I have to notify the House in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967 that the Queen has signified Her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

1. Finance Act, 1967.

2. Road Transport Lighting Act, 1967.

3. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1967.

4. Control of Liquid Fuel Act, 1967.

5. Criminal Law Act, 1967.

6. Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Orders Confirmation (Buxton, Stockport and York) Act, 1967.

7. Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (West Hertfordshire Main Drainage District) Act, 1967.

8. Metropolitan Water Board Act, 1967.

9. University of Bradford Act, 1967.

10. Newquay Urban District Council Act, 1967.

11. Guildford Corporation Act, 1967.

I have a brief statement to make.

There has been confusion of interpretation of my instructions on when to put down one's name for the debate on the Consolidated Fund Bill on Tuesday. My staff—and I, if hon. Members came to me—informed hon. Members that names would be received—first come, first served—as soon as the Leader of the House announced the date of the debate in the House.

Some hon. Members in good faith stayed until the announcement was made and then went to my office to give in their names. Others, in equally good faith, and perhaps with more ingenuity, queued some time before outside my Secretary's office to hand in their names as soon as they reckoned that the statement had been made in the House.

I have consulted the three Chief Whips of the parties, and to be fair to all I have decided to select the order of topics handed in by balloting for places in the Consolidated Fund Bill debate on Tuesday. I think that this will be fair to the House.

rose—

Mr. Winnick.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker—

Order. I have already called the hon. Member for Croydon, South (Mr. Winnick).

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. A number of hon. Members, including myself, once the statement was made yesterday by the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock), took the view that it would be a waste of time to submit an application to raise a topic on the Consolidated Fund Bill.

May I ask for your advice and guidance at the moment? Does it mean that if one submits an application now to speak on the Bill it will be included in the Ballot, or is it too late?

The hon. Gentleman is correct. It means that.

Mr. Speaker, as one of those who queued up outside your Secretary's office, may I put one or two points to you about the Ruling that you have given? It was not, with respect, that hon. Members queued up and put their names in when they reckoned that the statement had been made. They put their names in in your office as soon as your office told them that it was open to receive notice of application for subjects for the Bill.

With respect, there was no confusion as far as your instructions were concerned, Mr. Speaker. I inquired on at least two occasions from your office as to the precise procedure, and I was told that subjects could not be accepted until after the Leader of the House had made his Business statement for the following week. Nothing at any time was said as to where the hon. Member who wanted to give notice of a subject was to sit or stand until the Leader of the House had made his statement.

I and a number of my hon. Friends inquired of the precise position from your office and were given to understand in most specific terms—I make no complaint about this, but the terms in which we were assured were quite specific—that the order in which subjects would be selected for the Consolidated Fund Bill would be first come, first served. Having been given that assurance specifically on two occasions by your office, I went along and waited until after your office was satisfied that the Leader of the House had made his statement. With respect, there was no confusion whatsoever. The only confusion that I have been able to discover was in the mind of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock).

Order. If the hon. Gentleman reads the Ruling that I have given he will find that all that he has done is elaborately to paraphrase one part of it. The Ruling that I have given criticises neither those who queued outside my office nor those who interpreted what was said the other way. There was confusion in the minds of hon. Members other than the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock). The hon. Gentleman may be quite right in his interpretation but other people have a right to different opinions.

We now come to the business—

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sure that your attention will have been drawn to the occurrences in the House late last night. While I fully appreciate that the business of the Government is a matter for the Leader of the House and of the Government, and not yourself, may I ask you, on behalf of the House, whether you would consider reviewing the rules in this matter regarding a carry-over from morning sittings?

May I put to you very humbly, bearing in mind that we all know your zealous regard for the rights of hon. Members, the point that there were a number of hon. Members yesterday morning who sat through the debate and who were expecting that the debate on the horticulture and agriculture Orders would come on late last night. The Government then decided, in their own judgment, not to put those forward. As a result, a great many hon. Members were put to very considerable inconvenience.

I would hope that perhaps you, Mr. Speaker, could confer with the Leader of the House to see whether some arrangement can be made to ensure that when a morning sitting spills over into the late evening hon. Members are fully informed before the evening part is reached as to what is to happen.

I will deal with the point of order in two parts.

First, I cannot comment at all on the proceedings of last night. One of the features of a Count is that it completes the evening and no point of order can be raised after it. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to raise matters which caused him great distress last night, he must seek his Parliamentary opportunity. There will be a Parliamentary opportunity.

On whether I should change the rules of the House so that business which took place in the mornings should be carried over automatically without change of mind on the part of the Government, this, I am afraid, is not a matter for Mr. Speaker at all.

Further to your most gracious Ruling, Mr. Speaker, may I make clear that I was not asking you yourself to change the rules? I was only asking whether you would consider having discussions with the Leader of the House to see what can be done about the matter.

Mr. Speaker has already expressed his opinions to the said Committee about the introduction of morning sittings, but the arrangement of morning sittings and the decisions about morning sittings are matters in no way for Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker is not the master of the House; he is its slave.

Can you tell us, Mr. Speaker, when the Ballot for next Tuesday will be drawn?

I shall probably take the Ballot on Monday. That does not preclude any hon. Member who catches my eye on the Consolidated Fund Bill debate from raising the grievance which he wants to raise before Supply is granted, before the money is voted. It may interest the House to know, however, that at present at least 40 topics are sought to be discussed during the 24 hours, the 12 hours, or whatever the time of the debate will be.

Mr. Speaker, may I raise with you a point of order on a different matter? On 6th July I put down a Question to the Prime Minister on the subject of redeployment and unemployment which was for answer on 27th July, which was 21 days later. I received notice yesterday, 20th July, that it had been transferred. That was after a period of 14 days.

May I ask whether there is any way in which the House can insist upon transfers being made at an earlier stage, because the effect of this is that it is now not possible for me to put a Question to the Prime Minister on this important subject of mounting unemployment because there is now no time left? Had the Question been transferred immediately, it might have been possible for me to rephrase it or in some way arrange it so that the Prime Minister would answer it. But because of the long delay I have been thwarted, so to speak, in that opportunity.

Is there any way in which the House can ask that if Questions are to be transferred—I know that this is a matter for the Government—they should be transferred within a limited period of time in advance?

I would hope that points about Questions would usually be raised just at the end of Question Time, which is a convenient moment. I am not unsympathetic to the point which the hon. Member has raised. I have no power, of course, to interfere with the transferring of Questions from Minister to Minister, but I would express the hope, which has been expressed from the Chair before, that if Ministers transfer questions that have been put to them to another Minister they will let hon. Gentlemen know as soon as possible.

I understand that a later Amendment on the Notice Paper, standing in the name of the Solicitor-General, takes account of the fact that very soon Clause 20 may not describe what the law is in that the Civic Amenities Bill has now completed all its stages in the other place.

Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman could explain what will now happen to the Clause, in view of the proposed Amendment to Schedule 6.

Perhaps it might be convenient for me to deal with this matter if and when my Amendment is called on Schedule 6. Otherwise, I shall have to deal with the same thing twice.

That would be more convenient. The right hon. and learned Gentleman's Amendment will be called on Schedule 6.

Clause 78 deals with the speed limits on vehicles of different classes. I understand that it is a consolidation partly of Statute and partly of Statutory Instruments. It refers to Schedule 5 of the Bill, which again sets out the contents, if I understand it rightly, of Statutory Instruments, and again, in Part II of Schedule 7, those Statutory Instruments are repealed wholly or in part.

This, of course, is not strictly a consolidation of the law, in that a consolidation of Statutory Instruments into a Statute does alter the rights of the subject in taking action for the invalidity or ultra vires nature of a Statutory Instrument if that be so. The inconvenience perhaps, in this case, is that it may be necessary from time to time to alter the speed limits here referred to, so one has to put in another subsection in this Clause giving the Minister power to make those alterations.

It is not a very convenient way to consolidate. Surely the normal way would be to keep the existing Statutory Instruments in being and effective and to give the Minister power to alter them as necessary by further regulations. Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman will explain why this course has been adopted of embodying these existing Regulations as part of the Bill, and therefore as part of our Statute law. In the normal course of events, these Regulations may be changed from time to time and might have been better left as Regulations now.

I submit that there is an obvious advantage in incorporating the whole of the law in a single instrument, in this case a Statute, rather than in a number of instruments consisting of a Statute and regulations. I appreciate the point which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) has put to me on earlier consolidation Measures. It is true that, whenever Statutory Instruments are made by a Minister in pursuance of statutory powers, these instruments may be open to challenge in the courts as being ultra vires.

If there were instruments which embodied a substantial volume of law and it was proposed to include them in a Statute, I agree that there might in those circumstances be some loss of the rights of the subject. But here we are dealing with Statutory Instruments which merely prescribe speed limits. I cannot imagine that, in these circumstances, anyone would attempt or attempt with any success to challenge such an instrument in the courts. There is no loss to the rights of the subject. What is being done is to incorporate these regulations in the Statute giving the Minister power to vary. That is surely a convenient course for everyone.

I would like to know why the bringing into operation of Clause 17 is being postponed. The Clause deals with the restriction of the use of heavy vehicles on weak bridges. This is a consolidation Bill and I had presumed that the law on this point is in existence perhaps in some other words than those in Clause 17. Why, then, is it necessary to postpone the operation only of Clause 17 out of about 113 Clauses?

The answer, of course, is that this is a consolidation Measure. Under the law as it stands, the bringing into force of these powers depends on an order made by a Minister and we could not put a precise date in the Bill without altering the law, which is what we are not entitled to do under the consolidation procedure.

I am still not quite clear about this. The right hon. and learned Gentleman says that it would be altering the law to bring Clause 17 into operation at once. Is it in some future legislation? What is the position? I do not quite understand this.

It reproduces existing legislation because this is a consolidation Measure.

I beg to move Amendment No. 11, in page 106, line 9, at the end to insert:

I think that I am justified in being a little angry. I raised this point on Second Reading. I was first called to order by Mr. Speaker. Evidently, I had not expressed the point properly in opening it and it took me a little time to explain to Mr. Speaker how the point was in order, the point being that when another Bill was passing through the other place we should not pass legislation contrary to a Bill which was just reaching its last stages in the other place. My intervention was treated with scorn by the Solicitor-General. He brushed it aside casually and said, "It is a point which does not matter. It is a trivial point."

Then the Government table an Amendment which appears on the Notice Paper today. I saw it only this morning. Even then, they did not get it right and they have had to amend it by a manuscript Amendment. Perhaps in future the Solicitor-General will treat the points I raise on consolidation Measures with some respect.

I support what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page). What has happened here shows how important it is to have someone as alert and wise as my hon. Friend, even on a big consolidation Measure like this. I was present for the debate on Second Reading. I confirm every word my hon. Friend has said about the way he was treated by the Solicitor-General.

The real answer is that the Government have been trying to push through at all hours far too much legislation in a short time. It shows the complete and utter mess which the business of the House is in that on a Bill like this, which is an agreed and wanted Bill by both sides—I agree that it is right to have this consolidation Measure—the Government have to amend their own Amendment.

This is one defect we have been able to spot due to the wisdom of my hon. Friend. We do not know how many other mistakes may have crept through in the Bill, despite all our scrutiny. Why cannot the Government get even their own Amendments right without having to table a manuscript Amendment? I deplore the way in which Government's business is being conducted at this stage of the Session.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This is a drafting Amendment occasioned by the fact that the Bill providing for certain West Indian territories has now received the Royal Assent.

This is, in substance, a drafting Amendment, I suppose. This provides the Under-Secretary with a useful opportunity to tell us about the progress relative to reciprocity. The Bill makes provision for us to return to Commonwealth countries people alleged to have committed offences there. The whole basis of the legislation is one of reciprocity. Throughout the earlier stages of the Bill we heard much about what had been enacted in Australia; we heard that Australia was ahead of us in the matter of legislation on this.

The Amendment raises the question of the position of the West Indies territories —Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, Nevis, and so forth. What proposals does the Under-Secretary know of for these territories to enact reciprocal legislation corresponding to the Bill? If the Under-Secretary is in order in doing so, I ask him to tell us about other Acts which may be passing through other Commonwealth chambers at the moment.

I do not see that this arises. All that is happening is that, instead of the words

"within the meaning of any Act of the present Session relating to the West Indies "

the Bill is being amended to read:

"within the meaning of the West Indies Act, 1967 ".

This is all that is at stake.

I cannÓt tell the hon. Gentleman exactly what legislation is going through in the West Indies. I would have made inquiries about this if it had been relevant to any Amendment which is to be before the House.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment increases the protection given by paragraphs (b) and (c) of Clause 4(1). The provisions, which relate to matters of race, are extended to include tribal matters. These provisions were modelled on Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition, but in the inter-European context tribal considerations do not play a very great part. The object of this provision is clearly to protect minorities who might be prejudiced because of their ethnic back-ground.

It must be accepted that if a man were conclusively to satisfy the courts that as a member of a particular tribe he might face certain prejudice and not receive a fair trial, it would be embarrassing if the courts had to reject any such argument which had merit on the ground that the case was not covered by the reference to race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. It is possible on an ordinary commonsense view that tribes in certain parts of the world could not be regarded as races, and it has, therefore, been thought prudent to amend the Bill to put it beyond doubt that race includes tribe, and that is what the Amendment does.

