our Commonwealth there are people of all colours and creeds. If we allow these enemies of society to preach sermons of hatred and prejudice, are we not inviting trouble? That is not free speech; that is the very negation of it, and it should not be tolerated.

It is said that it is difficult to frame legislation, but there is legislation in existence in many countries against racial incitement. It exists in Austria, Denmark, in the Federal German Republic, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Switzerland. Indeed one might say it exists in every country in Europe except in this country which proudly boasts of free speech and of looking after the rights of minorities. I am sure that the Home Secretary is in possession of the words which appear in the legal codes in Switzerland and in the Netherlands. There is no difficulty there in putting forward words which legislate against racial hatred or enmity. I think that I gave the Home Secretary the words used in the Indian code. Legislation in India is very strong on this point. If this can be done in other countries, where does the difficulty arise here?

The Home Secretary put forward what in many ways is an attractive argument by saying,"We do not want to put on the Statute Book legislation which will deal with one particular sect", and he referred to Jews in this connection. I agree that we do not want to deal with one sect, but we are not dealing with one. We are dealing with racial enmity and prejudice, with colour prejudice and with things which are said against minorities. Surely, it would be quite proper to put a comprehensive piece of legislation on the Statute Book which would deal effectively with it.

The Bill will receive its Second Reading. We support it as far as it goes, but I emphasise that it is totally inadequate to deal with the real problem. I hope the Government will yet realise that it is no use tinkering with the problem, that it must be tackled effectively and quickly. I hope that something on the lines suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper will be adopted. Perhaps the Government can alter the Long Title of the Bill so that in Committee we may get down to the real problem and try to achieve a practical solution.

6.10 p.m.

I am glad to have this opportunity of following the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman). I concede his point that these difficulties must be seen from afar, so that they may be avoided. He was quite right to remind us of some of the circumstances abroad and say that such things could occur here.

I was very interested, also, in what the hon. and learned Member said about the difficulties of quarter sessions in interpreting Section 5. I have here a typescript of the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in the case of Jordan v. Burgoyne. I shall read one paragraph of it:
"This is, as I have said, a public order Act, and if in fact it is apparent that a body of persons are present—let me assume in Mr. Jordan's favour that they are a body of hooligans present—yet if words are used which threaten, abuse or insult—all very strong words—then that person must take his audience as he finds them, and if those words to that audience or that part of the audience are likely to provoke a breach of tile peace, then the speaker is guilty of an offence."
We have had two speeches to-day, one from my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), the other from my hon. Friend the Member for Was all, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid), which argued that we should have the broadest freedom of speech in this country. I do not think that either of my hon. Friends appreciated from the words of the Lord Chief Justice that there has been a marked reduction in freedom of speech following that interpretation. It was pointed out some time ago that many people thought that what mattered was the impact of words on the ordinary or reasonable man. Now, apparently, this is not so.

When the matter went to the House of Lords on an appeal which was rejected, Lord Reid said:
"…if he knows that there are people there who are likely to react to what he says, it does not matter whether those people are reasonable or not."
Further, Viscount Simonds said:
"When you get these racial differences and differences in creed, you must allow for the idiosyncrasies of your audience."
It is quite apparent to me, reading all that has been said, that there has been a radical alteration, and I am not at all surprised that the chairman of quarter sessions did not quite appreciate the full implications of the Section. I ask hon. Members on both sides of the House to read Section 5. They will see the point of ambiguity.

In moving the Second Reading, my right hon. Friend, for whom I have great respect, put his views extremely forcefully, but I pray in aid also what the Lord Chancellor said in another place, which represents the sum total of the law at present:
"As a result of the appeal…anybody who incites racial hatred is using threatening abusive or insulting words; and, indeed, I find it impossible to envisage words used at a public meeting which really incite hatred of any racial group which are not also at the same time threatening, abusive or insulting."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20th June, 1963; Vol. 250, c. 1406.]
He went on to conclude that the present law was adequate.

I suggest that this further point follows from what I have said. It is not apparent on a reading of the Section that that is so, that the Section embodies what the law has found. I suggest, therefore, that it is very desirable to make the matter clear and comprehensible to the man in the street and to all concerned. With the Bill now before the House, we have an opportunity to do this. It is proposed to amend the Public Order Act, 1936, and I suggest to my right hon. Friend that this is the occasion to clarify this piece of legislation.

We have been reminded that the Act is the Public Order Act, and, as the Lord Chief Justice rightly said, its purpose is to ensure public safety. This is why my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is in charge of the Bill. But what about the responsibilities of the rest of the Government? What we do now can have a long-term effect upon public order. If undercurrents or subversive action or movements are allowed in the United Kingdom, unrestrained expressions, they can affect the lives and welfare of hundreds of people. Let us remember that our Jewish population, which is making an enormous contribution to our good, has risen considerably since before the war. We must remember also that, in addition to the Commonwealth without, there is the Commonwealth within. In my constituency of Willesden, East, the number of Commonwealth people is 13,300, and the total of foreigners is 9,500, many of them coming from Europe. The whole situation has changed.

I am very glad that we have with us this afternoon one of the Law Officers of the Crown. I put to my right hon. and learned Friend this question. How would he deal with a case of this kind? If a speaker made a temperate speech, but, just before the meeting, or during it, a supporter distributed anti-racial leaflets, it could be that a man in the audience became so incensed by reading the leaflets that he created a commotion. As I understand the law, he would be liable to prosecution under Section 1 of the Public Meeting Act, 1908, yet the speaker who made the temperate speech would not be liable at all. It is quite extraordinary that this should be so.

Many hon. Members will recognise the leaflet which I have in my hand now. It is headed:
"Hitler was right!
Democracy means—Jewish control, National Decline, Racial Ruin".
I wrote to the Joint Under-Secretary of State to the Home Department about this and I received a reply on 27th August, 1962, in which he said:
"With regard to the leaflet itself, I am informed by the Commissioner of Police that the question of proceedings has been carefully considered, but that the conclusion has been reached that there are insufficient grounds to sustain a prosecution under the law as it now stands."
I ask, in all sincerity: has the law been altered since 1962 to make it possible to bring such leaflets within its compass? Nothing in this Act will enable a prosecution to be brought on this document, which is equally as vicious and poisonous as any speech. A speech is made orally. This is a speech written on paper, and it is extremely dangerous to the very existence of minorities.

I ask the Attorney-General to consider this, too. It is quite possible to have a packed and disciplined meeting inside a building to which only a few outsiders are allowed to enter. Arranged round the wall may be a number of anti-racial posters. Normally, at such an indoor public meeting, the discipline is arranged by the speaker's own henchmen. It would be possible for speeches to be made from the platform, perhaps, flamboyant anti-race speeches, but the meeting would not be broken up. Prosecutions would not follow, yet the organisation would receive Press coverage and the broadest publicity.

I emphasise a point made by an hon. Member opposite. At the meeting in Trafalgar Square, on 1st July, 1962, two of the speakers were arrested and charged, but what was the price?—at least 20 people in the audience who may have been there to defend themselves against insult had to appear before the court. Under the Bill before us now, we find that such people are liable, if the case is brought on indictment, to a penalty of as much as £500.

I pray in aid, also, the very heavy responsibility of the police in these matters. It is all very well for the court in its deliberations to consider calmly whether words are insulting and so on, but the police officer on the spot may allow a good bit to go by quite reasonably before he decides to close a meeting. These are all matters which we must consider.

One or two hon. Members have stated that my right hon. Friend has a number of precedents which he can accept from abroad. It is true that there are the Civil Rights Bill and the Interstate Public Accommodation Bill, 1963, of the United States. One will observe what has been happening. The United States, that great country, is appreciating that it has a problem in its midst. I do not propose to tire the House by going through the provisions of these measures, because many of them would not be applicable here. Many provinces of Canada also have legislation of this type. Suffice it to say that they have a problem in their midst and are seeking to deal with it.

Before the war, we had our Commonwealth abroad. At present, a large segment of the Commonwealth is in the United Kingdom, and it is growing fast. As has been said, there must be reciprocity in the legislation that we have. When a man comes here from abroad, he may have no protection, but if a white man goes to Kenya or certain other parts of Africa he expects protection and there is something written into the local legislation to ensure his rights.

It may be, as the Lord Chancellor said elsewhere, that the penalties which were imposed had a very sobering effect on the National Socialist movement. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has endorsed what was said. I urge hon. Members to remember what Mr. Jordan said when he came out of prison. The Evening Standard of 31st May, 1963, reported him as saying:
" 'My sentence has reaffirmed by beliefs. I shall carry on the struggle to free this country of Jewish domination and coloured immigration.' He had no complaints about his treatment in prison. 'The officers treated me absolutely fairly'. Mr. Jordan said he would soon be working full-time for the movement."
This is a man who had served a very severe sentence. The Lord Chancellor, in another place, said that the penalty imposed had had a sobering effect. If this man is a fanatic in his cause, even if the sentence is multiplied three or four times in duration and even if the amount of the fine is increased, will this man be driven into silence?

I am inclined to agree with what was enunciated by the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) and the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North, that great movements start from very small beginnings and can be exceedingly dangerous.

Does my hon. Friend think it right that any man, whatever his views, should be driven into silence?

I am not suggesting that a man should be driven into silence. What I am saying is that certain matters can be stated at public meetings which will have long-term repercussions. If the effect, as in my constituency, leads to violence and intimidation at a later date, even though not immediately, I say that there should be some legislation available to protect his interests. After all, we are a race which protects the minorities in our midst.

It is all very well to say that the legislation which was available many years ago is suitable in 1963, but the whole climate of opinion has altered and the composition of the populations in our great cities has altered. It may be that there is not such a broad interest in this House because many of the Cornish or Scottish Members of Parliament are not particularly concerned with problems of this nature, but if in the great centres like Liverpool, Birmingham and London there are problems for which we have responsibility as legislators, it is only right that Parliament should consider them circumspectly.

I turn to the question of penalties. I should have thought that they would have a certain deterrent effect on all those who were not fanatics in their cause. It is the people who are fanatics who are the most dangerous, and the Home Secretary should bear that in mind. He has said that he is prepared later to introduce legislation if he finds that his own legislation is deficient. I say to my right hon. Friend—and I represent a constituency next door to his—that the time has arrived when legislation should be introduced in the House. I see present difficulties and racial friction. There is not complete harmony.

The difficulties can be alleviated in some measure by setting up friendship groups for rehousing the people affected by racial tension and bringing peace into the homes. Local friction can be abated by racial integration and by taking other steps of this nature. These are voluntary steps taken by local groups. Nationally, the responsibility is with the Government and the House of Commons, because we know that sober speeches with live innuendoes can still be made in such a way that they do not create trouble at public meetings. It is the new Mosley approach. But, at the same time, such speeches can do incalculable harm to the millions of our people. This is the new, sophisticated approach of those who want to subvert the institutions of this country and to use every device that they can assemble for this purpose.

I may have become a little overheated, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, on a matter about which I feel rather strongly. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who has had great experience in this subject, will not be unaware of what is going on in the country and in his own division. It is most important that we should deal with this matter at an early stage. If I could put my hand on my heart and say that I did not think that we had problems, I should be prepared to concede my right hon. Friend's case that penalties are enough. But my experience is that we have these problems, and if we do not do something about them we will have something like the Kennedy legislation on our hands. It is not a question that foreign and Commonwealth elements are dispersed throughout our country. They are, in fact, situated in our large cities. It is a question of this House giving a lead. I do not think that any other course will be satisfactory or enduring.

6.27 p.m.

We are discussing the Second Reading of a very modest Bill, but the discussions relating to it have given rise to the expression of very fine and noble sentiments on which I believe there has been complete accord in the House.

As I say, the Bill is a modest one. It deals solely with the behaviour of people at public meetings or in public places and relates only to penalties. There is nothing in the Bill which creates a new offence. I have no quarrel in that respect. I am in favour of general legislation dealing with race and colour discrimination as a whole, but I do not think that a Bill which deals entirely with conduct at public meetings is appropriate to deal with the general question of race discrimination. That is a subject which is ripe for treatment, but it should be dealt with separately and not in a Bill which is concerned with public meetings and public order

I disagree with what the Home Secretary said on one aspect of this matter. He said that the Acts with which the Bill deals relate solely to public order. That may be true of the 1908 Act, but it certainly is not true of Section 5 of the 1936 Act. It is clear that the first limb of Section 5 deals with the subjective aspect, while the second deals with the objective aspect. A person who indulges in insulting behaviour or gives vent to insulting words with a particular intent commits an offence under Section 5, whether or not there is a breach of the peace or whether or not a breach of the peace is likely.

I believe that the 1936 Act and this House are concerned with personal behaviour in a public place, whatever the reaction to it, provided there is a particular intent in view.

Would the hon. and learned Gentleman feel that that particular intent is intent to cause a breach of the peace?

Of course it is. The fact is that Section 5 goes on to deal with the position where that particular intent is not present but is likely to be, and this clearly indicates that it is concerned with the personal behaviour of the individual, quite irrespective of whether or not there is a breach of the peace, because the breach of the peace aspect is clearly covered.

I want to make one or two comments on the penalties, which is the sole aspect dealt with by the Bill. The point has been made that the Bill will increase penalties and, therefore, the power of suppressing behaviour of this kind. I sympathise with the point made by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) that the increase in penalties seems to be directed to a far greater extent against offenders under the 1908 Act—those who indulge in disturbances at public meetings—than against those who indulge in offensive conduct and make insulting statements at meetings.

For offenders under Section 5 of the 1936 Act, and as far as these are dealt with summarily, the increase in penalties is quite derisory. The Home Secretary talks as if we are to have a substantial increase in penalties for persons who commit offences under Section 5 by indulging in insulting behaviour with intent to cause a breach of the peace, yet they are to be much the same penalties as now.

If these offenders are dealt with summarily today, they are liable to three months'imprisonment. Under this Bill they will still only be liable to three months'imprisonment. There is to be no change at all in that respect. It is true that the monetary penalty is to be increased from £50 to £100, but that does no more than take account of the effect of inflation as between 1936 and the present time.

It is true that if these people are dealt with on indictment the penalties are increased substantially. I hope that the Attorney-General will indicate whether it is expected that there will be a change in this regard. At present, as I understand it, they cannot be dealt with on indictment. In the Bill there is provision for them to be dealt with in that way and, if they are, then the plea that it increases the penalties very substantially has substance in it. But if it is not expected that serious cases will be dealt with on indictment, then the penalty increase is, I repeat, derisory.

A matter raised by several hon. Members, particularly the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger), is that there should be a revision of the wording of Section 5 so as to include words such as"inciting hatred of a racial group or section of the public". As I have said, the Bill does not create an additional offence and I do not quarrel with that. I concede immediately that the behaviour or the utterances that the hon. Member for Ilford, North has in mind would certainly be an offence under the wording of Section 5 as it stands.

It might well be asked, therefore,"Why do you want to change them when the behaviour or words you are attempting to deal with can be dealt with as Section 5 stands?" It might be argued, however, that there is some ambiguity about it. The fact that the chairman of London Sessions did not seem to appreciate the point is a suggestion that clarification is required.

The answer to that is that no one will have any excuse, now that the Divisional Court has pronounced on the matter, for a misunderstanding of that kind. I believe that insulting behaviour directed towards race or colour is a particular form of insulting behaviour to which it is desirable that attention should be drawn, and that those who are tempted in any way to indulge in that type of behaviour should have it made abundantly clear to them that they are committing an offence under Section 5.

The most that can be said critically of the proposal of the hon. Member for Ilford, North is that it puts something in the Bill which is there already. I concede that it does, but, in my submission, there would be considerable advantage in doing it nevertheless. It would draw the attention of those who are to administer the law—in many cases they will be laymen—and of those tempted to commit breaches of the law, to the fact that the 1936 Act, as amended by this Bill, has in mind in particular those who are indulging in insulting behaviour directed towards particular sections of the community.

I hope that in Committee it will be possible to amend the Bill, not, in effect, to create a new offence but to single out for special significance our particular revulsion against insulting behaviour or the expression of hatred of particular sections of the community.

This is a modest Bill. The heightening of penalties is fully justified. I hope that the Attorney-General will explain whether the heightening of the penalties is, however, illusory, or whether we really shall be in a position to deal with offenders under the Bill and the 1936 Act in a truly effective way.

6.38 p.m.

Like the hon. and learned Member for Cardigan (Mr. Bowen) I have some doubts about this Measure, but on the whole I come down at this time in favour of what is now proposed. If there existed circumstances such as have been described by some hon. Members, I would certainly take the view that even the proposals of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) were inadequate, but we have to have regard to the circumstances of our time and legislation of this kind, to public attitudes and to our experience over a decade or so.

We also must have some regard to liberty of speech because it is possible—and here I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) although I do not agree with him in other things—to end up by having a howling mob as arbiter of free speech in a society, and that would be highly undesirable. I should like to consider the question of whether we need to impose words beyond those which my right hon. Friend seeks leave to impose today.

I have spoken before in the House of my repugnance at those who attack racial minorities. There are very few things more cowardly than the behaviour of those people. If there were any real danger of these people gaining ascendancy, or if I felt that there were a possibility of a substantial increase in that behaviour, I should be anxious to go not only further than my right hon. Friend but also further than my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North. But are we able to say to ourselves that there exists in this country a situation which demands what might be regarded in some quarters as panic legislation and which would of necessity carry with it the risk of an unreasonable interference with the freedom of speech?

One of the compelling reasons which I find against taking any more drastic action than that proposed by my right hon. Friend is the influence of administration in legislation of this kind. It is really a matter of the view which current society takes of this legislation rather than what is actually in the Measure itself. If the House wanted to look at the possibilities in this respect, it should have a look, on the one hand, at the view taken in the Appeal Court and, on the other hand, the view taken by the chairman of quarter sessions—which I thought was a very remarkable judgment, though I am not a lawyer and it may be all right.

However, we have to realise that whatever words are in an enactment of this kind, in the end what happens and what matters is the current view that society takes of what is dealt with by the Measure, and interpretation is much more important than the actual words in the Measure or in any Amendment that we might make to the Measure.

I was forcibly reminded of the importance of administration when, after having been a Member of Parliament for a few years, I went on a Sunday morning to listen to the speakers on Hampstead Heath near where I then lived. I got annoyed by a Communist and started heckling him. Within a short time I was hauled out of the meeting by a young constable who said that if I did not behave better I should be arrested. It seems to me that if a fairly law-abiding person like myself, putting the case not too strenuously, could be dragged out—I was physically dragged out—by a constable and told that if I did not behave myself I should be taken inside, there exist already powers of some very considerable measure. Therefore, I feel that we ought not to rely too much on excessively punitive legislation, because it is the current interpretation of the Act in a given period of history which really matters.

I want next to deal with an important issue raised by the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner). Is it true that we are justified in going further at this moment of time because we stand in a position similar to that in which Germany stood in 1933? If this is so, I agree with the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West, but I ask the House to believe that it is not so. One of the most encouraging things to me since the end of the war has been the relative absence of anti-Semitic feelings in this country. The diminution has surprised me. But is there any danger of the circumstances of 1933 in Germany occurring here in 1963? I think not.

Although I am not a Marxist believer in the materialist conception of history, I admit that one of the fundamental requirements for the Hitler régime was the economic conditions of the day. They do not exist here, and I do not think they are likely to exist. I think, too, that we have in this country people who would not be prepared, once they knew of circumstances such as those which obtained in Nazi Germany, to allow them to continue. I also think that we have people in this country who are perfectly capable of recreating all the horrors of Nazi Germany. Let us have no dispute about that at all.

There are plenty of people in this country who are perfectly prepared to do exactly what was done in Nazi Germany. But the difference between our country and Germany is that the vast majority of the people in this community would not be prepared to allow it to go on once they knew of its existence. Therefore, I do not believe that there exists in this country anything approaching the danger which existed in Nazi Germany in 1933.

I want to finish by saying one or two things about positive race relations. We do not get good race relations within a community by passing laws and punishing those who do not do something to preserve them. That is not the way. We have to have laws which deal with offenders, but it is the creation of the positively good relations between elements in the community which is the important thing. I want to say a word or two about this at the risk of giving some offence, because I think not only that it is the duty of the majority to preserve a reasonably decent attitude towards minorities but that minorities also have their responsibilities in the society of which they are minorities. I wonder whether all minorities are carrying out their responsibilities as well as they might, and whether, indeed, our largest and, in a sense, our most controversial minority, the Jewish minority, is doing as much as it ought to do in this connection.

I know that this is a controversial matter and that I shall probably be accused of being anti-Semitic even though I am a member of the Council of Christians and Jews. However, I dealt with this in an article for the TAF magazine 14 years ago, and I think it is truer today than when I said it 14 years ago. The great problem of the Jewish community, as I see it, is that they live as a race apart. It is not merely a religious difference. I feel that good relationships would be better served if there were less positive seclusion among the Jewish community than exists at the present time.

I realise that when I said this 14 years ago there was no such thing as a Jewish National Home, and, therefore, there was a strong case in those days for preserving a Jewish community even in the scattered corners of the world. But today there is a Jewish National Home, and I wonder whether the great desire to remain an exclusive community within large communities is now as necessary as it was.

While the hon. Gentleman is making these comments, would he care to address other communities, such as the golf clubs of London and elsewhere, which make quite certain that the Jew is excluded? Does he not think it is possible that there are pressures which cause some of the problems about which he is speaking?

I have spoken on these matters previously, and I appreciate what the hon. Member says; that it is not by any means a one-sided exclusion. What I am saying—I say it as a member of the Scottish race which has in many ways done a very similar thing to that done by the Jewish race by going out into various parts of the world and settling in communities—is that I wonder whether it is not desirable now that we have a Jewish National Home for more integra- tion, and even assimilation, to take place here.

