asked the Secretary of State for Defence what rôle is intended for the F111K aircraft that cannot equally well be fulfilled by the Phantom F4.

The F111K is needed for high-level reconnaissance and for strike missions which require greater range /payload or greater all-weather capability than the Phantom F4 possesses.

While thanking the Secretary of State for that answer, may I inquire why, as the intention was for the F111 to fill the gap up to the time the AFVG came into operation and as the projected range of the AFVG was not to be greater than that of the Phantom, this rôle could not be fulfilled by the Phantom and all the remaining V-bombers in view of our reduced commitments east of Suez?

I have explained that the Phantom cannot do the things that the F111 can do. In particular, it has no high-level reconnaissance capability whatever. The F111 was not only designed to fill in until the AFVG came in: it was to supplement the V-bombers until 1975 and the AFVG after that.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what strategic rôle is fulfilled by British forces stationed in the Persian Gulf.

British forces are contributing to the maintenance of stability and peaceful development in the Persian Gulf.

What conceivable situation can the Secretary of State see in which British forces might intervene in Middle East affairs in view of our withdrawal from Aden, our reduced commitments in the area, and the outcome of the recent war between Israel and Egypt?

I am sure that the hon. Member must know that we have formal treaty obligations to certain States in the Persian Gulf, and we intend to carry them out so long as they exist.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the only consequence of the British rôle in this area is that we are the first to have our oil supplies cut off when trouble breaks out?

I am aware of no such thing.

Since the Government have destroyed the whole of Britain's influence and prestige in the Arabian Peninsula, how much longer does the Secretary of State think we shall be able to stay in Bahrain?

I think that such a question, coming from a member of a Government which was responsible for the Suez attack in 1956 and a man who was Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs responsible for launching the South Arabian situation on the course which it has followed, puts me under no obligation to accept the assumption or to answer it.

Have we learned the lesson, from the tragedy in Aden, that it is better to withdraw British troops from an indefensible position in support of an undemocratic Government before there is bloodshed?

I agree that if our position in the Gulf were indefensible, we should leave it; but that is not the case.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the very unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I give notice that I shall raise this at the first possible opportunity.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence at what annual rate of expenditure recruiting is now running; how this compares with the annual rate of expenditure at the similar period last year; and to what extent he proposes to reduce current recruiting expenditure.

The annual rate of expenditure is £10 million as compared with £9·8 million last year. The composition of the Armed Forces must be balanced, and future reductions do not affect the need for recruits now.

But is that not a ridiculous waste of money? What is the sense in having lavish four-page advertisements in the weekend "glossies" when the Armed Forces are to be cut by 37,000 anyway?

The age structure of a place like, shall I say, this House, is not particularly important, but the age structure of an infantry battalion is important. We have to get young people in to make up for the older ones who go out.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence why the statement, promised earlier this year, regarding young Servicemen who have been recruited at 15 years of age and who wish to change their minds, will not now be made.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if, in the light of the report of the Latey Committee and the consequent study by his Department of the implications for long-service engagements by young persons, he will now make a statement on recruitment of teenagers and the position of existing servicemen who were engaged as minors.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he is now in a position to make a statement promised on 13th March last on the position of men who enlisted under the age of 18 years.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now announce the changes in Government policy regarding recruitment and discharge of young men in the Armed Forces.

The Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority raises complex questions for us. I shall make a statement as soon as I can, but it will not be easy to satisfy everyone.

Is not this a breach of faith? Why should there be a need for still further examination of this inhumanity, particularly as the Forces are being reduced? The Minister has given three promises about this during the last eight months.

There is no breach o faith. We have to face the position of the school-leaving age going up in due course as announced, the Latey Report issued a few weeks ago, and the manning position of the Services, as well as the moral point with which my hon. Friend is concerned. I shall make a statement as soon as I possibly can.

Did not the Minister give an assurance to a deputation of hon. Members to him last May, which he subsequently repeated in a letter of 5th May, that within six weeks of the publication of the Latey Report he would announce the Government's conclusions on the question of the recruiting of young Servicemen? Why has the Minister broken his promise, and when can we expect the statement which he gave an undertaking to make to the House months ago?

The statement to which the hon. Gentleman refers was discussed when a deputation consisting of himself and a number of others came to see me. They pressed me to give an idea of when I hoped to be able to make the statement. I said that it would be a few weeks, or six or seven weeks, after the Latey Report. We were then thinking of the Report coming out in November, but in fact it came out in July. His Lordship worked faster than anyone expected at the time.

Surely a definite undertaking was given to the House during an Adjournment debate on 13th March? Since then there have been examples to which I have called the attention of the Ministry of Defence of exceptional lack of care for men who had enlisted and had arranged and saved for their discharge.

