I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Order. I have suggested that, with this Amendment, we group Lords Amendment No. 2.

When the Bill left this House, the words

"…since the celebration of the marriage…"

appeared in Clause 2(1)(a) and (b), but not in (c), where clearly they were not needed, nor in (d) and (e). However, in the other place, the noble Lord, Lord Dilhorne, moved the deletion of the words on the ground that they served no useful purpose. That Amendment was accepted with the approval of the sponsor of the Bill in the other place.

As it now stands, all the paragraphs are similarly worded, and there should be no difficulty in construing the behaviour of the parties or their separation as related to the period after marriage. There is no question of principle involved. The Amendment achieves both consistency of wording and clarity of meaning.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

I have suggested that, with this Amendment, we take Lords Amendments Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 10, which make roughly the same point at various parts of the Bill.

This Amendment has been much debated in this House and in the other place. An identical Amendment was moved with much sincerity by those hon. Members who opposed the Bill in our first suggestion, both in Committee and on the Floor of this House. While I confess that I have some nostalgia and preference for the original words "does not object", I see merit in the simpler and more easily understood "consent", and that consent is possibly stronger evidence of irretrievable breakdown than mere non-objection.

Doubts had been raised that the passive non-objection might not be as genuine and well-informed as one would wish. It was because of those doubts that, in Committee, I introduced the Amendment now to be found in Clause 2(6). Still the doubts and fears persisted, so this Amendment was moved and accepted in another place, though by a small majority.

So we are here asked to look at this matter again. It would seem to me that, in the majority of cases, it will make no difference that consent rather than non-objection is required. In most cases, both parties will be legally advised. In most cases, both parties will have agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

In most cases, both parties will have worked out mutually satisfactory arrangements.

I believe that the Amendment will not affect the principle of the Bill. While it may not go as far as some would wish, it will alleviate the fears of many of the Bill's critics.

I want, first, to offer the hon. Member for Rhondda, West (Mr. Alec Jones) my congratulations for getting his Bill to this stage with so few Amendments from the other place.

I am a little disappointed that we have to make this change in the Bill, and my object in intervening is to ask the learned Solicitor-General whether he can clarify one or two points of which, I understand, he has been given notice.

This Amendment was agreed to by a very small majority in the other place. The voting figures were 65 to 61. No doubt hon. Members have read the debate in the other place, so I will not reiterate what was said.

I should like to know, if consent is not forthcoming, whether that means that the person will therefore have to wait another three years before he or she can get the case reheard. Secondly, suppose a person cannot be found. There are many cases where one or the other spouse has disappeared completely. Can action be taken under desertion, or will such people also have to wait to a later time before they can try to get divorced again?

From what I have read in the other place, it seems that there might be a chance that the court could consider the withholding of consent in cruelty cases. This seems another reason why we should not have "consents", but should have "does not object". I think that it would make it more difficult for people if we have "consents" rather than "does not object". If a person holds very strong principles it is difficult to give consent. On the other hand, if there is what I think is a loophole in not having to object—in other words, a person does not have to purge his or her conscience but can let things slip past—this must be better. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for many people to give consent and it will hold up many of these cases.

I believe that at present the other side is sent a letter by post informing him or her that action may be taken and there is a form which asks whether the respondent objects to going before the court. Nowadays people can get full advice from the citizens' advice bureau or legal aid. I think that it would be much better to have "does not object" than "consents".

Owing to the lateness of the Bill being brought before the House it was not possible for me to put down an Amendment, other than one which would wreck the whole Bill, and I do not want to do that.

It seems strange, giving consent to a Bill not becoming an Act until 1971, that we have to rush these points through in this Session because otherwise it would fall. However, I should be grateful if the Solicitor-General could give an answer to the points that I have raised. This would clarify the position to many who may be worried about this proposed change in the Bill.

I rather hoped that I should not have to make another speech about this matter—this is the seventh occasion on which I have discussed it—but I cannot resist the opportunity of congratulating and thanking the hon. Member for Rhondda, West (Mr. Alec Jones) for having at last, although apparently with slight reluctance, acceded to the arguments that we put forward on such a number of occasions.

I am sorry to disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers), but I feel that we have at last accepted that if we are to have divorce by consent we ought to have consent. That is the fundamental point that we have now accepted, although somewhat reluctantly, and I have never been rigid about it. There seems to be overwhelming agreement in the country that there should be divorce by consent, but it must be done in a proper way.

I agree with the hon. Member for Rhondda, West that it probably does not make any practical difference, except in a few cases. It is more a question of the impression that it gives to people. I believe that there will be great satisfaction that this has been done. Although it is almost the only occasion—I think that there was one other occasion when I agreed with the hon. Gentleman—I am glad to be able to support him on this occasion.

Although congratulating the promoters of the Bill on their successful efforts, I deplore that they have found it necessary to accept this Amendment. I strongly support what was said by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers).

I remind hon. Members of St. Augustine's discussion of the word "consent", when dealing with the subject of rape. Consent, particularly consent in the will, to which he made reference, bears particularly strong connotations. It indicates a strong positive action. I suggest that these Amendments mean that difficulties are unnecessarily being put in the paths of Roman Catholics and orthodox Hindus who believe in the indissolubility of marriage. As the Clause stood it gave them a loophole, but with the introduction of the word "consents" it does not. Therefore, I deplore it very much.

I am prompted to intervene by the remarks of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devon-port (Dame Joan Vickers) about the words in sub-paragraph (d) and to ask the Solicitor-General one further question which has risen in my mind after listening to the hon. Lady.

Ostensibly, the courts would be able to look at either sub-paragraph (c) or (d), and, if there has been desertion, grant a divorce after two years without consent, because consent is not mentioned in sub-paragraph (c), but only in (d).

I can envisage a situation arising in which the parties have lived separately by consent for, say, 18 months, following which the man emigrates to South America without leaving a forwarding address. In such a case there is doubt whether the court should be looking at either sub-paragraph c) or (d) in deciding whether to grant the petition. If it was an absolutely clear-cut case it would be quite all right, because the court has to be satisfied of only one or more of the following facts, so that each of the sub- paragraphs can be looked at individually. But if there were cases where the court had to look at two or more of the subparagraphs and had to try to construe them together, I can see difficulties arising.

I should be grateful if, when the Solicitor-General replies, he will take that into account as well.

I respond to the invitation to deal with these matters, and I am glad to do so. While I make no complaint about this at all, it is only since I entered the Chamber a few moments ago that I heard that this matter was to be raised. But, I repeat, I raise no complaint about that. My hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda, West (Mr. Alec Jones) indicated to me, as I came in, that the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) was interested in this point.