This is a very small Amendment, but it slightly helps in clarification. However, it is interesting to note that not only does the Large Oxford Dictionary, in its definition of "race", include a reference to "tribe", but so does the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, and in those circumstances the matter would appear to be covered by the Bill as drafted. However, to make it even more clear it may be helpful to have a reference to "tribe", because in certain Commonwealth countries tribal considerations may be more appropriate than those which we normally think of as racial considerations.

This, therefore, seems to us to be a small, but helpful Amendment.

I beg to move, That this House cloth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

The purpose of this Amendment is to make it clear that if the new Fugitive Offenders Act has been brought into operation in relation to any country and the old Act of 1881 has been repealed, any new application made to this country for the return of a fugitive offender will be dealt with under the provisions of the new Act even though the offence complained of was committed before the new Act was actually in force.

This is a commonsense Amendment, although we on this side of the House have considered it with some care because it smacks of a legislation of a character about which we are not entirely happy, because it provides that a person who has committed an offence in the past and who may have anticipated being dealt with under the old procedure will now be dealt with under the new. There is, therefore, an element of retrospection in some sense. We do not like retrospective legislation unless on the whole it confers a benefit, and perhaps this Amendment has an element of conferring a benefit, because the new procedure, under which an alleged offender will be dealt with, will be more advantageous than the old.

While being guarded about this element of retrospection, on the whole we welcome the Amendment.

I beg to move, That the House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment speaks for itself. Under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, the Parliamentary Commissioner cannot conduct an investigation into actions taken by the Secretary of State under the Extradition Act, 1870, or under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and the purpose of the Amendment is to apply a similar exemption in respect of action taken under the Bill.

I beg to move,

That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Summer Time Order, 1967, be made in the form of the draft laid before this House on 6th July.

As the Order this year may be the last to be made under the Summer Time Act, 1947, it may be of interest to say a word about the background.

In general, the Summer Time Acts of 1922 and 1925 provide that summer time should run from the Sunday after the third Saturday in April until the Sunday after the first Saturday in October. In 1947, during a serious fuel crisis, an Act was passed which provided for summer time to be varied in any year by Order in Council. It is under the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of that Act that the draft Order has been laid.

This power has been used to extend the period in the years 1948–1952 and again from 1961–1967, so that summer time ends this year on 29th October. Hon. Members will know that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary recently announced the Government's intention of introducing legislation early next Session to apply the equivalent of summer time throughout the year. This morning our discussion is limited to this Order. But hon. Members will, of course, have ample opportunity to discuss the merits of the proposed permanent change when a Bill comes before the House next Session.

It would be idle, however, to pretend that the terms of the Order have not been influenced, at least to some extent, by the Government's decision on that larger matter and the result of the inquiries which preceded it. The intention is that the period laid down in the Order should cover the interval before the new legislation becomes operative and as my right hon. Friend told the House it is proposed that next year summer time should begin earlier than it has previously.

Over the last seven years summer time has begun towards the end of March—I stress "summer time" and not "summer"—and the present Order proposes an earlier start of four to five weeks, on 18th February. Hon. Members will want to know what the Government had in mind in choosing this date. We felt that this earlier start might help to accustom people to the projected change to permanent summer time.

But, this apart, our experience of the extension, during recent years, of the statutory period by a further three or four weeks, and its almost entirely favourable acceptance by the public, would have persuaded us that the time had come to make a further move in the direction which this Order takes.

The effect of the choice of 18th February, which I would stress is only four or five weeks earlier than has been customary, is broadly that on that day the time of sunrise by the clock will be almost exactly what it was on 21st December under Greenwich Mean Time —in London, this is just after eight o'clock. Hon. Members need not fear, therefore, that this will create any novel problems or difficulties.

On the other hand, the position is, of course, very much better at the end of the day than it is in mid-winter. Sunset is already some 90 minutes later and the extra hour added by summer time means that sunset by the clock in London will not be until 6.30 p.m.—about 21 hours later than on 21st December. Hon. Members will appreciate that this will allow most people to get home from work in the light and the more fortunate ones who get home around 5.30 p.m., will be able to take full advantage of the extra hour of daylight. In February, too, the days are drawing out rapidly both mornings and evenings so that any disadvantages of having a later sunrise by the clock will soon disappear.

I hope that for these reasons, and irrespective of their views on the introduction of permanent summer time, hon. Members will agree that the date for the present Order has been aptly selected. One other feature to which I should draw the attention of hon. Members is that special provision has been made for the Isle of Man. There summer time will not begin next year until 7th April.

This has been done at the request of the Isle of Man Government who, on this subject, would be competent to legislate for themselves, but which has been left, as a matter of convenience, to be covered by our legislation, with the power for special variation. The implication of this is that, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, the wish of the Isle of Man Government should be respected. This has been done by the variation in the Order.

It may appear at first sight a little unusual that, for seven weeks of next year, the Isle of Man will be working to a different time from both Great Britain and Northern Ireland. But it is for the Government and the people of the Isle of Man to judge what is in their own best interests. This is an almost entirely rural community, with limited commercial and industrial contacts. It has few dealings with the Continent of Europe, and its chief contacts with Great Britain are through the tourist trade, which does not properly start until Easter, which falls next year during the weekend 12th to 15th April. By then the time system in the island and the United Kingdom will again be harmonised.

There are no other features of the Order which call for hon. Members' special attention. It is, with the differences I have mentioned, the successor of many others which the House has approved in previous years, and, if the Government's intentions are fulfilled, it will be the last.

It might be convenient if I advise or warn hon. Members that we are debating this Order and not the legislation which it is proposed to introduce next year.

This is not the first time that I have had the pleasure of opposing these extensions of summer time legislation. While I have in mind what you just said, Mr. Speaker, I am bound also to have in mind what the Minister of State said; that it would be idle to pretend that the Order is not a paving arrangement for the permanent legislation which is to be introduced in the next Session. The right hon. Lady was frank enough to say that it was hoped, in this way, to accustom people to what that legislation would propose.

In as much as the Order will introduce summer time from the middle of February and keep it going until the end of October, leaving a mere three months or so of winter, one cannot escape some intermingling of the considerations which arise in this matter. I say that in view of your remarks, Mr. Speaker, but I hope that I shall remain in order.

The Minister gave some of the history of this matter. It would be more complete to say that this came in 1916 as a provision to assist during the course of the First World War. On that occasion the Act laid down—as did the Summer Time Act, 1922—a definition of the summer season with which most people would not be disposed to quarrel, unless they had undue regard to the weather.

However, what is proposed now is nothing to do with summer. It is really, getting away from euphemisms, introducing Central European Time to Britain for almost all the year—and doing so, in the explicit words of the Minister, to accustom us to this so that we shall the more readily accept it for 12 months of the year next Session. I suppose that this shows that the present Government are the last survivor of those who believe that the world is flat. We have heard the justification for this operation—it is being done so that everybody can be doing things at the same time.

Order. The fact that the Minister, when introducing the Order, made incidental reference—said just a few words—to the legislation which is ahead does not allow the hon. and learned Gentleman to open up the whole question whether we should synchronise with central Europe.

I am content that my remarks should be related simply to the Order—that is, from 18th February to 29th October—and I am not going to be greatly fussed about the little runt, if I may call it that, which is left for demolition in the next Session.

The extension of the period under the Order has been already—not today, but earlier—expounded to us as something which is justified by the commercial advantages which it will bring, in that it will make people do the same things at the same time in this country and in central Europe. The Minister obliquely mentioned that, because, in excusing the exclusion of the Isle of Man, she said that it would not be too bad for the people there because they did not have many commercial relations.

I take it that the reason for the Order —and I must have in mind the legislation for next Session—is this conception which the Government have of people in Britain working to the same time schedule as people on the Continent of Europe.

Order. I remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that we are discussing whether summer time should come in five weeks earlier.

I appreciate that, Mr. Speaker, and, of course, we are also discussing summer time lasting for some weeks longer. We are, therefore, discussing whether this extension should take place at both ends of the period. The Government are saying that it should take place because it will assimilate us with the countries of Europe. I am not making a fanciful point or indulging in some private foible, for I think that the Minister wll not deny that that is the motive behind laying the Order.

I believe that the Government also have the motive of preparing us for the next stage, and I submit that if the right hon. Lady considers that this proposal is before the House on the ground that it will help with the next step, then, if that is an argument in favour of the Order, it should be a relevant argument against it to say that the next step is not a virtuous one.

Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman will have an opportunity to talk about the next step when the next step is before the House. I allowed the Minister to make only an incidental reference to it. The hon. and learned Gentleman is, therefore, entitled to make only an incidental reference to the matter. The incidental part of his remarks is over, and he must now address his comments to the Order.

I could make a further submission to you, Mr. Speaker, but I am not particularly concerned to make those points. I am arguing that the Order, with its extension of the period, is laid before, and commended to, the House because of its assimilating effect. This is the case for the Order, with its extension in the spring and autumn. This is the case which I seek to rebut.

This proposal is not put before us on the ground that it will be a boon to the population. The Minister said that people will not experience great inconvenience and that may be so if one looks at the negative side. This assimilation will, the right hon. Lady said, not cost much because sunrise on 18th February will be no later under the proposed system than it would have been on 21st January. This, therefore, is accepted to be the rub or disadvantage. The advantage—the bribe or inducement—being set before us is assimilation. It is to that point that I wish to address my remarks and I do not believe that we could debate the Order except on that principle.

If one puts away the euphemisms about summer time, one must accept that this proposal is designed to extend Central European Time to this country for nine months of the year because, we are told, it will be commercially good for us. That is the case which I want to put.

We are acting under a Summer Time Act. This Order, in carrying out that Act, fixes the date on which summer time shall come into force. The Order extends it by five weeks at the beginning and at the end. The hon. Gentleman will have plenty of opportunity to discuss the other question later.

On a point of order. The right hon. Lady told us today—and, indeed, it was stated by an official Government spokesman in another place—that the purpose is to accustom people to the permanent change which will be effected. This is avowedly a precursor. Once we start summer time in February, we will never come out of it again, if the Government's intentions are fulfilled. Am I wrong in thinking that that enables us to discuss the effect of continuous summer time in future?

If we were to discuss it, then we would traverse the whole question of law which, I understand, is to be introduced next Session. Hon. Members will have an opportunity to discuss the general question then.

I am not seeking to discuss the general question of the law which will come next Session. I am arguing against an Order which extends summer time in the spring and autumn. If every argument against the Order is impermissible, then I do not see how we can debate it.

The right hon. Lady has asked the House to approve an Order. She has to adduce reasons in favour of it and give some advantage which will accrue to the public from it. I am saying that no advantage will accrue to the country from extending summer time in the spring and autumn. We have to ask ourselves what advantages the Government allege will arise from the Order. The advantage which they allege is not some domestic convenience of the population in going about their daily chores.

The right hon. Lady said that she did not think that the inconvenience would be marked. One approves an Order of this kind, not because the inconvenience will not be marked, but because there is some counter-balancing advantage. However small the inconvenience and the advantage which is alleged, the Government say that this is a god thing to do because it brings us closer to Europe. For the moment, because they are operating under the Summer Time Act, they say no more and I say no more. But I want to rebut the argument that we shall gain a national advantage from extending summer time in the spring and autumn.

To do that, I must return to my point that "summer time" is an inappropriate name and that the proper geographical, scientific name for what we are proposing is "Central European time". The Government appear to be the last people who think that we can gain that sort of advantage by this sort of proposal. The idea is that we will outweigh the disadvantage of getting up in the dark by doing the same things at the same time as people on the Continent.

But that is not so, People in Britain do things at different times from the times that people in France, Germany or Italy do them because the sun rises and sets at different times in different countries. Nothing that can be done by way of an Order like this can make people do things at the same time on different parts of the earth's curvature.

This Order abandons all pretence at dealing with the summer. When dealing with a period in the summer before, one could say that the range of daylight on either side was so great that by having this device one was persuading people to get up an hour earlier during that period and to do an hour earlier by the sun the things which they would be doing an hour later. When applied to nine months of the year, that argument is bound to go because there is no longer this elbow room of daylight on either side and people will begin to be regulated in their actions by the rising and setting of the sun. We may alter the time in the second half of February from nine o'clock to eight o'clock, but we will not make people do things at different times. They will accommodate themselves by the facts of lightness and darkness.

Order. The hon. Gentleman must come to the five weeks which we are discussing.

I am discussing summer time in the second half of February. If I cannot discuss that, then I cannot debate the Order, because the Order is about whether it should start on 18th February or the beginning of April. It is difficult to deploy a case against a proposal like this. The Order is of the utmost importance. The fact that the Government have tabled it for discussion on a Friday morning does not alter that. The fact that there are only a few hon. Members present does not alter it. It affects everybody in many important ways, and I do not think that it should be difficult to deploy the case against it.

Order. With profound respect, it is difficult but not impossible to deploy the case against the Order, but it is both difficult and impossible on an Order to permit a debate on the law under which it is imposed or the law of next Session which might or might not be introduced.

