asked the Secretary of State for Defence why, in view of Great Britain's diminishing defence commitments east of Suez, the residual requirement for a high-level reconnaissance and strike aircraft cannot be fulfilled by the remaining V-bombers, or sea-borne aircraft, instead of by United States-built F111Ks.

The F111K will come into service in about two years' time to replace the Canberra as a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft. It is required as much in Europe as elsewhere for this type of operation.

I thank the Minister for his Answer. Could he say in what part of the world he foresees it operating and from what bases?

The F111s, when delivered, will be deployed from the United Kingdom only, apart from training occasionally overseas.

Is it not the case that an agreement has been reached with our N.A.T.O. Allies that the F111K will remain assigned for the defence of N.A.T.O. in Europe and, therefore, will not be available for British defence commitments elsewhere?

It will certainly be required for deployment in Europe.

Is there any truth in the rumour that this is a fixed-wing aircraft and not a swing-wing aircraft, which presumably would weaken its rôle?

I cannot answer for rumours outside.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if, following devaluation, he will state the extra cost, respectively, of the proposed purchase of United States military aircraft, of Polaris missiles, of maintaining the British Army of the Rhine and Great Britain's military bases East of Suez; and what cuts he will now make in these four items of expenditure.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the additional cost of maintaining Great Britain's military forces in Germany and Malaysia consequent on devaluation; and to what extent these increases will be taken into account in the proposed overall reduction in military expenditure next year.

I have nothing to add at present to the statements made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration in the debate on 27th November and in reply to a Question by the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) on 29th November.— [Vol. 755. c. 43, 154.]

Will the Minister convey to the Cabinet the view of many Labour M.P.s that the whole of the proposed £100 million a year cut should come from arms and not a single penny off the social services?

That would be an extremely difficult operation, especially when we have just completed a three-year study in concert with our allies. This is in the Defence White Paper.

Is my hon. Friend aware that, whatever the increased cost may be consequent on devaluation, we cannot afford it? Will he convey to the proper quarters that the almost unanimous desire on this side of the House is that we should get out of Malaysia very much quicker than we are intending at the moment?

My hon. Friend should be aware that when we announced the £100 million cuts a week or so ago they were a cut-back of planned expenditure in the course of the next year.

Will the hon. Gentleman explain what negotiations are going on to improve the offset agreements with the United States Government?

It is a little early to give a specific reply, because we are taking some time to work out the whole effects of devaluation, not only on aircraft and Polaris, but on stationing and equipment in the Far East and Middle East or generally.

The Home Secretary, when Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time of devaluation, said specifically that arms cuts would be £100 million next year. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence produced the figure of £67 million in the debate on 27th November. Will my hon. Friend say which of these was right?

The £ 100 million cutback has taken place. We did not take into consideration devaluation or cancellation charges, but that was agreed to by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Be under no illusion, £100 million has been cut out of projected expenditure during 1968–69.

Is the hon. Gentleman in a position to say whether the net redaction to which his hon. Friend has referred will be nearer £35 million or £60 million?

No, Sir.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will state what, in view of his announced £ 100 million a year cut in arms expenditure, will be the estimated expenditure at current 1967 prices for 1967–68, 1968–69 and 1969–70; what reductions will be made beyond those mentioned in the July Defence White Paper; and what further reductions of forces manpower are planned.

As my right hon. Friend made clear in the Adjournment debate on defence on 27th November, the recently announced savings of £100 million represent a cut on the planned and announced defence expenditure total for the next financial year. I am not prepared to go further than he did on that occasion in anticipating future defence estimates.

Is it not a fact that at current prices over the next three years there will be no reduction at all? Does the Minister really believe that we should bankrupt ourselves in a vain attempt to maintain a world military rôle?

My hon. Friend should be aware that we made a pledge in 1964 that we would keep defence expenditure down to £ 2,000 million at 1964 prices and we would achieve it by 1970. We are managing to bring it down to £1,900 million two years earlier than planned.

Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that he did not answer that part of the Question about what his right hon. Friend said that other day, namely, that no further reductions in manpower are planned?

Not that I am aware of.

Will my hon. Friend point out to his Cabinet colleagues that no really effective reduction can be made in defence expenditure without a reduction of commitments? Will he explain that what needs to be done is a reduction in commitments so that the Forces do not suffer by a reduction as a result of cuts in defence expenditure?

