House of Commons
Monday, February 1, 1971
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
WALES
Drug Taking in Schools
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what study he has made of drug taking in Welsh schools.
Government Departments, the police and local authorities are making a careful study of the drug problem amongst young people and collectively considering the most effective measures of control.
On his visits to Welsh schools has the Secretary of State been able to form any opinion whether there should be inspection for evidence of drug taking?
There have been certain instances of drug taking among school children. I have no reason to believe that it is widespread in Welsh schools. However, schools in Wales certainly reflect the concern of society in general at the misuse of drugs, and during courses on health education pupils are being made aware of the dangers of drugs.
European Economic Community
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what steps he has taken to ensure that the interests of Wales are taken care of in discussions about the future of regional development policies in an enlarged European Economic Community, including the United Kingdom.
I can assure my hon. Friend that the interests of Wales and of the other regions are very much in mind in out negotiations to enter the E.E.C.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for that reply. Has he noted that the Government's declared policy for regional development does not conflict in any way with the regulations or the practice at present in force in the European Economic Community? Does he agree that there can be very bright prospects indeed for Wales from a development of community financing for regional development?
Yes. The Government believe that their existing policies are not incompatible with the Treaty of Rome. There have been no specific moves by the Six towards a harmonisation of their regional policies. As to the latter part of my hon. Friend's question, I agree that this would indeed be the case. The Government believe that entry could be beneficial for all regions in the United Kingdom.
In view of the increase in the number of factory closures in Wales and the decrease in the number of applications for new factories, how does the Secretary of State propose to protect the best interests of Wales in the matter of industrial development, whether Britain is inside or outside the Common Market?
The Question refers to the Common Market. As the hon. Gentleman will appreciate, the Treaty of Rome makes specific provisions for countries to make assistance available for regional development.
What specific steps have been taken by the Secretary of State's Department to ascertain the problems in agriculture and industry in Wales and how many members of his Department have been to similar parts of Europe to undertake a proper examination, as opposed to giving us loose undertakings about protection?
My Department is fully consulted during these negotiations in all matters which might affect Wales.
Mid-Wales Rural Development Board
asked the Secretary of State for Wales on what evidence he has decided that the people of Wales have rejected the proposal to establish a Mid-Wales Rural Development Board.
The decision not to proceed with the establishment of a rural development board for Mid-Wales was made on the evidence of the widespread opposition to the proposals.
How does the Minister of State account for the fact that no Member for Mid-Wales was returned to his side of the House? Surely this leaves him with no mandate to abandon this scheme? Is he aware of the concern now being expressed by farmers in the North Pennines area at the proposed abolition of that Board?
When I received the hon. Gentleman's election address in June I noticed that it contained no mention of a Mid-Wales Rural Development Board.
Is the Minister of State aware that he made enough noise about the Mid-Wales Rural Development Board? He made it an issue, and his party was completely rejected in Wales.
I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman returns to the attack, having been heavily defeated on this issue by the vast amount of opposition which came from rural Mid-Wales.
Does the Minister of State appreciate that a few days ago the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food gave as the main reason for abandoning the Pennines Board the fact that it exercised compulsory powers? Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate also that those powers were minimal and that if that was the real reason the Government could easily have changed the position by legislation?
At the inquiry at Aberystwith in the hon. Gentleman's own constituency, there were 133 objectors, four representing local authorities and 10 other organisations and various other agricultural associations. The opposition was intense.
Foxes
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what action is being taken by the Forestry Commission to control the fox problem in central Wales.
The Forestry Commission is keeping down foxes on its land, in the interests of its neighbours, both by direct action and in co-operation with fox destruction societies, to which it subscribes.
Could the Minister say how much the Forestry Commission contributes towards local fox destruction societies in Brecon and Radnor?
The Commission itself in the last 12 months spent directly £6,500 and the selected societies received 2s. per fox destroyed. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to have further information, I shall be happy to provide it.
Carmarthenshire (Visit)
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what plans he has to make an official visit to Carmarthen-shire in the near future.
I have arranged to meet the Carmarthen County Council on Friday, 7th May.
When the Secretary of State comes to Carmarthenshire he will hear that in my constituency three advance factories are now standing empty and that no inquiries at all have been received. In view of this fact and the growing crisis of confidence in the Conservative Government's regional development policy, could the Secretary of State say what action he is taking in trying to persuade his colleagues to restore the level of investment allowances to what they were before the Chancellor of the Exchequer so drastically devalued them?
I fully appreciate that concern has been expressed in Carmarthenshire, and I shall be meeting a deputation from the Carmarthenshire Joint Industrial Development Committee in Cardiff on 5th March to discuss these. problems.
Will the Secretary of State look not only at Carmarthenshire but also at the other regions of Wales? Will he pay some attention to the meeting organised by the North-Eastern Development Council, to be held in London on Wednesday next, to protest about the impact of the Government's as yet undefined regional policy? Will he look at the report in this morning's Times: By any standards this will be an impressive regional gathering. The initiative came from the North-East Development Council and the chairmen and chief executives of the Scottish Council, the Development Corporation of Wales, the North-West Industrial Development Association and the Cumberland Development Council will put their views. This represents collectively the views of some 18 million people.
All I can say in answer to that rather long supplementary question is that I shall certainly pay attention to all the views which are expressed.
Museums and Galleries (Admission Charges)
asked the Secretary of State for Wales how many letters he has received from individuals and organisations in Wales protesting against the Government's intention of imposing charges for admission to museums.
One, in addition to representations from the Council of the National Museums of Wales.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that answer. Since it seems that the moneys which will accrue from these charges will be used not to improve facilities but rather to hand out tax reductions to rich taxpayers in the United Kingdom, and since the overwhelming majority of citizens of Wales are not in the category of rich taxpayers, could he urge his colleagues to exempt the whole of Wales from the imposition of these mean and petty charges?
No, Sir. Attention is being given to the needs of special categories such as children, students and regular visitors, and to safeguarding the educational functions of the museums and galleries. The particular circumstances of the National Museum of Wales are being taken into account in the present consultations.
Casualty Units (Staff)
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what steps he is taking to improve the medical staffing position in casualty units in South Wales hospitals.
Hospital authorities, which are responsible, are doing their best to fill vacant posts. The problem of staffing casualty units is widespread in England and Wales, and discussions are currently taking place with the profession on means of improving the position.
In his answer the hon. Gentleman refrained from saying what steps he is taking to improve the position. I speak particularly of the Morriston Hospital in Swansea and would ask him to restore the casualty unit service to that hospital, which serves the greater part of my constituency in the Swansea Valley. One of the factors that deter recruiting of doctors is the provision of substandard accommodation. In Morriston and other hospitals accommodation should be brought up to modern standards, and the Secretary of State should increase the financial allocation to the Glantawe hospital and other boards so that they may be able to provide this accommodation and to recruit doctors.
I understand the hon. Gentleman's anxiety about this problem, which I admitted in my answer: namely, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient staff for casualty units. On Friday night I met the chairmen of the hospital management committees of Wales, including a member from the hon. Gentleman's area. This problem is very much under review by the hospital board.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this problem causes great concern throughout the whole of Wales? Will he now reconsider the decision in regard to the Llwynypia Hospital in my constituency since his decision is causing great concern in Llwynypia itself?
With respect to the hon. Gentleman, whose anxiety I understand, the whole problem in Llwynypia Hospital and many other hospitals, not only in Wales but also in England, is the difficulty of attracting staff for these casualty units.
At the risk of treading on the toes of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. George Thomas), could the Minister make sure that not too many new jobs are created immediately around the teaching hospital in Cardiff? It is being said by other hospitals in Wales that it is extremely difficult to attract new housemen to areas outside Cardiff because of the large number of jobs available near the teaching hospital.
That is another question, but I am quite prepared to look into it.
South Wales Ports
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what inquiries he has had as to the present and future potential of the South Wales ports; and if he will make a statement.
None, Sir. The five South Wales ports are currently operating profitably and I have every confidence that their future potential will be exploited to the best advantage.
Does that Answer not show the bungling incompetence and lack of liaison between Ministers of the Crown? May I ask whether the Secretary of State for the Environment did not defer to the Secretary of State's opinion prior to sanctioning the Bristol West Dock Development Scheme? Is this not incomprehensible in view of the figures available for Swansea itself, where the tonnage through the port in four years has increased from 6 million to over 8 million at the end of last year, and is the Secretary of State for Wales not a till small voice in the Cabinet, whereas in the country he is a strident factor in the Tory Party?
I do not know why the hon. Gentleman is so gloomy. The South Wales ports have had their best year since 1954. I have no reason to doubt the ability of the South Wales Docks to withstand competition from wherever it comes.
In view of the long, creditable and sustained efforts of these ports to build up alternative cargoes following the decline in coal shipments, will the Secretary of State give every help and encouragement to the British Transport Dock Board to extend and improve the facilities and equipment at these ports?
Yes, certainly. The port director and his staff, all of whom I have met, have shown themselves to be fully alive to all the possibilities of encouraging increased usage in the ports, and I have no doubt that the ports have a good future.
Will the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that the Government's action in authorising the port of Bristol's major expansion scheme has placed all the South Wales ports in jeopardy? Will he appreciate that all this empty talk of competition means nothing since we are only a tiny island and there is plenty of competition for our ports from the Rotterdams of this world?
To say that it places all the South Wales ports in jeopardy is quite wrong. The best judge is the British Transport Port Board, which does not appear to be unduly worried about the prospects of competition.
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I give notice that I propose to raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.
Artillery Range, Pembrey
asked the Secretary of State for Wales when he now expects the findings of the Court of Inquiry into the Defence Department's proposal to locate an artillery range at Royal Air Force, Pembrey, will be made public; and whether, in considering the findings, he will take into account the recommendations of the Roskill Commission.
The Inspector's findings and the Government's views will be made public after they have been fully considered. I shall take all relevant factors into account.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend bring to the attention of his right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Defence, for the Environment and for Trade and Industry the strong feelings not only of Welshmen but of perhaps more enlightened Englishmen against the proposed take-over of virtually the whole of Carmarthen Bay for an artillery range? Will he also take into account the fact that the air traffic control arguments advanced for moving the artillery range from Shoeburyness to Pembrey are not insuperable?
As I said to my hon. Friend, all relevant factors will be taken into account.
May I again press the right hon. and learned Gentleman to publish this report immediately? May I ask him to take a leaf out of the book of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who has seen fit to grant the people of Buckinghamshire and Essex the opportunity to discuss the Roskill Commission's Report? Will the Minister give the people of Carmarthen a similar opportunity to discuss this report?
As I have said, the report will be published as soon as it has been fully considered by the Government.
Motor Vehicles (Competitions and Trials)
asked the Secretary of State for Wales, having regard to the provision of Regulations 11(b) of the Motor Vehicles (Competition and Trials) Regulations, 1969, whether he will consider extending these regulations to make it obligatory for the Royal Automobile Club, before authorising an event under these regulations, to consult with highway authorities for the area over which the route or event lies.
No, Sir. The present arrangements are considered adequate.
Is the Secretary of State aware that in the early hours of 23rd November last year a motor club turned East Flintshire villages into motorised bedlam, endangering life and limb and shattering peace and quiet? Will he act with speedy decision to limit the ill-effects of these selfish sorties?
Yes, Sir. I am aware of the complaints made last year about a rally organised by a particular motor club. These were investigated by the Royal Automobile Club, and I under- stand that measures have been taken to avoid a recurrence.
River Dee (Water Extraction Scheme)
asked the Secretary of State for Wales when he proposes to announce the result of the inquiry into the Central Flintshire Water Board's Dee Extraction Scheme.
A reply will be sent to the Central Flintshire Water Board as soon as possible.
Would not the Secretary of State agree that it is a miserable state of affairs when a Cheshire authority can extract water from the Dee but a Flintshire authority cannot? Is he not also aware that water rates in my constituency are rocketing up because we have to buy water from a Cheshire authority which extracts that water from the Dee? Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman end his vacillating and indecisive attitude and make a decision on this important matter?
As I have said, complex engineering and financial questions are involved—
That is not good enough.
—and the need for consultation inevitably causes some delay in reaching a decision, especially when capital expenditure is in the region of £1.8 million.
In view of the indecisive reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek an early opportunity of raising the matter on the Adjournment.
Public Transport
asked the Secretary of State for Wales if, as a result of his consideration of transport questions in Wales, he will take steps to ensure an integrated and continuing public transport system in Wales.
Close liaison already exists betwen my office and the other various interests concerned to ensure that full consideration is given to meeting the essential public transport needs of Wales.
The Secretary of State is very careful to avoid any specific commitment or specific answer to my question, which asks what steps he will take. Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that unless he shows more urgency and less complacency, there will be neither an integrated nor a continuing public transport system in Wales?
The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, by Statutes passed by the previous Government, the National Bus Company and British Railways have a statutory duty to provide co-ordinated services. As to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question, no rail passenger services will be withdrawn in Wales without a most careful inquiry into all social and economic implications. As for buses, local authorities have powers to keep essential bus services running in rural areas.
Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of the interest aroused in Wales by the proposal to site the new national airport on Severn-side? Will he use his position in the Cabinet to ensure that this imaginative and visionary proposal is given consideration at the highest level?
I assure my hon. Friend that I shall give consideration to what he has said.
Will the Secretary of State say that the Cambrian railway, which has been threatened by his right hon. Friend with the withdrawal of grant at the end of this year, can be assured of an existence? If there is an inquiry, as I presume there will be, will the right hon. Gentleman and his Department give evidence in support of a stronger communications system?
As to the last part of the right hon. Gentleman's question, he knows that a Minister of the Crown could not possibly give evidence to such an inquiry. The statutory procedure, which the right hon. Gentleman knows well, is that there will be a public hearing by the Transport Users Consultative Committee, which will then report to the Minister on the hardship which closure would cause. There will be consultation with the Welsh Council about social and economic aspects, and there will be consultation with me. It would be wholly inappropriate for me to give evidence.
Rural Bus Services
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what representations he has recived from Wales in respect of the financial difficulties currently experienced by Welsh rural bus operators; and what replies he has sent.
Much concern has been expressed about the future of many of the rural bus services in Wales. I have drawn the attention of local authorities to the statutory provisions which enable them, with Government help to assist the operators. My officials have also had a number of meetings with local authorities at which there have been full discussions of the steps being taken to overcome the immediate difficulties.
Does not the Secretary of State appreciate that most rural bus operators in Wales have suffered a very serious decline in custom over the last 12 months, that the losses are increasing, and that the amount of grant they are asking for is becoming much more considerable? Although the provisions of Section 34 were realistic in 1968, they are not realistic now. Will the Government pay a larger share of the grant?
This is a very complicated matter which involves the finances of the National Bus Company and its ability to pay its way, and the decision of that company to ask local authorities to give assistance to rural buses. I can say that there is no prospect of increasing the direct Government contribution above 50 per cent., which is the percentage decided upon by the Labour Party when the arrangements were embodied in the Transport Act, 1968.
Would the Secretary of State not agree that the policy of ever-increasing subsidies from central Government for rural bus services can at best be only an interim solution, and that a long-term solution must be found by a greater and more flexible use of private transport in rural areas accompanied by tax concessions, the easing of various regulation, and so on?
These are matters which must be considered. Happily, this is a period in which we can get down to details and consider the future very carefully. Steps are afoot for that to be done.
Would not the Secretary of State take into account that any attempt to give further tax concessions to private transport would rebound and make far more difficult the prospects of maintaining a public transport system by rail or bus?
If private transport could provide a viable service, I am sure that it would command the support of everyone in the House.
Road Programme
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what changes he proposes in framing his future new road construction programmes to facilitate the further growth of the tourist industry in the Principality.
The needs of tourism are already taken into account in the road programme and I shall continue to bear these needs in mind when I add further schemes to the programme.
While in the past emphasis has quite properly usually been given to industrial need, does not my right hon. and learned Friend feel that now in some parts of the Principality there would seem to be a case for greater emphasis on the needs of tourism as a major growth industry?
I agree that tourism is a major growth industry. It is not easy to distinguish the needs of tourism from those of other industries, but I believe that our strategy of giving first priority to the east-west routes across the south and the north of Wales will help the main tourist centres.
Home Ownership
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what discussions he has had with building societies, local authorities and other agencies in Wales to expedite the growth of home ownership; and if he will make a statement.
The Government have a number of possible ways of en- couraging the growth of home ownership under examination but I am not in a position to make a statement today.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend take account of the fact there would appear to be in different parts of Wales a somewhat patchwork proportion of private and public housing? In view of the desirability of making home ownership available on an ever-increasing scale, will my right hon. and learned Friend look at this question with some urgency?
Yes, Sir. I think that this is a very important matter. A range of ideas is being considered, and a statement will be made in due course. It is interesting that Wales is primarily a country of owner-occupiers, with 55 per cent. of houses being owner-occupied.
Whatever the desirability of owner-occupation in Wales or anywhere else, does the right hon. and learned Gentleman recognise that with the new regional policy of this Government, with Wales being overtaken by a flood of redundancies, with its being in general a low wage area, and with poverty-stricken local authorities not being helped by the Government, this is hardly likely to give any meaning to the Tory Party's commitment to increase owner-occupation?
I cannot agree with what the hon. Gentleman has said.
Industrial Sites
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what was the number of firms which inquired about industrial sites in Wales as a result of the Enterprise Wales Exhibition at the Hilton Hotel in November, jointly sponsored by his Department.
I understand from the Development Corporation for Wales that 20 firms made definite inquiries at the exhibition itself. It is not possible to say how many of the inquiries received since that date were a direct result of the exhibition.
Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that at a time when industrial inquiries in Wales are at their lowest for three years, when redundancies are averaging 1,000 per month, and when unemployment, since this Government have been in power, has increased by 28 per cent., the figure of 20 inquiries at a luxurious and probably expensive exhibition was certainly inadequate and is equally a manifestation of the fact that the industrialists of Britain are dissatisfied with the regional development policy and are not now interested in coming to Wales as a result of 18th June?
The Government fully support the work of the Development Corporation. As I announced last Friday, we intend to continue Government support for it.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman now tell me why the Development Corporation for Wales is very heavily represented at the protest meeting to be held next Wednesday by all the regional councils against this Government's regional policies?
I met the Board of the Development Corporation for Wales at Swansea on Friday. We had a very long, detailed and useful discussion. I cannot remember any of the exaggerated protests which have come from the Opposition today being voiced by the Development Corporation.
Housing, Newport
asked the Secretary of State for Wales how many council houses were started and completed in the county borough of Newport in 1970; and how these figures compare with each year from 1962 onwards.
With permission, I will circulate the information in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
If the hon. Gentleman will study the figures carefully he will notice that there is a vast difference between the house-building performance of this corporation when it was controlled by the Labour Party in Newport and the past three years or so when it has been controlled by the Conservative Party. Does not the hon. Gentleman feel that it is time to tell the Conservative group to get on with the job of providing the necessary houses for the people of Newport?
It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman should have referred to this matter. I understand that the council intends seeking approval to build over 600 new houses in 1971. If this aim is achieved, it will be the highest figure for several years.
Hospital Services, Pembrokeshire
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what steps are being taken to obtain the medical staff required to man the accident unit recommended in the report prepared for his Department on the hospital services in Pembrokeshire.
Along with the other bodies which gave evidence to Dr. Bevan, my right hon. and learned Friend has asked the board to let him have its comments and proposals on the report by 12th February. I expect these to include the board's comments on the staffing of the accident unit at Haverfordwest. In the meantime, the unit is being kept open during the week-days from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. by local doctors and during the weekend by doctors from the West Wales General Hospital. Glangwili.