I am trying to address myself to the effect of the Order compared with the previous Orders which we have had. This is a very different Order from the previous Orders. It is a striking departure from all previous Orders on the subject in that it extends the period of summer time to nine months in the year. That raises considerations as to the effect of this change which surely must be in order in this debate. By taking the period back to 18th February we get to a point in the year when people will not be bullied by changing the clock. We should, therefore, be defeating the object of the exercise by making the dates too extensive. People will be regulated by the way in which the sun rises and sets. Therefore, the idea that the new dates will give the public a great commercial advantage is obviously nonsense.

It could have only the slightest relevance in relation to the Central European Time zone. We are not proposing to go on to Eastern European Time. As for the advantage which it is hoped to gain, I believe that one country in the Central European Time zone—Italy—is already playing this game again and is going a further hour forward. Are we to chase those who do not—

Order. That would be a legitimate question on the Measure that will be taken next Session.

I venture to suggest, Mr. Speaker, that it is a legitimate question today—

Order.

Well, in that case, Mr. Speaker, I simply cannot deploy my arguments. One is driven sometimes by the rules of relevance to put one's thoughts into words, and I feel that it is a waste of time to deploy the arguments which I wish to deploy against the Order.

If the hon. and learned Member disapproves of my Ruling, he has his Parliamentary remedy.

I dislike the Order equally with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell). I shall endeavour to keep myself strictly in order, but the few comments which I desire to make will apply as much to the extension of summer time to periods anterior to 18th February as to the period covered by the Order and its institution on 18th February. I will make my observations in a very few words.

It seems to me that a great many people who have to get up very early in the day and who, by 18th February, 1968, would in normal circumstances have been looking forward at last to beginning their day by daylight, will be condemned by the Order to beginning their day in the dark.

I concede that there is a case for saying that there are great advantages in having longer hours of daylight at the end of the day, and that it is one of the purposes of summer time generally. I concede that there are advantages in having the same time as our continental neighbours, but in matters of this kind advantages and disadvantages have to be weighed against one another.

School children, agricultural workers and women who rise early to clean offices, who by 18th February in any year would be saying, "Now we can go out by daylight", will now be getting up and going out in the dark if the Order is implemented. For that reason alone, which is important because it affects the daily lives of a very large part of the community, I deprecate the Order and would be sorry to see it carried into effect.

There is the further consideration that those people will be more liable to meet with accidents in the early hours of the morning than they would otherwise have been. For these reasons, I join my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South in asking the Minister of State to think again.

I support the Order, although I am conscious of the difficulty of keeping within the relatively narrow confines of what is before us. I hope that I shall succeed in doing this, but I well understand the difficulty against which the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) was chafing. Indeed, I share his feelings and I hope that when the fundamental major matter comes before the House we may have an opportunity of discussing it.

My right hon. Friend the Minister of State offered some of the background leading up to the Order, but she did not mention—I wish that she had—that the whole concept of summer time was started in 1912 by a gentleman named William Willett, who lived in Chislehurst, my constituency, where there is a memorial to him. The reason why he introduced summer time, which is germane to the Order, is that he was an early riser. As he rode about in the early morning, he was conscious that other people were still lying abed asleep. He therefore introduced this device as a means of getting people up earlier.

I appreciate the value of this, because I am a sluggard, a lie-abed—

Order. We are all interested in Mr. Willett, but we must connect Mr. Willett and his own domestic habits to the five weeks which we are discussing.

Yes, Mr. Speaker. I simply wish to say that I am grateful for this extension of a device which provides a little measure for me to get up earlier.

The campaign started in 1912, but summer time did not come in, as the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South rightly said, until 1916, when it was brought in because there was a war and it was found to be necessary. Once it was introduced, the benefits were instantly manifest. I hope that we will not have to wait for a fearful cataclysm of that kind before the hon. and learned Member sees the merits of a further extension.

I support this narrow Order on the ground that it will benefit the business fraternity in the south of England, particularly those who have connections with Europe. That is the argument why it should be extended by even these few weeks. The business fraternity do not reach their offices in the London area generally until about half-past nine or even ten o'clock. They wish to telephone their business friends in Europe, who have already been at their offices about two hours—

On a point of order. If it is in order for my hon. Friend to deploy the commercial advantage, Mr. Speaker, why was it out of order for me to deny it?

The hon. and learned Member has anticipated my calling his hon. Friend to order. The question of the convenience of using the telephone must be related to the period of the five weeks in question.

If I may develop that briefly, that is an advantage, Mr. Speaker, because people in countries like Switzerland get to work as early as half-past eight. By the time we get to work, a couple of hours of their day has already gone. They go to lunch—

Order. The hon. Member is discussing the general issue. An Act about this was passed some time ago. The Order is being introduced under it. The Order specifies certain dates. The hon. Member must address himself to that. He will be able to talk about the parent Act and further Acts on a future occasion.

I would point out, Mr. Speaker, that the Act was passed as long as 40 years ago, and that conditions have changed.

Order. That is a perfectly proper remark, as would be most of the remarks made by the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), to be made in another debate.

I therefore come to the Order.

I am glad that the Minister of State is not extending it much beyond 27th October, because I agree with my hon. Friends that in the north of England, as the right hon. Lady will know, to get up in the morning in the dark for the two or three winter months is a great disadvantage and hardship for those who live in the north of England.

In that case, what about the business fraternity in the south-east of England?

For about three months of the year, they must lump it. The business fraternity will get an advantage for nine months of the year. I have lived in the north of England when there was summer time in winter. In my view, it is not advisable to have summer time for the two or three winter months for those who live in the north of England.

I hope that I shall keep strictly in order in discussing this Order, and before doing so I will say at once that I welcome the fact that summer time is to be permanent.

I have a few questions I should like the right hon. Lady to answer. First of all, have there been any precedents for having a different time in the Isle of Man and the rest of the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands? Does she not consider that this will cause considerable inconvenience to a large number of people? Surely the House will agree it is highly anomalous that while we shall have summer time in the United Kingdom and Channel Islands on 18th February next year summer time will not exist in the Isle of Man till 7th April. That, I think, is one inconvenience of this Order.

If the Government are going to change the whole law of summer time why bring in a period to end on 27th October next year? If that is the intention of the Government, why not have an Order with no date? If it is not the intention of the Government, what have they in mind? I think the Minister should tell the House exactly what is the significance of the date 27th October next year. If it is going to come to an end then, all very good, but if it is not going to come to an end why does she want those three months?

Although it may be beneficial to extend summer time throughout the whole year, would it not have been very much better not to have put into the Order the extra five weeks next year, but to have had the normal period of summer time, and just not have it come to an end? It seems to me that in putting in the five weeks the Government are having the best of both worlds.

The right hon. Lady should explain to us what her thinking is about this and why it is necessary to have this extra five weeks. Is it her case that, as with the sonic booms, she is going to test the reactions of the public during this time? By some of her remarks she gave the impression that this is to be the precursor for the years that lie ahead. If, in that period, public reaction is violently against any change, is she saying the Government are still open to representations about the matter?

Finally, I should like to know, if what this Order is really doing is to extend summer time by five weeks, whether she can say what the position will be between 18th February and 7th April in the various time zones in Europe, because it is on that matter that the House should be satisfied that there will be some extra convenience to the inhabitants of this country. We shall have in Britain itself a difference of time in the Isle of Man and the rest of Britain in that period. What will be the position with the Republic of Ireland? It is extremely relevant, as to whether or not Northern Ireland should have summer time six weeks earlier. This is a matter of great relevance to the introduction of summer time in any one particular year.

Can the right hon. Lady also say, if this Order is passed in its present form, what the effect in relation to the rest of Europe will be during that six-week period? Will they be having the same time as well as the British Isles?

Whatever the arguments are in favour of the Order it still seems to me that it would have been better to have done what I suggested, and that the better solution would have been not to have put in an earlier period but to have let summertime come in at the normal time, and then continue it or let it lapse. I think the right hon. Lady ought to convince us about these points before we agree to this extra period of summer time.

I start by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon) on having made almost every point that could be made about this Order and having done so while remaining strictly in order.

This is a matter we have discussed in previous years but the two new factors are, first, that there is to be a substantially earlier bringing into force of so-called summer time, and. a factor of greater significance, and the most important factor, as my hon. Friend said, that this is a precursor to permanent summer time.

Indeed, summer time brought into force now on 18th February is not, in one sense of the word, summer time as such, and it would be lunatic in future to refer to this as summer time. Indeed, we have been invited to put forward other names for the time. We shall have to consider that later on, but this Order is bringing so-called summer time into effect on 18th February. I understand that there have been about a hundred suggestions for the new name for so-called summer time. "Central European Time" was suggested, but I think it has rightly been discarded, but in view of the time at which this debate is taking place one might consider the possibility of calling it "Greenwich boom time" or "sonic boom time". No doubt the right hon. Lady has discarded that on economic grounds—

Order. This is not the time to discuss the nomenclature.

Having enjoyed my moment of latitude, during which, perhaps, outside there has been another sonic boom, I will come to the provisions of the Order itself.

A substantial part of the argument for having summer time earlier is, I think, that there will be something in the nature of a trial period before having permanent "summer time". We want some assurance why it has been decided that we should start it so early, and why the arguments put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West have not yet prevailed. Why should it not be brought in at the normal time and then allowed to run on gradually, rather than take this course and plunge us suddenly back into darkness or into a greater degree of darkness?

With the additional five weeks there will obviously be problems—problems for the schools and in the countryside. We wonder if they have been dealt with, and we shall be interested to hear what precautions have been taken to see that school timetables are adjusted, for they may have to be altered. We do not want the children in the country to be subjected to great inconvenience. It would perhaps have been better, as my hon. Friend said, to have had it about a month later and just let it continue, and then the problems could have been considered and met.

The farming community may be put to some inconvenience by this additional summer time, and one wonders if there have been full consultations with the National Farmers' Union, and what it had to say. One has not had representations oneself about this from constituents but, obviously, it will cause considerable inconvenience to some farm workers, and I shall he interested to hear if the farm workers' union is in favour of the order. I understand there was a great deal of consultation before the Order was drafted, but I think we ought to hear about it from the right hon. Lady.

It comes to this, whether it is good, tactically, to bring this Order in, so as to bring in so-called summer time five weeks earlier, or whether it would be good, tactically, as my hon. Friend suggested, to bring in summer time at the normal time, and to let it flow on. It seems to me that the arguments are fairly evenly balanced.

If the Order goes through—this may be the answer to my hon. Friend—I understand the position will be that the right lion. Lady will have achieved that all the clocks throughout Europe beat in time in harmony—with the exception of those in the Republic of Ireland and Portugal.

Would my hon. Friend not agree that the point I was making about Ireland is extremely relevant?

I do indeed. It is extremely relevant, that on 18th February all the clocks throughout Europe will be striking in time, except in Ireland and Portugal, which as far as one knows, have not come into step. I understand that Portugal will be the other European country which remains out of step—as, of course, will be the Isle of Man, by the very terms of this Order.

Is it not a fact that the clocks will not be beating in time? The result of having summer time in this country in any part of the winter will not mean that the clocks in Europe will beat at the same time, because times will change, as they always have done.

That which is indicated on the clock will be the same from 18th February, as I understand it, other than in the two countries which I have mentioned. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend is not putting forward the backdoor case for returning to local time in various parts of the country.

Order: If the hon. and learned Gentleman were to do that, he would be out of order. However, I do not think that he would do it.

I rather suspect that he would indeed be out of order if he were going that. In any event, I think that that is the position, but the right hon. Lady will be able to tell us.

With our economic sights forcused on Europe, perhaps it is a good thing at this early stage that we should have an opportunity of correlating the position, because undoubtedly it will be of advantage to the business community. If I pursue that any further, however, I shall be out of order.

I am surprised that there have not been many representations from Scotland, because I understand that on the date on which the Order comes into force, on 18th February, lights in Glasgow will have to continue to be on until about 9 a.m. One is concerned, too about the position in the north of Scotland, and it is rather surprising that there have not been representations by the Scots. Perhaps they recognise that it is a good thing to get uniformity of the position from 18th February and they are prepared to put up with the inconvenience. It is perhaps a little unusual to find them so ready to put up with inconvenience for the benefit of the rest of the United Kingdom but if that is the position, one is grateful for the attitude which they have adopted.

Our other concern is for the children. From 18th February, it is hoped that schools in remote country villages may alter their opening times. In answer to a point made by one of my hon. Friends, it is understood that there is likely to be a reduction in road casualties, since most of the rush hour will be in daylight from February. As for assaults on children, statistics show that these take place far more often in the evening and night-time hours of darkness than in early morning hours of darkness. All the evidence shows that children run the risk of molestation to a greater degree on their way home from school than on their way to school in the mornings. With an extra hour of daylight in the evening, therefore, this Order will be of advantage.

On the hole, we welcome it, but I shall be grateful if the right hon. Lady will deal with the points raised by my hon. Friends and by me particularly with regard to schools.

Mr. Speaker, I find considerable difficulty in replying to a lot of this debate since you have ruled so much of it out of order. However, I look forward to the lively debate which obviously will take place next Session when we have the Bill before us and hen many of the arguments ruled out of order this morning will be deployed.

The hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) accused me of saying nothing about this proposal being for the benefit of the people. I remind him that I devoted part of my speech to pointing out that many workers will be going home in daylight after 18th February as a result of this Order who would otherwise go home in darkness. Apart from paving the way for legislation, there will be a benefit in that respect.

