asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will now make a further statement regarding the shortage of personnel, in total, in the three Armed Forces of the Crown at 1st April, 1970; and whether the figure of 11,000 estimated at 1st April, 1970, relates to the same total service establishment as extant on 1st April, 1969.

The total requirement for trained male officers and other ranks fell by about 9,000 during the period.

Yes, but the hon. Gentleman still evades answering the Question which I have put to him twice. Do the figures for the total establishment of the three Armed Forces at the end of 1969 correspond exactly to the total establishment at the end of 1970, and do the respective shortages for those two dates, given as 9,900 and 11,000 respectively, both appertain to the same total establishment figure or to different establishment figures?

I understand the hon. Gentleman's Question. I understood it when he asked me a month ago. I answered it then, and I have answered it today.

The hon. Gentleman has not.

The establishment which we regard as the trained necessity fell during the year by the figure I have quoted. That is the simple and absolutely straightforward answer to the hon. Gentleman's Question.

I think that it would help the House and save me a later supplementary question if the hon. Gentleman would give the comparative percentage shortfall in establishments in the two years.

I shall give those figures in a Written Answer if the right hon. Gentleman puts down a Question. It is a complicated matter to define the requirements for trained strength, bearing in mind other matters. There is no reason why one would want to keep the information from the House. It is a matter of not wishing to give a long-winded answer if the right hon. Gentleman asked a longwinded question.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the current ratio of civilian, non-industrial and industrial to military personnel employed by or serving in the defence forces; and what increase or decline there has been in this ratio since 1964.

The ratio of civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence to military personnel in the Services has gone down from 0·87 to 1 in 1964 to a current figure of 0·84 to 1.

I welcome that answer in general terms, but will my right hon Friend explain why, in that case, the number of civilian scientists employed by his Department has gone up by 6 per cent., with a net increase of 360, in the past five years, according to information supplied to me by his Department? Will he explain this in the light of the publicised reduction in the military research effort?

The answer is that during the period of reduction there has also been a period of increasing sophistication of our defence capability, which naturally calls for additional scientists.

Is not the improved ratio due to the fact that the Government have cut the teeth arms and uniformed services without cutting the civilian staff to the same extent?

No, that is absolutely wrong, and if the hon. Gentleman will read Annexes E and F of the current statement on defence expenditure he will see how wrong he is.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what were the final recruiting figures for the financial year 1969–70; and what is the current shortfall to the latest date for all three Services.

Final recruiting figures for the financial year 1969–70 are not yet available. Provisional totals are about 35,250 male other ranks, making a shortfall of about 12,400.

In view of the very alarming shortfall of 12,400 recruits, would it not be wise for the Government to seek to stop the forced rundown of forces, and the non-voluntary redundancy which is particularly being forced on the Fleet Air Arm, until such time as recruiting improves?

The hon. Gentleman should consider the figure of shortfall with some caution. It has largely resulted from recruiting failures in previous years which produced a cumulative shortfall. The recruiting figure last year is, we believe, about 7,000 better than in the previous year, and the indications are that this improvement will continue.

On a point of order. Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the Minister's reply to this Question and the earlier Questions on redundancy, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment on an early occasion.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what revised estimate he has now made of the total cost of United States military aircraft, including the Phantom, to be delivered and accepted in the year to 5th April, 1971, expressed in£s sterling; and to what extent reciprocal sales of such aircraft as the Harrier jump-jet and other types and Rolls Royce jet engines, to the United States of America diminish the United Kingdom's outgoings in the year stated.

No United States military aircraft are due to be delivered in the current financial year but continuing dollar expenditure associated with these purchases will amount to about£60 million this year. The answer to the second part of the Question is well over£20 million.

Those two then, comparing the one with the other, mean that the net outgoings in this year will be only of the order of£40 million?

The situation is even better than that, because expenditure in dollars by American Forces stationed in this country in itself is sufficient to cover the whole£60 million to which I have referred.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now make a further statement on the progress of the multi-rôle combat aircraft project.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a further statement on the multi-rôle combat aircraft proposal.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a further statement about the multi-rôle combat aircraft project.

We are examining with our partners the results of the project definition study which has just ended. I hope to be in a position to make a statement in a few weeks' time.

When shall we be told how much it will all cost?

I am consulting the other Governments concerned about the release of information. I appreciate the desire of the House to have more facts on both numbers and costs than it has been possible to give so far. Until agreement has been reached on proceeding to the development stage, some of the consequences of recent German decisions have been dealt with, and I have received the agreement of my partners to give further information, I am unable to give it.

If the Germans are reducing their orders to 400, and we are uplifting ours to 400, as the Germans have not designed a combat aircraft for 25 years is not this the appropriate moment for Britain to reconsider whether we should not have industrial leadership in this project?

