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Commons Chamber

Volume 770: debated on Wednesday 23 October 1968

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House Of Commons

Wednesday, 23rd October, 1968

The House met at half-past
Two o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Private Business

Saint Mary, Hornsey Bill

So much of the Lords Message [22nd October] as relates to the Saint Mary, Hornsey Bill, to be considered forthwith.—[ The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

So much of the Lords Message considered accordingly.

Ordered,

That the Promoters of the Saint Mary, Hornsey Bill shall have leave to suspend proceedings thereon in order to proceed with that Bill in the next Session of Parliament, provided that the Agents for the Bill give notice to the Clerks in the Private Bill Office of their intention to suspend further proceedings not later than the day before the close of the present Session and that all fees due on the Bill up to that date be paid;
That on the third day on which the House sits in the next Session the Bill shall be presented to the House;
That there shall be deposited with the Bill a Declaration signed by the Agents for the Bill, stating that the Bill is the same, in every respect, as the Bill at the last stage of its proceedings in this House in the present Session;
That the Bill shall be laid upon the Table of the House by one of the Clerks in the Private Bill Office on the next meeting of the House after the day on which the Bill has been presented and, when so laid, shall be deemed to have been read the first, second and third time and shall be recorded in the Journal of this House as having been so read;
That no further fees shall be charged in respect of any proceedings on the Bill in respect of which Fees have already been incurred during the present Session;
That these Orders be Standing Orders of the House.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith.

Saint Saviour, Paddington Bill

So much of the Lords Message [22nd October] as relates to the Saint Saviour,

Paddington Bill, to be considered forthwith.—[ The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

So much of the Lords Message considered accordingly.

Ordered,

That the promoters of the Saint Saviour, Paddington Bill shall have leave to suspend proceedings thereon in order to proceed with that Bill in the next Session of Parliament, provided that the Agents for the Bill give notice to the Clerks in the Private Bill Office of their intention to suspend further proceedings not later than the day before the close of the present Session and that all fees due on the Bill up to that date be paid;
That on the third day on which the House sits in the next Session the Bill shall be presented to the House;
That there shall be deposited with the Bill a Declaration signed by the Agents for the Bill, stating that the Bill is the same, in every respect, as the Bill at the last stage of its proceedings in this House in the present Session;
That the Bill shall be laid upon the Table of the House by one of the Clerks in the Private Bill Office on the next meeting of the House after the day on which the Bill has been presented and, when so laid, shall be deemed to have been read the first, second and third time and shall be recorded in the Journal of this House as having been so read;
That no further fees shall be charged in respect of any proceedings on the Bill in respect of which Fees have already been incurred during the present Session;
That these Standing Orders be Standing Orders of the House.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith.

Petition

Prescription Charges

I beg to ask leave to present a public Petition which contains the signatures of 8,394 persons. The signatures have been collected by No. 14 Region of The National Federation of Old-Age Pensions Associations. No. 14 Region covers the counties of Bristol, Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire. The Petition specifically protests at the decision to impose prescription charges on women between the ages of 60 and 65, when the normal age of retirement for women is 60, and claims that they should be exempt from payment beyond that age.

The Petition is in the following terms:
To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled.
The Humble Petition of members of The National Federation of Old-Age Pensions Associations.
SHEWETH
That prescription charges for women between the ages of 60 and 65 are a burden causing great hardship to the many women of that age group who need medical care.
Wherefore your Petitioners pray that your Honourable House will reject any legislation that may be brought before you which plans to impose prescription charges for women between the ages of 60 and 65.
And jour Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray, &c.

To lie upon the Table.

123456
Date when Closure claimed, and by whomQuestion before House or Committee when claimedWhether in House or CommitteeWhether assent given to Motion or withheld by Speaker or ChairmanAssent withheld because, in the opinion of the Chair, a decision would shortly be arrived at without that MotionResult of Motion and, if a Division, Numbers for and against.

and (2) in the Standing Committees under the following heads:—

12345
Date when Closure claimed, and by whomQuestion before Committee when claimedWhether assent given to Motion or withheld by ChairmanAssent withheld because, in the opinion of the Chair, a decision would shortly be arrived at without that MotionResult of Motion and, if a Division, Numbers for and against.

—[ The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

Private Bills And Private Business

Return ordered,

of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders introduced into the House of Commons and brought from the House of Lords, and of Acts passed in Session 1967–68:
Of all Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which in Session 1967–68 were reported on by Committees on Opposed Bills or by Committees nominated partly by the House and partly by the Committee of Selection, together with the names of the selected Members who served on each Committee; the first and also the last day of the Sitting of each Committee; the number of days on which each Committee sat; the number of days on which each selected Member served; the number of days occupied by each Bill in Committee; the Bills of which

Adjournment Motions Under Standing Order No 9

Return ordered,

of Motion for Adjournment under Standing Order No. 9, showing the date of such Motion, the name of the Member proposing the specific and important matter and the result of any Division taken thereon, during Session 1967–68.—[The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

Closure Of Debate (Standing Order No 31)

Return ordered,

respecting application of Standing Order No. 31 (Closure of Debate) during Session 1967–68 (1) in the House and in Committee of the whole House, under the following heads:—

the Preambles were reported to have been proved; Bills of which the Preambles were reported to have been not proved; and, in the case of Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, whether the Provisional Orders ought or ought not to be confirmed:

Of all Private Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which, in Session 1967–68, were referred by the Committee of Selection to the Committee on Unopposed Bills, together with the names of the Members who served on the Committee; the number of days on which the Committee sat; and the number of days on which each Member attended:

And, of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders withdrawn or not proceeded with by the parties, those Bills being specified which were referred to Committees and dropped during the sittings of the Committee.—[ The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

Public Bills

Return ordered,

of the number of Public Bills, distinguishing Government from other Bills, introduced into this House, or brought from the House of Lords, during Session 1967–68, showing:
  • (1) the number which received the Royal Assent;
  • (2) the number which did not receive the Royal Assent, indicating those which were introduced into but not passed by this House, those passed by this House but not by the House of Lords, those passed by the House of Lords, but not by this House, those passed by both Houses but Amendments not agreed to; and distinguishing the stages at which such Bills were dropped, postponed or rejected in either House of Parliament, or the stages which such Bills had reached by the time of the prorogation or Dissolution.—[The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]
  • Public Petitions

    Return ordered,

    of the number of Public Petitions presented and printed in Session 1967–68 with the total number of signatures in that Session.—[The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

    Select Committees

    Return ordered,

    of the Select Committees appointed in Session 1967–68, with the Sub-Committees appointed by them; the names of the Members appointed to serve on each, and of the Chairman of each; the number of days each met, and the number of days each Member attended; the total expenses of the attendances of witnesses at each Select Committee and Sub-Committee; and the total number of Members who served on Select Committees; together with so much of the same information as is relevant to the Chairmen's Panel and the Court of Referees.—[The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

    Sittings Of The House And Business Of Supply

    Return ordered,

    of (1) the days on which the House sat in Session 1967–68, stating for each day the day of the month and day of the week, the hour of the meeting, and the hour of the adjournment; and the total number of hours occupied in the Sittings of the House, and the average time; and showing the number of hours on which the House sat each day, and the number of hours after the time appointed for the interruption of business; and (2) the days on which Business of Supply was considered.—[The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

    Standing Committees

    Return ordered,

    for Session 1967–68, of (1) the total number and the names of all Members (including and distinguishing Chairmen) who have been appointed to serve on one or more of the Standing Committees showing, with regard to each of such Members, the number of sittings to which he was summoned and at which he was present; (2) the number of Bills. Estimates and Matters considered by all and by each of the Standing Committees, the number of sittings of each Committee and the titles of all Bills, Estimates and Matters considered by a Committee distinguishing where a Bill was a Government Bill or was brought from the House of Lords, and showing in the case of each Bill, Estimate and Matter, the particular Committee by whom it was considered, the number of sittings at which it was considered and the number of Members present at each of those sittings.—[The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

    Special Procedure Orders

    Return ordered,

    of the number of Special Procedure Orders presented in Session 1967–68; the number withdrawn; the number against which Petitions or copies of Petitions were deposited; the number of Petitions of General Objection and for Amendment respectively considered by the Chairmen; the number of such Petitions certified by the Chairmen as proper to be received, and the number certified by them as being Petitions of General Objection and for Amendment respectively; the number referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses; the number reported with Amendments by a Joint Committee, and the number in relation to which a Joint Committee reported that the Order be not approved; and the number of Bills introduced for the confirmation of Special Procedure Orders;
    Of Special Procedure Orders which, in Session 1967–68, were referred to a Joint Committee, together with the names of the Commons Members who served on each Committee; the number of days on which each Committee sat; and the number of days on which each such Member attended.—[The Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means.]

    Oral Answers To Questions

    Scotland

    Windblown Timber

    1.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress has been made with clearing windblown timber following the storm in January, 1968; and if he will make a statement.

    By the end of September about 10 million hoppus feet of the timber had been cleared and delivered to consumers. Another three million hoppus feet had been cut and were being processed. Altogether this represents nearly one third of the total quantity blown down.

    I regard this rate of progress as not unsatisfactory, but I hope all those engaged in clearing the timber will not relax their efforts in the months ahead.

    As there are still 17,000 acres to clear, at this rate of progress will the operation be completed before deterioration sets in in 12 months' time?

    I should not like to give a date when this operation will be completed. Certainly the Forestry Commission is doing all that it can to make up for shortage of skilled labour by trying to persuade people from the Forestry Commission to take a temporary transfer to the areas most critically affected.

    How much money has been paid to Scottish landlords as a result of these compensation proposals, and how can this be reconciled with a demand from the Opposition for a reduction in public expenditure?

    Without notice I could not give a precise figure. I think that my hon. Friend is referring to the transport allowance which is provided to try to get the timber removed before it deteriorates.

    Agricultural Buildings (Rating)

    3.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has completed his review of the rating of agricultural buildings; and if he will make a statement.

    My right hon. Friend is continuing his examination of this matter, but he is not yet in a position to make any statement.

    Cannot the Government really treat the matter more urgently, because there is grave concern in the industry? It has been under consideration now for many months. Is the hon. Gentleman aware not only of the gross anomalies that are arising, but of the cost burden put on the industry at a time when the Government are asking it to replace imports?

    The Government are well aware of the urgency of the matter, but the hon. Gentleman will understand that it is a very complex question. We are aware of the anomalies and difficulties facing the industry and in our discussions with the National Farmers' Union of Scotland we will explore them.

    Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the decisions being taken now are raising very serious anomalies and causing widespread apprehension in Scotland, and that the derating of agriculture requires clear definition and clarification?

    I recognise the need for clear definition and clarification. But the hon. Gentleman will realise that this is a very complex problem. We are giving it very urgent consideration, but it involves a whole number of complicated aspects, not only within agriculture. These require the right kind of decision rather than a hurried decision. We are treating the matter urgently.

    A94 Perth To Stonehaven Road

    4.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he proposes to classify as a trunk route the A94 Perth to Stonehaven road.

    I have nothing to add to my reply of 22nd May to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Dewar).—[Vol. 765, c. 82.]

    Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that at that time he said he would be in a position to take a decision in the summer of this year? Why is there this delay? Does not the hon. Gentleman realise that this route is vital, not only to the areas around it, but to the development of the North-East? Will he give this a much greater priority than he has done so far?

    I think the hon. Gentleman is under a misapprehension. He may recall that on 22nd May I said that the decision would be taken at the end of the complete Tayside study, and that will not be ready until toward the end of next year. It is important that we should get this right.

    Does not my hon. Friend realise that that would mean that no real action could be taken on this vital route until well into the late 'seventies, and that this is a very unsatisfactory situation, which is leading to great frustration in the North-East?

    I must correct my hon. Friend. Approved schemes for improving the A94 are eligible for 75 per cent, direct grant aid. The decision on improvements lies with the local highway authorities. Later we can decide whether it should be a trunk road.

    Royal Commission On Local Government

    5.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government will be published.

    13.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he expects to receive the report of the Royal Commission on Local Government.

    I understand that the Royal Commission now expects to complete its report early next year. Publication may take a few weeks thereafter.

    Will the report be presented to the right hon. Gentleman, or to the Paymaster-General, who has now taken over his responsibility for devolution?

    I think the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the report will be presented in the usual way to the Minister responsible, and that is the Secretary of State. May I take this opportunity of correcting what may have been a misapprehension. Publication of the report is not a matter for the Secretary of State, but for the Commission itself.

    Employment

    6.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress has been achieved towards meeting the employment targets set in paragraph 1 of Command Paper No. 2864, The Scottish Economy; and if he will make a statement.

    Significant progress has been achieved—particularly in higher levels of investment, industrial building and new jobs and relatively lower unemployment and a reduction in net emigration to England.

    Is the Minister aware that, contrary to the theme of his Answer just now, although the White Paper contemplated an increase in jobs of between 50,000 and 60,000 by 1970, the number of jobs in Scotland has fallen by 32,500? Is not the right hon. Gentleman thoroughly ashamed of this record?

    No, Sir, not at all. The hon. Gentleman should appreciate that, if one starts taking interim years, whether in the previous four years in which he is making his comparison, one gets different figures. We have every reason to be satisfied with the large number of new jobs coming in, and with the way in which Scotland has stood up in the present economic atmosphere, which shows a strengthening of the pattern of Scottish industry.

    Does the right hon. Gentleman mean by that—I think everybody appreciates the difficulties of interim years—that he still expects to reach his target by 1970?

    I think what I have said is that our target should remain. This is a considerable improvement. Whether we shall reach it as quickly as that depends on how quickly we put right the whole general economic situation in Britain.

    11.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will instruct the Scottish Development Department to carry out a survey into the reasons for the decline in the number of persons in employment in Scotland since 1964.

    The causes of the decline in male employment, which started long before 1964, were fully analysed in the White Paper on the Scottish Economy. The Government's wide-ranging measures for dealing with the problem are now taking effect.

    The right hon. Gentleman will recall that during those last three years of Tory—

    Will the right hon. Gentleman recall that during the last three years of the Tory Government when he was driving industry away from Scotland with his cries of woe the number of persons in employment in Scotland increased by 16,000? Over the corresponding period since then the number has dropped by 13,000. Is it not about time the right hon. Gentleman changed his job?

    I think it is time the hon. Gentleman changed his books of reference, or looked more closely into them. He will find that it depends on which year he takes. If he took 1963, he would get a different result. We must not judge these things too quickly. The result of the actions that we took in 1965, 1966, and 1967 in relation to the greatly increased drive for new industry will prove by 1970 that the figures suggested by the hon. Gentleman are far too gloomy.

    The right hon. Gentleman is asking the House to be too naive about this. We all want to get more jobs. Whatever books of reference we take, we see that there has been a considerable drop in the number of jobs. I do not think he can ask the House—

    How can the right hon. Gentleman justify his statement to the House that his policies are being effective, in view of the drop in the number of jobs?

    The right hon. Gentleman should bear in mind that since we became the Government there has been a doubling of effort in new factory building in Scotland, and a considerable improvement in relation to male jobs. What we are up against is a considerable run-down in agriculture, of men leaving agriculture, and leaving the traditional industry of mining and other heavy industries.

    Shotgun Licences

    7.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will obtain reports from chief constables as to how many shotgun licences have been issued by the police in Scotland since the introduction of the new regulations.

    I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply given on 16th October to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor)—[Vol. 770, c. 142.]

    May I express the hope that the figures given in the answer showing the number of shotgun certificates issued will convince the hon. Gentleman and his party propagandists that shooting is not a sport that is confined to a handful of opulent aristocrats?

    I think the hon. Gentleman is referring to members of the party opposite in that respect. Of course we recognise that. This is why there has been a generous acceptance of most of the applications made. I recognise the ideological difference between a practising farmer and a member of the aristocratic class which the hon. Gentleman knows so well.

    Old Houses (Improvement Grants)

    8.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he will introduce higher improvement grants for modernising old houses to take account of increased building costs since the last occasion on which the maximum grant payable was fixed.

    Proposals for higher maximum granted were published in July in our White Paper, The Older Houses in Scotland: A Plan for Action. The legislation implementing these proposals will be introduced as soon as possible.

    Does the Minister think that the increased grant will be sufficient to encourage the modernisation of these houses, which we all agree was far too slow in the past? This shows that even the initial grants were too low. Therefore, any increases must be higher relatively than they were originally if we are to achieve what we want.

    I hope so. I am pleased with the self-critical note which the hon. Gentleman introduced in respect of his Government's performance in previous years.

    Sanquhar And Kirkconnel

    9.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received from the Scottish Economic Planning Council concerning the future of Sanquhar and Kirkconnel; and what reply he has sent.

    Advice given by the Council is confidential, but I can confirm that it has considered the future of the area, which is of course included in the development study of the South-West which was requested by the Consultative Group.

    Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that I appreciate the efforts of the Board of Trade and the Secretary of State? Can he assure me that all the stops will be pulled out to complete negotiations with those firms at present interested in the area?

    In so far as I have influence in this matter, and it is my concern, the hon. Gentleman can take that assurance for granted. Since its designation as a special development area there has been a considerable stimulation of interest in it, and I hope that we shall get some results in the not too distant future.

    General Teaching Council

    10.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will enter into consultations with the General Teaching Council to ensure that teachers of Scottish origin are not in future required to take the English equivalent of a Scottish qualification which they already possess in order to qualify to teach in Scotland.

    Does the hon. Gentleman recall that in a case to which I drew his attention a constituent of mine was told that in order to qualify to teach in Scotland she would have to take an English A-level in a subject for which she already held a Scottish Higher? What conceivable purpose can be served by this sort of provision which has driven the girl to teach in England instead of in Scotland?

    Entry qualifications for teaching in Scotland are different from those in England. This is a long-standing situation. The General Teaching Council is aware of it, and I have explained the particular case to the hon. Gentleman at great length on more than one occasion.

    Economic Planning Council (Chairman)

    16.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now appoint a Chairman of the Scottish Economic Planning Council.

    As the right hon. Gentleman has himself occupied this position since the formation of the Council, is it not time that he stopped giving himself advice and appointed somebody else so that he can have more time for the many jobs which the Secretary of State ought to be doing?

    I assure the hon. Gentleman that his opinion is not shared by members of the Council who welcome my presence as Chairman in that they can advise me directly. I assure the hon. Gentleman that other Economic Planning Councils throughout the country would welcome a Cabinet Minister as their chairman.

    Storm-Damaged Houses, Glasgow

    20.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many of the storm-damaged houses in Glasgow have now been repaired; how many still remain to be repaired; and how long he estimates it will take to complete the repair work.

    29.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland why, in view of the good summer season for outdoor building and repairs, little progress has been made in Glasgow with house repairs to remedy the effects of the storm of January 1968.

    Of the 29,000 roofs which were damaged, 16,500 have had full repairs, and 8,500 roofs of council houses have had repairs fully adequate for the winter. Some 4,000 tenement roofs have had only temporary repairs, and Glasgow Corporation is doing all it can to ensure that these are dealt with as quickly as possible, although it cannot assess how long the work will take.

    Many repairs have been difficult to carry out because they have involved dealing with the effects of years of neglect.

    Is it not shocking that nine months after the hurricane this vast amount of repair should still require to be done? What has happened to the hon. Gentleman's May forecast that all houses would be wind- and waterproof by the end of September and the further forecast which he made at the end of September that they would all be waterproof by the beginning of the New Year? When will they be wind- and waterproof? Will he cut the cackle, and get on with the job?

    Fortunately, the hon. Gentleman and I are not responsible for repairing roofs. It is a very difficult task, one calling for skilled men, of whom 11—two only recently—have lost their lives. It is, therefore, no laughing matter. The dilapidation of many of the storm-damaged roofs has been such that repairing only the storm damage was just not good enough. We are doing our best to keep those houses wind- and watertight until we can carry out the permanent repairs, when the city of Glasgow will be better roofed than it has been for 50 years.

    Does the Minister realise the concern his statement will occasion in Glasgow? How many of these 4,000 roofs are covered by tarpaulins? Will he resume his efforts to persuade employers of private building labour to put all their spare workers into the Corporation pool to work on this before the winter rains start?

    The hon. Gentleman will be able to learn the numbers if he asks that question at the headquarters in Glas- gow. The Government's contribution in this very difficult situation has been substantial. The available labour force for which the original target was 1,000, is now well over 1,500.

    Is the Minister of State aware that I was in Glasgow yesterday studying this problem? Although I am prepared to agree with him that much has been done in the last month or two, yesterday the people at the storm damage centre told me that in their estimation over 100,000 people are still at risk from having water through their damaged doofs. Is the hon. Gentleman satisfied with this? Is he certain that nothing else can be done? If he is, I will have a chat with him afterwards.

    I am aware that the right hon. Gentleman visited Glasgow yesterday. I shall be very happy to have a chat with him or, indeed, with any other Member, either later today or at any other time, to see if we have missed any points which could profitably be pursued. Last Friday the Lord Provost pointed out that the number of complaints about leaking roofs was substantially less than might have been expected before the storm occurred. The dilapidation of property in Glasgow has been going on for many years.

    Is my hon. Friend aware that the problem was there before the storm and that the right hon. Member for Argyll (Mr. Noble) was too late in going to look at it?

    About 700 of the 900 complaints which were made at the time of the last heavy rainfall in Glasgow concerned separate properties. The rest were duplicate complaints. Of that number more than half were being dealt with under the private factors' arrangements with small firms. We hope to be able to take that up later on when we proceed with the matter further.

    Controlled Houses (Rents)

    21.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what plans he has for reviewing the rent of controlled houses.

    In the White Paper, The Older Houses in Scotland—A Plan for Action, my right hon. Friend announced proposals to extend the "fair rent" system to controlled houses which are improved with grant assistance, or which are already in good repair and have the basic amenities.

    Does that mean that the Government now recognise that out of controlled rent it is impossible to maintain houses in a safe condition and that to this extent the storm damage last January has had one good effect?

    Irrespective of the storm damage, it was our intention following the publication of the Cullingworth Report to produce the Bill which I hope that we shall produce next Session and to which the White Paper is a prelude. This Government, unlike the Tory Government, have accepted the need for this Bill.

    Scottish Economy

    22.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what action has been taken to accelerate the development of the Scottish economy during the past quarter; and if he will make a statement.

    The Government have adopted a wide range of measures to accelerate the development of the Scottish economy. Their success is now beginning to be reflected in more investment and more industrial building, and in comparatively lower levels of unemployment and migration to England.

    Is the Secretary of State aware that that reply is far from specific? Of all the things which could most help to accelerate the development of the Scottish economy, a reduction in the rate of taxation, particularly the Selective Employment Tax, is surely the most important. Could not the right hon. Gentleman intensify his efforts in this respect?

    Hon. Gentlemen should make up their minds. One minute they are asking for more to be done, which means expenditure. The next they ask that taxation be reduced. The results of the public expenditure in Scotland can now be seen to be the greatest drive Scotland has ever had to modernise our roads and to build new factories, hospitals and schools.

    To what extent is the development of the economy retarded by the shortage of skilled labour? To what extent is this being remedied by the increase in the training facilities available?

    This is a relevant consideration. We may run into considerable difficulties arising from the absence of skilled labour. We have made considerable inroads into solving this problem by industrial training, by the retraining of people displaced from their jobs, and by grants for intraining in industry.

    As the job losses in Scotland for the last three years have been much greater than the targets predicted by the Government in the White Paper—resulting in minus 7,000 jobs a year instead of plus 10,000—will not the right hon. Gentleman take this very seriously and consider further measures?

    Yes. The new jobs coming in have acceded to our targets. We are considerably stepping up our efforts to attract new industry. The high level of industrial development certificate approvals in the last few years has been well maintained in this year. This year we have already allocated 14 advance factories, a problem which was worrying the House last year.

    28.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now issue a report on the first half of the period covered by his White Paper on the Scottish Economy, Command Paper No. 2864, namely, the three years ended 31st December, 1967.

    The quarterly reports on Scottish economic development already give regular information on economic progress, and statistical indicators are given in the Digest of Scottish Statistics, the latest edition of which is about to be published.

    But since the White Paper was issued with a fanfare of publicity very shortly before the 1966 election, and since information now becoming available shows a massive gap between the targets and the results, is the Secretary of State not under an obligation now to make a special half-term report according to the principle recommended by the Minister of Technology?

    No, I do not think there is any necessity for that, because our targets remain the same and I have already answered Questions about this. The actual figures of progress in relation to new factories, I.D.C.s and the rest, are all available to hon. Members if they want to pursue them.

    Is not the Secretary of State aware that his complacency in this matter is alarming? What is the use of producing a plan if all its figures are not attained? As his colleague in England had to admit that their National Plan had to be withdrawn, why does he obstinately refuse to do the same about his own?

    What I have said is that the aims in respect of improvements in the Scottish economy must remain the same. I have said in answer to Questions that it make take a little time longer to reach them, but that does not mean that we do not continue to make the effort.

    Hospitals, Fife (Orthopædic Surgeons)

    23.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the number of sessions per month given by each part-time orthopaedic surgeon in the West Fife and East Fife Hospitals Board of Management, respectively, and the average waiting time for patients requiring clinical examination.

    Each of the two part-time orthopaedic surgeons in Fife gives nine sessions per week; one undertakes two sessions in West Fife and seven in East Fife, and the other six sessions in West Fife and three in East Fife. The average waiting time for patients requiring orthopædic examination is seven weeks in West Fife and five to six weeks in East Fife.

    I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Is he aware that the nominal description "part-time consultant" gives such a consultant the opportunity to utilise the resources of the National Health Service for his private patients? Is my hon. Friend further aware that there is a strong impression in Dumfermline and Kirkcaldy that there is a certain amount of queue jumping for beds by these people who can afford to pay the fees charged by these consul- tants? What does my hon. Friend propose to do by way of investigating this apparent abuse of the National Health Service?

    If my hon. Friend will give me any evidence to substantiate what he says in the second part of his supplementary question, I will examine it. Both part-time consultants are employed on a maximum part-time basis which is for nine sessions a week, as compared with 11 sessions for full-time consultants. This arrangement dates right back to 1948.

    Judges (Political Activities)

    24.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will seek powers to prevent the appointment of members of the Scottish judiciary to committees set up by political parties.

    25.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will seek powers to ensure that Scottish members of the judiciary do not engage in party political controversy.

    I refer my hon. Friends to the reply I gave to the hon. Member for Rutherglen (Mr. Gregor Mackenzie) on 16th October.—[Vol. 770, c. 377.]

    Is my right hon. Friend aware that the reply he gave last week was certainly not borne out by the rather disgraceful events at the beginning of August when it was shown quite clearly that the Scottish judiciary did not appear to be aware of the generally accepted convention of the constitution? Is my right hon. Friend aware that there has been much discussion since as to what arrangements exist to enable this to be enforced?

    I think there is no need for any statutory powers to enforce this. I think it is now generally recognised, and the behaviour on the whole of Scottish judiciary bears this out. In the particular instance to which my right hon. Friend referred there has been a satisfactory conclusion with the withdrawal of the acceptance of the gentleman concerned.

    Will my right hon. Friend not consider the setting up of some commission to investigate appointment to the judiciary in Scotland, which is in the nature of a large-scale racket?

    No, I do not think so. I think the procedure for appointing judges in Scotland is well established and I am not aware that that has led in practice to any large-scale racket.

    Will the Secretary of State reconsider his answer to the last question, as it is not so much a racket that we are concerned about but the connection between party political appointments to the bench which is worrying the Scottish public? That is the point.

    I am aware that the public accept the judiciary to be impartial and independent and I am satisfied that the judiciary accept this.

    Abbotsinch Airport

    30.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he expects to reach a decision on the request of Glasgow Corporation for permission to develop the vacant ground at the southwest end of the main runway in the interests of the safe operation of civil aircraft using Abbotsinch Airport.

    This will depend on the results of further discussions with Glasgow Corporation for which my right hon. Friend is now asking.

    Will my hon. Friend proceed hastily with these discussions? Is he aware that this vacant ground is in the flight path of aircraft using Abbotsinch Airport, which means that it is used by birds and birds are always a danger to civil aircraft?

    Not all birds, but in this context that is a fair point to make. On the contention that the application should be regarded as having no bearing on any possible future proposal to extend the runway, but rather because it is related to what my hon. Friend has said and to some other matters, the Secretary of State is asking for further information before he can adjudicate on the matter.

    Would the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that civil aircraft are not using Abbotsinch at all at the moment? Will he do his best to get them operating there again?

    Electricity And Gas (Coal-Fired Stations)

    31.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the annual cost to the Government of compensating the electricity boards and the Scottish Gas Board for using coal-fired instead of oil-fired stations; and for how long he plans to continue these payments.

    Payments to the Scottish electricity boards between September, 1967, and July, 1968, amounted to £1,031,671. Amounts will vary from year to year according to electricity load requirements, fuel prices and other factors. Under the Coal Industry Act, 1967, payments may be made until 1st April 1971, but the need for them is kept under review.

    Payments to the Scottish Gas Board are the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Power.

    Will my hon. Friend consider giving some form of compensation to other people who lose because of this as he is prepared in this case to compensate electricity and gas boards? Will he consider compensation to people such as river pilots and the harbour board, which has lost £92,000 in revenue in the last year because of the reduction in use of our ports?

    I shall consider those points. I shall be grateful if my hon. Friend will write to me about some of the more detailed aspects of his supplementary question.

    Hunter Report

    32.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he hopes to publish the results of his consideration of the Hunter Report on Salmon and Trout Fishing.

    27.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now make a statement on the Hunter Report, outlining his proposals for implementing the Report's recommendations.

    My right hon. Friend's consideration of this Report, and of the representations which he has received on it, is not complete and he cannot yet say when he will be able to make known his proposals.

    What is to be done to provide more fishing for those with modest incomes?

    Could not the Govment start on the less controversial part of the Report, which could assist greatly the tourist industry, without prejudice to later decisions on the important matters affecting the salmon-netting industry, as we proposed in the debate on this subject over a year ago?

    We did consider that and decided against it. The Report is a unity and should be seen as a unity. I hope that our proposals, when they come forward, will be dealt with as a unity. I understand that hon. Members opposite frequently try to make a differentiation between salmon and trout fishing and other fishing. The important problem is to make sure that we open up the rivers of Scotland for the people of Scotland.

    Forth Road Bridge (Tolls)

    33.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will take steps to abolish tolls on the Forth Road Bridge; or if he will introduce legislation to charge tolls on each new motorway.

    Tolls are charged on all new major river crossings in Great Britain which provide exceptional savings to their users, and we could not make an exception of the Forth Bridge. Charging tolls on all new motorways is impracticable, because of the cost of manning numerous access points and the danger of diverting traffic on to roads already overcrowded.

    What then is the difference between financing a motorway over water and financing a motorway over land?

    Where are these other waterways in Britain which receive the same sort of treatment as that the Minister mentioned?

    The Mersey Tunnel, the Dartford Tunnel, the Tyne Tunnel, the Severn Bridge and the Tamar Bridge.

    Police

    34.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps he is taking to ensure that police recruitment is directed towards the areas of greatest need.

    Forces whose total strength is near their authorised establishment have been asked to limit recruitment to the replacement of officers leaving the force and, where they cannot accept recruits, to advise applicants to seek appointment in forces seriously under strength. Such forces can continue to recruit without restriction.

    Would my hon. Friend not agree that it would help recruitment if some elements, which are often found on the Opposition benches, ceased to over-emphasise almost to distortion the difficulties in some areas?

    I believe my hon. Friend is referring to the recent controversy involving Glasgow. I have no doubt that some of the irresponsible statements made in that situation acted as a great disincentive to recruiting.

    37.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will give the recent recruitment figures for each Scottish police authority, and distinguish in those figures between recruits joining the police force for the first time and trained policemen transferring from one force to another.

    As the Answer contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

    Am I right in thinking that there are very great differences in the success of recruitment in different areas? Will my hon. Friend resist any suggestion that a policy should be followed designed to favour certain bad areas at the expense of neighbouring forces by attracting to those areas trained policemen?

    If my hon. Friend is referring to discussions at present going on in relation to under-manning allowances, it would be preferable if I did not comment on that at present. If he feels that because of other facts there could be a move into certain areas of difficulty, I can assure him about his area. In the nine months up to September, 1968, Lanarkshire had 141 recruits compared with 61 in the same period for 1967.

    Following is the Answer:

    The numbers recruited by individual police authorities between 1st July and 30th September, 1968, are as follows:

    City and Burgh Forces

    Aberdeen1
    Dundee11
    Edinburgh24
    Glagsow75
    Inverness

    County and Combined Forces

    Angus2
    Argyll2
    Ayr10
    Berwick, Roxburgh and Selkirk3
    Caithness
    Dumfries and Galloway4
    Dunbartonshire7
    Fife7
    Inverness-shire1
    Lanarkshire25
    Lothians and Peebles9
    Orkney
    Perth and Kinross4
    Renfrew and Bute9
    Ross and Sutherland2
    Scottish North-Eastern Counties6
    Stirling and Clackmannan7
    Zetland
    209

    These figures are based on provisional monthly returns and it is not possible to distinguish between recruits on first appointment and transfers from other forces.

    39.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress has been made in recruiting civilians to release police officers for duties more appropriate to their training; and what has been the effect on the total manpower available to the police since 1964.

    There have been substantial increases in the number of traffic wardens and other civilians employed on clerical and technical duties and these have made a significant contribution to the strengths of police forces in Scotland. At 31st December, 1964, the total manpower available to the police numbered 10,959, of whom 933 were civilians, and at 31st December, 1967, 11,722, of whom 1,475 were civilians.

    I congratulate my hon. Friend on the success of the policy of recruiting such additional workers. I ask that in future it is always clearly shown how each police force stands in respect of both those categories of officers.

    It is useful to keep these points in mind. I thank my right hon. Friend for his comment. We have improved the figures of manpower available to the police in Scotland by almost 1,000 since 1964.

    Does not the Minister feel that there is scope for increasing the recruitment of policewomen?

    I am sorry. I did not quite hear. Did the hon. Gentleman ask if we are keen to recruit policewomen? The answer is, of course, "Yes".

    I think that there is, subject to the general situation prevailing. Policewomen have played a very important rôle over the past few years. I hope that it will be a continuing and perhaps developing rôle.

    Chiropodists

    38.

    asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will introduce legislation to make statutory registration compulsory for all chiropodists in Scotland.

    My right hon. Friend has no proposals for legislation, but I understand the matter is under discussion in the profession.

    Is my hon. Friend aware that anyone can set up as a chiropodist without any training, experience or qualifications of any kind? Does not he consider that this matter requires very urgent attention?

    There is already statutory provision for registration under the Professions Supplementary to Medicine Act, 1960. But the matter my hon. Friend now raises is much wider, and this is a very complicated matter.

    Board Of Trade

    Trade With South Africa

    41.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the development of trade with South Africa.

    In the first eight months of this year, exports were £177 million and imports were £192 million. Exports were a little down compared with 1967 but total South African imports have been falling and the indications are that we have been maintaining our position in this market.

    Is South Africa still our second or third best overseas customer? Does the Minister agree that if Her Majesty's Government implemented the spirit of the Simonstown Agreement and supplied arms for South Africa to enable her to fulfil her obligations the picture would be even better?

    South Africa continues to be one of our most important markets. We have no evidence that business has been lost, except for one specific case, because of our policy regarding arms. As I said in my Answer, the present indications are that this year we are retaining our position in the market.

    What negotiations have the Government had with South Africa over the export of black cricketers?

    Has the Minister's attention been drawn to the reports published this morning on the London Chamber of Commerce mission's return to this country after close investigation of South African trade, which showed that for the first time for many years we now have an adverse balance with South Africa, and that this is largely due to the dissatisfaction of the South Africans and the refusal of the present Government here to allow defence equipment to be exported?

    Special factors have increased imports from South Africa this year, such as the unusually large imports of maize, fruit and vegetables, ore and metal scrap. Our evidence is that we are maintaining our share of the South African market, and I think that the figures will show an increase in our exports to South Africa this year. Obviously, we in this country wish to develop the best possible export situation in South Africa consistent with our policy on the export of arms.

    United Nations Trade And Development Board Meeting, Geneva

    42.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the proceedings of the United Nations Trade and Development Board meeting held at Geneva in September.

    This session of the Board was largely devoted to examining the methods of work of the Conference, the Board itself and its principal Committees. The main conclusions were that the sessions of the Conference should in future be shorter and that they should be concentrated on issues of fundamental importance, and that the Board should normally meet once instead of twice a year. The Board also considered the role of U.N.C.T.A.D. in the preparations for the Second United Nations Development Decade.

    Does the Minister accept that the Board's decisions must be regarded as welcome, particularly the decision that the Board should meet only once a year since the meetings appear to occupy a great deal of time? Could he say something about the Board's decision on the recommendation that there should be further international developments in shipping? Does not he feel that this is something on which this country, as a major shipping nation, could press id order to avoid flag discrimination and what appears to be an increasing subsidisation of shipping industries by all major maritime nations?

    I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is important that U.N.C.T.A.D., like other international organisations, should from time to time study the manner in which it conducts its work. We welcome the Board's decisions about its future meetings. The question of shipping is being considered. It is a matter of major importance to this country, and we are taking a part in the discussions currently going on.

    South Yorkshire (Civil Airport)

    44.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade what representations he has received from local authorities and organisations regarding the conversion of Lindholme Royal Air Force Station to civilian use, and the creation of a new South-Yorkshire airport in the Goole-Thorne area; what reply he has sent; and what action he proposes to take.

    I have received no representations about the conversion of Lindholme to civil use. I understand that proposals for an airport in the Goole/Thorne area have been forwarded to the Commission on the Third London Airport. The Commission will no doubt take account of them.

    In view of the necessity for improving transport to South Yorkshire, will the Board of Trade give every encouragement to the establishment of a civil airport in this area?

    I am entirely in favour of every measure which can reasonably be taken to provide adequate air facilities in South Yorkshire and elsewhere. In so far as we can, we shall certainly help, although I think that the immediate proposals are concerned with a period still some distance away.

    Kennedy Airport (Transit Passengers)

    48.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that passengers in British civil aircraft in transit through Kennedy Airport, New York, to onward destinations in the same aircraft are subjected to customs, immigration and health procedures; and whether, in view of the fact that this is contrary to normal international practice, he will ask the United States authorities to desist from this practice.

    Yes. The United States authorities have notified the International Civil Aviation Organisation, as they are entitled to do under the Convention, of a difference between their own procedures and those prescribed as a standard in Annex 9 of the Convention. There is no discrimination against British aircraft or passengers and it would not be appropriate for me to intervene.

    Can the Minister say what useful purpose is served by making transit passengers, whose baggage is safely on their aircraft, go through customs and through immigration procedures in a country into which they do not want to immigrate?

    That is not really the point. This is a matter of domestic United States law. We may take the view that it creates inconvenience, but as long as the domestic law of the United States takes this form we have no alternative but to conform.

    Hotels (Loans Scheme)

    49.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give details of the independent advisory committee on whose recommendations are based the terms and conditions governing any loan issued under the experimental hotel loans scheme.

    The Committee consists at present of six members with experience related to tourism and the hotel trade. With permission, I will circulate details in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

    Following is the information:

    Composition of the Hotel Loans Advisory Committee

    The Chairman of the Committee is Sir Leonard Cooke, O.B.E., J.P., an independent member of the Board of the British Travel Association and a former President of the Co-operative Wholesale Society.

    The other members of the Committee are: Mr. D. J. Davies, Chairman of the Wales Tourist Board and member of the Board of the British Travel Association; Mr. E. C. Garner, M.C., Managing Director of Hickie Borman, Grant and Co. Ltd., a member of the Board of the British Travel Association and a former Chairman of the Association of British Travel Agents; Mr. A. W. Hardie, E.R.D., Chairman of the Scottish Tourist Board and Deputy Chairman of the Cumbernauld New Town Corporation; Mr. C. R. Hinds Howell, C.A., Senior Partner in Messrs. Singleton, Fabian and Co. (Accountants) and a member of the Council of the British Hotels and Restaurants Association; Professor S. Medlik, Professor of Hotel and Catering Aministration in the University of Surrey and and independent member of the Economic Development Committee for the Hotel and Catering Industry.

    50.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement of the progress of the hotel loans scheme, giving the number of applications so far received and the terms and conditions on which loans are to be issued.

    A total of 139 applications for loans was received before the Scheme was closed for new applications on 31st March of this year. Loans are offered on the terms and conditions recommended by the independent Hotel Loans Advisory Committee as appropriate to each case.

    Is it not clear from study of the progress of the scheme that it is not properly geared to the needs of the hotel industry generally, and that there is quite unnecessary delay in the payment of the loans?

    There have been criticisms, but we have been genuinely trying to produce a scheme that meets the industry's needs, which we very fully recognise. The applications have been processed as fast as possible. I hope very much, and I am sure that it is its intention, that the Committee will go ahead and complete its job.

    Will the Minister do something to simplify the questionnaire which people receive when making application for the loans? A great number of the questions asked in it would never be asked in the private sector if a person were applying for a similar loan from a bank. Cannot the whole procedure be simplified and made more straightforward?

    I will look at the hon. Gentleman's point, because in principle it is very fair. But the closing date for the scheme has been reached, and perhaps we should bear his point in mind in any future proposals we may bring forward.

    Fishing Industry

    53.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade in what respects the proposed merger of the firms engaged in trawler fishing differs from the plan recently rejected by the Monopolies Commission; and whether he will make a statement.

    Discussions are continuing between the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation and firms in the industry but we have not yet had firm proposals. It would be premature to make a comparison with the merger considered by the Monopolies Commission.

    Would my hon. Friend not agree that in view of the difficulties that the fishing industry is going through and has been going through for a number of years, the need for modernisation of the fishing fleet, the improvement of the: safety precautions both for the ships and for the men at sea and the constant subsidisation of the industry, the best solution would be to take it into public ownership?

    I agree entirely with my hon. Friend about the problems that the fishing industry has faced, and it is for this reason that we welcome the investigation that the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation is now making. It would, of course, be premature for me to comment on the proposals that it will bring forward.

    Does it not look as if the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation and the Monopolies Commission are forming entirely contradictory attitudes on a single problem? What are the Government going to do about it?

    The right hon. Gentleman is a little premature in saying "forming contradictory attitudes". The Industrial Reorganisaiton Corporation has not come to any conclusions. He should wait before criticising.

    Prepacked Commodities (Testing)

    54.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will take steps to arrange for the primary examinations of prepackaged commodities under the Weights and Measures Act, 1963, and other legislation to be undertaken at the point of production or importation.

    A substantial amount of testing of prepacked commodities under the Weights and Measures Act, 1963 is already carried out at the point of production or importation.

    Will my hon. Friend press it further in connection with the work of Her Majesty's inspectors as a substantial part of retail trade in food is pre-packed and it is very desirable that the primary consideration and inspection should be at the point of production, thus minimising the work of the inspectors in other areas so that they can concentrate on other aspects of consumer goods?

    As I replied to my hon. Friend, testing goes on at the point of production. Nevertheless, inspectors already have to test weighing and measuring equipment at retail premises, and it is, therefore, economic and convenient for them to test pre-packed goods at the same time.

    Airport Terminal Buildings

    55.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will introduce legislation to enable him to improve the standards of cleanliness in the terminal buildings at all airports under the control of the Airports Authority and to introduce efficient catering services.

    I do not necessarily accept the implied criticism of the present position but in this case this is not an appropriate subject for legislation. It is a matter of day-to-day management.

    Is the hon. Gentleman aware that following some recent comments of mine I have received overwhelming support for my contention, and that by comparison with Kennedy and other international airports conditions at Heathrow are a disgrace? Will he reconsider his Answer?

    In the first place, although the hon. Gentleman has made very clear his own particular experience, and although he may have found some support, there are others who would take a different view and feel that those who work at London Airport in difficult conditions do a first-rate job. On the second point, I think it right that we should recognise those matters which are appropriate to this House, involving legislation, and those which are appropriate to management. For this reason, I think that the management should be left to carry on with its job.

    Would my hon. Friend recommend all airports to emulate the very high standards in these respects of the municipally owned and controlled Manchester Airport?

    I am aware of the very high standard at Manchester and elsewhere. Perhaps I should say that if hon. Members have constructive suggestions about how matters might be improved and where in any way they fall short, I am sure that the British Airports Authority and municipal authorities would be only too happy to receive them.

    While I appreciate that the British Airports Authority has been in existence for only a comparatively short time, is the hon. Gentleman nevertheless not aware that many people think that London Airport is the worst shop window in London? Surely it goes back to the original design and trying to situate everything in the centre of the airport. Will he institute an inquiry to improve the ghastly state of affairs whereby even today people have to travel to and from aircraft in out-of-date charabancs with passageways less than a foot wide?

    I agree that in a number of respects the design of London Airport falls short, but the supplementary question goes wide of the Question about cleanliness.

    On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I will raise the subject on the Adjournment.

    New Industries, Merseyside

    56.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade what new industries have been developed in the Merseyside development district since October, 1964; how many new jobs have been created; and what plans there are for the future.

    Between October, 1964, and September, 1968, 756 I.D.C.s were approved for the Merseyside Development Area, including Skelmersdale and Winsford. It is estimated that these projects should eventually provide nearly 50,000 new jobs, of which nearly half will be for men.

    The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) did not ask a supplementary question. Mr. Heffer, Question No. 57.

    On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it a rule of the House that if there is no supplementary question from the originator of the Question there may be no supplementary question from any other hon. Member?

    57.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade what publicly-owned interests have been created in the Merseyside development district since October, 1964; how many workers they employ; and what plans he has for the future.

    About 3,700 Civil Service jobs have been created on Merseyside by the establishment of the National Giro and a Board of Trade Investment Grants Office, and by the dispersal of work of the Inland Revenue and the Ministry of Public Building and Works. A further 2,500 to 3,000 Civil Service jobs will be added over the next three years or so, as a result of dispersal and reorganisation.

    Would my hon. Friend agree that, while this is very welcome, it is only playing around with the problem of newly-developed Government-sponsored industries on Merseyside? Will the Government look again at the question of developing such industries on Merseyside because it is essential that something should be done within the next year or so in addition to those created by private industry?

    I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about the importance of creating new employment opportunities on Merseyside, a matter in which I have a common interest with him. I think he will agree that the National Giro has made a major contribution to the creation of employment opportunities. Private industry is also coming in and must, of course, bear a major proportion of the burden of providing further jobs.

    While one recognises the need for further jobs on Merseyside, will the hon. Gentleman tell the House how the figures that he as given compare with the jobs produced by the introduction of the motor industry to Merseyside when my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) was Chancellor of the Exchequer during the last Tory Administration?

    The motor industry has, of course, made a major contribution in providing jobs on Merseyside but, equally other new industries have been brought there. The motor industry has been expanded, and the shipbuilding industry is in a healthier state at the moment—it is an industry on which Merseyside greatly depends—than when right hon. Gentlemen left office.

    Special Development Areas (Designation)

    58.

    asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give the criteria by which special development areas are designated.

    The areas selected are in general those where, in the absence of special measures, colliery closures are likely to cause very high and persistent unemployment.

    Would my hon. Friend not agree that a precedent has been created in the last few weeks in that for the first time a non-coal mining area has been designated as a special development area? Can he assure the House that in future other non-coal mining areas will be considered on their merits for special development area status?

    I think that my hon. Friend is referring to the case of Millom, which was regarded as a special case because of the very high unemployment expected to result there from the closure of the Millom Hematite Company. Of course, the Government would examine other cases on their merits. Nevertheless, the main intention in creating special development areas was to deal with problems of colliery closures in areas where other employment opportunities were lacking.

    Is not Millom a case in point which shows the folly of the Government's policy? Here was a private enterprise firm which could have been kept going if the Government had been prepared to assist. Is it not true that the Government refused to help the firm?

    In the case of Millom the Government acted on the advice of the Board of Trade Advisory Committee. If the hon. Gentleman is saying that the Government should invest money in these cases irrespective of the likely outcome for public money of that investment, all I can say is that the Government do not agree with him. If the Government are to place money in private enterprises they must have a prospect of viability.

    In view of the current more favourable prospects for machine tool investment, will my hon. Friend confirm that it is the Government's intention to reduce the investment grants for development areas on 1st January from 45 per cent, to 40 per cent.?

    As my right hon. Friend the President of the Board announced in July, it is the intention of the Government to revert to the previous rates for investment grants on 1st January, 1969. That is 20 per cent, outside development areas and 40 per cent, inside.

    In view of the criteria laid down in the original reply, will my hon. Friend get the Department to look again at Thorne in my constituency, where a coal mine has been closed and the unemployment percentage is now over 11 per cent.?

    My hon. Friend informs me that the Department has already looked at this case. I am prepared to look at any case again, but if it has already been rejected I cannot hold out any great hope to him.

    Official Report (Correction)

    On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I seek your assistance? In the OFFICIAL REPORT of today the speech I made yesterday has been divided into three parts. One-third—the final part—has been attributed to me, one-third to the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Bottomley), and the initial third, albeit timed at 4.46 p.m., has been included in Answers to Questions, which, I respectfully suggest, would, if left unamended, represent the longest intervention you have ever permitted at Question Time.

    I have, properly, received a letter of apology from the Editor of the OFFICIAL REPORT, but I wonder whether directions could be given so that this arbitrary triple dissection could be ended and my speech reported as one speech?

    I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) for the kindly way in which he has called attention to the error. I deeply regret this serious error in the OFFICIAL REPORT. It is so serious, and errors of this magnitude are so rare, that today's edition of HANSARD may well become a collector's piece.

    I have received a letter from the Editor of HANSARD. I will not read all of it, but he points out the error to which the right hon. Gentleman has called attention and states:
    "I apologise to you and to Mr. Thorpe for this unfortunate error, but, beyond saying that it was an error, I cannot imagine how it can have happened.….
    The code lettering and numbering of the typescript report was correct, but the first page of the typescript report of Mr. Thorpe's speech, which was coded and numbered O.4, was set up in print following the page which was coded and numbered E.12 of Oral Answers."
    The error has obviously taken place after the typescript left this building. The Editor states in his letter that he will correct the error in the Bound Volume and I have asked him to put an erratum in today's HANSARD. In a later message, he says that the weekly HANSARD will contain the right hon. Gentleman's speech with all three parts in the same portion. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devon, North.

    Barbados (Gift Of A Parliamentary Library)

    3.34 p.m.

    on 30th May this year, this House gave leave of absence to a delegation comprising the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, North (Mr. R. W. Elliott), my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Kelvingrove (Dr. Miller) and myself, accompanied by Mr. H. M. Barclay, a Deputy Principal Clerk of the House, to proceed to the Island of Barbados and there present a gift to mark the occasion of that island's independence.

    I believe that you, Mr. Speaker, have received a copy of the Address to Her Majesty the Queen by the Barbados House of Assembly in which it expresses its thanks for a gift of a Parliamentary Library to commemorate the achievement of independence. I would like briefly to tell the House of our visit and then perhaps you could read the text of the Address and order it to be entered in the Journal.

    The delegation was received with the utmost cordiality and good will and we were extended friendship by everyone we met. We had opportunities to meet people in all parts of the island and in all walks of life. We wish to express our appreciation for the hospitality shown to us.

    The presentation ceremony took place in the House of Assembly in the capital town of Bridgetown, under the chairmanship of the Speaker of that House, and was attended by a very large audience and conducted with due ceremony and sense of occasion. It seemed, however, to the delegation that there was an inadvertent omission from the list of books presented, and I am sure that it will have your approval, Mr. Speaker, that a copy of the poetical works of Robert Burns has since also been placed in the Library of the House of Assembly.

    The delegation remembers with pleasure the opportunities given to it to see this beautiful island and will always remember the warmth and sincerity of its reception. I am asked, Mr. Speaker, to convey to you personally, and to this House, the appreciation of Mr. Speaker Brancker and Members of the Barbados Houses of Parliament.

    I wish to thank the hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. John Robertson) and his colleagues for the way in which they carried out their mission.

    I have been asked to read to the House the message which the House of Assembly has sent Her Majesty. It is headed: "Barbados House of Assembly to the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty." and reads:
    "Most gracious Sovereign,
    The House of Assembly, with loyalty and due submission, beg to inform Your Majesty that they have thankfully received from the House of Commons in the United Kingdom a most valuable gift of books for their Library.
    The House note with pleasure that this gift commemorates the independence of Barbados and that Your Majesty had been pleased to direct, in response to a Prayer made by the House of Commons, that the proper supply be provided. The House accordingly wish to thank Your Majesty for this gesture of good will and respectfully request that an expression of their warm appreciation to the Honourable House be conveyed to Mr. Speaker."
    It is signed by Mr. J. E. Theodore Brancker, Speaker of the House of Assembly. I will see that the message is entered in the Journal of the House.

    Public Order Act 1936 (Amendment)

    3.38 p.m.

    I beg to move,

    That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Public Order Act 1936 so as to provide for the identification, imprisonment and subsequent deportation of persons other than Her Majesty's subjects and of alien militant agitators taking part in, or conspiring in the preparation of, lawful public demonstrations.
    The object of my proposed Bill is to limit to the people of this country, to Her Majesty's subjects, the right of lawful public demonstration in this country. The Bill would make aliens who conspire in the preparation of such demonstrations or take part in them liable to prosecution and, on conviction, imprisonment and deportation.

    The Bill would not take away from aliens the right of political asylum here. It would take away no right from any British subject. The right to organise lawful demonstrations would not be curtailed. Indeed, it would be protected from the hostility which it attracts from the public at present because of the presence at lawful demonstrations of alien militant agitators.

    I give an example which was reported in HANSARD on 4th April. It is a description by the officer in command of the police of what happened at the end of the demonstration in Trafalgar Square on 17th March, when the demonstrators had moved off to attack the United States Embassy in Grosvenor Square.

    The officer in charge stated:
    "The German contingent were particularly militant at this stage and occasionally halted in the roadway until there was a clear space ahead, then, holding their banner poles horizontally with each man in the front rank gripping a pole with both hands, they ran forward in step chanting 'Seig heil' ".

    Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to intervene?

    On a point of order. Is it a Standing Order that no interventions can take place in a Ten-Minute Rule speech? It has happened before when you have allowed interventions, Mr. Speaker.

    It is not a Standing Order, but it is the custom of the House. It is always possible for an hon. Member to follow with a speech against granting leave to introduce the Bill.