Is my hon. Friend aware that, though in general the report has been widely welcomed, there will be no satisfaction until it is implemented? Is my hon. Friend further aware that as the recommendations were made by the Department's Chief Medical Adviser it must be assumed that they are practical and that he will ensure that they are carried into effect?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his interest in this difficult matter. The report was made only a short time ago. We look forward to hearing the answers from the Welsh Hospital Board to the recommendations of the group.
asked the Secretary of State for Wales if he has discussed with the Chairman of the Welsh Hospital Board the contents of the Report on the Hospital Services in Pembrokeshire prepared for his Department; and whether the Board intends to issue an early statement of its intentions.
I have discussed the Report with the Chairman of the Welsh Hospital Board. As I indicated in reply to my hon. Friend's previous Question, the Board and the other bodies which gave evidence to Dr. Bevan have been asked to submit their comments on the Report to my right hon. and learned Friend by 12th February.
I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Will the Minister undertake to publish the results of that report? I think that my hon. Friend will agree that we are entitled to expect an early and clear statement of the hospital board's intentions as it is, after all, acting as the Minister's agent in this matter?
I will certainly look at that.
Is the Minister aware of the serious disquiet within the area of the Cardiff Hospital Management Committee concerning the imminent statement from his Department about hospitals in the locality, involving, as rumours have it, a serious cut-back in finance with a possible loss of 400 beds? Will the Minister assure the people of that area that the rumours are not true? Will the hon. Gentleman further undertake to have a look at the machinery by which we understand his right hon. Friend's statement will be released tomorrow and also at the chain of information, which seems to leave the Cardiff Hospital Management Committee as the last body to which the decision will be made known?
If the hon. Gentleman will put down a Question on that matter I will answer it. Question No. 19 refers to Pembrokeshire.
May I ask the Minister of State whether it is proposed to publish tomorrow this important statement to which my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Fred Evans) has referred, since there are Questions relating to that today?
I was answering only Question No. 19.
Cardiganshire (Infrastructure)
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what plans he has to improve the infrastructure of Cardiganshire.
With permission, I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT details of trunk and principal road schemes which are programmed or in the preparation pool, and sewerage and sewage disposal schemes which have been authorised. Approval in principle has also been issued for the acquisition of 60 acres of land for industrial development near Aberystwyth.
Is it not true that all, or very nearly all, were matters to which the previous Government had applied their mind? Does the Secretary of State remember that up to mid-summer of last year the improvement of infrastructure was regarded by the Conservative Party as a clear alternative to all the profligate regional development policies of the then Government? We on this side are interested to know what the right hon. and learned Gentleman will do to allow the Conservative Party to acquire a measure of credibility in relation to these promises.
We have announced that additional funds are being made available for that purpose. I hope that local authorities in Cardiganshire and elsewhere in Wales will take advantage of this extra provision of funds.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the sewerage schemes, to which the previous Administration applied their mind just before the election, had been held up for many years before that date?
In many cases that is certainly so.
Teaching Hospital, Cardiff
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what was the original estimated cost of the new teaching hospital at the Heath, Cardiff; and how this figure compares with the present estimated final cost.
The original estimate, made in 1962, was £12,957,000. The latest estimate is £18,207,000.
Does the Minister appreciate that this great prestige project is having a highly detrimental effect on other hospital development in Wales? Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that the Royal Gwent Hospital in Newport serves a large industrial population and is simply bursting at the seams at the present time? Will the Minister please give greater priority to it?
I do not accept what the hon. Gentleman has said about the Heath Hospital. I assure the hon. Gentleman, however, that the increase in the estimated cost of the University Hospital of Wales has in no way delayed redevelopment of the Royal Gwent Hospital.
Employment
asked the Secretary of State for Wales whether he will ask the Welsh Council to make a new study of current and future employment prospects in Wales.
The Welsh Council's terms of reference are wide enough to cover a study of this nature.
Does the Secretary of State agree that, although he thinks that our views on the matter are exaggerated, in a situation where 1,500 redundancies have been declared in the first three weeks of last month and in the third and fourth quarters of last year inquiries from new firms wishing to move to Wales dropped remarkably, there is urgent need for a new study of current and future job prospects as many people feel that the future is gloomy indeed in that direction?
Yes. I can certainly assure the hon. Gentleman that I am very concerned not only about the situation that has obtained in the last few months but about the situation that has obtained for several years in Wales.
Is it not strange that hon. Gentlemen opposite were appearing to be excessively optimistic about employment prospects a few months ago, whereas now that the Conservatives are in office they are excessively pessimistic? [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Is it not a fact that their pessimism can be most damaging?
I will only say that it is of particular concern to me that unemployment in Wales has been persistently high for over four years.
Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) could not have been more apt in his criticism of the Tory Government and that I could not have put it better? Will he commission an economic strategy survey for South-East Wales similar to the one published for North-West Wales today, particularly as the Government's present approach to and policies for regional economic problems have been singularly lacking in anything that could vaguely be described as a strategy?
I have told the House on other occassions at Question Time that the Government are at present considering very carefully the full regional employment policies for Wales and that an announcement will be made shortly.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the proposal that has been made for the location of a major airport in the South Wales and Severnside area could be a valuable item towards the long-term provision of employment in South Wales, especially as in the coming 10 to 15 years employment in the coal mines is likely to diminish rather than increase? Will he use his position in the Cabinet to give emphasis to this proposal in all its seriousness?
I am aware of my hon. Friend's interest in this matter and I assure him that consideration will be given to the point he raises.
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what recent discussions he has had with the Welsh Council concerning the increase in unemployment in Wales; and whether he will make a statement.
I attended a meeting of the Welsh Council on 12th October, 1970, and discussed with it a whole range of issues, including unemployment. Concern was expressed to me about the high rates of unemployment which have prevailed in Wales in recent years.
Is it not time that the Secretary of State pulled his socks up? Is he aware that since October the situation has deteriorated very badly in Wales? What arrangements has he made to meet the Welsh Council, which is deeply disturbed by the current increasing unemployment in the Principality?
I am constantly in touch with the Chairman of the Welsh Council. At its meeting on 25th January I do not think this matter was raised. I understand that a panel of the Welsh Council is about to make an investigation. As I have said, it is particularly of concern to me that unemployment in Wales has been persistently high for over four years. In January, last month, the unemployment percentage for Wales was 4.3 of the insured population. In January of last year the figure was 4.3, and in all of the last five years it has been approximately 4.3.
If the right hon. and learned Gentleman really has the good of Wales at heart, will he stop harking back over past years— [Interruption.] —and simply undertake the responsibility which his Leader has given him and get on with the job of job creation in Wales?
Hon. Gentlemen opposite do not like it when one hits back because they feel that it is solely their prerogative to be offensive and introduce party politics into Question Time and the Welsh Grand Committee. I pointed out that while the percentage of unemployment in Wales is deplorably high, there are, nevertheless, fewer people unemployed in Wales today than there were a year ago; and the percentage difference between England and Wales today compared with a year ago is slightly better.
Is it not a fact that unemployment in Wales and elsewhere is entirely due to the policies of the previous Administration? Hon. Gentlemen opposite who are in any doubt about that should ask why they went to the country last June and did not hang on for another six months.
There are many reasons why unemployment in Wales is high, but Question Time is not the time to go into the matter in detail.
Might I, as an Englishman, make a fervent plea to the right hon. and learned Gentleman on behalf of the Welsh people? Since we in the northern region do not have a voice in the Cabinet, may I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman to argue for a reversal of the present development area policies of the Government lest Wales suffers the fate of the North-East, where in my constituency unemployment has increased by 15.3 per cent. since last June?
Unemployment in the North-East is a problem, and has been for many years. I have no doubt that the change in development area policy will be of benefit not only to Wales but to the regions and that Wales together with the regions will benefit when the economy of the United Kingdom has improved.
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what plans he has to deal with the hight rate of male unemployment in the Caerphilly constituency.
The Department of Trade and Industry will continue to do all it can to attract additional new industry to the area.
The people of this area are now becoming extremely tired of non-answers. Will the Secretary of State accept that his reply a few moments ago about stabilising unemployment at 4.3 per cent. ignored that that figure represents a major achievement over years during which there was a heavy programme of pit closures but at the same time enough jobs were brought in to stabilise the unemployment level in Wales, and, further, will he accept that male unemployment in this particular area is running at 9 per cent., which the people there regard as completely intolerable? If he himself cannot evolve policies, or persuade his right hon. Friends to evolve policies, to improve the situation, will he tender his resignation as a mark of his having failed the Welsh people?
The hon. Gentleman has written to me on this matter and I have given him details of the reasons why there have been redundancies in his constituency. He will know that the jobs in prospect for the Caerphilly, Cardiff, Bargoed and Merthyr group of employment exchanges, parts of which straddle his constituency, total 3,780, of which 2,400 are for men.
On the question of Government policy to deal with this problem, has not the Secretary of State overlooked that the purpose of changing the nature of the inducement was to reduce public expenditure and not to increase employment in Wales, and does he not realise that this is having a serious effect on the attraction of new industry? Is it not a fact that the change-over to tax allowances means that new firms which did not settle in Caerphilly, Cardiff and other places are prevented from so doing because of the loss of the investment grant? What does he propose to do to overcome that?
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, as a result of policies pursued by the previous Administration over many years there is a shortage of mobile industry in this country today. The change to tax allowances as opposed to grants affects certain industries which may have a liquidity problem which is general throughout the United Kingdom, again as a result of measures introduced by the previous Administration. I have no doubt that, ultimately, the change will greatly benefit Wales and will bring into Wales more viable and permanent industry.
asked the Secretary of State for Wales if he will initiate an inquiry into the employment problems created in the Rhymney Valley by the redundancies at Hy-Mac engineering works at Pontlottyn, and the proposed total closure of Cardiff machine tools factory at Taffs Well.
No, Sir. But I can assure the hon. Member that the Department of Employment will make every effort to find suitable alternative employment for all those made redundant.
Is the Secretary of State prepared to state a time limit over which the loss of 1,000 male jobs added to an existing 9 per cent. male unemployment can be remedied, or shall we be told that there are 2,000 jobs in the pipeline over the next four years? Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman undertake to read the Manpower and Productivity Service Report of the D.E.P. of last June on the Cardiff Machine Tools Limited, which details some relevant factors regarding these closures? Further, does he realise, in the context of his reconstruction of Welsh local government finance, that by putting industrial mortgages into the locally determined allocation schemes he has struck out of the hands of local authorities one of the main tools with which they previously attracted industry into the valleys?
I have expressed to the hon. Gentleman my sympathy at the redundancies which have taken place in his constituency, and I have told him that my information as regards the Garth works was that the closure resulted from financial losses which the company had incurred over the past few years, due mainly to a low level of demand both at home and in the export market, coupled with increasing costs of production. He will remember that I told him also, as regards Hy-Mac, that they were the consequence of a process of rationalisation which had been necessitated by the depressed state of the construction industry in recent years. I hope that there will be an improvement in the future.
United States of America (Visit)
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what plans he has to seek to make an official visit to the United States of America in the near future.
I have no plans at present to visit the United States of America.
is it not a fact that those companies which inquired about the chances of developing in Wales following the visit to the Hilton Hotel were not taken in by the Government's economic policies for Wales? Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that if he were to go to the United States he might find American companies a little more gullible? Is it not a fact that while one of the advantages which we are hoping to get in Wales from entry into the European Economic Community is investment by foreign companies, the Government's present policies for Wales are less advantageous for foreign investment than in any other part of the E.E.C.?
That is totally untrue. Indeed, of the 20 industrialists who made specific inquiries at the Development Corporation's exhibition in London, one has firmly taken a site in Wales and two more are examining sites.
Road Signs
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what decision he has reached concerning road signs in Wales; and whether he will make a statement.
I am considering representations recently made to me by county authorities and others on this matter and hope to make a statement very shortly.
Is the right lion. and learned Gentleman accepting those inquiries on the basis of the circular which I sent out last year? Am I to assume that, in general, he is adopting the same policy? If he is taking a different line, will he indicate the differences? Is he aware that many people are watching his reaction to the blackmailing tactics of some people at the present time?
I certainly accept the circular which the right hon. Gentleman sent out at the beginning of last year, and I have already said so. In fact, it may be surprising to the right hon. Gentleman to learn that I paid tribute to him for what he did. Indeed, I believe that not enough credit was given to him for his efforts in this matter. If he had accepted some criticism from the minority with less excitability, he might have been given the credit which he deserved. I intend to look at this matter to see whether any improvement is possible, having regard to the complex issues bearing on road safety and the environment.
Mr. George Thomas; next Question.
It is a pity that we must leave this one, Mr. Speaker.
A5, Chirk-Corwen
asked the Secretary of State for Wales what steps he is taking to improve the main A5 trunk road between Chirk and Corwen, and, in particular, the dangerous bend at Bwlch y Rhysgog near Glyndyfrdwy.
Five schemes costing in all more than £150,000 are pro- grammed for starting in the financial year 1971–72, including a visibility improvement at Bwlch y Rhysgog.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that reply, but he will be aware that this is the main highway from London into North Wales and that a great deal of the economic viability of North Wales depends upon the quality of this route. Is he aware that on two counts—first, the considerable inconvenience due to traffic bottlenecks at Llangollen, with consequent queues of vehicles three, four and five miles long, and, second, the question of safety, especially at Bwlch y Rhysgog where there have been five fatalities in the 12 months ending last July—everything he can do to urge the programme forward will be greatly appreciated by the people who live in the area?
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Work will start on these schemes when the engineering details have been agreed and the necessary land acquired.
Caravan Sites
asked the Secretary of State for Wales if he is satisfied with the progress made in Wales towards complying with the requirements of the Caravan Sites Act; and if he will make a statement.
I am reasonably satisfied. I refer the hon. Member to my right hon. and learned Friend's reply of 2nd November last to the hon. Member for Flint, East (Mr. Barry Jones). Welsh Office officials are keeping in close touch with the responsible local authorities.—[Vol. 805, c. 303–4.]
Would the Minister of State say what advice his Department has given to the local authorities, for example, by information from surveys to determine where the problem is greatest, what advice is being given on the use of, for instance, model rules for sites, and what steps are being taken to educate the public in the matter?
There has been a varied reaction to this problem from the various local authorities in Wales. All I can say is that my right hon. and learned Friend is aware of the position in Denbighshire, and officers of the Welsh Office are in touch with the county council, which is, I know, anxious to solve the problem.
On the question of caravans in Wales, has not the time come for the Minister to give a direction to local authorities to prohibit an increase in the number of caravan sites or the granting of any new licences within two miles of the Welsh coastline?
The provisions of the Caravan Sites Act to which the Question refers deal with tinkers and gypsies.
Aber Bridge, Caernarvon
asked the Secretary of State for Wales if he will make a statement on the rebuilding of the Aber Bridge in Caernarvon.
The question of building a bridge over the Afon Seiont is under discussion between the Caernarvon County Council and the Caernarvon Royal Borough Council. At the county council's request, I am arranging a further meeting between my officials and those of the two authorities.
I thank the Minister of State for that answer, which is a little more encouraging than the reports we have heard that his Department has been dragging its feet in the matter. Does he realise that the rebuilding of this bridge is of immense importance to the Royal Borough, and especially to its great and growing tourist trade?
I assure the right hon. Gentleman, whose interest in the matter is well known, that the Welsh Office is not dragging its feet. I myself met representatives of both councils, and I have expressed my willingness to meet them again whenever they wish.
Local Government Reform
asked the Secretary of State for Wales when he intends to publish his proposals on the reform of local government in Wales.
I hope to announce my proposals for local government reform in Wales this month.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman take it that we on this side would even be prepared to accept a delay in any such announcement if we could be assured that his proposals for reform of local government in Wales, when announced, will include some element of financial reform to ensure that our local authorities have sufficient finance to carry out essential services, services which are now being undermined by actions of the present Government?
That is a somewhat different subject from my proposals for local government reorganisation. I hope that my proposals will be announced very shortly.
Derelict Land Clearance
asked the Secretary of State for Wales how many local authorities in Wales have made representations to him that the new loan sanction system will restrict their proposals for the clearance of derelict land; and what replies he has sent.
Eleven local authorities have made representations. I refer the hon. Member to what I and my hon. Friend said in the Welsh Grand Committee on 20th January, 1971.
Since the Secretary of State for the Evironment has, I understand, substantially increased the sums available for loan sanction in the County of Durham for the clearance of derelict land, is the Secretary of State for Wales not able to announce similar substantial increases for loan sanction for clearance of derelict land in the counties of Wales?
I have nothing to add to what I told the Welsh Grand Committee. The hon. Gentleman will recall that I said that I am arranging that the Welsh Office will now discuss with the authorities concerned what additional help may be necessary.
North-West Wales
asked the Secretary of State for Wales whether he has completed his consideration of the Report of the Welsh Economic Council on the economy of North-West Wales; and whether he will make a statement.
The Report was formally approved by the Welsh Council on 25th January, 1971. I am now considering it.
In considering this valuable Report, will the Secretary of State consider also what specific financial assistance he will give in order to carry through some of the important recommendations made therein? Does he realise that, valuable though these recommendations are, it would be rather cynical to parade them before the Welsh people if he knew very well that there was not the means to carry them out?
There are a number of recommendations, and they will be considered very carefully.
POST OFFICE (DISPUTE)
With permission, I should like to make a statement.
Officials of my Department yesterday had separate meetings, followed by a joint meeting, with representatives of the Union of Post Office Workers and of the Post Office. I was kept informed throughout the day and in the evening I met separately both the union and the Post Office.
I am sorry to have to report to the House that no progress was possible. Both sides held firmly to their positions as I explained them to the House on 20th January.
The union maintained that the Post Office's offer would, given the trend of pay settlements since their last increase, mean a relative worsening of the position of their members which they were not prepared to accept. They made clear that they would only resume negotiations on the basis of an improved offer from the Post Office; without this, the strike would continue and would result in long-term damage to relations between management and staff.
For its part, the Post Office insisted that its offer was a fair one and should be seen not in isolation, but as one of a series of substantial improvements in pay and conditions since the Corporation was set up. It said that any addition to its present offer would lead to a further early and substantial increase in charges, and that this on top of the increases coming into effect in a fortnight's time would lead to a downward spiral in the volume of Post Office business which would damage the commercial viability of the Corporation and the longer-term interests of its staff and of the public.
In spite of this, the Post Office repeated its willingness to go to arbitration, but as before the union maintained its attitude that any form of arbitration is unacceptable to it.
Although I made clear that I was prepared to continue talks under my chairmanship either separately or jointly, both sides felt that no further progress was possible at this juncture. I told both sides that while I must regretfully accept that I could do nothing further at present, I would continue to keep in close touch with developments and that my Department and I would be available for further discussions at any time should this seem useful.
The House will, I know, share my concern about the serious effects of the strike on the public and I will make another statement the moment there is anything further to report.
Is it not a fact that the right hon. Gentleman only moved at all because Mr. Victor Feather offered his services to both sides? Is it not a rather undignified position for the right hon. Gentleman to be in, that he attempts to use his conciliation services only to outflank Mr. Victor Feather?
Is not the right hon. Gentleman misleading the House when he suggests that although he was willing to hold joint discussions both sides—that is, including the unions—thought that they would not be of any useful purpose at this stage?
Is it not a fact that the union has made it clear that it is in a position of flexibility and that it is the Post Office that is standing rigid? Is it not clear that the union would welcome joint discussions under the chairmanship of the right hon. Gentleman as soon as possible? Will he please bring pressure to bear on both sides to get talking round the table?
