House Of Commons
Friday, 10th July, 1964
The House met at Eleven o'clock
Prayers
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
Orders Of The Day
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Bill Lords
Order for Second Reading read.
11.5 a.m.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second Time.
In September, 1962, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who was then Home Secretary, asked the Criminal Law Revision Committee to advise him whether the law needed amendment on a number of points relating to the issue of insanity in criminal proceedings. The Committee's conclusions were set out in its Third Report, which was published as a Command Paper (Cmnd. 2149) last September. In accordance with the usual practice, a draft Bill implementing the Committee's recommendations was prepared on its instructions by Parliamentary counsel and appended to its Report. The Bill now before the House is in the form of the Committee's draft Bill, subject to a few modifications and the addition of provisions making corresponding alteration in the law relating to courts martial. The Committee is, I think, to be congratulated on producing its admirable Report on these complicated problems within a matter of some months. Clause 1 of the Bill provides that henceforward the special verdict commonly referred to as "guilty but insane", which is given when a person charged on indictment with a criminal offence is found by the jury to have done the act charged, but owing to insanity to have been not criminally responsible for it, shall be that the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity. The old common law rule was that if a person, at the time of committing what would be an offence if done by a sane person, was insane so as not to be criminally responsible for it, he was entitled to be acquitted. The Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800 required the jury in such circumstances to state whether the ground of acquittal was the insanity of the accused, and empowered the court to order him to be kept in custody until Her Majesty's pleasure should be known. The form of the verdict was, however, altered to its present form of "guilty but insane" by the Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883. Both the 1923 Atkin Committee on Insanity and Crime and the 1953 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment considered that the special verdict should again be one of acquittal in language as well as in substance; and this view was endorsed by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. Clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill provide for an appeal against the special verdict. No right of appeal against it exists at present, because under Section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, it is only a person "convicted" on indictment who may appeal and the special verdict is technically an acquittal. The absence of a right of appeal has not, I think, been a matter of much significance in the past, because, as the Atkin Committee pointed out, the plea of insanity would normally have been put forward by the defence, and because the issue of insanity was not likely to be raised if there was any real question whether the accused committed the act. In October, 1961, however, in giving judgment in the case of R. v. Duke the Lord Chief Justice said that the absence of a right of appeal against the special verdict might work injustice, although he did not suggest that it had done so. He pointed out that the creation by the Homicide Act of the defence of diminished responsibility had afforded another reason for giving such a right. Although there has been conflict of practice, the courts have held in some cases that where a defence of diminished responsibility has been put forward in the case of a charge of murder the accused is insane, so that the special prosecution may call evidence that the verdict may be given contrary to the wishes of the accused; and, indeed, one of the effects of the Bill is to resolve the uncertainty by making express provision to allow the prosecution when a defence of diminished responsibility is put forward to call rebutting evidence of insanity. That is dealt with in Clause 7. It seems right, therefore, that the special verdict should be subject to appeal. The detailed provisions as to the grounds on which the appeal may be brought, and the power of the court to allow or dismiss the appeal, are similar to the provisions as regards appeals against conviction in Sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907. Where it substitutes a verdict of guilty for the special verdict the Court of Criminal Appeal will have the same power to sentence the appellant as the court of trial would have had, except that if the appeal results in the appellant's being convicted of a capital offence, the sentence will always be one of life imprisonment. Clause 4 of the Bill deals with the most difficult aspect of the Committee's Report, namely, the question when the issue of a person's fitness to be tried should be determined, when that issue is raised when he appears before a superior court on indictment for a criminal offence. Practice on this point has not been uniform, although the issue is ordinarily tried before the accused is called upon to plead; and it has been held that once it is raised it is the duty of the court, having regard to Section 2 of the Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800, which governs the present procedure, to have it resolved before beginning or continuing the trial. The practice which is usually followed is open to the objection that it provides no opportunity for testing the prosecution's case before the issue of insanity is put to the jury, and that consequently a person who would have been entitled to an acquittal on the facts, had he been able to stand his trial, may suffer injustice. The Committee was divided on the question whether the issue of fitness to plead should continue to be determined on arraignment or immediately it arises, or whether postponement of the issue should be allowed, as has occasionally been done. The possibility that injustice might result is in practice small, and there are obvious difficulties about allowing a trial to start without first investigating the accused's fitness to plead. Although some members of the Committee were not persuaded that any change in the law was warranted, the majority took the view that postponement should be allowed up to the opening of the case for the defence, including the determination of any submission that there is. no case for the accused to answer, and that is the course which the Government think should be adopted. Under the Bill, the court will have a complete discretion to decide whether the issue should be determined on arraignment or as soon as it arises, or be postponed to a later stage up to the end of the prosecution's case. If, before the issue is determined, the jury acquits the accused it will not be necessary to determine it, and he will be discharged. The Act of 1800 is also invoked in the case of deaf mutes, even though not insane in the usual sense, if by reason of their disability they do not satisfy the criteria of fitness to plead: that is, if they are unable to understand the course of proceedings at the trial, so as to make a proper defence, to challenge a juror to whom they might wish to object and to understand the details of the evidence. It is largely for this reason that Clause 4 differs slighty from that in the Committee's draft Bill, so as to enable the court, in exercising their discretion to decide whether the issue of fitness should be postponed, to take into account the nature of the supposed disability. As a further safeguard, the Committee recommended that there should be a right of appeal against a finding of unfitness to plead, and this is provided in Clause 4(6). A successful appeal against a finding of disability would result in a fresh trial, unless the Court of Criminal Appeal considered that the appellant should have been acquitted before the issue of fitness was determined. Clause 5(1) of the Bill modifies the existing arrangements for dealing with the accused when the jury return a special verdict or a finding that he is under disability. The present effect of a special verdict or finding of unfitness is that the accused is ordered by the court to be kept in custody until Her Majesty's pleasure shall be known, and under Section 71 of the Mental Health Act my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary then orders his detention in a specified hospital, from which he cannot be discharged without the Home Secretary's consent. A person found unfit to plead may under Section 71(5) of the Mental Health Act be remitted to prison to stand trial if he later recovers, although the power to bring such a person to trial is rarely exercised. Under the arrangements envisaged in Clause 5 there will no longer be any reference to Her Majesty's pleasure and it will be for the court, not the Home Secretary, to order the accused's detention in hospital, although as at present it will be for the Home Secretary to specify the hospital concerned and the patient will not be able to be discharged without the Home Secretary's consent. The power to remit for trial a person found under disability who later recovers will be preserved. The Committee considered whether it would be better to give the judiciary the same discretion to make hospital orders with or without the restrictions on discharge which make the patient subject to the Home Secretary's control, in respect of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, or under disability, as they have under the Mental Health Act in dealing with mentally disordered persons who are convicted. The Committee concluded, however, that the present system, should be retained, subject to slight modifications, primarily on the ground that it works satisfactorily in practice, that the Home Office is in a better position than the courts to investigate the questions relevant to the accused's treatment, and that uniformity is highly desirable and is more likely to be achieved if cases continue to be handled by a single experienced authority rather than by a great many different courts. The Government have not thought it right to accept a further modification which the Committee suggested might be made. It recommended that the courts should be able to release any person found not guilty by reason of insanity or under disability if, after hearing medical evidence, they were satisfied that it would be safe for the public and the accused to do so, instead of requiring his admission to hospital. It is felt that there are objections to dividing the responsibility in this way between the Home Secretary and the courts, and inquiry which has been made of the judges by the Lord Chief Justice has revealed that they are also of that opinion. I feel sure that there will be less risk that a person might be released who would subsequently prove to be dangerous if the accused is always sent initially to hospital where he would be examined before his discharge was authorised. It would be open to the court to indicate to the Home Secretary in suitable cases that, in its opinion, the release of the person concerned would involve no danger to the public, and to leave it to the Home Secretary to authorise, if he thought fit, the patient's discharge after a short period of observation. Clause 5 (2) provides that the Court of Criminal Appeal, when it allows an appeal against the special verdict and substitutes an acquittal, shall order that the appellant should be temporarily detained in hospital if it considers this to be necessary on grounds equivalent to those on which a person who is at liberty may be compulsorily detained for observation under Section 25 of the Mental Health Act, that is to say, if his disorder warrants his detention in the interest of his own health or safety, or with a view to the protection of other persons. The effect will be to place the appellant in the same position as that of a person detained under Section 25, namely, that he may not be detained for longer than 28 days unless, meanwhile, steps can be taken to continue his detention under other provisions of Part IV of the Mental Health Act, which applies to persons other than those detained by order of a criminal court. The appellant is likely to be already detained in hospital in pursuance of the special verdict when his appeal is heard, and the order for his temporary detention in suitable cases will give a breathing space in which to make the best possible arrangements for his disposal. Clause 7 is designed to remove a doubt which exists on the question whether the prosecution can call evidence of insanity when a defence of diminished responsibility is put forward under the Homicide Act. The doubt arises from a long established rule that the prosecution may not call evidence of insanity, even with the accused's consent; and in giving judgment in the case of R. v. Duke the Lord Chief Justice pointed out that a conflict of practice had grown up on this question. The Committee recommended that the prosecution should be empowered to allow the prosecution to call evidence of insanity when the defence is one of diminished responsibility and that, although the matter is apparently not in dispute, there should also be express provision for the converse situation by allowing evidence to be called showing that the accused was suffering from diminished responsibility when a defence of insanity is put forward. Clause 8 of the Bill and Schedule 2 bring the law concerning courts-martial so far as appropriate into line with the main provisions of the Bill. Except as respects courts-martial, the Bill does not apply to Scotland or to Northern Ireland. I feel confident that the Bill will be generally welcomed as effecting a useful and liberalising improvement of the law and as such I commend it to the House.11.18 a.m.