At this stage of the Bill, when so little time is left, I must be very careful in my endeavours to elucidate for the benefit of the House the legal effect of the proposals in the Bill. I have throughout, of course, to be extremely careful in matters of this kind for the obvious reason that they are of great importance and it is desirable that hon. Members should proceed with their consideration of the Measure without there being the slightest element of misundering in their minds or a wrong impression created.

Having, I hope not too formally or oppressively uttered these cautionary observations, I should tell the hon. Member for Devonport that it is very difficult to give an honest responsible answer that would be satisfactory to her. I say that for this reason. When the Bill is enacted—if enacted it is—and comes to be construed in the courts of law, questions will arise on the proper construction of its provisions.

My understand is that the question whether there has been consent to a decree will be a question of fact for determination by the learned judge upon the evidence if there be argument about it. When I say that I do not really think that I can be charged with running away from the point. It would be wrong to do other than emphasise what I have just said. As I understand, in one or two, or a few, of the countless varieties of cases with which the courts may be confronted in dealing with this provision it will be arguable whether, as a question of fact, having regard to all the circumstance, non-objection may amount to consent.

I do not think that it would be right to suggest that the proposed change will not tend, in a very few cases—and I am grateful for the intervention of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), because I agree we are dealing with a small minority of cases—to make it more difficult to proceed when one spouse has disappeared, or is apathetic, or has conscientious objections. In a small minority of cases the change may add to the difficulties.

That is my impression, and I convey it, I hope with candour, to the hon. Lady the Member for Devonport. What is fundamental here is the question of fact whether there is consent. I can readily see the matter developing with findings of fact, so that in a whole variety of cases, on the evidence, and in the particular circumstances, non-objection will be treated by the courts as amounting to consent.

The hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) asked about the bearing of this on cases where, for example, there was some kind of overlap or parallelism between subsections (1)(c) and (1)(d). I would wish to clarify the difficulty introduced by the hon. Gentleman, but I am not sure that I can do more in answer to his question than I have endeavoured to do in answer to the Lady the hon. Member for Devonport. Here again, it will be a question of fact, and the matters will be considered in that light by the courts.

In answering these questions in that fashion, and in responding in that manner to the hon. Lady's question, I have given the best guidance that I can upon this matter. The House may be interested to hear what the sponsors' view is about the point that has been raised. What I have said thus far is, I think, the best I can offer on the question of the construction of the language.

I think that the Solicitor-General is right when he says that there will be some addi- tional difficulties as a result of the Amendment. It is worth reminding ourselves, and particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers), that these difficulties would not have arisen had the Amendment moved in Committee by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) not been resisted. His Amendment would have enabled the courts to dispense with the necessity for consent if they were satisfied that it was being unreasonably withheld, or if they were satisfied that the respondent could not be found. Unfortunately, the hon. Member for Yarmouth (Dr. Gray) and my hon. Friend resisted that Amendment, with the result that we are all placed in a difficulty.

I repeat that the Solicitor-General is right when he says that the Amendment will create some difficulties, but I do not think that they will be very great, or that they will apply to many cases. The Amendment will stop one or two divorces going through which would otherwise go through, but it has the great merit of honesty. We know what it means.

I appreciate the reasoning behind the hon. Member for Yarmouth wanting there to be loopholes, but I hope that the House will not proceed on that basis. I do not think that that is an honest way to deal with the law. We must show the circumstances in which we want there to be divorce, not try to leave loopholes so that people who, as a matter of principle ought not to be divorced are left loopholes which enable them to let the divorce go through.

The Amendment has the great merit of honesty. I am glad that the promoters have accepted it, and I congratulate them on so doing.

The point raised by the hon. Lady the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) is a valid one. It has been argued before, but not with the same pungency as it was today. The hon. Lady should not console herself too much with the Solicitor-General's reply, because, although it may be hypothetical, there could be circumstances in which non-objection could amount to consent.

I share the view of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), who spoke about the clarity of the Amendment and said that it was unlikely that this circumstance would arise very frequently. I hope that when the matrimonial rules which will flow from the Bill come before the House the hon. Lady will look at them scrupulously with her customary vigilance to ensure that while they fall within the intention of Parliament, they are not more restrictive than that which has been done.

I suspect that the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) can derive a little more comfort, because, in the circumstances which he has in mind, if there was evidence before the court of desertion at the start of the separation, in short, that the husband had left without the consent of the wife, or that it occurred en route—

I said that a husband and wife might have separated by agreement and been living apart for 18 months before the husband took off for South America, and the two-year period would have to begin from then.

If that happened en route, if there was evidence that during the 18 months when they were separated there had been not an agreement, but on the contrary some evidence that one had broken off relations with the other without the other's consent, it might be thought that there were sufficient facts for the desertion to begin to run from that time. If the person concerned could not be found, if he had gone to South America, the rules of substituted service may be able to be applied, and in that case the five-year period may not be necessary.

I say to the hon. Lady the Member for Devonport and to my hon. Friend the Member for Yarmouth (Dr. Gray), who has drawn attention to the unfortunate position in which the Amendment will place many Catholics who may not wish to participate in any form of divorce proceedings, but who would have allowed the divorce to go through, that in 1963, when the hon. Lady was actively engaged, as I was, in that task of reforming the divorce law and we would not have thought that six years later it would be possible to have divorce by consent.

Order. With respect, we are not on Third Reading. The hon. Member must speak to the Amendment.

We should accept that divorce by consent in this form after two years is so fundamental a change that those of us who may like the wording to be slightly altered must take the point of the hon. and learned Member that at least this presents the facts to the country showing that we have reached this point and, if there are to be subsequent modifications, perhaps they can be made without arousing the enormous controversies that have already arisen on the Clause.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This is a drafting Amendment.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

When the Clause emerged from Committee in the Commons, it provided for a specific duty being laid on the solicitor to certify whether he had discussed with the petitioner the possibility of a reconciliation. During Third Reading an Amendment was moved with great sincerity by the hon. Member for Wimbledon (Sir C. Black) which was accepted on Report. The Amendment substituted "that" for "whether". This was accepted—and I suggest that we should accept it—despite the known views to the contrary which were held both by the Law Society and by the National Marriage Guidance Council.

When I suggested that the House should accept the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Wimbledon, I said that it would possibly be necessary for the House to reconsider the question when the Bill was returned to us from the other place.

