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Commons Chamber

Volume 717: debated on Tuesday 27 July 1965

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House Of Commons

Tuesday, 27th July, 1965

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Private Business

Birkenhead Corporation (Mersey Tunnel Approaches) Bill

City Of London (Various Powers) Bill

Mersey Tunnel (Liverpool/Wallasey), Etc, Bill

Lords Amendments considered and agreed to.

Brighton Skydeck Bill Lords

[ Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified]

Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

Conway Corporation Bill Lords

Read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

Pembrokeshire County Council Bill Lords

[ Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified]

Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

Rochdale Canal Bill Lords

A verbal Amendment made to the Bill; Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

Oral Answers To Questions

Technology

Foreign Countries (Mutual Development Projects)

1.

asked the Minister of Technology what discussions he has held with foreign countries regarding the mutual development of advanced technological projects.

As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary explained on 3rd May, the possibilities of practical collaboration in the fields of aircraft development and other advanced technologies are being considered with various European Governments. In my own field there have been a number of talks at the official level, but matters have not yet reached the stage where discussions between Ministers would be fruitful.

Does the Minister agree that really it is extremely important that we should get closer co-operation with Europe in the field of science, and has he carried out any detailed analysis to find out in which sectors of science and technology such co-operation would be fruitful?

It is, of course, highly desirable that there should be collaboration in civil technological subjects, but I repeat that it is in the best interests of all of us that we should not hurry into something of no commercial value to us. The hon. Gentleman will have heard of the steps taken in one field and we hope that there will be opportunities to develop others, but this is not primarily a Government responsibility.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that, with the approval of his Ministry, a conference was held three weeks ago with all the European technicians with regard to computers and space research with a view to finding out how far the private enterprise computer and space research industry could collaborate in having an independent European production of these articles?

I am aware of that conference, of course, because we participated in it, but I remain convinced that it is primarily a commercial job in the first instance.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a number of analogue computers were being used in connection with the TSR2? Is he taking any steps to see whether these computers might be useful in the joint development, for example, of the swept-wing aircraft with the French?

No, Sir. I have not. This is primarily the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation.

Computer Advisory Unit

2.

asked the Minister of Technology what is the number of civil servants currently employed in the Computer Advisory Unit.

Does the right hon. Gentleman consider that this unit has an expanding rôle? Can he hazard a guess as to how many civil servants there might be in 12 months?

I believe that the unit has an expanding rôle. As I outlined in my speech in the recent debate, it is likely to grow. The extent to which it grows is dependent upon the rate at which we are able to recruit people, but certainly there will be growth.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that this extension of the interests of the Computer Advisory Unit to cover those of the local authorities and the nationalised industries should have been made 10 years ago? Is he aware that a further extension might now be required to enable the Conservative Party to elect its new leader?

Order. I do not think that the Minister even of Technology can assume Ministerial responsibility for answering that. The first part was a matter of opinion, so the Minister cannot answer that either.

Will the right hon. Gentleman consider giving more information about the number of cases that the unit has considered and which are currently under review? The difficulty faced by the House, as the right hon. Gentleman realises, is how to measure all the efforts and information that the unit has to offer?

There have been a considerable number of cases, but there is a later Question on the subject and I hope to draw the House's attention to it then.

9.

asked the Minister of Technology when the Computer Advisory Unit will be making its report to him; and whether he will make a statement.

The computer advisory service reports to my right hon. Friend continuously on technical aspects of computer policy and on proposals in the public sector to acquire computers as they arise.

Fast Breeder Reactor (Site)

3.

asked the Minister of Technology, in view of the fact that the most appropriate location for the forthcoming fast breeder new type reactor station is at or near Dounreay Atomic Station, with its relevant scientific equipment and staff, if he will now take steps to have it placed there; and when he will now take decisions on whether the project will proceed and on where it will be sited.

10.

asked the Minister of Technology when he expects to make a statement on the siting of the prototype fast breeder reactor.

19.

asked the Minister of Technology whether he will now announce the siting of the proposed prototype fast breeder reactor.

I expect the Atomic Energy Authority to submit to me its proposals for a prototype fast reactor some time in the next few months. As soon as possible thereafter the Government will announce their decision whether to proceed and, if so, where the reactor should be built. The claims of Dounreay will be taken fully into account along with those of other possible locations.

Does not my right hon. Friend realise that it would be in the national interest if the splendid but largely experimental work carried out at Dounreay were linked up with an adjacent factory of a productive character producing scientific instruments, fine tools, machine tools and similar articles, which at present have to be imported from Germany and elsewhere, to the national loss? Will my right hon. Friend take steps to bring this about?

This is a difficult assessment to undertake. One has first to understand what the experimental reactor is doing and what a prototype fast reactor would do. It would be a producer of energy for transmission to industry. That would be the purpose and not to be used as an instrument to make fine tools. Wherever it is placed it will inevitably create energy that will require to be transmitted to an adjacent industrial area. But it would not be the corollary of putting it in an area that one should set up another establishment at the same time.

Can my right hon. Friend indicate when the Atomic Energy Authority will be making its recommendations to him? Will it be this side of October or November? Can he further say what representations he has received, particularly from Scottish sources, on the siting of the fast reactor in the Highlands on social, economic, political and every other ground one can think of?

I cannot state precisely when the Atomic Energy Authority will report to me, but, as I have said before, I hope it will not be much longer before I can announce the date. Delay was caused by the fact that the Authority had to complete work on the design of the fuel elements before it could make suggestions as to the creation of the prototype reactor itself. Representations have been made to me from Scotland, and they have been very substantial. Indeed, many areas have made a point that it should be placed where it would be of the greatest value to Scottish development.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the last Government intended to come to a decision on this matter in March or April this year because they were concerned about research work drying up at Dounreay and a consequent brain drain? Why is it taking so long to come to a decision?

The facts are not as the hon. Gentleman suggests. The last Government were not intending to come to a decision by March or April. They could not have done so until they received the report from the Authority. Research work is not drying up. The Authority has a considerable amount of work to do at Dounreay. My understanding of the approach is that the facilities will be used for the creation of power for development of the Dounreay area in toto.

Nevertheless, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that considerable anxiety has been expressed by many bodies and by hon. Members on both sides about the delay in the decision? Is he further aware that Mr. Norman Elliott, Chairman of the South of Scotland Electricity Board, has come out in favour of the reactor being placed at Dounreay? Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the work on burn-up in the fuel elements is sufficiently advanced to make the prototype forecast compare favourably with the advanced gas-cooled reactors?

I would not be prepared to confirm that until I have received the report. As the hon. Gentleman is aware, I am conscious of the anxiety over where the prototype is to be placed. Indeed, he and I were together during a recent visit to examine the social and economic problems affecting Caithness. The decision will not be delayed any longer than is required to consider all the economic and social consequences.

Marine Nuclear Reactors

4.

asked the Minister of Technology if he will now make a statement on the progress of the development of marine nuclear reactors.

36.

asked the Minister of Technology whether he is satisfied with the rate of progress of development of atomic reactors for marine propulsion of surface vessels and that sufficient manpower and resources are now being devoted to this; and if he will make a statement.

The Joint Anglo-Belgian programme on the Vulcain reactor continues as planned and the experimental operation of a Vulcain-type core in the Belgian BR. 3 reactor is about to start. As my replies to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. J. H. Osborn) on 7th July indicated, the effort on marine reactor research and development has been diminishing for some time, pending a Government decision on a nuclear merchant ship. I am satisfied that the Authority was right to reduce its effort.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a considerable volume of professional opinion believes that no further technical advance can be obtained until a prototype ship is afloat? As the matter has been under consideration by the Government for some months, when can we expect a final decision on a prototype nuclear-propelled ship?

I am aware that there are some views to the effect that there can be no further developments until they can be put into practical operation. But there are also views that it is useful to continue the programme envisaged for reactors in order to get information for purposes other than propulsion for nuclear ships. We are all conscious of the need for an early decision, and I hope that there will be an announcement before the Recess. I cannot go beyond that today.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the fact that he has reduced the number of people working on the subject, together with the expenditure, almost forces him to reach a decision quickly, otherwise we shall ask him "Why"?

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the United States Government are experiencing considerable difficulty in connection with their nuclear ship "Savannah", about which there was so much enthusiasm some time ago? Before the Government reach a decision, will they consider all the factors involved, including the cost, so as not to waste money?

I do not want to anticipate the statement which, as I have said, will be given before the Recess. One must recognise that there are considerable differences of opinion about the value of nuclear propulsion for commercial shipping at this time. There are no successful examples of it in the world now, and there is little enthusiasm amongst the maritime nations to develop nuclear ships.

Hovercraft

5.

asked the Minister of Technology if he will now make a statement on the future of the Hovercraft industry.

As my hon. Friend will remember, I referred to Hovercraft in some detail during the debate on 14th July, 1965. The Hovercraft industry has got off to a good start, and I believe that Hovercraft will make a valuable contribution to transport and to our exports.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is great potential for the Hovercraft in a cross-Channel service, and particularly a cross-Channel ferry service? Will he and his right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport do whatever they can to encourage British operators to get into this field so that it will not be left to foreign operators?

Discussions are at present in train between us on the possibility of a Solent ferry service being operated by British Railways. It is necessary to remember when talking of the Hovercraft, as I made clear in the recent debate, they were not simply created for internal use. They were also designed to have export possibilities, and if people buy them they have to have somewhere to use them. There have to be some easy waterways in order for experiments to be carried out. We hope that the Hovercraft will be a commercial success, which is why we are asking British Railways to continue its experiments in this direction.

Has the right hon. Gentleman had any discussions with the Secretary of State for Scotland about the use of the Hovercraft for communication between the islands of Scotland? Further, has he had any discussions with the Minister for Overseas Development about the possibility of using Hovercraft instead of helicopters on rescue operations in areas with poor communications, such as Pakistan, where the recent flood disaster could have provided a splendid opportunity to use them?

I have not had direct discussions with the two Ministers concerned on the specific subjects mentioned by the hon. Member. The subject is still under consideration by the Interservices Hovercraft Working Party, which is considering where they can be used. There are some really valuable uses to which they can be put at the moment.

What advice, if any, has the right hon. Gentleman received on the potential of the Hovercraft in relation to the Channel Tunnel?

Have I got the question correctly? Did the right hon. Gentleman mention Hovercraft in relation to the Channel Tunnel?

I asked what technical advice has the right hon. Gentleman received, if any, on the potential of the Hovercraft in relation to the Channel Tunnel.

Unless someone has been misleading me, they are not constructing the tunnel for Hovercraft; they are constructing it for rail services. If there is any basis for an assumption that Hovercraft might be a useful creature to operate in the Tunnel, I suggest that a direct Question should be put down.

Machine Tools

6.

asked the Minister of Technology what action he has taken in the last two months about the cyclical difficulties in the pattern of machine tool ordering within that industry.

32.

asked the Minister of Technology when he expects to have the report of the working party set up to study the difficulties created by the cyclical pattern of machine tool ordering.

As I told the House on 14th July, the membership of the working party I have appointed to study these difficulties is now complete. The Working party has held its first meeting and I have asked it to report as soon as possible.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say how long it took the working party before it held its first meeting after 14th June? Secondly, what is the present position in relation to the cycle in the pattern of machine tool ordering in the industry?

The working party has had its first meeting. I have not got the particular date. It is a substantial committee in its own right. I did not quite understand the second part of the supplementary question. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would put it down.

There has been a cycle of ordering in the machine tool industry which that industry has found it difficult to carry. When he answered a similar Question last time he said that he was considering financing the stocks in this difficult cycle. What is the position of that cycle at the moment?

This machine tool committee has been asked to consider the problem of cyclical difficulties. We have placed in front of it a number of tasks upon which it can make its examination, one of which is the question of the ordering of stocks in slack periods and the ordering of prototype models. It has not yet reached its conclusions on this, but it will let me know as soon as it has. I suggest that we should not get into the position where we assume that the committee will resolve the problem of cyclical ordering of machine tools. It is not a function of the committee.

Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the latest published figures suggest that in the three months ending in April the new home orders for machine tools are 20 per cent. lower than for the preceding three months? In view of that trend, does he not agree that it would be highly desirable that this committee should report at the earliest possible moment?

I agree. The hon. Member will recall that in the debate on technology I mentioned that the Machine Tool Trades Association had not expressed such concern as I did about this problem, because I think it is a wrong position where we have a down-turn in our machine tool ordering at this time. But this machine tool committee is a committee of some substance, and the people on it know what it is all about. It consists of people like Sir William Carron, Mr. Harrison of Alfred Herbert Ltd., and Mr. Kearns, Chairman of the M.T.T.A. They know what the problems are. I mention those three people as an indication of that fact that this is a committee of substance.

13.

asked the Minister of Technology to what extent his Department is consulting the machine tool industry with a view to extending public participation in the manufacture of machine tools.

I am not at present planning an extension of public ownership into the manufacture of machine tools. No consultations are therefore taking place.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that we on these benches have been pressing for a consideration of this policy for a very long time in view of the inefficiency of the machine tool industry, as at present owned and controlled? Is my right hon. Friend looking at this again, because progress is going to be slow unless he carries out this consultation?

Of course, we are aware of the dissatisfaction that has existed in some quarters about the pace of growth in the machine tool industry and its inability, in some cases, to meet requirements of modern industry. The question specifically asked of me was whether I have plans at the moment, and the answer to that is certainly not.

Would the right hon. Gentleman be assured that, whatever his Left-wing friends want, public participation in the machine tool industry would not help it at present? What is really required at the present time is a new scheme of investment allowances to get over the cyclical trend.

I do not accept that that is a right conclusion. The question I was asked was whether I had had any discussion as to the possibility of public ownership at this time. The answer is still "No".

Will my right hon. Friend have a careful look at the very substantial imports of machine tools with a view to establishing Government manufacturing facilities in this field to which the machine tool industry has at present expressed a complete indifference?

In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman was very anxious to deny that there was any risk of a sword of Damocles hanging over the industry, may I ask him what he is now going to do with the lesser swords being hung over it by his hon. Friends?

One of the things which I feel would be helpful to the machine tool industry would be for it to recognise that we have set up an appraisal team which has a responsible task in trying to determine the issues and problems confronting the machine tool industry. The House should address itself to serious questions so that we can help rather than hinder the industry.

Women Scientists

11.

asked the Minister of Technology what steps he is taking to encourage the recruitment of women scientists into the computer industry.

The Ministry of Technology is examining with the others concerned the need for further training courses to increase the supply of computer staff of all kinds. My right hon. Friend understands that the computer manufacturers would be glad to recruit more women scientists with the right talents and qualifications. If my hon. Friend has any evidence to the contrary, the Minister will be glad to consider it.

I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. I am glad that he and the computer industry realise that there is a great deal of skill and ability among women—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and not only in matters of science and technology? May I remind him that a recent educational survey showed that girls in secondary and grammar schools—and, therefore, the heads of mixed and girls' secondary and grammar schools—are unaware of the opportunities that are available for girls and women in science and technology? Will my hon. Friend, therefore, take this matter up with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Education and Science and see that all the available information goes into all the secondary schools?

On the first part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question, I would say that she proved her point a long time ago, as far as the abilities of married women are concerned. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear"] Some hon. Members opposite have nasty looks on their faces. Currently, there are shortages of mathematicians and physicists in industry, so there is no difficulty in married women who opt out of computer work for a period finding other employment. But in the next two or three years we shall need between 300 and 400 more people in this work, and it will be quite a job training them. I hope that my hon. Friend's Question will have some effect in obtaining publicity.

Is my hon. Friend aware that it will be dangerous to rely wholly on the computer-producing industry to produce the necessary amount of staff for industries requiring computers? Is he further aware that last week I took a short course on computers, at the hands of a lady systems analyser, with, I think, beneficial results?

I was only going to add that currently there are about 200 courses with some element of computer knowledge at the technical colleges and universities in this country. My right hon. Friend, together with other Members of the Government, is examining the whole question of facilities.

Computer Industry

14.

asked the Minister of Technology what discussions he is having with the computer industry in Great Britain to expand production to meet foreign competition, with particular reference to modern design and price.

My Department keeps in close touch with computer manufacturers on all these matters.

Would my right hon. Friend not agree that it is not design or price but rapidity of introduction and new equipment by British manufacturers which matters?

This is the criticism that has been made against the British computer industry very frequently. It is not so much design or price. It can be argued whether a particular design is the most suitable one, but there have been considerable delays in the introduction of new equipment. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wallasey (Mr. Marples), on the last occasion of a technology debate, drew attention to the fact that he had been giving particular attention to the question of software. We also have been giving some attention to this and hope that the British computer industry will recognise that that is one of its failings and help us in that direction.

Would my right hon. Friend consider inviting British computer manufacturers to put forward a design for a computer which could be used in schools, because the industry will not have sufficient people who know how to use computers unless we begin training them, as in the United States and the U.S.S.R., at school? Furthermore, will he bear in mind that the successful design and manufacture of cheap computers for schools would be of tremendous export value?

One of the British computer manufacturers is already tackling this. It forms part of our discussions with the Department of Education and Science, because we, too, believe that there needs to be training of young people in the use of computers.

In order to keep part of world trade looking towards this part of Europe, has the Minister any views on the suggested merger between an English computer firm and a French one?

This is a different question. It was raised a little earlier on another question, probably before the hon. Gentleman entered the Chamber. I have said that this is, in some cases, a matter for commercial interests in the first instance. They have drawn my attention, as the Minister responsible, to this, and we shall be dealing with it at some time.

Holland And East German Research Stations (Co-Operation)

15.

asked the Minister of Technology what technical co-operation exists between the research stations of his Department and similar establishments in Holland and East Germany.

The Ministry's research stations exchange information as appropriate with the corresponding research institutes in Holland. There is rather less contact with East Germany.

I am glad about the first part of the Answer, but not about the second. Can I ask my hon. Friend if he is aware that, in the field of industrial building in particular, we have a great deal to learn from East Germany? Is he also aware that officers in his Department are not allowed to go on official vists to East Germany, and, if they do go in order to visit scientific establishments, they have to go at their own expense and take time out of their annual leave? We are the losers in this. Will my hon. Friend undertake to have a look at this so that it is put on a more sensible basis?

My hon. Friend will accept that this is a difficult question in view of the political atmosphere in relation to East Germany since the end of the war, which obviously creates some difficulties. It would be a mistake to believe that there are no contacts with East Germany. The Warren Spring Laboratory and an East German scientific institute are co-operating at present, and there is an exchange of research reports.

Kipper Sausages

16.

asked the Minister of Technology if he is aware that the new discovery by Aberdeen's Torry Research Station under the auspices of the Herring Industry Board, whereby kipper sausages can be produced with the herring bones eliminated, can be of commercial value to Scotland and of benefit to consumers; and when the process will be completed so that they can be put on sale.

The process referred to is being developed by staff of the British Food Manufacturing Industries Research Association, which is an independent organisation, grant-aided by the Ministry of Technology. The results are promising, but I cannot say when they will be ready for commercial application.

Does the Minister realise that it is the partnership of the herring with Aberdeen Angus that has made the British nation great? Will he give what assistance he can to this very desirable experiment with a view to maintaining the greatness of the British Commonwealth of Nations?

While not wanting to go too far into the possible effects of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the consumption of kipper sausages, it is true that research is going on into this, but the commercial value to Scotland of smoked fish sausages is said to be uncertain.

British Industry (Modernisation)

17.

asked the Minister of Technology what measures he is now taking to encourage the modernisation of British industry and to make it more competitive in world markets.

I would refer the hon. Member to the full account I gave of my Department's activities in the debate on 14th July.

Quite apart from the strictures of the Estimates Committee, which are very serious, would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that one of the most helpful steps that he personally could take to make British industry more competitive in world markets would be to support the incomes policy of the Cabinet of which he is a member? Does he support that policy or that of the Transport and General Workers' Union? If it is the latter, he ought, in decency, to resign from the Government.

There has been rather a lot of noise. The hon. Gentleman was asking about the modernising of British industry.

Could I deal with the relevant part of the question? I was reminded of the strictures of the the Estimates Committee. It would not be my wish at this time to make a comment about this. I shall do so at the appropriate time, but I would remind the hon. Gentleman that these great strictures which were made—and not the way they were reported in the Press—were that we had not put people from industry on the appraisal committees, a fact which I denied a few moments ago by giving the names of some members of one of the main committees. Another of the strictures was that there had been a delay in making appointments and that there was topheaviness of structure. I hope that this House will at some time get round to the idea that it is much more important to know whether we are going to put the British computer industry, or any other industry, on its feet, rather than whether I have two deputy secretaries in my Department.

Will the right hon. Gentlemen remember the advice of his hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, West (Dr. Bray) and throw his weight about in Whitehall rather more? Will he try to persuade his hon. and right hon. Friends to use the purchasing power of Government and local government agencies to place orders only with companies and firms which are using modern equipment and techniques?

This is part of the approach which my Ministry is making to other Government Departments. When we get down to the question of bringing practical issues before the House, I wonder how many hon. Members opposite would support the idea that we should throw our weight about to place orders where we want.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is a sad reflection on the so-called attributes of private enterprise that they have to be so dependent on his Ministry encouraging them to do what they ought to have been doing long ago?

Boac And Bea (Computers)

18.

asked the Minister of Technology what co-operation he has been able to achieve between the British Overseas Airways Corporation and British European Airways in the use and purchase of British computers.

20.

asked the Minister of Technology what steps he is taking to ensure that the computer to be purchased by the British Overseas Airways Corporation will be compatible with that already in use by British European Airways.

Both Corporations have at different times from 1963 onwards satisfied the Government of the day that the computer systems of their choice were the best technical and commercial solutions to their requirements. The computer systems of the Corporations already intercommunicate, but the new equipment which B.O.A.C. are ordering will make this easier. It is important that each Corporation should have the system which meets its requirements, and these are not necessarily identical.

If the right hon. Gentleman wants to put the British computer industry on its feet, surely he could use his influence with nationalised Corporations such as B.O.A.C. to buy a British computer system, because this is the one Corporation which could assist the British computer industry in its developments.

Yes, Sir, I agree that this should have been the position. However, I would remind the hon. Member of the point I made, namely, that since 1963 both Corporations have made it clear to the Government and had the Government's endorsement that they should purchase the computers which they require. They put forward the reasoning—it was put to me in the technological debate—that I ought not to interfere if the Corporations were satisfied that they were getting the best piece of equipment. I happen to hold different views about this, but the facts were as I stated.

While accepting at once that it is in the interests of both Corporations that they should buy the computers best fitted to their own services, would the Minister not agree that it is wrong that B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. should not have reciprocity; that they are not able to programme one another's passenger information so as to pass it on to one another? Is this not the same as building one railway line with a 4 ft. 8in. gauge and another with a 5 ft. 2 in. gauge? They must be compatible.

It is not the same. The particular operations which these computers are doing are ticket and passenger checking and documentation. These were the aspects in which they were making themselves compatible with American lines which use the international airways. The B.E.A. machine is compatible, to a degree, with the new machine which is being ordered. Therefore, it is not worsening the situation. It is, if anything, easing it. The Corporations, although entitled to have advice and guidance from us—they had it from our Computer Advisory Unit—have been given a wide degree of freedom from Ministerial control in the past, and they exercise this—all the nationalised industries do.

Is the Minister aware that this illustrates the need for continuity in such complex systems and that, if we are to avoid such quandaries arising in the future, all the work of his Programming Centre and Computer Advisory Unit is needed to lay the foundations of a healthy industry in future?

That is obviously correct, and we are hoping that the unit will be of value to people who want to purchase computers before they place orders.

In view of the importance of compatibility in these computer systems, would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what the advice of the unit was?

On the advice of the unit, we saw no justifiable reason at this stage for preventing B.O.A.C. putting the order where it went.

Space Programme

21.

asked the Minister of Technology if he will make a statement on the space programme prepared by his department.

My right hon. Friend has no direct responsibility for space research but following an invitation from the Secretary of State for Education and Science, he has directed the Atomic Energy Authority to undertake research on the design of the "payload" for the large astronomical satellite project of the European Space Research Organisation. At present, the Authority is carrying out a preliminary design study, which is expected to take about six months.

Has there been co-operation between my right hon Friend's Department and the Postmaster-General about satellite communications?

There is very considerable co-operation and constant discussion between the two Departments.

Could my hon. Friend say when the satellite will be launched in Australia?

It is very difficult to give any precise date, but probably some time in 1967.

Prime Minister (Official Visits)

Q2.

asked the Prime Minister what official visits he proposes to make abroad during the month of October.

I have, as yet, no official visits arranged.

India (Nuclear Guarantee)

Q3.

asked the Prime Minister if he will now make a statement on the proposal that India should be given a nuclear guarantee.

Would the right hon. Gentleman recall that the last time he answered that question he said that he would deal with it in the debate which followed that Question Time, but in fact he did not deal with it? Some of us are getting anxious about what is happening here. Could he give us a little more information about whether there is any progress or not?

It is not for me to express any comment on the anxiety which hon. Members opposite are suffering. We attach great importance, as I have said, to this. I am sure that the hon. Member realises the very great difficulties of securing anything in the nature of a nuclear guarantee. I have nothing to add to what I have said today, and I had nothing to add in the debate.

In view of the importance of this subject, would it be the policy of the Government to discuss with the United States Government and the Soviet Union the possibility of a guarantee of the nuclear security of nonnuclear Powers as part of a non-dissemination agreement?

Yes, Sir. This is, of course, highly relevant to the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference which is to meet at Geneva in the near future, and the question of nuclear assurance of this kind is relevant to an anti-dissemination agreement.

Arms (Overseas Sale)

Q4.

asked the Prime Minister what steps he is taking to co-ordinate the activities of Departments concerned with the sale of British arms overseas.

If the hon. Member is concerned about co-ordination as it affects the positive selling of arms, I would refer him to the Answer given to him by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on 21st July.

Is the Prime Minister aware that on that occasion his right hon. Friend said that Sir Donald Stokes and the "super arms salesman", when appointed, would be concerned with the sale of secondhand arms, as well as the sale of new arms? How does he reconcile that statement with his own call on 16th December for a ban on the bloody traffic in secondhand arms?

I was referring to the extremely dangerous practice going on, which have been debated many times in the House, under which arms are transferred from Governments to private salesmen, who have been going all over the world selling arms to troublemakers and many of them have been used against British troops. My right hon. Friend's statement referred to Government-permitted sales to our allies and Commonwealth partners, whether they be new or secondhand arms. There is all the difference in the world between those two things.

Would my right hon. Friend agree that it is still the policy of the Government not to sell arms to South Africa?

Could my right hon. Friend assure us that we will not speed up arms and slow down housing? Is he aware that there is a great danger that this might lead to an inflation of the arms industry at a time when we need all the skilled labour for the advanced factories?

There is no question of speeding up arms production. We have had a number of historic debates in this Session when we have been voting in respect of cutting down on aircraft and other arms programmes which have become irrelevant to our defence needs. Where there is an agreement to arm some of our allies in N.A.T.O., we feel that United Kingdom types of weapons should be used and not exclusively American weapons, some of which have been sold as a result of pretty high pressure salesmanship.

Is the ban on the sale of secondhand arms still the policy of the Government, and do the Government intend to make any proposals in this field at the forthcoming disarmament conference?

I should not like to say at the moment whether it is appropriate at the disarmament conference or for straight handling at the United Nations. It is, and has been under successive Governments, the policy to keep very strict control over the sale of secondhand arms from this country. In my statement last December and previous statements I was concerned with international arms traffic through international privateers.

Battle Of Peterloo (Commemoration)

Q5.

asked the Prime Minister what official preparations are being made to commemorate the Battle of Peterloo.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that, inasmuch as recently we have been celebrating the Battle of Waterloo, in the opinion of many hon. Members on these benches the Battle of Peterloo is just as important, in view of the fact that this was the first Chartist demonstration?

I would not say that it was a Chartist demonstration. The Charter had not then been signed. In the Waterloo celebration we were celebrating a great victory by British and allied troops. I am not certain that it could be said that the actions of the 15th Hussars and the Cheshire Yeomanry in the Battle of Peterloo were quite such a glorious achievement.

Would the Prime Minister consider appointing the hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Hamling) Minister for Technology, as this would assist a forward-look generally?

I think that the last word was said in the Peterloo Medal when quoting Verse 14 of Psalm 37. The medal said that

"The wicked have drawn out the sword, and have bent their bow, to cast down the poor and needy, and to slay such as be of upright conversation."
For my part, while I am prepared to receive any representations from the Manchester City Council about any proposed celebration, I should prefer to leave it to Psalm 37.

Nuclear Weapons

Q6.

asked the Prime Minister on what date he received the letter and banner of the Hiroshima Mothers' Group for the Prevention of Nuclear War; if these are now available for inspection at No. 10 Downing Street; and if he will make a statement on the policy of the British Government towards the prohibition use, testing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

On 11th June, Sir, and the banner was later returned as requested to the sender. As for the Government's policy on nuclear weapons, I would refer my hon. Friend to my speech in the debate of 19th July and to the numerous Answers I have given to Questions on this subject.

With reference to that speech and subsequent references, will the Prime Minister confirm that it is still the policy and view of the Government on this question of the nuclear deterrent, in particular of the British independent nuclear deterrent, that, as was said in the Labour Party manifesto, it will not deter anyone and its possession will impress neither friend nor potential foe?

Yes, Sir. I think that what I said on 17th December showed that what was claimed to be an independent deterrent in fact was not. I think that our analysis has been confirmed by all the facts which we have learned since. I confirm, as I stated in the debate last December, that it is our policy to internationalise the so-called national deterrent.

Will the Prime Minister confirm that he will keep the British nuclear deterrent for use as a nuclear guarantee to India?

I have said that what we intend to do as far as India is concerned is to discuss the provision of an effective international deterrent for the purpose of any guarantee which may be worked out for India to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia.

Does my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister appreciate that it is not only the women of Japan who are concerned about the existence of nuclear weapons but women throughout the world, and the women of Great Britain in particular; and that they at least, as a majority group of world women, would appreciate this country's surrender of the right to test nuclear weapons and to have nuclear bases on British soil and the right to take part in nuclear alliances which are contrary to the United Nations Charter?

I accept that women all over the world want to see the end of nuclear weapons. This view is not, of course, confined to women. We all do. This is why the Government have taken the initative at Geneva—or will be doing so—in tabling proposals to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Our own national policies were fully explained on 16th and 17th December and subsequently. But I cannot accept that alliances of which we are members are contrary to the United Nations Charter.

Does the Prime Minister recall that the Muncipality of Hiroshima and the people of Hiroshima have made constant efforts to warn the nations of the world about the dangers of nuclear war? Will he ensure that if any Members of the present Government visit Japan they will go to Hiroshima and not avoid doing so as Tory Ministers did?

I will certainly consider my right hon. Friend's proposal. It is a fact that Japan has had a very real interest in warning the world about nuclear weapons. So, if I may say so, has my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker), and the chorus of groans from right hon. and hon. Members opposite every time a Nobel Peace Prizewinner gets to his feet is a further addition to our views about their international policies.

In order to get this into perspective, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that everyone on these benches—and, I feel, everyone on the Government benches—has been a member of the campaign for multilateral nuclear disarmament?

We have always supported a comprehensive multilateral agreement to ban nuclear weapons everywhere in the world—

although I think that some of the policies of the last Government stood in the way of that multilateral convention—[HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."]—with their harping on the so-called independent deterrent for purely domestic purposes. This is why my noble Friend is taking an initiative in the matter at Geneva.

On a point of order. As an ex-Tory Minister who visited Japan, may I be called to ask a supplementary question?

I am sorry. Hon. Members often have special claims to be called, but I have to ignore them in order to make progress.

Balance Of Payments

Q7.

asked the Prime Minister, in view of possible balance of payment difficulties arising during the Recess, what arrangements he is making for dealing with such difficulties; and if he will give an assurance that he will seek to recall Parliament if such a situation develops.

The balance of payments is much better than it was a year ago, and my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer hopes to make a Statement reinforcing previous Government measures later this afternoon. As for the second part of his Question, I would refer the hon. Member to the provisions of Standing Order No. 117.

Is the Prime Minister aware that many well-informed people think that the balance of payments crisis may develop more severely in September and that further measures may be necessary beyond those to be announced this afternoon? Will he give an assurance that Parliament would be recalled in such circumstances?

I am not sure that the hon. Member is aware of the text of the statement to be made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon. As for the views of certain well-informed people, I am anxious to know who is informing these well-informed people because, as I stated in the original Answer, compared with a balance-of-payments deficit of £800 million last year, all the signs are that the balance-of-payments deficit this year will be considerably less than half that figure, which is quite a good interim report.

Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the time has come when hon. Members of all parties, irrespective of their political views, should divest themselves of political prejudice and stop indulging in gloom and despondency? Does he recall that during the past years we have frequently had balance-of-payments problems but that on no occasion has the House been recalled to deal with them?

I particularly remember that in the very grave balance of payments crisis which followed Suez, when we were fully opposed to the Suez operation but when it was a question of strengthening sterling, we from the Opposition Box expressed our full support for any measures to save sterling, despite the fact that we were completely opposed to the policy which had led to the crisis in the case of Suez.

The right hon. Gentleman has said that three times in this Session. Will he take it from me that it is quite incorrect and that in fact the Finance Bill and the policy of imposing temporary increases in taxation were opposed through all their stages by the Labour Party.

In fact the right hon. Gentleman is a year out. The Finance Bill was in the previous year. Perhaps he is referring to the Autumn Budget, and the following Finance Bill. If the right hon. Gentleman is saying that if an Opposition opposes a Finance Bill it is acting against sterling, I will take his point, whatever the motives for the protracted debate on the Finance Bill. But in that case we supported the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Macmillan, in his demand that action be taken to save sterling. But we reserved our right to oppose, for example, petrol rationing and the increased supplementary taxation on petrol, which was not done in the Finance Bill but on a Ways and Means Resolution—and the right hon. Gentleman himself said that it was not a Budget.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that all the well-informed views of which we have been told were not so well informed about the outcome of the first ballot for the Tory leadership?

I do not think that that arises out of this Question in any way at all. All I would say is that if, with a balance-of-payments deficit of £800 million last year, there was a feeling that that was a tolerable figure to be accepted—which we were told repeatedly by right hon. Gentlemen opposite, although we did not agree with it—then I think that, with a balance-of-payments deficit this year of much less than half that figure, there is no possible justification for any financial crisis when the economic position is improving rapidly and when we require more time to get it completely right.

I am not going to ask the right hon. Gentleman about the degree of support which he gave to the measures which I took to defend sterling in 1961. However, are the measures which the Chancellor of the Exchequer will announce today well thought out, because we have not yet received a copy of the statement which the right hon. Gentleman is to make? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]

On the question of my right hon. Friend's statement, the right hon. Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) did not convey a copy of his statement to me on 26th July, 1961, because it was regarded as having budgetary significance; and it is not usual to transfer any statement from the Chancellor of the Exchequer dealing with policies of that kind. So the right hon. Gentleman did not give me a copy of his statement. I hope that he is not trying to suggest that at any time I or any of my hon. Friends supported his policy on Suez. But I now know a great deal more about what he was doing at Villacoublay and Sèvres on that occasion, and I hope that one day he will come clean with the House because of the effect he then had on sterling.

Balance Of Payments (Government Measures)

The measures taken in the Budget to correct the balance of payments deficit are beginning to take effect. This year's balance of payments deficit is likely to be well below half last year's figure. To ensure that we reach our aim of eliminating the deficit in the course of next year and of maintaining the strength of sterling, the Government have decided to adopt the following measures.

First, expenditure at home. The Government intend to slow down the rate of expenditure on capital projects and to defer as far as possible purchases of equipment and stores by Government Departments, local authorities and nationalised industries.

Housing, schools and hospitals will be contained within their existing programmes. For other non-industrial capital projects for which contracts have not yet been signed, the starting dates will be postponed for six months. Exemptions will be made for projects in development districts and areas of high unemployment. Similarly, purchases of goods will be deferred to the maximum possible extent.

All Government Departments have been instructed to carry out this policy and to arrange for other bodies for which they are responsible to do likewise. The nationalised industries will be called on to follow a similar course of action. Local authorities will be asked to follow suit.

Loan sanction and grants will only be given to local authority projects which are urgently required. In particular, sanction will not be given except in special circumstances to loans for expenditure on land purchases in advance of requirements, on civic buildings, offices and a variety of miscellaneous projects which, though desirable in themselves, are not essential at this time. The expenditure in these categories is now running at £150 million a year.

Lending by local authorities on mortgage for house purchase has trebled in England and Wales in the last five years, and in 1964–65 reached £180 million. With the co-operation of the local authorities this will be restricted to the average of the three years ended 31st March, 1965, namely, £130 million.

Since the beginning of the financial year drawings by local authorities on the Public Works Loans Board have been exceptionally heavy. In present circumstances a more regular phasing of issues is necessary, and I have asked the Public Works Loans Commissioners to arrange this forthwith.

The Government, in addition to reviewing their own establishments, are asking the local authorities to review their present establishments; and in the light of this to confine net increases in their staffs to very urgent services, where essential professional workers, for example, teachers, are required.

The House will recall that last spring I undertook to review the swollen programmes of public expenditure left behind by our predecessors. This review is now complete. As I forecast before the election, the examination revealed that it would not be possible to carry out all the programmes we inherited within the limits of our resources until the necessary rate of growth of production has been achieved. We have, accordingly, reshaped the total programme and I can inform the House that from now on expenditure will be kept to the level that we as a nation can afford. I am giving instructions to Departments that the 1966–67 Estimates shall be drawn up within a limit which has been determined for each Department within the agreed total.

As regards defence, good progress is being made with the review designed to reduce the forward defence programme by some £400 million by 1969–70 and to achieve a large cut in that part which falls on the balance of payments. Next year's programme is being reduced by about £100 million. As to other overseas expenditure, all Departments and public authorities are to observe the most stringent economy in overseas expenditure and do all they can to increase overseas receipts.

So much for cuts in existing expenditure. We shall also have to defer some of the desirable social reforms we had hoped to do in the immediate future. While priority must go to wage-related unemployment and sickness benefits, the Government have decided that it will not be possible to introduce an income guarantee scheme or remove the remaining National Health Service charges in the next Session. We have also decided to postpone the introduction of the scheme of specially favourable interest rates for owner-occupiers.

In regard to private investment, the Government will introduce legislation instituting a licensing procedure to govern the starting dates of privately sponsored construction projects of the value of £100,000 or more with the exception only of housing projects and industrial building. The control will be made retrospective to all such projects for which no contracts have been entered into before the time of this announcement. Provision will be made for exempting projects in development districts and areas with high unemployment.

It is further proposed to introduce control over office development in the Birmingham conurbation. An Order giving effect to this will be laid before Parliament as soon as possible after the Control of Office and Industrial Development Bill receives the Royal Assent. As my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade has already announced, closer control over industrial building will also be introduced when this Bill becomes law. It will become necessary in the London and South Eastern, Midlands and Eastern Regions to obtain an industrial development certificate for industrial development exceeding 1,000 sq. ft.

I have decided to reinforce the hire-purchase measures. As from tomorrow, the maximum repayment period of hire-purchase contracts will be reduced from three years to 30 months. This will apply to all goods which are now subject to H.P. controls other than furniture, bedding, cookers and water heaters, for which the period will not be altered. The Government will consult immediately with the gas and electricity industries to secure a reduction in promotional expenditure.

I propose to introduce some further changes in exchange control. The first concerns direct investment outside the sterling area. Hitherto, official exchange has been allowed in certain cases regarded as specially favourable for the balance of payments. For the time being no further approvals will be given for the use of official exchange in such cases. All approved projects will have to be financed with investment currency or by borrowing abroad.

Another change concerns investment currency. I announced in the Budget that certain receipts of foreign currencies by residents of the United Kingdom which had hitherto been allowed to be sold as investment currency would in future be exchanged at the official rate. The same change will now be made in respect of certain other receipts, including the proceeds of life policies and the assets of immigrants redesignated as residents of the United Kingdom.

Finally, I am asking the Bank of England to exercise more uniform control over borrowing in this country by companies registered here but controlled by non-residents of the sterling area.

It is the Government's policy to limit to the greatest possible extent facilities for financing imports of manufactured goods for home consumption and imports of all kinds for stockbuilding. With the Government's approval, the Governor of the Bank of England has now written a further letter to the banks. It asks them to scrutinise with even greater care than they do already all requests for credit when there is prima facie evidence that to provide the finance would facilitate payment for imports.

As regards prepayment for imports, at present payment for imports into this country may be made at any time between the date of contract and the date of arrival of the goods. In future, payments will not normally be allowed before the goods have been shipped. This should produce a useful once-for-all saving and help to check excessive purchases.

If the exchange control measures I mentioned earlier are continued for a full year, these, together with this once-for-all saving, should produce a total saving in official exchange of at least £45 million over the next year.

My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade is introducing from Monday next a further improvement in the Export Credit Guarantee Department bank guarantee facility, by reducing the qualifying contract value from £50,000 to £25,000.

Arrangements are also being made to reduce the cost of shorter-term credit. This will affect a much larger volume of exports, and help many more companies. For shorter-term credits of at least 30 days and less than two years, guaranteed unconditionally by the E.C.G.D., the banks have agreed in principle to make finance available at Bank Rate. This compares with rates of around 1 per cent. above Bank Rate at present. The scheme will involve a large extension of the E.C.G.D.'s unconditional bank guarantee facility.

Details will be announced as soon as possible.

Also in this field of exports, urgent action will also be taken to increase efficiency in the docks and to improve access to them.

Together with the other measures the Government have taken previously, these further steps will reinforce our position and enable us to continue with the tasks of balancing our payments and reconstructing the economy.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I have your guidance? In view of the unfortunate decision not to provide the Opposition with a copy of this statement—for reasons which may or may not be well based—and in view of its importance, and bearing in mind that it cannot be debated now because the Order Paper is fixed, is there any way of having a short Adjournment so that a considered probe can be made in the interests of understanding the statement?

Having listened to the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman, I must say that I can see no reason why he should not have delivered a copy of the statement to the Opposition, in accordance with the normal courtesies of the House. Both sides will agree that we have listened to a very grave statement indeed, which will have the most serious repercussions throughout the whole of the country. We shall have the opportunity on Monday of debating the whole economic situation, including this statement, but as the statement was handed to my right hon. Friend only when it was actually being made by the Chancellor, I will now only make one or two brief observations.

First of all, I would say to the Chancellor that we on these benches—

Order. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will contrive to put the observations in an interrogatory form.

I apologise, Mr. Speaker.

I hope that the Chancellor will appreciate that we will not shirk from giving our full support to measures that are genuinely in the interests of the nation. The statement raises a number of questions, and the first is: will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what is the total financial effect of all the measures he has announced? Secondly, is it not the case that the primary purpose of these further measures is to reassure foreign opinion? Does he realise that the lack of confidence that exists abroad is the direct consequence—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Oh, yes—of the inept and incompetent handling of our economic affairs?

Lastly, does he not agree that the announcements he has just made to the House make a mockery of the Labour Party's election manifesto, and show the Labour Party's promises for what they were—a hollow fraud on the electorate?

I would certainly want to give the Opposition every proper facility in regard to this statement, as is always done, but there is, as the right hon. Gentleman will notice, a sentence in it which talks about licensing controls which are retrospective from the time of this announcement and that, I think, is an important reason for not previously giving the Opposition a copy. In any case, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said—and I do not want to make a major point of it—apparently when a similar statement was made in 1961 a copy was not supplied.