This Bill exemplifies again the very great assistance that we in this House receive from small expert Committees who devote their willing services to investigating topics of intricacy and difficulty. I think that everybody would wish to pay tribute to the members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee for what is an extremely valuable report upon an abstruse matter perhaps but nevertheless one which is of very great significance to those unfortunate people who are involved.
I think that the whole House will wish to pay tribute to the hon. Lady the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department for the inspired manner in which she threaded her way through the intricacies of this very legalistic Bill. Her exposition was lucidity itself, and we are grateful to her. At first sight, the Bill seems to deal with a remote topic which affects only a few persons who are mentally disturbed and who have had the misfortune to come before our criminal courts. It may be that is true, if one just looks at this Bill as such. Nevertheless; it has very human aspects. It is always our endeavour and duty to try in liberalising and humanising our system of law to remove from it aspects which in themselves do not tend towards a rather more humane point of view. The illogicality legally of finding a person guilty but insane dates back only, as was said by the hon. Lady, to the Act of 1883. In that sense that Act was inferior to the Act of 1800 which did not contain the inconsistency which exists in declaring a person guilty when in the next words it is said that he was insane and therefore unable to form the intent which could possibly make him guilty. For 83 years the law of this country did not bear that blemish. In 1883 the blemish was introduced. It is said—I speak with great reverence of her—that it reflected the view expressed by Queen Victoria that insanity was consistent with guilt and that the right verdict to pronounce in a case in which the act charged was found to have been proved was "guilty but insane". I think it is generally recognised now, and nobody would cavil at this, that that is an utterly illogical point of view which is inconsistent with the more humane principles on which we try to formulate our present law. A person who is insane and charged with committing a breach of the law, if he is insane, cannot in logic be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. I feel that we have made a useful step forward in recognising that in Clause 1. No doubt only a few person are affected. Happily only a few persons are so disturbed in their mental operations that they transgress against the criminal law and are unable, because of mental confusion, to keep themselves out of its meshes. For these few persons what we are doing is something important. It may well be said by the cynic that a person who is mentally disturbed and detained in hospital does not mind very much whether the legal terminology which involved his transfer to hospital contained a phrase to the effect that he was guilty or whether it did not, but more accurately expressed his condition as being not guilty by reason of insanity. This may well be the case, but modern humanising processes in the law require that we should not try to rule our fellow citizens by crude broad generalities expressed in the terms of our rules of law, but that we should try so to fit and adapt our legal system, as it evolves, that it takes account of the infinite variety of individual human cases which go to make up the whole stuff of which our law is composed and the whole business with which our courts occupy themselves. Clause 1 takes a step in that direction and I am glad that the Government have introduced this provision. Turning to Clause 2, one finds that it fills a gap which at present exists. I take the view that the Atkin Committee was wrong in concluding that there should be no appeal. I think there should be an appeal. It is only by the accident of drafting that hitherto there has not been an appeal from the special verdict of guilty but insane. It is simply because Section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, provided that an appeal lies only at the instance of a person who has been "convicted on indictment," and the verdict of guilty but insane does not come within that description. I think that there ought to be an appeal. It is a very serious thing for a person to have it said of him by a court that he was not guilty, but not guilty because he was insane. A finding of that sort almost inevitably blasts the future for years, if not for always, of a person of whom that is said in our courts. Cases may arise—I do not say that they will arise very often, probably it will be only rarely—where a person wishes to dispute a finding of that sort on appeal. I think that he ought to be allowed to do so and to challenge a finding which has resulted in his being so stigmatised. Clause 2 gives him that opportunity. If he wishes to exercise a right of appeal against a special finding of that sort, he must do so in the knowledge that the result may be that if his appeal be successful a verdict of "guilty" may be substituted and that if it is, as a result of that appeal, punishment may follow which will take the place of the confinement in a hospital designated by the Secretary of State. From the point of view of the appellant the result may not be so very different in the long run. Nevertheless there is, or may be, a significant difference from his point of view between being stigmatised as being a lunatic and having committed an offence because of and while he was a lunatic, and being simply described as a person who has offended against the criminal law. Both situations are highly unfortunate for the person concerned, but one may be worse than the other and it ought to be open to the citizen to seek to substitute what in his eyes, I should have thought, would very often be the lesser of the two evils, namely, a finding that he was guilty rather than that he was not guilty but only because he was insane when the offence charged against him was committed. I therefore entirely support the view which the Government have adopted on the advice of the Committee, that here there should be the right of appeal. I was particularly glad to observe the proviso which states that in the event of the relevant offence being capital murder, if an appeal is allowed against the special finding, the resulting sentence, in the event of a verdict of guilty being substituted, will not be the death sentence but a sentence of imprisonment for life. I should think that it would be contrary to our ideas of fairness to subject a person accused to what is in effect a double ordeal ending in a death sentence. I think this is a humanistic approach which we should all welcome. I come, in effect, to the second part of the Bill which deals with insanity, but with a situation in which the person accused is plainly unfit to understand what is going on. In that case the issue arises of unfitness to plead. The Committee was in difficulty, as the hon. Lady has pointed out, in deciding at what stage in the proceedings it was right, upon a review of our criminal processes, for the issue to be decided whether a person charged was unfit to plead. There were various alternative suggestions. It might be done when the accused person is arraigned. Alternatively the issue of unfitness to plead should be one which could be postponed to a later stage, or postponed right to the end of the whole trial, even after the verdict of the jury had been recorded. There were various suggestions and the Committee was unable to arrive at a unanimous conclusion. Speaking for myself, I entirely agree with the conclusion at which it has arrived. The question poses a dilemma. If the accused person has to be found fit or unfit to plead at the outset of the trial, which is the present practice, he is, or he may be, deprived of the advantage of being able to demonstrate, through his counsel, that the evidence adduced to support the prosecution case fails to make out a prima facie case against him. If that is demonstrated by cross-examination by his counsel on his behalf, he is, of course, entitled to an acquittal. If the issue of his being fit or unfit to plead has to be decided at the outset with the result that the trial does not proceed if he is found unfit to plead, he loses that advantage. I do not think that a right and fair situation and the proposal made by the Committee which the Government has accepted remedies it. The other horn of the dilemma is this. There is something incongruous, even almost absurd, in the idea of a person being tried who does not understand what is going on. If it is said, as the Government say—I think rightly—that the issue whether an accused person was fit or unfit to plead can be postponed to be decided at the time when the defence is opened, it could be said that the somewhat farcical procedure would have to be gone through of the prosecution case being deployed and witnesses examined by counsel on behalf of a person who may be found quite unfit to understand what is going on, or to give any instructions, or to have any idea that he is on trial and has an interest in securing that the proceedings against him are dismissed. I would prefer that the court should go through the procedure of examining the prosecution's case in the knowledge that the person in the dock may be found, after the case has been deployed, to be unfit to plead. If he is, then that issue may be decided before the defence is opened and the proceedings can stop there. In a difficult situation, that is the lesser of the evils. I am, therefore, glad that the Government have accepted the recommendation of the Committee, which has my support. I move on to Clause 5 which, again, really deals with terminology. Its purpose is somewhat analogous to that envisaged in Clause 1. Clause 5 substitutes for the language that the convicted person is to be detained during Her Majesty's pleasure more realistic language to the effect that he is to go to a hospital specified by the Secretary of State; and that his discharge is to be subject to permanent suspension, as it were, until he is cured. That is substituting language which describes the real situation for language which is such that it may give a wrong impression of what is going on. I prefer the new language, and the Clause has my support. The Joint Under-Secretary pointed out the provisions in Clause 5 in regard to temporary confinement to hospital. I need not go into the individual intricacies involved in this, except to say that I would have no criticism of what the Clause does in this respect and that the Government were right to have taken this course. The only other Clause about which I need comment is Clause 7, which is simply designed to remove an uncertainty. The convention that the prosecution should not call evidence of insanity in some circumstances leads to an illogical result which is difficult to justify. Clause 7 makes that convention inapplicable and allows the prosecution to call evidence to rebut the alternative pleas that may be raised of insanity or diminished responsibility. That is sensible and anything which removes doubt and enables learned judges to know better where they stand in directing the jury is desirable; and Clause 7 makes an advance in that direction. It is generally conventional to say that one will wish to change a Measure and chop it around in Committee. I doubt whether hon. Members will wish to make much change in this Bill. Obviously we will want to look at it carefully, but from my reading of it I have not detected anything at which I would particularly wish to cavil. It has been drafted after the closest consideration of the matter by persons with great knowledge of the subject for whom I have the highest respect. I think that they have come to the right conclusions and I very much hope that the Bill will receive its Second Reading.11.34 a.m.
I wish also to thank the Joint Under-Secretary for the clear and concise way in which she presented the Measure and to join with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) in congratulating those who have been concerned in preparing the Bill. It is an important Measure, not so much, perhaps, because of its technical content, but because it deals with a problem relating to people who are or may be incapable of understanding what is happening to them because of mental difficulty or aberration.