No, that is not so. I tested this out very carefully with Mr. Jackson yesterday evening and he said, as I stated in my original statement, that he did not feel that any joint discussion under my chairmanship or in any other form could be any use unless he first knew that the Post Office was prepared to increase its offer.
That is rather different.
It is not different at all. I made this absolutely clear in my statement. I explained that the Post Office is equally firm that while it will go to arbitration it cannot, for the reasons that I summarised to the House, increase its offer, because it is certain that that would mean a substantial further increase in charges. It believes that that, coming on top of the big ones which are due in a fortnight, would lead to a downward spiral in its volume of business to the detriment both of the public and the longer-term interest of its staff. That is the position of deadlock. As I said in my statement, neither side is prepared to move.
As to the first part of the right hon. Lady's question, I should have hoped that her object might be to promote peace rather than strife in this matter. It is a nonsensical suggestion that she made, which is nothing but mischievous. The leader of the union in question went out of his way at the first meeting, when he asked me to report to the House as I did, and again last night, to express satisfaction at the rôle I and my Department had played.
Honest Bob.
Both sides knew after the first meeting that I was available at any moment. I am ready to intervene whenever there is a sign of movement. I did not believe that there was any chance of movement, but in view of what was said I thought that there might be. If there is any chance that there might be any movement I regard it as my duty to intervene.
Is it not obvious that very little additional work of value can be done either by the House or the Government in this unfortunate dispute at present? Does not my right hon. Friend agree that it is now time for both sides to reconsider their position, particularly in the light of the arbitration procedure and the vicious damage which the dispute is doing to the economy?
I asked both sides last night to report the position and consider it further, the Post Office with its full board and the union with its full executive.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the unilateral abandonment of the principle of wage comparability by the Post Office Board has created great bitterness throughout the Post Office trade union movement? Is he also aware that if levels of pay in the Post Office are to depend upon ability to pay it will be very unfair for the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications to give directions that charges should not increase, and that it will be very unreasonable to expect Post Office staff to maintain socially desirable but uneconomic services?
I must maintain my own responsibilities in this and not be drawn too widely. The hon. Gentleman and the House should realise that perhaps the biggest increases in charges in history, certainly in my memory, are to come into force in a fortnight. Of course, I understand the sincerity of feeling of the union on behalf of its members. That is why the difference between the two sides is both simple and very difficult to bridge, because on the one hand— [Interruption.] If the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) is anxious for prices to go up, perhaps he will get up and say so. We are in a dilemma here. The employers feel that they have made improvements in pay and conditions which, including their present offer as it stands, will add about £120 million a year to their costs. They have already put upon the public the very big increase which is coming in a fortnight's time. If they increased their offer further that would mean a further increase in prices. They genuinely believe that that would not only be unpopular with the public, but genuinely believe that it would lead to a reduction in their volume of business, which would rebound in the longer term to the disadvantage of their staff.
While sharing my right hon. Friend's great concern over this strike, may I ask whether he does not agree that it is bearing hardest on pensioners? Could not a temporary arrangement be made with the banks to enable the pensioners to cash their pensions?
I personally hope that the union will continue to make it possible and do all it can to see that, despite the strike, pensioners are not left without their pensions. So far the union has gone out of its way to do this, and I hope its members will continue to do so. I think that is how we should leave it for now.
Is there not a fundamental inconsistency in the Post Office's attitude? The right hon. Gentleman has twice repeated that it is willing to go to arbitration, although it considers that its 8 per cent. offer is fair. If it is prepared to go to arbitration, does not that imply that it is prepared to consider the consequences of an increase over and above the 8 per cent? If it is prepared to consider that increase, as it must be if it is prepared to go to arbitration, would it not be more helpful if it would say so now and start negotiations?
The position of the Post Office, as I understand it, is that it believes its case to be a good one, that it is prepared to go to arbitration and that its case would be upheld. [HON. MEMBERS: "What if it were not?"] If it were not upheld, the Corporation has said that it would abide by the result. It has emphasised, of course, that if there were to be an increase on the offer it would have to ask for further increases in prices. This view is as sincerely held on the employer's side as the union's case is on the union's side. [Interruption.] The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff, South-East intervenes again. I would have thought that he would have realised by now that whoever occupied my position should not express views in favour of one side or the other in matters of this kind. [Interruption.] Hon. Members opposite may hoot, but they should, bear in mind that the union—and this is not always the case—is very satisfied indeed in this case with the part I and my Department have played.
That may be a matter for the House to decide eventually, but I hope that we can at least agree now about one thing—and that is that we want this dispute to end. I believe that further questioning and debate in the House would not be in the best interests of the situation at the moment. Let us have a post mortem afterwards, if hon. Members so wish. I will bear my responsibilities and stand up for my actions. In the meantime, I hope that we can all accept that the less we say about the matter at the moment the better, except to say that the sooner the strike is settled the better.
Is not the crux of the matter that the Post Office contends that the union's claim would result in a 9d. post while the union says that it would not? Has my right hon. Friend had the chance to consider the suggestion I put to him last week—that a firm of chartered accountants acceptable to both sides be called in to make a detailed cost investigation and to report?
I will consider that and any other suggestions. The real difficulty at the moment is that there is no willingness on the one side to accept arbitration of any kind. I have, particularly in my talks both on the first occasion and again yesterday, asked the union whether it would consider not only arbitration within the terms of its agreement with the Post Office but any other form or guise or any similar sort of process. So far it is adamant in saying that it would not be willing to accept it.
rose —
rose
If the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) does not mind, I will call several of his hon. Friends who have risen several times.
Is not the simple fundamental question whether the postal workers are receiving a just wage? If they are not, they should be given a just wage, no matter what happens to the charges. That is the morality of the case.
That is a simple statement which, in its simple form, I dare say the great majority of people would agree with. But what people have not yet discovered how to do, in this or any other country that I am aware of, is how to find the impartial authority that will lay down a scale of relativities which seem to be just in all the circumstances. If that were so, life would be much easier but that is not the case and the hon. Gentleman must know that it is not.
Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the great majority of my constituents are either low-paid workers on the land or retired people living on fixed incomes, and that they regard the present rash of wage demands, of which this is only one, as posing a frightening threat to their standard of living?
This does raise the kernel of the problem—that if we continue with the present cost inflation everyone will suffer. All of us should bear some regard to charges and costs which lead directly to increased prices. I believe that we must also bear in mind that the rate of money increase really has to be considered very carefully in this and every other industry.
My remark which led the right hon. Gentleman to ask whether I was in favour of increased prices and if so why I did not say so was that otherwise there would be an unjust settlement. This is surely the case and I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he has a view that he should express. Is not he aware of the fact that, since 1953, wages in the Post Office and the rest of the public service have been fixed on the basis of comparability and that there has been no departure from that principle as far as I know by this Government? If he is not departing from it, the Post Office workers clearly are entitled to more than 8 per cent. If he is departing from that, he should say so.
It was the right hon. Gentleman's own Government who passed the legislation hiving off the Post Office as a public corporation charged, like all other public corporations are, with certain financial duties and targets. It has to consider the charges it can make and the business it can acquire as a result of charges, and it cannot divorce itself of that responsibility. The right hon. Gentleman talks about a just wage. That, like the point raised by the hon. Member for Thurrock (Mr. Delargy), is an extremely difficult concept. He will remember that the Labour Government for years resisted pressure, when they had a statutory prices and incomes policy, to defie what constituted a low-paid worker. They consistently refused to do so. The Post Office includes some low-paid workers, but compared, for example, with local authorities or some other sectors we have dealt with recently its workers are not in general low-paid.
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On at least four occasions the Secretary of State seems to have gone out of his way to plead the employer's case. He has not seen fit—
Order. I must warn the hon. Gentleman that he must come quickly to a point of order if he begins like that.
Is this a proper way of maintaining a judicial impartiality?
That is not a matter for the Chair. We must now move on.
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF (STATEMENT)
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter which should have urgent consideration. namely, The statement by General Sir Geoffrey Baker, Chief of the General Staff, that he would like to see British soldiers fighting in Vietnam alongside Australians as in two world wars. It is specific in that according to the Daily Telegraph, General Baker was attending. an official Press conference in Canberra. It is important since it is out of keeping with the British political tradition that generals, however eminent, should make loaded political statements—contrary to Government policy.
Above all, it is urgent, as in the present critical situation in Laos and Cambodia it may well be desirable for the British Government to seek to act as a mediator as a co-chairman of the Geneva Convention. Any hope, however slender, of a successful mediation would be jeopardised if the Government failed to repudiate statements such as that of General Baker, who said: I am very sorry indeed Australian troops have been fighting on their own. This issue raises some rather deep other issues both of relations between senior officers and the Government, and British foreign policy in South-East Asia.
The hon. Member asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter which he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely, The statement by General Sir Geoffrey Baker, Chief of the General Staff, that he would like to see British soldiers fighting in Vietnam alongside Australians as in two world wars. Under Standing Order No. 9, Mr. Speaker is directed to take account of the various factors set out in that Order but not to pronounce on the merits or to give any reasons for his decision. I have given consideration to the hon. Gentleman's representations, but I have to rule that his statement does not fall within the provisions of the Standing Order and I therefore cannot submit his application to the House. We must get on to the Orders of the Day.
Further to that point of order.
Mr. Speaker has ruled.
On a point of order, if it is possible to raise a point of order by courtesy of Government supporters. Of course we accept your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, but, as the right hon. Gentleman is present, would it be possible to ask whether, as the Leader of the House will have taken note of the concern obviously felt in some quarters about what must be a matter of some constitutional importance, it would be possible for the appropriate Minister to make a statement on the matter in the near future?
That is not a point of order. However, I have no doubt that the Leader of the House will have noted what the right hon. Gentleman has said.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
[THIRD ALLOTTED DAY]
Considered in Committee [Progress, 28th January].
[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]
Clause 32
PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
3.55 p.m.
I beg to move Amendment No. 658, in page 22, line 40, leave out from' (a) to end of subsection and insert: 'is made in writing after the commencement of this Act shall be conclusively presumed not to be intended by the parties to be a legally enforceable contract unless the agreement contains a provision which states that it is the intention of the parties that the agreement should be a legally enforceable contract'.
It may be for the convenience of the Committee if we also discuss the following Amendments:
No. 705, in page 23, line 3, at end insert: 'and (c) contains a provision that the agreement is of specified duration'. No. 661, in page 23, line 6, leave out subsection (2).
The Opposition Amendment is the opposite of the Government's proposal. The Government propose that all agreements are to be presumed to be legally binding unless otherwise specified. We would make it clear that all agreements should not be legally enforceable unless the parties concerned clearly specify otherwise.
On this, as on most other issues in the Bill, there is a fundamental difference between the Government and the Opposition. The Donovan Commission devoted the whole of Chapter 8 of its Report to the subject of the enforcement of collective agreements. In paragraph 506 it said: We thus reject the proposal to make collective agreements—whether substantive or procedural—enforceable at the present time. We do so, not because we think the law could not in any circumstances assist in the reduction of the number of unofficial strikes. It cannot do so in this country today—this is the point. To take steps in this direction today would be not only useless but harmful, and they would undo a great deal of the good we hope to see done through the reform of the collective bargaining system which we recommend. I stress that the words in the Donovan Report are "useless" and "harmful". Yet the Government, particularly the Solicitor-General, in a speech to, I think, the Industrial Society at the weekend, and the Secretary of State, have often said that their proposals are based on the Donovan Report. On this, as on most other issues, in fact it says the opposite. The Government have ignored the Donovan Report on this as on the subject of the closed shop.
The Government may argue that legal enforceability has helped to stop unofficial strikes in other countries, but in the United States, for example, where the enforceability of contracts and agreements was introduced in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, there has been no change in the number of unofficial strikes. The Clause is a great leap in the dark, and it will cause only unpleasantness and confusion for employers, trade unions and work people. It is a guarantee that from now on we shall not have any substantive agreements in British industry.
We all know that industry is undergoing a major social change. Everybody accepts that and it has been discussed in the House frequently. I put it to Government supporters: how can a trade union official in the circumstances of a major social change in industry commit his members and his union not to allowing a breach of procedure? It is not realistic and the fact is that it is most unlikely in any case that employers will wish their hands tied on such issues as the status quo.
The hon. Gentleman used the expression "breach of procedure". Did he mean "breach of agreement"?
4.0 p.m.
The point is that I am talking about substantive agreements at this time. The next Clause will deal with procedure agreements and if I did use tae word "procedure" I was meaning the collective agreements at present under discussion. I cannot think that I did use the word "procedure", but in any case there is a very close connection and when we are talking about collective agreements we are talking about agreements which are both substantive and procedural agreements. In British agreements it will be discovered that there is no distinction between the two.
The hon. Gentleman obviously does not understand that when agreements are drawn up in British industry there is usually no great distinction between the substantive and procedural agreement. At this stage we are in basic terms talking about the substantive agreement.
If trade union officials and employers are not likely to allow their hands to be tied, what can the results be? Instead of promoting authoritative, comprehensive and written agreements at the level where power lies, that is at plant and factory floor level—and the making of such agreements has been developing fast since Donovan—such agreements will come to a grinding halt. It is true that the employers could make a mockery of the law and they may well do so. They could say that in every agreement there should be written into it a provision that it shall not be legally enforceable. This is what the trade unions will insist upon.
What an absurd situation. By their policy the Government are ensuring that any employer who really wants an agreement in industry has to be a party to a statement which in practice detracts from the commitment to the agreement. At the same time the Government say that they are concerned about unofficial strikes. I do not know how they can say that and yet put forward a proposal which virtually means that we are not likely to get agreements in industry. It is clear that the Government's proposals are not designed to get up-to-date agreements but to ensure that we continue with agreements which are in some cases totally out of date.
We have a situation developing in the engineering industry and no doubt some of my hon. Friends who are acquainted with that industry will wish to develop this point. At the moment, discussion is going on within that industry and trade unions are saying that they are not prepared to accept an agreement unless there is a Clause saying that it shall not be legally binding. Let us look at the York Agreement of 1922, which the unions have consistently tried to change. That agreement is out of date. It is an agreement whereby works conferences take up to four weeks, central conferences take from ten to 23 weeks and often there is a complete failure to agree and the whole issue is referred back to plant or local level.
We all accept that such an agreement requires to be drastically revised. The Government's proposals will not help in any way to bring about such a revision. One of the serious side-effects of making agreements legally enforceable will be that the trade unions will be turned into policemen and will be policing their own members. They will become disciplinary bodies over their rank and file and if the unions wish to avoid that then obviously they can ensure that there shall be no legally binding agreements.
Imagine what would happen inside the trade union movement if the policing regulations were brought into operation. We could have the ridiculous situation which developed in the Swedish mining industry in 1969. Miners were on unofficial strike and so that the unions could avoid being affected by the action of their members the local trade union official was the only man working at the mine. We could have that sort of ridiculous situation here.
We ought to get away from these absurdities because they make no contribution whatever towards solving our industrial relations problem. I recognise that this Clause will be welcomed by the lawyers. As the Conservative pamphlet "A Giant's Strength", issued by the Conservative Lawyers' Association in 1959, said: As lawyers we are very conscious that the unions have little cause for gratitude to our profession. If this Clause goes through they will certainly have less cause than they have had in the past and they certainly have not had much in the past.
Will my hon. Friend take note of the fact that this will not be welcomed by the lawyers because it is the very contrary to what judges have declared to be the law today?
I must tell my hon. and learned Friend that I was not referring to all lawyers. As has been said on this side of the Committee, many lawyers are opposed to this, but it is interesting to note that the basis for these current proposals arose from the Tory Lawyers' Association. They were developed later by "Fair Deal at Work" and ultimately embodied in the Bill.
What the right hon. Gentleman and some of his Friends have been doing is nipping across to America and coming back with some pretty ill-digested snippets from United States law and then urging them on the Tory Party which ultimately brings them here to embody into British law. Again I would like to point out to the right hon. Gentleman that conditions are not the same in the United States and it is about time he understood this. There are other people who have had very real experience in the United States and whose voice should be heard on this.
Professor Harry Wellington, a leading American professor concerned with industrial relations problems, in giving oral evidence to the Donovan Commission, Day 41, pages 1757–8, said: What is accomplished by making the collective agreement an enforceable contract? … The answer, it seems to me, is that little if anything positive comes out of this, while a great deal detrimental to the system of private ordering results. Accordingly, on balance, I would favour not making the agreements enforceable. — When we bring the law to bear there is pressure towards uniformity and it tends to undermine the benefit that comes from diversity. Our basic objections to enforceability are these. First, agreements would become inflexible and rigid. There could be a build-up of resentment. Secondly, enforceability could lead to longer strikes. Hon. Members opposite accept that it will not settle strikes. There could be more unofficial strikes and longer strikes. They would be more difficult to settle and there would be the involvement of the whole legal apparatus.
The hon. Gentleman is making categorical statements about what would flow from enforceability. But the authority he quoted said that only "on balance" did he favour not making agreements enforceable. It seems that the hon. Gentleman is out of balance in drawing conclusions from the quotation.
If somebody seriously considers a particular question and then, on balance, comes down against it, it is clear that he thinks that the balance is on that side. That is all that I am saying. On the basis of an understanding of the law as it operates in the United States, Professor Wellington comes out against it, on balance. I should have thought that that should have been taken into consideration by the Minister as well as all the evidence which has been built up that enforcing agreements is not the way to achieve happy industrial relations.
Our third basic objection to the enforceability of agreements is this. The unions could be transformed into policemen and disciplinary bodies. Enforceability could lead to internal conflict in the unions, creating tensions, and ultimately to break-away unofficial bodies.
Fourthly, enforceability would involve a whole series of legal problems if the contracts were made enforceable. Let me give an example of the legal problems. Who would be "the parties" to the agreement? A party to a legal contract must be either a human person or a legal person. It is clear that a great deal of argument and confusion could arise on this point.
We believe that the Government's proposals add absolutely nothing to solving the problem of improving agreements either procedural or substantial. This is a further example of the Government making dogmatic proposals which will in no way help to solve the real difficulties of industrial relations. Therefore, I urge my hon. Friends to give the fullest support to the Amendment.
We are not saying that there should not be any legally enforceable contracts at any time. We are saying that that is a matter for the parties concerned. If they so desired, obviously they could decide that a contract should be legally enforceable, although the general feeling in the trade union movement is against any type of legally enforceable contract. There may be a feeling that certain specific agreements should be legally enforceable. We are saying the opposite of what the Government are saying. They are saying that all agreements should be legally enforceable unless there is contracting out. We say that if one believes in the principle of voluntary agreements and agrees with the principle of the voluntary establishment of industrial relations the Amendment is sensible and the Clause should be rejected.
4.15 p.m.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer) started by saying frankly and fairly that the intention of the Amendment was to reverse the basic provision in the Bill. One could understand that if the content of the Bill was an irrebuttable presumption that all collective agreements should be enforceable in law. But that is not what is said in Clause 32. What is said there is that there will be only a presumption which is not only rebuttable but rebuttable at the will of the parties stated in the simplest form. A presumption in such a limited and rebuttable form is in harmony with the normal pattern and working of our national life and with the evolution of our law and practice; and it will not prove injurious to collective bargaining in general or the trade union movement in particular.
It does not follow that all actions in human life which are ultimately regulated by the law are therefore conducted with close regard to the legal consequences at every point. They are in no way overshadowed and oppressed by the legal provisions which are there as a card of last resort and have been found to be the prerequisite of a free and ordered society. With the vast majority of agreements in this country, apart from agreements of a purely social character, there is an irrebuttable presumption that they should be enforceable at law. But no question of enforceability ever arises in the vast majority of cases. The agreements are made, they are intended to be honoured at the time of their making and they are in fact honoured. Legal enforceability is there only in reserve, necessary in the case of the defaulter and promise-breaker but innocuous and unnoticed in the vast majority of cases.