I think that my hon. Friend is on a different point from the one affecting boy entrants, which is the matter I am looking into at the moment. I cannot accept that there are cases in which no care is taken in these matters. A great deal of care is taken with compassionate releases of one kind or another.

Will the Minister give some indication of the advice which we should give to many young Servicemen who have been in touch with us and whom we have advised we are waiting for his report? How do we tell them what their position is, particularly the number of cases in the hands of the National Council for Civil Liberties, which was part of the deputation to the Minister? We all understood that we would get a report from him within six weeks of the Latey Committee's Report coming out.

I think that my hon. Friend can get the reply from her question, namely, that we are waiting for the Report. I draw attention to the fact that in May of this year I said I would be pleased to receive representations and ideas from any hon. Member. I have not received any, but if anyone has any particular case or views on the matter I shall be only too pleased to receive them.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now make a statement on his recent inquiries into the corruption of young guardsmen by a well-to-do vice ring promoting homosexuality in the Household Cavalry and the Welsh Guards; and what action he is proposing to take.

I have nothing to add to the reply I gave to the hon. Gentleman on 25th October.—[Vol. 751, c. 484.]

That reply said that the Department was investigating the matter. What I want to know is when will the report be ready, will it be published, and will the Minister confirm that there is truth behind these very serious allegations?

The hon. Gentleman is incorrect. The reply I gave was that the inquiry was being conducted by the Metropolitan Police. It is not yet complete. The Army is assisting, and I should have thought that the House would consider this to be the right way to do it.

Will my hon. Friend expedite the inquiry, because many rumours are flying about which are not likely to encourage recruits to join the Services. I am serious about this. I cannot discount the rumours, or vouch for what is happening. The inquiry should be expedited.

I agree with my right hon. Friend. That is what I will do. I am as worried as he is.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many holders of the Military Medal in Scotland do not receive a gratuity; and what is their average age.

No records are kept which would give this information.

Would not my hon. Friend agree that we are discussing a diminishing number of people because of the age factor? Will he re-examine this matter and rectify what many people think is a gross injustice?

The administrative cost would not justify the results that would follow, and there would still be considerable anomalies. If any hon. Member has details of cases of hardship I will gladly look at them to see whether there are Army charities or things of that sort which can assist.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence when his report on the case of Leslie Parkes will be published.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on his inquiries into the case of Mr. Leslie Parkes.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has any further statement to make on the case of Leslie Parkes.

I have nothing to add to my statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT for 25th October.—[Vol. 751, c. 1731.]

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that we have the strong impression in this House that the military prosecution, which was based on very sound grounds, was suspended for political and publicity reasons? Will he take this opportunity of saying that the Army was in no way to blame, because considerable aspersions have been cast on the Army for the action it took?

I think that the hon. Gentleman cannot have consulted his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) who, speaking from the Front Bench, with all his authority as a spokesman on home affairs, and with his legal and military background, asked me to do precisely what I did. No aspersions have been cast on the Army, but there were a number of factors in the case which, as the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone argued, made it desirable that if possible it should be dropped, and I took his advice.

Is it not the fact that in this case the charge was withdrawn before the summary of evidence was completed, and it was later found that the charge was fully justified? Does not this wholly vindicate the Army authorities, and prove the Minister's personal intervention, whatever his intentions at the time, to be both hasty and unjustified?

No, Sir. That is not what right hon. and hon. Members from the Front Bench and back benches opposite said at the time. The situation sometimes arises in the civil courts when, for one reason or another, the Attorney-General decides that he should enter a nolle prosequi. Unfortunately such a proceeding is not available to the military authorities under military law. I believe that it should be, that in similar circumstances it is right that military proceedings should be brought to an end as they can be in the civil courts.

I recognise that some features of the way in which the proceedings were brought to an end were unsatisfactory, and I regret this, but I believe that more damage would have been done to the public interest and to the Army's interests

if the proceedings had been allowed to continue.

In the original statement my right hon. Friend said that the legal department of the War Office decided to take steps to rearrest Parkes, presumably on very substantial ground. Was any Minister consulted prior to this step being taken which would have avoided the necessity for quashing the proceedings on what my right hon. Friend termed public grounds?

No, Sir. This was one of the minor errors of judgment to which I referred in my statement. My right hon. Friend will no doubt recall that when he was Secretary of State for War the right of military rearrest after the failure of civil proceedings was a matter of great controversy between his Department and another one. I think that it would have been better if, on this occasion, before this step was taken—there was no precedent for more than 20 years, and even the precedent was imperfect in many respects—there had been consultation at a higher level.