The view of the public and Parliament on the subject of insanity or unbalance of mind has changed considerably since the passage of the 1883 Act, itself a retrogressive Measure, introduced mainly because so exalted a personality as the then Queen was able to change the law by putting pressure on her Prime Minister as she had been attacked by a person of disordered mind. She was able to place such pressure on the Prime Minister that such a radical change in the law was made as to describe a person as being insane and guilty because of his insanity—a change which would be regarded today as literally impossible. In 1883 Parliament introduced that Act simply to cope with a situation which had arisen because the Queen had been attacked. Today we do not regard an insane person in the same way as was customary years ago. We look upon him as an unfortunate member of our society who must be dealt with in a more delicate and considerate way than an individual in possession of all his faculties. We have come to regard the insane person as a brother, and if a family has amongst its members an individual who suffers from this terrible complaint that family generally regards itself as having a special duty to perform towards him because he is not gifted with the same faculties as the other members of the family. He must, therefore, receive very careful help. We must remember that it is not merely the individual himself who is affected by the verdict "guilty but insane." It means that all those connected with him have the reflection on them that a member of their family has committed a crime, one more or less serious according to the circumstances. It makes a substantial difference if a person is found to be not guilty than if a verdict of guilty is declared. I happen to belong to a branch of the profession in which we sometimes deal with this problem in both civil and criminal matters. It is extremely difficult to know in such circumstances exactly what to do in advising individuals whether or not to take a certain course of action, particularly in criminal matters—for example, advising relatives that an attempt should be made to convince a court that the person should be declared to be insane. It is a serious thing indeed if one must advise that although he may be declared to be insane, he will still be considered as guilty of having committed the offence, which may be a capital one. It has been said in another place, I think rightly, that there is a reflection on us all, irrespective of party, in the fact that the present state of the law should have continued for something like a hundred years without anything being done about it in Parliament. I know that comments are sometimes made here about lawyers in general, usually in a light rather than in a serious vein, but the fact remains that some members of a committee of the type that has made the recommendations being implemented in this Measure are lawyers. They know what they are talking about, and what happens in the courts. It is a pity that we do not take more and quicker notice of what lawyers propose. It was said by a very eminent counsel a few days ago in another place that the average time it takes for this House to assimilate what such a committee puts forward is 35 years. In the present issues, it could be contended that nothing could be done in the lifetime of the late Queen Victoria, but there have been many sovereigns since then, yet it has taken over sixty years for this piece of legislation to be brought forward since her death. We can now understand why it takes so many of us so long to get certain Measures carried through this House. The hon. Lady the Joint Under-Secretary of State smiles, but I am sure that she will recollect cases where it has taken years before something could be thus pushed through the House. In some cases, a private Member desires to do something to carry into effect what eminent lawyers have recommended. We know that there are many Bills on the Order Paper that will never reach fruition, although they seek to implement proposals which committees of lawyers and judges and others have forcibly recommended for a long time. I might say with all humility that one or two have been put on the tapis by myself—one of them as a result of very strong comments of judges about the desirability of legislation. Even such a simple thing as a Bill to take the flick knife from use—Order. I do not think that one can keep within the rules of order on a Second Reading by discussion of other branches of the law.
With respect, Mr. Speaker, I was trying to point out how long it had taken to bring this Measure forward and explaining that that was in line with what happens in other directions. But I shall not pursue that topic further.
I welcome the provision for appeal against a conviction of sentence and I hope that I shall not be out of order if I refer to how opinion has changed in this direction. Until fairly recently, when a person had pleaded guilty in one court he was not allowed to appeal to a higher court against conviction, having changed his mind about the correctness of his plea or having found that his plea was not the proper one. That position was changed some years ago. The same considerations apply here. I see no reason why a person properly and appropriately advised, as I have no doubt that in such a case he would be, even though he might not fully comprehend the position should be prevented from the right of appealling because that in itself indicates that there is a possibility of a reverse of the decision of the lower court. Fresh evidence may come forward, and if there is such a possibility the individual concerned should certainly have the right of appeal against a previous decision—all the more so if the question of his sanity is at issue. If I may say so with respect, I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport and the Government, and feel that the way out indicated by the Government is the right one—subject, of course, to further detailed consideration of the Bill. I think that this Measure will be received with satisfaction and commendation on both sides of the House and by all those Members of the general public who understand the conditions at present prevailing.11.47 a.m.
I am very glad that all who have so far spoken welcome this Measure, as I am sure the whole House does. I was particularly happy to hear the right hon. and learned Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) say that he doubted whether it would need much change in Committee, although the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) may well have some important matters to put before the Committee. Obviously, however, the general principles in the Bill will be warmly welcomed by everyone.
I should like to join with the right hon. and learned Gentleman and with my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State in expressing thanks to the members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee. This Committee was first appointed in 1959 by my right hon. Friend who is now Foreign Secretary, and consists of many distinguished lawyers—probably the most expert in these fields that could be gathered together in one Committee. I am sure that the learned judges and some of the other members will understand if I pay a particular tribute to those on the Committee who do not hold official positions but who give of their own time and expertise, and give Parliament such help. In reply to the gentle chiding by the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West on the subject of delay, I might point out that this same Committee has produced five reports. The first, on Indecency with Children, was made in 1959, and was put into law in 1960—I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will realise that, in speaking of delay, I was not referring to the Committee at all.
I appreciate that.
The early Committees did not deal with all that is dealt with in the Bill but the House should take pleasure and pride in the fact that the first four of these five Reports have been or are being enacted into law with the support of the whole House. The 1959 Report dealing with indecency with children was enacted in 1960. The 1960 Report dealing with suicide was enacted in 1961. The Report on the procedure of right of reply published in 1963 was enacted this year, and now this Bill will enact this year the Report published in 1963 dealing with the present subject. This is a very satisfactory conclusion and a justification of the importance of the Committee which was established in 1959. It must also give a certain satisfaction and must point a certain lesson to the House that here we are in 1964 agreeing apparently unanimously that what Parliament did in 1883 in changing what a previous Parliament had done in 1800 was wrong. This gives us a caveat as it shows that the ancient Parliament in 1800 was right and the subsequent Parliament was wrong, and in 1964 we are putting matters back to 1800, to the general satisfaction of all sides of the House. I repeat that I am glad that the House has welcomed the provisions of the Bill. The hon. Member for Leicester, Northwest is right to say that this is an important Bill and to agree with his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport that it will bring a rightful change in the general attitude of the law to people suffering from diseases of the mind. I commend the Bill to the House.Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[ Mr. McLaren.]
Committee upon Monday, next.
Zambia Independence Bill
Considered in Committee.
[Sir ROBERT GRIMSTON in the Chair]
If the Committee is agreeable I propose to put the Clauses collectively. If it is desired that I should put them separately, I will do so.
Clauses 1 to 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8—(Agreements Relating To Barotseland)
Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
11.54 a.m.
I was very sorry that I was not able to take part in the debate on Second Reading, because it ended earlier than I had expected and I thus lost that opportunity. During that debate things were said about this Clause with which I would not have been in full agreement.
I should now like to say that I regard the outcome of the negotiations which led to the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 as one which was very happy both for Barotseland and for the new country of Zambia. I do not wish to go back to mention the things said on Second Reading, if only for the reason that I have not given notice to the hon. Members who said them, but it would be most unfortunate if the impression were to go out of the House that what has taken place with regard to Barotseland is in any degree a disappointment and disadvantage to the people of that country. It was said on Tuesday, for example, that the Litunga of Barotseland had been brought in at ten o'clock at night to sign an agreement by which he lost the control of his country and which, in effect, abolished Barotseland and completely changed the situation of that country. That is very far from being the truth. I do not want to mix up the two functions in which I am concerned in Barotseland, but the fact is that the negotiations which took place over a period of 11 months, and which finally ended in the Barotseland Agreement, 1964, were negotiations of a particularly happy character in that all those who took part in them had as their final objective the discovery of a method of association which would allow their country and Northern Rhodesia to go forward happily together in harmony, not starting with recrimination, and arriving at an agreement between two Protectorates which would not be an armistice line in a long-drawn struggle, but which would allow them to go forward together as one country making the best use of their resources, human and material. I would be most unhappy if anything said in the debate on Tuesday, after the success of that long effort, should lead in Northern Rhodesia to doubts and disharmony and to a feeling that the sacrifices made on both sides were not profitably made and would perhaps better not have been made. I am sure that the contrary is true and that when the Litunga of Barotseland signed that Agreement at ten o'clock at night it was merely a formal and ceremonial ending to 11 months of hard and extremely useful negotiations. I find no particular significance in the fact that the Agreement was signed at ten o'clock at night. This Parliament reaches most of its important decisions at that hour. In case there should be any lingering doubt about that, I should like to say that the Agreement signed at ten o'clock at night: in London, which is the subject of this Clause, was virtually identical in all its terms with that which had been signed in the full light of day and in complete harmony in Lusaka three weeks before. It would be quite untrue to say that by that Agreement Barotseland passes away its rights and will lose its distinctive way of life or cease to exist as a significant part of Zambia. The contrary is true. Anyone who reads the Agreement, which has been published as a Command Paper will see that on the contrary not only the Litunga and his National Council, but also Dr. Kaunda and the Ministers of the Northern Rhodesia Government, were all most anxious that Barotseland should continue to make its distinctive and in some sense separate contribution to the total life of the new country. Hon. Members will find preserved in that agreement all the traditional rights of the Litunga, all the traditional ways by which the Lozi people have lived their lives so successfully as one of the most significant parts of the territory of Northern Rhodesia. They are all safeguarded in the form of a solemn agreement which was signed by the Litunga, by Dr. Kaunda and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. At the time Dr. Kaunda gave a solemn promise on behalf of himself and his Government that after independence had come into force, after the passage of this Measure, he, on behalf of his Government, would solemnly and publicly reaffirm as an independent country their adherence to this agreement and their observance of its terms. When that is the case, when all the traditional life of Barotseland is incorporated in this Agreement, when the whole thing has been done in an atmosphere of complete good will and they all want to go forward together happily, and when, as I say, this is no mere armistice line but a genuine fusion of entities, it seems to me tragic that words should be spoken which might stir up forgotten disagreements in Northern Rhodesia. 12 noon. That is why I have taken this opportunity today, as one who has had some knowledge of what has happened, to say that this Agreement, and Clause 8 which embodies it, is something of which everybody in Barotseland, from the Litunga to the humblest of his subjects, and everyone in Northern Rhodesia, from the Prime Minister to the members of tribes other than the Lozi, can all be very happy and in which they can rejoice. I am sure that in passing the Bill with this Clause in it we shall not be doing anything which is in any way derogatory to the undertakings which have been given over half a century to the Litunga of Barotseland on behalf of British Governments, but that, on the contrary, we shall have joined in a wise and fruitful Agreement. I trust that that will be the message which will go out from this House on the deliberations of the Bill, rather than some of the things which were said—I am sure in good faith, but not perhaps in full knowledge of the facts—by some hon. Members in the debate on Tuesday.I support the observations of the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell). There have been controversies about Barotseland in which probably he and I have taken different points of view. But new agreement has been reached, and I agree that nothing should be said today or on a future occasion which would in any way revive the controversies which have previously taken place about the future of Barotseland.
