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Commons Chamber

Volume 777: debated on Wednesday 5 February 1969

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House Of Commons

Wednesday, 5th February, 1969

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers To Questions

Scotland

British Standard Time

1.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received from local authorities about British Standard Time.

32.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many representations he has received to date against British Standard Time; and what replies he has sent.

45.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many representations he has received from official bodies in Scotland in favour of the results of introducing British Standard Time since October 1968.

59.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received to date from local authorities and other interested bodies about the operation of British Standard Time; and what reply he has sent.

Since 27th October, 1968, when the Act came into force, I have received representations against British Standard Time from 23 local authorities, 13 other representative organisations and 28 private individuals. In addition, one hon. Member has sent me a petition signed by a number of his constituents; and one newspaper editor has forwarded to me a number of protests from his readers. All these representations have been, or are being, acknowledged, but no other reply has been sent except where information was specifically requested. No representations in favour of British Standard Time have been received officially since that date.

Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that there are clear indications that the vast majority of the people of Scotland are fed up with these long dark mornings? How does he intend to assess the degree of misery and frustration of these people?

We are trying to assess the situation first of all on the basis of this winter and then in the full review in 1970. Hon. Members opposite really must not exaggerate. Some of the recent figures, for example, suggest that B.S.T. is having precisely the opposite effect on the accident rate to that which some unthinking hysterical attacks have suggested.

When the Home Secretary went to Scotland he appeared to promise a review of the experiment at the end of the year, but he has retracted that promise since returning south of the Border. Will the hon. Gentleman take the Home Secretary by the scruff of the neck and take him back to Scotland?

This abuse is quite unwarranted. The hon. Gentleman knows that we are continually reviewing the situation and are assessing it again at the end of the winter. The full review still remains for 1970. There has been no change whatever in the programme.

If the hon. Gentleman thinks that there is no widespread disapproval of this move in Scotland, he must be terribly out of touch with opinion. Is he aware, for example, that in the Ayrshire County Council there has been a move to suspend education altogether for a month in winter in order to avoid the dark mornings? Does not that show what people think about this?

That is precisely what I meant when I referred to unthinking hysteria. All sorts of moves of this kind have been suggested, but no actual decision has been taken. Of course, there has been widespread discontent about darkness in the mornings, but I have to measure that against some of the facts which have been coming forward—for example, a 30 per cent. reduction in the death rate among children over the last two months. One must measure the facts against the irritation.

Is my hon. Friend aware that parents are petrified by the thought of the children going out in these dark mornings, for the simple reason that they do not know whether or not they have arrived at school until home time comes? It is because of this fear that demonstrations have taken place by parents and pupils in Coat-bridge against B.S.T. Will my hon. Friend bear their point of view in mind?

I am aware of the disquiet which exists. But there is no difference, basically, between not knowing now whether a child has been to school safely and not knowing in previous years. I agree that this has been added to by apprehensions of darkness, however, but I ask hon. Members to look to their own consciences in this matter and to wait until we see the end of the winter and the figures, which at present—and I put it no stronger—suggest the opposite result of what hon. Members claim.

Does not the hon. Gentleman recognise that the large majority of people in Scotland are opposed to B.S.T. because of the general nuisance it causes, besides the difficulties in such industries as agriculture and building?

I am aware that every change produces irritation. The hon. Gentleman should not only look at that aspect but should consider the facts as they unfold. It is interesting to note that at a recent meeting I had with a branch of the N.F.U. differing views emerged as to the effect of B.S.T. on agriculture. There is no reason for the assumption the hon. Gentleman has made. It seems, on the contrary, that a tendency towards approval is beginning to take place. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] It is more verifiable than the nonsense coming from hon. Members opposite.

In view of the dark reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

8.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what arrangements he is making to assess the effects of British Standard Time in Scotland during the winter 1968–69.

13.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will conduct a survey in Scotland of the effects of British Standard Time.

36.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what study he has now made of the effect of British Standard Time in Scotland; and if he will make a statement.

39.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what machinery he plans to use in order to ascertain the opinions of people in Scotland about British Standard Time during the survey which the Government have undertaken to carry out.

The assessment to be made at the end of this winter will be on the basis of the information then available to the Government, including, in particular, information about road accidents. Unless this indicates a need for further inquiries or consultations, no other survey is envisaged until the spring of 1970, by which time we shall have had the experience of two winters on which to base a final judgment.

What useful point can there possibly be in having such a review if the Government obstinately refuse to consider any change before the end of the three-year period?

I still do not understand hon. Gentlemen opposite. They ask us to keep this under continual review. We say we will keep it under continual review. Then they complain when it is suggested that this action can take place. If the facts indicate that that kind of action should result from the survey in 1970, it will be taken. I should have thought that that would have been perfectly clear even to hon. Members opposite.

While accepting the importance of the road accident figures, may I ask the hon. Gentleman to bear in mind also the feelings of millions of ordinary people upon whose lives the Government have imposed this frightful irritation? Why cannot he give us an assurance that, if the survey is to be worth anything, he will introduce legislation to end this experiment, if the survey proves it to have been a failure?

I am continually being astonished. This situation should be equated against the facts, as, for example, that there has been a 13 per cent. decrease in accidents to children between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. I must repeat that hon. Gentlemen opposite should look at their consciences when they try to stir up this kind of hysteria about this particular case. Let us look at the facts and examine the matter then.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Scotland would respect him much more if he were to accept the realities of the situation and scrap this unnecessary tampering with time which is loathed throughout Scotland?

I am asked to look at the realities of the situation. I have been pleading with hon. Gentlemen opposite to look at the facts. Facts are realities—not the subjective impressions often created by hon. Members opposite.

While, of course, the decrease in the accident rate is something which we welcome very much indeed, is not this only one of the many important factors, and what is the purpose of the survey if no action is to be taken till 1970?

As always, we get a little touch of realism from the hon. Gentleman, and I thank him for it. Of course it is only one of the facts. It happens to be the one fact about which there has been the most fuss made over the last few months. It is one we are taking into account, of course, in examining the matter, including the effects on the industry in which the hon. Member has a great interest.

Have there been any further representations from the Scottish T.U.C. and the Scottish C.B.I., two bodies which were in support of the experiment?

No. I have had no such further representations, but my hon. Friend is perfectly right to draw attention to the fact that two important and significant bodies in Scotland approved of this decision.

Transport (The Borders)

2.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has considered the Hibbs Report, a copy of which has been sent to him, on the Waverley railway route in relation to the economic future of the Borders; and what action he proposes to take.

I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) on 18th December.—[Vol. 775, c. 395.]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that this valuable Report highlights the importance of communications in the Borders? What immediate steps will he take to improve the roads to Newcastleton and the main A.7 from Hawick to Langholm and the South?

As the hon. Gentleman knows, priorities in respect of many of these roads come within the purview of the local authorities concerned, and they are taking all necessary action. One thing the Report brought out was that the rather hysterical protests which went on and on about this were not really justified in relation to the effect which it would have upon the economic and social life of the communities concerned.

As good communications are essential in the successful redevelopment of any region, will not the closure of the line detract much from the good of the enormous investment grants which are being pumped into the country?

No, Sir. It is interesting to note that in other parts of this particular area where investment grants are being taken up, and where there is no rail communication, there has been no deleterious effect.

Hunterston B Power Station

3.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is his latest estimate of the capital cost of the Hunterston B nuclear power station, including the initial fuel charge and of the cost per unit sent out after allowing for interest during construction.

There has been no significant change from the figures which were given in reply to Questions from my hon. Friend on 22nd January, 1968, and 26th June, 1968. Interest during construction, estimated at £15 million, was allowed for in the estimated unit cost.—[Vol. 757, c. 52; Vol. 767, c. 84.]

Is my hon. Friend aware that the miners have consistently argued that the country has been deceived into thinking that the coal industry had to contract because coal was too dear? Before he refers to previous Answers, will he agree that, on the basis of costs and other facts before the House, the case is made for an independent investigation into the cost of alternative fuels?

I sympathise with my hon. Friend, but I do not accept that assertion. We have tried very hard in Questions to meet every factual point which he has endeavoured to make, for example, on the unit costs which we calculated according to the ground rules specified in my hon. Friend's Question of 22nd January, assuming a long-term interest rate of 7½ per cent. I am willing to revise the figures if he wishes to argue the case on an 8 per cent. long-term rate and puts a Question down to that effect.

Freeman-Fox Transportation Study (Midlothian)

4.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement arising from the Freeman-Fox Transportation Study commissioned by his Department with particular reference to the county of Midlothian.

I understand that the consultants will be meeting separately each of the authorities which sponsored the study, including Midlothian County Council, to explain the implications of their Report for its area. Thereafter, the Report will require study by all those concerned.

Has my right hon. Friend been able to assess the reception which the Report has had generally in Scotland? Second, has he any information on any representation made from my constituency about certain aspects of the Report about which there seems to be some dispute?

There is no doubt that the Report has attracted considerable interest, and many aspects been welcomed, although there have been questions about other aspects in relation to the Esk Valley and so on. It is too early yet to say more; we still have to have the comments of the local authorities concerned before we further our discussions about it.

Clyde Estuary (Industrialisation)

5.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland, whether he will now make a statement regarding current proposals submitted to him for industrialisation on the Clyde.

34 and 35.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland (1) which local authorities are giving financial support for the study being presently undertaken of industrial developments in the Clyde Estuary area;

(2) if he will give an undertaking that no decisions concerning the siting of any major industrial development in the Clyde Estuary area will be made prior to a public inquiry being held on the total development of that area.

The local authorities included in the group which commissioned the Clyde Estuary Development Study were the county councils of Argyll, Ayr, Bute, Dunbarton and Renfrew, and the town councils of Dumbarton, Greenock and Port Glasgow, all of which contributed to its cost. I would like to express my appreciation of the group's initiative in commissioning this study and publishing the report.

I am sure that the report is now being carefully considered by all concerned, and I shall be consulting the appropriate authorities about further procedure. I propose to initiate very soon a public local inquiry into the planning application of the Murco Petroleum Company for a refinery development at Longhaugh Point, and associated development at Wemyss Bay, and I cannot exclude the possibility that separate action on other matters dealt with in the report may prove to be both desirable and practicable.

Will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that, when the time comes, due consideration is given to the relative merits of a site in the Upper Clyde, where development would be possible on a larger and more worthwhile scale?

I have to be careful about this. I am sure that any inquiry which takes place will consider all the relevant suggestions made. Eventually, the matter will come to me, and I do not want to come down on one side or the other at this stage.

Since this concept involves so many authorities, does my right hon. Friend agree that we have not the planning machinery on a sub-regional basis adequate to look at the problem? Will he make the public inquiry as wide as possible, not excluding the possibility of re-examining the Erskine township proposal which will entail such a heavy burden in Glasgow?

We must bear in mind that in this case we got together all the local authorities concerned for the first time. The nature of the report and the interest which has been aroused by it are an indication of the value of that. I should certainly like to see it taken much further.

Has the right hon. Gentleman received any proposals submitted by the newly nationalised steel industry? If not, has he aproached that industry to ensure that the valuable asset of deep water in the Clyde Estuary is fully used at a time when the world trend is towards even larger bulk shipping?

That is one of the relevant possibilities touched on by the Report. I have no such proposal before me. The only one which needs decision in respect of inquiry is the one I mentioned, the Murco application.

I compliment my right hon. Friend on the work which he has instituted or assisted forward here, but will he bear in mind that any large-scale development on the estuary of the Clyde will have considerable implications further up the river? Will he see to it that authorities such as, for example, those in Lanarkshire are brought into any planning which may be done in this connection?

Yes, Sir. Advance copies of the report were sent to the Clyde Valley planning authority, and that authority will be given the opportunity to participate in consultation concerned with the general follow-up.

Council Houses (Rents)

6.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the average rent for council houses in Scotland; and by how much it is lower than the economic rent as a result of subsidies from the Treasury or the rates.

In 1966–67, the last year for which the information is at present available, rents averaged about £45, and the Government and rate fund contributions about £70.

With this indiscriminate help on such a large scale, how does the hon. Gentleman expect to bring private house building up to the same level as in England and Wales? Would it not be better if he adopted the famous Socialist principle—"From each according to his ability"—in the payment of rent?

"And to each according to his need." [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] we are all Socialists now. It is important that we have a rent rebate system, and the Government are seeking to encourage this with the local authorities, going hand in hand with reasonable rents as well. The hon. Gentleman will be interested to know that the £70 divides itself into £28 and £42—£28 from subsidy and £42 from the rates. He will know also that the local authority associations in Scotland are being consulted about the long-term principles for fixing local authority rents which were suggested in the Report of the Prices and Incomes Board.

Is my hon. Friend aware that this continual denigration of council house tenants and criticisms about the rents they pay is not a good thing for Scotland, and that while we recognise that we want reasonable rents, we must remember that owner-occupiers buying houses are receiving far more by way of relief from Income Tax than council tenants do in subsidy?

Will the Minister bear in mind that the rents of houses of which the Secretary of State is the landlord—through the Scottish Special Housing Association and the New Town Corporations—are on the high side, and higher than local authority ones?

I do not think the hon. Member is quite right in saying that the Secretary of State is the landlord. The Scottish Special Housing Association and the Development Corporations are the landlords.

Great Western Road, Glasgow

7.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland, in view of the doubt as to the ultimate need for a wider Great Western Road in Glasgow, if he will advance funds so that the Clyde and Kelvindale Expressways may be constructed first and subsequently decide on the necessity of any alteration to the Great Western Road.

No, Sir. I accept the corporation's view that the prior need is for the completion of Great Western Road as a dual-carriageway route.

Is it right for the hon. Gentleman to wash his hands in this way of a matter of this importance and shelter behind the corporation when, without the money he is providing, nothing would be done? In view of the unique nature of this road going through a highly populous district of great amenity, would he not consider building roads on either side in the hope that, once they are built, it will not be necessary to spoil this road?

I have looked most earnestly into this matter, and, of course, I see the hon. Gentleman's concern, and I share it, about the actual route itself, and also about the trees, in particular. I am sure the corporation will do everything possible to make sure that, with the improvements, amenities are preserved, and as many of the trees as possible. We looked into the question of the alternatives. The early improvement of Great Western Road is required for the increased flows of traffic from the north and west flanks of the Inner Ring Road. All the engineering advice given to us, both Departmentally and from the corporation, is that we must proceed with this road.

Divorce Law (Reform)

9.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what plans he has to reform the divorce law in Scotland in view of the present proposals for England and Wales and the recommendation of the Scottish Law Commission.

As I told the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok (Mr. Wright) on 21st January, while this has never been thought a suitable subject for Government legislation, I am willing to consider a request for drafting assistance should an hon. Member come forward with a Bill on lines which appear likely to be generally acceptable.—[Vol. 776, c. 95.]

While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him if he will not agree that it is highly unsatisfactory that so important a matter should be left to the lottery of the Ballot for Private Members' Bills? In view of the declared expression of opinion made by the Law Commission and of the fact that the English Bill recently before the House received its Second Reading in terms of Scottish votes cast, could my right hon. Friend not go a little bit further and say he will use his influence to try to get time for any such Private Member's attempt?

No, I do not think so. In this respect, we are following tradition, and I think, on reflection, it is a fairly wise tradition.

If the General Assembly in the coming May endorses the recommendation of its committee, and falls into line with the Bill going through the House for England and Wales, and in view of the Law Commission's opinion, surely, in those circumstances, the Secretary of State must accept that it would be entirely wrong to leave our divorce law unreformed, simply to await the chance of a Private Member's success in the Ballot in some future year?

I am glad that the hon. Member raised that question. The report before the Assembly at its last meeting was something which many of us would hesitate to legislate for, and he must know that the Assembly sent it back to the Presbyteries and that Edinburgh and Glasgow, which are the only two to have considered it, have thrown it out. So we had better wait and see what the Church of Scotland decides.

Private Schools

10.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what increase there has been in the number of pupils in private schools in Scotland from 1964 to date.

The number of pupils in independent schools dropped by some 400 between January 1964 and January 1968. Figures for 1969 are not yet available.

Does that Answer rebut the claims which have been often made that this party is doctrinaire in its approach to the private sector, and will my right hon. Friend keep under review this sector of the grant-aided schools?

The figures I have quoted do not include the grant-aided schools, which are not normally included in the private sector as such. There are figures increased slightly, but my hon. Friend will know that grant-aided schools, as well as independent schools, are now before the Public Schools Commission.

Will the hon. Gentleman give an assurance to the House that he will defend to the uttermost the principle of freedom of choice in education?

I think we have argued this at very considerable length. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] The answer is, "Yes". [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] But there is a difference of opinion, I think, between the hon. Gentleman and myself as to what, in fact, freedom of choice means, particularly in the State sector of education.

Legal Aid

11.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to deal with the increase in the costs of legal aid.

As regards criminal legal aid, I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given by my right hon. Friend on 29th November, 1968, to a Question by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Mr. Clark Hutchison). The main purpose of the changes in procedure effected by the Act of Adjournal which came into operation on 2nd January is to contain the rising cost of the criminal legal aid scheme.

The growth of expenditure on civil legal aid is very largely due to a continuing increase in the number of certificates granted in respect of divorce actions in the Court of Session. This is a matter to which the Law Society of Scotland have called attention in recent reports on the legal aid scheme, and I am watching the situation closely.—[Vol. 774, c. 212–3.]

Will my hon. Friend say what is the degree of resistance among practising lawyers? Will he give the latest figure in terms of those lawyers who have refused to practise as an automatic reaction to the Act of Adjournal?

I presume that my hon. Friend is referring to the recent action by the members of the Glasgow Bar Association. I have great pleasure in telling the House that they have returned to the operation of the scale.

Has the Minister considered the reduction that would follow in the cost of civil legal aid if the Court of Session were abolished as a court of first instance, or, alternatively, if undefended divorce actions were remitted to the sheriff; and has it occurred to him that the number of lawyers per case would be reduced from three or four to one, with an obvious increased saving to the taxpayer who foots the bill?

I know the point which the hon. Lady is making, and this formed part of the work of the Committee which looked at sheriff courts. The Committee felt that the net saving along those lines would not be considerable, and it may very well have been right.

Gale-Damaged Roofs, Glasgow

12.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is now satisfied that the damaged roofs in Glasgow from the January 1968 gale will be wind and watertight in a permanent or semi-permanent fashion by 30th September, 1969; and if he will make a statement.

Of the 29,000 roofs which were damaged, 27,400 have had full repairs or repairs fully adequate for the winter. The remaining 1,600, all tenements, which so far have had only temporary repair, are being fully maintained by mobile repair squads under the control of the corporation. Some of the 1,600 are scheduled for early demolition; the corporation should be able to ensure that the rest have fully adequate repairs quite soon.

I thank my hon. Friend for his excellent answer. Will he agree that after last Thursday's storm and the small number of complaints received, the work repair force in Glasgow has earned the gratitude of the people of Scotland?

I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. I certainly endorse what he said about the men who worked so hard on this.

What grounds can the Minister give us for believing that his forecast on this occasion will be accurate?

It depends upon the nature of the roofs that remain. The general state of dilapidation of these roofs is something which has to be seen to be believed. The hon. Gentleman should see it for himself.

Rents

14.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will seek to amend the Prices and Incomes Act, 1968, so as to bring the rents of new local authority houses within the control provisions of the Act.

For its duration the Prices and Incomes Act empowers my right hon. Friend to limit increases in rents of existing houses. The fixing of rents for new local authority houses, which raises different issues, must remain the sole responsibility of these authorities, but I expect them to exercise moderation in present circumstances.

Will my hon. Friend not recognise how grossly unfair it is that tenants of new local authority houses now coming into occupation, where rents are fixed much higher than for older houses, have no protection under the Prices and Incomes Act, whereas tenants of older houses have such protection. What is he prepared to do about it?

My hon. Friend may recall that Section 10 deals not with the control of rents but with the control of increases. Our efforts to get adequate rent rebate schemes are beginning to show fruit, and I hope that hon. Members on both sides will help us in persuading local authorities to adopt rebate schemes.

Will the Minister agree that, since in 1967 rents in England averaged about 35s. 8d. as compared with 18s. 4d. in Scotland, the Scottish ratepayer is bearing a disproportionately high burden of local authority expenditure?

There are differences between Scotland and England in industry as well as in housing. The point made by the hon. Gentleman is a perfectly fair one in contrasting the two countries, but whether or not one can assume that Scottish wages are the same as English wages is another matter.

Caravan Dwellers

15.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what action he proposes to take to give to caravan dwellers similar protection to that which the Rent Act gives to the occupiers of houses.

I have no evidence at present to suggest that any special action is required. If my hon. Friend has any particular cases in mind, I shall be happy to consider them.

Is my hon. Friend not aware that, owing to the shortage of houses in Scotland many people are occupying caravans, thus helping themselves instead of imposing a burden on the local authority? These people have been living in caravans for long periods; does he not think that they should have rent protection?

We have discussed this with the local authorities, and the consensus of view among the local authority associations is that legislation is not needed. Indeed the Association of County Councils has argued with us that giving protection to residential caravan sites might tend to perpetuate their existence when the real answer, they aver, is to provide permanent houses for the occupants of caravans.

North-East Scotland (Report)

16.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he expects Professor Gaskin's Report on North-East Scotland to be published.

I thank my right hon. Friend for that information. As I am sure that he accepts the importance of this Report to North-East Scotland, will he use the very considerable influence of his Department to ensure that no further blows to the structure of industry in the North-East, comparable to the one just suffered by Inverurie, take place before the Report is published and future plans based on its recommendations are made?

I cannot see such a blow falling within the time scale which I have mentioned, and I should hope that it will not. I have now received the Report and we will waste no time in considering the advice contained in it; it is a very lengthy document.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the recommendations in the Report will receive financial backing from the Government?

Housing Subsidies

17.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the total cost of housing subsidies; what estimate he has made of the effect on the average council house rent of their abolition; what proposals he has received advocating such a course; and what reply he has sent.

The cost of Government subsidies for local authority houses is of the order of £20 million a year, equivalent on average to some 10s. per house per week. We have received no proposals for abolishing these subsidies.

Is my hon. Friend aware that the Leader of the Opposition and other right hon. Gentlemen opposite have made a proposal of this sort, and that if all subsidies are abolished the answer to Question No. 6 would indicate that that would mean an average increase in the rent of 30s. a week? Will he resist this kind of proposition?

In reply to the last part of the Question, Yes, Sir. If my hon. Friend recollects the earlier answers to Questions, he will find that £42 plus £28 would then be transferred on to the existing rent of £45.

Does the Minister recognise that his hon. Friend has got the views of the Leader of the Opposition completely wrong on this? He has, for example, completely neglected the question of rent rebate schemes, and has not the Secretary of State authorised considerable increases in rents for the Scottish Special Housing Association and the new towns?

These are governed by the Prices and Incomes Act, and many authorities, particularly Conservative authorities, would like to impose substantially heavier increases. It would be useful if the Leader of the Opposition could make up his mind what he means about abolishing housing subsidies.

Is the Minister aware that the leader of the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) has come out for abolition of housing subsidies, and where the leader leads the rest follow?

I have no doubt that when the Leader of the Opposition again visits the Midlands he will probably adopt this as a new policy.

Is there not a lot of hot air about this, and cannot be agree on all sides of the House that we want those people who can afford to pay an economic rent to pay an economic rent, and those people who cannot afford to pay an economic rent to get a rebate?

When the hon. Gentleman was in the Scottish Office he regarded this as a hot potato; he is the one who is responsible for most of the hot air on the subject.

Forth Bridge (East Fife Road Link)

18.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when it is expected to make a start on the construction of the Fife regional road linking the Forth and Tay Road Bridges.

The proposals for an East Fife road linking the Forth Bridge to the Kirkcaldy area are not yet finalised. It will be included within the roads programme for the 1970's, but it is too early to assign a starting date on its priority in relation to other schemes in Scotland.

Does my right hon. Friend recognise that if the East of Scotland is to be developed, particularly the part between the Tay and the Forth, this road scheme must be treated with much greater urgency than hitherto? Will he reconsider the order of priorities?

I do not think that we can reconsider just like that the order of priorities in this one part of Scotland without taking into account important schemes affecting other parts. My hon. Friend will be the first to appreciate that there are other places which merit consideration in respect of main road programmes.

Will the right hon. Gentleman not agree that the amount of traffic between the Kirkcaldy and Glenrothes area of Tayside merits the immediate making of the Kirkcaldy—Tay Bridge Road into a trunk road?

I do not think that it warrants it at the moment. The hon. Gentleman should appreciate that there may be differences of opinion even in his own area as to what should be the first priorities.

As this road would link two toll bridges, will the right hon. Gentleman give a straight answer to this question? Has he changed his mind on the indefensibility of charging tolls on bridges since the publication of the Labour Party booklet entitled "Signposts for Scotland"?

The hon. Gentleman is nothing if not persistent, but that has nothing to do with this Question.

Housing Modernisation Scheme, Rosyth

19.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if, in view of the inadequacy of the modernisation scheme of the Scottish Special Housing Association in Rosyth, he will instruct the Scottish Development Department to make a further grant to improve the quality of this modernisation.

I cannot accept my hon. Friend's opinion that the modernisation scheme is inadequate.

Is my hon. Friend aware that there is a great deal of dissatisfaction among the residents of Rosyth about the inferior quality of the modernisation being carried on at present? Is he further aware that I have information to the effect that the Scottish Development Department has given instructions for the programme to be slowed down and that much less money should be spent, even from the existing funds for the purpose, which are not yet exhausted?

I would not accept my hon. Friend's point about the scheme as a whole. We have authorised in principle expenditure of £829,000 on the scheme, which was taken over by the S.S.H.A. in 1963. While they cannot be completely modern houses, I think that it is agreed that the modernisation scheme is a good move. I am surprised at my hon. Friend's complaints. I looked into some three years ago, and I have had none since.

New Hospital (West Fife)

20.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will consider the building of a new hospital in the Dunfermline and West Fife area to replace the present complex of separate units making up the hospital service in this area; and what action he proposes to take.

The building of a new district general hospital to serve Dunfermline and West Fife is accepted by all concerned as the long-term solution to the hospital needs of the area. It is not yet possible to say when the project is likely to find a place in the programme, and the existing facilities have therefore been improved and extended.

Is my hon. Friend aware that it is becoming increasingly apparent that a new general hospital is required to replace the several out-dated buildings making up the Dunfermline and West Fife hospital services? Would he not give favourable consideration to the possibility of putting this into the forthcoming quinquennial review?

It is agreed by everyone that we need a new district general hospital in this area, but I cannot say when this project can be fitted into the programme.

Has my hon. Friend taken into account medical evidence in the area, some of which suggests that lives are being lost because of this dichotomy of provision for the West Fife area? Will he give a firm undertaking that this provision will be in the next quinquennial review?

I am not quite sure what is the medical evidence to which my hon. Friend refers. If he cares to pass it on to me, I shall of course consider it. In the first instance, it is for the regional hospital board to determine the order of priority in a matter of this sort. There are many projects in the South Eastern Region which it has to consider in making that determination.

Constitution (Commission)

21.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland by what machinery his Department will submit evidence to the proposed Commission on the Constitution and to its sub-committee on Scotland; and if he will make a statement.

It is customary for bodies of this kind to receive written and oral evidence from the Departments concerned, and I shall be ready to assist the Commission in any way I can.

Does the right hon. Gentleman expect to receive a request from the Commission before the end of this year? If so, will he be in a position by then to provide evidence?

I do not know when the Commission will invite such evidence. When it does, we shall be ready to provide it.

Will the Commission be in a position to compare public expenditure per 1,000 of the population in Scotland with public expenditure in the North-West of England? Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of the English regions would like public expenditure on the level which has been achieved in Scotland? Do we need a Constitutional Commission for the Northwest?

I think that it is quite sufficient to be Secretary of State for Scotland, without taking on responsibilities for the North-West. I am conscious of the fact that there are many regions in England who consider themselves very much neglected compared with expenditures and achievements by the Government in the direction of Scotland.

Will the Secretary of State assure the House that, whatever machinery is adopted, the evidence will be heard in public?

In view of the squabbling self-contradictions in the Scottish National Party, even on its own constitution, will the machinery established allow the Commission to treat with due reserve any evidence alleged to represent the official policy of the Scottish National Party towards the United Kingdom Constitution?

I think that the quality of the members of the Commission will be such that they will be able to sift and assess the importance of any evidence given to them.

Scottish Special Housing Association

22.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will seek to make the Council of the Scottish Special Housing Association an elected body.

In these comparatively minor matters of taste and amenity such as the placing of caravans in gardens, could not the S.S.H.A. be more sensitive to the wishes of locally elected town councils?

It might, but it should be entitled to make judgments. Four of the members of the Council of the S.S.H.A. are serving members of local authorities, and a fifth is a man with distinguished local authority experience.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that I have received a complaint this morning from the honorary secretary of Broomhill Tenants' Association which goes back two years and is in respect of shortcomings of the same kind referred to by the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell), carried out by the Scottish Special Housing Association? Why is this body so lacking in responsiveness to the wishes of its tenants? Is it that it may be suited for building houses, but not for managing them?

The hon. Gentleman is on a different point. However, if he will be good enough to let me see the letter, I will draw it to the attention of the S.S.H.A. I must emphasise, however, that the Council is set up to manage the affairs of the body, and, on the whole, it does it very well.

Water Rates (Transitional Arrangements)

23.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is satisfied on the extent to which small burghs were consulted by regional water boards before transitional financial arrangements were approved by him; and if he will make a statement.

The orders providing for transitional financial arrangements were made as a result of consultations between the Government and the local authorities concerned.

While the hon. Gentleman may be satisfied about the legalistic formalities under which consultations took place, will he not recognise that some local authorities in my constituency, such as Laurencekirk and Stonehaven councils, feel that his assurances about reasonable transitional arrangements were not fulfilled? Does he regard as reasonable a five-fold increase in water rates as a result of regionalisation?

I do not want to go into the views of those two local authorities. Every authority was consulted statutorily and, before the circulation of draft water orders, the Department held regional meetings to which every single constituent authority was invited. In addition, the authorities set up their own steering committees to consider various aspects of water regionalisation. My only comment on Laurencekirk is that perhaps its rate is inflated by the fact that it is not charging to the general rate as much of its water requisition as it is entitled to do, thus reducing expenditure reckonable for the rate support grant.

Will the hon. Gentleman not recognise that adequate transitional arrangements were not made in the case of the small burghs? Will he not agree that the recent position has justified fully the fears that we expressed during our debates on the Water Bill about the impact that it would have on water rates in the small burghs in Scotland?

The hon. Gentleman is guilty of a tremendously sweeping statement. There were 199 authorities involved. Because something like half a dozen are protesting about this, to say that that means that we have betrayed the small burghs is a piece of hyperbole.

Mr. Speaker, in view of the unsatisfactory nature of that Answer, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Pit Bings, Dumbreck Kilsyth And Cowie

26.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to remove the pit bings at Dumbreck Kilsyth and the bings at Cowie.

This is primarily a matter for Stirling County Council, and in May, 1968, my right hon. Friend approved in principle the council's proposals for clearing away these bings, with the help of 85 per cent. grants.

Is my hon. Friend not aware that, with the prevailing wind coming from the west, if the bings should ignite, smoke would be blown right into the town site and cause considerable deaths? Is it not dangerous for this bing to remain as it is? As responsibility is placed upon the Secretary of State for Scotland to see that bings are removed under the Town Planning Acts, will he put into operation his powers if the local authority will not puts its powers into operation?

I know that my hon. Friend is in a difficult position vis-à-vis his county council. There is no argument between the Government, the county council and my hon. Friend about whether these bings should be removed. However, the timing of their removal is a matter for the county council. As I have said, we have offered 85 per cent. clearance on them. I am aware of the Dumbreck bing in particular, and no doubt my hon. Friend has seen a copy of the Report from the N.C.B. that it should be removed by direct dumping, as that would take far less time.

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I will seek the earliest opportunity to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Caithness (Industrial Development)

27.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what action has been taken by the Highlands and Islands Development Board to promote the industrial development of Caithness following the report of the working party on the Wick/Thurso area.

The Board is about to publish a synopsis of the Report, and I understand that its Chairman has recently written to my hon. Friend explaining how the Board is following it up.

While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that reply, may I ask whether he recognises the continuing urgency of the need to underpin the economy of that area in view of the welcome industrial expansion of Inver-gordon further south? Has he given any thought to the possibility of establishing a permanent co-ordinating committee to press forward the industrial development of that area?