    The report of the police officer—[An HON. MEMBER: "A liar."]—which I am now quoting was quoted to the House by the Under-Secretary for the Home Department and it is in the HANSARD from which I am quoting. Having made that report about the Germans marching forward in step chanting "Sieg heil", the police officer was not called a liar by the Minister at any time. The report goes on:

    "Both footways in Regent Street were crowded with pedestrians in an attempt to get out of the way, many being obviously cowed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th April, 1968; Vol. 762, c. 748.]
    I have always regarded it as one of the chief glories of the House that we should see to it that the people whom we represent are not cowed on a Sunday afternoon in Regent Street, or anywhere else, ever, by militant German contingents running forward in step and chanting, "Sieg heil". The people whom we represent are prepared to put up with a lot from their fellow countrymen, though their tolerance is now being stretched to the limit. The British people are fed up with being trampled underfoot by foreign scum. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] The House would do well to recognise the seething resentment and anger of the people whom we represent at being offered as a sacrifice to alien militant agitators with no true cause.

    I say with no true cause because however hard one tries to discern a true cause or a noble ideal which may be said to inspire the alien element in such demonstrations as that planned for Sunday, it is very difficult to find it.

    The chairman of the March 17th Ad Hoc Committee which organised the riot in Grosvenor Square wrote to The Times on 21st March boasting that his next riot would be even bigger, while claiming that he was not actively encouraging and planning the use of violence. That same chairman is the editor of a fortnightly publication, the current issue of which devotes some space to the organisation and preparation of next Sunday's demonstration.

    The editorial, on page 2, is headed:
    "Students must make revolution".
    The "Diary of Events", on page 4, gives the editor's programme of visits to various universities manifestly in connection with organising this demonstration, and there is no harm in that. This publication at this time may not unfairly be cited as the fountain of inspiration which moves alien militant agitators to come to this country, as the editor puts it, "to make revolution"; those are his words.

    What is the message? On page 5 of the publication we have it. It is described by the editor as the answer made by "an organiser" of the Columbia (United States) University "rebellion" of students, to the charge made against him of nihilism. The answer is encapsulated in one sentence from the text which follows and that one sentence is extracted by the editor and printed as the headline in anticipation of Sunday's demonstration. It reads:
    "Up against the wall, mother fucker. This is a stick-up'."
    Some might criticise the language as being rather callow and immature, but the House and those with responsibility for the security and well-being of decent, quiet-living constituents must criticise the message itself in substance as nothing but destructive aggression.

    If this is the quality of the revolutionary leadership specifically imported from abroad to cow Londoners on Sunday—[Interruption.] I am quoting the actual text of the publication which constitutes an invitation to these people to come here and make revolution. If this is the quality of the agitators who are being specifically invited here on Sunday for this purpose, I put it to the House that this is one of the imports which this country might just manage to do without. But if we are to have such imports—

    I remind the hon. Gentleman that he is seeking leave to bring in a Bill under the Ten-Minute Rule.

    With respect, Mr. Speaker, I am watching the clock with the sane attention as you. As you ruled that interventions were out of order—

    I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not waste his own time intervening in his own speech.

    I may be running close to time, but I have been interrupted by interventions which have taken—

    I was saying that, if these are the imports which are being invited, they are imports that we could do without, and that people from America or Germany, or wherever it may be, who try to provoke our constables because we show them a tolerance which they would not show to others if they had the revolution which they want, should not be allowed to come here for this purpose.

    I therefore ask leave for the Bill to be introduced so that the liberties which we properly defend for our own people should not be abused and brought into disrepute by others brought into this country specifically for the purpose of provoking the police and causing public destruction. The Bill could easily be got through all its stages if the Government had a mind to allow it before we rose on Prorogation.

    3.48 p.m.

    The hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) has advanced an absolutely monstrous proposition. I can well understand that he should have done so in the form of a Ten-Minute Rule Bill, because that was the only way in which he could get away with a speech such as that to which we have just listened. It would be almost too ridiculous for the House to pay any attention to the hon. Gentleman's totalitarian theories, except that silence might be misconstrued as approval, and that is why I intervene to ask the House to oppose the Motion for leave to introduce the Bill.

    The only countries which have legislation of this character are the Communist or Fascist dictatorships, and I should like to quote two short examples. One is that of a young schoolboy, Stuart Taylor, who was arrested in Spain while on holiday there after being alleged to have shouted the word "Liberty" during a political demonstration. For this he spent two weeks in a smelly and uncomfortable Spanish prison before being bailed out by his parents at very heavy cost to themselves.

    The other example is that of War Resisters' International, who went to Moscow recently to protest against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Two young people, Miss Vicki Rovere and Andrew Papworth, were deported for the offence of giving out leaflets there.

    They were returned to the United Kingdom without having suffered any punishment of imprisonment, such as the hon. Gentleman is suggesting in his proposed Bill. These two examples, which could be paralleled by many others, show that only in dictatorships, under Communist or Fascist control, is this type of legislation permitted.

    It may be convenient for the hon. Gentleman that Sir Oswald Mosley is in London at this moment. The hon. Gentleman might be able to take his advice on how demonstrations could be controlled—a theme on which Sir Oswald has expressed himself somewhat forcibly in this morning's papers—by treatment that would be more appropriate to Nazi Germany in 1936 than Britain in 1968.

    My second point is that the hon. Gentleman's Bill, as I understand it, would be a contravention of at least two of the Articles in the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 10(1) provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. Article 11(1) provides that everyone has the right and freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others. We could not pass this Motion without committing a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, which Mr. Harold Macmillan once described as the prior condition without which our society will fail.

    Thirdly, the Bill would be anomalous, because it refers to subjects of Her Majesty the Queen. That would mean that citizens of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, Sierre Leone, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania, Mauritius, The Gambia, Malta, Guyana and Barbados could come here and legitimately take part in these demonstrations, whereas citizens, for example, of Nigeria and Pakistan, which are republics, could not.

    Fourthly, I would point out that the Home Secretary already has power to deport aliens who have been in Great Britain for less than two years, without any right of appeal to the Metropolitan Chief Magistrate, and that even where an alien has been here for two years he can be deported without such an appeal if the security of the State is threatened. Commonwealth immigrants can also be deported within a period of five years if they are convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment.

    My next point is that the hon. Gentleman's Bill would seek to make the preparation of a demonstration an offence in itself. I always thought that if, under our law, an action was in itself lawful, then it could not be deemed to be a conspiracy to organise it. The hon. Gentleman is, therefore, committing a fundamental breach of our law.

    The Home Secretary already has power to stop the entry of aliens or citizens from the Commonwealth where he believes it is in the public interest for him to do so. It is quite reasonable for him to refuse entry in cases where persons have been convicted of offences involving violence during public demonstrations. That is a

    Division No. 308.]

    AYES

    [3.55 p.m.

    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)Glover, Sir DouglasMaude, Angus
    Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)Glyn, Sir RichardMaydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
    Bell, RonaldGower, RaymondMills, Peter (Torrington)
    Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)Gurden, HaroldMonro, Hector
    Bossom Sir CliveHarrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)More, Jasper
    Brinton, Sir TattonHarvey, Sir Arthur VereMorgan, Geraint (Denbigh)
    Bromley-Davenport,Lt.-Col.SirWalterHarvie Anderson, MissMurton, Oscar
    Cooke, RobertHogg, Rt. Hn. QuintinNabarro, Sir Gerald
    Costain, A. P.Holland, PhilipNeave, Airey
    Currie, G. B. H.Iremonger, T. L.Nott, John
    Dance, JamesJenkin, Patrick (Woodford)Onslow, Cranley
    Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)Jopling, MichaelOsborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
    Elliott, R.W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)
    Emery, PeterKershaw, AnthonyPink, R. Bonner
    Eyre, ReginaldKitson, TimothyPrior, J. M. L.
    Fleteher-Cooke, CharlesLewis, Kenneth (Rutland)Pym, Francis
    Galbraith, Hn. T. G.MacArthur, IanRamsden, Rt. Hn. James

    safeguard which the hon. Gentleman has neglected.

    No doubt inadvertently, by seeking to introduce his Bill at this moment, the hon. Gentleman is encouraging the very violence on 27th October which he purports to be trying to prevent. The more discussion there is of repressive measures being taken against lawful demonstrations, the more likely it is that unlawful action will result. So far, I am happy to say, both organisers and the police have taken a responsible line, and I very much hope that 27th October will pass off without any violence at all.

    I deplore violence as much as any hon. Member and I would appeal to editors of newspapers, and producers of television programmes, to listen more closely when peaceful protests are made, so that people do not say that the only way they have of getting the attention of Governments is by organising demonstrations which end with violence.

    If the Bill were allowed to go through the House of Commons unchallenged it would be the greatest affront to civil liberties in this House for many years. It would be an unsightly stain on the reputation and honour of this House, which has always, under every Government of whatever complexion, upheld the principles of freedom and justice.

    I hope that the Motion will be rejected by an overwhelming majority so that the hon. Gentleman will be made aware of the repugnance and shame that we feel at his monstrous suggestion.

    Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of Public Business):—

    The House divided: Ayes 62, Noes 159.

    Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.Wright, Esmond
    Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)Younger, Hn. George
    Russell, Sir RonaldWhitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
    Scott-Hopkins, JamesWilson, Geoffrey (Truro)TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
    Smith, John (London & W'minster)Wolrige-Gordon, PatrickMr. John Page and
    Stainton, KeithMr. Victor Goodhew.

    NOES

    Abse, LeoFernyhough, E.Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
    Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)Finch, HaroldMorris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
    Allen ScholefieldFoot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)Newens, Stan
    Archer, PeterFord, BenNott, John
    Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)Gardner, TonyOakes, Gordon
    Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)Garrett, W. E.O'Malley, Brian
    Bagier, Gordon A. T.Ginsburg, DavidOrbach, Maurice
    Barnett, JoelGray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)Orme, Stanley
    Beaney, AlanGreenwood, Rt. Hn. AnthonyOwen, Will (Morpeth)
    Bessell, PeterGregory, ArnoldPage, Derek (King's Lynn)
    Bidwell, SydneyGrey, Charles (Durham)Pardoe, John
    Blackburn, F.Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)Park, Trevor
    Booth, AlbertGriffiths, Eddie (Brightside)Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
    Braddock, Mrs. E. M.Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)Pentland, Norman
    Bradley, TomHamilton, James (Bothwell)Perry, Ernest (G. (Battersea, S.)
    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)
    Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)Harper, JosephPrice, Christopher (Perry Barr)
    Brown,Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,w.)Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)Probert, Arthur
    Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)Haseldine, NormanRandall, Harry
    Buchan, NormanHattersley, RoyRees, Merlyn
    Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'bum)Hazell, BertRhodes, Geoffrey
    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)Heffer, Eric S.Ross, Rt. Hn. William
    Cant, R. B.Herbison, Rt. Hn. MargaretShaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
    Chapman, DonaldHorner, JohnSheldon, Robert
    Coe, DenisHowie, W.Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.
    Coleman, DonaldHughes, Emrya (Ayrshire, S.)Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
    Concannon, J. D.Hughes, Roy (Newport)Short,Mrs. Renée (W'hampton.N.E.)
    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)Hynd, JohnSilkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
    Crawshaw, RichardIrvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)Silverman, Julius
    Cronnin, JohnJackson, Peter M. (High Peak)Skeffington, Arthur
    Cullen, Mrs AliceJeger,Mrs.Lena(H'b'n&St.P'cras,S.)Slater, Joseph
    Dalyell, TamJohnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)Small, William
    Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)Jones, Dan (Burnley)Snow, Julian
    Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)Jones,Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)Spriggs, Leslie
    Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)Kelley, RichardSteele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)
    Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)Lawson, GeorgeThorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
    Davies, Harold (Leek)Tinn, James
    Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)Turton, Rt Hn. R. H.
    Delargy, HughLomas, KennethWaiden, Brian (All Saints)
    Dempsey, JamesLubbock, EricWatkins, David (Consett)
    Dewar, DonaldMcBride, NeilWellbeloved, James
    Dickens, JamesMcCann, JohnWhitaker, Ben
    Dobson, RayMacColl, JamesWilkins, W. A.
    Doig, PeterMacdonald, A. H.Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick
    Dunn, James A.Mackenzie,Alasdair(Ross&Crom'ty)Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)
    Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)Willis, Rt. Hn. George
    Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)Maclennan, RobertWilson, William (Coventry, S.)
    Eadie, AlexMcMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)Winstanley, Dr. M. P.
    Edwards, William (Merioneth)MacPherson, MalcolmWoof, Robert
    Ellis, JohnMahon, Peter (Preston, S.)Yates, Victor
    Ennals, DavidManuel, Archie
    Ensor, DavidMapp, CharlesTELLERS FOR THE NOES:
    Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)Marks, KennethMr. David Steel and
    Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)Miller, Dr. M. S.Mr. Russell Kerr.
    Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'ham, Yardey)Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

    Orders Of The Day

    Justices Of The Peace Bill

    Lords Amendments considered.

    Clause 1

    Appointment Of Justices, Oaths Of Office, Etc

    4.4 p.m.

    I have not selected the three Amendments in the names of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Christopher Price) and his hon. Friends, but they will be able to express the point of view expressed in these Amendments in the debate.

    Lords Amendment No. 1: In page I, line 5, at beginning insert:

    "Subject to subsection (1A) below,".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I suggest that we take, at the same time, Amendments No. 2, 3, and 4, 9 to 21, and 23.

    When I spoke on the Second Reading of the Bill, which, among other things, abolishes ex officio justices, I ventured to explain that the principles on which the proposals in the Bill were based were, first, that the lay bench should include men and women of integrity and intelligence drawn, so far as practicable, from all sections of the community. The other principle which I emphasised was that cases coming before magistrates' courts should not be tried by a single lay justice.

    Since the Bill, including the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London among the ex officio justices who should be abolished, left this House, the Amendments which we are debating were carried in another place with the approval of my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor and of the Government because, in their view, they do no violence to the basic principles of the Bill. On the contrary, I shall seek to show that they achieve the substance of the Bill's intentions.

    When the Bill was debated here, there was, with the exception, I think, of my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Mr. Tuck), general praise among the lawyers on the Government, Conservative and Liberal benches of the high standards of justice administered in the City of London magisterial courts. I do not think that there was any criticism of its quality. Their past record compares favourably with that of any lay bench in the country, whether the test be that of successful appeals from their decisions or any other.

    It was also pointed out in the debates here, and it is the case, that the aldermen of the City of London differ from the local government ex officio magistrates in a number of very important respects which are relevant to their suitability to be justices of the peace.

    First, they are selected with a view to their suitability as magistrates. Whatever system of appointment may be devised for the City of London, there appears to be little doubt that the aldermen would almost certainly find themselves among those appointed justices of the peace by reason of their qualifications and character. The City authorities have given the Lord Chancellor an assurance that the overriding consideration in selecting a person to be an alderman will be that he or she is particularly well qualified to serve as a magistrate.

    Secondly, appointment as an alderman is not limited in time. Other local government ex officio justices—for example, the mayors and chairmen of county and district councils—often serve for only one year and in no case can they hold office for long without having to be reelected. The City aldermen normally hold office for life and, therefore, they are able to serve for many years as magistrates until they reach the compulsory retiring age.

    The aldermen receive full training before they are allowed to sit as magistrates. They sit regularly, and their record of attendance shows a higher average than for lay justices in the rest of the country. But, in spite of these considerations, the Government took the view that a City bench consisting of one alderman sitting alone was unsatisfactory and did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. No woman has ever sat on the City bench. In the event, a court of decision consisting of one lay magistrate sitting alone is not thought to be as satisfactory a court as a court where two or more justices are able to consult together, particularly on the difficult problem of what the sentence or treatment of the offender should be.

    The Bill has been discussed and considered at length since it left this House and, in my submission, the compromise, which it undoubtedly is, contained in the Amendments remedies the defects against which the provisions of the Bill were directed and fully achieves the main purposes of the Bill while preserving the best features of the present arrangements. Under the Bill as amended in another place, the City magistrates will no longer be able to sit alone, as they do now, but must sit in benches of at least two justices and not more than seven, as do lay justices throughout the rest of England and Wales.

    The Lord Chancellor will appoint justices for the City of London in the same way as he does in the rest of England and Wales. Those whom he will so appoint will outnumber the aldermen by at least two to one and, possibly, by more. The City bench will thus no longer be the perquisite of the aldermen. They will be, indeed, in the minority.

    The method in which the bench will work is set out in paragraph 1 of Schedule A, in Lords Amendment No. 10:
    "The persons holding office as justice of the peace for the City of London shall constitute a single body of justices, without distinction between those holding office by virtue of the charter and those appointed by the commission of the peace, and the powers and jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor and aldermen as justices by virtue of the charter shall be the same in all respects as those of justices appointed by the commission."
    These arrangements, therefore, will ensure that the City bench is composed of persons representing a cross-section of the community living and working in the City of London. It will include also a reasonable number of women.

    Aldermen will be subject to the same age limits and conditions regarding the supplemental list as their fellow justices. If an alderman should misbehave or consistently neglect his duties he can be prevented from acting as a magistrate by the Lord Chancellor, who can exer- cise in regard to him his powers to make an exclusion order under Section 4 of the Justices of the Peace Act, 1906.

    The justices who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor will be able to preside over the courts in the City of London. Although the Lord Mayor will be chairman of the whole bench, he will, of course, be able to preside only on the occasions when he is present. [Laughter.] That if I may say so, is a flashing statement of the obvious. Nevertheless, it may be worth stating. The Lord Mayor will preside when he is there, but there will have to be at least 12 courts a week and probably more. When the Lord Mayor is not sitting, one of the deputy-chairmen will preside. The number of aldermen who may become deputy-chairmen ex officio is limited to eight, which will probably be not more than one-third of the total number of deputy-chairmen required.

    There was at one stage a proposal in another place that all the aldermen should be deputy-chairmen, but that was rejected, partly because it would be no great encouragement for an ordinary lay justice to become a justice of the peace in the City of London. Therefore, this compromise has been reached whereby only about one-third of those who become deputy-chairmen will be aldermen.

    Accordingly, I submit that this compromise represents a satisfactory settlement of what had become a somewhat unhappy controversy. It does no violence to the main purposes of the Bill and it takes advantage of the best aspects of the present arrangements. I therefore commend to the House the Amendments which embody the compromise. Unhappily, I am not able to be in the House from 4.30 for a time, and I hope that I may be excused for what, I trust, will be only a short absence.

    4.15 p.m.

    I should like to congratulate the Attorney-General upon accepting the Lords Amendments in regard to the constitution of the bench in the City. To most of us, I believe—and I think that I speak for most of my hon. Friends on this side—it appears to be a reasonable and proper compromise. I know that the Attorney-General will not mind if I say that I welcome it rather in the spirit of the words in the Scriptures that there is more joy

    "in heaven over one sinner that repenteth"

    I admit to no conversion to the hon. and learned Gentleman's very restricted view on this matter when we were discussing it earlier.

    I could not for one moment concede that my views were restricted. I took the view then, and I expressed it on Second Reading that in putting forward a scheme which taken over the length and breadth of the country, had many merits and advantages, which we on this side conceded, the Government, in trying to force the administration of justice in the City into this mould, were, nevertheless, trying to force it into a procrustean bed and were doing so with more regard to a doctrinaire ideology than to the merits and necessities of the case.

    I rise this afternoon, however, to welcome something and, therefore, I do not wish to go over old ground and to stir up old controversies [An HON. MEMBER: "The hon. and learned Member already has."] I merely answered the right hon. and learned Gentleman. This compromise has the great merit that it recognises the fact that the administration of justice in the City has been second to none. As the Attorney-General himself said, the record of the City bench, for instance, in the matter of appeals shows this. Indeed, this was likely because, as we all know, the aldermen in the City underwent considerable training in their duties for serving on the City bench.

    I recognise the force of the case for doing away with ex-offico magistrates in the rest of the country. That case did not apply to the City of London, where the administration of justice was extremely good. The compromise in the form of the Amendments from the House of Lords recognises that the City is a very special case in the administration of justice. I therefore welcome it wholeheartedly and hope that the House will do the same.

    I would like to oppose the Amendments with all the steam that I can muster. When considering them we should remember something of the history. The Government were defeated in the Lords, which is not an uncommon occurrence these days, on this issue in Committee. That was the culmination of a sustained campaign in The Times by the City of London to defend what I consider to be very narrow interests indeed. The House of Lords felt it had a right to back up these interests, and it did so by forcing upon the Government this compromise.

    I am at a loss to understand why this compromise was made at all. I suspect that it was made because, at the time, the Government were particularly anxious to mollify the House of Lords because they hoped to get some agreed reform of that House. Whatever the truth of that, it is not true any more. Hope of that type of agreed reform has very much passed away.

    Just as the Lords, in speech after speech, said that it was their duty to defend the interests of the City of London, I think that it is the duty of the House of Commons as a whole to defend the Justices of the Peace Bill which this House put through all its stages and sent to the House of Lords.

    I feel this particularly strongly because, although I am a Member of Parliament for the City of Birmingham, and people may ask what interest have I in the City of London magistrates, we in Birmingham also have some pride in our municipality. We, too, have a Lord Mayor, and we have had some very distinguished Lord Mayors who have been Prime Ministers and also have been ex officio magistrates. Many of them have been more distinguished than any of the aldermen of the City of London, very many of whom, to us in the City of Birmingham, are faceless men.

    We have had some famous Lord Mayors in Birmingham. If the Lord Mayor of Birmingham is to be deprived of his status as a justice of the peace, why should we in the House of Commons agree to give that privilege to the aldermen of the City of London simply because they appeared to have open access over a period of months to the correspondence columns in The Times to raise a campaign of that sort?

    I would like to remind the Attorney-General of his words in this House on 10th April, when he said that it was a matter of principle:
    "The principal object of this part of the Bill"—
    he said—
    "is to improve the system by which persons become J.P.s in England and Wales. Most of the Bill's provisions are based on the principle that magistrates' courts should generally be composed of lay J.P.s who are men and women of integrity and intelligence, drawn, so far is practicable, from all sections of the community and who have been specially selected to be J.P.S."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th April, 1968; Vol. 762, c. 1444.]
    Of the magistrates who would, if we accept these Lords Amendments become ex officio magistrates and justices of the peace, one could not possibly say by any stretch of the imagination that they would be drawn so far as is practicable from all sections of the community. That simply would not be true and in advising us to accept the Lords Amendment the Attorney-General is going back on the speech—every time I read it I am more and more convinced by it—which he made in the House in rejecting this proposal on 10th April. It is a speech I commend to every hon. Member, because I think that it bears reading again and again.

    Perhaps I may come to one or two specific points.

    Why, under this compromise, as he calls it, should the Lord Mayor of London always be the chairman of the City justices? The Attorney-General has said of justices that it would not be fair to appoint lay justices if they had no hope of rising to the rank of deputy chairman. Surely that applies a fortiori to the chance of rising to the rank of chairman?

    I very much hope that the Lord Chancellor will find some very eminent people indeed who, perhaps, have not time to indulge in some of the ceremonial activities in which aldermen in the City indulge, but who want to be lay justices. I hope that he will find some very eminent people to be lay justices in the City. What we are saying is that, however eminent they are, they can never rise to be chairman of the City justices. That is absolutely wrong, and is another reason why we should reject these Amendments.

    Why should City justices be ex officio as of right, eight deputy chairmen? I would remind the Attorney-General that even the Lord Chancellor, who fathered this compromise, if anyone did, said in the House of Lords:
    "I am not sure that eight ought not to be six: eight will give them a little more than perhaps their fair proportion."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords; 23rd May, 1968; Vol. 292, c. 849.]
    Even the Lord Chancellor has admitted that eight is too many, and yet we are told that this is a reasonable compromise we ought to accept. I do not believe it. We ought not to accept it, but should turn these Amendments down, because every single argument that the Attorney-General has put forward is equally an argument for making them appointed justices, and not ex officio justices. If they are men of such outstanding, admirable integrity, such legal judgment, then they will be absolutely clear and obvious people for appointment. It seems to me it would be far more just, far more proper, to put on the Statute Book a piece of legislation which has the quite clear principle that we have justices who are appointed and not ex officio and will allow all those aldermen of the City of London who are qualified to be magistrates to have their chance of being appointed lay magistrates.

    I see no reason at all for succumbing to this pressure and accepting these Amendments. The Government stand up to the T.U.C. they stand up to the A.E.F.; they stand up to pressure groups, particularly on the Left, all over the country. The only pressure group they seem unable to stand up to is the sustained campaign by the City of London. It is a disgrace and we ought to oppose it.

    As a London Member I can well sympathise with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Christopher Price) that Birmingham should have lost completely what London has in part saved, and I understand his feelings in that part of his argument. Indeed, I would go further, because I am one of those who took the view that it was quite unnecessary over the country as a whole to sever the traditional connection between magistracy and the heads of local authorities. It is a pity that this should have fallen victim to the somewhat dogmatic view of the Lord Chancellor in this matter.

    As a London Member I am glad that a concession is being made to the centuries-old tradition of the City of London in this respect. This is a very vivid illustration of the advantages of the existence of another place, that a matter of this sort can be there discussed and, as the Attorney-General quite rightly said, a compromise between opposing views can be worked out there.

    I see no reason whatever for any change at all in the arrangement for the administration of justice in the City of London. I do not want to weary the House by repeating all the figures, but the number of appeals, for example, shows that justice has been efficiently, fairly and economically administered under the old system. If it lay with me I should follow the advice of Lord Melbourne and say, "Why not leave it alone?".

    4.30 p.m.

    Although the Attorney-General is now giving a vivid illustration of the truth of his proposition—I see that he has come back. I was about to say that he was demonstrating the truth of his profound proposition that the Lord Mayor cannot preside when he is absent. I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for having been prepared to accept this compromise, which will work towards the efficiency of the administration of justice.

    It is a good thing that the long tradition of the administration of justice being connected with the Lord Mayor and aldermen in the City should continue. I am not sufficient of a traditionalist to advocate that if it is shown to be inefficient, but as it has not been shown to be inefficient, but, on the contrary, has been shown to be efficient, in my view it is a good thing that it should continue in some shape or form.

    I accept this as a compromise which enables an old tradition to go on. Had the Attorney-General not now demonstrated the truth of his proposition by finally departing, I would say that he, of all men, should know that there is sometimes value in the preservation of traditional ways and offices, for he is himself the holder of such a traditional office in a Royal borough, his holding of which gives great pleasure to that borough. I hope that the right hon. and learned Attorney-General welcomes the compromise and that the Solicitor-General, with his Scottish determination, will hang on to it and not allow himself to be bullied out of it by his hon. Friends.

    Every hon. Member who has spoken, including the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), has described this as a compromise. I suggest that it is nothing of the sort. It is a straightforward surrender to the forces of tradition. The speech of the right hon. Member clearly indicates that. The only compromise about the position is the extremely compromising situation in which my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General finds himself this afternoon. He has cogently and lucidly argued against a separate system of justices for London and against a separate one of the ex officio justices. He has led us through the Lobbies and in Committee.

    In another place, when the subject came up in Committee, the Government maintained their position. But, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, they were overwhelmingly defeated because a lot of faces were seen there who are rarely seen there. An arrangement was, therefore, arrived at between both sides in the other place.

    My right hon. and learned Friend has tried to foist that agreement on us today. I support what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Christopher Price), namely, that this House will not be treated in this way. We, the elected House, had made a decision in this matter. We now have a non-representative, non-elected body coming to the aid and succour of another non-representative, non-elected body. The arrangements made in this so-called compromise are bad for justice in themselves. They will provide the worst of all worlds.

    For example, eight deputy chairmen who are aldermen will be appointed. If the arithmetic of my right hon. and learned Friend is correct, and the city aldermen are to be outnumbered by two to one, it means that there will be 24 deputy chairmen in one court. Was ever any chairman or Lord Mayor so assisted?

    How will it work? We do not know yet. In respect of juvenile courts or domestic courts, the argument in this House previously was that the very constitution of City justices precluded domestic or juvenile courts being held. Will one of the deputy chairmen, because he is an alderman with an office unrelated to justice itself, sit as chairman of a domestic court or a juvenile court?

    I hope that the House will reject what the Lords are trying to do. The Bill has been uncontentious except for this item. It is a matter of principle that throughout England and Wales there should be no ex-officio justices. Another place has dared to interfere with that principle, and has sent the Bill back with the necessary Amendments. My right hon. and learned Friend now has the very unpleasant task of trying to persuade the House to accept the arrangement.

    I end with a quotation from an editorial in The Guardian of 25th May, which concludes:
    "The point at issue is whether or not every City alderman should have an automatic and inalien right, because of election to one office, to perform judicial duties which are unrelated to it. To think that he should is a strange attitude of mind in a democracy in the twentieth century. And how does the Government expect ordinary people to accept painful industrial changes when such painless change at the top is apparently too much? The Commons ought to reject Lord Gardiner's happy compromise out of hand."
    I hope that the House will do just that.

    It is not often that I rise to support the Attorney-General, however learned he may be, and perhaps it is a good thing that at this moment he is not here. If the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Christopher Price)—who is now leaving the Chamber and is to be another absentee chairman—will come back I will tell him that his speech, far from destroying the case made by his right hon. and learned Friend showed that if he had his way he would prefer the Bill never to have reached the Statute Book.

    The hon. Member's main argument was that he disapproved of the Amendment made in another place which would leave intact some of the traditional basis of the City of London, principally because that tradition would not also remain with the chief citizen of the great City of Birmingham.

    I have a great deal of sympathy with him on that point. I was somewhat critical when the Bill was first debated, because I thought that it was one of those perfect examples of doing something for the sake of doing something and then finding that what is being done, instead of creating an improvement, will make the position even worse.

    It is incredible that the chief citizens of our ancient boroughs and county boroughs who have received this ex-officio appointment should be considered by the Government as not suitable to preside over a bench of magistrates when the people of their boroughs have been prepared to accept them as their chief citizens.

    I was at no time arguing for ex-officio magisterial status for the Lord Mayor of Birmingham, simply because practically every Lord Mayor of Birmingham has already been a justice of the peace, appointed on his merits before attaining the office of Lord Mayor.

    Which shows that a good deal of the purpose of the Bill was not necessary.

    We had a system which was working very well in the City of London, under which certain persons held magisterial office because of another appointment. It had been shown by the figures that under that system the City bench worked at least as satisfactorily as any other bench. I do not represent a London constituency, and I have no axe to grind for London. I represent a Lancastrian constituency, and we have not even a Lord Mayor who has been disfranchised, because, unfortunately, my constituency has not a Lord Mayor within its boundaries.

    I dislike getting rid of a system which is working well just for the sake of getting rid of it and because people say that it is traditional. If anything happened in the City of London which could be criticised, I would be the first to complain about the inefficient working of the system of justice. But no one can say that.

    In this country, we have worked our affairs with good humour, common sense and compromise. In this case, I think that it was right for the Lord Chancellor to accept the compromise in the other place and for the Attorney-General to put it before us today. I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite will not be carried away by too much ideological nonsense. All that they are asked to do is to allow tradition to continue, with large safeguards now built into it by the Lord Chancellor, keeping a bit of the colour that we all treasure and allowing a system which, over the years, has been proved to work satisfactorily to continue into the future.

    When hon. Gentlemen opposite have had their bit of fun, I think that they will support the Attorney-General on this Amendment. At least, I hope that they will, because it is essential.

    I hope that no one will think that I am entering into the debate with a sense of fun and that, after it is all over, if we make a wrong decision, we shall regard it as so much water under the bridge. This is a very important matter, and I shall oppose the Lords Amendment.

    There have been various arguments advanced today, notably from this side of the House, and I shall not attempt to go over all of them. But some comments have been made which should be taken up.

    One is the argument that we should leave matters as they are because these magistrates, as one hon. Member said, are doing a good job on the whole. When we think of the administration of justice, I hope that we shall strive for as near perfection as we can. The point that they are doing a fairly good job on the whole is no argument.

    For a short period of my life before leaving the area, I was a justice of the peace. My right hon. and learned Friend made great play of the fact that aldermen of the City of London would be required to go through exactly the same mechanism as everyone else and that they would be required to attend training courses. Comparatively recently, it was decided that such courses were necessary. In other words, it is nonsense for anyone to say that justice has been served in the best possible way by the traditional system in the City of London and elsewhere.

    It was recognised that people being appointed to the bench under the old procedure, either as City of London magistrates or as lay magistrates elsewhere, needed training. It was for that reason that after a good deal of pressure that a system of training was established. It was felt to be necessary if a man was to be a good justice of the peace.

    However, this is only one aspect of the present selection procedure. Before people deemed to be suitable are given extra training, the theory is that the Lord Chancellor has an advisory body which goes through the list of suggested names. It is not known to the general public who the people are who compose this body. They may have served for many years on the bench. They may know something of the law. But before the point is reached of selecting magistrates and training them, each person's qualifications are examined.

    Another flaw in the argument is that local councillors, elected to do a different job altogether, are the people who decide who should be appointed aldermen, following which the aldermen automatically become justices of the peace. That will remain the position if the Lords Amendment is accepted.

    4.45 p.m.

    The point which the hon. Gentleman is making gives cause for a good deal of disturbance. How are these people selected by the Lord Chancellor? Are they elected? Who are they? It is almost a secret court. Hardly anyone knows who they are. What, for example, are their qualifications compared with those of the average alderman?

    Mr. Deputy Speaker, I see the warning look in your eye, and it may be that the question of how we get justices of the peace is one which we could debate on another occasion. I know that you will rule me out of order if I pursue it now.

    The hon. Member for Ormskirk (Sir D. Glover) questions whether the people selected by the Lord Chancellor are any good. In reply, I say that it is generally understood that the Lord Chancellor selects the people who examine the qualifications of would-be magistrates because they have experience in these matters. Whether that is the best way for him to get advice is open to doubt, but I am sure that it has some merit. The Lord Chancellor has to do the job, and it may be that he could draw on greater expertise if he went elsewhere for advice, but it cannot be denied that the persons who perform this function make up a specialist body—

    Order. I must ask the hon. Gentleman to come to the Lords Amendment.

    It is a body which has an important rôle to play in the selection of justices of the peace, but its work does not apply to aldermen of the City of London.

    I hope that the House will treat this matter seriously, because I am sure that we all want justice not only to be done but to be seen to be done. It is a great honour to be appointed a justice of the peace, because it is known that such persons are selected from all walks of life because they are people of integrity. Those are important qualifications. I doubt whether aldermen of the City of London come from all walks of life, but that is just a small point that I put in for the sake of argument.

    There is great feeling about this, and it is important to demonstrate that justices of the peace are selected for their capabilities and their sense of integrity. If there is any hint of jobbery, snobbery, fobbery, or tradition associated with the post, the whole concept of justice will be lost. I hope that the Lords Amendment will be rejected by an overwhelming vote.

    The House is talking about my constituency, as indeed it was on the recent Ten-Minute Rule Bill. I have never had any connection with the Corporation of the City of London, and when this Measure and this issue first appeared I felt, without thinking about it, very much as hon. Gentlemen opposite have expressed themselves this afternoon. But on inquiry—[Interruption.] I am not ashamed to inquire. On inquiry, I was converted.

    The hors. Member for Bristol, North-West (Mr. Ellis) expressed many of the misconceptions which have bedevilled this issue. He began by saying that it was not sufficient that the aldermen should do quite a good job. They do not do quite a good job; they do a job which, statistically, cannot be bettered—in 1967 there were only six successful appeals out of 19,000 cases. Can that, in this imperfect vale of tears, be bettered?

    The hon. Member for Bristol, North-West also mentioned training. The aldermen of the City of London have for many years, before other justice in this country were trained at all, been required to undergo a course of training which, even now, is more rigorous than the Government have proposed for other justices.

    Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the measure of success of justice depends on the number of appeals that are allowed? If so, we can imagine, and, indeed, we could mention, many nations where no appeals succeed, but we reckon it to be bad justice.

    Much as I should like to enlarge on world affairs in general, I feel that we must limit ourselves to justices of the peace and not look into the perfection or otherwise of judges who deal with appeals.

    The hon. Member for Bristol, North-West also asked "Who are these aldermen?". Well, who are these turtle-fed plutocrats? The Lord Mayor is an architect. Two aldermen are lawyers. One is a solicitor. [AN HON. MEMBER: "How many live in the City?"] About the same proportion of aldermen live in the City of London as the proportion of the people who appear before them for justice. Another alderman is an accountant. There is also a textile agent, a builder, and a grocer who started from scratch. They come from all walks of life, but some have demonstrated that they can get out of a walking pace. Another alderman is a fruiterer and there is another builder—[HON. MEMBERS: "How many wage-earners?"] We have had these aldermen criticised as justices because they are not elected. But, unlike all other justices of the peace in the country, they are elected. They are the only justices of the peace to be elected.

    The happy conversion of the Attorney-General and his colleagues has brought relief in my constituency, relief not satisfaction—relief that at least one thing which works is not to be dismantled. I have made four speeches on this subject—they were all much the same—and I will not make it again now—but it gave me a humble pleasure, with no wish to crow about it, that the Attorney-General this afternoon made the same speech as I have made previously. I am not in the least concerned with tradition, face or pressure groups. I am not called Smith for nothing. I am simply concerned with what works, and this system does work.

    Hon. Gentlemen opposite have allowed their fondness for abstract principle to run away with them. They are obsessed with uniformity. We have even had quibbling about the relative merits of eight deputy chairmen or six deputy chairmen. I am not in the least concerned with uniformity. There are two Lord Mayors in my constituency. The fact that one is to be ex officio chairman of a bench and the other is not does not bother me. Uniformity has always bedevilled us. Almost all advances in civilisation and all worthwhile human progress has come from strictly non-uniform people. It would be difficult to assemble 630 more non-uniform people in a more non-uniform place than this House. I hope that arguments based on uniformity will never be advanced nor listened to here.

    On this occasion hon. Gentlemen opposite must overcome their understandable and natural horror of anything which actually works. They have got what they want. The Bill introduces a bench in the City of London like all other benches in the country. Surely they cannot object to having the aldermen thrown in as well for nothing. I earnestly hope that the Attorney-General will not listen to his hon. Friends, but will persevere with this Lords Amendment.

    I listened to the arguments with an open mind and I approached these Lords Amendments with impartiality. Indeed, I must declare an interest: I am a London lawyer. I was born and live and work in London. However, I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General will assure his constituents in Liverpool that geographical factors will not come into this argument and that London people are no different from Liverpool people.

    One of the more endearing habits of the legal world is that when a learned judge gives a really indefensible judgment containing a ludicrous error it is said that he has misdirected himself. I believe that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General and my right hon. and noble Friend the Lord Chancellor, two people whom I respect as much as anybody in these two Houses, have on this matter sadly misdirected themselves.

    I found the Attorney-General's speech much more convincing the last time he spoke on this matter when he was arguing in precisely the opposite direction. Her Majesty's Opposition are at least consistent in their subservience to illogical privilege, but we are sorry to see some recent converts on our Front Bench.

    On the previous reading of this Measure there were many speechs of elegance and intelligence, and none was more so than that of my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, when he said:
    "it is unthinkable, indeed incredible, that the status and reputation of the City, the Lord Mayor and aldermen will be whittled down one iota if they are deprived of the inherent and automatic right to be made justices of the peace when they are made aldermen.… The House has generally accepted the fact that a man is appointed mayor should not be a ground for entitling him to administer justice in the magistrates' court. The principle which underlies that argument applies with a good deal of force to the arrangements for the City of London."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th April, 1968; Vol. 762, c. 1442–4.]
    5.0 p.m.

    Any alderman who is worth being made a justice of the peace will be made one under the normal procedure. What is indefensible is that a man who is unsuited to being a justice of the peace should be one ex officio. Surely it is wrong to appoint anyone to any position, and, above all, to one involving judicial power, because of the mere fact that he holds another post?

    The American example of elected judges is not an encouraging one, but these aldermen are not even elected democratically in the way that American judges are. At least, the American judges have to face democratic re-election at intervals, and, therefore, the weeds can be removed. I think that I am right in saying that these aldermen elect each other, which is no form of democratic sanction.

    All the letters which I have received on this subject from people who live in the City support the rejection of these Amendments, though I must admit I have only had one.

    If the hon. Gentleman gets letters from my constituents, if he will forward them to me I shall deal with them.

    I am glad to hear that. I have a great respect for the hon. Gentleman, and I listen to his speeches with real amusement. The fact is that his constituent said that he had despaired of the hon. Member's views on this matter.

    Perhaps I can recall to the House the words of the Lord Chancellor in the other place. He said:
    "We all know that in America a number of judges are elected, not appointed. I should not have thought that that was a good basis for appointment. I have yet to meet any American judge or lawyer who likes that method.…
    So far as election is concerned, in a sense it is a self-perpetuating body, in so far as nobody can be appointed an alderman unless the Court of Aldermen elects him.… He can never be a justice unless he is prepared to start off by canvassing people and standing for election to the Common Council. Then he has to be promoted from the Common Council to the bench of Aldermen. I suggest that, on the face of it, that is not a sound method."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 13th May, 1968; Vol. 292, c. 46.]
    I submit that we want to get away from this type of appointment to any judicial bench, and that the ideal should be the open appointment of justices of the peace and judges openly arrived at; but I appreciate that it would be out of order to carry on that argument on this occasion.

    As has rightly been said by my hon. Friends, the only reason the Government are behaving like a spaniel on this occasion and lying on their back and wagging their tail is that they are capitulating to the incumbents at the other end of the building. Once we let those incumbents run Parliament, it will be the end of any sense and purpose of hon. Members being in the Commons. This is an illogical method of legislating, because many of the noble peers who steamrollered the Amendments through have never been seen since, and, indeed, were rarely seen before in their Chamber. This is a question of one indefensible skeleton coming along to try to prop up another indefensible skeleton.

    If we accept the Amendment it will be as logical as if we solemnly constituted ourselves as judges. Just because we have been elected for one function, according to the argument of hon. Gentlemen opposite we are, therefore, ipso facto, qualified to do something totally different. Surely the Labour Party exists to put an end to such illogical privileges which affect other people?

    The reason the Government accepted the Amendment, or intended to before the vote this afternoon, was that they were still attempting to appease the other end of the building, but that policy failed notably. The appetite of the other end of the building was only whetted, as was seen at the time of the Rhodesia Order.

    In their hearts I believe that the Government know that these Amendments are totally indefensible. I suggest to the House that we come to the assistance of the Government in their embarrassment and that we help them out of their predicament by rejecting these Amendments. We had a similar task last night. I for one have no wish to cause any trouble to my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench: if, therefore, the Government will withdraw the Amendments, I shall not divide the House against them.

    The quarrel between the hon. Member for Hampstead (Mr. Whitaker) and his hon. Friends, and between the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General and his friends, if he has any, is a pretty one, but not one in which I ought to intervene.

    Like my hon. Friend the Member for the Cities of London and Westminster (Mr. John Smith), this will be the fourth speech that I have made on this subject. I think that the hon. Member for Hampstead has made three. It is welcome to hear now different speeches from others on a subject which we have canvassed very fully in the House.

    I believe that one of the straitjackets we sew for ourselves in this place is that the Government can never give way without, apparently, losing a great deal of face, without the Minister in some way having his nose rubbed into what he has said before. It seems to me that one of the most sensible things any Administration can do when a good case is made against it is politely and courteously to end with a compromise. This compromise is not what we would wholly like or what hon. Gentlemen opposite would like, but it is a sensible compromise. I think that when the Government do that they ought to be congratulated.

    We put forward our arguments both on Second Reading and in Committee. They found support from that side of the House, and from the Liberal benches. On Report, the mighty majority of the party opposite sank to 18, so we must have convinced some of the people that our case was a good one. We must have convinced those who abstained, or were not here, and I can only believe that that was because of the arguments we advanced.

    Our case was that if one took the criteria of what worked well in justice, what the superior courts thought of it, whether they thought it was effective and whether, at a low cost, it was an efficient exercise of the machinery of justice, we ought to retain it and not tamper with it. Our case was on the basis of considering the end result of this form of administering justice. We could see no reason for altering it at greater expense and requiring more man hours to operate the altered system.

    The Bill then went to another place. I do not know how Lord Goodman would be regarded from the point of view of his political persuation. As far as I know he sits on the Crossbenches, but he is closely associated with many hon. Gentlemen opposite. He moved the Amendment from which this compromise has come. Many of those who took part in the Division were Crossbench peers. They did so because, on the balance of the argument, they decided that it was not wise to start taking away the administration of justice in the City of London from what hitherto had been a sensible and efficient mechanism. Eventually, a compromise was evolved. The absent Attorney-General told us that this was a compromise. I repeat that it is not what hon. Gentlemen opposite want, nor what we on this side want.

    The Amendment is not a compromise. It is discrimination against aldermen and other civic leaders in the rest of the country.

    The hon. Gentleman may think of it in that way. Our case is that the City of London should be left alone because it works and because it is efficient. As my hon. Friend the Member for the Cities of London and Westminster said, anything that works well arouses the hilarity of hon. Gentlemen opposite who see it so rarely and unusually. Therefore, this was a compromise. If the hon. Gentleman will study the debates which took place before the Bill went to the Lords and the speeches made and the views adopted by both sides, he will see that this proposal is a compromise which I, for one, think that it was wise to make.

    Therefore, I will, strange as it may seem, join the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General and their friends, if they have any friends, in the Lobby when this is put to the test.

    When I find criticism for a proposal I am putting forward coming from this side of the House and when support for it comes from the other side, I look into the merits of the issue with special anxiety and concern. I assure my hon. Friends that I have applied this test very carefully on this occasion. I do not think I have had the pleasure of hearing the Lords Amendment welcomed or recommended by any of my hon. Friends.

    Then I ask myself: have we got in the Amendment, despite the fact that it is acknowledged to be a compromise, the substance of what we sought to achieve? With as much seriousness and sincerity as I can command, I invite my hon. Friends to take the view that we have got a good deal of the substance of what we sought to achieve. It is significant that the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) said, with perfect candour, that what the Opposition want is that the City of London should be left alone. Whatever can be said about the Bill, even as amended after, as I trust will be the case, this Lords Amendment is accepted, it does not have the consequence of leaving the City of London in this respect as it was. A change of some importance is being made.

    I am not resorting to sleight of speech or to triviality when I say that we have the substance here. As an outcome of the Bill and with the Amendment in it, albeit that the Amendment is there, there will be important changes in the administration of justice henceforward in the City of London. In future aldermen will not sit alone to try cases. For the first time, the way will be open for a woman to be a justice in the City of London. There will be justices—this is the key to the matter—appointed by the commission of the peace who will outnumber the justices who hold office by virtue of the Charter.

    I ask my hon. Friend to acknowledge that that is an important change and, from the point of view which we on this side share, a change for the better.

    My hon. and learned Friend makes a very valid point. Does he recall that the original intention behind the Bill was to do a certain thing to a section of privilege? My hon. and learned Friend is now arguing that this is becoming a smaller minority, but he is not arguing against the continuation of the privilege.

    5.15 p.m.

    I take that point. I do not conceal for one moment from my hon. Friend or from any other hon. Member that the proposal has the character of compromise. That is what I think my hon. Friend was emphasising. What I am concerned to satisfy him and other of my colleagues about is that this is a compromise from which we are getting substantial advantages and achieving a substantial degree of progress towards the objectives which we hold to be desirable.

    There are additional factors which can reasonably and fairly be brought forward in support of the Lords Amendment. I do not resort to the concept of tradition here. For my present purpose I do not call tradition as such in aid. It is probably true as a matter of record that in London, no doubt because of the practio3 of aldermen to try cases alone, the practice in the selection of persons to serve as aldermen has been to have regard to whether they will prove to be good magistrates and carry out their magisterial function completely and effectively.

    I think that I should be allowed to develop this point.

    The circumstances that particular regard is had to this quality in the selection of aldermen in London may well account for the undoubtedly interesting and significant fact that the record of the decisions made by London aldermen is remarkably impressive, if one applies, as I think that it is reasonable to apply, as a test of their capacity, the extent to which their decisions stand up on appeal.

    I want to consider as fairly as I can, and in the same spirit as that in which I have thus far advanced this argument, the proposition put by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Christopher Price) and others, that what is proposed in the Lords Amendment is on analysis found to be, as it were, disparaging and derogatory of other great corporations and of the Lord Mayors of our great cities.

    Nobody has a more deep respect for the heads of our local authorities and for their record and capacity than I have. However, again having resort to a matter which I will describe as a matter of record, in London special attention has been paid, again because the prospect has usually been that of aldermen sitting alone in court, to training as magistrates. This has been a significant feature affecting this matter in London and affecting it more prominently and more emphatically than in the case of our other corporations.

    This is a function and an aspect of another point which I have advanced, namely, that in London there has been a particular disposition, which I do not think has applied elsewhere, to select aldermen having regard to their potential qualifications and merits to carry out their functions and duties as magistrates.

    The basis of appointing lay magistrates surely is to have representatives of all sections of society with varied backgrounds and records of experience in the community. What special qualities have these gentlemen in the City of London which give them an undiluted right to sit on the bench?

    My hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme), with characteristic skill, has put forward an emotional case against this proposition. It does not alter the facts and matters of record to which I have referred. It is still the case, despite what he has said, and although he may not attach weight to it, that this is a distinctive character which attaches to the aldermen of the City of London. When they are selected to be aldermen special regard is had to the prospect of their serving in a magisterial capacity, and that fact is reflected in the special training which they receive.

    Does this not apply to Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow or Edinburgh? Are they not equally qualified there?

    My hon. Friend is still further emphasising the point I have sought to deal with. I have endeavoured to put before the House the factors which are present, and which I regard as significant and factors of importance, which in some measure distinguish the position in London from the position in the greatest of our provincial cities.

    I ask my hon. Friends to acknowledge that this part of the argument is contained in the context of what I invite them to regard as a substantial advance being made in the direction we want. The situation in the City of London is not going to be the same after this Bill as it has been before. To the extent that privilege to an undesirable degree has been a characteristic of the administration of justice in London, it will be diminished and reduced by this Bill. Because these are the governing factors, I recommend the House to agree with the Lords in this Amendment.

    At the risk of being described as characteristically skilful. I wish to say one or two things quite sincerely about this matter. Rather than being skilful, I think most of us on this side of the House have the utmost difficulty in trying to sort things out. It would appear that in an excess of zeal and dedication the noble Lords have thrown a sprag into the machine. As a result of their deliberations and of our deliberations today, the whole administration of justice in the magistrates' courts is once again being called into question.

    This is regrettable and deplorable because the administration of justice in our country has a great deal to commend it. In view of what we see happening in other countries, I think we can say that the way we manage affairs in our courts is the envy of the world. One or two things worry me. I do not think that in a democratic land we should be arguing whether it is right and fitting that aldermen and mayors should become lay magistrates. That beggers description and takes us away from the old belief that we want in our courts people who are wise and true.

    An hon. Member who has now left the Chamber said that it was a wonderful thing to have legal people acting as magistrates. I hoped that he would stay long enough to hear me say that I do not concur in that view. I believe it better to have in our courts sitting in judgment people with a normal human heart.

    I am not an authority on that. Without professing to be a jack-of-all-trades, I have had much experience of local government and magistrates' courts. It is better to have a normal human heart than a critical legal mind. It is bad enough to have legal luminaries taking preponderance in affairs in our courts and having too many of these people at times, rather than laymen who can bring a clearer jurisdiction into play. If there are any shortcomings in our courts, the legal people in their professional capacity have to take their share of responsibility.

    I have not agreed with all the criticisms expressed by my colleagues today, although I can appreciate that they are hopping mad about the situation which has been presented to us. To say that mayors because they are mayors, or aldermen because they are aldermen, are entitled to be magistrates is stretching democracy too far. I should describe it as a travesty of democratic procedure. For 15 years or more I was in local government. When I became a mayor I became a magistrate, but I think I would have been just as good a magistrate before I was a mayor.

    Order. I must ask the hon. Member to come a little nearer to the City of London, which is the matter concerned in these Amendments.

    Yes, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I am aware of what I am expected to do.

    Magistrates must know how to adjudicate and to conduct the affairs of a court. With all the complex problems with which people engaged in local government have to contend, the number of committees—we have the Maud Report and ideas for limiting responsibilities of people in local government—I know that you are about to call me to order again, Mr. Deputy Speaker—

    Will my hon. Friend tell us which side he is on?

    This applies in an intimate way to the work of the courts. Those of us who have served in the dual capacity know that only too well.

    I remember the magistrate who asked a young man why he had taken some property, and the reply was that he had spent his money, on wine, women and song and wasted the rest.

    5.30 p.m.

    Order. The relevance of the hon. Gentleman's remarks to the Amendment escapes me. I hope that he will help me to understand how he is speaking to the Amendment.

    I am grateful for your tolerance, good will, and even cooperation, Mr. Deputy Speaker. But I realise that I must come to order. In sitting in judgment on these matters and trying to arrange the best possible system in a democratic way, we must try to be wise and objective. I do not agree that this is the most democratic way in which we can tackle the problem. We should always try to bring into our courts the best people from all spheres of life.

    The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr. John Smith) rightly took pride in his constituency. I take pride in my constituency, which goes back a little further than his. We were Roman quarters when his was a swamp. We have a Lord Mayor who, like the Lord Mayor of the City of London, is an ex officio member of the Privy Council. They are the only two in the country. We have a Mansion House, in which the Lord Mayor resides, which is older than the Mansion House of the City of London.

    Therefore, when I considered the Bill I had a little apprehension about removing part of the colour and trappings which are an essential part of the life of my city. But, like the hon. Gentleman, I did not find much ideological passion about it, and I did not make any inquiries about it because I did not think that it required inquiries. It seemed to me that it was a somewhat innocuous Bill, and that on the whole it might do good. I do not care very much whether it arrives on the Statute Book in its original form or the form in which it now is.

    What worries me is how the compromise was arrived at. How on earth did we come to this situation? I accept everything the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) said about the desirability of hammering out compromises between different points of view if it can be done in the course of the passage of legislation through this Chamber. But in the Lords something quite different happened. Vested interests in the City got on to their friends to appear in the Lords and there upbraid the Government for taking—

    Order. I must ask the hon. Gentleman to use the traditional form of address of the other Chamber.

    They took the opportunity of their presence in the other place to put the case for what are really vested interests. Whether or not the vested interests have a good case—and I express no view about that—it is highly regrettable that this should be an avenue open to them and probably to no one else.

    If I had decided to make an issue of the right of my Lord Mayor to sit on the York City Bench on the grounds that that was part of the historic trappings of my constituency, I should have had to scratch my head to find friends in the other place who could have raised the matter. It is true that His Grace the Archbishop of York and the Vice-Chancellor of my university, Lord James of Rusholme, are members of the other place. But neither is a member of my constituency, deeply regrettable to me as that is. Therefore, it was not their personal concern. The only voice for the City of York in the whole of this Legislature was my humble self.