I find that that integration already exists at two levels. I worked for many years in the East End, and I know that the Jewish people are very well integrated in the Gentile community there. There are few differences at all between them. Also, there is an upper crust which is also very well integrated. But in my experience it is the middle-class section of Jews—I know many of them very well—who live far too exclusive an existence. When people live apart from a community they can be very easily misrepresented.

As I represent a large part of the middle-class Jewish community, I should not like it to be thought that I accept what my hon. Friend says. I do not think that it is so. There is always a tendency for those who worship together and have a common interest to be together. Certainly, at Hendon, I find that the Jewish community takes its full part in everything, in the same way that the Catholic and any other community does, and there is little anti-Semitic feeling. Jews can represent Christians and Christians represent Jews on local bodies. They all get on perfectly well together and mix socially all the time.

I am glad to hear that my hon. Friend takes my view. I wish that I was as convinced of it as he is, because I am sure that if there were less exclusion and more integration there would be less misunderstanding than at present.

The hon. Member is addressing his comments to the Jewish community. Would he be aware, for example, that there is a widespread view among that community that unless he has the advantage of being a baronet, it is highly improbable that a Jewish candidate could be adopted by the Conservative Party as a Parliamentary candidate? Does not the hon. Member think that perhaps the type of lecture which he is giving could well be given in many of the constituencies which send Tory Members to Parliament?

I am certain that a vast amount of prejudice still exists and I want to break it down. I address my remarks not only to my fellow Christians but also to Jews. Jewish people have a duty to try to help those of us who want to break down this prejudice and I believe that in all respects they are not doing as much as they should.

May I ask you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, whether this discussion on doctrinal questions is germane to the purpose of the Bill?

It is getting a little wide, but I have not considered that the hon. Member was out of order in view of the general trend of the debate beforehand. It is, however, getting a little wide.

As, obviously, there is a certain amount of opposition, although I want to stand up for the rights of free speech even in this debate, I will leave the matter where it rests with the assurance that those of us who belong to the Council of Christians and Jews will, despite some difference of opinion, continue to do what we feel best to integrate our society.

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has done a service in bringing forward this rather limited Measure. I consider that it is all that is needed and demanded by present circumstances, but should there be any deterioration, I for one will be ready to support him in a more serious Measure.

6.53 p.m.

I am not quite sure what the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mr. Shepherd) was trying to say in the latter part of his speech, and if I were to attempt to argue about it I, too, might find myself out of order. It seemed to me, however, that he was introducing matters which could be discussed properly only in a much more extensive manner.

The hon. Member might have taken into account, for example, that some people say that assimilation of the Jewish people had gone further in Germany than in almost any other country, and yet the greatest catastrophe to the Jewish people happened there. This possibly points to the fact that anti-Semitism is due not to the activities of the Jews, but to the atmosphere of the societies in which they happen to live. It would be wiser to approach the matter in that sense.

Many compliments have been paid to the Home Secretary during this debate. In so far as they refer to the temperate and elegant and even eloquent language used by the right hon. Gentleman in introducing his Bill, the compliments were justified. If, however, we are considering what the right hon. Gentleman proposes to do and not to do, it is not possible to pay the compliments, certainly in the excessive manner which has been done by some hon. Members. The more the debate has continued, the more it is evident that the Home Secretary has gone about dealing with the subject in quite the wrong way.

I do not propose to argue this point in detail, because the case has been overwhelmingly made for a law against incitement to racial hatred or the dissemination of race hatred, however it may be described. The speeches of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), my hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale (Mr. Greenwood), the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) and others have made an overwhelming case for such a law. There are difficulties in incorporating it in the Bill that is before us, although I think that those difficulties could easily be overcome. I do not propose to argue the case much further, because it has been made so powerfully by those who have put it.

The Home Secretary, however, has argued against having such a proposition, either in this Bill or, presumably, in other Bills. He said that if this Measure did not work satisfactorily, he would recommend a further Measure to the House of Commons later. Apart from that, he seems to be against any such proposal as has been advocated by my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) over so long a period. The Home Secretary devoted part of his speech to opposing that today, even though it is not part of the Bill.

If the Home Secretary wants to prove his good faith in this matter, he should let the House of Commons have the right to decide. Therefore, we should have the most specific indication from the Attorney-General whether the Government will alter the Bill to enable this matter to be argued and voted upon in Committee. If the Government reject that proposition, I would certainly wish to withdraw the compliments which have been paid to the Government, because if they say that they will not alter the Bill, and will not allow the House of Commons to decide this matter, all the polite words which have been used in the debate do not mean anything. All that they would mean is that the Government insist that it is they who shall decide whether there should be such a law and that the House of Commons shall have nothing to do with it.

This is pre-eminently a matter which the House of Commons should decide. Who is best qualified to decide whether there should be a law against the dissemination of racial hatred, the Cabinet or the House of Commons? If the Government refuse to alter the Title of the Bill to enable an Amendment of the kind put down by the hon. Member for Ilford, North to be discussed and voted on in Committee, the Government will be saying that they will not allow the House to have any say effectively in this matter. That would be a disgraceful state of affairs.

This is not a question in which great, difficult consequences would follow. Indeed, some people have argued that according to the latest judgment, on which we have had discussion by many hon. Members, the law already condemns the dissemination of racial hatred. In that case, it cannot be a tremendous point whether that declaration is made openly in a Bill. If it is not such a tremendous point, all the greater should be the argument that the Cabinet should let the House of Commons decide the question.

No enormous difficulties would follow for the Home Secretary in his administration of the law or his organisation of the police. The Home Secretary has not said that it would be utterly damaging to the country if such a proposition were incorporated in the law. He has not put his argument as strongly as that. Therefore, why not let the House of Commons decide?

The Home Secretary knows perfectly well that whatever words he uses, and however much the Attorney-General says that the Government have listened most carefully to what has been said, from bothsides of the House, and that this has been an agreeable debate, however much they say that the Government will take into account the views which have been put, it so happens that the Government propose to go ahead with the proposition which they have fixed upon earlier—that is, according to the Title of the Bill—which specifically excludes the right of the House of Commons to decide the matter.

In their answer to that question, put to them at the beginning of the debate by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, the good faith of the Government is at stake. If they say that they will not alter the Title, all their willingness to listen to the debate and all their good manners will count for nothing. They will be saying that the Cabinet will decide the matter and that they will not allow anybody else to have any influence on it.

When the Home Secretary remembers that on nine occasions my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough has secured the good will of the House to introduce such a Measure, does he not think it rather arrogant of him to say,"I do not care how often the House of Commons votes in favour of this proposition. We, the Cabinet, will decide it"?

It could be argued that this is a matter like the question of capital punishment which the House has always agreed should be settled by a free vote. Why will not the Home Secretary allow this matter to be settled by a free vote of the House? He could do it immediately by saying that he will alter the Title and allow the matter to be debated and we would then have the collective wisdom of the House of Commons instead of the decision of the Cabinet itself to settle the matter.

Haying said that—and I hope that we will get such an Amendment because the arguments are overwhelming—we will have to do it with care. The hon. Member for Ilford, North illustrated that when he said that he had considered altering the words which he had first proposed from"incitement to racial hatred" to"incitement to hatred against any sections in the community".

That would be a very dangerous change, partly for reasons already suggested. Many of us would go to prison on that ground. If we are to be denied the right to tell the truth about landlords, free speech is at an end. Many hon. Members opposite have made speeches—and I dare say that they will do so again when they are especially hard up—saying that all the ills of the country are due to unofficial strikes or shop stewards. By the Clause as drafted by the hon. Member for Ilford, North in his lapsed mood, it would be possible for such a speech to be an offence. The provision should be confined to the dissemination of racial hatred and I do not see that there is any difficulty about devising such a provision. The hon. Member got it right the first time. No doubt he has been listening to some member of the Government who advised him badly. He got into trouble on that account and he should return to his original inspiration.

To return to the Bill which, after all, is what we are discussing—[Laughter.] It is the fault of the Government; every other speaker has done this and there is no need for anybody who has just come in. and who has not listened to the debate, to jeer. It is one of the condemnations of the Government that practically the whole of the debate has been on what they have refused to incorporate in the Bill.

This is one of the most miserable little Bills that I have ever seen, and that is saying a great deal. It is a Bill which intensifies the penalties without clarifying the offences and without making the certainly of detection any the greater. That is a bad principle on which to legislate at any time. Governments usually do that when they are in a panic. They cannot think how they can specify the offence more clearly, so they say,"Let us slam on the penalties and make them tougher". [An Hon. Member:"Flog 'em."] Yes, it is allied to that sort of psychology.

The Home Secretary said that he would be very tough about dealing with these unspecified people—although he specified a few. He had no right to do that. He specified the Committee of 100, among others, but he had no right to say that all the activities of the Committee of 100 fell within the Bill. Nor had he any right to talk in those terms of the Communists and many others. No Government have the right to specify a group and say,"We condemn a group of people irrespective of whether they break the law". What we are discussing is whether the law should be better clarified, and the Bill does not do anything to clarify it. It leaves it to the police. When he says that the penalties are to be much more severe, the Home Secretary thinks that that will show what a strong man he is in dealing with the problem, but if he does not more carefully define what the problem is, he will not be being so strong. As Disraeli said,"Like all weak Governments, they resort to strong measures".

The Home Secretary thinks that if he makes the penalties stiffer, it will escape attention that he has failed to clarify the offences. He has failed to clarify what is meant by racial discrimination and many comparatively innocent people will suffer under the increased penalties which he is imposing in respect of other matters.

For example, disorderly conduct which is designed to break up public meetings is a crime under the Public Meetings Act, 1908. There are many gradations of disorderly conduct which are designed to break up public meetings. The hon. Member for Cheadle gave an example of how a constable came to him at Hampstead because he was heckling a Communist and said that he might be"had up" for an offence, presumably under the Public Meetings Act, 1908. This Bill might be called the Hecklers Suppression Bill. The hon. Member for Cheadle might not have been as inoffensive as he pretended and the constable might have had a case, but, if he was as inoffensive as he pretended to be, then either the constable was acting very wrongly, or the Act which enabled him to act in such a fashion was itself wrong.

May I assure the hon. Member that I never displayed anything like the violence of which he is capable?

I am out to protect my own powers of violence, which means that pretty well everybody else will be covered. There is nothing wrong with violent speech. It has to be protected. I was attempting to come to the hon. Member's rescue—he did not seem to be as grateful as he should have been—because he instanced a case in which a constable thought that he had the right to suppress a heckler.

I do not think that constables should have the right to suppress hecklers. Hecklers contribute a great deal to the political scene and most public speakers would be improved when heckled. Indeed, some should be heckled much more ferociously than they are. However, it is difficult to draw the line between heckling and the crime of disorderly conduct which is designed to break up public meetings.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper gave an example in which, apparently, it was carried too far. He said that there was no provocation, but I dare say that there was. It may not have been the kind of provocation which we have been discussing, but it is a very tender line to draw. I do not see why the penalties for disorderly conduct designed to break up public meetings should be stepped up merely to deal with the spreading of racial hatred. Why not have a law dealing with the spreading of racial hatred, leaving aside the present penalties for disorderly conduct designed to break up public meetings?

Some people talk as though those who hold the public meetings or demonstrations are the offenders. Of course they are not. All the liberties about which we hear so many boasts were obtained by demonstrators. As I listened to the Home Secretary lauding our liberal principles and rights of free speech, I wondered how many of them would have been gained if we had had a Public Order Act with these severe penalties for the last hundred years. Most of the rights of free speech in this country have had to be fought for by demonstrators against the Government of the day, against the powers of the day.

Leaving aside the things we want it to do which it does not do, what the Bill does specifically is to put more power into the hands of the police to decide, in effect, what is the law. I do not think that the Home Secretary can deny that, because the police will have greater encouragement to decide what they think is conducive to public disorder. The fact of the Bill being pushed through and the fact of the penalties being increased will encourage the police to believe,"We can go a bit further in putting some of these people in 'jug', or taking them to court."

The hon. Member is quite correct. The police can decide whether to make a charge and, in most of these cases, when the person comes before the magistrates the police evidence is accepted. It is all very well to say that the police have a very difficult job. We always use that sentence before we say what we think about it. No one envies them their job. They ought to have more pay. [Laughter.] It is no good hon. Members laughing; there have been many occasions when the police have behaved improperly.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper referred, quite properly, to the incidents which happened in the 1930s. No one who saw those incidents could say that the police were not to a great extent acting on the side of the Fascists. They were assisted in that by the law of the land.

I quite see that the police are always in difficulty because they come to the protection of those who are making speeches rather than the protection of people who want to heckle or to stop a demonstration. Therefore, the police may appear to be biased. It is no good anyone blinking his eyes to the facts that in the 1930s the police were regarded as enemies of the people, because on many occasions they were seen to be acting on the side of the Fascists.

Was not that exactly the reason why the Government of the day introduced the Public Order Act, 1936?

The Public Order Act, 1936, also had some objections to it. Like this Bill, although this proposes heavier penalties, it was a big, blunt instrument. Because the Government would not take action against racial discrimination they employed a blunt instrument to stop the demonstration by anyone within an area. Many of us at that time criticised the Public Order Act. We criticised it because it was as stringently against those who were perfectly properlydemonstrating as against those who were using demonstrations to spread racial hatred. We said that we should have a law, if one could be clever enough, which discriminated between those two. But that Act did not make any attempt to discriminate between those who were properly demonstrating and those using demonstration for what should be a criminal offence, spreading racial hatred.

The Government do not attempt to do this now. My hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough has been urging this on them for ten years. The Government say that they have been considering it for a whole year, but what do they do? They produce at the end of that time a Bill which merely increases the penalties, and which, possibly, will do nothing to prevent the spread of racial hatred, but which in the process may increase the penalties against perfectly innocent demonstrators who are trying to put their point of view.

I do not know what is happening in London today. There are many people in London today who want to protest against the visit of Queen Frederika to this country because of what they consider to be the tyranny which is prevailing in Greece. They have a perfect right to demonstrate. As the Prime Minister said a week ago, they have, of course, a perfect right to demonstrate. Someone in interfering with their rights. If someone protests, who has caused the demonstration? If the Bill were in operation now those who protested would face heavy penalties, increased to £500 of a year in prison.

The Evening Standard tonight designates London and its protective measures as a police State.

That is an example of how the Government get into a panic and use enormous powers, not to guard against the evil against which they have a right to guard, but in such an extensive manner that they interfere on a grand scale with the liberties of perfectly law-abiding people who have a right to make their protest.

The Government do not deserve any credit for the Bill. The only way in which they can rescue any credit is by permitting the House of Commons to vote on the issue of racial discrimination and the spreading of racial hatred. It would have been much better to do that in a separate Bill. All we have here is an excuse from the Government. They think they can fob off the House of Commons with the Bill, which contains many injustices which we must try to remedy in Committee. We should alter all these penalties when we are in Committee. The Bill does not deal with the real problem, which should concern the House and the country, of how to stop the bestial spread of race hatred.

It deals with something else, and the Government, in their usual shoddy manner, think that they can get away with it. I hope that the few remarks I have made reveal that not only am I objecting, but that most of those hon. Members who have spoken in the debate, although in very polite accents, criticised the Bill for failing to deal with the real problem which concerns the nation. I hope that the Government will take the Bill away and reconsider it and that, in Committee, we shall do our best to make a silk purse out of this sow's ear.

7.16 p.m.

I listened with care to all that the Home Secretary said. Like my hon. Friend the Member forEbbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot), I was much impressed by the vigour with which he spoke against those groups whom the whole House quite clearly abhor, but I am very suspicious of a Bill which merely introduces heavy penalties, because we have a long history which has shown again and again that merely by increasing penalties we rarely deal with the crux of the problem.

When I have endeavoured on other occasions to introduce some Measures which would cause some alteration in our laws, oft-times I have heard complaints that if we altered existing laws and made them more permissive we would take away from the general public the power of discriminating between what is morality and what is law. We are always told when attempts are made to reform the law that there is a great danger, if we allow offences no longer to be offences, that it will be misunderstood by the country. It will be believed that although there are offences which we regard as offences against morality, if we cease to make them offences against the law people will regard what is immoral as proper.

I cannot think of anything—and apparently this is true of all hon. Members—which is more abhorrent than racial hatred. There is nothing more obscene. I should have thought, therefore, that when an occasion presents itself, as it does today, when it could be made abundantly clear that we regard dissemination of racial hatred not only as something which is an outrage against humanity but such an outrage that it should be declared in our law as a criminal offence, this would be one of the least of the measures that the Government could take.

I listened to the Home Secretary in order to find the reasons why he did not want to introduce into this Bill something in the form of a declaration that racial incitement was an offence. The reasons seemed extraordinarily odd. It was suggested that this was superfluous because the words proposed would be merely repetitive. This would not be the first Act in which a draftsman had said the same thing more than once in a different way. That kind of argument cannot impress members of the Jewish community in this country, those who are coloured, those who have had a traumatic experience behind them which has happened as a result of racial prejudice.

Again, it was suggested by the Home Secretary that the reason he did not want to introduce words of this kind was that he had some diffidence in introducing the concept of race within our law. I do not understand what he means by this. After all, he was a more or less vigorous Minister for Welsh Affairs at one time. Is he suggesting that words such as"Welsh" are abhorrent, that a man would not wish to stand up and admit to being a Welshman or a Jew? Does he think that if within an Act of Parliament he declared that the hon. and learned Member for Cardigan (Mr. Bowen) was, in fact, Welsh, the hon. and learned Member would feel offended? Does he think that anything within an Act of Parliament of that kind would make someone of the Welsh race, or any Jew who has the privilege of belonging to the Jewish community, feel in the slightest bit offended? Or that any coloured man would feel offended because we indicated the fact that he was coloured?

What is the reason? People belonging to minority groups do not feel ashamed of belonging to them. It seems an extraordinary attitude to suggest that to make it an offence for any persons to declare publicly that they wish to incite people against those who belong to a racial minority would be offending the members of the racial minority. Has any responsible Jewish leader in this country expressed such a view? Or has any coloured man who is the leader of his community done so? From whom is the Home Secretary protecting the Jew and the coloured man? This will not do at all.

I followed the argument put up by the Lord Chancellor in another place. As I understood it, his argument against any introduction of words which would include incitement to racial hatred was based on the fact that it would mean that the difficulties of the police might be increased. As I understood it, the suggestion was that this would be a subjective test on the part of a police officer confronted with a situation where a man was using certain words. However, I feel that the Home Secretary owes it to the minority groups in the country to have it clearly indicated that racial incitement is an offence, and the right hon. Gentleman owes it also to the members of the police forces.

At present the police officer on the spot is faced with the dilemma of deciding whether words being used are threatening, abusive or insulting. He has to assess them and decide, on what is being said, whether in his view there is the basis for a charge. He has to decide alternatively whether the behaviour is threatening, abusive or insulting. In many cases these could be nice points. Those of us whose professional work brings us into contact with the police have a great respect and regard for them. But I would not say that one of the particular attributes of the police is that they are so sophisticated as to be able to distinguish nicely between one word and another; and in the heat of a lively public meeting it would be placing an intolerable burden on the police in many cases to decide whether what was being said was words which were threatening, abusive or insulting.

Even worse, a policeman may have to decide whether what is being said is likely to cause a breach of the peace. He must anticipate whether he could prove before a court whether a breach of the peace was likely to be provoked. These are hard tasks. Why does not the Home Secretary want to make it quite simple by inserting a Clause to make clear beyond any doubt that if anybody incites the community to racial hatred—we all know the type of language and the words which are used—he would be committing an offence. A police officer would know then that an offence was being committed. Why should we hinder the police rather than help them? Would not that be a much more objective test? Do not we owe this to the police in order that the matter may be placed obviously beyond doubt?

I wish to take up a second point raised by this Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) has anticipated something which I wanted to say and which, until he elaborated the point, had not, in my view, been said in sufficiently definite terms in this debate. A heckler is an important part of public life. The Home Secretary says that we must not legislate to restrict free speech. To bring in the possibility of penalties against people who are protesting in some form or other against what is being said might quite easily lead to an interpretation of something by a police officer on the spot as coming into conflict with the Act of 1908. That is wrong. It is not only a question of protecting the heckler. In doing this the Home Secretary has shown—if I may say so with great respect—that he lacks an historical sense, because in fact it is no use attempting at this moment to bring in a Bill which merely adds on some penalties to pre-war legislation.

As the Foreign Secretary has said, racialism is one of the most explosive forces in the world today. We have something like half a million coloured people in this country and about the same number in the Jewish community here. Surely it has to be understood that when events throughout the whole world are showing, unfortunately and lamentably, the dynamic of racial feeling; when we know what happened to the Jewish community and how it was decimated, do hon. Members think that that has not affected the minds and attitude of coloured people and of Jews?

I was brought up in a place where I went to school and where I belonged to the only Jewish family which sent children to the school. I came from a home which, fortunately, gave me pride in having the privilege of belonging to the Jewish people. Even in the pre-war years I was not taught to bear anti-Semitism with a patient shrug. I well recall that in my early days at school I was constantly fighting in the playground. The teachers were very sensible and wise. When I fought someone of my own size I usually managed to cope, and sometimes I did with people a little taller or bigger than myself. But there were occasions when I received a thrashing. On those occasions I found—fighting was, of course, prohibited in that school as in other schools—that when the teachers became aware of the matter, the boy who had given me a thrashing received a thrashing for the offence he had committed. That was very wise. It was a good way to deal with the situation.