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether, before he procured the discontinuation of these military proceedings, he had had the advice of the Law Officers about whether it was proper to do so? I am sure the right hon. Gentleman recognises that there is great anxiety that an executive Minister should stop the ordinary processes of a prosecution because he happens to be under political or Press pressure. Will the Minister join me in congratulating the Attorney-General on showing the hollowness and absurdity of withdrawing a charge which was a good one?

I really think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman, with all his legal experience, should think twice about his second remark. He seemed to be suggesting that in the proceedings which he took for perjury the Attorney-General was pursuing the Army's case against Parkes as a deserter. I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman is not suggesting that that is the case. If he were, it would be most improper.

Is the Minister aware that his reply concerning the Army's part in this is totally unsatisfactory, because it is now evident that, whatever the local police may have done, the Army was in no way to blame for what happened? As the Army cannot speak for itself in this House, will he make this clear?

I hope that nobody is trying to put me into the position of criticising the Army as a whole. I believe that some errors of judgment were made in this case, and this is why I thought it right that it should be brought to an end and Parkes released. The errors to which I have referred are the long delay between his arrest and re-arrest, the circumstances of the arrest itself, the circumstances in which Parkes was held in detention, which may be held, and were held, by many hon. Members to have prejudiced the later trial, but, above all, the propriety of using Section 74 to re-arrest a man and take military proceedings when a civil court had found that there was no case that he was subject to military law. I am trying to ensure that this type of case can never arise again. I think that the House as a whole strongly approved the statement I made a fortnight ago that in fact it should not in future be the practice to use Section 74 in cases where the magistrates have found that there was no case to be heard under Sections 186 and 187.

On a point of order. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise this question at the earliest opportunity.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many Royal Navy personnel have been directly involved in the Vietnam war.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many members of Her Majesty's forces have been engaged in Service duties on land in Vietnam, in the air over Vietnam or in coastal waters around Vietnam, in the last two years; what were their duties; to what units of Her Majesty's forces they were attached, or to which foreign or Commonwealth forces they were attached, or seconded.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what British service personnel have been attached to United States or Allied forces in South Vietnam.

There are seven attachés and assistant defence attachés on the staff of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Saigon, together with a supporting staff of 10 other ranks.

Visits to South Vietnam by Service officers to gain information have numbered 19, involving 42 officers in all, in the last two years.

On three occasions a Beverley aircraft has been detached from Singapore to Saigon to help with the distribution of relief and welfare supplies provided by various charitable organisations. The total number of Service personnel concerned has been 56.

Occasionally, shorter-range R.A.F. aircraft stage through Saigon en route from Singapore to Hong Kong, there being no suitable alternative. In this connection, there is an R.A.F. movement control officer at Saigon airport.

Since 1965 some 30 British Service personnel who have been on loan or exchange with Australian or New Zealand forces have been to South Vietnam for short visits mainly in ships. The arrangements under which they are exchanged or loaned preclude involvement in active military operations and the Service men in question have not been so involved. However, extensive inquiries have brought to light that one Royal Naval officer, who retired from the Service in January this year, took part for a few days, while previously on a loan posting to the Royal Australian Navy, in bottom searches of merchant ships in Vietnam waters.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is strong feeling in this country that British Armed Forces should not be used in any way in the Vietnam fighting? Is my right hon. Friend saying that, apart from this one exception, the Evening Standard story was untrue? Can he make a definite statement about the Evening Standard article?

Yes. The Evening Standard article was completely untrue. It said that personnel of Royal Navy Combined Operations had been conducting secret military operations in Vietnam during the last 12 months. As I have made clear, this was totally untrue.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that, in view of the concern on these benches that our forces should never be engaged in any capacity whatever in that war, we are grateful to him for his careful inquiries?

indicated assent.

I agree that British combat forces should not be directly engaged in the Vietnam conflict, but will the right hon. Gentleman consider sending a British military medical team to serve with the Australian contingent in Vietnam, to help, our Commonwealth casualties and also civilian casualties?

Given our responsibilities as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, I think it would be wrong for British forces to be involved in any way in military operations in Vietnam. I regret that I must decline the hon. Gentleman's suggestion.

The House will be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for clearing up this matter, but will he make it clear that not only are British personnel not used in any secret investigations in Vietnamese waters but are not used for any purpose in clearing underwater obstructions or wrecks round Vietnamese ports?

Yes, Sir. I can give that assurance.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to ensure that the military lessons of the Vietnam war are available to Her Majesty's Forces.

I have nothing to add to the answer I gave to Questions by the hon. Members for Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair) and for Merton and Morden (Mr. Atkins) on 31st May, 1967.—[Vol. 747, c. 65–6 and 71.]

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that much less can be learnt by defence attachés, especially at embassies, than by observers stationed for substantial periods with the competent forces? Have we now or have we had such observers?