    As a result, the Lord Mayor of York will not be sitting on the York City Bench ex officio. But it was different for the City of London. Quite apart from the fact that it had the distinguished services of the hon. Gentleman opposite, valuable and honourable services that he can give to the City, it also had a large number of noble Lords in the other place who could exert influence.

    It is about time that stopped. I still do not feel any ideological passion about the Bill, and I am prepared to allow the compromise to go through, but I share the views that have been expressed on these Benches about the method by which the compromise was reached. I hope that the Government will take note of them. It will not be enough for them to come forward with reform of the House of Lords, which will be another botched up compromise hammered out as a result of the probings of vested interests. We must have a thorough, root and branch clean-up of the other place in order that this kind of thing cannot go on.

    In introducing the Lords Amendment my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General made particular play of certain words. He said that no violence was done to the principle by the Lords Amendment. I respect both him and my right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General, but I carefully noted that neither suggested that this reflected credit, and it is on this point that I wish to speak.

    It was originally contended in the provisions dealing with ex officio magistrates that mayors and lord mayors had a ceremonial attachment to the office of magistrate, which was given to them because of their local representative office. Now we hear that flowing from this the aldermen in the City of London not only enjoy the privilege of ex officio office but, my right hon. and learned Friends tell us, perform a most useful service.

    The House recognised that a useful service had been performed by the aldermen of the City of London before the Bill was introduced. The original intention was to remove the automatic right of appointment to the office of magistrate of aldermen, mayors or lord mayors. My right hon. and learned Friends say today that we have gone part way to achieving this objective, and that we should accept the compromise as going far towards the original principle. But it still leaves an area of doubt in that people—a diminishing number, I accept—can be appointed ex officio on the basis of privilege. If my right hon. and learned Friends were really looking for a compromise they could have gone one step further and said that they were prepared to accept an Amendment that a limited number of aldermen from the City of London should be appointed ex officio, subject to recommendations being made to the Lord Chancellor and to there being provision for them to be able to carry out the function, just as other magistrates are appointed, and they would by the very nature of things be appointed. That would have been a protection, and I am sure that the Opposition would have been prepared to accept such an Amendment.

    Under this present compromise there is the possibility—I put it no higher—that a person could be appointed an alderman and automatically made an ex officio magistrate, and that some part of his life as an alderman could render him unsuitable as a magistrate, if he was not originally unsuitable for that position. That is a wrong situation to allow under any revision of the law, but that is what the Bill really does.

    I ask my right hon. Friends not to press the Lords Amendment. We were all very much persuaded and heartened by the statements made from the Government Front Bench on the Second and Third Readings of the Bill. It would be churlish of me to say that it is wrong to change one's mind, and I accept the suggestion by the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) that it is not always a bad thing to do so, but it reflects less than credit when one changes one's mind on a deeply held principle, and this is a deeply held principle. If it was the implementation of some different practice I could have accepted this, but I honestly believe that one is hard put to it to compromise on the basis of principle. I ask my right hon. Friends to remember this when they press the House to accept the Lords Amendment.

    I hesitate to intervene at this stage, because most of the arguments have already been canvassed, but I take the opportunity of the Attorney-General's return to the Chamber to invite him to reply to a point made in a number of speeches earlier which he did not have the advantage of hearing and to which his hon. and learned Friend did not choose to reply.

    It relates to the predicament in which hon. Members find themselves when the Government convince them at earlier stages of a Bill that an important and

    Division No. 309.]

    AYES

    [5.42 p.m.

    Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)Costain, A. P.Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony
    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)Crossman, Rt. Hn. RichardGrey, Charles (Durham)
    Alldritt, WalterCurrie, G. B. H.Grieve, Percy
    Archer, PeterDalkeith, Earl ofGriffiths, David (Rother Valley)
    Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)Dalyell, TamGriffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
    Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)Dance, JamesGriffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
    Bagier, Gordon A. T.Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)Gurden, Harold
    Beamish, Col. Sir TuftonDavies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)Hall, John (Wycombe)
    Beaney, AlanDavies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
    Bell, RonaldDavies, Harold (Leek)Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)
    Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)Delargy, HughHarper, Joseph
    Biggs-Davison, JohnDempsay, JamesHarrison, Brian (Maldon)
    Birch, Rt. Hn. NigelDigby, Simon WingfieldHarrison, Walter (Wakefield)
    Black, sir CyrllDobson, RayHarvey, Sir Arthur Vere
    Blackburn, F.Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)Haseldine, Norman
    Bossom, Sir CliveElliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)Hazell, Bert
    Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. JohnEmery, PeterHeald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel
    Boyden, JamesEnnals, DavidHeath, Rt. Hn. Edward
    Braddock, Mrs. E. M.Ensor, DavidHirst, Geoffrey
    Bradley, TomErrington, Sir EricHogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin
    Brinton, Sir TattonEyre, ReginaldHolland, Philip
    Bromley-Davenport,Lt.-Col. Sir WalterFernyhough, E.Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.Finch, HaroldHughes, Roy (Newport)
    Bruce-Gardyne, J.Fletcher-Cooke, CharlesHunt, John
    Buchan, NormanFortescue, TimIrvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)
    Buck, Antony (Colchester)Foster, Sir JohnJanner, Sir Barnett
    Bullus, Sir EricCalbraith, Hn. T. G.Jeger, George (Goole)
    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)Garrett, W. E.Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
    Callaghan, Rt. Hn. JamesGinsburg, DavidJones,Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)
    Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)Glyn, Sir RichardJopling, Michael
    Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)Goodhew, VictorKenyon, Clifford
    Carlisle, MarkGower, RaymondKershaw, Anthony
    Clegg, WaltorGrant, AnthonyKing, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
    Cooke, RobertGrant-Ferris, R.Kitson, Timothy

    contentious issue should be decided in a certain way and then when the Bill comes back at a subsequent stage after a compromise has been reached In another place seek to persuade them with the arguments they rejected earlier, which stands the whole debate on its head. This is a highly embarrassing situation for hon. Members to find themselves in, and it calls for some explanation from the Government. We have had no explanation why the compromise was arrived at, why the principles enunciated with such force at earlier stages have been jettisoned and why we should be sold the compromise as something acceptable in these circumstances.

    Finally, how can the Attorney-General possibly say that this so-called compromise does no violence to the principle of the Bill when he has so clearly outlined that the main principle is to abolish ex officio justices throughout the country and ensure that members of the bench are appointed by the regular proceedings on the sole criterion of their suitability to exercise judicial office?

    Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—

    The House divided: Ayes 195, Noes 82.

    Knight, Mrs. JillOswald, ThomasSnow, Julian
    Lane, DavidPage, Derek (King's Lynn)Speed, Keith
    Legge-Bourke, Sir HarryPage, Graham (Crosby)Stainton, Keith
    Longden, GilbertPage, John (Harrow, W.)Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
    Lyon, Alexander W. (York)Peart, Rt. Hn. FredStonehouse, Rt. Hn. John
    McAdden, Sir StephenPentland, NormanTapsell, Peter
    MacArthur, IanPercival, IanTaylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
    McBride, NeilPerry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
    McCann, JohnPerry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)Tinn, James
    MacColl, JamesPink, R. BonnerTurton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
    Mackenzie, Gregor (Ruthergien)Pym, FrancisUrwin, T. W.
    Manuel, ArchieRamsden, Rt. Hn. Jamesvan Straubenzee, W. R.
    Maude, AngusRankin, JohnWaddington, David
    Maydon, Lt.Cmdr. S. L. C.Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir PeterWalden, Brian (All Saints)
    Mills, Peter (Torrington)Rees, MerlynWalker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
    Miscampbell, NormanReynolds, Rt. Hn. G. W.Walters, Dennis
    Monro, HectorRhys William, Sir BrandonWeatherill, Bernard
    More, JasperRidsdale, JulianWhitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
    Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)Williams, Donald (Dudley)
    Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)Rodgers, William (Stockton)Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
    Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)Rose, PaulWilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)
    Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)Ross, Rt. Hn. WilliamWolrige-Gordon, Patrick
    Mott-Radclyffe, Sir CharlesRossi, Hugh (Hornsey)Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.
    Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir HughRussell, Sir RonaldWorsley, Marcus
    Murton, OscarScott-Hopkins, JamesWright, Esmond
    Nabarro, Sir GeraldSharples, RichardWylie, N. R.
    Neave, AireyShore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)Younger, Hn. George
    Nott, JohnSilkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
    O'Malley, BrianSinclair, Sir GeorgeTELLERS FOR THE AYES:
    Orbach, MauriceSkeffington, ArthurMr. Ioan L. Evans and
    Osborn, John (Hallam)Slater, JosephMr. J. D. Concannon.
    Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)Smith, John (London & W'minster)

    NOES

    Abse, LeoGregory, ArnoldNorwood, Christopher
    Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)Oakes, Gordon
    Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)Hamilton, James (Bothwell)Orme, Stanley
    Booth, AlbertHamilton, William (Fife, W.)Owen, Will (Morpeth)
    Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)Heffer, Eric S.Pardoe, John
    Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)Herbison, Rt. Hn. MargaretPark, Trevor
    Cant, R. B.Horner, JohnParkyn, Brian (Bedford)
    Carter-Jones, LewisHughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)Probert, Arthur
    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
    Crawshaw, RichardHunter, AdamShort, Mrs. Renée(W'hampton,N.E.)
    Cronin, JohnJeger,Mrs.Lena(H'b'n&St.P'cras,S.)Silverman, Julius
    Cullen, Mrs. AliceJones, Dan (Burnley)Spriggs, Leslie
    Davidson, James(Aberdeenshire,W.)Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)Steel, David (Roxburgh)
    Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)Kerr, Russell (Feltham)Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)
    Dewar, DonaldLeadbitter, TedThorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
    Dickens, JamesLedger, RonTomney, Frank
    Doig, PeterLomas, KennethWatkins, David (Consett)
    Dunn, James A.Lubbock, EricWhitaker, Ben
    Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)Wilkins, W. A.
    Eadie, AlexMacdonald, A. H.Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)
    Edwards, William (Merioneth)Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross&Crom' ty)Winstanley, Dr. M. P.
    Ellis, JohnMaclennan, RobertWoodburn, Rt. Hn. A.
    Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)Woof, Robert
    Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)Yates, Victor
    Faulds, AndrewMapp, Charles
    Fraser, John (Norwood)Marks, KennethTELLERS FOR THE NOES:
    Gardner, TonyMiller, Dr. M. S.Mr. Christopher Price and
    Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)Newens, StanMr. Arnold Shaw.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 5

    Justices' Clerks

    Lords Amendment No. 7: In page 6, line 10, leave out "on questions of law" and insert:

    "about law, practice or procedure on questions".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Perhaps it would be convenient to discuss at the same time Lords Amendments No. 8.

    I trust that these Amendments will be uncontroversial and that the events flowing from them will be less disturbing than those associated with the earlier Amendments. They relate to the functions of the clerks to the justices and they are made after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice and with the agreement with the Justices' Clerks Association to meet points which were raised in another place. They make clear the extent of the functions of the justices' clerks. They have, I understand, attained the approval of the Clerks' Society and of the Magistrates' Association and I think that they will be of value to the clerks as a clear exposition of the range of their functions.

    In relation to this matter, I once again express my gratitude to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes), who has taken such an active part in this exercise. I do not think I need labour upon the range of duties which are now spelt out in the Bill. As I have said, they meet the approval of all concerned and have the blessing of the Lord Chief Justice and those who have responsibility in this work.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman will be relieved to hear that I will encourage my right hon. and hon. Friends to support him in this Motion. Indeed, without our support he might be in grave difficulty. I share his pleasure at the incorporation of this provision into the Bill and add by tribute to the hon. Member for Bolton (Mr. Oakes), who took a particular interest in this matter early on. The provision will be of great assistance to justices' clerks in defining the scope of their tasks and duties, which needed to be done. I commend both Amendments.

    When their Lordships confine themselves to improving legislation we have passed, they do a very good job, and I support these two Amendments. It is a pity that they do not restrain their instincts by confining themselves to such matters.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Schedule 4

    Enactments Repealed

    Lords Amendment No. 22: In page 19, line 49, column 3, at end insert "and (3)."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This again is, I trust, an uncontroversial Amendment. It is consequential on the repeal of Section 45(2)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, which is to be repealed with the enactment of Clause 1(8), which abolishes arrangements for appointing stipendiary magistrates under local Acts of Parliament.

    Section 45(2)(c) of the 1948 Act provides that, for the purposes of the Act relating to probation, an area which is not a petty sessional division may be described as such by the Secretary of State. The provisions relate only to the area of the jurisdiction of the local Act stipendiary magistrate. Subsection (3) merely empowers the Secretary of State to adjust the arrangements for probation so as to accommodate the special circumstances of a local stipendiary's area. The subsection should also therefore be repealed.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Remaining Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Race Relations Bill

    Lords Amendments considered.

    Clause 1

    Meaning Of "Discriminate"

    Lords Amendment No. 1: In page 1. line 13, at end insert:

    "( ) It is hereby declared that for those purposes segregating a person from other persons on any of those grounds is treating him less favourably than they are treated."

    6.0 p.m.

    Temporarily I am taking the place of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and his hon. Friends who will no doubt be here on the wings of speed to deal with the first Lords' Amendment which falls for the consideration of the House. I see that the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) wishes to intervene and I most gladly give way to enable him to do so.

    On a point of order. For the information of the House, can you tell us, Mr. Deputy Speaker, whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman has moved to agree or disagree with the Lords' Amendment?

    I was hoping that the right hon. and learned Gentleman would come to that very soon.

    I shall invite the House to agree with the Amendment and I shall be even happier to invite my hon. Friend to explain to the House why this course is being taken.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I owe you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and the House an apology for not being here on time.

    The purpose of the Amendment is to make it clear that the provision of separate but equal facilities is unlawful under the Bill. As originally drafted, the Bill said that "discriminate" meant to discriminate on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origin. It was to meet some criticisms that on Report the Home Secretary introduced an Amendment which substituted the definition which appeared in the Bill passed by the Commons, namely, that a person discriminates against another person if he treats him "less favourably".

    It was argued in Committee and on Report, and later argued in another place, that this could leave a loophole for the establishment of separate but equal facilities. The Government never accepted that this interpretation could be put upon it, but the argument that the Bill would have permitted the establishment of separate but equal facilities was made, and it was felt that it would be helpful to make a change which would remove any sort of doubt, and that is the purpose of the Amendment.

    I assume that the thinking behind the Amendment is that an individual of whatever colour might seek to get round the Bill by providing separate accommodation or other separate facilities for different races or colours when he would be assumed to be indulging in racialism.

    I should like to ask the Minister about the reverse case in which people of a certain race wish to be segregated for particular purposes. Just after the war I had the experience of evacuating a lot of ex-prisoners of war from various parts of the world on one of Her Majesty's ships. We evacuated many races, including Indians, Pakistanis and British, and we had to provide their own food, kitchens, cooks, eating places, lavatories and so on. This was done to the satisfaction of all.

    Clause 8(11) provides that employment can be refused on a ship if it results in persons of different colours or races being compelled to share sleeping rooms or messrooms or sanitary accommodation. I assume that if separate spaces are provided, people of different races or colours could serve in the same ship, and that is probably happening now, although it does not happen aboard H.M. ships, where recruiting occurs regardless of colour and where, so far as I know, all share the same messing, cooking, and so on.

    However, there may be occasions when members of certain races, for various reasons, require separate accommodation. We are hoping to disperse the racial communities in this country, but some of them do not want to be dispersed, or at least will not do so for many years. They may wish to continue living in their communities and abiding by their own customs.

    I do not know why there is so much distinction made for ships, but in work places in this country people of different races may want their own places for eating and their own cooks for reasons similar to those which I experienced in ships. We recently saw the Minister himself attending a function at which he sat on the floor without his shoes and put something over his head—I do not know why he did that. If certain racial groups want to have their own accommodation for whatever reason, eating or otherwise, what would be the legal position? Would an employer be in trouble if he provided such facilities? I think that too much attention is being paid to the individual who may wish to practise racial discrimination and not enough to the problem of the groups who may wish to have their own accommodation, for whatever reason it may be.

    By leave of the House, Clause 8 deals with ships. It was considered that in ships people would be living in close proximity and that their living accommodation would be almost a home for the time being. In this legislation we have accepted that there are certain exceptions. We deal with the normal situations in this country, but if there were to be a situation in which a small group of individuals, of whatever colour, asked for separate treatment, I think that it would be very difficult for an employer to provide it. Certainly, if he did there might well be others who would think that such provision was an infringement of the Bill.

    It would be helpful for people not to ask for separate provision in the circumstances of many races working or operating together. On the other hand, if a minority group wished to have a club of its own providing separate facilities, that would not be covered by the Bill. Clause 1 deals with a general definition to which exceptions are made in Clause 8 and other parts of the Bill.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 7

    Exception In The Case Of Residential Accommodation

    Lords Amendment No. 3: In page 5, line 21, leave out "in connection with" and insert "for the purposes of".

    I beg to move, That this House cloth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    During discussion in the Commons Committee, an Amendment had been proposed by the hon. Member for Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair) to except from the housing provisions of the Bill the disposal of property where the person concerned does not use an agent or does not advertise. An Amendment on these lines, although not exactly in the terms moved by the hon. Gentleman, was moved by the Government and accepted. It was net intended, however, that when a person disposed of his property in this way he should be prevented from obtaining advice from a third party as to the value or state of the property, even if the third party was in business as an estate agent.

    The owner might use the services of a person who is also an estate agent for doing various jobs in connection with the sale of a house, such as providing reports on its value or condition. Many persons are in business as estate agents, surveyors and valuers. The effect of the Amendment is that a person who sells property owned and wholly occupied by him, will be excepted from the housing provisions of the Bill, provided that he does not use the services of an estate agent as defined in Clause 7(8) to find a buyer, and does not publish an advertisement or notice in conection with the sale.

    As the hon. Gentleman knows, the majority of my hon. and right hon. Friends expressed the view that it was probably wrong to extend the provisions of the Bill to individual sales of owner-occupied property. This goes some way to assisting the person who does make an individual sale of his own property, and wishes to put himself outside the ambit of the Measure. It makes it clear that he will be able to consult an estate agent relative to an offer, and so forth, and then dispose of his property privately in any way he wishes, so long as he does not advertise or put it through the hands of an agent.

    That meets the point raised by my hon. Friend and also points raised in another place, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor. We welcome this Amendment.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 8

    Exceptions In The Case Of Employment

    Lords Amendment No. 5: In page 6, line 38, leave out subsection (8).

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    It will be convenient if we also take Lords Amendments Nos. 6, 9, 31 and 32.

    These Amendments are technical, moving the definition of "British ships or aircraft" from Clause 8 to Clause 26.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 9

    Charities And Acts Done For Charitable Purposes

    Lords Amendment No. 7: In page 7, line 21, leave out from "affecting" to "benefits" in line 22 and insert:

    "a provision which is contained in a future charitable instrument and confers".

    6.15 p.m.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    In the Bill as originally drafted, Clause 9 provided an exception for anything done in order to comply with the provisions of any enactment for charitable purposes and taking effect before the passing of the Act. New charities and those already made, but not taking effect before the passage of the Act, were not to benefit from the exception, although it was intended that if they sought to discriminate they should benefit from Clause 2(3) of the Bill as drafted. Clause 2(3) was deleted and the Government did not seek to reinstate it.

    There therefore remained no exception in the Bill for discrimination by any future charity. The Government introduced an amendment on Report to protect the position of any future charitable instrument having as its main object the conferring of benefits on persons of a particular race, descent, ethnic or national origin.

    The Amendment was welcomed by the Opposition and in another place. However, in another place there was criticism that it was too restrictive in that it did not cover the charitable instrument which had such a provision as one of its main objectives. An Amendment was proposed in another place which the Government thought defective, but it was agreed that there was a substantial point here, and it is in order to meet this criticism that this Amendment, accepted in another place, is now commended to the House.

    We very much welcome this Amendment. It is fair to say that it has its origin in points raised from our side of the Committee. The original position seemed absurd. As originally drafted, the Bill would have made it well-nigh impossible for a charity to confer a benefit on a specific class or group of people. It was met partly by the Government Amendment in Committee, and this Amendment now goes the whole of the way to meet the situation which could arise if, for example, a rich Pakistani wishes to establish a charity for the benefit of a particular category of his fellow-countrymen.

    There is no reason why this should not be done, and it is now made clear that this will be possible, even if only an ancillary purpose of the charity is of that character, whereas without the Amendment it would have had to be the main purpose. This ties the matter up and clarifies the position.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 14

    General Provision As To Investigation Of Complaints Of Discrimination

    Lords Amendment No. 10: In page 9, line 24, leave out from "complaint" to "is" in line 25 and insert:

    "which is made to them within two months of the act complained of and also, if the Board think that special circumstances warrant its reception, any complaint made to them or a conciliation committee after the expiration of that period if in either case the complaint"

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The purpose of this Amendment is to allow the Race Relations Board discretion in "special circumstances" to authorise the investigation of cases which would otherwise fall outside the time limit of two months. It has always been the Government's intention that there should be a time limit for making complaints. In Committee, I argued that any decision would have to be an arbitrary one. The general conclusion was that two months seemed to be a reasonable period, and it was one accepted as reasonable by the Board. In another place Lord Gifford quite properly raised the point that it could well be that a person might not discover the possibility that he had been the victim of discrimination until more than two months had elapsed.

    One can imagine a person seeking to buy a house and being told that a higher offer had been received, so that his offer is unacceptable. He might discover some time killer that no such offer had been received and that the house was sold at a lower price. After consultation with the Board, the Government decided that an Amendment should be moved on Report, in another place, to enable the Board, in special circumstances, to authorise the investigation of cases which would otherwise be out of time.

    In all cases it will be for the Board, not the conciliation committees, or the voluntary machinery, to decide whether there are special circumstances. In this way the discretion will be exercised uniformly and it will be for the Board to decide in any particular case whether there are special circumstances. We understand that it would not, for example, consider delays caused through ignorance of the law or domestic circumstances. The Government are confident that the Board can be relied upon to exercise this discretion judiciously, and recommend this Amendment to the House.

    I have some slight misgivings on this Amendment. The two-month limitation period made it clear beyond peradventure that stale claims about discrimination could not be brought before the courts. Now we have gone very much the other way, from a two-month period to an unfettered discretion, given to the Race Relations Board, which can consider and bring before the courts complains however stale. We have great confidence in the Board, but I wonder whether by giving it an unfettered discretion to bring forward any complaints, however stale, we are going too far.

    I have made a considerable study into the limitation of actions, because in my early days in the House I was lucky in the Private Members' Ballot and managed to get through an Act which enabled people to bring actions outside the usual statutory period in specific circumstances. The principle should be that there should be a certainty of period and that outside that certainty, save in very exceptional circumstances—and perhaps there should be guidelines as to what constitute exceptional circumstances—an action should not be brought. Are we going too far by going from a very strict two month limitation to giving the Board a virtually unfettered discretion'? I must express some misgivings about the Amendment.

    To put the record in perspective from another point of view, I congratulate the Government on accepting the Amendment. I see the strong likelihood in some instances of someone not knowing whether he has been discriminated against. But I should like an assurance that the person who is discriminated against and who does not take action within the requisite two months will be given every opportunity and assistance to put forward his point of view and for the reasons for the delay to be ascertained so that too great an onus is not put on him to give proof which it is perhaps impossible to obtain.

    I am glad that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State indicated that the Board will have fairly wide discretionary powers.

    I accept that cases could arise in which two months is an absurdly short time. But to argue that the time should be limitless is carrying the argument to a length which cannot be defended. If there is any reason for doing that, perhaps the Under-Secretary of State would tell us what it is.

    We must think of the Race Relations Board. I do not doubt that it will be under heavy pressure to take up cases which it thinks, in its discretion, should not be taken up. It is desirable that it should have the protection of the law and that it should be able to say that this is what Parliament decided and that it can act only within certain limits. I should not have thought that it was in the Board's interest to make the latitude so substantial that it might well find itself in difficulty.

    I think that the House should accept the Amendment. I understand the misgivings of the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) and we must take them into consideration. I do not believe that housing is a particularly good example, but evidence in relation to employment which might not be available within the two months might come to light after the two months. For example, there could be letters which were not seen by anyone which could be discovered after that period. It would be quite unjustifiable and wrong in those circumstances if such evidence were not put before the Board. After all, the safeguard is that the Board will decide whether there is a case. It would be quite wrong if the Board did not have the opportunity of considering the matter and saying, "Here is a case which we must investigate."

    I recognise the misgivings of the hon. Member for Colchester and know that they are sincerely held, but there is a case for the Amendment which might well be accepted.

    I can understand the reason behind the Amendment and, to some extent, I have sympathy for it, but would the Minister say whether the Board will be required to state the circumstances which led it to agree to extend the period of two months? It is important that anybody who is involved should know the circumstances in which the Board agreed to extend the period beyond two months.

    I did not intend to speak in the debate until I heard the remarks of the hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvingrove (Dr. Miller). He seemed to have a very different idea of how this provision will work from the impression given to me by the Minister. The hon. Gentleman said that the Board would have a wide discretion. I agree that on paper its discretion is wide, but I think that the Minister indicated clearly that the Board will operate this discretion in a very narrow field. It would be helpful if the Minister could say whether I am right or whether the hon. Member for Kelvingrove is right.

    In certain respects, the word of warning of the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) would be valid if we did not take into account that this is a new venture, as was said in Committee many times, outside normal judicial conventions with which the hon. Gentleman has been involved professionally. Therefore, we need not have the fears which we might otherwise have if we did not have regard to the powers of the Board, which are negligible from a judicial point of view.

    This is a conciliation process and it would be wrong if, in our duty as conciliators, we put forward an arbitrary long-stop period. Having regard to the way in which the Board fits into the process, I do not think that there are the dangers which there might be if it were a court with powers to mete out punishment.

    With the leave of the House, may I say that the Board shares the Government's view that a time limit is important. It does not wish to be cluttered up with old, stale cases. The question of special circumstances does not affect the matter of staleness and the time factor. It is the circumstances which lead to the complaint not being registered within what is accepted to be the normal time, namely, two months.

    May I say, in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Kelvingrove (Dr. Miller), that it is not intended that the Board should have wide discretionary powers.

    The hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) wonders whether we should define "special circumstances". It would be very difficult to do so. The only difference between us is that he uses the term "very special circumstances" and the Amendment uses the term "special circumstances". I think there is a strong case for making a modest change so as to prevent injustice. I do not think that any hon. Member would wish there to be a situation in which a complaint of discrimination could not be made because the facts were not known to the complainant and that because of the two months restriction he should be unable to present his case, as others would do. I hope that the House will accept the Amendment.

    Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that it might be sensible to impose a limit on the time allowed to elapse after a complainant might reasonably be held to be in a position to lodge a complaint?

    6.30 p. m.

    There would be disadvantages in that. If we were to write in a new time limit, we would find that it came to be accepted as the normal limit. The normal time limit is two months and there will be only special circumstances in which the Board would be prepared to extend it. The Board makes suitable facilities available for people to make their complaint, but it does not wish to encourage people to make a complaint other than at the earliest possible moment when the evidence is to hand.

    The Minister did not say whether the Board would be required to state the circumstances in which it was prepared to extend the period.

    The Board will not be required to state the circumstances. As I indicated earlier, however, the views of the Board are clear. It wants this limit. It would not accept, for example, that "special circumstances" included ignorance of the law, domestic circumstances or the fact that somebody was travelling. If special circumstances were pleaded, it would be necessary for a person to explain why he did not have the evidence of discrimination at his disposal before. If anyone asks the Board to do so, it may state the circumstances, but the Act will not require it to give an explanation.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause 18

    Nature Of Proceedings In England And Wales

    Lords Amendment No. 12: In page 12, line 17, at end insert:

    "and in those proceedings, whether or not such a claim is made, an application may be made in accordance with section (Validity and revision of contracts) of this Act for revision of any contract or term in a contract alleged to contravene any such provision."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment, I suggest that we take also Lords Amendment No. 17 and Amendment No. 23, after Clause 21, in page 16, line 10, insert new Clause "B" (Validity and revision of contracts).

    The new Clause set out in Lords Amendment No. 23 provides for the revision of contracts which contain discriminatory terms which contravene the Bill. As the Bill stands, such discriminatory clauses in contracts would be unlawful—for example, under Clause 2. The effect of this would be that not only would a discriminatory term in a contract be held to be void and unenforceable, but in certain circumstances the contract as a whole might be unenforceable. The result might well be that the term of the contract would be unenforceable by either party. This could have undesirable consequences.

    In insurance, for example, a coloured person might find that after paying premiums for some years, because the contract contained a discriminatory element he could not recover anything if his house were burnt down. For the same reason, a coloured tenant might find that he had no clear right to stay in his flat. The other party to a contract might also suffer unreasonably and unfairly. For example, a landlord who, perhaps unwittingly, had included a discriminatory element in a contract might find that he could make no claim against the coloured tenant who, over a period, had refused to pay rent.

    It would not be sufficient to deal with these difficulties by a simple provision that contracts should remain enforceable even if they contained a discriminatory element, first, because this would permit the enforcement of the discriminatory term in the contract, and, secondly, there would be the possibility of overlapping jurisdiction, since the same contract might give rise to proceedings for damages under the Bill and for breach of contract in the ordinary courts.

    The new Clause provides a solution to this difficulty by empowering the court to revise the discriminatory terms of a contract. The effect would be that in proceedings brought by the Board, and at the request of either party to the proceedings—that is to say, either the Board or the defendant—the special county court could order revision of any discriminatory term, including the omission altogether of the offending term, so as to make it fair and just in all the circumstances. The time limit of two months, subject to the Board's discretionary power to extend in special circumstances, for the receipt of complaints would apply in such cases.

    The Amendment to Clause 18 provides that such an application for the revision of a contract may be made in proceedings brought before the specially designated county courts where any of the other claims which are listed in Clause 18(1) is made. The Amendment to Clause 19 makes similar provision for Scotland. This seems to be a sensible if somewhat unorthodox solution to a rather difficult problem.

    It seems entirely sensible that there should be specific provision in the Bill that a contract is not unenforceable or invalidated because of the inclusion within that contract of a clause which may be contrary to the Bill, but, as the Attorney-General has said, this is an unusual and unorthodox solution. The court will be asked to revise and rewrite certain clauses in a contract.

    The only clear parallel is, perhaps, in the realms of the renewal of a business tenancy, which is sometimes referred to the court and the court decides in all the circumstances what terms are right for its renewal. From memory, that is probably the nearest parallel.

    I am not entirely clear, however, why it is necessary for the court to have power to revise the contract or why it would not be sufficient to say that the discriminatory part of the contract—that which is reprehensible—shall not be enforceable, leaving the rest of the contract intact. Only in exceptional circumstances, it seems to me, would it ever be necessary to consider a revision of the contract.

    Nor am I entirely clear how far the revisionary powers given to the court extend. I take it that it would be only in unusual circumstances that the court would go beyond a narrow and confined limit. This, however, does not come through entirely loud and clear from the Clause. I take it that, in effect, the Race Relations Board would probably not be called on to exercise its judgment if an application was made on the validity of a certain section of a contract. It would probably almost invariably agree to an application when a request for one was made by either party to a contract.

    At first blush, it might seem that if any power is to be given to the court, there should, perhaps, on those occasions, be a direct power for one of the parties to the contract to go direct to the court without reference to the Board. However, I do not think that any great mischief could spring from the inclusion of these revising provisions because of the high esteem in which most of us hold county court judges. This is, however, a novel and interesting procedure which, on the whole, should be acceptable to the House.

    I am grateful for the friendly reception by the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) of the new Clause. The powers of the court to revise ought to be stated in the broad terms which are contained in the Amendment so that the court can deal with the situation as it arises.

    The proposal is not entirely unprecedented. Hon. Members will see that the rights of persons who are not parties to the contract are protected by the provisions of the Amendment. Accordingly, it is one which I can commend to the House.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 13: in page 12, line 25, leave out subsection (3).

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment, it is proposed to take also Lords Amendments Nos. 14, 18 and 19.

    These are technical Amendments relating to the jurisdiction of a county court in respect of acts done on ships or aircraft outside the district assigned to the court. They are consequential on the Amendments concerning contracts and conduct relating to acts abroad.

    Will not a county court judge get into difficulty when a foreign Government orders something to be done on an aircraft in their jurisdiction? On a South African aircraft on which I travelled the last passenger was not allowed to take his place because he would have to sit next to an Indian. I wonder what the attitude of a county court judge would have to be when the South African Government ordered something which was discriminatory on a British aeroplane at Johannesburg airport.

    If I may reply, with your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, this was raised on Lords Amendment No. 9 which provided an exemption for acts which were committed abroad, particularly where it was necessary to comply with the laws of the country in which the boat or aircraft, or whatever it was, was at that time. Provision is, therefore, made for precisely the circumstances described by the hon. and learned Gentleman.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 15: In page 12, line 42, leave out subsection (7).

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With the next Lords Amendmeant, No. 15, it is suggested we take also Lords Amendments No. 16, No. 20 and No. 21.

    I am prepared to call a Division on No. 15 or No. 16 if one is asked for.

    These Amendments relate to the question whether or not the special county court shoud be assisted by the presence of assessors sitting along with the judge when a matter comes to be adjudicated. Those who have studied this subject with the care which, I know, the House has done, will recollect that the authors of the Street Report recommended that special tribunals should be set up to deal with enforcement.

    This was not accepted by my right hon. Friends and myself because we felt that unless there were comprehensive rules as to procedure and evidence the tribunals might not command respect, and that even with such rules they might not be seen as instruments of the law in quite the same way as the courts, and might come to be regarded—this would be a dangerous possibility—as conferring special rights on minority groups.

    Those who did recommend special tribunals did so largely because they thought it was important that enforcement of this new legislation should be in the hands of persons possessing special knowledge and experience of the problems of race relations, and the provision for the appointment of suitable assessors to assist the county court judge was introduced to meet this point of view.

    I was chided by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) in Committee about this, but it does seem to me to be a sensible solution to the problem. The main argument in support of the provision is that the presence of assessors might well give additional confidence to those who come before the special county courts specially appointed to deal with enforcement, since they would know that, in addition to the judge, in whom they would, of course, have confidence, there are two persons with special knowledge of the subject of race relations to advise him in dealing with the case.

    In another place the Lord Chancellor drew attention to the fact that, under the county court procedure, either party under the rules can already ask the judge to appoint assessors from a list maintained by the registrar. I understand that it has been intimated that the Race Relations Board might well decide in any event to take advantage of that procedure, and, if that were done, one might find a difference of practice as between one court and another and as between one part of the country and another, and I think it is desirable to maintain consistency in this matter.

    We feel that the availability of these assessors, who will be men with experience and responsibility, will be of assistance to the learned county court judge who will be charged with difficult jurisdiction in a new field of the law. We feel he will be assisted by their presence, and accordingly I invite the House to reject these Amendments from another place which propose to do away with this additional machinery in the court.

    6.45 p.m.

    This is the first occasion I have taken part in any of the debates upon this Bill. This is a provision in this part of the Bill which deals not, of course, with the principles of it, but with the mechanism, the way in which it is to be put into effect and how it is to be seen to act by the persons who appear before the tribunals which will make the decisions.

    There is no doubt, as everybody here in the House properly appreciates, that this is a sensitive subject. The necessity of the Bill has been doubted by some, and strongly supported by others, but it does introduce a new and novel tort, a new and novel civil wrong, into English law, and the perpetration of such a tort or civil wrong renders our citizens, all of us, liable to be brought before the court and liable, at the hands of that court, to be mulcted in damages, to have an injunction imposed upon us, or to have a declaration made against us.

    This is something which we should take into account. We hope that it will be rare and, as the Bill has provisions for conciliation, that conciliation will of course be predominant. Nevertheless, it is a tort for which citizens may well be brought before a court. It carries with it overtones of crimes to a certain extent because of the penalties which follow from the imposition of damages.

    However, Parliament has decided, in the Bill, to create a justiciable issue, to evolve rules the breach of which, in certain circumstances, calls for action by a court of law, and it seems to me that it is immensely important that this should be left to the courts of this country, and the courts of this country which have to administer the law of this country should be the persons who should deal with this new, novel jurisdiction, though it may be, but, nevertheless, a jurisdiction which is going to be an important one.

    I accept, of course, that there are certain jurisdictions where there is use of assessors—in the Admiralty Division of High Court, the Elder Brethren of Trinity House, but they are giving specific, technical advice upon specific, technical shipping matters; in the Restrictive Practices Court now there have been introduced assessors to give particular technical advice. Of course, there is the power, which has been referred to by the Attorney-General, in the county courts to have assessors introduced, but, as far as my experience goes, and that of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), with his 35 years' experience, mine being restricted to only 20 years, and in the experience, I believe, of anybody in this House, never have assessors ever been known to be necessary in the county court.

    It is vital that we should not make it appear that there is anything extraordinary in this particular procedure calling for extraordinary forms of judgment. If it is to work, and it is hoped that it will work, then it has to be accepted as part of the normal and ordinary conduct of the ordinary courts applying ordinary remedies.

    Let me remind the House of what, I presume, will be the procedure. There is a complainant, and that is the Race Relations Board, a statutory body, but it may be, as citizens may be, in the position of, as it were, the prosecutor. Then there is the respondent, and the respondent is the citizen. Whom does he look for in normal matters to be the arbiter in any conflict which he may have with either the State or a fellow citizen? He looks to that arbiter who is the judge. What, in this particular jurisdiction, has the judge got to do?

    The judge in this case has to find the facts in accordance with the evidence and he is trained to assess the evidence and be able to deal with it. He must decide whether or not there has been proven any unlawful discrimination. If he so finds on the evidence before him he applies, in his discretion and in the exercise of his jurisdiction, the various remedies which are open to him under the Bill—an injunction, or special damages or loss of opportunity damages, or, thirdly, a declaration which, once made, affects the character of the person in respect of whom it has been made.

    These are the normal remedies which the courts are experienced in applying and are applying daily as part of their ordinary duties. How, in such circumstances, is a judge to be helped by assessors? What rôle can they play? What can they do? The judge has to decide the facts on the evidence, and then, in his discretion, apply the necessary remedy. If the assessors are merely intended to dress the court up, with no real purpose and no real task, it is foolish to introduce them into this sensitive and novel form of legal administration.

    Who will these assessors be? What will their experience be? In Admiralty cases we sometimes need the experience of men who have been ships' captains, or who have had experience in a certain department of maritime affairs, because an assessment has to be made of certain technical matters. But how can a person who has "special knowledge and experience" of race relations affect a justiciable issue? What advantage will he be in respect of the matter in dispute?

    Secondly, the Attorney-General said that the presence of assessors will add to the confidence of those who appear before the courts. Is that really so? When persons appear before a court at present to hear a determination on the question whether or not damages should be awarded against them, or whether an injunction should be levied or a declaration made, do they have less confidence because the county court judge sits there alone? Is it not much more likely that an adverse impression may be gained by one of the parties if, in a case brought to court by the Race Relations Board, he sees sitting on the bench two persons with special knowledge and experience of race relations? He may well ask himself, "What are they there for?"

    The Bill would be much more effective if these remedies were granted, under the court's jurisdiction, by the man who sits there day in and day out exercising administration in all the different fields of law. If we make this aspect of the law a special one we shall create something which will not carry with it the confidence of persons who think that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done.

    Judges judicially administer the law in accordance with a remarkable tradition, which is universally recognised. It is a question who should be the arbiter between the citizen and the State. The normal exercise of the normal function of the normal court is what we should be seeking in this jurisdiction. We do not want and should not have a special Tribunal—which is what this will appear to be to the persons who come before it. The customary, traditional, proper and efficient arbiter who carries the confidence of most people is the judge. It is the judge and the judge alone who should decide these matters.

    My right hon. and learned Friend has asked, and the learned Attorney General has pointedly failed to answer, what appears to be the central question in this matter, namely, what are these assessors to do? The only positive point made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman was that they were to provide additional confidence. I do not know whether that was intended seriously. Is it really suggested that our county court judges who, every day of the week, are deciding matters of crucial importance to our citizens—such questions as whether a citizen shall retain his home—require additional confidence in their capacity, or in respect of their fairness or integrity, to be given by the presence of two gentlemen sitting on the bench with them to perform functions of which we have been told absolutely nothing?

    We cannot leave the matter there. When, on top of that, it is pointed out by the right hon. and learned Gentleman that under the county court rules there is a procedure, albeit one which is not used, for the appointment of assessors, he weakened what little case he originally had. Under those rules, if the Race Relations Board, as plaintiff, wants an assessor, and if the county court judge thinks that such an application will help, he can agree to the appointment of an assessor. The only difference—although it is a vital one—is that in this case the assessors will be imposed on the county court judge, whether or not he wants them.

    What are these assessors to do? Are they supposed to help the judge to make up his mind on the law? They would appear to have no qualifications for that. Are they to help the judge make up his mind on the facts? These cases will be delicate, sensitive and difficult. Is it really suggested that it will be more difficult for a learned county court judge to make up his mind on these matters, when he has to decide questions of fact every day in his working life, than it will be for him when he deals with those other cases day by day—some of them being of even greater importance to the citizens who come before him?

    We are entitled to be told what is the purpose of these gentlemen. In referring to another place I cannot go into details, but I can refer to the experience of the noble Lord who moved the Amendment there. These gentlemen have been defined as being in very much the same class and type as the most admirable persons who will sit on the Race Relations Board. The defendant will undoubtedly have confidence—all citizens will have confidence—in the county court judge, but when he finds two other people—the same type of people as those who constitute the formal plaintiff, the Race Relations Board—sitting beside the judge and telling him, either when he is on the bench or after he retires, things that the defendant does not hear, can the House judge what his state of mind will be?

    I know that Trinity Masters sit with assessors in Admiralty cases, because it is assumed that a judge may not know the blunt end of the ship from the sharp end. That is a technical matter. But what are the assessors to do in a situation in which they apparently confer with the judge behind the backs of the parties to the case? If the right hon. and learned Gentleman thinks that that will add to the confidence of a defendant he is lamentably wrong, and I hope that he will think again.

    Many people—probably the majority—regret the fact that these matters are to be taken to the courts at all. They will wonder profoundly whether such a procedure will not aggravate rather than improve race relations. In that atmosphere, surely it is important above all else that those who have to decide that, nonetheless, the matter shall go to the courts should take every possible step to ensure that it goes to the court on the best basis, and that surely is that those who are arraigned to answer for this new civil wrong should have complete confidence that they are getting a fair deal.

    I am certain that the ordinary citizen will be satisfied that he is getting a fair deal if he goes before one of Her Majesty's judges. With due respect to these eminent gentlemen, it is possible that his confidence of that will be diminished if, sitting with that judge, are people who are not judges, are not known to administer justice and who may be thought to take a somewhat partisan view of the matters before the court.

    If the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants this most sensitive and difficult part of the Bill to work in a way in which our citizens will feel that a fair deal is being given, he will agree with the Lords on this extremely sensible Amendment.

    7.0 p.m.

    I shall be brief, because my right hon. and hon. Friends have put forward the case admirably from this side of the House.

    I want to emphasise two points, the first of which is the sense of injustice which may be felt by a defendant. I am trying to visualise the situation where an instructing solicitor goes into court with his client, who is the defendant. The client says, "Who are those two people sitting with the judge?" The solicitor will say, "They are the assessors." The defendant will then ask who they are, and his solicitor will tell him that they are specialists in race relations, to which his client will retort, "But the people who have brought me before the court are specialists in race relations, so what sort of justice can I expect?"

    My right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) asked: on what matters are the assessors to advise the judge? When they retire, as inevitably they will have to, and a defendant sees the three of them go away to consider the judgment of the court, what sort of questions will the judge ask them? What sort of practical advice will they give to the judge? No one will have any idea of what they say to the judge in the absence of the defendant, and that must cause misgivings in the mind of anyone waiting for a judgment who has no knowledge of the sort of matters being discussed.

    Then there is the difference between the present system of appointing assessors in a county court and the proposals in the Bill. As has been said, this has to be on the application of one of the parties, and the judge has the right to decide whether or not he wants assessors.

    A further point in the present system which is different from that laid down in the Race Relations Bill is that, under Section 91 of the County Courts Act, any of the parties has the right to object to an assessor either on personal grounds or because of his qualifications. I can see no grounds under this Bill for any objection to be made. That is a serious defect. If a man can object to an assessor in other matters brought before a county court, he should be able to object to an assessor appointed from the Lord Chancellor's panel and the Registrar should be able to hear the objection, as he can in ordinary matters.

    For those reasons and the others put forward by my right hon. and hon. Friends, the Amendment should be accepted.

    I speak as a layman on these points, although I have been most impressed by the arguments advanced by my right hon. and hon. Friends. However, I want to approach matters from a different point of view. As the House knows, I have opposed the Bill from the beginning. I believe that it will worsen race relations rather than help them. I hope that I am proved wrong.

    It cannot be right to treat the proceedings under the Bill as something extraordinary. Individuals who come within the purview of the legislation should be regarded in the same way as any other citizen. We are dedicated to ensuring that every citizen is treated on terms of equality with everyone else. All citizens should have the same rights and the same responsibilities. It is a mistake to set up a court in such a way as to give the impression that special treatment is to be given to a section of the population. That is how it will appear.

    That is the only objection that I have to this proposal. I cannot enter into the legal arguments which have been advanced. In my view, we should not do anything which makes it appear that we are making special provision for one section of the population which, like all other citizens, should be on terms of equality with other residents of our country.

    I do not intend to take up much time in adding to what has been said already by my right hon. and hon. Friends. However, I have a special interest in the Amendment because, in Committee, I moved an Amendment to the same effect which met with very much the same arguments from the learned Attorney-General. Now that this Amendment has been made in the other place, I submit that the House should accept it, and I summarise my reasons in this way.

    In all the attacks made upon our institutions over the last few years, the one which remains unattacked and in which, as far as I am able to judge, confidence remains absolute, is the integrity, judgment and quality of Her Majesty's judges and the justice administered in Her Majesty's court. Therefore, when we create a new wrong and provide a new remedy for it, why should we not leave the determination of the matter, which is essentially one of fact, for Her Majesty's judges unassisted by these new-fangled assessors?

    What are the assessors for? Hitherto, we have had assessors in the Admiralty Division. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) said, they are there for highly technical reasons, to keep the judges right on technical matters. We also have assessors sitting with recorders at quarter sessions in juvenile cases, but they are there as juvenile justices experienced in dealing with children to give the benefit of their advice.

    If these assessors are persons with special knowledge of problems connected with race and community relations, they are precisely the sort of people that we shall find on the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees. If they have any special qualification at all, will not defendants think that it is one which gives them a bias against them? Is it right that in matters of this kind defendants should be brought before the courts feeling that, sitting on the bench with the judge, are people not with a special qualification but with a special bias? To a great extent, the proposal will vitiate the aims which everyone in the House has in mind when considering the legislation.

    A further point which has been made by my right hon. and hon. Friends is that confidence will be shaken, since the assessors' advice will be given to the judge privately behind the scenes. It will not be done in open court and will not be seen. As a result, justice will not be seen to be done. Apart from a bias, what special qualifications will they bring to bear which a judge, deciding matters every day of the week, will not possess? He has the ability to assess evidence and decide where the truth lies. In those circumstances, what need can there be for assessors?

    In another place, one of the noble Lords described a compromise, as such it is, when he said that it had been suggested that we should have a special tribunal for this—

    Order. The hon. Member knows that he cannot quote a noble Lord in the other place unless that noble Lord was a Minister who was expounding Government policy.

    I did not intend to quote, Mr. Speaker. I am grateful for the warning.

    This has been described as a compromise. We are to have these assessors because a tribunal has, quite properly, been rejected. But it is a compromise with a bias, and it would be much better without the bias. I hope that the House will accept the Amendment.

    The right hon. and learned Attorney-General knows that my right hon. and hon. Friends and I are anxious that the Bill should work. We think that it will work. We do not share the regrets, referred to by the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), that certain matters should be brought before the courts. We think that it is high time they were brought before the courts. We hope, along with the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) that the Bill will work. I believe that the hon. Gentleman's hopes will presently be fulfilled. Whether it works, of course, will depend on whether we can get the British public to accept it and accept that it is fair.

    Having considered all the arguments carefully and read the debates, I incline to the view expressed in the Lords Amendment rather than the view expressed today by the Attorney-General. I speak as a layman. Right hon. and learned and hon. and learned Members will realise I must comment in a different way. That does not mean that I do not appreciate and support what was said by the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson). I do. But as a layman I look at the courts in a slightly different way.

    I have confidence in our legal system and in our judges, though perhaps not total and absolute confidence. My confidence is diluted with a certain amount of healthy, though not disrespectful, suspicion. I certainly feel that were the courts encumbered with additional persons, whose functions I understand imperfectly, whether they be described as assessors or in some other way, my confidence would perhaps wane, particularly when there is a clear association between those persons assisting the judge and one of the parties to the action, the Race Relations Board.

    Surely, persons who are specially qualified and knowledgeable in race relations and whose opinions will be valuable and necessary are inevitably those who will be grouped together in the public mind with the Race Relations Board. Their observations may be necessary in any case, but surely they should be heard in the way that other necessary observations should be heard—as witnesses. If we can possibly do something to preserve the general view that this is a judicial procedure going on in the ordinary way, we will maintain public confidence in the arrangements upon which we have embarked.

    I do not want to make too much of this. We want the Bill to work and we are anxious that it should work, but I cannot believe that this kind of arrangement will help it to work. It will support arguments which have sometimes been advanced on this side, though to my mind wrongly, arguments with which I do not agree. Some hon. Gentlemen have suggested that all sorts of fears and things might happen. I believe that this kind of procedure could add weight to those arguments. I have argued with these points, but this procedure would make it more difficult for me to argue with them. Therefore, I urge right hon. and hon. Gentlemen to think again.

    I want the evidence and the opinions of persons with special knowledge of race relations to be heard where appropriate, but I should like them to be heard in the same way that other people are heard—as witnesses. I should not like them taking part in the judicial process.

    7.15 p.m.

    I support those of my right hon. and hon. Friends who argue in favour of the Lords Amendment.

    In the other place the Lord Chancellor, in a speech which was remarkably lukewarm in support of this part of the Bill, said that even if it did not do any good, at least it could not do any harm to have assessors. I believe that it does harm. My right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-carpenter) has rightly pointed out that the Race Relations Board is the plaintiff. But it goes further than that, because before the action can come to court the Board has to determine to take it to court. Before it can make that determination it has to come to the conclusion that the act is unlawful and that it has failed to get a settlement. Therefore, when the action goes to court the Board has firmly decided and committed itself to the view that the defendant has acted unlawfully.

    What happens when the man gets to court? He appears before an individual whom he looks upon as the arbiter of his rights and finds, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) said, two people sitting beside him whom he is then told have special knowledge and experience of problems connected with race and community relations. In the defendant's mind two of those three people will be linked with those who are not only the plaintiffs, but who have already come to the firm opinion that he has acted unlawfully.

    What is their purpose in being there? Surely it cannot be said that they are there to assist the judge in deciding on the facts. Not only are these simple facts for a judge to decide, but we have specifically written into the Bill the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal by either party against the county court judge's decision on a point of fact. Therefore, there is already a check on that matter.

    If it is to be said that they can give assistance because of their knowledge of race relations, the time when that assistance is required is not in the court, which is concerned with questions of fact which the judge has to decide, but at an earlier stage in deciding whether it is of advantage to race relations ever to take proceedings. I think that this is an extremely dangerous proposal.

    I end by quoting the Lord Chancellor in another place, in reply to the first debate, when he said:
    "It is particularly necessary that any persons who are in a race relations court should have confidence in the court, and they are more likely to have confidence in an ordinary court than in some special tribunal."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 30th July, 1968; Vol. 296, c. 219.]
    To the individual concerned, seeing three people there, it will have become a special tribunal rather than an ordinary court. I pray in aid those words of the Lord Chancellor as the strongest possible argument why the Lords Amendment should be accepted.

    As one who, throughout the Committee stage, was in favour of a strong Race Relations Act emerging, I have been impressed by the arguments on this side of the House in favour of accepting the Lords Amendment. I agree, in particular, with the arguments that there should be as little interference as possible with the normal procedure of the county courts. It is not a good thing to have clandestine advice given and urged upon a county court judge in circumstances which, in the early stages of this law's operation, are bound to seem a bit strange. If expert knowledge of race relations is needed in one of these cases, surely it is up to the plaintiff, the Race Relations Board, to explain any special circumstances and the special consequences that might follow certain acts.

    I do not believe that the Board should need to call expert witnesses, as has been suggested. It is itself the expert body. When it has reached a conclusion, it must itself urge the case, with all its aspects, before the judge. The judge ought not, I believe, to be cluttered with other advisers. Nor do I believe that the defendant in any such case should have to face, as it were, the uncertainty of a judge cluttered with two other people about whom he knows nothing.

    I, too, find it difficult to understand why courts dealing with matters arising under the Act, as it will be, should be in any way differently constituted from courts dealing with all the other important matters affecting the citizen. One can see the purpose of a judge sitting with assessors from time to time. One can understand—and this has been said already by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter)—the sense of a judge wanting to sit with experts in the complicated technical fields, but why would a judge need to sit with experts in this class of case? As I understand it, the judge will have to deal with pure questions of fact and then apply the clear criteria in the Act, and I cannot understand that that will be any more difficult than deciding whether a driver has been negligent, and then having to decide the most difficult matter of all, namely, how much the unsuccessful defendant should pay by way of damages.

    If the judge considers himself in any difficulty, if he feels that these matters of race relations are too difficult for him to apprehend—a situation which I can hardly imagine will arise—he has the Race Relations Board, the prosecutor, there to help him. It is there to assist the judge. It is there to put these technical matters—if they can properly be called technical—before him. I respectfully argue that it is highly undesirable that precisely the same sort of person should be sitting with the judge as constitutes the Race Relations Board.

    I find it extremely difficult to understand who is a race relations expert and who is not. There is no objective criterion which can be applied. There is no objective criterion, such as professional qualifications, and I do not envy the Lord Chancellor his task of compiling a list of people who are supposed to have special expertise in race relations.

    But if these experts exist—which I doubt—why not call them as expert witnesses? They can then establish their expertise and expose themselves to cross-examination, like any other expert witness. In that way justice will be seen to be done. It will not be seen to be done if, as has been said, the judge sits there with two assessors who are able to whisper to him advice about which the unfortunate defendant knows nothing. He will not have the faintest idea of the nature of the advice given to the judge by the assessors.