May I quote from a letter of the Law Society, giving its views on this matter:

"In my Committee's view to make it mandatory for a solicitor to discuss the possibility of reconciliation with his client would have the most unsatisfactory results. If he is obliged to do so when he knows there to be no possibility of a reconciliation, observance of this requirement will quickly come to be regarded as a formality. Not only will it often be clearly futile to discuss reconciliation but in many cases, for example those which the Bill is particularly intended to help, where the petitioner has children by a stable union which he wishes to regularise, to go through the motions of discussing the possibility of a reconciliation will be an absurdity.

My Committee feel that if this provision of the Bill is enacted in its present form the result will be to bring it into contempt and that if it is to serve any constructive purpose it must be restored to its original form."

As a consequence of this letter, an Amendment was moved in the other place to reinstate "whether" for "that" which was accepted without Division. It received the support of the Lord Chancellor, and I am asking the House to support it now.

I share the view of the hon. Member for Wimbledon. I am sure that all hon. Members want reconciliation machinery, but we want effective and practical reconciliation machinery. If the machinery we devise becomes a mere formality, it serves no useful purpose and is self-defeating. I therefore ask the House to accept the Amendment in the best interests of securing as effective a machinery for reconciliation as possible.

I cannot let this matter pass without saying a few words. As the hon. Member for Rhondda, West (Mr. Alec Jones) has said, the effect of the Amendment is to undo an Amendment which was accepted without a Division on Report and to put back the Bill into the form in which it came before the House on Report.

With the greatest respect, I am not unduly impressed by the letter from the Law Society. The society is entitled to be heard in the same way as any other body that may be interested in this matter, but its reluctance to accept the Amendment which was made on Report could arise from not wanting to be troubled with the not very onerous duty which the Amendment would place upon its members, a duty which, in the view of the House on Report, is one that it should be willing to undertake.

The hon. Member for Rhondda, West was most helpful and courteous in dealing with this and certain other of my Amendments on Report, but he made it clear that he accepted my Amendments, including this one, in the interests of the machinery for reconciliation, which is, after all, the matter with which we are concerned. I am much more interested, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman is, in providing the best machinery for reconciliation than in considering what may be a matter of convenience for members of the legal profession. If I have to choose between the two considerations, I shall choose the course which I think is in the interests of reconciliation, and I hope that the House will follow me.

The letter from the Law Society suggests that, if the Clause is to serve any purpose, it should be restored to its original form before the Amendment was made. That phrase, I think, is used in the letter. With the greatest respect, if the Clause is to serve any purpose, I suggest that it is necessary that the Amendment should stand. If the Clause is restored to its original form, it imposes no obligation on anybody to do anything. It simply says that

"provision shall be made by rules of court for requiring the solicitor acting for a petitioner for divorce to certify whether he has discussed with the petitioner…"

Solicitors who wish to relieve themselves of what they may regard as a burdensome duty will adopt the invariable and standard practice of certifying to the court that they have not discussed with the petitioner the possibility of a reconciliation, and that will be the end of it. For all practical purposes, it might have been better to have left out the Clause altogether than to include the Clause in the form in which the other place has sent it back to us.

I do not think that I am wandering away from the point in saying that in the debate in the other place it was stated by more than one of their Lordships that they thought that the Clause was not good at all, and that it would be better if it had not been included but, if it is to be included, it was better that the word "whether", which they inserted, should be in the Clause rather than the word "that".

If "whether" is substituted for "that", the Clause becomes largely meaningless. It will have no effect at all. To borrow a phrase from the Law Society's letter, it will serve no purpose, whereas it would have done if the Clause had remained as amended on Report.

I understand the difficulty of the House. It has made it clear by a majority that it wants this Bill to get on to the Statute Book. I realise the difficulties of the sponsors. Even if they were in sympathy with rejecting this Amendment, that might defeat their major purpose, so I do not propose to obstruct the Bill by taking this matter to a division. However, I am disappointed by the attitude of the sponsors and by this Amendment. As a result, I believe, the improvement which this House made in the Bill has been removed. I regret that very much.

I am sure that the hon. Member for Wimbledon (Sir C. Black) wished, when he moved his original Amendment, to find the best machinery for reconciliation, but it does a disservice not only to the Law Society but to the Marriage Guidance Council if we thought that their views and the representations which they obviously made to the other place were based on convenience. Anyone who has studied the reconciliation procedure in other countries has seen the great dangers which arise if attempts are made in legislation to promote machinery for reconciliation which is reduced to an utter formality.

When it opposed the proposal to oblige a solicitor to discuss the possibility of reconciliation regardless of all the circumstances, the Law Society was trying to avoid a situation in which that procedure became a formality. It would be absurd, and would tend to bring this procedure into contempt, if, even when a woman, for example, came to a solicitor black and blue, having suffered from a brutish husband, she was then asked to effect a reconciliation. If a woman had been living apart for five years and there were children by another union, any reconciliation procedure might well come into contempt if it were mandatory as, understandably, was in the hon. Member's mind.

I know that the hon. Member has great experience of these matters and I am listening to him with interest, but would he not agree that there have been many cases in both those sets of circumstances in which a reconciliation has been effected and a stable marriage restored?

Yes, that is so. However exceptional it may be, it is right that the court should know whether there has been any attempt at reconciliation. It is precisely because of that that, with this Amendment, the court would know whether it should implement the provisions designed to encourage reconciliation in Clause 3. If the judges then knew "whether" any attempt had already been made, they could then decide whether it was desirable to order an adjournment to try to effect a reconciliation. Without this word, the courts would not know whether or not to have that adjournment.

I am sure that the Marriage Guidance Council is right, with all its profound experience in these matters, to have a great diffidence about any move which suggests compulsion in trying to bring people together. They know that such methods are counter-productive. Although I am sure that there is no difference between the hon. Member for Wimbledon and the rest of us in our desire to have reconciliations, I think that the other place has been wise in giving us the opportunity for second thoughts by means of this Amendment.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This is a long and apparently cumbersome Amendment, but, as those who have followed the Bill will see, it is not nearly so formidable as it may appear. It has been put in this form so as to ensure complete understanding of what is intended. Until the hon. and learned Member for Southport (Mr. Percival) drew our attention to the fact, I doubt whether it was fully appreciated, even by the sponsors, that the Clause originally meant that it was possible for a divorce decree to be opposed in all circumstances on the grounds that it would result in grave financial or other hardship.

I am sure that the whole House was determined that, where the grounds for a petition were a five-year separation, it was important that the respondent should be totally protected as far as humanly possible. We wanted to ensure that a defence was available, immediately, that the dissolution would result in grave financial or other hardship. But it could not have been the general intention to suggest that that defence should be available when a petition was based on other grounds.