As the"headmaster" here, the Home Secretary deals with the situation in an entirely different manner. It seems that he expects that the Jewish community and the coloured people should receive abuse and the dissemination of racial hatred with just a shrug. When I look on the history of my people—as most Jews do—it is not our martyrs which we regard with pride. For example, we do not take pride in the action of those Jews in York in the thirteenth century who, when surrounded by a howling mob, decided to commit suicide. The people in whom we take pride are the Judas Maccabeuses of history. We look at what happened inside Germany and in Europe. It is not those Jews who, alas, first stripped themselves, then dug their own graves and then were shot in whom we take pride. We take pride in those Jews who fought back in the Warsaw ghetto and showed that they would hit back when people attacked them.

We take pride in the Jewish National Home in Israel and the fact that the people there are not quiescent about racial hatred. We, too, must recognise the damage that can be done to democracy and which may destroy the democratic life of every nation. We must not assume that the half a million Jews who have elected to stay in this country and have not gone to the National Home—they are British citizens of the Jewish faith—are prepared, or that their young people will be prepared, to accept quiescently the fact that people can disseminate racial hatred by which children may be affected.

How would I like it if I found that on the corner of my street a man was whipping up racial hatred and teaching youngsters hatred which could affect my own children? Yet under the Bill hecklers, people who dare to take any action at all against this evil, are clearly in danger of suffering increased penalties, penalities far greater than those to be meted out to those who provoke these horrible occasions. I am profoundly uneasy. It is because I have this great sense of unease that I trust the advice given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale that we should have an opportunity in Committee to go much further into this matter will be heeded.

I trust that the Long Title will be amended so that we can have a wider debate. The Home Secretary may not agree with the point of view expressed on both sides of the House, but that point of view is deeply held. It requires careful examination. The Jewish community would be dismayed if it thought that, as a result of a strategem in the form of the Title to a Bill, the House of Commons was denied the opportunity carefully to consider a matter which requires earnest consideration.

I hope that the Government will have second thoughts. I hope that we shall have an opportunity to go into the Bill in greater detail so that we shall have in the end a Bill of which we can be more proud than the House of Commons can be of this wretched little Measure.

7.31 p.m.

I intervene very briefly because I think that I may be personally involved in some aspects of the arguments which have been advanced. I very much hope that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) will not leave the House, because I intend to make a reference to him. During what has been described as my"campaign" to introduce some control over immigration into this country, I personally was subjected to a certain amount of abuse, not least from the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. There is a great danger involved in extending this Bill so as to import into it any racial content, because it is obvious from what has been said in the debate that I myself would be in grave danger of being proceeded against under such a Bill if it were passed.

When I attempted to introduce a Bill under the Ten Minutes Rule to provide for the deportation of immigrants guilty of serious offences, despite the fact that they had been in this country for five years or more, I was accused by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale of being prejudiced. He used these words:
"All he has done is to use the Ten Minutes Rule procedure to make a further smear against immigrants coming to this country, and he has done so in a most disgraceful way."—[Official Report, 5th March, 1963; Vol. 672, c. 218.]
If those words, which were said under the cloak of privilege in the House of Commons, were to be taken at their face value, it would mean that if I had uttered outside the House what the hon. Gentleman criticised I would have come under the provisions of the Bill as amended in the way he would like.

In all my arguments for the control of immigration or for the strengthening of the deportation rules I have stated only the facts. They were disputed on that occasion, but they had been mentioned in Hansard. If I say that in regard to living on immoral earnings in the Metropolitan Police Area more than one-half of those convicted are immigrants, if I say that one-third of those convicted come from a certain country or a certain part of the world, according to the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, and, I suppose, many of his hon. Friends, I should be accused of a smear, although what I say is a fact, and a fact that I have the right to put before the public. If the view of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale and some of his hon. Friends were accepted and if an Amendment such as he suggests were introduced importing a racial content into the Bill, in future I would be very wrongly accused of being guilty under the Measure and my liberty of speech in stating facts to the country, as I have the right to do, would be seriously affected.

The hon. Gentleman had better be very careful, because the Government claim that racial hatred of that type is already catered for under the law.

7.35 p.m.

The Home Secretary, in introducing the debate this afternoon, said that there were momentous problems involved in the debate and therefore we are all justified this afternoon in discussing the details of the Bill and many of the important problems behind it. Before turning to the wider problems, I want to refer the Attorney-General to a practical consequence of the Bill as it stands at present. I want to refer to the increase in penalties to be imposed on people who organise or take part in a counter demonstration or who are at a meeting at which racial minorities are offended and attacked and who are provoked into some counterstatement or counteraction.

I thought that the Home Secretary dwelt far too often upon the Jewish community. I would have welcomed it if the Home Secretary had said a good deal more about the racial attacks being made all over the country against coloured Commonwealth citizens who dwell amongst us. I know that the Home Secretary had good reason for leaving the debate early. He informed my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) of his reason. I make no complaint of his absence. I repeat that the Home Secretary said singularly little about the serious problems that coloured Commonwealth citizens are facing who dwell in various parts of the country.

I am reminded of an example that occurred in Sheffield not long ago. The Fascist Union Movement decided to hold a meeting in Attercliffe, where there is a considerable concentration of people from various Commonwealth countries. They are working in industry in Sheffield or on the buses. They are making an excellent contribution to the life of the community in Sheffield. It is a contribution which I am glad to say is being more and more appreciated by the citizens of Sheffield. The Fascist Union Movement announced in the most offensive manner that it would march through the City of Sheffield to Attercliffe, demonstrate in front of the houses in which citizens who have a different colour from most of us are living, and show them where they got off. The Fascist Union Movement spent a fortnight announcing this demonstration in the most threatening terms. No action was taken by the authorities against the Fascist Union Movement.

The first thing that happened was that a number of local people in Attercliffe got together and decided that they did not like this kind of demonstration occurring in their midst. A couple of reverend gentlemen joined them and took a leading part in their deliberations. In the streets of Attercliffe in those days many local citizens expressed a fear which they felt. People were saying,"We have lived in peace around here. We have not had any trouble. Now the Fascists are to hold a demonstration here. We do not know what the result of it will be. There might be violence. Children might be harmed. We do not like it. We are disturbed about it". Many housewives were interviewed by the local paper—the Sheffield Telegraph—which I am glad to say played a very good part in this and allowed some of the local people to voice their independent opinions, regardless of political affiliation. Day by day the paper published a number of expressions of opinion from local residents. Thereupon, the local residents, encouraged by the support they were getting from all over the City, announced that they would attend this meeting, if it were held, and make their opinions heard. As a result, the Fascist Union Movement cancelled its own indecent and threatening demonstration.

I support and welcome the action taken by the people of Attercliffe. They displayed good sense. They did not want the introduction of ugly race hatred into their part of the City. They expressed their opinion in an unmistakeable manner.

Let us assume for a few minutes that the Fascist Union Movement had decided to go ahead with its provocation. It must be remembered in this case that the movement was not to demonstrate on the highways and byways outside Sheffield or, perhaps, in a part of Sheffield where there were not so many Commonwealth citizens living. The movement had announced publicly that it would deliberately go to an area of Sheffield where people whom it wanted malignantly to attack lived in considerable numbers. Let us suppose that the movement had announced that as the purpose of their demonstration. It is generally known that these Fascist organisations quite deliberately organise their marches and meetings to intimidate and harass members of racial minorities. That is why they wanted to go to this section of Sheffield. Let us assume that the Fascists had not decided, in the face of public opinion in Attercliffe, to call off their demonstration but had insisted on going to Attercliffe. In fact the police then decided to ban the march and the march having become illegal the Union Movement cancelled the demonstration.

Let us assume that instead the Facist Union Movement had decided not to march to Attercliffe but to go there by the normal means of transport, as they had done on other occasions when they had held provocative demonstrations in certain parts of our industrial cities, and had gone there and held their ugly, malignant demonstration. Undoubtedly, a considerable number of local people in Attercliffe would have turned out to oppose and heckle them.

Under the legislation that the Government are now introducing, these ordinary decent people who did not want race hatred introduced into their section of the community, if they had turned out and, having been provoked, said some hard things against the Facist speakers, they would be hit by the full penalty of the law just as much as those who were going to Attercliffe to introduce provocation into that peaceful area. Surely the Government should regard that as absurd when they look at it carefully and face the reality of the situation as it exists in this country.

I turn to another aspect which concerns the mentality of the Facist Movement. The hon. Member for Cheadle, who has been attending the debate for a good many hours and who has only recently left the Chamber, said that there was no danger like that of 1933 in Germany in this country at present, and, therefore, he could not see that the terms of the Bill needed widening. I agree at once that there is no such danger. Speaking for myself, I also agree with his assessment: I believe that if an attempt were made to build up a big Facist party in this country there are sufficient people to oppose it and defeat it. Having agreed on that, I must say it is not very relevant to what we are discussing in this Bill. We are discussing a much narrower point, namely, whether there is anything special in the kind of racial attacks that are being made by the Facist movement and whether there is anything specially criminal in the malignant theories which they have distributed and in the kind of attacks which they have invited other people to make upon members of racial minorities.

I should like to put to the House and to the Attorney-General an argument that was worked out some time ago by the French playwright and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. When he dealt with the philosophical implications of the problem of racialism and anti-Semitism he decided to write a long essay on anti-Semitism, and what he said about anti-Semitism would apply equally to all kinds of racialism whether directed against the minority that is singled out because of different colour, or any other cause. This was his argument. He said, rather startlingly, at the beginning of his essay that an anti-Semite is by implication a potential murderer, This is a statement which many people who at one time or another have harboured some anti-Semitism themselves will be greatly shocked by.

Jean-Paul Sartre knew that he was starting his philosophical argument by a statement which would be regarded as shocking by many people. I repeat that he started by saying that every anti-Semite is a potential murderer. He then went on to proceed with the argument in this way: if one attacks a person because he is black or because he is Jewish one is attacking him for qualities which are inherent in him and for qualities—and this is the essential point—which he cannot change.

Here I should like to turn to the speech made by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), who said that if we are seriously restricting the rights of what we can say against people and how we can criticise people, are we not going to reach a situation where it will become illegal to attack capitalists and landlords? I should like to point out to the hon. Member the illogical way of his reasoning, because it is obvious that if there is normal political warfare between parties, for instance, and someone attacks someone as being a Labour man, or a Socialist, this is an attack of an entirely different quality because the Labour man can change into a Liberal or a Conservative.

The party opposite now harbours in its midst one hon. Member who made all his political career on this side of the House and was at one time Under-Secretary of State at the Air Ministry, and is now beginning to play some part on the other side. Therefore, if these attacks are made on people who hold a particular view, they are capable of change. Jean-Paul Sartre says that if you attack a man because he is Jew that is something that he cannot change. If you attack a Jew or if you attack a Negro for certain qualities that must be eradicated, there is only one valid conclusion to this state of reasoning, and that is that you must destroy him physically. That is why Jean-Paul Sartre starts off with his argument that the anti-Semite is essentially in the long run a potential murderer. Therefore, we have no right to take his argument too lightly.

One of the essential characteristics of all Fascist movements when they attack members of the Jewish faith is to point out that they have the qualities of a pest or a plague. That can be seen in all the early pamphlets of the National Socialist Party of Germany and is equally present in the propaganda of Colin Jordan. Colin Jordan has successfully picked up the essential argument used by the Hitler's National Socialist Party and he is applying it in his propaganda in this country. One is therefore driven to the conclusion that there is an essential difference in quality which I should like hon. Members who have doubts on this matter to consider very seriously. There is an essential difference in quality as to the kinds of attack people make when they make an attack based upon racialism or an attack based on a different position in society, the landlord, for instance, or a difference of opinion—Conservative or Labour. This is altogether a different kind of attack. It is for that reason that racialism ought to be included and named as an indictable criminal offence in this country. It is a case which is of profound relevance to what the Home Secretary called the momentous problems behind the piece of legislation that he is introducing.

There is one other aspect with which I want to deal, having, I hope, established the case that this is a peculiar kind of attack; one other aspect which should prevent us from belittling the kind of movement that Mr. Jordan and others have built up in this country. I have in front of me a leaflet which was published a few weeks ago in Western Germany. It is published in German. I hope that someone at the Home Office has seen it by now. I shall not wish to conclude that they have not seen it, but if they have not I shall be glad to hand it over at the end of the debate. This pamphlet is in German and is addressed to the National Socialists of Germany. It says at the end of the page,"Printed and published by the National Socialist Movement, No. 74, Princedale Road, London, W.11". It was published in this country but is being distributed in Western Germany, and this is what it says to the National Socialists of Germany. I translate:
"National Socialists of Germany, we in Great Britain salute the heroic victory of thirty years ago under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and the monumental achievements of the National Socialist Movement. We know that in Germany today under the Jewish democracy there exists no political freedom. National Socialist manifestations are most severely punished. We ask you only to keep the faith. The faith lives on and should live on among the young generation. In the world outside a new movement exists. The National Socialist revival has begun. We have united with the National Socialist movements in the U.S.A. and in other countries and we have started to fight for our idea and for the liberation of the world from the Jewish rule of power. The day will come when the swastika flag will fly again. We shall win. Sieg heil. Germany, awake! Printed and published by the National Socialist Movement, 74, Princedale Road, London, W.11."
This is a new kind of propaganda which, only a few years after the kind of events which occurred in Germany, is reintroduced from the shores of this country to Western Germany. It really does make one feel amazed and puzzled that from the very country which for more than a year was mainly responsible for keeping the Third Reich at bay there should now come this kind of propaganda, and that it should be possible to organise it here.

This is an aspect of the propaganda which the National Socialist Movement in this country carries out in Germany, but it is not an isolated case. I have also in front of me, the House may be interested to hear. a report in a respectable liberal paper published in Frankfurt on 28th June this year—only a few days ago. In this report they are reporting about a number of swastika posters which had been put up in Frankfurt. They point out that it is not quite certain yet, but they are almost certain that they can be traced to this country. The article says:

"Swastika posters. Who are the culprits? It has not so far been possible to trace the unknown persons who during the night from Tuesday to Wednesday deposited or pasted on house walls posters containing anti-Semitic and National Socialist matter. The acting chief prosecutor, Herr Weitzel, declared that some twenty of these posters measuring 25 by 15 centimetres had been secured. The imprimature is that of an English body calling itself the National Socialist Movement which allegedly has its address in London, W. 11."
The Joint Under-Secretary of State will be able to tell the House whether this is the alleged address or the real address of the Movement. The article goes on:
"Investigations are being made to establish whether this is in fact the seat of a neo-Fascist organisation."
I quote quite deliberately that second example to prove to the House that this is not an isolated instance and that it happens most of the time and has been going on now for several years. I think it is the duty of the Government when making law and amending existing law to be aware that there is an international arm of this movement which is perhaps not quite so insignificant as the activities of the movement in this country are alleged to be by some hon. Members from time to time.

The essential quality of a Fascist campaign both at home and abroad is the design to create a state of mind in an audience which leads to one outlet only, and that is direct physical violence against the members of the minority which is being attacked. That is the deliberate design.

The Home Secretary spoke in contemptuous terms about the members of the Fascist groups in this country, and most people are tempted to agree with him, but on one occasion I undertook a certain amount of research into the background of the activities of National Socialists in various countries and for this purpose I went to the International Research Institute for Social History in Amsterdam and I looked at some of the documents concerning the period of the rise of the German National Socialist Movement between 1922 and 1933. I was particularly interested in a bundle of letters which had been addressed anonymously by members of the National Socialist Movement in Berlin to the Deputy Director of Police in Berlin in 1931, who has since died, a Dr. Weiss, who happened to be a Jew. Those cards and letters are kept under lock and key and one has to get special permission to get to them, and young people, rightly, are not allowed to see them, because they are a collection of obscenity, under the guise of political attack, the equal of which I have never seen in any other research institute which has interested itself in matters of this kind.

The relevance of that to this debate is this, that many Members of this House know that as soon as they begin to take an interest, say, in the problem of South Africa, or in the well-being and safeguarding of the interests of our coloured Commonwealth citizens in this country, then they receive a similar kind of correspondence.

I had not been in this House for more than eighteen months when I took part in a demonstration in Trafalgar Square about the problems in South Africa and organised by the National Executive of the Labour Party, than which no more respectable body, I suggest, can be found in the United Kingdom. The demonstration was presided over by a former Minister of Pensions, one of my right hon. Friends who normally sits on the Front Bench and who speaks for us on pensions matters from time to time, and there were a number of prominent people who were the speakers. Circling the demonstration were a number of lorries full of members of the National Fascist Movement and other Fascist groups and they made a particular spectacle of themselves by spitting on the people taking part in the demonstration, and giving the Hitler salute. I took an interest in this, and I asked a police officer on duty about it, and later I put down a Question about the behaviour and action of the police and, as a result of this one Question, I immediately received a letter posted in Brighton—with no address, of course, and no signature—and in the most indecent terms.

It is quite clear that there is a whole group of people of that kind at work in this country who are of the same mentality as the people who were responsible for the bundle of letters which I discovered, several years ago, in the Research Institute in Amsterdam.

This is not a matter of which we can take only little note. These people are of criminal intent, and they are using the means of racial attacks in order to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in this country which they hope will lead in the end to the destruction of our Parliamentary and democratic institutions, and that is why this is a matter which does not concern primarily the members of the racial minorities but concerns primarily the Members of this House of Commons and the Government, whether they sit on the Treasury Bench or a little further removed from the Treasury Bench at the present moment, but holding great and high responsibilities.

This is why the Government have a case to answer, and in view of all this information, which to some extent, at any rate, must be at their disposal, it is their bounden duty to let the House of Commons decide whether this Bill ought to be more widely drawn. For us it is a matter which concerns the future of Parliamentary democracy in this country, and it is for the House to decide.

I hope that, in a matter of this kind, second and wiser counsels will prevail, that the Government will have another look at this whole problem and that they will try to work with majority opinion in the House to pass a Bill which will, in the end, provide the basis of action against those who by racial attacks wish to incite to criminal action those whom they address at their meetings.

8.0 p.m.

Although I wish to be brief in my remarks, I think it only right that an hon. Member who represents a Scottish constituency should associate himself with the protests that have been voiced by hon. Members, particularly those on this side of the House, against racial discrimination. We have, in Scotland, a long history of recognising the need to allow public meetings, processions and demonstrations to take place. Approvalto hold these demonstrations was not won easily and today they are an inherent and accepted part of our Scottish tradition. I only wish that this principle was accepted as freely throughout Britain.

No one can believe that this miserable little mouse of a Bill is equipped to deal with the main cause of disorder at public meetings. For many years hon. Members have been talking about racial incitement and discrimination and the plight of minorities. My hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) has played a major rôlein urging the Government to do something to prevent racial discrimination. After all the agitation that has taken place, the Government introduce this miserable little Bill. It is to be regretted that after the attempts that have been made over the years by my revered and hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough—with his constant desire to see minorities regarded as human beings, whatever their colour or creed—we should be faced with this sort of Bill.

On eight or nine occasions my hon. Friend has attempted to introduce a Bill to humanise the present position. On each occasion he has been spurned by the Government. It is, probably, because of the doubts, uncertainty and, perhaps, a little heart searching by hon. Members opposite that we now have this Bill, although it is nothing more than a miserable scrap of paper which does not measure up to the discontent of our time. Considering the indignities and obscenities to which minority groups in Britain are being subjected, something much more enterprising is needed from the Government.

I was appalled by the speech of the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), who tried to smear coloured people as being the cause of immoral houses being kept. [Hon. Members:"No."] He certainly mentioned immoral earnings. This is a bad time for any hon. Member opposite to be using those sort of arguments. If anything has weakened the moral fibre of this country it has come from higher levels of society. I do not want to use this sort of argument, but I am merely endeavouring to comment on the speech of the hon. Member.

I hope that the hon. Member will devote his speech more directly to the Second Reading of the Bill.

I agree, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I am endeavouring—[Interruption.] I think that I heard the hon. Member for Willesden, East (Mr. Skeet) use the word"mud". I can assure him that I am not in the mud.

I will not give way to the hon. Member. As yet, he is only a boy in the House.

It is a pity that when the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South made that smear against coloured people he was not corrected at the time. I am merely now trying to redress the position and to put the matter in its proper perspective. Gibes of that sort only weaken legislation and it ill befits a supporter of the Government to say those sort of things. I am not attempting, by my remarks, to get into the gutter. I am trying to square my conscience and that of hon. Members opposite with the situation as it exists.

In my view, the Bill is being used by the Government merely as a buffer instead of curing the real evil and singling out racial incitement as an offence. It is a buffer and nothing else. It would be easier for the police force if there were a singling out process of the main causes of public disorders at meetings. It should not be left to individual officers or senior police officers in the areas where meetings take place to decide for themselves if something said by a speaker is causing incitement.

I am afraid that the heckler who may be right in his repudiation of the racial hatred being disseminated may be the person to be proceeded against by the police simply because the disorder may occur from the heckler's questions. This is a dangerous position. It would be easier for the police to recognise whether an utterance is leading to racial hatred if the facts were written into the Bill in terms of what and who should be proceeded against.

In terms of the heckler, the Bill may be dangerous. I hope that it will not, but we have already seen the danger signals of public disorder in Britain. For example, in the Evening Standard tonight we read the blazing headline:
"It's a 'Police State' Welcome."
That headline refers to the Greek Royal visit and the report beneath it states:
"Shortly before the train bringing the royal guests was due to arrive, the Victoria area got a glimpse of a police State."
It goes on to indicate what can happen when the police swoop, and says:
"They sealed off a 50-yard area outside Woolworths in"—

I am sorry to have to interrupt the hon. Member again, but he should devote his remarks to the Bill and to its Second Reading. His remarks are getting far too wide.