I know Prime Minister Kaunda very well, and I am sure that he will carry out this Agreement in the letter and in the spirit. I am sure that there will be a similar response on the part of the Paramount Chief of Barotseland, and I hope very much that this Bill will go from this House today with unanimous agreement and that we will put behind us the controversies which may have led to division in the past.I should like to re-echo what has been said by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway), and I hope that the Minister will be able to adopt a similar course.
We have had this morning the advantage of two speeches which could not have been better informed. The hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, South spoke with personal knowledge of the negotiations extending over many months, and my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough has a knowledge of Africa, and in particular of Zambia, for which I would think we all have the deepest respect and in which we have the fullest confidence. Both hon. Members have said that they feel that the Agreement which has been entered into reflects the settled will of the three parties to the Agreement. If one examines it, it seems to balance nicely the interests of those concerned on each side. I profoundly hope that the Agreement, which I am sure will be honoured by Dr. Kaunda, will put an end to differences which, unhappily, have arisen in the past over a considerable period of time, and that Barotseland and its inhabitants and the rest of Zambia—for Barotseland is an integral part of Zambia—will live happily together in future and that this Agreement will promote concord over many years.I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), to the right hon. and learned Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) and the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) for what they have said.
The Committee will know that certain agreements were entered into between Her Majesty and the Litunga of Barotseland, which is part of Northern Rhodesia, with respect to the administration of Barotseland. Her Majesty also formally assumed obligations under agreements concluded between the British South Africa Company and the Litunga during the period that the company was responsible for the administration of the Territory. Undertakings and understandings connected with these agreements have also from time to time been entered into. These agreements, undertakings and understandings did not in all cases clearly distinguish between the rights and obligations of the Crown and the rights and obligations of the Government of Northern Rhodesia in relation to Barotseland. But, following the conference, a new Agreement, to which hon. Members have referred, the Barotseland Agreement, 1964, was entered into between the Government of Northern Rhodesia and the Litunga, which was intended to define the relationship between the parties when Northern Rhodesia becomes independent and to supersede all existing obligations. The purpose of this Clause is to terminate all existing rights and obligations both of the Crown and of the Government of Northern Rhodesia under the existing agreements, undertakings and understandings, except those arising under this Agreement. Similarly, provision was made in the Uganda Independence Act, 1962, terminating agreements between the Crown and the kingdoms in Uganda. The possibility of giving Barotseland the same sort of status within Zambia as the kingdoms had within Uganda was considered, but the parties to the 1964 Agreement decided otherwise. Under that Agreement, Barotseland, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, is part of the unitary State of Zambia. I was very pleased to hear what hon. Members have said. I repeat what I said in the Second Reading debate. We have not deprived the Litunga of power. It was a freely-negotiated Agreement. We have honourably discharged our obligations. I have never visited Barotseland—I have only seen it in photographs and on film—but I hope that in the months or years to come I may be able to go there. I am sure that this Committee will wish to the Lozi people, under the rule of the Litunga, increasing success, prosperity and happiness, and that in the unity of Zambia all will go forward in progress.Question put and agreed to.
Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 9 to 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 1 to 3 agreed to.
Bill reported, without Amendment.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
12.11 p.m.
I am sure that I shall be expressing the views not only of my right hon. and hon. Friends but, on this occasion, of hon. and right hon. Members opposite in welcoming the Bill and wishing the best of all possible futures to Northern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia will begin its independence, under its new name of Zambia, with great hopes but also with some dangers.
It has great hopes because, under the very wise leadership of Mr. Kaunda, there is now, to a quite extraordinary degree, co-operation and good will between the African and European races in the Territory, and this extends also to the Asians who are there. It is an act of some generosity—perhaps that is too strong a word—it is certainly an act of great statesmanship that Mr. Kaunda has agreed to the representation of the European race in a special way in the Legislature of Northern Rhodesia. In this spirit, a spirit which has very happily been expressed also in the neighbouring territory of Kenya, we can say that it is possible to solve the problems of independence of these nations with the co-operation and good will of all races in the territories, and our great desire is that in Zambia this co-operation and good will will grow in the experience of independence. I have said that there are not only hopes, but there are dangers. There are dangers because of the geographical position of Zambia, one of the three territories emerging separately again after the dissolution and dismemberment of the Federation. Only this week, we have welcomed the independence which has been granted to Malawi and the attendance yesterday of Dr. Hastings Banda at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Yesterday, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, a welcome was accorded to the fact that Zambia would be independent and that its Prime Minister would be a partner in future conferences. But the danger for Zambia obviously lies in its proximity to Southern Rhodesia, which presents such an issue of controversy at this time. I do not wish, on this happy occasion, even to refer to the problems which arise in Southern Rhodesia, but I hope that our Government will, in these difficult circumstances in Zambia, give every possible aid to the stability of the new independence which that country has gained. I hope that they will give an assurance to its Government that we will seek to aid it in every way we can so that its stability may be assured and it may go forward in independence not only to contribute to the Continent of Africa good will between the different races, but to contribute in its economic advance, the improvement of the standard of life of its people and the progress of its education an example to those countries which have already attained independence and to those which are marching towards that goal.12.15 p.m.
We all have our opinions about what has been achieved or has not been achieved during this Parliament, but one fact which will stand out in its history is the number of territories which have achieved self-government during this Parliament. When the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) once said that he did not conceive it his duty to preside at the dissolution of the British Empire, or words to that effect, even he could not have foreseen the rapidity with which self-government has been achieved by so many countries and the old Empire has grown up into the Commonwealth which, we hope, will be a very much greater conception than the old Empire ever was, great as was its history.
As Zambia is, I believe, the last of the territories with which we shall deal in this way during this Parliament, it might be worth while if the Government were to publish a complete list of all the territories which have been given independence during this Parliament, showing to the world thereby the process by which Britain has peacefully made this great transformation. Sometimes we are accused of imperialism by other Governments, and I think that a complete list of the countries which have achieved self-government in complete agreement during this one Parliament would be an object-lesson to the rest of the world.12.17 p.m.
I join in what has been said by hon. Members opposite and I extend my good wishes to this new country at its inception.
Many perils face newly independent countries in Africa today, and Northern Rhodesia will have its share of them, but I am fairly optimistic about the way in which they will be handled. One cannot say more than that. It would, in any case, be presumptuous and, perhaps, not altogether appreciated if one sought to offer advice on an occasion like this; it is better to confine oneself to good wishes. I say only that patience and tolerance are two of the hardest qualities for a newly independent country to learn in Africa today, but I am sure that they are the conditions for success. I feel some confidence for Northern Rhodesia because I think that not only Mr. Kaunda personally, but many of those who surround him, within and without Barotseland, have personal qualities which could give Northern Rhodesia a good chance in the difficulties which lie ahead. I venture to hope that they will not spend too much of their time bothering about being next door to Southern Rhodesia. But I do not want to talk about that subject today. I have views on it which might very well not agree with those of the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway). I am sure that it is much better for people to give their best attention to building up their own country when there is so much to be done rather than bothering about what goes on around them. In my view, there are two kinds of national leader for emerging countries. One is typified by Kemal Ataturk, who raised his country to the position which it is in today by sheer hard work and by pressing the doctrine of sheer hard work and of building it up by self-help and concentrating on the tasks in his own country which lay immediately ahead. There is the opposite kind of national leader, like President Nasser, and, I am sorry to say, a good many others in the world today who rely heavily on the emotional aid of xenophobia to keep control over their country, and do not press constantly the doctrine that greatness, independence and prosperity come by bending over one's last and giving one's best attention to the problems within oneself and one's country. I hope and believe that Northern Rhodesia will follow the example of Kemal Ataturk rather than that of the nationalist leaders so that it will keep itself out of the dangerous whirlpools of emotion and African nationalist sentiment which are causing so much distress and tribulation of mind in that Continent today. Because I have some confidence that it will have that good sense, I am optimistic about the future of the country which we are inaugurating by the Bill.12.21 p.m.