Inevitably, the arrangements for work sharing of the project are complicated by the German decision to which the hon. Gentleman has referred, and this is one of the matters now under negotiation.

Is it proper for the Minister to deny month after month to the House and to the taxpayer even an approximate estimate of this expenditure, which must run into hundreds of millions of pounds?

It is not a question of denying information. The point is to get the agreement of my partners, the other two Governments concerned, to the publication of figures which will not even be known until agreement on the form of the development phase has finally been determined. I would be very much under criticism if I gave the House figures which had no basis in fact.

We are grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the assurance that he will make a full statement about the position as soon as possible. Could he say what is the attitude of other Governments, including the Italian Government, to the project? We are grateful that he has shown an awareness of the anxieties about this project. Have the Government any contingency plans for the production of alternative aircraft if these negotiations should break down?

There is no question whatever of negotiations breaking down. Indeed, we are now in the final stages of reaching agreement on proceedings to the development phase. On the question about the Italian Government, since the Germans decided not to order the single-seater version of the aircraft, the Italians have also decided not to order that particular aircraft since they would have been the only country wanting a single-seater version. They have not yet decided their attitude on the two-seater version.

Could my right hon. Friend say what will be the in-service date of this aircraft? Is he hopeful that there will be export sales to third countries?

On the first question, that is one of the matters on which I want to consult my partners before giving information. On the second question, I believe that this aircraft will be unique in the world when produced because there will be no aircraft with this type of capability, particularly in short field performance, at anything like the price at which this will be available.

What about TSR2?

That would be much more expensive.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will advise the firms carrying out military aircraft projects for Her Majesty's Government that there is no official objection to their making available to hon. Members of this House any information which he himself has made available to journalists at a non-attributable Press briefing.

No, Sir.

What is the Minister afraid of? Clearly not me, but perhaps of some of his friends? What inhibits him giving freely to this House information which, in spite of the Official Secrets Act, he seems willing to give to journalists?

I can assure the hon. Member that I find him comic rather than alarming. On the second question, as the House knows, many estimates have been published in the Press. Indeed, Flight published two quite different estimates in recent weeks.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that we regard it as quite unsatisfactory that he should make a personal comment about one of my hon. Friends? Does he realise that there is considerable anxiety, which has been expressed on both sides of the House, about the way in which information is available to the Press which is not made available to the House of Commons?

As I have pointed out in my answer to a previous question, I would have thought the right hon. Gentleman, who is a Shadow Minister of Defence, an office which I hope he will hold for a very long time, would recognise that it is necessary, when attacked, to defend oneself. On the other question, many figures have appeared in the Press, even the same newspapers, which have differed from time to time. I cannot take responsibility for any of those figures, but if I can get the agreement of my partners I shall seek to give the House more figures when we proceed to the development.

Is the Secretary of State aware that the figures about M.R.C.A. upon which we as Members are relying are based on something we saw in the Financial Times two weeks ago?

I am not aware of that, but I am interested to know the papers my hon. Friend reads.

In view of the cynical and unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible moment.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the total cost to date of the ships and aircraft engaged in the Beira patrol and those supporting them, including all pay, fuel and repairs, as well as trooping.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a further statement on the effectiveness, and cost to date to public funds, of the Beira patrol, including the air component based in Malagasy.

To calculate all the total cost to date of the patrol would involve a disproportionate amount of effort. The average annual running cost of the ships and aircraft normally engaged on the patrol is about£2·75 million, but this would have been incurred wherever the forces concerned were employed. The total extra cost to date is about£1·75 million. The patrol has been most effective in denying any oil through Beira to Rhodesia, and the Umtali refinery is closed.

Is it not a fact that the Minister wishes to conceal the extent to which the resources of the Fleet are being squandered on this irrelevant exercise? Will he instead pay attention to the needs of the Merchant Navy, as recommended by the Rochdale Report out today, which has been neglected?

There is certainly no question of hiding the extra costs. These extra costs are important, and they have been given to the House on numerous occasions.

Is it not the case that these costs need not continue to be incurred if it were not for the fact that hon. Members opposite are encouraging the illegal Smith régime to continue its illegality by making suggestions that should the Conservatives ever return to power they will change this country's policy? Ought my hon. Friend not to draw it to the attention of Mr. Smith that the majority of opinion polls now suggest that it will be a very long time before the Conservatives return to power?

Any support by hon. Members opposite on this issue has been noticeable by its absence, but we have carried out to the full our obligations under the Security Council Resolution of 9th April, 1966.

In assessing these costs, does the hon. Gentleman use the same method of slice costing as does the Secretary of State when assessing the cost of aircraft carriers in the area? If not, what is the cost on that basis?