But surely that is offset completely by the fact that they will be going to work in the dark. Incidentally, may I point out to the right hon. Lady that the winter solstice occurs on 22nd December, and not 21st December.

I pointed out that some people would be coming home in daylight and would have the benefit of an extra hour's light at the end of the day.

I want to congratulate the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon) for raising so many matters which were in order. He questioned whether we ought to have had this Order for February rather than leaving the starting date for summer time as it had been previously. However, we have not always had the same date for its introduction. Over the years, there has been a tendency to make it earlier. It started by beginning late in April and, over the last few years, it has been brought back to March. Even without the contemplated legislation, the Order is continuing a process already begun in earlier years.

Mention has been made of the Isle of Man. They have the right to legislate for themselves by themselves. It was at their request and to be more tidy in this respect that they were included in the Order. It is a matter entirely for them, and they wanted their summer time to begin in April. If we had refused to include them in the Order, they would have legislated for themselves.

As for Central European Time, we shall be in step with Europe, with the exception of Portugal—[HON. MEMBERS: "And Eire."] I agree that Eire raises a problem with regard to Northern Ireland. We have no official agreement with Eire for this, but Eire usually follows the United Kingdom in legislation of this kind, and we hope that the same will apply in this case.

Have there been consultations with the Government of the Republic of Ireland about this, which would seem to have been the courteous thing to do?

Up to now, there has not been consultation about the Order, but usually Eire follows the United Kingdom in these matters.

The hon. Member for Southend, West asked if it would have been better not to have put in the date of October for the lapsing of the Order since there will be legislation and probably we shall not go back from summer time in October, 1968. Obviously, we cannot anticipate what the House will do about the Bill which is to come before it next Session. Therefore, we have had to put in the date of October. If the Bill was turned down, it would be necessary to have the October date in the Order.

The hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) raised some very important points about children going to school. It is a fact that most accidents to children take place at the end of the school day, rather than at the beginning of it. This extra hour of daylight in the five weeks from February to the end of March will be of great benefit in preventing accidents to school children. As the hon. Gentleman said, incidents involving the molesting of school children usually occur after school and not in the mornings before school.

For reasons which are quite obvious, I concede that the molestation of children is more likely to take place in the evening than in the morning. However, will the right hon. Lady deal with the point which I made, that there will be a greater danger of accidents to children in the mornings if they are going to school in the dark?

That is a debatable point. I should have thought that, if children were coming home in daylight, a great many of the accidents which take place at the end of the day would be prevented. I think that it is when children dash out from school that the accidents occur. This is a debatable point. I do not think that anybody can answer it, but it is my impression that it will prevent more accidents at the end of the day, which is the time when children are most in danger.

Although there has been some opposition to this Order, as no doubt there will be to the Bill when it comes before us, I think that in general it has been welcomed, and I hope that the House will now approve it.

Before I put the Question, may I observe to those hon. Members who have clashed with the Chair that I have every sympathy with hon. Members who, on an Order, seek to discuss the broader issues of the parent Act or any subsequent Measure. I suffered from the same disability in the days when I was a back bencher, but I must observe the rules of the House.

Mr. Speaker, may we have your guidance? Here we are extending an advantage, or a so-called advantage, to the country for a period of five weeks. Is not one entitled to argue whether that is, or is not, an advantage, to the nation during that period?

With respect to the hon. Member, that is what I was humbly try-mite to suggest to the House during the last half hour.

I beg to move,

That the National Steel Corporation (Change of Name) Order 1967, a draft of which was laid before this House on 5th July, be approved.

The purpose of the Order is to change the name of the National Steel Corporation to the British Steel Corporation. The Government have always seen the advantage of using the word "British" in the Corporation's title, but there was in existence at the time when the Iron and Steel Bill was passing through Parliament a company called the British Steel Corporation Limited, a subsidiary of the British Iron and Steel Federation.

It was always expected, however, that this difficulty would subsequently disappear, and the Iron and Steel Act, as a result of discussions and debates in the House of Commons, therefore empowered the Minister to change the Corporation's name by Order when the opportunity arose.

The Federation has now agreed to give up the name British Steel Corporation Limited, and rename its subsidiary B.I.S.C. (Investments) Ltd. The way is, therefore, open for the Corporation's name to be changed and the Order provides for this to operate from 27th July the day before vesting date when the nationalised steel industry will come into the ownership of the British Steel Corporation.

This is the first debate on a steel matter that we have had since the Act became law. The debates on the Bill were extremely long, and I am happy to assure you, Mr. Speaker, and the House, that the debate on this Order will be nothing like the length of the debates which we had at any stage of the Bill.

Although we remain utterly opposed to the whole concept of the legislation, we on this side are pleased to see this Order, and if I appear at any stage to be delighted about this, I shall try to keep any smugness which may be apparent to the minimum. The fact is that the matter comprised within the Order was suggested to the Government during the very first debate in Committee, when we debated a number of possible alternative means for what was then the National Steel Corporation.

I was a little surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman say that the Government had always been prepared to look at this as a possible name. When we suggested calling it the British Steel Corporation, the Minister gave two reasons for rejecting it, and I think that it is worth looking at them. One was the reason to which the hon. Gentleman referred, that the name was at that stage pre-empted by a subsidiary of the British Iron and Steel Federation.

In Committee, the Minister said:

"Hon. Gentlemen opposite have asked why we should not call it simply the "Steel Corporation" or the British Steel Corporation or some other name. I confess immediately that I do not like the idea."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 27th October, 1966; c. 116.]

I think that it is a little jejune of the hon. Gentleman to come to the House this morning and say that the Government have always welcomed the name the British Steel Corporation, but we have to remember that that was said at a stage of the Bill when anything that was suggested from our side of the Committee was automatically and brusquely rejected.

In the ensuing 2090 columns of HANSARD, and 168 hours of Committee debate the right hon. Gentleman learned his lesson, and left that Committee a very much wiser man than he went into it. So much so that when, on Report my hon. Friend the Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) proposed to give the Government power to change the name of the Corporation, they were very ready to accept the principle of the Amendment. My hon. Friend argued:

"We believe that the Corporation should explicitly carry the title 'British'."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th January, 1967; Vol. 739, c. 781.]

This was accepted in principle by the Government, though they did not like the drafting, and in another place they introduced a new Clause. The Government spokesman, Lord Shackleton, said that this was clearly the result of the Opposition's initiative:

"We think that the initiative of the Opposition in suggesting this is useful,"—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, House of Lords, 28th February, 1967; Vol. 280 c. 1037.]

The point must be made that the hon. Gentleman is enabled to bring forward this useful Order as a result, not of one, but repeated initiatives while the Bill was going through Parliament. This is one of many instances of the Bill being improved as a result of Opposition pressure, and we welcome the Order.

There are one or two points which I would like to put to the hon. Gentleman. First, why have the Government chosen the name "British Steel Corporation" rather than "British Iron and Steel Corporation"? The point which immediately occurs to me is that the letters B.S.C. are already in frequent use as the title of the British Sugar Corporation, which is another State corporation. Clearly, the extent to which there is likely to be confusion between the two is bound to be limited, as they operate in wholly different spheres, but here we have two wholly-owned statutory corporations with the initials B.S.C. Presumably the Government considered this, and rejected the suggestion which had been put forward by a number of my hon. Friends that it should be the British Iron and Steel Corporation, which would have given the letters B.I.S.C. which would not have been confused with anything else.

In choosing the shorter title, did the Government have in mind the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor) in Committee, namely, the desirability of keeping the name as short as possible because of the substantial expense which is bound to arise from the printing of letterheads, the painting of signs on lorries and so on?

We recognise that this change of name became possible only as a result of the overall agreement which the Minister had always hoped for, and has been amicably reached between the Minister and the British Iron and Steel Federation, but B.I.S.C. is also used by the Federation. Was the Federation asked to allow this to be used for the State corporation If it was, why was this rejected by the Minister?

Secondly, can the Parliamentary Secretary say at this stage whether the British Steel Corporation will be carrying on trade in that name? Will this be the name of the Corporation which will engage in the selling of steel products either in this country or abroad? Articles have appeared in the Press, some obviously inspired either by the Corporation or the Ministry, about the form which the organisation of the Corporation will take. There has been a suggestion that there will be a number of large groups. The Minister indicated in Committee—

Order. We cannot discuss the form—only the name.

You anticipated my next sentence, Mr. Speaker.

It was indicated in Committee that if this were to happen the trading entities would trade under the names of the existing companies. This would be expected, as substantial goodwill obviously attaches to them. But we are entitled to some indication of the extent to which the name "British Steel Corporation" will be a name under which steel will be sold by the nationalised sector.

I have in mind here the statement made the other day about a common pricing policy, put out by the member of the Corporation responsible for commercial affairs—Lord Layton. He referred to common pricing, loyalty, bonuses and so on. This appears to postulate centralised control, and that it will be done under the name of the British Steel Corporation—

We are discussing an Order which changes the name from "National Steel Corporation" to "British Steel Corporation". That is the issue that we are discussing.

With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I do not think that either the Parliamentary Secretary or I have referred to one of the principal reasons why the name "National Steel Corporation" was disliked by us from the beginning, namely, that it was the name of the fourth largest American steel company. In Committee and on Report we raised the question of the obvious confusion that would arise if the British Corporation sold in competition with the American company, and if it had to register patents, trade marks, business names, and deal with all the other legal matters.

The Government are right to move away from this name, because there would be conflict and dangers of confusion. I ask whether the change has been made because now, contrary to what was said in Committee, it is envisaged that the Corporation will be selling under its new name. I will not labour the point, Mr. Speaker, but it is relevant to the question why the Government thought it right to change the name. Presumably, they accepted our argument that there could be confusion with the National Steel Corporation of America.

I merely ask whether this postulates the fact that they are envisaging that the Corporation will sell under its new name, or whether the sales will be handled—as we had always expected would be the case—by subsidary groups, which would retain the names of the companies.

I had another point to raise about the writing of the name of the various properties of the Steel Corporation. Would there be a British Steel Corporation House? What is the plan for the London office? Since I have already asked a number of questions, however, and this last question does not arise as directly out of the Order as do the others, I will leave it.

I merely say that we have not budged one iota from the hostility that we have expressed towards the whole of this legislation, and our deep and bitter opposition to the whole concept. We realise, however, that the Order makes an improvement which we recommended not once but three or four times both here and in another place, and if the Parliamentary Secretary can answer my questions to my satisfaction we shall have no difficulty in allowing the Order to go through unopposed.

Both at the beginning of his comments and at the end the hon. Member for Wanstead and Woodford (Mr. Patrick Jenkin) raised a general point about the history of this title. I was not in on the protracted Committee stage—thankfully—not having then been appointed to my present post, but as I understood the position there had been no doubt in my right hon. Friend's mind, and in the mind of my predecessor, as to the advantage of incorporating the word "British" in the title.

The only question that had arisen at an earlier stage was the question of the practicability of the matter. All sorts of queries arose. Therefore, by the time that the matter was considered on Report further consultations had taken place and further thought had been given to the matter, and the Government were happy to accept in principle the enabling power to change the name should the opportunity arise. That is what we are doing today.

The hon. Member raised certain queries about the possible confusion that might arise over the use of the initials B.S.C. both by the British Sugar Corporation and the British Steel Corporation. That was one of the thoughts in our minds at the outset, but we took the view that it would be manifestly absurd to confuse sugar with steel in commercial practice. We do not expect any difficulty on this score when the Corporation begins its activities as such.

Basically, the title has been designed in this way because it is shorter and simpler, and because steel will be the most significant part of the Corporation's production on vesting.

The hon. Member asked whether the Corporation would be carrying on trade as the "British Steel Corporation", and he linked with it the question of the possible use of existing names, with all that goes with it, historically and commercially, up to date. The answer must be that at this stage and for some time ahead there will clearly be a continuing use of existing names in various circumstances. The ultimate situation will depend upon the way in which the industry reshapes itself both organisationally and in terms of trade abroad and in this country.

The Corporation will trade under its own name, but the detailed manner in which it will undertake trading under certain other names will be a matter for the Corporation and not for my right hon. Friend the Minister.

As for the possible confusion between the American National Steel Corporation and the British Corporation, no difficulties have arisen since we accepted in principle the power to change the name, and we do not expect any to arise. To all the points raised the answer must be that matters of this detailed nature will be for the Corporation to decide in the conduct of its business.

As for the hon. Gentleman's observations about the legislation in general, I can only say that the arguments have been held at length over the years prior to and since the last election. The decision has been taken and we think that it will be effectively operated.

I beg to move,

That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that, on the ratification by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg of the Convention set out in the Schedule to the Order entitled the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Luxembourg) Order 1967, a draft of which was laid before this House on 22nd June, an Order may be made in the form of that draft.

It has been suggested to me that we should take the three Income Tax Orders together.

That would be convenient to this side of the House, Mr. Speaker.

Thank you very much. If so, that is what we will do. The first Order will be moved and we will discuss the other two with it.

This Order relates to the new comprehensive Double Taxation Convention with Luxembourg which was signed in London on 24th May last and laid before the House on 22nd June. This is the first convention to be made between the two countries, and for those who are familiar with these conventions it will be at once apparent that it is based on the draft model convention drawn up by the Fiscal Committee of the O.E.C.D., and therefore follows closely the general pattern of other conventions recently concluded by this country and which the House has had the opportunity of debating. Perhaps for that reason it is not necessary for me to outline the provisions, which now follow familiar lines. But I should refer specifically to the provisions relating to the taxation of, and relief for, dividends, because they tend to vary in different agreements.