Yes. I am prepared to look at the last point. I think that something has been done locally between the Board and the local authorities. I am conscious of the concern in the area. It was for this reason that the Board and the local authorities got together to see what they could do about it.

Geriatric Beds (Glasgow)

28.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware of the shortage of geriatric beds in the city of Glasgow; and what action he proposes to increase the provision of such beds in the city.

The regional hospital board has since 1965 made available more than 700 additional geriatric beds for Glasgow—an increase of 60 per cent. There is still some shortage, but the Board hopes to provide more than 400 further new beds by the end of 1972, including some replacements. By then there should be enough hospital geriatric beds to meet the accepted standard.

I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. This is a very serious matter. There is still a long waiting list and it is to be hoped that these 300 to 400 beds will soon be available for the city of Glasgow.

I accept that. We started from a very bad position about four years ago. A good deal of improvement has been made, but some improvement is still to be made.

General Teaching Council

29.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations have been made to him by the Educational Institute for Scotland, Senior Secondary Teachers Association and the Scottish Schoolmasters Association about a review of the General Teaching Council; what replies he has sent; and if he will make a statement.

I have received representations for an early review from the Scottish Schoolmasters Association and have replied to them in the sense indicated in my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Scotstoun (Mr. Small) on 18th December.—[Vol. 775, c. 396–7.]

Once my right hon. Friend has representations from the E.I.S. and the S.S.T.A., will he consider an early review? Now that the dust has settled, will my right hon. Friend promise an early review and give a date?

I have already firmly stated that I am willing to have an early review. I did not mention anything about dust settling. I said as soon as it was considered desirable by the main bodies concerned. I stand by that.

Will the right hon. Gentleman recognise that we wish to be generally helpful in this situation? Will he accept that a large body of those teachers who have not registered would be encouraged to do so if, before long, he were in a position to announce that a review of the constitution and formation of the General Teaching Council would definitely be held within a stated period? Will the right hon. Gentleman undertake to keep in the closest touch with this aspect —

Perhaps I may just finish the question by asking the Secretary of State whether he will keep in touch with these bodies so that an agreed statement can be made at the earliest possible moment.

Yes. I think that I made the Government's position on this very clear when we debated it fully last week. The indications proved to be helpful in this respect. As far as I can see, the position is getting much calmer as days pass.

Doctors

30.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland in view of the steps taken by other countries to induce Scottish doctors to seek medical practice abroad, whether he is satisfied with the content of official information distributed to doctors; and if he will make a statement.

I have issued to senior students and recent graduates in medicine in Scotland a pamphlet on Career Guidance which outlines the opportunities available in the National Health Service and other public medical services in Great Britain. If my right hon. Friend has any further suggestions to make, I should be glad to consider them.

Is my hon. Friend aware that a great many doctors are being misled by the propaganda about the streets of Canada and elsewhere being paved with gold, only to find when they get there that they cannot see it for snow and ice? Would it not be advisable for some of the facts about conditions in Canada and elsewhere, where doctors go under a misapprehension, to be brought to the notice of Scottish doctors so that they are not misled?

I am not sure that it would be part of my function to indulge in anti-Canadian propaganda. We must make the National Health Service in this country as attractive as we can to our doctors, and that is what we are working very hard on at the moment.

Does the hon. Gentleman realise that one of the best steps that he could take to make the National Health Service more attractive to doctors in Scotland is to ensure that the level of taxation imposed on them compares more favourably with the levels they receive in places like Canada?

I do not think that doctors are in any special position concerning taxation compared with other professions, or, indeed, with the rest of us.

31.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps have been taken by his Department to advise doctors in Scotland about the proposals for reorganising the National Health Service and the opportunities this will give for the modern practice of medicine, in order to offset the steps taken by other countries to seek for recruits from Scotland for their medical services.

The Green Paper was widely publicised when it was issued in December, and the British Medical Association sent copies to all doctors in Scotland. In the further consultations now to take place, the potential benefits for medical practice will be fully discussed.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that general practitioners feel that the development on one side of the local authority services and on the other the diagnostic services of the hospitals is gradually squeezing them into a position where they are not able to practise medicine in the way that they would like? Will he ensure that as soon as possible general practitioners get an opportunity of access both to local authority facilities and to those of the hospitals?

I think that what we want to ensure in any reorganisation is that valuable, scarce and expensive skills are properly used. It is too early yet to say what kind of reception our Green Paper will have. But my right hon. Friend will remember that we preceded this with a certain amount of consultation, and I expect very informed discussions will arise.

Teachers

33.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many qualified and experienced teachers have been dismissed from teaching, and have received notice of dismissal, respectively, for failure to register with the General Teaching Council.

Education authorities have adopted motions for the dismissal of 404 teachers. Notices of motions for dismissal have been issued in respect of a further 105 teachers.

Is it not time that a stop was put to this disgraceful exercise here and now? Would the hon. Gentleman accept that there is not a child in Scotland whose schooling is worth sacrificing to enable him to save his face? Will he withdraw his regulation and release local authorities from an impossible position which is not of their choosing?

We have debated this matter many times. There is no question of saving the face of the Government or of anyone else. The matter has been made quite clear. I am glad to say that only last week there were another 399 registrations to the General Teaching Council. It seems that the number of teachers we are now dealing with is already coming down and will continue to come down. I hope, at the end of the day, that it will not be necessary for any teacher to lose his job. There is no reason why he should.

Will the hon. Gentleman give us the other side of the coin and tell us how many non-certificated teachers have already been dismissed from service?

Is it not unfair that some schools in Glasgow, as a result of dismissals, will have as many as a dozen classes on part-time education? Is this not a tragic situation for the children involved? Surely some action should be taken to avoid such a situation in any school.

The situation can easily be avoided by the teachers registering now. which is what they are doing.

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Employment

37.

asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will make a statement on the progress made since 1965 towards achieving the employment targets set in the Scottish Economy, Command Paper No. 2864.

I have nothing to add to the reply I gave the hon. Member on 4th December last.—[Vol. 774, c. 1502–3.]

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that there has been no progress but a total collapse of the policies expressed in the White Paper? Is he aware that in order to achieve the forecasts he needs to produce 90,000 extra new jobs in Scotland by next year, which is three times as many as are now in the pipeline? What is he doing to meet the target?

The hon. Gentleman is once again indulging in his usual aggressive hyperbole and ignoring all the facts and statements that have been made. We are in fact proceeding with the redevelopment and the growth of industry in Scotland at a far greater rate than ever the previous Administration did. Had we accepted the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, we would be spending less and providing fewer jobs.

Is the Secretary of State not forgetting that his record over the past four years is that he has achieved a net drop in the number of jobs at the rate of 7,000 a year? Does he not think that this is shameful compared with the net gain of 7,000 a year between 1960 and 1964?

In the last four years of the Government to which the hon. Gentleman is allied, although he was not here, the potential employment provided was 54,600 jobs. In our four years it is 84,300.

How does the Secretary of State explain that the trend over the last two years has been quite different from what he forecast in the White Paper referred to in the Question?

The trend has not been quite different—[HON. MEMBERS: "It has."] The hon. Gentleman should appreciate that he is trying to draw simple conclusions from a very complex situation.

Why does the right hon. Gentleman continue to ignore the simple fact that there are now fewer people in employment in Scotland than there were when he took office four years ago?

This is because the working population has decreased, due to there now being more old people, more students, and more youngsters at school. There are now 6,000 more full-time students than there were before.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that one factory in my constituency requires 300 female workers but cannot get them? Is my right hon. Friend aware that since we came to power the increase in the number of electronic industries in Lanarkshire as a whole has been astronomical? On behalf of my constituency I say, "Thank you".

I do not think there is the slightest doubt that the Scottish economy is stronger today than at any time under hon. Gentlemen opposite. If they were to look at the figures published in the Press this morning about the shipbuilding industry they would be able to talk about facts, rather than use their imagination.

Members' Tea Room ("Glasgow Herald")

I have a statement to make to the House.

I have looked into the question of the disappearance of the Glasgow Herald yesterday from the Members' Tea Room, the issue having been raised by the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton). I am informed by the Acting Serjeant at Arms that each day three copies of this newspaper are placed by his staff in the Tea and Reading Room. When the attendant sorted the papers in this room at 2 p.m. he found that all three copies were missing. It is not known who removed them. Various copies of newspapers disappear from time to time from this room, and it is rarely possible to ascertain who has taken them.

In addition to the copies in the Tea and Reading Rooms, two copies of the Glasgow Herald are placed in the Members' Smoking Room. The attendant who puts them there reports that one copy was still there at 2 p.m., and again at 4 p.m. I might add that the Library has two file copies, one of which was available throughout the day. The other copy was borrowed for a short time by a Minister of the Crown, but was duly returned.

Mr. Speaker, I thank you for giving me forewarning of your statement, and I am glad to know that the acquisitive instincts of Ministers are not so highly developed as those of back benchers.

Having raised this matter yesterday, may I confess that I removed the copy of the Glasgow Herald from the Tea Room? I did so for five minutes, to have it photographed in the Library. I gave a copy to the Leader of the House, and if anyone wishes to see a photostat copy, containing all the sensational revelations I referred to yesterday, he can apply to me and I shall show it to him.

Bill Presented

Housing (Scotland)

Bill to prescribe a tolerable standard for houses and to make provision for the treatment of houses and areas, and for payments in respect of houses purchased or vacated, which do not meet that standard; to make new provision with respect to the repair of houses; to make further provision for grants by local authorities and contributions out of moneys provided by Parliament towards the cost of providing dwellings by conversion, or of improving dwellings; to amend the law with regard to rents payable for certain dwellings in good repair and provided with certain amenities or improved; to confer powers on local authorities in respect of the improvement of the amenities of residential areas; to amend section 160(1)( a) of the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1966; and for purposes connected with those matters, presented by Mr. William Ross; supported by Dr. J. Dickson Mabon, and Mr. Harold Lever; read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 81.]

Jury Verdicts (Scotland)

3.32 p.m.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to abolish the verdict of not proven in the Scottish criminal courts.
I do not think that there is any necessary merit in having legal uniformity north and south of the Border. I am equally aware that there is no point in retaining a legal custom merely because it has been embedded in our system for many centuries. It may be in these circumstances that the onus of proof lies on the person who is proposing a change, and I am very much aware of that when I ask the leave of the House to introduce my Bill to abolish the verdict of not proven in Scottish criminal courts.

I feel strongly that there is no case for its retention in terms of legal machinery. As I understand it, for example, and I take it only as an example, there is no way in which a matter can be reopened by the prosecution if fresh evidence came to hand after a not proven verdict had been recorded.

There is no legal difference between a not proven verdict and a not guilty verdict. Lord Cooper, in his judgment in MacArthur v. Grosset, described it as "a distinction without a difference". Although that may be the legal position, however, it seems to me that there are wider social considerations of some weight. I think that there is a general assumption which is quite understandable that when a charge is found not proven the jury wished to convict, but could not do so, and that when such a verdict is reported the accused has escaped his just desserts on a technicality. I feel that this is an unsatisfactory situation.

Willock, in his book on the Origin and Development of the Jury System, in Scotland, quotes Hume to the effect that the not proven is "merely the mark of a deficiency of legal evidence to convict". He goes on to say that this still holds good, and that as a result a stigma attaches to someone who has had a not proven verdict recorded against him. I do not like that situation. I should like it to be removed. I am aware that the verdict was authoritatively approved by the High Court on appeal in the case of McNicol v. The Lord Advocate, when Lord Clyde handed down the leading judgment. He argued then, and no one will disagree with him, and I certainly shall rot, that if the prosecution case is established beyond reasonable doubt, then the proper verdict is one of guilty, but he went on to say that if there was a reasonable doubt, if the prosecution case was not proved, the proper logical verdict was not proven, and a verdict of not guilty should only be brought in if it was "positively established by the evidence that the accused did not commit the crime".

That may be a plausible and correct analysis of the present situation, but it is one about which I am not happy. It seems to place a very heavy burden on the jury. At the moment, they have one set of questions to answer on the facts—are these advanced sufficient? If they are, have they been established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt? If the answer is "No", they have to take another decision, one which is very different, because it is a moral judgment. They are invited to say, by the very existence of the not proven verdict, "We cannot convict, but we are still damned sure that the accused did commit the offence, and, therefore, we shall ensure that he leaves under a cloud, by bringing in a not proven verdict". I submit that this is incompatible with the well known principle that a man is innocent until he is proved guilty.

I accept and recognise that for many people this is a hopeful slogan, or at best a pious wish. The very fact that the police have arrested is reasonable ground for assuming that the accused committed the crime, but our whole court practice is based on this assumption of innocence and it seems to be a valuable one. We cannot reconcile the existence of the not proven verdict, which has been called "our curious verdict", by Lord Kilbrandon, in his 1966 Hamlyn lecture, with the general principle of innocence until proof of guilt. If there is a presumption of innocence, it can be displaced only by a verdict of guilty. If there is no verdict of guilty, again the assumption is that he is innocent, and he is entitled to an acquittal.

I recognise, and it was argued in a plausible and persuasive article recently in the Glasgow Herald, that the not proven verdict by its existence enhanced the not guilty verdict in the Scottish courts. This is a rather optimistic point. I do not accept that people's minds work that way. I submit that they concentrate not on that deep analysis, but on the handful of cases which are found not proven.

It has also been suggested that the not proven verdict helps the accused, that it is a kind of loophole, a bolthole, for the jury who feel that they ought to convict, but do not want to. I am not sure that in the present climate that is a good thing. If one is thinking about the helping the accused, and about jury reform, I think that a critical look at the simple majority of eight-seven, might be more helpful. In any case, I submit that this does not over-ride the essential principle about which I have been talking, or compensate for the real injustice which can result.

In 1966, out of 3,336 people proceeded against after full committal in the Scottish courts, 98, quite a significant number, had a verdict of not proven recorded against them. In 1967, it was about the same, 99, four of them on murder charges. There is a social stigma here. Hon. Members can imagine what it would be like if they were employers and what their attitude would be if they saw on a man's record the words, "Not proven" as distinct from, "Not guilty".

I am not immune from sympathy for or from the sentimental attachment to the old traditions of the Scots law, which have grown up over many hundreds of years. All of us have known of the not proven verdict and many of us first came across it as the dramatic climax to famous Scottish trials, going back to Madeleine Smith, but the fact that it has no good practical use must be remembered. It should be abolished and juries should be left to do what Lord Cameron called the "proper and honest thing"—namely to acquit and discharge from the courts without a stain on his character anyone whom they feel unable to convict on the evidence produced by the Crown.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Dewar, Mr. Willis, Mr. Maclennan, Mr. Small, Mr. Mackintosh, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Hannan, and Mr. Rankin.

Jury Verdicts (Scotland)

Bill to abolish the verdict of not proven in the Scottish criminal courts, presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 9th May and to be printed. [Bill 79.]

Consolidated Fund Bill

Considered in Committee; reported, without Amendment.

Motion made, and Question, That the Bill be now read the Third time, put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 89 ( Consolidated Fund Bills), and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Administration Of Justice Bill Lords

Order for Second Reading read.

3.43 p.m.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

This Bill has over 30 Clauses and deals with a large number of matters. Its cumulative effect represents yet another important chapter of law reform. It should render less daunting to the litigant the complex processes of litigation. There are valuable individual changes affecting the man in the street, like that in Clause 20, which enables orders for interim payment before trial to be made to victims of accidents in the conditions prescribed. But many Clauses in the Bill are highly technical, and, although they have their own importance, I cannot contend that they are of absorbing parliamentary interest.

However, I take comfort from the famous reply given by Mr. Micawber to David Copperfield, when Copperfield asked:
"'How do you like the law, Mr. Micawber?'
'My dear Copperfield,' he replied, 'to a man possessed of the highest imaginative powers, the objection to legal studies is the amount of detail which they involve. Even in our professional correspondence,' said Mr. Micawber, glancing at some letters he was writing, 'the mind is not at liberty to soar to any exalted form of expression. Still, it is a great pursuit, a great pursuit.'"
One aspect of that great pursuit in recent years has been the increasing interest shown by lawyers in law reform and I am happy to acknowledge the contribution which judges, solicitors and barristers have freely made to the prolonged study of complex and difficult problems in the administration of justice.

Part I of the Bill is concerned with the county courts and amends the County Courts Act in a number of important respects. Clause 1, for instance, extends the pecuniary jurisdiction of the county court in actions of contract and tort or for money recoverable by Statute from £500 to £750. The jurisdiction of the court has always depended generally on the amount in dispute or the value of the object in dispute. Originally, the limit, when the modern county court system came into being in 1846, was £20. By 1938, it had risen to £200, in 1955 it was raised to £400 and in 1965 to £500.

The purchasing power of the £, based on the Consumer Prive Index, fell by just over 31 per cent. between 1955 and August 1968, so that the equivalent of £500 then is about £655 today. The equivalent of the 1938 limit of £200 would be £742 today, so there are strong arguments for extending the jurisdiction of the county courts merely to keep pace with the fall in the value of money. These arguments have recently been reinforced by the Report of Lord Justice Winn's Committee on Personal Injuries Litigation. One of its recommendations was that county court jurisdiction in these cases should be increased to as much as £1,000, with power to increase it after a trial period to £1,500.

But the Committee wanted a number of things to be done before that recommendation was implemented, including the improvement of court buildings, the installation of tape recording equipment and the provision of a large central court on each circuit. These are clearly desirable, but, unhappily, they cannot be accomplished overnight. But my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor, who has these matters under consideration, has concluded that there should be, in the meantime, a general increase in jurisdiction to £750. This will result in a small but sensible measure of relief to the High Court judges without imposing an undue burden on county court judges.

Clause 10 provides that future increases in jurisdiction can be made by Order in Council after an affirmative Resolution in each House of Parliament approving the draft Order. This will avoid the difficulty which we have experienced in the past of necessary increases in jurisdiction having to be postponed because of the lack of that rare commodity, parliamentary time. It will also make adjustments of the limits easier, should the Reports of the Payne Committee on Enforcement of Judgments and the Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions make further changes desirable.

Clause 2 makes the alteration from £500 to £750 wherever £500 appears in the County Courts Act. Clauses 3 and 4 are concerned with transfers from the High Court to the county court and vice versa and with what happens when an action in the High Court should have been started in the county court because the amount recovered is within the limit of county court jurisdiction.

The Bill follows the existing practice by providing that if a plaintiff does not recover more than a certain amount—the amount specified is £600—he will get only his county court costs. This therefore leaves a margin of error

I apologise for not being present at the beginning of the Attorney-General's speech. This is not quite the practice where the plaintiff recovers but does not recover the total amount. If he recovers £500 he gets costs only on a county court scale whereas now, if he recovers, £1,500, reduced by two-thirds for contributory negligence to £500, he gets High Court costs.

I should like to have notice of that and deal with it in due course.

As I said in dealing with the sanctions contained in the Bill, if the plaintiff recovers a small sum in the High Court, that is, a sum less than £150, he will get nothing in the way of costs. The object of these provisions is to give the strongest encouragement to litigants to bring actions in the county court. The provisions are in line with the recommendations of the Winn Committee; indeed they follow them. Under Section 47 of the County Courts Act, 1959, the judge may allow such costs as he thinks fit if there is sufficient reason for an action in the High Court.

Before my right hon. and learned Friend leaves Clause 4, may I ask him this? He has made an interesting point, that the maximum jurisdiction of the High Court in 1938 was £200 and, therefore, in terms of increased cost of living, and so on, the equivalent now would be £742, but the minimum jurisdiction in 1938 was £50 and on the same calculation the minimum jurisdiction should now be £185. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] It is, therefore, incomprehensible to me, and I gather, to some of my hon. Friends, why this minimum jurisdiction should now be raised to £600, which is more than three times the appropriate figure in terms of the change in the value of money. It seems that the plaintiff is being very seriously penalised.

I do not think that that is so. We are translating to equivalents of the 1938 position. [HON. MEMBERS: "That is not so."] Perhaps my hon. Friends may make their interventions in due course. As I have said, under Section 47(3) of the County Courts Act, 1959 a judge may allow such costs as he thinks fit if he thinks there is sufficient reason for a plaintiff bringing an action in the High Court.

Clause 5 of the Bill increases the equity jurisdiction from £500 to £5,000, but this increase is not so startling as it sounds. Indeed, there has been no increase in this jurisdiction for 103 years. The £500 limit is now so low as to render the jurisdiction almost nugatory. The Family Provision Act, 1966 has enabled the county court to make provision out of estates of up to £5,000 in value. Therefore this provision, the House may feel, is completely logical.

Clause 6 will give the county court ancillary jurisdiction to enable it to grant an urgent injunction, even before an action is started. This is in line with the High Court jurisdiction in this respect and will enable immediate injunctions to be obtained in the count court, whereas up to now a party would have to be put to the expense of proceedings in the High Court.

Clause 7 relates to two questions affecting the right of audience. The first, which has given rise to controversy, is the provision in Section 89 of the County Courts Act whereby a solicitor cannot employ another soicitor as his agent to appear at the hearing of a case in the county court. Here, a demarcation question arises. Solicitors have long felt that it was unreasonable to put clients to the expense of briefing counsel if the solicitor himself could not appear in the county court. In practice, in recent years the provision has perhaps become more honoured in the breach than in the observance because solicitors have been able to get round the difficulty by the process of serving notice of change of solicitor on the other party.

When the recent Matrimonial Causes Bill was before the House I resisted an Amendment to the effect that solicitor agents should be able to appear in undefended divorce cases. I contended at the time—and I am still of that view—that it was wrong to make an exception in the case of undefended divorce when the matter would be dealt with comprehensively. Since then the Prices and Incomes Board, in its Report on Solicitors' Remuneration, has condemned the current operation of Section 89.

The opportunity to do away with this provision has now arisen and I do not think its continued existence is defensible. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said in another place that he does not think that it will make any appreciable difference to the Bar, because solicitors have been able to get round the provision by serving notice of change of solicitor.

The second matter in Clause 7 concerns actions by local authorities for rent recovery of small premises. Subsection (2) will enable a local authority officer who is not legally qualified to appear before a county court registrar in such proceedings as of right and not as at the moment by leave of the court. This Clause will pave the way for repeal of the Small Tenements Recovery Act, 1838, under which local authorities go to magistrates' courts in this type of case. It is the policy of the Lord Chancellor to encourage bringing these proceedings in the county court, which is the most suitable court for such proceedings, rather than in the magistrates' court. This subsection will help local authorities by making county court procedure more attractive and less expensive.

That may be so, but if a case is brought in the county court will the judge have jurisdiction to try the case instead of rubber-stamp it, which has had to be the position in the magistrates' court?

I am sure that the judge would not be content with rubber-stamping and that proceedings would receive the customary care which such proceedings have in the county court.

The difficulty is that one expects county courts to give the matter the necessary attention, but it must be a rubber stamp as they have not the jurisdiction and they must give the protection which is asked.

I should like to look at that, but I should think that the merits of such an application would be considered—[HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] I should like notice of the question and I shall return to it later. It surprises me that the prospect of a mere rubber-stamping exercise is what the courts would have to face, but I promise to look into the point.

Clause 8 provides for county court judges to summon at the public expense, assessors to assist them in reviewing taxations of costs by registrars.

Clause 9 will enable county court rules to be made to increase the jurisdiction of the registrar. County court registrars have always been able to hear small cases, particularly undefended ones, and the present limit of their jurisdiction is £30. The Winn Committee recommended an increase in this jurisdiction to £100 in line with its other recommendation, to which I have already referred, that the judge's jurisdiction should be increased to £1,000.

As I have explained, it is not proposed to increase the judge's jurisdiction to that extent for the present and, consequently, an increase in the registrars' jurisdiction should be proportionately less than that recommended by the Committee. An appropriate figure would appear to be 10 per cent. of the judge's new jurisdiction, and that is why the Clause provides for an increase to £75.

Clause 9(2) will enable rules to be made to authorise a registrar, as well as a judge, to direct that a case for hearing by the judge in one court shall take place in another of the judge's courts. This will make arrangements for trial more flexible and allow a case which has been started, for instance, in a court where the judge sits only once a month to be transferred to another court on the registrar's direction so that the matter can be dealt with more speedily.

Clause 9(3) will enable rules to be made to allow the court to disallow costs where they have been incurred improperly or without reasonable cause or wasted by undue delay, misconduct or default on the part of solicitors. This is in line with existing powers in the High Court, and, although it is not expected that the power will be used at all frequently, it will provide a useful sanction where cases have not been conducted properly.

I have already dealt with Clause 10. Clause 11 deals with a number of minor miscellaneous matters in this field, including the increase in the amount of fines laid down in the 1959 Act which may be imposed on jurymen and witnesses who do not appear or on officers of the court who misbehave. There has been no change in these fines for 34 years, and the increases are in line with those made in the recent Criminal Justice Act.

Part II of the Bill deals with what is known to lawyers as the "leapfrog" procedure. So, even if lawyers are denied, to use Mr. Micawber's phrase, any exalted form of expression, they do occasionally indulge in these flights of fancy. The "leapfrog" proposals derive from difficulties which arise when a judge of first instance is bound by an existing decision of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords. Although the judge may think that the decision of the higher court is wrong, it is useless for the unsuccessful party to appeal, unless he is pre pared to go to the expense and trouble of taking the case to the House of Lords.

An appeal to the Court of Appeal would, in any event be wasted, because the Court of Appeal is, at present at any rate, bound by its decisions and by those of the House of Lords. This means that in some cases, such as Revenue cases, a litigant may have been first to the General or Special Commissioners of Income Tax, have then appealed to a single judge, then gone on to the Court of Appeal, before a final decision can be reached by the House of Lords after an enormous amount of time, trouble and expense.

The Evershed Committee, in 1953, recommended that a High Court Judge should have power to certify that an appeal from his judgment was fit to go direct to the House of Lords where the questions to be the subject of the appeal were essential to the determination of the cause and were of substantial legal or public importance and were covered by an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal. The question would, alternatively, have had to have been wholly or substantially related to the construction of a Statute or Statutory Instrument.

Clauses 12 to 16 incorporate the principle of those recommendations. I should, however, explain to the House that the Bill, as it now stands, contains a number of modifications to the proposals that were incorporated in the Bill when it was first introduced in another place. These changes followed discussions between my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.

The Bill now enables the judge to grant a "leapfrog" certificate to eliminate the Court of Appeal where his decision involves a point of law of general public importance relating to the construction of an enactment or Statutory Instrument and which has been fully argued before him and fully considered in his judgment or is covered by a previous decision of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords and was fully considered in their judgments.

The House of Lords is now included, as it was not in the Evershed proposals, because it has been announced, as the House will know, that the House of Lords sitting judicially will in future regard itself as free to depart from its previous decisions when it appears right to do so. The certificate of the judge will be issued only—this is an important departure from the Evershed recommendations—when all the parties to the proceedings consent.

A further modification of the original proposals is that the judge's certificate will not in itself authorise a direct appeal to the House of Lords but simply enable the parties to apply to the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords for leave to bring a direct appeal. This will give to the Appeal Committee a measure of control over the number and type of cases which are appropriate for direct appeal. It is proposed that the Committee should decide whether an appeal can be brought on reading the papers and without hearing the parties or their representatives. The procedure should, therefore, be relatively quick and inexpensive for the parties. This, the House may think, is an important improvement.

If all the parties do not consent, and there is still a very arguable point, will there be appeal procedure in the normal way to the Court of Appeal so that the case can go ultimately to the House of Lords in the normal course of events?

Yes. The case would go through the normal stages to the Court of Appeal and, if the litigant had sufficient money and courage, thereafter to the House of Lords. Some lawyers think that a large number of male descendants—or female descendants, for that matter—should be bred from men like that.

I do not think that I need trouble the House at this stage with the more detailed provisions of this part of the Bill, except to say that Clause 15 prevents a certificate from being granted in certain cases—for example, where the decision of the trial judge is normally final—and that Clause 16 extends the provisions of this Part of the Bill to Northern Ireland, with necessary modifications.

I come now to Part III of the Bill, in which we move to a rather different part of the legal world. The purpose of this part of the Bill is to empower the Court of Protection, which manages the affairs of mental patients, to direct or authorise the execution of a will or codicil on behalf of a patient. The Court of Protection has power at present under the Mental Health Act, 1959 to direct a settlement of all the property of a mental patient whose affairs it is managing. A patient cannot, however, make a valid will except during a lucid interval, because he is incapable of understanding the nature of the business on which he is engaged. The court has, in the past, avoided the injustice that might arise from this inability to make a valid will by authorising a settlement under the power to which I have just referred.

Although the existing law is intended to safeguard the position of the mental patient and those for whom he might have been expected to provide, its practical effect is to place him at a disadvantage. For instance, a patient might, on marriage, have made a will in favour of her husband; subsequently, he may leave her, obtain a divorce abroad which is not recognised by the English courts, and re-marry. Meanwhile, the wife becomes mentally ill and is no longer of testamentary capacity.

The only way to prevent the will from taking effect is by means of a settlement, but it would be much simpler and cheaper if a new will could be made for the patient; and, furthermore, to make provision for the patient's family or for a servant by a legacy or an annuity in a will would be far less complicated and less expensive than by using the process of a settlement.

There is another reason in this somewhat complex field why the patient is at a disadvantage. This is because a settlement of property is a disposal of assets for Capital Gains Tax purposes. In addition, stamp duty is payable. If the patient was of sound mind and had testamentary capacity, his legal advisers would undoubtedly recommend that he should make a will under which there would be no immediate Capital Gains Tax liability or stamp duty payable rather than effect a settlement.

The Treasury has been consulted and agrees that, just because a person is unfortunate enough to be mentally ill or incapable of managing his affairs, there is no reason why those affairs should not be administered with the same regard to tax considerations as in other cases.

Clauses 17 to 19 seek, therefore, to remove this injustice by amending the Mental Health Act, 1959. The Court of Protection will be able to direct or authorise the execution of a will, although if the patient recovers his testamentary capacity he will be able to revoke the will which the court has made and make such new will as he wishes to make in the normal way.

Part IV of the Bill deals with a number of miscellaneous and supplementary provisions.

Clauses 20 and 21 stem from the Report of the Winn Committee, although the provisions go somewhat wider than its recommendations. Clause 20 will enable an order for interim payments to be made not just in personal injury cases, as the Committee suggested, but in other cases in both the High Court and the county court as specified by rules made under the Clause. This will be a useful addition to the powers of those courts in that a plaintiff will be able to obtain payment of damages in the type of case where liability is admitted and in which the only dispute is as to the extent of the injuries and the amount of the damages.

As those who practise in the courts will know, the delay involved in obtaining a judgment in cases of this kind often causes intolerable hardship and has frequently been criticised. It is hoped that the interim payments which will now be possible will go some way towards alleviating the hardships which plaintiffs must suffer during, I regret to say, the period of perhaps two years which they must wait before a final judgment in their favour is given in the courts.

Clause 21 provides for the court to make orders before the commencement of proceedings for the inspection, preservation or custody of any property as to which any question may arise in the subsequent proceedings. This was recommended by the Winn Committee, but the Clause goes somewhat further in including the taking of samples. The usefulness of this provision is obvious. Only too often evidence is available shortly after an accident or incident which may give rise to proceedings but subsequently, by the time of the trial of the action, it is not available for inspection or examination. These provisions will apply to the High Court and the county court under rules.

With Clause 22 we come to another Report, that of the Latey Committee on the Age of Majority. It recommended that the Divorce Division should have concurrent jurisdiction with the Chancery Division in matters of wardship, adoption and guardianship of infants cases. It is desirable, however, not only to implement that recommendation, but also, on general grounds, to enlarge the Lord Chancellor's power under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, to redistribute the business from one division of the High Court to another by allowing the Lord Chancellor to confer jurisdiction on more than one division concurrently.

The Latey Committee looked forward to the time when we might have a family division of the High Court. I take the same view. It may well be that, in due course, there will be a reconstitution of the High Court. But in the meantime, it is thought that the Lord Chancellor should be able to make as flexible arrangements as are possible within the existing framework, and this is what the Clause seeks to achieve.

Clauses 23 and 24 are concerned with what goes on in the Law Courts—and curious things go on in that labyrinth. Clerks to the registrars of the Chancery Division are so called despite the fact that they are not clerks but qualified solicitors. They do not like being called clerks and Clause 23 enables them to be called assistant registrars. Although they are hard to get—and this is the more important part of the Clause—they cannot be appointed now unless they are of two years' standing. There is difficulty in recruiting solicitors and the removal of this limitation should help to recruit them.