If that were to be done, I hope my hon. Friend will realise it could not be done unilaterally or quickly. It has to be done in concert with our Allies, with whom, of course, we have military pacts.

When will these cuts become effective, and are they sufficient to save sterling?

In the planned year as promised, 1968–69.

On a point of order. Unless the Defence Minister is ill, should we not be told why, when we have a whole series of Questions to him, he is not here to answer them?

That is not a point of order for Mr. Speaker.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence to what extent the defence planning of the United Kingdom is co-ordinated with that of South Africa.

Planning for the defence of the Cape route is co-ordinated with South Africa in accordance with the terms of the Simonstown Agreement.

Since Simonstown and naval co-operation are more than ever essential to our security, how are the Government honouring the spirit of the Simonstown Agreement? In view of the appalling trade figures and Admiral Bierman's visit, have the Government completed their reconsideration of their hypocritical arms ban?

The latter point is very much different from the one in the Question. With regard to the Agreement, we recognise the importance and value of the Cape route. The Commander-in-Chief, Western Fleet, is responsible for overall planning of that region and we have a senior officer for co-ordinating planning locally.

When are we to dissociate ourselves from this absurd Agreement? Against whom is the South African alliance directed?

The Simonstown Agreement is working extremely well and is serving us well at the moment.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that after the hash his party has made of affairs in the Middle East the route round the Cape is much more important than ever before? Is he also aware that there are grave rumours that the French are to replace us in Simonstown? Will he give an assurance that that is not so?

As far as I am aware, it is not so.

Does not the illegal presence of South African Forces in Rhodesia make a nonsense of any coordinated defence policy with South Africa? Will my hon. Friend give a categorical undertaking that there is no intention of supplying Buccaneers to the South African Air Force?

Arms to South Africa is the subject of a later Question. We have always recognised the importance of the Cape route, and for that the Simonstown Agreement has been kept in being. My hon. Friend should be aware that it is playing a strong part at the moment.

As the supply of arms to South Africa is an essential part of cooperation with South Africa and of the spirit of the Simonstown Agreement, will the Government say categorically whether they are or are not reconsidering their present policy on the supply of arms to South Africa?

I can only give the same answer to the right hon. Gentleman as I gave to one of my hon. Friends. There is a later Question on the Order Paper specifically on this subject, and I will answer it when we come to it.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I believe that the Minister of Defence is making reference to a Question of mine, No. 51. Has he given you any indication, Sir, that he wishes to answer this Question at the end of Questions if it is not reached?

The answer is "No".

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the estimated additional cost of the purchase of military aircraft from the United States of America consequent on devaluation; and whether, in the new circumstances, he will seek to cancel all these orders.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the additional cost in sterling of military aircraft ordered from the United States of America since October 1964, arising out of the devaluation of the £ sterling.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence following devaluation of the £ sterling and additional costs of buying foreign aircraft and defence equipment, whether he will cancel all outstanding orders and buy British equipment alone, including resuscitation of the TSR2 on account of its much cheaper cost post-devaluation than F111 United States aircraft.

asked the Secretary of Slate for Defence what will be the extra cost of the United States aircraft on order due to devaluation.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what increase there has been to the cost in sterling of military aircraft ordered from the United States of America following the devaluation of sterling.

The net budgetary addition to the continuing aircraft programme will be about £10 million a year. Because of the F111 offset arrangement, only about two-thirds of this represents additional foreign exchange costs.

Why does not my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence delight the international bankers by cutting public expenditure in the defence field and do it by cancelling these orders, because the need for these aircraft is very problematical indeed?

These agreements have been entered into. They concern the Hercules, which are now coming to this country; the Phantoms, which are coming next year; and the F111, on which we have got a particularly good offset agreement. These aircraft are operationally required, anyway, for our rôle in Europe.

For how many years will this £10 million apply? Will not the hon. Gentleman agree now that it was a great error on the part of the Labour Government to destroy the TSR2 and that these figures would make even the Secretary of State's bogus figures look silly?

That is ridiculously absurd, because we are getting the 50 F111s at half the price we should have paid for the TSR2s.