We must ask ourselves whether there is anything so inherently different in a collective agreement of this sort as to make it an exception to that normal practice. If it were so, it could be found only in the nature of the matters the subject of the agreement or in the fact that they are collective. The normal subject matter of a collective agreement is in regard to the rewards to be paid for work done—one of the most ordinary subject matters of contract.
The law, rightly, never compels anybody to work for an employer if he does not want to do so. No action for specific performance of a contract of personal service lies in English law, and that is reflected in the Bill, at Clause 114, which, quite properly, specifically enacts that safeguarding provision in the Bill. Clause 114 says: No court shall, whether by way of— (a) an order for specific performance or specific implement of a contract of unployment, or (b) an injunction or interdict restraining a breach or threatened breach of such a contract, compel an employee to do any work or to attend at any place for the purpose of doing any work." So that fundamental and wise safeguard of principle is enshrined in the Bill. Does the hon. Gentleman wish to put a point to me about action for specific performance of contracts of personal service?
Everyone accepts that no one is going to be forced to return to work, but what will happen is this: if the workers have broken an agreement by taking unofficial action in one or another they can then be brought before the courts to pay compensation. While they cannot be forced back to work they can be made to pay compensation, and if they refuse to pay compensation they can be put in gaol.
With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I am coming to the pattern of the Bill in the context of the provisions for legal enforceability. I am coming to that in a moment. It does mirror to this extent the general pattern of the law. The law, as I said, does not in any event provide for specific performance of contract for personal services; there is no obligation, no requirement, to return to work; and quite properly so. What the law does is to provide machinery for the interpretation of agreements, damages for proved loss—and proved loss only—and injunctions to restrain a breach where monetary compensation is an insufficient remedy. That is the background of the law against which the provisions of the Bill are to be judged, and that pattern, that remedy, has been found necessary for the small minority of cases where the intervention of the law is required. It has been found over the years to be the minimum requirement for sanctity of contract in any free society less simple than the Garden of Eden and less perfect than Paradise.
Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman, as a lawyer, not recognise, when he talks about the sanctity of contract, that by later Clauses directly relating to this issue it will be possible for the Industrial Court, following a C.I.R. recommendation, to enforce a contract on both sides, making it legally binding? That is a complete reversal of the basic British common law.
I am coming to that. I am dealing at the moment with the provisions of this Clause 32, and the presumption there which, clearly, can be negatived at the will, however informally expressed, of the parties; we are dealing here only with the cases where the parties have not seen fit to make use of that easy and informal procedure.
Against that background we have to ask ourselves whether there is anything to make it inappropriate that that should be the procedure in regard to collective agreements, when it is the universal experience that it is necessary for individual agreements. I would submit that in logic and principle, the answer must be, No. The requirement of legal enforceability as a card of last resort can hardly be less in a case of collective agreement where the danger of breach is aggravated by the possibility of minority or irresponsible action.
I want to take up the hon. Gentleman's reference to the Donovan Report. He cited paragraph 506, and read out extracts, quite fairly—there is no complaint about that—including the words enforceable at the present time". You read it very well. "At the present time" is not, of course, 1st February, 1971.
Not "you". My hon. Friend.
Order. The hon. Gentleman must not interject from a sitting position.
rose —
I take the hon. Member's point.
What I said, Sir Robert, was that the right hon. and learned Gentleman referred to "you" and he should have said my hon. Friend.
It is immaterial what the hon. Member said. What is material is where he said it from.
The hon. Gentleman's intervention was unconventionally done, as is not unexpected, but he was also right, and that, perhaps, is a little more unexpected.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Walton read quite correctly, but my point is that, quite clearly, "at the present time" is not 1st February, 1971. It is some date earlier than June 1968, and as a good deal has happened in those three years, the Committee has to ask itself whether the basic premise on which the Donovan Commission proceded holds good today or not.
At paragraph 462 it said: Unofficial strikes in breach of a collective agreement are very rare, and offer no urgent problem of legislation or otherwise. The whole basis of the thinking of Donovan was that we were concerned only with very short-term procedural unofficial disputes.
In 1971 there is a good deal of concern in regard to much larger matters than that, and it is in the context of 1971 that we must look at these matters. The hon. Gentleman did not quote paragraph 502 of the Donovan Report: We are not in principle opposed to the use of legal sanctions for the enforcement of agreed procedures. So it was at that date that the Commission rejected it, without prejudice, therefore, to the general position. In any event the Committee does not regard the Donovan Report as Holy Writ. We accept some of it on both sides, and on both sides we differ from some of it.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman has done me the courtesy to state that I read the whole paragraph in full and that I was very fair.
Not all of 502.
If the right hon. and learned Gentleman will go on with paragraph 502 he will see: At the present time legislation making procedure agreements legally enforceable would not in fact be enforced, and like all legislation that is not enforced would bring the law into disrepute.
I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. That does not derogate from the point I was making. The sentence he has read is governed by the opening words "At the present time". The point I am concerned about is that the Commission did not necessarily find the general principle obnoxious.
I have a great respect for the members of the Donovan Commission and in particular great respect and personal regard for its Chairman, but, as I was saying, we do not necessarily, in any event, take everything they say as Holy Writ, and on this particular point there is a stronger case, in my view, for legal enforceability than appears from Donovan.
It is a case which is reinforced by the general experience of group agreements. After all, in the ordinary way, if people group together to make an agreement or to take action, so far from narrowing responsibility they widen it. This is the basis of partnership law, the joint and several responsibility, responsibility not only for one's own deeds but those of one's fellows. It was the original basis of company law in the days of unlimited liability, and when it was changed it was not by way of excluding the collective entity from legal liability, but the reverse; it was by way of concentrating responsibility on the collective entity in order to safeguard and immunise the individual member. That is the general pattern, and it is difficult, against that, to see how there can be any objection in principle, whatever may be said as to convenience, to making collective agreements enforceable.
4.30 p.m.
The general principle of concentration on the collective entity is again followed in the Bill. There is to be no action against individual members. The Bill goes even further: officials are expressly exempt from action under Clause 90(5), provided that what they are doing is in the scope of their duty.
If we have regard to what is proposed to be done, we see that nothing can happen if the parties make use of their right to take the agreement out of the presumption as to legal enforceability. If the parties at the time of making the agreement decide not to take it out of the presumption of legal enforceability—in other words, at the time of signing the agreement they mean it to be kept and expect to be kept—and if, in spite of that expectation, there is a breach of the agreement, what is the position in that small minority of cases? A complainant can take the matter to the Industrial Court under Clause 90—a court with a judicial presidency and a balanced composition.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is joking.
I ask the hon. Gentleman to be objective about this. There is no reason in principle why the Industrial Court should not act as fairly, objectively and effectively as the similar Restrictive Practices Court with a similar basis.
The jurisdiction the Court will have is analagous to the ordinary pattern. It is set out in Clause 90(3)—a declaration as to interpretation of the rights of the parties, an order for compensation, or an order in the nature of an injunction. Before any order is made, the court must first find that the complaint is justified; in other words, the onus is on the complainant to show an unfair industrial practice. Even when that onus is satisfied, the remedy is still discretionary, as the Committee will see from Clause 90(2): if the application is well-founded, the Court may, if it considers that it would be just and equitable to do so… So even when the onus is discharged there is still a discretion in the Court.
Then, if and only if after all that, it comes to an award of compensation, compensation is doubly limited. It is limited, first, to the loss actually sustained after the duty of mitigating loss has been performed, and again only to the extent that is just and equitable in all the circumstances". That is Clause 102(1). It is limited, second, by the monetary limits set out in Clause 103.
I believe that legal enforceability, so limited, so qualified and so circumscribed, is appropriate and will be beneficial in the context of collective agreements. After all, history shows us that there is always a tendency for large institutions to wish to opt out of the normal forms and processes of the law. The nation has not gone along with that. In most cases, with the passage of time the institutions have come to agree that it is right that they should be brought within the law. The general view—not only the lawyers' view—of the British people is that no organisation is so mighty as to be outside the law.
The hon. Member for Walton referred to lawyers in this context. I assure him that I have no wish to see the activities of the law increased as such. I believe that legal enforceability operates at its best when it is not used, when it is no more than a background to help the parties define and honour the intentions that they hold and the agreement that they have expressed. But if the law is expelled altogether, there is then the inevitable danger of private courts, unsatisfactory processes, and the like.
The older Members of the House may remember that in my shared ministerial responsibility for the Restrictive Trade Practices Act I made speeches at the Dispatch Box on this very theme of getting rid of those private courts in the context of restrictive practices. Therefore, my approach owes nothing to the desire to expand the activities of the law.
Then perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman would do something to get rid of the lawyers' private court while he is about it.
I take note of the hon. Gentleman's suggestion.
Answer it.
If the hon. Gentleman is referring to the disciplinary processes of the Bar, he will know that they have undergone a radical improvement and alteration in recent years. If he does not believe that, he should ask his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), who knows.
Still less is my approach to the Bill due to any desire to injure trade unions or employers' organisations. On the contrary, I am a friend of collective bargaining and both parties to it, and wish it well. I was brought up in the atmosphere of collective bargaining. My father was engaged in it for many years, as one hon. Member opposite at any rate knows very Well from his hereditary connection with the same industry. I therefore had an early opportunity to know of the personal friendly relations and the mutual esteem and regard that existed between people sitting on opposite sides of the table. In my own case it had the very happy result that when I entered the House of Commons I was privileged to enjoy the friendship of some of the great veterans of the trade union movement who were still Members of the House in those days.
It is in no spirit of hostility but quite the reverse, because I believe that what is sought to be done will strengthen and increase the stature of collective bargaining and trade unions alike, that I support the proposals of my right hon. Friend and the retention of this basic provision in the Bill.
The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) proved too much. If indeed these provisions are so easily rebutted, why are the Government going to all this trouble to put them into the Bill? I have the greatest respect for the right hon. and learned Gentleman's advice. He and I have been in this place for a quarter of a century, and I fully accept from him that it is not done with any malice. However, it puts a very different complexion on the Clause if eminent lawyers are of the opinion that there are no teeth whatever in this provision. If it is so fantastically easy to rebut that to which someone has put his signature, the whole thing is a waste of time from beginning to end.
I did not suggest that anybody would go against what he had put his signature to. I said that the Bill makes it very easy in a very informal way for the parties to agree that there should not be any collective enforceability.
I am obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I think it comes down to what I was arguing.
We are now in a difficult period in which parties have undertaken bargaining at national level and there is the strongest opposition by the T.U.C. and executives of trade unions to making a contract legally binding. As a matter of national bargaining, I imagine that there new activity is to take place against a will be very few agreements in which the trade union side will not insist on a provision that it should not be legally binding. Indeed, it would appear from what one reads that, as discussions on this Bill go on and on, employers' associations are becoming less enamoured of its contents. Indeed, it is by no means clear that opposition to making contracts legally binding is to be found only on the trade union side.
Factory agreements are of far greater consequence and are more widely indulged in than once was the case. The vast majority of trade unions do not permit of factory agreements to come into operation until they have been ratified by the trade unions themselves. In large measure the national executives for many years have not insisted on vetting all factory agreements. I suppose that I have concluded more agreements at factory level than has any other Member of this House. None of these agreements was ever vetted at district or national level. We in the factories had a great reputation for being able to look after ourselves in the matter of agreements. However, if there is now to be an onus of legal responsibility on trade unions then most of the unions will insist on the letter of the law as comprised in their rules books and will not allow shop stewards' organisations to finalise arrangements until the union itself has had the opportunity, not only to vet the arrangement, but also to seek legal advice upon it. This will mean a fantastic delay.
What will happen in the meantime? In many instances the men on the shop floor will know that an arrangement has been made. If many weeks are allowed to past before ratification of those arrangements there will be sheer chaos in a number of the larger firms in industry. The general strategy of both the Labour Party and the present Government is aimed at trying to obtain factory arrangements and create negotiating machinery where there at present is none, and to improve machinery which is defective. I am sure we all hope that where there has been no satisfactory negotiating machinery in a factory or an industry before such machinery will now begin to spring up. It follows that as a result many managements and shop stewards will be new to the difficult problems of industrial negotiation. If all this background of possible legal action, this will surely retard progress. I had the task of dealing with large numbers of inexperienced people both in management and on the shop floor during a period of crisis in the last war. They had to be supervised much more stringently than would be the case with more experienced negotiators. We then had certain legal obligations because of essential work orders and that sort of thing, but we did not have the lawyers breathing down our necks, as I suggest will happen when and if this Bill becomes law. This legislation will retard rather than advance the quality of negotiation and will delay the rapidity with which such agreements can be made.
My hon. Friend for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) mentioned the great changes which are taking place in the engineering industry involving three or four million people because of the fact that the York Memorandum of 1922 is now obsolete. Indeed, a great many organisations which were brought into being in 1922 are obsolete both politically and industrially.
No.
4.45 p.m.
When arrangements made nearly 50 years ago are now in the melting pot—arrangements in which the trade unions have pressed for a change for a great many years—it would seem that employers are now agreeable to certain changes taking place. If the parties now have to conclude a new set of arrangements, bath nationally and locally, at a time where there is fear and uncertainty—and there will certainly be uncertainty as a result of the speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East—on the part of the trade unions, I consider that this kind of legislation will retard and possibly make the situation even worse.
It has already done so.
My hon. Friend says that it has already done so. I am not referring so much to uncertainties in the sense of this legislation. I am on the point whether the law can bite on arrangements made in factories and can retard and obstruct deliberately arrangements which in many cases involve the difference between men carrying on with their work and going on strike. I prophesy that, if this is to be the way in which this kind of legislation is to be enacted, then because of its very existence we shall probably see more unofficial strikes taking place. I ask the Secretary of State to think again and to agree to our Amendments.
[Mr. GODMAN IRVINE in the Chair]
I hope that my hon. and learned Friend in his reply will take up the point made by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) as to what is a legal entity. I regard this as an important matter. As I understand the situation, once the Bill is enacted and trade unions are registered they will then become legal entities. It would be helpful if we could have that confirmed.
I confirm that now. The Committee will see that matter set out in Clause 70.
I am obliged to my right hon. Friend. In listening to speeches made from the Labour benches, it seems to me that Donovan is regarded as a sort of latter-day god. But not everything in that Report could be accepted on all sides of the Committee. There was much that was obviously good, and obviously some which was at least debatable in terms of modern industry.
I thought that the arguments put forward by the hon. Member for Walton were reprehensible in the extreme. Why should all other sections of the community be liable in law for their actions and agreements while the trade unions can choose such conditions and situations as they like but remain outside the law?
They are not outside the law.
Perhaps hon. Gentlemen opposite have not read the Amendment which they are putting down this afternoon. I commend it to their attention.
Surely, as the Opposition have Donovan on their side in this debate, there is something to be said for their case.
Throughout the whole of the industrial life of this country, an Englishman's word has been his bond. One can go to the Baltic, Lloyds, or the Stock Exchange, and one will find that agreements are entered into by word of mouth, with no paper exchanges. Throughout the world a level of integrity in British business men and professions has been built up which has been the envy of the world.
We make these agreements and we expect to honour them. We do not make agreements and at some stage unilaterally say that they are not something with which we can go on any longer. But that is what is happening in industry today.
Rubbish.
The right hon. Gentleman should not say "rubbish". He should look at what is happening now in the Ford Motor Company. An agreement was entered into between the Ford Motor Company and the shop stewards and trade unions which was to carry on until 1st March of this year, and the men have gone out on strike on Thursday, Friday and again today. That is an absolute outrage and a breach of an agreement entered into by the unions and the management.
Is the hon. Gentleman not aware that workers in the motor car industry work on a belt system? Who decides the speed of a belt? Has the hon. Gentleman never considered that the speeding up of a belt can cause an unofficial dispute or a walk-out, or that under those circumstances a legally enforceable contract would have no relevance to the reality of the shop floor situation.
That is a preposterous argument. What was thought to be a firm agreement was entered into by the Ford management and the trade union concerned. The agreement was to run until 1st March. The unions have gone on strike now, on 1st February, in breach of that agreement. Business in this or any other country cannot proceed on this basis. We expect contracts to be honoured. We expect managements to be sued if they are in breach of their contract. In management we enter into agreements freely after long negotiations and we expect to keep them. Equally we expect workers to do the same.
rose —
The basic trouble is that the trade unions at top level do not want to accept responsibility for their members. They have allowed the shop stewards movement to get completely out of hand. We have reached a situation where the tail is wagging the dog. This has been brought about because at the top level of trade unions we have had for years weak and vacillating men who are quite unable to control the militants within their movement. It is not in the interests of the shop stewards -movement to see this sort of legislation become law. Once it does, the responsibility Will revert td the management of the trade unions, where it should be. They will then become a legal entity and will be responsible for agreements which they enter into. That is vital for the well-being of our industry.
In every industry management has to make promises to its customers, whether at home or overseas. If unofficial strikes or unofficial action such as we are having today, especially at Fords, is carried on and perpetuated, then there will be no more confidence in British industry and industrial management.
I spend a lot of my life travelling abroad trying to get orders for this country. I am continually faced with the question from industrialists all over, "Can you keep your promises?" In the present industrial climate it is always very difficult to keep the promises that one makes, with a strike here, a strike there, and so on, and with the great majority of strikes unofficial.
Agreements must be freely negotiated, and when they are reached they should be as binding as any other agreement entered into by other sections of the community.
My right hon. and hon. Friends have dealt with the industrial relations aspect of these Clauses and the Amendment. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) dealt with the legal side, and it is right that a lawyer from these benches should answer what he has had to say. It seems that the points which he made were fundamentally unsound. The arguments which he put forward were based upon two principles. The first principle is that agreements freely entered into should be enforceable, and the second principle is that under the Bill these agreements are not so enforceable anyhow. I deal particularly with the first one, because that seems to be the more serious.
If the hon. and learned Gentleman is purporting to paraphrase my argument, he may wish to do so briefly but he should not do so unfairly. I did not put it like that. I said that legal enforceability as a last resort was a normal minimum requirement in life, and that there was no reason why in principle it should not be operated in the case of collective agreements. But under the Bill if the parties do not like it they have merely informally to express that view.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman drew attention to certain Clauses of the Bill, the effect of which is that these arrangements are not wholly enforceable but enforceable only by way of actions for damages. I was referring to that. But I leave that aside because I am more concerned with the first of these principles, that agreements freely entered into should be enforceable at law.
As a legal principle that is absolutely accurate. But the question is whether agreements of this kind are intended by the parties to be enforceable at law, because it is only agreements which are so intended which are enforceable according to our comon law. The courts have held that agreements of this kind are not intended by the parties to be enforceable at law. That is what has been decided by the courts.
5.0 p.m.
If that were in any way in doubt, I should pray in aid the views of the Donovan Commission, which was chaired by a distinguished lawyer. It said that agreements of this kind ought not to be regarded as being enforceable at law, and that can only be on the basis, and indeed was on the basis, apart from any industrial questions, that the parties do not so intend unless they specifically say so. Indeed, if the position were that an agreement of this kind was intended by the parties to be enforceable at law there would be no point in having this Clause at all, because it would be enforceable without a statutory provision to that effect.