As I have said, the extra cost of the patrol is less than£400,000 a year. It is not possible to provide a complete allocation of all the administrative and support costs to particular teeth units. It has never been the practice to do so, and it is not the practice at the moment.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on the request by Brunei to retain and pay for a battalion of Gurkhas.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is, and will be, the British contribution to the defence of Brunei.

Twenty-four officers and twenty other ranks from all three Services are currently on loan to the Brunei armed forces. At present there is one Gurkha battalion in Brunei as part of the forces now stationed in South-East Asia. As regards the future the Government decided in 1968, as the House knows, progressively to withdraw British forces from South-East Asia over the period up to the end of 1971. This, of course, includes the Gurkha battalion in Brunei. We have been holding confidential discussions with the Sultan, not yet concluded, about the consequences of this decision for Brunei. While the full costs of the Gurkha battalion are at present met by the Brunei Government, in the future the problem will be a question no longer of finance alone but of the total resources available in terms especially of backing and support.

Is it not a fact that the Government policy east of Suez was to continue what they called the residual colonial responsibilities? Is not Brunei a protectorate, and if they are to rat and ask Brunei to pay for the cost of the Gurkha battalion, what security will there be for other protectorates for which we are still responsible?

If the hon. Gentleman reads the treaty with Brunei, he will know that the Brunei constitutional position in relation to Her Majesty's Government is different from that of other protectorates.

Would my right hon. Friend not agree that, while the Gurkha Regiment has served this country in the past, it is now an anachronism in terms of our imperial days, and that the economic circumstances in Brunei and elsewhere should be improved so as not to place reliance on the Gurkha Regiment?

I do not accept that view. Recruiting to the Gurkha Regiment plays a part in sustaining the economy of Nepal, but I am certain that particular factor is not a major one in determining the attitude of the Nepal Government on this matter.

Will the right hon. Gentleman look at this matter again? In particular, there are a great many volunteers in Nepal who are prepared to serve in Gurkha battalions. If they are being paid, as is the case at the moment, by the Brunei Government, would he not use them as an extra battalion after 1971 for exchange with the troops who will be stationed in Hong Kong?

I cannot undertake to do that. The question of the withdrawal of the Brunei battalion is already settled, and this is well understood. The House will recall that there was no Gurkha battalion—or any British troops—in Brunei until 1962.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will order an independent inquiry into the circumstances relating to the death of a radar plotter from H.M.S. "Hermes", particulars of which have been sent to him, whose injured body was recovered from the harbour at Malta on 25th February last after he had been missing from his ship for 19 days.

This is properly a matter for the Maltese authorities, and the examining magistrate reported yesterday on the outcome of their inquiries; I understand that what amounted to an open verdict was recorded. A full report of the proceedings is being sent to me today and I will write to the hon. Gentleman as soon as I can.

That is unsatisfactory. When a Serviceman dies in peculiar circumstances overseas it is natural that the British public should want to know the reason for his death. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that I and others have been asking questions for some time about this affair but that we have not been given any hard information or, to date, any news of what the coroner found in this case? We have merely been told that this man was not murdered. How did his injured body come to be in the harbour at Malta?

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's anxiety on this issue, and I have profound sympathy for the relatives of this man. I suggest that he and I should await the full report of the coroner. The delay that has occurred has been due to administrative difficulties and the sickness of the magistrate who acts as coroner in Malta.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what was the peacetime establishment for male officers, other ranks, junior soldiers, boys and apprentices on 1st April in each year since 1966.

As the answer contains a number of figures, I will, with your permission, Mr. Speaker, publish it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that until a Minister answers the question on this subject posed by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcestershire South (Sir G. Nabarro) the House will have no means of comparing the shortfall from year to year against the establishment figures and that there will continue to be concern lest the rate at which the Government are proceeding with redundancies is much too fast having regard to the present state of recruiting? Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that the House should be given the perfectly simple information for which hon. Members have been asking?

If hon. Gentlemen opposite would ask for perfectly simple information they would get it, but if the right hon. Gentleman looks at the Question, which I have answered, he will see that it does not in any way speak of a shortfall. It merely asks for the establishment figures, and those I have given.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the resource cost of forces stationed overseas related to the foreign exchange cost.

As I explained to the House on 8th April, this depends on the location and composition of the forces. The answer to the Question may not be the same in all circumstances. [Vol. 799, c. 529–30.]

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he told us in March that, broadly speaking, one could arrive at the resource cost of a force in a theatre by taking the foreign exchange cost and multiplying by a factor of three? Does he uphold that and, if so, how on earth, when the foreign exchange cost of the present east of Suez policy is about £50 million, can he cost Conservative policy at£300 million?

Yes, Sir, and I can answer that very well indeed. In the Middle East and Far East theatres the resource cost is about three times the foreign exchange cost, if one takes the forces as a whole. This is proved by the fact that the total saving to the defence budget of our withdrawal east of Suez will be£300 million in resource cost and£100 million in foreign exchange cost. This, I believe, is welcomed by the taxpayers as well as by hon. Members on both sides of the House.