No, Sir. We have no such observers because the last Govern- ment, in July, 1964, decided that it would not be wise to allow British officers and men to serve as observers with fighting forces in Vietnam. That was a wise decision, and the present Government intend to stand by it.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I draw your attention to the fact that reference is constantly being made to things said in this House during the last Session?

I shall be dealing with that point of order at 3.30 p.m.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence under what conditions Great Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent will be used independently outside its international rôle.

As I told the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) on 1st March, the Government cannot conceive of any situation in which we would need to exercise the right to the independent use of our strategic nuclear weapons.—[Vol. 742, c. 484–5.]

Can the Government nevertheless confirm that it is our policy to use our strategic nuclear deterrent independently if our supreme national interest is at stake? Secondly, if that should be so, does that include Polaris and the exercise of our nuclear capabilities in N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O. and CENTO?

The hon. Member has asked a hypothetical question about a hypothesis which Her Majesty's Government cannot entertain.

But surely the right hon. Gentleman will confirm that the terms on which the British nuclear deterrent is committed to N.A.T.O. reserve to the Government the right to use that deterrent independently in certain circumstances.

As I have made clear, I cannot conceive of circumstances in which we would need to exercise that right.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what has been the total value of arms sales to the Republic of South Africa in the last 12 months.

As the Prime Minister reminded the hon. Member on 28th July, 1966, it is a long-standing and necessary convention that details of arms sales to individual countries are not disclosed.—[Vol. 732, c. 1890.]

Can the Minister say whether the South Africans have requested certain British military equipment and, if so, whether the Government are now considering that request?

I cannot reveal what requests are made by individual Governments to us for arms sales. All I can say is that the embargo that was placed on arms to South Africa still stands.

Can my hon. Friend assure the House that there is no substance in reports that the Government are considering lifting their embargo and supplying certain types of military equipment to South Africa?

This question is bound to come up time and time again. We are always pressed to comment on the question whether we are considering our policy afresh. I reiterate that at this moment we stand by the United Nations Resolution of 18th June, 1964, which banned all arms to South Africa.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the arrangements for withdrawal of British troops from Aden.

As the House knows, our forces in Aden will be withdrawn by the end of November. Aircraft of Air Support Command, augmented in the initial stages by civil aircraft, will make the main lift of personnel and a Royal Naval task force off Aden will cover the withdrawal.

Before our withdrawal is it intended to pass further areas of Aden over to the Federal Army? Will the right hon. Gentleman answer an important question, namely, whether there is any information as to who is at present controlling the Federal Army?

Yes, Sir. The latest information is that the Federal Army is fully under the control of the officers appointed to command it. On the first question, the withdrawal will be phased and, as it proceeds, certain areas will be handed over to the Federal Army. The House will recognise that I cannot be expected to give details of the phasing of the withdrawal plan.

Leaving aside the political implications of withdrawal at a time when anarchy appears to prevail in the Federation, can the right hon. Gentleman say what difference the advancement of the date of our withdrawal would make to the cost of air transport, stated to be £140 million in last year's Defence Estimates?

I am afraid that I cannot answer that question without notice.

Will the Minister give advice to the civilians in the Aden area as to what action they should take when our troops are withdrawn?

Yes, Sir. I would like to explain the situation in relation to this very important problem. At the moment there are about 500 British and friendly nationals in Aden, 200 of whom will be leaving before the last troops leave. That will leave about 300. We have contingency plans at any moment before independence to withdraw the remaining British civilians if they wish to be withdrawn. After independence, if some or all the remaining British civilians wish to leave we would seek a safe conduct from the authorities, but we shall have a very powerful Navy task force for a short time in local waters, and if it is necessary to use the task force—which will include a commando carrier—we shall do so.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether, in view of the failure to develop surface-to-surface weapons for the Royal Navy, he will reconsider the case for the replacement of exsting aircraft carriers by small modern carriers.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether, in the light of the sinking of the Israeli destroyer "Eilat" by Komar missiles, he will review Her Majesty's Government's policy not to replace aircraft carriers due to become obsolescent in the early 1970's.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what further consideration he has given to the replacement of existing aircraft carriers by small modern carriers.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will reconsider the provision of small modern carriers, in view of the threat from surface-to-surface missiles and the lack of alternative defensive measures.

The answer to all four Questions is, none, and, no, Sir.

Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that, although the helicopter has an important rôle to play in submarine warfare, anti-surface ship helicopters are vulnerable to fighter aircraft and missiles? Will he therefore look again at the whole case for cheaper and less sophisticated aircraft carriers?