It is difficult to quantify the total financial effect, because in some cases we are talking about reduction of pressure of demand and, in others, about reduction in Government expenditure. I have said that on defence there will be an immediate reduction of £100 million, and the hire-purchase measures should, on the other hand, reduce demand by about £65 million. There will be other consequences arising from the deferment of capital projects for six months which I cannot at this stage quantify, although figures will become available in due course.

As to whether this action is necessary to reassure foreign opinion which is disturbed by the consequences of the handling of the situation by the Government, it really is a little too much for hon. Members opposite to try to slide out in this way. I need only refer them to the O.E.C.D. Report which speaks of the persistent and deep-seated weaknesses in the economy which have grown up over a number of years. It is with these that we are grappling. It is these that we are attempting to overcome in the reconstruction of the economy.

It is, of course, necessary to reassure foreign opinion that the events of the last 13 years are not now continuing. What foreign opinion wants to be clear about is that this country is reconstructing its industries; that it is in a position to earn is keep; and that it is in a position to pay its way. Every measure we take to achieve that is a real reassurance of foreign opinion.

As to the election manifesto, a number of things were said, I would remind the right hon. Gentleman, of the way in which he and his colleagues contradicted me in November, 1963. I said to the country:
"The Tories are embarked upon a spending spree. It is like taking on hire-purchase commitments when we do not know how much they will be and whether we shall be able to afford them."
This was hotly denied by all Conservative spokesmen at that time.

There were other matters, too. The plain truth is that the Government of the day concealed the truth because they were throwing away the money of the people at that time.

This is, of course, a grave and will probably be an unpopular statement—probably it was not worth making unless it was grave and unpopular. Will the Chancellor assure us that the Government are not speaking with two voices? Will they tell the people that they have to accept unpopular things? Is he satisfied that he has taken enough out of consumption goods, for there has been a feeling that a soft home market, whatever is done for exports, may end in more consumption at home?

Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the question of investment allowances? Is he satisfied that private investment will go on at the required level? Did I hear him say that overseas defence expenditure will not be cut this year, but next year, by £100 million? If so, is he satisfied that that will be enough?

I shall try to remember all those questions. The right hon. Member may remind me if I forget some of them.

First, as to whether this will be unpopular, I have no doubt, but believe and trust, that the people will accept what is necessary so that we should balance our external payments and live within our means. To say anything less, or to believe anything less than that, would be unworthy of the people of Britain.

As to whether enough has been taken out of home consumption, I think that one of the effects of these measures will be to ensure the speeding up of a number of projects which, at the moment, are lagging because of the great strain to which the economy is subjected. It may well be that we shall get more out of the economy even in the short run as a result of greater concentration of effort of this sort.

Thirdly, on the question of overseas military expenditure, with the rest of my colleagues I have worked on this ever since we came into office. We have made substantial changes, for instance the cancellation of TSR2 was a very early decision.

I do not know who voted which way; but we made that change. I think that everyone realises that in this field we can make changes of this sort only over a very long period. I assure the right hon. Member that to cut £100 million on military expenditure next year is a very considerable achievement. I assure the House that I shall go on doing my best to make certain that we get this cut of £400 million in the period we have set ourselves. I believe that it can be done, but we need the support of all in the House and of the whole country if we are to do it.

Are copies of this statement now available for hon. Members? Will the Chancellor explain how the cut in local authority mortgages will achieve any saving whatever, because, if people are unable to get money from local authorities, they presumably will get it from somewhere else, or will be unable to purchase houses? Would my right hon. Friend care to explain how this is an effective way of saving?

I think it true to say that there has been an explosion in the field of local authority borrowing for which they pay only interest, while the greater part of the capital has to be found by the Exchequer. The fact that that has gone up so substantially to £180 million is at least evidence that we could not maintain such a rate of expansion. Of course, this will mean—I do not deny it and it would be foolish to deny it—that it will be more difficult to get money from this source to purchase housing; but we have to choose between that and other consequences which would be much more unpleasant

We will, of course, support proper measures to defend sterling—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—unlike what happened in 1961, when I recall some of the speeches made by hon. and right hon. Members opposite. In view of what the Chancellor has said in one of his answers about speeding up, is this stop or is it go?

I saw in the Press that what we were suffering from was too much go-stop and not too much stop-go. The theoreticians can work out what the difference is. What I think will be the effect is to ensure that at the end of the production pipeline we shall be getting a faster rate of production than we were getting before because of the very great strains which were placed on the economy. It is within the experience of every industrialist that the fulfilment of orders—including many important export orders—has been held up because of failure to get sufficient labour or through shortages of components. This will have the effect of making the economy much more balanced than it has been over the last two years.

While we fully appreciate the prime necessity for the Government to pursue a policy to make certain that the country can stand on its own feet in the world, and pay its own way, before we can do the things we want to do, may I ask my right hon. Friend to answer two specific questions? First, can he estimate whether his proposals will have an effect, and if so what effect, on the level of employment in this country?

Second, since the proposals that he is making are meant to deal with an immediate emergency, does he not consider that to postpone the proposed cut of £400 million in defence expenditure for four years will not help him to achieve the objects that he has in mind?

There is no doubt that the election programme on which we stood, and about which many of us made many speeches, said that we put the economic recovery of the country first; and until we get the economic recovery of the country we cannot fulfil the social programmes and aspirations we have in mind. I and others made speeches on television and in the country, but, of course, we were not helped by hon. Members opposite telling the electorate that everything was all right.

The effect on employment is a matter about which the whole Government, including, of course, myself, are very deeply concerned. We have not been in the Labour movement for many years to create a substantial measure of unemployment. Let there be no doubt about that. [HON. MEMBERS: "Or on this side."] I do not except hon. Members opposite from that desire, but there is strong feeling about this matter. Our intention is, as we have endeavoured to do and, to a certain extent, have succeeded so far, to secure a redeployment of labour. There are now important export industries which cannot get the labour they require to fulfil orders. Everyone knows that there is a shortage of exports today. It is the basic weakness from which we are suffering. Therefore, the Government's policy is directed to positive redeployment of labour towards those fields.

As regards postponement of defence cuts, I promise the House that it is not my or the Government's intention to postpone any defence cuts which are reasonable and feasible. This is a very tough field in which we are operating, but I give the House the assurance that we shall make the maximum cuts at the earliest possible moment.

What does the Chancellor judge has worsened between April and July to make these serious restrictions and postponements necessary now? If they are necessary now, as they may be, why did he not foresee that at the time of his Budget?

There are two reasons. First, demand has continued to rise despite what I did in the Budget, although hon. Members opposite voted against it on the Second Reading of the Finance Bill. It would have been even worse if they had carried some of their Amendments to the Bill. The other major point is that exports have not been rising to the degree on which I was relying. The relationship between imports and exports is not satisfactory yet and that is a relationship that must be satisfactory. This is the other major reason why I felt it necessary to introduce these steps at this time.

Would not my right hon. Friend agree that there is something basically wrong with our priorities if we are now saying that we cannot next year improve on our housing record for this year? Would he give some assurance to the housing industry, particularly to those who are involved in industrial building, about the future so that they do not at this critical stage start to cut back on their capital investment and thus affect the tremendous programme, which we should all like to see next year, to give first-class homes to our people?

What I said in my statement was that the housing programme will be contained within the present programme. This will mean that, as a result of lessening demand in certain other fields, it will be possible to achieve that programme. I doubt whether it could have been achieved at the level which the whole construction industry was trying to maintain at present. Therefore, we can assume that there will be a continuation of the housing programme but I do not think that it is possible at this moment to expand it over this year's level, which has been increased over previous years.

Would the right hon. Gentleman reconsider the answer which he gave to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) about the effect on the balance-of-payments problem of the cancellation of aircraft orders? He said that this had reduced it. In fact, the cancellation of the fighter and transport aircraft manufactured at home and ordering the aircraft from America has already increased the load on the balance of payments by some £230 million.

Secondly, would the right hon. Gentleman tell us how much of the reduction of £100 million which has been decided upon in the defence programme for next year is to fall on overseas expenditure? When can we expect details of these cuts to be announced in the House?

The right hon. Gentleman will know from his past experience that we are at this moment engaged in settling next year's Estimates between the Departments. It is this decision on next year's Estimates within which the Ministry of Defence will be working from now. It knows that it has to work within that total. So there will be no question of announcing the cuts. The Estimates will come along in the normal course of events and there will then be announced the policy which the Estimates carry out, as well as the equipment which is required.

As regards the effect on the balance of payments of ordering aircraft from overseas, the right hon. Gentleman will know that no orders for the F111 have yet been placed. As regards other aircraft, this was part of a major operation to secure a redeployment of the labour force into fields where we believed that it would be more productive for the national economy. That was the reason that it was undertaken.

While appreciating my right hon. Friend's dilemma, and also noting in his statement the several measures which he mentioned to help the development districts, may I ask him whether he will keep a very close watch on unemployment in these areas? He will recall that in the past each measure led to a rise in unemployment in the North-East and in Scotland. Will he ensure that whatever actions he takes will not stem the gradual move towards recovery brought about by the last nine months of Labour Government?

We do not believe that it is either humanitarian or a proper use of our resources in skill and manpower to allow the development districts and the rather wider areas where there is high unemployment to remain in that state. We therefore believe that it is proper on all counts not to apply the full rigour of these measures in those particular areas. I believe that this marks a very great difference between what is being done now and what has been done on some other occasions.

When the right hon. Gentleman says that the housing programme will be continued within its present level, does he include the private sector? If so, how does he propose to enforce that? Does this also mean that the increase in local authority building which the Minister of Housing and Local Government announced only a very short time ago is being scrapped? Can he say how many houses it is his object to take out of the programme which otherwise would have been built this year? How does he reconcile that with the Prime Minister's statement on 12th September last that it was intended by a Labour Government to apply to housing the methods of an operation of war?

I think that the last part is certainly true, with the new systems of house building being developed. It is a great pity that they were left unused here for so long after other countries had developed them. May I say to the right hon. Gentleman that we shall have plenty of opportunities over the new few days to debate the detailed questions which he has put to me. I am sure that answers will be given to him then. [HON. MEMBERS: "Wriggling".] We are not debating the matter now. The right hon. Gentleman asked me a number of questions. Do not get impatient. The hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Hirst) never stands up to intervene. He merely sits there and squeals.

The number of housing starts next year will be the same as the number of starts this year. My right hon. Friend is having discussions with the building societies now to see whether a floor and a ceiling can be put on the level of private sector house building. If this can be done, we shall have a well-balanced housing programme which will match our needs, or, at any rate, the productive possibilities of the construction industry.

Chattel Mortgages

4.6 p.m.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make provision for the granting of mortgages upon personnal chattels; and for purposes connected therewith
I realise that after what has just been said by the Chancellor of Exchequer this may seem a remarkably bad time to suggest a new practice in the production of credit within the country. At the same time, after what has been said, it looks as if there will be more people needing it. Anyway, my proposed Bill has, and has long had substantial support on both sides of the House. I must declare an interest. It is an interest which I have had throughout the debates on hire purchase. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will acquit me of any charge that it has swayed my judgment in any improper way.

What I seek to do is to try to make good a defect, as I see it, in the present law on credit. At present, it is possible to obtain a mortgage on what is called fixed property—house property and the like—but one cannot raise loans of money against movable goods. The only alternative is hire purchase, for which we legislated in the last Parliament, or the new and increasing practice of the unsecured loan, which seems a mere evasion, and not a very satisfactory one.

One thing which is not possible is for a purchaser to raise a loan against goods which he has newly acquired. The reason is that the present law dates from way back in the last century when, owing to harsh dealings, no doubt, the Bills of Sale Acts were passed—that of 1878 which acted to protect creditors, and that of 1882 which acted to protect debtors. Raising money at that time was seen as a way, so to speak, of pawning the furniture, and restrictions were placed upon this. It was not then foreseen that people who were credit-worthy and in possession of good incomes would be considering acquiring chattels on credit.

The limitations are also due to the Moneylenders Acts, which prevent the lending of money except under very stringent conditions. It was the rigours of these Acts which led to the introduction by a private Member 30 years ago of the concept of hire purchase.

The Bill which I seek leave to introduce would, first, permit mortgages on newly-acquired chattels only, thus making it quite different from the ordinary raising of personal loans. Secondly, it would authorise the advances of money on such mortgages by persons and businesses carrying on banking, insurance or other activities such as the Board of Trade may in future regard as proper for the issuing of loans on chattel mortgage. Thirdly, it would lay down a standard form of chattel mortgage which Parliament would approve as being fair to customers. Such a form would be suggested in the Schedule to the Bill.

If such a concept as I have mentioned is acceptable, the purchaser in the future would own the chattels that he has bought. They would no longer be the property of a finance company. He would, therefore, be able to dispose of them or to deal with them as he saw fit and he would be able to retain the proceeds of sale and any benefits that he was able to get for them in place of the difficult processes of repossession and other things which obtain under hire purchase.

Furthermore, the Bill would do away with an increasingly elaborate subterfuge, which, we must admit, is a legal fiction, of hire purchase, which is now being found increasingly cumbersome, especially after the recent additions to the law on the subject. The most worthy objective of all is that the costs to all the parties, especially the purchaser, would come down. For those reasons, I beg to ask leave to introduce the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Dr. Bennett, Sir E. Errington, Mr. W. T. Williams, Sir H. Butcher, and Sir E. Bullus.

Chattel Mortgages

Bill to make provision for the granting of mortgages upon personal chattels; and for purposes connected therewith, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 29th October, and to be printed. [Bill 201.]

Orders Of The Day

Trade Disputes Bill

Lords Amendments considered.

Clause 1—(Certain Acts Not Actionable In Tort Or As Delicts)

Lords Amendment No. 1: In page 1, line 5, at beginning insert:

"( ) This Act shall not apply if it is shown that a threat of the character specified in the next following subsection was made to secure the termination of the employment of any person."

4.14 p.m.

I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

If it is convenient, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that we might discuss, at the same time, the remaining two Lords Amendments: in page 1, line 5, after the preceding Amendment, insert "Save as aforesaid", and in line 15, at beginning, insert "Where this Act applies".

Hon. Members will remember that our purpose in introducing the Bill was to clear up the confusion concerning trade union law which had arisen from the Rookes v. Barnard case. The Bill does this by providing that it shall no longer be actionable to threaten to break a contract of employment or to threaten to induce another person to do so in the circumstances of a trade dispute.

Like the rest of trade union legislation, the Bill does not distinguish between threats with different kinds of purpose. It applies to all threats where there is a trade dispute. This is not because we wish to settle in the Bill once and for all the question of whether all such threats should be protected. It is because we wish simply to restore the position which for 60 years before Rookes v. Barnard was generally believed to exist and to leave the policy decisions in this matter until the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations has reported.

The Bill was amended in another place to remove from its protection threats to secure the termination of the employment of any person. The Amendment is mainly directed against strikes to enforce a closed shop, although, as I shall argue presently, it does not stop there.

Our position has been made clear in the debates on Second Reading and in Committee. Although Rookes v. Barnard was itself a closed-shop case, its effects are not limited to cases of that kind. They extend to other kinds of strikes as well. Equally, the Bill extends over the whole field of trade disputes. It is, therefore, wrong to think that this is a Bill to legalise the closed shop. We recognise that the closed shop issue is an important one in this context, and we do not by any means have a closed mind on this subject.

There are, however, arguments on both sides. It may well be that change is needed in the law in this matter, and we shall all await the outcome of the Royal Commission's deliberations with great interest. It may well be that further protection of the individual is necessary.

Having said that, however, this House cannot escape the arguments on the other side. It is all very well for people to talk about the rights of the individual—every hon. Member is entitled to lay the greatest emphasis upon the rights of the individual—but we have to remember that there are rights of the majority as well. We do not hear so much about the rights of the majority. There is, for instance, the right of workers to say that for a reason which they regard as important they do not wish to work with a certain individual. There is also the question whether it is reasonable that a man should be allowed to take all the benefits that a union obtains through negotiation without paying his dues and accepting the responsibilities of membership.

It does not seem right to us to come down on one side or the other of this very important matter in the Bill. I again urge the House to agree that the sensible thing is to wait until the Royal Commission has reported. The best course is simply to restore the previous position, which was well understood, until we have the report of that Commission, so that all the issues arising in the sphere of industrial relations can be dealt with together with due regard to their relationship to one another. A piecemeal approach would only raise more problems than it solved.

The difference between the right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) and myself in this matter is that the right hon. Gentleman believes that these major problems within industrial relations can be dealt with one by one and separately. I cannot accept that view. There is a relationship between the closed shop and the unofficial strike and restrictive practices. It is my firm conviction that we must see this as a whole and then introduce the necessary legislation if that is required.

However strong the reasons for full protection for the individual may be, the Amendment to the Bill that is proposed does not achieve that. All that it does is to remove from the scope of the Bill threats of a breach of contract aimed against an individual. It would not affect threats of something which is not a breach of contract.

One of the major problems of industry today is that men take industrial action without breaking their contract. One of the problems of the present unofficial action is that men are not in breach of contract; they are working according to the rule book. Therefore, the protection which the Lords Amendment would give to the individual would only be partial and inadequate.

That is one reason for criticising the Lords Amendment, but a more important reason is that it would detract seriously from the main purpose of the Bill. The Bill is intended to clear up confusion about the legal position which may hamper trade unionists in their work, but the Lords Amendment introduces fresh uncertainties. As I have said, it removes the protection of the Bill in closed shop cases; but it goes wider than that. It might apply, for instance, in the circumstances of a dispute over discipline—for example, if workers objected to working for some particular reason for some particular supervisor or manager. I am not defending such conduct any more than I am defending the closed shop, but it may reasonably be asked if it is right for the law to be brought into these matters.

We must remember that this would be a complete departure from our traditional methods of dealing with industrial disputes, and it might be argued that it would have the effect of making industrial relations worse instead of better, but whether it is right or wrong to bring the law in, it will certainly be confusing to bring it in for some trade disputes and not for others. Where precisely will the boundary rest? Trade union officials are not lawyers; they cannot deal in the fine distinctions between different strikes which lawyers draw—very different distinctions from those which are used in the actual field of industry. It is unreasonable to expect them to carry in their heads a number of complicated provisos about the rights which the Bill confers.

The practical result of retaining the Lords Amendment would be that trade unionists would be unable to mention the possibility of a strike to an employer in many cases without the fear that they were exposing themselves to action for intimidation. As amended, therefore, the Bill will not prevent the worsening in industrial relations which is always likely to take place if this legal problem is not cleared up.

I suggest to the House that it would be particularly unfortunate for trade unions to be affected by uncertainty of this kind at present. The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations is just getting into the main part of its work. It has recently sent out to interested organisations a survey of the questions on which it would like to have evidence. One glance at that will show how dependent the Royal Commission will be on information and any evidence from the trade union movement. I hope that the House will agree with me in this matter, that we should do all we can to help towards better industrial relations by passing the Bill in the form in which it will do most good, and that we should, therefore, await the findings of the Royal Commission, the guiding lights which I hope will be given to this House as to future relationships and terms of contract and of employment relations between employer and workman, and, indeed, between workman and the State.

I therefore suggest that we send the Bill back to another place, expressing disagreement with the Lords Amendment.

I never get any particular pleasure out of attacking the Minister, for he and I think in the same way on a number of issues. I remember that when I was Minister he helped me on various issues, and I have tried to do the same thing for him; but I am bound to tell him that in this case, as he knows, our approach is fundamentally different. I must say to him things which he may think somewhat harsh in this context, but I should be failing in my duty if I did not, because we on this side of the House feel very strongly about this matter.

The Minister said that the main difference between him and me is that I want to deal with the matter piecemeal and he wants to deal with it comprehensively. I suggest to him that that is not correct. Really, the difference is that he has brought in a piece of piecemeal legislation. Perhaps "a piece of piecemeal legislation" is an unfortunate phrase, but he gets what I mean. He has brought in this element of piecemeal legislation. He has done so, as he may say, in response to undertakings he had given, but he has brought it in and we have sought to show him that, even accepting the liabilities he may feel he had undertaken in regard to this he need not have stuck on this particular point. This is the real issue between us on this.

This is the issue we argued in this House before. This is the issue which has come back to us from another place. We believed that there had never been shown that degree of urgency which the Government claimed in regard to any need for action arising out of the Rookes v. Barnard case. We accepted that undoubtedly a degree of confusion had arisen in regard to this. I have never denied that. I have always said that there was something to be said for having this looked at and, if it was shown to be necessary, to do so, to take some action, but we have not accepted that it need cover a case similar to Rookes v. Barnard.

In the Rookes v. Barnard case the actual issue was resolved, and the anxieties of trade unionists arose not because of that, but because, as the right hon. Gentleman has said himself this afternoon, genuine fears, whether right or not, arose in the minds of many trade unionists as to whether there were wider implications of the judgment which would seriously affect trade union officials in carrying out their normal duties.

This was the issue which was always put to me when I was Minister. On this matter, this was the issued posed, and this was the issue which, I understood, was the issue the Government wanted to deal with.

When the Bill first came before us, and we discussed it in the House on 16th February, I genuinely thought, in my Second Reading speech that there was a case which I put to the Minister for an Amendment in line with the one now before us, although not in exactly the same words. Indeed, we moved a similar one which we debated when we were in Committee on the Bill. I was then quite expecting that I would have a soft answer from the Minister in reply. I thought that the Minister might have responded saying he would agree to such an Amendment.

This is what I said on Second Reading, and I should like to remind the House of my words:
"I should like to ask a specific question of the Minister. If the Bill secures its Second Reading, will he be willing in Committee to accept an Amendment designed to exclude from the Bill's protection intimidation intended to injure individual workers?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 16th February, 1965; Vol. 706, c. 1039.]
That was a specific question which I put then, and I was hopeful—it shows how wrong I was, and how I misjudged the Minister's character—that he would accept such an Amendment, because it seemed to me it in no way impeded trade unionists in what they were seeking to achieve, and there was no need for the Minister to have stuck on this particular point.

Others, of course, have said that the party opposite had a mandate for doing this and that it should not be impeded from carrying out its legislation. Well, in seeking to see whether this point is established I studied with the very greatest care a booklet which, as the right hon. Gentleman probably knows, was produced at the last election. The only reference to anything of this kind is on page 10, being a reference to a charter of rights. It says:
"The right of trade union representation and proper safeguards against arbitrary dismissal would be included"—
in the charter. That is the only reference I found, and as I read that it would seem to me to be supporting our line of argument in regard to this, because this is arbitrary dismissal at the behest of a trade union, and I should have thought that that ought to be covered as much as any other sort of arbitrary dismissal. So I say to the Minister that if his party has a mandate for anything it has a mandate for accepting our Amendment. I therefore hope that this will encourage the Minister, even at this very late hour, to go back on this rather unfortunate attitude which he has taken to it.

4.30 p.m.

To go on from that point, it is true that in the Queen's Speech at the beginning of this Session it was said that a Bill would be introduced
"to give workers and their representatives the protection necessary for freedom of industrial negotiation."
That is exactly the point that is covered by the Bill with the Amendment. If they demand, in addition, that in their industrial negotiations they should always be in a position to insist on a man being dismissed, I do not think that that is a reasonable requirement, and I do not believe that the Minister thinks that it is, either. The Government have given effect to this pledge in the Queen's Speech, even with the Amendment, and, while we shall be discussing their failure on certain other items in this House later this week, the right hon Gentleman can hold his head high even if he accepts the Amendment and say that he has honoured this pledge.

There is also the point in the Queen's Speech about which I reminded the right hon. Gentleman on an earlier occasion. In the last paragraph it said:
"In all their policies My Government will be concerned to safeguard the liberties of My subjects."
The point of the Amendment is to safeguard the liberties of individual subjects. This is the point which I put to the Minister, and with which he did not deal. He has never dealt with it, nor has his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. This is a point of some substance, and the liberty of the subject matters in regard to their policies as stated in the Queen's Speech. It matters to Members on this side of the House who feel strongly about it, and it arose in regard to questions asked of the Prime Minister in respect of the Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 20 of the Declaration of Human Rights says, in its second paragraph, that no one may be compelled to belong to an association. The Prime Minister was asked about this earlier this year in the House, and he stood by the answer that was given by Lord Lindgren in another place. He said that the Government stood by the Declaration of Human Rights, and, when he was pressed on this matter, he added, in regard to this legislation which had not then been produced, so we did not know what would be in it,
"… we did not intend to raise any fundamental question of human rights in dealing with it."—[OFFICIAL RFPORT, 17th November, 1964; Vol. 702, c. 192.]
Before the election, at the T.U.C. Conference in September, he said:
"… we will legislate to put the matter of legal interpretation beyond all doubt. I am advised that this can be done clearly, briefly and crisply without raising the issues of human rights or public policy."
That seems to be the basis on which the Prime Minister gave his answer in the House. In fact the Bill, without this Amendment infringes on this principle of the Declaration of Human Rights.

I am puzzled about this. Of course, I would not defend intimidation, and I believe that the whole law on this matter ought to be reviewed. During the last few weeks my attention has been drawn to a letter sent out by a firm near Grantham to its workers. The letter said that the National Union of General and Municipal Workers had recruited workers to the union from the firm. It went on to say that if any worker joined this union he would either have to resign or, if not, he would be given his cards and dismissed. Only if a worker refused to join the union would he be retained. The employer added that he hoped that this would be taken in the spirit in which it was intended. A very strange remark indeed! I think that that was a deplorable letter to issue to the workers in that firm.

If we are to review the law of the closed shop, I want to look at the law with regard to the inalienable right of a person in a free society to earn his living as a member of a trade union.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because it helps me to make my point clear. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is deplorable that a firm should take that action, and I agree, too, that the Royal Commission should look at all these issues, but it is the right hon. Gentleman who has brought in this legislation. We have not brought it in, and the point that I am making concerns this Bill.

The Minister cannot avoid that issue. That is the difficulty. Had legislation been brought in with regard to employers which would be affected in this way I would support the point that the Minister has just made, but he has brought in this legislation in this form and I am trying to get the right hon. Gentleman to accept the Amendment which leaves the position clear until the Royal Commission has reported on these issues.

What we seek to do by the Amendment is to leave it so that the position in regard to an individual case, as in Rookes v. Barnard, is left as it is according to the law now, before the Bill is passed, but that the wider issues which really worry trade unionists are dealt with by the Bill. This is the difference between the Minister and myself, so it is right to remind him and the House about the conflict between Article 20 of the Declaration of Human Rights and the legislation which the Minister is bringing forward. I do not think that it is invalidated by what he said, but I am glad that he brought this out so that we can clarify the position between us on this matter.

The Bill raises an issue on fundamental human rights, and we have tried to eliminate this point. We tried to do it in this House, but we failed. Their Lordships, by another form of words, have put the matter right. The Government are seeking to enforce what I believe to be an unnecessary and damaging factor in the Bill, and that is why we must resist what the Minister is urging upon us.

As everybody knows, the Bill was brought forward specifically with the idea of preventing a recurrence of anything similar to the Rookes v. Barnard judgment going forward. I have never conceded the need for urgent action, but I have always accepted that this was a feeling in the minds of many trade unionists. They came to see me about it on many occasions, but nobody ever put this issue to me. It was never said to me, "We must have this right to enforce the closed shop". Those who came to see me were concerned about the wider issues, and I am saying that as this was never put forward as a major issue I do not see why the Minister cannot accept this Amendment.

This is the feeling that I have had all along in regard to it. This is the point with which the House has to concern itself now, and I cannot see why the Bill as amended in the other place, should not go forward, because it gives unions all the protection for which they ever asked me. I do not know whether they have asked the Minister for additional protection, but it certainly gives security to trade union officials in its amended form.

Do I understand that at no point in his conversations with the trade unions was the right hon. Gentleman asked to restore the law to what it was thought to be before the Rookes v. Barnard case?

They asked me to restore the law, but they never specified this particular reason for so doing. Their reason for wanting the law restored was that ordinary trade union officials carrying out their everyday duties would be impeded by that decision. I am speaking about their reasons, rather than about what they asked for. We never discussed the form of words. We always discussed the reasons, and that was always the wider reason that was given for their request. That was the position when I was Minister, but, of course, I do not know what reasons they have given the right hon. Gentleman.

That was the position when I was Minister, and that is the position in which we are now that this Amendment, or a similar one, has been discussed at length in this House and accepted in another place, and we must, therefore, press for its retention.

I do not understand why people in responsible trade union positions reacted as they did when this Amendment was passed by another place. According to The Guardian of 26th June, Mr. Woodcock said:
"If this Amendment simply makes illegal the threat to strike without making illegal the strike itself, then we might be driven to advise unions not to get in contact with the employers at all and simply to advise their people to walk out without informing anyone of their intention to do so, and without giving any opportunity for negotiations. This is why I call it distorting industrial relations. But if we are driven to it by the vindictiveness and stupidity of the legislators—in this case the House of Lords—we will have to do it."
Shortly afterwards another trade union spokesman, Mr. Jack Jones, the Acting Assistant General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union, at his union's annual conference, complained that the Lords' Amendment had stopped the Government from carrying out their election pledge about Rookes v. Barnard. He went on to say that the Lords were saying that the workers should not have the right to strike and should not threaten to strike.

The Minister knows as I do that those statements are wildly inaccurate, but, as far as I know, he has not corrected them. Perhaps he would like to do so before this debate ends. I have already dealt with the reference to the election pledge and I need not say more about that, but I do not understand why the comments of trade union leaders have so distorted this matter. The Amendment has effect only if there is an attempt to force the dismissal of another worker.

I grant that that can happen for various reasons. I have heard it argued that workers might refuse to work with another man because his method of working was dangerous. The Minister gave other examples today. But if that were so, there must be plenty of other ways in which to put the matter right without resorting to this form. It must be an extraordinary situation in which one has to rely on the provisions of the Bill to protect people who are trying to have some alteration made on this basis, and I cannot believe that it is necessary.

The most obvious case—there are not many of them and I do not want to overstate my argument—arises when a man refuses to join or, like Rookes, rejoin a union. This is the issue of the closed shop, or the union shop, as some hon. Members like us to say when they want us to be precise. On this the Minister has always been frank with the House and has repeatedly stated that he is opposed to the closed shop—and he repeated it this afternoon—that it should be considered by the Royal Commission.

When the Bill was on Report in this House, the Minister said:
"… I am convinced that the closed shop, with all the complications which surround it, is precisely the sort of problem which needs to be studied by the Royal Commission. To try to legislate about it without the benefit of such a study is, in my view, like trying to read without learning the alphabet … all that we have tried to do is to bring some measure of order out of the chaos created by the House of Lords decision in Rookes v. Barnard. …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th May, 1965, Vol. 712, c. 1262.]
I have tried to show that although I accept that that is the general intention of the Bill, there is no possible justification for the Minister's stand on this Amendment. That is where we differ. The right hon. Gentleman has all he wants and I do not know why he is trying to bring in this other little bit. He would get a ready response from the House if even now he said, "I accept that I have been wrong and blind in all this and will now accept the wise advice of another place and the other side of the House". He has the chance to be big hearted and big minded and I invite him at some stage to be so.

The right hon. Gentleman is not facing up to the issue and did not face up to it when the Bill was before us earlier. The Bill gives the unions what they have asked for and I repeat that no trade union ever asked me for this assurance and I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman has been pressed for it. Why is the trade union movement insisting on this issue now? Why is the Minister insisting on it?

I suggest that the answer is probably to be found in the emotional reaction of many trade union leaders to this whole question, and I realise that this is something which one has to bear in mind. I believe that the speech of Lord Citrine, in another place, repays study in this context. I have always regarded him as a pillar of the trade union movement and as one who did not normally take an extreme view. But I must admit that I was very much taken aback by his line on this Amendment in another place. He referred to it as a "blacklegs' charter". This is a very highly emotive phrase, but it does not help calm analysis of the problem. However, it typifies the intolerant attitude in many areas to anybody who attempts to defy union militancy.

If a dispute arises and a man—or men—refuse to go on strike with his fellows, we all know the way in which such a man is sometimes treated. He is abused, or sent to Coventry, and sometimes there are demands for his dismissal. We all know that this happens, and yet in most cases the fact that he does not strike has little effect on the effectiveness of the strike. Usually, only one or two men are involved in not striking.

I appreciate as well as hon. Members opposite the violent emotions which are aroused when any dispute breaks out, but we ought not from this House to appear to condone or encourage those who take hostile action against their fellows. Although we accept that it happens in fact, we should not be seen to encourage it and I hope that at least in this House we can continue to attempt to safeguard the minority, or the individual, even if we do not agree with the minority's actions.

4.45 p.m.

The House has always cared passionately about the individual and I can remember cases when there have been scenes about an individual who was in danger, for instance, from some arbitrary authority in some foreign land and for whom asylum in this country was sought. I have always thought that the House was at its best on such occasions.

But have we not an equal responsibility about those who seek to exercise an arbitrary authority against an individual in our own country and about action which can cost him his livelihood in this country? I do not suppose that we have all agreed with the views of some of those others whom I have mentioned, but we have nevertheless given them protection. The House has an equal duty to protect any man or woman in this country who has not contravened the law and who wishes to continue in his chosen employment.

Hon. Members opposite say, and the Minister said this afternoon, that majorities have rights, too. The right hon. Gentleman said that further protection of the individual might be necessary, but that the majority had rights. He was then speaking about the Royal Commission. My answer is that of course the majority has rights, but it is in a position to protect itself and to take advantage of its rights. But the rights of a majority carry clear and inescapable responsibilities with them. One of those responsibilities is to see that the power of its position is not abused. That is what we have to face with trade unions, as with others in this country.

It is the basis on which discussion takes place in this House. If we base our political system on the rights of minorities and majorities, at least we should see that it applies in other sections of our national life, including the unions.

The hon. Gentleman will have a later opportunity and I am now coming to the end of my remarks.

Order. If the right hon. Gentleman does not give way, the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) must resume his seat.

The hon. Gentleman will have plenty of opportunity to intervene. I was drawing my remarks to a close. I have tried to state the case fairly and that is why I do not propose to give way.

In this House we base ourselves on minorities having absolute rights which we are proud to defend and it is right that we should apply that same principle to minorities in industry. That is why we on this side of the House attach such tremendous importance to this issue.

I am not suggesting that a great many people will be saved and protected by the Amendment. The Minister rightly said that the issue was narrow. However, the principle is very important. It is a principle in which we believe. We believe that the Minister is failing in his duty by resisting the Amendment. I say that to do so can do great harm and give the wrong impression, and for that reason I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends, when the time comes, to show their feelings on this matter in the Division Lobby.

I am surprised that an ex-Minister of Labour can deliver a speech of that type. I am not complaining about the tone or the manner of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, but I am amazed that one who has had experience of the Ministry of Labour should treat the matter so academically. One would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman, as the Opposition spokesman, would have dealt with the right of the other place to amend a principle which has already been decided by the House of Commons. After all, there were long debates about this question here. The House of Commons took its decision. One can understand the other place altering details, but it exceeds its functions when it interferes with a principle which has been decided here.

I should declare my interest. I started my adult life as a miners' lodge secretary. I became a miners' agent. I had five years in the Ministry of Labour dealing with these problems at a time when they were ten times more difficult than they are now. I refer to the period of resettlement after the war, when we had to deal with tremendous problems. In addition, I am a miners' Member and sit on the N.U.M. Executive. In that sense I shall present what I consider to be the opposite side of the case from that presented by the right hon. Gentleman.

Before taking part in this debate I have read carefully and in detail the OFFICIAL REPORT of the proceedings in the other place. I thought that the debate there took place in a very rarefied atmosphere. It is true that Lord Citrine brought an element of reality into the debate. I commend the noble Lord's speech to my hon. Friends. I ask hon. Members opposite to read what Lord Citrine said paying due weight to his tremendous experience and the tremendous contribution he has made to the welfare of the people.

The consequences of what their Lordships have done should be considered. It came out more than once in the right hon. Gentleman's speech that the concern of the Opposition, as of the House of Lords, is to protect the rights of the non-unionist. Is their purpose served by the Amendment? In their desire to protect the non-unionist, they confer protection upon the thief, upon the persistent absentee, upon the irresponsible, and upon those whose behaviour threatens the safety of their fellow workers.

The right hon. Gentleman should listen to the voice of practical experience. I represented 3,000 men in a pit. We had a case of a man who persistently, in the pithead baths, robbed his fellow workers' clothes and got away with it. He was prosecuted once when he was caught. We knew who the man was. He was prosecuted the second time. Under the Amendment I should commit an illegal act if I said to the colliery manager, "Our chaps will not work with that fellow any longer. He must be got rid of". [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes, this was argued in their Lordships' House. It was the threat to strike against another man in breach of contract.

If I said to the colliery manager, "We shall strike. We will not work with him", it would mean that we would be handing in our notices, not doing anything unofficial. It would not be the men who would be liable under the Amendment. It would be myself.

I am trying to follow the right hon. Gentleman's argument. If the case is as strong as that, why does not the colliery manager take action? Why is it necessary for the men to force the issue in this way?

The right hon. Gentleman may not understand it. In those days such things happened in a colliery. If a man happened to be a particular friend of the pit manager, no matter what his defalcations everything was done to cover up for him.

I give as another example that of the man who was stealing the other fellow's trams of coal, altering the markings on the trams after they had been filled by somebody else. He was very difficult to catch. All the workers came under suspicion. Eventually a trap was set and the man was found. In such circumstances the rest of the chaps in the pit would say, "We will not work with him". The lodge secretary would have to tell the manager, "There will be trouble. The boys will not work with that fellow who has been guilty of marking trams".

Perhaps when the right hon. Gentleman replies he will remove these doubts from our minds. That view was supported by the Lord Chancellor in another place. I assume that he knew what he was talking about, especially as Lord Citrine also expressed this point of view about the effect of the Amendment. There is the case of the man who is always stealing other men's tools. What are we to do with him? These are ordinary human relations in a pit or in a factory where a group of men are working together.

In most pits and in most large factories today the success of the production depends upon the team function. It depends upon the production line. If everybody pulls his weight, results are good. If one man is absent every Monday or every Friday and thus upsets the production rhythm, he is responsible for reducing the earnings of the rest of the group. We have seen this on conveyors; men have had to suffer as a consequence of persistent absenteeism by an irresponsible workman. The other men have said "It is time that this man was turfed out of our team".

I am curious about this. The right hon. Gentleman is talking from the point of view of union organisation. As all these men are members of the union, why does not the union discipline the worker who is at fault?

Is it desired by hon. Members opposite that unions should control employment?

I am speaking mainly from my experience in the mining industry. Men's earnings are materially affected by the irresponsible action of one man, but that one man is protected against any collective action against him by the Amendment their Lordships have carried. That is my complaint.

It would seem that in some of the examples given by the right hon. Gentleman the man at fault could have been convicted by the magistrates. Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that in such circumstances, if the body of men after such a conviction told the manager that they did not want to work with the dishonest man, the manager would not be likely to retain him?

Whatever the manager would like or would not like to do, the fact is that their Lordships' Amendment protects such a man from any collective action on the part of his fellow workers. The hon. Gentleman has certainly put a point. The manager has the right to sack the man for that conduct, but the body of workers who suffer from that conduct have no right to make collective representations. This blows the Amendment to pieces.

5.0 p.m.

May I mention one other case? When I was a miners' agent at a colliery next to the Senghenydd Colliery where an explosion occurred, killing over 400 men, there were rumours of smoking in the pit. Nothing alarms men more than the smell of tobacco smoke underground. They know that everything is at stake and there may be 1,000 men in the pit. The smell of tobacco smoke is the one thing that sets them all on edge. Very often, because of the way the ventilation runs, it is extremely difficult to find out who has been having a smoke.

Sometimes the offenders are found out and, thank goodness, smoking underground is a rare occurrence. Are miners to be told in future that they will have to continue to work with a man who has been caught smoking underground? Are not they entitled to say to the management, "This man must not be allowed to work here again"? Are not they entitled to protect themselves?

The right hon. Member for Grantham is concerned about protecting one individual. This matter goes far wider than the question of a closed shop. It is not a question of membership of the union. The Amendment has been framed so widely in the desire to protect the non-unionist that it gives protection to men of great irresponsibility.

I am following the right hon. Gentleman's argument closely, and I am puzzled. This is a Bill concerned with acts done "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" I fail to see how the sort of conduct to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred can be described as coming anywhere near within those words.

Any difference between management and workmen is a trade dispute. Let us get down to what happens in real life and not in the rarified atmosphere of the courts. Any difference between management and workmen is a dispute about the conditions and circumstances of employment.

Surely in the case of those whom the right hon. Gentleman is describing it is not a dispute between management and workers, but a dispute between the men collectively and a fellow employee.

Yes, but when the other workmen concerned make their representations to the management it becomes a matter in dispute.

All right, but that is the view taken by the Lord Chancellor in another place. If the hon. Member will read the Lord Chancellor's final speech he will find that he took this view. I am prepared to accept the Lord Chancellor's judgment on the point.

As for the non-unionist, the darling of the Conservative Party, it is astonishing that in my experience I have not met this type of individual who wears a halo because he will not play in the team. This man who is a non-unionist, who will not join a trade union or, having joined, cannot get his own way and becomes a non-unionist is apparently a man of the highest principles, actuated by the highest motives. This is an astonishing indication that the right hon. Member for Grantham has no understanding of what goes on either at pit level or shop floor level.

In my experience the non-unionist was a chap who either spent too much time in the pub or put too much money on the horses. He was usually the chap who had not paid his rent. These are people who are nurtured in the Conservative club. He is usually the stool-pigeon of the colliery manager. He is usually used to carry tales and he receives preferences and privileges in his job in order to betray his fellow-workers.

Hon. Members opposite may say that this is not so, but that is my experience and I am sure that trade union officials who have had the same experience as I have had in the mining industry would say that the non-unionist of high principle is perhaps one in 100,000. I never met a trade union official who took the view taken by the right hon. Member for Grantham and some others.

No, I will not give way again. I have already given way six times.

In the desire to protect the non-unionist the Amendment sacrifices the well-being and the interests of the vast majority. It gives to the irresponsible person a protection which the right hon. Member for Grantham wanted to give only to one person, that is the non-unionist. In that sense the Amendment fails to do what the right hon. Member wants it to do in a limited way. At the same time, it provides cover for those who believe that non-unionism is a sacred cause and it denies the right to thousands of workers in small factories to become unionists. One would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman would have shown the same concern for the minority who cling to the right to be unionists and are denied it that he is showing for the non-unionist.

I hope that my right hon. Friend will stand by his guns. We do not want to create a non-unionists' charter. Lord Citrine was absolutely right. The Amendment is nothing but a potential blacklegs' charter and I hope that we shall reject what their Lordships have done.

The right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards) has made some remarkable points in such exaggerated terms that he has done considerable damage to whatever case he may have been trying to make. I am sure that this is not the view of the ordinary average trade unionist, but the right hon. Gentleman apparently believes that anyone who does not belong to a union is bound to be a crook, a thug, a stooge or a spy and may even dare not to agree with the right hon. Gentleman's party.

The hon. Gentleman should not misrepresent me. I said that the non-unionist was irresponsible. I did not say that he was a thug or anything like that. I said that he was a man who often forgot his social responsibilities.

If I misquoted the right hon. Gentleman in including almost the only epithet which he did not use I withdraw that one, but the substance of my argument remains that he spoke of non-unionists in a most wild and exaggerated way which I do not believe represents the true feeling about them even among loyal members of trade unions. We must not, because we happen to belong to a body of people, believe that those who disagree with us are in some way morally inferior, which was the tenor of the right hon. Gentleman's speech.