As Viscount Dilhorne said in the other place, it would be extraordinary if a wealthy or comfortably-off woman were founding a petition on the basis of the continued adulteries of her husband, and he could then obstruct the petition with a defence that he would suffer financial hardship as a consequence.

In these days, when everyone is concerned that there should be no unnecessary expenditure, particularly through the Legal Aid Fund, it would be most unfortunate if this defence were made, frivolously or for more sinister motives, and the court had to examine all the circumstances of the marriage and the interests of all concerned and squander its time in making such a prolonged inquest into every one of these cases when, in the end, it would prove unnecessary.

Therefore, I think that the object of another place was to make certain that the courts should not be burdened by frivolous defences, that public expenditure should not unnecessarily be incurred, and that, at the same time, the protection necessary for the wife who has been apart from her husband for five years should be maintained. I think that as the Clause is now drafted that objective is attained.

When I first read the new Clause I was doubtful about it, but I am now satisfied that it is right. It seemed at first that the protection given to the respondent was being narrowed in a manner that might be unfair. I do not think that it is necessary to discuss the matter at any length. I was quite sure, from his attitude throughout, that the noble Lord who moved the alternative Clause would have had in mind very much the desirability of not narrowing that protection unduly. There is no doubt that the very clear explanation given by the hon. Gentleman is sound, and I support it.

As one who has always put a great deal of emphasis on Clause 4, I had certainly always thought of it in terms of Clause 2(1)(e). Therefore, I am happy with the change that is being made, for the reasons given by the hon. Gentleman, and for the additional reason that I think that as the Clause left this House, and as applying to the other paragraphs of Section 2(1), it could have brought into the law an uncertainty which would have been thoroughly undesirable. Whatever we think about the Bill, we certainly do not want to legislate in an any more uncertain way than we can avoid.

For those reasons, the House would be well advised to agree with their Lordships in this case.

I echo that last point. It will be no surprise to the sponsors to know that the fact that something to which apparently I drew their attention has resulted in making divorce easier in some circumstances will give me no great pleasure. But it gives me great satisfaction that their Lordships have done, and the promoters have accepted, something that will make the law clearer, and prevent this House from parting with yet another piece of legislation which leads only to interminable litigation.

I am one of those who feel that just as important as the motives and ideals behind legislation is the form which it takes. I am not sure that the second is not even more important than the first. Therefore, I welcome the Amendment and congratulate the sponsors on accepting it, because I think that it will have the effect of saving us from providing yet another source of much litigation.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This is purely a drafting Amendment. It is really a question of the choice of an English word, and who am I, as a Welshman, to object.

In my submission, it is not a drafting Amendment. Is is a thoroughly bad piece of English. We do not speak about the walls of this House and the roof hereof. We talk about the walls of this House and the roof thereof. I do not understand why the Amendment has been made.

One of the Law Lords had a different view, and who am I to differ with the Law Lords?

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

The Amendment fixes a specific date for the coming into operation of the Bill. It was a negotiated Amendment in the other place, agreed to without a Division on the basis that a further Bill to deal with financial provision in matrimonial causes would possibly be in force by that date. The Law Commission's Report recommending such a Bill has now been published, and The Lord Chancellor has said in the other place that the Government will introduce a Bill based on the Report.

I am somewhat disappointed with the delay that the Amendment causes, but I accept it, and hope that the House will. I hope that the delay will be used by all of us, by the Government and back-bench Members, by those who supported the Bill and those who opposed it, to ensure a swift passage for the Bill which will implement the financial provisions contained in the Law Commission's Report.

This matter requires some consideration and discussion, because it has caused concern outside the House, as some of us know from correspondence we have had.

It is necessary to remind the House of the history of the matter. It all arose from the famous letter the Lord Chancellor wrote, which was sanctified by the Solicitor-General in putting it before the Committee. It was in no way an official action or official letter. It was a personal letter, but it was given the odour of sanctity, if that is the right word, by the Solicitor-General.

That gave a great deal of comfort to a number of people who have been very anxious about the financial position of the first wife. It was felt that the Lord Chancellor had, in effect, given a personal guarantee that there would be ample opportunity to discuss and give full consideration to any possible improvements in the law, not just taking the Law Commission's Report on a plate.

Now we have a different position. The Lord Chancellor has, in effect, withdrawn this personal undertaking, and we now have merely a date. There is concern about this. I am not expressing any final view until we have had an opportunity of discussing it, but there is undoubtedly a feeling that there is a risk now. We have already heard it said that this matter must be got on with as speedily as possible, because time will be required. I hope that it will be required.

There is concern about the nature and contents of that Bill. The hon. Member for Rhondda, West (Mr. Alec Jones) spoke as if it were the tablets brought down by Moses. It is not; it is only a proposed draft. There will have to be a Bill. I do not profess to be an expert in these matters, but I have already heard several very strong questions about certain parts.

12 noon.

We must also remember that, on the face of it, the Report makes it clear that there is no question of anything being done about the question of pensions, a matter which is of the greatest importance to many of us. Parliament may take the view that something must be done about it. It is all very well to say that 1st January, 1971, is a long time ahead, but it is not in parliamentary terms. We do not know what legislation will be announced next month, and matters may be brought forward which will occupy the House for days and nights.

While I am not opposing the Amendment at this stage, I hope that we will have a clear discussion of the matter. Our anxieties justify our asking for information about what is going on. I do not see why we should depart from the original method, unorthodox though it was in one respect, of having the matter dealt with personally by the Lord Chancellor. Knowing the Lord Chancellor, we hoped that something effective might have been done to enable people to feel that they had a guarantee. If we have a year of uncertainty in politics, as seems likely, people will not know where they stand. It is therefore all the more important that the matter is fully explained.

The fixing of a date must force the Government into finding time for the other legislation about which hon. Members have spoken and which we will welcome. We have seen the long time that it has taken the Government to provide parliamentary time for this essential Bill. We must not forget that thousands of people are waiting for this Measure to become law and the fact that they expected it to be law on 1st January, 1970. Already, we are putting it off for a year. This seems more than sufficient to enable the Lord Chancellor and other Law Officers to introduce the other legislation.

I strongly welcome the change that has been made because we now have a definite date. My only regret is that it was not possible to complete everything by 1st January, 1970.

I remind the hon. Member for Yarmouth (Dr. Gray) that thousands of people who have been or may be divorced are anxious that proper financial provision is made for them. That is the other side of the coin. I regret that this Amendment has been suggested, because I greatly preferred the words which were originally in the Bill.