I have had a careful look, as the hon. Gentleman will no doubt recognise, in recent months, but nothing which has recently happened has caused me to change my view that the best type of defence for ships at sea in the period after our own aircraft carriers phase out will be a combination of naval vessels, helicopter-borne missiles, perhaps surface-to-surface missiles and land-based strike aircraft. I am confirmed in this view by the fact that I have seen reports that the Soviet Navy is producing helicopter carriers and a substantial amphibious force but seems to have no current intention of providing a strike aircraft carrier to protect them.

While there may be serious economic objections to the provision of even small modern aircraft carriers, will my right hon. Friend ensure that, to the maximum extent, all surface ships will be provided with helicopters equipped with air-to-ship missiles?

Yes, Sir, this is a most important element in our policy, because, even if we had an aircraft carrier force of three, as the previous Government intended, we could not hope to have more than one on station in extra-European waters at a time, and the capacity of that one carrier to protect the whole fleet would obviously be very limited. By giving each substantial ship its own heli- copter or its own surface-to-air missile, we are substantially increasing the defensive capability of the fleet at sea.

Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind, before quoting the Russian Navy, that it has developed a very effective surface-to-surface capability and that this is perhaps why they do not need aircraft carriers or the very versatile manned aircraft, and that it would not be comparable to quote the fact that we do not need a surface-to-surface capability or aircraft? We have not developed, as a conscious act of policy, a surface-to-surface missile.

With respect, the hon. Gentleman, with all his previous Ministerial knowledge, will recognise that one does not protect the fleet at sea with a 20-mile surface-to-surface missile. That is not the function of the Komar missile or the Komar patrol boats.

What trials have been made of the helicopter using the AS.12? Was it not strange to decide to phase out the carriers before making sure whether this alternative protection of our vessels worked?

No, Sir, I do not think so, as I explained to my hon. Friend at the time in another capacity. The importance of taking a decision on the carriers—a decision which had been dodged by the previous Government for about 15 years—was that by taking it in 1966, we gave ourselves time to meet the requirement by the time that the carriers phased out.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will make a statement on the circumstances in which an unidentified flying object has been seen in the Okehampton area of Devon; and what are his plans to deal with a recurrence of this flying object;

(2) whether the flying object in the Okehampton area of Devon, which has been described as a star-shaped cross larger than a conventional aircraft, is a British aircraft or an unidentified flying object.

We received a number of reports of objects seen in the sky over North Devon in October. After investigation, some proved to be aircraft and some were lights. Of the lights, the majority were the planet Venus; but the source of a few lights has not been positively identified. I can say, however, that none of these unidentified lights was an alien object.

There are standing instructions for R.A.F. stations to report unusual objects seen in the sky, and standing arrangements for investigating these reports and similar reports from other sources. I do not consider additional action necessary.

Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that this matter is not only of considerable interest to the South-West, particularly the Okehampton area, but also of some concern? How does this statement square with the statements of two police officers and of engineers at Hessary Tor that low-flying objects were moving for over an hour in the area?

In answer to a Question yesterday and another today, I have published details of all the investigations which have been made over recent years, and none of these would give any reason to believe that there are unidentified objects in the sense which has been implied. Further, we have complete radar coverage to a very great height over all these islands and have access to that over Europe, and none of this leads us to believe in any sense that this is anything else than something which we know nothing about.

Can my hon. Friend assure us that he has received scientific advice?

I can give that assurance. This is not just an air defence matter. We have access to scientists of high repute—they have been consulted on all these matters—and also to psychologists.

The hon. Gentleman said that we have complete radar coverage. In these circumstances, can he explain how a letter was sent by his Department when a report was sent about one of these objects to the effect that it "might or might not" have been an aircraft but his Department was unable to say?

The problem is that, if one is notified of this right away, it is possible to give a more definitive reply, but when one gets a letter weeks later asking what it might have been on such and such an occasion, it is difficult to be definitive on it. But nothing leads us to believe that this is men from Mars or anything of that kind.

Would it not be desirable for the Government to encourage this idea that there are unidentified flying objects and that there is a danger of invasion from another planet? Would this not create the necessary diversion so that people in this country, and the electors in particular, would not worry about their economic problems?

Judging from the public's response to some newspaper reports, I can only hope that they will take my right hon. Friend's remark seriously.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what further plans he will make to equip surface vessels of the Royal Navy with ship-to-ship missiles; and whether he will make a statement.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to speed up the provision of surface-to-surface guided missiles for British warships.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is his policy with regard to the provision of ship-to-ship missiles.

As I explained to the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) on 25th October, the Royal Navy's surface-to-surface capability in the 1970s will be based on helicopter-launched guided missiles which will be provided in every ship from frigate upwards. We are introducing the AS.12 air-to-surface missile next year, and before the aircraft carriers phase out this will have been replaced by an even more effective helicopter-launched missile. These weapons will be fully effective against lightly defended surface targets such as the missile-firing patrol boats which sank the "Eilat"; by using helicopters to deliver them, we can both outrange the enemy missiles and achieve a flexibility of operation which would be impossible with a ship-launched system.—[Vol. 751, c. 1729–31.]