Is the Minister of Defence for Equipment aware of the sense of outrage felt by British exporters today who are bursting their boilers to earn foreign exchange by selling hard in the United States of America in order that his Ministry can dissipate their hard-won funds by buying American aircraft which we could build here in the first place anyway?

That is another ridiculously absurd proposition. Because we cancelled the strike reconnaissance programme of the Tory Administration— that was the P1154, the HS681 and the TSR2— we saved £1,200 million on their planned programme.

Would my hon. Friend like to comment on the nonsense of the offset agreement in so far as we are proposing to use productive resources to pay for planes which we do not need?

The offset agreement has already excited hundreds of British firms, has managed to get 40 major contracts in 17 towns in Britain, and is earning valuable dollars at the same time.

To what extent are the contracts relating to the offset purchases written in sterling and to what extent in dollars, because this obviously makes a difference to the final cost?

It is very difficult to work this out. This is one of the reasons why we keep saying to the right hon. Gentleman and to hon. Members opposite that it is not possible, because of devaluation, to work all this out so very quickly. Many of the aircraft that we are buying from abroad have got British equipment in them and it is difficult at this moment of time to work out what is the sterling content of all the contracts as distinct from the dollar content as well.

If it cannot be worked out, how can the Government give the House a figure as to the final cost?

This is being worked out on the individual contracts— the F111, the Hercules, the Phantom, and the Polaris submarine.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now publish the results of his investigations into the system of teenage recruiting.

My hon. Friend is not yet in a position to announce a decision.

Was it not stated that a statement would be made to the House between six and seven weeks after the receipt of the Latey Report? As it is now nearly 18 weeks since that Report was received, what is holding up the statement?

The Latey Report was not considered from the point of view of a firm decision in the House. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that my hon. Friend is working on this very hard and hopes soon to have a decision.

Will my hon. Friend tell us when we are likely to expect a reply in this matter? It has been hanging over now for quite a long time.

This is a very complicated matter. There are very important manning matters that affect the Services. I realise that many of my hon. Friends and others are very interested in this. I can give my hon. Friend an assurance that it is being pursued as hard as possible.

Is the Under-Secretary aware that the Minister of Defence for Administration gave a firm undertaking that he would make a statement to the House within eight weeks of the publication of the Report of the Latey Committee, that he has broken this undertaking, that he has broken his word to the House, and that many hon. Members opposite would be prepared to say so if they were not prevented from doing so by their Whips?

It is very important that a decision on an important matter like this should be firmly and permanently decided by considering all the factors. That is what my hon. Friend is doing.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what obligations and commitments abroad are being abandoned as a result of the defence cuts arising out of devaluation.

None, Sir.

Is not the Minister of Defence for Equipment aware that the Secretary of State for Defence said in the July White Paper that our obligations and commitments and our troops were at that time in balance? Was that statement quite untrue, or has the Secretary of State decided to expose our forces to quite unnecessary risks?

My right hon. Friend informed the House quite frankly that, because of the £100 million cut-back in planned expenditure, there may be marginal risks here and there. The hon. Gentleman asks if there has been any abandonment of commitments. I say, "No, Sir".

As the use of Aldabra, according to the Secretary of State, was necessary in the event of its being impossible to overfly certain countries, how can these commitments now be fulfilled?

There is another Question on the Order Paper about Aldabra, too. However, my right hon. Friend was quite frank and explained that this would certainly affect the flexibility of the force, especially if we wanted to use Aldabra for the Persian Gulf or for the South-about route to Singapore.

Does my hon. Friend's replies to this and to the previous Question mean that there is no major review of commitments taking place since devaluation? Is he saying that he and his Ministry have nothing to add about any proposal for a review of commitments since the debate of 27th November?

That is right, Sir.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he is satisfied that the Royal Navy anti-submarine forces are strong enough to ensure the survival of this country in the event of a major submarine attack by a hostile power; and if he will make a statement.

The present level of Royal Navy anti-submarine forces, together with those of our N.A.T.O. Allies, provides an effective shield against major submarine attacks. The introduction of the new classes of ships and equipment outlined in this year's White Paper will help to ensure that this remains the case.