Clause 24 will rationalise the position with regard to the appointment of the clerks of the Central Office of the Supreme Court. Under the old law they are supposed to be appointed alternately by the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls—a curious sort of merry-go-round—but, in practice, his has not happened for many years and they are, in fact, appointed by open competition, and the Clause brings the law up-to-date with that practice.

I do not think that I need detain the House long with Clause 25, which deals with the records of grants of probate and administration. At present the law requires that calendars must be printed of all grants and copies of them sent to every district probate registry, and also to Edinburgh and Belfast.

The Clause will give power to the President of the Probate Division to direct in what form records are to be kept in future and what particulars they are to contain, while doing away with the expensive distribution of the calendars which I have mentioned. There are a number of detailed amendments to the law in this respect with which I need not trouble the House.

Clause 26 is concerned with the apprenticeship of public notaries. I do not suppose that their activities and functions are well known to the House. However, they perform a variety of functions connected with the authentication of signatures, official seals, the certification or execution of deeds, contracts and powers of attorney and the verification of other facts and things done in their presence. In London, much of their work is connected with documents like bills of lading and negotiable matters relating to international trade.

A person wishing to become a public notary must serve as an apprentice to a public notary or a person using the art and mystery of a scrivener. He is appointed not by the Lord Chancellor, as the House might expect, but by the Archbishop of Canterbury. He is appointed by the Archbishop through his master of the faculties. In turn, the Lord Chancellor appoints 500 clergy to livings. My noble Friend suggested in another place that one day he and the Archbishop might do a swop, but he did not say it in quite that inelegant language.

The point of the Clause is that in London an apprentice to become a public notary must serve seven years, whereas elsewhere he need serve only five. The London notaries think that five years is sufficient a period, and Clause 26 meets their wishes.

Clauses 27 and 28 are concerned with pension arrangements. The aim of Clause 27 is to promote transferability between members of the judiciary from one aspect of judicial duty to another. At present, cross-posting between judicial positions is often almost impossible because there are no arrangements for the transfer of pensions between posts which are paid out of central funds, local funds or a combination of both.

The positions affected are largely those of judges of first instance silting in criminal courts, other than High Court judges, and they include additional judges at the Central Criminal Court, the Recorders of Manchester and Liverpool and full-time chairmen and deputy chairmen of quarter sessions and stipendiary magistrates outside London.

At present, there are provisions for transfer of pension rights between offices paid out of central funds, and the object of Clause 27 is to extend these arrangements to cover judicial positions of the kind which I have mentioned. The result of this amendment to the law should be greater flexibility in the appointment of judges.

Clause 28 remedies a defect in the law governing pensions. It will enable the Registrar and Assistant Registrar of Criminal Appeals to have the same rights with regard to widows' and children's pensions as others in similar positions. The Clause also deals with full-time chairmen and deputy chairmen of certain quarter sessions. At present, if they have previously held a public office and are drawing a pension as a result of that service, there is no provision for an abatement of their remuneration as a chairman or deputy chairman of Quarter Sessions. Clause 28(2) will bring their position into line with that of others who are drawing pensions while holding judicial office.

Clause 29 deals with the remuneration of the Chancellor of the County Palatine of Durham who has jurisdiction for the area around Durham to hear Chancery cases which are ordinarily heard in the Chancery Division of the High Court in London. The Church Commissioners at present pay part of the Chancellor's salary, and the object of the Clause is to enable the Lord Chancellor to take over the Commissioners' liability in return for a payment by them of a capital sum amounting to 15 years' purchase. The rest of the Chancellor's salary is paid by local authorities, and the Clause does not affect their liability in any way.

Clause 30 will extend the legislative powers of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to enable it to abolish grand juries at assizes. Grand juries were abolished in England and Wales about 35 years ago, as a result of which the duration of criminal proceedings has been reduced, and it seems reasonable that they should also be abolished in Northern Ireland. The Clause will also enable the Parliament of Northern Ireland to amend the law relating to the presentment of indictments.

Clause 31 concerns application of the Bill to the Crown, and provisions as to orders which may be made under the Bill. Clauses 32 and 33 deal with minor consequential amendments and other necessary matters.

I apologise for burdening the House with so much detail, but this is, as I have said, a varied Bill, the aim of which is to promote sensible, useful, and I hope uncontroversial, reforms in the administration of justice.

Order. May I remind the House that many hon. Members, some learned and some not learned in the Parliamentary sense, wish to address the House. I shall be able to call them all if speeches are reasonably brief.

4.22 p.m.

The House is indebted to the Attorney-General for taking us through the provisions of the Bill and trying to squeeze a little juice out of what is on the whole a dry lemon. I do not under-estimate the practical importance of some of the changes it introduces, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman used some of the hyperbole of Mr. Micawber when he said that the Bill was another important chapter in law reform.

I accept that the Bill is useful and reasonable and I do not believe that it is controversial. But we shall want to examine in Committee some of the matters foreshadowed, particularly Clause 4, to make sure that the object of Part I is fairly achieved. The object is to give a wider jurisdictions to the county court, the court which is much more convenient and practical for so many people who have to bring their causes before the courts, and to ensure that with changes in the value of money the limits are not to the disadvantage of the plaintiff or defendant.

I am interested and a bit surprised that we are having this debate on the Floor of the House. We dealt with the Theft Act in a Second Reading Committee, which can include between 20 and 80 hon. Members. This Bill seems eminently suitable in many respects for the Second Reading Committee, thus leaving the Floor of the House clear for other matters. That was the idea of the Second Reading Committee, which seems to have worked in the past on important changes of the law such as the Theft Act or the Civil Evidence Act. It may be that it is because the Bill deals with the question of jurisdiction that no application was made to the House by the Government to send it to the Second Reading Committee. But they must not then complain if other of their Measures are squeezed out.

The Bill seems to me a useful Measure and part of the process of law improvement which should go on continually. It deals particularly with the matters of procedure, and I have always believed and said that the kernel of law reform concerns the reform of the laws of evidence and the procedures of the courts.

Part 1 deals with increasing the jurisdiction of the county court. What we must bear in mind, and what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has not told us about, is that this will inevitably mean a greater burden of causes in the county court, with a greater increase in its use, and more time being taken up by the judges and staff of the County Court. I much favour the increased jurisdiction, but I should like the Attorney-General to tell us at some time how many more county court judges will be required. It would be quite useless if we made the change and found that the pressure of business was then such that cases were not being tried with the proper expedition.

It is important to keep the quality of the county court judges as high as it is today. As has often been said in the House, it used not to be as high as it is today, but now the county court judges are of a much increased stature. I hope that in the future they may also have an opportunity to exercise some criminal jurisdiction, to give a greater breadth to their expertise in their duties as judges. I hope that when the right hon. and learned Gentleman gives us the numbers of the county court judges he will also assure us that their quality will be maintained.

As the right hon. and learned Gentleman may know, many county court judges are now helping considerably with criminal work, and the Lord Chancellor is very grateful to them for this.

I appreciate that. It is a very good innovation, and I hope that it will be extended. But it takes the judges away from their work in the county court. Many cases are now being tried by deputy county court judges, just as a fair proportion of the work being done at assizes is being done by commissioners. This may be necessary in certain circumstances, because of par ticular difficulties, but it is not right that there should be so much dependence on deputy county court judges and commissioners. A litigant has the right to have his cause tried by the appropriate judge. That is what the judge is for, and that is what the litigant wants. The Bill will increase the numbers of causes in the county court. There are already complaints about the amount being tried by deputy county court judges, and, therefore, I impress on the right hon. and learned Gentleman the urgency of seeing that the right number of judges is created as a result of the Bill.

One problem that leads to criticisms in the county court concerns listing and the delays which arise. It is not unusual for a county court case to go part-heard and not return to the list for many weeks, or sometimes months. It is not right that the litigant, his advisers, counsel, and so on, should have a part-heard cause go over for many weeks. I hope that with the increased jurisdiction, and, therefore, the increased pressure, a close examination will be given to the difficult problem of organisation of the courts to try to avoid the lengthy delays over part-heards and adjournments.

Is it not also a fact that there is no transcript of such proceedings, and that in, say, a very detailed industrial injury case it is necessary to rely on the notes of counsel and the judge, and that it could very well go against the litigant?

That is true. There is the difficulty that there are no shorthand writers and no mechanical recording. I hope that when mechanical recording becomes more widespread it may be brought into the county court. The hon. Gentleman makes the very valid point that if there are weeks and months of delay evidence can be forgotten. It can be seen in the note of the judge, but the impression given by the witness is wholly gone. This should be avoided, and I hope that it will be.

Therefore, while we all welcome this move, there are problems concerning more judges and better organisation in the county court structure which, I hope, the Lord Chancellor's Department is studying with great care.

As foreshadowed by the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme), Clause 4 relates to a matter which we shall want to examine closely to ensure that the balance is maintained and that no plaintiff suffers, particularly in the personal injuries case which are such a vast proportion of the causes being tried.

Last Session, we had an unsatisfactory debate about the County Court Rules. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate, the Lord Chancellor has, in relation to the County Court Rules Committee, an express power of veto. But we also understand—but do not know, since complete explanation was not given last Session—that the Lord Chancellor purports to exercise a veto over the Matrimonial Causes Rules. These however, have the same basis as the High Court Ruples, where there is not an express veto by the Lord Chancellor but where, we understand, it is claimed that the Lord Chancellor's veto is implied therein. In that case, surely there is no need to have an express veto set out in the County Court Rules.

If the Attorney-General can assist us by clearing up, by a side wind, as it were, some of the unsatisfactory nature of our debate of last Session, we can learn whether there is thought to be an implied veto in the High Court and in the Matrimonial Causes Rules as opposed to the express veto set out in the County Court Rules.

Some of the provisions in the Bill are based on recommendations made long ago by the Evershed Committee. It is good to see in his place, Mr. Deputy Speaker, your predecessor in that post—the right hon. Member for Islington, East (Sir Eric Fletcher), who was a member of the Evershed Committee. I hope that he will be able to catch your eye later. The Bill was greatly improved by another place. There has recently been criticism of the other place, but those of us who know something of such Bills as this appreciate the considerable amount of work done there to improve them.

For example, when the Bill first came before the other place, the Lord Chancellor, on Second Reading, resisted what is now Clause 13. There was then no Clause 13 It was inserted in the Bill in Committee, when the Lord Chancellor accepted it. In my view, it has improved the Bill, since it provides that the House of Lords, in its judicial capacity, can review causes without the expense of a hearing—without any persons appearing. The cause can be decided merely on the papers. This can be done without expense and will be a good check upon the use of these powers solely by the judge of first instance.

I listened with interest to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said about litigants who take their causes to the House of Lords having to be men of courage and wealth, but Lord Chorley, in another place, on behalf of the academics, insisted upon the importance of the Lords getting the law right even though it may be an expensive exercise. It would be interesting to have a study of how many litigants in the Lords or the Court of Appeal are either legally aided or are a great company or are supported by, for example, a trade union. I wonder how many litigants are unfortunate enough not to get legal aid, or do not have a great organisation behind them. It would be interesting to have statistics on this at some time to see how the problem bears on individuals.

In Part III of the Bill, we heard an example of the typical Treasury attitude when faced by the problem of wills for the mentally disordered, but it is obviously right that this provision should be introduced. Clause 20, in Part IV. dealing with interim payment where liability is admitted, is sensible. The other parts of Part IV are also sensible.

But in Clauses 21 and 22 we come back to the Rules Committee, about which we have had acrimonious debate. They give the Rules Committee power really to legislate. I am old-fashioned enough to believe that this place should legislate and not a rules committee, however distinguished it might be and however eminent the lawyers sitting on it. If the Lord Chancellor has a veto over the Committee, one is, in effect, having legislation by a Minister in addition, and I have never thought that to be satisfactory either. We will want to look at these Clauses carefully to ensure that we are not giving to a committee, over which a Minister has power of veto, power to legislate.

However, in my view, this is a useful Measure. It is a reflection, of course, of the fall in the value of money, since £200 in 1938 is now worth £742, while £20 in 1846 is probably also worth £742 now. Even so, it is right that this adjustment should be made and that more persons should be able to bring their causes to the county court. I repeat my warning that the success of the Bill depends upon sufficient judges and sufficient organisation to ensure that the provisions can be properly carried into effect.

4.36 p.m.

I, too, extend a cordial welcome to the Bill and congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend and the Government on having managed to include such a large variety of useful and desirable reforms, some more important than others, in this miscellaneous and comprehensive Bill. It would not be right on Second Reading to attempt to discuss more than perhaps two or three of the Clauses, but I have something to say on a few of them.

Before doing so, I want to refer to Part II, which outlines the "leapfrogging" proposals. As the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) has said, these Clauses received a great deal of consideration in another place and were substantially amended. The Bill in its present form, not only differs from the recommendations of the Evershed Committee, but also differs from the intentions of the Government as they were when it was originally introduced. I hope to be able to convince my right hon. and learned Friend that the Bill can be improved in one important particular.

As my right hon. and learned Friend said, the provisions of Part II—generally known as the "leapfrogging" provisions—stemmed from the recommendations of the Evershed Committee, which sat from 1947 to 1953 and made a large number of recommendations for improving the practice of the courts and the administration of justice, and was particularly concerned to reduce the expense of litigation. I had the honour of serving on that Committee, together with my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor.

Not the least important recommendation was that, in certain cases where it was realised that it was inevitable that a decision could only be reached in the House of Lords, a judge of the High Court should certify that it was an appropriate case to by-pass the Court of Appeal and to go direct from the court of first instance to the House of Lords, thereby saving the litigants involved a very considerable amount of expense.

We realised that a provision of that kind would be appropriate only in certain cases and that, therefore, certain conditions should be laid down to enable that procedure to be adopted. We proposed, as the Bill now provides, first, that there should be a point of law of general public importance; secondly, that it should involve either the construction of an Act of Parliament, or a Statutory Instrument, or that there should be a binding decision of the Court of Appeal, the effect of which would mean that the Court of Appeal would be bound and could give a decision only one way, whatever it might think of the merits; thirdly, that the trial judge should certify that the case was appropriate for going direct to the House of Lords. These three conditions are embodied in the Bill.

But the Bill now embodies a fourth condition, namely, that all parties should consent. This is contrary to the recommendations of the Evershed Committee and is, in my opinion, not only wrong, but will produce hardship and injustice. The matter was carefully considered by the Evershed Committee which, in paragraph 502(b) of its Report, said:
"We do not think it necessary that there should be a consent by both parties to the litigation, either before the trial or afterwards, at the time the application is made."
When the Bill was introduced in another place, my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor, who had signed the Report of the Evershed Committee, as I did, endeavoured to justify the change which he had introduced with these words:
"The Evershed Committee did not recommend one of those limitations, and that is that all parties should consent. I have put that in on the representation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid. He is apprehensive that the House of Lords, with quite enough to do already, might have too many of these cases."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 12th November, 1968; Vol. 297, c. 441.]
Substantial changes have been made in Part II, and Clause 13, as it now stands, is entirely new. The original intention of the Government was that the certificate of the judge of first instance that the case was fit to go to the House of Lords should be sufficient. Objection was taken to that by a number of Law Lords in another place who indicated that they thought that the House of Lords ought to have some control over the number of cases brought under the "leapfrog" procedure.

This, also, was considered by the Evershed Committee. We pointed out that if, after a certificate had been given by the judge of first instance, it was open to either party then to go to the House of Lords, that would open the door to a great deal of additional expense being incurred—counsel being briefed and argument before the House of Lords as to whether the "leapfrogging" was appropriate. As the Evershed Committee reported, to permit that would go far to offset any savings which might otherwise be achieved by a "leapfrog".

In Committee and on Report in another place, a compromise solution was reached and that solution is now embodied in Clause 13. To obviate the expense of a hearing before the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords after a certificate is given by the trial judge, it is now proposed that the House of Lords should retain control over which cases bypass the Court of Appeal. Clause 13 enables the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords, on receiving a certificate from the trial judge, to grant leave or not as it pleases and—and this meets the objection of the Evershed Committee—Clause 13(3) provides that such an application should be determined without a hearing and, therefore, without expense

I am entirely in favour of the introduction of Clause 13. But the introduction of Clause 13 seems to me to make it quite unnecessary and irrational to preserve in Clause 12(1) the requirement that the consent of the parties to a certificate should be obtained. Let us examine what might happen. Let us take a case which it is eminently desirable should bypass the Court of Appeal, a case in which there is involved a point of law relating to the construction of a Statute or a Statutory Instrument, a case in which the courts are bound by a previous decision of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords and which is, therefore, exactly the kind of case which, to save expense should go direct from the court of first instance to the House of Lords.

In such a case, why should the consent of both parties be required? Either both parties would consent, in which event there would be no problem, or one party would oppose, either for good reason or bad. It is not unknown in litigation for litigants sometimes to have ulterior motives, and sometimes to put a less wealthy litigant to unnecessary expense. It is not unknown to take advantage of inequalities of economic strength as between one litigant and another.

I therefore take as my illustration a case which, pre-eminently, should bypass the Court of Appeal, but in which one party, for some reasons, chooses to oppose. The trial judge will be able to take account of that opposition. If he thought it reasonable, he would not give a certificate; if he thought that the opposition was unreasonable, he would grant a certificate. But that would not be final. With Clause 13, the House of Lords would have a final say in the matter and it would know whether it was a reasonable case to bypass the Court of Appeal.

Therefore, under the provisions of the Bill as we now have it, the provision, contrary to the recommendation of the Evershed Committee, that the consent of both parties is necessary, seems to me not only unnecessary, but calculated to produce hardship and injustice. For those reasons, I hope very much that, when we reach the Committee stage, an Amendment which I shall propose in that sense will commend itself to the Government and will not be found unfavourable in the House of Lords.

Having said that, may I now make two or three comments on one or two other Clauses? Proceeding in reverse order, I shall deal first with Part IV. I welcome the provision in Clause 20 that the court should have power to make interim payments. One knows only too well that, not only in running down cases, but in other cases, litigants often suffer great hardship by having to wait one year, two years, or sometimes more, before collecting, under the order of the court, the damages to which they are entitled following the injury which they have sustained.

My hope is that the rules of court to be made under Clause 20 will be sufficiently flexible and wide to enable the courts to take full advantage of these powers and that they will not be limited merely to cases in which liability is admitted and the only issue is as to damages.

I particularly welcome the revision in Clause 17, giving the Court of Protection, or a judge nominated on behalf of the Court, power to execute the will for a patient. For a long time I thought it incongruous that the Court of Protection should have the much greater power of being able to execute a settlement for a patient, a settlement being irrevocable, yet be denied the power to make a will, which can always be revoked.

That seems eminently desirable, Adequate provision can be made in those cases in which a patient for whom a will has been made subsequently enjoys a lucid interval, during which, the will made on his behalf will be brought to his notice and he will be given an opportunity of exercising his own discretion.

Part I deals with the extension of jurisdiction to county courts. I subscribe entirely to what was said by the Attorney-General. As a solicitor, I naturally applaud the provision in Clause 7, which, for the first time, enables a solicitor to employ another solicitor in a county court. It has always been the case with London solicitors. They can employ a county agent to conduct a case in a non-London county court. It has always seemed anomalous that a solicitor practising in one provincial county court should not be able to employ a solicitor in another county court where the case comes up. I have always regarded existing law on the subject as being a rather glaring example of a demarcation dispute and a restrictive practice. I am very glad to see that it is to be removed and that the learned professions are setting a good example to industry and the trade unions in taking an opportunity to remove restrictive practices.

I would like to go much further, and I am sure that my hon. Friend would support me, in two respects. On Second Reading one can mention matters not included in the Bill, Something has been said about the county court bench, and the necessity that will probably arise of recruiting to that bench. I have always thought that it would be very desirable that provision should be made to enable solicitors to be appointed county court judges.

I want to mention something contained in a dissenting addendum to the Ever-shed Committee, signed by Sir Thomas Barnes, as he then was, by Lord Crowther, as he now is, by Professor Marshall and myself. As long ago as 1953 we were of the opinion that one of the most obvious and perhaps one of the most likely methods of reducing the cost of litigation, to the general benefit of the public, would be if there could be fusion between the two branches of the legal profession.

I know that this is a controversial subject, but as we are on this today, it is appropriate to remind my right hon. and learned Friend of what was said then. We pointed out that
"It was ruled at an early stage of our proceedings that consideration of any proposals for fusion of the two branches of the profession was outside our terms of reference."
We expressed the view
"… that the question of fusion ought to be considered forthwith by an appropriate body constituted for the purpose with appropriate terms of reference. The view is held by some that fusion would result in a reduction in the costs of litigation. Whether or not this is so, we do not know; but the division of the profession into two distinct branches is one of the most obvious peculiarities of our system which invites criticism and requires to be rationally and convincingly justified."
I hope that after that absence of time the Govrnment might consider setting up a committee to investigate this subject.

4.56 p.m.

May I, first, follow, very briefly, the last two or three remarks made by the right hon. Member for Islington, East (Sir Eric Fletcher)? I assure the House that this will not become an inter-union wrangle between both sides of the legal profession, but it should be remembered by those who think that costs will be reduced through fusion, that this is a most doubtful proposition.

It can also be said that, for the plaintiff it is equally doubtful whether it is to his benefit. I find it difficult to think that if we had partnerships of barristers and solicitors, and if a plaintiff went to a firm, that that firm would willingly say to the plaintiff:
"This is a case which we really cannot handle ourselves. You ought to go to someone else."

What would happen is what happens in the United States. There are lawyers, or attorneys, who call themselves "trial lawyers", and who are much more expensive than barristers in this country.

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend.

There would undoubtedly be a certain amount of specialisation. One of the great advantages of the present system is that when a plaintiff wishes his case to go to any court he can go to any solicitor, and that solicitor can get the best advocate in London, or anywhere else to represent him, without any difficulty.

I want to concentrate my remarks on the first few Clauses, dealing with county court jurisdiction. The county court is the familiar court for the overwhelming number of people who come into contact with the law, if one dismisses the criminal courts. For those dealing with civil actions, the county court is where they go to get justice, and it is there that they get their impressions of how justice is dispensed. I welcome the increase in jurisdiction to £750, and I note the reference to inflation made by the Attorney-General. Some significant figures were given in the other place. We have changed the jurisdiction simply in money terms from £200 to £750 and it covers very much the same kind of thing. That is true in strict money terms, but the ordinary litigant, who does not follow these things with the same mathematical precision as the economist, will find it rather more difficult to accept that his £750 case is not one that should merit the highest attention of the highest court in the land. It is difficult for him to follow the changes. There is no doubt that they will look upon their cases in the higher as of considerable importance.

It is likely that the Beeching Report, which we hope to have in the near future, will recommend tremendous changes in the county court jurisdiction. I shall be surprised if it does not. We have already had the Winn recommendation to go to £1,000, allowing for changes in accommodation and equipment.

Before coming to what I regard as the great needs in the county courts, I digress for a moment to follow up an intervention which I made while the Attorney-General was explaining the provisions of Clause 7. I accept that it is probably some time since the right hon. and learned Gentleman was briefed to appear in the magistrates' court, and he is fully excused for not being immediately apprised of the fact that, if a local authority wishes to recover a council house, the magistrates have no right to consider the merits of the matter. They must ascertain simply that the proper officer is making the request and that the request is made in proper form. If that has been done, the court must order possession in a very few weeks, if not days.

The Bill does nothing about that anomaly, but something ought to be done. I do not see why those who come to the county courts as tenants of council houses should not have the same protection as those who come as tenants of private landlords. There ought to be the same consideration given to them in deciding whether they should have to vacate their tenancies.

I have one other preliminary point to make which, judging by the noises earlier, several hon. Members opposite wish to make. It will be difficult, as the figure goes up—it is now going to £600—whether one should proceed in the county court or in the High Court. It is an increasingly difficult decision to make, and one must bear in mind that it is made on behalf of the unfortunate plaintiff by his counsel or solicitor. He pays the costs if the wrong decision is made. I do not know that there is much we can do about it.

I understand why it is necessary to make sure that people do not always start in the High Court—there would be some firms, I think, which would start every case in the High Court, for obvious reasons—but, on the other hand, the House should itself recognise the difficulties which may be put in the plaintiff's path and that of his advisers by the ever rising limit of county court jurisdiction, which, as I say, will in the near future be even higher than £600.

I come now to what I regard as the crying needs in our county courts. Above all, the need is for accommodation. I have already said that the county court is the familiar court of the ordinary civil litigant, the overwhelming number of people who have civil disputes, but so often they still have to go to courts which are totally unacceptable in this day and age. I hope that priority will be given to the provision of courts which are acceptable, bearing in mind the growing weight of business and the importance of the cases which are being heard. We are always asking for more Government expenditure, and I understand the difficulty, but the provision of better accommodation ought to have high priority.

There is also the need—these are, perhaps, lesser considerations, but important none the less—for at least a full circuit library. This should be a high priority in all circuits. Too often, on arriving at a county court, perhaps insufficiently armed oneself, one finds that one then has to trail round the local solicitors' offices and the rest to get hold of the appropriate authorities which have come to light, which have been mentioned or which appear to be necessary as the case proceeds. This, again, is doubly necessary now that we are raising the limit to £600 or £750—and, perhaps quite soon, higher still.

It has been suggested that there should be full electronic equipment for all county court cases to be transcribed. I suspect that that is beyond the possibilities of Government finance at the moment, but could not something much simpler be provided? Why cannot we have a simple tape recorder so that the one thing which is really necessary, the judgment of the county court, might be fully transcribed, if necessary. I cannot help regarding as unsatisfactory the system by which the judge's note, counsel's note or the solicitor's note, perhaps with the assistance of the note taken by the solicitor's shorthand typist who comes with him, are, as it were, all jumbled together to produce the judgment so that one may decide what happened some weeks before in the county court.

This is a fertile field for injustice, and I am sure that, for the expenditure of £40 or £50 per circuit, a machine could be provided for the county court judge so that the full judgment could be available, if necessary.

I turn now to another aspect of the matter which gives us concern. It has already been touched on by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ascot—[Laughter.] I beg his pardon. The elegance of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) is perfect Ascot, but I know very well that he represents Epsom. We are constantly adding to the work of our county court judges. Frequently nowadays, they go to the criminal courts. At Middlesex Sessions, I understand, most of the county court judges have to do at least one or two months a year. Much the same is true in the large provincial centres, for example, in Liverpool and Manchester.

Every Act which we pass seems to call upon the county court judge in some way. I think that I am right in recalling that in the recent Commonwealth Immigrants Bill it was provided that the whole question of race relations should now fall into the county court judge's lap. That may not lead to a great deal of work—I hope that it will not—but it is true, none the less, that we are putting an increasing amount of work upon the county court judges. The Bill will increase it further.

The problem of adjournments, through no fault of the county court judge, can be very real. In the main provincial towns, the judge sits continuously so that a case may be adjourned and taken in the list the next day, but where a court sits for just one day and moves on round the circuit, quite important cases may be adjourned and have to be picked up again. We ought to try to stop that.

The Lord Chancellor's office tries to stop it. I know that it takes the trouble to find out every quarter what is happening; it secures a list of the adjournments and the sitting days so that it has the information. The Lord Chancellor's office is taking the trouble to obtain the information. I hope that it is acted upon, because it is a serious problem for a litigant having a case tried in the county court to the tune of £600 or £750.

The hon. and learned Solicitor-General has promised us for a year now that the Payne report would finally be produced. I think that it has now been produced. I hear that it may have arrived at the correct office, although we have not seen it yet. It will be a great boon if we can take away from the county court judge the endless and tedious business of judgment summonses which should have no place in his court. This would be one way by which we could remove from his shoulders a great burden and give him time to look after the much more serious matters which we are now putting upon him.

With those remarks, I welcome the Bill.

5.10 p.m.

We have heard a very erudite and interesting address from the hon. Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell). In a sense he has made my task a little lighter, because he has drawn attention to some of the inadequacies of the county court procedure on which I intend to concentrate. I do not want this afternoon to talk about the Bill generally. Generally I think it is a good Bill which does some very useful things. However I think we have to have regard to the fact that it increases county court jurisdiction from £500 to £750 in claims. I do not object to that in principle, but I think we have to read Clause 1 in conjunction with Clause 4, and this penalises in costs a plaintiff who takes a High Court action where he could have brought a county court action. I do not necessarily say that this is bad in itself, but I think it might well be bad in one particular class of cases, those of the industrial injury type of case, a number of which will fall to be considered by the county courts in future if this Bill goes through unamended whereas they have hitherto been considered by the High Court, and I would like the House to consider the problem of those cases as affected by Clauses 1 and 4 and, to some extent, Clause 7.

I admit that it is quite possible to substantiate a major claim in industrial injuries on simple points of fact and law where the damages will exceed £750. On the other hand a claim may be for less than £750 and still be a substantial sum of money to a working-class family, and it may require complex points of fact relating to factory technology, industrial organisation, medical knowledge, and complex points of law, to be resolved. I think the general experience of those who have engaged themselves in industrial injury business is that the second class of case is more likely to occur than the first class, and it is this sort of case which shows the danger of arriving in the county courts, with all their inadequacies, at which hon. Members on both sides have already hinted, if this Bill goes through in its present form.

My simple thesis is that, as at present organised, the county courts cannot cope with complicated industrial injury cases, and that in consequence there will be a denial of justice in these cases. My right hon. and learned Friend said he was going to find it difficult to indulge in imaginative flights of Micawberism in his speech, but I think he introduced one when he drew a rosy picture of electronic equipment and masses of building material all descending on county courts. I notice that wisely he did not put a date for the realisation of the picture, and I think the House would be well advised to consider Clauses 1 and 4 with some caution as a result.

We also have to remember that most of the defendants in the industrial injuries cases are insurance companies. They have at their disposal great resources and expertise, and if justice is to be done, then countervailing expertise must be available to plaintiffs. It is my contention, therefore, that these cases are not very likely to become more simple as time goes on, but likely to retain their complexity.

I think the real criticism of the Bill is, firstly, that, whereas, for historical reasons, most of the work relating to industrial injuries is concentrated on the High Court at the moment, it is proposed by this Bill to take this work and disperse it and allocate it to a legal system which is widely diffused throughout the country. This will require a totally different attitude from that which has been hitherto. I find on my computation that there are 90 county courts and 110 registrars of county courts scattered throughout the country. This of itself will make life much more difficult than it has hitherto been.

For instance, interlocutory proceedings are not unknown in this class of work, and at present may involve only a fairly quick visit by counsel or solicitors, but in future it may well entail a day's journey from where they have their present offices or chambers. Claims for further and better particulars are not unknown in this type of work because of the complexity and importance of fact and law involved. These at the moment are dealt with swiftly and very often on a 1.30 summons or something of that sort. In future these may entail a lengthy journey and take up the whole day of a busy legal adviser, whereas at the present moment only a very brief period of time indeed is involved. This will apply even to cases referred to county courts in the Home Counties, but even more to county courts farther afield.

We have to remember that most of the people practising in this class of business are concentrated in one or two centres and so for them it will take an even longer time. We have to remember that, where hearings are in the county court, counsel, solicitors, medical witnesses and others are only, generally speaking, able to deal with one case at a time. At the moment, for instance, a medical consultant may be working in his chambers in Harley Street until the time he goes to give evidence, he can be summoned to the High Court, and give his evidence, and return to practise in his chambers for the remainder of the day. In future—and my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) can speak with more feeling on this subject than I can—if the proposal in the Bill is carried out this same medical consultant will have to stay throughout a whole day, having travelled to some provincial centre, to give evidence for perhaps no more than ten or fifteen minutes, and the whole day of a busy man whose time is expensive will have been wasted. One has to bear in mind that the scale of county court costs is not as high as that of High Court costs, and one wonders where the difference between the money actually expended by these expert legal advisers and their medical and industrial witnesses, and the scale costs, will come from. However, these are all matters of organisation.

One then gets down to the question of the facilities of the county court. They have already been touched on by hon. Members. I think it can be said first that very few county courts have any consultation rooms, and none at all, to my knowledge, has any adequate law library. My right hon. and learned Friend, I am sure, will be fully seized of that point because he has probably heard many time the old adage that lawyers know no more law than anybody else, they just know where to look for it. I think that this point is of some considerable importance.

The question of shorthand transcripts has also been raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme). He raised it particularly in relation to the problem of an adjournment, where, if a case has been adjourned for several days, the parties concerned have to try to work out, as a result of their lengthy longhand notes or their rather inadequate memories, what was said on the previous occasion.