    An analogy can be drawn between the situation which will arise under the Act and the situation which has long been known to exist in magistrates' courts. For a long time people in this House and elsewhere have criticised the practice of magistrates' clerks retiring with the justices. The criticism is that if the magistrates' clerk goes out with the justices how does the layman know whether the decision which is ultimately arrived at is the decision of the justices, or that of the clerk? Consequently, the practice has grown up, thank goodness, of the magistrates' clerk not automatically retiring with the justices, but only going out later if specifically asked to do so, and this practice has enhanced the prestige of the courts. I belive that the prestige of the courts will be dangerously diminished if the judge is required to sit with these people who can give him secret advice, the nature of which the defendant will be left to guess.

    This is not just a lawyer's point. It will be a thoroughly bad thing if matters of race relations are dealt with in any way differently from the other matters which affect the rights of the citizen. The ordinary courts of law are good enough for all the other involved problems which have to be dealt with, and I do not see why they should not be considered good enough to deal with the problems which will arise under the Act.

    I do not think that there can be tremendous feeling about either side of the argument because as yet this is an untried quantity, but I think that I can draw upon one or two points of logic to prove that the argument advanced by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) is wrong. It is precisely because this is a special problem that special machinery is being provided, and why it is logical for there to be a special kind of court.

    The value of the rôle of the assessors will, I think, be a case of the proof of the pudding being in the eating. A lot will depend on the people who act as assessors. Hon. Gentlemen opposite have made far too many assumptions. They have assumed that these assessors will necessarily be people who have long experience in race relations conciliation. That need not necessarily be the case. The right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) begged the question. I think that the answer to his case is that there is no substitute for experience. In arriving at a proper judgment, one has to draw on experience.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to be horrified by the title "assessors", but they are used on various occasions. I am thinking of appeals tribunals in connection with the National Health Service, with pensions, with disablement, and so on. We draw on a wide range of experience outside the legal profession.

    It may be that one or two of the assessors will be legal people, with the additional experience of race relations. As the Member for Southall, I can see that there will be a need to draw upon the experience of living with race relations problems which, at the moment, affect only a few areas. It has been emphasised during the debate that the defendant must feel that he is going before a body from which he will get justice. I feel confident that he will when all the facts are known, and that the facts are more likely to be known if there are present people who can assist the judge, or who are able to elicit the facts. I think that that situation is more likely to arise if the Bill is unaltered than if a change is made now.

    We must remember, of course, that it is not only a question of justice for the defendant in the case as we term it—and he will be a special kind of defendant—but of justice for the plaintiff. He must be assured in advance that people of experience will be sitting in judgment as part of the machinery, and that they are able to make a proper judgment and proper assessment after failure has been registered through the conciliation machinery.

    There is, of course, no definition of who is a race relations expert. Everything will depend on the calibre of the assessors, and, above all, on the experience they have gained in dealing with this delicate problem.

    7.30 p.m.

    If the House were to arive at a conclusion upon the basis of the argument which has been advanced from almost every quarter of the House, it is almost impossible to believe anything other than that it would accept the Lords Amendment. The arguments in support of the Amendment have not been put merely by those of us who, admittedly, hold a special view. They have been put by the Liberal Party. They have been put by my hon. Friend the Member for Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair), who is known to have a special point of view. There have been eight speeches. With the exception of the hon. Member for Southall (Mr. Bidwell), there is not one of those who have spoken that does not think that the arrangement which is proposed is a bad one.

    I do not want to add any more legal argument, nor am I competent to do so, to what my hon. and learned Friends have said. I want to add one thought which I think is important. We in the House are and must be sensitive to every kind of public opinion. We must have regard to the mood in the country for which we seek to legislate. Whatever views we have on the Bill, whether we are amongst those who think that it should be a strong Bill or whether we are amongst those who think that it should be a weak Bill, we must admit that there is in the country immense criticism and, indeed, some resentment of it. Those who are strongest for the Bill should be the first to ensure that this mood is diminished and not increased. We must have regard to this mood in the country.

    There is a second mood which is no less important—that of a person who is accused before the county court. It might be worthwhile for us to try to think ourselves into his position. He is being accused of an offence which has never previously existed. Unlike us, who have been through all these arguments, it may well be that, until he is accused, he never even knew that such an offence existed. His solicitor will have told him that it is an offence for which his father could not have been charged because it is a brand new offence in Britain. Because of this, he is bound to approach the court with at least some subconscious feeling of resentment. That is always a bad thing.

    The only thing which might relieve this so-called "defendant" of that feeling is the wisdom and understanding of the judge before whom he appears. It must be part of the function of the judge to restore to him some confidence in the judicial process to which he is being submitted.

    If this person appears before the judge and sees before him, sitting right and left of the judge, two persons who, even though they were the Archangel Gabriel, clearly have a close association with the prosecution, he cannot possibly have the confidence in the court which he should have. I believe that this is self-evident. If the hon. Member for Southall, who I see indicating dissent, will compare the definition of those who are to be assessors with that of those who are likely to be appointed to the Board, he will find that they are interchangeable. This cannot be right when one set of people will be conducting the prosecution and the others—the assessors—will sit beside the judge.

    Perhaps what I have said is far less important than what has been said by other hon. Members. It is reasonable that the Attorney-General should pay heed to the opinion which has been expressed.

    By leave of the House, I want to seek to reassure the House about some of the anxieties which have been expressed in the course of this interesting and serious debate.

    I question the assessment made by the hon. Member for Dorset, South (Mr. Evelyn King) of the reception the Bill has had in the country. I do not think that it has been received with resentment. What has been reassuring, on the contrary, has been the substantial and widespread acceptance of the Bill.

    I want to underline the essential element in the machinery which is being set up. The decision in the case will be that of the learned judge. He will make his decision in open court. He will give reasons for it, as our learned judges do. That judgment will be unfettered. He will have the benefit of the assistance of those who will be expert in race relations and in community relations—men with special knowledge in that sphere.

    I do not see any analogy between what is proposed and the reference made by my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor in another place to the anxieties he would have towards a special tribunal specially set up outside the ambit of the ordinary courts. This will be a county court judge sitting in judgment assisted by two assessors.

    I do not think that there is any less confidence in the Restrictive Practices Court because a learned judge of the High Court has two laymen with special experience in that field sitting beside him assist- ing him to adjudicate where the public interest lies in regard to the matter which that court considers.

    Nor do I see any ground for comparing the situation that this machinery will provide with the anxieties that have been expressed about justices' clerks retiring with lay benches. The worry there is that the justices' clerk, being a professional lawyer, may overbear and exert excessive influence over the lay magistracy. Here we have a judge.

    I entirely agree that we must bear the defendant's state of mind very much in the forefront of our minds. I do not see any reason for anxiety in a defendant's mind that there is some curious association between the lay assessors and the Board. After all, the assessors will be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. They will be completely independent of the Board. There will be a certain common qualification, in that each will have in special knowledge of this subject, but these assessors will be independent from the Board. There is no reason to think that their advice will not be given quite independently to the learned county court judge. He will not put up with fools gladly. Nor, indeed, will fools be appointed.

    He may well have them in front of him. There speaks a right hon. Gentleman, no doubt not calling upon his own experience. The judge is the judge of the trial. I do not share the anxieties which have been expressed about any special tainting of the assessors, because they have the same kind of qualifications as members of the Board might have, with any prejudice against a defendant. Nor do I take the view that the standing of this special county court will suffer by reason of this special machinery. We are dealing with a new cause of action.

    Before the Attorney-General leaves the arguments advanced as possible grounds for anxiety, will he address his mind to the anxiety which has been voiced that these assessors will be giving evidence to the judge? They will be putting at his disposal their special knowledge of race relations. That is indistinguishable from giving evidence to him, but they will not be giving advice on the law. The evidence they give cannot be examined by the plaintiff. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman address his mind to that?

    I thought I had been trying to do so. This is always the problem with assessors in courts where the assessors are used. They bring their experience and special knowledge to bear to assist the judge in his conclusions not only about questions of fact, but where, as in this case, the granting of an injunction would be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. He will call upon their experience and views on that matter. His judgment will be the final one and he will make such use of the help that they may give him as he thinks fit.

    I do not think that the anxieties which have been expressed justify us in rejecting machinery which has been thought to be helpful by those with experience in this field. It has been thought to be helpful by those who will have much of the responsibility hereafter for seeing that it works. This is a difficult question but in the circumstances I commend the machinery that has been introduced into the Bill as a sensible and reassuring compromise between the special tribunal on the one hand and the ordinary court on the other. I hope the judges will find that this machinery will be of assistance to them in the most difficult task which admittedly we are imposing upon them.

    I am sure the whole House is grateful to the Attorney-General for the soothing, peaceful and almost ecumenical tone with which he has sought to reassure those in various parts of the House who were not satisfied with his first efforts. If he will forgive me saying so, he is such a nice old thing, that I do not want to knock him about in any sort of way. [Laughter.] On the other hand, as he frankly admitted, this is a compromise. The trouble is that it is frankly a compromise between nonsense and sense.

    The Attorney-General knows perfectly well—I think I know perfectly well, although I am not a member of this Government, but have been a Member of other Governments—what has happened here. The lawyers in the Government on the whole have won a considerable victory. They made their colleagues withdraw what was originally an out-and-out nonsense and they have succeeded in inserting a modicum of sense in what originally was an insane proposal. Therefore the Attorney-General and the Lord Chancellor deserve our warmest thanks. The appalling nonsense of a special tribunal has been averted. Instead we have the ordinary county courts sitting.

    The Attorney-General drew an analogy with the Restrictive Practices Court, but that is a bad analogy. The lay members of the Restrictive Practice Court are members of the Court. Their decision is that of the court as well as that of the leading central figure. The lay assessors in race relations cases in the county court will be not only lay assessors but lay figures. The Attorney-General, with some pride in his voice at his internal triumph in the internecine struggle between Departments and Ministers, rightly took satisfaction in the fact that the assessors would be no good anyway because the judge will be the only one entitled to give a decision. In this the right hon. and learned Gentleman was perfectly right in drawing a distinction between them and the clerk to the magistrates.

    7.45 p.m.

    In the magistrates' court the clerk tells the magistrates what to do although he has not the right to express himself. The danger here is that the judge after going through the motions of listening to lay figures to his right and his left will come to his decision without taking the slightest notice of what they say, because he is not bound to do so. That is why it is a nonsense.

    The only person who believes in this compromise is the admirable and single-minded honourable Member for Southall (Mr. Bidwell), because he thought that these people would do some good. The best that we on these benches can say is that, like the holy water on Mount Athos, they will do no good and no harm. This is a poor recommendation for a novel piece of judicial procedure, but the hon. Member thinks that they will do some good. He thinks that race relations is a specialised subject that nobody except the experts knows anything about.

    Although like my right hon. Friend I have not been in county courts for some time, I know something of what goes on in Marylebone County Court and various county courts in or near my constituency. Let me tell the hon. Member that, as a famous Irish advocate said to a judge, "There is practically no other subject of discussion." Race relations are the constant bread and butter of the Old Bailey, the county courts and Inner London Sessions. They are discussed there all day because the great problems of race relations are constantly before the courts.

    It would not be in order for me to remind the House of the content of this Bill, but it is largely about employment and housing. Almost every day in the county court problems arising between coloured tenants and white landlords, between coloured landlords and white tenants, or between neighbours of different colours are coming before the courts. Sometimes this leads to cases of ejectment, sometimes to actions over false imprisonment, cases of wrongful dismissal, cases of assault—in a magistrates' court—and sometimes something worse at the Old Bailey. These things are the bread and butter of the courts today.

    Simply because we have produced a new statutory tort which deals with this tiny aspect of this subject which is under constant discussion we have to invent two assessors, who might as well be stuffed with straw for all the good they will do, to satisfy those hon. Members of the Government side who originally wanted another kind of nonsense. We shall divide on this Amendment.

    I am sure the House, as usual, has been entertained by the jovial and impish style of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), but behind all this joviality there is very much a defence of lawyers and the position of lawyers. We must be quite honest about this. Behind it are not arguments about the rôle of the assessors but the defence of the lawyer. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."]

    Division No. 310.]

    AYES

    [7.50 p.m.

    Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)Boyden, JamesColeman, Donald
    Alldritt, WalterBraddock, Mrs. E. M.Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
    Allen, ScholefieldBradley, TomCrawshaw, Richard
    Archer, PeterBroughton, Dr. A. D. D.Cullen, Mrs. Alice
    Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
    Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)Brown,Bob(N 'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
    Bagier, Gordon A. T.Buchan, Norman
    Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
    Barnett, JoelBuchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
    Beaney, AlanButler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)Davies, Harold (Leek)
    Bence, CyrilCallaghan, Rt. Hn. JamesDavies, S. O. (Merthyr)
    Blackburn, F.Chapman, DonaldDelargy, Hugh
    Booth, AlbertCoe, DenisDempsey, James

    Hon. Members who are lawyers say "No" to that. If there were a group of joiners on this side of the House and we were discussing carpentry and joinery we would be most indignant if someone who was not a joiner dared to talk about joinery. I accept and understand the point of view of the lawyers, but this is not just a question of lawyers. It has been pointed out that this is something new. We all agree that it concerns probably the most difficult problem with which we have had to deal. There is no earthly reason why, under those circumstances, we should not go outside our normal procedure to make certain that those who are brought before the courts have the best possible advice.

    One hon. Member said that there are no experts in race relations. He asked what was meant by experts. But there are experts in race relations. There are some people who have had much more knowledge, experience and years of hard work in this field than others, and, perhaps, than the judges have ever had. It would not be a bad thing for a judge, when making a decision, to have the advice and benefit of the experience of two people who are not necessarily lawyers but have a special knowledge in race relations. It is no good trying to get away from the fact that there are people with that sort of special knowledge.

    The very humourous speech of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone was really up to standard. I and the whole House thoroughly enjoyed it. But let us not be carried away by that sort of speech. This is a most sensible suggestion, and I hope that the House will support the Government.

    Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—

    The House divided: Ayes 148, Noes 101.

    Dewar, DonaldJones, Dan (Burnley)Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)
    Dickens, JamesJones,Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)Probert, Arthur
    Dobson, RayKenyon, CliffordRankin, John
    Doig, PeterKerr, Russell (Feltham)Rees, Merlyn
    Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)Lawson, GeorgeReynolds, Rt. Hn. G. W.
    Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)Leadbitter, TedRhodes, Geoffrey
    Eadie, AlexLomas, KennethRoberts, Albert (Normanton)
    Edwards, William (Merioneth)Lyon, Alexander W. (York)Rose, Paul
    Ellis, JohnLyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)Ross, Rt. Hn. William
    Ennals, DavidMcBride, NeilShaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
    Ensor, DavidMcCann, JohnShore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
    Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)MacColl, JamesSilkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
    Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)Macdonald, A. H.Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)
    Faulds, AndrewMackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)Silverman, Julius
    Fernyhough, E.Maclennan, RobertSkeffington, Arthur
    Slater, Joseph
    Fraser, John (Norwood)McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)Small, William
    Gardner, TonyMacPherson, MalcolmSnow Julian
    Garrett, W. E.Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
    Gourlay, HarrySpriggs, Leslie
    Mallalieu,J.P.W.(Huddersfield,E.)Steele Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)
    Gray, Dr Hugh (Yarmouth)Manuel, ArchieTinn James
    Greenwood, Rt. Hn. AnthonyMapp, CharlesUrwin, T. W.
    Grey, Charles (Durham)Marks, KennethWainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)
    Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)Mason, Rt. Hn. RoyWalden, Brian (All Saints)
    Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)Miller, Dr. M. S.Watkins, David (Consett)
    Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)
    Hamilton, James (Bothwell)Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)Whitaker, Ben
    Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)Newens, StanWilkins, W. A.
    Harper, JosephOakes, GordonWilley, Rt. Hn. Frederick
    Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)O'Malley, BrianWilliams, Clifford (Abertillery)
    Haseldine, NormanOrbach, MauriceWilliams, W. T. (Warrington)
    Heffer, Eric S.Orme, StanleyWilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)
    Houghton, Rt. Hn. DouglasOswald, ThomasWoodburn, Rt. Hn. A.
    Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)Owen, Will (Morpeth)Woof, Robert
    Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)Page, Derek (King's Lynn)Yates, Victor
    Hughes, Roy (Newport)Park, Trevor
    Hunter, AdamParkyn, Brian (Bedford)TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
    Hynd, JohnPeart, Rt. Hn. FredMr. J. D. Concannon and
    Irvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)Pentland, NormanMr. Ernest G. Perry.
    Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

    NOES

    Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)Hall-Davis, A. G. F.Pink, R. Bonner
    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)Pym, Francis
    Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)Harrison, Brian (Maldon)Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James
    Bessell, PeterHarvey, Sir Arthur VereRawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
    Black, Sir CyrilHogg, Rt. Hn. QuintinRees-Davies, W. R.
    Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. JohnHolland, PhilipRhys Williams, Sir Brandon
    Brinton, Sir TattonIremonger, T. L.Ridsdale, Julian
    Bromley-Davenport.Lt.-Col.SirWalterKaberry, Sir DonaldRossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
    Buck, Antony (Colchester)King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)Russell, Sir Ronald
    Bullus, Sir EricKirk, PeterScott-Hopkins, James
    Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)Kitson, TimothySinclair, Sir George
    Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)Knight, Mrs. JillSmith, John (London & W'minster)
    Carlisle, MarkLane, DavidStoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
    Clegg, WalterLegge-Bourke, Sir HarryTapsell, Peter
    Costain, A. P.Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)Taylor Edward M.(G'cow Cathcart)
    Currie, G. B. H.Longden, GilbertTaylor, Frank (Moss Side)
    Dalkeith, Earl ofTilney, John
    Dance, JamesLubbock, EricTurton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
    Digby, Simon WingfieldMacArthur, Ianvan Straubenzee, W. R.
    Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross&Crom'ty)Waddington, David
    Elliott,R.W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)Maude, AngusWalker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
    Errington, Sir EricMawby, RayWalters, Dennis
    Eyre ReginaldMaydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. c.Weatherill, Bernard
    Fortescue, TimMills, Peter (Torrington)Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
    Foster, Sir JohnMiscampbell, NormanWilliams, Donald (Dudley)
    Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)Monro, HectorWilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
    Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)Winstanley, Dr. M. P.
    Glover, Sir DouglasMunro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir HughWolrige-Gordon, Patrick
    Glyn, Sir RichardMurton, OscarWright, Esmond
    Goodhart, PhilipNabarro, Sir GeraldWylie, N.R.
    Gower, RaymondNeave, AireyYounger, Hn. George
    Grant-Ferris, R.Osborn, John (Hallam)
    Grieve, PercyOsborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
    Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)Page, Graham (Crosby)Mr. Jasper More and
    Gurden, HaroldPardoe, JohnMr. Anthony Grant.
    Hall, John (Wycombe)Percival, Ian

    Remaining Lords Amendments disagreed and agreed to.

    Lest I should be thought churlish, perhaps I might just say how glad we are to have had the assistance of the Minister and congratulate him on his promotion. We are grateful that he kept himself in his previous job for this evening.

    Committee appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to certain of their Amendments to the Bill: the Attorney-General, Mr. Buck, Sir Peter Rawlinson, Mr. Ennals and Mr. Harold Walker; Three to be the quorum.—[Mr. Ennals.]

    To withdraw immediately.

    Reasons for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments reported and agreed to; to be communicated to the Lords.

    Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Bill

    Lords Amendments considered.

    Clause 2

    Right Of Illegitimate Children To Legitim

    Lords Amendment No. 1: In page 2, line 27, leave out Clause 2.

    Read a Second time.

    8.0 p.m.

    I think that it might be for the convenience of the House, Mr. Deputy Speaker, if we took, at the same time Lords Amendment No. 22.

    I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    We debated this matter at great length on principle and in Committee and further in the House on Report. We believed that the existing Clause 2 was an essential part of the Bill. Its removal would, it appears to me, be a breach of the principle underlying this part of the Bill, the purpose of which is to improve the succession right of illegitimate persons. The method that we have adopted, in following the Russell Report, was to equate the rights of illegitimate children in their parents' estates with those of legitimate children.

    It has been argued that it is too great a step and potentially too disruptive a step to confer on illegitimate children. It seems to me that this is a problem of the established law of succession, one that can be and could be disruptively exercised by legitimate children at present. The logic of the argument of those who put it forward, therefore, would be to change the basic law of succession rather than modify or restrict it to the right of legitim.

    It is wrong and unacceptable in the terms of the Bill that the illegitimate child should have no rights or a lesser right than that of the legitimate child, because this again, as I argued on many occasions previously, would be punishing the illegitimate child for the circumstances of his birth, over which he had no control. That is the key issue here.

    As the Under-Secretary has said, the Amendments give rise, very shortly, once again, to the whole question of how far we can properly go in improving the status of the illegitimate child without at the same time unduly prejudicing the material and legitimate interests of a widow and children of a marriage.

    I will not rehearse the attempts that were made by my hon. Friends and myself in the House and in the Standing Committee during the earlier stages of the Bill to try to reach a compromise. I think that this is a field of the law in which a compromise would have been desirable. We on this side of the House approached the problem with as much humanity, sympathy and understanding as I think one possibly could from the point of view of the illegitimate child. No one denies that the illegitimate child is not responsible for the circumstances of his birth, and if anything could be done to improve his status without prejudice to the other competing interests, it should be done.

    During the Committee stage we tried a number of compromises. My regret is that the Amendment with which we are faced today is not a compromise. It is all or nothing. Personally, I should have preferred a middle way to the all or nothing situation with which we are faced.

    I have all along said that with regard to the estate of the mother there is a very strong argument for putting the illegitimate child in the same position as her other children, and I think that there are also circumstances in which the illegitimate child should have a claim on the estate of the father—as, for example, where there is no widow or there are no children to complicate the issue or, indeed—I think this would be acceptable to most hon. Members—where the illegitimate child has at any time lived in family with the parent or other issue of the marriage.

    But because those attempts at a compromise here and in another place have been rejected, we are now faced with a situation in which the choice is a simple one: do we open up in general terms the claim of the illegitimate child to legitim out of the estate of the parent, or do we preclude that claim altogether? Much as I regret it, I have no hesitation in coming down to the latter view, although I would have preferred a compromise on this matter.

    We have already passed the provisions of Clause 1, which are calculated to give the illegitimate child a corresponding share of the parent's estate on intestacy to that enjoyed by the children of the marriage. It may be said that it is only logical, that being the case, that the claim of legitim, which is enjoyed by the legitimate children in Scotland, should likewise be applied to the illegitimate child. But there are very material differences here and the effect of this provision is likely to be very much more drastic and material than the earlier provisions of the Bill.

    By virtue of Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964, on intestacy, there are built in to the law substantial safeguards so far as the surviving spouse is concerned. I am concerned with the position of the widow. I shall not rehearse the provisions of the Act, but it gives a substantial built-in claim on intestacy on the part of the widow on the deceased husband's estate, both with regard to heritable property and movable property.

    Legitim and other legal rights under Section 10 only fall to be calculated from the net movable estate; that is to say, after those prior claims by the surviving spouse have been satisfied. In that situation, the claim for legitim on an intestacy may not be very material. Indeed, it may be virtually valueless.

    The position of the widow is strongly safeguarded by statute law so far as the law of intestate succession is concerned. A different situation arises under the provisions of Clause 2, because the claim for legitim is a claim which a child or children have, a built-in claim on the estate of the person which cannot be defeated by will. This is unique to Scots law in the sense that, so far as I am aware, no corresponding provision applies in the law of England. Indeed, the Russell Committee, which made these recommendations, was dealing here with a feature of the law of intestate succession quite unknown, I understand, to the law of England.

    The question arises: are we not going too far by giving the illegitimate child this built-in claim which can override the wishes of the parent and what, in my submission, are the proper and legitimate interests of the widow and the children of the marriage? I give an example of how this could operate.

    Suppose a man in the earlier years of his life was responsible for the birth of a child, perhaps before his marriage. Having married he then, as he is entitled to, leaves the whole of his estate to his widow—which, indeed, is what one would expect in normal circumstances. If there were children of the marriage, those children, if they chose to exercise their right to legitim, could, of course, command a share of the movable estate amounting to one-third.

    Let us, however, take the case of the man with no children who leaves a widow and chooses voluntarily, in the exercise of his testimentary powers, to leave the whole thing to her. Along comes an illegitimate child, of whose existence perhaps the widow has not known. Indeed, the father himself may not have known of its existence. That child can properly, under the provisions of the Clause, lay claim to one-third of the movable estate. This is a material inroad into what I regard as the legitimate interests of the widow.

    Let us, again, take a situation where there are children of the marriage. In many cases, especially where smaller estates are concerned, the children do not exercise their right to legitim but are happy to let their mother, who, after all, has done a great deal for their well-being and welfare over the years, to have what the father has left. Human nature being what it is, could one really expect that attitude to apply in the case of an illegitimate child who has never been a member of that family? This is where the shoe really pinches. What is legitim for? What is the nature of the right?

    In my submission, legitim is a right which flows from the family relationship, a right which belongs to the children of a family—a husband, a wife and the issue of the marriage—and it is out of that familiar relationship that this right arises, and it is a worth-while provision which the law of Scotland has long recognised. What we are being asked to do here is to make it possible for a complete outsider, who has no blood ties with the other members of the family, to come along and upset even a will which the deceased parent has made.

    8.15 p.m.

    I am not challenging the hon. and learned Gentleman's humanity, but I am challenging his judgment to some extent. He gives a recital of various cases. Would he care to comment on the case of an unmarried mother who has a daughter, but leaves nothing to her? This is very important and he knows the aspect to which I am referring. Under the proposition he is putting, how could the daughter be established as a rightful heir or have some claim on any substantial property the mother may have left? What would be the position of a daughter?

    The hon. Gentleman raised this case in Committee and I do not want to take up too much time going over the situation again. Supposing the mother dies intestate then, under the provisions of Clause 1, the illegitimate daughter has her claim in the same way as a legitimate child would have. The hon. Gentleman raised the issue of what claim the illegitimate child would have on the mother's estate. She would certainly have a claim on intestacy. She would not have, I submit, a claim to legitim if the mother left a will cutting out the daughter.

    This is why I said that I would have preferred a compromise, because I believe the relationship between mother and illegitimate child, by the nature of things, to be very strong, and I would have preferred a situation in which, in the case of the mother's estate, a claim for legitim could be exercisable. I agree with the hon. Gentleman there, as I agreed with him about this in Committee. One of our Amendments in Committee was designed specifically to safeguard a claim of this nature at the instance of an illegitimate child on the estate of the other.

    My concern here is with the position of the estate of the father, because the estate of the father has certain family responsibilities which arise from the nature of life as we know it in this country—an obligation of support, an obligation to his widow, an obligation to the children of the marriage—and it is where the proposals of the Bill impinge on these obligations that it seems to us to be going too far.

    After all, it is not as though the illegitimate child is devoid of any means of support under the existing law. If a woman gives birth to an illegitimate child, she is perfectly entitled on proving the paternity of the child to a continuing obligation on the part of the father for aliment for the maintenance of the child, and under the existing law even after the death of the father there is a prior claim to support at the instance of an illegitimate child out of the estate, and by prior claim I mean that it is a debt on the estate and that it comes before the legal rights of the widow and children.

    Therefore, it is not a case of saying that we are depriving the illegitimate child of all support. The law already covers the situation along those lines and, as I have said, if we had had our way, it would have gone much further than that.

    The problem here is whether we are going too far in introducing a proposal that the illegitimate child should have a claim on the legitim of the father's estate. In our view, that is going too far. Let us look for a moment at some of the other repercussions of this proposal. On intestacy, while it might be difficult to prove paternity if the parent has died, there is certainly no rule in Scotland to establish a claim during the life of the parent, because the parent can defeat the claim at the end of the day by leaving a will; but if one writes in a claim of this nature which overrides testamentary freedom, there is every incentive on the part of the illegitimate child to establish a claim for paternity during the life of the parent.

    I ask hon. Members to think for a moment of the repercussions of this situation on family life. When we are talking about the morality of all this, we should not altogether ignore the repercussions which these provisions may well have on the family life of equally innocent people, the mother and the children of the marriage. Indeed, I think that it was the Under-Secretary himself who said that one of the disadvantages of all this was that it might give rise to a great deal of speculative litigation of an unpleasant kind—this is at column 32 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of the Standing Committee. It is an inevitable consequence of this type of legislation which the House should not readily overlook that it could give rise to speculative litigation of an unpleasant kind.

    But it is worse than that, and let us not shy away from this. It opens the door to the kind of blackmail action which one cannot rule out as a possibility. In the representations which I have received from various legal bodies, possible blackmail action loomed very large in the calculations. There is every incentive, even if the claim is not well-founded, in this situation to put forward a claim in the hope, if only in the hope, that it will be bought off in this way. Those are factors which I ask hon. Members on both sides of the House to consider.

    We have here to consider the rights of the illegitimate child who is in no way responsible for the situation in which he finds himself, and one readily accepts that. But that is not the only side of the problem. The other side is what effect this is liable to have on the institution of marriage and the institutiton of family life. Is not this something which we should be trying to preserve rather than prejudice? There is no doubt that legislative provisions of this kind are calculated to prejudice the happiness and unity of family life and also liable to prejudice the legitimate financial interests of the widow, about whom, like many other hon. Members, I have always had an acute concern.

    I hope that the House will reject the Minister's proposal.

    I venture to take part in a Scottish debate as I was a member of the Russell Committee and wrote a dissenting note which is relevant to this discussion. Clause 2, which the Lords Amendments would reject, is based on certain proposals of the Russell Committee and it is right, although I apologise to the House for taking some time, that I should read the actual wording of those proposals.

    Paragraph 49 says:
    "Having regard to the right to continuing aliment it cannot be said that unless legitim is extended to bastards they are left in all cases in Scotland without any possibility of benefit from the estate of a deceased parent who has disposed of all his property by testamentary disposition. It may therefore be argued that, if a bastard in Scotland may have this continuing right as well as a right on intestacy, he is no worse off than the bastard in England or Wales who (on the basis of our previous conclusions) would have an opportunity of claiming under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act as well as a right on intestacy."
    Paragraph 50 says:
    "We stress, however, that our recommendations for England and Wales are designed to elevate the bastard, in that jurisdiction, for the purposes of succession to a parent's estate, from a status inferior to that of the legitimate child. Failure to extend legitim to bastards would to that extent preserve for the bastard, in that jurisdiction, in the field of succession, his inferior status. The relevant comparison is not the position of a bastard in England and Wales with that of one in Scotland: it is the position in Scotland of a bastard with that of a legitimate child."
    Paragraph 51 says:
    "We consider that it would be right that for purposes of leigitim the bastard should have the same rights as a legitimate child of the deceased parent, whether father or mother."
    That is the essential part of that recommendation and that is the basis on which the Government desire to retain Clause 2.

    But the argument is that this is not intended to be fair treatment to the illegitimate child. If it were, it would be said that the law of England was all wrong. It is designed to give equality as between legitimate and illegitimate simply and solely for the sake of giving equality. That is the principle which pervades the whole of Part I of the Bill and it is in objection to that principle that I made my dissenting note to the Russell Report.

    I do not wish to argue that principle, because I would certainly go wide of the Amendment, but I hope that I can properly draw attention to Appendix IV of the Report. That gives the legal position in all the diverse countries in which the Russell Committee took evidence of illegitimate children. In not one country, and that includes countries such as Denmark and Sweden, which have been extremely progressive in this context, have the legitimate and the illegitimate child been equated in succession from the father.

    8.30 p.m.

    We received evidence to the effect that this was attempted in certain countries, which found that it did not work and returned to the old system. The Government are trying to do something which they will find impracticable. It is easy and comforting to one's conscience to take a sentimental view of the position of the illegitimate child, and to say that it is not in any way his fault, and that he should be treated just as well as the legitimate child. I would go to this length and say that it is morally right for both the individual citizen and the legislature to try to avoid, as far as possible, discriminating between the legitimate and the illegitimate.

    I say as far as possible, because I do not believe that it can be right or wise to avoid discrimination to the point of infringing on the basis of marriage as a principle. If one were to do that, one would have to go to the length of enacting that the parents of an illegitimate child would be deemed, so far as the child is concerned, to have been married. That is obviously nonsense and, therefore, one cannot go the full length. This Clause goes beyond the point of what is reasonable or possible.

    The Society of Writers to the Signet has said that this proposal is, in effect, legalising polygamy by a side wind. The Society of Writers to the Signet is hardly an insignificant body. In Scotland, the right of legitim is an essential part of the legal basis of marriage. This Clause interferes with that and, to that extent, damages the institution of marriage.

    If it is not improper for a mere English Member to intervene in the hon. Gentleman's speech—[Interruption.] yes, he is an English Member, too, but he is speaking on Scottish law—it might be appropriate to remind him, and hon. Gentlemen who are interested in this debate, that if one took, for example, the historic example of King Robert II of Scotland, who had numerous bastard children, whose descendants are now occupying some of the most lucrative estates in Scotland, it would run contrary to some of the arguments which he has put forward.

    If I may go further than that, I would remind the hon. Member that King William the Conqueror was himself a bastard. I do not think that that carries the argument very far. I am saying that, if one introduces legislation which impinges on the legal basis of marriage, one is doing an injury which, in the long term, will be very great indeed.

    I do not want to argue this purely on the broad legal principle. There will be serious and immediate practical difficulties following this legislation. In most cases the rights of legitim are simply not in force. That is what I am told. Families agree among themselves not to enforce those rights strictly, but to deal with the property left by one or the other of their parents in the most convenient way.

    Most modest estates do not consist of a convenient little bundle of Stock Exchange securities, or gold hidden under the bed. The ordinary individual who dies leaving some sort of estate leaves a business, something like a shop. I do not mean the building of a shop, I mean a shop business, very often with a rented shop. That kind of property simply cannot be cut off.

    When a man leaves a small shop business and a widow and one married child, there will almost invariably be some arrangement made between the parties that one will run the business and make some provision for the other, depending on the age of the parties and considerations of that kind. But the claim of a capital sum—and legitim is the payment of a capital sum—by an illegitimate person who is not a member of his family will absolutely prevent the possibility of any such arrangement being made.

    This sum is not insignificant in the case of a single illegitimate child, but a person may have two or three illegitimate children, and they will come in, and between them they can take up to one-third of the estate. The result will necessarily be an immediate need to realise the property such as it is, in the case of a business as a going concern almost invariably with very heavy loss, and this will do grave damage.

    It must be remembered that in very many cases the illegitimate child will be the offspring of a mother who is extremely hostile to the widow—this is a matter which I do not think I need argue—and who will be very strongly disposed, when the child is an infant, to take the utmost steps to enforce the right and proceed even to damage the interest of the rival family. This would be a very unfortunate result.

    Secondly, there is a very powerful reason for ensuring that a wife should be entitled to rely on her own legal rights and on the rights of any children she may bear to her husband. Every hon. Member would agree that that is a proper basis on which the House should legislate. But the result of Clause 2 will be that a wife who marries a man who bears him a child and then finds that the husband is enticed away will have her own and her children's rights very seriously reduced by the rights of legitim which will go to the illegitimate children. That is entirely wrong.

    Have the Government considered the effect of adoption in connection with this Clause? As I understand, certainly in England, an adopted child loses all right to legitim. There will be a very strong temptation in the case of a fairly well-to-do father of an illegitimate child to make an approach to that child's mother with an offer of money to get the child adopted. Under the Clause, the mother will get nothing, and therefore if she is a relatively poor woman, as may often be the case, an offer of hundreds of pounds or perhaps £1,000 will be extremely tempting to her. She would get something whereas she would have got nothing before. She will sell the child's birthrights under this Clause because the child will be only a year or two years old and will not be able to argue for himself.

    It is wholly improper to put this sort of temptation before a man and woman. I do not think that it is right that women should be tempted to have their children adopted, or that men should be prompted to put this sort of temptation in the way of those by whom they have had illegitimate children.

    It seems to me that the whole effect of the Clause is wrong and contrary to public policy and that it will lead to harm in the short run and do grave harm in the long run. I hope that the Government will accept these arguments and agree that the Clause should be taken out of the Bill.

    . This is positively the last appearance of the Bill in this Chamber. I start by congratulating the Government on acting on the Russell Committee's recommendations. It is extremely pleasant to find that we are well ahead of our English colleagues in this respect at least.

    As the House will have gathered from the well-argued, serious speeches of the last few minutes, a considerable matter of principle is at stake in the Amendment, which, in effect, strikes out Clause 2. Not only is there a sharp difference on technical matters, but there is displayed a broad split in social attitude between the two sides of the House.

    I may say, in passing, that I particularly regret that the hon. Lady the Member for Hamilton (Mrs. Ewing) is not here tonight. I say that only because she made it known publicly that she was extremely annoyed at not being selected to serve on the Committee on the Bill. We were led to understand that it was a matter in which the hon. Lady had a deep interest and on which she was well qualified to speak. Indeed, some sympathetic members attempted to challenge the Committee of Selection with points of order on the matter.

    I understand that the hon. Lady has chosen tonight to go to a boxing match. All I can say is that I sincerely hope that we will not in future be able to look back and draw general lessons as to her priorities from this.

    The hon. Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) very fairly said that the principle running through the Bill, and which has been struck out by the Amendment, is that the Government are trying to put the legitimate and the illegitimate on the same basis. The hon. Member fairly and frankly said that he could not accept that aim. It was not a matter of ways to achieve it. He disagreed drastically and basically with what we are about. This has been clear throughout the discussions on this point both in the House, in Committee and in another place.

    The Government have been saying that the illegitimate child has been unfortunate. Everyone is agreed upon that. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Pentlands (Mr. Wylie) made the point eloquently a number of times. The child often had been cast out from the family circle. It had not been part of the family group, and in that way had been victimised by circumstance.

    Where we disagree, and where the split comes, is that the Government go on to say, "Very well, we shall try at least, in, perhaps, a narrow, material sense, but, we think, an important sense, to minimise this misfortune by giving illegitimate children full financial rights in the estate of the parents." The Opposition go on to argue, however, that those children have been victimised in the past and because to correct the wrong would cause distress for other parties, they are prepared to victimise them further and push them even further into the wilderness.

    It is worth remarking, in passing, that there are illegitimate children who have lived in the family circle and have been accepted into the home. If we strike out Clause 2, we will leave them at the mercy of the parent who is drawing up a will.

    It may be that a child can live for many years in the family, in the home, and yet, at the end of the day, the parent, for reasons best known to him or her, perhaps due to a temporary quarrel, may decide to cut the child out of the will. The natural child is protected fully by legitim, but the illegitimate child in those circumstances would be the loser in every respect. The point is not quite as simple as is sometimes made out.

    I accept—I would be insensitive if I did not—that the presence of an unexpected or unknown illegitimate child after the death of the father can cause dis- tress to the natural children and to the widow. It is, however, a matter of balance. We all accept and have stressed that the illegitimate child is the innocent victim of the social stigma which has attached itself to him. I do not think that, on balance, it is right that such children should be asked to suffer further.

    It may be that as a result of the Bill as the Government would like to see it there will be a tendency to put the matter to the test by raising actions to establish paternity during the course of the parents' lifetime. However, I do not think this will be very common. Certainly, if the child, or the person claiming to be the child, has no prima facie case I can hardly imagine he would find it very easy to proceed in the courts to any great effect.

    8.45 p.m.

    There has been a deal of controversy and talk about morality. I do not wish to proceed too wide on this matter. All I would say is that I do not see how providing legitim for illegitimate children can be said to be striking at the very essence of marriage. I would have thought, if we are talking about morality, that there would be a very strong case for saying that the law ought to lay down the responsibilities we should attach to parenthood.

    To push the case to an extreme, it might be argued that, as the Lords would leave the Bill, it is encouraging a man who has an illegitimate child to turn round and say it does not matter because there is compulsory provision for the natural child only. I do not see why that responsibility should be so written off if the child is illegitimate, but there should attach responsibility in the fullest sense of the word, the same responsibility which the father would have had to face if the child had been born within wedlock.

    The most common argument, which I confess I cannot fathom, is that in some way it is wrong to write in legitim because legitim is a matter of right and excludes the wishes of the testator or the potential testator, and that it does not matter whether a man makes a will, he cannot defeat legitim, and that this in some way is an infringement of his personal rights as an individual. If one accepts that point of view one should abolish legal rights altogether. The whole case for legitim is that it is something which cannot be eliminated, something which cannot be avoided, it is something which the child can absolutely count on, whatever his relations may be with his parent. I do accept the argument that the illegitimate child is particularly at risk, and likely to be forgotten or swept aside. He doubly needs the protection I should have thought of legitim in a situation like this.

    I accept that there may be technical difficulties about proof undoubtedly in a small minority of cases or a long period of time elapsing before a child turns up claiming to be the illegitimate child of a deceased person, but the onus of proof will always be on the claimant. In the insurance world there are a number of devices such of caution which ensures executors against events much less obscure and covers the possibility of unexpected demands after a long lapse of time.

    I do not see the point made by the hon. Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth)—I certainly do not see it as a sizeable point—of small family business and the sudden unexpected appearance of the illegitimate child claiming legitim and so completely upsetting the cosy, private family arrangement. After all, as the hon. Member knows—and he probably knows more about this than most of us here in the Chamber—legitim only attaches to movable estate. If the business were so small or so shaky or in so unfortunate a financial position that money could not be raised to pay off a child claiming legitim, then it would seem to me that the amount involved would be very small indeed. It would only occur in the marginal cases and I do not think the argument is a major weight in the balance.

    I was not suggesting that he might want to appear suddenly, although it might happen if a father had gone off and had an illegitimate child. Secondly, taking the ordinary sort of small business we are talking about, the claim might be for just about one-quarter of the total capital invested in the business. One cannot, running a business of that kind, pay out anything like one-quarter of the capital.

    I do not see exactly how the hon. Member arrives at one-quarter of the capital unless he is envisaging a situation in which the wife claims, and there are no children, but in that case no legitim would be paid at all till the illegitimate child appeared and claimed, in which case it might amount to one-third at a maximum. It is only upon the movable estate, and it must occur only in rare circumstances. If the business is of substance I would have thought that arrangements could have been made.

    As the Amendment stands, I agree with the Minister that to exclude Clause 2 runs contrary to everything that the Government are trying to do. We are here giving the illegitimate child full rights, as far as possible, as a child of the parent concerned, and it would be extremely inconsistent and unfortunate if we were to strike out that Clause and leave in Clauses 1 and 4.

    Clause 4 deals with the abolition of the illegitimate child's right to aliment after the parent's death. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Pentlands (Mr. Wylie) said, in effect, that this was part of a package deal—a quid pro quo. He explained in Committee that it was true that the illegitimate child was losing an important right, but, on the other hand, he was getting a great deal under Clauses 1 and 2. To lose Clause 2 would be to upset the whole balance and destroy the pattern of what the Government are trying to do. This would be an unfortunate and retrograde step.

    The hon. and learned Member made it clear that he was in an unfortunate situation, because he did not want to argue the case in the extreme terms which the House of Lords had forced upon him. He agreed that there was an argument for saying that if Clause 1 existed Clause 2 was a logical progression from it. He has not explained to my satisfaction why he has now departed from that stand. Let me remind him that in Committee on 2nd April, 1968, he said:
    "If the basic proposition in Clause 1 is correct, it is logical and proper that the provision of Clause 2 should follow, because this Bill seeks to put the illegitimate child in exactly the position of a legitimate child regardless of all other considerations, and this would not be done if the right to legitim were precluded, because that is the right of the child of the marriage."
    I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not think that the solution suggested is the best one, but the only message that we can take from what he said in Committee is that to start altering the balance and cut out one of the Clauses in an arbitrary way will not result in an orderly position. What he said in Committee set out the matter with great clarity and brevity, and I can only recommend to its author and to his hon. Friends the logic of what was then said.

    Would it not be proper for the hon. Member to read the next sentence, which goes on to explain why there was a distinction between Clauses 1 and 2? I said:

    "A right of this nature is, in effect, more significant than the rights under intestacy, for two reasons. One is that the Succession Act, 1964, built in very substantial safeguards and interests to the surviving spouse, and the right of legitim, jus relictae, only comes along after the prior claim has been satisfied."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Scottish Grand Committee, 2nd April, 1968, c. 40.]
    That is why Clause 2 is more offensive than Clause 1.

    I agree that the hon. and learned Gentleman has more reservations about Clause 2 than about Clause 1, but he stressed that if Clause 1 stands Clause 2 is a logical progression. He had the courage of his convictions then because he will remember that he did not move to delete Clause 2 in committee; he merely tried to amend it in certain ways.

    I want to add one or two points to what has been said already in this very interesting debate, and I start by saying that this is an immensely difficult problem. I do not think that anyone on either side of the House should be happy about either of the two solutions, because there are disadvantages in both.

    We shall not affect all illegitimate children or anything like all of them by this change of the law. We are not talking about the happiness or otherwise of the vast majority of illegitimate children, because most of them subsequently are legitimated by their parents marrying. Of the remainder, the vast majority become adopted. It is a growing custom to adopt illegitimate children. We shall not put right any hardship to any of these cases by this change in the law. We are dealing with only a very small proportion of those unfortunately illegitimate who are disowned by their parents.

    I accept at once that this change in the law can be of important benefit to some of that small number. What I argue is that the countervailing disadvantages in society as we know it are so powerful that we ought to be reluctant to make the change. Whatever may be the benefit to a small number of illegitimate children, it cannot put right the original wrong of bringing an illegitimate child into the world. That is undoubtedly a great disadvantage to that child and we are trying to remove it, but one cannot entirely eradicate the original wrong.

    What it comes to, therefore, is that the vast majority of illegitimate children are not affected by the change, and a small number of them may get some advantage, but the disadvantages are very much greater.

    Mention has been made of the distress caused to the members of a happy, united family who have lived together for many years by the appearance at a late stage in life of an illegitimate child whose existence was not known to them. That may seem unusual, but it can happen, and it is most undesirable from the point of view of the family, which is an important element in our society, that it should be allowed to happen.

    Then there is the more distressing though rather unlikely case of the appearance of a supposed illegitimate child after the death of the father—

    Does not the hon. Gentleman accept that there is the illegitimate child to be considered? I do not see why he should suffer in silence, nor do I see why the legitimate family should be kept in ignorance of the kind of man the husband or father is, merely in the interests of maintaining a respectable façade.

    The hon. Gentleman does me an injustice. I have attempted to make it clear that I start from the position of my sympathy being with the illegitimate child. If we can put matters right, we should try to do it. However, two wrongs do not make a right, and we must be careful to see that what we do is in the interests of the child.

    In some respects, this change in the law may be of disadvantage to the very person whom we are trying to protect. Adoption has been mentioned, and we have heard an outline of the situation which could arise when adoption is the solution chosen. Here is another case which should be considered. Once the change in the law takes place, if the illegitimate child is born to a woman and the father is reasonably well off, what will the family lawyer advise the mother of the child to do when the question of adoption comes to be considered? If he advises her to have the child adopted and she does so with the agreement of the father, in due course the child becomes the adopted child of its new pa rents and so loses any rights to benefit from its natural father.

    Supposing in later life, that child discovers who its real father is. I know that that is not supposed to happen, but it very often happens through the family lawyer. What will be the thoughts of that child when it realises that its adoptive parents, being poorly off, took him over and denied him the right possibly to a large sum of money from his natural father? This may be an unusual case—and I think that it is—but we are here to consider unusual cases before passing laws. We have to consider this matter carefully, because it can be against that child's interests to be cut out of what could be a consider able benefit in its natural father's estate.

    9.0 p.m.

    It might look even worse. We must remember that, when the act of adoption takes place, the natural parents have to consent and sign the adoption papers. If the child in later years finds that it has lost an expectation through this act, it will look like collusion between the adopting parents and the natural father to get this possible liability on the estate of the natural father out of the way. Many people will say that this is a very unusual case. So it is. But that is what we are here to consider.

    As I see it, the hon. Gentleman is saying that, if this law were passed, there would be the odd case where a person would not get legitim; therefore, no one should get legitim. Is that what the hon. Gentleman is arguing?

    That is putting the matter in an extreme way. I am trying to show where it can work in the opposite way to what everyone intends.

    What will happen when an illegitimate child is born and the mother marries someone, not the natural father, who is very well off? When the illegitimate child grows up, he will have a rich mother who might be living in the lap of luxury and a father who possibly has a wife and family in poor circumstances. Assume the natural father then dies. The illegitimate child will have a right of legitim to that poor father's estate to the detriment of his widow and children. Yet the illegitimate child, making this claim and possibly making a substantial difference to the happiness of the declining years of the widow, may be extremely well off owing to the good fortune of his real mother. Will that be equity or fairness? This cannot happen in the present situation when legitim is confined to the family of a father and mother who are married with their own children. These are cases where this extraordinary law will prove very difficult to administer. I hold very strongly that the disadvantages are unable to outweigh the undoubted advantages to a small number of illegitimate children.

    My natural inclination is to agree that anything we can do to help an illegitimate child to lead a normal life is a good thing. But we should not do this absolutely wantonly without considering the effects and the side effects of what this law will produce.

    Finally, I come to the family. It is not enough to say that, in the small number of cases, it is worth threatening the happiness and security of families as such to try to put right a wrong which took place possibly many years before. Let us not forget that the illegitimate child who has been completely abandoned and who is to get the benefit of this law has but the most negligible connection with the family of whose estate he will become a part. He has no personal connection of any kind in many cases, and it is not worth threatening the happiness of families in these cases for the sake of this benefit.

    I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman, but I see what he is driving at. Will he tell the House what his solution would be to the shocking case of a wife who has positively rejected her husband then coming along and claiming legal rights, to the dismay of the united, happy second family?

    That is a different situation, because we are dealing with a separated wife from a previous marriage. The second marriage is, and must be, entered into in the context of there having been a previous marriage. I do not see any terriffic, sudden, unheard of hardship in that. This is something with which everyone has to live.

    What we are concerned with is the bringing in of a cuckoo to the nest at a late stage in a marriage. This is a sad thing to consider, and something which we ought to regard seriously. Marriage is the basic element of our society. The family is the basic unit, and we should not do anything to weaken the ties of the family, or to threaten the unity of family life generally.

    Having started with a great desire to do the best we could for the illegitimate child, on balance, and with reluctance, I come down on the side of saying that this proposal goes too far. I should have preferred a compromise like that suggested earlier. I think that that would have been fair to all concerned.

    I think the House should be clear that we are not talking about a compromise. Indeed, if the proposition put forward by the Opposition were carried it would mean that there would be no reform, despite the fact that some hon. Gentlemen opposite have grave doubts about whether the Amendment should be made.

    The hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) started by saying that this was a distasteful business for both sides of the House. I think one can follow that by saying that if there was no illegitimacy we should not be discussing it, but we live in the world as it is, and therefore we, as legislators, have to face the facts.

    The hon. Gentleman quoted a lot of hypothetical cases which might arise if the Bill had been passed in the form in which it was before it went to the other place. As the House has to vote on this issue, I do not propose to quote hypothetical cases. I am not a lawyer, but, as a Member of this House, I think that I am entitled, in a debate such as this, to relate my experience of this matter. I referred to this in Committee, and I think that I have a responsibility to mention it again before we go into the Lobby to vote. I think that I have a responsibility to try to make clear what we are voting about.

    I agree with the sanctity of marriage, but I do not believe that people should be allowed to be absolved from their responsibilities. I do not think there is anything distasteful about illegitimate children as such. It is not their fault that they are illegitimate. Whether children are legitimate or illegitimate, I do not think their parents should be absolved from their responsibilities.

    The whole issue was brought forcefully to my notice when I was a newly elected Member. I held a surgery one night, and it was attended by a middle-aged lady of good bearing and appearance. She had a responsible job. She told me that she had a difficult case which she had discussed with lawyers, and had taken an opinion from a Queen's Counsel, but had been told that nothing could be done for her.

    Her case was, simply, that she was the illegitimate daughter of a wealthy spinster, and one day she had picked up the papers and read the news of her mother's death. She had not been given the opportunity to attend the funeral and when she made inquiries she found that her mother had left all her wealth to a far removed cousin. She went to lawyers in Edinburgh and inquired about her position. She found that she had no legal rights, and that she was not entitled to one penny of the estate.

    I do not want to stick out my chest, but I think I can say that whereas the lawyers failed, I, as a Member of this House, managed to get agreement over the issue. I think that it is wrong for a Member of this House to be called on to discharge this kind of responsibility.

    The way in which I handled the matter may or may not have been responsible for the lady getting a settlement. I should make it clear, perhaps, that I do not know the amount of the settlement she got. She told me that she was satisfied and that, because there was no legal right, she thought that we should not pursue the matter.

    I do not think that her mother should have been allowed to hide her past. I do not think that my constituent should have been forced to go round all the legal brains in Edinburgh to discover if she had a case and then go to her Member of Parliament and say, "I have lived in this area all my life. People do not know it, but I have to tell you that I am an illegitimate child. This is my problem".

    Instead of talking about hypothetical cases, I believe that we should talk about actual cases. I believe that cases such as that which I have described prompted the Government to bring forward this legislation. I agree that we may discover that errors have been committed. This happen.; with all legislation. We always improve on legislation. There is no perfect piece of legislation; there is no perfect set of words. I believe that tonight the House has the opportunity to make people face up to their responsibilities in relation to illegitimate children and that this legislation will enable illegitimate children to get what I think are their legitimate rights.

    I hope that the House will support the Government and disagree with the Lords Amendment.

    This is not the first time that I have had to participate in this debate. Twice before we have had this discussion and the same kind of argument has been deployed. I have never known an issue in which the basic principles and morality which divides one side from the other have been so clearly deployed. Under the banner of family relationships hon. Members have been discussing property relationships. They have advanced the sanctity of property, whereas we have been concerned with the sanctity of life. They have created a picture of the illegitimate child disrupting the home as if this was the only situation. One hon. Member even used the term "a cuckoo in the nest". The basis of hon. Members opposite is the Victorian basis of a middle-class family dependent upon property. The argument which has been advanced could almost have been culled from "The Forsyte Saga".

    On very few speeches have we come down to the real issue here, which is that of the illegitimate child. I prefer the Scottish nomenclature, rather than "bastard". We used to call such a child a "love-child". We might get better thinking and feeling on this issue if we thought about them in that way.

    I was shocked by the contortions of the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger). His was a most extraordinary speech in which, as he agreed when I interrupted him, he argued that, because in one strange and unusual case a child of a rich father who had discarded him could be aggrieved, we had to reject the rights of every illegitimate child. This was a most extraordinary proposition and after my interruption the hon. Gentleman agreed that this was the basis of the argument.