Would my right hon. Friend agree that both the resource cost and the foreign exchange cost of our forces abroad are still too great?

Yes, Sir, and that is why they will be reduced from the present£120 million to£60 million when the withdrawal east of Suez has been completed in 18 months' time.

Do the figures—of£300 million in total and£100 million saving in foreign exchange cost—have full regard not only for the increased costs in Hong Kong as a result of the reinforcements there but also for the costs of Gan and Masirah, the general capability of which the Government think should be maintained? Will he explain the discrepancy between what he told the House on 5th March and 8th April?

I have already explained what the right hon. and learned Gentleman describes as a discrepancy. I was talking about different things. (Interruption.] In the first case I was talking about the cost of Conservative policy, while in the second I was talking about the current cost of British forces compared with the foreign exchange cost of keeping them there. The fact that we shall still be spending£60 million in foreign exchange outside Europe at the end of 1971 is explained partly by the factors to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman referred; namely, the size of the British garrisons in Hong Kong and the continued staging posts at Gan and Masirah. I would have thought that the right hon. and. learned Gentleman would have been aware of that.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what defence, other than passive measures, the British Armed Forces in Germany have against chemical warfare, in view of the fact that the Soviet forces there are equipped and trained for offensive chemical warfare and that it is their policy to use chemical warfare equipment as conventional weapons to the maximum extent consistent with tactical advantage.

Our defence in this field consists entirely of passive measures.

Has not the time come for some reappraisal of N.A.T.O.'s policy on chemical warfare? Would not my right hon. Friend agree that it is intolerable that our young soldiers in Germany should be exposed to horrible, deadly and paralysing gases which the Soviet forces have available for them in large quantities without any fear of reprisal?

N.A.T.O. as a whole has chemical weapons available to it because the United States maintains an offensive chemical capability. However, I believe that both the former and the present Government in Britain were right not to stockpile offensive chemical weapons in the United Kingdom. If the House really considers the situation, I believe that it will recognise that it is almost inconceivable that enemy forces would use chemical weapons against N.A.T.O. forces except in the circumstances of a mass invasion—in which event more terrible weapons would surely come into play.

Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that the essence of this is the interpretation that nations put on the Geneva Convention? Has not the time come when all the dedicated work that has been done in the interests of this country and of our forces at Porton demands a reconsideration of that policy?

No, Sir. With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, who I know is extremely concerned about this matter, there is nothing in the Geneva Convention which prohibits countries from using chemical or other weapons in retaliation. This is quite another matter. The present Government and their predecessor have not believed it necessary for British forces to stockpile offensive chemical weapons. I believe that that has been the right decision and that it is particularly right to maintain it at a time when Her Majesty's Government are seeking a new convention in the disarmament talks on the banning of chemical weapons.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what assurances he has received regarding the number of United States-controlled tactical nuclear weapons manned by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces in Germany, in the light of the superiority of the opposing Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in numbers and conventional weapons.

I am satisfied that N.A.T.O.'s capabilities match its strategy.

Would my right hon. Friend agree that a more definite reassurance on this issue is desirable in view of the strategic arms limitation talks which are now taking place in Vienna? Would he further agree that, whether or not we like it, in the last resort the land defence of Western Europe is at present dependent almost entirely on United States-controlled tactical nuclear weapons?

Tactical nuclear weapons are not among the subjects under discussion at the strategic arms limitation talks. Indeed, they are specifically excluded. The United States Administration have stated on more than one occasion in recent years that over 7,000 American tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on this side of the Atlantic. I do not think that my hon. Friend need be under any anxiety as to the adequacy of N.A.T.O.'s capability in this respect.

Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that the United States presence in Europe is apt to be considerably reduced in the years soon to come? What is he doing to put in place of American tactical nuclear or conventional forces an adequate European deterrent to a Soviet attack?

The hon. Gentleman does no service to the cause which I am sure he espouses by stating as frequently as he does that it is inevitable that there will be massive American force reductions starting in the middle of next year. That is by no means the case. He must recall, if he was present during our last defence debate, the decision of Her Majesty's Government to return 6 Brigade to Germany in the autumn of this year. This is an example which has been welcomed by all our allies, and not least by the United States.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will now define tactical nuclear weapons to ensure that the potential enemy against whom they might be used is aware that it is Her Majesty's Government's policy not to exchange strategic nuclear weapons.

A tactical nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon used against a tactical target. I have said this in the House before. Of course, it is not Government policy to use nuclear weapons of any type unless a major invasion of Western Europe has already taken place and N.A.T.O.'s conventional forces are unable to resist it.