It would be supererogatory on my part to add much, but we have almost come to the end of our consideration of this Measure. It is one of great significance in the changing pattern of Africa.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. H. Hynd) said, the movement towards self-government and the growth of the number of independent countries in Africa is one of the great changes in the modern world. The Commonwealth of Nations is, after all, one of the greatest groupings of people for peace throughout the earth—over 700 million people of different races. We should all welcome the advent of a new country—when I say "a new country" I mean new in independence, but old in history—to take its place with the existing members of the Commonwealth in the great struggle to solve the human problems which face the world. I would simply add my hope for the future prosperity of this new country and my best wishes for its happy development and a peaceful and prosperous future. I do not think that it would be right for me to add more, but I am sure that in what I say I voice the feelings of the whole House on this most auspicious occasion.12.22 p.m.
I join the right hon. and learned Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) in what he has said. I agree that this is an occasion of great significance, and I am glad that the hon. Member for Accrington (Mr. H. Hynd) urged that a list should be published of what has been achieved in this Parliament.
We can be proud when we look at the picture in, I think, The Times today and see Her Majesty surrounded by the leaders of the Commonwealth countries and when we look, too, at the list not only of the heads of Governments who are attending, but of those whom they have brought with them. We remember, when we were taught history at school, some of the great conferences in Europe in the past, but they pale in significance in the number of people represented compared with the number of people whose leaders are here in London today. I think that it is proud-making for this country that we have been able to become partners in this great Commonwealth experiment. I agree with the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) and with my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) that there are difficulties which Zambia faces, land-locked as she is with her communications going through other lands. I trust that she will be able to overcome these difficulties and that, like their great Zambesi River, the Zambian people will go forward to great prosperity to the benefit not only of themselves, but of mankind elsewhere as well.Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Housing Bill
Lords Amendments considered.
Clause 2—(Power Of Corporation To, Make Loans To Housing Societies)
Lords Amendment: In page 3, line 34, after "make" insert "loans".
12.25 p.m.
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
It would be convenient if, with permission, we could take with this Amendment the Amendment; in page 3, line 35, to leave out "loans to meet" and insert:"for the purpose of enabling the housing society to meet the whole or any part of any".
If the House so pleases.
Both Amendments are drafting Amendments making it clear that the Housing Corporation can make loans of up to 100 per cent. to a housing society.
Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5—(Schemes For Corporation To Provide Housing Accommoda Tion In Place Of Housing Society)
Lords Amendment: In page 7, line 17, after "prepare" insert "and submit to the Minister".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
Again, with permission, it would be convenient to take, at the same time, the Amendments in page 7, line 26, leave out "and" and insert:and in page 7, line 29, after "may" insert ", if he thinks fit,"."(2) Where a scheme under this section is submitted to the Minister by the Corporation,"
If the House so pleases.
These Amendments also are mainly drafting and are designed to simplify the present subsection of Clause 5 by splitting it into two subsections. There is no change of meaning. The Amendment in line 29 is purely a drafting alteration which again does not affect the meaning.
Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.
Clause 8—(Building Society Advances To Housing Societies To Which Corporation Have Made Loans)
Lords Amendment: In page 8, line 40, leave out paragraph ( b) and insert:
"(b) any advance which in accordance with section 21(7) of the Building Societies Act 1962, a building society is treated as having made by reason of a transfer—(i) from one housing society to another, or (ii) from a housing society to the Corporation, or (iii) from the Corporation to a housing society, of the mortgagor's interest under a mortgage securing an advance made by that building society."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This also is a drafting Amendment to meet criticisms of the existing draft and to make the position clearer.Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18—(Suspended Improvement Notices: Effect After 5 Years)
Lords Amendment: In page 20, line 28, leave out "twelve" and insert "six".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The Amendment is designed to reduce the period of 12 months to six months which is allowed at the end of the five years from the date of the declaration of an improvement area for the service by the local authority of the final improvement notice. The House will recall that local authorities are not obliged by Clause 18 to serve a final improvement notice at the end of the five years, but if they intend to do so the period of six months should give them ample time to complete the final stage.
Question put and agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 20, line 46, leave out from "to" to end of line 48 and insert:
"offer, or arrange for some other authority or person to offer, suitable alternative accommodation to the tenant, so as to afford to the tenant a reasonable opportunity of taking up that alternative accommodation."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This Amendment is designed to make it clear that a local authority's obligation under Clause 18 will be satisfied if it either offers or arranges for some other authority or person to offer suitable accommodation.
12.30 p.m.
I am glad to see this Amendment on the Notice Paper, because while it provides that the local authority shall do what is right in the interest of the tenant, it enables it to do so in a manner in which it would often need to be done, whereas the original draft was too rigid.
If I may do so without trespassing on your patience, Mr. Speaker, I should like briefly to refer to the next two Amendments, which have a causal connection with this one. We are to be asked, I understand, in subsequent Amendments to put the court in a position where it can impose rather more stringent conditions upon the local authority. I wonder whether that was done because the local authority had been given this greater flexibility in the way in which it could fulfil the undertaking to the tenant. The Minister may want to refer to this when we reach the Amendments in question.I should like to ask my hon. Friend a question. It is, I assume, still the case that if a tenant does not wish to leave, even though alternative accommodation is offered, he cannot be forced to leave the accommodation so that the improvements can be effected. This seems to me to be a vital safeguard which we should retain. There appears to be nothing in the Amendment to destroy that safeguard.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) can be reassured. What it amounts to is that if the local authority wishes to enforce the improvement notice and it can satisfy the court, should the tenant appeal to the court, that it has offered alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the failure of the tenant to consent, it can enforce the improvement notice.
As to whether, in any particular case, it would be possible to do so with the tenant there, I obviously could not generalise. There is, however, no suggestion that the Amendment gives the local authority power to evict the tenant. It merely obliges it to carry out the improvements despite the tenant's lack of consent and to claim, under later provisions of the Bill, the corresponding increase in rent.Question put and agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 21, line 6, leave out "may" and insert "shall".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
Here again, if we may take the next Amendment with this one, I think that it would be for the convenience of the House.If the House so pleases.
The first Amendment is a paving one for the second Amendment. I hope that I am replying also to the point raised by the hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) in saying that the purpose of the second Amendment is to enable the tenant, if there is doubt whether the accommodation offered under the previous Amendment is suitable, to go to the county court and to give the county court jurisdiction to decide on that matter and, at the same time, to give the local authority an opportunity to come back at a later stage, if the court decides that it has not offered suitable alternative accommodation, with a further offer or proposal.
What the second Amendment does further is that after efforts by the local authority to find the alternative accommodation and satisfy the court, it enables the improvement notice, instead of being suspended indefinitely and hanging over the house, to come to an end if the local authority is unable to satisfy the court as to the alternative accommodation for the tenant.Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 21, line 10, after the words last inserted insert:
"(5) As soon as practicable after service of a withdrawal notice under subsection (3) of this section in Scotland the local authority shall cause to be recorded in the General Register of Sasines a certificate in the prescribed form stating that the said notice has been served as aforesaid."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is a Scottish Amendment consequential upon the two which preceded it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19—(Dwellings Outside Improvement Areas)
Lords Amendment: In page 22, line 43, at end insert:
"(c) If the works are to a lower standard than full improvement, the improvement notice may. at the discretion of the local authority, specify a period shorter than twelve months."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The Amendment applies only to improvements to the reduced standards for dwellings outside improvement areas and not in tenement blocks. It was made clear in another place that local authorities would be advised to exercise care when using their discretion to specify a period less than 12 months and that in any event they probably should not specify a period of less than six months. It was, however, thought that with reduced standard improvements, many of which would be of minor character, six months or a lesser period than 12 months would be appropriate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23—(Local Authorities May Acquire Dwellings, Etc, In Tenements In Improvement Areas In Scotland)
Lords Amendment: In page 28, line 19, at end insert:
"(5) The power conferred on a local authority by section 131(1) of the Act of 1950 to pay certain allowances to persons displaced in consequence of the exercise of certain powers shall include power to pay allowances to any person displaced from a house or building which, or a part of which, has been acquired by a local authority under this section; and accordingly in the said section 131(1) after paragraph (e) there shall be inserted the following paragraph—
', or
(f) which, or a part of which, has been acquired by the local authority under section 23 of the Housing Act 1964'."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The purpose of the Amendment is to allow local authorities to pay removal expenses and allowances for disturbance to people who are displaced as a result of a compulsory purchase order made under the Clause.Question put and agreed to. [Special entry.]
Clause 24—(Acceptance Of Undertakings To Carry Out Works)
Lords Amendment: In page 29, line 4, leave out "or section 21(2)" and insert:
"section 21(2) or section 22(1)".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The purpose of the Amendment is to make clear that the owner of a Scottish tenement dwelling can give to a local authority an undertaking that he will carry out improvement works at any time before an improvement notice is served on the dwelling and to ensure that if he does so, the local authority is not debarred from serving an improvement notice later if the undertaking is not fulfilled.Question put and agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 29, line 34, leave out from "modifications" to end of line 38.
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The Amendment removes words which, on further consideration, are not thought to be necessary.
If the words which it is proposed to remove are not necessary, why was the earlier Amendment required? Do we understand that as a result of this Amendment, subsection (7) of the Clause will in future apply to a dwelling referred to in Clause 22? The Bill states that this Clause shall not apply to such a dwelling. We are proposing to remove that. Presumably, therefore, once the Amendment is made, the Clause would apply to such a dwelling.