The right hon. Gentleman seemed to suggest that the Amendment was designed only to protect the non-unionist. I do not know where he gets that idea. We are talking, as we have done throughout the lengthy stages of the Bill, about individuals, and whether they are unionists or non-unionists makes no difference whatsoever. They have the same rights.

It should be said in this debate that neither unions nor trade unionists—or management, for that matter—ought ever to make the point that the other place or this House talks in a ratified way about matters which it does not understand because many Members of both Houses do not happen to be employers, managers or trade unionists. What we are discussing now does not only matter at that level. We are discussing a question of vital principle, a question on which every Member of this House and of the other place is perfectly entitled to hold firm convictions. Indeed, he ought to hold them and be prepared to assert them to over-ride the individual opinions of both management and labour on issues such as this.

I am sure that I take the hon. Gentleman with me, nevertheless, when I say that purely academic statements here without any knowledge whatever of the temper and influences in industry and the events which take place in steel works, in pits and the rest ought to be very deeply considered before they are uttered.

Again, I feel that the Minister himself is suggesting, as has been frequently argued, that in matters like this everything should be left for decision at union or management level. I cannot agree. I have some claim at least to speak on the management side of this question. I "say some claim" because I do not pretend to have intimate knowledge on all these points or to understand—and I do not believe that any one person can understand—the detailed problems of every industry as they may be affected by this Measure. But we must talk here in broad principle, and if the rights of the individual are not broad principle, I do not know what is.

The right hon. Member for Caerphilly said that the fact that the Amendment would, potentially, include some protection for undesirable people, thieves, shirkers or those who produced hazardous or dangerous situations, was an argument against the Amendment. I do not follow him there. Very often, the law protects people whom we might regard as morally undesirable, but that is no reason for saying that the law is had. We must not argue that because a crook may benefit from a safety regulation on the roads, we should not have safety regulations on the roads. That would be absurd.

Many of the cases cited by the right hon. Gentleman would come within the purview of management. Several of my hon. Friends who intervened during his speech made this point. Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously intend the logical consequence of his argument in the last case which he gave, the case of smoking in a pit, an act which would almost qualify as the offence of attempted murder, in view of the appalling consequences which it might bring? Does he really mean that, if it were established that a miner down a pit had committed that offence, any colliery management now, or in the past, would not sack him instantly, or, incidentally, that there is not such a penalty written into every regulation which the collieries have?

The hon. Gentleman asks me a question. I should say that 999 colliery managers out of 1,000 would take instant action themselves. What concerned me was the state of affairs if the men made representations. Under the Amendment, they would immediately be caught.

We ought not to take too long on these points, but I must answer that. Even if the Amendment were adopted, there would be nothing to prevent the men going to the management and saying, "In such circumstances, we shall strike, not to secure dismissal of this man but because you are not carrying out your own safety regulations". That is precisely what I should do in similar circumstances. I cannot treat that point with any seriousness as a point against the Amendment. There may be other points, but that cannot be one.

The Minister made the point that the Rookes v. Barnard judgment extended far beyond the actual case itself. Of course, this is precisely why the Bill was brought in in the first instance. We accept that that is so. We may not like the Bill—I do not like it myself, and I think that nothing should have been done but the matter should have been left to the Royal Commission—but that is water under the bridge now, and we have to consider the specific Amendment before us. Of course, the implications of the judgment went far beyond the Rookes v. Barnard case, but had they not done so, I wonder whether the Government would have brought in this Measure at all to deal only with the Rookes v. Barnard type of case, that is, the case in which a man was to lose his employment as a result of union action. If the issue had been confined to that, I do not believe that the Government would have brought in the Bill, but, if they had done so nevertheless, they would have faced a barrage of criticism from everyone in this country who knows of not very many but, none the less, too many cases of men being pressured out of their jobs by union action, and sometimes on not very firm ground. The nation as a whole does not like that sort of thing.

The Amendment is designed precisely to remove from the Bill this particular aspect but no others, and in so doing it would give the protection which the unions say they need in their ordinary operations, provided that they are not directed against an individual. My right hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) dealt at some length with the question of the rights of majorities. The rights of majorities, of course, are usually built into their own strength and their ability to defend their rights. A great deal of the legislation passed by this House over the centuries has been directed, on the other hand, to ensuring that the minority does not suffer under the will of majority. This is the issue again here.

5.15 p.m.

It has been frequently argued that the Amendment affects the closed shop issue. It does to some extent, though not necessarily, and I do not think it necessary to argue against the rather extraneous points which have been brought in about people not wanting to work with a certain man or about people resenting the fact that a non-unionist may get the benefit of union negotiations without contributing to the funds. This is not the central point. The central point is the protection of people against the possibility of oppression.

The Minister pointed out that the Amendment, if carried, would in any case give only partial protection to the individual and it did not go as far as the Opposition sought to go. I accept that. I even add to the limitations which he cited. He said that the Amendment would not operate where a threat was made but there was no breach of contract. This is true. It would not operate also if no threat were made but a strike were called off the cuff, without preliminary warning. But all this is no argument for saying that what protection the Amendment would give should not be given to the individual. Why should it not be given merely because the protection would be only partial? The whole Bill is only partial. It operates in very limited circumstances. It is no argument to say that the Amendment would not afford full protection. We sincerely hope that the full protection will be afforded—a difficult thing to do—in the Report of the Royal Commission and any subsequent legislation, but, in the meantime, we ask for the best protection for the individual now.

It has been argued that there would be great confusion in the mind of trade union officials because the Bill might apply in one case and not in another and they would not know in what circumstances they might contravene the law. We heard this argument countless times in Committee, and I can only repeat the same reply to it. The law is an immensely complicated mass which the ordinary citizen frequently does not understand. Could every hon. Member put his hand on his heart and swear, confident that he was telling the truth, that he had never contravened any law, however well intentioned he may have been?

I was not proposing to give vent to any oaths myself, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. The point has been made that such confusion can arise, and obviously it can, but it is up to trade union officials, as it is to all of us, to know what the law is. They would at least know one thing, and that is that they had better be circumspect if their actions are aimed at the termination of the employment of any individual. I feel, therefore, that we must press this Amendment. I hope that my hon. Friends are going to stick to their guns on it, because I am sure that if right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on both sides have considered it, they will agree that the last thing the House should attempt to do is infringe the rights of individuals. However much they may wish to protect the operations of trade unions, that is the one thing they must be careful not to do.

I should like to discuss three of the opinions that were advanced by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir T. Brinton) and by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber), in dealing with the whole question of shop organisation and unofficial strikes and their origin. Before doing so, perhaps I might mention that, contrary to what has been said already in the debate, the overwhelming majority of trade unionists throughout the country will rejoice at and welcome the statement by the Minister this afternoon in rejecting the Lords Amendments.

Hon. Members opposite have raised three very important issues which affect the basic purpose of trade union organisation. I want to make quite clear the very important distinction between the closed shop and 100 per cent. trade union membership. It is an extremely important question, and we must be clear about the definition of the two expressions. The trade union movement supports a great deal of what has been said in its opposition to the very crude type of closed shop, where it means that when a man seeks employment at a particular factory, corporation or municipality, he is told that, of necessity, he must be a member of a certain trade union. In other words, in the case of the closed shop the employer names the trade union. That is the important point about it and its definition—the fact that if a man seeks employment and agrees to accept work, he is told that he must belong to a particular trade union.

The trade unions are believers and advocates of 100 per cent. trade union membership in the shop, meaning that an individual commencing work has the right of choice and some degree of freedom to say which trade union he is about to join, so long as it conforms to the general negotiating machinery which applies to that particular shop. In engineering, for example, a man going to work in a factory will be asked to become a member of a trade union belonging to the confederation which negotiates on behalf of workers throughout the engineering industry. In other words, there is a degree of flexibility.

It is absolutely essential that we should understand the difference between the closed shop principle, to which many of us are opposed in its crudest sense, and a shop which is attempting to achieve 100 per cent. trade union organisation. I mention that because it is an important contributory factor to many shop floor disputes which have been seen to take place in recent times.

The second point was raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham—the origin of unofficial strikes. I can quite understand why many hon. Members oposite have raised the question of "wage drift" recently and are asking the House to place sanctions on trade unionists who take unofficial action. If one makes an analysis of present wage agreements and wage levels throughout industry, it soon becomes pretty obvious that the major gains that have been made in industry in terms of wage levels have arisen from "wage drift" and not from national negotiations. To take the example of engineering again, our nationally negotiated wages have been very slow to rise over the years. If we were totally dependent upon national negotiations as an industry, we would be far behind what is now required to keep up with the rising cost of living.

Order. I am not contradicting anything that the hon. Gentleman has said, but he must relate what he is saying to the Amendment that we are discussing.

I apologise, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I was attempting to follow up the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham, who was talking about the origin of unofficial strikes.

One can understand the reasons why they occur, because they are directly related to floor level negotiations—the thing that we now describe as "wage drift". It is from that source that the major wage increases have been achieved. As a result, we get conflict between managements, and it is a conflict of interests. The weapon used by the person in the factory in attempting to increase his negotiating strength is the threat to withdraw labour, and it is in that context that most unofficial strikes occur.

We must recognise that 99 per cent. of strikes are unofficial before they become official, and one of the reasons—

Order. I would again ask the hon. Gentleman to come to the Amendment. The right hon. Gentleman who referred to the point did eventually get to the Amendment. The hon. Gentleman must get to the Amendment, which deals with the threat to an individual

I am trying to follow up the point made by the right hon. Gentleman that it is a contributory factor. I am trying to follow his rather tenuous path and come to the question of the individual. What we are talking about is a balance of rights—on the one hand, protecting individual rights and, on the other hand, protecting majority rights. It is in that context that I am talking about the origin of unofficial strikes.

Order. Before the hon. Member for Bath (Sir E. Brown) intervenes, may I express the hope that he will not intervene on the argument which is, I hope, leading up to the hon. Gentleman dealing with the Amendment itself.

I am not going to talk about wages. I merely want to understand the hon. Gentleman's point when he says that the closed shop begins at shop floor level and that we must understand that these organisations are affiliated to a confederation. Surely the hon. Member will agree with me that it is the confederation which negotiaties and not the local people.

I have listened very carefully to the hon. Member's point, but I have failed to grasp it. The relationship between the individual's rights and the confederation which would be negotiating on his behalf is precisely what I am talking about.

Let me come to the third point that was raised, because perhaps it is more directly involved in the question of the rights of individuals. It is the right to strike as an individual. I make these observations and relate them to what I have said before and what the hon. Member for Kidderminster mentioned when he talked about the plight of the individual, because I hope that both sides of the House will reject any attempt that is made at any time to impose sanctions upon trade unionists when they avail themselves of their right to withdraw their labour. I hope that we will do everything we possible can to defend that right at all times, and that we will not listen to what I call the extremists demanding that sanctions be taken against trade unionists for exercising their individual right to withdraw their labour.

I make the point because it is very important that we should recognise that we are living in a class society. In a class society, we say that it is right for speculators and investors to withdraw their investments if the return is not great enough; in other words when they make an investment they do so on the understanding that they will get the greatest return. Therefore, if we accept that that is an individual right for a speculator or investor, surely we must at all times say that a man who has only his labour or brain, or a combination of both, to offer has exactly the same right to withdraw his labour because that is his equivalent to investment.

5.30 p.m.

I would not argue about the individual's right to withdraw his labour any time he wished to. But we are talking about the right being exercised collectively. There are many things that one may do legitimately as an individual which one may not do in agreement with other people. One has only to look at the Restrictive Trade Practices Act.

Precisely. In this sense we must always speak collectively. During my trade union experience I have never known a man say that he proposed to establish a strike on his own. It must be done collectively. Strength in the workshop results from collective action. I accept that.

The point about maintaining the right to strike at all times is a very important one, particularly because we await the publication of the Royal Commission's Report in order to tidy up some of our ideas about it. But we ought to say clearly where we stand about the rights of individuals in this sense, and must at all times be vigilant to maintain those rights and permit no interference with them.

I finish on a point which has already been made concerning the right of the individual in the workshop not to belong to a trade union. In my trade union experience I have known only three people refuse to become members of a trade union, and they refused because they did not want to pay the trade union dues. They were concerned about the weekly contribution and not the principle involved. Apart from the Rookes v. Barnard case, which is the classic one, I have never really known anyone in a factory say that he objected to the principle of collective security and collective bargaining, but I have known those three people who objected to being forced to pay trade union dues, and I think that that is the basis of many of the criticisms that we hear when men attempt to establish the principle of following their individual wishes.

I join my fellow trade unionists throughout the country in telling the Minister that we totally endorse and support what he has said, and we emphasise with all our vigour the need to reject the Lords Amendments.

I sat speechless through the Minister's reading of his speech, which I can only think was prepared for him by Transport House and was not really his own case. He must have been acutely unhappy in presenting it to the House. He is a Minister whom many of us admire—kindly, genial, tolerant. He must have been acutely unhappy about bringing forward proposals which are intolerably vindictive in their nature. He cannot have had very much joy in telling the House about them.

I was fascinated to hear the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), who is not at the moment in the Chamber, talking about the academic atmosphere in which trade union matters are discussed in this House and another place. He would have us believe from the example which he gave that where there was a persistent absentee damaging production and the earnings of men on a production line and the men wanted the individual sacked, the management would not do it. But we know that in real life not only would the men's earnings be damaged but so would the factory's production and profits, and the first people who would want the individual sacked would be the management, but the management would not dare to sack him for fear of strike action and unsettled labour relations. In real life the boot is very much on the other foot.

We were told of a man who was found smoking in a mine and who might be taken on at another mine after a major disaster in which men lost their lives. The last time I went down a pit I noticed a very large warning at the pithead that anyone found with cigarettes in his possession or smoking below would be subject to instant dismissal. I can hardly think that it was an example from real life which was quoted to us.

The Government's case for the original Bill was that there was uncertainty in the minds of trade unionists which must be clarified without delay, uncertainty which arose from the Rookes v. Barnard case. It was also said that that uncertainty would interfere with the day-to-day activities of trade union officials. I can well accept, and most hon. Members can, that that is a very fair case for the Minister to make. He made it on a number of occasions in Committee and in the House.

The hon. Gentleman missed the point all the time we were in Committee. It is true that we wanted to clear up the confusion. I said that. But the main purpose of the Bill was to put us back as far as was possible where we had been for 60 years, so that we could review the whole matter by means of a Royal Commission.

On Second Reading the right hon. Gentleman said that he would hesitate to bring in any further action before the Royal Commission had reported other than that required to put the law back where it was. The Lords Amendment does not affect the day-to-day working of trade union officials. We are constantly asked to debate Clauses which are in a negative form, and that makes it very difficult for us to understand them. However, if we put them into the positive we are able to see exactly what is meant by the proposed legislation. When we turn this proposal from the negative to the positive, it says, "This Act shall apply if it is shown that a threat is made to secure the termination of the employment of any person." This clearly, as I see it, introduces the principle of victimisation. The right hon. Member for Caerphilly referred to the right of the other House to interfere with a principle passed by the House of Commons. The principle of victimisation is surely hardly one that the Minister would have any pride in having forced on to the Statute Book.

I have three very simple, straightforward questions to ask, and I hope that I may have answers to them. First, if there is one example which the Minister can quote to show that failure to accept the Lords Amendment would have interfered with the normal day-to-day working of trade union officials since the Rookes v. Barnard case, will he quote it to the House? I do not want an airy-fairy "It might happen at so-and-so." Surely the Minister must have been seeking concrete examples to give the House to show the damage which would be done if we failed to accept the Lords Amendments. May we have just one example quoted to us so that we can see where since the Rookes v. Barnard case non-acceptance of the Lords Amendment would have a serious effect?

Secondly, does the right hon. Gentleman consider that victimisation, which would be legalised by leaving the Bill unamended, is part of the normal day-to-day activity of trade union officials?

I will be happy to do so. I mean the precise, phraseology which the Bill, if this Amendment is not accepted, will put into operation. The Bill would thereby legalise

"… a threat … to secure the termination of the employment of any person."
The Rookes v. Barnard case was one of victimisation. I have a case in my constituency, which I quoted in Committee.

The case is one of arrant, outright victimisation of a man because he failed to renew his subscription to a trade union which he quarrelled with, did not want to belong to and refused to belong to. It was a matter not of money but of principle. That man was not allowed to continue to work in that shop and as a result he has employment other than the highly-skilled position that he might have been in had the union allowed him to continue work.

Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that in that case there was a strike or threat to strike?

There were both a threat to strike and the beginnings of a strike but the management reacted in the way the union asked. The action taken was very much on the same lines as that in the Rookes v. Barnard case except that this man did not take the matter to the High Court and suffered as a result. I have sent the papers to the Royal Commission and I hope that it will give careful consideration to the example.

Time and again I have tried to explain to the hon. Gentleman that Mr. Rookes was a profound supporter of the closed shop. He started off as a supporter and quarrelled with the branch secretary and other officers of the union because they would not take militant action. He fertilised the bog in which he was eventually caught.

I cannot see what Mr. Rookes's beliefs have to do with it. He may have believed that the earth is flat but his beliefs had nothing to do with the case and the question of whether he had the right to refuse to join an association that he did not wish to join.

Thirdly, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is against Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, reaffirmed by a spokesman of the Government in another place. On 23rd February last, Lord Conesford asked Her Majesty's Government:
"… whether they accept the principle laid down in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by the General Assembly … in 1948 … viz., that 'No one may be compelled to belong to an Association' …"
against his will. The reply began:
"My Lords, the Government accept the principle laid down in Article 20."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 23rd February, 1965, Vol, 263, c. 684.]
What could be simpler than that? But now we have legislation in defiance of Article 20. We are to legalise victimisation to compel a man to join an organisation against his wishes. That is no more than paying lip-service to the U.N. and is particularly disconcerting to the many thousands who support the United Nations Association.

The Minister should take courage, go back to his Transport House masters and tell them that he is not prepared to continue to press this legislation, which is vindictive and intolerant and so much at variance with the commonsense, international agreements and sense of justice of which this House should be so proud.

5.45 p.m.

I want to take up a point about the problem that arises as between the majority and the minority viewpoints. Everyone will agree that it is essential in a democracy to maintain a balance so that there is fairness between the position of the majority and that of the minority. Everyone accepts this within the context of our democratic society. But it would seem that hon. Members opposite have a very strange view on the question of human rights and what precisely is fair.

I have been in the trade union movement all my adult life. I have been a shop steward, a federation steward and a branch official and have held many other offices within the movement. I want hon. Members opposite to look at this from the other point of view. I know of many cases where men have said that they are not prepared to work alongside individuals who were not members of their unions, but I have also known cases where action has been taken against trade unionists in various ways, sometimes by dismissal, only because they were active and militant trade unionists.

Thus, when the working people in a factory or mine or on a building site see comrades who are speaking on their behalf—in many cases, elected shop stewards—being subjected to victimisation and possible dismissal, it is understandable that they should say that they are not prepared to work alongside people who will not join the union.

It seems to me that we are getting bogged down about the issues in this case. We are not really discussing the principle. Despite the attempts of hon. Members to raise the principle, what we are discussing is why the Government feel that the Amendment ought to be rejected. That leads us to the question of why the Bill was brought in in the first place.

It is understandable that the Opposition should regard this as a matter of principle because the interests of both sides of the House come out clearly in the situation. I have heard the arguments which are now used by the Opposition made many times and in very different circumstances. I draw attention to a speech by Mr. Victor Feather, Assistant General Secretary of the T.U.C. Speaking at the Trades Councils' Conference in 1964, and talking in terms of the Rookes v. Barnard judgment, he was reported as saying:
"This judgment involved the trade union movement but it could not involve the trade union movement in isolation from the work trade unions did; therefore, it involved collective bargaining, and that, in turn, involved employers and management as well as trade unions. It presented a threat not to the trade union movement solely but to the orderly processes of collective bargaining of Britain which were a model for the rest of the world. Our collective bargaining system was flexible and brought about changes in an orderly way. Rookes v. Barnard could replace the orderly procedures that existed in British industry for the settlement of industrial disputes, with the prospect, if it were carried to its logical conclusion, of industrial chaos."
This view was not merely the view of Mr. Victor Feather. The General Council of the Trades Union Congress consulted its legal advisers on the matter. Legal opinion was very clear. It was precisely the same as that of Mr. Victor Feather; in fact, it was probable that Mr. Feather was basing his argument upon information and advice that he had received from legal sources.

The essence of the matter was that there was a need for a revision of the law so that the position could be restored to what it had previously been understood to be. Everyone had thought that in carrying out his duty a trade union official could take his stand in relation to trade union matters without the threat of intimidation, but the decision in Rookes v. Barnard altered this situation completely. And it was not only the position of a trade union official that was involved; this could be brought about by a third person. This was a very serious situation for the trade unions.

The General Council approached the Government of the day and asked them whether they would be prepared to write 16 words into the Act as it stood. The Government were not prepared to consider this. If we read the correspondence that passed between the T.U.C. General Council and the Government of the day we see that the Government were adamant that under no circumstances was this to be brought about. Their whole argument was based upon the need for the establishment of a Royal Commission.

I am sure that the hon. Member heard my right hon. Friend say that from the very beginning he asked for particulars of any real difficulties to be brought to him. He said that he was always willing and anxious to deal with them if they were drawn to his attention.

I was coming to that point. It is true that because of the furore that developed as a result of Rookes v. Barnard no other action was taken at the time. It is also true that since then there has been a General Election, and that at the moment no employer would be prepared to take action, because we now have a Labour Government. But the facts are that while the law remains as it stands, without being amended by the Bill, it can be invoked at any time. This is a very serious threat to the trade union movement. It is one that must be removed, and one that the Bill seeks to remove.

I want to take up the question of the freedom of the individual. Freedom does not mean licence. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Precisely. "Hear, hear", say hon. Members opposite. When workers who are engaged in proper trade union negotiations feel that it is important that all the workers in their establishment should belong to trade unions—not to one, but a number, within the trade union movement—surely they have the right to put it forward as a serious argument, and if an individual does not wish to belong to a trade union he can do what many bosses have told me to do. They have said. "If you do not like it here, Heffer, you can leave." I have said. "No—the answer is to try to change this situation through trade union negotiations. "If a worker does not like working with people who are 99 per cent. trade unionists he can leave and work somewhere else. He has that right. He can work with people who operate an open shop and do not believe in trade unionism.

In many parts of the United States the so-called "right to work" laws operate. In these States there has been an abandonment of proper negotiated trade union agreements, and there is chaos in industry precisely of the type that trade unions do not want to see introduced into this country. We have built up a vast, organised trade union movement which conducts its business properly with organised employers. We believe in organised agreements. If the Amendment is accepted it will be the thin end of the wedge for the complete and utter destruction of proper negotiating machinery in the long run. That is what we are arguing about. That is the essence of the problem.

It is clear that these arguments about the freedom of the individual do not really matter, because if the Opposition were really serious about this they would have added something else to the Amendment. They would have put in a few words providing that no action should be taken against individual workers by management. I do not see those words being added to the Amendment. I do not see hon. Members opposite rushing forward to propose a form of words of that kind. Why not? It is because they are not really concerned with that sort of thing. What they are concerned about is the workers who organise themselves into trade unions for their own protection. That is why the Opposition are fighting in such an organised way.

The whole attitude of the Opposition to the question of trade unions has been clearly revealed in this Chamber. The other day, at Question Time, an hon. Member asked why legislation should not be introduced to prevent unofficial strikes. Unofficial strikes are brought about because workers reach a certain stage at which they cannot accept the situation any longer. There are even unofficial strikes in Franco Spain and in Soviet Russia. Wherever workers feel that they cannot tolerate the situation any further they take unofficial action.

We live in a democracy. We believe in persuasion. We believe in not bringing about certain situations by force. But that is what hon. Members opposite are trying to do. They are trying to fetter the trade union movement. I hope that the House will reject the Lords Amendments.

The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) followed the normal line. He may not have meant to emphasise it to such an extent, but nevertheless he took the line that everybody on this side of the House is basically against trade unions and that we have no experience of them. He proceeded to list his experiences, and suggested that we were not interested in the question.

If the hon. Member did not mean that, I apologise to him immediately. But if he reads the report of his speech in tomorrow's HANSARD he will see that that was the suggestion that he made.

I want to try to deal with what I regard as the major points that we are discussing within the very narrow terms of this Lords Amendment. The main thing is that the Minister said again, this afternoon, that this Bill was designed to put back the law to what everyone thought it was before the Rookes v. Barnard case. I do not want to go into a long argument about this. All I can say is that there are some very reliable authorities who, even in 1906, and since, have expressed the view that this was not so, and that the 1906 Act did not give the protection from actions for tort to trade unionists in all actions that they may take. Certainly the Lord Chancellor of the day when the 1906 Act was brought in, and Lord Citrine, in his book, are both on record as pointing out that this was not so.

Even if it were so, what one has to remember is that one is now 60 years on from 1906. It seems funny to me that we should have to put the law back to what it was felt to be in 1906, particularly when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), in telling us of some of his interesting experiences, said that when he was a lodge steward he had problems ten times more difficult than they are today. In other words, even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Caerphilly was pointing out that we have moved a long way in the whole question of industrial relations since 1906.

The Bill deals, purely and simply, with threats, and threats by a person. It does not even need to be a trade union official. The arguments that have been put forward have been that trade union officials ought to have the right to work and to do their job without the danger of becoming involved in legal actions. Even if the Amendment was accepted, officials would have to be a little more careful in issuing threats to managers and that would only be where the rights of a person to continue in employment were involved—

Is the hon. Gentleman trying to tell the House that a threat to intimidate is worse than intimidation itself?

6.0 p.m.

Yes, certainly I am. This is an important point. We know full well that a person, not an official, not a shop steward, the leader of a group of dissidents inside a union, can threaten the management that if certain action is not taken, labour will be withdrawn.

The employer could then try to work out a balance of what he would lose if a strike took place, against what it would cost him to placate those who were threatening strike action, when there may not be the possibility of a strike if the crunch came. In other words, it may very well be a bluff.

As far as the Rookes v. Barnard decision is concerned, no one can be certain that if B.O.A.C. had refused to sack Rookes, the union would have withdrawn its labour from London Airport. This is a matter of conjecture, and this is the reason why I say that a threat could be more dangerous and more damaging, particularly where an individual is concerned, where an individual is causing difficulties, and where the employer knows that, if he dispenses with his services, then his problems are over and there is no possibility of a strike taking place. In those circumstances, I think that a threat could be more damaging to the person on the receiving end than the actual strike.

The hon. Member for Walton referred to the fact that we were dealing with balance and that the balance must be kept right. This is true. It involves rights and responsibilities of those who have joined together collectively into a trade union, and those who for one reason or another have decided that they do not wish to join that particular corporate body. It also involves those-I agree they are few—who may have been disciplined by their trade union, and as a result it is impossible for them to belong to that particular union.

There we have the balance which we must try to maintain. I think everyone in this House would accept that it is important that trade union officials, in their day-to-day activities, should not have to take a training in law to make certain that they are not getting themselves into difficulties. It is right and proper that the principle of the 1906 Act should have been brought in, and it is right and proper that we should make certain that in their normal, legitimate activities, they should be reasonably protected.

There is also another point which we have to consider. An individual can lose his employment and there is nothing that this House, or the Minister or anyone else can do to prevent a group of men from physically withdrawing their labour or refusing to work with him. There is nothing we can do about it and let us not attempt the task.

What the House can do is at least to make certain that the person concerned can have a forum to which he can go to prove that he has suffered damages as a result of this, and to claim some sort of compensation for that damage. This is where we have to keep the balance right. I think that when this Bill gives a sweeping right, not only to trade union officials, but to other persons who threaten action, which would cause great damage to the person concerned, we should be wrong to take away that person's right to be able to go to the courts and, if he can prove he has suffered damage, and that that damage was caused by people acting contrary to law, in the form of a conspiracy not already covered by an Act of Parliament to claim compensation.

The Declaration of Human Rights has been mentioned. I do not propose to dwell upon it except to point out that it is important that we should not become hypocritical. If we accept what the Declaration of Human Rights says about "solemnly entering into", then I do not think we can run away and say that neither we, as the Houses of Parliament, or as Minister of Labour, or as the Government, are forcing anyone to join an association. Technically we may get away with that argument, but if we do not accept these Lords Amendments we shall be giving licence to other people to do just that. We should seriously consider whether we are right in taking this action. If we are not prepared to retain this right for the ordinary individual, then at least we ought to be truthful and to say that we must now ask that this section of the Declaration of Human Rights should be cut out so far as we are concerned, because we cannot abide by it. This is a matter to which I do not think we ought just to pay lip-service.

It is true, as the Minister has said, that this Bill will obviously sweeten the whole atmosphere and allow the Royal Commission to be able to work in a better atmosphere than it may have been able to do if this action were not taken. I believe that the Minister ought to be happy, in regard to that part of the Bill which gives everything except this narrow point, to wait until the Royal Commission reports before he decides whether the Royal Commission is of the same opinion as we are about the right of the individual. Hon. Members have tended to refer to anyone who is dealt with in these circumstances as a "non-unionist", this description being applied to those who fail to join a union and those who refuse to join a union. The suggestion was that the only men who refused to join a union were those who were influenced by the question of the "subs". In my experience, this is not so. I have known few people who have refused to join a trade union when they have been approached and shown the benefits which could derive from their joining that union.

In my experience as a shop steward over a long period, I have found that the voluntary approach—by which men were shown what may be obtained and what they were already obtaining from the services of a union, as well as the other services they could enjoy, particularly the legal support if they were involved in an action concerning an employer's liability—results in few people refusing to join. There are certain religious orders, for instance, who say that someone should not join a trade union. I believe that they are wrong, that this is a closed shop in reverse, but this is, nevertheless, an important point. Those people should be entitled to wide employment, unless their fellows feel so strongly that they force the employer to get rid of that man. In those circumstances, that man should not be denied the right which is denied to no one else in this country—to go to the courts and seek his legal remedy.

This problem goes even further than that. As I said earlier, there have been cases of an ordinary member of a trade union being faced with this terrible dilemma, that his own department, the men in his own shop, decide that they will take unofficial action. The executive committee of the union says, "There is no need for this. We are telling you that negotiations are going on and the last thing we want is for you to withdraw your labour." They probably even send someone from London to tell the men, "This is not on." Yet the men still insist on coming out on strike. What does the ordinary man do? Does he follow his executive or does he say, "Against my wishes—I believe that this is wrong—I will go out with my fellows on unofficial strike."?

In some cases, he follows the stream and goes out with his fellows. That is the end of it. But what of the man who says, "No. I went to the last policy conference and we decided on a number of resolutions, which the executive is carrying out. If I go out on strike now, I shall be taking action with my foot against motions put forward with my mouth."? He does not take part in that unofficial strike. As a result, he is treated as a blackleg by his fellows—there are few cases of this, but it can happen—and he may be disciplined and lose his trade union card.

How do we deal with that person? Is he to travel the country finding the odd open shop where there is still no need for him to join a union, getting himself established and then having to move on again as soon as the closed shop is established there? Not only that, but he will be unable at any time to go to any court in the land and sue for any compensation for the damages he has sustained.

This is what we are discussing. I suggest that we—whether we are trade unionists, employers or experts in this and that—are here as Members of Parliament not to look after the interests of one section of the community, but to make certain that the balance is right. If we do not accept this Amendment, the balance will be wrong and it will legitimise victimisation. In most cases, trade union leaders will not use this wrongly, but we should remember that the reference in the Bill is to "a person" and this gives too much power.

I would remind the House that the hon. Member for Walton said that freedom should never be licence. I believe that, if we accept the Lords Amendment, we shall be maintaining about the right balance in which trade union officials can go about their daily job without let or hindrance, and that the ordinary individual, whether a member of a trade union or not, will still have his legal remedy if, in some action over which he has no control, he is damaged and faced with the prospect of being able to find no remedy in any court in the land.

6.15 p.m

It was a pleasure, in some ways, to listen to the speech of the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), because, although I disagreed with a great deal of what he said, he was at least talking on the right wavelength. It was clear that he was talking from personal knowledge of the background. Although he said things with which I disagree, he made points which were objective, intelligent and intelligible. He made the correct point, that what we are talking about is the question of an individual. My complaint is that the individual, to whom most of the Opposition speakers have directed their attention, is not the individual referred to in the Amendment. The Bill refers to:

"An Act done after the passing of this Act by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute."
This is the person with whom we are concerned.

What the Lords are seeking to do is to remove the protection from that person. They are, in other words, seeking to expose that person to the possibility of being sued. If we were to spend a little more time being concerned about the person referred to in the Bill—the person exposed to the possibility of being sued at law by the Lords Amendment—and concerned ourselves a little less with the various hypothetical persons who have been mentioned by the Opposition as being people who may suffer intimidation and victimisation, we should do right. We should do right not only because we should be addressing ourselves to the actuality but because we should be talking about the Amendment, which we ought to be talking about, and not about the Bill as a whole.

For this reason, I should like to talk about this chap. He is not always the stereotype in the minds of hon. Members opposite. He is not always the big trade union boss who says, "You shall do this." Much more often than not, he is a chap who happens to have undertaken a certain responsibility as a shop steward or something of that kind. He is not another stereotype, the militant Communist who exists sometimes in the minds of hon. Members opposite. More often than not, the chap in this position is virtually drafted there by his fellow workers and asked to stick his neck out. What hon. Members are seeking to do is make it more difficult for him to stick his neck out, to make it more difficult for him to undertake this responsibility, because he would know that by undertaking that responsibility he would expose himself to the danger of being sued in law.

Hon. Members opposite ask whether this has happened. We in the trade union movement can tell them that since the Act has been passed it has been more difficult in trade unions to get the ordinary rank and file trade unionist to undertake the ordinary responsibilities within the movement, because they are scared that they will place themselves in a difficult position in taking the actions which have to be taken almost every day. Scarcely a day passes without a trade unionist going to the boss and saying, "If we cannot get this settled the chaps will come out". Under the Amendment that is a threat.

When the hon. Member refers to the unwillingness of trade unionists under the Act, he means since the Rookes v. Barnard decision, does he not?

Yes. I mean until the Bill becomes effective and recreates the position as we thought it was before Rookes v. Barnard. That is the position which we are seeking to re-establish. We cannot accent the Amendment because it removes an essential protection.

I will be brief. Indeed, I might not have intervened at all had the right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) done me the courtesy of allowing me an intervention in his speech. My right hon. Friend who followed him gave hon. Members opposite the opportunity to intervene on six occasions. Perhaps next time the right hon. Member for Grantham will not fail to see me when I stand up.

The point which I would have made in that intervention relates to the Declaration of Human Rights. That must be seen in its context. If we were to say that this United Nations statement is to be effective in relation to employment and workers, civilised society would be impossible. All guilds have accepted the proposition that obligatory membership of associations is right and proper, and in the old days they used to enforce it. Certain establishments in the City possess this theoretical power to enforce membership of an organisation. Not only the workers but also employers have done this. The idea of obligatory membership in relation to work is well established, and it is operated in relation to doctors and the law. Membership of an organisation in work is part of our society.

The United Nations statement means that it is improper to extend that necessary obligation, which is part of the economic framework of society, into a political obligation, and this is why in the trade unions we rightly have the ability to opt out of political obligations. The analogy which has been drawn in rather exaggerated terms by some hon. Members opposite, but in more reasonable terms by the hon. Member for Totnes, is not a valid analogy for that reason and for many other reasons with which I will not weary the House. I support my right hon. Friend in opposing the Amendment and in standing for the Bill unamended.

The hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) would agree, if he considered his remarks carefully, that they are not valid in relation to a threat which might be made to withdraw labour. He said that if the Amendment were accepted then a shop steward or a person representing a body of workers could not go to the employer and say, "Unless you do so and so my colleagues will withdraw their labour." He can still do that in any circumstances except if the action which he is taking is to persuade the employer to dismiss one of his colleagues.

If the employer has not carried out all his obligations, for example if there is a dangerous machine, he can go to the employer and say, "Unless you put the machine right and instal safety guards, I shall have to persuade my colleagues to withdraw their labour". It is only in the one case covered by the Amendment that he cannot do it without laying himself open to the sort of action which we saw in Rookes v. Barnard.

I am a trade unionist, and, like the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), I start with a prejudice in favour of the trade unions. But we cannot accept the pronouncement that people, however eminent, such as Lord Citrine, necessarily represent accurately the views of the whole body of trade unionists in this country. It is wrong for anyone to claim that they are doing that unless they have carried out a thorough survey in their own trade union or the movement generally. I agree very much that we should pay serious attention to the views expressed by leaders of the trade unions, but we should not say that they necessarily represent the views of the rank and file members.

Is the hon. Member suggesting that a man who has been General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress for many years and who is regarded as the greatest British authority on trade unions has little more right to claim that he knows what is in the minds of British trade unionists than perhaps other people?

Not necessarily. If he has been General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress for a number of years he may be out of touch with the workers on the shop floor. It would be out of order to say too much about this, but I could quote many examples to show where the leadership of the trade unions is out of touch with the rank and file. The recent go-slow on the railways is probably an outstanding example.

The fact that for a period they have been slightly out of touch with the rank and file does not mean that they do not know what the rank and file are thinking. That was the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson).

The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) suggested that the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress was more likely to know what were the views of the rank and file than were some other people. It depends on who the other people are. I am saying that he is not more likely to know what are the views of the rank and file than is a shop steward who is engaged in day-to-day negotiations or even somebody at district level or even the hon. Member for Totnes, who has been a shop steward in his time. I am not trying to make too much of it. All I am saying is that one should not accept the pronouncements of people, however eminent they are in the trade union movement, as necessarily being indicative of the views of the general majority either in their own union or in the movement as a whole.

I am not entirely happy with the wording of the Amendment, because there is something in the contention that it goes too wide. I listened carefully to the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), and I thought that his examples were a little far-fetched. It would have been better if in another place they had accepted the Liberal Amendment, which was concerned only with acts done with the sole intention of forcing another person to remain or to seek to become a member of a trade union. This Amendment from another place could cover a much wider area than those people who will not join a trade union. The examples given by the right hon. Member for Caerphilly did not strike me as being very plausible. But I agree that if a person smoked in a mine he would be dismissed instantly—not in 999 cases out of 1,000 but in 1,000 cases out of 1,000. I should like the right hon. Gentleman with his long experience in these matters, to quote me one example of a miner who has been found to have smoked down in the pit and who has not been instantly dismissed.

6.30 p.m.

The hon. Gentleman might care to know that I began in the coal mines in 1925. In the first mine in which I worked, with 450 other men, smoking was allowed underground.

That may have been true in 1925, but I do not think that it is true today. From the discussions I have had with people who are experienced in the coalmining industry I understand that smoking is one of the gravest fears of men working underground and that there are severe penalties, including that of instant dismissal, for men found smoking. Perhaps if such stringent regulations were in force in 1925 the number of accidents in the mining industry at that time would have been reduced.

The right hon. Member for Caerphilly then spoke of persistent absenteeism, mentioned the case of men in a bonus team and pointed out that by one member of the team being persistently absent on the Monday or Friday the earnings of the rest of the team were reduced. I should have thought that absenteeism was sufficiently serious a matter to be dealt with without threats being made to the management for securing the dismissal of the persistent absentee in such circumstances.

I go this far with the right hon. Member for Caerphilly, that there might be cases, which we cannot at the moment envisage, which could be covered by the Tory Amendment of another place and which might not be covered had the Liberal Amendment been accepted. I will give one example, although in doing so I do not want to suggest that this is likely to happen often, although its happening is conceivable. There may be a group of workers who are colour prejudiced and who do not like working alongside someone from, say, the West Indies. They might decide that to procure his dismissal they will threaten the employer to withdraw their labour unless he accedes to their request. This is an unpleasant situation to have to discuss and I am mentioning it merely to point out that there are circumstances other than those mentioned by the right hon. Member for Caerphilly which must receive our attention and which could occur in this context.

Our Amendment would make it illegal to make such a threat in order to get rid of a man on colour grounds whereas the Liberal Amendment would not.

That is correct. Although this is an unpleasant situation to envisage, it could happen, and the fact that a few examples have been given today does not mean that we know how far the Amendment we are discussing might extend. I agree that in the case I have cited the Conservative Amendment is an improvement on ours, but there might be other instances in which the Tory Amendment, extensive though it is, might have undesirable consequences.

There are only two factors in favour of leaving the Bill exactly as it stands. One is that the trade unions believe that the Amendment would greatly restrict their operations. They consider it right and fair that no restriction should be placed on their activities, pending the Royal Commission's Report. Many trade unionists are under a misapprehension about the effect of the Amendment and, as the hon. Member for Putney said, this is a question of explaining exactly what are the implications.

The second factor is one to which the Minister drew attention when he said that the main thing was to put the situation back to where it was for 60 years following the passage of the Trade Disputes Act 1906. However, with respect to the right hon. Gentleman, lawyers differ as to what the position was prior to the Rookes v. Barnard decision. Even the Lord Chancellor has said about that decision that the difficulty of the Rookes v. Barnard situation was that nobody knew what it was that it had decided. For this reason I hope the Government will not make too much of the argument that by accepting the Amendment we are destroying something which was in existence for 60 years, for different legal authorities have different views on the subject. For that reason it would, on balance, be better to accept the Amendment and go forward to the result of the Royal Commission on that basis.

I have a few observations to make on the speech of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock). It might be wise, at the outset, to consider the position of a shop steward, to which the hon. Gentleman referred following the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins).

It has been suggested that under the Amendment a shop steward might be in jeopardy if he threatened an employer that the men would withdraw their labour if a certain person was employed. However, might he not be in this difficult position? A shop steward or permanent officer of a union might seek, in a friendly way, to warn an employer, but this might be interpreted as a threat. For example, it might be interpreted that, by going to tell the employer that by employing a certain person there might be trouble in the shop, this could be construed at law as a threat.

This brings us back to the point made by the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), when I pointed out that an action—such as the withdrawal of labour—would not be covered by the Amendment but that a threat of such an action would be. This seems to be a strange anomaly in the law; that when one does a thing one is not punished or sued and the action is not actionable, while a threat is.

Is not the position that if a person strikes in breach of contract he is liable—that he may not be sued, although he is liable to be sued?

I am referring to the Amendment, which says nothing about an action. It refers to a threat. I am under the impression that we are speaking to the Amendment and not about a hypothetical situation.

We might ask which could cause more damage. Does a threat cause more damage than an action? For example, a strike may cause considerable damage. I should have thought that the argument in this case was quite clear; that a threat in itself might cause no damage whatever—such as a friendly warning that might be given by a shop steward to an employer or the passing on of information—whereas a strike could certainly cause damage. It comes as a strange surprise that the Opposition lightly con-template strikes, but take more seriously the threatening of shop stewards who warn employers in an effort to prevent strikes. This is a strange "turn up for the book".

I mention, in passing, that our discussion of the Bill has been extremely friendly. I understand that some hon. Members were rather afraid that there might be, as a result of this discussion, some kind of verbal assault on another place. That has not eventuated. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] The answer is because my right hon. Friend is such a reasonable and kindly man and that any prospect or talk of an assault would be quite out of character. Indeed, my right hon. Friend set the tone of the debate. I have heard nothing of a sufficiently violent or controversial nature in this debate to cause anyone in the other place a particular spasm.

The Declaration of Human Rights has been mentioned several times, and it was also mentioned in the Standing Committee. One is entitled to ask why, if the Opposition place so much store on that Declaration, they do not live up to it—because they do not. Very many of them belong to associations of one sort or another where compulsion is used and where the Declaration of Human Rights is frequently transgressed. Never once have they protested about it here, and it comes as passing strange that they should talk about it now.