But it goes much further than that, because when one looks at the definition of "collective agreement" in subsection (b) one finds that a collective agreement is not only an agreement but also an arrangement, and necessarily an arangement must be something, if it is to mean anything at all, which is even less intended by the parties to have binding force than an agreement would be intended. Thus, we have not only agreements which are not intended by the parties to have binding force being made enforceable at law by the Clause but something less than that, being by way of an arrangement.
But even that is not the end, because when one looks at what these collective agreements are deemed to consist of one is drawn to the provisions of Clause 34. One finds that by virtue of that Clause a collective agreement, which is, by virtue of the Bill, to be a legally enforceable contract, is to be so construed that it shall be an unfair industrial practice for any party to the agreement not to take all such steps as are reasonably practicable for the purposes … of preventing persons acting or purporting to act on behalf of that party from taking action in breach of the collective agreement or … where the party in question is an organisation, of preventing members of the organisation from taking any such action. Thus, for example, a group of employers, or organisations of employers, will, if they enter into an agreement of this kind, find written into the agreement by law a provision which requires them to take action in order to prevent a member of their organisation from acting in breach of it. That is the further provision which is written into these agreements when they are legally enforceable.
The effect of that is that in deciding whether the parties intend such agreements to be legally enforceable, one has to look not only at what they say but also at what is written into them by virtue of the provisions of Clause 34 imposing on the parties a duty, in addition to what is written into the agreements, to take all such steps as are reasonably practical in order to exercise some form of compulsion on their members, whether they are members of a group of trade unions or of a group of employers' organisations. Can one really feel that the parties to such an agreement or arrangement with that sort of term written into it would intend that such an arrangement or agreement shall be enforceable at law when they do not expressly say so, when it is already held by the courts that any procedural agreement or agreement between groups of trade unions or employers' organisations is not normally intended to be enforceable at law at all?
It follows from all that that the principle which the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East has advanced in favour of his suggestion that all we are doing is following the ordinary principles of common law is wholly contrary to the principles of the common law, and to the law as we now understand it.
I am obliged for the legal contributions that we have heard and, not being a lawyer, I am listening with great interest to the arguments from both sides. May I ask my hon. and learned Friend whether, when the Bill becomes an Act, many of the agreements made in industry, and particularly in the engineering industry, will have to be drawn up in the presence of lawyers on both sides?
If such an agreement is to be regarded as legally enforceable, if the consequences provided for by Clause 34 are to be written into it, and if the further penal consequences provided by later provisions of this Measure where there is a breach of contract and an unfair industrial practice are to follow, it will certainly be highly desirable for there to be advice available on both sides. I say "both sides" advisedly, because employers' organisations will equally be affected. In my view, it will be advisable for both sides to get advice from people who are legally qualified to give it. [Interruption.] I hope that hon. Members will have regard to the effect of industrial relations of that sort of situation.
I do not wish to take up any more of the Committee's time. I felt it right to deal with the legal side of the matter, because the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East, with all the authority that he commands on these matters, presented the case as though all that we were doing was sanctifying an already legal principle. The fact of the matter is that we are doing precisely the contrary, and I hope that when the Committee deals with the Amendment it will bear that strongly in mind.
I think it may help to speed the progress of the Committee if I intervene now, and if further points arise I or one of my hon. Friends will be prepared, if it is the wish of the Committee, to intervene again later.
It seems to me that on this subject the Opposition want to have their cake and eat it. On the one hand they say that this proposal will have no effect, that it is meaningless, that it is without influence, but in the next breath they say that it will have the most dire results. They cannot have it both ways. It either is effective or is not effective, and if it is to be effective, then we want to consider rather carefully what its effects will be, and I shall try to do that later.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman has got me mixed up with one of his hon. Friends.
In moving the Amendment the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer) called in aid the Donovan Report. I think that we had better get ourselves a bit straight about this Report. It sometimes amuses me to hear hon. Gentlemen opposite parading as disciples of Donovan. Are they in favour of the registration of unions? Are they in favour of appeal to an independent board or tribunal which has agreed union members? I could go on with many important proposals with which the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) once agreed in "In Place of Strife" and which hon. Gentlemen opposite have disowned. It is true that they, too, can point at some of my hon. Friends and say the same. The truth is that both sides of the Committee accept some of the Donovan proposals and reject others. Neither of us is really in a white sheet about this.
I think that what we can agree about is the basic analysis of the Donovan Report of the nature of the disease in British industrial relations which we ought to be attempting to cure. What Donovan drew attention to three years ago and said was peculiar to Britain and very serious is about twice as bad now as it was then. What I am referring to is the number of unofficial strikes, usually in breach of procedure agreements. That is what the Donovan Report unanimously drew attention to as being peculiar to the British situation, and particularly serious and urgently in need of being tackled.
I often hear the right hon. Gentleman talking about strikes. He is seeking to import segments of American law into our legislation. I draw to his attention the fact that General Motors, with 400,000 workers at 4,000 plants, was on strike for eight weeks last year, and during that period lost more days than we have lost in the past two years.
I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to the point that that was the first serious strike which General Motors had had for 24 years. I suspect that not only Lord Stokes but everybody who works for British Leyland, as well as the country as a whole, would be a lot better off if the same could be said of the British Leyland organisation. However, that is an issue apart from the one which we are discussing in the Amendment.
The hon. Member for Walton is entitled to say that the Donovan Report, at the time of publication in June, 1968, in paragraph 506 came down against making collective agreements legally binding. However, we are just as entitled to say that from the moment of publication we disagreed with Donovan and made out disagreement absolutely plain. We believe that events over the last three years have tended to strengthen our case.
Will the right hon. Gentleman go further and admit that the Conservative Party had already made up its mind in "Fair Deal at Work", irrespective of whatever Donovan came out with afterwards?
We had studied the problem long, carefully and fully. We felt fairly firm about our recommendation, and we saw nothing in Donovan to shake us on this point. We have had three years to consider Donovan. We saw nothing in the Donovan Report—we made this clear from the beginning— which persuaded us that Donovan was right and we were wrong. We believe that the events of the last three years have confirmed our view rather than the opposite.
It is fair to point out, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) pointed out in an outstandingly important speech laying down the principles which we are seeking to enact and the reasons for them, that in paragraph 502 the Donovan Commission made clear: We are not in principle opposed to the use of legal sanctions for the enforcement of agreed procedures. Donovan was not opposed to that in principle, but stated, in 1968, that it thought it inappropriate in practice.
The Donovan Report makes a number of references to this point; for example, paragraph 484, in which Sweden was being discussed. I will not take up time by quoting the whole paragraph. I paraphrase it, I think fairly, by saying that Donovan said, in effect, "If we in Britain could have written agreements as precise as in Sweden it might be that legal enforceability would be helpful, as it is already in Sweden." Donovan made clear that although it came down against that principle at the time, it was not opposed to legal enforceability in principle.
I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman does not want to be unfair. If he is to update Donovan to 1971, perhaps he will update the Swedish position to 1971. There has been a large and increasing number of unofficial disputes in Sweden.
That may be, but they are very much better than here. We should recollect that before the introduction of the present pattern of law, Sweden was affected by unofficial strikes just as much as we are, anyhow, for 30 to 40 years. The effect of a similar law in Sweden has almost completely cured this problem. The evidence from Sweden tends to be more on our side than on the side of hon. Gentlemen opposite.
Although Donovan recommended against legal enforceability in practice, it made clear that it was not opposed to it in principle. It was a practical judgment, not a judgment of principle. The practical judgment was made at times which, I believe, were very different from those in which we live today.
5.15 p.m.
I should now like to deal with some of the specific points raised by the hon. Member for Walton. The hon. Gentleman asked: how can union officials commit themselves not to allow their members to break agreements? Union officials cannot. Nor are they being asked to do this.
As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East pointed out, one cannot have a commitment to specific performance. The Bill makes clear that no individual worker can be compelled by a court to return to work or to suffer a penalty for not doing so. Even if the Bill did not make that clear, I understand that no court would find against a union official for failing to achieve specific performance by all the members on whose behalf he negotiated. Obviously, it would be grossly unfair. All that a union official can and is being asked to commit himself to is to use his best endeavours to see that an agreement which he makes on behalf of his members is honoured. We believe that if there were a more regular attempt to use best endeavours to achieve the honouring of agreements far more agreements would be kept and fewer broken than at present. We would not move from an imperfect world into a perfect one. We are talking about shifts in degree. We are in no doubt that if unions and officials right down the line feel themselves committed, when they have made an agreement, to take some positive, reasonable steps—they cannot be asked to do more—to see that agreements are kept, the position would be improved. It would not be perfect, but the position would be better than it is now.
Who will decide whether a trade union official has used his best endeavours? This is a debatable point. Somebody will have to decide whether he has or has not used his best endeavours. Who will decide that?
This is one of the rôles of the court in a disputed case. This is also one reason for these matters coming before new special courts—not old traditional courts—comprised of people with industrially sophisticated experience and knowledge. Not simply a judge or a lawyer, but a judge flanked by people with real knowledge and experience of industrial affairs. We have little doubt that in those circumstances reasonable opinions can be formed.
I must repeat what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East said; namely, that the effect of law is not only, or even mainly, in the use of the law, but the influence which its existence has on the way that people behave and carry on their business. That is always the major effect of the law for good or ill—we believe in this instance very much for good.
The hon. Member for Walton said that one objection to our proposal was that it would turn trade union officials into policemen and that they would be expected to discipline their members. I think that the hon. Gentleman should have exercised a little caution when he said that. I remind the hon. Gentleman of some words of his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition when he was Prime Minister. [Interruption.] Is not the present Leader of the Opposition the same person as the former Prime Minister? Or do hon. Gentlemen opposite believe that one changes when one changes sides in this House, so entitling one to stand on one's head?
That is what the right hon. Gentleman is doing.
At least I know I am standing on the same two feet and putting forward the same proposals from this side of the Committee as I did from the benches opposite. When Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition said: …it will place an obligation on the union or unions concerned to get them back to work. He went on later: In the cases I have mentioned, the T.U.C. will place an obligation on the unions concerned to get their members back to work. It will then be the duty of the unions concerned to do this, including, where appropriate, the use of their rule books"— Is not that the unions acting as policemen? The right hon. Gentleman went on: In this case there is an obligation, where it is needed, to use the rule book, including fines, suspensions and expulsion—which is a very serious punishment in a closed shop industry—where this is not carried out and the unions are not taking effective action."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th June, 1969; Vol. 785, c. 701–3.] That was the present Leader of the Opposition speaking in this House not 10 years ago but less than two years ago.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that my right hon. Friend was there referring to occasions when trade unions took action voluntarily and were responsible for deciding their own rules at their own conferences? Under the Bill, on the other hand, the rules will be drawn up and approved not merely by the unions but by the industrial relations commissioner and, if necessary, the registrar?
The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong about that. The then Prime Minister was speaking about the situation in the absence of a change in the law. He was saying that the unions should act as policemen, which is to what the hon. Member for Walton as objecting. The registrar will not write a union's rules, any more than he would have done under the proposals of the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn or the recommendations of the Donovan Commission. He will only be satisfied that the unions' rules say what it is wished they should say about certain specified subjects. Hon. Gentlemen opposite cannot argue that it is wrong for the unions to act as policemen when their Leader said that that is precisely what they should do.
Instead of getting involved in arguments about what was said in the past— [Interruption.] —we can all do that; there is nothing clever in that sort of argument—will the right hon. Gentleman now deal with the specific charge that we have made about the Bill? I am sick and tired of the nit-picking in which hon. Gentlemen opposite indulge about what was said by various people at various times. I have always stood on my own two feet in this House and said what I believe. I said that the Bill would mean trade unions being expected to act as policemen against their members. Will the right hon. Gentleman now answer that charge and say "Yes" or "No" and not dodge the question?
My answer is "No". I thought I had made that clear. It is a reasonable defence for me to go on to say, considering that the charge has come from the Opposition Front Bench, that the advocacy that the trade unions should act as policemen came from the Leader of the Opposition when he was Prime Minister. Considering that the hon. Member for Walton and his right hon. Friend both speak from the same Dispatch Box, they had better get themselves sorted out before making the sort of remarks that the hon. Member for Walton has been making on this issue.
This is the difference between us. We are not seeking to make trade union officials policemen over their members. It was hon. Gentlemen opposite who did that, not only in what the then Prime Minister said but in the right hon. Lady's proposals in "In Place of Strife", by which if a striker refused to obey a conciliation arrangement, he was liable to be penalised under our criminal law. This Bill lays it down that no individual worker shall be able to be ordered back to work by any court or suffer any penalty for failing to do so.
There is, therefore, this major difference. We are proposing the exact opposite to what the hon. Member for Walton fears. We are merely saying that unless there is a contracting-out clause, both sides shall be bound to use their best endeavours to try to get the members on behalf of whom they have signed to keep to the agreement, and we believe that if that position is achieved, much good will follow.
Is it proposed that the legal enforceability provisions should apply to all agreements in industry and not just to those which relate to wage agreements and so on and which are decided annually or at intervals of several years? In other words, will the provisions apply to agreements covering piece rates and similar matters which are negotiated almost daily?
We refer in the Bill to written agreements. Thus, the sort of agreements about which we are talking in the Clause are only those which are put in writing, and that is an important exclusion. There are, of course, many informal agreements, and I urge the hon. Gentleman to consult his trade union colleagues about those which exist in other countries and about which no difficulty arises.
We are the only industrial country which does not have the situation which we are now proposing. This is common form in other countries and they do not and the terrible effects, difficulties and fears which hon. Gentlemen opposite have mentioned. This is common form in countries like the United States, Canada, Sweden, Germany and Holland. I urge hon. Gentlemen opposite to ask their trade union colleagues in other countries about this, and they will find out the exact position.
On several occasions we have tried to get this point cleared up. We have never received a clear answer and we ask for one now. Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that he is importing, by this Clause, into Britain parallel provisions from United States law? [Interruption.] He said that all the other countries had this provision and he wanted to know what we were kicking up a fuss about. We are kicking up a fuss because we fear that this will be both useless and harmful— [Interruption.] It could be harmful because it is useless.
Is it not a fact that under American law a collective agreement becomes legally binding at the wish of either party? Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that if either party does not want it to be legally binding it will not be so? Can we have a clear answer?
I am not clear about the exact position in the United States, but I am clear of the exact position we wish to achieve in this country. We are saying that a written collective agreement shall be legally binding on the parties who signed it, unless they have made the contrary clear. To some extent, we are playing with words in the sense that, unless both parties agree, they cannot sign the agreement. Either both have to agree not to have a clause in, in which case the agreement is legally binding, or both have to agree to an opting-out clause, in which case it is not legally binding. If one cannot do either of those, one cannot have an agreement. In that sense, therefore, the right hon. Lady is right in saying that either side has the power of veto over the other.
5.30 p.m.
But is this not entirely different from the United States system? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] We are a little tired of the Government's sloppy talk and sloppy thinking. The right hon. Gentleman said a few moments ago that other countries have what he proposes, and he asked why we should object to it. Then, when I ask whether he is importing the American system, he says that he does not know what the American system is. Will he, therefore, stop saying that all countries have what he is proposing in his Bill?
With respect, I did not say that—or, if I failed to make it abundantly clear, let me put it right now. What I meant was that in one form or other—I agree that the form varies from country to country—it is common practice that collective agreements are regarded as legally binding and legally enforceable on the parties entering into them, and we are exceptional in this country in having an assumption that they are not. They can be so regarded in this country, but so much has the assumption been to the opposite effect that it needed the Donovan Commission to point out the obvious: that, except between one union and another, it has been possible all along to have legally binding agreements in this country. However, as I say, so much has it become the habit not to do so that even the power to do so has become forgotten.
I do not wish to interrupt the Minister too frequently—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—I mean that sincerely—but the responsible national Press has accused us of not discussing the Bill in detail, and—
Order. The hon. Gentleman has been here long enough to know that that is an unpromising start.
With your permission, Mr. Godman Irvine, may I make it a rather better ending? On a point of order, could I have from the Minister a reply "Yes" or "No"—
No.
Hon. Members opposite do not know what they are talking about.
Order. The hon. Gentleman is well aware that a point which he, wishes to put to the Minister must not be prefaced by the phrase "On a point of order", so that he has unfair advantage over other hon. Members.
Will the Minister—
This is the Committee stage, and hon. Members can intervene again—
We have time.
I am glad to hear the hon. Gentleman take that view of the length of time ahead of us. I was about to say that so often in our debates I am criticised for making over-long speeches, but so often they are over-long because I give way to interruptions. If, on the other hand, I do not give way, I am criticised on that score instead, For the moment, therefore—
rose —
For the moment, I must proceed. perhaps I shall give way if I am allowed to carry on a little with my argument.
rose —
No. The hon. Gentleman is nowhere near the top of the list.
In an intervention during the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Cooper), the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton spoke about the motor car industry and asked the Committee to realise that the pace of, a conveyor was set by the Management and that it controlled the pace of the work. If the pace of the conveyor was changed, he said, it should not be surprising if there was an unofficial strike, because of natural and understandable feelings on the part of the employees concerned. How the hon. Gentleman asked, could we have an enforceable agreement about that?
The hon. Gentleman does not seem to realise that an enforceable agreement properly drawn up has clauses which deal with all that sort of variation. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes, it does, and either the management would not be allowed to do that or, more probably, since any union or management entering into a contract cannot foresee exactly what may happen during the fixed term for which it is binding itself, there will be procedures for dealing with matters of that kind. This is one point coming from the United States on which, I believe, even many of the union leaders most opposed to other aspects of the American pattern agree; namely, that there are these procedures so that when a quarrel of that kind conies up in the course of a legally binding fixed agreement the parties commit themselves to abide by the procedures, which nearly always include arbitration, to settle questions of that kind instead of having to settle them by walking out on strike.
May I press the right hon. Gentleman on precisely that question of flexibility? Experience in the United States teaches that where grievances build up and develop, even though the parties can get a national agreement at the end of the three-year contract it is often not possible to get agreement in local factories. Sometimes a strike continues in certain areas for longer than it does in others while the local grievances are solved. With the flexibility of our type of agreement, on the other hand, if we have the best procedures possible, which we say we ought to have, one can deal with that sort of thing through the medium of a flexible agreement.
It is only too obvious, as the Donovan Commission said, that we are very far from having such agreements.
Then improve the agreements.
Precisely. Up to now, I have largely been taking up points raised by the hon. Member for Walton, but he has now given me the cue which I was waffling to move on, to the positive purpose of our proposal. The difference between us is that we believe that the two sides should have to contract out of legal enforceability, and the Opposition say that should have the right to contract in. That is the difference between us, and it is important, therefore, to understand why we hold to our view.
We hold to our view because we accept fully the Donovan analysis of the informal system in company and plant bargaining in this country and the need to make it more formal and more precise. I forget for the moment which paragraph of the Donovan Report it is, but there is a paragraph which talks of the desirability at company and plant level of having precise and written agreements. How do we obtain such agreements? We have to admit that in the last three years since Donovan, alas, we have not made much progress towards them.
We believe that the laying down of this presumption of legal enforceability will be a powerful pressure or incentive to the parties to make more precise and more written agreements. We believe that, if the parties come to the bargaining table knowing that, then, although they may end up with a contracting-out clause and the whole thing not legally enforceable, there will none the less from the beginning be a new element injected into the thinking on which the agreement is being reached. It will help to engender more careful thinking about what ought to go into the agreement, about the effects of it, and about whether those who will have to live with it are likely to find it acceptable. We believe that this will engender a more precise and comprehensive approach to the making of an agreement, even though at the end of the day the parties finally decide to put in a contracting-out clause and it is not legally binding.