The rate of withholding tax which may be imposed in the source country on dividends paid to residents of the other country is not normally to exceed 15 per cent. for portfolio investment and 5 per cent. for direct investment. There is a similar 5 per cent. provision in relation to royalties. The agreement provides for a credit for underlying tax to be given in cases where the recipient of the dividend is a United Kingdom company which controls not less than 25 per cent. of the voting power of the paying company. In other words, there is a 25 per cent. test of control for that provision. Perhaps that is all I need say at this stage about the Luxembourg Order.

The South Africa Order relates to a Protocol which amends the Double Taxation Convention between the United Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa, which was signed in 1962. The Protocol was signed on 14th June last and laid before the House on 7th July. The Order concerning South-West Africa relates to an exchange of letters on 14th June in Cape Town, immediately after the signing of the Protocol. The substance of the letters is included in the Schedule to the draft Order, the effect of which is to extend the Portocol to South-West Africa.

The Orders deal only with double taxation relief in respect of dividends received from a South African or South-West African company by a United Kingdom resident. Our double taxation conventions generally need amendment to take account of the 1965 changes in our tax system, in particular, in relation to underlying tax, to withdraw the relief in the case portfolio investment and to define the circumstances in which relief is to be given for direct investment. It is with those matters that the Orders deal.

Portfolio investors' relief is withdrawn, and on direct investment we have made clear from the outset that, subject to reciprocity, we are prepared to give relief where there is a 10 per cent. control by the recipient company. In the case of both South Africa and South-West Africa this reciprocity exists. It is provided because in both cases the general rule under their domestic laws is that dividends received by a company are not within the charge to the normal tax which is levied there.

Accordingly, the Protocol provides for credit for South African underlying tax where the recipient is a United Kingdom company which controls at least 10 per cent. of the voting power in the South Africa company paying the dividend. It is proposed that that shall similarly be extended to South-West African companies.

Article II ensures that the provision will not operate retrospectively. It will apply only to dividends payable after the date of entry into force and dividends payable on or before the date of entry into force which are chargeable to tax for a future tax year.

I am coming to the conclusion that the double tax Orders, are perhaps not among the most exciting matters which we debate here. We are reaching the 10th, 11th and 12th—or thereabouts—in the series, and the prospect of facing another 50 or 60 before this round of re-negotiations is completed fills me with the deepest gloom. But they must be dealt with, and we shall do so as briefly as we can.

However, I have a few points to raise. The hon. and learned Gentleman pointed out that the Luxembourg Order is based on the O.E.C.D. model Convention, and, indeed, it has followed it very closely, probably as closely as any we have yet had the pleasure of dealing with. This clearly demonstrates the value of the work of the O.E.C.D. in bringing common rules to a pattern of treaty negotiation which otherwise, because it is of necessity conducted on a bilateral basis, could give rise to enormous variations and complications.

The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned Article X of the Luxembourg Order, dealing with dividends. It exactly follows the O.E.C.D. model, with its discrimination in the withholding tax between direct and portfolio investment, with the maximum of 5 per cent. for direct investment and 15 per cent. in the case of portfolio.

In Article XXV we see one of the lacunas of the O.E.C.D. Convention. The problem of a common pattern for giving relief for underlying tax was clearly one of the matters on which the members of the O.E.C.D. were unable to reach agreement. The commentary on Article 23 of the model convention, which deals with the special credit in respect of dividends, says in paragraph 52:

"Certain States wishing to apply the credit method allow in their Conventions, in respect of dividends received from companies in other States, credit, not only for the amount of tax directly levied on the dividends in those other States, but also for that part of the companies' tax which is appropriate to the dividends. Member States applying this method are left free to do so."

The hon. and learned Gentleman has explained that as a result of a change to the Corporation Tax the Government have found it necessary to withdraw the relief for underlying tax from portfolio investment, though they still allow some relief for such tax on direct investment. We have been over this matter a number of times, but one question arises. The usual pattern which appears to be developing in the Conventions in which this country is concerned is that there is no relief for underlying tax on portfolio investments.

Where there is a direct investment in the Commonwealth, whether or not there is a treaty the test of direct investment is a 10 per cent. holding. Where there is a treaty, it has almost always been possible to negotiate that for the direct investment the test should be a 10 per cent. holding. It is only where there is a non-treaty relief for a non-Commonwealth country that the fall-back position, as it were, the least favourable test, is applied—the test of a 25 per cent. holding in the company in the other country.

But here we have a Luxembourg Treaty that the Government have been able to negotiate only for a 25 per cent. holding. I should be grateful if the Financial Secretary could explain why it is thus necessary to treat a United Kingdom direct investor in Luxembourg less favourably than he appears to be treated in other European countries where the 10 per cent. rule applies. That is to say, there will be a number of investments in Luxembourg which would have been regarded as direct if made in France or Germany but because they are made in Luxembourg they will be treated as portfolio investment because the holdings will be less than 25 per cent.

The Orders in respect of South Africa and South-West Africa are very much more limited and deal only with what the Financial Secretary said in earlier debates is the limited alteration necessary to bring the Conventions into harmony with our new tax system. Here we deal with disallowance of credit for underlying tax in portfolio investment. I imagine they here apply the mirror image provisions of Section 31 of the Finance Act, 1966, in that deductions shall be allowed from a dividend paid abroad only to the extent that the foreign company would be allowed to deduct on a dividend paid from that territory to this one.

In the case of South Africa this is an unusual provision. The distinction between direct investment and portfolio investment is that the test of withholding tax credit is not a 10 per cent. or a 25 per cent. but a 50 per cent. holding. Under the South African law investment is regarded as direct investment in connection with the rate of withholding tax if it is a 50 per cent. holding or more. This seems to give rise to very much complication which will apply in reverse to British investment in South Africa. So where a company has a holding of less than 10 per cent. of the share capital of the South African company, there will be no relief from underlying taxes and the rate of withholding will be 50 per cent. Where the share is 10 per cent. or up to 50 per cent. there will be relief from underlying taxes, but the 15 per cent. rate of withholding of tax will apply. It is only if the share is more than 50 per cent. that one gets the full rates.

This appears to add an unnecessary complication and an unnecessary additional consideration which British investors in South Africa will have to consider before they decide what share of the investment to take. This seems to be unduly complicated. I hope that this will not be a permanent arrangement and that we shall not have to find ourselves dealing permanently with two different tests of direct investment, one for deciding the rate of withholding tax and the other for deciding whether the underlying tax will or will not be levied.

Apart from those remarks, we welcome the Orders. If the Financial Secretary can answer our points I think that we can let them go unopposed.

If I may, with permission, speak again, I agree with the hon. Member for Wanstead and Woodford (Mr. Patrick Jenkin) that these are not among the most exciting matters that we debate in Parliament. If the prospect of a substantial number more of the Orders to come daunts him somewhat, I can only promise him that we will see that they do not come as single spies.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman's remarks about the value of the O.E.C.D. model convention, which is fully demonstrated in the case of the Luxembourg Agreement. There is no doubt that it has greatly facilitated negotiations in this field.

With regard to the question about the test of 25 per cent. control in connection with the Luxembourg agreement, the hon. Gentleman stated the position correctly, which is that we are prepared in the case of non-Commonwealth countries to accept a 10 per cent. control where reciprocity is offered. But I am afraid that the answer is that it was not offered in this case. That is the reason why there is the 25 per cent. test.

With regard to the South African agreement and the question of the test of 50 per cent. control in relation to withholding tax, the hon. Gentleman is right in saying that this is the reflection that we received in applying the mirror image provisions. What he specifically asked was whether he could hope that this would not be a permanent provision. This is a matter for negotiation. This is only an interim agreement dealing with the immediate interim situation. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that when the time comes to re-negotiate fully the agreement, as I think must happen before too long, we shall bear in mind the points that he has made and seek to negotiate provisions which would be more in conformity with some of the other agreements that we have.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the welcome that he has offered in general to the Orders.

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

The Clause deals with betterment levy chargeable, or possibly chargeable, on the rights of occupation granted under the Bill. As I shall have to refer to the rights of occupation in connection with other Amendments, it might be as well if I referred to them in some little detail as an introduction to this Clause.

What we are considering here is the right of a spouse who is not the owner of property to occupy the property, and the right is defined in the Bill only as a right of occupation and may depend for its extent upon an order of the court. The court may declare the extent of the rightful occupation of the dwelling-house both physically and in a period of time and so on, and may make such order as the circumstances justify. That order may provide for periodical payments, for obligations as to repair and maintenance and, indeed, it may last longer than the marriage itself, because the court can order that the right to occupy shall not cease with the termination of the marriage. So that there is here something in the nature of a tenancy for the spouse in whose favour the order is made. It seems to me that it has all the elements of a tenancy—the possibility of periodical payments and obligations such as one would find in a tenancy—and the term may be longer than a week, a year, or even a fixed period of years, because it certainly is for the length of time that the marriage subsists and it may well be for some period after that.

So it is the right in the property that we are considering and rights in property are subject to a levy under the Land Commission Act when certain events occur. Under the Act, there are some six chargeable acts or events on which betterment levy is chargeable, and chargeable by reference to the development value of the property on the occasion of these events. These six events are labelled in Section 27 of the Act as Cases A to F. I do not think that we are concerned here with Case A—the case of a sale of property, which is not likely to occur in the transactions contemplated by the Bill—but we may well be concerned with Case B.

If these rights of occupation are to be considered as being in the nature of a tenancy, then they may well come within Case B, which is a disposition granting a tenancy either for seven years, when it has to be reported to the Land Commission, or for less, when there is an option to report. The right to occupy under this Bill is not really defined and so it may well be that the courts would hold it to be a tenancy of the property.

If it does not come under Case B, it might well come under Case E, which deals with the granting of an easement or the releasing or modifying of an easement or a restrictive right. It is that phrase "restrictive right" which might catch the transactions contemplated by the Bill. Supposing the property has become subject to a spouse's right to occupy. Let us take the example which we argued all through the Committee stage of the Act as being probably the most frequent example.

The husband has left his wife, who has remained in the matrimonial home. She has registered her charge against that in the proper way and has a right to occupy. Then the husband wishes to sell the house or perhaps to acquire the occupation of it back from her, and by arrangement between the two he purchases her right of occupation—he buys her out so that she has to find another home. Such a transaction certainly is the release of a restrictive right, a right over the property which restricts the use of that property. What is meant by "restrictive right" is defined in Section 85(1) of the Act as

"…a covenant or agreement restrictive of the use or development of land, not being a covenant or agreement made between a lessor and a lessee or, except as respects Schedule 4 to this Act, an obligation on a vassal imposed by a superior or mid-superior;"

The latter part of that provision I understand refers to Scotland and, as the Bill does not apply to Scotland, is perhaps irrelevant here.

If, contrary to what I have been saying previously, this right of occupation is not a. tenancy, then it may well be something in the nature of a restrictive right and if it is released then that may be a chargeable act or event under Case D, giving rise to betterment levy.

As a third alternative, it may be a chargeable act or event under Case F, which is what one might call the "dustbin" into which all other chargeable acts or events are swept by Regulations made by the Minister. He is restricted in the Regulations he can make creating chargeable acts or events by Section 35(1) and (2) of the Act. He can make Regulations creating chargeable acts or events out of the dispositions there described. But they must be dispositions which renew or extend a tenancy or which vary the terms and conditions of a tenancy by releasing or making a covenant or agreement whereby the development of any land comprised in that tenancy is restricted.

Again, if, as I have suggested, the wife's right of occupation can be considered to be a tenancy, then it would be possible for Regulations to be made by the Minister, under Case F, bringing the release of the wife's right of occupation into Case F as a chargeable actual event. So there is a strong possibility that the creation of the wife's right of occupation as being the creation of some interest of value in the property might be a chargeable act or event under the Act. Certainly, the occasion of the release of the wife's right of occupation might be a chargeable act or event.

My Amendment is intended to prevent that happening. It would be quite unjustifiable for the Government to step in in the course of these domestic transactions which the Bill contemplates and take their cut. It would be wrong to tax or levy a capital charge upon one of the spouses whose property this was on the occasion of the arrangement between husband and wife, who have become estranged and are obliged to arrange their domestic affairs in terms of this Bill.

It is merely to make certain by a statement in the Bill that this will not happen, that no levy shall fall upon either party to these transactions, which are domestic transactions even by the terms of the Bill as it stands, that I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will see fit to accept this declaratory provision. We must ensure that there will be no imposition of levy on these occasions.

It is no bad thing that the provisions of a Bill such as this should be examined closely. The careful attention which the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) has already given the Bill had the effect of improving it in Committee.

The point the hon. Gentleman raises in the Clause has exercised the minds of the sponsors of the Bill considerably. We are at one with the hon. Gentleman that it would be a great pity if rights arising from matrimonial difficulties were to attract betterment levy. That is not the intention. Possibly we are also in agreement that, unless a further Clause is required to achieve the object, it is much better that it should not be included, particularly at a time when the public is rightly insisting that legislation should be no more complicated and no longer than circumstances require.