    Surely the Under-Secretary is not suggesting that there is anything wrong with looking at the effects of legislation before passing it. The hon. Gentleman is seeking to censure me for having mentioned this. This was a straightforward example which we should deal with. He and I both ought to deal with this in a sensible and adult way.

    I ask the hon. Gentleman to examine what is being proposed. I suggest that it would be quite improper to reject legislation which affects the vast mass of illegitimate children because of a hypothetical situation in which one child might feel aggrieved—not at being rejected, but from knowing that there was money to be got which he did not get. It again comes back to the property relationship. I plead with hon. Members opposite to get away from this devotion of mind and thought to property and to start thinking of human beings.

    9.15 p.m.

    We are told that we are not going to solve the problem and it is said that two wrongs do not make a right and we should not penalise a settled family, but we must consider this young "cuckoo", we must consider the effect on the child himself. If a wrong has been done we accept that it cannot be put right in this way, but additional suffering must not be put on the innocent sufferer because of the initial wrong. Hon. Members opposite are saying that the illegitimate child who is innocent must have the suffering put upon him rather than on the family. I know the difficulties of the family and I respect the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Dewar) who said that, however painful this must be, it is right that they should know the background of the situation and the nature of the father. I have always thought that truth is more valuable than covering up.

    This matter has been argued at great length. I especially respect the arguments put forward by the hon. Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) who has contributed a great deal to our thinking and to that of the Russell Committee. I exempt him from some of the strictures I have on hon. Members oppo-

    Division No. 311.]

    AYES

    [9.15 p.m.

    Abse, LeoFraser, John (Norwood)Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
    Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)Garrett, W. E.Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
    Alldritt, WalterGourlay, HarryNewens, Stan
    Allen, ScholefieldGray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)O'Malley, Brian
    Archer, PeterGreenwood, Rt. Hn. AnthonyOrbach, Maurice
    Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)Gregory, ArnoldOrme, Stanley
    Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)Oswald, Thomas
    Bagier, Gordon A, T.Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)Owen, Will (Morpeth)
    Barnett, JoelGriffiths, Will (Exchange)Page, Derek (King's Lynn)
    Beaney, AlanHamilton, James (Bothwell)Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)
    Bence, CyrilHarper, JosephPentland, Norman
    Blackburn, F.Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)
    Booth, AlbertHaseldine, NormanPerry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)
    Boyden, JamesHazell, BertPrice, Thomas (Westhoughton)
    Braddock, Mrs. E. M.Heffer, Eric S.Probert, Arthur
    Bradley, TomHerbison, Rt. Hn. MargaretRankin, John
    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.Horner, JohnRees, Merlyn
    Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)Reynolds, Rt. Hn. G. W.
    Brown,Bob(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,W.)Houghton, Rt. Hn. DouglasRhodes, Geoffrey
    Buchan, NormanHowarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
    Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)Ross, Rt. Hn. William
    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
    Chapman, DonaldHughes, Roy (Newport)Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
    Coe, DenisHunter, AdamSilkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
    Coleman, DonaldHynd, JohnSilkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)
    Concannon, J. D.Janner, Sir BarnettSilverman, Julius
    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)Skeffington, Arthur
    Crawshaw, RichardJones, Dan (Burnley)Slater, Joseph
    Cullen, Mrs. AliceKenyon, CliffordSmall William
    Dalyell, TamKerr, Russell (Feltham)Snow Julian
    Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)Lawson, GeorgeSpriggs, Leslie
    Davidson, James(Aberdeenshire,W.)Leadbitter, TedSteel, David (Roxburgh)
    Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)Lomas, KennethSteele Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)
    Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)Lubbock, EricTinn, James
    Davies, Harold (Leek)Lyon, Alexander W. (York)Urwin T. W.
    Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)Walden, Brian (All Saints)
    Delargy, HughMcBride, NeilWatkins, David (Consett)
    Dempsey, JamesMcCann, JohnWatkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)
    Dewar, DonaldMacColl, James
    Dickens, JamesMacdonald, A. H.Whitaker, Ben
    Dobson, RayMackenzie, Alasdair(Ross&Crom'ty)Wilkins, W. A.
    Doig, PeterMackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)
    Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)Maclennan, RobertWilliams, W. T. (Warrington)
    Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)
    Eadie, AlexMacPherson, MalcolmWinstanley, Dr. M. P.
    Edwards, William (Merioneth)Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.
    Ellis, JohnMallalieu,J.P.W.(Huddersfield,E.)Woof, Robert
    Ennals, DavidManuel, ArchieYates, Victor
    Ensor, DavidMapp, Charles
    Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)Marks, KennethTELLERS FOR THE AYES:
    Faulds, AndrewMason, Rt. Hn. RoyMr. Ioan L. Evans and
    Fernyhough, E.Miller, Dr. M. S.Mr. Charles Grey.
    Finch, HaroldMorgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

    NOES

    Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)Black, Sir CyrilCampbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)Brinton, Sir TattonCampbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)
    Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col.Sir WalterCarlisle, Mark
    Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)Bullus, Sir EricClegg, Walter

    site. I know how deeply he has been involved, but I ask him to consider this point. He rejected our views because he said we are not concerned with fairness. I cannot make a distinction between fairness and equality. Our attempt is to bring fairness and equality to the illegitimate child who is deprived of his proved rights and happiness. In both cases fairness and equality combine.

    Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—

    The House divided: Ayes 153, Noes 91.

    Costain, A. P.Kaberry, Sir DonaldRussell, Sir Ronald
    Currie, G. B. H.King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)Scott-Hopkins, James
    Dalkeith, Karl ofKirk, PeterSinclair, Sir George
    Dance, JamesLane, DavidSmith, John (London & W'minster)
    Digby, Simon WingfieldLegge-Bourke, Sir HarryStainton, Keith
    Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
    Elliott,R.W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)Longden, GilbertTapsell, Peter
    Errington, Sir EricMcAdden, Sir StephenTaylor,Edward M.(G'gow,Cathcart)
    Eyre, ReginaldMacArthur, IanTaylor, Frank (Moss Side)
    Fortescue, TimMaude, AngusTilney, John
    Foster, Sir JohnMawby, RayTurton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
    Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)Mills, Peter (Torrington)van Straubenzee, W. R.
    Glover, Sir DouglasMore, JasperWaddington, David
    Glyn, Sir RichardMorgan, Geraint (Denbigh)Walters, Dennis
    Goodhart, PhilipMunro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir HughWard, Dame Irene
    Gower, RaymondMurton, OscarWeatherill, Bernard
    Grant, AnthonyNabarro, Sir GeraldWhitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
    Grant-Ferris, R.Neave, AireyWilliams, Donald (Dudley)
    Grieve, PercyOsborn, John (Hallam)Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
    Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
    Gurden, HaroldPage, Graham (Crosby)Wright, Esmond
    Hall, John (Wycombe)Percival, IanWylie, N. R.
    Hall-Davis, A. G. F.Pink, R. Bonner
    Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)Pym, FrancisYounger, Hn. George
    Harrison, Brian (Maldon)Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James
    Holland, PhilipRees-Davies, W. R.TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
    Hornby, RichardRhys Williams, Sir BrandonMr. Timothy Kitson and
    Jopling, MichaelRossi, Hugh (Hornsey)Mr. Hector Monro.

    Clause 4

    Amendment Of Law With Respect To Right Of Illegitimate Child To Aliment After Parent's Death

    Lords Amendment No. 2: In page 3, line 7, at end insert:

    "to the extent that that person was enriched by receiving that property,".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 9

    Rule Requiring Corroboration Not To Apply In Certain Civil Proceedings

    Lords Amendment No. 4: In page 6, line 8, at beginning insert:

    "( ) This section applies to any action of damages where the damages claimed consist of, or include, damages or solatium in respect of personal injuries (including any disease, and any impairment of physical or mental condition) substained by the pursuer or any other person."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I propose that we take, at the same time, Lords Amendments Nos. 5 to 10.

    I had better briefly describe the purpose. Clause 9 deals with the general requirement of Scots law that the party on whom the onus of proof rests must produce corroborated evidence if he is to succeed. The Clause as it left this House abolished the requirement over a wide range of civil actions. These Amendments would limit the area of abolition at this stage to personal injuries actions until the Scottish Law Commission has completed its review of the law of evidence as a whole. The Report of the Commission and the Bill already reserve a group of civil actions, mainly consistorial proceedings, until that time.

    The Government remain of the opinion that it is wrong for corroboration to be a sine qua non in civil proceedings.

    This is not what we are discussing here since the Amendments accept the abolition of this requirement. All that is at issue here is how far at this stage the abolition should go. It has been accepted on all sides that if a civil action is covered by the original Clause it is only in the area of personal injuries actions that there is an urgent need for reform.

    There was discussion earlier as to the practicality of this. We have had further discussion with the Chairman of the Law Commission and others on this question. Bearing in mind that the main practical problem that was outlined at earlier stages is to be remedied and also the feeling of unease in certain sections of the Scottish legal profession on this, difficulties might arise if we abolished corroboration in the wider field in advance of the general review. I ask the House to agree to these Amendments.

    9.30 p.m.

    I welcome the Government's change of heart on this matter. All along we have opposed the wide terms of the original proposals, which made a radical change in the law of evidence in Scotland, far beyond the range in which the alleged need for a change was stated to arise. In some ways, this is a narrower Amendment than the one we tried to promote in Committee but it is desirable that the application of this proposed change should be limited to the area in which it is said to be really necessary.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Clause "A"

    Admissibility of statements produced by computers

    Lords Amendment No. 11: In page 10, line 15, after Clause 12 insert new Clause "A".

    "A.—(1) In any civil proceedings a statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall, subject to the provisions of section (Procedure) of this Act, be admissable as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence would be admissable, if it it is shown that the conditions mentioned in subsection 2 of this section are satisfied in relation to the statement and computer in question.
    (2) The said conditions are—
  • (a) that the document containing the statement was produced by the computer during a period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by any person;
  • (b) that over that period there was regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities information of the kind contained in the statement or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived;
  • (c) that throughout the material part of that period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, that any respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of that period was not such as to affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its contents; and
  • (d) that the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from in- formation supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities.
  • (3) Where over a period the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in subsection (2)(a) of this section was regularly performed by computers, whether—
  • (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
  • (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
  • (c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
  • (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers,
  • all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this Part of this Act as constituting a single computer; and references in this Part of this Act to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
    (4) In any civil proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say—
  • (a) identifying the document containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
  • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that document as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the document was produced by a computer;
  • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in subsection (2) of this section relate,
  • and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall, subject to the provisions of section (Procedure) of this Act, be sufficient evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and—
  • (i) for the purposes of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it;
  • (ii) any such certificate as aforesaid shall be lodged within such time as may be prescribed, not being later than the expiry of the time prescribed for the furnishing of information under section (Procedure) (3) of this Act;
  • (iii) any person lodging such a certificate as aforesaid shall, within the time prescribed under paragraph (ii) of this subsection, send a copy thereof to every other party to the proceedings.
  • (5) For the purposes of this Part of this Act—
  • (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
  • (b) where, in the course of any activities carried on by any person, information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
  • (c) a document shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
  • (6) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, in this Part of this Act "computer" means any device for storing and processing information, and any reference to information being derived from other information is a reference to is being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment, I suggest that we discuss Lords Amendment No. 12, in page 10, line 15, after the Amendment last inserted to insert new Clause "B"—Provisions supplementary to section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers).

    Amendment No. 13, new Clause "C"—Procedure—Amendment No. 14, new Clause "D"—Amendment of section 7 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1966—Amendment No. 15, Amendment No. 16, Amendment No. 18, Amendment No. 19, Amendment No. 20, and Amendment No. 21.

    I know that this is a very complicated-looking swatch of print, but the matter at issue is simple, although the content may be complex.

    Lords Amendments Nos. 11 to 14 introduce into the Bill four new Clauses dealing with the admissibility in civil cases of evidence in the form of documents produced by modern business methods. The other Amendments are consequential upon the new Clauses.

    They introduce in the law of Scotland provision for the use in evidence before the civil courts of information produced by methods now in widespread use in business and elsewhere, such as computers and microfilm devices. This is not the introduction of any new principle, since there are already provisions in Scots law faciliating the introduction of business records in evidence.

    These new Clauses should be regarded as an extension of the principle to cater for modern developments. Similar provisions are contained in the English Civil Evidence Act and were approved by the House earlier this year. I do not want to go into detail on the provisions but one of the important points at issue was that, after the Civil Evidence Act was passed, we received many approaches from the business world to the effect that businesses, especially large businesses operating throughout Great Britain, would not be able to take advantage of the provisions of that Act if they were in doubt about the position in Scotland.

    In the circumstances, the Government thought that, if it were done, it were better to do it quickly. We regard this provision as necessary since obviously we could not continue the process of record-keeping for businesses in England and Wales only, but must ensure that they are usable in civil proceedings in Scotland as well.

    These Amendments are clearly desirable. It would be totally unacceptable in commerce to have two different provisions of the law of evidence within the United Kingdom concerning the application of computers and other modern devices.

    But it seems incredible that something which, in principle, is so relatively simple should require such an enormous Amendment. I echo what was said in another place by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid. He commented:
    "There must surely be something wrong with our methods of drafting if it takes five pages of close print to introduce what is apparently a simple Amendment of this kind … it seems to me to add point to the growing demand that the traditional style of drafting ought to be radically altered."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 13th June, 1968; Vol. 293, c. 288.]
    I do not suppose that anyone here who has taken the trouble to read these Amendments could possibly disagree with that sentiment.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 13

    Interpretation Of Part Iii And Savings

    Lords Amendment No. 17: In page 10, line 27, at end insert:

    "(2C) The clerk of any court having custody of any document shall, on the application of any person who wishes to rely, by virtue of section 10(2), section 11(2) or section 12(2) of this Act or any corresponding provision for the time being in force in any part of the United Kingdom outside Scotland, on the contents of that document in proceedings which he proposes to raise, or which are pending, in any court in the United Kingdom, and on payment by that person of such fee as may be prescribed by act of adjournal or act of sedurunt, as the case may be, made with the approval of the Treasury, issue to that person a copy of that document, or of the material part thereof, certified or otherwise authenticated by or on behalf of the court."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Subsection (2)(c) which the Amendment proposes to introduce into Clause 13 is necessary to ensure that Clauses 10 to 12 in the original Bill work smoothly. Hon. Members will remember that these are the Clauses which allow the admissibility in future civil proceedings of the findings of the court in earlier criminal and other types of civil cases. The purpose of the new subsection is to enable litigants or prospective litigants to obtain copies of the relevant documents relating to an earlier case from the clerks of the courts who have custody of them. The Lord President of the Court of Session who has been consulted on this by the Lord Advocate is satisfied that this will meet the needs of the situation.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Remaining Lords Amendments agreed and disagreed to.

    Committee appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to certain of their Amendments to the Bill: Mr. Buchan, Mr. Oswald, Mr. Ross, Mr. Wylie and Mr. Younger; three to be the quorum.—[ Mr. Ross.]

    To withdraw immediately.

    Reasons for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments reported and agreed to; to be communicated to the Lords.

    Town And Country Planning Bill

    Lords Amendments considered.

    I have tried to convey to the Opposition my selection of Amendments. In case there is any doubt, may I run over them? I have selected the Opposition Amendment to Lords Amendment No. 25; that to Lords Amendment No. 29; that to No. 38; that to No. 39; that to No. 41; that to No. 46; those to No. 52 and to No. 55; that to No. 63; that to No. 78; that to No. 91; that to No. 122; that to No. 125; that to No. 128; those to No. 129; the second of the two to No. 132; those to No. 155; the second of the two to No. 161; the second to No. 168 and that to No. 173.

    Clause 2

    Preparation Of Structure Plans

    Lords Amendment No. 1 agreed to: In page 3, line 27, after second "the" insert "structure".

    Clause 3

    Publicity In Connection With Pre Paration Of Structure Plan

    Lords Amendment No. 2: In page 4, line 43, leave out from "the" to "he" in line 1 on page 5 and insert:

    "purposes of paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) above have been adequately achieved by the steps take by the authority in compliance with that subsection".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    It would be convenient if we also take Lords Amendments Nos. 3, 5 and 6.

    These Amendments relate to the Minister's powers at the preparatory stage in the making of structure and local plans. Similar obligations are placed upon the local planning authority with regard to both kinds of plan, and are contained in Clauses 3(1) and 7(1) respectively. These require the authority to take such steps as will, in its opinion, secure adequate publicity for the matters it proposes to include in its plans, and to give opportunity to make representations about them. The authority then has to consider any representations made.

    It was argued in another place that the power of the Minister to return a structure plan or to direct the authority not to proceed with the adoption of a local plan, if he is not satisfied that the authority:
    " … have adequately complied with subsection (1)".
    is non-effective. Amendments 2 and 5 meet this point. Their effect is to ensure that the Minister is able to control the process of approval or adoption of a plan where he is not satisfied that the local planning authority has taken adequate steps. The Minister's consideration will now be directed to the purposes set out in paragraphs (a) and (c) of the subsections. It is from his satisfaction or otherwise with the results of the steps taken, rather than from a consideration of the steps themselves, that his powers to require further action will flow. Amendments 3 and 6 are consequential upon Amendments 2 and 5.

    We are grateful for this Amendment. The intention of the machinery in Part I, as I understand it, is to ensure that there is public participation in this. It is right that the Minister should supervise this operation and the new machinery, just to see that it is serving its purpose. We join with the Government in welcoming this Amendment.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 5

    Alteration Of Structure Plans

    Lords Amendment No. 4: In page 6. line 20, leave out from first "and" to "4" and insert "sections 3 and".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The purpose of this Amendment is to secure that the same obligations with respect to publicity and public participation as applied to the original submission of a structure plan are made to apply also to proposals for alteration to that plan.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 9

    Adoption And Approval Of Local Plans

    Lords Amendment No. 7: In page 9, line 33, leave out "subsection (2)" and insert "subsections (2) and (3)".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The effect of this Amendment is to ensure that the local planning authority shall not adopt a local plan if the Minister has directed under subsection (3) that the plan shall not have effect unless approved by him. The condition which it is now sought to impose was included in the Bill as introduced, and the omission of the reference to the relevant subsection was inadvertent.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 8: In page 9, line 43, after "him" insert:

    "(4) Where the Minister gives a direction under subsection (3) above, the local planning authority shall submit the plan accordingly to him for his approval".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The purpose of this Amendment is to make explicit a procedural step which has so far only been implicit in the Bill. It relates to the Minister's power to "call in" a local plan so that, instead of its going forward for adoption in the standard fashion by the local planning authority, it would become subject to procedures leading to the Minister's approval.

    So far the Bill has merely said in Clause 9(3) that the Minister may direct that a plan shall not be effective unless approved by him. It has said nothing about an obligation thereby resting upon the local planning authority to submit the plan to him for approval, although Clause 7(2), by its wording, contemplates that this will be done. The Amendment states categorically that, as a consequence of the Minister's direction that a local plan is not to have effect unless approved by him, the authority must submit the plan to him for his approval. Amendment 10 is purely drafting.

    9.45 p.m.

    We had considerable discussion on this procedure earlier, and we endeavoured to point out that the procedure seemed to be defective in that the local authority could send a copy of the plan to the Minister and the very next day pass a resolution for adoption of it. Possibly this Amendment meets the case in that it obliges the local authority to obtain the Minister's approval and not to adopt before it does so. To that extent, although I recollect that it was either the Minister or the Parliamentary Secretary who did not seem to take in our point earlier, it seems to have been digested now and, if I read the Amendment correctly, the problem has been solved.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause 10

    Alteration To Local Plans

    Lords Amendment No. 9: In page 10, line 16, at end insert:

    "( ) Without prejudice to subsection (1) above, a local planning authority shall, if the Minister gives them a direction in that behalf with respect to a local plan adopted by them or approved by him, as soon as practicable prepare proposals of a kind specified in the direction, being proposals for the alteration, repeal or replacement of the plan".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The Bill confers no powers for the Minister to direct the local planning authority to prepare and submit proposals for the addition, repeal or replacement of a local plan, such as he has by virtue of Clause 5(1) in relation to a structure plan. The effect of this Amendment is to repair that omission and to provide that without prejudice to the local planning authority's power to prepare plans at its own discre- tion the Minister shall have a power, exercisable in relation to local plans, whether adopted by the authority or approved by the Minister, to direct the local planning authority to prepare as soon as practicable such proposals for the alteration, repeal or replacement of a local plan as may be specified in the direction.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 13

    Supplementary Provisions As To Structure And Local Plans

    Lords Amendment No. 12: In page 12, line 17, leave out from beginning to "have" in line 18 and insert:

    "(d) without prejudice to paragraph (b) above, provide for notice to be given to particular persons of the approval, adoption or alteration of any plan, if they"

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment is designed to eliminate a duplication between subsections (1)(b) and (1)(d) of Clause 13 and potential confusion as to the purposes of paragraphs (b) and (d) because they repeat, to some extent, the same provision, except that subparagraph (d) relates to the giving of notices to persons who have objected to the plan and notified the authority of their wish to receive notification of the approval, adoption or alteration of a plan.

    The effect of the Amendment is to sharpen the distinction between paragraphs (b) and (d).

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 13: In page 12, line 25, at end insert:

    "( ) require a local planning authority, in such cases as may be prescribed or in such particular cases as the Minister may direct, to provide persons making a request in that behalf with copies of any plan or document which has been made public for the purpose mentioned in section 3(1)(a) or 7(1)(a) of this Act or has been made available for inspection under section 3(2) or 7(2) of this Act, subject (if the regulations so provide) to the payment of a reasonable charge therefor."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment was moved by the Government in another place following pressure from the Opposition, who wanted a provision which would have required a local planning authority, in making available its structure plan for inspection as required by Clause 3(2), and local plans as required by Clause 7(2), also to make them available for purchase.

    The effect of the Amendment is to enable the Minister in his regulations to require a planning authority to sell on request copies of any plan or document which had been made public for the purpose of Clause 3(1)(a) or 7(1)(a) or which had been deposited for formal inspection under Clause 3(2) or Clause 7(2).

    I welcome the Amendment. It will be of tremendous assistance to planners, architects, surveyors and all those who have anything to do with planning. It is a great step forward and will enable them to work quickly and accurately.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 14: In page 12, line 27, leave out from beginning to first "or" in line 28 and insert:

    "structure plan or local plan which has been approved, adopted or made, or any document approved, adopted".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The purpose of the Amendment is to make clear that paragraph (f) of subsection (1) covers local plans as well as structure plans in all respects.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause 15

    New Provision As To Enforcement Notices

    Lords Amendment No. 15: In page 13 line 9, leave out "20th December" and insert "the end of".

    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government
    (Mr. James MacColl)

    I beg to move. That this House does agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is one of a series of Amendments which substitutes references to the beginning or the end of the year for a date in the middle of a month. Knowing the great capacity of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) for demagoguery, I hope that he will not start a campaign, "Give us back our eleven days", because the change will help the developer, who will have more time to prepare himself and adjust his affairs.

    I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will not start any such campaign. I welcome the Amendment very much. It is far more convenient in practice to have things of this sort starting at the end or beginning of a year than trying to remember a date such as, for example, 20th December. I hope that on a later Amendment the hon. Gentleman will accept a similar principle. I shall remind him of it.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 16: In page 13, line 39, leave out from beginning to "on".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The Amendments together deal with the service of enforcement notices under Clause 14. Their effect is to put upon the local authority the duty to consider whether other people who are not directly involved in the enforcement notice but who have a substantial interest should have notice of the orders.

    The Opposition have constantly pressed that there should be no danger that somebody who is affected by an enforcement notice should not hear about it. The wording is being distinctly improved in that it is now no longer at the option of the local planning authority to decide whether to serve a notice on a person who is materially affected.

    An effect of the two Amendments is that it is open to the local planning authority to have an opinion that a person is not affected and, therefore, fail to serve him with the notice. We are, however, grateful for this substantial improvement in the direction in which the Opposition have urged.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 18: In page 14, line 24, after "notice" insert:

    "(without prejudice to their power to serve another)".

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, at end add:

    'and to the Minister's power to make an order as to the payment of costs, incurred before the withdrawal, in preparation of or for an appeal to the Minister'.
    The object of this Amendment is to provide for the payment of costs after the withdrawal of an enforcement notice. The Clause gives the local authority power at any time to withdraw an enforcement notice. The Amendment seeks to enable the local authority to do that without prejudice to instituting another enforcement notice at a later stage.

    The situation will, however, undoubtedly arise where an enforcement order has been issued and a person on whom it has been served has incurred considerable costs in preparing, possibly, for an appeal and going into the background of the planning permission. This could mean the employment of solicitors and surveyors and considerable work.

    It may well be that the local authority, when it issued the enforcement notice, did so without thorough investigation. We on this side think that if that is the case, the Minister should have power to award costs when an enforcement notice is withdrawn.

    I cannot recommend the House to accept this Amendment to the Lords Amendment. It is, I think, clear that under Section 64(1) of the principal Act the Minister has power to award costs in relation to any proceedings before him on an appeal. That would apply to an appeal against an enforcement notice as much as to any other appeal. The effect of this Amendment to the Lords Amendment would be to give him power to intervene by awarding costs in something which never reaches him at all, because this would be something going on between the developer and the local authority and it would be very difficult for the Minister to be called upon to interfere in a matter of that sort. There are so many things which can go wrong leading to the withdrawal of a notice and, possibly, the substitution of another. Knowledge of the facts may have been mistaken, something may have misled the authority as to what the position is, and it is not fair to the authority to think it is a matter in which it must necessarily be to blame. The whole business of trying to enforce planning decisions is bad enough without putting this extra burden of costs on the local authority, and I could not advise the House to do it.

    That is a most disappointing answer. Surely the Minister is aware that the local authority has served an enforcement notice, and the person on whom it is served makes his preparations for defending himself against that notice and appealing, and the local authority withdraws the notice and serves another, so that there is a continuous application, as it were, by the local authority against the owner or developer. Surely, where the local authority is correcting its own enforcement notice by withdrawing one and issuing another, one should look upon the case as a continuous proceeding, and there should be a right to the person who is served with the notice to recover costs he has incurred.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 16

    Appeal Against Enforcement Notice

    Lords Amendment No. 22: in page 15. line 29, leave out from "if" to "been" in line 30 and insert "neither the appellant nor that person has"

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is really a drafting Amendment to improve an Amendment which was made to the Bill on the suggestion of hon. Members opposite on Report here. At present the Minister is empowered to disregard the failure to serve notice if either
    "the appellant or the person has not been substantially prejudiced."
    It is better to have it that neither has been, to make quite certain that no one was prejudiced. To this, the Lords Amendment helps.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 23: In page 16, leave out lines 16 to 22 and insert:

    "(7) Where an appeal against an enforcement notice is brought under this section, the appellant shall be deemed to have made an application for planning permission for the development to which the notice relates and, in relation to any exercise by the Minister of his powers under subsection (5) above, the following provisions shall have effect:—
  • (a) any planning permission granted there-under shall he treated as granted on the said application;".
  • I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said. Amendment.

    With this Lords Amendment I suggest we also take Lords Amendments Nos. 203, 230, 231, 249 and 250.

    At one stage in the progress of the Bill it was hoped to get rid of a deemed application—

    It being Ten o'clock, the House stood adjourned.

    Business Of The House

    Ordered,

    That the Proceedings on Consideration of the Lords Amendments to the Town and Country Planning Bill, and on the Motion relating to Detention Centres may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. McBride.]

    Town And Country Planning Bill

    Lords Amendments further considered.

    It was hoped that it would be possible to get rid of a deemed planning permission when an enforcement notice goes to appeal. The Minister has powers to deal with a planning decision as well as an enforcement notice. It has been found that it was not possible, in particular, where there is an industrial development certificate or office development permission, or, in the case of a statutory undertaker, where two Ministers are responsible for dealing with the planning applications, and for those reasons it has been necessary to bring back into the Bill the concept of the deemed planning permission.

    I am puzzled to discover how the hon. Member has read into the Amendment something to do with I.D.C.s and O.D.P.s. I have been puzzled by the wording of the Amendment. The Amendment deals with an application by an appellant that he has been right all along. The applicant is claiming that he had planning permission to start with—before the enforcement notice was served on him—and that he had done all he should have done before he carried out any development. If the Minister allows the appeal the permission should date back for the full period. Does the Clause mean that when the Minister allows an appeal the permission dates only from the Minister's decision? I am not sure what the effect is. That is what is said in the new subsection that we are now asked to approve.

    I hope that the wording is clear to some people, but the Parliamentary Secretary confuses me even more by introducing other things which are not mentioned in the subsection. The subsection says that when there is an appeal against an enforcement notice and the Minister allows that appeal he may treat his decision as being made with a planning permission dated when the application was made. It is all very confusing, and if the Parliamentary Secretary, with the leave of the House, can explain it a little further, we shall be grateful.

    I am sorry, Mr. Speaker. If I have the leave of the House I should like to explain a little further. I.D.C.s come in respect of the Amendments to the Schedules, especially Schedule 6, and the O.D.P.s also come in under that Schedule.

    On the other point, he and I are at cross-purposes. I was dealing with a case where an enforcement notice has been upheld and it is not correct to say that planning approval is resurrected, because the enforcement notice has been wrongly served. There are cases where the enforcement notice is upheld. The Minister then goes on to look at the planning merits as such and decides that, on those merits, planning permission should be

    A.—(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, a use of land is established if—
    5(a) it was begun before the beginning of 1964 without planning permission in that behalf and has continued since the end of 1963; or
    10(b) it was begun before the beginning of 1964 under a planning permission in that behalf granted subject to conditions or limitations, which either have never been complied with or have not been complied with since the end of 1963; or
    (c) it was begun after the end of 1963 as the result of a change of use not requiring planning permission and there has been since the end of 1963 no change of use requiring planning permission.
    15(2) Where a person having an interest in land claims that a particular use of it has become established, he may apply to the local planning authority for a certificate (in this Act referred to as an ' established use certificate ') to that effect;
    20Provided that no such application may be made in respect of the use of land as a single dwelling-house, or of any use not subsisting at the time of the application.
    25(3) An established use certificate may be granted (either by the local planning authority, or under section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) below, by the Minister)—
    (a) either for the whole of the land specified in the application, or for a part of it; or
    (b) in the case of an application specifying two or more uses, either for all those uses or for some one or more of them.
    30(4) On an application to them under this section, the local planning authority shall, if and so far as they are satisfied that the applicant's claim is made out, grant to him an established use certificate accordingly; and if and so far as they are not so satisfied, they shall refuse the application.
    35(5) Where an application is made to a local planning authority for an established use certificate, then unless within such period as may be prescribed by a development order or within such extended period as may at any time be agreed upon in writing between the applicant and the local planning authority, the authority give notice to the applicant of their decision on the application, then, for the purposes of section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal)(2) below, the application shall be deemed to be refused.
    40
    45(6) Schedule (Provisions as to established use certificates) to this Act shall have effect with respect to established use certificates and applications therefor and to appeals under section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) below.
    50(7) An established use certificate shall, as respects any matters stated therein, be conclusive for the purposes of an appeal to the Minister against an enforcement notice served in respect of any land to which the certificate relates, but only where the notice is served after the date of the application on which the certificate was granted.

    given. That is why one needs deemed planning permission in these cases, where other operations have to take place before final approval is given.

    Question put and agreed to.

    New Clause "A"

    Certification Of Established Use

    Lords Amendment No. 24: In page 16, line 31, at end insert new Clause A:

    55(8) If any person, for the purpose of procuring a particular decision on an application (whether by himself or another) for an established use certificate or on an appeal arising out of such an application—
    60(a) knowingly or recklessly makes a statement which is false in a material particular; or
    (b) with intent to deceive, produces, furnishes, sends or otherwise makes use of any document which is false in a material particular; or
    65(c) with intent to deceive, withholds any material information, he shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £400 or, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both."

    Read a Second time.

    If it is not too complicated, I suggest that we take with this the Amendment to Lords Amendment No. 25, the three Amendments to Lords Amendment No. 24, and Lords Amendment No. 168.

    I do not think that it would be convenient to take the Amendment to Lords Amendment No. 25 with the Amendments to Lords Amendment No. 24. It does not really follow.

    That is why I suggested it very tentatively. Then we had better group together the three Amendments to Lords Amendment No. 24 and discuss those, because they attempt to change the Clause.

    We are now discussing Lords Amendment No. 24. I call on an hon. Member to move the first of the three Amendments to it, and we will discuss with that the other two Amendments.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 14, at end insert:

    (d) it was begun on a date four years or more before the date on which the application for a certificate under this section is made and it has continued for that period of four years and it is a use which would be a breach of planning control such as is described in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of section 15(3) of this Act had the date of the breach been within that period of four years.
    The new Clause which is represented by Lords Amendment No. 24 is very welcome. At earlier stages of the Bill, we discussed how to get over the difficulty, now that the four-year rule is abolished in many cases, of knowing whether a use had been established in the past when, in the future, one would have to go back so many years.

    The new Clause provides the solution by requiring application for a certificate that established use has been acquired.

    The new Clause seems to have defects in at least three places. May I refer first to Clause 15(3), which makes certain development unassailable after four years? If the development is building, engineering, mining or other operations, an enforcement notice cannot be served after a period of four years, and the same applies to a change to a single dwelling house. If that occurred more than four years previously, an enforcement notice cannot be served.

    It would be very convenient if those facts could be the subject of an established use certificate; of one obtained a certificate to say that the building was erected more than four years ago or the change to a single private dwelling house occurred more than four years ago. It is intended by the first Amendment that it should be possible to obtain an established use certificate relating to the uses mentioned in Clause 15(3) and which becomes unassailable after a period of four years.

    I pass to the second Amendment, in line 20, to leave out from the beginning to 'any'. It relates to the proviso to subsection (2) of the new Clause. The proviso reads:
    "Provided that no such application may be made"—
    that is, an application for an established use certificate—
    "in respect of the use of land as a single dwelling house, or of any use not subsisting at the time of the application."
    I can see the reason for the last few words of that proviso, that one should not apply for an established use certificate for any use which is not subsisting at the time the application is made. But why should a man be precluded from obtaining an established use certificate for a dwelling house? Suppose that I built two dwelling houses on one plot. It might be necessary, when disposing of one of those dwelling houses, to satisfy the purchaser that there has been an established use if a planning permission cannot be produced. This may frequently occur with a house built many years ago in the garden of a large house, no planning permission can be produced, and the purchaser wishes to know that the use has been established. If we are setting up machinery for obtaining certificates of established use, let us apply it to the most ordinary case so that it may be really useful to those in practice in the sale and purchase of houses.

    The Amendment to line 50 seeks to amend subsection (7) of the new Clause, which says that an established use certificate shall be conclusive when someone is appealing against an enforcement notice. I foresee that there may be an application for an established use certificate relating to a plot of land with two houses on it—the example that I gave just now—and under subsection (3) the local planning authority refuses the established use certificate for one house. That is, it gives a certificate relating to the whole plot, but says that the certificate only gives permission for one house to be built on the plot. Is the applicant to be bound by that as conclusive, if he is then served with an enforcement notice, to pull the other house down?

    Another example could arise from subsection (3). There might be an application for an established use certificate relating to a petrol filling station which is also a secondhand car mart. The local planning authority could give the established use certificate for perhaps the petrol filling station and immediately serve an enforcement notice relating to the other use. If subsection (7) remains as it is the unfortunate applicant is bound by the terms of the certificate issued by the local planning authority and cannot argue against it when he comes to deal with the enforcement notice. Therefore, the proposed Amendment to line 50 seeks to make the established use certificate conclusive evidence against the applicant if it grants him everything for which he asks; but, if it grants him only part of his application, it should be binding against the authority and not against the applicant.

    I have dealt with the three Amendments. But, Mr. Speaker, it might be convenient to deal with another part of the Clause not directly dealt with in the Amendments.

    I am obliged.

    The other complaint which I have against the Clause is that it does not set out completely the machinery. I think, therefore, that it will be necessary for the Minister to make regulations concerning it. I do not see any power directly in the Clause itself for the making of regulations. It may be that regulations can be made under some other Clause, but I should have been happier if the Minister had reserved to himself the right to set out the machinery for applying and issuing the certificate of established use, and then it could be adjusted as one got used to the operation and saw how it was working.

    10.15 p.m.

    Perhaps I can deal, first, with the short practical point made by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) at the end of his speech. The machinery for the working of this is to be found in the proposed new Schedule A, that is Lords Amendment No. 168.

    I am glad that the hon. Gentleman expressed satisfaction with this rather complicated new Clause introducing the new idea of the certificate. As he said that, I shall not go into such detail and precise description of the Clause as I might otherwise have been tempted to do. I shall deal mainly with the Amendments the hon. Gentleman has proposed.

    The main point where the hon. Gentleman and I differ is in the appreciation of the point of having this procedure. The hon. Gentleman, quite rightly quoted Clause 15(3), and referred to cases where the four-year rule still applies. In this case the Bill does not interfere with the existing position. In other words the problem for the conveyancer is the same as it is in the 1962 Act, and there is no need to bring into this Clause any new procedure for dealing with those points.

    The purpose of the new Clause to deal with the problems which has been raised in criticism of the abolition of the four-year rule in the case of certain uses is to have some procedure whereby it will be possible for the conveyancer who wants to find out the position of the land to get the certificate and use it as the basis of his work. He will not need to do that in the other cases where the existing rule is kept.

    If I put it in this way, it might help the hon. Gentleman to understand the position. The established use certificate must state what use is established. It is not a negative thing which ranges over the whole field of alternatives and says which ones have not been established. The fact that it does not mention a particular use does not mean that it is not inclusive of that use.

    The hon. Gentleman asked what happened where there was a partial certificate not covering all the land. In so far as the certificate does not cover part of the house, the developer would be able to test the matter by waiting for an enforcement notice to be served on him. He would then have the right of appeal to the Minister against that notice. In that way he would be able to test whether the decision was right.

    I do not think that the Parliamentary Secretary has explained the proviso. My hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) went into detail on the question of the single dwellinghouse which is expressly excluded in line 20 of the Lords Amendment. This must be an important point in conveyancing. A summer house or a garage might have been converted into a dwellinghouse; there may never have been planning permission; the four years being up, it would not any longer be possible for the planning authority to serve an enforcement notice. If there is to be a sale the purchaser wants to know that this is a valid use. I understood the Parliamentary Secretary to say that, if it is impossible to issue a certificate of established used, a developer could wait for an enforcement notice to be served and then appeal to the Minister. This is not much use in the case of a sale. A developer could not go to the local authority and say, "Would you mind serving an enforcement notice so that I can appeal against it and this development can proceed"? Surely it is much better to use the concept of a certificate of existing use in the case of a single dwellinghouse.

    By leave of the House, Sir. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman has appreciated the point I made. There is no difference from the position as it has always been. That problem has always arisen if there has been use of a single dwellinghouse without planning permission. That has not caused any difficulty. The difficulty arises because in certain other cases the four-year rule is being abandoned. The practical reason is that, in the case of the single dwelling-house, it is comparatively easy to see what is going on. It will rarely be bad planning to turn, say, a large block of flats into family occupation. There is the case of a conversion of a garage into a house. That is not the sort of thing which it is necessary to deal with. That is why it has been excepted and left in as still subject to the old 1962 legal position.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Clause "B"

    Grant Of Certificate By Minister On Referred Application Or Appeal Against Refusal

    Lords Amendment No. 25: In page 16, line 31, after Amendment last inserted, insert new Clause B—

    "B.—(1) The Minister may give directions requiring applications for established use certificates to be referred to him instead of being dealt with by local planning authorities; and, on any such application being referred to him in accordance with such directions, section (Certification of established use) (4) above shall apply in relation to the Minister as it applies in relation to the local planning authority in the case of an application determined by them.
    (2) Where an application is made to a local planning authority for an established use certificate and is refused, or is refused in part, the applicant may by notice under this subsection appeal to the Minister; and on any such appeal the Minister shall—
  • (a) if and so far as he is satisfied that the authority's refusal is not well-founded, grant to the appellant an established use certificate accordingly or, as the case may be, modify the certificate granted by the authority on the application; and
  • (b) if and so far as he is satisfied that the authority's refusal is well-founded, dismiss the appeal.
  • (3) On an application referred to him under subsection (1) above or on an appeal to him under subsection (2) above, the Minister may, in respect of any use of land for which an established use certificate is not granted (either by him or by the local planning authority), grant planning permission for that use or, as the case may be, for the continuance of that use without complying with some condition subject to which a previous planning permission was granted.
    (4) Before determining an application or appeal under this section the Minister shall, if either the applicant or appellant (as the case may be) or the local planning authority so desire, afford to each of them an opportunity of appearing before, and being heard by, a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose.
    (5) The decision of the Minister on an application referred to him, or on an appeal, under this section shall be final.
    (6) In the case of any use of land for which the Minister has power to grant planning permission under this section, the applicant or appellant shall be determined to have made an application for such planning permission; and any planning permission so granted shall be treated as granted on the said application."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 1, leave out 'applications' and insert:

    'an application or applications in general or of a specified class'.
    This is in the nature of a probing Amendment. The Clause which the Lords Amendment brings in gives the Minister power to give directions requiring applications for an established use certificate to be referred to him.

    Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

    No indication is given as to just which applications the Minister will require to be sent to him. I looked at the debate in another place and obtained singularly little information from it. Lord Kennet said very little. I asked the Minister to say just what cases he had in mind.

    Is the hon. Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) begging that someone should intervene, or is he moving his Amendment? Is he inviting the Minister to intervene?

    All good Parliamentary Secretaries are trained to say as little as they possibly can. That helps to get through the business. That, I am sure, is how my noble Friend was assisting in another place.

    The hon. Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) said that his is a probing Amendment, so I shall explain the position. We do not think that it will be necessary to call in groups of cases. It will be only single applications which normally will be called in. Most of these cases will not be called in but there can be exceptional cases where there is a call in and it is important that in those cases it should be also possible to call in the established use certificate as well as the application ancillary to it. It is not, in our judgment, necessary to have this extra power.

    Surely the word "applications" in the Lords Amendment includes what my hon. Friend the Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) put in his Amendment. Although it may be the intention of the Minister to call in only single applications when they are important enough to receive his immediate consideration, the new Clause as worded would enable him to call in applications in general or a specified class. What the Parliamentary Secretary has put on the record will be rather confusing to those in practice to know whether there is a possibility of the Minister calling in from a district or numbers of a certain kind. 'The wording is not definite and it leaves one in some doubt.

    I hope that the rubric to the new Clause will be written a little more clearly. It does not refer to an established use certificate at all, but speaks of the "Grant of certificate". This is not part of the Bill, but it helps when the marginal note explains what is in the Clause.

    Question put and negatived.

    I beg to move the following consequential Amendment to the Bill, in page 19, line 27, leave out

    'section 16(2)' and insert 'sections 16(2) and (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (4)'.
    This Amendment deals with the transfer of appeals to inspectors. It is important also to bring the new Clause "B" in and that is the purpose of this Amendment.

    "( ) There a person (in this subsection called 'the contractor') is under contract to another person (in this subsection called 'the developer') to carry out any operations on land and—
    (a) a stop notice takes effect (whether in relation to the developer or the contractor, or both) prohibiting the carrying out or continuance of those operations; and
    (b) the operations are countermanded or discontinued by the contractor accordingly,
    10then, unless and in so far as the contract makes provision explicitly to the contrary of this subsection, the developer shall be under the same liability in contract as if the operations had been countermanded or discontinued on instructions given by him in breach of the contract.
    15This subsection applies only to contracts entered into on or before 1st November 1969, whether before or after the commencement of this section."

    Read a Second time.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment, as amended, agreed

    Clause 17

    Power To Stop Further Development Pending Proceedings On Enforce Ment Notice

    Lords Amendment No. 26: In page 16, line 41, at end insert:

    "The operatons which may be the subject of a stop notice shall include the deposit of refuse or waste materials on land where that is a breach of planning control alleged in the enforcement notice."

    10.30 p.m.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The Amendment proposes to add to the list of matters that can be halted by a stop notice the tipping of refuse or waste materials. There might be some argument as to whether the interpretation of the Clause as it stands would include something which is not specifically building, engineering or mining. Therefore, it is desirable to spell out that if somebody goes on tipping refuse it is quite likely that it would be possible for the planning authority to serve a stop notice.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 29: In page 17, line 29, at end insert:

    I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. On Amendment No. 29, at the foot of page 12315 of the Notice Paper, there is an Amendment which I have accepted—I mean selected.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 16, leave out '1st November' and insert 'the end of'.

    The Lords Amendment deals with the contractor's position when a stop notice is served and with his rights against the developer. It defines those rights by saying that the contractor shall be in the same position as if the developer had wrongly stopped the contract.

    If a stop notice is served on the developer, he will be forced to stop the work being done, and the contractor will then have the same rights against the developer as he would if the developer had had no cause to stop the contract work. But the Lords Amendment provides that the contractor and developer can contract out of that provision. After 1st November, 1969, they must deal with the subject in the contract.

    This is unsatisfactory. If it is right to make statutory provision now for contracts now in existence, why should not it be right to make it for contracts whenever they are entered into? No doubt the R.I.B.A. form, the civil engineering form, or that terrible Government form, the CCC/Works form, will all be amended. Little printed slips will be issued to stick on the printed forms.

    But not all building is carried out by such contracts. Indeed, a great amount is carried out by most informal contracts and sometimes no written contract exists at all. Therefore, I doubt the wisdom of putting in the last paragraph of the Lords Amendment:
    "This subsection applies only to contracts entered into on or before 1st November, 1969, whether before or after the commencement of this section"
    I doubt the wisdom of the whole provision but especially do I doubt the wisdom of fixing the date as 1st November, 1969.

    I remind the hon. Gentleman of the Amendment we passed only a few moments ago altering the date of 20th December to the end of the year because the latter date was far more convenient. My Amendment to the Lords Amendment would shift the date now proposed as 1st November, 1969, to the end of 1969, making it an easy and convenient date to remember, thereby making the Lords Amendment more practical and more useful to those who have to deal with these matters.

    The Lords Amendment would be better without that last paragraph altogether, but if we have to have it let us amend it to put it in a form more convenient to those who have to practise in this work.

    I am rather surprised that the hon. Gentleman should take this attitude about contracts, because it is surely better to let commercial gentlemen work out their own arrangements with the minimum of interference from the State. It is necessary to have a bridging operation because we are introducing legislation which could alter the contractual position while a contract is running, and it may also take time for people to prepare for the new position.

    In general, it seems best to accept that, when people get used to the problems arising out of the "stop" notice, it will be one of the things in the law which contracts will deal with and that they will make their own arrangements as regards compensation, etc. This is a sensible provision, keeping interference to a minimum but giving a reasonable breathing space for bridging operations.

    There are many impressive arguments which I could deploy against an alteration in the date proposed by the hon. Gentleman, but Mr. Speaker said he was thinking of accepting the Amendment to the Lords Amendment although per incuriam. I know a hint when I hear one I am happy to accept the hon. Gentleman's Amendment to the Lords Amendment.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 19

    Determination Of Planning And Simi Lar Appeals By Persons Appointed By The Minister

    Lords Amendment No. 32: In page 18, line 39, at end insert:

    "( ) appeals under section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (2) of this Act".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment we can discuss Lords Amendment No. 35.

    These Amendments put appeals against refusals to grant established use certificates into the list of kinds of appeals which may be transferred to inspectors for decision by means of regulations under Clause 19. At the moment, there is no intention of transferring them. We want to see how this will work and how the new techniques of established use certificates will operate before we ask the inspectors to take on the rather onerous responsibility of interpreting them. While it is desirable to have these powers, we do not intend immediately to use them.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 34: In page 19, line 8, leave out "section" and insert "Part of this Act".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I suggest that with this Amendment we take also Lords Amendments Nos. 37, 41, 42 and 43, with the Amendment thereto.

    These are substantially drafting Amendments. The revised form of wording more neatly covers both the Clauses which authorise the appointment of persons to determine appeals. It is no longer necessary to make a specific application of the provisions of subsections (5) to (8) of Clause 19. The other Amendments delete references.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 36: In page 19, leave out lines 22 to 25.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment I suggest we take Lords Amendments Nos. 38 and 118 and the Amendment to No. 38.

    The substantive Amendment is that to Clause 19, line 42. The others are paving, or consequential. The Amendment is partly concerned to achieve something similar to the present subsection (7), but paragraph (b) is new. The point is that if somebody wishes to challenge an inspector's jurisdiction by saying that the matter is not one with which he should have properly dealt, he must say so when the hearing is taking place. He should not have the opportunity of having his cake and eating it by chancing his luck to see what sort of decision he gets out of an inspector and then challenging him and saying it was a matter which should have gone to the Minister.

    It is desirable that the inspector's jurisdiction should be taken as serious and important. If somebody submits to his jurisdiction, he should not have second thoughts about it. But if he has reason to challenge at the time, he should say so and he will not then be caught by this provision.

    10.45 p.m.

    Paragraph (b) of Lords Amendment No. 38 precludes a person who has appealed to the Minister and whose appeal has been referred to a person appointed by the Minister, an inspector, as we call him, from taking action if he finds that the inspector did not have the necessary jurisdiction. He may have heard a type of appeal not included in that class of appeal which is to be delegated to a person so appointed. The whole basis of the appointment of an inspector to hear appeals in place of the Minister is the regulations in which will be set out what class of case the inspector is to hear. He is to hear only cases in those prescribed classes and if my Amendment were accepted and if he oversteps his jurisdiction, there would be a right to go to the High Court and challenge it.

    It should be remembered that in many of these appeals the parties will not always be represented by a solicitor or counsel. Many are dealt with by letter and a visit to the site in a very informal way. The parties may seek not to go to the cost of instructing solicitors and briefing counsel and engaging those who are knowledgeable in these matters. A party may carry it through on his own and then discover later that it is a type of case which ought not to be heard by an inspector.

    If the appeal is to the Minister, and the Minister hears it himself, his jurisdiction can be questioned at any time. Why should that not be so with an inspector? We seem to be depriving the so-called litigant of a right to challenge after a decision has been made by the inspector. It is not always possible to discover whether an inspector has the proper jurisdiction at the time he hears the appeal and it may be only later that facts come out to show that he did not have that jurisdiction. It is dangerous to deprive the appellant of his right to challenge later.

    I would not have intervened if I did not think that this was one of the matters which will affect many people in every constituency. What worries me about this problem is that as a result of this new procedure an enormous number of people may query the decisions of inspectors with their Members of Parliament. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) that in this sort of appeal many people will not engage solicitors, or brief counsel, but will deal with the matter themselves and, to be blunt, get into a mess doing so. Having got into a mess, they will come to their Members of Parliament and ask them to get them out.

    As I understand, the decisions made in the Bill will mean that the Member will not know how to set about that. This is not an unusual situation for Members of Parliament, but it is not one which we should encourage. The Clause, and the Bill as a whole, is not providing nearly sufficient safeguards, or appeals of last resort, without involving a great deal of expense, for the ordinary simple appeal, into which people enter, over very small building matters.

    They are already confused, and as I understand the argument, they will be even more confused as a result of this legislation. Yet the whole purpose of it is to make it easier for the individual to get justice in appeals of this kind. From what my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page), who is an expert in this matter, has said, it is quite obvious that it will be even more difficult for the individual litigant, on appeal, without counsel or other legal advice, to get a just decision. What is even more important, it will be more difficult for them to feel that they have got a just decision.

    With the leave of the House. I do not want to discuss the merit of this, because it would be out of order, but this does not take away any other right of access to the courts. If the inspector misbehaves, disregards the rules of natural justice, or in any other way exposes himself to an appeal to the High Court, that appeal will not be affected. A person will be in the same position then because the decision will be open to challenge.

    The whole point is the narrower one of jurisdiction—that it is not right that, if the appeal has been heard, it should then be open to a person, without having challenged the jurisdiction, to reopen the matter by going to the courts.

    This is serious. How is a non-legal litigant to know that? If I have a solicitor I will know it, but if I deal with this on my own and find that it is too complicated, who will tell me that I have the right to which the Minister refers?

    That difficulty arises in any sphere. We all want to help, in every way we can, people who are unrepresented. No one wants planning legislation to be regarded as a pitched battle between legal representatives. Nothing can make planning law easy, but we have a booklet explaining the system, and the rights of the appellant.

    One may have a case when the inspector will have been given power to deal with areas of land which are under two acres. It may happen that, after measuring an area of land, it is found to be slightly over that figure. It would be undesirable for the whole matter to be reopened later if no one takes any point about the marginal difference at the inquiry. I cannot advise the House that it would be wise—

    Would the Minister apply his mind to this? The inspector will be given his jurisdiction by a series of statutory instruments. As he says, it may apply to two acres, or something of that sort. It is possible he may be dealing with something hidden away in those instruments, about which the ordinary appellant would not know, and would not find out until he took legal advice after the decision.

    I do not want to go into the merits now. It is very late in the day for that. One of the arguments in favour of this system is that one should have a form of summary jurisdiction where the inspector, who is the person available, who is there and sees it, comes to a decision, so that matters do not have to be referred or reconsidered. Therefore, it would not be a good thing to complicate his jurisdiction. If these points are taken and the inspector then decides to go on with the inquiry, that is a very different matter.

    This is extremely important. We are dealing with many people who take their own planning appeals to the inspector without legal advice. I have never found any inspector who went into a great deal of detail with the ordinary "Joe Soap", the person who appeals and who has no knowledge of the law, to explain his rights in the appeal.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) has mentioned six points. Can the Minister assure the House that when cases of this sort come before an inspector, he will enunciate those six points and tell the non-legal applicant what his rights are and what sort of thing he has to justify before the case proceeds? If the hon. Gentleman can assure the House of this, he will remove a great deal of our unease.

    As I have said, we certainly intend to explain in booklet form, which will be available for study, in as simple a way as we can, what the new procedure is. We will be having inspectors who are carefully chosen for this work and are given special instruction about it. I am certain that among the things that will be mentioned, they will have their attention drawn to the important question of their jurisdiction and to the importance of people understanding it.

    In the nature of things, in the great number of these cases, the inspectors deal with them with great skill and competence. Few people are more acceptable for their fairness and competence. I am sure that they will want to make a great success of this work, bearing in mind these points, to which their attention will be drawn.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 20

    Determination Of Appeals By The Minister

    Lords Amendment No. 39: In page 20, line 15, leave out from "Minister" to "shall" in line 16 and insert:

    "whichever of the following provisions arc relevant, that is to say those of the principal Act;
    section 16 of this Act;
    section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (2) to (4) of this Act;
    Part I of Schedule 3 to this Act; and
    section 14 of the Civic Amenities Act 1967,"

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, leave out '(4)' and insert '(5)'.