In our view, the importance of this provision is not so much in making an agreement legally enforceable at the end but, rather, in introducing into the bargaining situation a new consideration, a consideration tending towards greater care and greater precision in the thinking, the drafting, the making and the keeping of the agreement.
The arguments put forward by Mr. Andrew Shonfield in the last part of his note of dissent to the Donovan Commission are familiar to the House, and so I will not go through them, but we think that they are the best statement of why we believe in the beneficient efficacy of this proposal over a period of time. We believe that both employers and unions will find that where a union is prepared to make a promise and put its name on the line in support of that promise employers will give it more in return. This will gradually lead to a cumulative build- ing up of stability and confidence in collective bargaining, which is what the Donovan Committee said was most needed.
Therefore, we support the Clause as it stands, and ask the Committee to reject the Amendment. We believe that we have here a pressure for change in the direction which the Donovan Commission said was most vital of all.
I should like to make two points in support of the Amendment. The first is somewhat technical, so it is perhaps unfortunate that the Solicitor-General is not present to hear it. My second point is a general one.
The intricacies of the Bill, about which there has already rightly been considerable comment, should not create a doubt about the effect of the Clause upon those industrial agreements between trade unions and employers' associations which are enforceable under the existing law. I am particularly concerned about those agreements and what their fate will be if the Clause goes through unamended.
I understand the position under the present law to be this. If terms of service are agreed between an employer and a trade union acting on the express authorisation of each of a number of workers to settle terms on their behalf, so that the union is acting as a duly authorised agent for the employees, and if the employers' organisation is authorised in precisely the same way to settle terms of agreement on behalf of the employers, then provided that both are acting properly as agents within the scope of their authority, the agreement they reach, whether oral or in writing, may be valid and enforceable in the ordinary courts as they are now.
I stress the question of oral agreements, because they could be called collective agreements in one sense, in so far as under the present law—certainly in Scotland; I would not presume to speak for England and Wales—they would be enforceable in law. Accordingly, the first doubt created is whether the effect of the early part of the Clause is perhaps to diminish that degree of enforceability.
My second doubt relates to the word "party" at the end of the Clause. It is not a definition but a gloss. It does not define "party" but simply says that certain things are comprised within the term. Had it defined "party" in such a way as to confine "trade unions" to trade unions, and not include individual trade unionists, it would be clear that my first point was not well founded. But with the gloss that the Bill gives, "party" is still open to be construed by the court as including an individual trade unionist who has authorised his trade union to act on his behalf in reaching an industrial agreement as to certain terms and conditions of employment.
It is not without interest that the Clause applies to organisations of workers as well as trade unions. Have the Government fully worked out the implications of that in law? Those implications seem to me to undermine quite seriously the provisions of Clause 5.
5.45 p.m.
My general point is that there is a big difference between contracting in to enforceability and contracting out of enforceability. I do not propose to add to the arguments that have already been made on that point, but I should like to stress certain points arising from that distinction. Contracting out of enforceability, which is what the Bill contains, is obviously liable to lead to trouble when the agreement is being forged in a situation of stress. No hon. Member would be realistic if he did not face the fact that many industrial agreements, perhaps the most important ones, will be forged under precisely such circumstances. In situations of stress, due to anxiety, inadvertence, misunderstanding or pressure, whether financial because the union is running short of money if it is striking, or because of a particularly attractive additional percentage being offered to the workers, both the workers and the employers seeking agreement could be tempted to reach agreement at a somewhat earlier stage than might otherwise be the case. With contracting out, the scope for misunderstanding, anxiety and pressure is greater than with contracting in.
Associated with that important general point is this question. With contracting in to enforceability we are running along a well understood path of the law of contract. The Government are seeking not only to introduce enforceability into a type of agreement where it has not previously existed in the present form but are also seeking to introduce the principle of contracting out. In other words, they are taking two novel exploratory steps at one time, and that is unwise. I think that I am well founded on Donovan in saying that. The Government would be much better advised to take one step at a time, to introduce a degree of enforceability and see how that works, instead of taking two steps. If they take two steps, they are certain to trip.
Contracting in is in accordance with the ordinary rules of law, equity and justice as we understand them in this country, whereas contracting out is less so. Moreover, again realising that bargains and agreements will be made under the industrial stress of the workshop, we must face the fact that contracting in or contracting out will be used as another counter in the bargaining negotiations. If we have contracting in, it will be for the employers to make a slightly better offer at the end of the agreement so as to make it a binding, enforceable contract. When an agreement is reached the employers will say, "We want it made enforceable, and if you agree to that you will get a little bit extra". But if the principle is that of contracting out, the veto will be the other way. In practice the trade union or the organisation of workers—it need not be a trade union; it could be a splinter group — can say, "We will not agree to your offer of 10 per cent. unless we contract out". That will become part of the bargaining process, which would be to the detriment of the principle the Government wish to introduce in the Bill.
For those reasons the Amendment is not only very reasonable but is the only correct course.
On a point of order, Mr. Godman Irvine. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Murray) has brought out a very significant point, that the law of contract in Scotland is different from that in England. I know that we are always accused of being nationalistic when we try to make these points, but we have a Lord Advocate, and I think that you have the powers, Sir, as Temporary Chairman, to ask that he shall come here and explain the matter lo the Committee, particularly Scottish hon. Members, because it is very important for the people of Scotland.
Order. The hon. Gentleman is ascribing to the Chair powers it does not possess.
The interesting point about Clause 32 is that it has caused considerable anxiety amongst employers. This is partly because they will be required to alter a lot of their methods and partly because a collective agreement, when signed, could be turned against them. The first thing that they will have to do is give much more information to their employees before any agreement can be made legally binding. They will also have to start their negotiations much earlier. In many industries, particularly the smaller firms, negotiations are rather rushed through. If employers are to have any hope of making an agreement legally binding, they will have to start their negotiations much earlier.
Another thing that is absolutely essential is that the disputes procedure which the employers draw up will have to be greatly improved, and the unions will have to see that the disputes procedure in a factory is improved so that, before they get down to anywhere near signing a collective agreement, any dislikes they may have of bargaining methods can be dealt with much more quickly. Finally, employers will have to have more skilled personnel staff because the unions will employ their own highly skilled people in collective bargaining. Until the employers make these adjustments in the personnel side of their factories, I do not see agreements being considered legally binding.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) mentioned the motor industry and the speeding up of methods on the track. He did not think that this country could make agreements legally binding. If they are to make alterations on the track, managements in the motor industry will have to make known their intention much earlier than they do now if they are to bring the unions into a legal agreement. Until there is the emergence of one union for the motor industry, I do not see agreements being made legally binding. We look forward—the sooner it happens, the better—to the formation of a united automobile workers' union in this country. Until that happens, there will be great difficulty on legally binding contracts in the motor industry.
The boredom of work has been mentioned. It was pointed out that unless this was taken into account there was the danger of unofficial walk-outs. We need more social inventiveness in this country about the question of boredom at work, altering work methods and trying to understand why people walk out on unofficial strike so quickly in mass production industries like the motor industry. There will be nervousness and suspicion on both sides before one can make an agreement legally binding. As has been pointed out by my right hon. Friend and others, it will be some time before agreements are made legally binding, and wage agreements are no magic cure for industrial relations.
The Secretary of State and I will agree at least on one thing—our admiration for the technical excellence of the speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). It was charming. He even remembered the close association between his father and my father in the building trades industry many years ago. The speech was fluent, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman's speeches always are. It showed a mastery of the law, although not sufficient to convince my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin). But it scared the pants off those of us who understand industrial relations on this side of the Committee in thinking of what might happen if diamond-hard legal minds of that sort are ever turned loose on industrial relations in workshop and factory.
The point I intended to make to the Secretary of State when I sought to intervene was that he would help the progress of the Committee substantially if, instead of trying to deal with the knotty legal points, he skirted them and brought the Solicitor-General in. He need not feel ashamed about it because this is what we shall all be doing if the Bill comes into operation. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich put an able case and the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East put an equally able case, and one of the points I would make is that once we have the legal lumber out of the way, we can get down to discussing the industrial relations problems. This again is a reflection of what will happen in the country if the Bill becomes law.
We have been trying to find out from the Secretary of State whether he has the intention that Clause 32 shall actually apply in British industrial relations. There is still some doubt about that. If he does not intend it to apply, of course, Clause 32 becomes a lot of inconsequential legal waffle which it is a waste of time for the Committee to consider. Indeed, that may well apply to a large part of the Bill. If, on the other hand, the right hon. Gentleman does intend the Clause to apply, then I agree with my hon. and learned Friend that it shows bias against the trade union movement in that it is applying a principle of law to industrial relations that is not generally applicable in the English law of contract. The general principle of the English law of contract is that legal relations will not be created unless it is intended that they shall be created, whereas the principle in Clause 32 is that there will be legal results even although one party to the contract does not really want them to apply.
The right hon. Gentleman is showing no comprehension of what he is doing. One of his arguments in the Consultative Document was that he wishes there to be legal enforceability of contract because he wants clear and unambiguous language to apply in British industrial relations. He spent a large part of his speech today explaining what he meant. In many circumstances, the right hon. Gentleman may well be right, but one can easily point out the trouble encountered in trying to deal with this sort of problem by applying the law.
I have a confession to make. From time to time I have been involved in the drafting of agreements affecting industrial relations and from time to time I have deliberately indulged in a certain soothing ambiguity of language. The reason is quite simple. People who draw up such agreements are not stupid. They are doing their job and one of the things one must face is that it may be better to fudge an issue slightly in order to get an agreement and keep the wheels of industrial relations turning than settle down and clearly define one's terms, at the same time clearly defining the areas of disagreement between the two parties, in the result getting industrial strife instead of settlement. Yet, by the pressure of the law, the right hon. Gentleman is trying to settle these matters in one particular direction when a whole variety of circumstances have to be taken into account.
The right hon. Gentleman wants language which makes it clear what the parties have agreed to. People who draw up industrial agreements are endeavouring to do just that. The phrases they use may be inelegant to lawyers from outside who try to interpret them in accordance with the canons of legal interpretation, and also to the layman who comes into the industry and looks at them. But they are very often phrases which are known and understood in the industry, however inelegant they may be, and are designed particularly to have meaning for the people who are sitting around the table and reaching agreement even if they mean very little to people outside the industry or the workshop, as the case may be.
One of the chief condemnations of Clause 32 is that there will be a fantastic spread of industrial agreements in language which the average man on the shop floor, or the average person in the office, does not comprehend because the parties around the table will be endeavouring to protect themselves from legal consequences which the right hon. Gentleman is importing by Clause 32 and will be putting their agreements into tightly drafted legal language which will mean nothing to a great many people.
We have to consider the problem of the shop steward. The right hon. Gentleman may be fortunate but I have not met many shop stewards who have had the advantage of a lengthy legal training. These people are very often appointed because no one else will do the job; in any case they are elected from among their work mates with no legal training; they are not professionals in many cases. Sometimes, however, the manager may give them time off with pay and sometimes they may even have an office of their own. Sometimes they spend a great deal of time on such work rather than pursuing their normal trade. But one must accept that they are not all like this. The fact is that the majority of them in most factories are ordinary men at the workbench endeavouring to do their job and help out their mates at one and the same time. From time to time, from the negotiating table at the factory, or from national level, there will descend, not like manna from heaven but with dull thuds, these complicated legal agreements, drafted because the people at national level are trying to protect themselves from possible legal consequences. It is a problem that we have to face.
6.0 p.m.
If there are people who trust each other, particularly as well as the father of the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East and my father did in the building industry, by all accounts it is possible that even if there is legal enforceability people will understand what they mean and will be able to interpret the position of each to the other. I carry this further because each will know that the person who would have to invoke legal relationships and take action under Clause 32 will be in agreement with himself. From this point of view, no protection is necessary.
I should like the right hon. Gentleman to bear in mind, however, that only once has that sort of relationship to break down and the employer to take the union to the National Industrial Relations Court or the union take the employer to the court, and all the simplicities of industrial relations though trust will be swept away and they will be back to the hard and fast drafting of industrial contracts in complicated legal language.
There is also the problem of the enforcement of these legal industrial contracts. Once a contract of this sort is reached between trade union and employer, not only is it applicable to them but it becomes part of the contract of employment of every individual within the industry. One of the great advantages of trade union recognition to a trade union is that it sets out negotiating machinery in the factory or industry concerned; one of the great advantages to the employer is that he knows that when he speaks to people who control that machinery, he speaks to people who can probably deliver the goods.
This afternoon there have been several references to the motor car industry, but the motor car industry is the great exception, or one of the great exceptions, in British industry. The general picture of British industry is of a systematised, organised bargaining structure, with people sitting round tables and trusting each other—the gas industry, the electricity industry, local authorities, the Health Service, textiles, baking, rubber, and so on. The trouble is that Conservatives are mesmerised by things like the motor car industry, which is a particular problem. What they are doing is providing a solution which may or may not work in the motor car industry, but which will certainly make things incredibly complicated in many other industries which until now have been working satisfactorily.
Once a legally enforceable industrial agreement has been reached between trade union and employer it will become part of the contract of employment of every individual within that industry. The right hon. Gentleman is setting up a system of courts parallel to the negotiating machinery which trade unions already maintain. What will be the consequences? He must seriously consider this possibility.
An individual employee, perhaps a Communist, perhaps a Trotskyite, perhaps a barrack-room lawyer, perhaps wanting the district secretary's job, perhaps just one of the awkward squad—
A Tory trade unionist!
He may be a Tory trade unionist. Having decided that he has a problem under the agreement, which is legally enforceable, he may put his case to the branch. The branch may consider it, but say that it does not propose to press it. Under the Bill, such an employee will no longer have to pay attention to the branch, because if he is sufficiently determined he will be able under Clause 90 to take his case to an industrial tribunal. There he will be able to fight it. If he does not win it there, he will be able, under Clause 100, to take it to the National Industrial Relations Court, and he may win it there. If he wins, he will undermine the agreement which the trade union has negotiated at national level. Therefore, once the Bill comes into operation every trade union agreement will be the sort of agreement which has to be drafted as tightly as possible to prevent that sort of thing.
It must be borne in mind that the terms of a collective agreement, whether enforceable or not, are in fact incorporated into an individual's contract of employment which, as of now, is enforceable by an individual who disagrees with his colleagues in the branch. The only thing is that an individual would have to enforce it through the county court and then through the ordinary legal channels to the Court of Appeal.
The concept that an individual should be entitled to assert the terms of his collectively agreed contract of employment is not new, but from now on the machinery will be more informal machinery; namely, the industrial tribunals which will be established along the lines foreshadowed by the Bill to have been introduced by the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) which provided for any questions arising out of individual contracts of employment to be referred to industrial tribunals. We are achieving that object, making available to individuals a more informal means of enforcing their contracts of employment than was foreshadowed in the Labour Government's Bill.
I am grateful for that intervention. The intervention of the right hon. Member for Mitcham (Mr. R. Carr) and that of the Solicitor-General have clearly demonstrated what will be the difficulties of applying the Bill, if it ever becomes law. I have pointed out the lack of legal knowledge of the right hon. Member for Mitcham, and now we have had a clear indication that, although the Solicitor-General has a firm grasp of the law, he has no grasp of the industrial relations aspect of what he is saying.
The Government are introducing a Bill, which will be put on the Statute Book with a great fanfare of trumpets, to say that collective agreements may be legally enforceable. They will develop an alternative system of courts, again with a great fanfare of trumpets. The result will be that individual employees will be much more likely to exploit the new system of courts than they ever were the system of county courts. There is proof positive of this because the number of employees who make use of the county court to enforce their terms and conditions of service is practically nil. However, the Secretary of State knows better than anybody else in this Chamber of the number of ordinary employees who have made use of the tribunals set up under the Redundancy Payments Act. That is what will happen under the new system of courts to be created by the Bill.
I have little else to add to my case except to say that I am sure that many of these things have never occurred to the Secretary of State. Although I should have had difficulty in comprehending what he was at at the beginning of last week, when the right hon. Gentleman was in his capacity of bold bad capitalist, as from the middle of last week we have been aware of witnessing the right hon. Gentleman in his capacity as the leader of the Pilkington strikers. I can understand why he wants to have a parallel system of courts to undermine the union negotiating machinery, and that is what he is at throughout the whole of the Bill. The only amusing thing about it is that someone like the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Sir C. Taylor) or the hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) fought his election campaign, unbeknowing at that time, on behalf of the Pilkington strikers.
[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]
This is proving to be an excellent debate. Practically no one on either side of the Committee has lost his temper, and that is fairly unusual, and we have had serious speeches on a fundamental matter. It is not the first time that we have had an excellent debate. For example, on Wednesday night we had a magnificent debate about the closed shop. In that, as in this debate, the issues have been evenly divided. In the end, it is a matter of judgment which way one votes, for there is not an overwhelming case one way or the other. None of us on either side can be absolutely certain that we are right. What is clear is that the Opposition and the trade unions have a genuine dislike of the Clause and on this side of the Committee we should respect that. They have been developing very respectable arguments for the last two or three hours to which we should listen. I put it to my hon. Friend the Member for Iford, South (Mr. Cooper) that they have Donovan on their side.
I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) says that Donovan is out of date because it came out two or three years ago, but I do not agree. The issue to which Donovan was paying attention was the question of unofficial strikes and that is still the issue today. I asked my right hon. Friend to consider meeting the objections of the Opposition.
This may sound an astonishing thing, but it is time that we had a little conciliation. I must admit that I have always felt strongly about enforcement agreements. I can remember talking about this during the General Election, saying that we must make agreements enforceable but the more I think about it, the more I listen to people with experience in these matters, the more I wonder whether I might be wrong. If I do not vote for this I will not be ashamed of changing my mind. We will make better progress in the Committee if we have a little give and take on such issues. That is surely the purpose of the debate. I do not think that the Clause is worth going to the stake for. I do not think that it is all that important.
If it goes through then every agreement, or most of them, will have a clause inserted saying that the agreement is not to be legally enforceable. The trade unions will take a great deal of care to see that this happens.
I appreciate that my hon. Friend is being sincere in this. Is he saying that he prefers the Amendment to the Clause, or does he say that neither should appear?
I am saying that there is not a great deal in it. Whichever way it goes, both sides accept that there will be agreements which will contain a clause saying that that agreement is not legally enforceable. We say that this is perfectly acceptable to us and the Opposition say that all agreements should be presumed to have such a condition unless the contrary is stated. What I say is that it is about time that we tried to meet each other's point of view and tried to understand that the Opposition have a genuine point here which we should meet if we can. In that way we might have a better Committee and we might improve the Bill instead of continually taking diametrically opposed views on every subject.
There will be many subjects in the future on which we shall no doubt lose our temper, but there seems to be a case here for trying to meet the point raised by the Opposition.
Would my hon. Friend consider that some industries are working in extraordinarily competitive markets overseas and are anxious to have some stability for a foreseeable period. It is only when they have some assurance that they will have an enforceable contract, one that can be sustained for a reasonable period, that they are likely to enter into any lasting agreement.
Of course I agree that industrialists are worried about the situation and would like to see better stability and better agreements. I would point out that not all industrialists think that this Clause will necessarily produce that result. More important than the issue we are discussing now is whether we could not get a little better climate for the rest of the Bill because it really would help in dealing with this subject which is so vital, not only for Members, but for many millions of people in the country.
I will not say anything about the law because I am a solicitor not a lawyer. I have listened, fascinated, to the legal gentlemen arguing this and would not know which was right, but I believe that common sense is more important than legal niceties. If we do meet the Opposition on this Clause, which I do not think is worth going to the stake over, we might change the climate and make better progress on the rest of the Bill.