The question at issue is whether, if the Clause were not added, there would be any danger of betterment levy being attracted under the Bill as it stands. The sponsors of the Bill have given their attention to this question. I can set the hon. Gentleman's mind at rest at once by saying that it is the overwhelming opinion of those concerned that the rights of a wife arising under the Bill could not be construed as a tenancy. A tenancy arises by voluntary agreement. On that score, it appears that there is no reason for fear.

A tenancy is defined—for example, in the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954—as being one created by agreement or by enactment. A tenancy can be created by law and not only by agreement.

There may be situations where legislation specifically sets out to create a tenancy. We could not envisage a court holding that the House had unknowingly created a tenancy by virtue of the provisions of the Bill. There would appear to be little danger that a court could hold that the rights of a wife arising under the Bill amounted to a tenancy.

Another possibility envisaged by the hon. Gentleman arises under Case E and from the use of the term "restrictive right". It may have escaped the hon. Gentleman's attention that that term is defined in Section 85 of the Land Commission Act:

"restrictive right' means a covenant or agreement restrictive of the use … of land, not being a covenant or agreement made between a lessor and a lessee".

The right of a wife arising under the Bill could not be a covenant or agreement, which again must import a voluntary agreement between the parties.

The possibility which has considerably exercised the minds of the sponsors of the Bill is Case F. This is dealt with in Section 35 of the Land Commission Act, under which a possibile chargeable act would be a disposition made for a valuable consideration. My first reaction in Committee was that there could not be a situation in which any act arising under the Bill would be for valuable consideration but it was pointed out in Committee that there might be a situation in which a wife released her right in consideration of a more generous allowance of maintenance. In those circumstances, I was convinced that there might be something which was done for valuable consideration.

What remains is whether it fulfils the other conditions which it would have to fulfil before betterment levy would be attracted—in other words, whether it is a disposition. We have taken the best advice we can obtain. Our advice is unanimous that it would not be held to be a disposition within Section 35 of the Land Commission Act. Clearly, it is not the kind of situation which was contemplated when that Act was passed.

The only danger was whether incidentally the term "disposition" might have been found to cover the kind of situation which the hon. Gentleman has in mind. The best advice we have received is to the effect that there is no danger of that happening. In these circumstances, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will take the view that the danger which he has in mind is one which upon investigation has been found not to exist and that the Clause is not necessary.

May I exercise my right of reply? I accept that the hon. Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer) has taken very good advice. However, I am not convinced that this could not be a disposition under Section 35 of the Land Commission Act—that is, Case F. It could well be brought within Case F by the wording of Section 35 referring to extensions or releasing of tenancies.

I still say that a tenancy can be created not necessarily by agreement between the parties. We know only too well that a rent-controlled tenancy has no agreement whatever between the parties and depends entirely upon Statute. It may have originated in an agreement, as indeed the marriage has in this case, but it soon drifts into an enforced tenancy as between landlord and tenant. The tenancy created from the right of occupation created by the Bill might well be such a tenancy. I should have been much happier if an assurance had come from the Government Front Bench that no levy would be charged upon these transactions. Perhaps the Solicitor-General would like to intervene, or nod or shake his head to give some indication whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer thinks that he may be able to collect levy out of these transactions.

Whatever may be said in the House, and whatever assurances may be given about the best advice having been taken, when cases come before the courts what is said in the House is irrelevant. It is the wording of Statutes with which judges have to be concerned. There is a grave danger to the parties that the courts may decide that a dealing with the rights of occupation of the wife is a chargeable act or event or can be made such under Case F in Section 35 of the Act. I wish the sponsors of the Bill could have accepted the Clause. I do not feel inclined to withdraw it.

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

The Clause deals with the compensation which may be payable on the compulsory purchase of property subject to the wife's right of occupation. I draw a parallel here with the case of compulsory purchase of property which is rent-controlled. When an acquiring authority such as a local council wishes to acquire property which is subject to a rent-controlled tenancy, it can acquire the property at the value of the property with a controlled tenant in it; that is, it can acquire the property at investment value and not at vacant possession value.

The unfortunate owner of the property may see it passed to the local authority at a low value because it has a controlled tenant in it and, immediately it gets into the hands of a local authority, the local authority is not bound by the Rent Act and does not have to keep the controlled tenant there. It can get him out. Having acquired the property, the authority gets it at vacant possession value, having paid for it at its value with a controlled tenant in it.

We may have exactly the same parallel in the case of a wife—and again I use the example of the husband's house and the deserted wife, or the wife who has been subject to a matrimonial offence of some sort—when the local authority puts a compulsory purchase order on the house. It offers the husband who owns the house the value of the house with the wife in occupation and with the wife's right to occupy, a right to occupy as against the owner of the property for something longer than the mere periodic tenancy, for the life of the whole marriage and possible longer. There is a great difference in value between a house with vacant possession and a house with the wife in occupation who has been deserted but who has a right to occupy it and may have an order of the court giving her that right. The local authority may be able to purchase the house at that low figure and then acquire vacant possession from the wife.

As the Bill stands, I do not know whether the wife's right of occupation holds good against a local authority which has acquired the property, but, on a proper construction of the law, that right does not hold good against the local authority, although the authority is under some obligation when it acquires property to assure the Minister who gives consent for the compulsory acquisition that it can re-house the tenant if it desires to pull down the house. But, strictly, the local authority would have the right to turn it into property with vacant possession, having acquired it at a value subject to the wife's right to occupy indefinitely.

Neither the husband-owner of the house nor the wife-occupier of the house would benefit out of the value of the right to occupy. The local authority acquiring the property would put that value in its pocket. This cannot be right and the Bill must contain a provision to avoid that.

In the new Clause I have suggested that, because the right to occupy is a matter between the spouses it should be disregarded in a compulsory acquisition of the property and that the acquiring authority should pay the value as though that right did not exist, that it should pay the value of the property as it would be when it got into its hands and it had vacant possession. The domestic right of occupation as between the spouses should not be a matter of profit to the acquiring authority, and as the Bill stands it would.

I would not mind if it were provided that an acquiring authority should pay to the injured wife compensation for her right to occupy, or should give her alternative accommodation and give the remaining compensation to the husband. But it would be quite wrong if the acquiring authority could acquire the property at a value which showed that the property was subject to the right of occupation for an indefinite period and could then acquire vacant possession from the person entitled to occupy it. In some cases the authority would be paying no more than half the proper value of the property, and there should be some provision to prevent that.

The new Clause would prevent that and it would be fair and it would allow the husband and wife to make arrangements between themselves as to future accommodation for the wife. This should be dealt with somewhere in the Bill, which should make clear what is to be the position on the compulsory purchase of the property.

The problem which the hon. Gentleman has mentioned arises from the difficulty of holding the balance fairly among the various interests which may be entailed in a piece of property. The principle of compensation on compulsory acquisition is that the acquiring authority should pay the market value of the property, neither more nor less. Any property may be subject to a number of acts which can appreciate or depress its value and the kind of situation which could arise under the Bill with the wife in occupation might be one. Of course, if the husband were to sell the property privately to a private purchaser, he might well receive for it a lower price than he would have received if the wife had not been in occupation.

The sponsors of the Bill have devoted a great deal of attention and consultation to this matter. They feel that the public ought not to be called upon to pay more than the private purchaser would be called upon to pay in that kind of situation. The principle running through the whole of compensation on compulsory acquisition is that the public should pay precisely what a private purchaser would pay, and in those circumstances we feel that the husband ought not to receive more because the property has been acquired compulsorily than he would have received if he had sold it privately to a private purchaser.

It is fair to say that the wife's problem, as the hon. Gentleman was fair enough to indicate, would almost certainly be met from the fact that she would probably receive alternative accommodation from the local authority. No doubt the hon. Gentleman will acknowledge that we could not write into the Bill legislation which would fetter the discretion of the local housing committee, but there is every reason to believe that the wife's problem would be solved.

If both husband and wife are sensible, they can dispose of the whole problem. If the husband were minded to sell privately to a private purchaser, he would no doubt say to the wife that it was in both their interests that they should receive the highest possible price for the property, and that it would therefore be sensible for the wife to realise her right and for them to make their own arrangements as to the financial situation between them. Equally, one hopes that the husband would do precisely the same thing if there were any likelihood that the property would be acquired compulsorily. If in these circumstances and contrary to her own interests the wife still held out and refused to surrender her interests, it would be open to the husband to apply to the court to terminate her interests under Clause 1, and the court would be entitled to take into account all the conditions arising.

In the circumstances, there does not appear to be any risk of injustice to anyone. There would be a risk, if the new Clause were accepted, that the public would suffer injustice, because it would be called upon to pay more than a private purchaser.

It is quite untrue that the public would be called upon to pay more than the private purchaser. The hon. Gentleman has missed the point and I have probably not explained it carefully enough.

If there is a sale to a private purchaser by the husband and the sale is subject to the wife's right to occupy, the private purchaser pays a price less than he would pay for vacant possession. If he wanted vacant possession, he would have to buy out the wife, to buy her right to occupy, and he would then have paid full vacant possession value of the property.

If the sale is to a public authority, is that authority bound by the wife's right to occupy? I have had no answer to that as yet. I think that it would not have to buy the wife's right to occupy, but could acquire vacant possession without paying for it.

It is quite true that I did not answer that question. The advice which the sponsors of the Bill have received is that the authority would not be bound by the wife's right of occupation but in practice would almost certainly rehouse her, so that it would not be a question of buying her out, but of arranging alternative accommodation.

This is a shocking position. In this case a public authority is lot paying more but is paying very much less. It is acquiring property at an investment value and is then able to turn it into a vacant possession property. It is the public authority, or the public through the authority, which is gaining the benefit of there having been a squabble between husband and wife.

Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that what he is really suggesting is that, in a case where a husband has the fetter of the obligation to provide a home for his wife, the local authority should pay the husband a sum which does not reflect that fetter but which compensates him as though he had no such obligation in any shape or form—and that, having done that, the local authority should accept the obligation of rehousing the wife?

When a local authority acquires property which is occupied and proposes to demolish it, it has the obligation of rehousing the tenants. Certainly it is under at any rate a vague obligation to do so in that it must obtain the consent of the Minister to a compulsory purchase order and, in doing so, the necessity to rehouse is there. While there may be no obligation, the Minister is told that the authority will be able to rehouse them.

There is no getting away from the fact that, in a case where a husband and wife have had a squabble of this sort, the local authority will be able to acquire the property at half its value. I said in my opening remarks that I did not mind if the Measure contained a provision stating that the authority should pay the wife her right to occupy, but—

Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that the local authority should pay the wife the value of her right to occupy and then rehouse her?

This must happen in the case of an ordinary owner occupation. If the house is owner occupied and is not subject to a clearance order, when the local authority must pay only the site value, then the authority must pay the value of the property to the owner occupier—and it is under an obligation to rehouse that owner occupier. It should he remembered that, in such a situation, the local authority is taking away from an owner occupier the property in which he is living rent free and is giving him accommodation in a council flat or somewhere else.

In which case?

I am talking about the ordinary owner occupier of a house. On acquiring that property, the local authority must pay the value of it, regardless of the fact that it is also under an obligation to rehouse the owner occupier. It rehouses him in a council flat, for which he must pay rent, when, in his own property, he was not paying rent.

Exactly the same should apply if the owner occupiers are husband and wife who have become estranged. The local authority should not be allowed to acquire the property at less value than it would be able to acquire it if the couple were living together in a happy matrimonial home. Just because the two people are estranged the local authority will, under the Bill as drafted, be able to acquire the property at a lower value. Since there is no provision in the Bill to prevent this from happening, I cannot withdraw the new Clause.

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

This new Clause deals with rights of occupation and breaches of obligations. When moving previous new Clauses I described the rights of occupation I have in mind. I refer to the right of the wife to occupy adversely to the husband-owner of the property, or the circumstances may be the other way round; the wife might be the owner and the husband given the right of occupation.

The property may be freehold and subject to a restrictive covenant to be used as one dwelling house. The order of the court settling the rights of occupation as between the parties may divide the house into two homes. Indeed, it might divide it into more than two. If the in-laws were staying there it might be advisable to divide it into three homes. We cannot anticipate what the order of the court may be in settling the rights as between the parties when there has been this breach in the matrimonial home.

The property might not be freehold but leasehold. It might then be subject to a covenant by the lessee not to assign, sublet or part with possession of the property. If the wife has the right of occupation and the husband is the lessee, and the husband has gone out of occupation —perhaps in obedience to a court order defining the wife's right of occupation—the lessor in that case might say, "There has been a breach of covenant and you have parted with possession". In these circumstances the husband, if he went to the court for relief against a breach of covenant, would probably get relief granted to him. The lessor would not be allowed to forfeit the lease. But we do not want to create litigation; to force either side, in these circumstances, to go to court to get the relief of the court against the forfeiture of the lease.

These are just two examples of where a right of occupation granted under the Bill may cause a breach of obligation by the owner or lessee of the property; that is, the spouse who is given the right to occupy under Clause 1. It should be made clear that no person who is entitled to the benefit of a restrictive covenant—no lessor who is entitled to the benefit of covenants under a lease—may use this occasion of domestic difficulties to claim damages for breach of a restrictive covenant or forfeiture of a lease for a breach of covenant in the lease. I am sure that the sponsors of the Bill do not have the intention of opening the door to a difficult landlord in a case like this. But it would be far better to say so definitely in the Bill, so making the position clear and avoiding future litigation.