That, I suppose, explains why we made the earlier Amendment to incorporate in the Clause a reference to Clause 22. Why, however, is all this necessary when acceptance of undertakings to carry out works on dwellings in Scotland is already dealt with in the next Clause, Clause 25? It is difficult to fit these two Amendments and Clause 25 as it now stands together.Under subsection (1), the Clause applies only before an improvement notice has been served. It is, therefore, unnecessary to say in subsection (7) that it shall not apply where an improvement notice has been served under Clause 22.
The hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) has raised the question of Clause 25. Clause 24 deals with undertakings to carry out improvements given before the service of improvement notices. This is the general procedure in England, but if it is convenient to do so there is no reason why it should not be applied to tenements as well. Clause 25 deals with the special case of undertakings to carry out work given after an improvement notice has been served and applies only to tenements in Scotland. No similar procedure is required for other houses because in their case the procedure before notice has been served ensures that every opportunity has been given to arrange undertakings.Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34—(Adjustment Of Relations Between Lessors And Lessees)
Lords Amendment: In page 40, line 13, at end insert:
"(1A) This section shall not authorise the county court to increase the rent payable to the landlord in respect of an agricultural holding as defined in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948."
I beg to move, That this House doth agreed with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This Amendment is necessary as a result of bringing the service occupier in an agricultural cottage into the provisions of the Bill regarding improvements, and this Lords Amendment ensures that any increase in rent which may result from improvements falls to be determined under the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, which is clearly most suitable, and not under the other provisions which apply in the ordinary cases which are related to the Rent Act.
I take it that really the need for this Amendment springs from the new Clause C which, I see, is to be added later. Of course, we on this side of the House very much welcome both this Amendment and the one which gives rise to it. This was a matter which was discussed at some length in Committee on the Bill. I am very glad that the Government have been able to make this extension in the purposes of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 40, line 16, at end insert:
"(3) Subsection (1A) of this section shall not apply to Scotland, but this section shall not authorise the sheriff to increase the rent payable to the landlord in respect of—(a) an agricultural holding within the meaning of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949, or (b) a croft within the meaning of the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955, or (c) a holding within the meaning of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Acts 1886 to 1931."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is the Scottish parallel to the previous Amendment. This disapplies the Clause to agricultural holdings in Scotland and leaves the adjustment of rents of such holdings under existing legislation.Question put and agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 40, line 16, after the words last inserted insert new Clause A (Rent limit in Rent Act
1957: increase for improvement under Part II):
"A.—(1) In the case of an improvement effected in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or final improvement notice or an undertaking accepted under this Part of this Act, section 5 of the Rent Act 1957 (increase for improvements) shall have effect subject to the provisions of this section.
(2) If—(a) the landlord, or a predecessor in title of the landlord, is the person who expended money on the improvement, and (b) a standard grant under section 4 of the Act of 1959 in respect of the improvement, although obtainable, has not been obtained, the said section 5 (4) (under which, as amended by section 27 of the Act of 1959, the making of a standard grant reduces the increase of rent authorised by that section) shall apply as if that standard grant had been obtained.
(3) In any proceedings relating to the increase authorised by the said section 5 in respect of the improvement it shall be assumed, until the contrary is proved, that a standard grant was obtainable in respect of the improvement.
(4) The local authority shall, at the request in writing of the landlord or the tenant, give to him an estimate in writing of what the amount of the standard grant would have been if it had been obtained, and for the purposes of any such proceedings that estimate shall be sufficient evidence of what that amount would have been.
(5) Section 25 of the Rent Act 1957 shall apply for the interpretation of this section."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This new Clause, I think, meets the point which was originally raised by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. Skeffington) in Committee, whereby it would be possible in a controlled dwelling for the landlord, by refusing to take the grant, to put up the rent a good deal higher than would otherwise be the case, and that that might conceivably be used as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the tenant to leave the house. Accordingly, this Amendment provides that even in those circumstances, if the landlord does not take the grant, the grant he would have been entitled to is taken into account.Again, I am glad to see this Amendment, but I wonder whether we could be told whether it applies to Scotland, and, if not, why not? I do not think it can, because of the legislation to which it refers, but why is there no Scottish equivalent to this new Clause? I see that later we have another new Clause and that there is a further new Clause translating that into Scottish law. There does not, however, seem to be any such Scottish equivalent to this new Clause now before us.
The immediately following Lords Amendment is the parallel Clause for Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
New Clause "B"—(Increase In Controlled Rent In Respect Of Improvement Under Part Ii)
Lords Amendment: In page 40, line 16, after the words last inserted insert new Clause B (Increase in controlled rent in respect of improvement under Part II):
"B.—(1) In the case of an improvement effected in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or a final improvement notice or an undertaking accepted under this Part of this Act, section 2(1)(a) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 (increase for improvements) shall have effect subject to the provisions of this section.
(2) If a standard grant under section 19 of the Act of 1959 in respect of the improvement, although obtainable, has not been obtained, the said section 2(1) (a) (under which the amount of the permitted increase in rent in respect of expenditure incurred by the landlord on the improvement of a dwelling-house to which the said Act of 1920 applies is limited to an amount calculated at a rate per annum not exceeding twelve and one half per cent. of the amount so expended) shall apply as if for the reference therein to the amount expended on the improvement there were substituted a reference to that amount diminished by a sum equal to what the amount of the said standard grant would have been if it had been obtained.
(3) In any proceedings relating to the increase permitted by the said section 2(1)(a) in respect of the improvement it shall be assumed, until the contrary is proved, that a standard grant was obtainable in respect of the improvement.
(4) The local authority shall, at the request in writing of the landlord or the tenant, give to him an estimate in writing of what the amount of the standard grant would have been if it had been obtained, and for the purposes of any such proceedings that estimate shall be sufficient evidence of what that amount would have been.
(5) In this section ' landlord ' and ' tenant' have the same meanings respectively as in the said Act of 1920."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is the Amendment which does the same for Scotland as does the previous new Clause for England and Wales.
12.45 p.m.
My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Craigton (Mr. Millan) regrets very much that he is not able to be with us this morning. At this stage, so do I. I am very glad to learn that this is the Scottish equivalent, even if, to somebody not expert in these matters, that is not immediately apparent. I notice, for example, that there is a reference to one-half of 1 per cent. I thought that in Scottish Clauses the full phrase per centum was used. This may have misled me.
Am I right in thinking that the legislation referred to in this new Clause is United Kingdom or, at any rate, Great Britain legislation, and that, therefore, we can be sure that the Clause would apply and can be administered without difficulty under Scottish law? I ask because I believe that some of my hon. Friends for Scottish constituencies were a little doubtful on this point.I can give the hon. Gentleman that assurance, that references to United Kingdom enactments would not give difficulty. I should like to say straight away that I realise why the hon. Gentleman has found some difficulty in identifying these new Clauses, because the words "England and Wales" have not been included in the rubric to the immediately preceding new Clause, and the word "Scotland" is not in the rubric to this one. This will, I understand, be put right. I realise why the hon. Gentleman did not immediately recognise that this is a Scottish Clause, but I can assure him on the point which he has raised.
Question put and agreed to.
New Clause "C"—(Amendments Of Agricultural Holdings Act 1948)
Lords Amendment: In page 40, line 16, after the words last inserted insert new Clause C (Amendments of Agricultural Holdings Act 1948):
"C—(1) Section 9 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (increases of rent for improvements carried out by landlord) shall apply as if references in subsection (1) of that section to improvements carried out at the request of the tenant included references to improvements carried out in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or final improvement notice or an undertaking accepted under this Part of this Act:
Provided that where the tenant has contributed to the cost incurred by the landlord in carrying out the improvement, the increase in rent provided for by the said section 9 shall be reduced proportionately.
(2) Any works carried out in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or final improvement notice or an undertaking accepted under this Part of this Act shall be included among the improvements specified in paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 to the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (tenant's right to compensation for erection, alteration or enlargement of buildings), but subject to the power conferred by section 78 of that Act to amend the said Schedule 3; and section 49 of that Act (which makes that right to compensation conditional on the landlord consenting to the carrying out of the improvements) shall not apply to any works carried out in compliance with such a notice or undertaking.
(3) Where a person other than the tenant claiming compensation has contributed to the cost of carrying out the works in compliance with any such notice or undertaking, compensation in respect of the works, as assessed under section 48 of the said Act of 1948, shall be reduced proportionately."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is the new Clause to which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) referred just now. It arises from the inclusion of the agricultural service tenant in the provisions of the Bill. The Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, ensures provision for compensation where the tenant, that is to say, the farmer, has been improving the farm cottage in which he in turn had a service tenancy, and this ensures that such improvements can be taken into account, either in a claim by a tenant for increased terminal grant at the end of the tenancy, or in adjustment in the rent despite the fact that the improvement was undertaken compulsorily and without the consent of the parties, which constitutes the present condition in the 1948 Act.Question put and agreed to.
New Clause "D"— (Adjustment Of Re Lations Between Lessors And Lessees Of Agricultural Hold Ings, Etc In Scotland)
Lords Amendment: In page 40, line 16, after the words last inserted insert new Clause D (Adjustment of relations between lessors and lessees of agricultural holdings, etc. in Scotland.):
"D.—(1) Section 8 of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949 (increases of rent for improvements carried out by landlord) shall apply as if references in subsection (1) of that section to improvements carried out at the request of the tenant included references to improvements carried out in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or a final improvement notice or an undertaking accepted under this Part of this Act:
Provided that where the tenant has contributed to the cost incurred by the landlord in carrying out the improvement, the increase in rent provided for by the said section 8 shall be reduced proportionately.