[Mr. E. L. MALLALIEU in the Chair]
6.15 p.m.
Listening to the interesting speech of the hon. Member for Chippenham (Mr. Awdry) gives some indication of the way in which the debate is going. I think the hon. Member will find, if he goes into this more deeply, that there are underlying reasons why the Government want this Clause as opposed to the superficial reasons advanced. I would like to put a point to the Solicitor-General which relates to something said by his right hon. Friend. The Secretary of State said that this Clause referred to written agreements. If we look at subsection (3) it says: In this Act 'collective agreement' means any agreement or arrangement (whether written or oral)… In other words, it refers to oral agreements while the Amendment deals specifically with written agreements.
Many agreements in industry are written but many are oral. If this is to apply to written agreements then the situation will arise when there will be pressure for more oral agreement as opposed to written agreements. In itself, since industry is more complicated and agreements are becoming increasingly difficult to arrive at, that will cause all sorts of problems. People who have negotiated such agreements know that a great deal of day-to-day agreements are made by management and become established as custom and practice agreements.
These are prevalent in the engineering industry, in the docks and many other places. They are subject to the binding agreement of management and trade unions. Allowing for the argument often used that certain agreements are broken, the fact is that there are tens of thousands of agreements in British industry, large and small, which are respected by both sides of industry year in and year out. This is the experience of many people and it is my own experience. I remember a new works manager who challenged some form of agreement in the factory where I worked. I said, "Sir, this has been accepted by your predecessor, it is custom and practice within the factory." This matter went to higher management which had no hesitation in endorsing the previous practice. If higher management had not done so it would have been putting in jeopardy its standing over a period of years. Higher management was not prepared to prejudice the situation because so much must depend on good will.
A barrack-room lawyer can create all sorts of mischief. There has built up within a factory or industry the feeling that when something is said it will be maintained. It is not always possible to do this. If the Government think that they can improve the situation by bringing in the law and making agreements legally enforceable then they are completely mistaken. In large measure this Bill is directed at the engineering industry. A large part of Donovan dealt with the multifarious procedures in that industry.
Take a national agreement made in the engineering industry. It is negotiated between the Engineering Employers Federation and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. The main points are set out in the agreement. But it may be very difficult to interpret and one must deal with a large number of shop stewards, not all of them as well versed in industrial affairs and practices as other shop stewards might be, as is often the case with managements. Notes for guidance are drawn up in a small booklet which is sent to the district committees and shop stewards throughout the engineering industry. The notes for guidance are not always easy to follow, but they are not written in legal language. Often there is a measure of disagreement about them between unions and management.
If agreements are written, not in the present form, but in legal language, it will be impossible for shop stewards and management to understand them. Although in many large factories there is a strong organisation and a great deal of experience among management and unions, the majority of employees work in medium and small firms, and it is these employees for whom collective agreements will have to be interpreted. Will these agreements be legally binding? Will we have the lawyers in at every stage? If so, it will be absolutely ridiculous.
I wish to point out why the Government, under pressure from certain sections of industry, want the Clause in the Bill. The reason is that they want a wage agreement to be arrived nationally and then no wage movement to take place for three years. In other words, the Clause is aimed at wage drift. If they think that they can stop wage drift by making agreements legally enforceable, they are living in cloud-cuckoo-land. I do not think that that is possible.
The type of long-term agreement which has been experimented with recently—and I use the word "experimented" advisedly—will not be countenanced by the trade unions if it means the restriction of wages for two or three years. They just will not accept it.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that in America, where two-year and three-year agreements operate, there is provision for paying increases, and making improvements in conditions, at the end of each year?
Anything can be negotiated into an agreement. It was said by one of the leaders in the engineering industry not long ago that the last package deal was probably the last national agreement of this type which would be negotiated in this country. We do not have an American situation here. There is still a great deal of individual piece work as opposed to measured day work in this country. With piece work and day-to-day negotiation with the ratefixer which leads to continual changes in price, there is often a measure of disagreement between management and trade unions.
I understand the point made by the hon. Member for Bosworth (Mr. Adam Butler), but I do not think that it is possible in Britain to make provisions of the kind to which he refers. The Government are bitterly opposed to cost-of-living increases, and so on, and people will not accept things which they agreed to in 1968 if conditions have radically altered by 1971.
Stress has been laid on the Donovan Report today. I wonder how long it will be before we canonise Lord Donovan. The Donovan Report has become almost a bible. There are contradictions in it and the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) took a great deal of pleasure in trying to point out some of them to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). The Donovan Rep-port is the only report which has investigated British trade union movement in great depth and with thoroughness in the last 60 years.
The Secretary of State was rather silly to take us up about quoting the Donovan Report Many of, my hon. Friends and I are opposed to the points it makes about registration. we were critical of parts of the Donovan Report when we discussed it when the Labour Government were in office. Andrew Shonfield and other people have made very sharp points which must be contested about the Donovan Report. But the central point which the Report makes about collective bargaining and agreements is that it believes in free collective bargaining and that agreements should remain free from the law. If we deny this, we are missing the point which the Donovan Commission made. With all the evidence produced by the trade unions, employers and lawyers and all the expert advice tendered to it, Donovan came out firmly in favour of free collective bargaining without legal enforceability. That is the central point.
By opposing the legal enforceability of agreements we are not saying that the trade union movement should be beyond or above the law. The trade union movement is not outside the law. A great deal of nonsense is talked about the trade union movement being the fourth estate. The law is applicable to the trade union movement as it is to anybody else, and the proof of this is that the trade unions use the law. They have taken people to court, and they have been taken to court themselves. Many matters have been challenged in the court, whether it be on the question of elections or the dismissal of people.
6.30 p.m.
What we object to is bringing the law directly into collective bargaining and wage negotiation. I believe that the method of bargaining in British industry is based fundamentally on mutual trust. It is the exception that takes the headlines in the Daily Express, not the proven rule. It is the exception that is highlighted. Nothing is said about the tremendous work that 185,000 shop stewards do in British industry. They oil the wheels of industry. If, for instance, the York agreement as it now exists—on which the unions are more near to agreement with the employers but, unfortunately, they are bedevilled by the Bill from getting agreement; if the current agreement, with all its weaknesses and its anti-union bias as we see it, were to be withdrawn and everybody in the engineering industry left to his own devices, the strikes that we now have would be nothing to what would happen, because there is a measure of responsibility in industry. To deny that is completely out of line with what the trade union movement stands for.
The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East dealt with the legalistic argument and talked about making agreements legally binding. All sorts of words are used which are not necessarily legally binding. The right hon. and learned Gentleman is often quite an authority on foreign affairs. Agreements between statesmen are not legally binding, because it would be impossible to make them so, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman recognises. He and I, as candidates, gave pledges to the electorate in the best of faith in June. Perhaps it is a pity that the electorate could not take some of his hon. Friends to court to make them answer for the words which, I am sure, they said in all good faith prior to 18th June.
To equate agreements in industry with the law of contract in regard to normal British practice is wrong. They are not the same thing. There is a very great distinction. If hon. Members opposite cannot see that distinction, that is what divides the two sides.
An hon. Member on the Government side recently made a short but telling speech in which he spoke about the other problems in industry, such as boredom, repetition, sickness and illness. We recognise all these problems that exist. We say that the law will not resolve them. To make contracts legally binding will resolve these problems but will aggravate them.
If we left the situation as it is today, one could make contracts legally binding if one so desired. It is not necessary to put it in legalistic language or write it into the Bill. By their Amendment, my hon. Friends have shown the alternative. I hope that we oppose and defeat the Government on this point, because in discussing collective bargaining this is the next stage from our debate last week. It is another kernel to the whole discussion. The basis of our argument is that legal enforceability will not improve industrial relations but will make them worse.
I have always listened with respect to the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) when he speaks about this problem, and I have had sympathy with him on what seems to be the general message that he has tried to convey. I have been wondering where we differ. The hon. Member has made it clear in the speech which he has just made.
The hon. Member seemed to think that the Government's proposals in the Bill will lead to longer term agreements, and he said that we could not have that. If the country is to be able to compete successfully in this highly competitive world, we really must have longer term agreements.
I am sure that the hon. Member does not wish to misrepresent me. What I said, in effect, was that if the Government's proposals go through, any chance of longer-term agreements would be ruled out.
The reason why we must have this provision in the Bill, and why I should have to come to a different judgment from my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham (Mr. Awdry), is that I believe that it is more likely to result in longer-term agreements.
I believe that it will give an extra bargaining point to the trade unions and that the normal process of negotiation will continue. I believe that management and employee will get to a point at which they can come to agreement which will be in the best interests of industry. I believe that the unions will be in a position to say, "We will refuse to use our veto, we will not bring this out of the legal requirement. If you give us this extra point, we can come to agreement." This extra weapon in the hands of the negotiators on the trade union side is more likely to result in the stage being reached that they can arrive at a longer-term agreement than is the case in the present situation.
The hon. Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Moyle), who charged my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) with being charming and fluent—the hon. Member was both, and I congratulate him—gave the other difference between himself and myself on this matter. He cited occasions when he had been a party to negotiations in which, he said, in order to reach a point of agreement, he had deliberately used words in a hazy way; he had secured agreement by not being absolutely clear. As a result, he had been able to come to an agreement whereby production in his department had been able to continue, whereas to have been more precise and legalistic might have prevented this.
That is a little old-fashioned. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer) said exactly the same thing. Unfortunately, we have moved away from the former practice, and those of us in the management side of business have found it a sad situation. I remember when, a few years ago, one could go into the market place and strike a bargain merely by slapping the hand. One did not need to have it in writing and circulate it in triplicate signed with the company's seal. Nowadays, the whole atmosphere is different, with all the legal advice, guidance and cynicism which has grown up. I am sad that this is the situation; I wish it were not.
If one is buying a house, renting a garage or making the normal contracts which in the old days could have been done by friendly agreement, today it must be committed to writing so that people know where they are. I believe that my right hon. Friends are right in providing that the next step shall be that people who are party to these agreements accept them as legally binding unless at the beginning of their discussions they opt out of that decision.
I am certain that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will have the support of all those who have an understanding of this problem and that, on consideration, hon. Members opposite who are battling for the official trade unions will see the strength that this gives to the official trade unions. It gives no strength to the militants or to the breakaways. Those who support official collective bargaining should go into the Lobby with us on this issue, and I hope that they will do so when the vote is taken.
The right hon. Gentleman said that in the trade union movement and in other fields and in other nations there were agreements which were tightly drawn, and he spoke of the British people, but he forgot that the British people, and the British people in the trade union movement, like a good settle- ment, and prefer giving a little and taking a little.
The right hon. Gentleman, to whom I listened very carefully, did not say anything about these words in the Clause, that a collective agreement shall be conclusively presumed to be intended by the parties to it to be a legally enforceable contract. He did not say whether these words would apply to agreements from national to workshop level, but I think we are entitled to be told whether they do.
The Clause provides that any collective agreement is legally enforceable if such agreement does not contain a provision to the contrary, but I submit that the present system of collective bargaining, not legally enforceable, has worked very well, is the essence of flexibility, has great virtue, and has served the nation well. If agreements are made legally rigid and stay fixed, prices, profits and jobs do not, as we have had ample opportunity since 18th June to see—in the classic phrase, "at a stroke".
Therefore I wonder why the Secretary of State seeks to wreck this system which has proved, in my view at least, of great benefit to the nation. If legal enforceability is to be extended to every arrangement or agreement then, according to subsection (3), the definitive subsection, which says that "collective agreement" is any agreement whether written or oral, it will apply to every shop agreement or arrangement and to every works agreement or arrangement, and it will result in the whole field of industrial relations in British industry being encased in a cocoon of case law. Flexibility will go.
The conclusion is that if an employer wishes an agreement to be legally enforceable he will not seek to write into that agreement that the agreement is not legally enforceable. This provision, as do many other provisions in the Bill, shows that the Bill is biased against the workers and biased towards the employers. Subsection (3) says: In this Act 'collective agreement' means an agreement or arrangement (whether written or oral) … My hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) dealt with that, but certainly it means that any agreement, written or oral, made when the Bill becomes an Act will be legally binding, although these agreements are made quite freely in British industry by trade unionsts and employers. I have been a party to many of them myself.
The Solicitor-General must be unworldly if he believes that the workers will secure justice if they attempt to substantiate an oral agreement, because I believe the employer will always be able to secure witnesses—with reliable memories, shall I say?—should there be any dispute concerning the position of trade unionsits alleged to be partners to an oral agreement, who have secured other situations, and who have been laid off by their former firm. What can be the position under an agreement which is an oral agreement and which is termed legally binding?
This Clause means that the dice are being loaded against my fellow trade unionists, and it militates against the system in which industry-wide agreements have been possible, and it means that industry-wide agreements, which have raised wage rates, will have no place at all. They will have no place under the conditions which will be created by this Bill. As has been said, it is impractical to superimpose on the existing British trade union system a set of legal presumptions which do not fit the British scene. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heller) dealt with that very well. It has been conclusively demonstrated that if collective bargaining agreements were to be legally enforceable a complete restructuring of collective bargaining would be necessary. It would mean that the informal, inflexible shop floor arrangements based on common sense and common interests, and now widespread in British industry, would have to give way to tightly drawn and probably incomprehensible contracts at plant and company level and covering every inconceivable eventuality.
6.45 p.m.
Everyone who has been party to an agreement of this flexible type made between trade unionsits and employers knows that the informal, flexible arrangements and agreements so made are made because of personal knowledge, and that, in my submission, is infinitely superior to the legal straitjacket method of this Bill which, I frankly tell the right hon. Gentleman, is anti-trade union. The "conclusive legal presumption" is a fallacy, as the Government will find out, since trade unionists are loyal to the things they create themselves, the things they maintain themselves, and the things they defend them selves —not things imposed by judges and employers, and maintained by lawyers—and defended by nobody.
This Clause is certainly one of the more puzzling Clauses in the Bill, and having heard it expounded by several lawyers on either side of the Committee I am not surprised that many laymen have been misled by it. It has been widely believed among many trade unionists, certainly in my own constituency, that the effect of this Clause would be to make it possible for legally binding agreements to be imposed on them against their will, and I am glad to have my right hon. Friend's assurance that that is not the case, but I am inclined to agree rather with the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heller) that the probability is that, as a result of this Clause, the number of written agreements which will be entered into will be substantially reduced. In this I think it is more likely that the hon. Member is right than that my right lion. Friend is right in believing that there will be no change.
This is not necessarily a bad thing, because it is more important that agreements should be kept than that they should be numerous and frequent, but I think it is still incumbent on the Committee to try to remove any avoidable disincentives to the signature of written agreements, and one of the strongest disincentives is the fear of being bound indefinitely by such an agreement. That fear was voiced by the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) just now. It is inherent in the objections to the York Memorandum of 1922. As time goes on it can certainly be the case that, where a written agreement is signed, experience will show that one party gets a greater advantage from it and the other party less advantage from it than either of them originally anticipated, and that there will be found a strong inducement in the one who has gained advantage to resist any desire on the part of the other party to revise the agreement.
This, it seems to me, can be avoided by making it clear that no agreement will be legally binding unless it contains an express provision for a time limit, and that is the reason why I put down my Amendment No. 705, which would have the effect of adding a third condition qualifying the provision that written agreements shall be deemed to be legally enforceable. I believe that Amendment would be welcomed by trade unionists, and I have no reason to think that employers would find it objectionable.
I do not wish to intervene at any great length, but my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State gave an undertaking that certain of the points raised would be answered at about this stage.
In reply to the argument advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham (Mr. Awdry), my right hon. Friend, and indeed all of us on this side, believe that we are here trying to arrive at what is the right balance on this as on every other part of the Bill. We believe that here, too, we meet a posture which should commend itself to my hon. Friend. It may be that the arguments my hon. Friend advanced over-state the case as he puts it because of a misunderstanding of how far we are trying to go. My hon. Friend said that during the Election he argued that we should make all collective agreements enforceable. If he did that, he was arguing a case other than that which I lay before the Committee tonight. The divide is not as great as that.
The hon. Gentleman was not the only one so to argue.
That may be fair. The function of debating in this kind of Committee is that we distil the meaning of the difference between us. We have been urged to do that, but that it not the effect of what we are doing.
The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) asked whether the presumption would apply to national, allover agreements. It will, but in each case it is a presumption which the parties are free to set on one side. The presumption about enforceability applies only where the parties are agreed upon it and it is not an attempt to make all agreements enforceable.
What legal position would arise about enforceability if an employer said, "I wish to make the agreement legally enforceable" and the trade union said, "We oppose it"?
There would not be an agreement arrived at and the employer would have to face the fact that the other party with whom he was negotiating was not negotiating with a view to arriving at a legally binding agreement and they would have to arrive at an agreement which was not legally binding. A legally binding agreement can be made only when both parties, even in negotiations in this context, agree that that is what they want.
The effect of this presumption is a limited one. It is to tilt the balance so that people start believing that they intend to make a legally binding agreement. If they go further and say, "We do not want to do that", it is no longer a legally binding agreement.
I emphasise that we have not gone down the draconian road which some people have urged upon us. I do not believe, as has been suggested, that every agreement will be accompanied by an exclusion clause of a kind which would be implied in that situation. It is perfectly possible—indeed, probable—that many of them will be. The habit of making enforceable collective agreements will spread at a pace which people on both sides of industry determine for themselves. All that we are suggesting is that there should be a leaning in that direction.
We do this substantially for the reasons set out by my right hon. Friend in quoting paragraph 36 of the Note of Reservation by Mr. Andrew Shonfield; this is the limit of it: The proposal in essence is that the bias of English law, as it has been hitherto, should be changed. Instead of making it complicated and difficult for unions to enter into contractual obligations which are enforceable at law, so that it has become an eccentric thing for a union to do, unions and employers should be encouraged to treat it as the normal thing to do. However, it is up to them to decide and we merely suggest that they should move in that direction.
Several hon. Members have suggested that a move in that direction will lead to such a change in the wording and style of collective agreements that it will be undesirable. This anxiety was given voice to by the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme), in particular. If it be the case—I do not want to parody the case—that many existing agreements are badly drawn and unintelligible, they are not alone in that. Many other agreements that people make with each other in ordinary and commercial life are not drawn with crystal lucidity, but they are abided by and honoured and, in the last resort, given effect to in the courts when and if a dispute arises about them. That in itself is not an insuperable difficulty.
If it be the case that they are all made in that style, is it in the long run desirable that they should remain so? Donovan said, as I think my right hon. Friend quoted, that one of the objectives which the C.I.R. should set itself is that agreements should be precise and in writing. If the pressures arising from the formulation in the Clause encourage people to try to define more clearly what they need so much the better. There must be many situations in which strife in industry arises because of badly drawn and unintelligible agreements. So if the law impels people towards greater clarity and the enunciation of clearer agreement procedures which give rise to less doubt, surely it can be only to the advantage of both sides.
Surely the hon. and learned Gentleman is not telling the Committee that something is precise merely because it is in legal language and in writing? Half the time of the courts is taken up in interpreting Acts and legal jargon. This will make it increasingly difficult for British industry.
That point again illustrates an apparent difference between us which I think is not a true difference. If when Donovan said that collective agreements should be precise and in writing he thereby meant that they should be drawn in legal jargon, and if when we say that it would be advantageous for agreements to be clear and in writing and for people to be prepared to accept them as legally binding we meant legal jargon, the hon. Member would have a point. We do not accept, any more than Donovan accepted, that an agreement which is precise must be in legal jargon. All that we are suggesting is that an agreement can be arrived at—this is one of the pressures for which Donovan argued—that is compact, clear and precise and which sets out what the parties intend to agree. It need not be in legal jargon—far from it. If it is precise so much the better.