I would like you to think again about that, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. The Bill is, presumably, dealing with the matter of public order. No knowing smiles in the House of Commons or elsewhere can deny that the police were today dealing with what they considered was likely to be a public disorder. This has been put out for the information of, and for action by, senior officials of the Metropolitan Police Force. If you are ruling that out of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I cannot understand it, and I should like you to clear up the position as to whether we are dealing with public disorder or not.

There will be no misunderstanding, I am sure, between the hon. Member and myself. This is a Bill to increase the penalties for offences under Section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936. It is to increasing the penalties that the hon. Member should be devoting his remarks.

I can concur in that Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I have been complaining that that is all the Bill does. I have been complaining about what is not in the Bill. I have been an hon. Member for a considerable time now, and I believe that to be in order. I complain that the Bill does not go far enough. That is the whole tenor of my remarks, and I am very glad to note that you agree with me.

I am arguing for a Bill that designates in a more definite form the main cause of racial hatred so that we can control the disorders that are worrying so many thinking people in all parts of Britain. We have read today of the lengths to which senior police officers in London have gone, under instruction, to avoid public disorder—just because there is no direct indication to the police what public disorder is. That is a danger signal that the Government should heed, and I hope that we will be able to pay full regard to it in Committee, that we will be allowed our peaceful demonstrations against what we think are injustices, and that we may improve the Bill out of all recognition compared with its present form.

8.12 p.m.

All who have listened to this debate today will agree that we have had a most instructive and valuable discussion. If one thing has emerged more clearly than another from practically every speech, it is that, on both sides, nearly every hon. Member is dissatisfied with what the Bill contains. While there may be a substantial measure of agreement—or, perhaps, not very much disagreement—about the specific, limited and puny reforms that the Bill introduces, every hon. Member has pointed out that the Bill entirely fails to deal with the issue uppermost in the minds of practically all of us—racial hatred and racial discrimination.

I hope the Attorney-General will be able to give us a categorical assurance that before the Committee stage is reached the Long Title of the Bill will be amended so that we may have an opportunity to express our opinions in Committee as to whether there should be added to Section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, words on the lines suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot), the hon. Members for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) and for Willesden, East (Mr. Skeet), and by my other hon. Friends.

Without such an assurance being given, the Government will not only be rendering a great disservice to the House and expressing some contempt for the views expressed but will be failing in their duty to let the House of Commons express its opinion on a matter which the Home Secretary himself said raises a momentous issue.

It is unnecessary for me to emphasise the views that have been expressed so forcibly and eloquently by, among others, my hon. Friends the Members for Pontypool (Mr. Abse), Penistone (Mr. Mendelson), Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) and Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman). I would only say that members of the Jewish faith are not alone in feeling and expressing their condemnation and loathing of the resurgence in this country of anti-Semitism or of fascism in any form at all. The whole House is convinced that those hon. Members have rendered a service by drawing attention to something that has arisen in our community, and which should not be ignored.

Having said that, I want to deal, in as moderate and tolerant language as I can, with what I understand to be the objections raised by the Home Secretary and by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) and by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Kirkdale (Mr. N. Pannell), who, unfortunately, is not now in his place. As I understand it, they are the only three speakers who have attempted to oppose the demands that have been made on both sides of the House that Section 5 of the Public Order Act should be amended by introducing into it specific words to make it a clear and unambiguous offence for anyone in a public place or in a public meeting to use words inciting racial hatred. That is the short and simple issue now before the House.

I am perfectly prepared to proceed in my arguments on the assumption made by the Home Secretary in opening this debate. He said, and I agree with him, that there should be no interference with freedom of speech unless the need is proved up to the hilt. We can all make violent speeches about anti-Semitism and about Fascism, we can also make strong speeches about freedom of speech, and we can all recognise, as we should—and as I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale does as much as anybody—that, basically, the whole of our liberties depend on the victories that have been won in exercising freedom of speech.

I understand this Bill to deal with one aspect only of freedom of speech—not freedom of speech in general, not freedom of speech in writing, but freedom of speech in public meetings. The whole basis of the Public Order Act, which introduced certain limitations on freedom of speech at public meetings, is that freedom of speech at public meetings is meaningless and illusory unless the Government of the day can preserve public order, because we cannot have freedom of speech at a public meeting without public order. It has therefore been recognised since 1936 that if anybody at a public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words that are likely to cause a breach of the peace there is an offence.

I contend, as my hon. Friends and most hon. Members opposite have done, that that is not enough, but I accept the view that one ought to justify any further limitation of freedom of speech. Before attempting that, however, I want to examine what was said by the hon. Member for Kirkdale in a very revealing speech. He said, and one has to meet the point, that he believed that if this amendment of Section 5 of the Public Order Act were made he would probably be exposed to penalties if he advocated at a public meeting, as I think he has, and is entitled to do in this House, that Commonwealth immigrants who have committed an offence should be deported.

I should like to ask the Attorney-General his opinion. Is it his view or is it not—and I will not express an opinion about it—that in the interest of freedom of speech a person who honestly and sincerely believes that Commonwealth immigrants should be deported is entitled to say so? That is an arguable proposition. Is that the Attorney-General's view?

The only point I made in my short speech was that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M Foot) accused me of a smear which comes under the definition of"abusive" and according to his definition I should have been liable under the type of Bill that he wanted to see introduced.

I am obliged to the hon. Member. I want to see how far this proposition goes. After all, the Home Secretary resists our demand that the use of words inciting to racial hatred should be made a specific offence. I am trying to find what is the rational and logical basis, if there is one, on which that proposition is defended.

Does the Attorney-General contend, or could it be contended, as it might be by some, that in the interest of the hallowed tradition of freedom of speech anybody who sincerely believes that in the interests of our society as a whole Commonwealth immigrants should be deported is entitled to say so at public meetings? Is he entitled to go further and say that there should be a complete restriction on coloured immigrants?

Will the Attorney-General allege that if somebody thought it was necessary to advocate complete restriction of Commonwealth immigration, even though that were bound to lead to racial hatred, he should be entitled to advocate such a policy because of the cherished tradition of freedom of speech? Is that the argument? I will assume for the moment that it is not. I will assume that the argument is, as was put forward, I think, by the Lord Chancellor in another place and by the Home Secretary today, that the real reason why the Government resist this desired amendment is that they think it unnecessary?

I hope that we shall have a categorical reply whether the Attorney-General thinks it desirable or not or whether he rests his case on the view that it is unnecessary. If the argument is that it is unnecessary, I must remind the House that until the decision of the Divisional Court in the Jordan case there was the greatest ambiguity as to what the words of Section 5 as they stand mean, and I do not think that it can be seriously contended that the decision of the Lord Chief Justice and his colleagues removed that ambiguity.

All that that judgment has done is to lay down that in the case of the particular words used by Mr. Jordan those words were sufficiently insulting or sufficiently abusive to enable the court to deal with him, Mr. Colin Jordan, under Section 5, but that leaves completely wide open all the other cases in which somebody, without necessarily using words which would be caught by Section 5, deliberately uses words calculated to incite racial hatred.

I regret that I was not in my place when the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South, spoke. He knows perfectly well that I was taking the chair at a meeting of the Committee on Statutory Instruments of which he is also a member. The hon. Gentleman was kind enough to tell me the gist of what he said and other hon. Members have also told me. This is how I understand his argument. He referred to blasphemy and how wise it would be if we now removed blasphemy as a criminal offence from the Statute Book. I agree with him.

The analogy I draw is that there was a time for many centuries in the history of our country when blasphemy was properly thought to be a criminal offence and was specifically mentioned as such, and in order to deal with it one did not have to rely upon common law or upon the use of insulting words which might provoke a breach of the peace. In those days, the reason was that blasphemy was regarded as so serious and so likely to undermine the whole structure of society that it should be punishable per se, without proof that anybody using blasphemous words might provoke violence or a breach of the peace. This is no longer the case. Today, people may use as much blasphemy as they like without their words leading to violence. They may provoke dissent and argument, but no one says today that the preaching of atheism or anything of that kind would lead to violence or a breach of the peace.

I contend that the very same reasons apply today in this other context. In earlier centuries blasphemy was singled out as a specific punishable offence, without proof that the use of particular words led to violence or a breach of the peace, precisely by the same reasoning as our society today justifies and requires us in our statute law to make the use of words inciting to racial hatred an offence. In the conditions of British society and world society, particularly in the conditions of the Commonwealth, without reference to the United States of America or anywhere else, the propagation of racial hatred is in itself something calculated to do damage to society, irrespective of the provocation it gives to those who are naturally incensed, whether they be Jews, coloured immigrants or any other minority. Nowadays, when racial tensions are increasing, and when it is part of the fundamental duty of all civilised Governments to try to reduce them and to promote the integration of immigrants and minorities of all kinds within the social structure in order to prevent trouble, precisely the same reasons, in my submission, apart from all the other arguments, justify and require the specific introduction into the Bill of the words which have been proposed.

I repeat what I said at the outset. It would be a thousand pities if the House parted with the Bill on Second Reading without an assurance from the Government that we shall have an opportunity in Committee of expressing the considered judgment of the House on this matter.

8.27 p.m.

Everyone who has heard the debate will agree that it has been both interesting and, on occasions, very eloquent. It has touched upon matters which are of the greatest importance in the functioning of our democracy. It deals with one of the most difficult problems in the art of government, namely, the holding of the balance firmly and fairly between the rights of free speech at public meetings, on the one hand, and the need to keep law and order and see that justice is done, on the other.

I agree fundamentally with my hon. Friend the Member for Was all, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid) when he says that free speech is not concerned with saying what is acceptable. It has nothing to do with that. If freedom of speech were simply limited to saying what most of the community thought was right and correct, it would be useless and utterly meaningless. I think that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) made the same point. Socrates, Galileo and many others we can think of wished, in their time, to say what was utterly detestable and wholly unacceptable to the people among whom they lived.

We must, I submit, remember to stand by what is a difficult attitude, which requires constant courage to maintain, namely, that perverse and erroneous opinions must be tolerated to the fullest possible extent, provided that reason and truth are left free to combat them. It comes back to what the philosopher said,"I disagree with every word that you say, but will defend to the last your right to say it". This is the difficult principle which we must consider when discussing what every hon. Member and the vast majority of the people of this country outside believe to be the utterly detestable views of Fascism which are now, to a small extent, showing themselves in our midst.

Certainly, if the fears expressed by some hon. Members opposite as to the likely recrudescence of that doctrine in our midst, following the pattern of Germany in the 1930s, revealed a serious risk, I would absolutely concede that very serious measures ought immediately to be taken. But for the reasons given by my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mr. Shepherd) and others I should have thought that the British people would never have a part of it and that we could rely on their good sense and knowledge of what it means utterly to reject any such doctrine.

We must, therefore, be careful in dealing with the question of the law affecting the right of free speech at public meetings to make sure that, in order to hit at one danger, we do not narrow it to such an extent or in such a manner that we exclude what ought to be the fair expression of opinion, and do not prevent people from expressing other unpopular views which did not occur to our mind at the time that we legislated.

I hope that the House will consider that, in general, the law should not be concerned with whether views or statements are correct, unpopular or accurate, and that citizens should be free to say whatever they wish, however wrong-headed it may seem to most people, unless there are overriding reasons of public policy why they should be prevented from making such statements.

Would the Attorney-General deal with what we have subscribed to, namely, the Declaration of Human Rights, which says categorically:

"All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration, against any incitement to such discrimination."
Do we agree with that or not?

The Attorney-General: It is not a question of whether we agree with it or not. It is a question of whether and to what extent people should be allowed to express their own views at public meetings. Is not that proposition to be the subject of discussion at public meetings by rational people who desire to say that it is either right or wrong? However wrongheaded we may be to disagree with the proposition, is it to be said that we must not under any circumstances dis- agree with it at a public meeting? The question is: are there, in this case, overriding reasons of public policy why people should be prevented, and in what circumstances should they be prevented, from expressing their opinions?

The question, I think, has come down to this: have we reached the position where the views of Fascists and, naturally, then, of Communists have become so extreme that they should not be tolerated or allowed to be expressed? Once we started on that slippery slope and, for the first time in this country, prevented the expression of extreme views because they were thought to be wholly unacceptable, we would then, I have no doubt, be under pressure in future to prevent the expression of extreme and unpopular views of a different category and nature at public meetings.

We must remember that we are not here dealing with any question of censorship. No one in this debate has discussed that question. We are not concerned with, and the Bill does not and cannot possibly attempt to deal with, the question of books, of printed matter not distributed at public meetings, of newspapers and of television. The control of opinions through those media is, of course, quite outside the scope of this debate, but it is because there are many people to whom those media are shut and who have no access to them that the rights of people at public meetings become very important indeed.

One point which was raised by the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) dealt with the position of coloured persons and the liability which they are to attacks of racial violence. I suggest that that is not a matter which we are really debating here today. I would have hoped that the Notting Hill case at the Old Bailey, some time ago, had shown that our law was quite strong enough to deal with outbreaks of violence of that nature. I hope that it will always be properly enforced. The sentences which were then passed were both exemplary and salutary and did much good for public opinion, not only in this country, but in Jamaica and the rest of the West Indies, whence the people against whom the attacks were made had come.

The hon. Member also asked what should be done if the meeting in his constituency had taken place. One thing that can certainly be done is to go and heckle. I hope that nobody will imagine that the law is being altered in any way to prevent proper and reasonable heckling at public meetings. We have had the Public Meetings Act since 1908 and I do not know that anybody has ever been charged with an offence under it for reasonable heckling. It could, of course, go to the extent of being a breaking up of the meeting, and then other considerations might arise.

Apart from publicly heckling the speakers, one could always take along a shorthand writer and take down what is said. If it is thought that a speaker has infringed the provisions of the Public Order Act, one can also lay an information. This is the real remedy to prevent people making speeches such as were made in Trafalgar Square on 1st July, 1962, which the courts have now said were an infringement of the law.

Would not the Attorney-General recognise that the Bill specifies heavy penalties where disorder might be created? While, in the past, heckling may not have been considered an offence and would not have troubled the police, where there is a penalty of the kind which is now envisaged if heckling leads to disorder at a meeting, an unskilled politician or police officer might consider that it was prohibited by the Bill, with the result that heckling might be limited for this reason.

The point I was trying to make was not that there is no legislation to deal with violence against coloured people. I am well aware that there is legislation on the Statute Book and I welcome the confirmation which the right hon. and learned Gentleman has given. My point was that under the Bill, which he is commending to the House, the penalties against those who have been provoked will be as heavy as the penalties against those who deliberately stage provocative demonstrations. Is not that unreasonable?

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman also bear in mind that the Public Meetings Act, 1908, contains the provision that

"If any constable reasonably suspects any person of committing an offence…he may if requested so to do by the chairman of the meeting require that person to declare to him immediately his name and address"
and that if he declines to give it the policeman can arrest him without warrant? Does the Attorney-General think it justifiable to fine a man £100 for that?

He would be fined not for that, but only if found guilty of the offence.

The basis upon which the increase in the penalties under the 1908 Act is being brought are as follows. There are two events that can happen to interfere with the right of public meeting. The first is where a man abuses it completely by making a speech which is threatening, insulting and abusive and is calculated or likely to cause a breach of the peace. That is where the speaker creates the disturbance. Under the statute, he is the person who has committed the principal offence and who now, if it is a serious offence, can be committed for trial upon indictment. This deals with the point raised by the hon. and learned Member for Cardigan (Mr. Bowen). It is intended that in the case of the most serious offences of outrageous abuse of public speech at public meetings an indictment should be preferred, although it must, in accordance with the usual law, be left to the prosecuting authority to determine.

To go back to the point I was trying to deal with, that is one side of the picture. The other side of the picture is that there are people who go to meetings determined that they shall not take place. That is what the 1908 Act was aimed at. This is putting into the hands of people attending the meetings the right of censorship, and that is utterly unacceptable. Therefore, the Government took the view that there is an equality between those who abuse the right of free speech in a manner which is wholly unacceptable and likely to cause a breach of the peace and those who prevent the right of free speech by causing a disturbance and breach of the peace. The heckler who goes too far, the man who is provoked to such an extent that he himself causes a disturbance, is, as far as I know, never charged under the 1908 Act. He is always charged, under the 1936 Act, of himself having used"threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour" in such a way as to be likely to cause a breach of the peace.

Therefore, if it is to be said that one is discouraging those who are likely to attend meetings because one is increasing the penalties too greatly, it ought to be an attack not on the increase in the penalties in the 1908 Act but on the increase in the penalties in the 1936 Act. I should have thought that the matter could be properly dealt with in this way, and that nobody supposes that a reasonable man who goes to a meeting and is provoked by a speech which is utterly provocative and loses control of himself would be very severely dealt with by the magistrate.

The maximum penalty under the 1936 Act, as it is being put up, is intended to deal with the extreme case of the man who abuses the right of public speech, as the court held in July, 1962, in the Jordan case. It is not that the penalties in the 1936 Act are being put up to a maximum. It must be recognised that those who are merely provoked and those who lost control and misbehave must be subject to the same maximum—though the probability of their ever getting the same maximum can, one would think, be ignored.

If a man went to a meeting, and found himself so intolerably provoked that he wanted to end the meeting, there is nothing that the Attorney-General can say to him to prevent a policeman charging him under the 1908 Act and his being subject to the increased penalties. That is the position. Nothing said by the Attorney-General here handicaps or inhibits the police from making a charge under the 1908 Act. Surely that is the position.

It has not happened for a very long time now, and I think it would be very unusual indeed. As far as I know, it has never happened. The gentleman who merely behaves in a somewhat outrageous way, including using insulting behaviour calculated to cause a breach of the peace, is not guilty of an offence under the 1908 Act. He has to go much further than that—to the extent of acting in a disorderly manner for the very purpose of preventing the transaction of the business for which the meeting is called—before he can be found guilty. Therefore, one has a much heavier burden before one can bring such a charge under the 1908 Act.

This is the basis upon which the maximum penalties are fixed. The Bill merely lays down the maximum penalties. The maximum penalties are fixed equally for the two offences, as it is as shocking to abuse the right of free speech as it is to prevent free speech, and within those two categories the extreme cases ought to be dealt with upon an equal basis. The courts can be trusted to separate out quite carefully those which have not really come anywhere near the worst form of the offence in either provision.

I was dealing with the Public Order Act and was about to submit, when I was interrupted and diverted, that the Act really does approach this problem on the right basis. There have to be two elements in any offence under that Act. First, the person has to use language beyond the bounds of fair discussion. It has to be threatening, abusive or insulting. On top of that, and in addition to it, the language has to be used either with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace or in circumstances whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned.

If one abandons either of these two legs of the criminal offence, one will either be punishing those who wish publicly to discuss important issues in perfectly moderate and correct terms, to which nobody could take the slightest exception, and then one will be censoring their actual views and not the manner of their expression; or one will be putting in the hands of an audience the right to censor a speaker because it complains not of the manner of a speech but of its contents.

The second leg of the argument is,"Why should not people be allowed to say what they like when no breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned?" But this would be applying to literature, books and the Press a different standard from that which would apply at public meetings.

Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman saying that one ought to be able to advocate racial hatred provided that in doing so it does not lead to a breach of the peace?

No. I am not saying that.

My next point will, I think, answer the hon. Gentleman. We must remember that there remains, in addition, a weapon of the law which is applicable not only to public meetings but also to literature, the Press and the other media I mentioned. This is the charge of sedition. For disorders which are deliberately provoked, and, in particular, those provoked by literature as distinct from speeches, we can use the law of sedition, and I think that it would be appropriate for me to remind the House of how the common law deals with provocative literature of that kind.

The common law was stated in these terms by the learned judge in his summing up on the last occasion of a prosecution for sedition, which was the Caunt case at Blackpool. He said that a man publishes a seditious libel if he does so"with the intention of promoting violence by stirring up hostility and ill-will between different classes of His Majesty's subjects".

That would, of course, be sufficient to cover the stirring up of hostility or ill-will on the grounds of religion, race or colour or any other of the matters we have been discussing.

Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman realise that in that case, although the prosecution, after the fullest consultation with all concerned, came to the conclusion that an offence had been committed, nevertheless the jury decided that an offence had not been committed? Does not he, therefore, understand that something must be done about a situation of that description, so as to make it abundantly clear what these provisions really mean?

The Attorney-General: I was dealing with the nature of the crime of sedition and seditious libel. I realise that that case failed, as the hon. Gentleman says, somewhat to the surprise of the prosecution which, I believe, was ordered by one of my learned predecessors, now Lord Shawcross. I would have thought, however, that we would not want questions of sedition and seditious libel to be tried by anybody other than juries. Seditious libel is a serious offence and is triable only on indictment.

We must remember that there is a delicate balance to be struck in the prosecution for sedition and that the jury, as reasonable men, will be considering not only the intention to provoke hostility and ill-will or hatred, but, on the other side, the essential rights of free speech. History has shown that juries have been jealous to guard the rights of free speech and reluctant to convict except in the clearest possible cases. Nevertheless, the procedure on indictment is not one which can be invoked as a measure of swift justice, since it leads to the more deliberate procedure of trial by jury. Consequently, it is a procedure to which resort should be had only in serious cases whose gravity is manifest after tempers have cooled down. But I should like to take this opportunity of telling the House that if our new Nazis or any other extremists carry things so far as to bring themselves within the law of sedition, I shall not hesitate to invoke that law against any such person.