Will my right hon. Friend tell us what a tactical target is? Does it, for example, include a city? Does not he agree that if the nuclear strategy of a limited tactical first strike by N.A.T.O. under certain conditions is to be workable, it is desperately important that any potential enemy should know that this is intended and nothing further?

As my hon. Friend will recognise, this is one of the extremely important matters which have been considered in the Nuclear Planning Group of N.A.T.O. in recent years, and considerable progress compared with past thinking has been made during these deliberations. The furthest I can go in attempting to give a single sentence definition of a tactical target would be a target the destruction of which has a direct impact on the course of the land battle.

Will the Minister then say, in the event of an incursion by armour from the other side of the frontier, how big a force would, in his opinion, have to be to be a strategic rather than a tactical force?

With great respect, I do not think the hon. Member listened very carefully to what I said. Tactical nuclear weapons are weapons used against targets the destruction of which is immediately relevant to the course of the actual fighting, as distinct from enemy cities or targets a long way behind the area where fighting is taking place. The size of an enemy tank thrust, although it may determine whether or not it is necessary for N.A.T.O. to use tactical nuclear weapons, has nothing to do with whether their use in that situation would be tactical rather than strategic.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what consideration he gave, in considering a policy of first use of nuclear weapons entailing the firing of battlefield nuclears on targets in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, to the corresponding targetting by the Warsaw Pact powers;

The whole purpose of N.A.T.O's. strategy of flexible response is to deter aggression or, if that fails—and over 21 years it has not failed—to prevent it from escalating automatically. As I have explained on numerous occasions, the adoption of this strategy represents a major steps away from the "trip-wire" strategy which was in force when I entered office.

As my right hon. Friend has just explained that he has difficulty in defining the precise difference between a tactical and a strategic nuclear weapon, on what grounds is he so confident as to say that, whereas strategic nuclear deterrence is not credible, tactical nuclear deterrence is credible? How does he know that the one will not escalate into the other?

Tactical weapons have a central rôle in reinforcing the credibility of the strategic deterrent. I must correct my hon. Friend. I would have no difficulty in defining tactical nuclear weapons in great detail, but this is a matter of some complexity, and I admitted to difficulty in finding an adequate definition in one sentence. Fortunately, I am not limited to one sentence, and neither are S.H.A.P.E. and the Supreme Allied Commander, in drawing up plans in this respect.

Would not my right hon. Friend agree that if the Government have said, as they have in the White Paper, that in certain circumstances we will be the first to use nuclear weapons, it is an open invitation for other Powers to use their nuclear weapons before we can get in with ours?

No, Sir. I do not think that that is the case. The fact is that it has always been N.A.T.O.'s policy in certain circumstances to use nuclear weapons against an overwhelming conventional atack. The fact that this is so is one reason why no such attack has ever taken place.

If the Secretary of State believes in a flexible response, why does he not say to his hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) that in answer to a chemical attack he would use nuclear weapons, something much more flexible? If he believes in a flexible response, why does he not have chemical weapons as well?

It is always a question of judgment. I think that the hon. Gentleman asked this supplementary question in a serious tone, and it is a very serious matter to decide in which areas flexibility is desirable and in which areas flexibility is not desirable. This is an area in which flexibility is not desirable, because I do not think that it would be in anybody's interest to give an impression to a potential enemy that we were prepared to fight a chemical-nuclear war in Europe.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give an undertaking that the number of tactical nuclear weapons available to British forces in Germany will not be reduced in return for a reduction in the number of medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at Great Britain and other countries in Western Europe from Russia and other Warsaw Pact countries.

This is a hypothetical question relating to a matter which would be of concern to the whole of the North Atlantic Alliance. It will hardly be appropriate, therefore, for me to give an undertaking such as the hon. Gentleman has in mind.

Would the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that his policy and N.A.T.O.'s policy of a flexible response depends on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in certain circumstances and that they are, therefore, vital to N.A.T.O.'s forces?

I am scarcely likely to forget that. I do not need the hon. Gentleman to remind me of it.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on the military aspects of the proposal by Euratom to seek nuclear know-how from Her Majesty's Government as the price for British entry to the European Community.

Her Majesty's Government have not received such a proposal. But in the event of United Kingdom entry to the Community our nuclear defence programme would remain outside the ambit of Euratom. Entry would be under conditions consistent with our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that there will be general satisfaction with that reply? In view of the impending negotiations between the Six and the International Atomic Energy Agency over the enforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, will he make it quite clear that until France signs the Treaty there will be no handing over of nuclear know-how to Euratom?

With great respect, this is a totally different matter. The question of military nuclear know-how is as I have described it. It is not affected by our prospective entry into the Community and would not be affected by our entry. France is a member of Euratom, and the Euratom provisions already apply to France and the other members of Euratom on the Continent.