One has only to refer to an association within the precincts of this Palace—the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. An hon. Member cannot take a trip abroad in certain directions—

Order. The hon. Member was good enough to remind us earlier that this debate was confined to this Amendment.

With respect, Sir, I am speaking to a specific point, which is that the right of employment might be terminated if a man refused to join a union.

Right hon. and hon. Members opposite talked about compulsory trade unionism, so I suggest that what I say is within the terms of the Amendment. They prayed in aid the Declaration of Human Rights, and I suggest that if the Declaration is to be prayed in aid in one context it is quite reasonable to pray it in aid in another. I hope that in talking about the Declaration of Human Rights and the consistency or inconsistency of hon. and right hon. Members opposite, Mr. Speaker, I shall not be ruled out of order, but I am, as always, speaking subject your guidance.

We on this side have always said in connection with trade unionism that the subject matter of the Amendment should be left to the good sense of people. That was precisely what my right hon. Friend was after when he said that we want to restore the law to the position we thought existed before a recent legal decision. We in the trade union movement have always said, and it has been widely accepted on both sides of the House over many years, that the law ought to interfere in trade union affairs as little as possible. It has been widely accepted that the lawyers should restrain themselves very much in relation to industrial matters, and particularly in relation to trade union matters because we have felt—and this is not a party matter at all—that in seeking to define these things in law too closely we run into great difficulties.

I have been a trade unionist ever since I started work, and those of us who are concerned with trade unions recognise that we cannot talk to ordinary working men about the niceties and exactitudes of the law. They will dismiss it in a very picturesque turn of phrase which would be quite out of order to repeat this afternoon, though I am sure that hon. Members, with their equally wide experience of the world, will not only know the words but will have heard them used on occasion by trade unionists and working men.

6.45 p.m.

We live in a very real and very practical world, but I suggest that by accepting this Amendment we would very quickly get into the impractical world, the artificial world, of exact definition by lawyers, and we would run into very serious trouble. One of the dangers of the Amendment is that it would expose trade unionists and trade union officials to some very severe uncertainties. For example, one hon. Member opposite has suggested that the real state of trade union law at the moment could be exemplified by leaving the word "not" from the Amendment, so as to make it read:
"( ) This Act shall apply if it is shown that a threat of the character specified in the next following subsection was made to secure the termination of the employment of any person."
He read that version to mean that at present this is how trade unionists operate, but he is completely wide of the mark, and any trade unionist, any employer or anyone with experience of industry would tell him so.

We believe that the lawyers should abstain here, but, in any case, I suggest that if members of the party opposite really want to make trade union law exact, really want to import the law into the trade union world in a much more widespread way than has hitherto been the case, this Amendment is obviously quite insufficient for that purpose. We would require a complete transformation of the legal position of trade unionists and trade unions, and the Amendment does not go half far enough in that direction. We should either do the whole thing properly or we should leave it alone, and my right hon. Friend's case is that until we have had this review by the Royal Commission we should leave it alone. These are very sound and logical reasons for resisting the Amendment.

Partial amendment is quite unsatisfactory. In this respect we can draw on the experience of previous Governments. It is most remarkable that the eloquent speeches we have heard from the benches opposite today were not made in the last Parliament, nor have they been made during the last 13 years, when they had the opportunity—

Order. The hon. Gentleman's speech must be directed, if I might remind him, to this Amendment.

I am most grateful, Mr. Speaker. I was trying to show that this partial Amendment is really insufficient, and that if right hon. and hon. Members opposite were really serious they would have taken action in this respect. If I was out of order, I apologise most sincerely.

If the Amendment were accepted, who would be sued? Would it be the working men, who issued threats? Or would it be the shop representative or the permanent trade union official? The Amendment would make the law much more uncertain than it is. Hon. Members opposite are already complaining that the law is uncertain; this Amendment would make uncertainty twice uncertain. For the reasons I have given, in addition to those others that have been advanced from these benches, I recommend the House to reject the Amendment.

I was rather sorry that the Minister of Labour closed his mind to the posibility of accepting the principle of this Amendment. He will be aware that on this side of the House there is a tremendous amount of good will for his attitude towards matters affecting labour relations and good relations in industry. For many of the things he has said and done he has maximum support from this side of the House. I was particularly surprised that he should have invoked in support of his argument an example of an employer who had given notice to employees because of their membership of trade unions. He must be aware that that kind of situation has long been condemned by public opinion including, of course, trade unionists.

I am not arguing with the hon. Member about that. We all condemn it, but it goes on and on. The only argument I was adducing was that we had better look at the whole picture before we legislate.

The point I was making was that the right hon. Gentleman is aware that it has long been condemned. For many years it has been accepted by both sides of the House and by the country that freedom of association is one of the constitutional rights of the people. This Amendment is directed to something quite different.

The right hon. Gentleman says "No", but I should have thought that he should take some account of the state of public opinion on this matter. While public opinion is solidly behind the idea of freedom of asociation, today a large degree of public opinion is deeply concerned about some aspects of the exercise of the power in whom that freedom is reposed. That concern extends far beyond the ranks of Conservatives. It is very deeply felt by Liberals. It is significant to those who read the proceedings on this Amendment in another place that the Liberal seers were among those who spoke most strongly about these matters. The concern extends through all sections of the community. Examples have been given tonight of the kind of situation we could envisage.

Recently, I read about such an association. Of course, there is always a background, but we do not know all the facts. That is why one is guarded in one's assessment of a situation, but it seems that in that situation there was a long history of dislike of a particular man. That led to a threatened strike. The reports of that situation refer to the man's assertion and claim that he was being victimised because he was working too hard. I do not know how accurate that statement may have been, but to refer to such a situation shows the danger which might exist.

My hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) referred to those minority religious bodies which, for reasons of conscience which we might think quite misguided, are placed in a difficult position. Is this House to enshrine in an Act of Parliament a provision whereby such people can be driven out of their industry? Is this to be the sort of law we are to pass? I cannot understand those who are the successors of persons who fought for freedom of association now being party to any kind of legislation which would lessen the freedom of an individual. It seems a wrong ending to what has been a splendid history.

The hon. Member completely misunderstands our situation. I am opposed to the closed shop, and always have been. I am opposed to compulsory trade unionism. All that we are saying is that this Amendment is the wrong way of setting about it.

I do not limit my argument to the closed shop. I am in favour of the maximum possible membership of a trade union, achieved by voluntary methods—

Yes, voluntary methods—and the knowledge that the union gives to its members. Nine willing members are worth 10 who are compelled.

We have to weigh in the balance whether it is worse for 99 to be aggrieved because of one person in their industry or for one apparently helpless man, not backed up by a great organisation, to be drummed out of an industry in which he has any possible skill. [An HON. MEMBER: "The same as doctors and lawyers?"] It is not the same as doctors and lawyers. That is where hon. Members are completely wrong. Doctors and lawyers are under the necessity of having a certain amount of knowledge demonstrated by their success in examinations. That is completely different. It is to ensure that the community has doctors and lawyers reaching a certain academic standard. We cannot compare that with the situation we are discussing on this Amendment.

Will my hon. Friend agree that that one person has the right to leave his organisation and also the right to stay in it?

He has the right to leave, yes, and he has the right to remain, but he should not be placed in a situation in which, without recourse to any forum, he might be driven out of a trade and unable to achieve a livelihood in the trade in which he has been trained.

I wonder whether the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) would make further observations on the question raised about the British Medical Association and the Law Society, which, of course, are compulsory trade unions? Is he attempting to suggest that some trade unions do not exist in which the members have, for instance, to pass an apprenticeship? Is there not an analogy between insistence on compulsory trade union membership for professional workers and for manual workers?

I thought that I had dealt with that argument. I suggested, I think rightly, that in the case of lawyers and doctors the main reason is the necessity for reaching a minimum academic standard.

The analogy also breaks down because a lawyer or a doctor cannot be kicked out of his organisation without a judicial inquiry, or an inquiry on judicial lines.

That is the case, but it is outside the terms of this Amendment.

It is no answer to the problem for the Minister to say that the sensible thing would be to wait for the report of the Royal Commission. It is desirable that these matters should be considered by such an august body, but we all know that such bodies take a considerable time to publish their findings and recommendations and there is an even longer time before their recommendations are implemented.

What I have said about the interests of many people, including Liberals, makes me hopeful that the Solicitor-General, with his long Liberal antecedents, will find himself constitutionally incapable of resisting the Amendment. I cannot believe that a man who has spent most of his political career asserting the rights of the individual could advocate support for a proposal which would have the most damaging effect on those rights. I hope that the Government will have second thoughts about this matter. We on this side of the House are just as much attached as they are to freedom of association and membership of trade unions, but we are desperately opposed to compulsion. We are desperately opposed to the principle of compulsion and the idea of force of any kind. We hope that in that setting the hon. and learned Gentleman will now announce that there has been a change of mind.

7.0 p.m.

The question before the House is whether it is right to accept the Amendment now or whether it would be better to await the Report of the Royal Commission. I claim some experience in trade union matters, because I have been a shop steward, district president, and other things connected with a trade union. The motivation and the background to this matter must not be overlooked. Some years ago there was the Crichel Down case, and I remind hon. Members of the atmosphere which prevailed at the time.

I draw attention to the provisions under the Defence of the Realm Act in relation to conscientious objectors. I yield to no one in my defence of the rights of the individual. I agree, however, that this matter is being viewed at the moment side by side with the present round of unofficial or wildcat strikes and also in the light of the judgment in Rookes v. Barnard.

In my union experience I had to deal with many people. Most of them had religious and moral reasons as to why they should not join a trade union. I met many such people. If the Amendment were written into the Bill and a certain interpretation followed, the sense of injustice felt by these people would be magnified and they would be prepared to test their case in the courts. When such cases go to the courts, there is always plenty of money from peculiar sources to support the rights of the individual. I do not object to this if it is done above board, but it is not always done above board.

In my view, it would be better to await the report of the Royal Commission. Under the existing structure I agree that the courts are the proper place to deal with the matter, but courts of inquiry with specific reference to certain industries and specific cases should be set up, rather than that case law should be built up in the courts. In my view if such a case were to be taken to court it would be magnified out of all reality.

The hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Hamling) said that this had been a very friendly debate. I agree with him. One of the reasons he adduced for saying that was that no assault had been made on another place. Perhaps he did not hear the speech of his right hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), who at the beginning of his speech said that the Amendment should never have been sent down from another place because it dealt with a question of principle and not with a question of detail.

I want to argue the exact opposite. It is of immense importance that on questions of principle another place should have the right to revise and review and send Measures back to us for reconsideration. After all, this House is absolute. It can do anything it likes in the end. To take a historical example, one of the things it has often done has been to vary the length of Parliament. There is no reason why the House should not pass a Measure extending the life of any Parliament to seven years, or 10 years, or indefinitely. That would raise a vitally important question of principle. [Interruption.] It has done so. We have had seven-year Parliaments. It the other place had no right to make us think again, our Constitution would be very much weaker than it is.

The essence of the Amendment, the retention of which I support, has been very clearly stated. As the Minister has said today, in Committee and on Second Reading, the difference between us is that, whereas he and his hon. Friends think that the Bill without the Amendment puts the law back where many people thought it was, we on this side say that the law is never what people think it is and that what, in effect, is happening is that, without the Amendment, the Bill would extend the immunities of trade unions, and extend them in a particular way, in that the Bill without the Amendment would give a positive licence to members of trade unions to use the threat of a strike to intimidate an individual.

I was interested to hear the Minister say, rather more clearly than he has said on previous occasions, that the reason why he opposes the Amendment is that he wants to hold the balance between an individual's right not to join a trade union and the right of the majority of trade unionists to refuse to work with a non-trade unionist.

The Amendment restores or adjusts a balance that is pretty heavily tilted the other way. In any society, particularly in industrial societies, individuals suffer at the hands of a majority. They may be sent to Coventry. We had the case only the other day of the man who caught a thief in his factory at night and then gave evidence against the thief in court. When it was discovered that the thief was a member of his union and worked in the same works, this man was sent to Coventry and he found life so unbearable that he left his job.

There are cases as hon. Members opposite know very well, of men who are sometimes much against their will obliged to pay funds to unofficial strike leaders, even though it may be against the rules of their union. There have been cases in which men who have refused to do this have not been supported by their union. There are all sorts of instances of this kind. [Interruption.] These cases are common. I can give chapter and verse of a case where this has occurred.

I have detailed facts of cases where this has happened. I will give the hon. Gentleman details later. These cases are very well known. [An HON. MEMBER: "Give the details now."] On the next occasion when I speak on this matter I will give two detailed cases.

Order. The confines of this debate must be borne in mind. It is legitimate to argue, no doubt, that, were this Amendment to be rejected, there would be increasing pressures by the union on the individual, but I think that to go through a detailed discussion of possible methods of bringing such pressures to bear goes beyond the bounds permitted.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. That is why I was not going into any detail. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite are being foolish. They know full well that these things have happened. can give them the details later. Therefore, all that we are saying is that, although these pressures exist, and everybody knows that they exist, these are inevitable and individuals have their legal remedy against them. Where it is a question of a man's livelihood, where intimidation can take the form of his losing his job and perhaps his livelihood, then at least he can have no remedy.

There is no suggestion that anybody can stop trade unionists or the majority of people in a factory or an industry from using the threat of a strike to get a man sacked. That can still take place. All that the Amendment does is to say that, if an individual loses his job and his livelihood, he should have the right to take action in court.

I am surprised that hon. Members opposite take such objection to this. I do not believe that any of them in practice would either wish to use such intimidation or indeed have ever done so. I find it difficult to understand why they feel so strongly about it. This is a very limited Amendment. It is a very limited thing we are trying to stop. It is essentially reasonable.

The only two arguments against it which I want to deal with are these. The right hon. Member for Caerphilly said that a halo is being put round a man who does not want to join a team. Almost all of the great reform movements in history have been started by men who did not want to join a team. The founder of the Christian religion did not want to join the Pharisaical team of his day. The founder of the Labour movement, Mr. Keir Hardie, did not want to join the political teams of his day. Such individuals seem to me to be admirable. They seem to me to need protection. If they can get a halo, some of them deserve it. I do not think that it is a strong argument to say that the team should be provided with the right to intimidate those who do not want to join it.

The second main argument against the Amendment has been that men should not enjoy the benefits a trade union has negotiated without becoming members of the union. Fundamentally, this is an argument for compulsory trade unionism. If wherever trade unions negotiate everybody has to apply to join a trade union, there will be compulsory trade unionism. I do not believe that hon. Members opposite want this. If all the 12 million wage and salary earners joined trade unions, the whole character of trade unions would change fundamentally. I do not believe that this is what they are after.

Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared to take this to its logical conclusion and put it in the form of an Amendment that those who do not belong to their trade unions should not receive the benefits of the trade union movement?

Let me put it in another way. I wonder whether that is a worthy argument. All great associations do not only work for their members. The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children does not only take an interest in the children of those who support the Society. Throughout their history trade unions have not only worked for the benefit of trade unionists. They have worked broadly for the benefit of all workers. I do not believe that there are many trade unionists who want to make trade unionism compulsory, and it would be contrary to the Declaration of Human Rights.

It is not only a question of people benefiting from the work which the trade unions have done. Throughout their history trade unions have enormously improved the standard of living of working people generally. Under full employment today the boot is very often on the other foot and it is a statistical fact, which I have mentioned before in Committee, that occupations where trade unionism is very weak have gained as high or even higher increases in wages since the war as those occupations where trade unionism is very strong. In the trade union movement in these days of full employment it is often true also that agreements negotiated by trade unionists have deprived trade unionists and non-trade unionists of advantages which they might otherwise have gained.

This is often true of piecework and of the pricing of new jobs. The pricing of new jobs is done at the pace if not of the slowest then of the slow, and once the price has been fixed the next thing that happens is that the trade unionists agree among themselves what percentage above the basic rate a man should be allowed to work. It may be 100 per cent., 150 per cent. or even 200 per cent., and they will not allow him to earn any more than that.

I was discussing this matter recently with the Amalgamated Engineering Union. Members of the union find that they can earn 400 per cent. or 500 per cent. more, but because for various reasons they want to keep their members in their jobs they have decided not to do that and no one is allowed to earn more than the agreed percentage. This pricing system is probably a more dangerous and more important restrictive practice even than over-manning. It is this sort of practice which prevents tens of thousands of people in industry from earning nearly as much as they could earn.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Does the wage structure have anything to do with the Amendment?

It is a legitimate argument to say—and I was listening with attention to it—that one reason why one might force a man out of his employment or threaten to do so was that he was doing more than was agreed as the appropriate maximum for him to do. To that extent the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) is in order.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

The argument, therefore, that those who are not members have benefited from what the trade unions have done is not always true. It loses a great deal of its validity in modern conditions. To use the power of the majority as a steamroller against the individual is contrary to the whole spirit of our way of life. We have the absolute power of the majority in many spheres of our society, but the whole basis of our life is that we use restraint and we do not use the majority, particularly against individuals, to force people out of their jobs or to compel them to do what they do not want to do. I think that this is true of the trade union movement as a whole and is the view taken of the sort of action which gave rise to the Rookes v. Barnard case.

7.15 p.m.

I am surprised, therefore, at the Minister not accepting this very limited Amendment to protect the individual in an extreme case. Trade unions normally do not use their power in this way. They are extremely tolerant and I do not understand why they do not want the Amendment to become law. I hope that the Amendment will be allowed to stand.

The right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) made the limited case which he usually makes on this point, but this legislation is important because under the general umbrella of this limited case which the right hon. Gentleman always argues reasonably there is room for the kind of smears and accusations which we have just heard from the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) about the trade union movement. It is for this reason that many of our constituents have taken a great deal of interest in the debates on the Bill.

The right hon. Member for Grantham expressed surprise again today that Mr. George Woodcock and Mr. Jack Jones, two responsible trade union leaders, have reacted in a certain way to the passing of this Amendment in another place. In expressing his incomprehension the right hon. Gentleman made clear, once again, what has bedevilled this whole business. When he was Minister of Labour—and this must be put on the record again and again—it would have been a comparatively simple matter to proceed in a reasonable, agreed manner to have co-operation between the Government of the day and the trade union movement in putting this matter right, without any prejudice to a more long-term inquiry into the general place of the trade union movement and similar associations in our national life.

This is why the right hon. Gentleman returns repeatedly to the subject and comments upon the reactions of Mr. Woodcock and other trade union leaders to this legislation. It is important that the House and the trade union movement should not forget that the right hon. Gentleman had two aims in mind. He did not want to put the matter right in the simple straightforward way suggested to him by the T.U.C., though he could have done that. Equally, he did not want to enter into conflict with the trade union movement. He therefore chose a way in between which would allow the Government to suggest to people that this was an opportunity to at tack the trade unions and, at the same time, reserve to the Government of the day a position in which they could not be accused of anti-trade-union activity.

Order. Will the hon. Gentleman address himself more closely to the Amendment? Our debate is confined to that.

With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I do not know whether you were in the Chair when the right hon. Member for Grantham spent some part of his time in declaring his amazement at the speeches made by Mr. George Woodcock, General Secretary of the T.U.C., and Mr. Jack Jones, Assistant Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union.

I was not, but I understand that the right hon. Gentleman was dealing with passages of speeches relevant to the Amendment. That is the point.

I submit, Mr. Speaker, that if I am allowed to continue my remarks in commenting on what the right hon. Gentleman said will be equally in order and related to the Amendment.

As a result of the right hon. Gentleman's attitude, the matter was not put right and the grave uncertainty created by the Rookes v. Barnard case was allowed to continue. Many hon. Members have argued that there is no real evidence that this uncertainty exists. If they had attended the last Trades Union Congress, and had talked to responsible trade union officers at every level, they would have been convinced that the decision in Rookes v. Barnard created the most widespread uncertainty.

To put the record straight, and in the light of what you yourself have just said, Mr. Speaker, I must remind the hon. Gentleman that the quotations I gave today related solely to the reactions of those people to the Lords Amendment when it was passed. I was dealing with their reaction after the Amendment was passed. I referred today to no other quotations from trade unionists.

But, in referring to the attitude of the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress and expressing his amazement at what had been said, the right hon. Gentleman did less than justice to Mr. Woodcock's point of view, not even hinting at the long history of this matter. Obviously, the reaction of the trade union leaders whom he quoted was not the reaction of men who, after the passing of the Amendment in another place, suddenly came upon a new subject for the first time. It was the reaction of men who had been involved in the matter ever since the negotiations started between Mr. Woodcock and the right hon. Gentleman.

I am sorry to interrupt again, and I do so only because this is extremely important. The point which arises here is the narrow one raised by this particular Amendment, and I was making clear that this was not a point which any of those trade union leaders had been concerned with when we were having our discussions earlier. This was a point which arose subsequent to the passing of the Amendment in another place, and my amazement was caused by their having raised it now and not before.

I agree that this is extremely important. That is the only reason why I am taking the time of the House in what I hope will be the final debate on this matter. Although the reaction of the two trade union leaders whom the right hon. Gentleman quoted was directed to the passing of the Amendment in these terms, behind it, nevertheless, was the uncertainty created by the Rookes v. Barnard case.

The right hon. Gentleman quoted from the speech of one of the two trade union leaders, referring to his reaction—of course, it was only rhetorically because he is far too responsible a man, and the General Council of the T.U.C. is far too responsible a body of men, to issue such a recommendation—"It seems that, unless this is put right, and the Amendment is removed, we shall reach the nonsensical situation under the Bill when it will be perfectly in order to say to trade unions affiliated to Congress, 'Do not ever have talks with your employers; just go on strike straight away and you will not be covered by the Amendment'". That is the relevance of what the right hon. Gentleman said, and I agree that this is of the utmost importance.

What happened at the time was that, in spite of the uncertainty created by the Rookes v. Barnard decision, the Trades Union Congress issued two suggestions or recommendations to its members. First, it told them, as it was in duty bound to tell them, that the decision in Rookes v. Barnard created great uncertainty all round, and it had good legal opinion to back up that point of view. But the General Council of the T.U.C., being a body of practical trade union leaders, knew that normal day-to-day industrial life had to go on and trade unionists still had their contribution to make. It therefore issued a second letter to affiliated trade unions saying, "But, of course, you must not now assume that you cannot, or should not, carry on your normal work as trade union officers and functionaries".

This brings me, in passing, to another important point. It is nonsensical to paint a picture to give the impression—some hon. Members who do not usually show themselves to be expert in trade unionism have taken part in the attempt—that throughout our industrial life there are many employers who share the Opposition's view on these matters. Any hon. Member who has discussed these matters with employers in his own area, as I and many of my hon. Friends have done, will know that a large majority are convinced that the whole attitude of the previous Government, when the Rookes v. Barnard case came up, has been harmful and has bedevilled industrial relations ever since.

Far from making a contribution to good industrial relations—

Order. We cannot cover the whole field of industrial relations. We must confine the debate to the Amendment.

Enough has been said to show that, insistence on putting this Amendment into the Bill, far from improving the situation or removing the uncertainty which is felt by so many trade union officers, will prolong the uncertainty and damage industrial relations. It is in this limited context that we must consider the issue before us now.

Many issues are raised by this narrow Amendment which are of the greatest importance to people who are active as trade unionists. There is the greatest concern in sections of the trade union movement in my own area, for instance, that matters must be put right. Mr. Jack Jones, in his speech, was doing no more than give expression to this widespread concern.

The Government have agreed that there shall be a wider inquiry into the place and function of trade unionism in society. By this Amendment, the other place is trying to make a decision meanwhile on a matter of vital importance to the trade union movement and to individual trade unionists.

The limited question which we have to consider today resolves itself into these propositions. First, to ensure reasonable harmony in our industrial life and in relations between employer and employee, the Government had a duty to agree to a simple change in the law to put the matter where it had been held to be for 60 years. This they did by introducing the Bill. Hon. Members opposite expressed their view on the matter and moved Amendments, but those Amendments were defeated. When the other place starts to interfere in more and more cases with some of the established principles embodied in legislation passed by this House, it ought to consider its own position very carefully.

I do not accept the novel constitutional doctrine enunciated by the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West that it is an important function of the other place to revise the principles embodied in legislation approved by this House. The hon. Gentleman is going back a long time if he believes that, and he will not find many supporters for that view among constitutional lawyers on his own side. However, I say no more about that now. I merely comment that it is a novel view to express for which he will find little support.

The Government having done their duty and having introduced this limited change, the other place decided to undo the essential part of what the Bill, already approved by the House of Commons, provided. Therefore, on this limited issue, it is the duty of the majority of the House of Commons to put the matter right, throw out the Amendment and restore the position as it was.

If there is to be a successful outcome from the general discussions now being pursued by the Royal Commission, if the best results are to be achieved, if our industrial life is not to be bedevilled as it has been recently, if the interests of good employers and good trade unionists are to be secured and if we are to retain the great amount of good will which already exists, silly complaints of the kind we have heard during the past 12 months from hon. and right hon. Members opposite must cease. They can do nothing but disservice.

On the other hand, in fulfilling the pledge they have given and in putting the position back to what it was held to have been for the previous 60 years, the Government are right in taking action, are right in advising the House to reject the Amendment and restore the previous position in the Bill, and are equally right in suggesting that we should only prejudice the work of the Royal Commission if we were to be rushed into action at the present time, appearing to undertake to tell the country that some of the conclusions being discussed there have already been reached.

That is the wider point. The more important one is that my right hon. Friend and the Government must know that the trade union movement expects them to stand fast on the original version of their legislation, and, therefore, that they must insist tonight that the Amendment should be rejected and the original position restored.

7.30 p.m.

I think that the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) was guilty of gross exageration when he suggested that the other place had undone the essential part of this legislation. No one can regard the Amendment as in any way undermining the purpose for which the Bill was introduced into the House. I think that the hon. Member is right when he says that many employers would accept the reversal of Rookes v. Barnard, because that was the point that the Minister of Labour made, in what I thought was a very fine speech, when he pointed out that in future the danger will be that employers and trade unions will agree about the case, and the Amendment is surely calculated to protect the individual and not the employer.

I support the retention of the Amendment in the Bill, and I want to say very shortly why. There is only one justification for the introduction of the Bill at the present stage. The Minister of Labour has said that we are setting up a Royal Commission and that everything should be left to that Commission. If that argument is carried to its logical conclusion, the Bill itself should be left to the Commission. On the other hand, I understand his point, and that is why I say that the sole justification for the Bill was that he had to enlist the good will of the trade unions for a thorough investigation.

As a result of the speeches in Rookes v. Barnard, and not the decision, there was a great deal of panic in trade union circles. When I say panic, many lawyers disagreed in the weeks following the Rookes v. Barnard decision, which is a fascinating decision from the lawyer's point of view, as to its interpretation. It is right to say that very few people in the country disagreed with the decision. Most people were worried about the implications of certain of the speeches in Rookes v. Barnard.

Nevertheless, I accept that the Minister should have wanted to set at ease the fears of trade unionists on the point, whether well founded or not. Therefore, he introduced the Bill. I have written to him and I have spoken on many occasions during the passage of the Bill. I have said all along that I was surprised that he did not accept the Amendment, particularly as I had pared down two Amendments to the final form of the Liberal Amendment which was so narrow that he could have accepted it.

I ask myself: was it right to put the fears of the trade unionists at rest? I think, yes. On the other hand, if the Amendment is accepted, does it in any way undermine the force of the Bill? I do not think that it does. The Amendment is perhaps a little wider than I would have drafted it myself, but, nevertheless, I am not very much worried about that. It is calculated to protect individuals against victimisation, which is what the ordinary people of this country want to avoid. In any society, it should not be possible for a body of men, whether employers or a trade union, to victimise an individual.

The Amendment would protect and reassure the individual, and I refer to the man who does not raise his voice, not the large employer who is prepared to play along with the trade unions. Why is it thought that the acceptance of the Amendment will in any way undermine the Bill?

May I deal with one matter that has been raised several times in the course of the debate, which is that the purpose of the Bill was to restore the law to what people thought it was? The right way to put it is that it was to restore the law to what some people thought it was.

A very distinguished leader in my profession, an hon. and learned Member who sits on the benches opposite, appeared for Rookes in that case, and brilliantly, if I may say so. He and his lawyer colleagues must have advised Rookes that they thought he would eventually succeed, or the case would never have been taken to the House of Lords. With their legal knowledge and experience they gave him certain advice which he must have followed and, in the end, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords declared the law to be what Rookes's counsel had always argued that it was. It is not right to say that the Bill itself was restoring the law to what people thought it was. Some people thought it was: it was always an arguable matter.

What I cannot understand about the Minister of Labour, for whom I have a very warm regard, is why he has not accepted the Amendment or an Amendment of this kind. If it was right to reassure the trade unionists by introducing the Bill, whether their fears were justified or not—and it was right—it is equally right to reassure those who want to avoid the possibility of the victimisation of an individual. That is why I could not but support the Amendment.

As the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) has said, the intention of the Bill is to restore trade union law to what it was thought to be prior to the Rookes v. Barnard case. If the Amendment is carried it will, in effect, change the whole trade union climate that has existed since 1906. As a consequence, the trade union movement believes that it is restrictive and will shackle its future recruitment and organisation.

It is essential for us to get the matter into perspective, because no doubt my right hon. Friend the Minister has in the Ministry of Labour statistics of the number of industrial disputes that have started as a result of strikes in support of a closed shop. I would venture to suggest that they would prove to be a very small proportion of the industrial disputes that take place in this country every year.

I must declare my interest in the matter because, before coming to the House in October, I was for 15 years a full-time trade union official and for many years before that an active shop steward. It has been my experience to endeavour to solve many problems resulting from the desire of members to get a 100 per cent. trade union membership in a particular workshop.

We must understand the mentality of the average trade unionist. He does not apply a closed shop to people who have principled objections to the trade union movement. I could quote many instances of trade unionists who have resigned from the organisation because they have joined a religious sect which forbids them, according to biblical teaching, to join a trade union or any other association. The trade unionists in the shop respect the beliefs of such people.

I have never known an industrial dispute against non-unionists who, for religious reasons, do not wish to join a trade union. But I have known of strikes caused by feckless individuals who wittingly get into arrears with their contributions and finally drop out of the union. They are prepared to accept all the advantages of trade union negotiations—better working conditions and higher wages—without making any contribution to keep the trade union organisation in being. The ordinary trade unionist regards this as immoral. This is similar to a man who takes a bus ride without paying his fare. He is getting services provided by the community but is making no payment for them and is, in fact, getting a free ride. I have no doubt that the man who takes a free ride on a bus can be prosecuted, but a trade union cannot prosecute a trade unionist who gets a "free ride" in trade union services.

The man who takes a free ride on a bus can no doubt say in court "I sincerely believe as a principle that people taking rides on buses should not pay fares. I believe that we should have a free bus service. Because I want to stand by my principles I took a free ride on a bus." I do not think the court would listen very attentively if such a plea was made. Yet the man would be demonstrating, as hon. Members opposite want all non-unionists to demonstrate, the right of an individual to say "I sincerely believe in having free rides on buses, and as a consequence you must respect my belief."

That is the attitude that hon. Members opposite adopt towards a non-unionist who takes "a free ride" at the expense of a trade union and accepts all the wage increases and other benefits obtained by the trade union without making any contribution. Quite rightly, men working in the shops take the attitude that if one receives services, one must pay for them. But hon. Members opposite seem to think that the Lords Amendment is directed exclusively against trade disputes designed to end a closed shop against non-unionists. That is not so. I could give from my own experience many instances of trade disputes designed, in the words of the Amendment, to secure the termination of the employment of some person, but not a non-unionist.

Some years ago my union had a complaint from members that a woman supervisor was a very strict disciplinarian. She was known as a sergeant-major. She was causing concern to the girls she supervised. For instance, the girls were allowed to go to the toilet twice a day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. They could not remain there for more than three minutes or else the supervisor hauled them back to the desk. This became so intolerable that they told the management that the behaviour would have to stop or they would take action. But it did not stop. In fact, it became worse. So the girls told the union that they wanted the firm to dismiss the supervisor.

One of the complications was that the supervisor happened to be a relative of the manager. Therefore, it was a little difficult for the trade union to induce the firm to dismiss her. The consequence was that the girls came out on a token strike for 24 hours. Fortunately, the matter was concluded to the satisfaction of the girls because a few weeks later the woman supervisor was taken away to a mental institution.

There was a case of a group of workers organised in a trade union who wanted to secure the termination of the employment of a person, not a non-unionist but a person who made their working lives intolerable. Surely it is the obligation of a trade union to look after the conditions under which its members work, not only the ventilation, lighting and space, but the physical conditions of supervision.

Had the Lords Amendment become law, presumably the woman supervisor could have sued the trade union for heavy damages because she could have made the case that there had been strong pressure brought to bear on the management to dismiss her. I could give other illustrations of similar industrial action taken against intolerable conditions affecting personnel employed in factories. I suggest that it would be an unwarrantable restriction of trade union activity if a union could not take action to safeguard the working conditions of its members.

Hon. Members opposite have been climbing on the band wagon, saying what a fine movement the trade union movement is. But this matter should have been rectified by the previous Administration. This is a belated piece of legislation, an interim piece of legislation pendinig the outcome of the Royal Commission's report, and I hope that the House will accept it.

7.45 p.m.

I want to say a few words primarily on the points raised by the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) and the hon. Member for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher) It is ludicrous to talk about the Amendment as though, as the hon. Member for Penistone said, it will affect fundamental principles and the operations of trade unions in general and threaten the freedom of action of trade unionists in their normal functions.

Let us consider how circumstances could arise which could be covered by the Amendment. First, there must be a threat which is expressed by a trade union, which can mean just a group of individuals. Secondly, it must result in someone being dismissed and, therefore, suffering injury. Thirdly, that person must go to the courts and sue for damages. This is concerned primarily with the question of the closed shop. It would be intolerable to reject the Lords Amendment wren we have a situation whereby a trade union can through a district committee or its national executive expel someone and then instruct its members to strike because the person is a non-unionist. Unless persons have a right to join a trade union, it is intolerable to threaten a strike because they are not members.

The hon. Members for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) and Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) suggested that we were talking hypothetically here and had no individual cases to quote. I hope that both of them will read the Committee proceedings in which details were given of individual cases. If they will walk five minutes from this spot, I will give them full details of a case. There was a skilled engineer, a member of a sheet metal workers union, who refused on three occasions to pay a so-called voluntary levy to finance a strike elsewhere. He refused on the ground that it was against the rules of his union. He was deprived of his membership, and the men on the shop floor then threatened to go on strike and finally had him dismissed. That is the kind of situation about which we are concerned, and it is the kind of situation with which the Amendment deals.

I feel that the trade union movement is not such that it must have two or three martyrs affected by circumstances such as these in order to obtain its co-operation in a fundamental review of the trade union law. This is only one of the circumstances in which individuals are suffering such damage. The Government will be taking a great deal of responsibility on themselves if they turn down the Amendment.

We have had a very wide-ranging debate on a very narrow Amendment, but I am bound to concede that this Amendment, as has been said throughout the debate, is a very important one, which raises matters of considerable importance to trade unionists and individuals.

The most remarkable feature of the debate has been the extraordinary assertions which have been made by hon. Members opposite, repeating what has been said outside, about the impact of this Amendment. I thought that we were living in a world of fantasy when I heard some of the suggestions put forward by hon. Gentlemen opposite supporting the Government who were trying to describe the consequences of the Bill. The right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards) seemed not to have apprehended the purpose of the Bill or its impact.

Of course, I understand the prejudices of many trade unionists throughout the country against the Amendment if they think that the consequences are the some as those described by many hon. Members opposite. But if they analyse both Amendment and Bill they will see that this is a wholly reasonable Amendment and that there has been the grossest possible exaggeration of the consequences of accepting it.

The highlight came when the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) said that if the Amendment were accepted it would be the thin end of the wedge in the negotiating machinery. I do not think that the Minister would be able to confirm that as a consequence of the Amendment. The truth is that the Amendment attempts to limit in a small and narrow degree the operation of the Bill. We support the Amendment because there is here a great conflict of interests which we think can be and ought to be resolved and because the Amendment will resolve it.

First, there are the legitimate functionings and rights of trade unions and officials. I do not think that any hon. Member on this side of the House would wish ordinary trade union officials, in the ordinary course of their normal duties, not to be able properly to perform those duties without risk of incurring legal action. But there is, as well, the desire that we should limit the power of people to victimise by illegal action individual citizens—and we are interested to see, in the light of the Queen's Speech, that the Bill is not performing the job of safeguarding the liberties of Her Majesty's subjects in this respect.

I cannot understand why any trade unionist or official should think it necessary for the unions or their members to have a licence from this House to permit a civil wrong of intimidation in order to get a man sacked by his boss. This is all we are discussing: is it right that an official should be able to commit what, in any other citizen, would be the civil wrong of intimidation in order to get a man sacked?

For trade unions and their officials to claim that they cannot function properly or that the negotiating machinery in industry will break down if they are not to have the right to exercise illegal pressure—or pressures that would be illegal in anyone else—in order to get a man sacked is an astonishing attitude. I am sure that it is based upon a misapprehension of the nature of the Amendment and the effect it would have.

The truth is that the Bill, as amended, would still provide ample protection to trade union officials against the risks that they foresaw—I think probably wrongly—as the result of the decision of the House of Lords in the Rookes v. Barnard case. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) that the ordinary trade union official would still be amply protected even if this Amendment were accepted. The bill would continue to provide protection for an official, acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to threaten with complete impunity that any contracts of employment—either his own or any of his members—will be broken, broken without proper notice and broken illegally, for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on any employer—in other words, committing the tort of intimidation—if his purpose is, in what I would imagine would be the normal course of negotiations, to bring pressure to bear on the employer.

If an official wants to deal with the wages and conditions of his members he can, even under the Bill as amended, commit what would have been the tort of intimidation in bringing pressure to bear, by threat of illegal breach of contract by his members, in relation to safety or to benefits or side benefits or to holidays or redundancy or to any of the 1,001 other items which arise in industrial negotiations. In all this, the official would still be entitled, under the Bill as amended, to proceed in a way in which he thought, after Rookes v. Barnard, he might not be able to proceed. The Bill will still protect him.

The only thing that the Amendment does is to remove from that situation in which the Bill will place a trade union official the single purpose where such a threat of intimidation and unlawful action has the objective of getting a man sacked by his boss. Is it such a terrible resignation of power by trade unionists not to be able illegally to threaten an employer with illegal action unless he sacks one of their fellow workers? They would still be at full liberty to bring all the lawful pressures that they have always been able to bring against the employers. Their ordinary right to withdraw their labour on due notice, their ordinary rights whereby they can exercise pressure so powerfully on employers, would remain to them except for the purpose of getting a colleague sacked.

What the unions are asking by insisting on rejecting the Amendment is nothing other than the right to do what no other citizen or organisation in this country is entitled to do—to intimidate an employer to sack a colleague. What justifications are put forward for this remarkable attitude? First, it is said that we must restore the law to what it has always been. That is a good Conservative attitude but one hon. Member opposite said that, if the Amendment were allowed, the image of the trade unions as they were in 1906 would be altered. I was a little surprised. I thought that the country as a whole, and the trade unions in particular, had made considerable progress since 1906 and I did not think that everything should be as it was then. That attitude is something which I had not expected to hear argued from hon. Members opposite.

Be that as it may, it has been pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) and the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock), that the law was in fact considerably doubtful before the Rookes v. Barnard case, and that it is not right to say that it is being restored to the position which everybody thought it had been in since 1906.

The author of the principal work on trade union law, Mr. Citrine, on page 476 expressly said, long before the Rookes v. Barnard case:
"If there is some ground of action other than the mere fact of interfering with contractual relations, the section does not afford protection."
What has changed is that the tort of intimidation has been given new emphasis and not that the law protecting trade union officials has been altered in any degree by the Rookes v. Barnard decision. I agree with the Minister that the decision in that case caused anxiety not by the actual decision itself but by the side effects and I hope I have made it clear that, in our view, the Bill has removed all anxieties from trade union officials in that respect. We are only suggesting that they should not be able to exercise illegal powers in order to get a man sacked.

Some hon. Members have mentioned that the question of personality arises—that Mr. Rookes has changed his opinions. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman himself said that we should not change the law in this way because Mr. Rookes at one stage was a convinced trade unionist.

8.0 p.m.

All these matters must be irrelevant. The great principles of law that protect the liberties of the subject are not dependent on who is to benefit from them. We know that habeas corpus has been exercised in favour of many unmeritorious people. The protection of the liberty of the subject is available for all, good and bad. If there is a good principle of law and the citizens should have the protection of that law, it should apply to them whether they be good or bad, or whatever their political views may be, and whoever they may be.

Another point was made about the position of the other place, although very little was said about it. It is not right to say that this Amendment attacks the main principles of the Bill. It makes a small exclusion from the wide protection which the Bill will provide for all trade union officials. However much people may think that the House of Lords ought to be abolished, the fact is that it still exists, and it matters not, while we have a constitution with two Chambers, how wide or how small is the ambit of an Amendment. If Members of either of the Chambers in the Legislature are to be expected to perform their functions they are entitled to perform them fully.

When political power rested in the other place Members of this House would have thought themselves craven if, on a matter of principle, they had not voted against the view of the other place, in which the major legislative and political power then rested. When the positions are reversed I should have thought that no Member would take the view that while we have two Chambers, two Chambers ought not fully to exercise their rights in these matters. The other Chamber has done so, and all that we have to do is to consider whether or not we agree with it. I hope that on this occasion the House will agree with the Lords Amendment, but if the two Houses find themselves in disagreement, our constitution has provided what will happen.

Another question is that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. The proposition that Article 20 in that Declaration provides is simple in the extreme, namely, that no one may be compelled to belong to an association. There is no qualification as to whether he should be a trade unionist or not, or whether he objects on religious grounds, or because he does not want to pay. It is an essential freedom of citizens that they should not be compelled to belong to an association, and this is something that I should have thought we all know in our hearts to be correct—something upon which we stand. It therefore surprised me that the hon. Member for Walton should have said that he thought that the Opposition had a strange view on this point. If it be a strange view it is at any rate the view of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is stating an abstract proposition very fairly, and I am listening to him most carefully. When that proposition is applied in practice all kinds of exceptional circumstances arise. The right hon. and learned Gentleman himself could not practise his own profession if he did not belong to an association—which I need not name.

I thought that we should have that intervention sooner or later. I know not whether the Solicitor-General or the Minister of Labour is to reply, but I will deal with the point now. That is the only argument that has been produced from anybody in the course of this debate why the principle of Article 20 should not apply in these circumstances. It is a wholly false argument, because we know that what we are talking about in the case of doctors and lawyers are professional qualifications which people have to obtain for the protection of the public before they are allowed to practise in professions which affect the public.

Not only do they have to acquire the qualifications; they can be expelled if they fall below the necessary protection that the public ought to have from professional qualifications. It is wrong to say that a person who wishes to join a profession has been compelled to join an association because he has been made to acquire the necessary professional qualifications to practise that profession.

In the end we come back to the principle which is simply stated, namely, that no one may be compelled to belong to an association. What the Amendment seeks to do is to prevent individual citizens in this country from being forced, by what would in any other person be an illegal act—by threats of victimisation and intimidation—to join an association when they do not want to do so, for good, bad or indifferent reasons, it matters not.