Is not the Under-Secretary aware that the Defence Estimates of 1967 says:

"…it is no longer realistic for the Alliance to attempt to provide maritime forces for conducting a prolonged war at sea…"

So the allied forces will not be available. Is it not a fact that our own anti-submarine forces have never been so weak and that the threat from submarines due to technical progress has never been so great? Is it not the truth that, in the event of a submarine attack, this country faces defeat and ruin?

Certainly not.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence now that the number of shore bases available to the Royal Navy and necessary for the protection of vital sea routes of Great Britain are being reduced, what alternative is being provided.

The reductions that have taken place have not affected the ability of the Royal Navy to protect vital sea routes to Great Britain.

Does not the Under-Secretary agree that Great Britain still depends on her sea routes for vital supplies? Does not each base which is given up underline the importance of those remaining— for example, Simons-town and Gibraltar?

The question of the importance of the sea routes is certainly one that cannot be ignored. In terms of the existing bases and those which have been given up, we have still managed to refuel and supply the Fleet at sea, and this will continue adequately.

How could the Royal Navy defend us against a megaton bomb that arrived by rocket?

I cannot see that that arises from this Question.

Will not the Government reconsider the position of Malta as a very useful base in view of the move of the Russian Navy into the Mediterranean and the threat that that involves to our shipping?

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that when we get out completely from Malta we still will have some limited base facilities into which we can from time to time, if the urgency is there, airlift supplies and equipment.

Is my hon. Friend aware that Sweden has ships going all over the world but has no bases anywhere except in Sweden?

In view of the totally unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek an early opportunity to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what resources of the Royal Navy are being made available for fishery protection, both in home and distant waters.

Regular patrols in home waters are carried out by the Fishery Protection Squadron's six coastal minesweepers. Distant water protection is afforded by frigates of the Western Fleet. Additional vessels are allocated from the Western Fleet to fishery protection duties from time to time if the need arises and other commitments permit.

The services of the Royal Navy in this field are very much appreciated, but is my hon. Friend completely satisfied that the resources made available are adequate to meet the growing amount of illegal fishing now taking place?

Yes, Sir.

Will the hon. Gentleman look into the possibility of using helicopters to patrol our sea coasts in order to prevent poachers?

It has been examined in the context of using frigates on the far distant patrols. As regards our own territorial waters, we feel that we have adequate coverage as it is.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the newly formed Royal Marines/Royal Navy Dependants' Fund.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force intend to introduce schemes similar to the Soldiers' Widows' Fund.

Two new funds, the Royal Marines/Royal Navy Dependants' Fund and the Royal Air Force Dependants' Fund, were established this year. In the event of death, they provide for a substantial and immediate grant to be paid to dependants. Members of the funds pay a small subscription. Neither of the funds is in any way financed from public money.

The funds have already demonstrated their usefulness, and the rapidly increasing membership shows that this is widely recognised.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what are the special features of the Seadart missile system.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether a production order has been placed for the Seadart missile system for the Royal Navy.

The special features of the Seadart medium range surface-to-air guided weapon system are its anti-missile capability, its effectiveness against targets at low-level, and its quick reaction. Certain contracts have been placed both for ship-fitted equipment and missiles to be deployed in H.M.S. "Bristol". The system is also intended for the new destroyers and cruisers heralded in the July White Paper.

What are the advantages of this system over other systems which have been developed, particularly Seaslug?

It has a better all-round performance than Seaslug, particularly against low-flying or very fast targets. We consider that it will be able to engage the smallest and fastest anti-ship missiles which we foresee.

As regards the low-level capability of Seadart, is it not a fact that its range is less than half that of the Komar, and is not this a reason for re-examining from the beginning the whole question of a simpler and cheaper aircraft carrier?

No, that is not true; but I cannot disclose publicly the details of the system itself.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what will be the British contribution to the collaborative project known as Mallard.

The British contribution will be to carry out in this country about one-third of this very important and extensive research and development programme.

Why are we doing this on a co-operative basis and not developing something of our own?

It is a collaborative project between four countries. The cost of the research and development will be about 125 million dollars, of which our share will be about one-third. It will satisfy our own requirements, and there is a good chance of sales of this equipment, too.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Have we not had enough planted Questions, and cannot we get on with the rest?

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will give an assurance that British-owned nuclear weapons will not at any time and in any place be operated under independent British control.