There is to be, so we are promised, a Bill based on the recommendations of the Law Commission making financial provision for divorced persons and the children in such cases, covering maintenance as well as the custody of children. The Bill makes divorce much easier in many respects and some provisions of it are highly controversial. I am not opposed to these in principle, though, like many hon. Members on both sides, I have substantial reservations about them.

The Lord Chancellor virtually made a promise that a Bill based on the recommendations of the law Commission would be introduced relatively early next Session. He explained that he could not anticipate the Queen's Speech, which we appreciated. The noble and learned Lord also made it clear that, in his opinion, it would be wrong to defer the operation of the Bill we are discussing for what he described as an "extraneous reason"; that is, unless Parliament gave him express authority to do so. The use of the word "extraneous" was extraordinary and it was the last word that I would have used. Parliament was seeking to give him the authority he said he would need to defer the coming into force of this Measure until other legislation was on the Statute Book. Thus, he had no need to worry on that score because what he desired was exactly what the Bill sought to give him.

Will the Bill which has been promised be on the Statute Book before the Bill we are discussing takes effect? Nobody can be sure. Indeed, there may be a General Election in the spring, if not next month. The Labour Party may not win it. The Government of the day may have different views. There may be such a rush of important measures arising from events beyond the control of the Government that there will not be time for such a Measure to be introduced. Nobody can guarantee that a Bill based on the recommendations of the Law Commission will be on the Statute Book in time.

Further, nobody can guarantee that the provisions of such a Bill will be satisfactory. The sponsors of this Bill may not like them. They do not know what shape the Bill will take by the time it is on the Statute Book. These are indisputable facts which must be considered as we discuss this important Amendment.

I have all along been concerned with this issue because of my anxiety that satisfactory arrangements might not be on the Statute Book for the maintenance of divorced persons and the custody of children. By this Measure taking effect on 1st January, 1971, we appear to be putting the cart before the horse in a big way. While I see no point in dividing the House on the Amendment, since Parliament has made its view absolutely clear on the subject, I regard this as a thoroughly bad proposal and see no reason for the rush.

I do not dissent from the Amendment, though it raises an important consideration on which we need the view of the Government before finally agreeing to it.

As matters stand, without the Amendment, it is always possible, if it were felt that something should be done about financial provisions, to bring pressure to bear on the Government not to make an order bringing the Measure into effect. This means that as long as the Bill stays in its present form we have that one means of bringing pressure on the Government to do something to improve the Bill to safeguard the innocent divorced party. Once the Amendment is made, however, that means will disappear. It will become merely a question of time. This makes it all the more important to know what the Government have in mind on this issue.

I reiterate what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) said about the history of this matter. It first arose on Second Reading, when a statement was made by the Solicitor-General. I hope hon. Members will forgive the delay as I try to find the relevant passage in the OFFICIAL REPORT, because it will be my daughter's wedding day tomorrow and I may be forgiven if my mind is not entirely on the contents of the Bill. The Solicitor-General said:

"In our earlier consideration of the whole matter it was recognised that the proposed changes in the law might involve important consequences from the point of view of social security benefits and financial arrangements. I think that it was widely felt, and understandably so, that if, for example, a wife living apart from her husband found herself divorced without consent at the expiry of the five year period, her position financially deserved careful consideration. For example, if, after the divorce, her husband died, the question of her entitlement to widow's pension on her husband's card might have been affected by the divorce. This point was helpfully taken by my hon. Friend earlier today.

It was also widely felt that the need to safeguard the position of spouses in this respect was certainly not entirely satisfactorily met by the provision, in general terms, that a decree could be refused if it were to result in grave financial or other hardship to the respondent. The position of divorced women has not been overlooked in the planning of the new insurance scheme, and it is being considered at the moment by the Government against that background of possible changes in the law of divorce"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th December, 1968; Vol. 775, c. 1077.]

There were some exchanges between myself and the Solicitor-General about that as to whether he could go a little further and indicate what he had in mind. I made no complaint then and I make no complaint now. Courteously, the hon. and learned Gentleman said that he could not give any indication; he could only say that the matter was being considered.

Right at that early stage, on Second Reading, we all, on both sides, recognised that in obviating one lot of hardship we might create hardship to other people. We all had in mind very much the question of the widow's pension. Here was a case where what we were doing might cause hardship in some cases.

I am not one of those who calls the Bill a Casanova's charter and thinks that every man over 55 will find himself what is nowadays, I think, called a dolly-bird, go off with her for five years, then divorce his wife and marry the girl. Some will, however, and some wives who have done nothing in their life except keep a lovely home for their family and bring up that family will find themselves the victims of such circumstances. To add insult to injury it may be that the husband having remarried after a very short time, the new wife, who has been the cause of it all, will get the widow's pension unless we do something about it.

I quite understood the Solicitor-General's inability at the time to go any further than he did. I am sure that we all appreciated the indication that he gave us that the matter was under consideration. Since then, a lot of water has passed under the bridge. The matter has been considered by the Law Commission. If I understand its Report correctly, the Commission's conclusion is that we cannot do anything about the widow's pension. We have simply to accept that the situation of which I have tried—albeit briefly—to remind the House, is one which will arise as the result of the passing of the Bill. If that is so, we ought to say so, and say so now.

Therefore, I would like to know whether the Solicitor-General can tell us whether the Government share that view. As the result of the consideration to which he referred on Second Reading, and as the result of the deliberations and considerations of the Law Commission, have the Government come to the conclusion that that is something which has to be accepted? Have they come to the conclusion that nothing can be done about the widow's pension? If so, I for one feel that it would be much better to say so now.

I follow that up by asking this question. Can the Solicitor-General tell us what the Government propose to do, assuming—I make this assumption in their favour for the purpose of my argument—that they remain for a little longer in a position to do so? What do the Government propose in the way of a timetable for their legislation to meet the point about which we are all talking, and what have they in mind to put in the legislation? It would be helpful to the House to know this.

Order. With respect to the hon. and learned Member, even on the eve of a wedding, he cannot debate in detail hypothetical legislation. He must link what he has to say to the Amendment.

Yes, Mr. Speaker. I link it this way.

Although I have said that, in principle, I support the Amendment, I would like the answers to the questions which I have posed before I finally commit myself as to whether I can support the Amendment. It depends upon what the Solicitor-General is able to tell us whether we are content with having a fixed time or whether we would prefer to have this little means of bringing pressure. If I may leave my remarks in that way so that I am not too far out of order, I am obliged to you, Mr. Speaker, for giving me that opportunity. I am aware that I am asking a lot, but I put my questions widely to give the Solicitor-General the opportunity to say as much as he possibly can.