Having reminded the House of the existence of that weapon, which deals not only with public meetings, but also with all forms of provocation which are likely to stir up ill-will and hatred on any grounds, I come back to the argument which we have largely had today, whether it would be beneficial to add within the Public OrderAct, 1936, a specific reference to racial hatred. Perhaps I can make two points. I venture to suggest, first, that even if this Bill had been law in July, 1962, at the time of the Jordan meeting, and had contained this provision, the police could not have dealt with the matter in any other way, and that it has been shown by the courts that they had sufficient power to deal with that meeting.

Secondly, I remind the House that it is difficult to conceive of any words which would promote racial hatred and fall within the Section without the use of threatening, abusive, or insulting language. It may just be possible to conceive of this being done, but I am bound to say that it is exceedingly difficult to see how it could be done, and I do not know of anyone who has succeeded in doing it yet. Therefore, as has been conceded by many speakers today, the words of the 1936 Act are adequate now to cover the sort of speech which we all want to prevent.

It has been said that the law was in doubt. It is perfectly true that it was in doubt during the period until the decision of the Divisional Court was available. This was the very reason why the Government waited to see what the decision was. I would have thought that, after all that has gone on to this moment, nobody could have said that he was unaware of the fact that abusive, insulting and threatening language must not be used on the subjects of race, Jews, or coloured people, and that to do so in public was to make oneself liable to the penalties of the law if abreach of the peace is likely to ensue.

The only merit which has been suggested for putting in Section 5 of the 1936 Act an express reference to racial hatred is that it will make plain to ordinary citizens what the position is. I have already submitted that they should now know. However, I should like to warn the House that however desirable that object may be, one has to be very careful when amending an Act that one does not hit at something which one never intended to hit.

First, the words"racial hatred" are not very precise and, for a criminal Statute, there might be substantial risks of bringing into the penalties of the criminal law matters quite different from and other than those which we have been discussing today. We have a great deal of violent discussion among Scotsmen, Americans, Jews, Russians and all sorts of people. Those are persons who belong to individual races. One might quite unintentionally widen the provisions of the criminal law to inhibit discussions to which no one would really object.

Secondly, if one did this one would be for the first time introducing into the criminal law a provision which deals with the opinion being expressed and not with the manner in which it is actually phrased. That is a very substantial difference. Provided that we are satisfied that the law at present will deal with people who make these outrageous speeches, I ask the House to come to the conclusion that it is not necessary to make any such alteration and that the law is adequate at the moment.

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain why it is proposed to restrict this law to words which are spoken and not to words which are written—such as those which appeared on the banner on the plinth in Trafalgar Square?

Of course, I express a personal opinion, which is not binding on the courts, but I should have thought that in view of the phrases of Section 5, which deal with"words or behaviour" at a public meeting, the distribution of poster by hand or their display by the organisers of the meeting, or the waving of banners and matters of that sort, come within the words of the Section. I express that opinion as my own view. Of course, the hon. Member will realise that this is not binding on the courts, but I hope the courts would agree that these are matters which come within the words dealing with behaviour at a public meeting.

I respectfully submit that by altering the law, if people are satisfied that it is adequate at the moment and only want it to be clarified, one would run the great danger of striking at opinions and, secondly, at widening it very much further than one had expected by the interpretation which might be placed upon it by the courts.

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman answer the point which was put at the beginning of the debate by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and by many others, whether the Government propose to alter the Title of the Bill to enable the House of Commons to decide on this matter which he has been discussing?

The answer to that is, no.

I remind the House of words spoken by the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) on 14th March, 1946 when he was discussing a very similar topic. We do not always agree with what the right hon. Member says, but on this occasion I commend his words to the House:
"what we require to do in this matter is to keep a sense of proportion, and leave these people to the sense of humour of the British people. We shall not cure Fascism in this country by turning the Home Secretary into a Fascist, with powers to suppress opinion."—[Official Report, 14th March, 1946; Vol. 420, c. 1263.]
There has been no real opposition—except on minor details of the balance of penalties, to which we can return in Committee—to the provisions of the Bill. There has been discussion only on whether it ought to be wider. I hope that as a result of the arguments I have advanced the House will now think it right to give the Bill a Second Reading.

Will the Attorney-General give the House some reasons why the Government have reached the decision that they will not allow the House of Commons to vote on the question whether this Clause should be incorporated in the Bill? That was put from the Opposition Front Bench at the beginning of the debate and it was raised by at least six other hon. Members, but apparently the right hon. and learned Gentleman is not proposing to answer it. He has not presented a single argument why this should be so. It is no use saying that the Home Secretary did not want to be a Fascist in this respect; he is treating the House as if it were a Reichstag.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House—[ Mr. Pearson.]

Committee Tomorrow.

Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure, 1963

9.0 p.m.

I beg to move,

That the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, passed by the National Assembly of the Church of England, be presented to Her Majesty for Her Royal Assent in the form in which the said Measure was laid before Parliament.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I wonder whether you would be kind enough to accept a Motion"That this House do now adjourn", in view of the fact that the House has been given a firm guarantee by the Leader of the House that this business, which involves a long and controversial Measure containing 89 Clauses, should come forward at a reasonablehour? Will you accept such a Motion so that this business should not be taken at this late hour, which is unfair to the House?

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. There are a great many hon. Members on this side of the House who would support what has been said by the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas). This is not a party matter and we were promised that we should discuss it at a reasonable hour. I wonder, therefore, whether I may ask the hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) through you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, in view of the feeling in the House, and the fact that this concerns a religious matter on which there should be reasonable harmony about the time when we discuss it, whether he thinks it would be better, and more in accord with the spirit of the thing we are discussing, that such a Motion should be accepted?

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) has drawn your attention to the fact that this is a long and difficult Measure containing 89 Clauses. It has also five Schedules and 47enactments. In my submission it is preposterous that the House should take this business with only an hour for debate. I wonder, with respect, whether we may ask the Leader of the House to express an opinion on what appears to be a breach of faith on the part of the Government.

I think that the hon. Member may be under some misapprehension. He has said that there is only an hour for debate. This is exempted business.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. May we have the benefit of your guidance? In view of what has been said, may some lead be given by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House indicating that no attempt will be made to bring this discussion to an end? That would be quite a different matter from not embarking upon it at all. If such an assurance could be given, some hon. Members would feel happy to have a period of discussion knowing that at the end of it no conclusion would be reached.

The Motion is in my name, and that of hon. Members on both sides of the House—

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. This is not a Government matter but a matter for the House of Commons. Surely we are entitled to appeal to the Leader of the House. It is not a party matter, or a Government matter.

If it is in order to do so, may I say that it is precisely because this is not Government business that it is not a matter for me? It is not for me to put this business down for a particular day. That is done by the hon. Member in charge of the Measure. As I have explained more than once, on Thursdays I try to ensure—on one occasion it proved impossible to do so—that this business would come before the House at a reasonable hour. There is no question of the Government having the Whips on or closuring the Measure, as was suggested. I am not here as Leader of the House but in my personal capacity, as I happen to be interested in this Measure. That is a pure coincidence. It is for the hon. Member in charge of this Measure to bring it forward if he is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so. My advice to the House would be—remembering, of course, that this is exempted business—that the undertaking has been fulfilled by the fact that this business came on at nine o'clock. But it is for the hon. Member in charge of the Bill to judge.

I think it might be helpful if I say that nobody realises more than I do the importance of this Measure, but I think that it would be as well that we should get on and consider it at the moment. I do not want to commit myself in advance, but let us see how we go.

The hon. Member will not do himself or his opposition to the Measure any good by making noises like that.

The hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) has just said that hon. Members on this side of the House who have voiced objection to the procedure now being adopted are opposed to the Measure. May I make it clear that the objections I have listened to, and in which I now join, do not necessarily arise from opposition to the Measure? They may be based on the assumption that the Measure is not being fairly discussed and time is not being given for it to be properly discussed, which is necessary for the healthy and proper conduct of the business of the House. I assure you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that I am not opposed to the Measure in principle. I do not rise for that purpose. I think that it is an abuse of the procedure of the House that such a complicated and extensive Measure should be placed before us at this time of night.

I have given my Ruling that I am not prepared at this moment to accept a dilatory Motion. I suggest to the House that we should start the debate and see how we get on.

I am not anxious in the least to hurry this Measure through without adequate discussion in the House. I am probably sufficiently well known in the House for hon. Members to realise that full well.

Perhaps it will be convenient if, in moving the Motion, I make a short general speech. Then, if after listening to the debate I might catch the eye of the Chair again, I will try to draw the threads together and deal with any detailed points which may have been raised but not answered during the course of the debate. I should perhaps say at this point that it is not as Second Church Estates Commissioner—

The hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) knows that I am supporting him in this Measure, but I personally feel strongly concerned about some of the complaints which have been made. My concern is a little strengthened by what he now says. Since you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, have been good enough to allow the Leader of the House to make a brief statement, we are in a slight procedural difficulty. Would the hon. Member for Dover consider delaying the Measure—not withdrawing it altogether, of course—if the Leader of the House could give us an assurance that he will find a good half day for the Measure between now and the Summer Adjournment?

I fear that that is a hypothetical question. I think that we had better get on with the Measure and see how we go, I have given the assurance that I do not want to see the Measure rushed any more than hon. Members on either side of the House do.

Perhaps I should say at this juncture that it is not as Second Church Estates Commissioner that I move the Motion but as a Member of the House who is also a member of the Church Assembly.

I think that it is common ground between all of us here that the ecclesiastical courts need reform. This has been the view of successive Commissions. The Lloyd-Jacob Report, the Report of the Committee of which Mr. Speaker was a distinguished member, referred to the jungle of courts. If there is, as I believe there is, an unanswerable case for the reform of the existing machinery, then it must be a matter for the Church Assembly to tackle. That is its function, and it has been delegated to the Assembly by Parliament. We are now asked to approve the results of the Assembly's labours. Having delegated to the Church Assembly the duty of producing this Measure, it is not for us to subject it to the kind of examination to which we subject a Bill in Committee. We have to look at the Measure broadly and say whether we are in favour of the principles which are embodied in it.

The Measure has its origin in the Report of the Commission on the revision of canon law. The Commission was set up in 1939 and reported in 1947. When that Report was received, it was felt that the proposals on ecclesiastical courts were so complex that they should be dealt with separately from the whole question of the revision of the canon law. It follows that, although this Measure has its origin in the canon law revision pro- posals, it is in no way dependent upon those proposals, and the Church believes that this Measure is necessary whether or not the canon law is eventually amended.

This Measure stands on its own feet, quite independently of the question of canon law revision. It is based on the report of the Archbishops' Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts, usually known as the Lloyd-Jacob Commission, which reported in 1954. These proposals were debated in the Church Assembly in 1955 and again in 1956. The Measure was generally approved at the summer session of 1961. It went through two stages of revision in the spring and summer sessions of 1962 and was finally approved in the autumn session of 1962. The reason that I have gone into details of its passage through the Church Assembly is to suggest to the House that it is quite clear that the Church Assembly has not taken lightly the burden of careful scrutiny placed upon it by Parliament. Not only that, but there has been consultation at every stage with the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Measure has been considered by other Departments as well, including the Prime Minister's Office and the Home Office.

Since the matter was submitted to Parliament, the Measure has been considered by the Ecclesiastical Committee whose Report is before the House and whose recommendation is
"that the committee is of opinion that the Measure is expedient and that it should proceed".
When the Measure was considered in another place, no votes were recorded against it. Generally speaking, it maintains the existing system under which cases of clergy discipline fall into two broad categories. In the first place, we have the conduct cases, that is to say, offences concerned with morality, unbecoming conduct or neglect of duty, and, in the second place, we have the reserved cases, that is to say, offences against the laws ecclesiastical involving matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial.

Conduct cases against priests and deacons are dealt with by the consistory or diocesan court, with an appeal to the Canterbury Court of Arches or the Chancery Court of York. In the case of bishops or archbishops, they are dealt with by commissions. Reserved cases—doctrine, ritual and ceremonial—are dealt with by a new court to be known as the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved with an appeal to the Commission of Review appointed by the Crown.

There are two matters which have caused some concern and which I think it is only right that I should mention in moving this Motion. The first is the abolition of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the final court of appeal in conduct and reserved cases, and the second, which has caused some concern, has been the retention of the bishops' veto.

By abolishing the Privy Council as the final court of appeal in cases reserved, that is to say, cases involving doctrine, ritual or ceremonial, the Church of England is, in fact, moving nearer to the Nonconformist Churches, and in making that provision for that aspect of the matter the Measure would commend itself to them. It is not likely that any Nonconformist Churches would be prepared to accept a purely secular body such as the Privy Council as the final court of appeal in matters which are essentially spiritual. This provision in the Measure will, therefore, I suggest, ease the process of the coming together of the Churches which, in our recent debate on the state of the Church of England, was welcomed in all parts of the House.

Perhaps I ought to remind the House that the new court of appeal in reserved cases in place of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is a commission under the Great Seal consisting of five persons appointed by Her Majesty, three of whom shall be Lords of Appeal who are communicant members of the Church of England, and two of whom shall be bishops who sit as Lords of Parliament. I would call the attention of the House to the fact that there is no attempt whatsoever to remove these matters from the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Courts. The commission will be one of great eminence, and it should be noted that the lay judges will be a majority of its members.

On the question of the retention of bishops'veto, I am going to say that this in no way alters the present position in reserved cases. It is a minor extension recommended by the Lloyd-Jacob Commission in conduct cases and covers them all, whereas before they were covered only on grounds of being frivolous, or on grounds of vagueness. I would say to the House most seriously that if we were to take the grave step of withholding consent to this Measure we should not get rid of the bishops' veto. The status quo which includes the bishops' veto in reserved cases would still remain. After, and when, the law of worship is brought up to date the importance of the bishops' veto will diminish, but till there is a reform of the law of public worship many things will go on being done which are illegal, some of which may be very minor, and in my view the bishops'veto is necessary to prevent trivial, or perhaps even malicious, prosecutions from occurring in the parishes. I believe that at present the veto helps the processes of order and reconciliation in the Church.

In the past doctrinal cases have been bedevilled by the fact that they took place in a criminal atmosphere. We are hoping that the new Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved will lift the whole thing up into quite a different sense and feeling so that these matters of doctrine, ritual and ceremonial will be treated more as though in a court of arbitration than as of a man on trial for misdeeds. It is our hope and expectation that with this court of inquiry, if the bishop allows it to go forward, the bishop will be much less inclined to impose a veto except on something which is of very minor importance.

Behind this Measure lies a great deal of thought and hard work over the last 10 years or so, and also the investigations of eight Commissions going back to the first one in 1883. We believe that this Measure is going to make a substantial contribution to the better ordering of the life of the Church, and I commend it with confidence to this House for approval.

9.24 p.m.

The hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) is one of our most greatly respected Members, and I was sorry that I had to cross swords indirectly with him at the beginning. My grievance really was with the Leader of the House who I felt, and still feel, has broken faith after promising much longer—well, a reasonable time—to deal with this Measure.

The Measure which is before us is one indeed which represents years of hard work on the part of those responsible for the administration of the Church of England. Having studied the Measure, I realise the intricacy and complexity of our present ecclesiastical laws. I acknowledge that there is need for a tidying-up Measure but, after serving as a member of the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament for thirteen years, I say to the House—although I am a Nonconformist by instinct, heritage and everything else—that I have never in all those years placed the slightest obstacle in the way of the Established Church having the reforms it required or that it considered it required.

It is only because I believe that major constitutional issues are raised by the Measure that I have taken the decision to appeal to the House tonight not to sanction it at this stage. I have been nurtured in a home in which there was great affection and respect for the Church of John Wesley. The creeds of that Church are the creeds of the Church to which I belong. Last weekend I was at a Methodist conference at Preston where I heard on every hand terms of affection and respect for the Established Church of England.

I say these things so that the House should realise that it is in no mean spirit that I come here to oppose the Measure. I come from certain deep convictions to which, I believe, I must respond. In the Ecclesiastical Committee and in another place the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Chester described this Measure as one of the most important that has ever come from the Church Assembly to receive the consent of Parliament. This underlines my plea that to consider this matter at 9 o'clock at night is unreasonable.

It is one of the most controversial Measures to come forward in my time. I was not in the House in the days of the great controversy over the Prayer Book, and in my time there have not been any really great battles. We had a debate one night on an Ecclesiastical Committee recommendation, but there have not been any great battles about Church of England proposals.

Other rights in this House are not secondary to the Church Assembly, especially when constitutional issues are raised. I believe that we all have an obligation to see that the rights of Parliament do not go by default when a major reform is proposed. The Church of England enjoys by law, by the favours of Parliament, privileges over every other Church in the land; Churches established by grace, though not by law. The Church of England shares in the government of the land. She has her representatives in another place, and they properly take part in discussions on Measures with a political content as freely as those which deal with ecclesiastical matters.

His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, once he has bean consecrated, becomes, as a noble Lord reminded another place, after the princes of blood, the principal subject of Her Majesty in this land and a leading member of another place.

The Archbishop of Canterbury is the monarch's principal religious adviser, because the Church of England is established. It is in the seats of power because it is established, and only because it is established. The whole country knows that when King Edward VIII abdicated, the Archbishop of Canterbury of the time played a leading part behind the scenes in the decision that was taken. Within the past few years we have had the further example of Archbishop Fisher playing the leading part in a decision affecting the Royal Family. We are, therefore, dealing in this Measure with those who are near power in this country.

As head of the Established Church, the Archbishop of Canterbury claims the right to crown the monarch—the leader of no other Church is allowed to have that privilege—

I understand the hon. Gentleman. He looks a part of the Establishment—and certainly sounds like it.

The parish priest regards everyone in his parish as a member of his church. In a debate on 14th December, on the Motion of the hon. Member for Armagh (Mr. Maginnis), we were told by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher), who is a distinguished luminary of the Church of England—

—that every parish priest has a duty to call on everyone in his parish. I remember protesting on that occasion and asking about the Roman Catholics, the Methodists, the Baptists, the Salvation Army people, and others who no longer regard themselves as the parishioners of the priests of the Church of England. I say that without in the slightest sense seeking to be offensive.

All national religious ceremonies are conducted in the Established Church—Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's are regarded as the citadels of our national religious ceremonies. Even in local religious ceremonies, the same priority is accorded to Anglican priests because the Church is established.

I have recounted these privileges of establishment because I believe that the House ought to remind itself from time to time that the Church of England receives much from being established. She receives a great deal that no other Church in the land is entitled to receive. But, by the very fact that she accepts establishment and the privileges that accrue from it, the Church of England accepts the price that establishment must exact. The Church of England is proving increasingly reluctant to pay the price of establishment, though she apparently wishes to continue with all the advantages of establishment. This is a matter to which we should give our attention, because in this Measure the Established Church seeks to have the penny and the bun.

The doctrine, the ritual and the ceremonial of the Established Church is not and ought not to be a matter for the sole discretion of the bishops of the Established Church. As long as it is an Established Church, claiming the privileges to which I have referred, it must be prepared to recognise that those who are not members of the Established Church have a right to see that the doctrines laid down by Parliament are accepted and honoured. I have been brought up to be very respectful to bishops. Too many bishops, as the House knows, themselves disregard decisions of this House to be in any position to discipline their clergy who do not accept the decisions of the House.

It is proposed in this Measure to take away the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which, of course, is one of the few remaining bulwarks we have, ensuring that the law is preserved and recognised in the Established Church.

Does the hon. Member really assert that the right of appeal, as it has been hitherto, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council does preserve anything?

Obviously, the Church of England thinks it does. Why is it so anxious? If the hon. Member is patient, no doubt in the small hours of the morning he may be called to take part in the debate.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council does not make the laws for the Established Church. It neither initiates the laws nor does it pass them. All that the Judicial Committee does is to bring the best legal brains to the problem of controversial issues within the Church, and it pronounces impartially on the questions which are at issue.

The advantage of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council surely is that it is out of the politics of the Church. It is not emotionally involved. Its members are not emotionally involved in the issues that are at stake. Who on the other side of the House knows of a court where there is a religious test for lawyers? Is it that we cannot trust the members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council?

The Right Reverend Bishop of Chester told me in the Ecclesiastical Committee and later told members of another place that the reason why the Church of England objects to appeals being made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is that members of that Committee need not be members of the Anglican Church and might indeed be people without religious convictions at all. The next step from that is to tell hon. Members of this House that they have no right to pronounce on matters concerning the doctrine, the ritual and the ceremonial of the Church of England.

If we allow it to be settled as a principle that, because members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are not necessarily members of the Established Church, they are unfit to pronounce upon these matters, what is to be the attitude of this House when the controversial canon laws come up for revision? It will not matter then whether hon. and right hon. Members of this House have any religious convictions at all, unless, of course, we have reached a stage when people believe in establishment without Parliament having any authority whatever. I believe, therefore, that this is a major constitutional issue.

I have no spleen towards the mother Church of John Wesley. I honour and respect the part which it has played in the life of our people. I respect the contribution that it makes today. But I say to the Church of England that it should have second thoughts about this Measure. It is not right to bring to Parliament a Measure of 89 Clauses and 50 Schedules, repealing nearly 50other Measures, and put tucked away in what is a major tidying up of the ecclesiastical law a constitutional step of great importance which removes the authority of the Judicial Committee solely because its members do not satisfy the creeds or beliefs of the Established Church. I would have thought that every lawyer in the House would sense danger in a step of this sort.