(2) Any works carried out in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or a final improvement notice or an undertaking accepted under this Part of this Act shall be included among the improvements specified in paragraph 18 of Schedule 1 to the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949 (tenant's right to compensation for erection, alteration or enlargement of buildings), but subject to the power conferred by section 79 of that Act to vary the said Schedule 1; and sections 51 and 52 of that Act (which make that right to compensation subject to certain conditions) shall not apply to any works carried out in compliance with such a notice or undertaking:
Provided that where a person other than the tenant claiming compensation has contributed to the cost of carrying out the works in compliance with any such notice or undertaking, compensation in respect of the works, as assessed under section 49 of the said Act of 1949, shall be reduced proportionately.
(3) Any works carried out in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or a final improvement notice or an undertaking accepted under this Part of this Act shall—(a) if carried out on a croft within the meaning of the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955, be permanent improvements on that croft and be deemed to be suitable to the croft for the purposes of section 14(1)(a) of the said Act of 1955 (crofter's right to compensation for improvements), (b) if carried out on a holding within the meaning of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Acts 1886 to 1931, be permanent improvements on that holding and be deemed to be suitable to the holding for the purposes of section 8(a) of the Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886 (landholder's right to compensation for improvements). and accordingly, after paragraph 1 of Schedule 5 to the said Act of 1955, and after paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the said Act of 1886 (both of which Schedules relate to permanent improvements), there shall be inserted the following paragraph—
'(1A) Works carried out in compliance with an immediate improvement notice or a final improvement notice served, or an undertaking accepted, under Part II of the Housing Act 1964'."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This new Clause is the Scottish counterpart of the provisions of the corresponding new Clause which applies only to England and Wales. This new Clause applies to agricultural holdings in Scotland and ensures that machinery will be available for adjusting rents and determining terminal compensation as a result of expenditure incurred on improvements under Part II of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 37—(Exclusion Of Dwellings Controlled By Crown Or A Public Authority)
Lords Amendment: In page 43, line 33, after "includes" insert "(i)".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The next following Lords Amendment goes with this one and it would be convenient to discuss the two together.As the House pleases.
The first of the two is paving the way for the second and I think it is fair to say that it is only drafting. The intention was that the exemption of local authority housing should include police houses, but we understand that there is some doubt about that with regard to the police committees under the new Measure, and hence this Amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.
Clause 40—(Interpretation And Construction Of Part Ii)
Lords Amendment: In page 45, line 40, leave out "the rack-rent" and, insert:
"any rent (including a rack-rent) payable by the tenant (as defined in this section)".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The Amendment arises from the extension of the Bill to the agricultural service tenant. It necessitates an alteration of the definition of the person having control. Normally, a service tenant does not pay a rack-rent, and, equally, a farmer does not normally pay a rack-rent for the farmhouse. The Amendment is necessary to ensure that in the one case it is the farmer tenant and in the other case the landlord who are the persons having control.
Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 46, leave lines 4 to 19.
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
It would be convenient, Mr. Speaker, if we could consider at the same time the Lords Amendment in page 47, line 27.Yes, if that is convenient.
This is a paving Amendment to the other, which redefines a tenant, again very largely, if not entirely, arising from the fact that the Bill has been extended to the agricultural tenant. I must point out that the Amendment takes the provisions a little further than we discussed earlier in that it extends the powers to an area improvement on the proposition that there might be an improvement area in a village and that among the houses in the village there might well be a service tenancy. It is a slight extension of what we discussed hitherto.
Question put and agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 46, line 20, leave out from "which" to end of line 24, and insert:
"as constructed contained, and which contains, two or more flats;"
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is a drafting Amendment redefining the term "tenement" as used for Scotland in Part II of the Bill.Could we be assured that this really is drafting and nothing more? The Bill as it now stands defines "tenement" as something:
The reference to a building which contains:"which was constructed in the form of, and consists of, … two or more flats, or … two or more flats together with shops, offices, stores or other premises".
seems to have disappeared as a result of the Amendment, and we are left only with the definition of "tenement" as a building which, as constructed, contained, and which contains, two or more fiats. Does that not make an alteration of substance, and is it not something more than a drafting Amendment? If the Amendment is made, what is the position with regard to a building containing two or more fiats, together with shops, offices, stores or other premises?"two or more flats together with shops, offices, stores or other premises"
The intention of the Amendment is to make sure that the definition will cover all kinds of Scottish tenements. I quite understand the point put by the hon. Gentleman and that he would like an assurance that this is so. The definition formerly in the Bill appeared to exclude a type of building which as originally constructed contained only houses but which as a result of structural alterations or changes of use now incorporates shops or other premises. This was not intended. The intention was to cover all kinds of Scottish tenements. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the definition now proposed will cover all of them and will not allow the type which I have mentioned to escape.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42—(Amounts Of Standard Grant)
Lords Amendment: In page 48, line 22, column 2, leave out from "and" to "satisfied" in line 23 and insert:
"before the time when the local authority approve the application they have been".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
I would suggest, Mr. Speaker, that we might perhaps deal at the same time with the remainder of the Lords Amendments to this Clause.Yes, if that is convenient.
The Bill provides for an enlarged, higher contribution from the taxpayer to the cost of providing standard improvements to a house should it be necessary, in order to carry out the standard improvements, that a bathroom should be added in a building at the back of the house or if cold water has to be introduced for the first time into the dwelling. But the Bill did not provide certain consequent arrangements which this group of Amendments seeks to introduce.
The Amendments cover three separate items. The first is where the upper limit shall apply, and that is that a maximum of up to £350 as opposed to £155 shall be paid by the taxpayer in virtue of the standard improvement, and that in such a case it shall be necessary for the local authority to make up its mind as to what upper limit it will contribute on behalf of the taxpayer and itself towards the improvement of the house. That is the effect of the first five Amendments.
The others are consequential and provide that the local authority, having so decided, shall inform the would-be improver of what the upper limit will be which the improver shall receive if he carries out the improvement. There is a slight consequential change, that at the moment, as drafted, the Bill authorises the local authority to pay up to the total cost, not being more than £350, but does not bind it to pay £350 if that should be half of the total approved cost. The Amendments, rectify that.
I hope I have it right that one of the effects of the group of Amendments is that the local authority will have to decide in advance what upper limit it will go up to and tell the improver. What happens if after it has made up its mind and told the improver and the work goes on, it appears, for reasons no one foresaw, that the works will cost more? The local authority might feel that if it had had all the facts before it, some of which possibly could not have been before it, when it made its first decision, it might have made a different decision. Has the local authority in the light of that any power to vary the decision? If not, it seems to me that we are putting a rather inflexible provision into the Bill.
1.0 p.m. The other point arises from the fact that the Amendments are so complicated that it is a little difficult to tell for certain just what they do and do not cover. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman can tell me whether there is anything in them which deals with the matter of modified improvement grants which we discussed at some length in Committee—the principle that, if a building has not a life before it of 15 years but only 10, the local authority should be allowed to make, in these circumstances, a modified grant. The point was argued in this House and again in Committee in another place, and my reason for thinking that there might, somewhere in these Amendments, be something dealing with the point is a remark made by Lord Hastings, speaking for the Government when this matter was discussed in the House of Lords. He said at the conclusion of a discussion on a proposed new Clause to provide for such modified Amendments:I assume that "take in" in that context means include and not deceive. He added:"I will consider it and discuss it again with the Department, and see whether there is anything that can be done in an extremely limited number of cases. It certainly would not take in a great many people."
In the light of that undertaking, I studied the Amendments to see whether the fact that the noble Lord was to consider it again and discuss it with the Department had produced any result. Quite frankly, I cannot see that any of the Amendments in this group do cover it. Nor can I see, if they do not cover it, any others that do. Was there further consideration and discussion with the Department? If so, has this produced any result in Amendments from another place?"That is all I can say at the moment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 2nd June 1964; Vol. 258, cc. 456 and 457.]
The hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) is right on the first point. When it comes to putting in cold water into what may well be an old house it is often not easy to decide what the cost will be. However, I think that local authorities, clients and builders are used to including in estimates a provisional sum sufficient to cover the cost, and the grant will apply to whatever is actually spent within that provisional estimate. If they go wildly wrong in the estimate—getting the maximum wrong—I fear that there is no provision here for that. But they are all used to this situation.
The hon. Gentleman is also quite right to search for pearls in this group of Amendments. But again I fear that there are only the three to which I referred. The answer to this question about Lord Hastings' undertaking to consult and think again is that no further Amendment has been suggested.Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to. [ Special entries.]
Clause 44—(Standard Grants Excluded For Certain Houses And Other Buildings In Multiple Occupation)
Lords Amendment: In page 50, line 28, after "1959" insert:
"so far as it relates to applications made by virtue of section 41 of this Act".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This Amendment has been introduced, on the suggestion of Lord Latham, to enable a standard grant to be made in respect of improvements of dwellings in houses in multi-occupation to the level of the full range of standard amenities.
Question put and agreed to. [ Special entry.]
Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.
Clause 52—(Conditions Attaching To Improvement Grants And Standard Grants In England And Wales: Rent Limit)
Lords Amendment: In page 57, line 23, after "Sections" insert "2,".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The Bill provides that, under certain circumstances, the landlord may increase the rent in a certain way but it does not provide that he must give notice of such an increase. The Amendment rectifies that omission.Question put and agreed to.