This is an entirely unsatisfactory basis. The problem possibly becomes even more acute when the question—

Is my hon. Friend not aware that if this proposal were adopted it might mean cutting down on time and that that would mean cutting down on the very heavy fees lawyers get, and that this, therefore, would be very badly looked upon by the legal profession outside and inside this House?

I am sure that any cutting down of legal fees would be very badly looked upon by the legal profession. On the other hand, what I am primarily concerned about is the question of justice for lawyers' clients. As far as I can see. the proposal in the Bill is unlikely to improve the position, particularly in so far as it relates to industrial injuries cases. How much more serious would be the lack of a transcript or an adequate record when an appeal from the county court is being considered? The acoustics in many of these places may also be poor.

I am glad that my right hon. and learned Friend mentioned some of the ways in which the legal education of county court judges is being improved. I hesitate to say that a county court judge's legal education needs to be improved, but it is fair comment to say that, because county court judges work in provincial centres, they are likely to be legally more isolated than High Court judges. They are likely also, because of the nature of county court work, to think more in terms of small sums of money, and when they come to deal with industrial injury cases their minds will still be geared to small sums of money, which might have a considerable effect on the amount of damages which they are inclined to award in these cases.

The rules of procedure for county courts are not entirely simple; some might even call them complex. What complicates the matter further is that different practices are adopted by different courts in interpreting those rules of procedure. This will make the work of those who have handled industrial injury business in the High Court and who are used to that atmosphere much more difficult when they have to deal with the myriad, 90, county courts throughout the country.

I welcome, in theory anyway, Clause 7, which makes provision for solicitors to appoint agents, but here we are up against a technical problem. A firm of solicitors which is used to dealing with industrial injury business and has operated in a centre such as London, with ready access to the High Court, may be able, in theory, to save itself considerable time and trouble, whatever might be said about counsel or medical and industrial witnesses, by appointing an agent to handle the cases in a county court. Here we are up against the historical facts of the situation. Very few solicitors likely to be appointed agents in these circumstances have had experience of industrial injury work which, by virtue of historical pressures, is so substantially concentrated in the major centres of population.

The county court was set up to deal speedily with simple matters on which no great principle arose and which involved small damages. Speed of litigation, which was one of the great merits when they were set up, does not work out in practice. I have details of a recent case where it took two months to get the proceedings heard because of doubt as to which of two county courts had jurisdiction. Eventually, a hearing date was given in January, 1967, but this was adjourned until February, 1967, and again to March, 1967. The case was then adjourned generally. Ultimately, it started on 2nd October, 1967, and continued to 1st December and again on 4th December. My right hon. and learned Friend will no doubt note the adjournment. The case was heard on 4th December only because the county court judge concerned was good enough to give up his holiday. Even then, judgment was reserved until a later date. I have other examples which I could quote, but the one I have given should convince the House that, whatever merits the county courts may have, they are not necessarily those of speedy litigation, particularly in a complicated industrial injury case.

Why is this being done? The Winn Committee Report gave no reasons. It may be because there is congestion in the High Court. Supposing there is; why should we not appoint more High Court judges and provide them with more courts in which to meet? Will it be lèse-majesté to suggest that a firm of management consultants, skilled in operational research, might be loosed upon the High Court to see whether their Lordships' administrative procedures might be speeded up? There are other ways of dealing with the matter.

No doubt the question of public expenditure will be raised. As the hon. Member for Blackpool, North has already said, public expenditure is difficult to come by, but public expenditure will equally be required if the proposal in the Bill goes through. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General was good enough to hint that substantial public expenditure would be required on the county courts in the not-too-distant future. I see he nods his head. So there is no question of saving public money if this method of solving the congestion in the High Court is adopted, rather than the other one of extending the facilities of the High Court.

The assessment of likely damages by the legal advisers to the plaintiff prior to the hearing of the case is highly complicated; it is an inexact science. It may well be that the case is started in the High Court for the best of reasons and then the case goes awry, the amount of damages awarded falls well below the £750 and the poor plaintiff is, as a result, substantially penalised in costs under Clause 4. Nothing could be more calculated to perpetuate the feeling amongst working-class litigants of the "them and us" attitude than that sort of situation. When a man who works with his hands, is injured, even if that work is directed by considerable mental skill, the whole future of his economic life is at stake. The House should go out of its way to make sure that he is not made to feel that he is being provided with second-rate justice at a poor man's court at this critical period in his life.

I therefore suggest that an exception be made in Committee whereby the industrial injury type of case can be excluded from the effects of Clause 4, and the choice left with the legal advisers of a plaintiff to take the case either in the county court or in the High Court, as they think fit. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will consider this point seriously in the interval, and that he will see his way to write it into the Bill before it becomes law.

5.29 p.m.

I share to the full the sentiments expressed by my right hon. and learned Friend, both in welcoming the Bill and in the notes of warning which he sounded.

I come straight to the first of the four Clauses on which I would like briefly to comment, namely, Clause 4. It seems to me to be perfectly clear from the interventions already made, both standing and sitting, that the House has serious misgivings about the Clause, and so have I. It is my view that, as a matter of principle, when we are considering provisions designed to penalise a litigant for an error of estimation made by his advisers, and when that error of estimation is in an area so inexact as damages, it is essential, both to the litigant and to the advisers, that there should be a reasonable cushion. I will not go into figures since I want to deal with the matter of principle.

Under Clause 4, if an adviser estimated that the damages would be £750 and, in fact, they were £600, that is to say, he was just 20 per cent. above, then his client might be penalised, because it is the client, not the adviser, who is penalised. I suggest that a margin of error in damages of at least 30 per cent. would be more reasonable, and that could be achieved simply by reducing £600 to £500. I appreciate that, beyond that, it is a matter for Committee, though I repeat that I share the misgivings which have been expressed about the Clause.

I turn now to Clause 5. I agree with the Attorney-General that the limits at the moment in respect of the equity jurisdiction which is given to the court under Section 52 of the principal Act are so small that very little, if any, of that kind of work is done in the county courts. I accept that that is a good reason for increasing it, say, to £1,000 or £1,500. Whether it should be one or the other would be a matter of judgment or opinion for discussion in Committee.

To raise it to £5,000 would be to revolutionise the equity jurisdiction of county courts. Not only would it bring in a little more of the comparatively small work, but a large volume of new work. After all, £5,000 is a substantial figure in relation to the kind of work specified in the relevant Section.

Many references have been made to the capacity of the courts to deal with an increased volume of work. My point is not simply on the increased volume, but on the different nature of the work. The Attorney-General may have had the advantage of seeing the memorandum submitted to the Beeching Committee by the Chancery Bar, in which the special features of Chancery work were pointed out. There are some very special requirements in the kind of work about which we are speaking under Clause 5. We have the judges, assisted by the Chancery masters, by the Chancery registrars and, anticipating only a little, by the assistant registrars, the latter being those who were clerks but whose work is so responsible that they are qualified men.

The Attorney-General said that curious things go on in that labyrinth. That is a graphic way of saying what was expressed more prosaically in the memorandum in these words:
"A great deal of responsibility in the interlocutory stages of non-witness matters falls upon the Chancery Masters, and in many cases a substantial number of applications are made in Chambers before the matter comes on for hearing. The nature of the case very frequently involves the making of a very complicated order which itself involves further applications in Chambers after the hearing for the purpose of working out the order."
My query is this. In practice, is it possible to provide the 90 county courts referred to by the hon. Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Moyle) with the very special machinery required if a court is to deal with any volume of Chancery matters? Would it not be better to proceed with a little more caution? The recommendation to the Beeching Committee was that courts like the Palatine Court of Lancaster and the Palatine Court of Durham might be given increased Chancery jurisdiction so as to get some of the work away from London. I can see the argument for that, but would it not be more wise at this stage merely to increase the limit to. say, £1,000 or £1,500 so that the jurisdiction of the county courts to hear some equity matters would at least be more realistic than at present? Before going to the extent of raising it to £5,000, which would entail building up new machinery in the county courts to deal with the work of a new nature which would then come to them, would it not be wiser to await the outcome of the Beeching Committee and see whether the dispersal of this work outside London might not otherwise be better dealt with?

The third of the Clauses to which I want to refer is Clause 10, to which as yet no reference has been made either by the Attorney-General or by anyone else. In our usual habit, we are legislating here for a reform which necessitates looking at two different Acts and three different places to see what we are doing. In Clause 1, we say that in Sections 39 and 40, which are the Sections providing for the general jurisdiction of the county courts, the figure shall be increased to £750. In Clause 10, we are amending Section 192 of the Act of 1959 so as to give power by Order in Council to increase that jurisdiction. It may be said that that is something which was done already in the 1959 Act and that, therefore, there is no departure from principle. But there is a departure from principle, and it is an important one.

While it is true that, in the 1959 Act, power was given to increase the jurisdiction by Order in Council, the limits to which the jurisdiction could be raised were prescribed in the Act. As a broad generalisation, power was given to increase the jurisdiction by £100 or £150 by an Order in Council requiring an affirmative Resolution of this House. What is done in the Bill is different. One can see the argument for what was done in 1959, because it might have been said, "It is unreasonable to have to come back to Parliament every time it is desired to increase the jurisdiction by £100 or £150, so we will give power to do that by Order in Council, but we will specify the top limit to which the jurisdiction can be raised by that method."

Under Clause 10, there is substituted a power to raise the jurisdiction by Order in Council, but there is no limit on the amount by which the jurisdiction may be raised by Order in Council. I submit that it is wrong to say that there is a special reason for departing from the principle established in the 1959 Act. What is required is not that the power to increase the jurisdiction by Order in Council shall go, but that it should, as formerly, be subject to a top limit to which the jurisdiction can be so increased.

Finally, I want to say a few words on Clauses 20 and 21. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) has referred already to them and used the phrase, "giving power to legislate". As I read the two Clauses, they are giving power to the Rule Committee to legislate—not just to make rules—about the jurisdiction of county courts. If this were not giving a power to legislate beyond making rules concerning matters of practice and procedure, it would be within the powers of the Rule Committee already, and there would not be occasion to give this extra power.

I do not quarrel with the proposition that it could be useful for both the High Court and the county court to have powers to order interim payments in cases where it was clear that some payment would be made ultimately, and thus enable the court to see that the plaintiff was not kept waiting for money which was undoubtedly due to come to him in the long run. But I question the desirability of leaving to the Rule Committee the legislation necessary to implement that intention.

We make a very frequent practice here of delegating powers of legislation by Orders in Council. Then we have what are called the "grandchildren" Orders and the further delegation of powers by Orders in Council.

I appreciate that in some cases this is necessary for administrative reasons, but there are no such reasons here. If it is desired that the court should have this new jurisdiction, we should legislate upon it just as in the Bill we are legislating on other aspects of the jurisdiction of the court.

It is wrong for two reasons. First, this is a new method of delegating legislation, and any extension of that principle is to be deplored and resisted. Secondly, guidance is needed. Someone has to give guidance on what this new jurisdiction is to be. Simply to put it on the plate of the Rule Committee that it should legislate without being given any guidance, when that Committee is subject to the veto of the Minister, is undesirable in principle.

With those reservations, I, too, welcome the Bill.

5.41 p.m.

I wish to refer to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Moyle) concerning Clauses 1 and 4, particularly as it concerns the problem of industrial injuries going from the High Court, almost on a compulsory basis, into the county court.

The majority decision of the Winn Committee was that in certain cases injured persons should, in effect, be compelled to proceed in the county court and should be penalised if they proceeded in the High Court. The Winn Committee said that it thought this question was very difficult and that it had discussed it at length, but it did not go on to give any reason for that decision.

My reason for intervening in a legal debate of this nature is that I hope to put what I consider to be a trade union point of view to the House because of the large amount of work done by trade unions on behalf of their members in the courts, particularly concerning industrial injuries. We all deplore injury in industry. We should like to see it reduced to the lowest possible level. But, despite the safety measures, modernisation, new techniques, and the hazards with which people live and work in industry, injuries do occur. Some injuries are of a very serious nature and liability has to be resolved by litigation between what is basically the insurance companies and the trade unions.

To give an idea of what is entailed, I should like to read from the February issue of the Journal of the A.E.U. Under the heading "Legal Case Book", it states:
During the month ended December 1968 our solicitors secured for members who had met with accidents, the sum of £138,682 representing 366 settlements. For the year ended December 1968 the amount secured was £1,921,155 in regard to 4,989 settlements."
This was an increase of 720 over the previous year.

The amount of damages involved—about £2 million over a year—gives some idea of the amount of work which has to be done on behalf of a trade union. I am quoting one major industrial trade union, but this happens in many other cases. Therefore, when it is recommended that these matters should go into the county court, we should consider it extremely carefully.

The majority of cases that I have just mentioned were settled out of court. But certain cases had to go into court, for obvious reasons. They were contested cases and, therefore, had to be decided. The settlement of these cases lays the basis for other cases which do not go into court. I do not want to teach lawyers how to suck eggs, but this is the reality of the situation. Scales of compensation arise and these become the guide lines, official and unofficial, for damages.

Recently there was a case in the High Court concerning a single boy of 19 who lost his life. The court judged at that time that his loss was valued at £500. If that is so, when dealing with such problems as this, raising the scale will bring into this situation many serious cases.

Considering the legal representation on the Winn Committee, solicitors were not very well represented. Nevertherless, Mr. Robin Thompson, who gave a minority decision dissenting from the main recommendation on this Clause, said that, although he accepted many of the other recommendations of the Committee, it would be against the interests of a large number of people who would be forced into the county court to accept the proposals to raise the jurisdiction. In effect this would raise legal fees as opposed to the compensation which would be obtained. It would, therefore, cost more for the claimants involved. Speaking for the A.E.U., it would cost my members a great deal more to pursue these types of cases.

Apart from cost, important issues have been raised about the suitability of county courts to give such judgments. This has to be taken into account very carefully. I am not conversant with the everyday working of these institutions, but I was astounded when I investigated the matter at the lack of facilities available to them. Differing standards exist within these courts. They are not centrally situated. In the complicated business of representation of people involved in industrial injuries, whether it be on the docks, on building sites or in factories, evidence is required—for instance, medical evidence, which needs very careful examination—and these cases can take some considerable time.

As a branch official and shop steward in industry I have seen the beginning of these cases when the claim form has been filled up with the details of the injury. I have seen the great amount of work which has been required by the solicitors before they were able to put the case to a barrister if it had to go into court. They have to collect medical witnesses and other evidence in many cases. These cases, some of them extremely important because of the precedents that they set, can, therefore, have an overall effect on what might happen.

Why are these cases being taken out of the jurisdiction of the High Court? I think that my right hon. and learned Friend has a duty to tell the House the reason for this decision. Libel cases will still be heard in the High Court. Are they more important than the case of a man who loses his index finger, and is perhaps prevented from following his previous occupation? We are told that one reason for this change may be the amount of time spent on hearing criminal cases, and defended matrimonial cases. We are also told that a reason for the change is that the High Court is not able to deal speedily with these cases, that there is a large backlog of cases waiting to be heard. We are told that judges are under pressure. No one would deny that, but if that is the kind of problem confronting us, surely the answer is to appoint more High Court judges. I hope that the Attorney-General will consider that suggestion.

The right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) spoke about the need for more county court judges and for maintaining the standards of those courts. Some people, particularly those who are not members of the profession, might say there is a need to improve them.

Many of us who have no personal interest in this issue are concerned to see that justice is done for the thousands of people who find it necessary to go to court to get their cases decided. I hear of responsible people saying that the High Court is the correct place for dealing with cases such as I have in mind. They take the view that only in the High Court can the people concerned be properly represented, and that it would be an injustice if such people were precluded from going to the High Court.

The Bill is designed virtually to force people to go to the county courts in specific cases, because if they go to the High Court and the sum they are awarded for damages is below £600—incidentally I do not know how that figure has been arrived at—it will be possible to claim expenses only on a county court basis. To my mind this is a dubious method of trying to force people to take specific cases to the lower court, and I do not think that this change is in the interests of justice.

Nobody has greater admiration than I have for my right hon. and learned Friend. I am sure that when he gives this matter further consideration, and when we deal with this issue in Committee, he will agree that it is right to give people the chance to decide in which court they want their cases to be heard. I think that giving a litigant and his advisers the right to make that decision is very important indeed.

It is of great importance to give those people whose only means of redress after an accident, perhaps resulting in permanent disablement, is to go to court, the right to choose the court at which they wish their cases to be heard. I think that it would be wrong to take action now which would prevent them getting the help they need. I hope, therefore, that my right hon. and learned Friend will consider seriously what we have said, and allow the existing freedom of choice to continue.

5.55 p.m.

I intend, I hope as always, to make my remarks as short as I properly can. I therefore do not propose to repeat what was said by the hon. Member for Sal-ford, West (Mr. Orme), nor what was said by the hon. Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Moyle), save to say that I agree with everything said by the hon. Member for Salford, West. I do not think that I can put the matter better than he did, and I shall therefore content myself with saying "Quite right".

There are further reasons why this type of case should not be sent to the county court, except in respect of very trivial matters. To do so will increase the delays, the overloading, and the work of these courts. I propose to deal with this more fully later.

There is another matter which I think I raised in an intervention during the Attorney-General's speech, when he was dealing with Clause 4, and no doubt the right hon. and learned Gentleman will deal with it when he replies to the debate. If I am not here then, I hope that he will accept my apologies. I have another engagement, which I have to fulfil, but I assure the Attorney-General that I shall read HANSARD with the greatest of interest.

Under the law as it is now, if a plaintiff has his damages assessed at a figure higher than the county court scale, but has them reduced by reason of his own contributory negligence to a figure below that scale, he still gets his High Court costs. As I read that Clause—and if I am wrong I hope I shall be corrected—if he gets an aggregate sum below the new figure he will not get his High Court costs. This provision will be a great injustice and will put on the plaintiff's advisers the responsibility of assessing, first, the amount of the damages according to the injury, and, secondly, whether contributory negligence will be found against the plaintiff, and if so to what extent. That will be an extremely heavy burden.

I accept that. I am sure that the Attorney-General will make sure that that is made clear before this Measure becomes an Act. Judges have to decide these matters on the wording of the Act, and it could be argued that the aggregate amount means the aggregate amount received by the plaintiff.

In recent years there has been a growing practice of passing legislation which is dealt with by county courts. There are a large number of landlord and tenant Acts, particularly those dealing with the Rent Acts. There are a large number of hire-purchase Acts. Judgment summonses, actions for negligence, and matters of that sort passed into the jurisdiction of the county courts. Equally important is the divorce jurisdiction which has been given to the county courts.

The Attorney-General knows as well as anybody in the House does that there is grievous complaint at the overloading of the county courts, with the consequent demand that they should do their work by appointing deputies ad hoc. In other words, there are not sufficient county court judges, by a long way, to deal satisfactorily with the work, and by "satisfactorily" I mean the proper expedition with which anybody who has had an accident can reasonably require that to be done. We must face the fact that it is long past the time when this should be remedied and there should be more county court judges. Their salary has not been increased for some years, and that should also be considered. I hasten to add that I have no personal interest in this matter.

The Attorney-General would also accept, I think, that one of the reasons why we are trying to shift work from the High Court to the county court is that the position in the High Court has been worsening. The Bill is partly due to the fall in the value of money and the growing congestion in the High Court, due to the fact that there are not sufficient judges, which is itself partly due to the fact that more crime is being tried with which High Court judges have to deal. At the moment, three High Court judges are sitting at the same time at the Old Bailey, and there are, I am told, only four High Court judges dealing with civil, that is to say, Queen's Bench, matters sitting in London, which is a ridiculous figure to deal with civil litigation.

When we have to pass a Bill appointing a sufficient number of county court judges to deal with this matter, it will be in the interests of the people that their litigation is tried reasonably quickly. Cases in the High Court are coming on five, six and sometimes seven years after the events complained of. I agree that one does not want to rush into litigation before a man to whom injuries have been caused recovers, so that one knows what he should be awarded, but these hold-ups in the lists of the courts are a scandal and a disgrace. I mean my words to be strong, because that is the proper description.

I agree that judges should be sent out to try crime, because it should be tried while the matters are fresh in the memories of witnesses, but not at the expense, whether in London or at assize, of a complete denial of justice to those who have civil actions to be tried. I hope that this will be dealt with properly and more or less immediately. I agree that the buildings are totally inadequate in many cases, but a good judge in a bad building is better than a bad judge in a good building.

Clause 20 deals with interim payments. As it reads—I agree that rules must be made under it—the judge could arbitrarily order a prospective defendent to pay the plaintiff interim damages almost regardless of the merits of the case. I do not think that that is intended, but that is what the Clause says. Plaintiffs have to wait far too long for the damages to which they finally become entitled, I agree, but to order a defendant who denies liability and is subsequently found not liable to make an interim payment which he may not recover after the court finds in his favour would be a grave injustice.

The "leapfrogging" procedure will not affect the vast majority of people. This is a legal necessity, possibly an attempt to make the law better on a small and, for a few people, very important point. But the right hon. Member for Islington, East (Sir Eric Fletcher) was right to say that one side should not have the power, by simply saying no, to block this procedure.

With regard to the hearing in another place, there are two objections to the proposal that there should be no oral hearing. One is that people who are refused their demands without even being able to give their reasons will, not unnaturally, always have a grievance. If the Attorney-General gives one side the power to object in the original court, that is all the more reason for an oral hearing in the House of Lords.

The other matters are mostly points of detail, better suited to Committee. I have raised what I thought to be the principal points of the Bill, above all those which have been overlooked, and particularly what the Bill's result will be. If the Bill is passed without those matters being considered, the present bad position will become even worse.

6.6 p.m.

Perhaps I may deal first with the controversial Clause 4—

I am conscious that, in claims for personal injuries, there is a very wide disparity of estimate between different counsel as to the likely damages to be awarded. Only two or three months ago, I was in a robing room in the North-East where a barrister showed various members of the Bar a photograph of an attractive young lady whose leg had been damaged. It was a cosmetic defect, a scar. He asked a number of barristers what amount of damages they would award on the basis of admitted liability. My guess was £850. No one agreed. There were two Queen's Counsel present, both highly experienced in civil actions and one, not in the other's hearing, said £2,000, while the other said, with equal certainty, £150. When they were told of their differing estimates, they were shocked. This episode makes it clear that there is not yet consistency in estimating civil damages.

Therefore, if one brings a case to the High Court but gets less than £600, costs will be awarded only on the county court scale. It could happen that a plaintiff got £550 damages but costs only on the county court scale and, therefore, out of his own pocket would have to pay the balance between the county court and High Court scale and be left with only £300 or £400. That makes the question of damages and compensation even more of a lottery. The Government should think again about Clause 4; they should leave the £400 as it stands and not increase it to £600. The more serious the injury, the more difficult it becomes to assess damages with any degree of accuracy. In England, damages are assessed on a low basis. To obtain £700 in England, one has to be pretty badly hurt. Damages are far too low.

It is said that the Bill's purpose is to make the jurisdiction of the county court equal to what it was in 1938. In 1938, it is said, the limit was £200, which is now worth £742, so if the county court jurisdiction is brought up to £750 that will just keep matters in line. But in 1938 the registrar's jurisdiction was £10, so if that argument is used we should also make the registrar's jurisdiction £35—three and a half times—and not £75 as the Bill proposes. The Government, by using this idea of three and a half times, have plucked figures out of the air to justify the argument. They are using it for the county court scales but not for the registrar's jurisdiction.

It does not matter what has happened to money's worth; what matters is whether judges have taken account of the difference in the value of money. In 1965 the jurisdiction of the county court was raised from £400 to £500. To justify an increase to £750 in 1969 one should be able to show, not only that money has cheapened by 50 per cent.—which it has not—but, more importantly, that judges are now awarding 50 per cent. more damages for the same kind of injury as in 1965. That has not happened. In England today the standard amount for a workman losing an eye is still under £3,000. By increasing the jurisdiction to £750 there is an attempt to get justice more cheaply by taking a sizeable chunk of High Court work out of the High Court and putting it into the county court.

If we were watching the way in which damages have increased we should increase the jurisdiction from about £500 to, say, £550. We are increasing it at a far higher rate in order to lighten the load on High Court judges. It is true that county court cases are cheaper. That being so, there is an argument for saying that we must have justice more cheaply. That is a strong argument for increasing the jurisdiction to £750. I do not condemn the increase in jurisdicition, but we should be clear what we are doing. We are getting judges of inferior status to decide matters previously decided by judges of superior status. To get justice even cheaper, the registrar, who is a solicitor who may have had no experience of court cases, is given jurisdiction up to £75. That means that the registrar will be more burdened than before. He will be deciding cases no whit less difficult than those which come before county court judges.

It is entirely wrong to make the assumption that because damages, particularly in cases of breach of contract or rent, are low therefore the legal problem behind the case is simple. One may have a problem of the utmost complexity involving a case worth £50 in damages. To put this additional load on the registrar, who may not be equipped to bear it, is a retrograde step. It is simply a method of getting litigation cheaply, not only for the litigant but also for the Government. I cannot resist the feeling that in this Bill the Government have considered that a registrar is paid less than a county court judge and therefore we should let there be more registrars than county court judges and, because county court judges are paid less than High Court judges, let there be more county court judges than High Court judges.

The purpose of the "leap-frogging" procedure is to save money for the poor litigant because it is so expensive going through both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. I completely fail to understand why this procedure does not apply for an appeal from the decision of a county court judge. If one appeals from a county court judge's decision, one has to go in the first instance to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords. Surely the smaller the sum initially the more important it is to save money subsequently. Why should it be that if one takes a case to the High Court one may skip the Court of Appeal and go straight to the House of Lords, but if one goes to the county court one has to go both to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords?

I appreciate how this anomaly has arisen. When the Bill was originally drawn the idea was that the High Court judge was a sufficiently senior judicial official to decide whether a case should go straight to the House of Lords. He would decide it without check or hindrance from anyone, but in another place, as a result of objections, Clause 13 was injected into the Bill. It was said that it would be window-dressing because, even if the High Court judge agreed, the House of Lords, sitting judicially without a formal hearing, could throw out and refuse an application to by-pass the Court of Appeal. With the subsequent provision in Clause 13 it does not matter whether the judge who made the original decision to by-pass the Court of Appeal is a senior or a junior judge because the matter is taken out of his hands.

I should like to hear the Attorney-General justify the reasons why the county court judge cannot make this decision, subject to the checks contained in Clause 13—in other words the approval of the House of Lords—when the High Court judge can do so. Likewise, it does not matter that one party does not consent to this procedure. It did originally matter as the Bill was provided but now, in view of the existence of Clause 13, what harm could come if a county court or High Court judge decided in the face of objections from one litigant that the leap-frogging procedure should be eliminated? The litigant has his appeal through the House of Lords and when the papers are read the House of Lords, sitting judicially, will see from the papers that the litigant objected in the court below. Therefore, in themselves there will be a form of appeal. I ask the Government to take that into account.

Inherent in the Bill is the decision of the Government to maintain the Courts of Appeal. Some people believe that there should be only one. When people talk, as increasingly they do, of a shortage of high calibre personnel to fill judicial offices, it is worth remembering that the House of Lords occupies 10 or 11 able judges and there come before them throughout the year able counsel. If we had only one Court of Appeal there would be an additional reservoir of judicial manpower to be put at the service of that one court which would remain.

The Bar is often accused of maintaining restrictive practices come what may. It is interesting that no one who is not a lawyer has complimented the Bar today for not objecting to the Clause in the Bill which permits solicitors to employ agents. That is something which they could not legally do before. The Bar Council has made no objection. No barrister in this House has raised his voice in protest. The Bar is entitled to credit for not opposing a change leading to greater efficiency and equity. This is an indication that barristers are not motivated only by vested interests.

I congratulate the Government on including in the Bill provisions relating to interim payment by the court in damages cases. One hears of terrible cases where three passengers in a car are injured and it is found that either the driver of that car or the opposing driver has been negligent but, because there is an issue between the two drivers, the three passengers are left out on a limb without damages for three or four years. In the circumstances envisaged in the Bill those passengers may be able to get money on account. Breadwinners may be incapacitated for years and the standard of living of their families destroyed. The Bill is very humane in that respect. I congratulate the Government on this aspect of the Bill.

6.20 p.m.

I declare an interest in the Bill, because as a solicitor I have practised on and off for a number of years in county courts. I have great confidence in the system of county courts, and in spite of what was said by the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme), people do get justice there. They are properly represented, it is fairly cheap and there is not much delay. I welcome the increase of jurisdiction in equity up to £5,000. I feel that it should have been increased far more in common law as well. I should like to see an increase to £5,000 both for equity jurisdiction and for contract.

I feel that it is a pity that the Government did not take this opportunity to allow the appointment as county court judges of members of the solicitors' profession. The hon. Member for Bradford, East (Mr. Edward Lyons) said that the Bar has not made objections on the question of right of audience for solicitors by maintaining restrictive practices and I welcome what he said. However, I cannot see why every county court judge has to be a barrister. I have no prejudice against barristers but solicitors very often make excellent registrars, and I feel would often make excellent county court judges.

Recently, I appeared in the county court before a registrar who had been a local solicitor in my area. It was a complicated little case. He took profound trouble with it and gave a magnificent judgment, missing not a single point. It taught me that a solicitor with many years' practice in county courts behind him makes an excellent registrar.

Why should a registrar be limited to cases involving only £75? If a solicitor is capable of making a good registrar, he should often be capable of making a good county court judge—though not in every case, of course. It would be a tremendous encouragement to the solicitors' profession if they felt that just one or two among them, perhaps specially qualified, who had spent their professional lives dealing with county court work could be appointed to the county court bench.

I do not think that this would be resented by the Bar. I hope that the Attorney-General will be able to tell us that it would not be. It would certainly be welcomed by the solicitors' profession. It would also help justice because it would persuade more solicitors to make their careers in the county courts and to become experts knowing that they might one day finish up as judges. This idea has been canvassed before. I mentioned it myself in our last debate on county courts. I did not get a very hopeful answer then. On the other hand, I was not totally discouraged. Perhaps the Government have had a chance to think again. It is, of course, a matter for the Lord Chancellor but the solicitors' profession would be interested to hear whether the Attorney-General has anything to say about it.

6.24 p.m.

The hon. Member for Chippenham (Mr. Awdry) will not expect me to go into his admirably brief speech on the question of appointing solicitors to county court judgeships. No doubt there is great merit in it but I would not care to express an opinion.

I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General on the admirable and lucid way in which he explained the Bill, which is of rather a complex and scattered nature. I hope that he will deal with the controversial points perhaps more carefully in replying than he did when I intervened on the subject of Clause 4. I have every confidence that he will do so.

I do not feel competent to go into matters of details which are really for hon. and learned Members and for those who practise as solicitors. But Clause 4 affects a large number of people with whom I have frequent and intimate dealings. I refer to injured persons who seek damages in the courts. I see a large number of these unfortunate people, referred to me by trade unions or solicitors, and it seems to me that their interests are going to be seriously prejudiced by Clause 4 if it is not amended in Committee, as I hope it will be.

I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend has taken careful note of the views expressed by several hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. Edward Lyons) and my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme). Most of those who have spoken have shown some doubt and disquiet about Clause 4.

It seems to me that there is no general objection to raising the jurisdiction of the county court from £500 to £750. There might well be a case for raising it higher still. But what is a matter of serious doubt is that litigants should be forced to use the county court when they are advised, and have every reason to believe, that their case would be more satisfactorily dealt with in the High Court.

My right hon. and learned Friend referred frequently to the Winn Report, which made recommendations in the general sense of Clause 4. I am sorry that he did not refer to the excellent separate report by Mr. Robin Thompson, of the widely respected trade union solicitors, W. H. Thompson. Mr. Thompson's report should give great food for thought.

I believe that Clause 4 will be unfair to the plaintiff because it will cause him to receive less compensation for his injuries, it will make his compensation harder to get and it will make his compensation much more costly to get. I think that it is generally agreed that damages awarded in county courts tend to be substantially less than those awarded in the High Court for the same sort of case. Perhaps if my right hon. and learned Friend studies paragraph 434 of the Winn Report he will move further away from the usual conception. He will see that this is specifically referred to by certain authoritative bodies—for example, the Bar Council, for which I have great respect, as do most hon. Members. According to paragraph 434, the Bar Council expressed the view:
"Awards of damages in the High Court have tended to increase, whereas in County Courts they have not, and High Court Judges in any event tend to award more generously."
The Bar Council could not be more authoritative on the question of county court damages.