The sponsors of the Measure confess that they were considerably puzzled, when a similar new Clause was moved in Committee, to envisage the kind of situation the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) had in mind; what kind of rights of occupation arising under the Bill might give rise to breaches of obligation.

It was unfortunate that when the matter arose in Committee the hon. Gentleman was unavoidably absent. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) moved that new Clause in his absence, but without having had the advantage of knowing precisely what the hon. Member for Crosby had in mind. Until today we were in the difficulty of wondering what sort of obligations the hon. Gentleman envisaged. I am grateful to him for pointing out two examples of the sort of obligations he has in mind and, so far as I know, those examples are exhaustive.

The hon. Gentleman's doubts are possibly unnecessary because it is inconceivable that a court would hold that an involuntary situation such as would arise under the Bill could constitute a breach of an obligation under a lease or mortgage not to part with possession or to use the dwelling as a single dwelling house.

In the very short time available, some research has been carried out, and it appears that there is authority for saying that breaches of obligations in leases would refer only to situations which have been voluntarily brought about by the tenant. Unhappily, I am not in a position to specify the authority. The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that the sponsors have no intention of opening the door to action of this kind by a landlord, but it appears that no court would countenance that kind of action or so interpret a breach of obligation as to cover a completely involuntary situation of this kind.

The courts will not take as gospel truth what we say here. They will look at the Act and construe its words.

If I did not give enough examples, let me give one or two more. A mortgage from a building society requires the premises to be occupied by the mortgagor. I have mentioned in the Clause settlements, trusts, and so on. There may well be a settlement or trust for sale under which the beneficiary is entitled to occupy the house, but if the occupation ceases the property is to be sold. One frequently finds this in wills —I have drawn the clause many times—and the trustees might be obliged, if the sort of arrangement contemplated by the Bill took effect and the beneficiary went out of possession of the House, to exercise the trust. They might have no alternative. The fact that it did not come about voluntarily would not excuse them from carrying out the trust.

How do we know that this is voluntary? It will be very difficult to say that this is a forced right against the owner. It is a declaration in a Bill that the injured spouse will have a right to occupy. When a marriage becomes estranged the two parties will recognise this and act in the way that the law requires. It is not involuntary if one obeys the law. It is a voluntary act following from estrangement of the marriage.

Throughout our debates we have had the benefit of the presence of the Solicitor-General. He did not intervene on the tax matters earlier. I will excuse him for that, since he is not in that Department. But, being a Law Officer, I think that he might give us the benefit of his knowledge on these legal subjects.

I intervene at the hon. Gentleman's invitation. I should have done so earlier if he had intimated a desire to hear any advice which I could give.

I agree entirely with what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer). His argument was not fully understood by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page). In effect, my hon. Friend was saying that for there to be a breach of an obligation contained in a conveyance, transfer, lease, tenancy, mortgage, settlement, trust

"or other similar acts or deeds or documents"

there must be the voluntary element. Somebody must bring about a breach. Here there is no voluntary breach of the conveyance, or whatever it may be. There is the separate operation of an Act of Parliament.

Having studied the matter, I cannot conceive of any circumstances in which a court would hold that the statutory creation by the Measure of a right of occupation could be construed as such a breach as that referred to in the new Clause. I therefore advise the House that the danger which the hon. Member for Crosby foresees is quite imaginary.

I rise with great trepidation merely to say that I thought it a little unfair of the Solicitor-General to chide my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) for not inviting him earlier to intervene. For those of us who are not lawyers, this is an extremely difficult Bill to follow.

My hon. Friend made a strong point when he said that it was not what we in the House said, however sincere and well founded it might be, which mattered in legislation of this kind. What matters is the letter of the Statute and how the courts interpret it. I trust that the Solicitor-General will not wait for invitations but that, when it is clear that there is a difference of opinion between two Members whose opinions we respect greatly, he will intervene and, out of his great wisdom and experience, enlighten the rest of us as to where the truth lies.

I beg to move Amendment No. 1, in page 3, line 13, at the beginning to insert:

(1) This section shall not apply to a dwelling house the legal estate in which is vested in persons who are spouses of one another either alone or jointly with other persons.

Clause 2 deals with the registration of the right to occupy as a land charge against the property. The remainder of the Bill flows from the registered right in Clause 2. I should have hoped that the Bill would be used on very few occasions and that in future the matrimonial home would be taken in the name of the husband and wife jointly.

But that means that all the rather difficult provisions and procedure in the Bill might be avoided. It is not clear from the Bill that if the property is taken in the joint names of the husband and wife or in the names of themselves and other trustees the rights and procedure in the Bill are avoided.

Clause 1 refers to the spouse who is entitled to occupy a dwelling-house as against the spouse who is not. If a husband and wife own the legal estate jointly, subject to a trust for sale, it is not clear whether either of them can say, "I am entitled to occupy the property." They may both be entitled under the trust, or it may be a trust in favour of one of them. There may be innumerable ways of vesting the property in trustees for the benefit of those who it is intended shall reside in the property.

It is necessary that the Bill should make it clear that when the property is vested in the husband and wife all this trouble about registering land charges, and so on, can be avoided. If that is clearly said in the Bill, the practice will prevail of the legal profession advising the husband and wife, or the intended husband and wife, that the right thing to do would be to take the property in their joint names.

That does not mean necessarily that they share the value of the property or have to contribute to the purchase price in equal value. It merely means that the legal estate will be held by them jointly and that if any sale or other dealing with the property takes place, it can be done only by means of the execution of a deed by both spouses and not by one over the head of the other. I am sure that that is the right way to deal with the matrimonial home and I hope that this will be the way in which matrimonial homes are dealt with.

If that is to be the case, let us say clearly that the Bill does not apply to that sort of tenure of property. By the Amendment, I endeavour to say so at the opening of Clause 2. Clause 1 is left intact: it describes the rights of occupation of the injured spouse. I say "injured spouse" because these rights are likely to occur only in the event of estrangement and difficulties in marriage. Clause 1 describes those rights fully. Only after Clause 1 comes the machinery for creating, by means of a land charge, something which the public will then know exists.

My Amendment would leave the definition of the rights of occupation as they are given in the Bill. It then states that if the legal estate of the property is held by the husband and wife, there is no need to proceed with the registration of the right of one spouse to occupy. The right of that spouse to occupy will be fully protected by the fact that no conveyance or other disposition of the property could take place other than over the signature of both spouses.

I am still not clear about the situation which the hon. Member envisages. The essence of Clause 1, to which he referred back, is that there must be a situation in which one spouse is entitled to occupy by virtue of an estate or interest and the other spouse is not so entitled. Those are the express words. That, presumably, is the condition precedent to the whole of the Bill. In other words, it applies equally to Clause 2 as to Clause 1. If that is so, I am still not clear—the fault is, no doubt, entirely mine—how the situation can arise in relation to Clause 2, to which the hon. Member has addressed his argument.

I can satisfy the hon. and learned Member by referring to a case—I do not think it matters that I am now disclosing the facts of a client's case, because it is some public knowledge —in which there is a compulsory purchase order on a matrimonial home. The home was bought by the parents when the wife was an infant under the age of 21 on the occasion of the marriage. The parents were not very certain about the boy whom she was marrying, so they bought the house as a gift to their daughter. They put it into their own names and the wife was the beneficiary under the trust. That is an occasion when property was put into the names of trustees other than the husband and wife.

The same situation could arise if the parents had been satisfied of the husband. They might well have put the property into the legal estate and the names of the husband and wife but named the wife, their daughter, as the beneficiary. That is an example.

That being so, whether or not they are beneficiaries, either party has the right to occupy; the legal estate is vested in the two of them. The whole purpose of the Bi11 is that the legal estate in the property shall not be conveyed away without the consent of both spouses. If the legal estate is already vested in both spouses, there is surely no need for either of them to go to the extent of registering a land charge and all the palaver and increased cost of conveyancing which would result from Clause 2 onwards of the Bill. I want to relieve those who already hold the legal estate jointly from any further trouble under the rest of the Bill.

Bearing in mind the elegance and precision of the customary draftsmanship of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page), I must confess that when I first saw the Amendment it gave me a nasty turn. I tried to imagine

"persons who are spouses of one another either alone or jointly with other persons".

For a shocked moment, I thought that the hon. Member was contemplating polygamy. I now appreciate what he had in mind, and I agree entirely with his first point.

Normally, a solicitor will be able to avoid all the difficulties which the Bill is designed to meet by advising a husband and wife who contemplate acquiring a matrimonial home to take the legal estate in their joint names. If that happens, the difficulties which the Bill is designed to meet will not arise and there is no need to worry. If there is no problem, we do not have to argue about the solution to it.

There are, however, situations—for example, in the instance cited by the hon. Member to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin)—in which, for one reason or another, those who supply the money are opposed to the principle that the parties shall take the legal estate jointly. That is the situation which the Bill contemplates.

Perhaps I may respectfully add my voice to those who, on occasions throughout these debates, have invited the intervention of my right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General. I am aware that the practising profession would welcome guidance as to the kind of advice which they might give to clients in this kind of situation and I would welcome it if my right hon. and learned Friend saw fit to intervene.

The difficulty which the hon. Member for Crosby contemplates does not, however, appear to me to arise, because the first words of the Bill exclude the situation which he has in mind. If the legal estate is vested jointly in the two spouses, the Bill does not apply. That is stated precisely by its opening words. The example given by the hon. Member to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich does not take the matter any further, because in that example such rights as they were—rights of the beneficiary under a trust—were in one of the spouses and the other had no similar rights.

Clearly, in that kind of situation, we would not want to exclude the operation of the Bill. That is the situation which the Bill contemplates. If the two spouses had taken rights in their joint names, the problem would not have arisen and there would be no need for the provisions of the Bill.

There are, however, two possible situations. One partner might need protecting because he or she does not have a legal interest in the property. In that case, the Bill operates or the partner does not need protection, in which event the operation of the Bill is excluded by the opening words. I do not see the difficulty.

I intervene in response to the invitation of my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer), though I think there is very little I can add to what has been said by my hon. Friend and by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin). I would agree with them that where we have a legal estate vested in two persons, as contemplated here—and I take it that the wording of the Amendment means simply a husband and wife—then the protection which is afforded by this Bill is unnecessary, and indeed the Bill does not apply. Clause 1 contemplates a state of affairs where one spouse is entitled to occupy the dwelling-house

"by virtue of any estate or interest or contract or by virtue of any enactment giving him or her the right to remain in occupation, and the other spouse is not so entitled.…"

It is simply to meet this state of affairs that the Bill has been introduced.

In Committee, and throughout, we have been considering the most common case, which is where the husband leaves the matrimonial home, the legal estate in the house is vested in him, and then he requires the wife to leave; and the purpose of this legislation is to give her a statutory right to remain. Of course, if there is a joint legal estate it means the husband and wife are both owners, and if the husband leaves the matrimonial home the wife already has a right to remain there, because she is one of the owners of the house.

The Bill has no application to that state of affairs. Therefore, while I appreciate the concern of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) in bringing forward this Amendment, I would advise the House that the Amendment is quite unnecessary.

Far be it for me ever to attempt to gild the lily which sits on the Treasury Bench, but since my right hon. and learned Friend referred specifically to the legal estate may I say that it seems to me, at any rate—I say this in answer to a point made by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) —that what he said applies just as forcefully to any equitable estate. Clause 1 applies to one spouse being entitled to occupy the dwelling-house

"by virtue of any estate or interest of contract"

and "interest" must, include a beneficial interest arising in equity.

Therefore, whoever may be the owner of the legal estate, if in equity, as a result of the sort of causes he referred to, one spouse has entitlement to occupy and the other does not have entitlement to occupy, then we have a situation which Clause 1 contemplates, but if the equities are such that both have a right to occupy then we do not have that situation and the Bill does not bite on that situation at all. Therefore, with very great respect to the hon. Gentleman, it does seem to me that both in the legal and the equitable situation his Amendment is wholly misconceived.

I am trying to visualise a house where there are separate legal estates—where, for example, the freehold estate is owned jointly by the husband and wife. As I read the Amendment the fact that the freehold estate was owned jointly would exclude that dwelling from the operation of the provisions of the Bill. There might be in existence a leasehold estate owned by the husband only, a separate person entirely. If that be so and my premises are right, the wife of the leaseholder would not be able to register the estate because the dwelling house would be excluded from the operation of the Bill.

I beg, to move, Amendment No. 2, in page 3, line 29, to leave out 'unless' and to insert:

'or

(c) the delivery of an application for the cancellation of the charge in accordance with subsection (2) of section 4 of this Act, unless (in the case of (a) or (b) above)'.

With this Amendment we can also consider Amendment No. 7, in page 5, line 27, Clause 4, after 'charge' insert:

'that charge shall thereupon be cancelled and shall cease to have any force or effect (notwithstanding that particulars thereof remain upon any register of charges) and shall not be renewable; and'.

Clause 2(2) sets out the occasions on which the spouse's rights of occupation come to an end and are described as

"the death of the other spouse, or the termination (otherwise than by death) of the marriage".