    The purpose of the Amendment is to correct an error which crept in because the existing subsection (4) (b) was added at the same time as the original Amendment was passed. The consequential adjustments were not made as they should have been. Therefore, it is necessary, at this late hour, to make this change in it.

    This puts us on this side in grave difficulty. We have a Lords Amendment before us. We had, first, a list of corrections which corrected the Lords Amendments. We then had a revised list of corrections which corrected the corrections. We then had a Government Amendment to the Lords Amendment.

    It is all very confusing and difficult to follow when we have 252 Lords Amendments to deal with, of which 22 are new Clauses and three new Schedules. There are 17 corrections of Lords Amendments, a list of revised corrections, seven Amendments to Lords Amendments, and two consequential Amendments. It really is difficult to follow this sort of legislation.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 24

    Supplementary

    Lords Amendment No. 44: In page 22, line 29, leave out from "1967" to end of line 30 and insert:

    "(a) if he was appointed by the Minister of Housing and Local Government, as functions of that Ministry and
    (b) if he was appointed by the Secretary of State, as functions of the Welsh Office."

    11.0 p.m.

    I beg to move, That this House cloth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    10"C—(1) In paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Act of 1946 (which applies special parliamentary procedure in the case of compulsory purchase of land forming part of a common, open space, etc., and is applied by section 73 of the principal Act to appropriation of land by local authorities under that section), in sub-paragraph (l)(b) (exemption where land is required for widening of an existing highway and the Minister certifies that it is unnecessary to give land in exchange), for the words 'that the land is' there shall be substituted the words 'that the land does not exceed 250 square yards in extent or is'.
    (2) Nothing in this section applies to or affects an order made before the commencement of this section."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 10, to leave out 'or' and insert 'and'.

    This would appear to be comparatively simple, but this Clause refers to the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act, 1946. While Lord Kennet, in another place, was at pains to say that the Government are preserving land protection and amenity as the 1946 Act implies, we on this side of this House are not too certain that the Clause, which is designed to extend the area of operation open to the Minister without exchange of other land, is not open to abuse.

    It is strange indeed that the Government should decide to insert this Clause

    This is a substantial step forward in the fields of liberty. Under Clause 24(2), the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration is given jurisdiction over determinations by inspectors who are officers of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government or the Welsh Office, but it does not cover the case where an officer of our Ministry is appointed by the Secretary of State for Wales to deal with a Welsh appeal, or vice versa.

    This Lords Amendment makes quite certain that if there is any cross-fertilisation of that kind the Parliamentary Commissioner will not be shut out.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Clause "C"

    Compulsory Purchase Or Appropriation Of Open Spaces

    Lords Amendment No. 46: In page 24, line 30, at end insert new Clause "C":

    which has the effect on Schedule 1(1)( b) to the 1946 Act of extending that provision, which at present relates specifically to the widening of an existing highway. What we should like to know is, for what possible purpose is 250 square yards of common land to be put? The Clause would allow it to be put to some use. That is already possible if it is to be for some such matter as a pumping station or a layby. I think that the local authority may have designs for a much larger enterprise, possibly a car park, or one of the Royal forests, or a car park on open heath land or one of the National Parks.

    It is feasible, as we see it, that the need for Special Parliamentary Procedure built into the Bill could be circumvented by making a series of essays against an unsuspecting Minister designed to take a bite of 250 square yards on each successive occasion. I might suggest that this Clause could become known as the "nibbler's Clause", under which commoners' rights were first eroded without land being given in substitution and without Parliamentary sanction. It is a dangerous Clause as drafted and that is why we have put down this Amendment.

    The position here is that at present Orders have to go to Special Parliamentary Procedure unless either a Minister certifies that an exchange of land is practicable or, where the land is needed for road widening, that the Minister certifies that no alternative land is necessary.

    The local authority associations have been restless under this limit to their discretion and we are always being told to be careful of the rights of local authorities, but my right hon. Friend has not felt that he could go all the way that they would have liked him to go, and that provisions for amenity should be retained. So, what the new Clause does is to extend the categories where the Minister can give a certificate without the provision of exchange land to cases where the land does not exceed 250 square yards in extent. That might apply whether or not they were used for highway purposes, but where there is no alternative, or where they are small, they should not be subject to Special Parliamentary Procedure. That does not, of course, mean that the Minister rubber stamps the order. He has to satisfy himself about it and to make inquiries, if necessary holding a public inquiry to get the position clear.

    I did not have the privilege of serving on the Standing Committee when these points were discussed, but I looked at the reports of the proceedings and I noted that the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) said that something was to be said for not unnecessarily using the Special Parliamentary Procedure where it would simply clog the work and there was no point in using it. All we are trying to do is to make a workable limitation giving the Minister discretion to deal with these cases without going through the Special Parliamentary Procedure.

    It is true that in Committee, when this was suggested, I was prepared to some extent to go along with the Minister and study whether this was a way of cutting down the Special Parliamentary Procedure, but on consideration of it, and having considered the cases which have come before the Joint Committee of both Houses as a result of the Special Parliamentary Procedure, I have come to the conclusion that that is just the sort of case we are dealing with here and that it would be a serious matter to agree to this Amendment and leave a loophole for local authorities to nibble at open spaces.

    The position at the moment is that whenever a local authority decides to acquire an open space compulsorily, it is obliged to give some other open space within its area in exchange. The only exception is when the land is required for the widening of an existing highway—I stress that point; it is not for building a new road—and the Minister is satisfied that the giving of other land in exchange is unnecessary, whether in the interests of persons, if any, entitled to rights of common or other rights, or in the interests of the public. A heavy responsibility is placed on the Minister, which in my experience he does not lightly take, in saying that the giving of other land is unnecessary.

    Up to the present the practice of the Minister has been not to say that the giving of land was unnecessary but to oblige the local authority to proceed by way of Special Parliamentary Procedure. This means that almost certainly there will be a public inquiry. It means that a statutory instrument will come before the House, for it to consider whether it wishes to object—or, to put it another way, for the amenity societies to have the opportunity to lobby their Members of Parliament, or to bring to the notice of Members of Parliament the feelings of amenity societies about any piece of land.

    This has had the effect of one or two cases being fought before the Joint Committee when there has been an objection in the House and the Statutory Instrument has been referred to the Committee. The amenity societies who have objected have sometimes succeeded in persuading the Joint Committee that the order in question should not be made. The right should be retained for anyone to say that land should not be taken unless other open space is granted in its place.

    What would happen if the Amendment were accepted? The local authority could say, "This land is required for widening an existing highway. We are only going to take 250 square yards at this moment. Therefore, we do not need to go to the Minister and ask him to say that it is unnecessary to give any other open space in its place; we can go ahead without asking the Minister to use his discretion in that way". Surely it will be the duty of a local authority, if it is convinced that open space should be taken for road widening, to use the law which is given to it by the Amendment and to say, "We shall take only 250 square yards at a time". As my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Murton) has said, the new Clause may well be called a nibbling charter for local authorities.

    It is a very serious erosion into a matter of principle, and it is sacrificing too much to streamlining. Many of these orders go through the House unquestioned, but that is not the point, except that those which go through in that way do not take up any time, and there is no difficulty about procedure. The few which are questioned illustrate the fact that this procedure is a very useful one, and is the right and proper way for amenity societies in particular to bring before Parliament points that they wish to make. When they have done so they have sometimes succeeded in getting the House to reject the Statutory Instrument.

    I hope that the Government will abandon this proposition. When the question was discussed in Committee I was prepared to consider it. It has been considered both inside and outside the House. We on this side have had a great number of complaints from those who see being whittled away the power of the amenity societies to bring to Parliament's notice their objections to local authorities taking open spaces without providing other open space land in exchange.

    I hope that the Government will abandon this Amendment.

    11.15 p.m.

    I want to make only two short points. First, the hon. Gentleman gave the House the impression that the local authorities were able to avoid satisfying the interests of the public if they kept under 250 square yards. That is not the position. All that happens is that they have to get the Minister's certificate rather than Special Parliamentary procedure. But the Minister has the duty to hold an inquiry where it appears to him expedient to do so, so giving everyone interested an opportunity to make representations. It is not a question of either "ducking" an inquiry, or having to come to Parliament to get a public investigation. The Minister has the duty to hold an inquiry, if necessary, before issuing his certificate.

    The other point that I would make, in passing, is that I accept what the hon. Gentleman said about the importance of the amenity societies. But I seem to remember that recently we have had a great deal of difficulty in getting the right relationship between the amenity societies and Parliament in dealing with some of the Orders that have been before Parliament. Everyone has been worried about not having full freedom to deploy their views. In the case of a public inquiry, there would be no difficulty. Everyone would be able to attend it. I think that that is a reasonable way to treat the local authorities.

    It is no good hon. Gentlemen opposite scolding us for being indifferent to the rights of local authorities by ordering them about, not trusting them and not treating them as responsible people. When we have a simple procedure allowing them to exercise their discretion by applying to the Minister for small increases very carefully defined in the Clause, I think that that is reasonable.

    We may be at variance in interpreting the wording. With the word "or" in the Amendment to which we have objected in our Amendment to it, it appears that the local authority has only to show that it is not taking more than 250 square yards, in which event it does not have to obtain any assurance from the Minister that the giving in exchange of other land is unnecessary, because the substitution of the words in the Amendment for the words "that the land is" in the 1946 Act means that there are two conditions. The first is that the land is not more than 250 square yards. The alternative is that it is required for road widening and the Minister does not think that other land in exchange is necessary.

    There are alternatives. The first leg is that there is the right of exchange. That is common ground. The second point is that it is needed to widen an existing highway. The third is that it is a small amount, not necessarily for a highway, but defined by the area. In all cases, the local authority has to get the Minister's certificate. It does not avoid that requirement.

    I question the principle of widening this at all. In the 1946 Act the Section refers only to highways. I cannot understand why the 250 sq. yds. should come in. Why cannot the Special Parliamentary Procedure continue to obtain? Alternatively, some local authorities have Acts of Parliament which allow them to transfer turvery rights and other things.

    We cannot have a Committee debate. We are dealing with Lords Amendments.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 30

    New Description Of Land Qualifying For Protection As Being Affected By Planning Proposals

    Lords Amendment No. 47: In page 25, line 24, leave out from "land" to "as" in line 26 and insert:

    "indicated in a structure plan in force for the district in which it is situated either".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I think that it might be convenient to take with this Amendment Lords Amendments Nos. 48, 49 and 50.

    I think that they are a little more than drafting, particularly Lords Amendment No. 47. That is a very substantial amendment to the time when a property is legally blighted. We have throughout our discussions on these blight clauses asked the Government to put the date back to the real date on which a property is blighted; that is, when there is some publicity about the proposals of the authority to acquire the property compulsorily or to develop the land around it. This is when the property is blighted—as soon as anybody knows that there is some development which will affect it.

    The Amendment leaves the clause with a false date: that it becomes blighted when the structure plan gets to a very advanced stage. But, long before it gets to that stage, the property will have become unsaleable and great loss may be caused to the owner through being unable to sell the property and being unable to oblige the acquiring authority to acquire it there and then. The owner has to wait with a worthless property on his hands perhaps for years while the structure plan is known to everybody—estate agents and prospective purchasers—and his property is blighted, although not in law.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 51: In page 26, leave out lines 3 to 16.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This series of Amendments has a twofold purpose. They introduce the name "blight notice" into the vocabulary of planning so as to distinguish between those and other kinds of notices, such as purchase notices, and consolidate in a single schedule the verbal amendments necessitated to the blight provisions of the 1962 Act.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    New Clause "D"

    Power Of Mortgagee To Serve Blight Notice

    Lords Amendment No. 52: In page 26, line 16, at end insert new Clause "D"—

    "D.—(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect for enabling mortgagees to take advantage of the provisions of sections 138 to 151 of the principal Act (notice requiring purchase by local planning authority on grounds of planning blight).
    (2) Where the whole or part of a hereditament or agricultural unit is comprised in land of any of the descriptions contained in paragraphs (b) to (f) of section 138(1) of the principal Act or paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 30(1) of this Act and a person claims that—
    10(a) he is entitled as mortgagee (by virtue of a power which has become exercisable) to sell an interest in the hereditament or unit, giving immediate vacant possession of the land; and
    15(b) since the relevant date (within the meaning of section 139 of the principal Act or, as the case may be, section 30(3) of this Act) he has made reasonable endeavours to sell that interest; and
    20(c) he has been unable to sell it except at a price substantially lower than that for which it might reasonably have been expected to sell if no part of the hereditament or unit were comprised in land of any of the said descriptions,
    25then, subject to the provisions of this section, he may serve on the appropriate authority a notice in the prescribed form requiring that authority to purchase that interest to the extent specified in, and otherwise in accordance with, sections 138 to 151 of the principal Act.
    30(3) Subsection (2) above shall apply in relation to an interest in part of a hereditament or agricultural unit as it applies in relation to an interest in the entirety of a hereditament or agricultural unit.
    Provided that this subsection shall not enable a person—
    35(a) if his interest as mortgagee is in the entirety of a hereditament or agricultural unit, to make any claim or serve any notice under this section in respect of any interest in part of the hereditament or unit; or
    (b) if his interest as mortgagee is only in part of a hereditament or agricultural unit, to make or serve any such notice or claim in respect of any interest in less than the entirety of that part.
    40(4) Notice under this section shall not be served unless one or other of the following conditions is satisfied with regard to the interest which the mortgagee claims he has the power to sell:—
    45(a) the interest could be the subject of a notice under section 139 of the principal Act served by the person entitled thereto on the date of service of the notice under this section; or
    50(b) the interest could have been the subject of such a notice served by that person on a date not more than six months before the date of service of the notice under this section.
    55(5) If any question arises which authority are the appropriate authority for the purposes of subsection (2) above, subsection (4)(b) above shall then apply with the substitution for the period of six months of a reference to that period extended by so long as it takes to obtain a determination of the question.
    60(6) No notice under this section shall be served in respect of a hereditament or agricultural unit, or any part of a hereditament or agricultural unit, at a time when a notice already served under section 139 of the principal Act is outstanding with respect to the hereditament, unit or part; and no notice shall be so served under section 139 of that Act at a time when a notice already served under this section is so outstanding.
    65(7) For the purposes of subsection (6) above, a notice served under this section or section 139 of the principal Act shall be treated as outstanding with respect to a hereditament or agricultural unit, or to part of a hereditament or agricultural unit, until—
    (a) it is withdrawn in relation to the hereditament, unit or part; or

    70(b) an objection to the notice having been made by a counternotice under section 140 of the principal Act, either—
    (i) the period of two months specified in section 141(1) of the principal Act elapses without the claimant having required the objection to be referred to the Lands Tribunal under that section; or
    75(ii) the objection, having been so referred to the Lands Tribunal, is upheld by the Tribunal with respect to the hereditament, unit or part.
    80(8) The grounds on which objection may be made in a counter-notice under section 140 of the principal Act to a notice under this section are those specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (2) of that section and in a case to which section 31(1) below applies, the ground specified in that subsection and also the following grounds:—
    85(a) that, on the date of service of the notice under this section, the claimant had no interest as mortgagee in any part of the hereditament or agricultural unit to which the notice relates;
    90(b) that (for reasons specified in the counter-notice) the claimant had not on that date the power referred to in subsection (2)(a) above;
    (c) that the conditions specified in subsection (2)(b) and (c) above are not fulfilled;
    95(d) that (for reasons specified in the counter-notice) neither of the conditions specified in subsection (4) above was, on the date of service of the notice under this section, satisfied with regard to the interest referred to in that subsection."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 12, leave out from "unit" to "and" in line 13.

    I think that it would be convenient to the House if the other four Amendments standing in the name of the hon. Member and his right hon. and hon. Friends were considered together, together with Lords Amendment No. 52.

    The new Clause is very welcome. It applies the blight provisions to the mortgagee. I should perhaps declare my interest at once, because in discussing this Clause I should like to give some facts from my own experience. As a director of a building society, and having been on what we call the arrears committee of that society, I know something about the difficulties of dealing with a defaulting borrower. This Clause would put the mortgagee in the shoes of the mortgagor so that he might use the blight provisions, serve a purchase notice, and oblige the acquiring authority to acquire at that time without waiting until some later date.

    First, may I refer to subsections (6) and (7), and say that there is going to be some difficulty here which may make the whole Clause ineffective in too many cases. Subsections (6) and (7) refer to the case where there is an outstanding notice. I foresee that a mortgagor who knows that his property has become blighted, and is likely, perhaps, to have to pay off the mortgage debt and have his property taken away from him at the same time, may have started off and served a purchase notice and then disappeared.

    This happens in many cases. While there is a notice outstanding served by the borrower, the mortgagee will be unable to take any steps at all. He will have to wait for a certain period set out in subsection (7), until that outstanding notice has in some way expired. I think there are likely to be great difficulties when that happens, and it is the sort of practical case which may happen all too often.

    Now I turn to subsection (2)(a), the subsection in which the Amendment at line 12 occurs. This paragraph requires the mortgagor to wait before serving his purchase notice until he is in a position to give immediate vacant possession of the land. This will give rise to grave difficulty. In the case of a building society mortgage, it will probably be three months' arrears before the society instructs its solicitors to take any action against the borrower, so that there will be that lapse of time.

    The borrower may have found that his property is blighted. He is determined then to escape his liabilities somehow. He stops paying the mortgage instalments. Perhaps when he has got as far as being in arrears with three months' instalments an originating summons is issued. If he is co-operative, service on him may take a week. If he is not very co-operative, one will have to obtain an order for substituted service, which may take a month to two months to obtain from the court.

    Then one has to obtain an appointment before the Master, and one seldom gets an appointment in under two months after serving the originating summons. The Master, if he thinks it is an ordinary case, will make an order for possession in 28 days after service of the order on the borrower. If he feels compassionate, he may make it 56 days. Drawing up the order will probably take two weeks. Service of the order will take another week. Thus, even if a vacation period does not intervene, eight or nine months will elapse before the order for possession is obtained. That is followed by a writ of possession which it will take the sheriff at least a month to enforce. Between eight and twelve months will pass before the mortgagee is in the position which subsection (2)(a) requires him to be in, of
    "giving immediate vacant possession of the land ".
    He should be allowed to start the purchase notice procedure before he reaches that position, and that is what the Amendment in line 12 proposes.

    11.30 p.m.

    The second Amendment—to leave out lines 31 to 39—in another effort to simplify the procedure. The paragraph it is sought to delete is a proviso that the Clause shall not enable a person, if his interest as mortgagee is in the whole of a property, to serve a purchase notice for part of the property, or if it is for only part of the property to serve a notice for the whole of the property. This will place the mortgagee of an agricultural unit in great difficulty. Perhaps only one agricultural cottage on farm land is affected by the blight and he will want to serve a notice for part of the property which is in mortgage to him. I see no reason why he should not do so. I do not see the point of the proviso to subsection (3).

    The Amendment in line 40 is another effort to simplify the procedure. The purpose of the Clause is to put the mortgagee in the position of the borrower, who has a right to serve a purchase notice; it is merely to put him in the shoes of the borrower so that, if the borrower fails to take the proper action, the mortgagee can do so. Instead of complicating the position with the provisions of subsections (4) and (5), can we not say simply that all that the mortgagee has to show is that the interest which he claims he has power to sell is an interest which would have given the borrower the right to serve the purchase notice?

    The Amendment in line 62 is a proviso
    "that a person entitled to serve a notice under section 129"—
    that is, a purchase notice if his property is blighted—
    "or under this section may require that he be joined as a claimant in a notice which is"
    outstanding. Where there is an outstanding notice, the mortgagee may be in difficulty in having to wait for the notice to expire or be removed. The Amendment in line 93 is consequential on this Amendment.

    We welcome the Clause. It will meet a number of difficult cases arising now. It will enable mortgagees, particularly building societies, to serve a purchase notice and thereby in many cases to preserve a property. I have experience of perhaps a score of properties which have become blighted, small dwellings where the owner-occupier has realised that a road is to be built through his back garden or on stilts in front of the windows of his house, and he has disappeared. The building society has lost touch with him and he has failed to pay his instalments. The house is empty. It does not take more than a week for that house to be ruined by hooligans. Windows and doors are smashed. If that house is left for eight or 12 months before the building society is able to say, "We can give immediate vacant possession because we have an order of the court putting us into possession", the property will be completely ruined before the purchase notice can be served.

    This would be a great pity, in many cases, particularly road widening and construction of trunk roads, where the Ministry of Transport is prepared to recognise the blight and purchase the property, because the road will not be built for some years, or to let the property to the local authority for housing purposes if the mortgagor can act quickly. The property can then come into the hands of the local authority quickly for housing purposes. This procedure would be beneficial to many more people than the mortgagor.

    I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to accept at least some of the Amendments because they are put forward in a spirit of trying to improve the Clause and with some knowledge of the practical difficulties in carrying out the procedure.

    I find it difficult to argue with the hon. Member because he has great knowledge and I cannot share his interest because I have not done work for a building society. Nor, I am happy to say, have I yet been an escaping mortgagor. So my interest is detached.

    In trying to carry out the wishes of the House, we have consulted the Building Societies Association, which is content with this Clause in its present form and we have cleared some of the very technical points which have been raised. I think that the hon. Member had the key to the matter when he said that the object was to put the mortgagee in the shoes of the mortgagor. That is correct, but the rights to serve blight notices are very limited under the principal Act. They are limited to owner-occupiers in residence. It is important that the powers given to the mortgagee should be no greater than those with the original mortgagor. That is why there is the provision that he must be able to sell with immediate vacant possession.

    On the second Amendment, it is the whole mortgage interest that is concerned and that follows the provisions of Section 139 (2,c) of the 1962 Act. The period of six months' grace given to the mortgagee under subsection (4,b) is to meet the difficulties of the mortgagee who does not find out what is going on and has to lake time to get his action organised.

    It would not be desirable to have two outstanding blight notices competing. It is essential that one should be dealt with before the other one is served. While there is an outstanding blight notice the benefit of that can be enjoyed by the other party.

    I apologise for the length of the new Clause, but a great deal of work has been put into getting it right. We have carefully consulted those who could advise us, and have come to the conclusion that this is the best way of making what we all agree is a very useful strengthening of the Bill.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 31

    Extension Of Grounds Of Objection To Purchase Of Claimant's Interest

    Lords Amendment No. 53: In page 26, line 17, leave out from beginning to "do" in line 25 and insert:

    "Where a blight notice is served under section 139 of the principal Act or section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) above, then in the case of land—
  • (a) falling within section 138(1)(c) of the principal Act or section 30(1)(a) of this Act; and
  • (b) not falling within section 138(1)(e) or (f) of that Act or section 30(1)(d) of this Act,
  • the grounds on which an objection may be made in a counter-notice under section 140 of the principal Act shall include the grounds that the appropriate authority (unless compelled to do so by virtue of sections 139 to 151 of the principal Act and section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) above."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The Amendment makes four changes in the Clause, but the only substantial one is the fourth. It may not always be clear to the planning authority what land will be required for the public use some time ahead. The Bill enables service of a counter-notice saying that the land will not be bought within 15 years, with the idea of relieving blight at least to some extent and giving some assurances.

    The Bill permits this in two cases—where the land has been shown in the structure plan as being required, and whether it is indicated in the development plan as land on which a highway is to be constructed. It is not proposed to place an additional limit on the power to serve a 15-year notice. This will operate in favour of the citizen. It will strengthen his position, and, therefore, it is to his advantage.

    I protest again about the 15 years' counter-notice. We have always objected to it. But the Amendment is a slight improvement from the Opposition point of view, in that it has reduced the number of cases in which the local authorities can say, "We shall not buy your property because we do not want it for 15 years. You can have it blighted on your hands for 15 years". I think that the Amendment reduces the number of cases in which this can be done. To that extent it is welcome, but I wish that we had done away with the 15 years' counter-notice.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 55: In page 27, line 20, leave out from "area" to end of line 27 and insert:

    "references in those provisions to the affected area being construed as references to the hereditament".

    Read a Second time.

    11.45 p.m.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, at end add:

    provided that it is not occupied by a resident owner-occupier.
    The provisions for the relief of planning blight have been generally improved, notably in Clause 30, but Clause 31 is not so happy. But in this part of Clause 31 the provision for blight compensation is actually reduced. Under Section 140(2)(c) of the 1962 Act, an owner of agricultural land who asked for his property to be purchased because he was unable to sell it because of blight on part of it could be resisted to the extent that only the blighted part need be purchased. I can see the reason for this. If part of a field is blighted, then it is unreasonable to require that the whole of the farm should be taken in order to cure the blight.

    Under the Act, other owners, if part of their land was blighted, could, and still can, require the whole to be pur- chased, and my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) has just mentioned the possibility of a motorway being put in close proximity to a house, making it intolerable to live in. However, subsection (6) of Clause 31 now extends the restriction from agricultural land to all land and the effect is that, if a person finds part of his garden is blighted, only that part need be acquired.

    This was discussed in Standing Committee, when the hon. and learned Member for Derby, North (Mr. MacDermot), then Minister of State, argued in favour of subsection (6) on the ground that the provisions of subsection (7) covered the case where the hereditament was not viable. He argued that, if there was to be a serious blight on a portion of the property, it might well be that the property was not viable and therefore subsection (7) would cover the case.

    The hon. and learned Gentleman also said that it was unreasonable to have to acquire, for example, a whole shop when only the forecourt was blighted. Again, I can see his reasons. But let us look at the practical effect. I have a case in my constituency of a bungalow, part of whose garden lies on the route of the proposed A41 by-pass. My constituent has tried to sell the bungalow and cannot. It is effectively blighted. When he consulted me, I consulted the Ministry of Transport, which gave the advice that my constituent should put in his requirement to purchase extremely quickly, because if it arrived after the Bill took effect he would not be entitled to have his property purchased.

    This brought forcibly to my attention the fact that this Clause represents a substantial diminution of the blight provision in relation to owner occupiers. According to the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman, my constituent would be left with an unviable garden, but would have a viable property. That will be the position under subsection (7). He would, in other words, have a viable but unsaleable bungalow. We are mainly moved not by the question of viability but by the question of saleability.

    The example I have quoted is proof to me that the assurance we received in Standing Committee was inadequate and does not afford reasonable protection to those who find their property unsaleable through blight. This change in the law should not, therefore, go as far as including residential owner-occupiers.

    The Amendment is a proviso which would bring about this restriction, and I therefore hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will feel able to accept it.

    The hon. Gentleman is pressing rather too strongly on one side. I see it as a balance, because we are introducing a power for owners to get compensation for disturbance, severance and injurious affection. That is clearly a substantial change to their betterment and it seems a reasonable quid pro quo that they should not be able to force acquiring authorities to take the whole of the hereditament when in fact they need only a minor part.

    To obtain injurious affection the owner has to retain all the property until it is actually acquired for the purpose of the by-pass. I think that that will be for a number of years. The Parliamentary Secretary is asking my constituent to hang on to an unsaleable bungalow for the next 10 years in the hope that one day he will get injurious affection.

    As we approach midnight I have no desire to conduct, as it were, a "surgery" for the hon. Gentleman's constituency cases. I am sure that he got good advice about that case, but we are here looking at matters in the light of the fact that much greater facilities will be available to a person who is suffering from blight. Therefore, this is a reasonable balance. If taking a part of a property rendered the rest unsaleable, the owner could force the authority to buy it under subsection (7) or (8).

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 35

    Restriction On Demolition And Other Works

    Lords Amendment No. 63: In page 30, line 32, after "order" insert "made by statutory instrument".

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, at end add:

    '(which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament)'.
    Clause 35 provides that when there is to be a demolition of a listed building, a reference shall be made, or notice shall be given, to the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments so that it may have an opportunity of preserving, by photographs or otherwise, a record of the listed building. It contains a provision that the Minister may appoint some other body in place of the Royal Commission to whom notice of the demolition of a listed building shall be given. Surely the House should be concerned with such an alteration. I do not know why it is necessary to make this provision. What is to happen to the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments? Is it to fade away? If so, what is to be put in its place? That is a matter of great concern.

    I hope that my Amendment will be welcomed by the Government and that they will bring such an important matter as this before the House.

    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government
    (Mr. Arthur Skeffington)

    I am sorry that on my first appearance in to night's proceedings I cannot advise the House to accept an Amendment, especially as the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) has been in such a constructive frame of mind tonight.

    The hon. Member asked what was likely to happen to the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments. We do not think that anything will happen to it—we certainly hope not. It is doing a wonderful job. Its historical records section has a collection which is not only the best in the country, but probably the best in the world. However, it is thought necessary to make provision in case for some reason at some time it should be wound up. The Bill will provide that failure to notify the Commission, or some other body in its place, could, in certain circumstances, carry penalties. An Amendment was introduced in another place because it was felt wise to get some publicity by having a Statutory Instrument for such a change.

    However, to go as far as the hon. Gentleman suggests would be to make rather heavy weather of it and moreover his Amendment could lead to an absurdity. If such an Order were defeated in both Houses, there might be nobody to do any photographing or anything else and not only would records not be kept, but in certain circumstances the demolitions of the buildings might not be notified and they would be in peril. We have gone a considerable way forward in providing that if there is any change, which we do not expect, it would be the subject of a Statutory Instrument and would, therefore, excite attention in both Houses, but not have the bizarre effect of the hon. Gentleman's Amendment, which might be that no recording was possible.

    The hon. Gentleman's argument is that he wants power to make an Order which Parliament cannot question because he is afraid that Parliament might chuck it out. That is no way in which to bring forward an Amendment of this sort. If an Order is made, and the hon. Gentleman wants publicity for it, let him bring it before the House and allow it to be debated.

    I do not accept that. The fact that the provision would be in the form of a Statutory Instrument would give the necessary publicity. It would be brought to the notice of all those interested in the Parliamentary sense, quite apart from any other action which the Minister may take, in what anyway would be a remote contingency. To go further would make it analogous with the situation in which nobody was keeping records, which would be unwise. Therefore, I could not ask the House to accept the hon. Gentleman's Amendment.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 37

    Purchase Notice On Refusal Or Con Ditional Grant Of Listed Building Consent

    Lords Amendment No. 65: In page 33, line 7, after "conditions" insert:

    "or, by an order under Part II of Schedule 3 to this Act, listed building consent is revoked or modified"

    12 m.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    During an earlier stage of the Bill in this House, a Government Amendment was moved providing for listed building consents to be revoked or modified, in the same way as planning permissions may be revoked or modified. The House will know that, in the case of revocation or modification, under the 1962 Act compensation is payable in certain circumstances, and it was thought right that similar provisions here should also carry with them the right to compensation.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 42

    Enforcement By, Or By Direction Of, The Minister

    Lords Amendment No. 69: In page 36, line 29, after "authority" insert:

    "(and, in Greater London, also with the Greater London Council.)".

    We can also take with this Amendment Lords Amendments Nos. 226 and 227.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment, I am sure, will be dear to the heart of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page). What we have done is to bring in the G.L.C. by making provision in the Bill rather than amending the Local Government Act, 1963.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 44

    Compensation For Loss Or Damage Caused By Service Of Building Preservation Notice

    Lords Amendment No. 72: In page 38, line 23, leave out from "building" to "shall" in line 25.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    We can also discuss with this Amendment, Lords Amendment No. 73.

    This Clause provides for compensation to be paid by local planning authorities for any loss or damage caused by the service of a building preservation notice which gives an unlisted building temporary protection pending consideration of the statutory listing. When we discussed this earlier the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason) painted graphic pictures of people who might have entered into a contract with a builder, but the work had not begun. As the Clause was drafted, this provision of compensation would not be possible.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Clause "F"

    Directions By Minister To Local Planning Authorities With Respect To Development Affecting Conservation Areas

    Lords Amendment No. 77: In page 42, line 46, at end insert new Clause "F":

    "F.—(1) The Minister may give directions to local planning authorities with respect to the matters which they are to take into consideration in determining an application—
  • (a) for planning permission for any such development as is referred to in section 1(6) of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 (special provisions as to publicity for applications affecting Conservation Areas); or
  • (b) for listed building consent for any works for the demolition, alteration or extension of a building in a Conservation Area,
  • and with respect to the consultations which such authorities are to undertake before determining any such application.
    (2) Different directions may under this section be given to different local planning authorities; and any such directions may require an authority—
  • (a) before determining an application to consult such persons or bodies of persons as the Minister may specify, being persons or bodies appearing to him to be competent to give advice in relation to the development or description of development to which the directions have reference;
  • (b) to supply to any person or body, whom they are required by the directions to consult, specified documents or information enabling the body to form an opinion on which to base their advice;
  • (c) to establish committees, consisting either of members of the authority or of other persons, or of both, to advise the authority in relation to the detemination of such applications as are referred to in subsection (1) above."
  • Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is an important provision, which has aroused some hostility from the local authority associations, which I understand. When this matter was discussed in another place, they were not perhaps fully aware of the consequences of the Amendment. I think that they may have exaggerated its consequences.

    To give a brief background to this, subsection (1) of the Civic Amenities Act requires local planning authorities to determine which parts of their areas are areas of special architectural or historic interest, the character or appearance of which it is desirable to retain. It provides for certain effects to take place if there is a question of development coming before them in relation to this conservation area.

    It was suggested by a great many interests at various times, and certainly in another place that it is important to get the right advice if the whole purpose of the Civic Amenities Act is to be effective. Subsection (1) enables the Minister to give directions—it is an enabling Clause—to the planning authorities about the matters which they are to take into account when considering the applications for development in conservation areas. Subsection (2) makes it clear that different directions may be given to different authorities. This is obviously right, as in some cases no directions may be given. There is also the question of the appointment of an appropriate committee to advise. I understand the arguments of those who say that we have a learned Royal Commission reporting, that there should be fewer committees, and provision is being taken in this instance for an additional one.

    Every case must be taken on its merits. As, in the case of the Countryside Act, it may be necessary in the initial stages for a special committee to be set up to consider countryside matters until the codes and the problems of areas have been decided, so it seems important that in certain circumstances there should be consultation with the appropriate bodies in this important matter. That will go a long way to retaining those parts of our ancient cities the character of which we should safeguard by every means we can.

    I can give an undertaking, which I am glad to do now in view of the local authority interest, that it is the Minister's intention only to recommend the setting up of such committees. It would not normally be a direction. The matter will be dealt with on the basis of tolerance and understanding, which is important.

    Nevertheless, all the bodies which are interested in this work—the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments and Buildings, the Victorian Society, the Georgian Society, certainly the Civic Trust and a great many others—feel that the general provisions of the Clause, which had a warm welcome in another place, are valuable. I hope that, in the way that I have suggested they will be interpreted, they will be widely welcomed in the House.

    There is quite a lot to the new Clause. The Parliamentary Secretary ended by admitting that it was mandatory, but not, he said, in the case of the last item of the Clause—the advisory committees. From the wording of the beginning of the Clause, I take it that the remainder is mandatory, because it states that

    "The Minister may give directions to local planning authorities with respect to the matters which they are to take into consideration in determining an application."
    That means that they must obey the directions of the Minister. That is my first objection. The Minister already has power to give advice. Here, however, the intention is that he shall direct that certain steps should be taken.

    First, let us look at paragraph (a) of subsection (1), which concerns the giving of directions
    "for planning permission for any such development as is referred to in section 1(6) of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 (special provisions as to publicity for applications affecting Conservation Areas)".
    Already, the Minister has issued Circular 53/67 giving local authorities advice on how they should deal with conservation areas. They have been given some specific hints. Presumably, it is on these lines that the directions will now come. As one example, the Ministry has indicated to local authorities that where there is a conservation area, outline planning application should not be accepted; plans for any proposals within a conservation area must be detailed plans with drawings attached.

    I do not know whether any reasonable consideration was given to this when the Ministry sent out this circular, but there are a number of objections. First, detailed plans with drawings mean very considerable expense for the developer. Remember that the developer normally goes along with outline planning permission to discover whether the local authority is amenable to the idea, and whether it will be possible to carry out the operation. It is always understood that the outline plans are there to be obtained at reasonably little expense before the developer starts getting down to detail. When he gets down to detail it costs tens and even hundreds of pounds, for preparing detailed plans for submission to the local authority wherever there is a conservation area.

    I am happy to say there are many conservation areas already, and many more to come, but wherever there is a conservation area the expense to the developer is considerable. It is possible for outline plans to have conditions attached to them. If it is necessary to ensure that outward appearance, the type of use, and so on, shall be in conformity with the necessity that the area should be conserved, I can see no reason why that cannot be in the conditions attached to outline planning permission.

    Then comes the question whether this is a feasible proposition. Remember that outline planning permission is required when a building changes hands. The Minister may say that it is possible for the developer to go along informally to the local authority and find out the sort of plan which would be acceptable and that this will avoid the expense of submitting detailed plans with drawings, but this is not much good where property is going to change hands. The purchaser will require to know not merely that "I have it on the old boy network that it will be all right", but that there is an outline planning permission with conditions attached. Then he is in a position to go ahead.

    This is a situation which is thoroughly unsatisfactory. The Ministry has already started on it, but at least at the moment local authorities do not have to accept its advice. I take it that this Clause means that the advice will be translated into orders, into directions which the local authority has got to accept.

    Turning to subsection (2) of the Clause, the directions will require an authority
    "to consult such persons or bodies of persons as the Minister may specify".
    Remember, this is mandatory. This is going much too far. This refers to amenity societies. We know that some amenity societies are excellent, but, at the other end of the scale, there are amenity societies which are little more than small pressure groups to preserve semi-private amenities. It ought to be clear whether the Minister, in directing a local planning authority as to which bodies it should consult, means every body which has formed itself into an amenity society or which calls itself an amenity society.

    12.15 a.m.

    There must surely be choice. Who is to do the choosing? Clearly, the Minister cannot. He has not a clue as to the motives and background of every amenity society in the country. I am happy to say that the amenity societies, like the conservation areas, are growing in number at a great rate, so clearly the Minister cannot do the choosing. The local authorities are not allowed to do the choosing, because under this Clause the Minister is taking the power to order local authorities which amenity societies they have to consult, so it is perfectly clear that the Minister is looking somewhere else, and I suggest that the only other place one can look is the Civic Trust, which maintains a register of all amenity societies in the country.

    If it is the Minister's intention to go to the Civic Trust and get advice, he should say so. When we look at this a little more closely we find that this is not a once-for-all reference. It is that all cases shall be considered in conjunction with x number of amenity societies which the Civic Trust have recommended to the Minister, because each planning application has a different scope. Some are of national importance, so that it will be necessary. The wording of the new Clause indicates that it is the intention that for individual applications, individual separate instructions shall be given. Clearly, different amenity societies will be concerned with different types of planning application.

    This means that an enormous amount of work will he placed on the Ministry and I suggest that they will probably try to shrug it off on to the Civic Trust, which ought not to have the burden of the volume of work I see arising from subsection (2).

    Paragraph (c) is the one case which is not mandatory. The Parliamentary Secretary tells us that local authorities will only be advised to establish committees. I should have thought that this would be the one case which might be mandatory. Tell them to form committees, but for heaven's sake do not tell them how to form them.

    I am second to none in my admiration for amenity societies. I have urged, during discussion of this Bill, that they should be brought into consultation, but this mandatory provision goes much too far. The Clause is resented by the local authorities, who were not adequately consulted. It implies that unless one gives mandatory instruction, they would fail to do their normal duty.

    I am sorry that the hon. Member has not understood me. I was probably speaking too fast. What I said in relation to the forming of committees was that it was proposed not to direct, but to advise. The whole subsection is enabling and not mandatory.

    If the Clause is enabling, there is no need to have it in the Bill, but I have drawn attention to the wording:

    "with respect to the matters which they"—
    the local authorities—
    "are to take into consideration …"
    This is mandatory.

    The hon. Member must read the Clause as a whole, or he will mislead everybody. It says at the beginning:

    "The Minister may give directions to local planning authorities with respect to the matters which they are to take into consideration …"

    He may give directions. If he does not intend to give them we do not need the Clause, but having given them they are mandatory. The local authority cannot say, "I am sorry. We do not agree about the outline planning."

    The hon. Member has an Amendment suggesting that the directions should not be mandatory. On the Lords Amendment he cannot discuss an Amendment which he has put down and Mr. Speaker has not selected.

    I am speaking against the whole Clause, because it is mandatory. I had used the word "mandatory" three times before the Parliamentary Secretary interrupted and tried to prove that the Clause was not mandatory. I hope that we can pass on from that.

    This is one more example of insensitive handling of local authorities by the Minister. He is always saying that he believes in independent local government and then giving it orders.

    I take this opportunity of welcoming the Parliamentary Secretary back to the Dispatch Box. Ministers of

    " G.—(1) Where an application for planning permission for any development of land is made to a local planning authority and the case is one where the authority are required to comply with section 1(6) of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 (special publicity for planning applications affecting Conservation Areas) the authority shall also comply with the following subsection.
    10(2) The authority shall, for not less than seven days display a notice on or near the land to which the application relates, containing the same particulars as are required by section 1(6) (a) of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 to be contained in the notice to be published by the authority in a local newspaper.
    15(3) An application for planning permission to which section 1(6) of the said Act of 1967 applies shall not be determined by the local planning authority before both of the following periods have elapsed, namely:—
    (a) the period of twenty-one days referred to in paragraph (a) of that subsection; and
    20(b) the period of twenty-one days beginning with the date on which the notice required by subsection (2) of this section was first displayed;
    and in determining the application the authority shall take into account any representations relating to the application which are received by them before both those periods have elapsed.
    25(4) In the said section 1(6), paragraphs (b) and (c) shall cease to have effect."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment we can take Lords Amendments Nos. 132, 198, 199 and 251.

    State may come and Ministers of State may go, but he, like Old Father Thames, keeps rolling along.

    I want to lake up the point made by my hon. Friend. The Clause gives the Minister reserve powers to interfere at will with local authorities, and this has been resented by local authorities. We must either decide to trust local authorities to do a good job or keep powers in reserve to deal with them if they do not behave as we want. In my opinion, it is time that we trusted local authorities; in fact, if we are to make any progress in devolution this is what we must do. That is why I support the attitude taken by my hon. Friend.

    Question put and agreed to.

    New Clause "G"

    Additional Requirement Of Notice For Development Affecting Conservation Areas

    Lords Amendment No. 78: In page 42, line 46, after Amendment last inserted, insert new Clause "G":

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 7, leave out 'seven' and insert 'fourteen'.

    The new Clause requires the local planning authority to put into effect special publicity for planning applications affecting the service areas which are referred to in Section 1(6) of the Civic Amenities Act, 1967, but subsection (2) provides that
    "The authority shall for not less than seven days display a notice on or near the land".
    I want to know why the period is only seven days. Section 1(6)(a) of the Civic Amenities Act, 1967, lays down that a notice shall be published in the local newspaper setting out details regarding the development application, which shall be available for public inspection from twenty-one days from the publication of the notice. Yet the new Clause provides only seven days.

    I admit that the Minister will probably have drafted this new Clause before the imposition by his right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General upon the long-suffering British public of the two-tier postal system, which will mean that even at the 5d. rate no aggrieved person will have a chance of getting an answer back within seven days. If the land to be developed is in a comparatively isolated area, down a less-frequented side road, or for some other reason is not considered to be a threat to amenity, we suggest that 14 days at least are necessary.

    I hope that the Minister will accept the Amendment.

    I cannot recommend the House to accept the Amendment. The seven-day notice is an additional period. It has to be there to give warning or notice that a certain development is likely to take place. It is itself an additional period of delay before the person wishing to carry out the development can have his application for planning permission dealt with by the local authority.

    As the hon. Gentleman said, under Section 1(6) of the Civic Amenities Act, 28 days must elapse from the receipt of an application before it can be considered. If his Amendment were accepted, it would be a period of 35 days. That seems to be an unreasonably long time to elapse before an application is even considered.

    In the Clause, we have carried out the requirements about giving applications adequate publicity, for which we were pressed constantly. We have done it in various ways, at the same time not making for too long a delay before the developer can know that his application is being considered, and all the steps which may flow from that. Taking the best advice that we can, we think that this is an adequate period.

    The posting of site notices is only one way in which developments are made known to people, but it is a new and important one. It will be noticed immediately in most cases, and we think that we have the balance right here. I could not advise the House to accept 14 days.

    I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman cannot accept the Amendment. It will not delay planning applications if the period of seven days is extended to 14. It is seven days within a period of a month. Neighbours arc not given sufficient time if the notice is exhibited for only seven days.

    Think of the man away on holiday. Think of the man away on a job during the week, in which case there will be only one weekend in which he can see the notice, which is, after all, intended to let neighbours know about what they may think of as a harmful development.

    We are dealing here not only with cases of conservation areas, but with Lords Amendment No. 132, which is the new Clause dealing with the display of notices. It is a very important Clause which was urged upon the Government both by the Opposition and by their own back bench Members. We joined in hoping that a Clause of this kind would appear in the Bill. Now it has appeared, and we welcome it, but we should get it right now that we have it there.

    I hoped that the Government would accept this slightly longer period for the display of notices, so that the display was to some purpose and would be seen by neighbours and those who thought that they might be injured by the development.

    Since we are discussing Lords Amendment No. 132 and the whole of the new Clause about the display of notices, perhaps I might address some remarks to the cases in which the new Clause will apply. I refer to subsection (1) and the very valuable procedure of posting site notices prior to planning applications. If I read that correctly, it is to apply only in cases where Section 15 of the 1962 Act applies. These are cases which are prescribed by the Minister. Up to the present, he has chosen to prescribe only the cases where harm is obvious.

    Unfortunately, I have not the cases before me, but my recollection is that they are more objectionable features like public lavatories, knackers' yards, fish and chip shops, and that sort of development. In those cases there has to be publication of notices in the newspapers, and all the procedure under Section 15 of the Act applies. These were not the sort of cases which we had in mind when we were urging the Government to produce some clause for posting site notices. We had in mind the ordinary cases in which one neighbour might be intending to develop his land to the severe detriment of another, and that all those who might be affected should have a chance of making their voices heard, through their local councillor representing their ward, by the appropriate committee of the council. This is the kind of case to which we hoped this would apply. But it has been restricted—wrongly, I suggest—to those cases which, up to now, we have known as very serious cases in which the Minister has made an order.

    12.30 a.m.

    I had hoped that the new Clause could be quite independent of section 15 of the 1962 Act and that the procedure for posting site notices could apply to ordinary cases of planning applications—not the sort of case envisaged by Section 15 of the 1962 Act and certainly not only the sort of case which appears in regulations under that Section.

    There is still time for the Minister to have second thoughts and to see that this clause and new Clause "M" can be applied to any sort of planning application where he thinks that the neighbours ought to be well informed before the application goes forward for consideration by the local authority.

    With the leave of the House, I should like to make two points.

    First, Section 15 is a good deal wider than the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) suggests. It covers all kinds of places of entertainment, for example. We will be looking into this matter. I give no undertaking, because I am in no position to give one now. However, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. MacDermot) at an earlier stage of the Bill, pointed out the practical difficulties of suggesting that site notices could be everywhere. Nevertheless, we will not close our minds to this matter; we will consider it.

    Secondly, I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has given a general welcome to the new Clause. I feel that perhaps we should make at least one concession at this hour of the night. Therefore, I advise the House, when we come to it, to accept 14 days instead of seven days.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Clause "H"

    Amendment Of 1946 Act, Schedule 1

    Lords Amendment No. 79 proposed: In page 43, line 6, at end insert new Clause H:

    "H. In paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 to the Act of 1946 (application of special parliamentary procedure to compulsory purchase order affecting ancient monument etc., subject to certificate by Minister of Public Building and Works that undertakings have been given as to its preservation) the reference to land being, or being the site of, an ancient monument or other object of archaeological interest shall be construed as not including a reference to a listed building or any land or object comprised within the curtilage of such a building unless the building or object is specified in the Schedule to the Ancient Monuments Protection Act 1882 or is for the time being specified in a list published under section 12 of the Ancient Monuments Consolidation and Amendment Act 1913."—[Mr. Skeffington.]

    Read a Second time.

    If the Parliamentary Secretary has not quite found his place I will go on talking, but I cannot talk for long because I do not understand what the Clause means. I was hoping that the hon. Gentleman would give us some explanation.

    Order. If the hon. Member does not understand it, and wants to talk about it, it will be hard for him to keep in order.

    Paragraph 12 of the First Schedule to the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1946 provides that any compulsory purchase order which authorises the purchase of land which is, or is the site of, an ancient monument is to be subject to Special Parliamentary Procedure unless the Minister of Public Building and Works gives a certificate that the acquiring authority has entered into an undertaking to observe satisfactory conditions about the use of the land.

    The reason for this Amendment is simply that the definition and description of ancient monuments in relation to that Act is different and much wider than in relation to the listed buildings with which we are dealing, and it will be unnecessary to have to ask the Minister to give consent in certain cases when

    10"( ) Where a Planning Inquiry Commission are to hold a local inquiry under subsection (3) above in connection with a matter referred to them, and it appears to the responsible Minister or Ministers, in the case of some other matter falling to be determined by a Minister of the Crown and required or authorised by an enactment other than this section to be the subject of a local inquiry, that the two matters are so far cognate that they should be considered together, he or, as the case may be, they may direct that the two inquiries be held concurrently or combined as one inquiry."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 9, after ' may ' insert:

    '(with the consent of all persons who are entitled to be heard at inquiries concerning the two matters and have expressed an intention to participate in either of these inquiries)'.
    Under subsection (3) a planning inquiry commission may hold an inquiry for the proper discharge of its functions even though neither the applicant nor the local planning authority desire an opportunity of appearing and of being heard. The proposed new subsection will enable a planning inquiry commission, on the authority of another Minister or Ministers of the Crown, to hold two inquiries concurrently, or if necessary combined. If the subsection is accepted as drafted it could, under certain circumstances, lead to considerable hardship where some person, concerned only with one inquiry, and possibly with only one aspect of it, finds himself faced with a much more complex set of circumstances in a combined inquiry, and as a result has to seek extra legal or other expert advice, including possibly the retention of counsel.

    If that person has one specific aspect of interest in the original inquiry, we feel that he should be entitled to have

    under the Bill he is not concerned with them, but this is merely a provision in another statute. The Amendment is designed to remove an anomaly.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 55

    Procedure On Reference To A Planning Inquiry Commission

    Lords Amendment No. 91: In page 46, line 42, at end insert:

    his say as to whether or not more than one inquiry should be held concurrently. It is not improbable otherwise that his small appearance may lead him between the Scylla and Charybdis of much larger and more powerful interests which, in their clashing, could involve him in very considerable time, trouble, and probably expense.

    The effect of the hon. Gentleman's Amendment would be to make concurrent inquiry procedure in a matter which is referred to the planning inquiry commission available only with the agreement of everyone wishing to be heard at either inquiry. The Government's view is that this is far too restrictive. This is an important power which saves much time and expense in circumstances where there is an opportunity to hold concurrent inquiries. This is obviously sensible where it is appropriate, as it is in many cases.

    To say that this could not be done if any person who may have a right to be heard objects would put the provision in jeopardy, at the mercy of anyone who might take a whim of one kind or another, thus denying the benefits of this provision to the ordinary citizen, to local authorities, and to statutory undertakers which might be proceeding, for example, under the Electricity Acts in the case of a power station.

    We all know from personal experience at inquiries that there is often the person who—sometimes for disinterested reasons, sometimes for very interested reasons—does not want the matter to proceed. That goes too far and I cannot advise the House to accept the Amendment.

    This is an important point, but I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman has said about the Amendment being rather wide and that perhaps anybody could frustrate a reasonable proposition that two inquiries be held at the same time. However, a man might have some small planning application in respect of land which is to be the subject of a planning inquiry commission. He may be involved in months of inquiry, being represented all the time—rather like the man in the orchestra with the triangle, who sits there for the whole symphony poised with his little striker until he reaches the point at which he has to strike the triangle.

    Somebody may want to build a garage in his back garden, but his house may be in the area which is being considered for a new London airport. He will be swept into that inquiry, an inquiry which perhaps is not going on just at one place. They may be looking at various parts of the country to decide on the best site for the new airport. So he, who has a house at Stansted, may have to follow the inquiry around in its investigations of other areas all round London to find where the aerodrome should be.

    Could the Minister satisfy us by giving the House assurance that he will issue a circular or give directions to those involved in the commission that they should not force an applicant for planning permission on some minor matter into a large planning inquiry commission where the expense may he prohibitive to him? This could be restricted to the applicant himself. Our Amendment goes wide in saying that anybody might refuse his consent to a combination of inquiries. We should be happy with an assurance that it will be the general practice of a commission of this sort not to sweep small planning applications into the net of the whole commission and make an applicant pay enormous costs in waiting for his small part to be decided.

    12.45 a.m.

    I speak again by leave of the House. I should like to con- sider what the hon. Member has suggested. It is the Minister who takes action where it seems appropriate that there should be two investigations under one umbrella. Often the planning inquiry commission may itself be holding a local inquiry as part of its investigation. On such an occasion no doubt the individual to whom the hon. Member referred could be heard, certainly at less expense than if there were two inquiries. The fear that this procedure might add to the expense is not real.

    I should like to look at the point the hon. Member has raised, but I remind him that the Minister will consider this question and can use discretion about where and when this procedure is appropriate.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 56

    Delegation Of Planning Functions To Officers Of Local Authorities

    Lords Amendment No. 92: In page 47, line 15, leave out

    "with or without restrictions or conditions".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The new subsection (2) restates the power now in the Clause for a council having delegated planning powers to delegate further to one of its officers, and adds a further power for such a council to delegate to an officer of the local planning authority. Paragraphs (a) and (b) restate provisions already in the Clause and (c) makes express provision for withdrawal of delegation either in general or in respect of a particular application. The Opposition in the Commons were concerned to see this power made explicit. Paragraph (d) provides for the automatic withdrawal of authority delegated by the council to an officer employed by the local planning authority if that authority withdraws its consent to the delegation.

    The new subsection (4) expands the present subsection (4) to cover cases of delegation by an authority to an officer of some other local authority, for which provision is made in the new subsection (2). The new subsection (5) ensures that a determination of an application falling within subsection (1) of the Clause, made by art officer with delegated powers, counts for all purposes as a determination of the delegating authority. It is right that if there is a dispute it is the authority which is to be pursued, not the officer, and this puts the prime responsibility where it should belong. This is very much in the interests of the officer undertaking the work.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 95: In page 47, line 30, at end insert—

    "( ) an application for an established use certificate under section (Certification of established use) of this Act".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment adds applications for established use certificates to the list of matters which may be delegated to an officer of a local authority. It is clearly appropriate to bring them within the range of matters which a local planning authority may choose to delegate to an officer.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 96: In page 47, line 34, leave out paragraph ( f).