I turn now to the evidence given to the Winn Committee by the T.U.C. I know that, in Government circles, it is not considered these days very "with it" to pay a lot of attention to the T.U.C.—

—but the T.U.C.'s views on this matter certainly deserve serious consideration. According to the Report, the main criticism by the T.U.C. regarding the extension of county court jurisdiction was the low level of damages awarded in some courts and the lack of uniformity in awards. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides will agree that there is a general feeling that, for the same injury, a plaintiff will get less compensation in a county court than he will get in the High Court. I cannot help thinking that this is an unfair situation. There is also a general feeling that even in the High Court damages are lower than they should be. This makes the situation even worse for the unfortunate litigant.

I will give an example of what can happen in a county court, and this is a distressing type of example. If one considers the case of a child who has been run over by a motor car—or it might be a young unmarried man killed at work; my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West referred to this type of case—it has been decided in another place that the appropriate damages for the loss of life is £500.

We will have the distressing situation of the parents of such a child—or it might be the parents of an injured young workman—having to queue in the county court to have their tragic case decided among many minor cases of, for example, hire-purchase default and minor disputes between neighbours. A situation like this is repugnant to hon. Members on both sides, but I fear that it will be the effect, from the point of view of damages, of Clause 4 as it stands.

The second point I wish to raise concerns compensation in the county court, which, I believe, will be more difficult to obtain. A substantial proportion of county courts are conveniently placed for plaintiffs. For example, in Manchester the county court is close to the assize court and, being in a central position, it is convenient for all concerned.

In some large centres of population, however—this particularly applies to London, where getting on for one-third of the population lives—it is difficult to get barristers, doctors who must give medical evidence and engineers who must give expert evidence to leave their offices, chambers and consulting rooms in the centre of the conurbation to go to a remote suburb.

In these days of intense traffic congestion this travelling may add hours to their work. In any event, the preparation of a case requires as much skill if it is coming before a county court as it does if it is going to the High Court. However, solicitors must make arduous journeys to remote suburbs, in addition to preparing their cases. I suggest, therefore, that it will be more difficult for the plaintiff to obtain his damages if Clause 4 is not amended.

My third point is to stress that it will be more costly for the plaintiff to obtain damages. It might seem that it would be less costly because county court costs, certainly for solicitors, are on a low scale—

and, as the hon. Gentleman's affirmation indicates, there is a strong case for saying that they are too low.

The question of obtaining expert evidence is a different matter. The costs allowed, from the taxation point of view, in the county court are often derisory compared with the amounts put in by expert witnesses. Who must pay the difference? It is the unfortunate plaintiff or his trade union organisation. This situation is manifestly unfair to the plaintiff and sways the whole balance of advantage towards the defendant.

I put it to the Attorney-General in an intervention earlier that it was unreasonable to make the minimum jurisdiction of the High Court up to £600, whereas in 1938 it was £50 since, on the basis of the difference in the value of money, the appropriate figure would have been £185 Why is there this extraordinary difference? The year 1938 was not a time when the troubles of the lesser paid were given the maximum attention of the Government. It was not the most progressive time in our history from the social point of view. Why, therefore, has the minimum jurisdiction been increased by three times the 1938 standard? The only possible explanation—if there is another I trust that my right hon. and learned Friend will provide it—is that it is felt that more pressure should be put on unfortunate litigants to drive them into the county courts. If that is the reason, why is this increased pressure being imposed?

We must, in considering the severe disadvantages imposed by Clause 4 on the plaintiff and the advantages which it gives to the defendant, consider what sort of people we are discussing. The real defendants in the majority of industrial injury and running down cases are either large corporations or insurance companies. From the point of view of cases in court, they have, in effect, unlimited funds as well as people of the highest legal, medical and other expertise at their disposal, often on a permanent basis. I suggest that these are not the people who should receive preferential treatment, as will be the effect of Clause 4.

If one considers the average plaintiff—the person who is involved in a road accident or an accident at work—one sees that this person is likely to suffer considerable and prolonged unemployment which will probably involve him in acute financial difficulties. I am speaking of the average plaintiff and not of the very poor.

The average plaintiff does not know how to readjust his economic life to his straitened circumstances. He will probably not be able to pay his rent. He may be in danger of eviction. Probably he cannot keep up his hire-purchase payments, particularly if he has become unemployed through accident or injury.

It is not the Government's business to sway the balance of advantage in justice towards the wealthy defendant. If anything, it should go to the plaintiff, who is the most vulnerable, particularly from the economic point of view. I hope, therefore, that the Attorney-General, who is an extremely sensible and able man and who is sensitive to the views of his colleagues, will agree to amend Clause 4 to avoid these unfortunate effects.

It is reasonable, indeed proper, to allow more people to use the county courts who wish to use them. It is reasonable and proper to improve the facilities of our county courts to enable more people to use them. It is, however, the very reverse of justice to drive into the county courts people who will suffer serious financial disadvantage through that pressure having been put on them.

6.40 p.m.

I want to make short comments on three points in the Bill, starting with the increased jurisdiction of the county court. It sounds very reasonable to say that in 1938 the jurisdiction was up to £200, that the value of money has changed so that the equivalent is now £742, and that therefore we will increase the jurisdiction to £750. But I very much agree with a great deal of what my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) said, and I have serious misgivings about the practicability of the step, apart from the question of justification.

There are many cases—personal injury, breach of statutory duty and others—tried in the High Court or at assizes in which less than £750 is awarded. Expert and medical evidence is called and the case can take a day, two or three days, and sometimes much longer. Where are the facilities in the county court for such a case to be tried in that way? I remember many times going down to county courts in my younger days and having cases adjourned over a long period. There is the problem of facilities; to try a case that will take some time, and there is the risk of adjournments.

We must also remember what has been said about the lack of transcripts and the fact that there is no law library at the county court. In addition, my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough, made the very valid point that damages are awarded in the county court on a lower scale than in the High Court, and the litigant, rightly or wrongly, often feels that the trial in the county court is second-class justice as compared with trial in the High Court.

We should also bear in mind that by increasing the jurisdiction we are placing another burden on the county court judges. The tendency of legislation in recent years has been to pile more and more tasks on county court judges. We do not have enough of them, and we have not sufficient facilities. I wonder whether we are not putting too great a burden on them. Although I acknowledge the argument about the value of money, we should look very carefully at the practical problem of the burden we are placing on the county court judges and see whether we are acting fairly to them or to litigants.

Having said that, I come to two points on which I very much agree with the provisions of the Bill. I consider that the most important, apart from the question of increased jurisdiction, are those in Clauses 12, 13 and 20. Reference has already been made to the provisions in Clauses 12 and 13, which deal with what has been called "leap-frogging". It is absurd that before a litigant can test the validity of a binding decision of the Court of Appeal on a point of law he must bring his action before the trial judge and then go to the Court of Appeal, telling both those courts that he has no hope of success but is merely doing it to bring the matter to the House of Lords, to test the matter there and obtain their Lordships' decision. Apart from the heavy costs, that procedure is farcical on the face of it.

It is true that in some cases it has been said that the House of Lords has the advantage of hearing the views of the trial judge and the judges in the Court of Appeal, but their Lordships have that advantage at the expense of the litigant. A strong case is made out for the provisions of Clause 12. Fifteen years have elapsed since the Evershed Committee recommended that change. Doubtless, thousands of pounds have been spent uselessly in costs in that period. They have been thrown away. I am glad that the present Government have at last seen fit to enact this provision.

When the Bill was introduced it contained a provision to leave to the trial judge the decision to go to the House of Lords. I saw considerable objection to that. Trial judges vary so much. I am glad that an amendment has now been made so that a decision can be made by the House of Lords. The only real objection to that was the question of costs, and that objection is now met by the provision that there is no hearing and therefore no expense in argument by counsel, and that the matter can be dealt with simply by the House of Lords looking at the papers.

I am rather attracted by what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. Edward Lyons) about the possibility of extending that provision to a decision of a county court judge. That should be considered to see if it is practical.

I rather agree that there is objection to the provision that there must be the consent of both litigants. I do not know why that should be essential before the matter can go to the House of Lords.

I very much welcome the implementation in Clause 20 of the recommendation of the Winn Committee. Most of us at the Bar must be familiar with many cases where a plaintiff must succeed but cannot obtain any moneys because of protracted litigation. I know of cases where the plaintiff has had to depend on National Assistance whilst waiting for a decision—personal injury cases, accidents to passengers in cars, where the only matter to be decided is the quantum of damages, where there is a battle with one, two or more defendants as to liability. It is absurd that the plaintiff should have to wait, sometimes for years, to recover a penny piece. These are cases of real hardship, and the provision for interim payments is welcome and long overdue. I am glad that it is not restricted to personal injury cases, because there are many others where liability exists and a payment should be made.

Having made those criticisms, I welcome the Bill for its other provisions and support it, but I hope that careful consideration might again be given to the question of jurisdiction, which, as I have said, I view with grave misgivings.

6.47 p.m.

The Report of the Winn Committee on personal injury litigation was not unanimous. The Committee was composed mainly of people from the legal profession, but there were only two people who had extensive knowledge of the legal side of compensation cases. One was Mr. Robin Thompson, who has extensive experience of trade union compensation, and who prepared a minority report, and the other was Mr. P. A. House, an insurance company representative.

There are many such cases each year, and a great deal of money is involved. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) mentioned a sum of £1 million in his trade union. Therefore, the trade unions are treating the Bill as very important. As is obvious from some of the speeches from this side of the House, many of us have been approached by the legal representatives of trade unions because they have grave misgivings about the Bill.

I have a vested interest. I am a member of the Draughtsmen's and Allied Technicians' Association, which does not have many accident cases, since its members work in offices, but in my constituency there are about 6,000 mine workers. There are frequent accidents, and the amount of compensation paid can be quite large.

The trade unions have had misgivings for some years about the existing law, feeling that the position is worse than it was in 1938, but we have learnt to live with the maximum of £500 being claimed in the county courts and having to go to the High Court for greater sums. Ninety-nine per cent. of the cases are settled out of court and the costs are agreed. This is an established and regular routine. It is always difficult to estimate the amount of damages which a court will award, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. Edward Lyons) said. There is always the opportunity to go to a higher court, with the union having to stand the difference in costs which could be awarded if the damages are less than 80 per cent. of the county court maximum.

In any negotiation or dispute between parties, tactics and bluff are obviously involved. I may be unethical in saying this, but in the trade union world we are rather blunt and we recognise that in negotiations and disputes people sometimes have to do things which they do not put into legal phraseology.

It is obviously policy for insurance companies faced with a claim to delay in the hope that, in the case of injury, the plaintiff will completely recover. It is policy for a union to call the bluff of an insurance company and issue a writ in the High Court, hoping that, in view of the excessive costs of a High Court action, the insurance company will settle out of court. I will not be dogmatic or adamant about this, but I am led to believe that quite a lot of this sort of thing has taken place in the past; so there is this sort of balance of power, with each side being aware of the extent to which the other side will go.

A change in the amount of damages the court can award will alter the status quo and give a little more power to the insurance companies than they have had. I will explain how. We are in favour of increasing the maximum award of the county court from £500 to £750. There is no objection to this. However, by increasing the maximum award we are also increasing from £400 to £600 the 80 per cent. award which must be obtained to qualify for High Court costs. If we settle for less than £600 in the High Court we shall be awarded only the equivalent of county court costs. This minimum is still maintained at 80 per cent.

Compared with the 1938 situation, this is a backwards step for the trade unions. In 1938 the maximum amount which a county court judge could award was £200. The minimum which a High Court judge could award was £50, or 25 per cent. of the county court maximum: there was a £150 difference. The £150 difference has been maintained, with the county court maximum at £750 and the High Court minimum at £600, but since 1938 the ratio has altered from 25 per cent. to 80 per cent. In other words, the decision whether to go to the High Court will now be much more difficult than it was in 1938, when the gamble was between £50 and £200. This will make High Court actions on the part of trade unions much more speculative ventures and will tend to deter trade unions from engaging in litigation. This will help insurance companies, because the bluff will not be as opaque as it was. There will be a tendency for insurance companies not to seek to settle in the county court but to want cases to go to the High Court.

The Winn Committee gave no reasons why it proposed this change. We are perturbed about it, for this reason. We should like concrete reasons to be given as to why the balance of power should Jean slightly more in future in favour of insurance companies and not towards trade unions. The number of cases proceeding to trial will increase considerably. There will not be the same urgency to settle out of court. With more cases going to the county court, there will be more expense for trade unions. We maintain that the need is for quicker settlements, not for more trials. Our view is that the Bill will lead to more county court trials and many fewer out of court settlements.

Clause 10 says that the figures can be increased by an Order in Council. I understand that such an Order can be opposed when it comes before the House, but it is nevertheless a process of gradualism which we might one day regret.

The case of Naylor in the House of Lords has been referred to. Mr. Naylor, who was 19, was killed in an accident two or three years ago. He left no dependants. The House of Lords, on appeal, reduced a compensation figure of £1,000 to £500. Using this as a precedent—I am not an expert in legal affairs, but I understand that legal gentlemen often use precedents—one can expect such a case to be settled by the county court in future, together with small-time actions such as those concerning hire-purchase debts, disputes between neighbours and so on.

There were no trade unionists on the Winn Committee. We do not demand that we should serve on such committees. We submit, however, that we have a legitimate complaint here, in that the decision whether to go to court will now be a much greater gamble and far more hazardous than it was for trade unions back in 1938. We hope that this position will be amended in Committee.

6.55 p.m.

We are debating the Administration of Justice Bill. On Third Reading one can discuss only what is in the Bill, whereas on Second Reading one can discuss, not only what is in the Bill, but what one would like to see in it.

Yes, Mr. Speaker. That is why I began by saying that we are debating the Administration of Justice Bill. I was about to say that I had hoped that the Bill would do more to assist in the administration of justice. If the Bill is enacted unamended, the position will continue that it costs a lot of money to go through all the processes of justice and to end up in the final court of appeal—the House of Lords. It is possible for a litigant to get assistance under the free legal aid scheme. I see nothing in the Bill aimed at improving the process of the administration of justice and making justice more easily available for the poorer type of person and for persons who, although poor, do not claim free legal aid.

The cost of justice and of the administration of justice is far too high. I suggest that one of the reasons for this is that there is nothing to restrict the amount of fees paid to lawyers. There is no such provision in the Bill. I am not surprised at this. A big argument is raised about another proposed Bill aimed at restricting the activities of ordinary industrial trade unions and preventing them from pursuing their legitimate activities in improving the standard of living of ordinary industrial workers; yet there is nothing in the Bill which will impose any restriction upon the fees charged by lawyers—solicitors.

There is, for example, no provision about refresher fees. I can go only on what I read in the Press. I have never been before a criminal court, but I read in the Press that refresher fees of 10, 15, 25, or 50 guineas are received. This Bill started in the Lords. Some of the noble Lords, I read, get thousands of £s per day in fees. I do not know whether before the introduction of the Bill it was thought necessary to ask the National Board for Prices and Incomes to investigate the extent to which the greatest closed shop in the country—the legal profession—should be brought within the scope of the White Paper, "In Place of Strife".

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the whole subject of solicitors' remuneration has been referred to the Prices and Incomes Board?

Of course I am aware of that. I was referring to the Q.C.s and other barristers who get thousands of pounds. There are many lawyers here, and I am trying to put the case on behalf of the litigants and ordinary industrial trade unionists.

I was dealing with the system of paying refreshers. I am told that barristers can get a refresher of as much as 50 guineas a day. I do not know what the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity would say if one of my dock workers. Jackie Dash or anybody else, were to ask for 50 guineas a day while waiting to unload a boat. I do not believe that Jackie Dash and his dockers would be allowed even to claim 50 guineas a day. It is this sort of thing which I want to be investigated, not so much the fees paid to solicitors, as the money which is paid to the legal fraternity in the courts.

Will the hon. Gentleman help the House by saying whether he thinks that the £1,000 and the 50 guinea refreshers which he has mentioned are particularly applicable to the county court?

I thought that the hon. Gentleman was listening. I began by saying that this was called the Administration of Justice Bill, and I was saying that many things could have been included which have been omitted. I was explaining that it would assist the administration of justice if the Bill included a provision to prevent these not poorly paid gentlemen of the legal fraternity from getting thousands of pounds per year and sometimes hundreds of pounds per day when the ordinary farm worker is told that his 17s. per week increase is being held up, even though it has been approved by the Prices and Incomes Board.

Such a provision would be politically very popular among industrial workers and in the trade union movement generally. Justice would not only be done, but would be seen to be done. These highly-paid legal luminaries should be brought within the scope of the prices and income legislation. If they were covered by, for instance, the White Paper "In Place of Strife"—

The hon. Gentleman may deal with the White Paper "In Place of Strife" when we debate it.

I was saying only in passing that I thought that some such provision should be included in the Bill.

The Bill provides for an increase in clerical staff and fees in the London area. It is Government policy to stop more staff from coming into London. It is difficult to get industrial workers in London and in the South generally and it is suggested by the Government that recruiting in the South-East should be kept to a minimum. However, the Bill provides for more officers, although we do not know exactly how many. It proposes that there should be additional registrars who are to receive £4,500. Who settled this figure? Was it referred to the Prices and Incomes Board, or discussed with the Trades Union Congress?

The point I am trying to make is that a different scale of judgment is applied to the lower-paid industrial workers. Immediately they ask for increases, action is taken, but when it comes to the legal fraternity, from High Court judges down to ordinary barristers, there is not the same anxiety to restrict incomes.

I am also concerned about the time taken by the courts to deal with cases. I have just read of one case which has taken 12 months to complete its committal stage. It will be another 12 months or two years before the case can be tried. If there were these delays and this terrific waste of time in engineering workshops, there would be uproar. One reads of courts meeting, adjourning for a day, returning for a day, going into recess and standing adjourned.

The administration of justice would be assisted if the courts met more frequently and for longer periods and perhaps for more weeks in the year. One regularly reads of many cases being held up and yet last August or September, when I went to see how the courts were getting on and visited the Old Bailey, I was told that the court was not meeting and was in the long adjournment. Why is it necessary to have a long adjournment?

The hon. Gentleman said that he went to the Central Criminal Court and found that it was adjourned; that was not true.

I did not say the Old Bailey.—[HON. MEMBERS: "You did."]—In that case, I was not correct. I meant the Law Courts in the Strand.

This was at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and I was told that the court was in recess. Four o'clock is not a reasonable time to pack up. It seems reasonable for the courts to sit until 5 o'clock or 6 o'clock. I am told that they usually start sitting at about 10 o'clock or 10.30, but 9 o'clock would be more reasonable. Fridays could also be used from 9 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock or 7 o'clock at night to get cases finished. We are told that there are arrears of cases and I am talking about overtime.

In the engineering industry and in industry generally, if there are arrears of work which cannot be handled in normal working hours, the "guv'nor" or foreman explains that there are arrears of work which have to be cleared and he suggests that, instead of finishing at 5 o'clock or 6 o'clock as normally, the men should stay on until 7, or 8, or 9 o'clock to get the work finished. Has such a system been considered for the courts so that they will sit on Friday nights and other nights to get these cases cleared? If we are to have administration of justice carried out speedily and on a scale which people can afford these are suggestions which might recommend themselves to my hon. and learned Friends and the Attorney-General.

There is also the question of the closed shop. We heard much in the Donovan Committee's Report about this. Has the Attorney-General examined this? It says in the Bill that a solicitor can get an agent. Should it not be made easier for ordinary people to go into the courts, without having ot have lawyers, barristers, Q.C.s, solicitors—

That is quite right, but it is not the impression given to the general public. The ordinary person does not know that he can do this without incurring the very heavy expense of legal fees. Why should it be that a person can win a case, be awarded damages yet find that he is out of pocket after paying legal costs? In my view, legal costs are far too heavy. Some action may be taken, perhaps in Committee, to make justice cheaper for litigants, so that this does not happen.

7.12 p.m.

With the leave of the House, I should like to deal with some of the matters raised in debate. I will resist the temptation to follow my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis) who has enjoyed his ride upon so many of his favourite hobby horses. He has rightly said that this Bill is concerned with the administration of justice. Whether that would be best served by a judge sitting from 9 o'clock in the morning until 7.30 at night is a matter that I would venture greatly to question.

A number of matters raised in the debate would be happy and fascinating subjects for discussion, perhaps on another occasion. There are such subjects as the merits or demerits of fusion of both branches of the legal profession. My own view is that the specialist service supplied by the Bar justifies its separate existence. It is a service to the public, who would be deprived if that service ceased to exist.

There was an interesting discussion upon the entitlement of county court judges to be drawn from the ranks of the solicitors' profession. Into that controversial theme I do not propose to enter in a debate on this Bill. I have urged, and I know that steps are being taken in that direction, that there should be easier transfer between the two branches of the profession. This will go some of the way, at any rate, to reduce the frustrations which some solicitors may feel about the present arrangements.

I come to the main issues to which the Bill gives rise. I should like to say how glad I am that the House has given a general welcome to the Bill, which undoubtedly introduces valuable changes in the administration of justice of assistance to the litigants. This applies whether or not he appears in person—and the vast mass of litigants do appear in person, per-haps not to their advantage, which is why we have the enormous extension of legal aid in this country. We have the finest system of legal aid in the world, and it is something of which we ought to be proud. It is an important social service, which has no equal in any other part of the world. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, North will rejoice in the thought that Administrations since the war, and particularly Labour Administrations, have taken such an active part in extending legal aid.

But I am falling into the very temptation I tried to resist—of pursuing interesting matters which have been raised. The main dissatisfaction expressed during the debate about the Bill undoubtedly arises over Clause 4. I have listened carefully to the criticism made by experienced trade unionists like my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton). I have heard the criticism from a respected surgeon and experienced lawyers who have expressed their anxieties about the sanction provisions in the Clause. All I can say at this stage is that I will see that most careful consideration is given to the objections that they have raised.

The proposed limits bring the figures in line with the decline of the purchasing power of the £. Proportionately at any rate, they do no more than that. The object of the sanctions is to encourage the bringing of proceedings in the county courts, where that is the appropriate court. I have been asked a number of questions about the possible effect of this increase in the jurisdiction of the county courts, upon the work of those courts. It is not easy to assess what the effects will be. If the jurisdiction of registrars of county courts was not increased, we should undoubtedly need more judges. The House will have noted that the registrars' jurisdiction will be increased, possibly in two stages, from £30 to £75. This will save a great deal of the judges' time. It may be that the increase in jurisdiction and the volume of work in the courts may require, and entail, an increase in the number of county court judges.

There are now 95 in post and the statutory maximum is 97. That number can be increased, under the Administration of Justice Act, 1968, by Order in Council, subject to affirmative Resolution.

A great deal of criticism has been made, much of it well-directed, against the difficulties being faced through the lack of facilities, buildings, scientific equipment, libraries and so on in the county courts. There is a very great backlog to be dealt with here. Unfortunately the restrictions are those of finance. More county courts are being opened. I opened one in Worthing not very long ago. It is impressive what facilities are provided in these new courts. As to the organisation of the work of the county courts, this is something to which we should be paying attention all the time, because I agree that it is deplorable that there should be a series of adjournments of the kind described by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewis-ham, North (Mr. Moyle). It is frustrating for everyone concerned. But Clause 9(2) will at least facilitate the transfer of substantial cases to central courts where better arrangements can be made for them to be heard. I can tell my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West, who has made a particular point on this matter, that the provision of recording facilities is being actively considered and experiments are now being conducted in county courts on the perimeter of London. We are doing what we can in that regard.

Proceedings in the county courts are less costly than those in the High Court, and to this extent the position of trade unions appearing for injured workmen will be eased. But I assure my hon. Friends that I take careful note of the point on sanctions which they raised. On the face of it, the transfer of jurisdiction will result in a considerable reduction in the costs to both parties.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, East (Mr. Edward Lyons) spoke of the difficulties which arise in the assessment of damages. He gave a vivid account of the estimates of what a young lady with an injured leg ought to recover in the courts, those estimates varying from, I think he said, £150 in one case to a Q.C.'s estimate of about £2,500; he must have been very susceptible. However, the range is enormous, and I agree that there are the difficulties to which my hon. Friend referred. The House will wish to know that the Law Commission is examining the problem of assessment of damages with a view to recommending how they can be better assessed. I entirely agree that this is a field of study needing further and urgent consideration.

The hon. and learned Member for Southport (Mr. Percival) raised the question of the proposed equity jurisdiction for the county court. The plaintiff is not compelled to bring a case involving not more than £5,000 in the county court in Chancery matters, and costs sanctions do not apply to equity cases. The defendant may ask the High Court to remove a case started in the county court to the High Court. The hon. and learned Gentleman raised one or two other matters as well which we can deal with in Committee in due course.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Sir Eric Fletcher) raised questions about the "leap-frogging" provisions of the Bill. As he said, the Evershed Committee said at paragraph 502 of its Final Report that it imagined that in the great majority of cases the "leap-frog" scheme would operate with the consent of the parties. By making this a condition of the scheme, it is possible to ensure that the House of Lords is not flooded with "leap-frogging" applications. I think that this was the basis of the anxiety expressed in another place by several Lords of Appeal. If consent by both parties were not required—I invite my right hon. Friend to consider this—a powerful litigant might try to intimidate his opponent by asking to go direct to the House of Lords. Some right of appeal would have to be given against the grant of a "leap-frog" certificate in these circumstances and the resultant expense might counteract some of the advantages of the scheme.

There were other matters raised during the debate which, I suggest, would be more appropriate for discussion in the Committee. I repeat my thanks to the House for its welcome to the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Standing Committee pursuant to Standing Order No. 40 (Committal of Bills).

Administration Of Justice Money

Queen's Recommendation having been signified

Resolved,

That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to increase the jurisdiction of county courts and to amend the County Courts Act, 1959, and to make further provision with respect to miscellaneous matters, including pension rights and related matters in connection with certain judicial offices, and the stipend and fees of the Chancellor of the County Palatine of Durham, it is expedient to authorise—
  • (1) the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any sums so payable under or in consequence of any provision of the said Act of the present Session, and of any increase attributable to any provision of that Act in the sums so payable under any other enactment;
  • (2) the payment out of the Consolidated Fund of any sums so payable under or in consequence of any provision of that Act, and of any increase attributable to any provision of that Act in the sums so payable under any other enactment;
  • (3) the payment into the Consolidated Fund of any sums so payable under or in consequence of any provision of that Act.—[The Attorney-General.]
  • Genocide Bill Lords

    Order for Second Reading read.

    7.26 p.m.

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

    The purpose of this Bill is to enable the United Kingdom to accede to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948.

    The word "genocide" was, reputedly, coined by the late Dr. Raphael Lemkin as recently as 1944. As a word it may be open to criticism, and, indeed, it was criticised on the Second Reading of the Bill in another place, but its purport is clear enough. It means the deliberate destruction of a national, racial, religious or ethnic group.

    In 1944, this was a matter very much to the forefront of people's minds. It was a time when the full measure had not yet become apparent of the inhumanity which had been perpetrated by the Nazi Government of Germany before and during the Second World War on millions of innocent men, women and children who had committed no crime but simply happened to be Jewish or members of some other persecuted minority. The awful revelation of Auschwitz, Belsen and Dachau had not yet burst upon an appalled world. But enough was known for men to realise that the monstrous crime of genocide which they had come to associate with past times and distant places—with ancient Rome and the Mongol skull pyramids of the late Middle Ages—that this old enormity was back in their midst.

    Two years later, we were fully aware of the whole terrible story of the systematic annihilation of racial minorities which the Nazis pursued with all the monstrous aids of twentieth-century science. There was a world-wide revulsion at these new means of perpetrating old barbarities. And so it was that, at its very first session in 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations felt impelled to take steps to outlaw this evil. It, therefore, approved two resolutions. In the first, it affirmed the principles of the Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal, which recognised that war criminals were not only those who violate the laws or customs of war but all persons who carry out "crimes against humanity". In the second, the Assembly affirmed that genocide is a crime under international law and that those guilty of it, whoever they are and for whatever reason they commit it, are punishable. It went on to institute the necessary researches to enable the present Convention to be drawn up. I shall not weary the House with a detailed history of the Convention, with which many hon. Members will, no doubt, be familiar. Sufficient be it to say that it was adopted by the General Assembly on 9th December 1948, and came into force on 12th January, 1951, 90 days after the minimum number of 20 States had ratified or acceded to it. The present position is that 73 countries are parties to the Convention. There have been 38 ratifications and 35 accessions, the distinction being that the 40 States which signed the Convention by 31st December, 1949, may subsequently formally ratify their signatures, while those countries which did not then sign may accede to the Convention by depositing what are called instruments of accession with the Secretary-General.

    As the House will, no doubt, recall, the Government's decision to accede to the Convention was announced by my right hon. Friend the then Minister of State at the Foreign Office on 15th November, 1965, and an undertaking was then given that, to enable this to be done, legislation would be introduced at a suitable opportunity to bring our domestic law into line with the Convention. To consider what this involves it is, I believe, necessary to look at the main features of the Convention itself.

    It is stated in the first Article that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in circumstances of war, is a crime under international law, and this is the fundamental principle on which the Convention is based, and this is an ideal which we shall endorse by acceding to it. The acts which constitute the crime of genocide are described in Article II, and this we have reproduced in the Schedule to the Bill. Contracting States are required by Article V to enact legislation providing effective punishment for persons guilty of genocide, and, by Article VII, to make genocide an extradition crime and for it not to be regarded, for that purpose, as a political crime. We can for the present discount that part of Article VI which relates to the trial of the offence of genocide by an international penal tribunal since no body capable of exercising the necessary international criminal jurisdiction has yet been created. We are left, therefore, with the need to provide for the crime of genocide, as described in the Convention, to be an offence both under our domestic criminal law and for extradition purposes.

    It would, perhaps, suit the convenience of the House if I now turn to the individual provisions of the Bill to see how it is proposed to fulfil these requirements.

    Clause 1 makes the acts specified in Article II of the Genocide Convention offences under the civil and military laws of the United Kingdom, and provides appropriate penalties for those who commit them, that is, life imprisonment where the offence is one which involves the killing of any person, and up to 14 years' imprisonment in any other case. It will not have escaped the notice of hon. Members that all, or almost all, the acts which the Convention includes in the generic term of "genocide" are already offences under our domestic law. Nevertheless, in making genocide, as such, an offence, we are not only fulfilling one of the basic requirements of the Convention but are also enabling persons charged with genocidal acts to be extradited for the specific offence of genocide, which will probably be necessary for compliance with the strict requirements of extradition law, and in any event will be in accordance with desirable extradition practice.

    It is, however, Clause 2 which is primarily concerned with the extradition aspects of the legislation, and it contains two not inconsiderable departures from the normal extradition practice followed in this country, and I think I should explain these in some detail.

    As I have said, Article VII of the Convention not only requires contracting States to grant extradition for genocide
    "in accordance with their laws and treaties in force".
    It also confirms that genocide, and the other ancillary offences listed in Article III, shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. All the Statutes which govern the surrender of offenders from this country to foreign and Commonwealth countries and the taking of evidence for use in criminal proceedings overseas contain safeguards respecting offences of a political character. This country, with its long heritage of liberality, has always prided itself on its tradition of political asylum; its willingness, whatever the cost, to accept a genuine political refugee. It is this tradition that has found expression in these safeguards in our extradition law, safeguards that we have only recently thought it right to extend, as regards the Commonwealth, in the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967.

    In the case of genocide, however, Article VII of the Convention requires us to suspend this protection. As recently as six years ago the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, who was then Lord Privy Seal, told us of the doubts which the Government of the day felt on that score, and which had up till then deterred them from acceding to the Convention. One cannot, however, overlook the fact that up to now 73 countries, many of whom are no less liberal in their outlook than ourselves, countries like Australia and Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden, have felt able to accept this restriction. All of them have been prepared to accept that genocide is so grave and vile a crime that a person who has committed it should not be able to evade extradition on political grounds, and after mature thought—and I concede that it is not a decision which could be taken lightly—the Government have decided that this view must surely prevail here also.

    I do not wish to minimise the importance of this decision, particularly when it is viewed, as it must be, against the background of the circumstances in which charges of genocide are likely to be made. The Government accept that, in the emotional atmosphere which gives rise to accusations of genocide, one cannot be sure that purely vindictive applications will not be made for the surrender of an alleged offender. Under the terms of the Convention as reproduced in the Schedule to the Bill, however, it will be necessary to show that the act was "committed with intent" and any such charge will have to be substantiated by the production of a prima facie case in accordance with the normal requirements of the Extradition and Fugitive Offenders Acts. This, we consider, should provide the necessary safeguard.