On the Judicial Committee, there is no personal bias as between its members and the people who raise protests. It was suggested in another place—I should not have ventured to suggest it otherwise—that the old school tie links many a bishop with his clergy. This is true. We can say it without being unkind. Hon. Members opposite know, as I know, the value of the old school tie. I am always pleased and honoured to deal with those who went to my old school. There are not many of them here.

Does anyone suggest that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is an irresponsible body? Has it made irresponsible decisions? I challenge anyone in the House to say that the Judicial Committee has treated in a frivolous or disrespectful manner the appeals which have come before it from the Established Church of England.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that no appeals have been made to the Judicial Committee now for over 50 years? Why dispense with it? It is not used.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. That is what I call a good Irish intervention.

We are told that the bishop has a right of veto. I turn now to this issue. He decides, and he will continue to decide, whether protests by people on grounds of doctrine, ritual or ceremony are to be allowed to pass him and go to another stage. He will be dealing with, and acting as a judge over, his colleagues in the Church. He will have to bring as impartial a mind to that task as the judge brings to his normal duties. I believe that there is danger in this question.

Today The Times, which is, in my view, a very readable newspaper—I do not wish to patronise it, but it is usually behind the establishment—[Hon. Members:"Oh."]—when the establishment is worth being behind. Over the years it has generally supported the party opposite. I know that just now The Times, like a lot of the supporters of the party opposite, is having second thoughts. I do not want to enter into that question. We can discuss that another time. But The Times has always been generous in its support for the Established Church. I think we can all agree on that. In its third leading article today it gives very faint support indeed for this Measure. In fact, it gives such support which amounts to a request for second thoughts on this Measure.

In view of what I have said, I believe that the Church of England had another honourable course which it could have taken rather than to bring this proposal about the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to this House. Through the years I have not been one who has called for disestablishment. I have felt, right or wrongly, that to take away establishment from the Church might weaken the cause of religion in the country. In an age when materialism is swirling round us and old values are disappearing, I have wanted, and I still want, to do nothing which would undermine those who are endeavouring to establish religion in the heart of this country.

The only honourable course for an Established Church which does not want the control of people who do not belong to it is to face up to the question of disestablishment. The Church might soon be telling the Prime Minister, who is not a member of the Anglican Church but who has the right to appoint certain of its bishops, that it objects to his doing so.

My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition is a very devoted member of the Congregational Church. As he told the nation on television recently, he is a Nonconformist. I have no doubt that, like all the Anglican Prime Ministers who have gone before him, he will bring the most earnest and careful consideration to the tasks which he will have to fulfil on behalf of the Established Church when he is Prime Minister. But if it objects to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it might even take exception to him.

I would not hold up the Measure on this ground, but I am a little anxious that social opinions of local clergy, which hitherto have not been liable to condemnation by their bishop, are now to become liable and that the protection which clergy have had in their social opinions is being taken away in this Measure. It is a little unfortunate, but that is not why—

Will the hon. Member define what he means by social opinions?

I thought that the hon. Member was anxious for me to come to a conclusion. If he is patient, I will see what I can do for him before I conclude.

Hitherto, when a bishop has exercised his veto in connection with his clergy, he has been obliged to give the reasons in public. Everyone has known why bishops have acted. In this Measure, however, the bishops are being given a power that they may exercise their veto and they do not have to account to anyone why they exercise it. There is a reduction in the constitutional rights of Her Majesty's subjects and it is one which cannot be ignored.

The Lloyd-Jacob Commission, to which the hon. Member for Dover referred, went out of its way to call for the end of the bishops' veto. It asked for a wider body to be set up to inquire into the matter. The hon. Member will, no doubt, remind us of this when he speaks a second time by leave of the House. In another place, the Archdeacon of Hastings was quoted by Lord Brentford, whose devotion to the Church of England is known throughout the land, as saying that bishops'powers are being extended from limited constitutional powers—I am not quoting exactly, as that would be out of order—to those of administrative autocrats.

In introducing this Measure, the hon. Member for Dover said that it would help Church unity and that it was coming nearer to the Nonconformists. There is no one in the House of Commons who wishes more than I do to break down the barriers between the denominations. I believe that young people are sickened by the differences between Christians who are walled in to their respective denominations. I do not, however, believe that this Measure helps as the hon. Gentleman thinks that it does. It is, in fact, the reverse. I believe that this Measure will help the Established Church to feel it safe to go on being established, as it is giving up nothing and claiming all.

For these reasons, I earnestly hope that the hon. Member will not put us into the position of voting against this Measure from the Church Assembly. I am resolved to do it if the Question comes tonight, but it would be fairer to the House, to the Church of England and to the country if this Measure were taken back for consideration of these detailed questions.

It is a pity that we are unable to amend this Measure. In their wisdom, our fathers granted autonomy to the Established Church to control a great deal of its own affairs. We do not initiate the legislation. We only have to approve or reject it. I cannot find it in my heart to approve the taking away of the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, especially since the grounds which are advanced are that those learned people may not be members of the Church of England. The House will be protecting its own right at another stage if it rejects this Measure tonight.

9.50 p.m.

We have listened to a speech of tremendous power, eloquence and sincerity, and it is difficult to follow. I found myself almost in entire agreement with practically every word that the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) uttered. I speak, however, from a somewhat different standpoint in that I speak as an Anglican who believes firmly and sincerely in the establishment of the Church of England.

I think it a pity—I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Cardiff, West—that this Measure is being taken at this time of night. I agree with him in objecting to that fact. My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) has been extremely courteus, both to myself personally and to others who have been opposed to the Measure, in endeavouring to arrange a time which would meet the convenience of all of us. We acknowledge his courtesy about that. He has been most helpful about it. I am sure that it was not his wish that the Measure should come on so late. But it is a pity that a method could not be found whereby the debate might have been postponed to a more reasonable time next week. However, we are, as it were, seeing how we get on, and I would hope that we should not be forced into taking a decision upon this Measure very late at night.

The hon. Member for Cardiff, West spoke of the difficulty under which we are in dealing with the matter. It is one of the unfortunate consequences—there are many unfortunate results—of the enabling Act that we can deal with this Measure only in toto—we have either to approve or reject it, and we do not have the power of amendment. It is a great pity that this is so. It was one of the causes of the great dispute and the great difficulty that arose between Parliament and the Church over the Prayer Book—the very fact that one had either to accept the new Prayer Book, the deposited Book, in full, or else reject it in full.

About 95 per cent. of the new Prayer Book was acceptable to the majority of the House of Commons, but, because of the obnoxious 5 per cent. or so of it, it had to be rejected, and we were left with the position which obtains now where that Prayer Book is in widespread use completely illegally—a state of lawlessness which the bishops are condoning.

The leading article in The Times, which has already been referred to, said at the end, after referring to the two main criticisms made of the Measure:
"These criticisms of the Measure, whatever validity they may possess, are essentially 'committee points', and the House of Commons is not concerned with the 'committee stage' of ecclesiastical Measures, which is the business of the Church Assembly. Parliament is called upon to approve or disapprove as a whole Measures which come to it from the Church Assembly, and only the weightiest objections of principle can justify rejection."
That argument would be valid if this were the Second Reading of the Measure or something analogous to a Second Reading, and if this were a Measure which we could approve tonight in principle, send to the Church Assembly for its committee stage, and then deal with it, as it were, when it came back on Third Reading. But that is not the case. What we are asked to do tonight, in effect, is to give the Measure a Third Reading, so that what this House approves tonight would become the law of the land after Royal Assent and would become irrevocable.

Therefore, if we decide that there is force in the objections made, and that the objections are such that the matter ought to be looked at again, I think that we are entitled to say, as the hon. Member for Cardiff, West said, that it would be right for the Church Assembly to look at the Measure again. We realise that an enormous amount of work has gone into this. We realise that the ecclesiastical courts have got to be reformed. We are not against the main principle of the reformation of the ecclesiastical courts.

But there are two principal matters contained herein—and I speak as an Anglican—that many Anglicans object to and that many of our friends in the Free Churches believe are such as to militate against the sort of unity we want to see among our Churches. I believe that they are weighty matters of principle, that they are not committee points at all and that they raise very substantial constitutional questions, particularly the first one.

However, before I come to them, I want to deal with one question of a general nature. My hon. Friend the Member for Dover said that this Measure was something of which the Church approved. It has been said several times in the debate that this is something which comes from the Church. It certainly comes from the Church Assembly—

—but that is not necessarily the Church of England.

I would concede that the Church Assembly represents the bishops of the Church of England, and I would concede, almost but not quite, that it represents the clergy. There are many clergy who consider that the House of Clergy is not too representative a body, that it contains a very great number of ex officio members. None the less, if it helps, I will concede, perhaps, that it represents the clergy.

But by no stretch of the imagination does the House of Laity represent the laity of the Church of England. I hold, and have always held, that if one accepts the test of membership of the Church of England to be that of the Sacrament of Baptism, which I think is the only right test, then one is dealing with the question of about 27 million people and that those 27 million are not represented by the House of Laity. They are represented by this House.

If, on the other hand, one narrows the definition of the membership of the Church of England from those who have had the Sacrament of Baptism down to those who are on the electoral roll of the parishes, one is then dealing with fewer than 3 million people, and the whole argument for the establishment of the Church of England disappears overnight.

Many of us respect the sincerity of my hon. Friend's views in general, but he is beginning to suggest that the Church Assembly is a packed body. He should be very careful before he makes such an accusation.

I think that my hon. Friend is being unfair to my approach. I did not say that it is a packed body. I said that it is an unrepresentative body, which is a slightly different thing. I conceded that it is representative of the bishops and possibly of the clergy, but I said that by no stretch of the imagination could it be regarded as representative of the 27 million laity.

My hon. Friend wants a body to be representative of those who have been baptised, but no longer belong. Surely the Church Assembly must represent those who now belong.

I would not accept that a man once baptised and given the sacrament of Holy Baptism can at any time cease to belong to the Church of England. If we are to create some sort of grades of membership of the Church we are getting into very deep theological water indeed.

The point is that in considering whether or not this Measure comes from the Church of England, we ought to be clear that"Church Assembly" and"Church of England" are not necessarily synonymous terms.

Let us deal with the two principal objections to the Measure. The first is the removal of the appellate jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It is not a bad thing to look at the history of this appellate jurisdiction. It goes back a very long way. It was said in another place, I think by the Bishop of Chester, that it dated from about 1830, but the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the inheritor of the Royal Supremacy in matters ecclesiastical, and the Royal Supremacy in matters ecclesiastical goes back to the Saxon kings.

It is often thought that it began with Henry VIII, but it goes back to the Saxon Heptarchy, because, prior to the Conquest, there were no separate ecclesiastical and civil courts. All the courts were together and were under the final appeal to the Sovereign. It was William the Conqueror who divided the courts into civil and ecclesiastical as a matter of convenience, but he kept to the Sovereign in council the final court of appeal in each case.

All down our history there has been running that thread, so that nowadays in civil cases the House of Lords is, in effect, the appeal to the Crown in council, whereas the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the inheritor of the appeal to the Crown in matters ecclesiastical. The Judicial Committee's immediate predecessor was the Crown in council and before that the Court of Delegates.

What is the argument for removing this ancient appeal? The argument which I have heard is that because the decisions of the Privy Council at the end of the last century, many famous decisions in matters of doctrine and ritual did not command universal respect in the Church, the court should be changed. Let us consider exactly what we are dealing with. The Privy Council was not a court which made doctrine. As the hon. Member for Cardiff, West said, it was a court which declared the law. Perhaps we might discern the functions of the Judicial Committee from its own words:
"It is not for the Court to decide whether opinions are theologically sound or unsound, but whether such opinions are contrary, or repugnant to, the doctrines which the Church of England by its Articles, Formularies, and Rubrics, requires to be held by its Ministers."
And later:
"The Court will apply to the construction of the Articles and Liturgy the same rules which have been long established, and are by law applicable to the construction of all written instruments, assisted only by the consideration of such rational or historical facts as may be necessary for the understanding of the subject matter to which the instruments relate, and the meaning of the words employed—its duty extends only to the consideration of that which is by law established to be the doctrine of the Church of England upon the true and legal construction of her Articles and Formularies."
In other words, these are statements by the Judicial Committee itself at different times and in its different judgments of the Committee's functions. In other words, it is a court of record to determine what is or is not the law. We are now told that because the decisions of this court do not command respect, the court must be abolished. I would have thought that that was a very strange constitutional doctrine to admit. Because its decisions have not been respected we are told that we must do away with the court and—I think this is even more sinister—that on the courts which are to be put in its place the decisions of the Judicial Committee shall not be binding. We shall be doing away with a very ancient doctrine of the continuity of law. What becomes of the law of the Church of England in the meantime? What is lawful and what is not?

This is doing something that even the disestablished Church of Ireland never ventured to do. When the Church of Ireland was disestablished there was written into its constitution the provision:
"That every Act which would have been a breach or violation of the ecclesiastical law of the United Church of England and Ireland and offence published by such law in Ireland at the time of the passage of the Irish Church Act of 1869 shall be an offence against the ecclesiastical law of the Church of Ireland coincidentally bound by the ecclesiastical tribunals of the Church of Ireland."
In other words, the Church of Ireland was saying that although it had achieved complete liberty and could do what it liked and was established in 1869, at least it recognised the need for continuity of law and that chaos should not ensue. Here we are removing the activity of the Privy Council and substituting a court and saying that that court shall not be bound by any decisions on law which have gone before.

That is a shocking argument. What is to happen to an honest, decent clergyman of the Church of England who, whatever controversies may have been breaking around him, has said,"I at any rate am faithfully carrying out the law of the Church of England as laid down and trying to preach what I am supposed to preach, trying to preach the Gospel within the law"? What is to happen to him now? What about all the previous decisions of the Privy Council? Is this to be left in a vacuum until such time as the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved determines what is or is not lawful in the Church of England?

Let us look at the two new courts, the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, first. I should have thought that to a good Parliamentarian the very name would be obnoxious. All good Parliamentarians are familiar with the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights expressly states:
"That the Commission for erecting the lay Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes and all other commissions of like nature are illegal and pernicious."
I suggest that this court, if we give it the vote tonight, would certainly not be illegal but it would be in fact pernicious.

What I want to deal with is the Commission of Review, the other court which is to have before it causes dealing with doctrine, ritual and ceremony. It is a purely religious court of appeal. This was a point made very ably by the hon. Member for Cardiff, West. It is required that in this court there shall be two bishops and three Lords of Appeal who shall be communicant members of the Church of England. This is something which no other professional body has.

We are asked to give to the Church of England a final court of appeal, the membership of which shall be qualified. In the case, for example, of the General Medical Council, a doctor is tried by his fellow doctors. If he feels aggrieved at the judgment he may appeal, and, oddly enough, the appeal goes to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He has a right of appeal to an impartial court which he knows as concerned solely with law. In future, that is not to be the case with the Church of England. We are to have a court, the membership of which is bound to be members of the Church of England—two bishops and three Lords of Appeal who shall be communicant members.

I am very surprised that this matter should come before us in this form. It goes even further and introduces a religious test inevitably for the office of Lord of Appeal. One could easily envisage a situation where among the Lords of Appeal there may be only three left who happen to be communicant members of the Church of England, or"fallen away" members as my hon. Friend would put it. One of them dies. What does the Crown do then when it comes to appointing a Lord of Appeal? The Crown is forced to say that to fill the court, and keep it in action, a Lord of Appeal must be appointed who shall be not only a member but a communicant member of the Church of England.

If ever there was an invitation to occasional conformity, that is one. I should have thought that wholly obnoxious and sufficient in itself to ask my hon. Friend to take this Measure back to the Church Assembly for the Assembly to look at it again.

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for giving way, because he was good enough to give way before. I am not a lawyer, still less a Lord of Appeal. But let me give my hon. and gallant Friend an analogy. I am a magistrate, like many other hon. Members. If my hon. and gallant Friend were to come to The Wapentake of Hallikeld, in the North Riding of the County of York, and commit some motoring offence, were there any difficulty about it, I and my fellow magistrates would want to visit the scene of the accident. Is there, to use the words of my hon. and gallant Friend, any"weighty objection of principle" to doing that?

I have great difficulty in understanding my hon. Friend. I am not a lawyer or a Lord of Appeal. But I must confess that I do not see the relevance of his interjection—

No. I will make a point of looking it up in Hansard tomorrow and will write to my hon. Friend.

If I may now—

Has my hon. Friend considered the fact that it is conceivable that at a particular time all three judges of appeal may well be Roman Catholics or of the Jewish faith or Free Churchmen? It is conceivable that there would be no person qualified.

I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. I thought I had made the point that it is possible that there would not be sufficient Lords of Appeal unless the Crown introduced a religious test. Either this court is nonsense, and could disappear altogether, or the Crown will have at some time, or may have in the future, to introduce a religious test. I should have thought that sufficient ground for rejecting the Measure without anything else

. The hon. Member for Cardiff, West drew attention to the question of what is known as the bishops'veto. This is not a Committee point, as The Times suggested. It is a matter of very great importance. It is regarded as one of very great importance by all the Evangelical Churches. It is so regarded not only by those who belong to Churches outside the Church of England, but also by those within the Church of England.

It passes my understanding why this veto, this power to prevent an action being brought against a clergyman, should be defended with so much vigour. The argument is advanced that it is necessary to retain this veto to prevent frivolous cases being brought. This argument has only to be examined for its weakness to be seen. First, under Clauses 18 to 20 any action against a priest or deacon is a cumbersome thing to bring. It requires at least six members of the parish who are on the electoral roll to bring the charge. In the case of a bishop or an archbishop, it requires a much greater number, including five parish clergy.

I would concede that that might not be sufficient safeguard, but surely it is possible to devise some different system. Indeed, there is a different system in the Measure. There is power for a court of inquiry to decide whether there is a prima facie case. In the case of the Church of Ireland, there is a very simple way. Instead of a veto being exercised by the bishop, there is a veto exercised by the archbishop. The veto does not rest with the bishop concerned in the diocese, who is much too close. It rests with the archbishop, after he has appointed a court to inquire whether there is a prima facie case.

It should not be beyond the wit of able men like the Bishop of Chester, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover, and ecclesiastical laywers to devise a simple method of preventing frivolous or vexatious litigation without enshrining in the hands of the bishop this power which could be entirely tyrannical. It is absolutely wrong. The vehemence with which it is held on to only increases the suspicions of those who feel that it will be improperly used. They fear that, if a clergyman introduces a doctrine or some form of ritual in a church which members of the parish or others conceive to be illegal, and these members of the parish seek to test whether it is legal, and if the bishop happens to agree with what is being done and supports it, the bishop can prevent any such case being tested.

Of course he can, but it is no valid argument to say that because it is the practice now we must enshrine it in this Measure and must not send the Measure back again to have this obnoxious power removed.

It will not only be enshrined. It will be strengthened. It is because the Measure produces a system of law within the Church which can justly be criticised at the beginning and at the end—at the very first stage where the bishop can exercise this tyrannical veto and at the final stage of appeal—that there are the gravest and most sincere objections to it. We believe that the House of Commons should reject it. That is why those who think in this way but do not wish to see the House of Commons divide on a matter concerning the Church, which we all love so much, join in appealing to those who have presented the Measure on behalf of the Church Assembly to take it back.

Please take it back and look again at these matters which we consider raise tremendous principles and which we passionately believe would be absolutely wrong to enshrine in the law and which we cannot in all conscience support. Let the Measure be brought back again when we will look at it again with very great sincerity, because we believe that it would be a great tragedy for the nation if this Measure were passed at a time when we are seeking by all the means in our power to bring the Christian people of this land together into some form of unity.

I believe with the hon. Member for Cardiff, West, that there are many in this Church and in others who have been on the point of accepting the ancient system of episcopacy and who would be deterred if they were to see the bishop elevated into being something like a petty tyrant. That is not my conception of episcopacy, and I am sure that it is not theirs. What we want to see is a greater, wider Church of England. We want to work for a Church of England where everyone who is a Christian within the land can feel that he has an opportunity to belong to it.

This Measure will inevitably work against it. It is a Measure produced by a party within the Church, and it will eventually divide both the Church—[Hon. Members:"No."]—and the Christian people of the nation at a time when we are seeking unity.

10.23 p.m.

I agree with those who think that the timing of the debate is most unfortunate. I do not know the intention of the hon. Member in charge of the Bill. There is a large number of hon. Members who still want to speak, and I suppose that at some time suitable to him the hon. Member will move that the debate be adjourned. I think that this will be necessary. We do not want to go on debating until 2 or 3 in the morning. On the other hand, it is not really agreeable or convenient to have a debate of this nature in two bits, separated by several weeks or, at any rate, days. We are gathered here tonight in an atmosphere appropriate to this Measure. We are considering it as earnestly and sincerely as we can, and we should like, if possible, to complete the debate and, if necessary, vote on the Measure tonight.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) said that it is unfair to this House and to the Church of England that this debate should be taking place so late at night. I would also point out that this is the time of night at which Hansard normally finishes reporting our debates for inclusion in the edition published the following morning, and it would certainly be a little unfair to the Church of England, at least, if Hansard were to go to press tonight containing a report of this debate which consisted only of the brief opening speech of the hon. Member in charge of the Bill and the two extremely able and eloquent speeches to which we have just listened. I think that would give those of the public at large who read Hansard a rather false impression of the balance of opinion within this House.

These two speeches we have just heard were, I thought, extremely interesting, not only for what was said in them, but because of the hon. Members who delivered them. One was by a Methodist who, as he told us, has always on the whole supported the Establishment. The other was by an Anglican who has the inestimable benefit, if I may so put it to him, of belonging to a disestablished Church.