Clause 68—(Restriction On Recovery Of Possession After Making Of Compulsory Purchase Order)
Lords Amendment: In page 72, line 32, leave out "nine" and insert "twelve".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This Amendment, which increases the period during which a landlord cannot, under the circumstances described, recover possession of his property without the permission of the court during the relevant period, extends the relevant period from nine to twelve months. This is a result of representations made by the hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) and a number of his hon. Friends during the Report stage in this House and I think that it will meet the wishes of all that this Amendment should be made.
We certainly welcome this Amendment as far as it goes, but I am still a little sorry that it has not been so worded as to close the gap completely. It was never quite clear to me why we could not say that, when a compulsory purchase order had been made, it should be impossible, except with the approval of the court, to turn the tenant out until the matter had been finally determined either by the acquisition of the House by the local authority or by the quashing of the order.
I agree that extending the relevant period from nine to 12 months makes it more likely that there will not be any gap period when it is still uncertain as to what was to happen to the order and during which the landlord could turn the tenant out. But it is not clear yet why we could not have worded it so as to make it clear that in no circumstances could there be any gap. The principle is reasonable. If the local authority applies for power to purchase a house, the landlord should not be allowed to turn the tenant out until it is finally decided whether or not the local authority is to have the house—in which case he will never be able to turn the tenant out. If the order is quashed, he will have the same rights as he had before proceedings were instituted.In this esoteric language in which we speak of these things, the hon. Gentleman is, I presume, referring to the fear that some compulsory purchase orders might not be settled aye or nay within even twelve months. I think that he would have a case if the average period for dealing with orders of this nature were anywhere near 12 months, but I can assure him that the average period for such orders is somewhere between 30 to 35 weeks.
I expect that, if a local authority pursues its processes with diligence, some weeks could be cut even from that average. The Department realises that there is a special necessity here to work as quickly as practicable and therefore there is ample margin to make this an effective cover for security for the tenant in every case where an order is made.I see the point but I am still not entirely happy. The right hon. Gentleman said that the average was about 30 weeks. But that is nearly three-quarters of a year and it is of the essence of averaging that some of the things one is considering are above the average. In addition, how long the period is in any particular case does not only depend on the diligence of the local authority but on the diligence of the Ministry as well.
I cannot see what harm would have been done in so wording the Amendment as to give exactly the effect I described just now, instead of prescribing a period of time. I agree, however, that it is unlikely that the thing would ever run beyond 12 months. But, if we are to amend the provision at all, why should we not amend it in a way which would make it quite certain that that could never happen? However, it is clear from the reference to a period of 35 weeks that it was desirable to extend the relevant period from nine to 12 months, because if the average were: 35 weeks, there might have been some which ran beyond the period of nine months. The increase from nine to 12 months is certainly better than nothing, and to that extent we are glad to welcome the Amendment.Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.
Lords Amendment: In page 72, line 37, at end insert:
"(1A) Subject to this section, in proceedings in the county court instituted during the relevant period to enforce against the former lessee the right to recover possession of the premises the court may if it thinks fit—(a) suspend the execution of any order for possession of the premises made in the proceedings for such period, not exceeding the period of twelve months beginning with the making of the said compulsory purchase order, and subject to such conditions, if any, as the court thinks fit, and (b) from time to time vary the period of suspension (but not so as to enlarge that period beyond the end of the said period of twelve months), or terminate it, and vary the terms of the order in other respects.
If at any time the Minister notifies the local authority that he declines to confirm the said compulsory purchase order, or that order is quashed by a court, or, whether before or after that order has been submitted to the Minister for confirmation, the local authority decide not to proceed with it, it shall be the duty of the local authority to notify the person entitled to the benefit of the order for possession of the premises, and that person shall be entitled, on applying to the court, to obtain an order terminating the period of suspension, but subject to the exercise of such discretion in fixing the date on which possession is to be given as the court might exercise apart from this subsection if it were then making an order for possession for the first time."
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
I suggest that the following Amendment may be taken with this one.If that is agreeable.
During the debate on the protection for tenants during the consideration of a compulsory purchase order, it was pointed out by the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) that while the tenants were protected against any eviction, save where the landlord got the authority of the court, the discretion given to the court to refuse eviction was limited to a matter of only a few weeks. It was pointed out from this side of the House that the tenant had the whole period during which the case was brought by the landlord to the court and the period during which the case had to wait before the court would deal with it, as well as the few weeks which judicially could be given before the eviction notice would bite.
Nevertheless, the point was fairly taken then that even with the protection provided it would be possible for a landlord to get the approval of the court to an eviction even before the compulsory purchase order had been considered and a decision taken by the Minister within what was then nine months and what has now been extended to twelve months. Consequently, the Amendment provides further protection for the tenants in a house for which a compulsory purchase order is being made. The form of the extra protection is that the court has power to extend the security of the tenant for up to a maximum period of twelve months, always provided that, if during that period the compulsory purchase order is quashed, it will be open to the landlord to seek the recovery of the property and that it shall be an obligation on the local authority to inform the landlord that the compulsory purchase order has been quashed. Even in this case the Amendment provides that it shall be open to the court, when considering the landlord's application for recovery of premises on which a compulsory purchase order has been quashed, to exercise its discretion about the further period of security given to the tenant within the maximum period of 12 months. I hope that this will be an acceptable further increase in the security of such tenants.1.15 p.m.
This is a welcome Amendment, because I always felt that it made a mockery of the law that it should be possible for landlords to get the tenant out when there were proceedings for compulsory purchase pending. Any measure which makes that less likely and which gives protection to the tenant in such circumstances is to be welcomed.
However, I cannot leave the Amendment without expressing my regret that the protection given in this and the preceding Amendments and the whole Clause applies only when it is a house let in lodgings or occupied by members of more than one family. I would have thought that the principle that it was a mockery of the law to allow a landlord to get the tenant out when the question of whether the house was to be compulsorily acquired was still pending was as sound if there was only one family as tenants as when the house was let in lodgings or occupied by more than one family. I regret that even in its amended form the Bill still gives this protection only to houses let in lodgings or to members of more than one family. This is a matter to which the House will have to return subsequently, when it will have to extend this principle to all dwellings.Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.
Clause 74—(Periodical Payments To Dispossessed Proprietor)
Lords Amendment: In page 79, line 17, leave out from "and" to "for" in line 18 and insert:
"if any dispute arises under paragraph (b) of this subsection, the local authority or the person claiming the compensation may by means of a reference in writing submit the dispute".
I beg to move, That this House cloth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
I suggest that the following Amendment may be taken together with this one.If that is agreeable to the House.
These two Amendments deal with only a very minor matter of machinery. In dealing with compensation for the dispossessed proprietor of a house taken over by a control order, there may sometimes be a question of a dispossessed proprietor who owns only half a dwelling, or only part of whose dwelling has been made the subject of a control order.
This can occur either because the dispossessed proprietor retains for his own occupation part of the multi-occupied dwelling, or because there are several dispossessed proprietors in the multi-occupied dwelling. The latter case might arise where a number of tenants of a dwelling have each sub-let their own part of that dwelling. In such cases, it is necessary for the compensation to be divided equitably among the dispossessed proprietors concerned or, if there is one dispossessed proprietor, for him to have his due share in respect of the control order part of the dwelling. This was done under the Bill as drafted by the valuer working on a division of the gross rateable value of the property. All these two Amendments do is to require that the question to the valuer shall be put in writing, so that all we are doing is making a minor administrative improvement in the machinery.Question put and agreed to.
Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to. [ Several with Special Entries.]
Clause 99—(Other Minor Amendments Of Housing Acts)
Lords Amendment: In page 108, line 28, at end insert:
"(3) In section 69(3) of the Act of 1957 (under which a local authority may issue a certificate that a house is fit for human habitation and will remain so fit for a specified period, not being less than five nor more than ten years) for the word ' ten' there shall be substituted the word 'fifteen'".
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
Under Section 69 of the 1957 Housing Act the owner of a house who proposes to improve it may apply to the local authority for a certificate showing that under certain circumstances, or, rather, subject to certain conditions connected with the fitness of the house and assuming that the house in the local authority's view shall have a life of not less than five and no more than 10 years, the owner shall be entitled to reecive from the local authority a certificate to that effect. If the local authority gives such a certificate, then for the period set out in it the local authority is debarred from taking action to secure the demolition of the house as unfit for human habitation either by including it in a clearance area under Part III of the 1957 Act or by means of a demolition order under Part II of the 1957 Act. During the debates on the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) pointed out that, since an improvement grant cannot be given unless the house has a life of at least 15 years, surely the 10-year maximum period under Section 65 should be extended to 15 years, so that if such an extension were made an owner could get a certificate excluding the possibility of the demolition of the house as unfit for habitation for a period up to 15 years. This seems to make sense, and this Amendment provides for the extension of the period from 10 to 15 years.Question put and agreed to.
Clause 102—(General Interpretation And Temporary Modification As Regards London)
Lords Amendment: In page 110, leave out line 12.
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
With the permission of the House, I should like to take this Amendment and the following two together.If that is the wish of the House.
The effect of these three Amendments is to make Part I of the Bill, together with a few Clauses in Part V of the Bill which are connected with Part I, effective on the passage of the Bill into law. Whereas Parts II, III and IV of the Bill will need a certain amount of preparatory advice from my Department and will involve the local authorities in a certain amount of preparatory thought and work and therefore we are content that they should come into effect a month after the passage of the Bill into law, Part I of the Bill can lead to action immediately.
That is why these Amendments are proposed, and I hope that they are acceptable to the House.Question put and agreed to.
Remaining Lords Amendments agreed to. [ Special entries.]
Adjournment
Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. R. W. Elliott.]
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-five minutes past One o'clock.