Another argument that has been put forward against the Amendment is: why should non-trade unionists reap the benefits and advantages of negotiations undertaken by trade union officials? I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West. I should not have thought that the trade union movement would want to put forward a claim that it came into existence to help only its own members. I should have thought that it would have stood upon a much wider basis, namely, that it came into existence to help not only its own members but fellow workers generally, and that it intended that not only its members should benefit from its efforts to improve wages and working conditions but all those employed in industry, irrespective of whether they were members of the union or not.

To take the very narrow view that trade unions have to force people into their organisations so that they can count up the pence paid in and compare the sum with what is going out seems to me to diminish their stature. That argument does not do them much credit.

What about the rights of the majority to decide with whom they should work? This argument was put forward by the right hon. Member for Caerphilly. He said that it was essential that employees should be able to say who should be the companions with whom they should work. The Amendment would not prevent any employee complaining about the thieving or dangerous activities of another employee. What it would prevent is the threat of illegal strike in order to get him sacked.

If a shop steward, a man on the shop floor, or mineworker, went to the management and said, "This man is stealing, and ought to be sacked", or "This man is smoking down the mine, and ought to be instantly dismissed", he could not possibly have committed a civil wrong of intimidation, and this Amendment would have no effect at all upon his position.

I was glad that, in the end, the right hon. Gentleman acknowledged that in 999 cases out of 1,000, or perhaps in an even greater proportion of cases, if such a complaint were made by an individual to the management the erring fellow workman would be sacked out of hand. I should have thought that was the ordinary and normal result. If it were not—and I should be surprised if it were not—the full and lawful pressures of the union would still be available to achieve the object it desired, namely, getting an undesirable fellow employee out of the place.

Surely the right hon. and learned Gentleman will recall that in Rookes v. Barnard there was an agreement between the union and the management that the union would have 100 per cent. membership, and that Rookes was a party to this agreement; indeed, he went to the management and this agreement was arrived at. If B.O.A.C. had continued to employ Rookes after he had left the union the Corporation would surely have violated the agreement to which it was a party.

I do not think it was a non-strike agreement which was part of the trouble. I do not think there was any agreement at all that B.O.A.C. would employ only 100 per cent. union employees.

I made a point on Second Reading which I think is important, but it has never arisen again. I am sure that hon. Gentlemen who are interested in this will realise that all employers' associations are trade unions, and that the Bill puts in their hands a weapon about which we have not heard very much, and the implications of which have been very little discussed. This Amendment would prevent an employers' association embarking upon a course of victimisation to get a man sacked from his job. This is something that I should have thought went in favour of the Amendment being accepted. It has not been pointed out that the position, not only for trade unions and their officials, but for the officials of employers' associations, will be radically altered by this Bill.

The other way of looking at it is to consider lock-outs in breach of contracts. They may not be now, for practical purposes, a very immediate threat, but changes in economic conditions might well make them much more realistic. If the district employers' association wanted to ensure that no union labour was employed on the shop floor of any of its members it could injure and damage trade unions and their members in the district by intimidating them and their workmen by the threat of an unlawful lock-out, even if they and their members were bound by an agreement that there should be no lock-outs.

This would be one of the consequences that would flow from the passing of this Bill, without this Amendment. The Amendment would prevent employers victimising anyone for the purpose of getting them out of their job. I use that not so much as an argument but as an illustration of what might happen, because I think that from the practical point of view it may not be very likely. I ask hon. Gentlemen to test it in their own minds and to ask themselves what they think is fair. If one is going to look at what are the fair rules one has to look at it from both ends, to see who enjoys the benefits of the Bill and whether they ought to have the Bill in its full extent, or limited, as we say it should be. If it is looked at from the point of view of unions and employers' associations quite plainly there is no employers' association which ought to be able to victimise a man in order to get him sacked from his job. If that is not right for an employers' assoication why on earth should trade unions be able to do it?

I ask the Minister why it is necessary and how can it be justified that trade unions should have a right which no other citizen or organisation in this country enjoys, namely the right to intimidate employers and management in order to secure the dismissal of an employee. It is wholly unnecessary to trade unionists to have this right while they and their officials can perform all the other functions and their normal duties, fully protected by the law, even with this Amendment included. I agree entirely with what the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) said, that all decent people were glad that Mr. Rookes got damages and thought that it was right and that justice had been done and that the victimisation committed against him should have given him a right to compensation.

If the Royal Commission should eventually decide that all other Mr. Rookes's should be deprived of that right to compensation, so be it, let us accent that decision. But unless and until the Royal Commission has decided that, on a full investigation of the matter, I ask hon. Members to consider whether it is right that we should do anything to make it easier for our citizens to be victimised by being sacked as a result of an illegal threat. I do not know whether we did not see the truth popping out just a minute ago when one hon. Gentleman opposite said that trade unions expected the Government to do their duty and stand by the Bill as introduced. There is their master's voice. Cannot they, on this occasion, consider that a small Amendment for the benefit of the individual citizen is wholly acceptable and ought to be accepted.

8.15 p.m.

Order. The right hon. Gentleman must ask the leave of the House to speak again.

I ask leave of the House to speak again, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

One of the interesting parts of this debate has been the attempt by the Front Bench opposite to make it appear that we on this side were in favour of the closed shop. I want to say very plainly that I am opposed to the closed shop. The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) put his finger on why I have always opposed it. The closed shop may very well eradicate or eliminate the rebellious man, the man who, as he rightly said, first started many causes and has found himself in conflict with the majority and with associations. Therefore, it has always appeared to me to be wrong that employers and trade unions might agree between themselves to prevent even a very awkward and rebellious person from exercising the right to be heard. Let it be very clearly understood by hon. Members opposite that during this debate no one has defended the closed shop as such.

There has been defence of 100 per cent. trade union membership, which is a legitimate ambition. In asking the House to reject this Amendment it cannot be interpreted that I am defending the closed shop. All I want to do—and I would agree to a large extent with some of the speeches that have been made—is to ensure that we approach this problem in the right and proper way. I do not propose to make a lengthy speech now because we have heard all the arguments before. I feel that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) and I could change places and deliver each other's speeches, because we have memorised them so often on this issue. We on this side of the House are confident that by restoring the Bill to its original form we shall be serving the best interests of industrial relations. Nothing I have heard from the opposite side alters me in my opinion.

The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) led me up the garden path for a couple of minutes. He said at one stage that confusion existed on the Rookes v. Barnard case among lawyers and trade unions. I thought that he would go on to the truly Liberal approach and say, "Let us sit down coolly and sort this out". Instead, he turned round and said, "Let us deal with it by this type of Amendment." The Rookes v. Barnard case, for good or ill—and great good may grow from that decision—left us in a state of confusion.

I thought that I understood what the matter was all about until the lawyers started explaining it to me. I still do not know what it is about. If I may deviate for a moment, two very eminent lawyers came to explain this to me when I was in opposition. In five minutes I was almost dismissed from the room because they had forgotten all about me; they were quarrelling between themselves as to what it was all about. These confusions have arisen and all we are suggesting is that the Royal Commission should sit down, with the legal background to this, and have a look at it.

The 1906 Act—which, I know, is not cherished too much by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery, because it is 60 years old and he is a forward-looking young man—recognised explicitly that trade disputes could be about the employment of an individual. Let me read the definition of a trade dispute of that Act in Section 5(3):
"In this Act … the expression 'trade dispute' means any dispute between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment … of any person.…"
We believe, on this side of the House, that such was that confusion that it would be far better to try to restore—if I may take the point of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery—what was generally assumed in industry to be the correct interpretation. The hon. and learned Member said that "some people" thought this, but, from my own trade union background, I can say that it was generally assumed that the 1906 Act meant certain things.

Therefore, the point which we wish to make is that, with the confusion which has been created, it would be far better to let the Royal Commission investigate the matter. The right hon. Member for Grantham said that he had some hard things to say about me. They were not hard at all, but what I want to say to him may be a bit hard. During the whole of his speech he never looked at the other side of the coin. I tried to intervene and to get him to face the high principle that, if a man has a right not to associate, surely, also, there ought to be the right to associate.

When Members opposite invoke the Declaration of Human Rights, there are two sides to the question. I have always believed, and still believe, that a man has a right to associate and a right not to associate. That is clear and simple. Whether it be on religious, political, or on any other ground, he has that right. That is what makes us men, I suppose, this eternal right to determine our course of action in these matters.

Hon. Members opposite—this may be hard to the right hon. Gentleman—spoke about principles without a deep knowledge of the forces and the tempers and the nuances of heavy industry today. To a man in a pit, the high principle is that every man should belong to the union. He regards the man who will not join in this collective machine which defends and looks after him as an outsider. It is no good saying that this man is an angel; the men who work with him regard him as a sinner. Therefore, they feel intensely that this man is an outsider, that he does not belong to the community.

We should, therefore, be very careful when we judge the attitudes of men. It is easy for right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to stand on their high horses and declare the massive power of the right of this Parliament to say that the individual should be protected. Of course it is the duty of this House to defend individual freedom. It is one of the great purposes of the House, to defend the individual. I hope that it will always remain so, but we cannot discuss this sort of thing in a vacuum. We have to understand the tempers of men and the strains under which they live and work in industry. When we talk about the Declaration of Human Rights we must realise that these general declarations are difficult to interpret in natural law.

That is why I wanted the Royal Commission. I wanted to know how we should interpret those matters in the circumstances of a modern industrial society. Not only on the question of the closed shop, but upon the right of men to associate has the Declaration of Human Rights been invoked. However, in the case which I drew to the notice of the right hon. Gentleman, there was

Division No. 263.]

AYES

[8.26 p.m.

Abse, LeoAtkinson, NormanBeaney, Alan
Albu, AustenBacon, Miss AliceBellenger, Rt. Hn. F. J.
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)Bagier, Gordon A. T.Bence, Cyril
Alldritt, WalterBarnett, JoelBenn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)Baxter, WilliamBennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

a direct contravention of the I.L.O. Convention of 1948, where it is laid down that a man has the right to associate and to join a trade union.

If we are to look at this problem—there are problems in the closed shop—it would be better if we looked at the whole legal background, had an objective review of the whole situation, and let the Royal Commission give us the guiding lights. Then, there may well be—I believe will have to be—fundamental changes in the law as it affects employers and workmen. This debate—

Would the right hon. Gentleman please answer one question, because I am a little disturbed by the tenor of the philosophy which he has just stated? Surely it is not his view that it is right that minorities should be protected from victimisation, but that that right should go when a majority may feel sufficiently strongly that they should not have it. Surely he is not putting forward that view for the commendation of the House.

I thought that I was saying exactly the opposite, but I am not a lawyer and I do not know.

I hope that what I have said shows how we on this side feel about the confusion which exists at present in the real state of the law. It has been demonstrated that it is difficult to distinguish these questions, even for those with experience in such matters. How much more difficult it must be for trade unionists with little or no knowledge of these things. I think that it is clear that this confusion must be removed and that this is incompatible with the Amendment. I invite the House to reject it.

Question put, That this House cloth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 294, Noes 291.

Binns, JohnHamilton, William (West Fife)Murray, Albert
Bishop, E. S.Hamling, William (Woolwich, W.)Neal, Harold
Blackburn, F.Hannan, WilliamNewens, Stan
Blenkinsop, ArthurHarrison, Walter (Wakefield)Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Boardman, H.Hart, Mrs. JudithNoel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)
Boston, TerenceHattersley, RoyNorwood, Christopher
Bottomley, Rt. Hn. ArthurHazell, BertOakes, Gordon
Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics, S. W.)Healey, Rt. Hn. DenisOgden, Eric
Boyden, JamesHeffer, Eric S.O'Malley, Brian
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.Henderson, Rt. Hn. ArthurOram, Albert E. (E. Ham, S.)
Bradley, TomHerbison, Rt. Hn. MargaretOrbach, Maurice
Bray, Dr. JeremyHobden, Dennis (Brighton, K'town)Orme, Stanley
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.Holman, PercyOswald, Thomas
Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)Houghton, Rt. Hn. DouglasOwen, Will
Brown, Hugh D. (Glasgow, Provan)Howarth, Harry (Wellingborough)Padley, Walter
Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & Fbury)Howarth, Robert L. (Bolton, E.)Page, Derek (King's Lynn)
Buchan, Norman (Renfrewshire, W.)Howell, Denis (Small Heath)Paget, R. T.
Buchanan, RichardHowie, W.Palmer, Arthur
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)Hoy, JamesPannell, Rt. Hn. Charles
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)Pargiter, G. A.
Callaghan, Rt. Hn. JamesHughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)Park, Trevor (Derbyshire, S. E.)
Carmichael, NeilHunter, Adam (Dunfermline)Parker, John
Carter-Jones, LewisHunter, A. E. (Feltham)Pavitt, Laurence
Castle, Rt. Hn. BarbaraHynd, H. (Accrington)Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)
Coleman, DonaldHynd, John (Attercliffe)Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Conlan, BernardIrvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)Pentland, Norman
Corbet, Mrs. FredaIrving, Sydney (Dartford)Perry, Ernest G.
Cousins, Rt. Hn. FrankJackson, ColinPopplewell, Ernest
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)Janner, Sir BarnettPrentice, R. E.
Crawshaw, RichardJeger, George (Goole)Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Cronin, JohnJeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)Probert, Arthur
Crosland, Rt. Hn. AnthonyJenkins, Hugh (Putney)Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
Cullen, Mrs. AliceJohnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)Randall, Harry
Dalyell, TamJohnson, James (K' ston-on-Hull. W.)Rankin, John
Darling, GeorgeJones, Dan (Burnley)Redhead, Edward
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)Rees, Merlyn
Reynolds, G. W.
Davies, Harold (Leek)Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)Rhodes, Geoffrey
Davies, Ifor (Gower)Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)Richard, Ivor
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)Kelley, RichardRoberts, Albert (Normanton)
de Freitas, Sir GeoffreyKenyon, CliffordRoberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Delargy, HughKerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)Robertson, John (Paisley)
Dell, EdmundKerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)Robinson, Rt. Hn. K. (St. Pancras, N.)
Dempsey, JamesLawson, GeorgeRodgers, William (Stockton)
Diamond, Rt. Hn. JohnLeadbitter, TedRogers, George (Kensington, N.)
Dodds, NormanLedger, RonRose, Paul B.
Doig, PeterLee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)Ross, Rt. Hn. William
Donnelly, DesmondLee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)Rowland, Christopher
Driberg, TomLever, Harold (Cheatham)Sheldon, Robert
Duffy, Dr. A. E. P.Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.
Dunn, James A.Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)Shore, Peter (Stepney)
Dunnett, JackLipton, MarcusShort, Rt. Hn. E. (N'c'tle-on-Tyne, C.)
Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)Lomas, KennethShort, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)Loughlin, CharlesSilkin, John (Deptford)
English, MichaelMabon, Dr. J. DicksonSilkin, S. C. (Camberwell, Dulwich)
Ennals, DavidMcBride, NeilSilverman, Julius (Aston)
Ensor, DavidMcCann, J.Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)MacColl, JamesSkeffington, Arthur
Evans, Ioan (Birmingham, Yardley)MacDermot, NiallSlater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)
Fernyhough, E.McGuire, MichaelSlater, Joseph (Sedgefield)
Finch, Harold (Bedwellty)McInnes, JamesSmall, William
Fletcher, Sir Eric (Islington, E.)McKay, Mrs. MargaretSnow, Julian
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)Solomons, Henry
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)Mackie, John (Enfield, E.)Soskice, Rt. Hn. Sir Frank
Floud, BernardMcLeavy, FrankSpriggs, Leslie
Foley, MauriceMacMillan, MalcolmSteele, Thomas (Dunhartonshire, W.)
Foot, Sir Dingle (Ipswich)Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael
Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)Mahon, Simon (Bootle)Stonehouse, John
Ford, BenMallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)Stones, William
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)Strauss, Rt. Hn. C. R. (Vauxhall)
Freeson, ReginaldMapp, CharlesStross, Sir Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)
Galpern, Sir MyerMarsh, RichardSummerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley
Garrett, W. E.Mason, RoySwain, Thomas
Garrow, A.Maxwell, RobertSwingler, Stephen
Ginsburg, DavidMayhew, ChristopherSymonds, J. B.
Gourlay, HarryMendelson, J. J.Taverne, Dick
Greenwood, Rt. Hn. AnthonyMillan, BruceTaylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Gregory, ArnoldMiller, Dr. M. S.Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)
Grey, CharlesMilne, Edward (Blyth)Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)Molloy, WilliamThomson, George (Dundee, B.)
Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)Monslow, WalterThornton, Ernest
Griffiths, Will (M'chester, Exchange)Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)Tinn, James
Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.Morris, Charles (Openshaw)Tomney, Frank
Hale, LeslieMorris, John (Aberavon)Tuck, Raphael
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Sheffield Pk)Urwin, T. W.

Varley, Eric G.Whitlock, WilliamWilson, William (Coventry, S.)
Wainwright, EdwinWigg, Rt. Hn. GeorgeWinterbottom, R. E.
Walden, Brian (All Saints)Wilkins, W. A.Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)Willey, Rt. Hn. FrederickWoof, Robert
Wallace, GeorgeWilliams, Alan (Swansea, W.)Wyatt, Woodrow
Watkins, TudorWilliams, Clifford (Abertillery)Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Weitzman, DavidWilliams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)Zilliacus, K.
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
White, Mrs. EireneWillis, George (Edinburgh, E.)TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Mr. Harper and Mr. Fitch.

NOES

Agnew, Commander Sir PeterDean, PaulIremonger, T. L.
Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)Digby, Simon WingfieldJenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)Doughty, CharlesJennings, J. C.
Amery, Rt. Hn. JulianDouglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir AlecJohnson Smith, G. (East Grinstead)
Anstruther-Gray, Rt. Hn. Sir W.Drayson, G. B.Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Astor, Johndu Cann, Rt. Hn. EdwardJopling, Michael
Atkins, HumphreyEden, Sir JohnJoseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Awdry, DanielElliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)Kaberry, Sir Donald
Baker, W. H. K.Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)Kerby, Capt. Henry
Balniel, LordEmery, PeterKerr, Sir Hamilton (Cambridge)
Barlow, Sir JohnErrington, Sir EricKershaw, Anthony
Batsford, BrianEyre, ReginaldKimball, Marcus
Beamish, Col. Sir TuftonFarr, JohnKing, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Bell, RonaldFell, AnthonyKirk, Peter
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)Fisher, NigelKitson, Timothy
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)Fletcher-Cooke, Charles (Darwen)Lagden, Godfrey
Berkeley, HumphryFletcher-Cooke, Sir John (S'pton)Lambton, Viscount
Berry, Hn. AnthonyFoster, Sir JohnLancaster, Col. C. G.
Bessell, PeterFraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)Langford-Holt, Sir John
Biffen, JohnFraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Biggs-Davison, JohnGalbraith, Hn. T. G. D.Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Bingham, R. M.Gammans, LadyLitchfield, Capt. John
Birch, Rt. Hn. NigelGardner, EdwardLloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'n C'dfield)
Black, Sir CyrilGibson-Watt, DavidLloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)
Blaker, PeterGiles, Rear-Admiral MorganLloyd, Rt. Hn. Selwyn (Wirral)
Bossom, Hn. CliveGilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)Longbottom, Charles
Box, DonaldGilmour, Sir John (East Fife)Longden, Gilbert
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. J.Clover, Sir DouglasLoveys, Walter H.
Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir EdwardGlyn, Sir RichardLubbock, Eric
Braine, BernardGodber, Rt. Hn. J. B.Lucas, Sir Jocelyn
Brewis, JohnGoodhart, PhilipMcAdden, Sir Stephen
Brinton, Sir TattonGoodhew, VictorMackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir WalterGower, RaymondMackie, George Y. (C'ness & S'land)
Brooke, Rt. Hn. HenryGrant, AnthonyMaclean, Sir Fitzroy
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)Grant-Ferris, R.Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain
Bruce-Gardyne, J.Gresham Cooke, R.Maddan, Martin (Hove)
Bryan, PaulGrieve, PercyMcMaster, Stanley
Buchanan-Smith, AlickGriffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)McNair-Wilson, Patrick
Buck, AntonyGriffiths, Peter (Smethwick)Maginnis, John E.
Bullus, Sir EricGrimond, Rt. Hn. J.Maitland, Sir John
Butcher, Sir HerbertGurden, HaroldMarten, Neil
Buxton, RonaldHall, John (Wycombe)Mathew, Robert
Campbell, GordonHall-Davis, A. C. F.Maude, Angus
Carlisle, MarkHamilton, Marquess of (Fermanagh)Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald
Carr, Rt. Hn. RobertHamilton, M. (Salisbury)Mawby, Ray
Cary, Sir RobertHarris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Channon, H. P. G.Harris, Reader (Heston)Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Chataway, ChristopherHarvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)Meyer, Sir Anthony
Chichester-Clark, R.Harvey, John (Walthametow, E.)Mills, Peter (Torrington)
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)Hastings, StephenMills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)Hawkins, PaulMiscampbell, Norman
Cole, NormanHay, JohnMitchell, David
Cooke, RobertHeald, Rt. Hn. Sir LionelMonro, Hector
Cooper, A. E.Heath, Rt. Hn. EdwardMore, Jasper
Cooper-Key, Sir NeillHendry, ForbesMorrison, Charles (Devizes)
Cordle, JohnHiggins, Terence L.Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Corfield, F. V.Hiley, JosephMunro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Costain, A. P.Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)Murton, Oscar
Courtney, Cdr. AnthonyHirst, GeoffreyNeave, Airey
Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)Hobson, Rt. Hn. Sir JohnNicholls, Sir Harmar
Crawley, AidanHogg, Rt. Hn. QuintinNicholson, Sir Godfrey
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir OliverHooson, H. E.Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Crowder, F. P.Hopkins, AlanNugent, Rt. Hn. Sir Richard
Cunningham, Sir KnoxHordern, PeterOnslow, Cranley
Curran, CharlesHornby, RichardOrr, Capt. L. P. S.
Currie, G. B. H.Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame P.Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian
Dalkeith, Earl ofHoward, Hn. G. R. (St. Ives)Osborn, John (Hallam)
Dance, JamesHowe, Geoffrey (Bebington)Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Davies, Dr. Wyndham (Perry Barr)Hunt, John (Bromley)Page, John (Harrow, W.)
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir HenryHutchison, Michael ClarkPage, R. Graham (Crosby)

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)Shepherd, Williamvan Straubenzee, W. R.
Peel, JohnSinclair, Sir GeorgeVaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John
Percival, IanSmith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)Vickers, Dame Joan
Peyton, JohnSmyth, Rt. Hn. Brig. Sir JohnWalder, David (High Peak)
Pickthorn, Rt. Hn. Sir KennethSoames, Rt. Hn. ChristopherWalker, Peter (Worcester)
Pike, Miss MervynSpearman, Sir AlexanderWalker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Pitt, Dame EdithSpeir, Sir RupertWall, Patrick
Pounder, RaftonStainton, KeithWalters, Dennis
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. EnochStanley, Hn. RichardWard, Dame Irene
Price, David (Eastleigh)Steel, David (Roxburgh)Weatherill, Bernard
Prior, J. M. L.Stodart, AnthonyWebster, David
Pym, FrancisStoddart-Scott, Col. Sir MalcolmWells, John (Maidstone)
Quennell, Miss J. M.Studholme, Sir HenryWhitelaw, William
Ramsden, Rt. Hn. JamesSummers, Sir SpencerWilliams, Sir Rolf Dudley (Exeter)
Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir PeterTalbot, John E.Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Rees-Davies, W. R.Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir DavidTaylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)Wise, A. R.
Ridley, Hn. NicholasTaylor, Frank (Moss Side)Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Ridsdale, JulianTeeling, Sir WilliamWood, Rt. Hn. Richard
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)Temple, John M.Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher
Roots, WilliamThatcher, Mrs. MargaretWoodnutt, Mark
Royle, AnthonyThomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)Wylie, N. R.
Russell, Sir RonaldThomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Conway)Yates, William (The Wrekin)
St. John-Stevas, NormanThompson, Sir Richard (croydon, s.)Younger, Hn. George
Sandy, Rt. Hn. D.Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)
Scott-Hopkins, JamesTurton, Rt. Hn. R. H.TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Sharples, RichardTweedsmuir, LadyMr. McLaren and Mr. MacArthur.

Remaining Lords Amendments disagreed to.

Committee appointed to draw up Reason to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to their Amendments to the Bill: The Solicitor-General, Mr. Godber, Mr. Gunter, Sir John Hobson, and Mr. Ernest Thornton; three to be the Quorum.—[ Mr. Gunter.]

To withdraw immediately.

Later:

Reason for disagreeing to the Lords Amendments reported and agreed to; to be communicated to the Lords.

Commons Registration Bill Lords

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

New Clause—(Registration Of Grazing Rights Limited By Number And Of Rights Not So Limited)

(1) Where a right of common consists of or includes a right to graze animals or animals of any class it shall be registered for the purposes of this Act as either—

  • (a) appendant, appurtenant or otherwise attached to a dominant tenement the location, address and acreage of which shall also be registered for this purpose; or
  • (b) held in gross by the claimant whose name and address shall also be registered.
  • (2) Any application for the registration of a right limited by number or class of animal shall state the number of animals to be entered in the register or, as the case may be, the numbers of animals of different classes to be so entered.

    (3) Where a right of common consists of or includes a right to graze animals or animals of any particular class or classes, limited by the number or class of animals to be grazed, it shall for the purposes of registration under this Act be treated as exercisable in relation to no more animals or animals of a class than that number or class or classes; and shall, when the registration has become final, be exercisable accordingly.

    (4) Where a right of common consists of or includes a right to graze animals or animals of any class or classes, not limited by number or class of animals, it shall for the purposes of registration under this Act be treated as exercisable in relation to the needs of either—

  • (a) the dominant tenement to which the right is appendant, appurtenant or otherwise attached whose location, address and acreage are registered under subsection (1) of this section; or
  • (b) the owner of the right in gross lying in express grant under deed as specified in that deed; or established or establishable under the fiction of a Lost Modern Grant or other common law principle.—[Mr. Corfield.]
  • Brought up, and read the First time.

    8.44 p.m.

    I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

    The following Amendments have been selected to be taken with the new Clause: Amendment No. 33, in page 7, line 43, leave out Clause 15; Amendment No. 34, in Clause 15, page 7, line 45, leave out from "shall" to end of Clause, and insert:

    "be registered in such manner as the Minister by regulations may prescribe".
    Amendment No. 41, in Clause 19, page 10, line 31, at end insert:
    (g) for requiring an application for registration of rights of common attached to any land to specify the location and acreage thereof.
    I understand that it would be for the convenience of the House if we also discussed Amendment No. 19, in Clause 10, page 6, line 16, at end insert:
    Provided that where a right of common consists of, or includes, a right not limited by number, to graze animals or animals of any class, any definite number of such animals registered in accordance with section 15(1) of this Act may be varied either by any subsequent scheme of management devised with the consent of the person registered as the owner of the land (whether under this Act, or under the Land Registration Acts 1925 or 1936), and of all persons in whose name rights of common over that land are registered under this Act; or as Parliament may hereafter determine.
    and Government Amendments Nos. 32, 35, and 36.

    This new Clause and one of our Amendments are designed to overcome the main difference of principle—perhaps even the only difference of principle—which divided us in the Standing Committee. The other Opposition Amendments—Nos. 33, 34 and 19—merely represent alternative methods of meeting our objections, so I think that we can very conveniently discuss them all together.

    The principle on which we are divided is embodied in Clause 15 which requires, in effect, that all rights of common for grazing which are not limited by number—and which in the old Norman French are always known as rights sans nombre—shall, for purposes of registration, be quantified and registered as rights to graze a definite and specific number of beasts. By virtue of Clause 10, once the registration becomes final the register becomes conclusive evidence of a right to graze that number, and that number only.

    As we see it, there are a number of objections to this principle. The first, and perhaps the least important—more a technical objection and, as some might say, a legalistic one—is one that the Government Amendments mentioned are designed to meet. However, this is not the most important objection. On the contrary, I think that the practical objections to which I shall refer later are the most fundamental.

    For a definition of the rights sans nombre, one turns to page 276 of the Royal Commission Report which defines sans nombre:
    "Literally 'without number'; applied to right of common of pasture appurtenant or in gross if the right exists for an unspecified number of animals. In the case of common appurtenant sans nombre the principle of levancy and couchancy is held to apply; in the case of common in gross sans nombre the right is limited to as many cattle as the common will maintain over and above the levant and couchant cattle of the lord and commoners."
    I think it is clear—although I shall not quote further—from Cheshire's "Modern Law of Property" that a right of common gross can exist if created by deed, although not by prescription, for an unlimited, number of animals over and above the numbers for which rights existed, for limited numbers depending, of course, on the carrying capacity of the common.

    The principle of levancy and conchancy implies that the numbers must be limited in accord with the wintering capacity of the holding. In the old days they were confined to the type of stock which were required either to work the holding or to manure it. In providing for the registration and determination of these rights, one comes up against two difficulties. The first is that the principle of levancy and conchancy can have very little relevance to any form of modern farming. The second is that where we are dealing with rights in gross not attached to any particular holding there is by definition no dominant holding in relation to the numbers which can be assessed. So, in actual practice, one is up against the determination of the actual numbers of cattle or other species of stock on the basis of the carrying capacity of the common. Of course, if there are a number of rights established with definite numbers of cattle attached, it would be relevant to the surplus carrying capacity over and above that of the particular common.

    Looking forward to the second stage of the operation which the Royal Commission, the Government and ourselves contemplate, it will be accepted that one of the main purposes of the operation, anyway as regards commons which are predominantly agricultural in their use and value, is usefully to increase the productivity of those commons, in other words, to increase the carrying capacity. It follows that if any specific number of cattle is to be determined under the Bill it will have to be based on the current carrying capacity of the common. Therefore, if the whole operation on which we are embarking is to make any sense at all it can be only a temporary number.

    On the face of it, we have the situation in the Bill in which we are inviting commoners to register rights with a view to their becoming established when the registration has become final as absolute and permanent rights, although we all know that the whole object of the exercise is that they should be neither absolute nor permanent. That, as I put it in Committee, is bogus in an Act of Parliament. I do not use that in any derogatory sense towards the Minister or the Parliamentary Secretary, but it is the result that the Clause produces as it is at present drafted.

    As I understand it, this is what the Minister seeks to put right by Amendments Nos. 32, 35 and 36. Clause 13, as amended by Amendment No. 32, would make paragraph (c) read:
    "any rights registered under this Act are apportioned, extinguished or released varied or transferred in such circumstances as may be prescribed."
    That deals with the power to alter the register where that is appropriate. So we start with the proposition that the Minister accepts that there may be variations and alterations of the register to meet them to the full under Clause 13 as amended.

    The Minister goes on to amend Clause 15 to make it clear that Parliament expects to have something to say on the subject at some future date. That is all right as far as it goes, except that I would query the drafting, in that it gives the impression that the right hon. Gentleman contemplates that Parliament will concern itself with the actual numbers on any particular common. I cannot believe that that is what he contemplates Parliament will do. It will merely set up machinery by which some other body can devise management schemes under which these numbers can be varied, either for all time or from time to time as the carrying capacity of the common varies.

    I must admit that that criticism applies, though I think to a lesser extent, to one of the alternatives we have tabled, namely, Amendment No. 19, which is an Amendment to Clause 10. That follows somewhat similar lines to those of the Minister's. I like to think that it perhaps inspired the Minister rather than that he inspired me, but that is as it may be. Our Amendment allows for a variation to be made with the consent of all the commoners of a common and the owner of the land, if he is ascertainable, either under this Measure or under the Land Registration Acts.

    Even on this narrow point, our Amendment has a very substantial advantage, because I am sure that we all want to see commoners get together before the second stage if they are disposed to do so. We should make it clear that if they are disposed to do so, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent them from getting together and varying the numbers, if this is appropriate in relation to the management scheme which they propose to devise. I therefore hope that the Minister will consider this alternative seriously. It is very much on the same principle as his own. At the same time it goes that little bit wider and is that much more valuable, if only because it encourages the co-operation without which we shall not make a real success of this legislation, either this stage or the next.

    As I said earlier, all this deals only with the technical or legalistic objection to the Clause as it stands. To our way of thinking, it is the practical objections that are the most fundamental and the most damaging. Put very shortly—I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) will wish to go into this in more detail, if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker—the requirement that all these rights need to be quantified seems to us to raise the following practical difficulties. First, this implies that, whether a particular common has had any form of stinting arrangement up to now or not, some form of stinting will have to be devised, though this is the fundamental of the second stage of this operation.

    There are a large number of commons which have never had any stinting and where the commoners are wholly unfamiliar with the process. It becomes more and more clear, as some of the evidence of the Nuffield Research Unit at Cambridge is studied, that this is by no means a simple and straightforward operation. Indeed, in some commons it can be a very complex one. In any case, it is very much the function of the management scheme stage, to which we look forward after five or six years, or some such period. I submit that it is wholly outside the proper function of the Commons Commissioner established under this Measure who, after all, is basically there, as I see it, to adjudicate on legal rights. As I understand it, this is the reason why he has to be a lawyer of so many years' standing.

    The second objection is that there are a number of commons which suffer, not from being over-grazed but from being under-grazed. If one were to limit the exercise of some of these common rights, which are at present without number, one would not only be doing no good but one might well be doing something which was positively harmful. This is a powerful argument for rethinking the approach to this matter.

    First, there are a number of commons where the commoners have got together not with a view to exercising their own rights but to let those rights, usually to one farmer, leaving the whole management to that farmer to cultivate it to the maximum benefit in accordance with the general policy of his dominant holding. The commoners, therefore, are interested only in collecting and distributing the rent among themselves. In that sort of instance, it clearly would be inappropriate to attempt a stinting operation at this stage, since there is clearly a manager running the common as a single unit and the commoners may not only be uninterested in stinting but wholly uninterested in achieving a result which will have no bearing on the prosperity of the common in which they are interested.

    We realise that this is a difficult matter and that is why we have tried to offer the right hon. Gentleman a number of choices. Although we have had disagreements on principle and drafting in Committee, I think we would all agree that the right hon. Gentleman has shown himself anxious to get a good answer out of this machinery when it is established. I hope that he will accept it as a compliment that in one of our Amendments we are prepared to leave it to him to provide regulations because this will give him more time to consider this difficult matter and to consult experts, whether research units, agricultural executive committees or Commons Preservation Society people, or whoever it may be. It will also give him time to prepare a scheme which will provide, if necessary, different alternatives for different types of commons. This is the purpose of our Amendment to Clause 15, leaving it as a short Clause and leaving the registration of these rights to be provided for by regulations.

    As for the new Clause, our approach has been rather different. It has been to try to give detailed guidance to the registration authorities on the registration of each main type of common right. In subsection (1,a) we are making clear that whether a right is appurtenant or appendant, the dominant tenement, in particular, should form part of the registration, and here new Clause No. 1 overlaps Amendment No. 41 which gives the Minister power to make regulations for the same purpose.

    In subsections (2) and (3) we provide for some guidance where a right of common relates to a common which has a limited number attached to it. In subsection (4) we are dealing with rights unlimited by number and here we suggest that those rights should be registered and exercised either in relation to the dominant tenement, if there be one, or where there is right in gross—whereby definition there is no dominant tenement—in relation to the owner of that particular right, leaving it to the management in the final stage to define the numbers and, if necessary, to make special arrangements for the seasonal changes on the common, and so on.

    9.0 p.m.

    Of our three main efforts to meet this problem, we prefer, in the circumstances, either Amendment No. 19 or Amendment No. 34, largely because both would allow time to work out a more satisfactory scheme. The first would enable the commoners themselves to do something in the meantime, and the second would allow the Minister to produce some sort of machinery which, I hope would—I am sure that it would—allow for an encourage alteration by consent where this led to an interim management scheme or a management scheme which might well be confirmed as permanent.

    I put the new Clause bottom of the list, but, again, I prefer it very much to the Minister's two little Amendments which do not go far enough, although they meet the technical point.

    Before calling the next speaker, I should add to the group of Amendments which we are considering at the same time the Amendment to Amendment No. 19.

    The controversy which has arisen on this point is unusual in the sense that it has absolutely no political content at all. Both Government and Opposition have been concerned solely to produce an effective Bill and one which, broadly, implements the recommendations of the Royal Commission. At first sight, the argument about quantification seems to be an obscure and minor matter, but, as one digs into it, one realises that it is much more complicated and more central to the successful operation of the Bill. It has gradually revealed itself as, so to speak, the key test of the Bill's practicability.

    At the moment, it is largely a matter of chance and history whether a grazing common is stinted or not. We derive some idea of the extent of this problem from paragraph 73 of the Royal Commission's Report, where it is stated that 79 per cent. of the common land in England and Wales is grazing, 33 per cent. being stinted—that is approximately 500,000 acres, and there is no problem about registering those grazing rights—and 46 per cent. being unstinted, that is, grazing without any definite number of animals attached to the right, and this latter area comes to nearly 700,000 acres. It is a sizeable problem, and the success of the registration process must largely depend upon the statutory requirements being clear, easy to comply with, and likely to inspire both confidence and action.

    The Government, in a commendable desire to expedite this procedure—they have done it successfully in regard to registration periods and so on—are here calling for a precise definition at a stage when the claimant cannot know it and, indeed, cannot be expected to know it. In this respect, the Bill goes outside the recommendations of the Royal Commission, which, looking at the problem in great detail, recognised the impossibility of claimants giving any precise definition at this stage.

    The key paragraph is worth quoting again. It is paragraph No. 275:
    "The impossibility of making an objective definition leaves only one alternative—to allow the commoner in his claim to rights of common of pasture to define them himself; in other words, to allow him to claim whatever he believes he is entitled to. If our recommendation is accepted, we do not think that in practice it will work badly. In most places, the commoners will settle their individual claims by discussion before registering them, some in their present associations or manor courts, the others in all probability by getting together informally in the parish hall or bar parlour."
    My only criticism of that paragraph is that I personally think that agreement is unlikely to be reached informally prior to registration. It is more probable that people will try to register, and that agreement will be reached only when one considers all the details that are involved at a much later stage.

    I would say that the subsequent survey into the management problems that are likely to arise in commons, which has been carried out by the Nuffield Foundation and Cambridge University and which includes several members of the Royal Commission, has confirmed my view. They are quite certain in their view that defining numbers at the stage of registration is not merely going to be difficult but is going to give rise to serious trouble. The basic reason for it is that where quantification exists, in the vast majority of cases it has come about only as a result of some stinting arrangements, and that any such arrangements are essentially a complex process of assessing and reconciling both the supply of grazing on the one hand and the demand for it on the other and coming to an agreement on a co-operative and not an individual basis.

    In Standing Committee we examined an old stinting arrangement of the late nineteenth century, and we were all surprised to find what a large number of factors were involved. Until those factors were determined, it was quite impossible for anyone to arrive at any quantification of numbers, whatever his authortiy in the matter. Therefore, without repeating the details of that argument, I am quite certain that quantification must be the result and, indeed, is the natural result of management and never of registration, and still less of adjudication by a commons commissioner.

    The most that registration can be expected to do is to identify the commoners and their claims of rights, plus the property in respect of which those rights may be based or the other titles on which they may be based. If we succeed in doing that, we shall have all the ingredients on which to work out a later quantification and stinting programme. It seems, therefore, that registration needs to be comprehensive, but I do not think it can be precise. If at the registration stage we try to do more, several practical difficulties must be expected, and that has been confirmed, as I have said, by the detailed examination of several hundred commons that has been going on for the last four years by the Nuffield Foundation investigation.

    Several difficulties will be apparent. As I have said, stinting has always been a very complicated process. It cannot bee simplified or speeded up because it depends on many factors which can be evaluated in deail only on the ground and in respect of a particular common—such as, what is the area of grazing which will be available, during what times, and what claims are there to be upon it? It is no easier to work out a stinting programme today than it was a century ago. If anything, it has become much more difficult because the techniques of agriculture are much more complicated and the potential non-agricultural, non-grazing usage and commitments of the common are more varied and probably more extensive.

    It seems to me that it is quite impossible for an individual commoner thinking of registration to have any idea of how to express his right, which may have been exercised almost from time immemorial by him and his forebears on the holding, in terms of definite numbers. Since the publication of the Bill anxiety on this point has been expressed in many areas. I merely mention the Commoners of Millburn Forest in the North and the Gower Common Association in Wales, and similar difficulties are known to obtain on Dartmoor and on Bodmin Moor.

    The second difficulty in practice is that stinting amounts to an act of enclosure in that in many cases it will replace the old manorial customs, and it requires, therefore, general agreement among all the commoners, who previously relied upon custom, to accept the new and exact regulation of the commons and the manorial wastes, and that, of course, would include, where one has a lord of the manor, dealing with the residue of grazing right and manorial right which remains in the enjoyment of the lord of the manor after the use made of them by individual commoners. Therefore, how can any individual claimant work out that sum at the moment of registration?

    Thirdly, modern husbandry practices make old stocking customs quite unrealistic. So I think that in practice the use to which any right can be put must depend on the consensus among commoners at the time of management later on and far beyond the time when individual claims would be determined by a Commons Commissioner.

    Mere quantification of numbers as suggested by Clause 15 would in practice cause chaos, because numbers by themselves have very little practical value. They have to be accompanied by express conditions about the types of animal which can be grazed in the alternative, details of areas that can be grazed, grazing seasons, and so on, all of which are matters of management and cannot be within the knowledge or jurisdiction of a Commons Commissioner.

    We have very good examples of modern stinting formulas which have been worked out. There is one by the National Trust at Rodburgh Common in Gloucestershire. One need only examine the position to realise that this is essentially something that can he arrived at only after the most detailed study. If one has a stinting programme it is not much use and is not meaningful unless there is some form of oversight and enforcement procedure. In modern times, for instance, there is the effective procedure at Allendale Common in Northumberland. We can see the need for enforcement procedure at Bollihope in County Durham. If we register numbers, even if this is not the intention of the Bill, it will be taken by many commoners as indicating and conferring some definite legal rights to certain fixed numbers when registration has become final. It may well be that, in many cases, later management schemes would have to cut down on such registered numbers simply because the carrying capacity of the common would be far less than the numbers claimed.

    9.15 p.m.

    I see the hon. Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) nodding his head and I think that I only have to mention Ebbw Vale for him to realise the astonishing excessive numbers at the moment being carried and claimed in respect of very small areas. Therefore, if any fraction of these numbers were registered, there would almost certainly in any subsequent management scheme have to be severe reductions. That would surely at least give rise to a great deal of complaint and even claims for compensation for expropriation.

    Then there are the other areas of hill country—again, I think, in Wales and the Pennines. Here, there are long chains of unstinted commons running across county boundaries. Grazing animals are no respecters of county boundaries and wander across them at leisure. It will be very difficult and certainly unjust unless relative quantification can be kept in step where an area crosses the boundaries between one local authority and another. This cannot be achieved unless and until there has been a comprehensive survey of the whole of each area of common and until there has been obtained the consent of all the commoners on each and every common to one comprehensive common standard. That would be wholly outside the jurisdiction and capacity of the commons commissioners acting within separate county boundaries.

    As registration is not in itself any evidence of legal title, we should then be in a worse position than at present because commoners would be uncertain of their legal standing although they would have to register fixed numbers. That kind of uncertainty, if created by compulsory quantification, could only be resolved by a later stinting scheme. As I have said, the biggest objection is that stinting arrangements can be reached only by allocating the resources of the common and regulating their use, and before one can assess the resources or carrying capacity there are a number of factors that must be taken into account.