Ironically enough, although I disagree with much of what my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West said about the Measure, I have always taken the view—at any rate, I did for many years—that disestablishment would, on the whole, be a good thing for the Church. My hon. Friend spoke absolutely justly—widening the debate considerably, as I am glad he did—when he said that Establishment confers its obligations as well as its privileges, but he did not mention one great handicap of being or belonging to an Established Church in A.D. 1963. The younger people of whom he spoke in another part of his eloquent speech do very often tend to look askance at the Church of England precisely because it is the Established Church: it is part of what is loosely called"the Establishment," in a wider sense of the word. So, although I agree with my hon. Friend that Establishment certainly has its obligations as well as its privileges, it also, I put it to him, may have its handicaps, and those of us who belong to the Church of England sometimes look half-enviously in this respect at the Free Churches, or at other parts of the Anglican Communion, such as the Church in Ireland, in Wales, or in South Africa, where the Churches are not established.

One part of my hon. Friend's speech, one of its most eloquent parts, was slightly punctured by what he called a good Irish intervention. It was a good Irish intervention in what was as a whole a very good Welsh speech, and, like all good Welsh speeches, it was tremendously sincere, tremendously passionate, and touched and spiced with thathumour with which my hon. Friend always succeeds in charming the House—but also, if I may say so, by a certain amount of purely unconscious humbug. My hon. Friend does not mind my saying that. I know he takes our exchanges in good part.

My hon. Friend quotes the old tag,"See how these Christians love one another." I have never known whether that tag was originally admiring or sardonic and cynical; I think the latter, probably. It unfortunately is true of a great part of the history of Christianity that Christians have been brutally and violently at war with one another, and have been intolerant of one another. I am extremely glad that, so far in this debate—as, on the whole, in the debate we had before Christmas—there has not been that note of mutual intolerance, except that I think the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr), who also got very near it in the debate before Christmas, was a bit intolerant of bishops as bishops. He belongs to the Anglican Church. He is an episcopalian, but he seems to have a deep-rooted suspicion of the unfortunate bishops of these two provinces.

That is not so. I have many good friends among the bishops. I have a tremendous respect for them. My father is a dean.

I am reminded of the well-known remark always uttered by anti-Semites,"Some of my best friends are Jews." Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South was so carried away, and rightly so, by his own eloquence that he has forgotten what he said. At one point he said, rather ominously, that the bishops' veto could be a tyrannical veto: then, a few sentences later, he was assuming that it would be. He was not merely saying at that point that it could be. He was talking about the bishops exercising"this tyrannical veto" as though every bishop were a tyrant. I am not myself all that struck with bishops.

Perhaps I could remind the hon. Member of the words of Sidney Smith:

"The besetting sin of bishops is the desire for power."

The besetting sin of a large number of people, not excluding some hon. Members of this House, is the desire for power. Indeed, we would not be here at all if we did not have a proper concern for power. All serious politics are concerned with power, its transfer and its use. However, I must not be drawn too far from the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure.

I was saying that, while I do not have all that much to say for bishops as a class, I just thought that the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South was a bit hard on them. For much of the past century they have tended to persecute people with whom, by and large, I would agree rather more than they have persecuted people with whom, on the whole, the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South would agree. I am glad to say that the days of persecution are past and the ecumenical age has arrived. We must now be extremely friendly to one another and not start hares, red herrings, or anything of that sort.

Most hon. Members will have received a number of letters and communications about the Measure. I thought that the most important of these was a letter signed by six eminent lawyers. In their letter these gentlemen say that the need for the Measure is"manifest and undoubted." They are aware that the state of the ecclesiastical courts is chaotic. But they go on to list the features in the Measure to which they object and to which, broadly speaking, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West also took exception. They say that"the Church, in its criminal jurisdiction, should follow the State system, which is generally considered to be highly satisfactory."

Most of us would accept that with some reserve, particularly if we have had occasion to take up with the Home Office the cases of constituents whom we believe to have been wrongly convicted or the subjects of miscarriages of justice. Everyone knows how extraordinarily difficult it is to get a case reopened once it has been decided by a court. Even such eminent unofficial legal bodies as the organisation"Justice" are by no means satisfied with the state of the law and procedures regarding appeals. There is a great deal to be remedied in this direction.

These six lawyers end by saying:
"We are troubled by the Measure in its present form. We believe it requires amendment to ensure a standard of justice at least equivalent to that of other Crown courts."
This is where I suggest the great difficulty for all hon. Members arises. As has already been pointed out several times, we cannot amend this Measure. Parliament in 1919, in the enabling Act, set up the Church Assembly. It was meant to be, I think, a step in the direction of giving the Church some measure of self-government, and it was also a step in the direction of bringing the laity of the Church into active participation in that Church's government, because, despite what the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South said about the Church Assembly as not representing the laity at large, before it was set up the laity had even less representation—within the Church's Convocations, for instance. So that there is, through the Church Assembly, some measure of lay representation.

I do not want to repeat the argument we had in that debate before Christmas, but I would remind the hon. and gallant Member that I agreed that the Church Assembly was not fully representative even of the most active practising churchmen, let alone of those whom he mentioned—the wider body—whowere, perhaps, no longer actively associated with the Church. But, of course, there are all sorts of elected bodies, such as county councils, rural district councils, and so on, that are not fully representative in the sense that we will find on them a complete cross-section of the population—the young, the old, working-class, middle-class, and the rest—because of the practical difficulties that prevent many working people and young people from standing for election to such bodies. But we do not therefore reject them completely as not being representative bodies.

Similarly, I am sure that the Church Assembly is imperfect in similar ways and for similar reasons, because there are not many laymen who can afford the time to come to London for the meetings of the Assembly. None the less, to parody what the First Secretary once said in another context, it is the best representative Assembly we have got.

I think that hon. Members of this House—which, of course, retains the ultimate veto; that is provided for in the enabling Act—should think very carefully indeed before rejecting a Measure which has taken the Church's best minds and best lawyers—not only bishops, but all sorts of people—ten years, by and large, to work out. We ought to think very hard before rejecting it. Therefore, each of us—and this is the great benefit of this kind of debate, with a free vote—must make up his own mind, according to his conscience, on the balance of advantages and disadvantages in the particular Measure.

These six distinguished lawyers, who, without any offence to them, being lawyers, naturally load the argument somewhat on the legal side—on the legalistic side, even—take the view that, although the Measure is very much needed, the defects in it outweigh the advantages; and that it should, therefore, be sent back to the Assembly for amendment there. The only trouble is that if we do that we cannot be sure what the Assembly will do about it. We cannot be sure that it will amend the Measure precisely in the light of some of the speeches in this debate—obviously. It will take the Assembly probably a good year to do so. It will regard that as time that might be better spent, perhaps, but if we send back the Measure that is what the Assembly will have to do.

I would say one thing in particular to my hon. Friend, who discussed the whole question of establishment and disestablishment. The present Archbishop of Canterbury, soon after he took office, did, in a friendly way, give notice that if Parliament were again to administer a major snub to the Church—as we did in 1928: I do not go into the rights and wrongs of that: we were perfectly entitled to do so—the atmosphere of the present day is such that there would be a major head-on clash between Church and State, which I do not think my hon. Friend wants; and the initiative for some form of disestablishment and of freedom for the Church would come from the Church rather than from Parliament.

I do not know whether this Measure is of sufficiently grave importance for its rejection by Parliament to lead to that result, which I think that some, at any rate, of those who might vote against it tonight would probably not want. Others might want it. I personally think that if we are to face the problem of the disestablishment of the Church of England—which has not really been so live a political issue in recent years as it used to be some years ago—I would prefer that we faced that problem on its merits and debated it straightforwardly, for or against disestablishment as such, and not simply, by rejecting Measures like this, sent to us by the Church Assembly, raise the issue of disestablishment, as it were, by a side-wind.

I heard the sermon in which the Archbishop of Canterbury said what he did; in other words, that if Parliament were to challenge the Church it would again raise the whole question of disestablishment. I know that the hon. Member speaks as both a member of the Church of England and a Parliamentarian. Does he feel as a Parliamentarian that that is really tolerable to Members of this House?

This is precisely where the dilemma of conscience, of which I was trying to speak, arises. I would not argue that Parliament has no moral right—it has the legal right—to reject a Church Assembly Measure. Indeed, on several occasions in this House, when taking part in debates on Assembly Measures, I have opposed them strongly—as, for instance, some of those clerical discipline Measures in the years after the war.

As a result of our debates on those occasions, the Church Assembly modified the disciplinary Measures so as to provide safeguards for the political and social opinions and activities of the clergy. In that case, undoubtedly, the opposition in this House was valuable both to the Church and to Parliament. But those, although important in their way, were Measures of relatively limited scope compared with this Measure which, as my hon. Friend rightly says, has tremendous constitutional implications and repeals a large number of other Measures, and is a bigger Measure in every way than the Measures on which we had debate at that time.

Every hon. Member has to weigh in his own mind whether the disadvantages of the Measure itself outweigh the advantages, and also has to weigh and consider very carefully what the probable or likely consequences of his action would be if he decides to vote against the Measure. That is as far as I can go. It is not a satisfactory answer to the hon. Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke). I am trying to put the matter as plainly and honestly as I can, and I cannot see that one can put it more clearly than that. It is an extremely difficult dilemma.

Incidentally, one of the six learned jurists who wrote to us had a dilemma to face, perhaps even more pressing and difficult than ours tonight. I took the trouble to write to each of the six, asking them for their comments on various points, and they were all good enough to reply, most courteously. One in particular, Mr. P. H. C. Walker, told me—in fact, I had heard so already—
"I also am in a certain difficulty since I was a member [of the Assembly] in charge of the Measure itself. I did, however, with the entire approval of the other members in charge, speak very strongly against two parts of the Measure relating to (a) the bishop's veto in ritual, ceremonial and doctrinal cases, and (b) the very wide powers of the Convocation Committee of Inquiry to throw out such cases on the ground that they were contrary to the interests of the Church of England."
He adds:
"My view is that the Measure as a whole is a good one and is a much needed tidying up of the existing hotch-potch of legislation. I am, however, reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the two matters I have mentioned above are defects so fatal that, if I were in your position, I should reject the Measure as it stands."
That is put very fairly, and it is friendly and honest advice. I find myself, however, forced to the opposite conclusion, although I am, and was, doubtful about some of the points in the Measure. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West has referred to the occasion when we discussed this matter in the Ecclesiastical Committee, which, I remind the House, is a statutory body consisting of Members on both sides of both Houses of Parliament and which did recommend the House to approve this Measure, I think, nemine contradicente. In fairness to my hon. Friend, I must add that he reserved his position, though I do not think that he actually voted against it.

My hon. Friend will remember that I insisted with the Chairman of the Committee that I wished to express my opposition. I reserved my right to oppose the Measure in this House. I did not reserve my position. I insisted that it should be recognised.

I do not know to what extent it is desirable that we should disclose in the House what has taken place in a Joint Committee of bothHouses, but, since this much has been said, perhaps I may say that, of course, my hon. Friend is perfectly right. Not only he but a number of us pressed the bishop and the chancellor who were present with questions. On the whole, I found their answers reasonably satisfactory. My hon. Friend reserved his position, but I do not think that he actually voted on that occasion against the Measure.

I accept that, of course. In that case, it was recommended to this House by—

—twenty-five, or whatever the number was, to one.

I agree with my hon. Friend, by the way, in regretting the absence of the phrase"social opinions and activities", which we did get included along with political opinions and activities in the discipline Measures.

I see the hon. Gentleman rising to ask what I mean by the phrase. I note the point which is made in the Comments and Explanations, that

"this phrase seemed dangerously vague and has been omitted".
Perhaps it has never cropped up in any actual case; I do not know. When we first discussed it in the years after the war, in the debates on the discipline Measures, I think that I instanced as an example of social activity—perhaps my hon. Friend may not approve of this—the case of a country parson going to a public house occasionally and having a pint or two—not getting drunk—I mean a pint or two of lemonade or shandy, of course—

—and that there might be some contumacious and narrow-minded elderly spinsters or"old wives" in the parish who would report him to the bishop for unbecoming conduct. That is what I mean, loosely, by one kind at least of social activities.

Then there are issues of policy or principle which, although they are political in one sense, such as the debate about capital punishment, might be regarded as social reforms just as much as political reforms. However, I do not want to go on too long.

I come to the two main objections to the Measure, the bishops' veto and the ending of the appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In my view, the Measure is positively good at both those points, because it shifts the emphasis from the criminal sphere to the pastoral sphere. The bishops'veto is not tyrannical. It is a protective, safeguarding veto, protecting the ordinary, humble parish clergyman against, perhaps, hysterical or cranky persons in his parish—and such cases are not unknown—or protecting him against totally frivolous prosecution. There are all sorts of ways in which the bishops'veto can be exercised in a beneficial way.

The Measure itself and the Report of the Ecclesiastical Committee both indicate strongly the pastoral nature of this Part of the Measure. The provision in Part VI that the bishop"affords an opportunity to the accused and to the complainant of being interviewed in private," is clearly a provision for a pastoral act. It is the act of a father in God, as the bishop should be, not a tyrant. As the father in God of his clergy and people, he is getting the complainant and the accused together, saying"Cannot you, as Christians, make it up?" I should have thought that this was a very good thing. After that, the bishop can either veto the proceedings or refer them for inquiry.

Then there is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This was where I was most strongly in disagreement with what was said by the two hon. Members who preceded me. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West, seemed to be holding up the Judicial Committee as an absolute paragon of non-old-school-tie, progressive opinions—the"best brains of the law," and so on—and so, no doubt, it may be. I do not know. In Church matters, however, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has shown itself, when appeals have gone to it, not at all consistent, not at all infallible and at present, I would say, wholly irrelevant to the circumstances of the time.

The hon. and gallant Member for Down, South, spoke about"continuity of law" and he was shocked because the new Court was not to be bound by the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Had he looked up some of the famous cases in the nineteenth century—which, no doubt, he has done, but it may be that I have looked up different ones—he would have found that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has quite frequently contradicted itself or its predecessors. There has been no continuity of law on Church matters in the past century. I assure the hon. and gallant Member of that.

The hon. and gallant Member quoted the famous statement from the Gorham judgment of 1852 that it is not the Judicial Committee's job
"to decide whether opinions are theologically sound or unsound, but whether such opinions are contrary or repugnant to the doctrines which the Church of England, by its Articles, Formularies, and Rubrics, requires to be held by its Ministers."

I think so.

It is worth noticing, especially in view of a recent incident in which the 39 Articles of the Church of England came into the news in a rather sensational way, that at that time one of the lords of appeal, Lord Stowell, said:
"If any Article is realty a subject of dubious interpretation, it would be highly improper that this court should fix on one meaning and prosecute all those who hold a contrary opinion regarding interpretation."
That is very interesting, because I think that nowadays most people who have studied the 39 Articles would agree that they were deliberately ambiguous: they were part of the attempt to hold the Church of England together comprehensively, to hold Puritans and more Catholic-minded people together in one national church. There are, therefore, large numbers of ambiguities, at least, in the 39 Articles, to which that opinion of Lord Stowell is highly relevant.

I do not think, incidentally, that all the findings of the Judicial Committee on the 39 Articles would be particularly acceptable even now to the hon. and gallant Member opposite, particularly its findngs in the case of Shepherd v. Bennett in 1870; but I will not go into that in detail.

The point I am trying to make now is that there have been a number of occasions when the Judicial Committee has contradicted itself or its predecessors. For instance, in Ridsdale v. Clifton, the Committee, according to the Law Reports:
"entered upon an elaborate and independent examination of the law bearing upon the legality of acts already pronounced illegal, and it was expressly stated, as their lordships' conclusion, that although very great weight ought to be given to the decision in Herbert v. Purchas, yet they were free and did not dissent on one point."
So much for the continuity of law in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It just is not so, with all respect to my hon. Friend and the hon. Gentleman opposite.

There was also the famous trial of Bishop King of Lincoln on seven charges, which I will not detail now because I have spoken for long enough.

Is my hon. Friend not aware that the objection of the Church of England is not to the incompetence or the lack of continuity of the Judicial Committee but to the fact that its members are not members of the Church of England? Will he deal with that point?

I will come to that point. I will just finish the point about the trial of Bishop King, in which the Archbishop of Canterbury gave judgment on the seven charges. The Church Association, an Evangelical body, appealed to the Privy Council, and the hearing took place 3½ years after the original trial, during which time this bishop, who was by general agreement a most saintly man, had this hanging over him. The Privy Council upheld the Archbishop's judgment, which on the whole seems to me to be favourable to Bishop King, although some parts of the judgment were expressed with what one might call typically Anglican and English compromise or evasion. For instance, he said that it was quite all right for Bishop King to have lighted candles in his private chapel—so long as he did not light them during services. That kind of thing seems rather trivial and absurd now.

However, these are the kind of matters that were dealt with in the 19th century by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and it was its findings which to a large extent, I think, brought that secular court into disrepute among churchpeople. After all, laymen do not like seeing their parish clergymen sent to prison for some ceremonial or doctrinal deviation. It does not happen any longer, I am glad to say, but even in the middle of the 19th century it seemed pretty distasteful to most people.

Now I must deal with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West. He asked why the Church is so anxious to get rid of the Judicial Committee if the Committee does not cut much ice nowadays. I think that this is precisely the reason: it is because the Committee does not have any relevance at all to present-day conditions or needs in the Church.

I dislike religious tests, as a general principle, as much as any hon. Member. Certainly I am very glad that we no longer have religious tests for membership of this House, fellowships at universities, or anything like that. On the other hand, there are obviously some religious tests which are applied quite innocently in all sorts of organisations of various churches and denominations. If one wants to join the Church of England Men's Society, one has to be a practising member of the Church. There are various other bodies in which religious tests are applied. Since the Crown and Constitution have been invoked, Mr. Speaker, I must point out that your highly-respected opposite number in another place, the Lord Chancellor himself, is subject to a religious test. He is not allowed to be a Roman Catholic. This is one of the curious survivals of the time that preceded Catholic emancipation in this country.

However, I have said as much as I should. In fact, I have gone on much too long, with the aid of a number of interruptions, but I did feel that, as the last two speeches were so weighty and so strongly against the Measure, I must say what I could for it, because, although there are some points in it which I do not like, they do not, I believe, outweigh the case for accepting it.

11.2 p.m.

I find myself in a very large measure of agreement with the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg), particularly in regard to his treatment of the two main criticisms of this Measure. But I must say two things to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr). He gave us a very interesting historical survey of this great topic. He was quite right in saying that it was William the Conqueror who separated the secular from the clerical courts and so on, but I wish he could have carried his historical survey a little further because he would then have told us that there was a time up to which bishops were members of the Judicial Committee, and then the time came when they were removed from it and only sat as assessors. I wonder very much, if the old position had still obtained, whether some of this trouble might not have been avoided.

My hon. Friend then objected to the fact that the new court would not be bound by earlier decisions. Of course it will be until the law is changed by a further finding.

Captain Orr: That is not how I read the provision. I would have thought the law is now in confusion. I would like advice on that.

My information is that the law will remain as it is until it is upset by a further decision.

I tremble at the thought of putting Ireland and Wales at loggerheads, but I must tell my hon. and gallant Friend that the Church of Ireland may not have wished to be bound by precedents from the courts in 1871, but the Church in Wales, as soon as it was disestablished, adopted provisions practically identical with those in this Measure. I do not think, therefore, that it can be as wrong as all that.

As the hon. Member for Barking has already told us, my hon. and gallant Friend overstepped the mark a little in some of the things he had to say about the bishops' veto when he talked about tyranny and all that. His rather approving quotation from Sidney Smith was some evidence of his inherent dislike of the bishops.

I found the speech of the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) in some ways easier to follow and accept, although I disagreed with many of his conclusions, but some of the things he had to say about the Methodist Conference in particular, and the unity of Christian people, are as dear to my heart as they obviously are to his, especially when he spoke of the unity among the Churches which many of us are seeking. Although I disagreed with him, I have sympathy with him and I took some comfort from what he had to say.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) has explained the Measure in great detail, and I do not want to add to any of the detail, but I must say, as the hon. Member for Cardiff, West said, that this is a big Measure. The Lord Bishop of Chester described it in another place as one of the most important ever to come before Parliament from the Church Assembly, and so it is. It is a strange coincidence that the wheel seems to have come full circle. The Lord Bishop of Chester, who with great skill and sagacity piloted the Measure through the Church Assembly and through the House of Lords, is one of those who didmore work on it than almost anybody else, and a century ago, a predecessor of his, the then Bishop of Chester, Bishop Blomfield, at the time of the great reforms which coincided more or less with the Reform Bill, was described then as the architect of Church reform. We have come a long way since then.

As the hon. Member for Barking said, we cannot amend this Measure. We must pass it or reject it. I submit, therefore, that when we are considering the comparatively few points of controversy—I will say later why I do not think that they are matters of principle—we should have in mind all the time that if we throw out this Measure we throw out in toto something which is badly wanted by the Church. This is something about which we should hesitate very seriously. After all, the Measure was overwhelmingly approved by the Church Assembly. It was considered most carefully by the Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, of which, like the hon. Member for Barking and the hon. Member for Cardiff, West and the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher), whom I see in his place, I am a member. We reported on it favourably, with the reservations of the hon. Member for Cardiff, West.

Parliament is, of course, absolutely free to do what it likes and to throw it out if it wishes, but I respectfully suggest that to do so would be very serious and would have serious consequences in a Measure like this which has been so carefully examined and so warmly approved.