Would my hon. Friend not agree that helicopters are very vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire? Are there no other weapons systems which he could devise?

But this will give us the flexibility and the cost-effectiveness which we require, and the "eyes" which the Navy wants, and we shall be able to operate far more effectively than with the ship-to-ship capability well beyond the horizon with helicopter-borne missiles.

Did not the decision to phase out aircraft carriers make the case very much stronger for these missiles? Is it not highly questionable whether the helicopter will do the job properly?

I would remind the House that I said last week that Seaslug Mk.II has a secondary capability of ship-to-ship and that Sea Dart, which is now coming into production, is primarily a ship-to-air missile, but also has a secondary ship-to-ship capability.

To allay public anxiety partly over this matter, will my hon. Friend confirm that there are also effective electronic counter-measures for ship-to-ship missiles?

Yes, Sir, and I know that my hon. Friend is fully conversant with them.

Can the hon. Gentleman give the present operability of helicopters at night or in a thick mist?

Not without a good deal of lecturing to the House, Sir.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence when the third and fourth Polaris submarines are due to be commissioned.

The third Polaris submarine, H.M.S. "Repulse", is due to be commissioned in the autumn of 1968; the fourth submarine, H.M.S. "Revenge", is due to follow six months later.

For how long is this independent deterrent to be retained? In particular, are the Government planning to develop a more modern warhead for the missiles to prolong the life of the Polaris system?

The deployment and development of hardened or Poseidon warheads for carriers and submarines is an entirely different question from that on the Order Paper, which concerns commissioning.

In view of the Prime Minister's clear undertaking on this question, may we be assured that all these had, at the time of the 1964 election, reached a stage at which it was impossible to stop their progress or cancel their production because they could not be adapted for any other purposes?

Yes, Sir. The House should also be aware—especially my hon. Friend—that, when a Government embark on building a very complex and expensive weapons system like this, lead items are ordered in many cases two years before the keel of the vessel is laid.

I should like to ask the Minister what estimate has been made of the running expenses of the Polaris submarines when they are commissioned.

I could not give that information without notice, but I shall be pleased to write to the hon. Member about it.

Will my hon. Friend ensure that when either of these is launched there is no mud about, because the last one was a very undignified spectacle?

As far as I can help it, yes, Sir.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what further changes he is instituting in the organisation of his Department.

I keep the organisation of the Ministry of Defence, which continues to evolve, under regular review. When I decide that any further major changes are needed, I shall, of course, inform the House.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these rumours have a very unsettling effect and result in a loss of confidence in the Service? If he intends to make any changes, will he announce them as soon as possible?

Yes, Sir.

Will the right hon. Gentleman recognise that he has the support of many hon. Members in the excellent work which his Ministry is doing to push forward the Polaris submarine programme and in the work being done on improved warheads?

I accept that compliment.

Order. Supplementary questions must arise out of the initial Question.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had with the defence authorities of Malaysia and of Singapore following the British White Paper of July,1967.

There has been the normal continuing exchange of views on matters of common interest.

In view of the uncertainty which the recent Parliamentary delegation found on this subject, both in Kuala Lumpur and in Singapore, on the British military rôle, will the right hon. Gentleman say categorically what steps he is taking to make quite clear to the people out there what can be done to honour the obligations of the British in the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement?

My impression is that there is no uncertainty whatever about the military side of our policy. I talked to the Prime Minister of Singapore only the other day about it and about the Malaysia position. There is great concern in both countries about the economic consequences of the rundown, and we are in the closest touch with them on that. As soon as we are in a position to make a further announcement, we shall do so.

Have the Government learned the bitter lesson of Aden? Will they reconsider the wisdom of announcing distant dates for British withdrawal in totally unpredictable circumstances?

I recommend the hon. Gentleman to read the recent pamphlet by the Conservative Central Office recording the conclusions of Lord Selkirk and other leading experts on the area. He will see that the objective set by those Conservative experts was the same as our own, but they left great uncertainty about the way and time in which they would carry it out. If hon. Members opposite are worried about uncertainty, they should applaud us for introducing some firm elements into the problem.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when he will announce a decision on the base or staging post at Aldabra Atoll in the Indian Ocean;

(2) what plans he has for the protection of the staging post at Aldabra Atoll in the Indian Ocean.

No decision has yet been taken on the possibility of building an airfield in the British Indian Ocean territory. I will make an announcement, one way or the other, as soon as possible. I am not prepared to deal on a hypothetical basis with the question of the protection of such an airfield.