Will the Secretary of State say what discussions he has had with the French Government about working more closely with the French force de frappe or if he has not had discussions, why not?

I have recently had the pleasure of prolonged discussions with M. Debré, the French Defence Minister, in Paris. This question was not discussed, because the French Government have repeatedly made it clear that they are not in a position to submit their nuclear military programme to the same type of integration with N.A.T.O. as the British military nuclear programme. I thought that the recent pamphlet published by the Conservative Central Office on this matter showed a welcome degree of progress in the thinking of the Opposition in accepting this as a fact.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he will announce his proposals for improving pensions of retired officers and officers' widows consequential upon the current study of the arrangements for increase in public occupational pensions.

The study of existing pensions to which I referred in the reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) on 3rd November, 1969 is in progress, but this is a complex matter and I am unable to say when the review will be completed.—[Vol. 790, c. 39.]

Is not this intolerably dilatory? Is the Minister aware that these officers and their widows have nobody to fight for them but himself? Is he not rather ashamed of the way he is handling this?

I am not remotely ashamed of it, nor am I ashamed of the way in which the previous Government handled it, which was exactly the same.

When will something be done for the benefit of the officers? Why should everything always be complex? Surely to goodness, are not there enough Ministers, civil servants, admirals, generals and other people to advise the Minister properly on this matter, so that he can get on with it and not always give this wretched answer which is destructive of the morale of those who have served this country so well in the past?

The answer to why so many things are complex is a matter with which philosophers have wrestled for the last 200 years, and it would be inappropriate for me to add my suggestions this afternoon. The hon. Lady can accept our absolute assurance that we share with her an anxiety to sort this matter out properly as quickly as possible, but she must accept our assurance that to do the job properly speed is not the overriding consideration.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will initiate discussions with the Common Market members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with a view to discussing the implications of a common policy on conscription.

No, Sir.

As all the Common Market countries with the exception of Luxembourg have conscription, would not Britain be the odd man out if we joined the Common Market with the object of having a unified defence?

I think that, not for the first time, the hon. Gentleman misunderstands some of the objections of the European Economic Community. I think he will agree that I am at least as enthusiastic for our membership of the Community as he is, and he may therefore rest assured that we are taking whatever steps are appropriate and necessary. This is not one of them.

We are well aware of my hon. Friend's views on the Common Market, and that is what worries many of us on this side of the House. France and other countries have used conscription and defence as an argument for Britain to join the E.E.C., and we are concerned that the Defence Ministry should state its position on this important issue.

I do not pretend for a moment that the issue is not an important or indeed fundamental one, but what I do insist upon is that on many occasions in the last two months the Government have made their position on conscription very clear. That position is unalterable, and I think it satisfies my hon. Friend.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many members of Her Majesty's Government have been admitted for treatment to Queen Alexandra's Military Hospital at Millbank since October, 1964.

According to my inquiries, three.

Would not the Minister agree that the use of this facility by members of the Government enables them to jump the general hospital queue? While I appreciate that members of the Government may need medical treatment, and may need it early, will the hon. Gentleman at least tell his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services to stop his hypocritical lectures about queue jumping to the private citizen who takes out a health insurance policy?

I assumed that that was the point that the hon. and gallant Member strove to make. This Service hospital, like other Service hospitals, has, as a normal part of its business, an arrangement with the Health Service so that it takes in patients who are non-Service if the situation allows. On the occasion to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman refers there was no degree of priority in the sense he means. The priority that existed was one which enabled all three—my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friends—to carry on doing their Government work. This resulted in the Secretary of State himself carrying out Government business very shortly after a serious operation, which is something for which he should be praised rather than blamed.

Was not that a rather mean little Question?

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether South African shore-based air support is available during combined exercises between British and South African naval forces in South Atlantic waters.

South African shore-based aircraft take part in these combined exercises.

Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that this shore-based air support will be very important if the Government's plan to abolish aircraft carriers is carried out? Is he quite satisfied that the South African aircraft in use and the technical equipment they carry are modern and up to the task they have to carry out?

Yes, Sir. I am quite satisfied of that.

If it is not in order, as the Prime Minister describes it, to play such games as cricket with all-white South Africans, is it not even more wrong to play war games with an all-white South African team?

I think that the House has recognised on many occasions the distincton between activities which are essential for the prevention of war and activities which are not essential for that purpose and which could be held to imply some political view of what happens in a foreign country which was undesirable. That is why we have always drawn a strict distinction between the position of Greece under the current regime and her position in the Council of Europe. I think that this is well understood.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence pproximately how many Service men went absent without obtaining leave or deserted in the last 12 months to a convenient date; and how many of these were boys aged 15 to 18 years or men who had enlisted between these ages.

Service statistics are not such as to enable me to give all the information my hon. Friend asked for. I will write to him.