No, Sir. I can, however, assure the hon. Member that it remains Her Majesty's Government's policy to internationalise all our nuclear weapons and that we can conceive of no situation where it would make sense for this country to use these weapons independently.

I thank my hon. Friend for that reply, but would it not be more sensible to carry the policy to its logical conclusion and get rid of the Polaris missiles altogether?

I remind my hon. Friend that the programme is now nearly complete, and such a nugatory expense would be astronomic.

Is it not correct that we have, nevertheless, the right to withdraw our strategic nuclear weapons if our national security is in danger?

That is right.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has considered official United States objections to the F111, details of which are in his possession; whether he is satisfied that this aircraft is suitable for purchase by this country; and if he will make a statement.

I assume that my hon. Friend is referring to the fighter version of the F111 aircraft which is being developed for the United States Navy. We are not purchasing this aircraft.

Is my hon. Friend aware that the Americans did not find satisfactory the aircraft which we are purchasing? Is not this an extra reason for reconsidering the matter? Why were we told, at the time when the TSR2 was scrapped, that we did not need aircraft of this kind?

My hon. Friend is misinformed. It is satisfying the United States Air Force, although their specifications are different from ours. I am quite satisfied, however, that it will satisfy us when delivered.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that all the reasons previously given for the purchase of this aircraft related to operations outside Europe, and there has been a complete reversal in the past few months?

The right hon. Gentleman knows that that is not true. It has been part of the argument that this aircraft would be capable of deployment East of Suez if required, but it has always had a Western European capability.

As the Government can see their way to taking a sensible decision to cancel the TSR2, what is there to prevent their taking a similar decision to cancel the F111K?

The Canberras are now gradually coming out of service. The F111 will supplement the V-bomber force in Europe, and, if we did not have an operational strike-reconnaissance aircraft of this kind, we should be dependent on the French in Europe and on United States cover in N.A.T.O.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what revisions he proposes to make in the procurement programme from the United States of America for Phantom aircraft following devaluation of the £ sterling; what will be the revised aggregate import cost of the 170 Phantom aircraft ordered; what additional orders he is arranging to secure in the United States of America for British naval, military and aeronautical equipment; and whether he will make a statement.

Including research and development costs, capital and interest payments and running costs over 10 years, the total dollar costs of the Phantom programme will be about £415 million. We have no plans for revision of this programme. On the question of additional United States orders for British equipment, I have nothing to add to the statement made by my right hon. Friend in the debates on 29th November.

Does the hon. Gentleman's Reply mean that no part of his postulated saving of £100 million on defence in 1968 may be attributed to these Phantom aircraft, and the £415 million to be spent on them over the next decade is, therefore, sacrosanct?

"Sacrosanct" would be a dangerous word to use, but, as far as I can see, it is quite safe.

In what year will these aircraft be paid for?

They will be delivered next year. We are allowed to pay for them over the next nine years.

Will my hon. Friend reaffirm the Government's previous position that they will not sell any kind of military aircraft, ships or any military weapons to the United States for possible use in Vietnam?

That has always been our policy. We do not sell arms if we know they are going to be used in Vietnam.

What proportion of the sum which my hon. Friend has mentioned is due to the order placed in 1964 by the Conservative Government?

I cannot say without notice.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many ships of the Royal Navy are employed in the maintenance of the Beira Patrol.

Two frigates are employed on continuous patrol.

Does not the Minister know that that is not the whole answer, and that, owing to the distance from Singapore, at least six ships are employed on this patrol? Will he make representations to the Prime Minister that we should discontinue this patrol in support of a sanctions policy which has clearly failed?

On the first part of that supplementary question, I am sure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows that it is not the custom to give details of fleet deployments. I utterly reject the second part.

Will my hon. Friend confirm that this patrol is based on Simons-town and takes place by kind permission of the South African Government?

I am happy to disabuse my hon. and learned Friend's mind of that. It is not based on Simonstown, and it does not take place with the consent of the South African Government.

Does not the Minister's answer mean that we are bearing entirely by ourselves a burden which ought in equity to be borne jointly with other members of the United Nations?

We are carrying the burden described in the United Nation Resolution, and carrying it willingly.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether it is intended to apply in 1968–69 the Government's policy of withdrawing from the Continent any forces of which the foreign exchange costs are not offset.