Is there a current cost estimate?

Yes, Sir.

Is the Minister aware that it is rather more than two years since he announced this as being a basic part of his defence philosophy, in the White Paper of 1965? That is rather a long time, and he has not yet produced any plans to bring into being what he suggested was essential in order to make use of the F111.

I am afraid that it was such a long time ago that the hon. Member has completely forgotten the terms in which reference was made to this matter. It was not regarded as a basic part but as a possible element of flexibility.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on the efficiency of the naval blockade as part of Her Majesty's Government's policy of sanctions against the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he proposes to withdraw the naval patrol from the Beira area.

The naval patrol off Beira has been wholly effective in that it has cut off the most direct means of oil supply to Rhodesia. Its success is amply demonstrated by the enforced closure of the refinery at Umtali. The additional expense of importing refined products over great distances is constituting a significant drain on Rhodesia's resources of foreign exchange. The patrol will be needed as long as the Security Council Resolution of 9th April, 1966, under which it was instituted, remains in force. On the costs of the patrol, including the R.A.F. detachment, I refer to the reply I gave to the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) on Wednesday, 25th October.

Does my right hon. Friend not agree that the policy of sanctions is little more than an expensive gesture, unless there are adequate means of complete enforcement? When shall we extend the blockade to ports not yet covered?

That is not a question for me. My hon. Friend knows that it raises a very large number of very difficult economic and political questions.

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is a complete charade, since oil is gushing into Rhodesia through other ports, as is known to the right hon. Gentleman and his Government? Is he completely unaware that this patrol ties down and commits more than one-third of our total frigate and destroyer force east of Suez? Is not this a thoroughly irresponsible and unnecessary burden on the Royal Navy at a time when it is so overstretched in that area?

I do not believe that the officers and men of the Royal Navy concerned regard this as a charade, and I do not think they will take very kindly to the hon. Member's reference to it as such. I can only tell him again, in case he did not listen to my Answer, that by blockading Beira we have forced the Umtali refinery to close down and imposed a major burden in foreign exchange on the illegal regime in Rhodesia.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the so-called efficiency of the British Navy outside Beira is by no means absolute in relation to sanctions against Mr. Smith's Government? Has he observed that not only in the public Press but in the House, in a film, it is alleged that there is still considerable connivance by British-owned companies in trying to breach the blockade?

That is quite another matter. The purpose of the naval blockade, as defined by the United Nations resolution, was to stop crude oil arriving at Beira, and in that it has been 100 per cent effective.

How many of Her Majesty's ships have been employed in this blockade and how many are employed in that capacity at present?

A patrol of two frigates has been employed continuously since the blockade began.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether Great Britain is still committed to, and whether forces are still available for, military intervention in Rhodesia following a breakdown of law and order in that territory.

The position has not changed since my reply to the hon. Member's Question last April.

Does my right hon. Friend not agree that, with the steady erosion of law and order as we understand them in Britain, that situation is rapidly coming about? At what point would he be prepared to intervene?

I do not believe that that point has come about, and I am afraid that I cannot speculate on hypothetical contingencies.

Do the British Government hold themselves responsible for the integrity of Rhodesia against aggression or subversion from outside?.

South Africa.

I do not know precisely to which matter the hon. Member is referring. If he will tell me I will try to reply.

The right hon. Gentleman is aware that there have been incursions across the Rhodesian frontier. Is not the House responsible for Rhodesia, according to the Government? I therefore ask, does the Secretary of State hear any responsibility for the defence of Rhodesia?

I have no responsibility for the incursions which have taken place, according to reports, in both directions, from North and South, but the hon. Member knows that protests have been made to certain Governments.

What further action will be taken about the invasion of British soil from South Africa? Can my right hon. Friend recollect any previous invasion of British territory when the benches opposite did not loudly demand that a gunboat should be sent?

I am not sure whether that is the purport of the question by the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison).

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what appraisals have been made in the last six months of the feasibility of the use of force against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; and what conclusions have been reached.

I have nothing to add to the statement of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 12th November, 1965.—[Vol. 720, c. 538.]

May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the fact that I have asked about feasibility studies in the last six months, during which the situation has changed? I want to know whether my right hon. Friend is asking us to accept, in a changing situation in relation to Rhodesia, that his Ministry has not made up-to-date feasibility studies.

I have often told the House that it is not the practice and never has been to discuss contingency plans in the House in detail. Nothing in the situation has required the Government to change the view expressed by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on the date I mentioned, when he said:

"I think the whole House will feel that we should not consider sending what would be a major military invasion for the purpose of imposing a constitutional solution on Rhodesia."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 538.]

asked the Secretary of State for Defence to what extent his present contingency plans are based on the criterion that a Soviet attack in Europe is unlikely in present circumstances.