Is it not the fact that there are very many cases of young soldiers going absent without leave in order to be with young wives who are on the verge of nervous breakdown, and who often have young babies, some small indication of the widespread unhappiness caused by the obnoxious system of holding boy recruits for 12 years in the forces, often against their will?

My hon. Friend knows that I share his concern. He asks me every month Questions that show his concern, and I assure him every month that a committee of inquiry is now inquiring into the conditions to which he refers. As to young men who absent themselves from or desert the Army for the reasons he gives, they may have been recruited as boy soldiers or they may have been recruited rather later. These are circumstances which face a disciplined Service and the members of a disciplined Service.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement concerning the negotiations for a balanced reduction in forces in Europe in so far as they affect the British Army of the Rhine and the Royal Air Force, Germany.

As I told the House in the Defence debate, N.A.T.O. is working hard to develop an approach to mutual arms reductions which will guarantee both sides at least as much security as they enjoy today. The form that such reductions might take can only emerge from actual negotiations, and so far I regret to say that there has been no response to the open invitation issued by N.A.T.O. to the Soviet Union and its Allies at Reykjavik in June, 1968.—[Vol. 797, c. 422.]

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that those who would have to bear the brunt of any attack feel that the balance is heavily weighted against them already, and that any reduction on our side would be disadvantageous?

No, Sir. Since I see perhaps more representatives of the German people who are no doubt in the position to which the hon. Gentleman refers, I can say that their view, on the contrary, and I share it, is that peace in Europe would be safer if we could organise mutual force reductions and maintain the balance at lower levels of expenditure and risk.

Does my right hon. Friend really expect a favourable response from the Soviet Union and those responsible for the Warsaw Pact? In view of the obvious change of opinion in the United States—the attitude of the Congress and Senate there—is there not a likelihood that there will be some substantial withdrawal of American forces from Europe in the near future? In those circumstances, do we not require a reappraisal of the military situation required in the West?

If my right hon. Friend is saying that unilateral arms reductions by Western Powers, whether the United States, Britain or Germany, would make mutual force reductions less likely, I entirely agree with him, and I hope that I can count on him to support me in resisting pressure from any quarter for unilateral reductions before we get these negotiations started.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he now has for increasing the size of the British Army of the Rhine in view of the present proposal by the United States Government to reduce the size of United States conventional forces in Europe by 25,000.

The United States Government have made no proposal to reduce the size of their forces in Europe.

Would the Secretary of State care to wager one week's salary that the Americans do not withdraw 25,000 conventional forces in the next year? As the Americans clearly will withdraw a very substantial number of men in the next couple of years, does the right hon. Gentleman plan to increase the size of B.A.O.R. or modify the plan for a graduated response?

I bet only on certainties, but I am prepared to take the wager that there will be no reduction of 25,000 in the next 12 months.

Although the United States made no definite proposal for the withdrawal of forces from the West, is not my right hon. Friend a little anxious about the position in the light of existing circumstances? Does he not consider that it might be desirable to review the position in the West with his colleagues associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation'? He said in reply to a question of mine that he hoped to gain my support in the event of a substantial withdrawal of American forces from the West. I give him the assurance that he will get all the support he requires.

I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend. I feel immensely fortified by his support. I have recognised for many years—and I have said this in the House many times—that some readjustment of the burden inside N.A.T.O. between North America and Western Europe was inevitable in this decade. I started discussing this matter with my European Defence Minister colleagues in N.A.T.O. two years ago, and our discussions have been immensely valuable, not only to ourselves, but to the American Administration. N.A.T.O. as a whole is discussing all the potential implications of this trend as a result of President Nixon's speech some months ago. But I remind the House that he also gave a guarantee in that speech that America could no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska, and that no reduction would take place at least before the middle of next years, and that no reduction had been decided after that date.

Is the Secretary of State aware that both sides of the House welcome the assurance which the President of the United States gave to Congress in February this year when he guaranteed that there would be no withdrawal before mid-1971? We are probably agreed that it would be wrong to assume that any reduction will be made in the United States forces, although Europe may have to bear a greater share of the burden. Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that it is just as important for America to defend Europe against Communism as it is for America to defend South-East Asia against Communism?

I do not know what implications the right hon. and learned Gentleman was trying to drag into his last remark. If I may treat the rest of his contribution with the seriousness with which he made it, I do not think that there is any disagreement between the two Front Benches in this House about the need to take this problem seriously and how to handle it. This should be understood by our allies as well as the British people.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what reduction in living charges will be made on those Servicemen taking part in the exercise in Malaysia this spring and summer 1970.

No Serviceman living in field conditions for two nights or more is charged for accommodation or food. Servicemen who are liable for single accommodation charges have these charges reduced when field conditions do not apply but they occupy sub-standard accommodation. These arrangements are as recommended by the National Board for Prices and Income in its Third Report on Forces' pay.