Then there is a restriction or limitation of that:

"unless in the event of a matrimonial dispute or estrangement the court sees fit to direct otherwise …"

Elsewhere in the Bill the right comes to an end also on the wife's making an application for cancellation of the land charge and handing over that application to some third party in the transaction.

It seemed to me that the Bill is rather contradictory, that in a later part of the Bill the wife's right of occupation or her charge evidencing that right of occupation is cancelled by her handing over an application for cancellation, for the fact is not mentioned in Clause 2.

If I could explain by the circumstances which are most likely to arise, the husband owns the property, he wishes to sell it, the wife has a right to occupy — I imagine the marriage has broken up —and she has registered a charge to make certain that anyone dealing with the property knows she has got that right, but the husband is providing her with other accommodation and so they have agreed amongst themselves that she shall release her right. The husband enters into a contract to sell the property

By another Clause in this Bill there will be an implied term in that contract, that he shall see that the wife's charge is removed from the register. So on completion at the office of the solicitor to the vendor, that solicitor, having obtained an application for cancellation signed by the wife, hands over to the solicitor for the purchaser the conveyance of the property and the application to cancel the charge. The solicitor for the purchaser probably accompanied by the solicitor for the mortgagee who also wants to see that the property is clear of the wife's charge and to see that at that moment it is clear. All this, of course, does not happen at the Land Registry itself or the land charges registry. What is the period of time when the application for cancellation is handed over to the purchaser? Where the mortgagee may get a right to the property, that charge is still registered.

Taking Clause 2 on its own it did not appear to be clear at what moment the charge is cancelled. I think it possible that by a later Clause a cancellation takes place immediately upon the handing over of an application to cancel to the purchaser's solicitor or the mortgagee's solicitor, or the lessee, for example, if there is a lease.

My problem may be solved if I can ask the hon. Gentleman if he can give me an assurance, and then I shall be happy. The assurance I hope he can give me is that the wife—again, we are taking an example of the wife who is deserted, and the husband wishes to sell the property—having handed over the signed application, that having been handed over to the purchaser on the completion of the sale, she will not have any right to take that back or cancel it before the charge can be removed from the register. If there is any chance of her being able to do that it would cause great confusion in conveyancing.

I can treat the hon. Gentleman even more handsomely than he has invited me to do. Not only can I give him that assurance but, because Clause 6(2) was introduced in Committee at his own instigation, it is clear that once the application by the wife has been handed over, it is irrevocable and she is deemed to have released the right of occupation from that moment. I am quite happy to read it if the House wishes, but I think that it would be taking up time unnecessarily. The result is that the hon. Gentleman has provided the solution to his own problem.

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. Accordingly, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move Amendment No. 6, in page 5, line 17, to leave out from 'interest' to 'that' in line 19.

Clause 4 provides that, in a contract or sale of dwelling house which is subject to the wife's charge for her right to occupy, there shall be an implied term of the contract that the vendor—assuming, again, the husband—before completion will procedure the cancellation of the registration of the charge.

Again taking the example of a husband and wife, with the husband owning the property and the wife the injured party, this is all plain sailing when the husband seeks to sell the property with vacant possession. He so arranges with the wife that she will go out of occupation and cancel her land charge on the property. When the application is handed over on completion, as we have heard in connection with the last Amendment, the wife's right is thereby cancelled.

The transaction may not be quite as simple as that. Suppose the spouses have become estranged some time previously, the husband has gone out of possession, and the wife has remained in occupation. Perhaps she does not wish to remain in occupation any longer, although she has registered her charge against it. It may be that she is going overseas for a holiday or that her work takes her somewhere else and that, for a time, the husband and wife arrange between them that the property shall be let.

Let us say that it is let for six months but that the wife's charge is left on the register so that she can return to the property if she sees fit. While it is let, assume that the husband and wife agree that it shall be sold. A contract is entered into for the sale of the property, subject to the tenancy. The tenancy may have three months to run, and the purchaser decides to take on the tenant for that time and then have vacant possession for himself. Why, on such an occasion, should there be any difference? Why should there be this restriction in Clause 4 that the terms of the contract obliging the vendor to remove the land charge should not apply?

Clause 4 is restricted at the moment to the case where the property is being sold with vacant possession. But that is not the only occasion on which the land charge may be registered in favour of the wife. It may have been registered previously and still be on the register, and the purchaser who has acquired the property and perhaps mortgaged it will want that removed.

It may be said that on such an occasion it can be provided for in the contract, all that Clause 4 is doing is to imply a term in the contract, and that when the property is sold without vacant possession and with a tenant in for some time, there should be a special clause in the contract saying that the vendor must remove the land charge. That seems to be an unnecessary trouble which could be provided against in the Bill. Surely there would be no harm in removing these words from Clause 4 and implying the term in any contract obliging the vendor to remove at his own expense a charge registered in favour of some one who has rights of ocupation.

I would like to see Clause 4 apply to any contract and not merely to one for vacant possession.

With his customary fairness, the hon. Gentleman has provided the answer to his own argument.

The standard situation is that either the purchaser expects to acquire vacant possession or he does not. If he expects to acquire it free from encumbrances, the Clause says that he shall have the benefit of that understanding, and the obligation is imposed on the vendor accordingly. If the purchaser does not expect to acquire the property free from encumbrances, there appears to be no reason why this undertaking should be implied.

Where the situation is more complicated, such as that which the hon. Gentleman outlined, the proper thing to do is for the parties to provide expressly for it in the contract. It is always open to them to do that. As a general rule, there seems to be no reason why one should imply such an undertaking into a contract in a case where the purchaser does not expect to obtain the property free from encumbrances.

It is right that I should say that the terms of the Clause have been discussed with the Law Society which has expressed itself completely satisfied. In those circumstances, it may be that the hon. Gentleman will be prepared to accept that the Clause deals simply with the normal case, falling on one side of the line or the other, and that more complicated situations should be left to the parties to make their own arrangements.

The case which I put forward was in no way complicated. It is the ordinary case of property being acquired with a tenant in it with a view to possession being taken at a later date. If it is thought desirable to include an implied term when property is being sold with vacant possession, I see no reason why it should not be implied on all occasions when there is a charge registered in favour of one of the spouses for the right to occupy. It is whether that charge is registered which is important, not whether the property is sold with vacant possession, and the vendor is responsible for getting that charge removed. Why should it be written into one contract and merely implied in another?

Before the hon. Gentleman sits down, does he acknowledge that the Amendment goes very much further than the situation which he has exemplified to the House? What he is saying in his Amendment is that the undertaking should be implied in every case and not merely where there is some limited benefit which the purchaser expects to acquire. In those circumstances, it seems a little hard to put upon the vendor the obligation of excluding this in cases where the purchaser expects nothing better.

rose—

We are not in Committee.

I took that as an intervention before I had resumed my seat.

It was lengthy enough to be something like a Committee speech.

I shall try not to repeat that offence.

The Bill will require a great number of further requisitions by the purchaser's solicitor, to try to find out the facts. The more implied terms there are in the contract to dispose of these difficulties, the less will be the requisitions. In the case which I envisaged, the solicitor will have to make requisitions about whether there is a right of the wife, and so on. I can see no reason for dividing contracts up in this way, and I had hoped that the Amendment would be accepted.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

I am conscious that the House has other business to discuss, but I cannot let this moment pass without breathing an audible sigh of gratitude that the Measure is approaching the end of its progress through the House. It is an unpretentious piece of legislation, but it may avert real personal tragedy for many people who are unaware of our deliberations.

I would not like the moment to pass without saying that on many occasions we have had to consider the balance of fairness between a spouse and her children on the one hand, and on the other a third party who spends money in good faith on the expedition of acquiring a home. Sometimes this involves dealing with a situation with the only weapons available, which are blatant legal technicalities. Where we have arrived at a conclusion on one side of the other of the line, the most that we can plead is that after careful consideration we have done our best.

I express my personal thanks to those who, both in and out of the limelight, worked very hard to achieve this Measure, to right hon. and hon. Members who took part in our deliberations, and to one other person who acquires more brickbats than bouquets, the Leader of the House, for having it made it possible for us to consummate our deliberations today.

I offer my sincere congratulations to the hon. Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer) for piloting the Bill through to this stage, particularly because, in my view, the intentions of the Bill are wholly good, and I support them entirely, but the Bill itself is wholly bad. It will cause an increase in legal work, to no purpose. We could have achieved the principals of the Bill in a much simpler way.

At a time when the legal profession is being accused of increasing the costs of conveyancing, the Bill will contribute to increasing them still further, and will be harmful to the desire to streamline conveyancing. All this could have been done in a much simpler way. I think that this is a bad Bill, and this makes me congratulate the hon. Gentleman even more for his success in getting a bad Bill through on a very good principle.

In view of what my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) has said about the Bill, I feel that I should rise on behalf of this side of the House to express our support for its principles. Unfortunately, the Bill did not get debated in second Reading, but, thanks to the searching Amendments put down by my hon. Friend, both in Committee and today, and thanks to the extremely able, courteous, and skilful handling of the Bill by the hon. Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer), it has since been given a thorough scrutiny.

I mean no disrespect to an honourable profession when I say that the argument has been conducted, on both sides, almost wholly by lawyers. The Bill is none the worse for that. It involves considerable legal technicalities, and from time to time it has been very difficult for some of the laymen to follow the arguments. Nevertheless, it is important that we enact legislation which is capable of being implemented and understood, and is clear and fair. This is why I thought that at an earlier stage my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby was right in saying that it is not what we say here about the provisions of the Bill that matters, so much as what the courts will say—because this is going to be very much a matter for the courts —about the actual words in the Statute.

The Bill is concerned with removing—happily for not a large number of people—a serious defect in the existing law with regard to the rights of a spouse who has become estranged, and especially those of a wife with young children. The hon. Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton said that it was an unpretentious Measure. That is a modest way of putting it. I think that it is an extremely valuable Bill. Something like this had to be enacted. We all know of tragic cases—I have had a number of them brought to my attention—in which a wife, very often with a number of young children, has been deprived of her right of occupation of the matrimonial home. Whatever the rights or wrongs which have led to the break up of the marriage, one's heart bleeds for the innocent children, already deprived as they would be of the love of both parents. It must be wholly wrong that in such cases there is no adequate safeguard for them. The Bill seeks to provide that safeguard, and to the extent that it does so it is deserving of our support. I pay my tribute to those who, with skill and pertinacity, have guided it through the House.

I join hon. Gentlemen opposite in welcoming the Third Reading of the Bill. This Measure has the support of the great majority of hon. Members, very much for the reasons which the hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine) has just expressed. It deals with a social evil, and many of us are familiar with the sort of matter with which the Bill is concerned.

I join in the congratulations which have been offered to my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer) for the way in which he has marshalled his arguments and carried the Bill through all its stages.

I extend my thanks to the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page). He was in a minority, though I know that that does not worry him very much. He was in a minority on this occasion, and a very small one, but he made a very useful contribution to the proceedings on the Bill, and it is a very much better Measure because of that.

I would like to refer to one matter which has arisen during the discussions on the Bill. The hon. Member for Crosby, and others, and some outside the House, have expressed a certain amount of apprehension about what will be the position of solicitors who have to advise their clients after the Bill becomes law. Where, for example, a solicitor is advising the husband, will he be under a duty to advise the wife, even though the wife may not herself be his client?

It is not possible for the promoters of the Bill, or the Government, to say what view the courts may take of the duty of a solicitor in an individual case should one ever arise, but it is evident that the courts would be bound to have regard to the facts of the case, as was pointed out by my hon. Friend in Committee. If a solicitor is consulted by the husband alone, it seems to me that it will be very difficult to argue that the solicitor owes any duty to the wife to inform her of her rights under the Bill, still less to protect them by the registration of a charge.

If solicitors were consulted by both husband and wife it might come to be regarded as their duty to inform the wife of rights conferred on her by the Bill, but it by no means follows that he should go on to advise the wife to register a land charge if the solicitor had no reason to suppose that the marriage was anything but a happy one.

This is borne out by the fact that solicitors at present do not appear to regard it as their duty to advise husbands arid wives to take a conveyance of the matrimonial home in their joint names, although the advantages of doing so may be thought to be even more important than those attached to the registration of a class F land charge, not least because of the considerable saving in Estate Duty in the event of the husband dying first.

It seems to me that in the case of the results of occupation conferred by the Bill a solicitor, like any other person, is entitled to take account of the practical realities of the situation with which he has to deal and should be under no obligation to advise a wife to register a charge when there is no reason to suppose that the marriage is likely to go wrong.

I thought that I should say something on that subject, but I rose mainly to join in the general welcome given to the Bill, and the congratulations which have been offered to my hon. Friend.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

On the last Amendment to the Bill I take the opportunity, once again, to thank my hon. Friends who have sponsored We Bill with me, and other hon. Members who have helped to improve it and also, in particular, once again to thank members of the Government who have been so helpful and so co-operative in its drafting and in helping to see it through.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

There is remarkable unanimity which I have not experienced for some time.

In supporting the Motion, I take this opportunity of congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead, West (Mr. Randall), who is not able to be here this afternoon but who is the sponsor of the Bill, and his hon. Friends, including my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Hamling) who has been good enough to move the Lords Amendment, upon their success in getting through this very useful and valuable Measure.