    It is a long list. There is the control of public access. There is nature conservation, which may eliminate certain grazing rights. Certain portions of the common may be sold or leased. There is the question of archaeological preservation, and the very important question of fencing or gating—because, if a common is fenced, it may greatly increase its carrying capacity. There is the question whether any part of the common may be subject to arable cultivation; the question of the state and scale of grassland husbandry of the common, and forestry and silviculture. There is even the question of the control of gypsies, and of water supplies, and scrub control. If there is not effective scrub control the grazing will be reduced; conversely, if there is control, it may be extended.

    Then there is the question of the degree of public access, in the form of games or sports, such as horse riding, golf and other organised games, together with camping. Some or all of those factors are bound to occur on most commons, and until it is known what effect they have on the carrying capacity of the common it is impossible to decide upon a class or the sum that must be arrived at before any numbers can be decided.

    I have wearied the House by indicating some of the practical difficulties. I assure hon. Members that these are not idle fears. They all exist today, and can be seen. They will at once become apparent if this quantification at the registration stage is insisted upon.

    We believe that it is not essential to press for this decision and that it would be far better to concentrate on the registration of claims in respect of all the dominant land upon which many claims are based. There is nothing original in this. That was an essential first stage in the traditional stinting award—but it was only the first stage. Our suggested Amendments are in the alternative. The new Clause spells out the detail required for comprehensive registration, and if still more flexibility is desired—and I would prefer that—Amendment No. 34 gives the Minister power to prescribe what matters should be registered.

    I would much prefer to see him have those admittedly wide powers, because we are agreed on the common objective, and if he can wait a little before specifying exactly what is to be registered he will probably have the advantage of being able to study the forthcoming Cambridge University and Nuffield Report, which will amount to a vade mecum of the management of commons and will make quite clear what are the indispensable matters to insist upon for registration, and what matters are best avoided.

    The House is greatly indebted to the hon. Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) and his hon. Friends for the efforts that they have made to solve a very difficult problem. The hon. Member talks about a controversy. I do not regard it as a controversy. We recognise the difficulty. I have tried hard to arrive at a solution which might be more acceptable.

    The difficulties were clearly brought out by the speech which the hon. Member for Norfolk, South has just made because, as I emphasised in Standing Committee, what we are trying to do—I hoped that this would be agreed between us—is to establish the legal rights of the commoners. It may well be that in many cases when we have established those rights we will face difficulties. As I emphasised in Committee, and I emphasise it again, I think that these are ancient rights which ought to be recognised, and our endeavours, as far as registration goes, should be to register those rights as accurately as we can.

    The hon. Gentleman talked about public access to common, nature conservation of the common, archeological preservation, husbandry, forestry, water, even gypsies and camping. These are not matters which should qualify and determine the legal rights of commoners. It may be that when we consider management these are matters which we should consider. What I am anxious to do, and I have been trying very hard to carry hon. Members opposite with me on this, is to consider these things, recognising the established rights of the commoners as accurately and as definitely as we can establish them. Here there is the difficulty that the records of manorial courts, since the abolition of copyhold tenure, are hard to come by and we are faced with a difficult problem. We have the Commons Commissioners and they have to discharge this obligation as best they can.

    The Royal Commission was faced with this difficulty and we are following its recommendation. When we talk about the importance of being definite one of the things that I emphasise is that, if we are to consider a scheme of management, it is important to know the relative rights of those who have rights in the common

    The thing that worries me is that, as I understand, it is quite possible to have a legal right in gross for a number of cattle, unlimited in number. Where I think the cases in the old books have proved that this is not possible is only when an attempt is made to establish this by prescription. Where the origin of the right can be proved as a grant it is possible. Therefore, I think that the right hon. Gentleman is not registering rights that exist, but he may in some cases be cutting down rights by putting a number on something which is, perfectly legitimately, unlimited.

    I would just make two points. First, rights are definite if we establish them. On the second practical issue, which is important, I think that if he looks forward and anticipates schemes of management—and one has to determine the relative rights of commoners on the common—the only way this can really be done is by having definition. That is a point which we considered in another context, when we discussed whether there should be a provisional register. If we had a provisional register we would have to move to a definite register at a later stage. I think that that was merely putting off a decision which would have to be taken if we are to tackle this problem.

    I recognise that the new Clause has some disadvantages, which the hon. Gentleman for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) anticipated. I would mention only two. I think that it would only add confusion if we introduce "appendant, appurtenant" into the definition. I agree with the Royal Commission about this; it would not make things any easier and would serve no useful purpose. The main criticism of the Clause is that it goes on to give "needs" as the criterion and one difficulty is that there is no definition of needs. It would be very difficult for a Commons Commissioner to apply this criterion. The other difficulty is that we should be changing the law by defining the rights as determined by needs. A very simple illustration would be a prescriptive right. For this reason, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the New Clause. It would mean a practical difficulty, that there is no definition of needs and it would mean a substantial change of the law which, I am sure, the hon. Gentleman would not wish to pursue.

    9.30 p.m.

    The hon. Member said that he had a particular preference for Amendment No. 34. The difficulty there is that it would merely leave it to regulations. I have found out that if this were left to regulations they would have to provide as we already provide in Clause 15. In other words, the regulations would empower me only to do what I feel I must do in the present Clause 15. We have to be definite and certain about this. We cannot start commons registration unless this is defined and certain. Once the process is begun, we could not alter the criterion.

    Therefore, this does not meet our difficulty—we have to decide on quantification—because I should have to decide and, having decided, we could not change the criteria or the process during registration. Amendment No. 41 also refers to regulations. This would give me no powers which I do not have at present. For this reason, I do not think that it would help. It might cause some difficulty about the powers at present in the Bill. Amendment No. 19 was the second preference of the hon. Gentleman. I had a good deal of sympathy with this. We are now trying to meet the point which the hon. Gentleman made in Standing Committee that there is the appearance of finality. Yet the whole discussion, particularly the contribution of the hon. Member for Norfolk, South, has made it clear that this will be subject to adjustment, that there will be schemes of management and improvement.

    There is a drafting difficulty over the Amendment. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman appreciates that the result of his Amendment would be that any variation would require the consent of all those who held rights in common, so that a person with a right of piscary would have to give his consent to a variation in rights of grazing. I do not think that the hon. Member expected that that would be the effect. This is the point on which I have tried to meet him and have failed. That is why I am advised that the effect of the Amendment might be to restrict the rights which commoners at present have in contract to vary their rights of common.

    This is a very real difficulty, which I will explain when I come to the Government Amendments. I concede at once to the hon. Gentleman the initiative in this respect. I do not claim to have anticipated him, but I was anxious to see what he might propose. I was sympathetic towards this and still wish to meet him as far as I can.

    There were difficulties with the hon. Member's Amendment. First, it was so drawn that the consent of those who had rights other than grazing rights would have been necessary to variation. Secondly, I am advised that the Amendment would have had the effect of limiting the rights which commoners have to vary their rights of contract. I put down an Amendment to Clause 13 to make it quite clear that we are providing for variation of rights of common. I agree that this does not make it very clear to whoever studies the Bill that we intend to make it clear in Clause 13 that there will be variation.

    In the further Amendments to Clause 15 I have been able to meet the point which the hon. Member made in Standing Committee that, as in Clause 1, we should make it clear that although we are providing for a definition of those rights, Parliament intends to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission and there will be legislation which will provide for the variation of the rights which are quantified under Clause 15. That is straightforward. What I have not been able to do is to meet the point which the hon. Member makes in his own Amendment that these rights can also be varied by agreement or in other ways by the commoners themselves.

    My difficulty has been that which I pointed out on his own Amendment—that I have been advised that the various efforts which we have made to meet this point have been unsuccessful and we have not been able to produce a form of words which would not possibly limit these rights and—

    The right hon. Gentleman is saying that there may be, by custom of the country, a means by which this can be done which, if it does not happen to be by mutual consent of all those concerned, we should be cutting it out by his words.

    I am obliged to the hon. Member. That is the difficulty which we face. What I have done is to take his Amendment No. 19, and to try to improve it by Amendment. But I have failed. I then put down two Amendments in Clause 13 particularly to call attention to the fact that these rights can be varied because I recognised that under the Amendment which I have made to Clause 15 it is unsafe to try to do this because we might be at serious risk of prejudicing some of those with rights of common who may wish to vary their rights.

    May I tell hon. Members of the other steps which I will take? By publicty we shall try to make this as clear as we can. We intend with the co-operation of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to take the professional staff of the Agricultural Land Service and to hold meetings which will be informal and informative of the commoners so that we may have fruitful discussions between the commoners and there can be an opportunity to give general advice and guidance to assist the commoners in proceeding to registration.

    The hon. Member realises that we have discussed this matter before. I hope that he will agree that while I have not been able to accept that quantification should be avoided, I have tried as successfully as I can—not as successfully as I should have wished—to meet his point that we should make clear that although we are quantifying the right under Clause 15, this is not final and Parliament will be proceeding in due course to further legislation on the commons which will provide for the management and the improvement of the commons.

    I will delay the House for only a few moments to issue a word of warning to the Minister now that the Bill has begun to be understood—now that its meaning is percolating down, as it were—because the problem of quantification is indeed a thorny one. Now that the implications of the Measure have percolated down to the local branches of the N.F.U. and the commoners' associations, grave concern, to say the least, is being caused.

    Several people have asked me what will happen once the Bill become law. "Do the Government really realise the difficulty and muddle there will be?", I have been asked. I therefore pass this warning on to the Minister because there is mounting anxiety about the difficulties associated with quantification at this first stage rather than at the second. The Minister must realise that he has been warned about the difficulties and problems—warned not merely by me but by many of my hon. Friends in Committee, by many important people outside Parliament and by the N.F.U.

    It might help if I tell the hon. Gentleman at this point in his remarks that we have had further discussions with the N.F.U., and I think that its members now concede that what we are doing represents the best way of tackling this problem.

    The right hon. Gentleman may have that impression, but that is not the case from the point of view of the Devon branch of the N.F.U. I appreciate that the members there may be a little difficult, but I assure the right hon. Gentleman that what he says is not so in their case. They are indeed worried about the real problem which exists, remembering that a large tract of Devon—and, I believe, of Cornwall too—is affected by the proposals. I assure the Minister, therefore, that there is still grave concern.

    Just to specify numbers of animals without management entering into the matter—with all that that means, although I will not go into that subject again now—will cause considerable trouble, some chaos and may even sabotage the whole Bill. That would be a great pity, so I now warn the Minister about these problems. I do not think that he has settled these issues yet, certainly not to the satisfaction of the Devon branch of the N.F.U.

    I welcome the news that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and its officers are to help to solve this difficulty. Nevertheless, we must realise that the problem is not so much the farmers, who more or less know what they stock on the moors and commons. The Minister has still not answered the question which I posed in Committee about the problem of the claims which will come from people outside the farming world and who, I am sure, will be registered. I hope that the Minister will now answer that question.

    I thank the Minister for the way in which he has dealt with the Opposition new Clause and the obvious effort which he, the Joint Parliamentary Secretary and their officials have made in trying to meet the points which my hon. Friends put in Committee and during the intervening period. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his approach to the matter because he has adopted a kind and sympathetic attitude.

    I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that no political controversy is involved in this issue. Both sides of the House are trying to achieve the same object, which is to get the right type of machinery to secure properly managed commons as a result of the passage of the Bill. What controversy there is has arisen over the method by which this may be achieved.

    In the debate today we have had some extremely good discussion and fresh ground has been broken. My hon. Friends have not merely repeated the points they made in Committee. At that stage we had an exhaustive debate on the various merits and demerits of the proposals before us and tonight we have heard some further excellent speeches. My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) made an excellent speech on the problems which will face the Minister if he persists in the attitude he has adopted. The Minister's mellow tone makes it quite obvious that he intends to persist in it.

    9.45 p.m.

    I accept the right hon. Gentleman's point about lack of definition making it possible for the new Clause to be interpreted as an attempt to change the law, but I do not think that he has met our points on the other Amendments. I might mention, in passing, that in connection with Amendment No. 41 the right hon. Gentleman said that he already had these powers. I take his word for that, of course, but I should like to be told where they exist.

    Our other two Amendments perhaps represent our first and second preferences. The Minister turned down the idea of taking the powers suggested, because he said that they were already there. I disagree, as I think it is necessary for him to meet the points made by my hon. Friends and, in particular, the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills). There would be no need for him to take the suggested action straight away; the methods to be used could be put off until the second stage.

    In my constituency in Cornwall there is quite an extensive amount of commons. The commoners as such, and the farmers as such, will find great difficulty in quantifying their existing rights. I do not say that it cannot be done—it can be done, and the Minister has said that it will have to be done later in any case—but it will put the Commons Commissioners, who will have to decide the issue, in an impossible position, and put the commoners in an extremely difficult position when they do not know whether a common on which they may now have rights will be fenced or enclosed, or what type or kind of management there will be. They will not know whether they should put in for this or that amount of stint.

    This is a very important point because, as the Minister said, registration under Clause 10, if accepted after the time allowed, will be as final as possible, with the exception of the variations embodied in the Minister's own Amendments. It will be as final as may be, with very little likelihood of increase. That means that registration of rights that up to now have been sans nombre will be of great importance but extremely difficult to achieve. The commoner, and the Commissioners at a later date, will be put in a very difficult position.

    I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to look once again at our Amendment No. 34 in Clause 15, which would give the Minister the right to make regulations prescribing the way in which this should be done. I am sure that it is the right way to go about things, and if the right hon. Gentleman agreed, it would give the necessary breathing space by which these registrations could be gathered together, and a comprehensive picture obtained before quantification in anything like finality took place.

    The Minister's method goes a long way towards meeting our case about the variableness of the registration, but the registration is not final, and those who register must not be under any impression that it is. If they were given that impression and at a later stage under the management then taking place their rights were reduced, they could well be in a position to ask for compensation. As it is, with the Minister's Amendment, that position would not arise. It seems a very cumbersome way of going about things, particularly the last line of Amendment No. 36:
    "or such other number or numbers as Parliament may hereafter determine."
    I take it that the Minister has taken what advice he can and that this is the only way in which this can be done. The right hon. Gentleman did not answer my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) who asked if this means that, for each and every new common, Parliament has to make a decision and the Minister has to lay an order. I do not think the Minister wants to have to do that or that he wants to have to make regulatory powers.

    While the Minister has gone an appreciable way—and I thank him for doing so and for the courtesy with which he has done so—towards meeting the case we have put forward on variableness in Amendments Nos. 35 and 36, he has not gone far enough. Although we accept his argument about our new Clause, I hope he will look again at the point made by Amendment No. 34. That is the correct way of dealing with the problem. If the matter is left as it is it will cause a great deal of difficulty and expense to commoners and a great deal of difficulty and trouble for the Commons Commissioners and for the right hon. Gentleman himself if he is still in a position to administer the law.

    I ask the right hon. Gentleman to think again about Amendment No. 34 as I believe that it is the correct way of dealing with this thorny problem. We are all trying to achieve the same end. This is not a political controversy. I am certain that if this were done in the way we suggest we should achieve what the right hon. Gentleman and we are trying to do.

    We ought to have some clarification about one point which arises. The House is in serious difficulty over the question of how quantification is to be done. There is a difference between this side of the House and hon. Members opposite about how much dispute there will be over claims put in by commoners. We think that there will be many disputes, while the Minister thinks that there will be very few. It is beyond argument that some disputes will certainly arise and that some people—perhaps few, perhaps many—will put in excessive claims where there are rights of this sort, sans nombre, and a great deal of time and expense will be taken up by disputes being heard by the Commissioners.

    We cannot seriously consider what the Minister is proposing unless we know on what basis disputes about quantification are to be settled. That is the whole basis of this part of the Bill. I earnestly ask the Minister to tell us on what basis, agriculturally, these grazing rights are to be settled. I am very disturbed that the Minister has not seen fit to involve the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in the various debates that we have had on the Bill. This is on his own shoulders. If he feels that he can manage without that Minister that is fair enough, but he must be prepared to answer these questions which are so important. He must say what he means by quantification and how disputes will be settled from an agricultural point of view.

    There are two extreme possibilities. First, in relation to sheep grazing, are the sheep numbers to be settled on the basis of present usage? If this is done, it will be unfair to commoners who for a variety of reasons are not at the moment using their rights. That is the one extreme. At the other extreme, will the sheep numbers be assessed by giving equal rights to all those who have rights to graze sans nombre on the common? If this is done, clearly it will be unfair to present users of the common.

    This is the basis of the difficulty. I do not think that we can proceed with the Bill, unless the Minister tells us how the present difficulty of quantification will be sorted out. After the matter had been raised in Committee, the Minister drew attention to a letter which he had received from the Cumberland and North Westmorland Branch of the National Farmers' Union. It was a most helpful letter. The Minister was kind enough to quote it. The letter drew attention to the difficulty which I have pointed out tonight. However, the Minister did not go any way towards explaining how the difficulty will be overcome. He has skated round this very serious problem throughout the proceedings on the Bill.

    We must have an answer to this tonight. If the Minister will not answer this point, and will not explain how quantification is to be worked out, he must tell us why he is not prepared to do this, because he has shirked this responsibility throughout the proceedings on the Bill. The choice is clear. The Minister must tell us how it will be worked out, or, if he refuses to do this, he must tell us why he refuses, because we must have this answer.

    There is one point with regard to the horrible word "quantification", registering the number of animals that any commoner is allowed to pasture. I am not a lawyer. I would like the Minister to repeat something which I understood him to say. I hope that he will repeat it in simple language so that farmers and others concerned can understand it. I understood him to say that the number of animals registered at the first stage under Clause 15 will not be hard and fast but may very well have to be altered in the second stage. Is that clear? Is that what the Minister means? If it is not, farmers and commoners will think that they have been defrauded if in the second stage the numbers they have registered have to be reduced.

    I am sorry that I did not reply to the point about my own Amendment to Clause 15. I am advised that that is not the effect. It merely indicates that Parliament may provide. It does not mean that Parliament would provide in the case of each individual common.

    What does the Minister mean by that? Does he mean that there will have to be Orders, Statutory Regulations, or a Bill? I have a suspicion that it means that a Bill will be necessary for each and every common.

    It would have to be a Bill, but it would not necessarily be a Bill for each common. I have used the words previously used in Clause 1. I take the point that I took before: it is offensive to anticipate what Parliament may do. We have gone as far as we can go in anticipating that Parliament may do something. What we were anxious to do was to meet the Opposition in making it as clear as we could that whatever is established by registration is liable to be affected by subsequent legislation providing for the management and improvement of commons.

    On his question about criteria I cannot satisfy the hon. Gentleman. We saw the difficulties of trying to define criteria when we discussed the new Clause. I cannot satisfy him because the Commissioners have to establish the rights according to the law. I remember saying in Standing Committee that in the sort of case he had in mind that probably the Commissioner would need an assessor.

    It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

    Ordered,

    That the Proceedings on Government Business may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. George Rogers.]

    Question again proposed, That the Clause be read a Second time.

    This is an extraordinarily complex and difficult subject but one has to pay regard to local custom and rights and one may well have in such cases as the hon. Member referred to in Committee a reference to an assessor to help the Commissioner in giving a decision.

    How is an assessor to begin to know how to do this? There is no law which says how one reduces rights to a specified number. The law is of no help to an assessor. I know many agricultural valuers, and my father was one. These would be the sort of people who would be the assessors but one can have one agricultural valuer saying one thing and another saying something entirely different. Unless the Minister gives a lead the assessor will be absolutely lost.

    This is the one thing that I cannot do. If I appoint a Commissioner to establish the rights according to the law—and this is the dialogue which we have had in Committee—I cannot advise him to pay attention to considerations which ought not properly to affect him. This is the difficulty, because the manorial courts have gone.

    As to the question of disuse, a right is not necessarily lost by disuse. Again it will be for the Commissioner to decide whether the right is established notwithstanding disuse. I cannot accept the proposal made by hon. Members opposite because, as I have said, in all honesty if I accepted it I would then have to bring in immediately a regulation to the effect of Clause 15. I must do this for the good reason that we are holding meetings to explain these matters and having explanatory publicity. It is important that we should be as definite as we can be so that the explanation can be understood. It would be very difficult if this matter were left open and the Ministry had to explain at meetings which we may hold that the position may be one way or another.

    We have had the difficulty that these matters have been discussed in the light of a provisional register, but there are no Amendments before us suggesting that we should have a provisional register. This is a final register. We have a timetable and I have been pressed again and again to be as expeditious as I can. If we had regulations we would have to define in the sense of Clause 15 and once we defined we could not go back. The proposal now put to us would introduce not only an element of uncertainty but also possibly an element of unfairness.

    May I, with the leave of the House, say a few words before the debate concludes?

    The hon. Gentleman moved the Second Reading of the new Clause. He does not need the leave of the House to speak again.

    I am obliged, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.

    What concerns me is that the Minister is saying, in effect, that he must establish legal rights. As I understand, it is quite possible to have a legal right without limit. I quote now from Cheshire, page 495:
    "In the case of a common in gross, there is no objection in principle to the existence of pasture without stint, in other words the right to put an unlimited number of cattle on the servient tenement because, as it is not appurtenant to anything, there is no dominant tenement with reference to the needs of which the content of the rights must be apportioned."
    He goes on to quote a judicial statement and sums up in this way:
    "Such an unstinted right might no doubt be granted expressly by deed, but it cannot be prescribed for."
    I think that the Minister is contradicting himself when he says that he must not alter the law, because that is precisely what he is doing. If he is insisting that every right, sans nombre, must be registered with a specific number, he is altering the law in respect of these particular rights in gross which do exist with an unlimited number attached to them.

    I suggest to him that there really is a strong case, particularly following what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling), for at least giving himself the opportunity to prescribe in regulations—even if this would be additional only to the powers he wants to take under Clause 15—for specific types of right, and there may indeed be special categories of common for which provision should be made. The right hon. Gentleman says that he does not wish to do anything to alter the law which might cut down anybody's rights. As I understand, if one insists upon putting a definite number on all these rights—which may well be legitimate in respect of some of them, particularly those which are either appurtenant or appendant—that will entail a cutting down of rights in respect of those which are in gross.

    I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman again to think hard and consult before we actually come to the Amendment. I confess that this new Clause is not the most satisfactory of all the methods we have, and I suggest that Amendment No. 34 is by far the most satisfactory way of proceeding, whether compared with our other efforts or with the Minister's. I ask him to try to meet us on Amendment No. 34, but, in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

    Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

    New Clause—(Ecclesiastical Benefices)

    Where any ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England is vacant the Church Commissioners shall have power to take any action which, but for the vacancy, would fall to be taken under this Act by the incumbent for the time being.—[ Mr. Corfield]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause be read a Second time.—[ Mr. Corfield.]

    It is proposed that with this new Clause we take the following four Amendments, all in Clause 19: Amendment No. 42, in page 10, line 32, to leave out paragraph (g) and to insert:

    (g) for enabling the Church Commissioners to take any action under this Act which would, but for the vacancy of any particular ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England, falls to be taken by the incumbent for the time being.
    Amendment No. 43, in page 10, line 32, to leave out paragraph (g).

    Amendment No. 44, in page 10, line 32, to leave out from "act" to "ecclesiastical" in line 33 and to insert:
    "with respect to any right belonging to an".
    Amendment No. 45, in page 10, line 32, to leave out from "act" to "ecclesiastical" in line 33 and to insert:
    "with respect to any land or rights belonging to an".

    This new Clause and all the Amendments which go with it are relevant to Clause 19 (1,g). I say "relevant", though in the context of this Bill I suppose that a more appropriate term would be "appurtenant to" or "levant" and "couchant with". Clause 19 (1,g) provides that the Minister may make regulations

    "for enabling the Church Commissioners to act on behalf of the incumbent of any ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England which is vacant".
    The first point which arises is that that does not make sense. This was pointed out in Committee, when the Minister said that he was quite unbiased about it and would look at the matter again. We note with gratification that the right hon. Gentleman has put down an Amendment to cause the paragraph to make sense. In the first place, as at present drafted it does not make sense because, ex hypothesi, there is no incumbent there if a benefice is vacant.

    The House can make its selection about the ways of dealing with the "sense" point. One attempt which I have made is Amendment No. 42. I concede at once that perhaps it is not the most elegant of drafting, but it does at least make sense, and Amendment No. 43 goes with it. Amendment No. 44 is an admirable Amendment put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester-sire, South (Mr. Corfield), and that makes sense. Finally, I am glad to say that there is Amendment No. 45, put down by the Minister himself, which one has to concede also makes sense.

    The first matter which arises is that we should make sense of Clause 19(1,g), and we hope that, with the many alternatives open to the House, it will select one of them and achieve a sensible Clause 19 (1,g), if it decides to persist in keeping that clause in its present form at all.

    That raises the second issue which comes before the House in considering the new Clause, and that is a consideration which was again raised in Committee as to whether it is right to provide for matters such as this by regulation and whether it would not be preferable, as envisaged by the new Clause, that the matter be dealt with in the body of the Bill—namely, that it should be stated quite clearly that,
    "Where any ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England is vacant the Church Commissioners shall have power to take any action which, but for the vacancy, would fall to be taken under this Act by the incumbent for the time being."
    I do not know about the elegance of the drafting, although it seems to be effective and cogent and I hope and expect that the Minister will support us and will adopt the Clause on behalf of the Government. I am confident in taking that attitude because of what the right hon. Gentleman said in Committee. The point was raised, and he said:
    "One is intending to make a provision. The provision is explicit, and unless there are difficulties which means that one ought to do it by regulation, I shall see whether we can meet the hon. Gentleman on this matter."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 15th June, col. 237.]
    That does not entirely make sense, just as the Clause originally did not, but what the Minister was saying was that he had made up his mind that the right people to act where there is a vacancy are the Church Commissioners. If that be the case, we feel that it would be entirely right that it should be said and should be put in the Bill as a definite statement.

    If the Minister does not accept the new Clause, we on this side should like to hear what are the difficulties which have arisen. He conceded in Committee that only if there are difficulties should a matter such as this be dealt with by regulation, and that normally such a matter is dealt with in the body of the Act. We would agree with that, because it is in accordance with precedent that a matter such as this is dealt with in the Act.

    Perhaps I might refer the Minister to Section 205 of the Town and Country Planning, Act, 1962, where, in subsection (2,b) he will find the following words,
    "in any case, the fee simple shall, for the purposes of a compulsory acquisition of the property under Part V of this Act, be treated as being vested in the Church Commissioners, and any notice to treat shall be served, or be deemed to have been served, accordingly".
    Here is a matter which is almost pari passu with what we are considering now where it was thought appropriate in the body of the Act to mention that the Church Commissioners in similar circumstances should be the right body to act.

    We shall be interested to hear whether there are any special difficulties of the character that the Minister referred to in Committee which prevent the Minister from adopting the new Clause, because we have no doubt that the proper place for the provision is in the body of the Act, and it is not an appropriate matter about which to give the Minister the power to make regulations.

    10.15 p.m.

    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources
    (Mr. Arthur Skeffington)

    First, I would express the gratitude of my right hon. Friend and myself to the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) for the matter which he mentioned. I do not think that I can agree with him that the Clause as originally drafted was quite as idiotic as he made out, but this is not to say that it cannot be improved, and we think that our Amendment No. 45 improves the Clause and simplifies what we want to ensure in it.

    As to the new Clause, my right hon. Friend, having consulted with those concerned, as he promised in Committee, has examined whether it would be advisable to provide for this matter directly in the body of the Bill, as the Clause suggests. I ought to say that paragraph (g) has had a somewhat unfortunate history. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman, who has been so interested in it, realises that it appeared only after discussion in another place. It was not in the Bill as originally drafted. It was put in at the instance of the Church Commissioners. We no sooner get it in and it comes from the other place, and there is this objection.

    Nevertheless, we have reconsidered the matter to ascertain the best way of dealing with Church property which might involve ecclesiastical property or rights covered by the Bill. We have consulted our advisers, and our view is that it should not be dealt with in the Bill. Elegant as is the drafting of the new Clause, it could not possibly provide for all the types of ecclesiastical rights relating to the subject matter of the Bill.

    We are dealing with a much more complicated matter than the transfer of the fee simple in the Town and Country Planning Acts. It is true that there are precedents for referring to these matters in a Statute. If I may give a point to the hon. Gentleman, he would have found a very much better precedent in the Pipelines Act. However, he will notice that it is at very considerable length, and if we wanted to cover all the types of rights in ecclesiastical property in this Bill it would make the subject matter of the Bill diminish in relation to the total length of the Bill. Those who have complained that this is a difficult matter, and that their constituents will not understand it, would find it even more difficult if a third of the Bill were taken up with such very complicated drafting. We cannot add this at present, and we think that it would not be in the interests of the Church Commissioners themselves, a view which, I think, they support.

    The matter will be provided for in regulations. My right hon. Friend will have detailed consultations with the Church Commissioners so that the regulations will meet all that they have in mind. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not feel it necessary to press his other Amendments on the point since in Amendment No. 45 we have substantially given the hon. Gentleman what he thought right and what we, on reflection, think right. We believe that the new definition puts the matter adequately and simply and leaves out all reference to "on behalf of the incumbent" because this is somebody acting when an incumbent is not there and we think this is a simpler and better way. We hope that when the time comes the hon. Gentleman will not press his Amendments, but will support Amendment No. 45

    I support the Clause, but I want to mention again my grave doubts about the whole matter being in the hands of the Church Commissioners only. I mentioned this point in Committee and still think it is important. We can hardly expect the Church Commissioners to be in touch with this sort of problem. Admittedly, it might be important that they should have the last say. But what do they really know in London about grazing rights and all that it means I do not think that they know very much about it. Surely it is the duty of the parochial church council during a vacancy to look after this matter, or at least the duty of the rural dean.

    Is the hon. Member speaking in favour in the Clause, or against it?

    I am just coming to my point about this, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that surely the parochial church council or the rural dean should advise the Church Commissioners and that it should not be left entirely to the Church Commissioners. We have previously been into the matter of hunting parsons and parsons who graze sheep and cattle on the moors and I do not want to go into that again. We have many vacancies, and we do not want to lose these rights. I ask the Minister to let the Church Commissioners know that they should at least take the advice of the parochial church council and the rural dean.

    The Parliamentary Secretary has missed the point. If the incumbent were in office the Minister would not need to make regulations. This new Clause would merely give the Church Commisisoners the power to carry out what the incumbent would do if he were there. This is a wholesale gift, as it were, to the Church Commissioners. More important, the hon. Gentleman suggested what is a very bad parliamentary procedure that the House should delegate to the Minister the right to legislate and that the Minister should then sub-delegate that right to the Church Commissioners. Clause 19 starts with the words,

    "The Minister may make regulations …"
    That is well and good. If he is to make complete regulations we have delegated power to him to do so. But then the Clause goes no to say that he may make regulations enabling the Church Commissioners to do something.

    That is really giving the Church Commissioners power to carry out sub-delegated legislation and it is bad parliamentary procedure. Far better, by our new Clause, to give the Church Commissioners the power to carry out quite clear duties which the incumbent would have carried out himself without having the status of delegated legislation—delegated to the Minister by this House with the Minister then sub-delegating it to the Church Commissioners.

    I am not satisfied with the Parliamentary Secretary's reply. He said that this provision is not as idiotic as it appears. But when there is a Clause which provides for one to do something on behalf of somebody who does not exist by definition, I regard that as a little stupid. I will not put it stronger. We hear about ghost writers in this House and we do not want ghost parsons creeping into the Bill.

    It is no excuse to say that the House of Lords forgot about this and have now brought it into the wrong place. That does not make the situation any better. I support the view that the proper place for this provision is in the body of the Bill. In the Clause as originally drafted—which the hon. Gentleman did not think particularly idiotic—provision was merely made for the Church Commissioners to act where the incumbent is non-existent.

    This is precisely what our new Clause itself says, that
    "Where any ecclesiastical benefice … is vacant the Church Commissioners shall have power to take any action which, but for the vacancy, would fall to be taken under this Act by the incumbent for the time being."
    I cannot see that there is anything in the Bill or in the registration under the Bill which does not fall within those words
    "… any action which, but for the vacancy, would fail to be taken …"
    This would not be the last Government who would get beyond saying that a thing cannot be done. A lot can be done if one is determined. I challenge anyone in this House or in Whitehall to tell me of a single thing that the Church Commissioners could not do by virtue of the Bill. Unless the hon. Gentleman can give us an example, he should follow precedent and put this provision in the body of the Bill where it belongs.

    Question put and negatived.

    Clause 1—(Registration Of Commons And Town Or Village Greens And Ownership Of And Rights Over Them)

    I beg to move Amendment No. 4, Clause 1, in page 1, line 11, to leave out paragraph (c) and to insert:

    (c) persons claiming to be or found to be owners of such land or becoming the owners thereof by virtue of this Act.

    It will be convenient to discuss, at the same time, the three Amendments standing in the name of the hon. Gentleman and the names of some of his hon. Friends, Amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 8, after "is", insert "claimed to be".

    In line 10, at beginning insert "claims to".

    In line 11, at beginning insert "claims to".

    Amendments No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 are exactly the same as Amendments which were discussed in Committee and I shall not waste time discussing them now. But at this stage in registration the rights required to be registered can only, by the nature of things, be claims to rights and do not become rights by the process of the Bill until that process becomes final under Clause 10.

    It therefore seems to us, with respect to our mother tongue, that it would be a good idea to say what we mean and not what the draftsman has got into the habit of murdering the English language with. I still maintain that this is what we should do. No doubt the Minister will tell us that there are great drafting difficulties. I do not want to waste time repeating what was said in Committee. I accordingly turn to Amendment No. 4, which is a variant. This has even more substance because, by virtue of Clause 10, when the ownership of land is registered under Clause 1 (1,c) we are specifically told that a person having registered himself as an owner means nothing in terms of his establishing any form of title. We had a really long debate on that point in Committee, and it was mentioned in the Second Reading debate. The Minister convinced us that, odd as it seems, that it was a sensible thing to do, in view of the fact that this was not the type of legislation or procedure which should affect such a complicated thing as title—especially title to a common, which tends to be more complicated than anything else. But the corollary seems to us to be that it makes bigger nonsense than ever to use the term "ownership of such land" as an item to be registered under Clause 1(1).

    We have, therefore, proposed a new paragraph (c) in respect of which I willingly admit that I am indebted to the Minister, having picked his brain on this, as he has picked my brain on one or two other matters. Persons, in the ordinary sense, do not become owners under the Act, but certain local authorities do, under the Interpretation clause. We are mutually agreed that this is satisfactory and I hope that the Minister will accept the Amendment.

    As the hon. Member said, Amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 would be unacceptable because they would require consequential Amendments which have not been put down.

    This is a fact. If the hon. Member feels that these Amendments should be accepted he should have put down the consequential Amendments.

    I hope now to be able to restore the harmony of the House. As he has said, Amendment No. 4 covers the point raised in Committee, when we conceded that there might be a disadvantage in not making it clear that title was not afforded as a result of registration. For this reason, I hope that the House will accept the Amendment.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 2—(Registration Authorities)

    I beg to move Amendment No, 6, Clause 2, in page 2, line 9, after "shall", to insert:

    ", subject to subsection (3) of this section,".

    With this Amendment it will be convenient to take Amendment No. 7, Clause 2, at end insert:

    (3) Where, subsequent to the passing of this Act any county borough ceases to be a county borough, the Minister may, by order, nominate as Commons Registration Authority such other new or existing local authority as he considers appropriate, notwithstanding that it is neither a county council nor a county borough council.

    Yes, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Very shortly, the purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that if during the course of this preliminary five-years' period, or whatever period is prescribed during which registration takes place, a change of status occurs in any local authority which, under the Act, is a registration authority, the Minister shall be enabled to ensure continuity by keeping the register going by whatever is the most suitable substitute authority created under the boundary change. The local government legislation contains an omnibus Section which enables the Minister to put in the actual order which alters the boundaries or status of a local authority a very large number of consequential matters. The real purpose of this Amendment is to ask the Minister if he can assure us that this matter would come under that omnibus Section. If he can assure us of that we would readily withdraw it. If not, will he accept the Amendment?

    10.30 p.m.

    I am happy to assure the hon. Gentleman, and the House that this matter has been very fully considered by my right hon. Friend, and the Minister of Housing and Local Government. The Amendment envisages one sort of change but there may be a great many. There may be an amalgamation of registration authorities or they may be divided, or their boundaries may be changed, and we have consulted the Ministry of Housing and Local Government about this. It is fully aware of the need when registration starts, to provide for this continuance by the appropriate authority, and we adhere to the view that this is something which has to be done by the county, or the county borough council, because it is a pretty substantial operation, and could not be done by a district council, or still less by a parish council. Provision can be made in the orders bringing forward the changes for any of these functions to be transferred.

    The hon. Gentleman may remember the Luton Order in the last stages of the last Parliament where there were an enormous number of functions, including the division of water undertakings between new authorities, so it is, technically, fairly easy, by established instruments, to provide for this. With that assurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press his Amendment.

    There may be a case where an authority had been acting as a commons registration authority, and the registration period had been completed, but it was in the course of hearing objections. In such a case it would be possible, in the order by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, to provide that the authority could continue with the objections, because it would be very confusing, at that stage to get a new authority to carry on with part-heard objections. This can all be done under the Local Government Act.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 8, Clause 4, in page 2, to leave out line 38 and to insert "for complying with any prescribed conditions".

    This is a drafting Amendment. We raised the matter in Committee, and the Minister said that he would look at it again. The last lines of Clause 4(1) read:
    "… documents (if any) as may be prescribed for the purpose of verification or of proving compliance with any prescribed conditions."
    It seemed to us that the point would be much more simply met by the words on the Order Paper, merely,
    "for complying with any prescribed conditions."
    Many provisions as to compliance would themselves be conditions which, I would have thought, would have been amply covered by the words on the Order Paper and, if that is so, it is a much simpler sentence. Other things being equal, I would suggest that the simpler sentence is always more appropriate than the longer one.

    I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for pursuing this point, but it does not quite help. The sort of example we have in mind is that it may be a condition that the applicant claiming common rights should give notice to certain persons of his intention to apply. The acknowledgement of the notice might then be prescribed as a document which would be required to be produced to prove compliance with the conditions, and it is for that reason that it is so worded. I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for according me the opportunity to explain the words as they are at the moment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    I beg to move, Amendment No. 9, Clause 4, in page 3, line 4, to leave out "if the land" and insert "which".

    With this Amendment we can also take Amendment No. 10, Clause 4, in page 3, line 7, to leave out "so registered" and insert "registered under this Act". and Amendment No. 11, Clause 4, in page 3, line 7, to leave out "so registered" and insert "registered under this section".

    This is a drafting Amendment, to a meet the point which I thank the hon. Member for Gloucester, South (Mr. Corfield) for raising in Committee. This improves the Bill. If I may anticipate, the hon. Gentleman's Amendment No. 11, which is also a drafting Amendment, also improves the Bill.

    Did I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that he was favourably disposed towards Amendment No. 11?

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendment made: In page 3, line 7, leave out "so registered" and insert:

    "registered under this section."—[Mr. Corfield.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 12, Clause 4, in page 3, line 7, at the end to insert:

    (4) Where any land over which rights of common are registered under this Act is registered under the Land Registration Acts 1925 and 1936 that fact, together with the name and address of the person in whose name the land is so registered, shall be noted upon the appropriate register maintained in accordance with the last preceding section.
    This Amendment can be easily explained. The object is to give complete equality to any land which is inside or outside land registration areas, as defined in the 1925 and 1936 Acts. One of the objects of the Bill is to enable owners of commons and the rights of commoners to be better known. It is quite illogical, if commons come in an area which is covered by the Land Registration Acts, that they should be any different. There are many commons which come under the present Land Registration Acts area. We hope that the Minister, for as long as he continues in office—not too long, we hope, but for the short time that he will be there—will extend the scope of land registration. It can be seen to be quite absurd that, at one time, the names of the owners were on the register and available, and, as the scope of the Acts advanced, they were not. This is quite illogical, and the Minister ought to put it right.

    I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but this would mean a radical departure from the provisions of the Land Registration Acts. However strongly the hon. Gentleman may feel about this, I am sure that he would agree that this is not the place to take such a step. However, I can assure him that we are alive to the point which he raises. We shall be discussing with the Land Registry the steps which we can properly take when we come to further legislation.

    I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's difficulty, because of the secrecy element in the Land Registration Acts. Nevertheless, I am sure that he will appreciate that if we can, under this Act, make the register as complete as possible, it will be to our advantage, so that, when someone goes to see who is the owner, it will be possible to get some indication of who is the owner, despite the fact that his title is registered. It is nonsense that, despite the fact that he is the real owner, he is the one man whom one cannot find in the register and discover that he owns the land. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will consider that, under regulations—his powers are wide enough—at least to provide for a note of the owner, where he consents even where his title is registered. At the moment, we are in a slightly ludicrous position, though I know that this would be hardly the right Bill in which to amend the Land Registration Acts. In so far as it is possible, I hope that we can get the fact known that these people are owners.

    I speak again by leave of the House. I appreciate the point which the hon. Member has made.

    In view of the fact that the Minister nodded twice, I gather that he is in agreement with me, although he will not admit it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 5—(Notification Of, And Objections To, Registration)

    I beg to move, Amendment No. 13, Clause 5, in page 3, line 34, to leave out "of the registration" and to insert

    "specified under subsection (6) of the last preceding section".
    Subsection (2) deals with the period during which objections to any matter which has been registered should be made. It provides that objection to any registration under Clause 4 may be made in such a period as will not be
    "less than two years after the date of the registration, as may be prescribed."
    We touched on this point briefly in Committee.

    The difficulty is that registration may take place, at any time, quite informally, and there will be a great variation in the times when a person or a commoner or an alleged commoner seeks to register his claim. It is difficult for people to know the time within which they have to bring forward their objections. We therefore seek a more certain date, and the only certain date which appears to be available is that provided for in Clause 4(6)—the time which the Minister prescribes after which no longer shall registration be possible. This is a known time, which could be varied according to the type of right which is to be registered, and which is easily ascertainable.

    How can a person who wishes to object to something being registered find out exactly how much time he has without going to the inspector and working it out in that way? It is much simpler to have a whole series of objections tied to a specific date which will be prescribed by the Minister under the provisions of Clause 4(6). I hope that the Minister thinks this right, will indicate so and will accept the Amendment.

    We very much sympathise with the purpose of the Amendment and we shall ensure that by the publicity and advertising at all levels we do all that we can in every way to bring home to all those who think they have any rights the period in which they must claim their rights or lodge their objections. That is fundamental to the success of this part of the Bill.

    But there is a fundamental objection to doing what the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) suggests, because it goes very much against the other exhortations which we have heard, particularly from the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins) that we should get the Bill working as quickly as we can. The Amendment would make no registration certain from objection for five years, whereas under my right hon. Friend's proposals this would be the case in less than four years.

    This matter would partly be dealt with in Regulations. May I recapitulate what was said? It was suggested that the registration period should be divided into two periods of 18 months, the first running from 1st January, 1967 to 30th June, 1968. We said that if this period could be started earlier we should do so but that we did not want to be unrealistic in suggesting that that could be done. The second period would run from 1st July, 1968 to 31st December, 1969. After a month or two to allow the registration authority to tidy up the registration, there would be a period of two years for the objections. Those claims which will be registered in the first period—there will be no fee, which is an encouragement—could become final after the 18 months plus two years, which would mean that by the end of that period there would be the second period of registration, and at the end of the total period one would have established all possible claims and all objections.

    10.45 p.m.