    As I mentioned earlier, the Clause contains another departure from customary extradition practice. This lies in subsection (3), which allows extradition proceedings to go forward even where the offence for which surrender is sought was not, at the time of its commission, an offence under the law of the country where it was committed. The Bill is, in short, providing for modification of the normal rule of "double criminality" which requires that an act for which extradition is sought shall have been an offence, at the time of its commission, under the laws of both the State making the request for extradition and the State on which the request is made.

    We have to remember, however, the peculiar circumstances in which the crime of genocide may be committed. Past experience has amply shown that it may be committed by or with the consent of the authorities in power at the time, and that those authorities may take the necessary steps to legitimate such acts by, for instance, legalising concentration camps, experimental surgery, and so on. It would make nonsense of the Convention and of this legislation if its provisions could be completely negatived by the simple expedient of legitimating legislation of this kind.

    In order, therefore, to frustrate any such unscrupulous device, we have followed the example of Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The House will perhaps allow me to remind it that that Article provides generally that no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence which did not constitute an offence at the time of its commission, but it specifically excludes acts which are
    "criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations".
    Genocide is such a crime, and it seems indisputable that it should, therefore, be made a returnable offence whatever its legal standing when and where it was committed. This the Bill does, even although the Convention does not strictly require it.

    Clause 3 extends the extradition provisions of the Bill to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the dependencies. It also enables the other provisions of the Bill to be similarly extended by Order in Council. Thus minor modifications can, if required, be made in the domestic provisions in order to meet differences in the law and the judicial structures of the individual Islands and dependencies.

    The Schedule reproduces Article II of the Genocide Convention, which specifies the acts constituting the offence of genocide.

    Before I conclude, I should like to try to set this legislation in perspective. I have already said that we are not creating offences which are, in essence, new offences under our domestic law, and it would be a singularly rare and unhappy event if there were ever to be a prosecution for genocide in this country. As to what use may in the future be made of the extradition provisions, one cannot of course say. But I would like to make it clear to the House that we do not know of anyone currently in this country who has ever been accused of genocide but has evaded extradition by reason of the political safeguard. The importance of this legislation does not lie so much in the number of prosecutions to which it will give rise, or in the number of persons whose extradition for offences of genocide it will secure, as in the proof which it affords that the United Kingdom, as a civilised nation and a firm defender of human rights, condemns this barbaric crime and undertakes to prevent and to punish it.

    May I conclude by saying that I am aware of the Motion in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. Francis Noel-Baker), and others, and I am only too sorry that, despite the rapid progress which was made with this Measure in another place, it was not practicable to complete its progress in time to enable us to accede to the Genocide Convention by 10th December last—Human Rights Day. With, however, the approval of the House, this Bill will, in the very near future, place us in a position to add the name of the United Kingdom to the parties to the Convention, and, by so doing, make a significant contribution to our international obligations.

    7.45 p.m.

    We on this side of the House believe that it is appropriate for the House of Commons to express its abhorrence of the evil of genocide by passing this Bill. The Convention to which we shall accede if we pass the Measure was adopted on 9th December, 1948, by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Before that, the Assembly, at its very first Session in 1946, had passed a resolution condemning genocide. The Assembly had fresh in their memory the transcendently horrific treatment meted out to the Jews by the Nazis, and it was certainly right that one of the first acts of the Assembly should be the condemnation of what so horribly had happened. We are right to enact domestic legislation which is of limited real effect, but which expresses our loathing of genocide or anything tinged by it.

    The Bill started its Parliamentary career in another place, where it was pointed out that it was particularly appropriate that legislation should be brought forward in Human Rights Year, and with that no one will disagree. In speaking of the Bill it would be insensitive not to express our feelings of deep and bitter frustration that we can, in practice, do so little to prevent acts in many parts of the world which are causing fantastic distress and misery to national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. The front page of one of our great dailies today mentions a matter of grave concern relative to this matter. It may be that these Acts are not taking place with any genocidal in tent, and we fervently hope that they are not. All that we can do is to send material help where it is called for; and that we are doing, and it is very valuable. We can also by our example and by our words here hope, however remotely, to influence others.

    To turn to the Bill which has been so fully explained by the Minister, I admit that I have misgivings about Clause 2(2). which prevents a person whom it is sought to have extradited on grounds of being guilty of genocide from putting forward the defence that his alleged crime was a political one. Such a provision might be thought to derogate from the right to come to this country to seek political asylum. History says that many crimes are committed in the name of politics, but can it be said that it is ever right to allow the commission of the crime of genocide to be met by the defence of its being a political crime? That is an issue which we must face.

    One is strengthened in the view that injustice can hardly be caused by the Bill by the definition of genocide which is set out in the Schedule and which requires specific proof that any acts done shall be done with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. It would have to be established that the person whose return was sought to the country where it was alleged that he had committed genocide had had the intention of committing genocide, and this intention would have to be proved, prima facie, before a British court. If a person had, prima facie, such an intent, it is difficult to see why he should not answer for it. One is strengthened in the view that injustice can hardly be caused by knowing that the Metropolitan stipendiary magistrates, who in the main deal with this, give the closest attention to such cases and would not easily be satisfied that a person had this intent unless it were clearly shown.

    It would be useful to know the figures of the numbers of applications for extradition which are made and the number which are refused. My impression is that quite a large number are refused, and that was stated in another place. I do not expect to hear the figures tonight, but perhaps they could be given in Committee. I suspect that the figures will be reassuring, and show the close attention which is given to this matter.

    The House should give close scrutiny to any legislation which involves a limitation of the political asylum which is traditional to this country. For the reasons which I have stated and which were stated also by the Minister who opened the debate, this seems to be a legitimate derogation from the absolute right to political asylum.

    The other matter of substance to which I wish to refer is the way in which the Bill goes further than is required by the Convention. It provides that genocide shall be a "returnable" offence despite the fact that at the time of its commission it may not have been an offence under the law of the land where it was allegedly committed. This, again, has caused certain misgivings. I appreciate that Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, while providing a person shall not be held guilty of a crime made criminal retrospectively, none the less went out of its way to make a specific exception in the case of acts which are criminal according to the general principle of law recognised by civilised nations. I think that that indicates the way in which any objection to this extra provision in the Bill can be met, but it is a matter on which we may want further discussion in Committee and some assurances from the Government. One does not like going against the basic principle laid down in Article 7 of the Convention on Human Rights that a person should know when he commits a crime that it is a crime, and it is only in exceptional cases that exception to that is acceptable.

    We recognise that the Bill makes little substantive alteration in our domestic law, and it is difficult to see how any act of genocide as defined in the Bill would not already amount to an offence under our criminal law. But we recognise equally that it is right to clear up the position about extradition, and it is no bad thing that an affirmative message should go from Parliament that it is united in condemning the heinous crime of genocide.

    To legislate to make propaganda is not usually very satisfactory and, in a sense, that is perhaps what we are doing. But a Bill of this character can be regarded as a legitimate exception because of the extreme view that we all take of the crime of genocide.

    7.52 p.m.

    I do not think that it is likely that there will be any deep divisions in the House on this subject, and I rise only to offer a warm welcome to the Bill.

    As my hon. Friend explained, its purpose is to enable the United Kingdom Government to accede to the Genocide Convention, which was adopted over 20 years ago by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9th December, 1948. That was the day before the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

    During those 20 years, again and again successive Governments of the United Kingdom have been asked from benches on both sides of the House when it was proposed to accede to the Genocide Convention. For a time, we were told that the Government had the reservations to which my hon. Friend referred. Then we were told that the matter was being considered. After that, it went to sleep again, and finally, on 15th November, 1965, my right hon. Friend the Minister of State said that in principle the Government had determined to accede to the Genocide Convention and to introduce this legislation. That was three and a half years ago. We waited, and it did not happen. Again the Government were asked what was delaying the matter. We were told that it was a shortage of what my right hon. and learned Friend earlier this evening called "that rather rare commodity". Parliamentary time.

    More than 20 years after the Convention was originally adopted, here we are at the end of the rainbow. Those of us who have perhaps made ourselves tiresome by our repeated Questions about it would be ungracious if we gave less than a warm and unqualified welcome to the Bill.

    There is another reason why it should be welcomed. The Genocide Convention is not the only international convention relating to human rights to which the United Kingdom is still not an adherent. There are other subjects where a similar pattern might be followed and where we are waiting for legislation to enable us to accede to the convention. To name only one, before I am ruled out of order, there is the I.L.O. Convention on Discrimination in Employment. Certainly I hope that nothing will be said or done tonight to discourage the Government from adopting a similar course in those cases. Now that the Government have done it in this one, I hope that they will realise how painless the operation has been. I hope that they will receive the acclaim to which they are entitled, so that they will go away saying, "We must do it more often."

    There is yet a third reason why I welcome the Bill and hope that it will receive an unqualified welcome in all quarters. As the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) said, this legislation in itself will not make a great deal of difference to our criminal law. However, I am not sure that I agree with him that it will have little real effect. There are very many measures which could be taken with a real effect internationally in dealing with genocide. Previously, when the United Kingdom has spoken in international circles and pressed for these matters, it has been met with the answer, "But you do not really care about this. You have not even introduced it into your own legislation. You have not acceded to the Convention. You are speaking with a double voice."

    For the first time, the Government will be able to go to the international community and say, "Now let us press for an international criminal court." When the Genocide Convention was first discussed twenty years ago, it was accepted on all sides almost without question that, hand in hand with the domestic legislation for which the Convention called, there would be set up an international criminal court. The whole concept of human rights means that the individual can appear before the world community as a plaintiff, even against his own Government. What was intended was that he might also appear before world opinion as a defendant, so that it would no longer be possible for someone to plead in answer to a charge of this kind that he was acting under the instructions of his Government, and even the almighty nation State could never again protect individuals who committed crimes against humanity in this way.

    What has been urged from time to time about this concept is that it would be a serious inroad upon national sovereignty and that it would be a very serious move against the very concept of a nation State. Some of us believe that that is one of the strongest arguments in its favour.

    Since then, Governments have lost the original conception of human rights with which they emerged from the last war. Perhaps they have also lost that very real sense of horror which everyone felt at the time when confronted with systematic genocide.

    So we have this narrow obsession with national sovereignty which, in 1954, resulted in the proposal for an international criminal court being adjourned in the hope that it would sleep the sleep of death. Now, in consequence, we can go back to the international community and wake it up again, without being accused of inconsistency. It may be that the United Kingdom Government can put in a word in the right place for the scheme of Professor Gottlieb that we might set up an international prosecuting commission which will issue international warrants for the arrest of people who, internationally, have commited offences of this kind, wherever they might be found in the world. This is now the subject of a feasibility study before the Human Rights Commission.

    Again, it would no longer be possible for the defence to be urged against the United Kingdom Government that they were acting inconsistently because they did not have this concept in its legislation. It might be possible for the Government to urge for the appointment of a United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights so that there would be someone to investigate complaints of this kind wherever they took place. Whatever might be the effect on our domestic legislation, here would be a point where we could cut some effective ice and might be able to help, for example, the Kurdish people in Syria and Iraq, the Anyanya people in Sudan, or the Indians in Brazil.

    This is only the beginning. It is very much the beginning. But, in the name of humanity and justice, let us at least welcome the beginning.

    8.0 p.m.

    I think that many hon. Members in the House know that I was instrumental in the Bill not going upstairs to a Second Reading Committee, because I felt that a subject of this importance should be debated on the Floor of the House. I make no apology for being successful in that rather irresponsible escapade. I was sorry that, as a result, it meant that we did not have Second Reading during Human Rights Year, but I still think that it was right and justified that the debate should take place on the Floor of the House.

    Like others who have spoken, I give the Bill warm and enthusiastic support. I will not devote my time to the discrepancies in the Bill, which are quite considerable, and many lawyers might be rather critical of its wording. The Bill is a causal result of the action we have taken in saying that we will ratify the Genocide Convention at the United Nations. Therefore, I believe that the House has a duty, before giving the Bill a Second Reading, to ask the Government—and I hope and believe that they will give a favourable answer to my questions—whether their ratification of the Genocide Convention is a negative or a positive ratification. I will explain what I mean by that as I develop my speech.

    As many Members know, I was a delegate at the United Nations in 1962. I have attended its sessions on many occasions since, representing, as many people also know, the Anti-Slavery Society, perhaps the oldest extant society in the world devoted to the dignity of man and the liberation of the human spirit. I am proud to be Chairman of that ancient society. I want to speak tonight against the hideous hypocrisy which permeates a great deal of the activities of the United Nations, hypocrisy which we, as a nation—and I am sure I speak for all sides in this House—have done all too little to combat.

    From our point of view the Bill would probably only have had effect in the Middle Ages when the great controversies were going on between religious sects, and the only individual who would have been covered by it would have been Hereward the Wake who deliberately said that it was his intention to exterminate all the Normans. He is on record as saying that, and, therefore, he would presumably have been prosecuted under the Bill.

    That is not the purpose of what we are debating tonight. When we have ratified the Genocide Convention, what action do Her Majesty's Government propose to take in the United Nations? May we expect from them a resolution demanding a Commission of Inquiry into the genocide going on in Southern Sudan? Action from the United Nations is long overdue. Now that we are ratifying the Genocide Convention, as the hon. Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer) so movingly said, and now that our hands are clean, are we going to move a resolution demanding that action be taken to deal with the problems of Southern Sudan where not thousands, but tens of thousands of people have been exterminated purely and simply because their racial basis does not agree with the majority of the nation.

    What action are Her Majesty's Government proposing to take in the United Nations to protect and succour the Amerindians in South America? We all know—or probably we do not know—that the Amerindians, the native people of the great continent of South America, are, in almost country where they still survive, a depressed and persecuted minority. About a year ago some of us may have read in The Times and in the French Press—and, I am glad to be able to report, widely publicised in the Brazil Press—the most outrageous but truthful story of the extermination of the Amerindian in Brazil: planes flying over villages and bombing the inhabitants, the villages being surrounded by machine gunners to shoot down those who escaped the bombing. Where have we read in our newspapers of any resolution or motion deploring this outrage in the United Nations or anywhere else? The terrifying thing is that these atrocities took place by and with the connivance of government officials whose job in life was to protect the Amerindian in Brazil. Yet, not only did this bombing go on, but they gave food to the Amerindian which had been laced with arsenic, and even the doctor employed by the government injected them all with smallpox. That is perhaps the most classical example we have had in some years of methods designed to exterminate a minority group in a nation.

    I ask the Government now that they have ratified the Convention, whether they will put down a resolution at the next meeting of the General Assembly deploring that this sort of situation should exist and demanding that machinery be set up in the United Nations to deal with it? If we do not, if all that we do is to ratify the Convention, we are being guilty of the hideous hypocrisy about which I spoke a few moments ago.

    I do not want to detain the House too long. But what about the Nagas in India? I will not devote my time to the tragedy of Biafra. In passing, about two years ago when we debated the Bill to give independence to Botswana, I made what I hope was a moving speech on behalf of the bushman in the Kalahari Desert. One hon. Member opposite was kind enough to come to me afterwards and say, "That is the best speech on an off beat subject that I have heard in a very long time." We gave independence to Botswana, but we took no trouble to see that the rights and interests of the bushman in that country were protected. There is no doubt that the deliberate aim of the majority population was to see the bushman either exterminated or die out.

    What are we going to do when we pass the Bill and ratify the Convention? The truth is that whatever high hopes there were in 1945, the United Nations has a deplorable record in human rights and the dignity of man. Thousands of resolutions have been passed in the Third Committee, of which I was a member. I came away a good deal disillusioned. I think that Lady Gaitskell, who represented the party opposite with great distinction for two or three years on that same Committee, shares my disillusion and disgust at the hypocrisy that goes on in these deliberations.

    Thousands of resolutions have been passed, in the Third Committee, in the Economic and Social Council, and in the Commission on Human Rights, yet not one slave has been liberated in all the great expanses of the world, nor one Indian in South America nor one native of the Southern Sudan saved from death or degradation. As a result of any resolution passed by the United Nations, not one woman has been saved from prostitution, not one human right has been made more secure. Resolutions, resolutions, resolutions, with a deliberate campaign going on in the United Nations to make certain that no resolution with teeth is ever passed to do something about the problem which we are discussing. Time and again I have seen operating in the United Nations resolutions which started with quite a lot of power, but were gradually watered down until, when the resolution was passed by the General Assembly, it had been made innocuous and therefore brought no improvement in the status of the individual.

    It was Mr. Dean Acheson who said that we in Britain had lost an empire, and yet had not found a rôle. I shall give this country a rôle. We are no longer one of the great powers from the point of view of aircraft or ships, but we should become the nation which, at the United Nations demands action, and year after year we should on this question of human rights put down resolutions demanding action, backed by a resolution saying how that action can be brought about to deal with slavery, genocide, and the rights of women. We should fight those resolutions through, even though we know that for years we shall still fail. But at least we shall be able to take pride in what we are trying to do. At least we shall be the nation in the United Nations which nobody can point the finger of scorn at as being another of the hypocrites who make up that great assembly.

    The Minister said, almost with pride, that 20 years after the Genocide Convention 73 nations out of 127 had ratified it, so 52 have not. The Supplementary Convention on Slavery of 1956 has now been ratified by 78 nations, so more than 40 have not ratified it. I shall not weary the House tonight—but I could—by going into the details of the resolutions in the United Nations, and in the Economic and Social Council, twisted by knaves into a political motive, forgetting what it is they are trying to achieve.

    We have been trying for 20 years to get the United Nations to bring in some kind of slavery board, similar to the Narcotics Board, to deal with the problem of slavery. Every time this resolution comes up, the teeth are removed from it, and I criticise my hon. Friends on this side of the House as much as I do those on the other. I understand that it is very difficult to take action here, but there has hardly been a resolution with teeth moved by the United Kingdom.

    At the United Nations in 1962, I moved a resolution on slavery, when, strangely enough, we had 100 per cent. support. Every nation voted for it.

    Order. We are discussing the Second Reading of the Genocide Bill, not the question of slavery.

    With the greatest respect, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I was using my closest experience about what had happened in respect of slavery, because the same thing has happened in respect of genocide. I shall not weary the House much longer on this theme, but always the resolutions are watered down.

    I am not saying that this country, by changing its policy at the United Nations in respect of genocide and all the other aspects of human rights, will achieve immediate success, but I think that we would have a rôle worthy of our history a rôle which is desperately needed at the United Nations, a rôle which I believe would give us back what is very much needed in this country, our pride in the British heritage.

    Let the Government say tonight, in words which will ring down the corridors of history, that in ratifying the Genocide Convention that is their aim, that that is their determination. I believe that if we do that we shall tonight be passing a Bill to fit in with the format of the United Nations. We shall be recovering some of the motive force which a nation needs, and we shall be doing something which is badly needed for a great mass of suffering humanity.

    8.17 p.m.

    It is obviously a proud day for Britain that we are discussing this Bill. We must all give it a very warm welcome.

    Only the other day I read an admirable essay, published by the Fabian Society, written by my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer), who has spoken so well this evening. In that essay, talking of genocide, he said that the countries which have ratified the Genocide Convention are those countries which are unlikely to commit genocide. One does not, of course, wish to suggest that those who have not ratified the Convention are likely to commit genocide. Indeed, as has been said, it has taken Britain 20 years to do so. How depressing it is that with so horrific a crime neither the Soviet Union nor the United States of America, the two most powerful countries in the world, have found the time or the will to pass a four-clause Bill outlawing an offence as nasty, as savage, and as horrendous as this one.

    If this Bill will cause countries such as those, the greatest in the world in terms of power, to rethink their attitudes to genocide and to its outlawing, it will have served a double purpose. Until the great powers of the world are prepared publicly to declare that genocide is a crime, and so to enact, many people all over the world will continue to wonder, with some depression, what kind of world it is in which we live. May the Bill therefore be the forerunner, and the example, for another 50 ratifications so that the world is at one on this issue.

    8.20 p.m.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Sir D. Glover) claimed, with some justice, to be the onlie begetter of this debate and the House should congratulate him on insisting that we discuss this important matter on the Floor of the House, rather than in a Second Reading Committee, where the significance of the act which we are taking would not have been fully appreciated. Although it may mean that the symbolic nature of the ratification during Human Rights Year has been lost, matters of this importance should, nevertheless, be discussed on the Floor of the House.

    I speak with some diffidence, because I fully realise, as was implied by the noble Lord who introduced the Bill in the House of Lords, that any criticism, however mild, of the wording might be taken as criticism of the principle of the Bill. I wish to make it clear that my own feelings are wholeheartedly with the intention and desire of the Bill. It is absolutely right that we should do this and I am only sorry that we have not done it during the last 20 years.

    My reservations do not stem, as did those of my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck), from Clause 2, which I think is a very good Clause. It is right that genocide should not be regarded as a political offence. It is, after all, murder, and no one has ever regarded murder as a political offence—

    Perhaps there are cases, but it is very unlikely that straight murder of this kind could be regarded as political.

    On the retrospective element, about which I have some hesitation, we must reflect that, if we had insisted on the principle of no retrospection in the years immediately after the war, not a single Nazi murder would have been brought to justice. So I am not worried about Clause 2.

    What I am worried about is the wording of Article II of the Convention itself, that is, the Schedule. It may be a little late to bring this up—the Convention has been in effect, for those who have ratified it, for more than 20 years, after all—but it is worded in a way which I do not think any Parliamentary draftsman in this country or the House would tolerate for a moment when creating a new criminal offence. It says:
    "… genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such …"
    It then lists the five ways in which this act can take place. The first is killing members of the group.

    It depends on what one means by "in whole or in part" and also on the various qualifications of the group. But we know that things are going on, as my hon. Friend said, in the South Sudan and have been going on now for 10 years or more of the most horrific kind which must, I should have thought, qualify under this Bill. Yet, certainly up to a short time ago, Her Majesty's Government were selling arms to the Sudanese Government. Presumably in these circumstances, the question of complicity must come in at some stage. The wording is so vague that it is not absolutely clear where the responsibility can lie.

    I am not suggesting that either this Government or their predecessor would ever recognise any complicity in genocide. All I am saying is that the thing is so loosely drafted that it could be claimed that, if the British Government supplied arms to the Sudanese Government, and the latter continued to carry out the acts which it has been carrying out, it is conceivable that the British Attorney-General could be required almost to prosecute himself.

    Only just before Christmas, a distinguished journalist in The Spectator accused the British Government of complicity in genocide in the case of Biafra. I will not go into that—I do not happen to agree with it; I do not think that the Nigerian Government are embarking on genocide, although I do not agree with the British Government's policy in Nigeria—but there are problems. Because the thing is so vague, it is almost impossible to see how a precise definition can be laid down in the terms of Article II describing exactly what this crime is. I am no lawyer, but if a case ever went to the courts under this Bill, judges might find themselves in very great difficulty in construing what it meant.

    I appreciate the point that we are creating no new offence, that this is such a blanket provision that all the things contained in the Schedule are already offences under our laws. If so, there is no need for the Schedule. All we needed was a declamatory Bill simply saying that we ratify the Convention and will apply United Kingdom domestic law to any act relating to genocide. We should have needed Clause 2, but not Clause 1.

    But I have my doubts about whether we may not be creating new offences which could be difficult to construe. For instance, paragraph (d) of the Schedule—
    "Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group"—
    is a very wide statement. With the best will in the world, I cannot see how it can fail to cover abortion, family planning and other things.

    It might be as well if we dealt with this matter now. I am sure that the hon. Member appreciates that the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e) are, of course, governed by the preceding words "committed with intent to destroy". Therefore, the question of birth control or abortion would be relevant only if it were "with intent to destroy".

    I appreciate that, but the hon. Gentleman does not see my point. Any act of birth control or abortion is "with intent to destroy". What one has to prove under this is the intent to destroy a particular group. It could be claimed that—I am taking this as a very large claim simply to illustrate the point: I do not think that it is true—if one intends to enforce an Act legalising abortion on a nation which regarded abortion with abhorrence, that would be in tent to destroy a particular group. This is possible and comes within this wording, and there is danger here of loose drafting. I have done a good deal of international drafting and know how difficult it is to get it right. I spent last week wrestling with a draft resolution on Greece. I think that we got it right. Most of it was drafted by me and it seems to have satisfied many people in this country, some of them, I must admit, rather surprisingly.

    What we are doing is incorporating loose international drafting in United Kingdom law. We can do nothing about it, since the Convention has been in existence for 20 years, and we cannot possibly say that we want it amended. It might have been a good idea, when this country ratified the Convention, if it made a declaration setting out its understanding of precisely what it meant. This is not an unusual practice in international affairs, but one which makes clear beyond doubt precisely what it is that the Government are proposing to do and would have removed certain ambiguities which arise from the loose drafting of this Article.

    I raise this only because I hope that we shall have many more Bills like this and that more and more such Conventions will come forward. One of the great things which this Government have done and which mine never did is to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights. That was a great step and one for which I pressed. We want more of these international Conventions to be ratified, but we must realise that many of them are badly drafted for the purposes of United Kingdom domestic law. If we are to make a practice of this it is necessary for Governments, when they ratify these matters, to declare in an annexe to their ratification precisely what they mean by it. If they do that, we shall avoid a great deal of trouble.

    I regard this as a very important piece of legislation. I think it vital that it should go through and I certainly do not intend to oppose it in any way. I merely utter this word of warning.

    8.30 p.m.

    I am sorry if I strike what some might think a somewhat discordant note. It does not mean that for a moment I am any less conscious than anyone else in this Chamber of the horrors perpetrated in Nazi Germany, or indeed of the horrors perpetrated in the world since the end of the Second World War and which are still being perpetrated, but my first reaction when I read the Bill was that it was not particularly helpful, that it was highly unlikely to play any part in changing the course of history, that it was not particularly damaging, and therefore should not be opposed.

    I was not very keen on any legislation which, to use the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck), might be construed as propaganda, but I was prepared to let that pass because, although most of the Measure increases the powers of the English courts, it is highly unlikely that the English courts will ever have to deal with the crime of genocide. That is of the very obvious reason that it goes beyond the civilisation we have attained. Anyone who committed the crime of genocide as defined in the Convention in any event would be guilty of another crime already existing under English law.

    I then began to look further and began to wonder why, although this Convention was approved as long ago as 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, succeeding Governments, both of the Left and of the Right, had apparently refused to touch it with the proverbial barge-pole. It struck me as odd that it should have been left to this Administration, not in the first year of its life, to take this Convention out of the Foreign Office cellars, to take this aged document from where it had lain all these years, and try to put it into law. Surely it cannot be contended, and would not be contended by any hon. Member tonight, that it was some wickedness on the part of preceding Administrations both Labour and Conservative that had prevented this international Convention from being implemented in English law.

    I looked very carefully and thought about this matter. I discovered, as I am sure every hon. Member in this Chamber must have discovered, that the reason why previous Governments have failed to implement this Convention is not because of shortage of time, for every Administration can find the few hours necessary to put through a Bill of this nature. It is because of Clause 2(2), which was dealt with by my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester. It says:
    "no offence which, if committed in the United Kingdom, would be punishable as an offence of genocide or as an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit such an offence shall be regarded as an offence of a political character, and no proceedings in respect of such an offence shall be regarded as a criminal matter of a political character."
    There are hon. Members who must have a very vivid recollection of the debates and discussions in 1963 over the case of Chief Enaharo. I was not here then, but I have read the various passages in HANSARD which dealt with that vexed case. Hon. Members on both sides of the House were desperately anxious lest the Chief, if returned to Nigeria, might not get a fair trial and might, in spite of all that was said in the affadavits placed before the English courts, have faced the death penalty.

    Hon. Members, particularly on the Labour side of the House, now the Government side, pointed out how anomalous it was that if an application were made for the extradition of a Commonwealth citizen it could not be resisted on the ground that the offence charged was of a political character, whereas in the case of a foreigner it could be so resisted. The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) said in one of those debates:
    "One of our traditions is that we do not send people from these shores when they are charged with political offences."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th May, 1963; Vol. 677, c. 1437.]
    Not surprisingly, Labour Members promised—I compliment them on this—to remove the anomaly.

    Section 4(1) of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, states:
    "A person shall not be returned under this Act to a designated Commonwealth country, or committed to or kept in custody for the purposes of such return, if it appears to the Secretary of State, to the court of committal or to the High Court or High Court of Justiciary on an application for habeas corpus or for review of the order of committal—
  • (a) that the offence of which that person is accused or was convicted is an offence of a political character ".
  • I hope that the House realises that, whatever the Government are doing tonight, one thing they are certainly doing is altering to a material degree the effect of an Act which they commended to the House only a short time ago. The Government are removing a part of the protection which they said it was necessary to give to citizens of the Common wealth—

    I am sorry to stop the hon. Gentleman in the full flight of his oratory, but I hope that he appreciates that the exception is very limited in compass and applies only to the quite exceptional case of genocide and not to political offences in general.

    I appreciate that. I was about to deal with that matter. Although I appreciate that it is only one offence which is excluded from the effect of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, my fears as to the possible effect of the Bill are not entirely fanciful. As was said in another place, applications for extradition on the ground of genocide are likely to be made, if ever, in the aftermath of a conflict, when bitterness is rife and when, if trumped-up charges are ever to be made, they are likely to be made.

    We should not close our eyes to the fact that the definition of genocide in the Bill is very wide indeed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Kirk) said. It would not be difficult for a Government to allege genocide rather than simple murder against a fallen politician. The Convention to which the Bill gives effect defines "genocide" as killing members of a racial group "with intent to destroy" that group "in whole or in part".

    I am taking into consideration, not (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), but the controlling passage at the beginning.

    Has not that been the unfortunate essence of almost every conflict in Africa in recent years—in the Sudan, Nigeria, the Congo? Every time in the background there has been a racial conflict. Not long ago it was suggested in the Lords that our extradition machinery is such that there is virtually no risk of a person being extradited who has not committed genocide. That is probably the Under-Secretary's case tonight. If it is not, then we could not allow the Bill to become law. My hon. Friend the Member for Colchester said that he did not think that there was any real risk of a person being extradited who had not committed genocide. I am not certain about that and I hope, therefore, that the Under-Secretary will deal with the matter in detail.

    If one considers the matter one sees that the applicant Government must merely put in an affidavit and make out a prima facie case. It is no part of extradition proceedings in this country that the applicant Government must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person has committed genocide. The procedure laid down involves the placing of affidavits before the court; and if a prima facie case is made out that the crime of genocide has been committed, then the person is liable to extradition.

    Bearing this in mind, I need only return to the definition of genocide which I gave. It is one of many definitions, but the one I quoted states:
    "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religous group…"
    I hope that the Under-Secretary will reassure us on this point. I reiterate that in extradition proceedings in this country the offence need not necessarily be proved. The applicant Government need only put documents before the court and, through those documents, make out a prima facie case.

    I have no objection to people expressing their horror at genocide. I hope that I shall do precisely that on many other occasions. I am disturbed lest, almost by a side wind, Parliament should be granting a licence to unscrupulous Governments to pursue their political enemies to this country.

    8.43 p.m.

    With the leave of the House, I will speak again, if only to deal with the points which I have been asked to mention. As expected, no hon. Member has evinced any fundamental objection to the Bill. The speeches have been fair, substantial and constructive and I was glad that the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck), speaking for the Opposition, was with the Government on the main provisions of the Measure.

    The hon. Member for Colchester asked about the number of applications for extradition. Between 1964 and 1967, inclusive, 40 applications were made, of which 20 were refused or abandoned. If the hon. Gentleman wishes me to give the figures for the individual years during that period I will do so.

    Like his hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington), the hon. Member for Colchester dwelt on the fundamental change that is made in extradition law in relation to a political offence, as it is described, but not defined, in the Extradition Act, 1870 and the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967.

    The hon. Member for Colchester, as I understood him, said that he was rather unhappy that we should have departed from the principle set out in Article VII of the European Convention on Human Rights. There is no such departure. The ideal is set out clearly but, in that Article itself, there is an escape clause, a specific exemption being made with regard to acts which are
    "… criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations."
    This is the point which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne articulated.

    I do not think that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne would go so far as to say that a political offence should still be regarded as a reason for not extraditing a person who is charged with genocide. The difference between us, therefore, is whether or not there are sufficient safeguards and whether the situation is properly defined. This is no doubt a matter we can pursue in Committee but, at this stage, I assure the hon. Gentleman that I am convinced that the safeguard that the State making the request for extradition should show a prima facie case, substantiating its claim that the person concerned has committed genocide, is sufficient and adequate.