It is of the nature of contingency planning that it should cover the unlikely as well as the more likely situation.

Can the right hon. Gentleman give a categorical assurance that no plans are being considered in his Ministry for further drastic reductions in the forces in addition to those already announced?

I can tell the House that my Ministry, like many others in Whitehall, is deeply concerned that we shall solve the problem of the foreign exchange costs of the British forces in Germany. With the hon. and gallant Gentleman's long Service background, he will know that it is not the custom for Ministers of whatever party in this House to speculate on planning.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the progress to date with F111 offset purchases, with particular reference to Elliott's order for head-up display equipment.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the value of the contract awarded to Messrs. Elliott Automation for head-up display equipment for United States Navy aircraft; and whether this will count against the F111 offset purchases agreement.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the major orders that have been obtained by British industry under the F111 offset-agreement; and how many British firms have so far tendered for orders.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what progress is being made with the F111 offset purchasing arrangements agreed with the United States Government.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give details of the defence contracts that have been obtained from the United States of America.

I am pleased to tell the House that proposals made by Messrs. Elliott Automation Limited for the supply of head-up display equipment for the United States A7 aircraft have been accepted. This should mean sales worth about $40 million. We have now received other orders from the United States Department for Defense, and from U.S. defence contractors, worth nearly $138 million. The main items are Spey engine components worth $82 million; three salvage tugs and two survey ships worth $40 million; aircraft equipment worth $6 million; machine tools worth $3 million; and general stores such as fence posts and pipes worth $4 million. The balance is made up of miscellaneous items of naval and army equipment worth $3 million. These orders have been won by 28 different firms.

While appreciating my hon. Friend's reply and the effect of the offset agreement upon our industry, may I ask whether he is satisfied that his Ministry and others are doing all they can to enable our firms to compete in United States markets?

The offset arrangement is giving British firms ample opportunity and they are responding very well. It has given them a chance to sell equipment of advanced technological design to the Americans. The Elliott equipment is a typical example.

Considerable doubt has been cast on the value of the offset agreement. Can my hon. Friend state whether the securing of this order was helped by the agreement?

Undoubtedly so. British industry already is taking a great interest. Indeed, 400 firms have shown an interest in the arrangement.

In view of the obvious effect on our shipbuilding industry, what has happened to the bid which it was hoped to make for minesweepers for the United States Navy?

As I have said, we are already building five other ships for the American Navy. After the slight "hiccup" our shipyards have been invited to bid for nine minesweepers.

How many British firms altogether have tendered for these and further orders?

Altogether 400 British firms have shown interest, but I cannot give the specific number of firms which have already tendered.

The items the hon. Gentleman listed in his first reply had already been announced in one way or another. Is it not the case that the head-up display was accepted entirely on its merits and not because of the agreement?

This is not true. The lower tariffs introduced in order to help British firms sell defence equipment to the United States have helped considerably.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Chief Secretary to the Treasury gave an untruthful answer to the House to my Written Question No. 30 last Friday concerning the total outstanding value of dollar debts contracted for aircraft in America by the present Government?

I do not know the Question or the Answer and so I cannot comment.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on progress with regard to the proposed Anglo-French helicopter deal.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on the Anglo-French helicopter deal.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether progress has been maintained on other Anglo-French collaborative projects since the cancellation of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft.

The Anglo-French Martel, Jaguar and Helicopter programmes are going well. Development of both Martel and Jaguar is well advanced and preparations are in hand for the start of production. At a meeting of Ministers in Paris last month agreement was reached to start joint production on the tactical SA330 helicopter and to embark on the full development of the light SA340 and utility WG13. A Rolls-Royce Bristol Siddeley engine was adopted for the WG13.

Is not my right hon. Friend a little concerned about future prospects of collaboration with the French in view of their attitude to the A.F.V.G. and towards our application to join the E.E.C.?

No, Sir. My impression is that where there is a clear common interest to be achieved which is accepted in principle in advance, it is possible to work out agreements in detail and stick to them. There is a clear common interest between Britain and France that these programmes should succeed.

Will my right hon. Friend give a categorical assurance that the programme will not become predominantly French as against Anglo-French?

Yes, Sir. We have taken care, particularly in the case of the helicopter, to balance out the work of design and production between the two countries.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what was the value of naval construction placed in the three years previous to 1964; and what is the comparable figure to date.

For the period 1961–63, £158·7 million. For the period 1965–67, £254·2 million. These figures represent the total cost of new construction, including weapon equipment and so on, which are given in the annual Estimates.

What proportion of this order have the Scottish shipyards received?