Like the majority of hon. Members who have contributed to the debate, I am concerned about this Lords Amendment. I do not think that it is really something between the people who are, in general, in favour of the terms of the Bill and those who are against it.

It seems to me that whatever one thinks about the Bill, all of us would wish that the uncertainty and the period in the law when an old Act is operative and a new one has been passed should be as short as possible consistent with the bringing in of the short Measures, about the protection of the wife in particular, to which we have all referred. There is, therefore, no attempt by those of us who are concerned about the Amendment to delay the bringing into operation of this new law for its own sake.

I do not question the absolutely genuine undertaking given by the Lord Chancellor and accepted by the sponsors of the Bill of an intention to bring in legislation in the terms of the Law Commission's Report. I do not want to discuss—indeed, I cannot within the rules order—what that Report says and, above all, what it leaves out.

What I do say is that particularly in an election year, there can be no sort of certainty that intentions, however sincere—and I do not question the sincerity—will be carried out. We have had during the past year, a non-election year, major Measures of proposed legislation which the Government have dropped. Every Government drops such pieces of legislation in any year. There is, therefore, no certainty.

What worries me about the Amendment is that it breaks the link between the Bill and the proposed legislation. At the moment, there is an undertaking by the Lord Chancellor not to bring the Bill into operation until that other legislation is introduced. If, instead of doing this, we merely insert a time scale, the link will be removed. The hon. Member for Yarmouth (Dr. Gray) said that this was something which would put pressure on the Government to give time for the other legislation. That, however, is the exact opposite of the truth. I think that the hon. Member is very naïve if he thinks that a time scale will put pressure on a Government to give time. I think that it is the other way round.

The fact that this legislation will come into operation willy-nilly irrespective of whether this House legislates again before 1st January, 1971, would, if there were a situation that something had to be dropped, be a very good reason for the Government—whatever Government it may be—to push out the other piece of legislation and let the Bill come into operation without the new legislation.

In other words, by breaking the link which is provided by the existing Clause, and which we in this House inserted, we shall remove any certainty that the Government will legislate. Therefore, there could well be the situation, which no one in this Chamber wants, that the Bill could come into operation without the supporting legislation.

I should, therefore, have thought that overwhelmingly the case was for the Bill as it left this House. There was then a clear and direct link between the two pices of legislation. There was an undertaking. Suppose, for sake of argument, that the other piece of legislation was brought in at the beginning of next Session and that it goes through in the new year. This Bill would get into operation earlier, perhaps, than 1st January. I am not trying to delay the Bill, but I think that we made a mistake in breaking the link which we put in earlier between the two pieces of legislation.

At this late stage the debate has turned to a theme which has been touched upon in one way or another almost throughout our consideration both of this Bill and of its predecessor. I do not know of any part of the subject which has given me greater concern than the desirability of dovetailing, as satisfactorily as one can, changes in the law of divorce with appropriate safeguards, financial safeguards in particular, to ensure that those affected are treated with reasonable fairness. This has been a matter that has exercised hon. Members on both sides of the House throughout our consideration of this matter and very properly.

The whole matter raises issues of real and authentic difficulty. The reason for the difficulty is perfectly simple. It is that it is almost impracticable and may from many points of view be undesirable that Parliament should approach dealing with changes in the law of divorce and financial provisions and pensions in a compendious Measure. The outcome of any such consideration by Parliament would in all likelihood be unwieldy if contained in a single Measure; it would have all sorts of objections in content and character because of its scope which I should have thought could very easily and reasonably be sustained.

If we acknowledge, as I think the House must, that there is the greatest possible difficulty in dealing with these important matters compendiously one is driven to the alternative which is to find the best way of dovetailing the different parts of the process. That has been the Government's concern throughout. One cannot get perfection in a matter of this kind but I would hope that the view would be taken by the House that a satisfactory outcome, on the whole, within the inescapable limitations to which I have referred, has been achieved.

It may well be that we are very near the point of my hon. Friend's Bill becoming law. It does so in this context, as a matter of narrative—of my noble Friend in another place having made it clear on Third Reading that the forthcoming Bill would be in substance what the Law Commission has proposed—and the House has been made aware, of course, of the Law Commission's proposals—and, secondly, that it will be introduced soon. That affords a satisfactory context and as satisfactory a context as is available in which the House can feel justified in giving final approval to this Amendment.

As we all know, one cannot go further than I have in presenting the matter. I am going to the limit imposed by commonsense and constitutional practice. Of course, one cannot say for certain that such and such a Measure in future will reach the Statute Book. It would be an outrageous proposition and not consistent with our methods. What I am proposing on behalf of the Government is the best that any representative of a Government could offer.

The same considerations apply to the matter of pensions. The question of the effect of my hon. Friend's Bill, if it becomes law, upon pensions arrangements is receiving the most careful consideration by the Government and is continuing to receive that consideration. There must be an element of mutual trust in our treatment of these matters on both sides of the House, and I am sure there is. I cannot go further than to say that this matter is receiving the Government's careful attention.

The hon. Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley) suggested that there might be some objection to introducing a fixed time provision into the Bill and that we were in this fashion breaking the link which exists between this Bill and future legislation on these relevant themes. I would concede that there is obviously a technical change. There is in legislative terms a breaking of a developing connection between the content of this Measure and future legislation. I think that he is right, but I cannot do better than to say that, here again, this matter must be dealt with on a basis of trust.

The House must make its choice on the issue which the hon. Member for Chelsea put forward. It seems to me that to apply in our legislative processes the kind of reasoning which the hon. Member so clearly presented is to defer change to the Greek kalends. He does not desire that and I do not suggest for a moment that he does or that he made anything other than a very restrained and helpful contribution to our discussions. The fact remains that, if we are dealing with a variety of matters which it is impracticable and undesirable to deal with compendiously, if we do not put a time limit in these provisions and say when it will take effect, we run the risk of postponing a final outcome indefinitely. I do not believe that the hon. Member would wish that to be the result, but it is, I think, the logical conclusion of the argument he addressed to the House.

In these circumstances, therefore, I hope that the House will think it appropriate to give its agreement to this Amendment. In one sentence, when expressing that advice, may I add that it will be in our minds, at this not unhistoric point in the history of this matter, how much on any showing is due to the efforts and skill and integrity which my hon. Friend and those working with him have shown in their treatment of the Bill.

I believe that the Law Commission would regard it as a fundamental breach of faith, of which a Lord Chancellor such as ours would be incapable, if we did not have—this cannot be said by the Solicitor-General, because of constitutional propriety—within the next Session a Bill in the form, or approximately in the form, which has already appeared in the Law Commission's Report.