    To ask for less would mean that the situation would be open to abuse. To argue for more would mean the restructuring of an important and fundamental part of extradition law. I am sure that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne would agree with the hon. Member for Colchester, who said that persons sitting in judgment on these matters attach very great importance to the strictest application of the rules under the relevant sections of the Acts we have mentioned. The same is true of the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965.

    This is a judicial procedure. It is not and cannot be a trial. Therefore, questions of proof beyond all reasonable doubt cannot arise and one must think of a standard that is lower than that but is adequate in the circumstances. I maintain that the standard of a prima facie case is reasonable. It is the sort of standard one would have in a successful committal to a higher court in our own domestic law.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer) hoped that the Government would do all they could to contribute towards the establishment of an international criminal court. I am sure that every hon. Member applauds such an ideal and endorses his hope. Of course there are difficulties. To a large extent, the setting up of such a body turns on a system of world order and a jurisdiction that is international. This is not merely a question of setting up courts alone. I am sure that he remembers the words of the distinguished jurist John Austin, who said that the test of law was the fear of punishment. That presupposes a jurisdiction and a sanction. In addition, of course, there are numerous technical difficulties which we must bear in mind.

    My hon. Friend would accept that the International Court of Justice is functioning, if not to everyone's satisfaction, at least effectively in certain areas, and it has not so far shown a notorious lack of sanctions.

    The question of a sanction in relation to a civil jurisdiction cannot be compared with the question of sanction in relation to a criminal court. My hon. Friend will have in mind certain cases where judgments were given over 20 years ago and have still not been satisfied. I take his point, however, and I am sure that we are as one in our aspirations in this respect.

    The hon. Member for Ormskirk (Sir D. Glover), whose record of humanitarian work we all respect and admire, and of whose compassion for the downtrodden and persecuted we are well aware, as usual made a very interesting contribution to the debate, and, as usual with his experience and expertise, he was able to broaden the basis of the debate a little. He put many temptations to wander into by-ways into my path, but I shall try to resist them. When he mentioned Hereward the Wake, I wondered whether it would be appropriate for me to mention Edward I in relation to my own nation. That gentleman also revelled in the title of Maleus Scotorum, but that was a long time ago.

    The hon. Gentleman raised questions relating to the Sudan, the Amerindians, the Naga tribesmen and so on. I know that he accepts that the real answer is that we have no locus standi in relation to any of those situations.

    I agree with him, as I am sure every hon. Member does, that Britain has perhaps a special rôle that it can play in the world in giving leadership in the suppression of such atrocities. I am sure that, at any rate to some degree, the passing of the Bill will enable us to travel a little further along that road.

    The hon. Gentleman mentioned slavery. It would be proper to seek to contradict the impression he has given that the Government have no intention of taking action to attain the ends envisaged in the Convention in this respect. The Bill is action of this sort, designed as it is to permit the United Kingdom to accede to the Convention, which we shall do as soon as we can. The hon. Gentleman is aware that the United Kingdom is a party to the two international Conventions dealing with slavery. I agree that the position internationally regarding their implementation is disappointing, but it is not the United Kingdom that is responsible for this situation. The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities debated a resolution introduced by the British member at its last session, appointing a rapporteur to study this subject.

    The hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Kirk) has commented on that part of Article III in the Convention which mentions among the acts which shall be punishable as genocide, under the letter (e), complicity in genocide. Complicity in genocide has not been included in Clause 2(1). The reason for this is that we take the view that that sub-heading in Article III is subsumed in the act of genocide itself in exactly the same way as, under our domestic criminal law, aiding and abetting is a situation in which a person so charged could be charged as a principal in relation to the offence itself.

    The hon. Member went on to say that he had great reservations about the drafting of Article II of the Convention, which is reproduced in the Schedule. I do not share his fears. He quoted the case of abortion or birth control and said that that would come within one of the headings listed in the Schedule. As I pointed out in my intervention, that could only be in a situation in which it took place with intent
    "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious group…"

    It is the words "in part" which worry me. It is very easy to prove trying to do it in whole, but much more difficult to prove doing it in part.

    If there were a situation in which there were a system which made abortion or birth control compulsory with a view to destroying a part of the population, not limiting the growth of the population, but making it impossible for a part of that population to reproduce itself, I agree that that would probably be a case of genocide.

    The hon. Gentleman also instanced a nation which did not believe in abortion, but which had legislation which made abortion compulsory. That, of course, would be an act of tyranny upon that nation and if such a law were passed with intent to destroy in whole or in part that nation, it would be clearly genocide. We would then be dealing not with abortion as such, or with birth control as such, but with tyranny, with genocide as defined in the Bill.

    My hon. Friend may take further comfort by having his attention drawn to the fact that paragraph (d) of Article II refers to "imposing measures intended", so that they will have to be measures imposed and inflicted so that it is doubly provided for.

    This is something which is now happening in India. Admittedly it is not abortion or birth control, but there is sterilisation.

    I shall not be drawn into an argument about forced sterilisation in India, but the question which has to be asked is whether it is done in order to limit the population, whether we believe in that or not, or with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.

    It would not be appropriate to pursue that matter further at this stage. Not one word has been said in this debate, happily, to suggest that there is anyone in this House who would not wish to see this Bill given a Second Reading. I invite the House so to allow it to go on its way.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill accordingly read a Second time.

    Bill committed to a Standing Committee pursuant to Standing Order No. 40 (Committal of Bills).

    New Towns Bill

    Considered in Committee.

    [Mr. HARRY GOURLAY in the Chair]

    Clause 1

    Raising Of Limit On Advances

    9.0 p.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 11, at end insert:

    Provided that no part of the increase shall be advanced to the Commission for the New Towns.
    The effect of this Amendment is to ensure that none of the £300 million by which the Bill increases the sum available for new towns should go to the New Towns Commission. We have been told that the Commission is to be abolished, therefore it is evidently not in need of cash. This is a probing Amendment to seek some positive statements about the future of the New Towns Commission and new town assets. This was raised on Second Reading, but I realise that the Minister cannot, in half an hour, deal in detail with all the points raised. He was necessarily somewhat limited.

    Now I hope that in the greater leisure of Committee he will be able to expand a bit on what he has previously told us. When we asked for some guidance on this during the Second Reading we were told:
    "The policy remains … that management responsibilities will be transferred to local authorities in due course. It is true that the problems do not stop at the ownership and management of housing … when it comes to industrial assets there are new and considerable complications which will need a great deal more study."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th Dec, 1968: Vol. 775, c. 1691.]
    That did not take us very much beyond what we already knew. This is a real issue, not just an academic quibble. There is great public discussion going on among people who are anxious and want to know the Government's position. In column 1685 of HANSARD of 19th December I quoted the words of the Prime Minister, which was the last we heard on this, except for the statement from the Minister.

    I want to quote what was said in the Labour Party election manifesto of 1966 on new towns:
    "We shall fulfil our promise to bring real democratic self-government to those which are fully grown, by the abolition of the New Towns Commission."
    Was this a pledge or merely a lightly-given promise? Notice the words "fulfil our promise". The Prime Minister spoke about a pledge for 500,000 houses a year. He said that this was not a lightly-given promise, but a solemn pledge, which the party would not go back on in any circumstances, however unfavourable. We want to know what is the situation about this pledge.

    Since the hon. Member has chosen to be polemical about this, if the pledge is as he said, I would remind him that any pledges given at the last election are subject to the Parliament Act, and there are two years of the term of office of this Government still unexpired. No one can honestly come to that Box and say that we have failed to carry out our pledges until the next election takes place. The hon. Gentleman is going too far in making such wild asseverations.

    The hon. Gentleman misunderstands me. I do not yet say that the pledge has been broken. I am asking whether the intention is that it shall be broken.

    I refer now to another statement, quoting here from the speech of the present Minister of Public Building and Works, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, on the Second Reading of the previous New Towns Bill. He stated the situation as it was in October, 1966:
    "The law setting up the Commission for the New Towns does not permit us to go far enough. The Government have, therefore, said that they will change the law, and they have said that they will take powers to dissolve the Commission when the time is ripe. I cannot promise that this will be done very quickly. There is unlikely to be room in the Parliamentary timetable before the third Session of this Parliament—and there are in any case many complex and conflicting considerations to be reconciled."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1966; Vol. 734, c. 1584.]
    That brings us to the third Session of this Parliament, the present one, but still we have no news of the abolition of the New Towns Commission.

    What we have is the Cuilingworth Report, which indicates that there may be considerable disadvantages in handing over even the housing stock of the New Towns Commission to local authorities. But, even if the housing assets are handed over by the Commission, that still leaves the other assets. If the New Towns Commission is to be abolished, where are those assets to vest? It is no longer suggested, I think, that they should be transferred to the local authorities.

    It is questionable, therefore, whether the present Minister can stand by the words of his right hon. Friend the Minister of Public Building and Works. We are entitled to hear something about the future of the Commission. If it is to survive with just a change of name in order to fulfil the election pledge, that will be a waste of time. The staff of the Commission are justifiably anxious about their future, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will give us a firm assurance on what the future is for new town assets.

    [MR. PROBERT in the Chair.]

    This Amendment arises on the Clause providing for more money, taking the figure up from £800,000 to £1 million. In support of my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason), I wish to ensure that the money is properly spent.

    The Minister is new to the Department. I hope that I may have him as an ally. I did not have from some other Ministers who have answered on this topic in the past quite the sort of alliance which I like. I should like from the right hon. Gentleman an assurance that he will spend some of the money in making contact with his colleagus in other Departments which have something to do with the development of new towns.

    My constituency, Peterborough—a famous constituency as well as a delightful one—is to be a guinea pig for a new concept of new town development. Peterborough is the first city in which the new towns policy is applied to an old-established traditional city. When the announcement was made, the Government made clear that the idea was, as it were, a transplant, adding to the established city of Peterborough a great extention to which 70,000 of London's overspill would go. It was made clear at the time of the announcement that the concept was new and that every effort would be made to keep in step with what the local residents wanted.

    It was a guinea pig idea which at first did not find favour with me, although it had the support of the local city council, of the local county council, and of the local Press, so that I was pretty much a lone wolf in asking the people in Peterborough to look at the small print of the idea—because all sorts of generous promises were made or implied when Peterborough was first asked to be a good neighbour to London and to take London's overspill and to do it in terms of the New Towns Commission. That meant setting up a development corporation to administer a city which has had its own civic authority in its own right for 700 years. It meant that the New Town Corporation would virtually take over development in that ancient city. It was made quite clear that if the city would be a good neighbour to London and help London with its great problem money would be forthcoming, and guidance given in a sympathetic way, so that Peterborough might be improved for those who were already there. It was on that promise that the development corporation was accepted by this ancient City of Peterborough.

    I remember that, when the first announcement was made, the supplementary question I was able to get in was to ask the Government to see to it that industrial development certificates would be granted; because it was quite clear to everybody that if the city was to expand to double its size there would have to be industries there to provide jobs for the extra people who would come in. I was given all the assurances one could expect—that that would be sympathetically looked at, that there would be some generosity in looking at the provision of industrial development certificates.

    When, later on, I probed this still further and I asked, "Where does Peterborough stand?" and would there be special inducements given to it as to development areas, Peterborough having accepted the onerous responsibility of taking on that expansion, provided that those inducements would be given to make the expansion a success, I was told that Peterborough could not have the same inducements as development areas but it would have the next priority. I did not know then and I have never known what that meant, and I have not had it explained up to this date. This case seems to me to come within the terms of the Amendment, and I wanted to point out to the House that those promises look like being broken, and before I, as a Member of this House, am prepared to vote extra money under the Bill, I want to be sure that it will be spent in a way which will allow the Government to keep their promises.

    I wait to place on record a report which appeared in a local newspaper. I do so because it states the case very well, and so I can save time. The newspaper is one which supported the expansion of Peterborough and the New Town Corporation wholeheartedly, and it was at first very critical of me when I ventured to suggest that the people of Peterborough ought to have been a little more discriminating about the sort of assurances which they were prepared to accept. The headline in this newspaper, dated 4th February, is: "Making a mockery of expansion?" These are the words which appear in this newspaper, which was wholeheartedly behind this scheme to alter the whole face and character of the City of Peterborough. This is what they wrote on 4th February:
    "The Board of Trade say that Morse Controls Ltd."—
    a local firm—
    "cannot expand in Peterborough. This decision is incredible and almost scandalous. On the one hand we have a firm which has been in the city for four and a half years, with an annual turnover of well over £250,000. Thirty per cent. of their goods are direct exports and 25 to 30 per cent. indirect exports. And they are expanding at a rate of 40 per cent. per annum. On the other hand, we have a city which has accepted the principle of planned expansion; a city which is to grow enormously over the next 10 to 15 years—if it can attract industry to come here—and which is the city that Morse Controls want to expand in. But the Board of Trade refuses them an industrial development certificate, saying that the northeast is the primary development area. This makes instant, outright mockery of the principle of expansion upon which Peterborough's future is to be based. It makes mockery, too, of the Development Corporation set up at great expense to plan Peterborough's expansion and of the city and county councillors who have bent over backwards to help the Government and its plans."
    It is no fault of the right hon. Gentleman; he can don a white sheet; but I hope that in his new capacity he will get in touch with his colleagues in the other Departments and make certain, (a) that they know what is happening to Peterborough; (b) that they know of the promise made on behalf of the Government by the Minister who instigated the expansion of Peterborough; and (c) that they do their duty in honouring the obligations made in their name.

    9.15 p.m.

    This case, which is only one of many, is the best example. This small firm has every right to expand in the city where it has been for the last four and half years. The Board of Trade by refusing to give permission will create a sour atmosphere in which the expansion of the city will be almost an impossibility.

    There are here hon. Members who have great knowledge of local government and who have themselves served in local government. They also have had promises from Government Departments and they know how sour local representatives and local residents feel if promises which have been given are deliberately gone back-on by the Government of the day.

    I am using this Amendment to argue the case of this firm. Much money has been spent and much disruption has been caused by the commencement of the expansion of Peterborough, and there are ten to fifteen years to go before fruition. If now there is a sour atmosphere, with local people feeling that they have been let down, then this expansion, which may eventually develop into something worthwhile, will be spoiled from the start. This will be detrimental to the standing of the Government, and will ruin a delightful and progressive city which is making a great contribution to the economic strength of the country.

    The chairman of the development corporation, a man appointed by the Government, who intends to do his duty, has said that an industrial development certificate should be granted. He has on record, in the newspaper in which I published a letter which I sent to the President of the Board of Trade and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that he agrees with the points which I made.

    I hope if the right hon. Gentleman gets his Bill, as no doubt he will, and if he gets his extra money, as I have no doubt he will, he will not take it that he has been successful in getting his Bill and forget all about it. He is the coordinator of all the Departments, the Department which has to make certain that we get the water, the Ministry of Transport, which makes certain that we get grants for roads, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government which decides the general planning of the area—

    And the hospitals, which involve the Ministry of Health and Social Security. One hospital which has just been completed has already been shown to be inadequate for the present population, and far from capable of meeting the demands which the expansion will bring.

    I appeal to the Minister not to allow the sourness to develop; to see that there is co-ordination with all Departments and, above all, to see that the promises which were given or implied when Peterborough was asked to be the good neigbours are implemented.

    I echo every word said by my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls). Redditch is in much the same position. Redditch agreed rather reluctantly to take a large amount of overspill from Birmingham on the understanding that the original town would not be placed at a disadvantage, but it has been.

    There has been for some time a large amount of important industry in Redditch. With the arrival of the new population, the existing industry is not nearly enough. Many people are being moved out from Birmingham where they have been paying rents of about £2 a week. Now they find themselves having to pay £6 10s. a week, which is quite a shock to them. An even greater shock comes when they cannot get employment in Redditch and have to travel to and from Birmingham to work and spend £3 10s. on fares. It means that many have outgoings of £9 10s. a week before they start to pay their own living costs. Either they must ask for increased wages, or they will suffer privation. If they seek increased wages, the cost of the articles produced in Redditch factories will be increased. Many of those articles are exported, and price increases would, of course, be fatal.

    I implore the right hon. Gentleman to see that I.D.Cs are granted to some of these new towns, because they have created a completely new problem in the country. I know that some of the less well-off parts of the country are entitled to priority in I.D.Cs over the wealthier parts. But when the Government create a new town, they create a new problem, and it is one which must be dealt with outside the ordinary allocation of money to the towns.

    I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough that bitterness exists between the old parts of towns and the new towns which are developing. It is vital that that should not get any worse. Surely what we want is a happy, contented community welding together the old and the new. With our traditional bits of the old Redditch and the old Peterborough, with their theatrical in terests, their operatic societies, their foot ball clubs—

    Well, Redditch has not a cathedral. All these lend something on which to build the new. It will be done with more hope of success if the two communities can be brought closer together.

    One matter which is causing great annoyance at the moment is the provision of schools. In the old part of Redditch, there are a number of bad schools which need money spending on them to bring them up to date. There is one with outside lavatories and no staff common room. It is thoroughly antiquated. However, most of Worcestershire County Council's allocation is being spent on three new schools for the new town of Redditch. If the Government want to create these new towns, they should make a special allocation of money for school building and education in them, and not do it at the expense in this case of the old part of Redditch and, indeed, the whole county. There is a good deal of ill-feeling at present because most of the allocation for the county of Worcester is being spent on the new town of Redditch. If we are to create these new towns which are so necessary, surely it is the Government's responsibility to take on the financial liability of looking after them quite separate from the old towns.

    I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman is bored stiff with me—

    when I repeatedly raise this matter of a hospital. But I must raise it yet again, although his hon. Friend was extremely courteous in receiving a deputation recently when we brought 20,000 signatures to him. It is beginning to be realised that the new town of Redditch is not something which will happen in future; it is with us now. Every week more people are coming into the new houses.

    We have been under hospitalised, particularly for maternity facilities, for many years. When I became a Member of Parliament one of the first things that I did was to get an Adjournment debate on maternity facilities. That was when my own party was in power. Unfortunately, I did not achieve anything then. Nevertheless, the problem is increasing greatly. There has been a natural growth of Redditch since the war, and now there is this artificial growth with the creation of the new town. Therefore, it is essential that the date of building of the hos pital is settled now, because it will take time to build. I firmly believe that unless it is tackled now we will have the most appalling health problem in what I hope and what I am sure will be, if the points which I have tried to put over briefly tonight are met by the Government, a happy, contented and closely welded town.

    I think that the House must congratulate both the hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) and the hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Dance) not only on the ardour with which they pressed the claims of the new towns in their constituencies, but on having expressed this ardour on an Amendment which has no relevance to the subject matter of their speeches. The hon. Member for Peterborough, for one fleeting moment, managed to relate a small part of his remarks to the third Amendment on the Order Paper, which we have not yet reached, and, with equal ingenuity, the hon. Member for Bromsgrove related a small part of his remarks to the second Amendment on the Order Paper.

    The first Amendment deals solely with the Commission for the New Towns. That Commission has no responsibility for the new town of Peterborough, nor the new town of Redditch. If I might have the same indulgence as the two hon. Gentlemen to whom I have referred, I remind them that the grant of industrial development certificates is a matter for my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade. It is not a matter in which I have no interest at all, but it is his responsibility. However, I take note of what the hon. Member for Peterborough said about his particular case. I was about to ask him whether he had raised the matter with the President of the Board of Trade, but I understood from his closing remarks that he had. In defence of my right hon. Friend I repeat that his first priority must be to consider the development areas. It is true that sympathetic consideration is given to the claims of the new towns, but it is not entirely accurate to describe the case which the hon. Gentleman put forward as an example of a promise being broken. The fact that this industrial development certificate was refused does not mean that it was not sympathetically considered.

    The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason), who moved the Amendment, did address his remarks to its subject matter, and I will briefly set out the position of the Commission for the New Towns. Its statutory purpose is to hold, manage and turn to account the property previously vested in the development corporations. It carries out substantial development, though not on the scale of a development corporation. It builds houses for sale and can give mortgages on them. It continues to receive subsidy for dwellings for old people moving into its towns, it builds extensions to factories which it owns, and makes some additions to its town centres. The Commission earns a revenue surplus which finances some of its develoment, but it is not sufficient to finance all of it, and if it were deprived of future Exchequer advances, as the Amendment appears to suggest, it would have to reduce the scale of its development.

    9.30 p.m.

    I think that the hon. Gentleman tabled the Amendment to try to get me to go further than I was able to go on Second Reading about the future of the New Towns Commission. I am sorry that I have to disappoint the hon. Gentleman. I can only repeat that it remains the policy of the Government that the New Towns Commission shall be wound up, and that the management of its housing assets will be turned over to the local authorities. I cannot say when this will be done. There are complications, though perhaps not such deep ones as involve the non-housing assets, but, as the hon. Gentleman will have seen from the Cullingworth Report, which I know he has read carefully, this question of the transfer of the management of housing assets is not a simple matter, and it is still under consideration by the Government, as is the whole of the Cullingworth Report.

    As my hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. J. T. Price) said, there is no question of any pledges, election or otherwise, being broken, nor was there any undertaking in the speech of my right hon. Friend the present Minister of Public Building and Works. All he said was that it would not be possible to introduce legislation before the third session of this Parliament. He did not say that it would be in the third session, merely that it could not be before that, and the hon. Gentleman must know that I cannot from this Box forecast future legislation, still less the content of future Queen's Speeches, but I repeat that the policy of the Government remains unchanged in this matter.

    I do not think that it is the hon. Gentleman's purpose to do anything to hamper the Commission for the New Towns in its activities in looking after these new towns which have been handed over to it by their respective development corporations. I am sorry that I cannot satisfy the hon. Gentleman's curiosity further than I have been able to go, but in the light of what has been said I hope that he will withdraw the Amendment.

    I said that this was purely a probing Amendment, and I was hoping that the right hon. Gentleman would be more forthcoming than he has been so far. If he had asked the permission of the Committee to breach a pledge made in the election manifesto, I am sure that we should have heard him with the greatest sympathy. But the right hon. Gentleman has not done that yet. Nevertheless, perhaps the time will come when he will.

    I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 2, in page 1, line 11, at end insert:

    (2) The preceding subsection shall come into operation one month after the Minister shall have laid before Parliament a statement of his proposals for ensuring equitable rents charged by development corporations for new towns and by the Commission for the New Towns.
    The Amendment requires the Minister to produce a statement of the policy for ensuring equitable rents. This, again, is a probing Amendment, intended to allow us to go a little further, and in particular to allow the Minister to go a little further, than we did on Second Reading when the right hon. Gentleman told us, I thought rather boldly, that the
    "New town rates are no higher than those charged by many local authorities for similar homes. New town corporations already receive the same generous subsidies as do local authorities under the Housing Subsidies Act, 1967."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December, 1968; Vol. 775, c. 1689.]
    That seemed to indicate that the right hon. Gentleman was not unduly upset about new town rents, but my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Dance) said that the average rate in his new town was 95s. a week. That cannot tie up with what the Minister said, that it is the sort of rent charged by many local authorities. Table 23 in the Cullingworth Report gives some corresponding rents for new town houses and council houses in the same place but it is unfortunately two years old, referring to March, 1967, and hon. Members will know that rents are rising everywhere. Probably every authority quoted has had to raise its rents during the past two years. But at any rate the table shows fairly wide discrepancies between new towns and council rents.

    We know the reason—the historic cost factor. If a substantial spread of houses was built in happier times when costs were lower, naturally the rents overall can be lower, because the cost of the new houses is spread over the whole field. This is not possible in a second generation new town. As the Minister said, a subsidy of £30 a year is available in those circumstances, but it is doubtful whether it meets the problem.

    The Minister put his finger on the solution when he said, a little later in our Second Reading debate:
    "It is true that development corporations with substantial housing stocks operate rent rebate schemes. That is the answer to a good deal of what has been said about hardship."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December, 1968; Vol. 775, c. 1689.]
    I agree that probably rent rebate schemes are the solution, but they occur only in development corporations with substantial housing stocks. We should hear what happens in the others. How many corporations cannot operate such schemes, or, if they can—

    My hon. Friend is so right. In Redditch, the new town corporation, not in any way through its own fault, since it does excellent work, has no old houses of any sort and is starting completely from scratch. That is why it cannot operate any rebate schemes. That is just as an example.

    That is precisely my point. I am suggesting that the Minister should review the whole system of new town rents and try to ensure that there is a uniform rent rebate scheme operated in all new towns and not just those which have some historic cost houses to help them out. Then he could ensure fairness to all new town tenants. At the moment, the situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory.

    Once again, I hope that this Amendment will give the right hon. Gentleman the opportunity to speak more freely than he could on Second Reading.

    I gladly respond to the hon. Member's request to deal in a little more detail with the question of new town rents than I was able to do on Second Reading. I should make clear that rent-fixing in new towns is primarily the responsibility of the development corporations within broad limits of policy laid down by the Minister. That policy is based on the principle that rents should, in the long run, cover costs after taking account of housing subsidies and special Exchequer grants.

    In a number of first generation new towns, including those handed over to the Commission for the New Towns, rent levels are in general now very similar to those charged by local councils. In other first generation towns, corporation rents tend to be, on average, rather higher than the local council rents but, to a large extent, this reflects the higher average standards of houses in the new towns and the fact houses which enable most local authorities to provide a far wider range of rents.

    Typical rents for older houses range from about 42s. in Hemel Hempstead to 50s. in Bracknell and Stevenage. It is recognised that a policy of immediate balance between rent and cost may not always be practicable in second generation new towns. Unlike first generation new towns and almost all local authorities, the second generation new towns have no stock of older houses which were built at below Parker Morris standards, when both building costs and interest rates were lower and whose rents could be pooled with the rents of the more expensive modern houses. Rents in these towns must be at levels which will not prejudice the success of the towns by preventing people from moving to them.

    The effect of this approach is that the rents of new houses in the second generation towns are not very dissimilar from those for comparable houses in the first generation new towns. Rents for the newer Parker Morris houses in the first generation towns range from 54s. in Welwyn Garden City to 86s. 6d. in Bracknell, while in the second generation towns typical rents for new Parker Morris houses range from 65s. in Skelmersdale to—my figure is 85s. in Redditch, not the figure quoted by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove. This is not markedly out of line with rents charged by a number of local authorities for similar houses.

    The Government are acutely conscious of the need to keep rents at reasonable levels in new towns as elsewhere. Housing subsidies were substantially increased under the Housing Subsidies Act, 1967, and new towns receive the same subsidies as local authorities. The additional Exchequer grants payable to development corporations were increased in 1967 for second generation towns. This grant is now on a descending scale which starts at a rate as high as £30 per annum on all dwellings built in a corporation's first four years. This ensures that most help goes to those corporations whose needs are greatest.

    As far as rent increases are concerned, the Government apply exactly the same policy to the new towns as is applied to local authorities under the Prices and Incomes Act. In addition, all new towns are required to operate effective rent rebate schemes to ensure that those with low incomes do not suffer hardship. I am told that this is in fact the case with the exception of Washington. Washington so far has built very few houses and does not yet think a rent rebate scheme is necessary.

    I shall send the right hon. Gentleman the actual figures from the new town corporation of Redditch. When I interrupted my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead, I pointed out that Redditch has no pool or houses by which it can operate a rent rebate scheme. That is no fault of the corporation's. It is first-class and does all that it can, but the rents are £6 to £6 10s. I admit that that rent includes a garage, but the occupant has to have a house with a garage or no house.

    9.45 p.m.

    There is a conflict of evidence here. I will check my sources, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will check his.

    But I am assured that Redditch has a rent rebate scheme. It has not as yet built a large number of houses.

    Returning to the substance of the Amendment, in fixing rents corporations must strike a nice balance between social and financial considerations and also take account of differing circumstances from town to town and from time to time. This is best dealt with administratively and flexibly within the framework that I have described. A statement on proposals such as the Amendment asks for would merely introduce an undesirable rigidity into the situation and I think it would hinder the efforts of development corporations to achieve the best possible reconciliation of conflicting considerations in the special circumstances of each new town. For these reasons, I cannot advise the Committee to accept the Amendment or the course that it proposes.

    I do not think that the Minister has attempted to defend the present position, except by saying that he believes in local autonomy. As this is a Government reponsibility, at any rate so long as these houses are in the charge of the development corporation, surely this is a responsibility to see fair play for the tenants. It is unreasonable to shrug the matter off by saying that this is a historic accident and therefore rents in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Dance) are sky high.

    They cannot be comparable when the Minister has admitted that there is this vast variation in rents for similar houses. I do not see how we can pursue this further, short of pressing the Amendment to a Division.

    The Minister has said that he will check his sources. He made his observations on the basis of what he thought was the position. If on checking it he finds that it is slightly different, has he left it open for something to be done about it; or, if we agree the Clause as it stands, will the Minister be placed in the position of being unable to do anything about it?

    As I understood it, the Minister said that there was a rent rebate scheme operating, which is different from saying that it is a satisfactory rent rebate scheme. It is a scheme based on rents which are very high and which can have little variation, because the need to bring in a high housing revenue is there. The Minister seeks to get equitable rents, by which I understand that rent rebate schemes should be more or less identical in different areas. I do not think this is impossible.

    I must ask the hon. Gentleman to say how high is "high". What I said was that these rents were reasonably comparable with local authority house rents for similar property in the same sort of area.

    No. That was exclusive. It is £6 10s. when rates and garage rental are added. The basic rent which my hon. Friend quoted on 19th December was 95s. exclusive of rates and exclusive of garage. That is high.

    Although the Minister feels that he cannot accept the Amendment, I hope that this discussion has given him food for thought and that he will consider whether he is really satisfied with the situation in new towns at present. Having said that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 3, in page 1, line 11, at end insert:

    (2) The preceding subsection shall come into operation one month after the Minister shall have laid before Parliament a statement of the results of the co-ordination of Government responsibilities for attracting employment, the provision of hospitals and the provision of road communications to new towns or to town development within the meaning of the Town Development Act 1952.
    This Amendment requires the Minister to produce a statement of the coordination of Government activities in relation to new towns, and it particularly refers to
    "… attracting employment, the provision of hospitals and the provision of road communications …"
    This matter was raised on Second Reading, when the Minister said that coordination existed. However, users do not have the impression that it exists. Roads seem to be built by chance, as it were, or they are not built at all, as in Harlow and Telford. We in Hemel Hempstead are lucky. We got the Ml rather by chance because we happened to be in a straight line between London and Birmingham. Examples of what I have in mind were given on Second Reading.

    A town can double in size, but its hospital facilities do not expand nearly as quickly. We in Hemel Hempstead are particularly worried on this account. There is no intention to provide greater hospital facilities for the town; in other words, the hospital facilities remain virtually the same as before it started to develop as a new town. I have written to the Minister of Health and Social Security asking him to receive a deputation which I intend to bring seeking to improve the hospital facilities in the area. Perhaps, instead, I should have written to the Minister for Planning and Land asking him to meet the deputation; that is, if he is co-ordinating these matters.

    The right hon. Gentleman confirmed to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Dance) that he was right in contacting the President of the Board of Trade. Hon. Members who represent new towns do not know which Department to approach. This must indicate that we do not have confidence that there is proper co-ordination. For example, we read today that the plan for Milton Keynes includes a new hospital, but I wonder at what stage it is to be provided.

    Hon. Members who represent new towns have the same fear about employment prospects. We have heard of the Minister's difficulties with the Board of Trade. My hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) spoke of his difficulties with that Department. On 19th December my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) spoke of the inadequate employment position at Haverhill where men are working below their proper skills and where houses are standing empty because of the lack of employment opportunities. It seems a tragedy that we should make enormous efforts to provide houses in a town in a delightful area, and then have them standing empty because the Board of Trade will not allow employment opportunities to come into the new town, or, in this case, expanded town.

    I also hope that the Minister will be able to answer a question I put to him on 19th December about the working of the London Overspill Liaison Group. He did not have time in winding up to deal with it, but I hope that he now feels ready to give us an account of how it is getting on.

    These matters of co-ordination do not require very frequent meetings between Departments, but something requires to be done. We want an assurance that the right hon. Gentleman or his right hon. Friend will thump the table and demand that their efforts in providing new towns are not stultified by the failure of other Ministries to co-operate.

    We have given examples of what is happening now. It is not much good just saying, "We have tried to do it with another Ministry, but it has other priorities". This should be a very high priority. In view of the huge investment by the taxpayer in the new towns, they must be made a success.