Does that mean that the troops going out to take part in the exercise, although they will be living in worse accommodation while acclimatising themselves to the conditions, will have the same fixed charges made on them as when they were in the United Kingdom?

That depends on the conditions under which they are living at the time and whether it is appropriate for a reduced standard of payment. That is a decision which should essentially be taken by the field commanders or by people to whom they may depute that decision. I think that we can rely on the matter being tackled with some degree of understanding.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many desert training exercises will be held this year based from Sharjah.

Between 1st May and the end of the year the Army will conduct four exercises based on Sharjah. None of these exercises is intended specifically to train troops to operate under desert conditions.

Will the troops be going out from the United Kingdom? If so, what acclimatisation will they need before they can effectively carry out any exercises in the desert? As this is the only place which we have left, having evacuated Libya, are four exercises sufficient to make a force ready to come to the aid of our treaty allies in the Middle East?

Some troops will not be stationed in Sharjah before the exercise is carried out. I have no doubt whatsoever that the plans for acclimatisation are adequate. The hon. Gentleman overstates the needs in this area and in the Far East. As for future desert training, my right hon. Friend made clear in the House a month or two months ago that one of the purposes of the large desert areas was to provide not desert training but training in very large areas where there was sufficient space properly to carry out the operations. That must be the criterion against which we judge our future policy.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has for purchasing helicopters from France and the United States of America.

The House has heard on several occasions about the Anglo-French helicopter package which is to provide the three Services with the helicopters they require. As the House will know, after reviewing their defence programme, the French have asked for some rearrangement of the helicopter programme, and their suggestions are now under review. It is our intention to secure a satisfactory settlement in view of the importance of the programme and the willingness which both Governments have expressed to see it through to a successful conclusion.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say why this important field of Anglo-French co-operation is now going sour? Is it because of the French refusal to buy British designs on chauvinistic national grounds, or because of our slowness in putting in firm production orders?

The programme is not going sour. The problem is quite different from either of the suggestions which the hon. Gentleman has made. The French Government are now carrying out a defence review of a nature which is all too familiar to us in the House, and it is the financial pressures arising from that review which have caused the French to review some elements of their requirements. I am hopeful that in the very near future we shall reach a satisfactory rearrangement of the programme which safeguards our industrial, no less than our operational, interests.

Would my right hon. Friend consider publishing in the OFFICIAL REPORT a table to show the extent to which we are able to fulfil from our own manufacturing resources our helicopter requirements of the different types?

I will consider that. I will not make any commitment before considering it. What I can tell the House now is that the powerful links which are being forged between the British and French helicopter industries are by far the best way by which Europe as a whole can guarantee a stake in this vitally important world market against severe American competition.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many officers have applied to retire from the three Services since 1st January, 1969.

The number of officers whose applications for retirement (including voluntary redundancies) were accepted during 1969 was 1,427. The total number of applications is not readily available.

Are not these figures rather disquieting? Cannot the Minister do more to try to persuade promising young officers to stay in the Services, particularly in view of the career structure ahead of them?

Naturally, one regrets that so many officers wanted to leave during the period, but, if it is any consolation to the hon. Gentleman and the House, the figure was appreciably smaller than in the preceding year. I hope that young officers will understand, as I think the House does, that there remains a substantial career in all three Services, with a good salary, and that many of their best interests will be served by remaining in the forces.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is particular anxiety about the position of officers in the Fleet Air Arm? There are allegations that there have been redundancies because of pressure which can only by the wildest stretch of the imagination be described as voluntary. Also, would the Minister make it clear that there is no truth in the suggestion that the Fleet Air Arm will not be allowed to fly at Farnborough, which, if true, seems incredibly petty?

The point raised by the right hon. Gentleman in the last part of his supplementary question is another matter. On the first part, I am sure that he welcomes our absolute assurance that there have been no pressures of the sort which he describes. I hope that we shall hear no more of that allegation from the newspapers or from anywhere else, because it is simply not true.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will take steps to rectify the anomalous position whereby part-time lady cleaners in Her Majesty's Dockyard, Chatham, are paid at lower hourly rates than full-time lady cleaners doing identical work.

Yes, Sir. The recent report of the National Board for Prices and Incomes on pay and conditions in the industrial Civil Service drew attention to a wide range of similar duties which are undertaken by industrial and non-industrial civil servants with differing rates of pay.

Is that a guarantee that the rates of pay of the part-time cleaners will be brought into line with those of the full-time cleaners? There is at the moment a very considerable differential.

The hon. Gentleman is correct in saying that there is a differential. The proper negotiating procedure is through the Whitley Council. If these negotiations take place, some modification or change may be made.