The concern which has been expressed by the hon. and gallant Gentleman for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) and others has, together with the activities of those who have been for and against the Bill, acted as a catalyst to make certain that the problem which concerns us all should be wrestled with and should emerge, as it will emerge, in that Law Commissioners' Bill.

The hon. and learned Member for Southport (Mr. Percival) put his finger on the problem which all of us must insist that the Government continue to grapple with—the problem concerning pensions. I hope that, whatever views may have been expressed during these debates, there will be complete unanimity that we should maintain pressure, which all of us believe is required, to ensure that justice is done to those who may as a consequence of divorce lose a widow's rights.

When we are arguing as to what should be the date or whether it should be indefinite, let us remember that, if, as I expect, within a matter of minutes the Bill becomes an Act, by stating a certain date we are releasing from human bondage tens of thousands of couples who have been waiting expectantly for the Bill to become an Act. I do not believe that the House would want them to allow to remain in incertitude, and further suspension. Whatever diffidence the House may have about the Bill as a whole, I do not believe that it would want the agony of these people, which has continued for so many years, to be prolonged.

I trust that within a few minutes tens of thousands of people will find that this Parliament has passed a Bill which will mean that, although there may be many thousands of divorces after 1st January, 1971, there will be tens of thousands of long-overdue marriages helping to stabilise family life.

May I inform the House that the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) is guiding the Bill through this stage on behalf of the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) who, I am sorry to learn, as the House will be, is ill and unable to be here.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Speaker, you are correct in saying that my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) is unwell. He was the sponsor of the Bill. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides will wish him a complete recovery.

This Amendment—and, for that matter, the others—is not, so far as I know, controversial. All the Amendments refer only to Clause 2, which was moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon), who, I am glad to see, is on the Front Bench and who tells me that he fully supports all the Amendments.

As time permits, and out of courtesy to the House, may I briefly explain the reasons for these Amendments. They are all designed to clarify and make more precise a Bill which not only has all-party support but also has Government backing. Clause 2 enables the court to impose a ban on participation in auctions either instead of or as well as the penalties of a fine, imprisonment or both. Clause 1 prescribes the maximum penalties—on summary conviction, a fine of £400 or six months imprisonment or both, and on an indictment two years or a fine with no limit or both.

As the Bill stands such a ban could be applied—I quote from lines 21 and 22 on page 2—to

"the person so convicted or his representative."

The view has been taken that this wording could lead to a ban being imposed on an entirely innocent person and that the court might wish in certain circumstances to limit the ban to the convicted person only. I can readily imagine circumstances in which that might arise.

Their Lordships took the view that the Clause could be misinterpreted or could unduly restrict the powers of the court. I think that their Lordships were correct in that view. The purpose of the Amendment is to give the courts discretion to exclude representatives of a convicted person from such a ban when this is appropriate and to make the scope of the ban, therefore, absolutely clear. This is a legal nicety of which I hope that my layman's explanation is clear.

The Amendment makes a distinct improvement in a Measure which is bound to be studied carefully far beyond these shores by people who recognise that Britain has an established position as the centre of the art world. It is essential that the highest standards be maintained and be seen to be maintained.

Since the Amendment was moved and passed in another place, I have had an opportunity to confirm that leading figures in the art world who have helped to build up our high and increasing reputation are fully aware of the damage done by dishonest practices and support the improvements suggested in another place, including this one.

Order. It has occurred to me that the House might take with Lords Amendment No. 1 all the remaining Amendments—

No. 2, in page 2, line 22, after "not" insert:

"(without leave of the court)".

No. 3, in line 24, leave out "less" and insert "more".

No. 4, in line 26, leave out "less" and insert "more".

No. 5, in line 28, leave out from "goods" to first "or" in line 30 and insert:

"intended for sale by auction are on display".

No. 6, in line 31, leave out "public".

No. 7, in line 31, at end insert:

"( ) In the event of a contravention of an order under this section, the person who contravenes it (and, if he is the representative of another, that other also) shall be guilty of an offence and liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £400;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine or to both.

( ) In any proceedings against a person in respect of a contravention of an order under this section consisting in the entry upon premises where goods intended for sale by auction were on display, it shall be a defence for him to prove that he did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that goods so intended were on display on the premises, and in any proceedings against a person in respect of a contravention of such an order consisting in his having done something as the representative of another, it shall be a defence for him to prove that he did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that that other was the subject of such an order.

( ) A person shall not be guilty of an offence under this section by reason only of his selling property by auction or causing it to be so sold."

Does that conform with the wish of the House? In the absence of objection, the hon. and gallant Gentleman may care to say something about the other Amendments, too.

I am happy that the House should discuss them all together.

As to Amendment No. 2, as it stands Clause 2 could lead to the ban being applied where none is intended or desirable. For instance, a convicted person might wish to buy a house or buy the memento of a friend or relative, or buy a car. This Amendment, which was suggested by the Board of Trade, would introduce some flexibility by enabling the court to make an exception to the ban in specified cases. It would allow a convicted person to apply for permission to take part in an auction for personal reasons, if there was clearly no scope for him to further his business interests. The Amendment does not say to which court the convicted person shall apply nor how the application should be made. I understand that there are good precedents for this.

As to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4, Clause 2 sets a minimum period for a ban on participation in auctions. It provides for a ban

"of not less than one year"—

on summary conviction and—

"of not less than three years"

on conviction on indictment. In certain cases these periods might be thought excessive and, in view of the option allowed to the court, it might be decided not to impose any ban even when a shorter period was desirable.

The view was taken in another place that a limit should be set on the maximum but not the minimum period of such a ban. This is a view with which I agree and with which I think the House will agree, also. On the other hand, expressing a personal view, it seems to me it was rather over-simplifying the question to fix the same periods of one year on summary conviction and three years on indictment as the maximum that can be imposed, the same periods as were originally suggested as the minimum periods. I would prefer higher periods—perhaps two years on summary conviction and five years on indictment. In fact, I do not see why there should be a maximum at all. None the less, this Amendment makes sense; it is an improvement and I hope that it will find favour with the House.

Coming to Amendments Nos. 5 and 6, Clause 2 as it left this House not only enabled the court to ban a convicted person from participating in an auction for a certain period. The ban also extended—quoting from lines 28 to 30 on page 2 of the Bill—to entering

"upon any premises where goods are displayed for sale by intended public auction or where any public auction has been announced to take place…."