The Question does not describe the Government's policy correctly. Our aim is to find satisfactory arrangements to meet the foreign exchange costs in future, either by offset purchases or by other means.

But does it remain the Government's policy, as stated last year, that they will withdraw from the Continent any forces the cost of which across the exchanges cannot be offset?

That was not said adamantly. The right hon. Gentleman knows that at the moment we are withdrawing one brigade and one Royal Air Force squadron. That is being discussed this week by the N.A.T.O. Council of Ministers. We hope that redeployment will be effective starting next January.

Is the Minister prepared to give an assurance that there will be no similar withdrawal in the next financial year?

I cannot give assurances of that kind.

What does the Government expect our ground forces on the Continent to do in the event of Russian aggression? Is he not aware that our forces there would be completely liquidated?

If everybody took the view which my right hon. Friend expressed, there would be no N.A.T.O. forces, no contribution from Britain, and a vast vacuum in Western Europe, and we should be overwhelmed in no time.

My hon. Friend is already overwhelmed.

Is not my hon. Friend aware that in his Budget speeches in the past two years my right hon. Friend who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer promised that the offset costs would be completely met, and on the last occasion at least implied that if they were not met the forces would be withdrawn?

Yes, but they have been very near to being met during the current year, and it will be our aim to get them met during the next year too.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what progress is being made in the disposal of surplus Territorial Army drill halls.

About 750 Territorial Army Centres are due for disposal as a result of the recent reorganisation of the Territorial Army. About 50 have been disposed of and the disposal of a further 519 has been authorised.

Will my hon. Friend assure the House that priority will be given to considering the possibility of using those premises for social and youth work in cities throughout the country?

That is exactly what is happening, though we should like to see the process speeded up.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what action he is now taking following devaluation to mobilise surplus capacity in the Royal Naval Dockyards for civilian production relevant to British export and import substitution programmes.

I have nothing to add to the reply given to my hon. Friend on 25th October, 1967.— [Vol. 751, c. 481.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that in the dockyards there are vast resources of skill, craftsmanship and capital equipment which at present are not being fully utilised, and that when the Government are constantly urging the full utilisation of resources for production they could become a focal point for growth in the economy?

Yes, Sir.

Is it not clear that the Royal Dockyards are quite unsuited for civilian production? What reductions in the total civilian manpower employed in the Royal Dockyards does the Minister now contemplate?

I am not sure that that arises from the original Question. There will be a slight fall in the total manpower in the four home dockyards. We are naturally anxious to use the labour forces to the full capacity, and if there is the possibility of subordinate work from outside industry we shall be happy to have it in the dockyard.

Will the Minister clear up a contradiction between his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who said that there would be real and painful cuts affecting Portsmouth, and his hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration who said that there would be an increased demand upon the dockyard? Which is it to be? Is Portsmouth to be prejudicially affected or not?

I think that the right hon. Gentleman is misleading himself and the House with his question. My hon. Friend said that there would be certain reassessments, and these will certainly take place. The hon. Members concerned have already been informed in the case of Portsmouth. It will mean a slight falling off in the level of overtime, and that is all. The four home dockyards have a full order book for the next few years.

Will my hon. Friend reappraise the whole policy concerning dockyards being allowed to go out to tender to private firms? At present, this is allowed in only a very few limited cases, such as the Colour Loft and the Ropery at Chatham?

That opens up a much wider range of matters, and I should prefer my hon. Friend to give me notice of such a question.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what progress is being made in determining the detailed characteristics of the new classes of ships in the future Fleet.

Staff work is proceeding on the new classes of ships announced in the July White Paper and satisfactory progress is being made in considering their detailed characteristics.

Will my hon. Friend assure the House that in this new class of ships for the Royal Navy we shall have a better cost-effectiveness?

Yes, Sir. That is one of the main aims of the exercise.

Can the Minister say whether, in view of what happened to the Israeli ship, "Elath", they will be equipped with weapons with a ship-to-ship capability?

As I said earlier there is one coming into production very soon, called "Sea Dart", which will have a very good secondary ship-to-ship capability.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what improvements on the original Valiant class the new Fleet submarine SSN.07 represents.