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The effect of the Amendment would be to exclude applications for listed building consent from the list of matters which local planning authorities may delegate to officers for decision. This was a backbench Amendment in another place which is acceptable. I think that the reasons for it are obvious.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 57

    Limit Of Duration Of Planning Permissions Past And Future

    Lords Amendment No. 102: In page 48, line 37, at beginning insert

    "Subject to the provisions of this section."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I suggest that with this Amendment we take Lords Amendments Nos. 103 and 104.

    At present, subsection (2) seeks to deal with the case where permission is granted in the future without any time-limit condition by the use of the words

    ". … and if not granted shall be deemed to be granted, …"
    However, this leaves the meaning a trifle obscure and ambiguous. Amendment No. 103 puts the matter right.

    On Amendment No. 104, the five-year limit of planning permission is still very objectionable to us. It is most regrettable that when the Minister had an opportunity of making an Amendment there seems to be no provision for applying for an extension of the five years once the condition of five years has been stated, or implied. We are dealing with the case where the five-year condition has not been stated in the planning permission and is therefore implied in it.

    I should have hoped that the opportunity would be taken in the Amendment to insert a provision that an extension could be made during that five years if both sides know that the development will not start within that period, but have no complaint about that. The five years can be altered before one starts, in the first conditions of the planning permission, but apparently nothing can be done to extend it during the five years. A new application must be put in and the thing started all over again.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 58

    Outline Planning Permissions

    Lords Amendment No. 107: In page 49, line 24, at beginning insert:

    "Subject to the provisions of this section".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I suggest that with this Amendment we take Lords Amendments Nos. 111, 112, 115 and 116.

    The substantial point is that the Amendment makes the wording of the Clause clear. The Clause is also deficient in that it contains no provision for the case where an outline permission has been granted before the commencement of the Clause, subject to an express time limit condition of some kind.

    Amendment No. 111 makes good this deficiency by inserting a new subsection stating that subsection (2) is not to apply to an existing permission with such a condition. The new subsection is similar in effect to subsections (3)(c) of Clause 57, which deals with detailed permissions.

    Question put and agreed to.

    "(4) If after the commencement of this section outline planning permission is granted without the conditions required by subsection (2) above, it shall be deemed to have been granted subject to those conditions.
    5(5) The authority concerned with the terms of an outline planning permission may, in applying subsection (3) above, substitute, or direct that there be substituted, for the periods of three years, five years or two years referred to in that subsection such other periods respectively (whether longer or shorter) as they consider appropriate.
    10
    15(6) The said authority may, in applying the said subsection specify, or direct that there be specified, separate periods under paragraph (a) of the subsection in relation to separate parts of the development to which the planning permission relates; and, if they do so, the condition required by paragraph (b) of the subsection shall then be framed correspondingly by reference to those parts, instead of by reference to the development as a whole.
    20(7) In considering whether to exercise their powers under subsections (5) and (6) above, the said authority shall have regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations."

    Read a Second time.

    Amendment to the proposed Amendment agreed to: In line 3, leave out '(2)' and insert '(3)'.—[ Mr. Skeffington.]

    Lords Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 119: In page 50, leave out line 46 and insert—

    "determination of the appeal.
    (4) Where after the commencement of sections 57 and 58 above a local planning authority grant planning permission, the fact that any of the conditions of the permission are required by this Act to be imposed, or are deemed by this Act to be imposed, shall not prevent the conditions being the subject

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 109: In page 49, line 33, leave out "two" and insert "three".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    It is suggested that with this Amendment we take Lords Amendments Nos. 110, 113 and 114.

    These were Opposition Amendments in another place which the Government have been happy to accept.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 115: In page 50, leave out lines 16 to 22 and insert—

    of an appeal under section 23 of the principal Act against the decision of the authority.

    (5) Section 18(3) of the principal Act (planning permission not to be taken as authorising operations carried out after the time limited in that behalf by the permission having conditions attached to it by or under section 57(1), (2) or (3) or section 58(2), (4) or (5) above; but in the case of such a planning permission (whether outline or other),—

  • (a) development carried out after the date by which the conditions of the permission require it to be carried out shall be treated as not authorised by the permission; and
  • (b) an application for approval of a reserved matter, if it is made after the date by which the conditions require it to be made, shall be treated as not made in accordance with the terms of the permission."
  • I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The principal change here is the new subsection (4), which puts beyond doubt that the time-limit conditions imposed on planning permissions after the commencement of Clauses 57 and 58 can be appealed against. It was always argued that this could be done but the matter is now put beyond doubt. The new subsection (5) contains provisions to ensure that time-limited permissions lapse if the development has not been begun, or, in the case of an outline permission, if an application for approval of reserved matters has not been made within the time-limits laid down.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause 60

    Termination Of Planning Permission By Reference To Time Limit

    Lords Amendment No. 120: In page 51, line 15, leave out subsection (1) and insert:

    "( ) The following provisions of this section shall have effect where, by virtue of section 57 or 58 above, a planning permission (whether granted before or after the commencement of those sections) is subject to a condition that the development to which the permission relates must be begun before the expiration of a particular period and that development has been begun within that

    "at the expiration of the period specified in the notice (whether the original period specified under subsection (2) above or a longer period substituted by the Minister under subsection (2) above)"

    Read a Second time.

    Amendment to the proposed Amendment agreed to: In line 3, leave out '(2)' and insert '(1)'.—[ Mr. Skeffington.]

    Lords Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    "(b) the undertakers' interest in the land was acquired by them as the result of a transfer under provisions of the Transport Act 1968 from other statutory undertakers and the land was, immediately before the transfer, operational land of those other undertakers"

    Read a Second time.

    1.0 a.m.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 3, at end insert:

    'whose statutory undertaking included purposes similar to those of the statutory undertaking of the acquiring undertakers'.
    period but the period has elapsed without the development having been completed.
    ( ) If the local planning authority are of opinion that the development will not be completed within a reasonable period, they may serve a notice (hereafter in this section referred to as a 'completion notice') stating that the planning permission will cease to have effect at the expiration of a further period specified in the notice, being a period of not less than twelve months after the notice takes effect."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment we can discuss Lords Amendments Nos. 121, 122, 123 and 124.

    The first new subsection is designed primarily to bring out more clearly the fact that a completion notice cannot be served until the period specified in the time-limit condition for the commencement of development has completely elapsed. This was implicit before, but is now put beyond doubt.

    The second new subsection provides for the planning permission to cease to have effect not less than 12 months after the completion notice takes effect.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 122: In page 51, line 44, leave out "as from the date specified in the notice" and insert:

    Clause 61

    New Provision As To What Is "Opera Tional Land" Of Statutory Undertakers

    Lords Amendment No. 125: In page 52, line 31, leave out paragraph ( b) and insert—

    This rather tongue-twisting Amendment to the Lords Amendment enshrines a principle about which we on this side are extremely worried. It is obvious that the Lords Amendment has been tailored to fit in with the provisions of the lamentable Transport Bill and we propose to place some curb on any suggestion that there might be a change of user under the provisions of the Transport Bill as reflected in this Bill.

    For instance, the Waterways Board might be given permission to include holiday facilities, including caravans and camping sites, which I would have thought was an unlikely activity for the Board. Similarly, a passenger transport executive could acquire land

    "for the purposes of their business; or with the approval of the Authority for the purpose of adding it to and disposing of it with other contiguous land of theirs of which they propose to dispose".

    Again,

    "where the use of their land for the purposes of their business can be combined with its use for other purposes, to develop the land by constructing or adapting buildings thereon for use wholly or partly by other persons…"

    There are various others, such as facilities for warehousing goods other than goods belonging to the authority and the provision of facilities for the purchase and consumption of food and drink and other refreshments. By our Amendment we would allow a transfer of user only to something similar to what had gone before. Otherwise, it would be a gross injustice to the private trader, and we feel that these activities should be curbed.

    I have some sympathy for the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Murton), but his fears are not wholly justified. I remind the House that certain planning rights accrue to the operational land of statutory undertakers and that Clause 61 provides that no new land shall become "operational" unless certain planning requirements are met.

    Under the provisions of the Transport Bill, land may be transferred among existing and new transport undertakings, and we had intended to provide that if this was already operational land, it should not lose that status upon transfer and have to requalify as if it were new land.

    Provision was, therefore, made in the former paragraph (2)(b) which went too far and would have covered, for example, the acquisition of railway land by a gas hoard with the intention of putting a gasholder on it. But when we tried to narrow the effect, we had extremely complex drafting problems, and we were forced back into the position that we originally had in mind. That dealt with transfers resulting from the Transport Bill.

    The amended paragraph (2)(b) therefore applies only to these. I am told that exchanges of land affected by the new Transport Bill are likely to fall into three groups and any exchanges or transfers outside these groups would be most unlikely. I should add that if any other groups of undertakings were similarly reorganised, this planning point could be covered in their own legislation.

    It is the word "similar" in the Amendment which creates the difficulty. For example, the purposes of a railway and a road transport undertaking may be similar in that both are concerned with the carriage of freight, but also different in that one is concerned with the movement of freight by road and the other with its movement by rail if operational land were transferred from one such undertaking to another, it would not be clear within the terms of the Amendment whether the land should stay operational or cease to be so.

    The Amendment makes it necessary only that the disposing undertakings shall have "included purposes similar" to those of the acquiring undertakers, and to the extent that all undertakers affected by the Transport Bill include something to do with transport, the Amendment might be held to let in transfers between any of these undertakings and would thus have no modifying effect on the Clause.

    It is to avoid needless applications for minor works on land which is already operational land of a transport undertaking that the amended Clause as it comes to us from another place is designed The further Amendment, even if it were capable of precise interpretation—and I am advised that it is not—would have the effect of necessitating for a short time a certain number of applications for minor works until such time as the land qualified for operational status under paragraph (2)(a).

    With regret, I must ask the House to reject the Amendment on the grounds that it is imprecise, that what it seeks to do is unnecessary, and that if it had succeeded, the effects would be short term only. Otherwise, it is a good Amendment.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 63

    Restrictions On Entitlement Of Statutory Undertakers To Com Pensation For Adverse Planning Decisions

    Lords Amendment No. 127: In page 54, line 16, leave out Clause 63 and insert new Clause "I":

    "I.—(1) Except as provided by subsection (2) below, statutory undertakers shall not be entitled to compensation in respect of a decision mentioned in section 170(I)(a) or (b) of the principal Act (right to compensation in respect of certain decisions and orders) where that decision is made after the commencement of this section.
    (2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply to compensation in respect of a decision made in accordance with section 159 of the principal Act refusing planning permission for the development of operational land, or granting such permission subject to conditions, where—
  • (a) planning permission for that development would have been granted by a development order by for a direction given under such an order that planning permission so granted should not apply to the development; and
  • (b) it is not development which has received specific parliamentary approval (within the meaning given to that expression by section 61(3) of this Act).
  • (3) Section 119 of the principal Act (compensation on refusal of planning permission or its grant subject to conditions) shall not apply in relation to planning permission for the development of operational land of statutory undertakers."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is one of the most important provisions in the Bill as it has come back to this House. Hon. Members will recall that we spent a great deal of time discussing compensation payable by local authorities to statutory undertakers when planning restrictions were imposed upon their developments. On Report, it was agreed that the undertakers' entitlement to compensation should be halved in two kinds of cases, but although this move was welcomed, I think that most hon. Members had some misgivings about the form of the Clause as it left this House. For one thing, it did not change the outcome of cases like that of the Abingdon gasholder, which is a historic planning case.

    I am glad to see that the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) is in his place. When we were discussing the Abingdon case, he played a very active and helpful rôle, as did the local authorities concerned and the gas board. After a great deal of patient negotiation, we negotiated the 50–50 settlement.

    But the case for abolishing the right to compensation altogether is strong. The Clause which we sent from this House was defeated in another place and replaced by a Clause which simply abolished compensation altogether in the two kinds of cases where the defeated Clause would have limited it. In considering what action to take the Government bore in mind the strong views which had been expressed in both Houses, and I am very happy to commend the new Clause to the House.

    I should like to thank the right hon. Gentleman for what he said about the part which I played in the Abingdon gasholder dispute. The House should know that it was on the right hon. Gentleman's personal intervention that we reached the settlement we reached, which was about 50 per cent. of what the Southern Gas Board could have obtained from the Borough of Abingdon and Berkshire County Council. I do not think that the former chairman, now retired, of the Southern Gas Board can possibly have foreseen the events which he would set in train when he attempted to bully the Borough of Abingdon into paying the full amount of compensation.

    I am very glad that good sense and fair play have prevailed in this case, which is of great importance to all local planning authorities and all those who seek to preserve the amenities and beauties of architecture in this country.

    I would like to join in the tributes to my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave), for his part in this, and also pay tribute to the Minister, who has been very concerned and careful over this. If I may, I would also pay a tribute to the previous Minister of State. We miss him on occasions like this. He went into this matter very thoroughly in Committee and we also discussed it on Report. It is very satisfactory that a Clause like this has now emerged, to everyone's approval. I am sorry that the Minister of State is not here, to rejoice with us in having found a solution.

    In this ministry, Ministers of State come and go. I hope that they will not pass as quickly as they have done previously, and that we shall enjoy the new Minister of State for a nice long time, at least as long as the Government remains, which, I hope, will not be a long time.

    Question put and agreed to.

    New Clause "J"

    Modifications Of S 164 Of Principal Act

    Lords Amendment No. 128: In page 56, line 4, at end insert new Clause "J"—

    "J.—(1) Section 164 of the principal Act (power of Minister local planning authority or statutory undertakers on acquisition or appropriation of land for development, by service of notice to secure extinguishment of statutory undertakers' rights over the land or the removal of their apparatus) shall be amended in accordance with this section.
    (2) A notice under that section shall not be served by the acquiring or appropriating authority unless they are satisfied that the extinguishment of the statutory undertakers' right or, as the case may be, the removal of their apparatus, is necessary for the purposes of carrying out any development with a view to which the land was acquired or appropriated.
    (3) The period referred to in subsection (1) of the said section (that is to say the period to be specified in a notice under the section as the period at the end of which the statutory undertakers' right will be extinguished or, as the case may be, before the end of which their apparatus shall be removed) shall be a period of not less than twenty-eight days from the date of service of the notice."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Lords Amendment in line 18, leave out 'twenty-eight days' and insert

    a reasonable period (having regard to the character and quantity of the apparatus)'.
    This is an Amendment to a new Clause which deals with the question of supply undertakers who have their apparatus in land which has been acquired by statutory undertakers. My concern here is really for the public, not the undertakers concerned. It is to see that the public does not suffer from one statutory undertaker taking over land in which there is supply apparatus, maybe gas, electricity or water, which is serving the public.

    It seems extraordinary that the Clause the undertaker who acquires the land can give so short a notice as 28 days to the supply undertaker to remove his apparatus. This may be a very substantial job. I thought that I had not read the Clause correctly at first. Surely it could not be that one statutory undertaker could insist that another should remove a great area of, perhaps, electric cables or water mains, within a period of 28 days.

    I put down this Amendment so that an undertaker could be given a reasonable period of time, having regard to the amount of work he will have to do to remove the apparatus, the character of the apparatus and the quantity, so that one statutory undertaker could not force another to carry out this work within 28 days.

    I hope that I shall be forgiven if I first describe the new Clause, to which this is an Amendment. The purpose of the Clause is to improve the machinery relating to service of notices under Section 164 of the 1962 Act. Under that Section, where any land has been acquired or appropriated by a Minister, local authority or statutory undertaker for planning purposes, the acquiring or appropriating authority may serve notice on any statutory undertakers having apparatus on, under or over that land, extinguishing their rights to have the apparatus or requiring its removal. The Section does not set any limit to the circumstances in which such a notice can be served or the time which must be allowed before it takes effect. Subsection (2) of the new Clause deals with the circumstances in which notice may be served and subsection (3) requires that at least 28 days shall be allowed for the removal of apparatus required by the notice.

    1.15 a.m.

    The effect of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) would be to replace the reference to 28 days by
    "a reasonable period (having regard to the character and quantity of the apparatus)".
    I do riot think that the Amendment would help. It is necessary to have a specific minimum period which is reasonable both to the authority and to the statutory undertakers. Unless a precise minimum is stated, it would be open to an authority to reduce the period drastically and it would be open to vexatious dispute as to what is a reasonable minimum in a given case.

    The Clause as it stands gives a reasonable floor upon which the authority and the undertaker can stand in making an arrangement for a particular case. I

    " K.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where land has been acquired or appropriated as mentioned in section 164(1) of the principal Act, and—
    (a) there is on, under or over the land any apparatus vested in or belonging to statutory undertakers; and
    10(b) the undertakers claim that development to be carried out on the land is such as to require, on technical or other grounds connected with the carrying on of their undertaking, the removal or re-siting of the apparatus, affected by development
    the undertakers may serve on the acquiring or appropriating authority a notice claiming the right to enter on the land and carry out such works for the removal or re-siting of the apparatus or any part of it as may be specified in the notice.
    15(2) Where, after the land has been acquired or appropriated as aforesaid, development of the land is begun to be carried out, no notice under this section shall be served later than twenty-one days after the beginning of the development.
    20(3) Where a notice is served under this section, the authority on whom it is served may, before the end of the period of twenty-eight days from the date of service, serve on the statutory undertakers a counter-notice stating that they object to all or any of the provisions of the notice and specifying the grounds of their objection.
    25(4) If no counter-notice is served under subsection (3) above, the statutory undertakers shall, after the end of the period of twenty-eight days therein mentioned, have the rights claimed in their notice.
    30(5) If a counter-notice is served under subsection (3) above, the statutory undertakers who served the notice under this section may either withdraw it or may apply to the Minister and the appropriate Minister for an order under this section conferring on the undertakers the rights claimed in the notice or such modified rights as the Minister and the appropriate Minister think it expedient to confer on them.
    35
    40(6) Where, by virtue of this section or of an order of Ministers thereunder, statutory undertakers have the right to execute works for the removal or re-siting of apparatus, they may arrange with the acquiring or appropriating authority for the works to be carried out by that authority under the superintendence of the undertakers, instead of by the undertakers themselves.
    45(7) Where works are carried out for the removal or re-siting of statutory undertakers' apparatus, being works which the undertakers have the right to carry out by virtue of this section or an order of Ministers thereunder, the undertakers shall be entitled to compensation from the acquiring or appropriating authority; and the amount of the compensation shall be an amount calculated in accordance with subsections (2) to (4) of section 171 of the principal Act but reduced, in a case where the authority carry out the works by the actual cost to the authority of doing so.
    50

    hope, therefore, that the House will reject the Opposition Amendment and will agree with the Lords Amendment.

    Question put and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Clause "K"

    Notice For Same Purposes As S 164, But Given By Statutory Undertakers

    Lords Amendment No. 129: In page 56, line 4, after the Amendment last inserted, insert new Clause "K":

    (8) In subsections (2) to (4) of section 171 of the principal Act, as they apply for the purposes of this section, any reference to 'the proceeding giving rise to compensation' shall, instead of being construed in accordance with subsection (5) of that section, be construed as a reference to the circumstances making it necessary for the apparatus in question to be removed or re-sited."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, in line 7, leave out 'technical or other' and insert 'any'.

    I suggest that we take, at the same time, the hon. Member's Amendments in lines 9, 13, 38, 42 and 56, if that suits the convenience of the Opposition.

    I am obliged, Mr. Speaker.

    The new Clause contained in Lords Amendment No. 129 is supplementary to the Clause which we have just discussed where statutory undertakers have acquired property in which another undertaker has supply apparatus. Looking at the matter from the point of view of the public, these Amendments are intended to ensure that the supply undertaker should not be forced to do something which may interrupt the supply to the public. It seemed to me to be restrictive on the freedom of the supply undertaker to require, in subsection (1)(b), that the grounds on which he could claim to enter and carry out work, remove and resite his apparatus, should be "technical or other grounds".

    It is true that the reference is to "other grounds", but following the word "technical" and applying the ejusdem generis rule, it would have to be something connected with "technical" and, therefore, unnecessarily restrictive. Surely, if the undertaker could show any grounds connected with the carrying on of the undertaking, that would be sufficient.

    The Amendments to lines 9, 13, 38, 42 and 56 deal with the same point. It may not be necessary for the supply undertaker to remove or resite his apparatus if he can enter on the land and protect the apparatus in some way. It may be that the statutory undertaker who has acquired the land will build a road which, when placed over the supply apparatus, would fracture it. It may be quite unnecessary to remove that supply apparatus. All that may be necessary for its protection might be to protect it against the sort of development required by the acquiring statutory undertaker. Therefore, I thought it wise to insert protection before removal or resiting to give the supply undertaker the power to enter and carry out that work.

    I shall have to ask the House to reject the Amendment. Section 164 of the 1962 Act, which the new Clause contained in Lords Amendment No. 128 amended, empowers a Minister, local authority or statutory undertakers who have acquired or appropriated land for planning purposes to serve notice on the statutory undertakers extinguishing their rights to have apparatus on or under the land and requiring removal of such apparatus. Subsequent provisions of the 1962 Act provided for the statutory undertakers to be reimbursed for the cost of this removal.

    I think that the House will appreciate that this is an important power in the context of urban renewal. Redevelopment will frequently involve very substantial changes in the existing street pattern, and that will mean alterations in the pattern of mains and pipes belonging to the statutory undertakers.

    The main point of the Clause is to empower the statutory undertakers themselves to serve notice on the acquiring or appropriating authority of the need to remove the apparatus where the undertakers think that the development to be carried out on the land makes it necessary for the purpose of their undertaking that there should be such removal. Section 164 of the Act, and the previous new Clause, have nothing to do with major development by statutory undertakers on land which they own. These provisions are concerned with items of apparatus which are generally small and often underground, such as junction boxes and meters, small apparatus of that kind, and with the mains which connect them.

    Turning to the Amendments which the hon. Gentleman proposes to the Lords Amendment, the effect of the first would be to enable statutory undertakers to serve a notice claiming that development necessitates removal of their pipes or other apparatus on "any" grounds rather than on "technical or other" grounds. The proposed wording might widen the grounds on which a notice might be served, since the word "other" is, in this context, coloured by the word "technical". "Any grounds connected with the carrying on of their undertaking" would be so wide as to embrace considerations which had no connection with the development which occasioned the service of the notice.

    Turning to the five other Amendments, which introduce the word "protection", they are undesirable for three reasons. First, the purpose of the Clause is to give a like power to statutory undertakers as is given to local authorities under the Clause in Lords Amendment No. 128. In the past, statutory undertakers had no power to serve a notice and therefore had no access to compensation provisions when an authority did not serve a notice. This Clause rights that position, but it is undesirable to put the statutory undertakers in a better position than the local authority in similar circumstances.

    Secondly, I do not think that the Amendment to the Lords Amendment is necessary as a practical issue. Previous difficulties have arisen because of the question of access. Thirdly, the Amendment to the Lords Amendment would certainly open the way to dispute and could lead to argument whether removal, resiting, or protection of apparatus were the proper course to adopt. So, in the light of the previous new Clause, I think that the Amendment to this Lords Amendment is undesirable in fairness as between the authority and the undertaker, and that, in practice, it is unnecessary.

    Question put, and negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 65

    Modification Of Transitory Exemptions Based On Pre-1948 Use

    Lords Amendment No. 131: In page 56, line 31, leave out subsection (3) and insert:

    "(3) In applying section 13(5), (6) and (8) of the principal Act (factors relevant for determining whether planning permission is required for resumption of use following the expiration of a limited planning permission) no account shall be taken of any contravention of previous planning control other than contravention of the provisions of Part III of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947; and accordingly—
  • (a) in both section 13(6) and 13(8), for the words 'or in contravention of previous planning control' there shall be substituted the words 'or in contravention of the provisions of Part III of the Act of 1947'; and
  • (b) section 13(10) shall cease to have effect."
  • I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Perhaps we could conveniently consider now also Lords Amendment No. 242 to Schedule 8.

    The point, briefly, here is that when Clause 65 of the Bill was considered in Standing Committee there was some criticism that it was difficult to understand. I hope we have improved the wording. The main point about subsection (3) of the Clause as originally drafted was to do away with the need in the context of this Bill to go back to whether or not the use was lawful or unlawful before 1st July 1948.

    As the Bill left the Commons, this certainly was not right. We hope that now the Amendment provides that lawfulness or otherwise of the use begun before 1st July is not now required for these purposes.

    Question put and agreed to.

    New Clause "M"

    Posting Of Site Notice Prior To Planning Application

    Lords Amendment No. 132 proposed: In page 57, line 6, at end insert new Clause "M":

    "M.—(1) An application for planning permission for development of any class to which section 15 of the principal Act (certain classes of planning application, prescribed by development order, to be supported by evidence of prior publicity) applies shall not be entertained by the local authority unless it is accompanied by one or other of the following certificates, signed by or on behalf of the applicant, that is to say—
  • (a) a certificate stating that he has complied with subsection (2) of this section and when he did so; or
  • (b) a certificate stating that he has been unable to comply with it because he has not such rights of access or other rights in respect of the land as would enable him to do so, but that he has taken such reasonable steps as are open to him (specifying them) to acquire those rights and has been unable to acquire them.
  • (2) In order to comply with this subsection a person must—

  • (a) post on the land a notice, in such form as may be prescribed by a development order, stating that the application for planning permission is to be made; and
  • (b) leave the notice in position for not less than seven days in a period of not more than one month immediately preceding the making of the application to the local planning authority.
  • (3) The said notice must be posted by affixing it firmly to some object on the land, and must be sited and displayed in such a way as to be easily visible and legible by members of the public without going on the land.

    (4) The applicant shall not be treated as unable to comply with subsection (2) of this section if the notice is, without any fault or intention of his, removed, obscured or defaced before the seven days referred to in subsection (2)( b) above have elapsed, so long as he has taken reasonable steps for its protection and, if need be, replacement; and, if he has cause to rely on this subsection, his certificate under subsection (1) above shall state the relevant circumstances.

    (5) The notice required by subsection (2) of this section shall (in addition to any other matters required to be contained therein) name a place within the locality where a copy of the application for planning permission, and of all plans and other documents submitted therewith, will be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours during such period as may be specified in the notice, not being a period of less than twenty-one days beginning with the date on which the notice is first posted.

    (6) If any person issues a certificate which purports to comply with the requirements of this section and which contains a statement which he knows to be false and misleading in a material particular, or recklessly issues a certificate which purports to comply with those requirements and which contains a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular, he shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100.

    (7) Any certificate issued for the purpose of this section shall be in such form as may be pescribed by a development order."

    Read a Second time.

    On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wonder if you can assist us. When we were dealing with Amendment No. 132, which we did when discussing Amendment No. 78, the Parliamentary Secretary stated that the Government were prepared to accept an Amendment to substitute 14 days for seven days. I was under the impression that the House had accepted that Amendment to Lords Amendment No. 78, but I mistook the voices as they were called.

    I understand that the Government are prepared to accept 14 days for seven days in Lords Amendment No. 132, which will leave a discrepancy between the two Clauses. I wonder whether there is any possibility of going back to Amendment No. 78 and correcting it to what I think the whole House hoped was happening and inserting 14 days instead of seven.

    When the House has made up its mind, it has made up its mind. The House is very powerful, but one thing it cannot do is to alter a decision that it has made in the course of a debate, and, having voted one way, later unvote that. I cannot comment on whether the House ought to have done what the hon. Member says it should have done. I can only take what has been done. Whether the House will reject this Amendment and be consistent or accept it and be inconsistent, is not for me.

    The confusion was shared on this side, Mr. Speaker. We owe the Opposition an apology for giving an undertaking that we would accept the Amendment and then inadvertently negativing it. A major part of the responsibility is on this side of the House. It would be embarrassing to have a different period in different parts of the Bill and it would be a great act of courtesy, and would facilitate the business, if the hon. Gentleman would be so kind as to agree not to press his Amendment to Lords Amendment No. 132.

    Further to that, I would wish, of course, to be courteous over this, but it is difficult to be courteous over an important point of law, in a Bill of this sort. I would have thought that there was a possibility in what happens after we have dealt with the Lords Amendments—

    The hon. Member cannot argue about the horse that has gone out of the stable. He can argue about this one if he likes, but what is done is done. Does he wish to move his Amendment to line 20 of the Lords Amendment?

    Question put and agreed to.

    New Clause "N"

    Procedure In Connection With Making And Confirmation Of Tree Preser Vation Orders

    Lords Amendment No. 133: In page 59, line 7, at end insert new Clause it "N":

    "N.—(1) The provisions which may by virtue of subsection (1)(c) of section 29 of the principal Act (tree preservation orders) be applied by such an order in relation to any consent thereunder shall include section 69 of this Act.
    (2) Regulations made by virtue of section 29(5) of the principal Act may (without prejudice to the generality of that subsection) make provision as follows:—
  • (a) that, before a tree preservation order is submitted to the Minister for confirmation, notice of the making of the order shall be given to the owners and occupiers of land affected by the order and to such other persons, if any, as may be specified in the regulations;
  • (b) that objections and representations with respect to the order, if duly made in accordance with the regulations, shall be considered before the order is confirmed by the Minister;
  • (c) that, if no objections or representations are so made, or if any so made are withdrawn, the order, instead of requiring the confirmation of the Minister in accordance with section 29(4) of the principal Act, may be confirmed (but without any modification) as an unopposed order, by the authority who made it; and
  • (d) that copies of the order, when confirmed by the Minister or the authority, shall be served on such persons as may be specified in the regulations."
  • Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The point about this Amendment is that there is now a general desire to prevent appeals coming into Whitehall wherever that is possible, and where there is no risk to the rights of the individual. In the overwhelming number of tree preservation orders—about 75 per cent.—they are unopposed and it is suggested and this Clause provides that where there is no objection to orders they can be confirmed by the authorities making them.

    Where there is an objection all the normal procedures will continue. This gives the local authority some powers. It will certainly save time, and I hope that it will commend itself to the House.

    The Amendment does not say how long the objector will have in which to make his objections. I should be grateful if the Parliamentary Secretary can tell us what period is to be laid down in the regulations. It all depends whether an objector is to have an opportunity to object.

    With the leave of the House, I should point out that the notice which accompanies the order states that the period of objection is 28 days.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 71

    Partial Abrogation Of Dual Control Of Office Development

    Lords Amendment No. 135: In page 60, line 8, after "application" insert "a copy of".

    1.30 a.m.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment deals with a small but important point. Subsection (2) provides that an office development permit shall not be required in support of a planning application for offices ancillary to industry if an industrial development certificate containing conditions restricting the amount of office floor space in the development has been issued. There is no statutory provision which requires the original certificate to be attached to the planning application. The Amendment deals with that.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 136: In page 60, line 24, at end insert:

    "(5) Development in respect of which there has been issued by the Board of Trade an industrial development certificate with conditions attached thereto by virtue of subsection (1) of this section shall be treated as not included in any reference to 'related development' in section 2 of the Act of 1965 (which makes an office development permit unnecessary if the amount of office floor space to be created is below the prescribed exemption limit, but for this purpose requires that space to be aggregated with office floor space created or to be created in the course of other development affecting the same building or site)."

    This Amendment is a safeguard which it is advisable to accept. Section 2 of the Control of Office and Industrial Development Act, 1965, makes an office development permit unnecessary if the amount of office floor space to be created is below the prescribed exemption limit, but for this purpose requires that space to be aggregated with office floor space created or to be created in the course of other development affecting the same building or site. This is known as related development.

    Without the Amendment it might be that although the intention, where later development takes place, was that no certificate should be required, because the wording had not been of the kind now proposed a certificate might become necessary because no permission would have been given for the space. The Amendment prevents this occurring.

    Question put and agreed to.

    New Clause "O"

    Transfer Of Ministerial Functions As To Stopping Up Etc Footpaths And Bridleways

    Lords Amendment No. 137: In page 64, line 25, at end insert new Clause "O":

    "O.—(1) Section 153 of the principal Act (power of Minister of Transport to make orders authorising the stopping up or diversion of highways in order to enable development to be carried out) shall be amended in accordance with this section.
    (2) The power conferred on the Minister of Transport by section 153(1) of the principal Act to make an order authorising the stopping-up or diversion of a highway, where he is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to enable development to be carried out as mentioned in that subsection, shall, in the case of a footpath or bridleway, be exercisable also by the Minister of Housing and Local Government where that Minister is so satisfied; and the Minister of Transport shall not make an order under that subsection in the case of a footpath or bridleway unless, at the time when he first publishes notice of the order in accordance with section 154(1) of the principal Act, it appears to him to be necessary for the said purpose also to authorise the stopping-up or diversion of some other highway, not being a footpath or bridleway.
    (3) Subsection (2) of the said section 153 shall not apply to an order made thereunder by the Minister of Housing and Local Government; but an order so made may make such provision as appears to the Minister to he necessary or expedient for the creation of an alternative highway for use as a replacement for the one authorised by the order to be stopped up or diverted, or for the improvement of an existing highway for such use.
    (4) In relation to an order made by the Minister of Housing and Local Government under section 153 of the principal Act subsection (3) of that section and section 154 of the Act (procedure and publicity for orders under section 153) shall apply with the substitution of references to that Minister for references to the Minister of Transport; and in subsections (4) and (5) of section 153 references to the latter shall be construed as including references to the former.
    (5) In section 32 of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (power of Minister of Transport to make temporary stopping-up or diversion order in connection with surface working of minerals),—
  • (a) in subsection (1), after the words 'Minister of Transport' there shall he inserted the words or the Minister of Housing and Local Government'; and
  • (b) in subsection (2), after the words 'Minister of Transport' there shall be inserted the words 'or the Minister of Housing and Local Government, as the case may be'.
  • (6) In this Act, 'footpath' and 'bridleway' have the same meanings as in the Highways Act 1959.
    (7) Nothing in this section applies to or affects an order made by the Minister of Transport before the commencement of this section or an order with respect to which he has, before that commencement, published in the London Gazette the notice required by section 154(1) of the principal Act.
    (8) This section shall not apply to Wales."

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The Clause is a long one. It transfers from the Ministry of Transport to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government the power to make orders under section 153 of the principal Act. We have had a good deal of discussion about this in connection with both the Countryside Act and this Bill. The Clause honours an undertaking we gave to the House, and the understanding that Recommendation 6 of the Gosling Committee should be covered in the Bill. The Clause provides for the total transfer.

    I hope that no hon. Member will ask me to explain the subsections, although I am prepared to do so if so requested.

    The hon. Gentleman is quite right in saying that we have had considerable discussions about Ministerial functions in regard to footpaths and bridleways at earlier stages of the debates on this Bill and the Countryside Act, and I will not weary the House by asking him to explain the various provisions of the new Clause.

    While it remains our view that the Government's handling of the Gosling Report has been a disgraceful way of treating that Committee and the House, it would be ungracious not to thank the Government for accepting the wishes of both sides of the House and the Gosling Committee in agreeing to the transfer of Ministerial functions in this way.

    I congratulate the hon. Gentleman for taking on this onerous duty, and we hope that he will not find it too troublesome in the future. If he does, I am sure that his hon. Friend in the Department, with his great interest in footpaths and bridle-ways, will be the cause.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 138: In page 64, line 29, leave out "had".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Amendment, I suggest that we take Lords Amendments Nos. 139 and 141.

    No. 138 is simply drafting. No. 139 is a paving Amendment to No. 141. Clause 77 provides powers whereby the procedure for making orders for stopping up and diverting highways may be altered so as to enable, in certain circumstances, concurrent consideration of applications for planning permission and of proposals for the stopping up or diverting of a highway if it is necesary to close the highway in order that the related development may take place.

    The effect of the Amendment is to extend subsection (2) of Clause 77 by the provisions in (a) and (b). I think that these will be found to be useful.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 140: In page 64, line 41, after "undertakers" insert:

    "or the National Coal Board".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    It adds the National Coal Board after "undertakers", because, for certain purposes, the Board is not a statutory undertaker, although it has been considered to be in certain provisions of the Planning Acts.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 142: In page 65, line 15, leave out subsection (4) and insert:

    "(4) In this section 'the responsible Minister' means, except in relation to Wales,—
  • (a) in relation to an order authorising the stopping up or diversion of a footpath or bridleway only, the Minister of Housing and Local Government; and
  • (b) otherwise, the Minister of Transport; and in relation to Wales means the Secretary of State."
  • I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    It might be convenient to take Lords Amendment No. 144 at the same time.

    These are little more than drafting Amendments which make clear the position as to the responsible Ministers in regard to this part of the Bill.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 143: In page 65, line 18, leave out "given" and insert "granted".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The correct word to use here is "granted", and not "given".

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 145: In page 65, line 31, leave out subsections (2) to (4).

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    No. 145 is a paving Amendment to the new Clause, which does two things. It brings together the existing material, which is Clause 78, about the conversion of highways into footpaths and bridleways, and supplements it with certain machinery provisions.

    The general principle of what has been done in Clause 78 to provide for the making of these orders or the right to compensation has not been altered.

    The subsections are clear, and I will not explain them unless the House desires, except to say that subsection (3) contains arrangements for permitting the use of specified vehicles or descriptions of vehicles which may be necessary in an emergency—fire engines, for example—even though the right of way becomes a pedestrian right of way rather than any other kind. Subsections 5 and 6 relate to compensation where people having an interest in land may be affected. Their position is safeguarded by those provisions.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 150: In page 66, line 13, at end insert:

    "( ) In section 32(3) of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (rights of statutory undertakers in respect of their apparatus where order made under section 153 of principal Act), after the reference to the said section 153 there shall be inserted an alternative reference to this section."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Where a highway is stopped up or diverted under Section 153 of the 1962 Act, the rights of statutory undertakers in respect of apparatus in the land over which the highway ran can be extin- guished under Section 32(3) of the Mineral Workings Act, 1951.

    The Amendment applies the power additionally in the case of highways stopped up or diverted under Clause 78.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    New Clause "Q"

    Power Of Local Authorites To Provide For Amenity Of Converted High Way

    Lords Amendment No. 153: In page 66, line 15, after the Amendment last inserted, insert new Clause "Q":

    "Q.—(1) Where in relation to a highway an order has been made under subsection (2) of section (Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway) of this Act, a competent authority may carry out and maintain any such works on or in the highway, or place on or in it any such objects or structures, as appear to them to be expedient for the purposes of giving effect to the order or of enhancing the amenity of the highway and its immediate surroundings or to be otherwise desirable for a purpose beneficial to the public.
    (2) The powers exercisable by a competent authority under this section shall extend to laying out any part of the highway with lawns, trees, shrubs and flower-beds and to providing facilities for recreation or refreshment.
    (3) A competent authority may so exercise their powers under this section as to restrict the access of the public to any part of the highway, but shall not so exercise them as—
  • (a) to prevent persons from entering the highway at any place where they could enter it before the order under section (Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway) was made; or
  • (b) to prevent the passage of the public along the highway; or
  • (c) to prevent normal access by pedestrians to premises adjoining the highway; or
  • (d) to prevent any use of vehicles which is permitted by an order made under the said section (Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway) and applying to the highway; or
  • (e) to prevent statutory undertakers from having access to any works of theirs under in, on, over, along or across the highway
  • (4) An order under subsection (8) of the said section (Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway) may make provision requiring the removal of any obstruction of the highway resulting from the exercise by a competent authority of their powers under this section.
    (5) The competent authorities for the purposes of this section are—
  • (a) the councils of counties, county boroughs and county districts; and
  • (b) in Greater London, the Greater London Council and the councils of London boroughs;
  • but such an authority shall not exercise any powers conferred by this section unless they have obtained the consent of the local planning authority and the highway authority (in a case where they are themselves not that authority)."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The purpose of the new Clause is to empower local authorities to carry out on highways which have been converted to footpaths or bridleways by order under the preceding new Clause "P" that sort of minor works which are appropriate where a pedestrian precinct has been created. This could provide for structures which are specified in either subsections (1) or (2).

    There is the safeguard that the placing of objects and structures on the highway must be done so that it does not block off the highway to pedestrians.

    Subsection (4) makes it clear that if an order converting a highway into a footpath or bridleway is revoked, the previously existing rights must be restored.

    Question put and agreed to.

    New Clause "R"

    Powers For Local Authorities Analogous To Section 153 Of Principal Act

    Lords Amendment No. 154: In page 66, line 15, after Amendment last inserted, insert new Clause "R":

    "R.—(1) Subject to section (Confirmation, validity etc. of orders under two preceding sections) below, a competent authority may by order authorise the stopping up or diversion of any footpath or bridleway if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to enable development to be carried out—
  • (a) in accordance with planning permission granted under Part III of the principal Act or the enactments replaced by that Part of the Act; or
  • (b) by a government department.
  • (2) The competent authorities for the purposes of this section are—

  • (a) the local planning authority; and
  • (b) in relation to development for which planning permission was granted by another authority to whom had been delegated the power of granting it, that other authority.
  • (3) An order under this section may, if the competent authority are satisfied that it should do so, provide—

  • (a) for the creation of an alternative highway for use as a replacement for the one authorised by the order to be stopped up or diverted, or for the improvement of an existing highway for such use;
  • (b) for authorising or requiring works to be carried out in relation to any footpath or bridleway for whose stopping up or diversion, creation or improvement, provision is made by the order;
  • (c) for the preservation of any rights of statutory undertakers in respect of apparatus of theirs which immediately before the date of the order is under, in, on, over, along or across any such footpath or bridleway;
  • (d) for requiring any person named in the order to pay, or make contributions in respect of, the cost of carrying out any such works.
  • (4) The powers of a competent authority under this section shall include power to make an order authorising the stopping up or diversion of a footpath or bridleway which is temporarily stopped up or diverted under any other enactment.

    (5) Section 32(1) and (2) of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (power of Ministers to make temporary order for stopping-up or diversion of highway in connection with working of surface minerals) shall apply to an order made by a competent authority under this section as it applies to an order made by a Minister under section 153 of the principal Act, with the substitution—

  • (a) for references to Ministers of references to a competent authority for the purposes of this section; and
  • (b) for the reference in subsection (2) to section 153(3) of the principal Act, of a reference to subsection (3) of this section."
  • I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment, which will be seen in relation to the next following new Clause,
    "Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes",
    gives effect to an undertaking which was made during Third Reading of the Countryside Bill.

    This new Clause reflects the powers of Section 153 of the 1962 Act. It empowers the local planning authority, or an authority granting planning permission by virtue of delegated powers, to make orders stopping up or diverting footpaths or bridleways for the reasons for which the Minister can make such orders under Section 153. I think that the provisions follow from this. It is a transfer from one power to another.

    Question put and agreed to.

    S.—(1) Subject to section (Confirmation, validity etc. of orders under two preceding sections) below, where any land has been acquired or appropriated for planning purposes and is for the time being held by a local authority for the purposes for which it was acquired or appropriated, the authority may by order extinguish any public right of way over the land, being a footpath or bridleway, if they are satisfied that an alternative right of way has been or will be provided, or that the provision of the alternative right of way is not required.
    10(2) Any reference in subsection (1) above to the acquisition of land for planning purposes is a reference to the acquisition thereof under section 68 or 71 of the principal Act or section 26 of this Act; and any reference to the appropriation of land for planning purposes is a reference to the appropriation thereof for purposes for which land can, or could have been, acquired under those sections.
    15

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 8, leave out "or will be".

    I suggest that we take the two Amendments and the Lords Amendment together.

    I am sure that it is sensible to take these two Amendments together.

    New Clause "S" provides for the extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes. At present the new Clause provides,
    "…the authority may by order extinguish any public right of way over the land, being a footpath or bridleway, if they are satisfied that an alternative right of way has been or will be provided…."
    My hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason) has pointed out that this provision is far too vague, and that there ought to be some duty placed on the authority to satisfy itself, not only that an alternative right of way will be provided, but that it will be provided within a reasonable time, before it extinguishes any public right of way under the provisions of the new Clause. It is far too vague to say that an alternative right of way will be provided at some distant date in the future.

    1.45 a.m.

    I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept the Amendment which will, I think, make sure that the local authority

    New Clause "S"

    Extinguishment Of Footpaths Etc Over Land Held For Planning Purposes

    Lords Amendment No. 155: In page 66, line 15, after the Amendment last inserted, insert new Clause "S":

    has to be satisfied that the alternative right of way will be provided within a reasonable time. This is a reasonable request, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accede to it.

    I should like to be in a position to ask the House to agree to this Amendment, though I was not particularly successful when I suggested this on the last occasion. I cannot, however, ask the House to accept it because the effect of it would be far more restrictive than the hon. Gentleman thinks.

    Perhaps I might consider, first, the Amendment to leave out "or will be". The provision now is that a local authority can extinguish public rights of way over land which it has acquired or appropriated for planning purposes. It has to be satisfied that an alternative right of way has been, or will be provided, or that it is not required.

    The middle provision is left out if one accepts the implications of the time limit in the Amendment. In quite a number of cases of development it is not possible to go ahead with the provision of an alternative route until some stage when the development has taken place. Consequently it might drive the authority to come to a speedy and convenient conclusion that the route was not necessary, or to hold up the development. I do not think that that is a reasonable position in which to put the authority. The Clause and the Lords Amendment provide three alternatives. Sometimes it is possible to provide an alternative right of way only when the development is some way advanced, and these provisions have been put in in the light of experience.

    The second Amendment seeks to impose some sort of time limit on the provision of an alternative. Earlier on hon. Gentlemen opposite rather twitted us about the fact that we were not prepared to leave matters to local authorities. These authorities are looking after the interests of the ratepayers, and I do not think one must assume that they will be negligent about something which affects the public. There is, however, an additional protection. These orders have to be advertised, and they are open to objection by the public. If sufficient evidence is available to satisfy the public that alternative routes are not likely to be provided, objections can be made, and they will be considered by the Minister before he confirms the order.

    We think that the position is satisfactorily catered for in the Lords Amendment, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press his Amendment.

    Amendment negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Clause "T"

    Confirmation, Validity, Etc Of Orders, Under Two Preceding Sections

    Lords Amendment No. 156: In page 66, line 15, after the Amendment last inserted, insert new Clause "T":

    "T.—(1) An order under section (Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act>) or (Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes) of this Act shall not take effect unless confirmed by the Minister, or unless confirmed, as an unopposed order, by the authority who made it.
    (2) The Minister shall not confirm any such order unless satisfied as to every matter of which the authority making the order are required under section (Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) or (Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes) (as the case may be) to be satisfied,

    (3) The time specified—

  • (a) in an order under section (Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) above as the time from which a footpath or bridleway is to be stopped up or diverted; or
  • (b) in an order under section (Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes) above as the time from which a right of way is to be extinguished,
  • shall not be earlier than confirmation of the order.

    (4) Schedule ( Procedure in connection with orders relating to footpaths and bridle ways) to this Act shall have effect with respect to the confirmation of orders under section ( Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) or ( Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes) of this Act and the publicity for such orders after they are confirmed."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The major new feature of the new Clause is the possibility of confirming such orders by the promoting authority if they are unopposed. This is a similar position to the one to which I referred recently in connection with another part of the Bill, I hope, therefore, that the House will find this equally acceptable. Where there are objections, the normal provisions will, of course, apply.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    New Clause "U"

    Agreements With Crown Estate Commissioners

    Lords Amendment No. 160: In page 67, line 7, at end insert new Clause "U":

    U. An agreement made by the Crown Estate Commissioners under section 200 of the principal Act (whereby a government department may agree with local planning authorities to secure the use of Crown land in conformity with the development plan) shall not require the approval of the Treasury; and accordingly in subsection (2) of that section the words 'the Crown Estate Commissioners or by' shall cease to have effect.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I suggest that we take Amendment No. 247 with this Amendment, The Crown Estates Act, 1961 provided that the Crown Estate Commissioners should be no longer subject to direct and detailed Treasury control. The Countryside (Scotland) Act provided that in that part of the world similar control need no longer be exercised by the Treasury. We have followed Scottish precedent.

    Question put and agreed to.

    V.-(1) This Act shall come into operation on a day appointed by an order made by statutory instrument by the Minister, and different days may be appointed under this section for different purposes and, in particular, different days may be so appointed for the coming into operation of the same provision in different areas.
    10(2) Any reference in this Act to the commencement of any provision thereof shall be construed as a reference to the day appointed for the coming into operation of that provision or, in the case of a provision which comes into operation on different days in different areas, shall, in relation to any area, be construed as a reference to the day appointed for the coming into operation of that provision in that area.
    15(3) An order under this section may make such transitional provision as appears to the Minister to be necessary or expedient in connection with the provisions thereby brought into force, including such adaptation of those provisions or any provision of this Act then in force as appear to him to be necessary or expedient in consequence of the partial operation of this Act (whether before or after the day appointed by the order).
    20
    25(4) The Minister of Housing and Local Government shall, for England, and the Secretary of State shall, for Wales, each maintain and keep up to date a register showing the effect of orders made under this section in such a way as enables members of the public to inform themselves—
    (a) as to the provisions of this Act which have come, or are to be brought, into operation, and on which dates and in relation to which areas; and
    30(b) as to whether, in the case of a particular area, any transitional provision has been made by such an order.
    35(5) The register maintained by the Minister of Housing and Local Government under this section shall be kept at his principal offices in London, and the register so maintained by the Secretary of State shall be kept at his principal offices in Cardiff; and both registers shall be available for inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.

    Read a Second time.

    I suggest that we discuss also Amendments Nos. 162 and 163, and I have selected the second Amendment to this Lords Amendment.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 34, leave out 'both' and insert:

    'copies shall be kept by the local planning authorities of all such entries in the Register as shall affect the area of that authority; and all such entries and'.
    In this case the Government have inserted a provision for a register to be kept by the Minister of Housing and Local Government of the coming into operation of the various parts of the Bill when enacted. The register is to be maintained in two places—in the offices

    New Clause "V"

    Commencement

    Lords Amendment No. 161: In page 68, line 29, at end insert new Clause "V":

    in London and in the offices in Cardiff. It will be a great help to the public to have this set out in a register to which they can refer to ascertain exactly where the various provisions of the Act will be in force, when they come into force, and so on.

    It could be made even more beneficial to the public if local authorities were obliged to keep a register so far as it affects their area. It would not entail any great expense or trouble for the Ministry to pass the information on to local authorities. A local authority must know when any Section is coming into operation in its area. There should be a register at the local registry which the public can inspect. This is a simple practical point which would make subsection (5) more beneficial to the public.

    In subsection (3) the Minister takes power to make transitional provisions which will in many cases alter the law.

    He will be able to do so by an Order which will not be laid before the House, let alone have any Parliamentary procedures applied to it. This seems to be taking immense powers. It is usual for an Order bringing an Act into operation on a certain date to be a simple statutory instrument not laid before the House and subject to Parliamentary procedure, but these Orders go further than ordinary commencing Orders. They will bring certain Sections of the Act into operation geographically, in some areas and not in others. I t would have been more helpful for the House to follow how an Act comes into operation to have Orders at least laid. I would prefer that they should be subject to annulment. As the new Clause stands, the Minister has complete power to make Orders without giving them the publicity one would hope they would have.

    We considered carefully whether there would be any great advantage in adopting the suggestion contained in this Amendment and decided that there would not be. I think the hon. Member realised this when he said that local authorities will themselves know what their position is. They get all the copies of statutory instruments as a matter of routine. In addition, local authorities will be informed by the Welsh Office and by the Ministry of commencement Orders relevant to their areas. The provision in the Bill for national registers is designed to meet a need for an authoritative statement on a collected national basis. For inquiry about an individual area, the normal thing would be to go to the local authority. Although we are not out of sympathy with trying to provide this information, the suggested procedure seems unnecessary and elaborate.

    We have had discussion about the point related to subsection (3). It is necessary to have regard to this other legislation. This is a provision which is always made and it is included here for obvious reasons.

    Amendment negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Schedule 1

    Special Provisions As To Development Plans In Greater London

    Lords Amendment No. 164: In page 70, line 25, leave out:

    "Part I of this Act (including this Schedule" and insert "this Act".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The effect of this Amendment is to ensure that the Greater London Development Plan will be treated as a structure plan for all purposes of the Bill rather than just for the purposes of Part I. This is of particular significance with respect to Part IV of the Bill, which adapts existing blight provisions to the new system of structure and local plans. It is clearly desirable that if the Greater London Development Plan is to be treated as a structure plan, all the related provisions should apply. The Amendment achieves that.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 165: In page 71, line 21, after "5" insert ",6".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The effect of this Amendment is to ensure that proposals for alteration of the structure plan for a London borough shall follow the same procedure as the original plan coming to the Minister through the G.L.C.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 166: In page 71, line 34, after "area" insert:

    "or is to be treated as an action area".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This and Lords Amendment No. 167: In page 71, line 41, after "area" insert:

    "or for an area which is to be treated as an action area".

    are drafting improvements to make clearer a point in two detailed applications of Part I of the Bill to Greater London.

    Question put and agreed to

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    "A.—1. An application for an established use certificate shall be made in such manner as may be prescribed by a development order, and shall include such particulars, and be verified by such evidence, as may be required by such an order or by any directions given thereunder, or by the local planning authority or, in the case of an application referred to the Minister, by him.
    102. Provision may be made by a development order for regulating the manner in which applications for established use certificates are to be dealt with by local planning authorities, and, in particular,—
    15(a) for requiring the authority to give to any applicant for such a certificate, within such time as may be prescribed by the order, such notice as may be so prescribed as to the manner in which his application has been dealt with;
    20(b) for requiring the authority to give to the Minister and to such other persons as may be prescribed by or under the order, such information as may be so prescribed with respect to applications for such certificates made to the authority, including information as to the manner in which any such application has been dealt with.
    25
    303.—(1) A development order may provide that an application for an established use certificate, or an appeal against the refusal of such an application, shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by a certificate in such form as may be prescribed by the order and corresponding to one or other of those described in paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 16(1) of the principal Act (requirement of certificate that the applicant is the owner of the land or has given notice to the owners of his intended application, or has tried to do so) and any such order may-
    35(a) include requirements corresponding to section 16(2) and (3) (contents of certificate), section 16(4) (planning authority not to determine application for a certain period) and section 17(3) (duty of planning authority and Minister on appeal to take into account representations by owners, tenants, etc.) of the principal Act; and
    40
    (b) make provision as to who, in the case of any land, is to be treated as the owner for the purposes of any provision of the order made by virtue of this sub-paragraph.
    45(2) If any person issues a certificate which purports to comply with any provision of a development order made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) above and which contains a statement which he knows to be false or misleading in a material particular, or recklessly issues a certificate which purports to comply with those requirements and which contains a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular, he shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100.
    50

    Provisions with respect to grant of certificate

    554. An established use certificate shall be in such form as may be prescribed by a development order and shall specify—
    (a) the land to which the certificate relates and any use thereof which is certified by the certificate as established;
    60(b) by reference to the paragraphs of section (Certification of established use) (1) of this Act, the grounds on which that use is so certified; and

    New Schedule "A"

    Provisions As To Established Use Certificates

    Application for certificate and appeal against refusal thereof

    Lords Amendment No. 168: In page 72, line 11, at end insert:

    (c) the date on which the application for the certificate was made, which shall be the date at which the use is certified as established.
    655. Where the Minister grants an established use certificate, he shall give notice to the local planning authority of that fact.
    706. In section 19(4) of the principal Act (register of decisions on planning applications) references to applications for planning permission shall include references to applications for established use certificates; and the information which may be prescribed as being required to be contained in a register kept under that subsection shall include information with respect to established use certificates granted by the Minister.