May I say a few words about the two criticisms which have been mentioned? On the abolition on the function of the Judicial Committee as the final court of appeal in everything except faculty cases—it would still retain that function, of course—may I say this: even before the introduction of this Measure the Committee was only an alternative to the Provincial Court in conduct cases. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dover said, every commission which has examined this matter since 1883 has recommended that it should cease to be the final court of appeal in cases like this. The Measure follows the Lloyd-Jacob Report and sets up a strong Provincial Court as the final appeal in conduct cases.

Regarding the reserved cases, which, of course, are more controversial, there is criticism, as we have heard, of the Commission of Review and its composition. I repeat what my hon. Friend the Member for Dover said. There is no attempt here to take jurisdiction from the Queen's courts. The Commission would be under the Great Seal with members appointed by the Queen. In spite of what the hon. Member for Cardiff, West and my hon. and gallant Friend said, I cannot see that it is unreasonable to ask that those who sit on a court like this should, in the one case by their office in the Church and in the other by their training, be able to speak with authority on matters of this sort.

The Times leader has been referred to by several hon. Members. It was mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend. I think it a very wise leader. It spoke of the feeling that a final appeal, even in cases where it was a matter of church doctrine and worship, should be judicial in its emphasis rather than doctrinal; but it went on to say:
"This requirement does not, however, appear to be incompatible with the arrangements contained in the Measure."
The hon. Member for Cardiff, West had a little fun at our expense about the general outlook and habits of The Times, but I think he was wrong in saying that its support for this Measure was very lukewarm. I should have thought it was a most thoughtful leader and came to its conclusions in a most wise and sensible way.

On the question of the appellate jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee, I again quarrel a little with my hon. and gallant Friend. The Church itself in the form of the Church Assembly, both clergy and laity alike, have agreed and accepted that this new Commission as the right form of final appeal.

I think my hon. Friend may be able to clear up a point made by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) about whether the Commission of Review is not bound by any decision of the Privy Council. He will find that in sub-paragraph 5 of paragraph 48.

Yes, and in sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph 45.

I turn to the question of the bishops'veto. As has been said by other hon. Members, this is not new. It is a veto which has existed since the Clergy Discipline Act, 1840. If tonight the House decides to reject this Measure, that power will still exist as it is now. Secondly, the bishops did not ask that this veto should be retained. The initiative for its retention did not come from the bishops. Thirdly, I hold that this is a most necessary protection for the clergy themselves. After all, the Book of Common Prayer is part of the law: part of the law of the land. Any departure, however small, from the Book of Common Prayer is a breach of the law and a cleric breaching it in any way can be hauled before the Ecclesiastical Court. The only way in which the clergy can be protected from frivolous and vexatious litigation is by the retention of this veto.

I think the House will agree that probably, if for nothing else, for the protection of the clergy and the good name of the Church of England this is very necessary. In the passage of the Lloyd-Jacob Report dealing with this veto in reserve cases there appeared this sentence:
"In this event—
that is, in the event of the revision of the law of worship not being carried out; and it has not been as yet—
"the only safeguard against the enforcement of a law which is repudiated daily in the practice of the Church will be the veto of the Bishop."
Since the great watershed, if that is the right word, in the history of ecclesiastical jurisdiction reform about 130 years ago, there has grown up—I suppose in a process of this kind this result is inevitable—a structure based upon Measure after Measure until the situation has been reached which the Lloyd-Jacob Report described as a"jungle of courts". It is in an effort to produce a real semblance of order out of the jungle that this Measure is introduced. I repeat that it must be looked at as a whole. Again I humbly suggest to the House that we should appreciate how very badly needed it is.

I refer once more to the leading article in The Times. It said that these matters are essentially Committee points, though I am not sure that I would go quite as far as that. But it then said this, and it has been quoted already:
"Parliament is called upon to approve or disapprove as a whole Measures which come to it from the Church Assembly, and only the weightiest objections of principle can justify rejection."
I do not believe that these criticisms fall within that category. This Measure is the product of ten years of work by devoted churchmen and if, because of the criticisms which I have mentioned and which have been mentioned by other hon. Members, the House were to reject the whole, I believe that it would be a very sad day for the Established Church.

11.16 p.m.

When we began the debate I said that we did not want to rush the Measure. I wonder whether my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House feels that he can find us some additional time on some other day. If he does feel so able, I would beg to move,

That the debate be now adjourned.

I am not quite sure whether or not the Motion has been moved, but if it has not perhaps I could move it. I recommend—

I take it, then, that I am in order in speaking to it. I think that the House would be wise to accept the Motion. We have had five knowledgeable and first-class speeches, to which the whole House has enjoyed listening, but a number of other hon. Members wish to speak. If there must be a vote, which many people would regret, no doubt it would be right that it should be at a time more convenient for the House as a whole. Though I cannot give any precise undertaking to my hon. Friend, because it is a complicated matter rearranging future business at short notice. I will undertake to do everything I can to bring this debate on at a wholly convenient hour for the House for its conclusion. I hope that on this undertaking the House will agree to accept the Motion.

Question put and agreed to.

Debate to be resumed To-morrow.

Motorways (Geologists)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. Finlay.]

11.19 p.m.

I am raising tonight an issue concerning the use of the nation's scientific manpower. I want to draw attention to some particular illustrations of this theme in connection with the construction of motorways. I believe that we all want to have an efficient motorway network constructed as quickly as possible. That is generally supported. Indeed, it is probably long overdue. I think it is generally agreed that this is bound lo cost millions. I am not jibbing at that. Certainly it is bound to create a great deal of disturbance. Some of my constituents have very good evidence of that. The driving of these huge projects, ruthlessly in some cases, through farmland and houses and across different parts of the country is bound to upset the normal tenor of the lives of very many citizens. These things are inevitable.

What is important is that the design of the motorways, the construction of motorways, should be most efficient, and, because a large cost is inevitably involved, that the job should be done as economically as it can be. Therefore, I think that in order to get the greatest efficiency of advance planning by the Ministry of Transport in the construction of these new roads the Ministry must ensure that the best scientific brains and expert advice available are being used. It is my opinion that at the moment this is unfortunately not being done.

I take as an illustration the story of the M.6, in particular the story of the construction of the M.6 through certain parts of my constituency. I am concerned with the 78-mile stretch of the M.6 Motorway which runs from Dunston in central Staffordshire to Preston in Lancashire. The original estimate in 1960 for this section of the M.6 was £50¼ million. The latest estimate, in 1963, is already £57 million, an increase of £6¾million for that 78-mile section of road. Why has this occurred? First of all, because tenders have been much higher than the Ministry expected—that is admitted by the Minister himself—to the tune of more than £2 million. Land costs have risen by more than £500,000. That is something which would bear investigation, but I am not going into that tonight.

What I am concerned with is that on this section of the motorway those carrying out the work have had to use extra sub-base materials at an extra cost of nearly £1 million—over £900,000, and to carry out remedial works at more than £500,000—to be exact, about £600,000; most of it spent on the borders of my constituency; about £1½ million additional expense on top of the enormous sum of £50 million which was estimated for this motorway in 1960.

Why has this occurred? It is admitted that there have been three kinds of difficulty. First of all, there was interference with water supplies to farms. Secondly, there have been difficulties from unstable ground which were not foreseen. Thirdly, there was the disastrous occurrence of a landslip on the Staffordshire—Cheshire border. The question is, could or should these difficulties have been foreseen and avoided? The Minister of Transport says,"No." He says they could not have been foreseen and could not have been avoided; therefore the extra cost is inevitable.

Let me take the actual cases themselves in detail. The Minister, writing to me on 18th June, in reply to an expert memorandum from Dr. C. S. Exley, of the Geology Department of the University of Keele, said
"If is true that excavation in the cutting"—
that is, to a farm—
"had the effect of cutting off the supply of water from a spring, but a quite disproportionate amount would have had to be spent on preliminary investigations on a scale sufficient to reveal the exact course of such supplies."
Secondly, regarding the bridge over the Keele-Madeley Road, the Minister said:
"It was fully recognised that a soft, marshy area containing dumped refuse would have to be traversed, and the removal of this material was provided for in the contract. The amount which had to be removed proved to be greater than our borehole investigation had indicated."
Thirdly, regarding Waltons Wood, where the land slip occurred and which involved the Ministry in costs exceeding £600,000 in addition to its original estimate, the Minister said:
"In the design of the motorway at this point, special provision was made for benching of the slopes and for some support at the foot of the embankment. There was generous provision for counter fort drains on the slopes and pipe drains under the embankment In the event these proportions proved inadequate and when slipping occurred despite them, we arranged for a more detailed investigation to be carried out by a specialist firm, who recommended the remedial measures now in hand."
In all of these cases unforeseen difficulties are said to have occurred; cutting off water supplies to farms, causing land slips with deposits seeping away—with the unfortunate extra cost to the Ministry of at least £1½ million. However, at the end of his letter the Minister stated:
"I am satisfied that proper preliminary investigations were undertaken in these cases…."
These were geological problems which, the Minister admitted in his letter, were extremely important in the context of the preliminary survey for the construction of a large project such as a motorway.

Were the geologists consulted before the trouble started? I am advised by expert geologists that these difficulties could have been foreseen. I am advised, for example, that the difficulties of pressure on the sandstone cutting off water supplies could have been forecast before that happened by any qualified geologist. Any expert geologist could have told the Ministry that such difficulties would occur.

My attention has been drawn to the six-inch geological survey map that has been in existence for a long time. This map shows many of the conditions which caused the difficulties. I have been particularly interested in a special geological survey which was carried out by Dr. E. M. Yates of King's College, London, and Dr. F. Moseley of Birmingham University into the Staffordshire-Cheshire border in 1958. I have with me—and, no doubt, the Ministry has got a copy of it by now—a map published in the 1958 edition of the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Geological Society. It gives details of the deposits in the area where the land slip, involving expenditure of £600,000, occurred. Writing in the Guardian on 4th June, 1963, Dr. Moseley said:
"About ten years ago Dr. E. M. Yates of Kings College, London, and I geologically surveyed part of this area and at the time I recorded cm my field maps extensive landslips on both sides of the Checkley Valley (Waltons Wood, etc.)."
At the end of his letter to the Guardian Dr. Moseley wrote:
"In any case I can see no excuse for not recognising the valley side for what it is, with the realisation that a road built across landslip would itself be subject to landslip."
There are four geologists in the Road Research Laboratory. There are more than 200 concerned with the Geological Survey and Museum. There are a number of geologists at the University of Birmingham, not far from the site of the M.6. I believe that there are some good geologists at the University of Keele.

How many of these geologists were consulted in the preliminary planning of the M.6? How many were asked about the depth of the boreholes necessary to get all the information? To what extent did the road engineers see the maps that were in existence in the geological libraries? Was the Minister for Science at any point brought in to the planning of this project? Is he brought in at the planning of any of these other projects?

I do not criticise the road engineers—they did the best job they could in the circumstances—but what seems to be absolutely clear, and what is admitted in the Minister's letter, is that the preliminary planning and surveying were inadequate. What seems to be absolutely clear is that all the geological information about these roads was not available to the engineers who were actually planning the route, so that, eventually, a whole piece of the road slid down in the places in which geologists had many years before diagnosed the danger of landslips.

We certainly need more scientific research, but we also need to use much more effectively the scientific research that is undertaken. This is an illustration of research having been done, yet lying unused in the museums and libraries, and experts who were available to the Government not being consulted. I believe that it is an example of the urgent need to modernise the machinery of planning these projects, and to bring the scientific brains that exist on to the ground floor before undertaking vast expenditure, in order to ensure that the expertise is fully utilised.

11.32 p.m.

This has been an interesting Adjournment debate, because the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) has not confined himself merely to a catalogue of local woes but has used the apparent weaknesses of road construction which he thinks he has observed in his own constituency as the occasion for querying the general adequacy of the preparatory measures that are taken before a road is built. The hon. Gentleman has been very persistent. He has written a number of letters, he has sent an account from one of his constituents who is very knowledgeable in the matter, he has asked Questions, and has now, finally, initiated this debate.

I gather from what he has said tonight that, as a result of his investigations, he thinks that we ought to make more effective use of the geologists in the planning of roads. He believes that during the construction of the M.6 there have been incidents that support this view, and that a failure to make full use of the geological knowledge has led to increased costs. That is the charge he is directing against the Ministry, and I hope to be able to show the House that his interpretation is not entirely correct. I believe that it is due to a misunderstanding of what is involved in road construction.

Before I deal with the incidents that appear to give some substance to the hon. Gentleman's contention, it might be helpful if I first briefly described the investigations carried out before a motorway route is fixed or the construction starts because, in spite of what the hon. Gentleman seemed to think, we do not just follow our noses. A great deal of preliminary work is done first of all. To begin with, the Minister appoints agents to carry out a survey for the design and construction of new trunk roads. The agent may be a county council or a consulting engineer, according to their commitments, and for the section of the M.6 in which the hon. Gentleman is interested the agent is the Staffordshire County Council—as he probably knows.

Once appointed, the agent begins by carrying out preliminary investigations, including ground surveys, to assist in determining the most suitable route. In appropriate cases, air surveys are also used to supplement the ground survey. After the preliminary surveys to discover whether soil conditions are likely to be a determining factor in locating the route, a more detailed survey is undertaken for design purposes. Here geological maps are always studied carefully. As an example of this, the hon. Member will be interested to know that during investigations of the motorway in Staffordshire six-inch geological survey maps of the whole route were examined thoroughly—both the solid and the drift maps; but maps are obviously not enough. Much more detailed information is required to provide a basis for designing bridge foundations, for selecting materials for embankments, for determining suitable slopes, and for similar purposes inseparable from building a road.

This additional information can be obtained only as a result of borings on the site. A great deal of money is spent on these preliminary investigations which are carried out by specialist firms. It may surprise the hon. Member to know that the soil survey for the 78 miles of the M.6 between Stafford and Preston cost over £1,300 per mile, and on the stretch from Preston to Lancaster the cost was about twice as high. At some points along the route it may be obvious from the outset that difficulties are to be expected. This is one of the advantages which come from the practice of studying the six-inch geological maps to which the hon. Member and I have referred.

Were geologists employed in the preliminary survey? If so, from what Departments did they come?

If the hon. Member will allow me to make my speech in my own way, I will come to that point.

At these points more detailed investigations are made where there seem to be difficulties. It is, of course, a matter of judgment in each case how detailed these investigations should be. As I am sure the House will realise, it would be prohibitively costly to carry out a soil survey so detailed as to eliminate every single unknown factor. Boreholes can be and are placed more closely together where difficulties are expected but this obviously will not reveal exactly what conditions exist under the ground for every inch of the route.

What the engineer has to do therefore is to weigh the extra cost of more detailed surveys against the benefits which are likely to arise from eliminating possible dangers. It must be accepted, however, that in large projects such as this there is always the chance of encountering unexpected conditions. I do not see how, in practice, this risk can be avoided altogether.

I think that the County Surveyor of Staffordshire did this. He realised from the start that the Waltons Wood area was a potentially troublesome area because of soil conditions. Particular attention was given to the location of the motorway in the area and the line through Waltons Wood was selected only after several other alternatives had been considered. These alternatives were rejected because of old mine workings and especially because satisfactory gradients could not be obtained on the other routes without costly viaducts and long lengths of excessively deep cuttings.

As the hon. Member knows, at Waltons Wood the motorway runs for a quarter of a mile on an embankment on one slope of a valley about sixty feet above a small stream. During the soil survey by a specialist firm, which I am informed has a geologist on its staff, boreholes were sunk at intervals of 70 yards. This is double the frequency adopted elsewhere on the route through Staffordshire and this is an indication of the attention which was paid to geological conditions on this site.

In the light of the geological information so obtained, special provisions were made, as the hon. Gentleman said, in the design of the motorway for terracing the slopes, for support at the foot of the embankment, and extra provision for drains on the slopes and under the embankment also was made. Unfortunately, as we both know, these precautions proved inadequate, and during constructiona serious earth slip occurred. Because of this, it was necessary to carry out an even more intensive survey, and, in the light of the report following this further survey, remedial measures were put in hand. These will provide stronger buttresses, even more drainage, and the replacement of the swampy substance on the valley floor by free draining material.

I fully recognise that this is an expensive operation costing about £600,000. What we want to know, however, is whether a fuller and more accurate survey, if it had been carried out earlier, would have avoided this expenditure. This is the important question, and the answer, broadly speaking, is"No". It would not have avoided the bulk of this expenditure.

This is something which is not, I think, properly understood. It certainly is not understood by the hon. Gentleman because, on 28th May, in a supplementary question to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary for Science, he referred to wastage and inefficiency on M.6. The assumption seems to be that, if we had been aware at the start of the true condition of the soil, the bulk of this additional expenditure could have been avoided. This is simply not true. As I have explained, the route through Waltons Wood was the only one which could be chosen and, as this could not be changed, the remedial work was, therefore, inevitable from the beginning.

I fully admit that there has been some abortive work, but it is absolutely an illusion to imagine that, if we had had a full survey at the beginning, we should have saved about £600,000.

I think that the question we are interested in is this. Are we using the quite considerable geological resources and expertise which we have? Are we using the geologists we have available at Birmingham, Keele and elsewhere? Is the hon. Gentleman saying that, looking back after the event, it would not have been wiser to obtain the information and local knowledge from these people which was there for us rather than rely on a firm which may or may not have used the one geologist available to it?

The hon. Gentleman really must allow me to continue. I think that I shall cover all these points, and the more I am interrupted the less chance I have of dealing with the various points made by his hon. Friend. I shall, I hope, deal with those points in due course.

I was saying that it is an illusion to imagine that the bulk of this sum would have been saved. It was necessary to do this work if the road was to be in that position. It is impossible to get away from that.

The other problems which have arisen elsewhere in Staffordshire have been no more than the kind of minor contingency which is to be expected on a large project like this. Unfortunately, I cannot refer to all of them, but, in the time available, I wish to say something, first, about the Keele service area to which the hon. Member referred.

Here, as the hon. Gentleman knows, the grading and earthwork balance made it necessary to excavate through the sandstone, and this had the temporary effect of interrupting a farm's water supply from a spring. In one of the letters which the hon. Member was kind enough to send to my right hon. Friend, it was remarked—and I assume that the hon. Gentleman supports this—that as a matter of elementary geology it should have been obvious that excavation below a given depth would cut off the water supply. But, of course, it was obvious. I hope the hon. Gentleman will not mind my saying that it ought to be equally obvious to him and to his constituent, as a matter of elementary engineering and economics, that there could be no question of altering the motor grading and earthwork balance in order to avoid the comparatively minor task of providing a new water supply for a single farm. Yet that seems to be the suggestion. We have got to keep a sense of proportion in these matters. Just as one cannot fry an egg without breaking the shell, one cannot build a road without being prepared to make some adjustments in the course of construction.

I intend to carry on and make my speech. If the hon. Gentleman does not like it, he will just have to put up with it. I have been interrupted three times and I am not being interrupted again.

The hon. Member raised another point about the material which was being added to the roads. In North Cheshire, gritstone originally—the hon. Member referred to nearly £1 million—used in the sub-base proved to be unsuitable for construction in damp conditions because it had a high content of fine material and it broke under the roller and it was necessary to substitute slag for it. That is not a question of geology.

As to the rest of the £900,000—the £693,000—it was discovered as a result of experience on the slow lanes in M.1 that in future the base on motorways should be of greater strength. It was because of this that these additions were made. It was nothing to do with geology but was merely the result of this change arising from experience on other roads. That is the sort of thing which cannot be avoided and in which a geologist will not be able to help.

I do not think that the hon. Member quite understands what is involved in the type of survey for which he and his hon. Friend are asking. Had a survey on the intensive scale of the one eventually carried out at Waltons Wood been applied to the whole of the M.6 between Dunston and Preston, it might well have cost between £5 million and £6 million. To buy security and certainty at this price would be a gross monetary extravagance and would be an unworthy use of the highly-skilled men of whose help the hon. Member is anxious that we should make more use.

I agree, of course, that engineers designing a road need information about soil conditions. Existing geological knowledge and surface surveys are helpful in the early stages. I hope I have shown the hon. Member that engineers are well aware of this and that they generally—and in this case certainly did—make use of geological material These preliminary investigations, as in the case of Waltons Wood, give warning of the areas where difficulties can be expected. The engineer, however, needs much more precise information about the actual conditions underground along the route. He cannot rely on maps or geological theory or even on geologists. He must put down boreholes. In the light of the information obtained from the boreholes, it is not the geologist, but the civil engineer, who is qualified to assess what loads the soil can be expected to carry and what action is necessary to improve and maintain its bearing capacity.

As the hon. Member probably knows, some engineers specialise in geology. Problems of structure and their relationship with the underlying soil are particularly their province. They combine a knowledge of engineering and soil mechanics with those aspects of geology which are relevant to construction problems. Specialists of this kind are employed by county councils and by consulting engineers.

The County Surveyor of Staffordshire has one such specialist trained in soil mechanics on his staff and it is interesting to note that both the County Surveyor and the Assistant County Surveyor have specialised in geology in diploma and degree courses. This does not mean that they are geologists, but it does mean that they have been specially trained in that aspect of geology which has practical application to engineering.

Because of that, I do not believe that it is ignorance of geology or an unwillingness to use geological techniques which is the root cause of such difficulties as from time to time occur. The trouble, as I see it, is that very occasionally boreholes do not reveal the full extent of the conditions underground, with the result that modifications to the design have to be made during construction. That is exactly what happened at Waltons Wood and I do not see that there is any sure and simple way of avoiding it.

In the last—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Deputy-Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at eleven minutes to Twelve o'clock.