This could place a person under such a ban in an impossible position. He could be barred from going into a public house or village hall where a sale was to take place at a future date, and he might not have any knowledge that that was the case. He might be barred from entering his own house if that were to be put up for auction. The purpose of Clause 2 is to prevent a convicted person from having a preview of goods to be sold by auction. The Amendment limits the ban to premises where goods which are the subject of an auction are displayed.

Amendment No. 7 adds three new subsections to Clause 2. The first subsection fills an obvious gap by providing penalties for a breach of a banning order imposed by the court. The penalties proposed are a fine not exceeding £400 on summary conviction but no prison sentence, and imprisonment of not more than two years, or an unlimited fine, or both, on indictment. I suggest that these are adequate and appropriate penalties and should make a convicted person upon whom a ban has been imposed think very hard before trying to evade it.

The second new subsection provides a defence for a person who breaches a banning order in genuine ignorance. A convicted person or his agent might enter premises where goods to be sold by auction are on display, without knowing that this was so. An innocent dupe might undertake to take part in an auction without knowing that he represented a convicted person subject to a ban. In every sale room there are men willing to bid on someone else's behalf. It is clearly important that where genuine ignorance can be pleaded there should be a defence in such cases.

The third proposed subsection allows a banned person to sell his own goods by auction. I am sure that that is sensible. The offence for which a ban may be imposed concerns buying and not selling by auction. The intention of the ban is not to prevent someone selling or arranging to sell his goods by auction. There are no grounds for preventing him disposing of his own goods or property at an auction if he chooses to do so.

Those are the reasons why the Amendments have been proposed to Clause 2. They all seem sound and, on the whole, to be improvements, and I hope that they will commend themselves to the House.

I congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) on the skilful way in which, at short notice, he has introduced these Lords Amendments in the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain), who has played a great part in pushing the Bill through both Houses, and I know that he will be very sad that he cannot be with us today.

This Clause, to which the Amendments apply, was tabled in Committee upstairs by my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon), and I congratulate him that this has now come back to us with certain Amendments improving it, which I fully support, and which have been explained in detail by my hon. and gallant Friend.

I do not think there is any need for me to say anything further axcept that this Clause, which was regarded with some disquiet by the predecessor of the hon. Lady the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade when it was introduced by my hon. Friend in Committee upstairs, has now apparently received approval by herself and her advisers at the Board of Trade. This gives great pleasure to my hon. Friends and myself because we feel that it gives teeth to an important Bill which we hope will have some effect on the trade and people who take part in auctions in the years ahead.

I also congratulate the hon. Lady on taking up the Bill at this stage in view of the transfer of her hon. Friend the Minister of State to another Department. While I am perhaps trespassing on your generosity, Mr. Speaker, may I express the hope that when other matters connected with the Bill come up for discussion in the House the former President of the Board of Trade will return to answer charges when they are made on the Floor of the House in due course.

I thank the Minister and her Department for the help they have given in getting the Bill through all its stages and I again congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe on his initiative in bringing it forward. I hope that with these Amendments firmly incorporated in Clause 2, and with the whole Bill on the Statute Book, we shall avoid having the scandals which we have had in the past two or three years in the fine art trade.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Surrey (Mr. A. Royle) and to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) for their kind references to this Clause with which these Amendments deal. With them I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) on getting the Bill through its final stages.

I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Sir J. Vaughan-Morgan), as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Surrey, without whose diligent activities the Duccio scandal, which gave rise to the birth of the Bill, might well not have received the public attention that it deserved. They and the Sunday Times between them have done a magnificent job in exposing a public scandal which we hope the Bill, as amended, though it has its limitations, will go some way to clear.

When I moved this Clause in Committee, a Clause suggested to me by leading figures in the art world, anxious to stop some of the loopholes, it was opposed by Her Majesty's Government, and I am grateful to them that they have not decided to oppose it in the final stages and, indeed, have been so helpful in devising amendments to the Clause.

Like my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes, the only Amendments about which I have a little doubt are Nos. 3 and 4, especially the latter. It may have been better to have had a longer period during which people could be kept out of sale rooms if they have been convicted on indictment of a very serious offence. None of us wishes to hold up the Bill at this stage. Indeed, it would be too late to suggest any Amendment now, and I think this is a slight pity. It will be very rare that convictions will be obtained under this legislation, but if a very bad case arises it is a pity that the period should be only three years.

The attention of Parliament now having been focused upon affairs like this, we shall watch this legislation in future to make sure that the penalties suggested are sufficient for any cases that may arise. These scandals that have been brought to public attention in the salerooms, although very rare, can be serious, and these practices are most unfortunate since they may cast some small doubt on the reputation of the London fine art trade which, in the overwhelming number of cases, has done an outstanding job for our country and for the reputation of the British art world. We are determined to stamp them out, and we shall watch the operation of this legislation with care to make sure that it is effective.

I am grateful to my hon. Friends, and I am grateful to the Government for their assistance in allowing Clause 2 to go forward. Apart from watching the progress of the Bill itself, we shall return, as my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Surrey said, to the more general points covered by the Ombudsman's Report on the Duccio affair on a future occasion.

I am grateful for the opportunity to associate myself with the kind remarks made this morning about the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain). We all greatly regret that he has not been able to carry the Bill through to its final stage, although, of course, we are equally grateful to his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) for what he has done.

As hon. Members have said, this series of Amendments is designed to tidy up Clause 2. Although there was some doubt in our mind originally about the efficacy of the Clause, it is agreed that it represents, probably, the best way of dealing with the matter.

On the more general points, I assure the hon. Member for Richmond, Surrey (Mr. A. Royle) that his views are very much in our mind. My right hon. Friend the Member for Grimsby (Mr. Crosland) and my hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Dell) not only wish to come and speak to the House when the Parliamentary Commissioner's Report is debated, but they feel strongly that they would have liked the opportunity to do so before the Summer Recess. They will have a strong case to make when it is debated, and I assure hon. Gentlemen that their wish to see the matter taken up on the Floor is no stronger than that felt on this side of the House.

We welcome the Bill. When the Amendments were debated in another place, the noble Lady who accepted them for the Government said that she was delighted to have a chance to accept all the Amendments on a Bill. I am delighted to welcome them here.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

First, may I say a word about the hon. Member to whom we are so much indebted for the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Consett (Mr. David Watkins). He would very much like to have been here, and there is no discourtesy to the House implied by his absence. He has done much sterling work on the Bill, and, had he been available, he would certainly have been present.

This is merely a drafting Amendment. It arose from a misprint in the Bill as it was passing through the House. I am willing to go into detail on exactly how it occurred, but I shall not do so unless the House wishes.