    Read a Second time.

    We dealt with this Amendment on Lords Amendment No. 24, but I have selected an Amendment which we will take now.

    2.0 a.m.

    I did not know that we had dealt with this Amendment on a previous Amendment, so I presume that I am permitted only to move our Amendment.

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 40, after 'Act', insert—
    'and section (Posting of site notice prior to planning application) of this Act'.

    Amendment negatived.

    Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Schedule 2

    General Vesting Declarations For Land Compulsorily Acquired

    Lords Amendment No. 169: In page 72, line 34, leave out "under the Act of 1946".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is purely a machinery matter. It does not in any way vary the obligation to make a statement telling a person whose land is being acquired what the effect of the general vesting declaration is. It merely goes to the power under which the regulation setting out the form of that statement is to be made. As the Bill stands, this will be done under the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act, 1946, but not all the compulsory purchase powers in relation to which the general vesting declaration power will be exercised are subject to the procedures of the 1946 Act, and it is more convenient that the regulation in question should be authorised to be made under the Bill in the same way as the form of the general vesting declaration.

    Amendment No. 170 is simply a drafting Amendment.

    Amendment No. 170 is far more than a drafting Amendment, though it is a draft Amendment in that it is the most shocking drafting that appears in the Bill. It asks us to refer to another Act, and read into that Act all sorts of words, and read a Schedule of another Act into the Bill. This is a subject that will affect practitioners in conveyancing, and it will be a very difficult exercise for them.

    We on this side of the House are entirely in opposition to the extension of the vesting declaration powers, and when they are extended in this form it makes things very difficult for those who have to understand the Act and bring it into operation.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 171: In page 75, line 27, leave out paragraph 16.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The Amendment is occasioned by the provisions of the Theft Act, 1968, the general purpose of which was to revise the law on theft. It provides among other things a penalty for
    "a person who by any deception or dishonesty obtains property (which includes money) belonging to another"
    and is convicted of the offence.

    The Theft Act repeals many penalty provisions in individual statutes in order that its general provision shall replace them. The Amendment will bring the Bill into line with the general policy. We had some discussion about this in Committee, in relation to penalties.

    Question put and agreed to.

    B.—Section 138
    In subsection (1)—
    (a) after the word ' Act', where occurring for the first time, there shall be inserted the words ' and of sections 30 to 33 and (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968';
    (b) paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be omitted; and
    10(c) in paragraph (c), for the words in parenthesis there shall be substituted the words ' (otherwise than by being dealt with in a manner mentioned in section 30(1)(a) or (b) of the Act of 1968)';
    15For subsection (5) there shall be substituted the following subsections:—
    20'(5) In this section and in the said sections 139 to 151 "these provisions" means the provisions of this section, those sections and sections 30 to 33 and (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968; and "the specified descriptions" means the descriptions contained in paragraphs (c) to (f) of subsection (1) of this section and paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 30(1) of that Act.
    25(6) In these provisions and in section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968, "blight notice" means a notice served under the next following section or under the said section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice)'.

    Section 139

    In subsection (3)—
    30(a) in paragraph (a) the word 'designated' shall be omitted in both places; and for the words 'any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of the last preceding section ' there shall be substituted the words ' paragraph (c) of section 138(1) above or paragraph (a) or (b) of section 30(1) of the Act of 1968'; and
    35
    (b) in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) for the words 'that subsection' there shall be substituted, in each place, the words 'section 138(1) above'.
    40In subsection (4), for the words 'a notice served under this section' there shall be substituted the words 'a blight notice'.

    Section 140

    In subsection (1), for the words 'Where a notice has been served under the last preceding section' there shall be substituted the words 'Where a blight notice has been served'.
    45For subsection (3) there shall be substituted the following subsection—
    50'(3) Any counter-notice served under this section in respect of a blight notice shall specify the grounds (being one or more of the grounds specified in subsection (2) above or, as relevant, section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) (8) or 31(1) of the Act of 1968) on which the appropriate authority object to the notice'.

    Section 141

    55In subsection (1), for the words 'notice served under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'a blight notice'.

    New Schedule "B"

    Consequential Amendments Of Plan Ning Blight Provisions Of Principal Act

    Lords Amendment No. 172: In page 76, line 28, at end insert:

    Section 142

    60In subsection (1), for the words ' Where a notice has been served under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words ' Where a blight notice has been served'.
    In subsection (2)(b), for the words 'the notice under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'blight notice'.
    65In subsection (3), for the words from the beginning to 'that notice' there shall be substituted the words 'Where the appropriate authority have served a counter-notice objecting to a blight notice'.

    Section 144

    70In subsection (1), for the words 'a notice has been served under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'a blight notice has been served'.

    Section 145

    Subsections (3) and (6) shall be omitted.
    75

    Section 146

    In subsection (1) for the words 'a notice under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'a blight notice'.

    Section 149

    80In subsections (1)(a), (1)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b), for the words 'the whole or part' (wherever occurring) there shall be substituted the words ' the whole or a substantial part'.
    85In subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b) for the words ' six months before the date of service' there shall be substituted the words ' twelve months before the date of service '.

    Section 150

    Subsection (5) shall be omitted.

    Read a Second time.

    Amendment to the proposed Lords Amendment agreed to: In line 23, leave out from 'provisions' to second '" blight' in line 24.

    Amendment to the proposed Lords Amendment agreed to: In page 26, leave out:

    'the said section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice)' and insert ' section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968'.—[Mr. Skeffington.]

    " (1) Regulations under this Act may provide that an application for listed building consent, or an appeal against the refusal of such an application, shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by a certificate in the prescribed form and corresponding to one or other of those described in paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 16(1) of the principal Act (requirement of certificate that the applicant is the owner of the land or has given notice to the owners of his intended application or has tried to do so) and any such regulations may—
    10(a) include requirements corresponding to section 16(2) (contents of certificate), section 16(4) (planning authority not to determine application for a certain period) and section 17(3) (duty of planning authority and Minister on appeal to take into account representations by owners, tenants, etc.) of the principal Act;
    15
    (b) make provisions as to who, in the case of any building, is to be treated as the owner for the purposes of any provision of the order made by virtue of this sub-paragraph."

    Read a Second time.

    Lords Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

    Schedule 3

    Control Of Works For Demolition, Alteration Or Extension Of Listed Buildings

    Lords Amendment No. 173: In page 76, line 43, leave out sub-paragraph (1) and insert:

    I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 15, after 'Act', insert:

    'and section (Posting of site notice prior to planning application) of this Act'.
    I am glad to have the opportunity to move an Amendment similar to one which was rejected by the Minister just now. I was surprised that he did so. All we are saying here is that the Minister could make regulations bringing into operation under Lords Amendment No. 173 the beneficial Clause which the House has already accepted—Posting of site notice prior to planning application. He has already taken power to bring into the regulations matters relating to Section 16 of the principal Act, which is the brother, as it were, to the Clause relating to posting of site notices. One would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman would have welcomed having the power we propose in this Amendment.

    I am sorry that I cannot advise the House to accept this Amendment, although I indicated earlier that there may be at some time some extensions. But again I must remind the House—I do not want to mislead it in any way—of the practical consequences of unlimited extensions to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. MacDermot) referred at an earlier stage.

    New Clause M is restricted to those classes of planning application which can be prescribed for the purposes of Section 15 of the 1962 Act—in present practice, those which relate to what is usually termed, "bad neighbour" development. The Amendment to the Amendment would widen that and is not acceptable to the Government at the present time.

    There is a further reason. The Amendment is unnecessary because paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 gives the Minister power to make regulations as to the manner in which applications for listed building consent are to be advertised, and this includes power to require the posting of site notices in respect of such applications. It is intended to use the power for this purpose so far as that category is concerned, so the hon. Gentleman's objective is already covered.

    Amendment negatived.

    Amendment to the proposed Lords Amendment agreed to: In line 18, leave

    out 'the order' and insert 'regulations'.—[ Mr. Skeffington.]

    Lords Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 174: In page 78, line 43, leave out "under this paragraph" and insert:

    "served in the prescribed manner within such period as may be prescribed, not less than 28 days from the receipt by him of notification of the decision".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment would enable the Minister to prescribe the manner in which and the period within which such appeals are to be made. He may not prescribe a period less than 28 days from the receipt by the applicant of the decision on his application.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 175; In page 78, line 49, at end insert:

    "or
  • (a) in the case of a building to which section 35(10) of this Act applies, that the Minister should give a direction under that section with respect to the building; or
  • (b) in the case of a building subject to a building preservation notice under section 43 of this Act, that the building should not be included in a list compiled or approved under the said section 32."
  • I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Paragraph 7(2) of the Schedule states that the grounds of appeal against refusal of listed building consent may include a claim that the building is not of special architectural or historical interest and ought to be removed from any list compiled or approved by the Minister.

    The Amendment adapts this ground of appeal for two special cases The first is where the building has not been listed but before the coming into operation of Part V of the Bill was made subject to a building preservation order under the 1962 Act; in such a case it is deemed to be listed, and the appellant's claim is that the Minister should give a direction to nullify the deemed listing.

    The second case is where the building has not been listed, but has been subject to an interim "building preservation notice" served by a local authority under Clause 43; in this case the appellant's claim is that the Minister should not confirm the effect of the building preservation notice served by the local authority.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 182: In page 84, line 41, at end insert:

    "Where in consequence of listed building consent being revoked or modified by an order under Part II of this Schedule, compensation is payable in respect of expenditure incurred in carrying out any works to the building in respect of which the consent was granted, then if a listed building purchase notice is served in respect of an interest in the land, any compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of that interest in pursuance of the purchase notice shall be reduced by an amount equal to the value of the works in respect of which compensation is payable by virtue of that paragraph."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment is consequential on the Lords Amendment No. 65, which we accepted earlier and adapts, for the purpose of listed building purchase notices, Section 134(1) of the Act of 1962 which refers to ordinary purchase notices.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 185: In page 87, line 3, leave out "of this Act committed by him" and insert:

    "or 40 of this Act committed by him with respect to the said building"

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Paragraph 20 of Schedule 3 preserves criminal liability for an offence committed under Clause 35, that is to say, carrying out unauthorised works to a listed building while a building preservation notice was in force, notwithstanding that the notice has lapsed. The Amendment makes similar provision for the case where there has been an offence under Clause 40, that is to say, a failure to comply with a listed building enforcement notice, during the currency of a building preservation notice.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 187: In page 87, line 11, after "thereon" insert:

    "under Part IV of this Schedule".

    2.15 a.m.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Paragraph 20 of Schedule 3 states that when a building preservation notice lapses, any listed building enforcement notices served while it was in force should cease to have effect, and that any proceedings on the enforcement notice should lapse. The Amendment makes it clear that the proceedings referred to are administrative proceedings, and not criminal proceedings in the case of an offence of failing to comply with a listed building enforcement notice under Clause 40.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Schedule 4

    Construction Of References In Sections 54 And 55 To "The Responsible Minister Or Ministers"

    Lords Amendment No. 188 agreed to: In page 87, line 35, leave out paragraph 3.

    Lords Amendment No. 189: In page 88, column 1, line 13, at end insert:

    "or to land in the case of which the circumstances mentioned in section 62(2) of this Act are present."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The purpose is to secure consistency. I have no doubt that the House will welcome the Amendment.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    New Schedule "C"

    Procedure In Connection With Orders Relating To Footpaths And Bridleways

    Lords Amendment No. 191: In page 88, line 30, at end insert new Schedule "C":

    Part I

    Confirmation Of Orders

    C.—1.—(1) Before an order under section ( Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) or ( Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes) of this Act is submitted to the Minister for confirmation or confirmed as an unopposed order, the authority by whom the order was made shall give notice in the prescribed form—

  • (a) stating the general effect of the order and that it has been made and is about to be submitted for confirmation or to be confirmed as an unopposed order;
  • (b) naming a place in the area in which the land to which the order relates is situated where a copy of the order may be inspected free of charge at all reasonable hours; and
  • (c) specifying the time (not being less than twenty-eight days from the date of the first publication of the notice) within which, and the manner in which, representations or objections with respect to the order may be made.
  • (2) Subject to sub-paragraph (4) below, the notice to be given under sub-paragraph (1) above shall be given—

  • (a) by publication in the London Gazette and in at least one local newspaper circulating in the area in which the land to which the order relates is situated; and
  • (b) by serving a like notice on—
  • (i) every owner, occupier and lessee (except tenants for a month or a period less than a month and statutory tenants within the meaning of the Rent Act 1968) of any of that land,
  • (ii) every council, the council of every rural parish and the parish meeting of every rural parish not having a separate parish council, being a council or parish whose area includes any of that land; and
  • (iii) any statutory undertakers to whom there belongs, or by whom there is used, for the purposes of their undertaking, any apparatus under, in on, over, along or across that land; and
  • (c) by causing a copy of the notice to be displayed in a prominent position at the ends of so much of any footpath or bridleway as is to be stopped up, diverted or extinguished by virtue of the order.
  • (3) In the foregoing sub-paragraph ' council ' means a county council, a county borough council, a county district council, the Greater London Council or a London borough council.

    (4) Except in the case of an owner, occupier or lessee being a local authority or statutory undertakers, the Minister may in any particular case direct that it shall not be necessary to comply with sub-paragraph (2)( b)(i) above; but if he so directs in the case of any land, then in addition to publication the notice shall be addressed to ' the owners and any occupiers' of the land (describing it) and a copy or copies of the notice shall be affixed to some conspicuous object or objects on the land.

    (5) Where under this paragraph a notice is required to be served on an owner of land and the land belongs to an ecclesiastical benefice, a like notice shall be served on the Church Commissioners.

    2. If no representations or objections are duly made, or if any so made are withdrawn, the authority by whom the order was made may, instead of submitting the order to the Minister, themselves confirm the order (but without any modification).

    3.—(1) If any representation duly made is not withdrawn, the Minister shall, before confirming the order, if the objection is made by a local authority cause a local inquiry to be held, and in any other case either—

  • (a) cause a local inquiry to be held; or
  • (b) afford to any person by whom any represenation or objection has been duly made and not withdrawn an opportunity of being heard by a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose,
  • and after considering the report of the person appointed to hold the inquiry or to hear representations or objections, may confirm the order, with or without modifications:

    Provided that in the case of an order under section ( Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) of this Act, if objection is made by statutory undertakers on the ground that the order provides for the creation of a public right of way over land covered by works used for the purpose of their undertaking, or over the curtilage of such land, and the objection is not withdrawn, the order shall be subject to special parliamentary procedure.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, the Minister shall not confirm an order so as to affect land not affected by the order as submitted to him, except after—

  • (a) giving such notice as appears to him requisite of his proposal so to modify the order, specifying the time (not being less than twenty-eight days from the date of the first publication of the notice) within which, and the manner in which, representations or objections with respect to the proposal may be made;
  • (b) holding a local inquiry or affording to any person by whom any representation or objection has been duly made and not withdrawn an opportunity of being heard by a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose; and
  • (c) considering the report of the person appointed to hold the inquiry or to hear representations or objections as the case may be;
  • and, in the case of an order under section ( Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) of this Act, if objection is made by statutory undertakers on the ground that the order as modified would provide for the creation of a public right of way over land covered by works used for the purposes of their undertaking, or over the curtilage of such land, and the objection

    is not withdrawn, the order shall be subject to special parliamentary procedure.

    4.—(1) The Minister shall not confirm an order under section ( Power for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) of this which extinguishes a right of way over land under, in, on, over, along or across which there is any apparatus belonging to or used by statutory undertakers for the purpose of their undertaking, unless the undertakers have consented to the confirmation of the order; and any such consent may he given subject to the condition that there are included in the order such provisions for the protection of the undertakers as they may reasonably require.

    (2) The consent of statutory undertakers to any such order shall not be unreasonably withheld; and any question arising under this paragraph whether the withholding of consent is unreasonable, or whether any requirement is reasonable, shall be determined by whichever Minister is the appropriate Minister in relation to the statutory undertakers concerned.

    5. Regulations under this Act may, subject to this Part of this Schedule, make such provision as the Minister thinks expedient as to the procedure on the making, submission and confirmation of orders under sections ( Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) and ( Extinguishment of footpaths etc. for land held for planning purposes) of this Act.

    Part Ii

    Publicity For Orders After Confirmation

    6. As soon as may be after an order under section ( Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) or ( Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes) of this Act has been confirmed by the Minister or confirmed as an unopposed order, the authority by whom the order was made publish, in the manner required by paragraph 1(2) of this Schedule, a notice in the prescribed form, describing the general effect of the order, stating that it has been confirmed, and naming a place where a copy thereof as confirmed may he inspected free of charge at all reasonable hours, and shall—

  • (a) serve a like notice and a copy of the order as confirmed on any persons on whom notices were required to be served under the said paragraph 1(2) or under paragraph 1(4); and
  • (b) cause a like notice to be displayed in the like manner as the notice required to be displayed under the said paragraph 1(2):
  • Provided that no such notice or copy need be served on a person unless he has sent to the authority a request in that behalf, specifying, an address for service".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is a long Amendment, but I hope that the House will agree that it was right to include it in a planning Bill. In the Countryside Act the House has recently dealt with an Amendment to the Seventh Schedule to the Highways Act, 1959, in relation to unopposed orders. This is the provision which we are now seeking to bring within a planning Bill. It would have been unsatisfactory, and I know that I shall carry the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) with me on this, to legislate by reference to another Statute as amended by another Bill passed in the present Session. We have therefore felt it absolutely right in the interests of clarity to deal with the matter in extenso as we have.

    The main features, which are taken very closely from the Seventh Schedule and Section 113(4) of the Highways Act, 1959, provide for local and national advertisement if an objection is made and not withdrawn, for the Minister to hold a local inquiry and, after considering the report of any inquiry he may confirm the Order, with or without modification, which then has to go through the processes which are the procedure in the 1959 Act. This seems to be right and I hope that the House will forgive the length of the Lords Amendment for the reasons I have given.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Schedule 6

    Adaptation And Interpretation Of Enactments, Etc

    Lords Amendment No. 192 agreed to: In page 90, line 22, after "Act" insert "this Act".

    Lords Amendment No. 193: In page 91, line 31, leave out from beginning to "references" in line 33 and insert:

    "References in any Act to the acquisition of land under Part V of the principal Act or to land acquired thereunder (including references which, by Schedule 14 to that Act, are to be construed as such) shall be respectively construed as, or as including (according as the context requires)".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    I emphasise again that it is necessary for the Bill to provide for the bringing forward of references to powers of acquisition under earlier enactments so that other provisions expressed in terms of these powers may be enabled to continue working as was intended. This is merely a list of such Statutes. There is no change in policy or any extension of policy.

    I want to query the drafting of the Amendment. Is it correct that it should be to leave out from the beginning to "reference"? I would have thought that that "reference" should also be left out. As it reads, the Amendment does not make sense. I think that the word "reference" should come out in order to put the Amendment in.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 194: In page 91, line 35, after first "and" insert "( a)".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Amendment 194 is drafting. Amendment 195 is consequential upon the repeal by the Bill of Section 67 of the 1962 Act. It is necessary to make the Amendment in its place.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 196: In page 92, line 2, at the end insert:

    " The Highways Act 1959 ( c. 25)

    In section 38(2) (specification of highways which are to be maintainable at the public expense), in paragraph ( e), after the words public path diversion order' there shall be inserted the words ' or in consequence of an order made by the Minister of Transport or the Minister of Housing and Local Government under section 153 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 or by a competent authority under section ( Powers for local authorities analogous to section 153 of principal Act) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 '".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This amendment provides that any footpath or bridleway, created in consequence of a footpath or bridleway closure or diversion order whether made by the Minister of Transport or the Minister of Housing under Section 153 of the 1962 Act, or locally confirmed under new Clause "R" because unopposed, shall be among those highways which are maintainable at the public expense.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 197: In page 92, line 12, leave out paragraph 10 and insert:

    "10. Any reference to section 68 of the Act shall be construed (according as the context may require) as including, or as being replaced by, a reference to section 26 of this Act."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Part IV of the Bill includes provisions adapting the powers of compulsory acquisition contained in the Act of 1962 to the new development plan system. In order to do so it repeals Section 68 of that Act and introduces corresponding powers in Clause 26. The Sixth Schedule makes specific adaptations to the 1962 Act, so as to ensure consistency between that Act and the provisions of the Bill. One of the adaptations so made is included in Paragraph 10, which provides that for any reference to Section 68 of the Act there shall be substituted a reference to Clause 26 of the Bill.

    Question put and agreed.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 204: In page 95, line 14, after "78" insert:

    "(Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway), (Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act) or (Extinguishment of footpaths etc. over land held for planning purposes)".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Paragraph 33 of Schedule 6 amends Section 176 of the 1962 Act, which provides for the manner in which the validity of development plans and of certain Orders and of actions by the Minister can be challenged in the courts. The Amendment adds orders under new Clauses "P". "R" and "S" to Paragraph 9(1)(b) of Section 176 and is necessary to make that Paragraph satisfactorily comprehensive.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 205: In page 95, line 27, at end insert

    "(h) any decision of the Minister on an application for an established use certificate referred to him under section (Grant of Certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (1) of the Act of 1968;
    (i) any decision of the Minister on an appeal under section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (2) of the Act of 1968."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is consequential on new Clause "B", and adds decisions on called-in applications for established use certificates, and on appeals against refusal of such certificates, to the list of actions by the Minister for which Part XI of the 1962 Act lays down the manner of challenge in the courts.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 206: In page 95, line 44, leave out from "section" to "above" in line 5 on page 96 and insert

    "(a) the validity of an enforcement notice shall not, except by way of an appeal under Part II of the Act of 1968 be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever on any of the grounds specified in paragraphs (b) to (e) of section 16(1) of that Act;
    (b) the validity of a listed building enforcement notice under section 39 of the Act of 1968 shall not, except by way of an appeal under Part IV of Schedule 3 to that Act be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever on any of the grounds specified in sub-paragraphs (b) or (e) of paragraph 17(1) of that Schedule.
    (2) Subsection (1)(a)".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    These Amendments delete the first and third of the new subsections and substitute for them a revised subsection (1). The object of the revisions is to ensure that a technical defect in the service of an enforcement notice or listed building enforcement notice cannot be pleaded in the courts as a ground for upsetting the notice, but must be raised by way of appeal to the Minister, who has jurisdiction under Clause 16(b) and paragraph 17(4)(b) of Schedule 3, to dis- regard the failure of service where no one has been prejudiced.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 208: In page 97, line 11, after "153" insert "or 155".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    The interesting provision about these Amendments which should commend itself to the House is that they deal with challenge to the validity of footpath and bridleway orders by bringing them under Part XI of the Act of 1962. Part XI of that Act provides that the validity of development plans and certain decisions and orders under the Act may be challenged in the courts, within six weeks of the decision being announced, on the grounds that the decision was either ultra vires or in some other way in breach of the law.

    At present, orders made by the Minister of Transport under Section 153 of the 1962 Act are subject to those provisions of Part XI and, therefore, challengeable in the courts. The Bill, in transferring jurisdiction relating to orders under Section 153 dealing with footpaths and bridleways to the Minister of Housing, leaves them subject to Part XI. This is for no very clear reason. The Amendment makes those orders subject to extinguishment rights, subject to challenge under Part XI.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 213: In page 97, line 38, leave out paragraphs 38 and 39 and insert:

    " . In section 183 (orders subject to special parliamentary procedure), after the word 'Act', where first occurring, there shall be inserted the words 'or section 78 or (Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway) of the Act of 1968'."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This Amendment does two things. It deletes paragraph 38 from Schedule 6 to the Bill as being unnecessary, and it substitutes a revised and clearer version of paragraph 39.

    I am sorry to spoil the hon. Gentleman's good run—he has been having it all his own way—but surely this must be wrong. The Amendment speaks of Section 183 as from the word "Act" which occurs in the second line of that Section. Therefore, it deals with Section 183(1) of the 1962 Act. In the Schedule of repeals, however, which we have not yet reached, I see that Section 183(1) of the 1962 Act is repealed.

    It seems to me that in Lords Amendment No. 213 we are amending a Section which is later to be repealed. In the Schedule, we are not dealing with any transitional matter. We are dealing with permanent alterations in the law. There must be something wrong if we are amending a Section and later repealing it. Whether there is a printer's error in the numbers or it is a substantial error, I do not know, but we cannot have this Amendment to a Section of the 1962 Act and then, a few pages later, repeal it.

    I would like to conside the point which the hon. Member has made. It may be that I have not understood it, but I think that the position is as follows. Paragraph 38, which extended the scope of Section 181 of the 1962 Act, was thought to be necessary to provide a right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law arising from a determination of the lawful use of land made by the Minister under Clause 16(5)(b) of the Bill in dealing with an enforcement appeal.

    On further consideration, however, it seems clear that any such determination must count as part of the appeal decision, for which a right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law is already provided in Section 180 of the 1962 Act, as amended by paragraph 37 of Schedule 6. A separate right of appeal under Section 181 is, therefore, unnecessary, and it may also be undesirable in the sense that a similar right under two different Sections might cause confusion. I may, however, have misunderstood the point and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising it.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 214: In page 98, line 12, at end insert:

    ".In section 196 (expenses of county councils), after the word 'thereto', there shall be inserted the words 'or under the provisions of the Act of 1968'."

    2.30 a.m.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    Its effect is to extend the application of Section 196 of the 1962 Act to the provisions of the Bill.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 215: In page 98, line 47, at end insert:

    " . In section 205 (ecclesiastical property)—
  • (a) in subsection (1), the words 'specified in paragraph I of the Eighth Schedule thereto' shall be omitted; and
  • (b) in subsection (3), after the words 'under Part VII of this Act' there shall be inserted the words 'or under section 18, 44 or (Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway) of the Act of 1968'".
  • I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    With this Lords Amendment we can also take Lords Amendments No. 219 and 220.

    The Amendments are mainly to do what is necessary to apply to the provisions of the Bill those Sections of the Act of 1962 whose application under that Act is limited to the provisions of the Act listed is one or another of the paragraphs of Schedule 8 to that Act. If the Lords Amendments were not made the Sections referred to would not apply to the Bill.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 224: In page 101, line 14, leave out "43, 45 to".

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    As drafted, the Bill does not provide that the Greater London Council would have the functions referred to in Clause 44 of the Bill. The drafting is now put right.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Lords Amendment No. 229: In page 102, line 20, leave out from "the" to end of line and insert:

    "said Act of 1968; for the words 'paragraphs (a) to (c)' there shall be substituted the words 'paragraphs (a) and (b)'; and for the words 'section 77(1)' there shall be substituted the words 'section 177(1)(a)'".

    Read a Second time.

    I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    If the House will disagree with the Lords Amendment I will move an Amendment in lieu of it.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Amendment made to the Bill in lieu of Lords Amendment No. 229: In page 102, line 20, at end insert:

    'for the words "paragraphs (a) to (c)" there shall be substituted the words "paragraphs (a) and (b)"; and for the words "section 177(1) of that Act" there shall be substituted the words "section 177(1)(a) of the Act of 1962"'.—[Mr. Skeffington.]

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Schedule 7

    Transitional Provisions And Savings

    Lords Amendment No. 238: In page 105, line 41, leave out paragraph 10 and insert:

    "10.—(1) References in this Act to an enforcement notice shall be construed as not including references to an enforcement notice served, before the commencement of Part II of this Act, under section 45 of the principal Act, or having effect by virtue of paragraph 11 or 12 of Schedule 13 to the principal Act, or paragraph 1 or 17 of Schedule 14 to that Act.
    (2) In relation to an enforcement notice so served, the provisions of the principal Act, and of any other Act passed before this Act, shall continue to apply as if this Act had not been passed.
    (3) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the withdrawal, after the said commencement, of an enforcement notice so served or the service thereafter of an enforcement notice under Part II of this Act.
    11. Section 9 of the Control of Offices and Industrial Development Act 1965 shall, in relation to an enforcement notice served before the commencement of Part II of this Act, have effect as originally enacted and not as amended by paragraph 57 of Schedule 6 to this Act.
    12. The amendment of section 14 of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 which is made by paragraph 64 of Schedule 6 to this Act shall not have effect in relation to a notice served under that section before the commencement of Part II of this Act."

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This provides for a revised form of transitional provision for the changeover from the superseded provisions of the enforcement code to the new provisions in Part II of this Bill.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Schedule 8

    Enactments Repealed

    Lords Amendment No. 246: In page 109, leave out line 23.

    I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

    This is drafting.

    This is the very Amendment to which I was referring on a previous Amendment when I said that a Section had been amended and then repealed. It may be that we have a wrong line in Amendment 246 and that it was intended to take out of the repeal Schedule, Section 183(1), but instead we have taken out the next line of the Schedule. I am not certain whether it was intended that we should restore to the law Section 194(6) and (7) of the 1962 Act or whether we should take out Section 183(1), but as the Bill stands, we have amended Section 183 and now we come to the repeal Schedule and remove Section 183(1). I do not know whether the Parliamentary Secretary is informed of the real position, but I think the House should be told what it is.

    I think we are right. The Amendment deletes the entry in the repeal Schedule relating to Section 194(6) and (7) of the 1962 Act because these subsections were repealed in previous legislation. I will check this, but it seems to be correct.

    With the leave of the House, may I say that this does not solve our problem. We are left with an amended Section which is then repealed and I put the point that we had perhaps got hold of the wrong line in the printing in Amendment 246. If we had, this would have solved our problem. We cannot leave the Bill in one Clause amending a Section of an Act and then repealing it.

    Subsection (1) of Section 183 is repealed, but the Amendment is to Subsection (2).

    Question put and agreed to.

    Remaining Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Detention Centres (Remission Rules)

    2.40 a.m.

    I beg to move,

    That the Detention Centre (Amendment) Rules 1968 (S.I., 1968, No. 1014), dated 27th June, 1968, a copy of which was laid before this House on 4th July, be withdrawn.
    The purpose of these Rules is to increase the existing period of remission in a detention centre order from one-sixth of the period to one-third of that period. I say at once to the Parliamentary Secretary—whom I am glad to see here this evening—that this is purely an exploratory Motion. I have no intention of inviting the House to oppose the Rules. I merely put down the Prayer—as it originally was—to ask the Parliamentary Secretary why the Home Office has decided to make these Rules at this time.

    The Rules refer to detention centres sentences of periods of over one month, but the Parliamentary Secretary knows as well as I do that in practice all sentences of detention in detention centres are for either three months or six months, and the practical effect of the Rules is to reduce the present three months' sentence —which, in effect, is a sentence of 10 weeks—to one of eight weeks, and to reduce the present six months' sentence—which is now five months—to a period of four months.

    It would be churlish of me if, at this hour in the morning, I did not assure the Parliamentary Secretary that I propose to be short in my remarks and to apologise to him and to any members of his Office who may be here for the fact that, due to no fault of either himself or myself what was at first put down as a Prayer should eventually end up by being taken at nearly a quarter to Three o'clock in the morning.

    There are five points that I wish to make. The first is I am a member of the Home Office Advisory Committee on the Penal System, and also a member of the sub-committee which is inquiring into detention centres. What I say I say purely as an individual and in no way committing either that Committee or any member of it to agree with the views I express. But there is no doubt that one matter which is before and in the remit of that Committee is the question of a suitable length for the period of remission in a detention centre.

    It is only right that I should say that the Committee on which I serve was informed in advance by the Home Secretary of his intention to make these Rules. It is equally right that I should say that the Committee at that stage said that it could see no reason why this change in the period of remission should not be made while its review was still in progress. I find it somewhat surprising that the Home Office, having put the whole problem of detention centres to the Advisory Committee and having invited it to set up the sub-committee on this issue, should decide, while the Committee is in process of making its decisions, to increase the period of remission in this way.

    It is some time since that Committee was set up. It is probably right to say that it is about half way through its discussion and its consideration and, speaking purely for myself and in no way committing the Committee, I think it unfortunate that the Ministry should have decided to increase the period of remission while the inquiry is still going on.

    One must comment that this is the second decision of this kind which the Home Office has made, the first being the decision to abolish the junior detention centres at a time when it had asked the Advisory Committee to inquiry into all the problems of detention centres.

    I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not think that I am being ultra-critical in what I say. The point which I want to make on that issue is that the period of remission to any sentence cannot be looked at on its own. Of necessity, the Advisory Committee is considering the suitable length of sentence at detention centres, whether the present period is the correct one, whether there is room for a shorter sentence, or whether the sentence should be of an indeterminate length. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that all those issues are ones on which the period of remission is dependent. If the Committee came down in favour, for example, of an indeterminate sentence or something of that nature, the whole question of remission would have to be looked at again.

    I ask the hon. Gentleman to explain to me why it is that the Home Office has felt it necessary to make this change at the present time. If there were urgent causes for it, one could understand the reason why they chose to do it now, but, for myself, I can see no possible urgency in any such change. Again speaking purely as an individual member of the Committee, my impression is that the weight or majority of the evidence that we have so far received is against the alteration which the Home Office is making.

    That is the first point that I wish to make. My second point is that, in one's visits to detention centres, it is clear that the present regime in them is geared to a 10-week period. The effect of the Order is to reduce that to an eight-week period. To that extent, I believe that that move will disrupt the present regime in those centres.

    Much discussion has taken place on the theory and basis of the detention centre. According to the White Paper which set them up, they started with the idea of providing "a short, sharp shock". Over the years since, as well as retaining the aim of a short, sharp shock, they have also taken on a training element.

    If the only purpose of detention was to provide a deterrent, many people would argue that the effect of one or two weeks in a centre would probably be sufficient. If it has now become the concept in a detention centre that, on top of the deterrent, an attempt should be made to provide some basic form of training and remedial work, it seems to me that the existing 10-week period is the minimum time in which this could be done and that to reduce it to eight weeks would be reducing the opportunity of putting a training element into the sentence. My own impression, both from what I have seen and from what I have read in the evidence provided, tends to support that view.

    Thirdly, I wish to raise with the Parliamentary Secretary the whole question of the purpose of having any remission at all in a detention centre order. The only possible reason, I suggest, is that it is a means of discipline and a means of imposing punishment within the centre by the ability to withdraw the remission which would otherwise be earned. If so—and I see the Parliamentary Secretary nod, so it must be so, and it is accepted as such—I suggest that the present period of two weeks on a three months sentence, or four weeks on a six months sentence, is adequate for that period.

    I am fortified in that view by the Written Answer which I got from the Parliamentary Secretary to a Question which I put down very shortly after this Order had been published. I asked the Parliamentary Secretary
    "how many youths at senior detention centres lost the whole period of 14 days remission whilst undergoing their sentence …".
    The Parliamentary Secretary, in reply, gave me the figures of the initial receptions and the figures of the awards of loss of remission that had been granted. But, concerning how many had actually used up, if that is the right word, the whole of their 14 days remission by bad conduct in the centre, the hon. Gentleman said:
    "The information is not available in the form requested by the hon. Member but I am able to confirm that the number of boys who lose the whole period of remission is very small."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd July, 1968; Vol. 769, c. 87–88.]
    I suggest that this confirmed the view that I had taken, that it is indeed seldom that the needs of discipline are such that they require a greater period than 14 days of remission which could possibly be lost.

    Fourthly, the other argument for increasing the period of remission is that at present the period of remission is related to the period of recall. The maximum for which a person can be recalled at present on a three months sentence is 14 days—I stick to a three months sentence, because the Parliamentary Secretary knows full well that the majority of sentences imposed are of that duration—but one argument is that that period of recall is not sufficient to be a deterrent for someone, having been released, not to misbehave in a way which might lead to his recall. That might be a relevant argument if one could say that within the concept of detention sentences recall had any effective part to play.

    I query whether recall basically does any good or whether it works in any way. Again, I am confirmed in that view by another Written Answer which I got on the same date, the 23rd July this year, to another Question that I put down to the Home Office on this matter. I asked how many youths at detention centres were in fact returned to detention centres on recall. The Answer was that in the year 1964, out of 4,500 initial receptions, only two were recalled. In 1965, out of roughly 5½ thousand, 28 were recalled. In 1966, out of 5,810, 16 were recalled. Finally, in 1967, out of a similar number of receptions, 22 were recalled. I think this confirms the view one had arrived at, that the powers to recall people to detention centres for any offence, or for any breach of probation whilst on remission from detention centres, are very little used. I very much doubt that the power to recall for 21 days rather than 14 days will be more widely used, or indeed have any greater or better effect.

    I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that if the purpose of the Order is merely to extend the period of recall to which a person should be subject, it might be better to scrap the idea of the recall being related to the period of remission and replace it by a definite period of recall which would have to be served, and which would not necessarily have any relationship to the period of remission which had been gained.

    I am conscious of the hour, and I have one final point to make. What concerns me most of all is a feeling, which I hope the hon. Gentleman will be able to refute, that the reason for this Order is not penal policy, but administrative necessity. The reason for it is that by increasing the period of remission so that we reduce the period that people stay in detention centres it is possible to increase the numbers of people who go through these centres in any one year. If, at the moment, detention centres are full and people are there for 10 weeks, there are roughly five turn-overs during the year. If the period is reduced to eight weeks, there will be roughly six and a half turn-overs during a year.

    I hope that that is not the reason, because it will be unfortunate if any clear decision on penal policy is made on the grounds of administrative necessity. If it is a shortage of centres which has led to this Order, it would be far better to extend the number of centres rather than play with the remission period in this way.

    I remain probing on this Order. I wish to know the reasons behind the Home Secretary's decision. I remain somewhat sceptical and critical about the decisions which have been taken, but I hope that I am not going to fall into the trap which I accused the Home Office of being in danger of falling into, that of making up my mind and making my decisions whilst the Committee of which I am a member is in the middle of its deliberations, and in the process of making its recommendations to the Home Office. I conclude by asking again to be told the reasons why this Order has been brought in at this time. I shall listen with interest to the hon. Gentleman's explanation of the need for it.

    2.58 a.m.

    The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has come to the House as an agnostic, as one who does not now believe, but is open to conviction, and I hope that very briefly, at this early hour of the morning, I might be able to say a few things which might assist him.

    My right hon. Friend announced his intention to make this change in his Answer to a Written Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Luton (Mr. Howie) on 4th July last. The period of remission which could be earned by a young person subject to a detention order before 1st August, as we have heard from the hon. Gentleman, when this Instrument came into effect, was one-sixth of the sentence. This was governed by Rule 26 of the Detention Centres Rules, 1952, which was amended by the Order made on 27th June of this year to enable remission to be increased to one-third of the term of detention subject to any forfeiture which might result from a disciplinary award.

    When this period of remission was originally decided upon in 1952 it was considered that this would provide a sufficient incentive to good behaviour and, futhermore, that on such sentences a greater proportion would be unjustified. Subsequent experience has cast serious doubt on this. It was found that the then existing period of two weeks remission on a three-month sentence was not in practice a very substantial incentive to good behaviour in the centre. Further, after release from a detention centre a young person is subject to statutory after care for a period of 12 months during which he can, if in breach of the requirements for his good behaviour laid down in the supervision order, be recalled for a period equivalent to the unexpired portion of his sentence. Thus the doubling of this liability, which is one effect of the increase in remission to one-third, serves not only as a sanction in respect of supervision but would provide a more adequate period for further training in the event of recall becoming necessary. Thus the principal benefit from the change was to discipline, since the young persons in detention centres would have more to gain or lose than at present.

    The hon. Gentleman has said that it would not appear from the statistics that more than a small fraction of those attending detention centres lose the whole of their remission. I do not challenge this. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will accept that that is not in itself a fact which proves that an extension of the remission period would not have a beneficial effect. It might well mean that there would be a substantial improvement in behaviour.

    Conversely, with regard to the question of supervision after release, there would be a greater incentive to good behaviour on account of the longer period. I agree that it would appear from the statistics quoted that it may well be that the change would be of only marginal consequence and benefit in this situation. It is, after all, a secondary consideration and it is unlikely that we could look to anything more than a marginal change and benefit in that connection.

    My right hon. Friend was satisfied that these advantages would of themselves justify the change in the period of remission, but he naturally satisfied himself that there would be no prejudicial effect on training or regimes in detention centres. Those who were consulted advised that there would be no noticeable difference in the effects of training by a relatively short reduction of the period in custody from ten to eight weeks in the case of a 3-month sentence and from twenty to sixteen weeks in the case of those sentenced to six months' detention.

    In view of the advantages, therefore, my right hon. Friend considered that, although the operation of detention centres was currently under review by a Sub-Committee of the Advisory Council on the Penal System it would be desirable to proceed with this change.

    The hon. Member who has put his name to this Motion is a member of both of the Advisory Council and this subcommittee. Although my right hon. Friend had concluded before the committee was set up that it was desirable to make this change, he took no action to implement it until the matter had been brought to the notice of the subcommittee, since it was clear that it lay within its terms of reference. The subcommittee, therefore, was informed in advance as long ago as March this year of my right hon. Friend's intention. The committee raised no objection to this being done while its inquiry was being carried out. Furthermore, the committee did not give any hint that there was any dissent from the course of action proposed to be taken by my right hon. Friend.

    I must disagree with the hon. Member in so far as he contends that once the committee had been set up with a wide remit in this connection it should have the inevitable consequence of putting a moratorium upon any further decision by the Home Office in this connection. I am sure he will agree that the decision of the Home Office in scope covers only a very small part of the field of study of the advisory committee.

    A consequence of increasing the period of remission to one-third was expected to be the creation of a number of additional places available at the existing detention centres. In fact, since the change in the period of remission, the number of young men in detention centres has fallen by about 250, thus relieving the pressure on the centres and lowering the rate of refusal of places to courts making application for them. While we expected that this would happen, it was not the reason for the change but a consequence of it and we were satisfied that the change could be made without detriment to treatment and training.

    For these reasons, I invite the House to reject the Motion

    Question put and negatived.

    Roads (Abingdon Bypass)

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. Joseph Harper.]

    3.7 a.m.

    This is the second time tonight that the House has heard of the affairs of my constituency. During the debate on the Town and Country Planning Bill, we heard how Abingdon beat off the attack by the Southern Gas Board and thereby saved the town's amenities, and this led to a revolution in planning in the area.

    It is now possible for the Parliamentary Secretary to make his name in Abingdon by being the first Minister to make up his mind about the route of the Abingdon bypass and so become famous in my constituency. I have to make a pretty sharp attack on his Department. He will understand that I do not like to do this, because I once served there as Joint Parliamentary Secretary, although that was in civil aviation many years ago.

    The traffic situation in Abingdon is now a matter of widespread criticism. It has been well known to Ministers for a long time, and hon. Members on both sides of the House have commented on it to me. Failure to deal with it lies fairly and squarely on the Minister, and also for the dilatory manner in which it has been handled over the past four or five years and more. It is causing the utmost annoyance to all parties. The hon. Gentleman knows that he can expect relentless pressure from me in this House until there is a decision about the route of the proposed bypass, although there will be a separate question which is not part of this debate tonight, of an inner relief road.

    It is not as if the position were new. For years the Department, through Ministers and officials' letters, have been sending out soothing messages to the local authorities and me until we cease to believe what we are being told. I will give an example of the sort of information one has received, in this case through a Question in the House on 24th July last. The hon. Gentleman himself then said that he was fully conscious of the need for an early decision. This has been stated many times, at any rate since 1964. Meanwhile, the volume of traffic along the A.34 through Abingdon is increasing, according to the Department's own statement, at an annual rate of 61 per cent. Worse still, according to the borough council, the size of the loads has grown at an estimated 50 per cent. and much larger vehicles are being used.

    For want of a decision on this route, a great deal of local controversy and uncertainty is building up. It is no exaggeration to say that everyone is fed up with the position. The manner in which we have been fobbed off in the last few years is very disquieting.

    On 4th February, 1966, the Minister of State said:
    "We are not quite ready to announce a decision for the line of a bypass at Abingdon. We hope it will not be too long"—
    We in Abingdon were pleased about that, but how wrong we were. One local newspaper said that this sort of statement from Parliamentary Secretaries almost had power to freeze the blood. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the situation is getting a great deal warmer, even if what that newspaper said is true.

    These anodyne statements from the Department are not very sincere, because they have not always been true. On 9th December, 1964, I took a deputation to see the Minister of State—I do not wish to make any personal attack on him, but he has been the channel through which most of these messages have come—and was told that three months study would be required before this matter could be settled. That was two years before the statement that the matter would receive an early decision.

    The result is that the county council and the Abingdon Borough Council are in complete despair. On 16th June, 1966, the Minister of State said:
    "I know that you will be glad to hear that we shall be instructiing Berkshire County Council to prepare Draft Orders fixing a line of new road at South Hinksey to a point south of Abingdon by-passing it to the west."
    That was also raised on 13th July, 1966, when I took another deputation to another Parliamentary Secretary. Of course there has been controversy about which side of Abingdon the road should go, and also on the necessity for a spur road to Didcot. I shall not go into those questions. I am talking of the need for Ministerial decision because, until then, there cannot be constructive discussion among the local authorities or the owners of property who may be affected by the road.

    On 16th August, 1966, the Minister of State again referred to the urgent need for a bypass at Abingdon and said that the Minister had decided in principle to bypass it to the west at the earliest possible date. Thus, we have had a flow of reassuring statements meaning nothing. This is bad administration, and I feel bound to criticise it strongly. It was said on 22nd November, 1966, that the road was being programmed from South Hinksey to Drayton but would not be built south of Drayton for ten years.

    Bearing in mind that I have been able, with the local authorities, to interview farmers, fruit growers and property owners along that road, it is embarrassing for us to be told regularly that the decision is being taken soon. These people are naturally very annoyed at the effect upon their property.

    Six months later, in April 1967, the Minister of State said:
    "We are now finally narrowing the choice of a line for the proposed new road from South Hinksey to Chilton."
    Was that statement true when he made it? Nothing has happened since it was made. My constituents are justified in being very angry. The Minister of State is well known for his conscientious work in the Ministry, and he has been very helpful to me in other matters. But such statements should not be made. That statement proved yet another false alarm; people were falsely encouraged by it.

    In October 1967, a new Parliamentary Secretary told me:
    "Our investigations and examinations of alternative alignments should be complete quite soon."
    In the ordinary meaning of the English language, that meant that we might expect a decision quite soon, but that was what had been said since 1964, if not before, when the previous Government were in power. It is hopeless to go on receiving such statements when nothing will happen.

    Then came the present Parliamentary Secretary, who dropped a bombshell in January, 1968. After all the previous encouraging observations, he said that the scheme could not be considered in isolation from a major route between the Midlands, Oxford and Southampton. This statement fell like a lead balloon on Abingdon. I do not know what route he was referring to. He did not say then, but perhaps he can tell us something about it tonight. On 12th March, 1968, he said, "Our outlook has widened", but he did not say in which direction and whether there would be a decision about the route.

    The only thing I could do was to hold a meeting of interested parties, local authorities and other bodies. This was held on 17th June, when I promised to campaign in the House for a decision. I assure the hon. Gentleman that I mean exactly what I say by the word "campaign", and I shall continue to do this

    The alternative routes have been examined for several months. On 24th July the hon. Gentleman said that he was looking at a line east of the town suggested by C.P.R.E. Perhaps he would care to comment on that tonight. That statement reawakened the argument about where the line should go. The hon. Gentleman has information about a route from the divisional road engineer, and the rates of return offered by the latest scheme are much more satisfactory than in the past.

    Not everyone agrees where the road should go, but everyone wants a decision. To have had encouraging assurances for several years is bad administration, and it would have been better not to have made them until there was a possibility of saying something constructive.

    Therefore, I await the hon. Gentleman's explanation of the manner in which my constituents and I have been embarrassed by those misleading promises.

    3.18 a.m.

    The hon. and gallant Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) has pleaded most convincingly the case for the early relief of traffic congestion in the narrow streets of Abingdon and neighbouring built-up lengths of the A 34.

    As I have told him on a number of occasions already, we recognise the problem and are doing everything we can to solve it as soon as it is reasonably possible to do so within the priorities of future road planning.

    The hon. Gentleman asks that a line should be published without further delay, and makes the whole thing sound very simple, as though we were deliberately going out of our way to hold up this work. In fact, as he knows very well the need to relieve traffic congestion at Abingdon is well understood by us—it is certainly well understood by me—and the best means of doing so is a problem which has occupied the attention of the Department for a considerable time.

    It is not simply a matter of selecting what might appear at first sight to be a reasonable line, to publish the line and then be damned. It is not as simple as this. We must ensure that the choice we make is the best one taking into account the need to get the best value we can from the investment and, equally important, the need to avoid unnecessary interference with the interests of the local communities worst likely to be affected by a new road. This is where our preparation pool procedures come in. They enable us to investigate possible alternative solutions and to ensure that the best is chosen.

    For this reason, and because on our general assessment of need a bypass of Abingdon appeared to justify relatively high priority, a scheme was included in the first instalment of the trunk road preparation pool announced in February 1967. Indeed, preliminary investigations into possible lines had been carried out even earlier. As we then saw it, the choice appeared to lie between a fairly close western bypass around Abingdon and Drayton, running southwards from the Oxford bypass at South Hinksey, and a more distant eastern bypass which involved two new crossings of the River Thames.

    The hon. Member has mentioned earlier indications that a draft Order to establish the line of the new road would be published before the end of 1967. We had certainly hoped that our investigations would justify the publication of details of a proposed line at an early date, at the time my hon. Friend the Minister of State gave the hon. Member this information.

    Unfortunately, as I have informed the hon. Member in correspondence, the first calculations of the rates of return for the preferred scheme were disappointingly low. They were a good deal lower, in fact, than the rates offered by many other trunk road schemes elsewhere in the country, and the result was that, on the basis of national comparisons, the Abingdon scheme appeared to merit no particularly high priority.

    To have published a line at that stage, when the scheme was likely to attract little or no standing in the road programme certainly would not have helped to get the road built more quickly. If anything its progress would certainly have been hindered. We might, with some justification, have shelved the scheme completely at this point, but this was never the Government's wish. Instructions were issued that further investigations should be put in hand to discover if possible a more acceptable solution which would offer a better return on our investment. When we talk about investment it is the investment of public funds.

    This gave us an opportunity to review the position on the basis of the very latest traffic information which had come to hand since the first calculations were made and to make absolutely sure that we were not overlooking any new factor which might improve the rate of return. It also enabled us to take a closer look at the way in which any proposals for Abingdon might be affected by possible longer term improvements of the strategic road network between the Midlands and the South Coast ports. This is the reply the hon. Gentleman referred to from my predecessor, now the Minister of Defence for Equipment. Would it be possible, for instance, to devise a scheme which would solve Abingdon's immediate problem and at the same time serve as a first step towards possible long-term development?

    This meant that, as one part of the general investigation, we needed to examine also the merits of a more distant western bypass of the Abingdon area, related to the needs of long distance traffic, rather than the shorter by-pass more specifically designed for the relief of Abingdon and Drayton. I make no apologies for pleading that such investigations took time. They were bound to take time if an adequate and comprehensive assessment of the relative merits of alternative routes was to be carried out. Hon. Members would quite rightly be the first to criticise us if these essential steps were not taken.

    We must ensure that the limited funds in the roads programme even though they are greater than ever in our history are spent in the best possible way and with the minimum of interference with the interests of the various authorities and individuals likely to be affected by the building of a large road scheme. This is a prerequisite of any democratic society. The investigations involved us in discussion with a number of local authorities and associations whose views are invaluable in helping us reach decisions.

    The Berkshire branch of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, for example, asked that an eastern bypass of Abingdon should again be investigated, on a new line which would involve only one Thames Crossing. We had already examined and rejected one possible line to the east, but we had a look at this new suggestion from the C.P.R.E. and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not suggest that we should have ignored the representation of the Council.

    I never said anything of the kind. I was complaining of a series of statements which proved to be untrue as to when the line was to be decided.

    I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman thought I suggested that. What I said was that I was certain that he would not suggest that we should have ignored these representations.

    Meetings were held to discuss a possible line through Bagley Wood near South Hinksey. In these discussions the Department of Forestry at Oxford University and the Ministry's Landscape Advisory Committee were involved. In passing, we are always grateful for the expertise which these specialists offer on the amenity aspect of road schemes.

    The problems of taking a road through orchard country south of Drayton have also been examined in detail in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture; and there has been lengthy correspondence with local authorities who would be involved if the bypass were taken between Abingdon and Shippon.

    These are the kind of consultations and discussions which go on continuously during the preliminary stages of scheme preparation, to ensure that every feasible alternative is adequately investigated before a decision on the publication of a draft road line is made. I suggest that no one would deny it is essential to have the right line when spending large sums of public money.

    The hon. Member for Abingdon has been in regular correspondence with the Ministry, and he has been assured that we have been pushing ahead with all these complex investigations just as quickly as possible consistent with the need for the thorough examination of each alternative proposal.

    In July I told him in answer to a Question that the additional information we needed should be available during August and that a decision would be taken as soon as possible thereafter. I am glad to be able to say that a report has since been received from the Ministry's agents, the Berkshire County Council, and I can take this opportunity to inform the hon. Member that, based on this latest available data, we are now satisfied that the economic rates of return are a good deal better than the earlier assessments had led us to suppose Assuming that costs remain as now estimated, this bypass scheme will certainly merit inclusion in the firm programme.

    We have still to complete one or two further detailed enquiries to ensure that what we propose will keep interference with the public to the inescapable minimum. I am sure no hon. Member would deny the fundamental importance of this. When these final investigations are completed we will publish details of the proposed line.

    I regret that I cannot say, this evening, exactly when publication will be possible and it would be premature for me to give details of the line we prefer, but I am prepared to say that, unless some unexpected new factor should arise in the next few weeks, which I have no cause to suppose, the proposed line will be to the west of Abingdon and that we should be ready for formal publication next Spring.

    I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept my assurance that the final decision will not be delayed one day longer than need be.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Adjourned accordingly at half-past Three o'clock a.m.