    Under the Bill and the regulations as now proposed it will be possible for the majority of the things we want to see registered to be so registered within four years. Acceptance of the Amendment would mean that this could not be achieved in under five years. This would be a great loss. We appreciate the hon. Gentleman's point about objectors having every right and we agree that adequate publicity must be given to the matter.

    Why have the Government chosen the date of registration rather than the date which will be prescribed under Clause 4(6)?

    The point that worries me on this matter is that one might have a situation in which there is a running period, so to speak, for objections. In other words, one may have a claim to a right of common made by "A" very early in the period and the objection period will run out, say, two years after that date of registration. But later in that two-year period one may get a claim to a right made by "B", whose right cannot be settled because the objection period will run on further—yet the two rights, if they are relevant to the same common, may not be able to be sorted out by the commissioners unless the two are held together.

    I am concerned lest we may have a situation in which, because of taking this date—producing, therefore, a running period, so to speak; the two years from the date of each individual registration—someone who goes to all the trouble of objecting may be called back to give evidence in a later claim because another claim in respect of the same common is so interwoven that the two cannot be decided separately.

    Despite the Parliamentary Secretary's laudible desire for speed, he may get himself into a situation in which the old adage, "More haste, less speed", will apply. I hope that he and his right hon. Friend will think about the matter further. If he cannot accept the Amendment or alter the Bill now, I imagine that something could be put into the regulations to ensure that the Commons Commissioners are able to deal with the problem I have raised, when it is likely that they will have to consider substantially the same issues on another claim relating to the same common.

    I assure hon. Gentlemen opposite that my right hon. Friend will look at this point again. We have had a number of consultations with the interested bodies concerned and this point has not been put to us. Perhaps it is because of the rather late hour that I have not completely understood the point about another objection arising, as explained by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield), but I assure him that we will look into the matter again after studying his remarks in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I can only add that, at present, we do not envisage any great difficulty.

    It is with a heavy heart that, in due course, I shall ask the leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment. I am tempted at this stage, in view of the totally unsatisfactory reply of the Parliamentary Secretary, to call out the troops, telephone White's and Boodle's and divide the House. That is tempting, particularly since the hon. Gentleman gave a most extraordinary answer. When I ask him why the Government had chosen as their linchpin the date of registration rather than the date to be prescribed in Clause 4(6), he merely replied that the date selected was more convenient, yet he gave no reason why it was more convenient. It seems to us more convenient to have the fixed date.

    The Parliamentary Secretary spoke about publicity being given to the matter. We agree with that. The publicity must be imaginative, but it will be difficult to publicise the individual dates of registration so that people will know exactly how long they have in which to lodge an objection. Despite the hon. Gentleman's unsatisfactory reply, I crave leave, reluctantly, to withdraw the Amendment.

    The hon. Gentleman has, with a heavy heart, asked the leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    And I beg to move—with a light heart in the certain knowledge of what the Minister will do about it—Amendment No. 14, Clause 5, page 4, line 2, to leave out "or" and to insert "and to any person".

    This point was discussed briefly in the Committee, when the Minister said that he would see whether there was a point of substance involved, as we firmly believe there is. Our intention is to make quite certain that if there should be, as there may well be, two claimants in the same registration claim, both shall be notified. I do not need to go into the various combinations one could have in this respect—I see the Minister nodding his head. I am sure that all my hon. Friends are extremely conversant with the position. We want to make quite certain that all concerned know just what is going on. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not want any ambiguity, or to be in a position later of having an incomplete Bill, leaving some people without knowledge of what is happening. I hope that the Minister will let sweet reasonableness prevail.

    This will be a thoroughly satisfactory answer, because we propose to accept the Amendment. It carries out what has always been the intention, which we thought had been adequately provided for. The Amendment makes the intention absolutely clear by providing that objections shall be sent not only to applicants but to those who are noted but not necessarily registered. Many people may be interested in a particular claim; the first will be registered, and the rest will be notified. The intention is that all the objections shall be notified.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 15, Clause 5, page 4, line 6, to leave out from "made" to the second "the" and to insert "by a local authority".

    This Amendment was originally tabled because I thought that in the Interpretation Act the words "any person" meant only ordinary persons and incorporated bodies. It has since been brought to my attention that it also covers unincorporated bodies. That, however, does not undermine the point of the Amendment because, as I understand it, subsection (5) is designed to provide that where registration is made other than on an application, one is concerned with the word "application." Presumably, it refers back to Clause 4(2), where a local authority, without having an application may effect a registration. If that be so, it seems to me that it can be done only by the local authority; and that the words "by a local authority" would be very much beta than the words "of any person." I still think that the Amendment is an improvement in terms both of clarity and of English.

    I am sorry to have to slip back into unsatisfactory answers again. We have considerable sympathy with the point which has been made. As the hon. Member fairly said, "person" under Clause 19 of the Interpretation Act covers both incorporated and unincorporated bodies, but the only local authorities we are concerned with here are the registration authorities.

    There are two cases where provision ought to be made for them to act. There is the case where they are requested to register common rights but the common has not been put on the register. There is the other case where, despite there being no application by anyone for registration of the common or green, the registration authority takes the view that that common or green should be on the register and it is in a position to deal with subsequent stages of procedure. Our advice is—and we have looked at this carefully—that the Amendment would throw a great deal of confusion on the wording of Clause 5 and might lead to doubt as to whether, or not registration authorities could hear objections if they were the applicant for registration.

    For these reasons I must advise the House not to accept the Amendment.

    The hon. Member's advisers, like the ghost parson, seem to find doubts under their beds. It seems incredible that there should be any doubt about this, but it is not a matter on which we should spend a great deal of time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 6—(Disposal Of Disputed Claims)

    I beg to move Amendment No. 17, Clause 6, in page 4, line 31, to leave out from "and" to the end of line 38 and to insert:

    "if no appeal is brought against the confirmation or refusal, the registration shall, if it is confirmed, become final, and if it is refused, become void, at the end of the period during which such an appeal could have been brought; but if no appeal is brought, the registration shall not become final until the date on which the appeal is finally disposed of, and the registration shall have effect in accordance with the direction of the court".
    This is a straight redrafting. I submit the Amendment because I suggest that the Clause as drafted could hardly be clumsier, particularly in the latter part:
    "and the registration shall, if it is confirmed, become final, and, if the confirmation is refused, become void—
  • (a) if no appeal is brought against the confirmation or refusal, at the end of the period during which such an appeal could have been brought;
  • (b) if such an appeal is brought, when it is finally disposed of."
  • I suggest that my drafting is very much better. If not, despite the doubts under the bed, I hope we shall be told why it is not.

    We are obliged to the hon. Member for his gallant attempt, but I am sorry to tell him that it has a flaw. The flaw is that the last words of the Amendment do not make any provision for the case in which the court makes a registration void, in other words, upsets the decision of the Commons Commissioner by making the registration void.

    The Clause is a little difficult to follow, but it is not easy to express this provision accurately without some difficulty. I must disappoint the hon. Member as his attempt fails because it does not cover the case where the court makes a registration void.

    This is not just a case of doubts under the bed but of dreams as well, because here we have clearly set out:

    "with the direction of the court."
    This is very common form. In the Town and Country Planning Act we have this sort of thing where the Lands Tribunal deals with a claim to purchase in advance and so on. I cannot accept that this is something which is not dealt with elsewhere. The whole object of the court is to give an opportunity of declaring void as well as confirming a registration. I do not call this a very good explanation. I hope that the dreams may develop into nightmares and that we shall have a better answer, because the answer given so far does not make sense.

    An attempt to improve Government drafting seems to fail. Is it your pleasure the Amendment be withdrawn?

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 8—(Vesting Of Unclaimed Land)

    11.0 p.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 18, Clause 8, in page 5, line 47, at the end to insert:

    Provided that where, subsequent to the vesting of land in a rural district council in accordance with paragraph (b) of this subsection, a parish council is constituted for the parish within which the land is situated, the said rural district council shall, unless the land is regulated by a scheme under the Commons Act 1899, forthwith vest the land in the said parish council.
    If I may translate this provision into my own language, it is really the right of a parish council to take a village green from a rural district council. This may be desired because of the introduction of a new parish or possibly because of a revised parish council. It may be that there are many lapsed parish councils, and possibly through new vigour, a lapsed parish council may be revived.

    In both these cases, they should have the right to own and manage their own village green or small common. It has been said that there are about 3,500 parishes without parish councils, but I am glad that this number is declining. The Amendment is important because important principles are at stake. Smaller villages with parish councils should look after their own affairs, or at least part of their own affairs. Among these the village green is very important.

    These rights and powers are rapidly being shorn from village communities. We cannot go into arguments about local government reform. That would be ruled out of order, as would the question of grouping parishes into other units, but everyone, I am sure agrees that in some cases, powers have to be withdrawn from parish councils and handed over to rural district councils. But I do not think this is true of village greens. The parish council should have the right to own and manage this important part of village life. It is right that even if parish councils have lapsed, and these rights have lapsed, they should be returned, if it is desired, to parish councils.

    Village greens are a heritage which are passed on to us and they should be maintained. I hope that all villages will stir themselves to life. Perhaps this Bill will remind them of the importance of village greens and that they will seize the opportunity to hold on to something which can play a part in maintaining village life. It is not only a right. It is highly desirable that a small parish council should take a real and active interest in its common. The village green should be the focal point of a village.

    Parish councils should seek to preserve the amenities of the green. These are amenities for sport, for playing cricket and football. Many of us learned to play our games on village greens. Children can play there without being interfered with by traffic, and the pensioner can take a walk in comfort and safety. The green is very important for courting, too. I well remember my courting days on the village green. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am glad to note that I have the House with me at least on this. We must preserve the village green not only for these, whether we call them courting or sporting rights, but also for villagers to graze cows or donkeys.

    A village should take pride in its green. Some do. I hope the Bill will stir to life those which do not. A village should be prepared to spend money and use voluntary effort to keep the green trim and tidy. None of these interests will be maintained if the land is vested in another authority. We cannot afford to lose this focal point of the village and the interest in it. I hope that, because of all its benefits, this right will be preserved by the parish councils. I hope also that the planning authorities in the new areas will make provision always for the village green. I hope that new parish councils will not only obtain these rights but will gladly bear the responsibilities of them. I humbly submit that in this case responsibility at parish level is more suitable than at rural district council level.

    I am not sure whether the right of courting is a right of common, or of profit or perhaps of easement. However that may be, I suggest that the Amendment is very much in line with what the Minister is anxious to do in subsection (5, c) which is, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, such as a scheme under the 1899 Act, to make the parish council the primary local authority. It is consistent with this that where there is no parish council but one comes into being the common should vest in the new parish council. I know that the Minister has to put this to council associations which unfortunately spend a great deal of time trying to cut each other's throats. I hope that any jealousy between parish council associations, rural district council associations and county council associations will not prevent the Minister accepting the Amendment.

    As I listened to the hon. Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) I wondered whether he was going to move a manuscript Amendment to some of the definition Clauses in the later part of the Bill. The effect of his Amendment is that where in future a parish council is created and the village green has been vested in the rural district council it should go to the parish council. I hope that it will be realised that when we say that we are sympathetic that is not a hollow phrase, because, as the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) has pointed out, subsection (5,c) makes this the dominating principle where the parish council still exists.

    There are snags, however, with the proposal in the Amendment. First, some representations have been made to me in the opposite direction. There are those who think that in general greens are better looked after by the larger authorities. This may be true in some cases and not true in others. Like the hon. Member for Torrington, I hope that the Bill will stimulate parish councils. Where a rural district council has had entrusted to it a village green and has expended money to provide a pavilion and things of that kind there may be some reluctance to transfer the green at a later stage to a parish council. It is easier to do this when the land is unclaimed and one makes a decision to which authority it goes. The suggestion has also been made that if a rural district council thought that it was going to lose a village green vested in it, the council might be more reluctant to take steps to look after it now.

    My right hon. Friend is sympathetic, because it is a guiding principle, and what he would like to do is this. First of all, on completion of the registration stage, we shall be able to see how many of these unclaimed greens there are and how many parish councils have been created to which the Amendment would apply. I can give an undertaking that, when the facts are known consequent upon registration, at the second stage of registration my right hon. Friend will see whether it is necessary, in his view, to meet the purpose of the Amendment. He is sympathetic, but he would like more time before making a decision in a matter which is not altogether free from snags.

    I support the Amendment. I had the privilege of serving the parish councils' association for some time as its legal adviser, and it survived that. The Amendment offers a way of making a definite step which would assist parish councils. Parish councils are as nearly a perfect a form of democracy as one could have. They are a classic example of democracy, in fact, because the council is answerable each year to the whole village, and it is precisely the sort of body which ought to deal with village greens. We are all glad to know that, by and large, this is the state of affairs wherever there is a parish council, and I cannot accept what the Parliamentary Secretary has said about the difficulty of handing a village green back from a rural district council to a parish council.

    Thank goodness, parish councils are not, generally speaking, at war with the rural district councils, so there should not be any difficulty. The fact that some money has been spent by the rural district council should not make any great difference. The money will have come from rates which the particular parish council has contributed to, and I do not accept that the objections to the Amendment raised by the hon. Gentleman have any real force.

    However, we take some comfort from what the Minister said about the next stage of registration and the possibility that the position may be rectified then, after further consultation with the National Association of Parish Councils. We are glad to know that the Government Front Bench take the attitude they do towards parish councils generally.

    I am sorry that the Minister cannot accept the Amendment. I hope that it does not mean that he does not accept in principle what I have been saying and he does not accept the activities on the village green. However, I gather than he is sympathetic, and I am glad that it is hoped to do something later on. In the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 11—(Exemption From Registration)

    I beg to move Amendment No. 23, Clause 11, in page 6, line 23, to leave out from "prescribed" to the end of line 26.

    I suggest that with this we should discuss the following further Amendments, all in Clause 11: Amendment No. 24, in page 6, line 24, to leave out "and".

    Amendment No. 25, in page 6, line 26, at the end to insert:
    "and the Registration Authority shall cause to be inserted in at least one newspaper circulating in the district an advertisement of the Minister's intention to make the Order, stating the place where the application can be inspected, and the address to which, within a period to be specified (not less than thirty days) objections to the making of the order are to be sent".
    Amendment No. 26, in page 6, line 28, to leave out, "it appears to him".

    Amendment No. 27, in page 6, line 29, to leave out "that".

    Amendment No. 28, in page 6, line 34, to leave out paragraph (b) and to insert:
    (b) after affording to any person submitting to the Registration Authority an objection to the making of the order within the period specified in the last preceding subsection, the opportunity of being heard by a person appointee by the Minister, and considering the report of that person he is satisfied that no rights of common have been exercised over the land for at least thirty years, and that the owner of the land is known.
    Amendment No. 29, in page 6, line 36, at the end to insert:
    (4) The person appointed to hear objections in accordance with the last preceding subsection may, if the Chief Commons Commissioner agrees, be one of the Commons Commissioners appointed under section 17 of this Act.
    Amendment No. 30, in page 6, line 37, to leave out subsection (4) and to insert:
    (4) The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority and to such other local authorities as may be prescribed, and shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application; and those authorities shall take such steps as may be prescribed for informing the public of the application and its grant or refusal.
    I shall select for decision the Government Amendment No. 30, and I include for discussion at the same time the Amendment to it in the name of the hon. Member for Rye (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine), after the second "shall" to insert, "in due course".

    The effect of Amendments No. 23 and 30 will be to oblige the Minister to send copies of applications for exemption to the relevant registration authorities and to each other local authority as may be necessary, and he will be enabled to provide by regulations for full publicity to be given to applications for exemption and to the rejection of an application for an order.

    When the Clause was debated in Committee, the Opposition stressed the need to give full prior publicity in respect of applications for exemption, and my right hon. Friend entirely agreed with that view. It is important to give everyone an opportunity to make representations beforehand and for these to be taken into account before a decision is reached. As the Bill stands now, potential objectors will be put on their guard by the Minister's advertisements in the London Gazette, which not everyone reads, and also in the local Press. These advertisements will be inserted before registration is started.

    It is true that, even where there are local newspapers, these are not always an extremely good medium, although, in my view, people read their local papers more comprehensively and thoroughly than they read the national Press. But all commoners, for instance, who may wish to establish their rights will read even the local papers, and a notice on the parish board will be even more effective. By the Amendment, we shall require district councils not only to make available copies of the applications for exemption but also of the Minister's advertisements as well.

    11.15 p.m.

    This will follow the general procedure which we have suggested in other parts of the Bill. We also think it is very important—and we agree with the Opposition on this and there has been no dispute on this matter—to let everyone know when an application is refused, because this refusal will be the result of objections made to the Minister. We think, on reflection, that it is necessary to notify the objectors of the Minister's determination.

    I do not for a moment want to oppose the Amendment, but I want to point out that the purpose of the series of Amendments in my name and those of my hon. Friends is to ensure the same result. It is to write it into the Bill instead of the regulations that there will be publicity. This would give an opportunity for anybody who can claim that his particular bit of land is not included in the common or forest under subsection (1) or that this particular area should not apply, to make written representations, if there is not a formal hearing in the normal sense of the Local Government Act. I was not quite certain that the Parliamentary Secretary covered this point.

    It seemed to us that, in view of the fact that these issues will be similar to those which the Commons Commissioners will consider under other provisions of this Bill, it might be useful for the Minister to use one of the Commons Commissioners to hear this issue, subject of course to the consent of the Chief Commons Commissioner whose prime duty must be to ensure that his Commissioners are available for the other hearings for which they are provided under the Bill.

    If I may come to Amendment No. 30, and touch upon the Amendment to it in the name of the hon. Member for Rye (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine) and myself, I think it is fairly clear what its purpose is, and I hope that the Minister will accept it. As his Amendment reads at the moment the new subsection (4) would read
    "The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority" etc.
    and then
    "and shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application."
    In other words, before dealing with it he has to tell them how he has dealt with it, rather on the principle of the parson under the bed who did not exist. I would suggest that with a very small insertion, which we suggest, the point is made quite clear.

    Possibly the best answer would have been a semi-colon after the word "prescribed", but there are certain difficulties in drafting an Amendment to insert a semi-colon, and it seemed that the better answer was after "shall" to insert "in due course" to make it quite clear that it is a later operation which the Minister has in mind, and so that it does not appear to be a contradiction in terms.

    This Amendment does improve the drafting, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman can give the assurance that anyone with an objection will have an opportunity to make representations and to have them considered.

    I should like to support the Amendment to add the words "in due course" to the Minister's Amendment No. 30. I found the subsection very hard to understand until I puzzled out that there must be two separate stages, so I hope that that clarification will be accepted.

    May I also ask the Minister, when he is prescribing the methods of advertisement that should be undertaken, to go rather more widely than the local Press? Acres of advertisements have to be inserted in the local Press under some statutory requirement or other, and it is fair to say that, although the law may be satisfied, very few people read those advertisements except inadvertently when they are looking for details of sales or for forthcoming attractions at the local cinema.

    What catches the attention is a notice which is actually affixed to the land in question. That is certainly true of railway closures. One can advertise as much as one likes, but a proposal to close a railway affixed to the railway station itself catches one's attention. Likewise, if a common or alleged common is to be the subject of an inquiry, putting the subject-matter on a board in a prominent place on the common and directing anyone interested to the local authority will, I think, result in the effect which we all want.

    I feel very much more strongly about the complete nonsense of Amendment No. 30 than my hon. Friends who have already spoken. It really does not make sense when one reads it.

    May I go back to what was originally in Clause 11, subsection (2)? In that subsection, the public was given the right to see an application before the Minister started to deal with it. That will be taken out, I assume, by the Minister's Amendment No. 23, and the only words put in its place are those contained in the last two lines of Amendment No. 30, which read:
    "and those authorities shall take such steps as may be prescribed for informing the public of the application and its grant or refusal."
    The common sense reading of that is that they inform the public that an application has been made and it has been granted or refused. There are not to be two separate publications of the application and the grant or refusal. If it means separate publications, it should say so in the Amendment, otherwise the public will not have the opportunity to see the application before the Minister has dealt with it.

    Going back to the beginning Amendment No. 30, that provides:
    "The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority".
    It is quite clear that the words "before dealing" apply also to the third line of the Amendment, and that, before dealing with the application, the Minister
    "shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application".
    Really, it is complete nonsense. Before dealing with it, he is going to tell them whether he has granted or refused it. Surely the right procedure is already contained in subsection (2), where the Minister tells the local authorities about the application, the local authorities are bound to advertise it or make it available to the public, the Minister then deals with it, he then informs the local authorities whether he has granted or refused it, and they then publish that fact. That is the order of things, surely. However, it is not the order of things in Amendment No. 30, because that puts them exactly the other way round. It stands the Minister on his head. It will confuse the local authorities completely, and it really is a shocking bit of drafting.

    I am surprised that that interpretation has been put on the Amendment by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) and the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page), because it was most carefully drafted. While the two hon. Members were making their speeches, I tried to interpret it in the way that has been suggested, and I failed to do so. Had the meaning of the Amendment been as suggested by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South, the words "before dealing with any application" would have been put at the beginning so as to govern the whole Amendment. But that is not the case. Certainly we will look at the wording again, but I am quite unable to give it the interpretation suggested by the two hon. Members.

    We were asked about representations in writing. I think that it would be possible to do that. We have considered the possibility of dealing with objections by means of a Commons Commissioner. On the whole, we have come to the view that it is much better that at this stage the matter should be dealt with by the Minister with the resources of his Department. For one thing, the Commons Commissioners are not likely to be appointed until the end of the first registration period, and unless we take steps to appoint a number earlier, at additional expense, they will not be there. It seems to us that these are matters with which the Minister and his staff can properly deal, and so we do not feel inclined to meet the hon. Gentleman on that point at this stage.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Further Amendment No. 30 made: Clause 11, in page 6, line 37, leave out subsection (4) and insert:

    (4) The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority and to such other local authorities as may be prescribed, and shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application; and those authorities shall take such steps as may be prescribed for informing the public of the application and its grant or refusal.—[Mr. Skeffington.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 31, Clause 11, in page 6, line 44, to leave out "decided by the Minister" and to insert:

    "a Commons Commissioner who shall, after the Registration Authority have given such notices as may be prescribed, inquire into and decide upon the matter; and section 18 of this Act shall apply".
    This is another suggestion that the issue raised in subsection (5) would seem to be a matter much more suitably dealt with by a Commons Commissioner than the Minister. I was surprised at the reference by the Parliamentary Secretary on the last Amendment to "the resources of the Department". What are they? Has the Minister a team of inspectors to hold inquiries, like the Ministry of Housing and Local Government? Is he empowered, like the Minister of Transport, to employ them from outside? Has he a panel of inspectors? If so, who sets it up—the Minister or the Lord Chancellor? It is glib to say that the Minister has these resources. The last time we questioned the Minister about his staff, he had taken on only some administrative officers from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, some from the Ministry of Agriculture and some experts on trees. As far as we know, he has no strength of inspectors.

    I suggest that our suggestion is worthy of serious consideration, not only to relieve the work on the Minister's hard-pressed staff who have none of these people to assist them but, more important, because this is a judicial issue. The Clause states:
    "If any question arises under this Act whether any land is part of the forests mentioned in subsection (1) … it shall be referred to and decided".
    This is essentially something to be decided in the same framework as the other decisions which have to be made of a judicial nature relating to the rights or status of common land. This is a question of status just as other questions of status arise in relation to common land or town or village greens. I suggest that in procedure and administration this is an improvement on the provisions in the Bill.

    The Amendment would require the Minister to arrange a hearing whatever objection was made to an application for exemption. It is suggested that the person appointed by the Minister should be a Commons Commissioner. It seems to us that the Amendment makes very heavy weather of a fairly simple matter. We do not think it desirable or necessary that a formal hearing should be arranged when an objection is made. I will explain why.

    11.30 p.m.

    It is expected that most of these cases will be open and shut—that they will be cases for exemption which have to meet the statutory requirements set out in the Bill. If there are any doubts, the Minister will refer the matter to be dealt with at a later stage and will not grant the exemption. Only when it is clear beyond peradventure that an exemption meets the conditions laid down in the Bill will he be able to issue his final authority to that effect.

    My right hon. Friend will, of course, as we have indicated, whenever there is an application for an exemption, give it publicity in the normal way in the London Gazette and in newspapers circulating in the vicinity of the land concerned. These advertisements will not only define the nature of the land and the exemption sought but will enable objections to be sent to the Department from any people who wish to do so. The advertisements will also specify the time limit for objections and, incidentally, will state where, in the offices of the local registration authority copies of the application may be inspected. Thus, people will not have to come to London to inspect the documents.

    An additional reason for resisting the Amendment is that it is not our intention to appoint Commissioners at this early stage and, therefore, the combination of the advertisements, access to the documents locally and the opportunity for objectors to submit objections provides a convenient administrative way of dealing with the matter.

    I give an undertaking that, if there is any doubt that an exemption does not qualify under the two loops in the Bill, the Minister will refer the matter for decision at a later stage and will not grant the exemption. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman will not feel it necessary to press the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 13—(Amendment Of Registers)

    Amendment made: In page 7, line 25, after "are", insert "varied or".—[ Mr. Skeffington.]

    Clause 15—(Quantification Of Certain Grazing Rights)

    Amendments made: In page 8, line 2, leave out from "number" to end of line 3.

    In page 8, line 7, at end insert:

    (3) When the registration of such a right has become final the right shall accordingly be exercisable in relation to animals not exceeding the number or numbers registered or such other number or numbers as Parliament may hereafter determine.—[Mr. Skeffington.]

    Clause 16—(Disregard Of Certain Interruptions In Prescriptive Claims To Rights Of Common)

    I beg to move Amendment No. 37, Clause 16, in page 8, line 19, to leave out "and".

    It would be convenient to discuss at the same time the following Amendment, No. 38, standing in the name of the hon. Gentleman and the names of some of his hon. Friends, Clause 16, in page 8, line 21, at end insert:

    "and
    (iii) in determining, in the case of a right of common in gross, whether the evidence justifies the presumption of a lost modern grant".

    The Amendments are linked, Mr. Speaker. Indeed, the first is a paving Amendment to the second.

    The purpose is to extend the provisions of Clause 16, which is designed to prevent the Prescription Act from running against the commoner when he has had a break in the use of his rights as a result of either animal health matters or his land being requisitioned. This is really only one aspect of a much more general problem.

    The earlier means of establishing many of these rights was the old common law prescription which gradually developed into the fiction of lost modern grants which, in turn, developed into the theory laid down by the Prescription Act. The grants followed relatively long and continuous use. It seems to us that these exemptions should apply whether one is concerned with the Prescription Act or not.

    I have picked out the case of rights of common in gross because the courts have found that rights of common in gross are not covered by the Prescription Act and cannot be established by that Act. They can only be established by provisions in common law—which becomes rarer and rarer because any generally proved grant could not have been made prior to 1198 or whatever the date of official legal memory is.

    Normally, a right in gross would depend upon the fiction of the lost modern grant, and if I may quote again from that admirable book, "Cheshire", it is stated that it is dependent on user as is the establishment of a right under the common law. As "Cheshire" says, 20 years is enough to raise a prescription, but there is nothing rigid. If we look to see where the plea has been successful in recent times, we find nothing less than 40 years; and the user must have been continuous, although I admit the Parliamentary Secretary's point made in Committee that it need not be quite so continuous as the user which is used in evidence under the Prescription Act.

    There is a case for extending the principle, because the Prescription Act is only a development of the basic idea of prescription at common law, as is the idea of the lost modern grant historically and logically, if there is any logic in this rather curious fiction.

    We had a very interesting discussion in Committee on lost modern grant, and the House would not be grateful in any way if I continued the discussion at any length, but it is an interesting point. Gaps in user are not nearly so important in common law or the doctrine of the lost modern grant, and the time factor in prescription has really become important only in the Act of 1832. I hope to give some evidence which I hope the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) will think is conclusive.

    Our view is that this Clause does not need to be extended as he suggests. If prescription under common law or lost modern grant, provided that there has been a 20 years' user at least before an action, is to be taken as the basis for establishing a right, then the case rests on Carr v. Foster, decided in 1842.

    This was an interesting case only 10 years after the new Prescription Act, and the judges in the Appeal Court of that time were not only familiar with the new Statute, but with the earlier law which had decided many of these cases. The Lord Chief Justice of that time and two other judges gave judgment, and Mr. Justice Williams said:
    "Before the statute, in cases relating to common, it was very usual to explain the ceasing to turn on cattle by the fact that there were not, at that time, commonable cattle to turn on. No necessary inference arises from a cesser during two, three, or seven years".
    This case also decided that "interruption" meant an obstruction by some person other than the claimant.

    We take the view that in the light of that judicial dictum which, I think, is a good interpretation of the common law and lost modern grant it would, if pleaded in the courts, make this Amendment unnecessary. Nobody would be likely to lose their rights if there is a 20 years' period before, and they could prove they were not intending to abandon the right to graze their cattle or whatever their right might be.

    I think that this does concern all rights of way. Clearly, as one of the old cases said, one cannot be continually using one's right of way in the same way one continually exercises one's right of grazing. I am perfectly willing to accept the Parliamentary Secretary's interpretation. Neither of us is likely to find a final answer to this, unless it goes to the House of Lords, which seems very unlikely. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 17—(Commons Commissioners And Assessors)

    I beg to move Amendment No. 39, Clause 17, in page 9, line 23, at the end to insert:

    (4) Where an objection before a Commons Commissioner relates to a right, not limited by number, to graze animals or animals of any class, and the person who has registered that right relies upon the exercise of that right during any period subsequent to 21st December 1964, and it appears to the Commons Commissioner that the number of animals grazed upon the common in the exercise of such right during any such period substantially exceeds the number habitually grazed in exercise of the same right before 21st December 1964, then, for the purpose of determining the definite number of animals referred to in section 15(1) of this Act, the Commons Commissioner may disregard any evidence of the exercise of the right during any such period subsequent to 21st December 1964.
    This Amendment goes right back to the debate on Clause 15 and the new Clause which we discussed earlier this evening, because it seems right that one should take precautions to prevent a vast over-stocking which could take place on these farms in order to establish a right, which is going to be so important under the new procedure of quantification, which the right hon. Gentleman is determined to bring in under Clause 15. The words drafted by my hon. and right hon. Friends to be inserted into the Bill say quite clearly that those commoners who have rights on commons and who rely on the exercise of those rights constantly to establish their rights, shall not, after 21st December of last year, be allowed to graze more animals than they had been habitually used to grazing before that period, solely for the purpose of establishing greater rights for the purpose of rights under Clause 15, for quantification purposes.

    The Minister will be aware of the exhaustive discussions we had about this in Committee when my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself pointed out to the right hon. Gentleman that it was quite possible that in the circumstances which are now going to prevail, of a final quantification taking place on registration under Clause 15, it was absolutely essential for those commoners who have rights sans nombre to try to establish the maximum amount in order to be able to get this on to the register. It is possible that in the West Country, as in the North and Wales and elsewhere, the ordinary commoner, the ordinary farmer, seeing the provisions of this Bill, and what he has heard about it, will think that the only way he can be certain of getting the best deal possible is to shove as much stock as he can up on to the moors in order to establish his right.

    At the moment he has this right of sans nombre, and in his view he can put as much stock on as he likes, as long as he puts some up there and maintains or establishes his right, as he has done in the past—and it could well be that he has not had all that many. Having read the announcements in the Press, and having read the Bill, or having been advised by his legal adviser, it could be that he will try to establish a greater quantity than he has been used to grazing over the past years or months, certainly before 21st December, when the Bill was published.

    It is more than probable that a great many people will put a great many types of stock on to these commons to establish for this one purpose. This could happen. There are certainly people in my part of the world, and in other parts too, who could do this. It is a natural consequence of the right hon. Gentleman being so stubborn in refusing to accept the arguments of Clause 15. If he insists on registration before management schemes are brought in, and quantification where rights are sans nombre this increased stocking is the natural corollary. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman is going to be sympathetic and accept this Amendment. Unless he does, the Bill will have a serious effect on the commons, some of which cannot hold or carry much more stock than is there at the moment. It is doubtful whether they can carry as much as is being carried.

    A great deal of anxiety has been caused by the existing provision of the Bill, certainly among welfare societies. The Dartmoor Preservation of Wildlife Society has written to me—and I know that it has written to the right hon. Gentleman, because I have had a copy of the correspondence—expressing great fear about what will happen if the existing provisions go through.

    11.45 p.m.

    I do not pretend that this Amendment deals with all the Society's complaints and those of the other welfare societies—some of them are exaggerated, I admit—but it says that, where a commoner has rights sans nombre for purposes of registration, in assessing the quantification at this stage, the Commissioner should not take into account any amount of stock which is shoved up on to the moors after 21st December last which is in excess of what he used to put up and commonly had done so in periods previous to 21st December, 1964.

    This is an eminently reasonable Amendment. It does not stop the commoner putting anything he likes up there, but it says that when the Commons Commissioner is working out the quantification when there is a dispute—as there is bound to be—he shall not bear in mind any excess quantity than was previously put up there. It will make it easier for the Commissioners if the commoner realises that this is so and this is the Minister's intention. This is the right way of going about this. It is making the best of what the Minister has made a very bad job. That is water under the bridge, unfortunately. These are the criteria which we are trying to bring into the Bill to make it work.

    I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's fears, which he has expressed before, but the Amendment would not be very effective. All it provides is that the Commons Commissioners "may" disregard any evidence of such exercises. That is all. This would not be helpful. The Commons Commissioners may disregard or regard. If the hon. Gentleman had the courage of his convictions, he would have put down an Amendment stronger than this.

    I do not want to throw these words in the Minister's face, but he made the point time and time again in Committee that he turned his face against directing the Commissioner on anything. In trying to co-operate with the right hon. Gentleman—as we have done throughout—we have used the word "may" rather than "shall". The use of this word would make it have great force on those people who will read, if not our debates, at least the new provisions if the Amendment is accepted.

    The hon. Gentleman has fallen into the trap which I set for him. I have made it clear throughout that we are concerned with the registration of rights. This is why the hon. Gentleman cannot go further than he has done in the Amendment. If he had used the word "shall", it would have affected rights. If the hon. Gentleman concedes—as he has conceded—that we are concerned with establishing rights, the most he can do is suggest that the Commons Commissioners "may" disregard the stocking of the common.

    As he anticipated me by saying, the Commons Commissioner will do his best to establish what are the legal rights. As I said to the hon. Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling) we are not putting criteria before the Commons Commissioners. We found it impossible to do so. For this reason also, it would be wrong to put into the Bill something affecting the Commissioner's exercise of his judicial function. This is not acceptable. What one can do, of course—this is different—is to pay regard to the hon. Gentleman's fears. If over-stocking occurs, there are remedies. The remedies ought to be taken.

    The best I can do to allay the hon. Member's fears is to say that this is the sort of thing which ought to be discussed at the meetings which I mentioned when we discussed the first new Clause and the Amendments which went with it. The fact that the claims have to be attested will discourage commoners from making exaggerated claims. But when one is concerned with the Commons Commissioners, here are people performing a judicial function and it would be wrong to try to affect them in this way.

    This is not the time to make a long speech or to elaborate anything which has been said so admirably by the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins). All I would do is to support the hon. Member in his contention. I strongly share his fears about the possible overstocking of the common land as a result of the Bill and, in particular, as a result of Clause 15.

    With respect to the Minister, I believe that the wording of the Amendment has much to commend it. He said that in his view it is not possible to give a directive to the Commissioners but one could give guidance to the Commissioners and, if I dare to read the mind of the hon. Member for Cornwall, North, this is probably what he has in mind. This would give guidance and at least express a caution to the Commissioners which would not otherwise exist. This is important not only for the sake of the animals concerned but for the sake of the commoners and for the sake of the land, too. I do not think that it is a matter which can lightly be dismissed, and I am disappointed that we have not had a more satisfactory and more realistic answer from the Minister.

    I support the Amendment. The Minister appears to think that the Bill compels people to register their rights. In fact, it compels them to register something other than their rights, possibly exceeding their rights; it is the requirement for quantification. Someone having a legal right will feel obliged, if he has to put it in terms of numbers, to graze some cattle in order to justify his argument.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) on the first Amendment referred to commoners who have already come together by agreement, informally, and let out the whole of the common to some other body or person to take all the grazing and pay a rent for it. When that situation arises, as it does, for example, at the Outwoods Cow Pasture, Atherstone, the individual commoners still retain their rights, and in that case we have common rights which are held by 180 owners of ancient messuages in the town. Their interests are represented by shares in the monetary income which is obtained from letting arrangements, made and supervised by an official called the piecemaster and a management committee.

    But these commoners still have individual rights of common pasture appurtenant to their town dwellings. Under the Bill they cannot just say that they have this common right of pasture appurtenant to their dwellings and let it rest there. Instead of registering the simple fact that the dwelling is a dominant tenement carrying a right of common, they have to go further and prove a definite number of animals. How will they justify their case unless they put up animals as soon as they can to fill out their claims?

    It is true that by so doing they may be breaching an informal agreement which they have come to not to exercise their common rights but to take some money in lieu. However, that will not be relevant when they seek to fulfil the requirements of registration. They must show what number of beasts apply to their right of common. I therefore apprehend that some commoners in this sort of situation—not all of them, but certainly some—may wish to get in first and possibly steal a march on their neighbours by placing animals on the common, perhaps resulting in overstocking.

    It appears that this could follow in such districts as Ebbw Vale, where the comparatively few genuine farmers there may be deterred, by the high cost of litigation, from objecting to the large numbers of animals which may be placed on common land to build up registration claims by people who are not bona fide commoners. I hope, therefore, that the Amendment will be accepted, for it would give some guidance, and perhaps justification, to a Commons Commissioner wishing to say, "For the purposes of registration I reject the evidence put before me". He cannot say that it is false evidence because presumably the evidence will prove that the animals have been put on the common. If we give a Commissioner the right to say, "I disregard the evidence for these purposes", we may achieve our aim because advance notice of the power to disregard evidence will discourage people from following a course of practice which, although helping to fill out a legal right, will probably be bad husbandry and be bad for the unfortunate animals which are placed on common land to share the insufficient quantity of grazing.

    I was disappointed at the Minister's answer, particularly since he picked on the word "may" and developed his argument from there. It was wrong for him to do that because we are here dealing solely with commoners who have rights sans nombre.

    As my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) explained, the Minister is saying that this is going beyond establishing legal rights. As the right hon. Gentleman recognised when we were discussing an earlier Amendment, we are dealing with commoners who have rights sans nombre, although he is now saying that the Commons Commissioners will quantify them and limit it down, so to speak. I should have thought that in this case it is only right and proper that the sort of provision contained in the Amendment should be included in the Bill.

    It would appear that the Minister has no real disagreement with my hon. Friends and I. He picked on the word "may", but in a completely different context, and said that it was not a direction to the Commissioners. We agree. It is not such a direction. It would apply where a common is under-grazed as well. Since it seems, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman accepts our case in principle, I trust that he will now accept the Amendment.

    As we have accepted the terms of Clause 15, and that quantification must unfortunately take place, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will realise that there is no disagreement between us on the principle of the Amendment. I trust that he will now look sympathetically at our proposal and will accept that its inclusion in the Measure will help to make it a better Bill.

    12 m.

    My difficulty is twofold. First of all, as I have said, we are not giving guidance to the Commons Commissioners and, in the second place, if one considers the qualifications of the Commons Commissioners one appreciates that we can leave it to their good judgment to weigh the evidence, and that is what one ought to do. The commoners will be advised that inflating a claim in this way is not likely to establish a right.

    Amendment negatived.

    I beg to move Amendment ment No. 40, Clause 17, in page 9, line 30, after the first "direction" to insert:

    "provided that any such modifications shall not result in increasing the costs payable by any party above those which would fall to be paid under the aforementioned rules);"
    Subsection (4) deals with the whole subject of costs, and this Amendment gives the Minister an opportunity to explain what is intended in this regard. We have heard that in other matters it is not proposed, for reasons that have been stated, to give directions to the Commissioner as to how he should perform his functions, and we should now like to hear how the Government see the question of costs being dealt with.

    Is it envisaged that costs shall, as in ordinary county court cases, follow the outcome of the cause, in so far as it is clear cut? If one claimant is successful in his claim to certain commons rights and the other claimant is not, is it suggested that the costs should automatically follow the successful claim? The subsection reads:
    "A Commons Commissioner may order any party to any proceedings before him to pay to any other party to the proceedings any costs incurred by that party in respect of the proceedings …"
    We should like to have that provision explained. The subsection goes on:
    "and any costs so awarded shall be taxed in the county court according to such of the scales prescribed by county court rules for proceedings in the county court as may be directed by the order …"
    How does the Minister envisage the county court scale being fitted into this type of proceeding before the Commons Commissioners, if a man has lost a claim to have, say, 50 cattle on a particular common? The subsection goes on:
    "but subject to any modifications specified in the direction …"
    Those words were included as a result of an Amendment moved in Committee by the right hon. Gentleman. My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) asked whether they did not give too broad a discretion to the Commissioners to award any sort of costs, and this Amendment seeks to modify that discretion so that the Commissioner cannot give more than the county court scale. He would have discretion up to the county court limits, but not beyond. We think that to be a proper and reasonable limitation of his powers. It would seem to be unusual for the Commissioner to be given almost unfettered power with respect to any modification or direction of county court costs.

    In Committee the Minister said that he would consider the point again and that he was concerned about the definition about costs in the Bill and the powers he had conferred on the Commissioner. I shall be interested to hear the results of his consideration, whether he thinks that the Amendment meets the case, or that he proposes to deal with it by regulations or some other means. At the moment the matter is by no means clear.

    I am concerned about the matter of costs. I am afraid that this is the theme in which my main objection to the Bill keeps recurring because it is applicable to practically every aspect of the Bill.

    The requirement to quantify the number of animals at the time of registration must increase the business of the Commissioner. Therefore it must increase the costs of the hearing. If the Commissioner had to decide only on the identity of the claimants, that they had a claim either in respect of their dominant land or through some claim in gross or by deed and so on, these would be all legal issues which can be fairly easily deter-minded; but once he is involved in settling matters which we think are properly matters of management, the amount of time and costs will increase enormously.

    I have a further fear. Registration seems to be a matter between one individual and another. The Commissioner should be determining an individual issue but, as we have seen, also if one has to arrive at quantification that can be done only by judging all claims, not on an individual basis but in relation to all other claims. It will therefore be very difficult for the Commissioner to take the individual claims and objections one by one. He will be bound to join them all together and have one general hearing with many individual claimants as parties. This may result in very heavy costs being awarded against one individual who perhaps through no fault of his may have failed to satisfy the Commissioner on one point about which the claimant felt absolute certainty.

    If only individual claims were being heard the costs would be limited, but if a great many have to be joined together the penalties could be very great. The necessity for quantifying will cause much joining together which otherwise would be unnecessary. I very much hope that the Minister will not hold out a sort of sanction of penal legal costs as a deterrent to claims, because that may have a very unfortunate effect in deterring some commoners from registering rights when clearly they ought to register them without delay.

    As a lawyer I find it difficult to know which does more damage, and which is more ambiguous in trying to maintain some basic guiding light in the assessment of costs, the Clause as drafted by Her Majesty's Government, or the Amendment put forward by Her Majesty's loyal Opposition.

    The only merit at the moment is that the Bill says that costs shall either be referable to the county court scale, or that if no such order be given, thereafter the county court shall make an assessment. I presume that is what the words mean.