    The phrase used by the Minister on 19th December was:
    "Co-ordination on new towns is already undertaken within the Government, and there is the closest co-operation between my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport, my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade and my Department in all these matters."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December, 1968; Vol. 775, c. 1687.]
    I do not think that "closest co-operation" is good enough. We want an indication of much more vigorous action, something so effective that we feel it down at the sharp end. The user should be satisfied. This is what we need and I hope that the Minister gives a better assurance than he gave last time.

    I should like to put again my arguments on Amendment No. 1, without having to repeat them. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will take those arguments which are applicable to the present Amendment. They are on the record. The reason I thought it a good thing to put them on the record on Amendment No. 1 is that they would not appear in tomorrow's OFFICIAL REPORT if they were made after half-past ten. I did not know how long our discussions would go on before we reached the present Amendment.

    Having made the particular point relating to Peterborough, I support the general wording. I hope that the Minister will recognise the mood of my hon. Friend and those of us who support him. The Amendments are not put antagonistically or critically. The fact that my hon. Friend withdrew them, without putting the Government to the trouble of calling their hoards to go through the Division Lobby, is proof that those of us who face the problem are making a genuine attempt to share minds with the Government and the right hon. Gentleman. I think that it is known that those of us with the new town problem meet in another part of the Royal Palace of Westminster to share our minds. This is not a party matter.

    This is not a question of the Opposition wanting to be difficult with the Government. The views we are expressing, as is shown by the reaction of hon. Members opposite, are shared in all constituencies, whether they are represented by Government or by Opposition supporters. The right hon. Gentleman would be doing the right thing for his colleagues in the Government as well as for the nation if he faced up to this.

    It being Ten o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

    Committee report Progress.

    Business Of The House

    Ordered,

    That the Proceedings on the New Towns Bill may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. K. Robinson.]

    New Towns Bill

    Again considered in Committee.

    I think that that little ceremony confirms the wisdom of my previous tactics. No one supports the traditions of the House more than I do, nor recognises more how they protect the people in Parliament, because they are tied up in conventions which give us orderly procedure, but I did not want that traditional interruption when I was dealing with matters relating to Peterborough. I do not mind the interruption when it applies to nation's business, but Peterborough is different.

    On both sides of the House, among hon. Members who are meeting those concerned with new towns, there is a feeling of disquiet and of a lack of coordination. Not that anyone is causing this deliberately or is being malicious. As one experienced in Government, I understand that consideration is first given to matters relating specifically to one's own Department and that, when one is faced with problems, like those of new towns, which come within the orbit of so many different Departments, it is all too easy to fall between all of these stools.

    The time has come, if it is that the Government want the sympathy and support of the people who have to implement this legislation, to have a Minister who will see that all the problems are properly looked at by the Departments—if need be, someone who can go to the Cabinet itself or to Cabinet Committees and thump the table to see that the issues are faced.

    I put employment as the first priority. Again, this arises whenever I talk to other hon. Members on both sides of the House. We have discussed this and it is in our minutes. It is an experience we have all had. It looks as though development areas are having a priority which, standing alone, may be right but which is one that, if given in the same way as over the last two years, is going to ruin any successful development of the new towns procedures. When I am told that the new towns will have next priority, I feel that the time had come when that next priority must be clearly defined. At what point is it adjudged in the nation's interests to see that the new towns are a success as against the provision of employment in development areas? Both are important and in some respects I think that priority to the new towns should take precedence over development areas.

    I think that the right hon. Gentleman is the right man for the job. He sits in the Chair which deals with most of the areas covered by new towns. He is a man of vast experience in Government. He was in charge of a most intricate and difficult Department for many years and has shown great administrative skill. I would like to think that he will be designated to deal with these matters.

    I would put at the top of his list of priorities the question of seeing that, if we are going to get houses built and plan new areas—which will be expensive—we also have the industries going to those areas to see that they are properly utilised.

    There seems to be a difference of view between the Ministry of Transport and the other planning Ministries which is spoiling the whole idea. I do not want to quote figures again, but we have already had the experience of one set of plans for a road being approved and all the people owning houses and other property in the area being disturbed, as is always the case with such plans, only to find everything altered. I am not saying that the alteration is not better, but it there had been co-ordination in the first place, there would not have been the disturbance and the upset which is caused when plans are made and then changed. I want the Ministry of Transport to consider what contribution it has to make in new towns.

    There is no need for me to elaborate about the need for hospitals and water supplies, but we want more detailed knowledge of what is planned in these respects. Ministers with Departmental responsibilities for these services have to get together to make sure that a scheme is understood and operated.

    There is one general problem which ought to be tackled. This concerns properties in areas which have been designated for development. The owners of such properties cannot sell them on the open market, because of the planning proposals, but there is often no date for the commencement of the development. Some of the extra money which the right hon. Gentleman is obtaining permission to spend should be used to purchase these properties in order to avoid what are often heartbreak and disastrous consequences for people who have to move because of a change of job, for instance, but who find that they cannot sell their property and take the normal advantage which the citizen is entitled to expect.

    If we want to make a success of the new towns, particularly now that new towns are being tacked on to traditional cities such as that which I described earlier, there must be a responsible Minister with authority and standing to see that all the Departments concerned with the various services know what is going on and are able to work together to provide a coherent development instead of the haphazard situation which exists today.

    The hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) always charms the House of Commons with his speeches. I can truthfully say that his manner is such that he could make comfortable a person on the scaffold.

    If he loses four more votes, he will be.

    The hon. Member referred to coordination. I want to refer particularly to Skelmersdale, the new town in my constituency. In planning a new town, it is always difficult to synchronise developments so that all the diverse interests will agree that everything is right. There are always difficulties about whether high or low priority should be given to communications, telephone services, water supply, recreational facilities, hospitals and schools. My right hon. Friend came to Skelmersdale on 2nd January to hear the opinions of those who have to deal with these problems, not only members of the development corporation, but the councillors of the local urban district of Skelmersdale and Holland. Let us make no bones about it—the local urban district council does not have the financial capacity to deal with these problems. They have the ideas, but they cannot will the end. They cannot provide some of the facilities the lack of which is creating friction in the community.

    I hope that, having listened to the complaints about the lack of recreational facilities and having heard what has been said about the need for planning for hospitals and the need to provide something tangible, my right hon. Friend will be able to give us some good news, and especially that he will be able to say that the present meagre grants will be considerably increased and that the Government will assist the local authority to get ahead with its plans to make for that richer life which people coming into the new towns expect.

    I want to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason) for all that he has done and said this evening. At the same time I should like to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Newens). He has done so much to help us get together in this matter, which proves conclusively that it is not, and never has been, a party matter. It has been done with the interests of those who live in the new towns at heart. I agree with so much of what has been said, that there is only one point I wish to raise and it is to do with tenant farmers whose land is threatened and in some cases taken over.

    I was speaking to a tenant farmer recently, whose land is to be taken over. He does not know when, he is completely in the dark about it. This is not conducive to good husbandry. We are so dependent upon the maximum production from the land at present that I feel that such farmers should know much more about where they stand, and for how long their tenure will last. For goodness sake, let us make sure that, from the money allocated under this Bill, they get realistic compensation.

    I do not want to make heavy weather of this, but this Amendment, like the rest, is defective in that it refers to the Minister when there is no reference to the Minister in the Bill. Furthermore, it refers to the Town Development Act, 1952, and Clause 1 of this Bill makes no provision for development under that Act. I take it that the Amendment was merely intended to allow a debate on the general need for co-ordination of responsibilities of various Departments. We discussed this on Second Reading.

    The need for closer co-ordination between Government Departments to ensure that the development of the new towns proceeds smoothly is fully accepted—without it new towns could never be built. The initial decision to designate anew town, although statutorily the responsibility of the Minister of Housing and Local Government or the Secretary of State for Scotland or Wales, as the case may be, is taken after the widest consultation with other Ministers, and implies a Government commitment to see that all the Departments concerned cooperate to the extent necessary for successful development.

    The Amendment refers to one or two specific things. I accept that the growth of employment is one of the most important matters in developing a new town. The development corporations keep in very close touch with my Department and the Board of Trade. There are interdepartmental arrangements to see that new town considerations are taken fully into account in applications for industrial development certificates. I am sorry to have to repeat this phrase, and not to be able to define it further, I think for obvious reasons, but it is a fact that subject to the needs of the development areas, those of the new and expanding towns have the next highest priority. It has been made abundantly clear that in these matters development areas have the first priority.

    10.15 p.m.

    This policy has succeeded, because the new towns in general present a success story. I urge this on someone like the hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) who has, so to speak, just entered the league. We have no doubt that Peterborough will be the same success as the other new towns have been. It is a success in which both parties can share and for which, although the new towns were started under a Labour Government, both parties, can claim a measure of credit.

    I accept that good road communications are essential. I explained on Second Reading the position as regards principal roads in new towns for which there is a special programme in which my Department determines the priorities. Trunk roads and motorways are dealt with under the national programme, whether they serve new towns or not, because they involve wider considerations of national interest and priority. However, new town development is a relevant factor which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport takes into account, although it is not the only factor which he has to consider. It is a reasonable claim that new towns either are or will be well served by the national road system

    The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason) spoke of hospitals and said that he was uncertain to whom he should go to press the claims of hospitals. Perhaps he missed his opportunity. I think that he ought to have come to see me at midnight on 31st October last, while I could still claim, perhaps, to have been Minister of Health and also to have become Minister for Planning and Land. This is a matter for which regional hospital boards and the Department of Health and Social Security are ultimately responsible, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no danger of the claims of new towns being overlooked. Three of them—Harlow, Crawley and Welwyn Garden City—each already have new hospitals. Not long ago I visited a new hospital under construction at Basildon. There is one at Stevenage. In the later new towns, sites have been reserved for prospective future hospital development.

    Peterborough has just completed a hospital, but that was done to meet the needs of old Peterborough. If it is proposed as an excuse for not putting up another one for the 70,000 extra people, we shall be back where we started.

    I had not heard that that excuse was put forward. I shall not tease the hon. Gentleman, but, if he had had his way, he would not, I think, have had his hospital until a good deal later than it was in fact completed. However, that is ancient history.

    There have been references to the question of blight, although that word was not actually used. I assure the Committee that development corporations will always sympathetically consider requests from house owners to buy their houses if that is necessary to avoid hardship. That is a general principle widely adopted.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Ince (Mr. McGuire) referred to my interesting and enjoyable visit to Skelmersdale in his constituency. I took careful note of everything said to me by all those whom I met during that visit. I cannot promise him immediate satisfaction on all counts, but I shall do my best for Skelmersdale as for the other new towns.

    The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead referred to what he called the London overspill liaison committee. Its correct title is the London Dispersal Liaison Group. This Group is working extremely well. The team of officials comes from my Department, from the Department of Employment and Productivity and from the Greater London Council. It was set up at the end of 1966 to keep the administrative arrangements under continuous review and to look closely into the related questions of publicity, adult retraining and the collection and presentation of comparable statistics of movement. It is in fact a very striking achievement in practical co-operation, and a very useful initiative, and I understand that it is working very well.

    The New Towns Act provides for the development of new towns by corporations appointed by the Government. They are the co-ordinators as well as the developers. It is their job to see that those parts of the new town development which they do not themselves provide directly are properly programmed and available at the right time. They do this by constant liaison with and consultation with the local authorities, the statutory undertakers, and the Departments concerned. Thus there is from the very beginning a built-in system of co-ordination. I think this machinery has worked well in the past, and the success of the earlier new towns proves that. There may, of course, be occasions when the machinery, like all machinery, works less than perfectly, and it would be wrong to be complacent, but on the whole it works well, and I do not think that the kind of formalisation of arrangements implicit in the Amendment would enable the machinery to work any better.

    The right hon. Gentleman has not mentioned the question of tenant farmers. He mentioned the question of blight in relation to housing. Does the same thing apply in the case of a tenant farmer? Suppose a tenant farmer feels it is no good soldiering on under the threat that, at any moment, his livelihood may go. Is he then entitled to serve a blight notice under the New Towns Act and the Planning Acts, and may he go at the time of his choosing and not at the whim of the development corporation?

    I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the same kind of considerations apply, and sympathetic reception would be given by the corporation to a tenant farmer.

    I do not think the right hon. Gentleman has quite told us where to go with our complaints on occasions other than 30th October last year. If we have complaints about the telephone service, for instance, should we then go to him or should we go to the Postmaster-General? This always seems a little bit obscure. I agree that, obviously, the minor complaints would go to the Postmaster-General, but where there is a major complaint about something hampering the whole running of a new town, does the right hon. Gentleman prefer our taking our complaint to him first, so that he can rouse up the Postmaster-General—or whoever the appropriate Minister may be? Would he tell us? Or does he prefer that a Member, or possibly a group of Members, should harass the Minister first and then, if they cannot get satisfaction, come to him? I think it would be helpful if we could have a statement of exactly how this co-ordination actually works.

    I think it would be proper in instances of that sort for the Member concerned to approach what I may call the functional Minister in the first instance, but I have, of course, a general responsibility for new towns, and I would always be glad to look into anything alleged to be affecting adversely the development of a new town. I am always prepared to take up with my right hon. Friends matters of this kind. I would not usurp the functions of my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General in providing telephones in old or new towns or the countryside.

    I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill

    Bill reported, without Amendment.

    Motion made, and Question, That the Bill be now read the Third time, put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 55 ( Third Reading), and agreed to.

    Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

    Scotland (Criminal Legal Aid Scheme)

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. Fitch.]

    10.25 p.m.

    First, I ought to make it clear that I am the possessor, although I am not sure whether I should say the proud possessor, of a legal qualification. I worked in a solicitor's office for a period before being elected in 1966. This does not in a technical sense constitute an interest, but it is a direct connection with the subject under discussion. I hope the House will accept that this is not the only reason for which I have chosen to raise the matter. The operation of the criminal legal aid scheme is important obviously to the person accused whose future may depend upon its efficiency, and to the health of society. It is important for the community as a whole to know that a person on trial will have the benefit of proper representation.

    It is, therefore, with some alarm that I and many other people have watched the views of the Government who finance the scheme diverging on one or two important administrative points from the views of the lawyers who service it.

    I do not wish to weary the House in the short time at my disposal by going into the technical details of the dispute. It is well known that there is strong opposition to the proposed change in the Act of Adjournal of 1964 bringing in certification that a case is of exceptional difficulty or complexity as a necessary preliminary to a claim for payment above the maxima laid down in the Act of Adjournal.

    In the interval between my application for this Adjournment debate and my success in obtaining it, the withdrawal from the legal aid scheme of the services by about 100 Glasgow lawyers has been ended. It occurred to me that it might be more tactful in these circumstances to drop the Adjournment debate but, as the matter is still in dispute and as negotiations in the conventional sense are not in progress, although the Law Society of Scotland is considering what further proposals to put forward, I still feel that the matter should be given an airing. It would be helpful if the Under-Secretary would say exactly how the Government see the situation and how they justify the changes.

    It is unfortunate that a matter which has aroused such strong emotions and such sprited debate has not been aired in the House. I do not know how important the Under-Secretary considers the changes to be, but they are certainly thought to be important, and it is a pity that the Government's case has not yet been stated. If changes of more than a technical nature are to be made in the Act of Adjournal in future I hope that Ministers will find an opportunity for allowing discussion in the House.

    The debate that has taken place on the issue has been well padded out in terms of principle, legal theory and ethics, but when it is boiled down it is a debate about finance and about fees. As I understand it, the Government are alarmed that excess payments above the maxima were made last year in 25 per cent. of summary cases, in 50 per cent. of sheriff and jury trials and in 80 per cent. of High Court criminal trials, altogether in some 2,600 instances. The simple aim of the change is to cut this expenditure.

    In general terms, I wish to express my worry about this. I am not sure that we spend too much on criminal legal aid, and there may be a case for saying that there are areas not covered by the scheme which ought to be. One obvious example is the police courts, where the vast majority of people who regularly appear make their debut as offenders and where the treatment meted out to them may have an important influence on future events.

    The £460,000 that we spent last year sounds an enormous amount in isolation, but, in the context of massive Government expenditure, I am not clear that it is such a significant sum. I understand that the rise in criminal legal aid expenditure is very much in line with that in civil legal aid and more or less on course with what has happened in England, where, in 1963–64, the bill was about £1½ million and rose in 1966–67 to £3 million. If it costs as much as £½ million to run in Scotland an efficient criminal legal aid scheme, I would prefer to see that money spent rather than risk the scheme being inhibited or cramped on financial grounds.

    I am not clear that the right question is to ask whether we are spending too much. I suspect that it is whether we are getting value for the money that we are spending. That is very much more of an open question. It would be unfortunate, and I have noticed this tendency in the Press and other quarters, for the dispute about the scheme to broaden into a wide attack upon expenditure on legal aid generally.

    If the economic case is so pressing, perhaps my hon. Friend could look again at the possibility of a contribution scheme. I am well aware that this was rejected by Lord Guthrie's Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings (Command 1015) as impracticable, but no doubt my hon. Friend will remember that there was a qualified note of dissent from the present Solicitor-General on the point. Since then, of course, the Widgery Committee in England, in paragraphs 89 to 135 of Command 2934, has reported in favour of a contribution scheme, and I understand that it is now being implemented south of the border as from October, 1968.

    I can see the practical difficulties. If a man is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, his income stops and it is difficult to expect him to contribute to his defence. Equally, it would be wrong if the effect was that only those acquitted were expected to contribute. However, a practical way round the problem has been found in England, and, if we are so worried about the cost of legal aid, I hope that the possibility of a contribution scheme will not be regarded as a closed question. It is worthy of re-examination.

    One of the troubles is that the cost of litigation is ever-spiralling. The skill of the lawyer, traditionally only available to the rich, has become available to the very poor, thanks to the arrival of legal aid. But there are still an enormous number of people in the middle category who find the cost of litigation daunting if not prohibitive. I hope that the introduction of a contributory scheme will widen the range of help and do something at least to minimise—

    Mr. Speaker, I am asking for a re-examination of the problem. But I take the point and leave it hurriedly if it is an embarrassment.

    If I may return to the subject of the dispute which is before the Scottish Office at present and which is, as yet, unresolved, my view is that it would be unfortunate if the criminal legal aid lawyer found himself in a position where he ought, in the interests of his client, to do a great deal of work, but was not sure that he would be recompensed for it.

    There are obvious disadvantages in any maxima being laid down in a scheme of this nature. As the scheme was constituted, even if the account presented, fell below the legal limit, still it had to be taxed and audited. The situation was not the same as it is in, say, conveyancing, where what is lost on the swings is gained on the roundabouts, where a fat killing can be made on some transactions which compensates for what has to be carried on other sections of work. If the system was being worked as it was constituted and as I understand it, there ought to have been careful auditing of even those accounts which fell below the limit.

    I should like to hear what abuses the Under-Secretary thinks there were in the scheme, and not in general terms, that too many cases were getting excess payments. I should like to hear in what way he thinks that certification by the sheriff will effect the limitation that he has been looking for. My feeling is that if there are abuses—and few lawyers to whom I have talked would deny that there are a certain number of abuses—they are to be found in the work entered in accounts not properly done or, in the small minority of cases, not done at all. I do not see, if it is getting through the auditor, how the sheriff can be expected to end that.

    I should not like to see a situation in which there was to be a reduction effected in the money spent on legal aid at the expense of those practising in general at the criminal bar. The abuses would be left untouched and might still crop up on those cases where certification for extra payment is not needed. Criminal legal aid work in the past has been the poor relation—an unattractive part of legal work. There is a grave danger that we will perpetuate that situation if we cut back on the money that is available.

    I do not pretend that I find all the points made against the changes attractive or valid. Some of the allegations have been highly coloured. The campaign that has been waged has been at times over dramatic. I do not accept the points made about confidentiality and the lawyer-client relationship. I do not think that this should necessarily carry great weight.

    I should be interested too if the Under-Secretary could say something about the rôle of the Procurator-Fiscal in applications for certification.

    I do not accept that relationships between the Bench and the bar would necessarily be jeopardised by the introduction of these changes. The fact is however that it is still firmly held and believed that this is so and for this reason alone it is worthy of comment and rebuttal by the Under-Secretary.

    There is a strong feeling, which may be exaggerated, that lawyers might find themselves in the situation of saying that if they prepare an elaborate case it will depend on which sheriff is on the bench whether they would get the certification they were looking for. This is not a unique situation. These are valid complaints that, in the initial application for legal aid by the accused, there are considerable variations in practice, depending on who is on the bench at the time. Looking at Section 2(2) of the 1967 Act, the only consideration that should be taken into account is the accused's financial circumstances. But I understand that there is a tendency to have a general wide-ranging inquiry into the type of defence that is likely to be available before a legal aid certificate is granted. I am unhappy about that situation. It is unfortunate, it may be inevitable, but that is not necessarily a good reason for extending it.

    The last point I should like to mention is the definition of "exceptional length, complexity or difficulty." It may be said: who is better to judge what happens in this connection than the man sitting in judgment on the case? It makes a fine rallying call and, to some extent, it is fair. But it is only fair to say that he is a good judge of what happens in his own court. I am sure that the Under-Secretary will accept that there may be circumstances in which a great deal of massive preparation can be done and perhaps, owing to the excellence and thoroughness of that preparation, the proceedings in court are shortened. There may be a last minute arrangement to plead to a lesser charge as a result of facts which have been uncovered. There may be many other circumstances which I need not enumerate. It would represent a fairly radical departure from the old principle on which certification was supposed to be given if preparation was to be excluded.

    I need hardly remind my hon. Friend of a recent judgment in the High Court handed down by Lord Wheatley, which has been widely commented on:
    "Counsel had argued that the length of time meant the time spent in preparing the case, and he could not agree with that interpretation. He was satisfied that it related to the time the case occupied in court."
    I shall be interested to hear my hon. Friend's explanation of what was in the Government's mind at the time when they introduced this scheme, as to whether preparation was a valid factor to be taken into account.

    I have raised this Adjournment debate largely because this is an unsolved dispute which has raised a great deal of fierce debate. I have, in a sense, raised it as a probing debate, in the hope that we may have from my hon. Friend a clear exposition of where the Government stand. It is an unfinished story. As my hon. Friend knows, the Law Society has a committee at work on this at the moment—its first meeting was tonight—to try to come up with a compromise which will be acceptable to all the parties concerned. I hope that it is successful. My feeling is that in the past the Law Society has been a little tentative in its actions. The abuses which exist are very much abuses, I suspect, which can be eradicated only by the lawyers themselves, and the Law Society, with its power to exclude someone from the criminal aid list, with its powerful position—a monopoly position—on the question of entry into the profession, could have done more to stamp out the causes of complaint which have led to the imposition of these changes.

    I hope that we shall get some useful and effective suggestions from this Committee. I hope, too, that this evening we shall get from my hon. Friend a firm pledge that he is not prepared to be inflexible, and that he will look with an open mind, and possibly with a sympathetic mind, at any proposals which flow from their deliberations.

    10.42 p.m.

    I can give my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Dewar) the assurance for which he asked on the last point he raised. I am well known for my flexibility in handling all these matters.

    Before I start on the general debate, I want to say that I am pleased that my hon. Friend has raised this matter because it gives me the opportunity of explaining the circumstances in which the new Act of Adjournal was brought into operation at the beginning of this year, and it also gives me the opportunity of dispelling some of the misconceptions which appear to exist about the procedure.

    I should like to make one or two general points. First, I accept completely the argument of my hon. Friend that criminal legal aid is socially desirable, and indeed socially necessary. We fully accept this, and I hope that my hon. Friend is not correct in saying that this has been used to broaden the attack against the scheme of legal aid as such. Certainly that is a view which we would reject. Indeed, it is because we are concerned to strengthen, and to be seen to strengthen, the rôle of criminal legal aid as fitting into society in this way that we want to produce the best kind of scheme. One of the things, however, which the Government must demonstrate is that they take proper care of the public purse in this matter. By doing this, even more confidence will be given to such a scheme.

    There is one misconception which I think I can dispose of briefly, namely, that the Act of Adjournal was somehow mysteriously brought into effect without going through the appropriate statutory procedure, or at any rate that it was not brought out and discussed. My hon. Friend is not under any misapprehension about this. The fact is that the statutory provisions under which this and all previous Acts of Adjournal have been made reserve to Parliament no further powers. They are delegated powers. They are delegated to the High Court of Justiciary, and no Parliamentary procedure is prescribed. Therefore the opportunity to debate this Act of Adjournal did not arise, and for this reason I welcome this debate.

    I should like to look, first, at the historical background to this. The traditional Scottish system for the defence of poor persons in criminal proceedings rested on the willingness of the legal profession in Scotland to give their services virtually free. From 1953 they were subsidised by an annual payment from the Exchequer, which in 1964–65 was increased from £8,000 to £16,000. Even so, according to the Report of the Guthrie Committee in 1960, there was, at least in Glasgow, competition for appointment to the list of agents for the poor. That Committee nevertheless recommended, rightly, that it was unreasonable to expect the legal profession to continue to act for accused people in the criminal courts without remuneration and the present scheme was brought in in 1964. This Act prescribed maxima which could, however, be exceeded at the discretion of the Law Society of Scotland.

    In its first full year of operation, 1965–66, that statutory criminal legal aid scheme cost £242,000. In the current financial year, it is expected to cost £490,000. The cost of the scheme has, therefore, doubled in three years. It is hardly surprising that, when the Government are exercising the most rigorous control of public expenditure, my right hon. Friend should question the justification for this very large increase and should look into it, not because we have criticisms of the legal aid as not being socially necessary—we have none—but to see whether the public purse is also being looked after. Accordingly, when my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Maryhill (Mr. Hannan) asked a question on this subject on 22nd May last, I said that my right hon. Friend was examining ways and means of containing this rapid growth of expenditure.

    Order. It would help the Official Reporters if the Under-Secretary would address the Chair.

    I am sorry, Mr. Speaker.

    Fees to solicitors naturally account for a high proportion of the total cost of the scheme—over 90 per cent.—and it was therefore in this direction that we had to look for economies in the use of public funds for the defence of accused persons.

    In May last year, my right hon. Friend put forward proposals to the Law Society, drawing their attention to the renewal of public concern about the cost of criminal legal aid and seeking their co-operation in measures, particularly in summary cases, to bring it more closely into line with what we felt we could afford and what the administration of justice required, and to place the remuneration of solicitors and counsel more firmly on the basis of payment for work actually and reasonably done. My hon. Friend was right to stress that this is not just a matter of principle, although much of the discussion has taken this form, but that much of it is due to a question of money, of costs and fees. One of the factors was the imbalance between expenditure on the defence of accused persons, which has risen in a remarkably short period to almost half a million pounds and the cost of the procurator fiscal services which, in the same period, has risen only from £350,000 to £450,000.

    The Law Society, which has statutory responsibility for the administration of the legal aid scheme, felt unable to accept all the proposals put to them, but they responded with certain constructive proposals of their own, which were then embodied in a memorandum dated 24th June, 1968.

    We were especially concerned at the extent to which solicitors had been invoking the so-called "escape clause"—Section 13(2) of the 1964 Act of Adjournal—which enabled them to claim fees in excess of the maxima. For example, the nominated solicitor acting for an accused person in summary proceedings in the sheriff court is allowed a maximum fee of 45 guineas, with an additional daily fee not exceeding 15 guineas for an adjourned hearing; and for a sheriff and jury trial, the solicitor is entitled to claim 75 guineas, with an additional daily fee of up to 20 guineas, or 15 guineas if counsel has been instructed, for an adjourned hearing. The Act of Adjournal recognises, however, that, in exceptional circumstances these maxima may not give enough remuneration to the solicitor for work actually and reasonably done, and Section 13(2) provides for that in cases of exceptional length, complexity or difficulty.

    In the memorandum of June, 1968, the Law Society accepted that this "escape clause" had been excessively invoked. My hon. Friend asked me to be more precise. I would rather not, with respect, but the Law Society has accepted that the "escape clause" has been excessively invoked. An analysis had shown that, in 1966–67, fees in excess of the prescribed maxima had been paid in almost 20 per cent. of the accounts submitted in respect of summary proceedings and over 40 per cent. of those relating to sheriff and jury trials. A similar analysis in 1967–68 has disclosed an upward trend, for in that year the proportions were about 25 and 50 per cent. respectively.

    The Law Society rejected a suggestion that the "escape clause" should simply be revoked, and proposed instead that the duty should be placed on the court at the termination of a trial, on application by the defence, to say whether in the circumstances of the trial Section 13(2) should be applied.

    At a subsequent meeting held on 27th June, representatives of the Law Society and of the Department agreed to adopt this proposal, which was later submitted to the Lord Justice-General along with certain other proposals for the amendment of the 1964 Act of Adjournal and thereafter embodied in the new Act of Adjournal, which came into operation on 2nd January.

    I am well aware that, after the meeting I have referred to, the Law Society had second thoughts and retracted this particular proposal. The point I am trying to make, however, is that the notion of the court's certifying whether a case had been one of
    "exceptional length, complexity or difficulty "
    was not so outrageous or revolutionary as to inhibit the Law Society from advancing it in the first place as worthy of consideration. In view of comments which were made later, this point should be kept in mind.

    What is the practical effect of the amendment to Section 13(2) of the Act of Adjournal? Hitherto the solicitor who considered that the work he had done on a case entitled him to claim fees higher than the maxima prescribed required only to justify his claim to the Law Society or, on appeal, to the auditor of the court. Under the new Act of Adjournal, he has to get a certificate from the judge who has presided at the trial to the effect that the case has necessarily been one of exceptional length, complexity or difficulty. If he is successful in his submission to the court, he then submits his account in the usual way to the Law Society which, as in the past, has complete discretion in determining how much would be "fair remuneration" for the work done. The trial judge does no more than decide that the case comes within this category. He does not decide the amount.

    If the solicitor's application is unsuccessful, his remuneration is still determined by the Law Society, subject to a maximum which has not been altered. The question, therefore, to which the court must address itself in considering an application under Section 13(2) is not, "How much should this solicitor be paid for his trouble?", but simply, "Has the case which has just concluded been exceptionally long, complex or difficult?" The High Court is satisfied that a decision of this kind is entirely within the competence of the judiciary, and I deprecate any suggestion that we are asking the judges to perform a duty for which they are not qualified.

    I refer my hon. Friend to a letter written by Mr. Norman Walker, a distinguished former sheriff, which appeared in The Glasgow Herald of 8th January, in which Mr. Walker said this:
    "The sheriff's duty under the new regulation is not to decide fees but to decide whether the case was exceptional. There is nothing new in this. In civil cases the sheriff has had power for over 50 years to allow higher fees to be charged against the unsuccessful litigant, and where such fees are allowable similar fees are charged by each solicitor against his own client".
    It was even more complex than this, because various other factors had to be taken into consideration at the same time. Therefore, there is nothing totally new in this principle.

    I cannot accept the argument either that this must be opposed because different sheriffs will have different attitudes. If we accept that the trial judge is competent to decide whether a man should be sent to prison for 5 or 10 years, we should not see this problem as being quite so difficult. I cannot accept that reflection on the bench. Nor can I accept that confidentiality is necessarily impugned in this way or that specialised knowledge may be altogether necessary.

    What was the old procedure which was, at least by implication, so much better? This allowed the solicitor to submit his account weeks, sometimes even months, after the case was over, to the Law Society, which had no knowledge, as the trial judge does, of the nature of the work done. I accept that the amount of work done may not necessarily show itself in the length of the actual trial, but it should be disclosed by the nature of the trial in precisely the same way.

    My hon. Friend was also anxious about the presence of the prosecutor. The rôle of the prosecutor is simply to provide any information about the case which the judge may ask for and to secure that the court is not misled as to matters of fact. This is the only reason for the presence of the prosecutor.

    With respect, I have little time. I hope I have said enough to explain the considerations which led my right hon. Friend to propose some adjustment in the procedure for claiming higher fees. I regret very much that a section of the legal profession in Scotland should have carried their dislike of the new arrangements to the point of withdrawing from the criminal legal aid scheme altogether. I am pleased that wiser counsels have now prevailed and that the lawyers concerned have applied for readmission to the criminal legal aid lists in Glasgow. I am aware that a working party has been appointed by the Law Society. I welcome the establishment of this working party. I have no doubt that the Bar Association in Glasgow will be willing to bring forward points of view—

    The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

    Adjourned at five minutes to Eleven o'clock.