    Presumably, the object of the Bill is to refer that matter to well-established legal principles. If that be a principle which the Government have taken care to write into the Bill, the county court scale of taxation is subject in well-defined cases to certain exceptions. For example, if there be a case in a county court for breach of copyright, the county courts, as the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) with his experience at the Bar will know, not only have the power to give punitive damages, but by the same token, inflated costs. Various other matters are exceptions to the well-laid-down scale of costs. So, if we are talking about exceptions, the county court already has them.

    Therefore, the first difficulty in the Clause as drafted is that the Government, having accepted the principle of existing county court procedure as a guiding light, thereafter promptly expresses lack of confidence in it by suggesting that there should be power of defined modification and whatever is said and whatever may have transpired in Committee, this is an unqualified modification in the hands of the Commons Commissioner.

    Either it is right to fetter his discretion by saying that assessment of costs shall be on a county court basis or it is not, and I should have thought that one could not have the best of both worlds. It is either the county court scale, or a matter for his discretion. If one is ready to give, him sole discretion, do not let us pretend that we are being respectable in tying it to county court costs, because we are doing no such thing, but using them as a useful guide.

    So much for the failure of logic in the Government Clause. Having established a principle, they make such wide exceptions as to destroy the principle almost altogether. The objection to the Opposition is that they say, "Yes, we are in favour of this. We think it is an excellent thing to rely on the persuasive precedent of the county court as far as assessment of costs is concerned. We agree that if no order is given, this is a matter for the county court. We agree there should be power for modification, but only in a downward direction."

    They overlook the fact that the county court judge has a discretion. He is bound, save for these exceptional cases, by the scale of costs. There is a ceiling upon what costs a county court judge may give, but there is also a discretion as to how far below that ceiling he will fix the final figure and if that is what the Opposition want to achieve, it is already in the power of the county court and this Amendment is unnecessary, repetitive and totally superfluous. If they are saying that modification shall be downwards only, this already exists. Therefore I would have said, first, that the Government's Clause as drafted breaches the very principle which they seek to perpetuate and, second, that the Opposition are bringing in an Amendment which is not necessary, having regard to the facts.

    12. 15 a.m.

    The hon. Member is thinking of a case where it has been before the court and the judge may order an upward or a downward change in the scale. The Amendment envisages the case where the Commons Commissioner directs the scale on which the costs should be taxed. It will not then go before the court. It will go before the registrar for taxing.

    I appreciate the hon. Member's ecclesiastic, almost Freudian slip in this matter. He knows well and as a practising solicitor knows far better than a member of the Bar that the question of taxing involves enormous powers of scaling downwards. The ceiling is established and references in the Clause to county court costs set what the ceiling will be. I am sure that the hon. Member will agree that the power of discretion which the taxing master has, taking the High Court as an example, is to say to himself, "Do we give the full costs, that is to the ceiling beyond which we may not go, or do we exercise our discretion and for certain reasons go far below that ceiling, either because the case was badly prepared or had no merit or because unnecessary expense was caused?" The discretion is downwards.

    If that is so, the very object which the Amendment tries to achieve is written into the Government's Clause and therefore the Amendment is superfluous. I should have thought that a far better course would have been not to move an Amendment to effect what is already in the Bill but rather to remind the Government of what would be reasonable to give as costs so as not to hit the county court ceiling in circumstances in which even if someone is successful he is not entitled to recover full costs. One should also ask the Government what they have in mind when they talk about modifications and what are the circumstances in which they can see the present ceiling being hit and overtopped, the scale bursting through the roof and reaching the chimney pots.

    This is the question which the Minister should answer. What are the circumstances which he can see where there is litigation, pursuant to the powers in the Bill, in which it would be reasonable for a Commissioner to exercise his discretion to give costs which overtop those laid down normally by the county court. These are the questions which should be asked. This is where the Opposition have failed to ask the relevant questions.

    One tries to follow the hon. Member's late-night logic with care but one finds it spurious logic because it is clear that a modification could be ordered by the Commissioner in an upward direction. The second point on the logic of the approach is that if the Government are wrong and if the Opposition are wrong in the Amendment, we are entitled to ask where is the Liberal Amendment which is right.

    I am asking the Government for a statement of the facts. I assure the hon. Member that there are no pacts as far as we on the Liberal benches are concerned about dividing the House late at night. There is no question of our saying, "You can send your boys home. We shall not ambush you. The three-line Whip is off, and everything will go through on the nod". On the last Amendment, the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins) got up to say how dissatisfied he was with the Minister's reply. This is the preamble to all his speeches in Committee and on Report, but there is not a cheep out of him when the Question is put. I warn the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) not to go home too early. He may find his views put to the vote.

    Will the Minister tell us what is meant by "subject to any modification"? What are the circumstances in which there will be a modification upwards? It is not in point to say that the modifification shall be only downwards. The object of an Opposition is to find out why this provision is here in the first place. In what circumstances should the modification be upward? If the answer is unsatisfactory, it follows that this provision should not be in the Bill at all. The Conservative Opposition are not pressing the Government and probing these questions as one is entitled to expect them to do, even, as the hon. Member for Colchester said, at this late hour.

    The hon. Gentleman talked about late-night logic and the difficulty he had in following it. If he finds the hour late, I sympathise and I applaud his resilience in staying up.

    We are entitled to know in what circumstances the Commissioner would recommend that the well-established costs awardable in the county court should be overtopped so that an unsuccessful applicant would be mulcted of a larger sum of damages than he would be if he were an unsuccessful litigant in the county court. A county court judge is in a far better position to exercise his discretion in these matters than a Commissioner. We must be very careful before giving to someone who is a barrister of seven years standing, however distinguished, greater powers than those which are given to one of Her Majesty's judges.

    I am surprised by the lecture on opposition which we have just had from the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe). In fact, it is he who is not asking the right questions. We raised this matter in Committee, and, no doubt, the hon. Gentleman will spend some of his Summer Recess studying that admirable document, the OFFICIAL REPORT of our proceedings at that stage.

    The problem here is that the Government, having adopted the county court scales as a guide, have at the same time indicated that the power to award costs will be a deterrent to the frivolous or unprepared claim. If costs are to be used for that purpose—it is part of their purpose, to some extent—it is right that the subject should know the maximum scale of costs to which he is likely to be put. If there are to be modifications, it is imperative that they be limited to the downward direction.

    I disagree entirely with the hon. Member for Devon. North that it would be right to give either a county court judge or a commons commissioner complete discretion to use a higher ceiling than is laid down in the county court rules. This is what I seek to prevent. Through our whole system, we endeavour to produce scales of costs which provide the maximum basis of assessment. If that is the general principle, it is wrong to give a junior judicial officer power to raise those costs at his discretion. This is why we submitted this Amendment. In my view it is both a sensible and a responsible Amendment and very much more so than anything that has come from the Liberal benches tonight.

    As far as the Opposition are concerned, I should think that we are about right. Hon. Members will recall that Lord Molson, in another place, moved an Amendment that we should make provision for High Court scale of costs. As it is getting rather late I would economise by accepting the argument of the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) in disposing of this Amendment. I would say to him that I feel no anxiety so far as he is concerned. I think that he has demolished the Amendment.

    This has to be left largely to the discretion of the Commons Commissioner. I do not envisage this being used as a deterrent, but one can think of the complexity of a case, one can think even of the value of the common rights involved, the factors in other words which shall determine the court in exercising such a power. This is a discretion which if exercised is appealable, and I think it is proper that this discretion should be there and I think that it will be properly exercised.

    Order. The hon. Gentleman has exhausted his right to speak.

    On a point of order. I considered that having proposed the Amendment I had a right to speak at the end.

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the Ruling has been given several times this evening that if an hon. Member proposed an Amendment he had the right, without asking leave of the House, to reply to the debate.

    With respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, your predecessor did in fact make the point. He called several of my hon. Friends to order when they asked leave of the House to reply to the debate on Amendments they had proposed. He called to order the Parliamentary Secretary, who also sought leave of the House to reply to a debate when he had himself moved the Amendment which initiated the debate. Has not my hon. Friend the right to reply to the short debate we have already had?

    All I would like to say is that one finds it a little difficult to reconcile what the Minister has said tonight with the doubts he expressed about this Clause in Committee. We have not heard anything about the change in his thought processes which has occurred to make him change his mind.

    This is an unusual power of a discretionary character, and that point seems to have been conceded by the Minister, but he now appears to take an entrenched position and to have hardened his attitude.

    It seems a pity that we cannot have some assurance about this. The Parliamentary Secretary has not exhausted his right to speak on this matter.

    Amendment negatived.

    Clause 19—(Regulations)

    Amendment made: In page 10, line 32, leave out from "act" to "ecclesiastical" in line 33 and insert "with respect to any land or rights belonging to an".

    —[ Mr. Skeffingtond]

    Clause 22—(Interpretation)

    12.30 a.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 46, Clause 2, in page 11, leave out lines 35 to 37.

    These words have a good precedent, but we are obliged to the Law Society for calling our attention to the fact that they might have an unfortunate effect. They pointed out, for instance, that the forecourt to a building containing, say, two fiats each separately owned, half of the forecourt being owned by the owner of each flat, such owners each having the use of the whole forecourt in common, might become common land, as might a private road between two rows of houses, the owner of each house having the ownership of the road fronting his property up to the middle of the road and having the right to use the whole road.

    It is for that reason that I move the present Amendment. I should reassure the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) that, on the other hand, I have received an assurance from the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society, whom we consulted, that they are satisfied with the Amendment.

    I must say that I am fascinated, after all that we have heard about the sanctity of Government draftsmanship, that we would have had a situation where the common entrance to a pair of semi-detached houses was a common and must be registered under the Bill, had it not been for a last-minute Amendment resulting from a suggestion by the Law Society. Perhaps the Law Society are the ghosts under the bed, and not myself.

    Anyhow, we are very happy to assist the right hon. Gentleman and accept his Amendment.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 47, Clause 22, in page 12, line 9, after "common", insert:

    "mean any rights recognised at common law or by the custom of the country as a right of common and".
    It is by no means the first time that a similar type of Amendment has been brought in during the course of the Bill's passage through the House. It was first of all debated in another place, it was referred to in this House on Second Reading, and it was the subject of an Amendment in Committee. That was a much more specific Amendment, which I moved, and all the way through the proceedings on the Bill in the House hon. Members on this side have been anxious to try and preserve as many of the rights of common as possible. Some of us have been slightly surprised that at no stage has there been any interest shown in rights of common by members of the Liberal Party, but now, at the fag-end of the passage of the Bill—

    I have been present through practically the whole debate this evening, so that attack is quite unjustified.

    All I would say is that there are 10 members of the Liberal Party in the House, four of whom represent constituencies where I imagine there are enormous tracts of common land, but not a cheep did we hear from any of them. However, here they are at this late stage making two cheeps for us to put on the record.

    To get back to the facts of the Amendment, what we are trying to do now is something that the Minister is anxious to accept himself. When I proposed an Amendment in Committee, he said that he appreciated and shared my view, and that has been the attitude of the Minister throughout the passage of the Bill. The Minister would very much like to specify in greater detail the rights of common involved. It is a shame that we have only very limited rights of common specified in the Bill. The Amendment would make much clearer what rights of common can be included and registered.

    12.30 a.m.

    I believe that the Minister has been frightened all the way through—I hope he will relent tonight—of specifying in greater detail the rights which may be registered. All the rights which embody the old-fashioned and quaint English words "estover", "pannage" and "turbary" are well known, and they are all recognised at common law. That constitutes the first part of our Amendment.

    I know that the Minister is frightened that if one attempts to specify what rights of common are involved one is in danger of leaving some out. But surely any other rights of common which might be left out are included under the heading of "customs of the country". I noticed that in our first debate at this stage my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) used the phrase "a custom of the country", and I noted with interest that the Minister nodded very vigorously. I am sure that the Minister and every other hon. Member is well acquainted with the phrase. It is frequently used. I am sure that it would cover all the problems.

    There are many customs of the country where there are local rights of common which the phrase would cover. My hon. Friend the Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) drew attention in Committee to the right of common of some of his constituents in Dartmoor Prison to take stone from the moor and break it up. I suppose that that would come under the heading "a custom of the country".

    I believe that the Amendment would cover all the doubts and worries that the Minister has. It still leaves the rights in respect of cattle gates and beast gates which he particularly wanted included. I think that it would solve his problems. No rights of common could slip through my definition. It is important that we should go as far as possible in specifying rights of common so that people will know what they must try to register. Many people enjoying certain rights of common will not realise that they should register them. If the Government will accept the Amendment, I believe that many people will realise that there are rights which they must register which they would not otherwise do.

    It is not a question of asking the Government to relent. What every hon. Member has to do in this very important constitutional matter is to make certain that by any definition that we put in the Bill we are not taking away from people rights which belong to them and may have belonged to people for hundreds of years. Far from establishing that, the Amendment would very severely curtail common rights which exist.

    If the Amendment were accepted, it would define for the purposes of the Bill common rights as rights recognised either at common law or by the custom of the country—whatever that may mean, because there is no possible definition of it and no statutory definition that I can find. We took the view on Second Reading and in Committee that if we attempted to define the Clause by additions or the kind of limitation which the hon. Member suggested we might be robbing large numbers of people of their common rights. The Government do not want to do that, and I am sure that no hon. Member does. It is impossible for us to say that there are not common rights recognised by Statute which are not recognised by common law. If we are asked why the Government cannot say so, the answer is simple. We have not had the chance to search hundreds of Acts of Parliament and perhaps thousands of local Acts. Therefore, it would be wrong at this stage to impose this sort of limitation.

    There is an even more fundamental objection. The definition suggested would not cover the kind of rights of common that arise in circumstances where a piece of common ground is exchanged for another. It frequently happens that, under a statute, a public authority requisitions a piece of common land and substitutes for it a piece of ground elsewhere. There may be on the ground substituted rights of common that would not come under this definition. Thus, whole categories of people with common rights would be excluded.

    Going even further—and this is no academic lawyers' argument—we should have to ask what is meant by common law. Unfortunately, it has a great many meanings. Although this might be of great interest to legal practitioners because cases which might arise could be limitless in number, this is not something that we want to put in the Bill.

    Do we mean by common law the whole body of the law of this country, or common law as it is sometimes defined—the law of the common courts before 1875, the law of the Queen's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Exchequer as opposed to the rules established by courts of equity? Do we mean, by common law, law that is derived from stated cases as opposed to statute law?

    This definition is capable of so many meanings that it would lead to hopeless confusion if it was part of the Bill. We included a special category of cattle gates and beast gates and one or two other cases which are generally regarded as rights of common but about which doubts have been expressed. But we have resisted all attempts at limitation either by definition or by trying to include an exhaustive list of all the possibilities.

    Is it not true to say that, because the word "includes" is used in the interpretation Clause, this is a clear statement by the Government that it is not to be taken as an exclusive interpretation? All the Government are doing is to say that the law is as it is at the moment. There are certain things on one or two matters which it is thought might be outside the definition and we are to say that these matters are to be included and taken into account.

    That is the general point about the definition. I developed this point at some length on Second Reading. If we attempted to produce an exhaustive list we should prejudice some people. If we used the definition in this Amendment, whole categories of rights would be left out. Such definition would be extremely complex because no one really knows what is meant by common law.

    I accept the explanation of the Parliamentary Secretary. It was not the intention to cut down the rights in any way. It was an attempt to put into the Bill some provision following discussion in Committee, when, I think, we all agreed that not only were we anxious to get the law right but as far as possible to make it clear to the sort of person who is likely to be a commoner without his having to find out whether his rights are being cut down.

    Certainly, the words "custom of the country" appear in a number of Agriculture Acts and they have always been possible of interpretation. I am certain that the common law does it. I am also sure that there are common rights created by statute. We are willing to withdraw the Amendment.

    This is not the time to dazzle the Government with a thesis about common law and I prefer not to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    12.45 a.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 48, Clause 22, in page 12, line 15, after "Act" to insert

    "or by or under any private trust or settlement".
    We should like to hear why it is thought necessary that this Amendment should not be made. It was said during the Committee stage that there might be village greens brought about by way of a private trust or settlement. Indeed, there are village greens which have come about in this manner. It would seem right that the definition Clause should provide for that contingency. I could name a possible one in Oxfordshire, and have a statement from a member of the Bar that it is a village green provided by a private trust. Therefore, we think it is necessary to extend "town or village green further than the definition of the land as given in this part of the Bill.

    We have put this Amendment down as being one which we think is necessary.

    I am grateful to the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) for raising this matter again, because it gives an opportunity to clarify the position. His Amendment would bring in a great number of recreation grounds which have not hitherto been thought of as being village greens because they are used almost exclusively for playing games and sports rather than for the activities mentioned by the hon. Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills).

    Village greens and town greens are frequently mentioned in legislation, but have not hitherto been defined. We have in the Bill defined them as pieces of land
    "… for the exercise or recreation of the inhabitants of any locality or on which the inhabitants of any locality have a customary right to indulge in lawful sports and pastimes or on which the inhabitants of any locality have indulged in such sports and pastimes as of right for not less than twenty years".
    Twenty years is the period which follows precedent as in the Rights of Way Act, 1932, as amended by the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, and we think that this will deal by definition with the normal types of town and village green.

    The Amendment would bring in many recreation grounds where organised sports and games were played and these are, of necessity, nearly all held for recreational purposes by charitable trusts, and supervised by the Secretary of State for Education and Science. My right hon. Friend is one of the Charity Commissioners for this purpose and the matter is, therefore, adequately covered. Section 4 of the Open Spaces Act, 1906, states that land can be transferred
    "… to any local authority on such terms as they"
    that is, the trustees and the authority—
    "… may agree, and the local authority shall thenceforth be entitled to hold the same as an open space …"
    This course might be open if there was a degree of community interest and supervision was held to be desirable. I do not think it necessary to bring in all the categories of ground. If they have been used by the inhabitants for twenty years, they will come under the scope of the Bill and be covered in that way. We think that they are adequately covered.

    I am much obliged to the Parliamentary Secretary. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Order for Third Reading read.—[ Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, the Duchy of Cornwall and the Duchy of Lancaster, signified]

    12.50 a.m.

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

    I am sure that the House, and those who took part in our discussions in the Standing Committee, would wish me to thank the Parliamentary Secretary for the great patience that he has shown in allaying the anxieties of the Opposition. I would also like to thank the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) and his colleagues for their pertinacity in endeavouring to improve the Bill. I hope they feel they have had some modest success.

    This is the first Measure to implement the Royal Commission's Report. This Bill is limited in its effect. It does no more than set out to establish the facts. I think fiat we all realise that until the facts are established we cannot go on to the second stage, of providing for the better management and improvement of our commons.

    The commons are very much part of our national heritage, with 1½ million acres still remaining, and I am certain that the Bill will be the first step in seeing that once again they play a vital part in our national life.

    12.52 a.m.

    I certainly do not wish to detain the House. I would probably not carry the back benches opposite with me when I say that I and my hon. Friends and, I believe, the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends, have found a certain fascination in this subject, with its very great historical interest, in a way mirroring the whole social development of our country.

    This is not an easy Bill to understand. We had assumed that the problems that have arisen could give to considerable difficulties. We have seen the clash between the right hon. Gentleman, supported by a large Government Department, and ourselves, supported by rather more agricultural knowledge than perhaps can be seen among hon. Members opposite. However that may be, I do not think that it has been an entirely uneven argument. I am a little disappointed with the right hon. Gentleman's timidity in accepting drafting improvements on advice that he has not very often been able to amplify in such detail as to enable us to judge its soundness.

    However, we are all satisfied that the right hon. Gentleman's intentions are honourable. We hope that they are not leading to the place where the old adage says they go to, and that he will not be daunted by the difficulties in formulating what he wants, or persuading his Parliamentary draftsmen to draft his requirements according to his liking. We wish his enterprise well.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

    Patents (Employees' Inventions) Bill Lords

    Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [ 23rd July], That the Bill be now read a Second time.

    Question again proposed.

    12.54 a.m.

    It will be in the memory of the House that I had just risen to my feet last week, during a very brief debate which had lasted perhaps 25 minutes, on the Second Reading of the Bill. I am sorry that the House needs to be detained longer, so I will try to be as brief as possible at this hour.

    It must be said that it is a strange position when the Government are so insistent in trying to rush this Bill through this Session, although there are apparently quite a number of other highly important Measures which they are concerned about. In so doing, they have neglected to consult, as I said in my earlier remarks, any of the bodies specifically concerned with the matter of patents, and particularly trade marks designs, or inventions generally.

    The Minister of State, Board of Trade, said that this was a small Bill. It is in length, but it is quite considerable in some of its implications; and because some of its implications are not quite as simple as is generally considered, I want, if I may to pose a few questions to the Minister before we leave the Second Reading.

    In his speech the Minister referred, particularly in the matter of apportionments, to the particular phrase "as may be just". We all understand this, but in leaving this to the courts there are a number of worries and considerations because completely new principles are involved. Some people think that there should be some criteria in the Bill by which an exact judgment could be made before the case goes to the court. I believe that the Minister of State is aware of this. I wonder whether it would be possible for the Government to do something along these lines when we get to Committee.

    I turn now to the element of retrospection on the Bill. It was said quite definitely in another place that the Bill was not retrospective. I accept that. The Bill sweeps away the action open to an inventor—either an employer or an employee—under Section 56(2) of the 1949 Patents Act. I do not criticise that at the moment. But what is the position of an inventor—an employer or employee—who has not taken action at the moment open to him under that Section on an invention which is already established and to which he would have had rights prior to the passing of the Bill? That action would be open to him normally under the 1949 Act. If the Bill is not to be retrospective, it means that any invention which has been used in the past would not be affected by the operation of this part of the Bill, that is, that it is not retrospective.

    However, what right then has the inventor or the employer to take action on his past inventions? As Section 56(2) is swept away, he is to have no powers at all, unless they be powers under the Bill, and, in those circumstances, the Bill must be retrospective. Because of the assurances in another place, it is extremely important that the Minister of State should clear up this matter. I cannot believe that it is the intention of the Government that an inventor should take action under an Act which they have swept away. That would be a nonsense.

    Is the Bill wide enough to cover joint inventions? I realise that it is wide enough to cover two people or a team of people employed by one employer who are working on the same project, but I should like confirmation of that interpretation—

    I am glad that the Minister of State nods.

    Is it not sense, if we are going as far as we are going in the Bill, that the particular power should be open to an employee and to another person who is not an employee? This happens in the medium sized or smaller businesses, and, in the same way, in the very small businesses, an employee may be working with his employer on an invention. What situation does the Bill cover in that case? It may be that neither of these cases is covered by the Bill, and it might be reasonable and proper if these points were covered by the Government themselves in Committee.

    I come to a technical point. There is some concern about the exception by Clause 1(2) from the operation of Clause 1. It reads:
    "This section shall not affect the operation of any agreement between them expressly providing for the allocation of that benefit".
    It is suggested—it seems to me with some force—that these words would not break a service agreement or contract of employment because such a document signed at the commencement of employment—and this is a normal procedure—could at best refer to possible future inventions, but it is most unlikely that it would be expressly allocating the benefit referred to in the Clause, which is the benefit in a specific invention made by the employee. I should like to know what is the exact intention of the Bill.

    If service agreements entered into are anticipatory of future inventions, are they not excluded by the operation of Clause 1(1)? If that is so, it puts industry in a strange position whereby it is perhaps possible that a new contract would have to be entered into for every specific invention which any team of persons working in research might be about to make. When one sets a team of people working on new projects they often stumble across a number of ideas, techniques and inventions which were not specifically considered in the immediate project. It seems nonsense to have lawyers rushing around to sign up all the employees on a new contract the moment the employees stumble on something new. That is carrying my example to a slightly absurd level, but I am trying to show the problems which might face certain industrialists, especially those working with many people on new designs and inventions.

    May I turn to the aspect of timing of the Bill? As with previous legislation, there is no statutory limitation to action which might or might not be taken by an employee or an employer. They will be able to take action at any time in the future about any invention in which they may have been involved. I should have thought it particularly important to have a time aspect or statute of limitations, for we are opening up a provision whereby an apportionment of value to an employer or an employee may be decided years after an invention. That would mean that a firm would have to keep exact books of record of every invention which may have occurred where there is no specific settlement so that if the matter comes to court they are able to provide some financial and factual evidence of what apportionment might reasonably be made by any decision of the courts.

    Industry should have the right to know that this application of the Bill will last for only a specific time. My hon. Friends and I have not set a time limitation. Whether it should be seven or 12 years should be open for discussion between the Board of Trade and the experts, such as the Chartered Institute and other bodies. There is every reason for saying that a statutory limitation of this kind should be considered and I am informed that this could be done.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) apologises to the Minister for not being here tonight. She was in her place for the first part of the Second Reading last week, but tonight she has had to go to her constituency. She has asked me to raise two points with the Minister concerning references in another place to the Central Awards Committee about civil servants and dock workers, a subject in which my hon. Friend has a constituency interest.

    My hon. Friend's first question is: are dock workers and civil servants covered by the Bill, or will they receive no greater benefit than that which they get at present? In other words, do the present contracts under which they serve stop them from benefiting from the provisions which apply to ordinary employees? [Interruption.] I realise that some hon. Gentlemen opposite are not worried about the Bill. I assure them that some of us are extremely concerned about it. I am being as brief as I can and I am sorry if some of them find my remarks tedious. My hon. Friend the Member for Devonport has some fears about the Bill. For people working in the docks, trying to do their best, just because they are employed by the State they should still have the same benefits as anybody else.

    My hon. Friend's second question is: will the Minister look into the working of the Central Awards Committee to see whether this cannot be hurried up, because there is no doubt that it is very slow and that there is a certain amount of bad feeling, particularly on the part of those who are working in these services, who feel that they are not being given the consideration which private industry would give to its employees?

    An assurance was given in another place that there would be at least two Amendments tabled to the Bill. When we reach the Committee stage my hon. Friends and I will table some Amendments to follow some of the points which I have raised. However, since the hour is late and while there is a great deal more that I could say, I will curtail my remarks at this stage because many of the other points are more appropriate for the Committee stage. I will only add now that the Government must realise that because of the lack of consultation about the Bill my hon. Friends must attempt to get the Measure right in view of the many years we have been waiting for this legislation to come forward.

    Perhaps it can be reasonably said that my hon. and right hon. Friends are partly to blame for the Measure not having been brought forward earlier. However, we have been waiting for the Bill since 1949, which is a considerable time. In view of the time we have been waiting for it, I cannot believe that there is such urgency now that it must be rushed through, perhaps at an hour as late as this. We must consider the matter further and, in so doing, it might be useful to fall in line with a number of international interpretations which are now being dealt with in connection with the problems of inventions and patents.

    I am sure that I am only reminding the Minister that a congress is being held in Tokyo of the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property, and we might well have been able to tie up with that as well as with the Strasbourg Convention. There are certain aspects of that Convention that are not being taken into the Bill. While we on this side want, in general, to improve this Bill, and are obviously delighted to support it, I would like the Minister to answer the few questions I have posed.

    1.10 a.m.

    With the leave of the House, I should like to answer the points raised. As I said on an earlier occasion, this is a very limited Bill. The wider amendments to the patent law of which the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Peter Emery) has spoken belong to another occasion. Quite clearly, from the aspect of international conventions in particular, our present patent law is very rapidly getting out of date. But we are not rushing this Bill through. As the hon. Gentleman says, this matter has concerned some lawyers, at any rate, for about 10 years. We have merely seized the opportunity to get the law right after the House of Lords decision to which reference has been made.

    As to consultation, because of the limited character of the Measure we went back to the Swan Committee, which recommended what we have since thought was the law. That Committee consulted practically everyone—the list of organisations which made representations to it and were consulted is very long. Trade unions, employers, patent lawyers—everyone who had an interest gave evidence. We went back to that evidence, and because of the narrow character of what we were trying to do we did not feel it necessary to ask those people to make the same representations again.

    If the hon. Member thinks that we have not had proper consultation, we can look into that aspect again; but I can assure him that we went over all the representations that had been made. We were merely trying to get the law as we thought it was before the House of Lords decision in the Patchett case—

    I do not want to make a meal of this, but the hon. Gentleman will realise that the consultation with the Swan Committee is now 16 years out of date, and it is no defence to say reference was made to evidence given 16 years ago.

    We were trying to put the law in line with what we thought it to be 10 years ago. Therefore, the point of consultation is covered.

    The hon. Gentleman asked about the criteria put in the Bill to guide the courts and the Comptroller of Patents. These criteria are spelled out, in response to representations in the other place, in subsection (3) of Clause 1. That subsection, which lays down the criteria, is in general accepted to be the right kind of guidance for the courts.

    The hon. Member also spoke of joint inventions. The Bill deals with inventions made by co-employees, as is implicit in subsection (3), but to deal with problems of inventions made by an employee and some third person would, we think, lead to far too many complications. Such cases would be dealt with under the ordinary common law. But we can look at this point again. The criteria are not exhaustive. We have the usual words to say that the court will pay regard to other relevant circumstances, which covers practically everything.

    Retrospection is a very difficult legal point, as the hon. Gentleman will appreciate. The Bill is not retrospective in the sense in which he put it, because it is recognised that there will be many firms which are exploiting inventions made before the Bill will come into force, and the employers have taken into account in their costings all the foreseeable financial claims that may come along. We can discuss the question of retrospection again.

    With regard to service contracts, what we should like would be that in the long run all employees should be covered by a desirable and workable form of contract, rather than that they should get involved in legal proceedings as to what their proper share of an invention or the fruits of an invention may be. The Swan Committee accepted the view that contracts for Civil Service employees were on the whole satisfactory, especially concerning the machinery of the Central Awards Committee. I appreciate the point the hon. Member raised about the time taken before the awards come out. We shall certainly look into that matter. So far as I know, apart from the time factor there are no complaints about machinery for dealing with awards to Civil Service employees.

    That, I think, covers the point raised by the hon. Member on behalf of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) about dockyard employees. They are covered. The hon. Member's fears about the way in which service contracts operate in the matter of inventions are unfounded. The type of standard contract which now applies in the nationalised industries has been built up on the basis of the Civil Service form of contract and works well. There is no need to make a separate contract. Every invention in that regard is covered by the same contract. If necessary we can look at this to see if it is satisfactory.

    The Bill does not specify any time limit, but it applies to two parties. As the hon. Member will see, in Clause 1(4) there is a trust relationship. The ordinary rules applicable to trustees and beneficiaries will apply. Those rules have been developed on sound lines over many years. We see no reason to depart from them to deal with the special case of employees' inventions. If we discuss the matter at great length as I imagine he wishes to do in Committee, I think the hon. Member will find that this arrangement is satisfactory. I have questioned the legal advisers on this point and I am satisfied that the trust relationship will work satisfactorily in the case the hon. Member mentioned.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill accordingly read a Second time.

    Motion made, and question proposed, That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[ Mr. McCann.]

    1.18 a.m.

    There are quite a number of technical points which I have to put to the Minister of State. We on this side of the House are not trying to be difficult, but we feel that it is an impertinence on the part of the Government to suggest that we should deal with these highly technical matters on the Floor of the House at this hour of the night. I should have hoped that we would not have the Committee stage on the Floor of the House, but upstairs, so as to avoid having in the House technical debates which are bound to arise. I do not know whether this matter can be discussed through the usual channels.

    I will not oppose this Motion the Government feel strongly about it, but the technical aspects and legal problems comprise the sort of thing that make it an imposition to ask that the House should deal with it in Committee of the whole House rather than by way of a Standing Committee.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[ Mr. McCann.]

    Committee this day.

    Domiciliary Physiotherapy

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. McCann.]

    1.20 a.m.

    The matter I wish to draw to the attention of the House is that of the physiotherapy treatment of patients in their own homes. I would like to thank the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health for remaining to this late hour to reply to the debate. I have advised the hon. Member of some of the points I wish to raise and I would like to put them as succinctly as possible.

    I wish, first, to refer to the case of a comparatively young man of 45 who suffered a stroke and who at various times during the course of his long illness, was quite unable to attend hospital, partly because of the weather conditions at that time of year and partly because of his general unfitness. He was, nevertheless, able to take a full course of physiotherapy at the hospital, and also got much benefit from physiotherapy in his own home.

    Because of the lack of provision in the National Health Service, to which I shall refer, this home treatment had to be provided by private resources, and had to be paid for. Here, I should like to pay tribute to the Luton Branch of the Royal Air Forces Association and others who met the bill for many months, so that my unfortunate constituent might have the physiotherapy treatment at home. I am sorry to say that he died during the last two or three months, but he enjoyed very much improved mobility over the last few months of his life. I saw him about earlier this year and I am sure that this was because he had been able to have this physiotherapy treatment at home when he was unable to go to hospital.

    This matter was raised at the R.A.F.A. conference at Edinburgh a month or two ago, where a resolution was passed about this which will, no doubt, find its way to the Ministry. I hasten to say that neither my constituent nor have I, any complaint about the hospital, or the consultation or treatment given there. This is merely a matter of the circumstances of a man being unable to go there and obtain treatment because of his state of health and the weather. As an urgent and desperate matter he had treatment from private sources, for which fees were paid, and which was not provided under the National Health Service.

    There is the question of minor injuries where a patient is not ill enough to be hospitalised, but where a course of physiotherapy at home would be very advantageous to make him fit again. I am thinking of broken limbs. No provision is made under the Health Service for payment for outside physiotherapy. This is a considerable gap in the provisions for the benefit of health. The treatment might have been to hospitalise this man for some months. There must have been a considerable saving to the State because he did not go to hospital for any length of time at all. I would have thought it would have been worth while for the State to provide physiotherapy at home in place of hospitalisation at a much higher cost.

    As evidenced by Answers to Questions which I have had in the last few weeks, the trouble is that the Ministry and the executive committees take the line that this treatment is a hospital service. All well and good. The Parliamentary Secretary, in reply to one of my Questions, said that it was a hospital service, but that consultants could give instructions for the physiotherapy treatment to be given at the patient's home in necessitous cases. But the plain fact is that there are no physiotherapists to spare in the hospital to carry out this treatment and we are, therefore, up against the impasse that it cannot be effected and the patient has to go without this domiciliary treatment.

    Hospitals have demands for more Physiotherapists than they can obtain to give treatment inside the hospital, but there are State-registered physiotherapists available under the Act governing services ancillary to medicine and their fees are not excessive. It seems quite proper that such treatment if authorised should be given by these State-registered physiotherapists. There are analogies in the Health Service. Chiropody is one and there are others. It is curious that this domiciliary physiotherapy service should be eliminated from the Health Service scheme.

    There are also many cases—and I do not refer to those where the general practitioner would naturally wish to have the views of the consultant at the hospital—where the general practitioner should be able in his own right to order domiciliary treatment for the benefit of his patient to improve his well-being and make him fit for work again. This is not the situation at the moment. No one except the consultant at the hospital can order physiotherapy either at the hospital or at home. It seems to me that considerable benefit would be obtained if the general practitioner were able to order it to be given in the patient's own home in cases which he approved. The general practitioner has considerable authority and power in many other respects in the National Health Service and I do not see why this power should be denied to him.

    The general practitioner should also be able to order minor personal equipment such as a tripod walking stick. Under the present arrangement such equipment can be authorised only by the hospital consultant.

    I feel very strongly on this matter. Like the subject of many Private Members' Bills and Adjournment debates, this is a point which has come to my notice in a tragic way. I have also met over the years other people who have paid for domiciliary physiotherapy for wives or husbands who are bedridden. They have improved the health of their bedridden relatives by providing this treatment at home at their own expense.

    If this is a matter affecting an enormous number of people it should be put in hand right away. If it is a minor matter from the point of view of the finances of the National Health Service, but not at all minor to the patients in these cases, that surely should not be a stumbling block to the Ministry in bringing it within the provisions of the Service. Either way, it is a matter for urgent action and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will say something of benefit tonight.

    1.30 a.m.

    The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bedfordshire, South (Mr. Cole) has no need to apologise to me at least for raising this matter even though the hour is a little late. He has raised it with his usual courtesy and put the matter very clearly, for which I thank him, for he has rendered a service in spotlighting a problem.

    In practice, there is not a great deal between us. The hon. Gentleman, as I do, wants to ensure, as far as is humanly possible, that the full range of services is given under the National Health Service to everyone in our society. His raising of the matter this morning gives me an opportunity to explain in a little detail the problems with which we are faced in trying to ensure that the fullest and best service is given.

    Let us be quite clear about the present position. The hon. Gentleman may be under some misapprehension about what domiciliary service can be given. A general practitioner can request a domiciliary consultation, and if the consultant, once he has attended the patient at his home, considers that domiciliary physiotherapy is the adequate and proper treatment for him, the consultant himself can see to it that the patient receives domiciliary physiotherapy. I am sure that this is being done in South Bedfordshire, although it is true that, because of various problems at present, it is done largely in urgent cases only.

    I am very sympathetic to the case which the hon. Gentleman mentioned and which he described as urgent and desperate. I do not wish to be thought to imply any criticism either of the general practitioner or of the hospital, but, if what the hon. Gentleman has said is absolutely correct, I think that the service would have been available to that particular patient if the case was so urgent.

    This is quite right in theory, of course, but the hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do that there is a limited source of physiotherapists in our hospitals and they really have not time to spare to go out on visits. It is always a question of trying to get the patient to hospital or of waiting until he is well enough to atttend. The hospitals have a problem, and the consultants know this, so the theory does not really work.

    I was saying that, within certain limitations, this is what applies. It is the desire of the Ministry that every possible effort should be made to see that urgent cases are given domiciliary treatment if that is appropriate.

    There is a problem, as the hon. Gentleman himself says, which we have to face. The problem is really in two parts. First it is a question of the shortage of staff at present. The numbers of the staff that we have are by no means adequate, as the hon. Gentleman says. There has been a slight increase in the number employed in the hospital service in the last year, and our job is to try to create the conditions where we can get an adequacy of physiotherapists working inside the National Health Service. We have tried to do this, and we are trying to do it, by various means.

    But let me put this to the hon. Gentleman. If there is an overall shortage of staff then, obviously, we have to deploy that staff to the best possible advantage. It is no good extending the use of physiotherapists in the domiciliary services, if we find that that method of employment of the staff within the context of the shortage is expensive—not in terms of money but rather of time.

    We find that under the present system, very often if one has got a physiotherapy department attached to a hospital, then one can get treatment on a group basis. I do not say there will not be cases where it is necessary to treat the patient in an individual way, but very often the group basis is found to be to the advantage of the patient. And we have to bear in mind that what we are faced with is the need to give this service to the greatest number of people we possibly can.

    The hon. Gentleman referred to the possibility of using the State-registered physiotherapists who are in private practice in the domiciliary field. Although he referred to a number of analogous services and quoted the case of the chiropodist, I would not accept that there were a number of analogous cases, nor would I accept that the chiropodist is analogous in any way. The fundamental reason, of course, is that the chiropodist does not need to work under medical supervision.

    I want now to deal with the second leg of the problem which we are having to face. There have been changes in concept in the use of physiotherapists in recent years. Recent developments in medicine have had a marked effect on the practice of physiotherapy. In 1962, the Minister's Standing Medical Advisory Committee observed that many patients still asked for massage because it gave a symptomatic comfort at the time of application and they assumed it must be doing some good, but in the long run it was kinder to teach them how to use modern aids to minimise their disabilities.

    They went on to say that it was perhaps noteworthy that hospitals with fuller facilities for rehabilitation made little use of massage. The Committee also found that whilst there had been a marked reduction in the use of massage and electrotherapy there had been a greater increase in the demand for other forms of physiotherapy, notably the modern type of remedial exercises, which are used in all stages of medical rehabilitation in a steadily increasing number of hospital departments and special centres.

    What we feel is essential, because there have been these changes, because there has been a shift of emphasis from massage and heat treatment to various other types of exercises and the use of appliances, is that if we are to use physiotherapy in the proper and most adequate manner, the whole of the treatment should be given in such a way as to be under direct medical supervision all the time. We consider that there should be medical control over physiotherapists, even when they are treating patients on a domiciliary basis.

    As I say, physiotherapists are in short supply, both nationally and in South Bedfordshire. Those available to the National Health Service should be employed where they can do most good. In a hospital, a physiotherapist can be used to the best possible advantage. We do not feel that we can afford to take any action that might well reduce the availability of staff to the hospital service.

    If we start employing State-registered physiotherapists who are in private practice in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests, there may well be, although I do not say that it necessarily follows, a temptation for those people who are wanting to come into the service, or who are likely to come into the service and, indeed, some of those who are in the service at present, to feel that they ought to go into private practice.

    I know that the hon. Gentleman would be the last Member in the House who would want the Government to take any step that was likely to reduce the number of this type of personnel available in the hospitals. I am sure that he will agree with me that, in the normal course of events, one can use the time and great skill of physiotherapists to far better advantage in the hospitals than in domiciliary visits. One wants domiciliary visits where it is not possible or where it is very inconvenient for the patient to go to the hospital, not as an in-patient, because such people are not normally inpatients anyway, but to attend the physiotherapy out-patients' department.

    I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I have looked through the papers searchingly since he raised the question with me, and that this has been the policy of successive Ministers, not merely the present Minister. The hon. Gentleman will probably know that at least three Ministers of Health before the present one have underlined, for the same reasons as we are stating this morning, the need to ensure the adequate supply of physiotherapists in the hospital service and the maximum utilisation of their time and skills, rather than dilute the service by the extension of domiciliary services.

    I agree with the hon. Gentleman that where one has urgent cases and where it is possible to extend the service beyond the urgent cases that have it at present, provided there is medical supervision, that would be extremely desirable. I can assure him that the Minister takes precisely the same attitude as the two or three Ministers before him who have had to face the fact that if we could assure ourselves that we should be able to get a sufficiency of this particular skilled person to enable us to expand the domiciliary service, then we should be only too glad to do it.

    I am very appreciative of the attempt that has been made by the hon. Member to get an extension of the domiciliary service in this field. I cannot accept his argument that there would not be any danger at all in using private practitioners without medical supervision.

    In the sort of cases that we have at the moment the general practitioner would naturally consult the consultant—the position with regard to consultation would be as it is at the moment—but in other cases, especially in minor cases, and also in some major ones, naturally the general practitioner would have a very close liaison with the person giving the physiotherapy.

    I accept that if we had an adequacy of physiotherapists that might well be so, although there is a school of thought that the general practitioner is not necessarily the best judge of what is best in this aspect of the service, and that—this is why at the moment we take the point of view that the general practitioner must call in the consultant—the person who is best able to determine the course of treatment is the consultant himself.

    I hope that the hon. Gentleman will do whatever he possibly can to encourage those who are at present in private practice to come into the National Health Service side. We are doing whatever we possibly can to improve the terms and conditions of service. There was a 9 per cent. pay increase last summer, and there is at present a review going on by the Whitley Council. I pay tribute to the skill and dedication of the people in the service who are working in this field, and I feel sure that those who are at the moment working outside the National Health Service would find a very fruitful place for their services if they would come into it.

    1.48 a.m.

    I should like a few moments to support the hon. Member for Bedfordshire, South (Mr. Cole), who has raised the important question of domiciliary physiotherapy treatment. I do so at this late hour because of the special experience in Coventry of the domestic physiotherapy service which has been provided.

    In Coventry, there is the Coventry and Warwickshire Hospital Saturday Fund. At the onset of the National Health Service that organisation was faced with a change in its objects because originally it was set up for the purpose of supplying ordinary hospital treatment. When the Service came into being, part of its previous obligations were taken over by the State. As a result, the organisation had to consider what it could do to provide for its members. I say "its members".

    The fund has just over 100,000 members who, through their employers generally, individually provide a small amount of money each week towards the organisation—

    The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

    Adjourned at ten minutes to Two o'clock.