With due respect to precision, would not good will be of greater value? I am certain from my own experience in engineering that the type of precision the hon. and learned Gentleman is now talking about will drive some of our managers, who are essentially practical men, potty.
That point has been made by others, and I will come to it. I do not want to give way to too many interventions, because I wish others to join in the concluding stages of this debate.
I have endeavoured to deal with the point about the interpretation of collective agreements in individual contracts. I will not return to that. There may be an opportunity to deal with it later.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Murray) raised a point about the meaning of "party" in subsection (4). The words are: 'party' …includes each trade union or other organisation of workers, each employer and each organisation of employers on whose behalf the collective agreement is so made. The intention of that is that an agreement made by or on behalf of an employer should make him a party to it, but there is no matching provision applying it to a trade union member and a trade union would be contracting only on account of itself. The member would become involved only if and in so far as it became part of his ordinary contract of employment, as is the case today.
I turn, almost finally, to the general set of arguments advanced—again without in any way wishing to appear to be patronising—sincerely and cogently, and illustrating the differences lying between us, by the hon. Member for Salford, West. Right hon. and hon. Members on this side recognise the importance of unwritten respected agreements. This was a point made by the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Dan Jones). We must acknowledge that in many other fields agreements are made, written or unwritten, which the parties do not intend to be binding but which they have as a part of the backdrop of their lives. In some cases that is what they normally assume them to be and that is the kind of assumption we suggest here, unless they agree to the contrary. Therefore, I endorse everything he said about the importance of that kind of agreement. It is not jeopardised by this provision. Clause 32(1) (a) does not apply retrospectively. It applies only to written agreements made hereafter.
7.0 p.m.
I agree that the essential thing is the underlying goodwill. We must carry the minds of men if we are to keep any kind of continuing harmony. We must remember that disputes can arise on both sides of industry. At present if a collective agreement or procedure agreement exists that is not enforceable in the last resort, the only remedy on the shop floor or on the part of the union on behalf of the shop floor is industrial action. We believe that the availability of a clear, enforceable procedure agreement with the remedies laid down will be as useful to them as the agreement will be to management. This has been the experience in other countries. This will not be to their disadvantage.
Several hon. Members suggested that we are putting forward a proposal that is aimed directly or indirectly at providing a means of checking the wage drift and as a shackle to be imposed for an indefinite time in regard to industrial agreements. This was at the heart of the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse). But it is not so. It is up to the parties, if they make a binding agreement, first to specify how long it will last, if it is to be binding at all; and, second, to write into it, if they wish to have them, escalator or variation clauses of the kind mentioned by the hon. Member for Bosworth (Mr. Adam Butler). If they agree on those terms and are prepared to do so, they may well find themselves getting a better wage bargain from the employer. I will not quote him again, but this is the point made by Mr. Andrew Shonfield in paragraph 40 of his memorandum. Once employers see that they are dealing with unions who are prepared to enter into long-term agreements, with whatever escalator clauses they like to include, those employers may pay more to get it. But it is up to the parties to decide on the range and content of that agreement or on whether it is to be binding. Therefore, we are not going down the fearful road which some hon. Members seem to envisage. We have been urged by some people to include a minimum fixed term presumption in the agreement, but we have rejected it. It is up to the parties themselves.
In answer to the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, I sympathise in many ways with his objective. Obviously, it is sensible that people should know the limits of what they are bargaining for and the period for which they are to be bound, but we do not feel that by accepting the Amendment we should help or clarify the purpose of the legislation. If an additional paragraph were to be added to Clause 32(1) it would substantially limit the area over which the new presumption of enforceability would operate. We feel that this is something which should be left to the parties themselves to bargain about. The parties themselves may agree on how long they are to be bound for. Therefore, I believe that the fear that my hon. Friend had in mind, although one understands it, is not one to which the Committee should succumb. I hope that on this basis my hon. Friends and the Committee as a whole will acknowledge this as an attempt to move in the right direction and not as an attempt to shackle retrospectively, the trade union movement, or anybody else, but to incline us towards a pattern of greater order in British industry.
I do not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman has given way.
I had in fact resumed my seat.
This is an important debate. I apologise to my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon), and I know that there are a number of hon. Members still wishing to take part in this discussion on both sides of the House. We have spent a considerable time on this one Amendment and it is imperative under the guillotine that we make progress, otherwise by the end of the three days we shall still be on the earlier matters rather than those which we are supposed to be discussing in the time allotted.
When the Solicitor-General told me he wanted to intervene as well as his right hon. Friend, I hoped that he would say that he had been so moved by the excellent speech of the hon. Member for Chippenham (Mr. Awdry) that he was anxious to build the bridge for which the hon. Member had asked. But instead he merely wished to try to pluck the hon. Member back into the fold. I can only hope he has not succeeded in doing so.
As the Secretary of State went through his ritual dance of quoting from "In Place of Strife", it is important that we get on record as a starting point what we have always argued on this side of the Committee about the making of collective agreements legally enforceable. This is part of what we said in "In Place of Strife". There are those who argue that one of the main causes of unofficial strikes is the fact that collective agreements in this country are not legally enforceable contracts. Faced with the fact that individual employers and unions who can already enter into legal contracts do not do so, they maintain that the answer is to change the bias of the law so that collective agreements become legally binding unless the parties specifically state their intention to the contrary. This would not only be ineffectual; it could prove a deterrent… The most urgent need is to press ahead with the reform of procedure agreements; but unions are not likely to co-operate with enthusiasm in this if they feel it is merely a first step to coerce them into making commitments they do not want. If I may so with all the modesty of authorship, I think that that passage summarises the case against the Government's position and gives a succinct answer to the rather limited argument of the Solicitor-General.
The right hon. Gentleman said when he intervened that we on this side wanted both to have our cake and to eat it. He suggested that on the one hand we were saying what an iniquitous proposition this was and on the other that it would have no effect. I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman has made this cardboard cake the centrepiece of his window display, even though he knows it is uneatable. We have no objection—I make this clear and we have made it clear all along—to the negotiating parties making collective agreements legally enforceable if they want to do so but, as "In Place of Strife" pointed out, we now have the situation that it is now open to the parties under the law, except in the case of an employers' association, for an indivi- dual company and unions to conclude legally enforceable collective agreements if they wish to do so.
We must ask ourselves two questions. Why have they not chosen to exercise that freedom of action? What kind of difference do the Government think this Clause will make to the situation? I do not think we have had an answer to those questions today. My hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) has his theories why the Conservatives put this Clause in the Bill. I will tell him my theory. I think they put it in because they could not get away from doing so, for the simple reason that over the past two or three years, and certainly during the time that I was at the Department of Employment and Productivity, the Conservative Party made this matter one of the central planks of its industrial relations creed.
Time after time we were told how all our troubles would be solved if we made collective agreements legally enforceable. The poor dear gullible Press picked it up and trotted it out in leading articles in illiterate newspapers, such as the Daily Telegraph. Time and again, when those newspapers were attacking Donovan and saying that we on this side of the House were not dealing with this serious problem with guts and courage, and so forth, I had to point out to them that this so-called Tory panacea was a total red herring if the Tory Party really meant what it said: namely, that collective agreements should be made legally binding if the parties so desired. Therefore, we have all been chasing a mirage for years.
"Fair Deal at Work" referred to the repeal of Section 4 of the Trade Union Act, 1871, and went on to say: This would put collective agreements on a par with any other type of contract—no more and no less. If that is what is said, it is, in effect, giving total freedom to the parties concerned.
It has been a courageous ploy that the Tories have made un and down the country. The Tories say that collective agreements should be like any other contract, no more and no less. If they are like any other contracts, they are voluntary agreements. The characteristic of a contract is that one enters into it as a free agent. "Fair Deal at Work" went further. In a very purple passage, it says: We believe it would be wrong to accord to collective agreements the quite exceptional status of a contract which must be enforceable — regardless of the wishes of the parties. That was the pure and noble sentiment of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite when they produced "Fair Deal at Work", for which they say that they have a mandate. They eat their words in Clause 35, as we shall see when we come to it. They will have some explaining to do whether those fine principles of "Fair Deal at Work" are now being abandoned.
On Clause 32 we are faced with a situation in which the right hon. Gentlemen on the Government Front Bench assure us that the legal effect of the Clause is that if either party does not wish the agreement to be legally binding he can veto it, and therefore he cannot be coerced into signing legally binding agreements against his will under the Clause. If that is so and those contracts are really like any other contracts, and, therefore, are voluntary, legal enforceability will not happen.
I was interested to see the rather pathetic paragraph 118 in the Consultative Document admitting this. It had been dealing with the legal status of collective agreements and what we have in Clause 32. It went on to say: Despite these provisions, there may still be no legally enforceable procedure agreements, or indeed no satisfactory procedure agreements a t all in some sectors of industry for some time to come. But what do the Government go on to say? It is not that they have been approaching the whole problem in the wrong way but, following the pattern of the legislative approach to industrial relations, of which my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) has warned us more than once, when the Government find that they have one policy which is fairly liberal but does not work, they do not go back on that policy but move forward to a more restrictive one, moving forward from Clause 32 to Clause 35.
The simple fact is that in Clause 35 we shall be doing the very things which "Fair Deal at Work" said would be wrong. The Tory Party raised high hopes among the electorate as to how marvel- lous it would be when collective agreements had been made legally enforceable, and it has given us the assumption that if only we had put the presumption into the law— the original argument— that they are legally enforceable unless the parties visibly and expressly contract out, that would change the atmosphere. They do not believe a word of it. They were fooling the electorate. But the electorate was expecting something and, therefore, the Government give us Clause 35, for which they never had a mandate, and which contradicts "Fair Deal at Work" and all their arguments so far.
7.15 p.m.
These legally enforceable collective agreements will not happen because the trade unions at least do not want their collective agreements drawn up by lawyers, and I am sure that that view is shared by a number of employers. The Solicitor-General did not convince any of us on this side of the House when he said that lawyers would be drawing up those agreements and that, therefore, they would be written in simple and precise language, the most lucid English that anybody could hope to read. Everyone in the House knows that that is nonsense.
What is extremely interesting is the anxiety which practical people express when they contemplate the effect of moving the lawyers massively into industrial relations, which would be the effects of this Clause. There was a very telling phrase in Mr. Pat Lowry's famous little booklet "Greener Grass?", which we all know that he wrote following intensive studies of the industrial relations system in America. On page 44 he says: I certainly did not appreciate quite how intrusive the law is in the industrial relations field. He is talking of America. Lest anybody should think that the American legal framework could or should be imported into the British system it must be pointed out that American law was first introduced in order to protect and encourage the growth of weak trade unions. Latterly the process of law was invoked to curb their strength or to control the irregularities that had developed. British trade unions have developed their strength in a voluntary environment and whatever assistance the law should now give them, in for example, the field of recognition, they certainly do not need the assistance of any such legal concept as a requirement to bargain in good faith. Yet the requirement to bargain in good faith is an integral part of the American system of the legal enforceability of collective agreements. We have the introduction of pendantry and theory into what should be a practical policy for the practical problems which we face. Therefore, what the Committee has to decide is not only whether this Clause is meaningless —for reasons which I have given, in practical terms it will have no effect — but also whether it could be positively harmful.
The right hon. Gentleman said that he thought that his method of making people contract out of legal enforceability would have the effect of making it more likely. He said that agreements would be drawn up more precisely in case— and they are significant words— the unions do not succeed in persuading their employers to contract out. He gives us a picture of the unions saying "We must have precise agreements because when we get to the negotiating table the employer may say, 'No, I insist that this is legally enforceable' and we shall be too weak to contract out."
Does the right hon. Gentleman really believe that? It may be true of a few industrial backwaters, but does he really think that the tough and experienced representatives of unions such as the A.E.F. and the T. & G.W.U. will throw in the sponge because an employer says, "Unless you make this legally enforceable we shall have no agreement"? What does the right hon. Gentleman think the A.E.F. and other unions are saying about the new engineering procedure agreement to replace the York Memorandum?
I shall tell the Committee what will happen if the Government insist on going ahead with this Clause and this form of contracting out. They will polarise collective bargaining on political lines, because it is happening already over the replacement of the York Memorandum. A new procedure agreement has been drawn up, but it is not being introduced because the unions say, on the one hand, that it will be introduced only with a contracting-out clause, and on the other hand the Engineering Employers' Federation, for political reasons, is afraid to agree to this for fear of embarrassing the Government.
I suggest to the Committee that the contracting-out principle will have the very opposite effect of what the Government have claimed, and I refer once again to the agreement that was reached through the voluntary method of the C.I.R. between the A.E.F. and International Harvesters, about which my hon. Friend spoke earlier. This process will have the opposite effect. We believe that agreements freely negotiated should, in normal circumstances, be kept, but we oppose the Government's way of doing things because we believe that it will impede the voluntary reforms on which we should all be concentrating.
How can we expect to encourage local officials or shop stewards to enter into more precise agreements giving them more specific and wider responsibilities if we then say that they will become legally answerable for any breach of those more precise and more extensive agreements?
[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]
But only if and in so far as those shop stewards who, by the right hon. Lady's own admission, have been making more precise agreements for themselves then agree on behalf of their unions to be bound by the agreement. Is there anything so wrong about that?
There is no quarrel between us on that. I say only that if there is legal enforceability in the background they will not agree— this is my whole point— and, therefore, the process of committing themselves to more precise agreements and greater responsibility will be reversed because they will be unwilling to accept the legal implications. Hon. Gentlemen opposite may say that this part of the Bill is not binding against their will but, as I have already said, because it is not binding against their will the Government are now following it up with Clause 35, which is binding against their will.
The Government are asking us to get written into collective agreements a kind of public negative. Under our method, if the employer succeeded in persuading a union that it was in the union's interest to make the agreement legally binding, there would have to be an express statement of that intention in the agreement. If the employer failed to persuade the union of that, we would be no worse off psychologically. Under the Government's proposals, if the union refuses to make the agreement legally binding it has to be written into the agreement, in terms, that it is not legally binding. I do not know of any better way of encouraging people not to keep their agreements, because the emphasis is on the negative, on the contracting out. This is the psychological effect of doing it the Government's way.
For all those reasons, if the Government will not accept, a the hon. Member for Chippenham urged them to do, our much more sensible way of expressing this provision, I must ask my hon. Friends to divide the Committee.
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 267, Noes 305.
I beg to move Amendment No. 709, in page 23, line 13, after 'any', insert 'written'.
I remind the Committee that with this Amendment we are taking Amendment No. 662, in page 23, line 14, leave out '(whether written or oral)'.
I am prepared, if requested, to allow a Division on both Amendments. However, I ask hon. Members to realise that if a Division is required on Amendment No. 662, it will come after we have disposed of Amendment No. 659, in page 23, line 13, at end, insert: '(made after the commencement of this Act)'.
I shall be extremely brief in proposing the Amendment, with the reservation that if there is a debate I shall beg to ask leave to speak again if I wish to speak at greater length.
[MISS HARVIE ANDERSON in the Chair]
Written into the subsection is a suggestion that any collective agreement may be written or oral. The Amendment seeks to take out "oral" and to concentrate on written agreements. I am not a lawyer, so my right hon. and learned Friend may convince me that it is necessary to have "oral agreements" or an "oral" definition included. However, it seems to me that if we are to bring the law into industrial relations an oral agreement cannot claim to be covered by the Bill. In the final analysis such an agreement could not be taken to court. If one sought to do so there would be more trouble in the works as there would be disputation between the parties concerned about what was agreed in any oral agreement. If there is to be a collective agreement which is to be oral then for it to be legal in this Bill it has to be written and if it is written it has to be signed.
I do not know to what extent, if at all, all agreements entered into in this way would be legally binding. If there were any question of oral agreements being brought before the courts, we could finish up with a bonanza for the lawyers, but headaches all round for managements and unions.
I assure my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) that we have looked carefully at the terms of the Amendment, which appears to march alongside that tabled by the Opposition, but we do not feel it necessary to make the change he suggests.
The definition of "collective agreement" of course applies outside the Clause. My hon. Friend will appreciate that. However, the presumption in subsection (1) (a) applies only directly to a written agreement. The only purpose of this definition is to include a procedure agreement, which may be oral or written; a procedure agreement is separately defined in this provision.
The practical area where this may be relevant is in Clause 34, in which it is identified as being an unfair industrial practice for any party to a collective agreement to break that agreement. One recognises the case which my hon. Friend put in relation to an obligation to keep a collective agreement in writing. The practical point here is that there are already a number of collective agreements in existence which may have been intended to have legal force— others may be entered into hereafter— and which, though not in writing, may be intended to be legally binding by all the parties. It would, therefore, seem wrong to restrict the definition of a collective agreement, the breach of which is unfair, only to such agreements in writing.
It might, in some areas, be a retrograde step to assert affirmatively that an oral agreement which was intended by everybody concerned to be binding should, nevertheless, be regarded as immune and free to be broken by anybody at any time. For this reason we do not feel that it would be right to accept the Amendment, although we appreciate the reasoning that lies behind it.
There may at present be certain oral agreements which are binding but which are not legally binding. If there is a wish to continue with those agreements, will they, under the Bill, become automatically legally binding? Is it not possible that all such agreements, which are at present considered to be binding, might disappear and will never happen again because under the Bill they will have to become legally binding?
7.45 p.m.
I think my hon. Friend has misunderstood the use of the phrase "have to become". If there are oral agreements now which are "binding" in honour only but are not legally so, the mere passage of this Bill will not affect them. On the other hand, there are now some oral agreements which are legally as well as morally binding, and they will survive the passage of the Bill and be protected by the inclusion of this definition.
I am rather puzzled about the effect that the Clause may have. Suppose two sides to an agreement, without reducing that agreement to a single piece of writing, each records in writing the terms of that agreement. Presumably that would be regarded as an oral agreement. What would happen if their was an exchange of pieces of paper? Would that oral agreement then become a written agreement, and thereby come within the scope of the Clause?
In this context the hon. and learned Gentleman asks two questions. First, he wonders what would happen if two people, in the context of the Clause, agreed with each other and entered into a binding agreement orally. That could be binding, just as any other agreement could be. For example, if the hon. and learned Gentleman and I agreed on some contractual matter, it does not have to be reduced to writing for it to be binding. If it is reduced to writing and it becomes an agreement in writing, then it is presumed to be binding, unless we assert to the contrary.
The example which he gave was, as it were, the half-way house point at which both reached an agreement orally and both made private notes about it so that it was in writing both ways, but not in agreed writing. The position that would arise there would be the same as the position in any other field. It would be art oral agreement with each asserting its own evidence of what had been orally agreed. It would not carry with it the presumption that it was intended to be binding.
The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned two questions. I wondered what the position would be if there were an exchange of documents.
If we exchanged those documents and we were both agreed on them as being a true record of our agreement, it would probably become an agreement in writing, in the same way as in any other field.
I hesitate to take part in this discussion, which has been largely monopolised by those with a direct interest in industry on either side. However, it seems that we are in a legal quagmire, with the Solicitor-General's every word placing us deeper in the mud.
The hon. and learned Gentleman admitted that an agreement which is made orally and which is reduced to writing on both sides, and where the pieces of waiting are exchanged, may perhaps then be a written agreement. When one recognises the enormous effects that a written agreement could have in our industrial relations, if the Bill is ever to be made effective, then to leave a point like this in doubt in relation to a Clause which deals with such minutae indicates scandalously bad drafting. We must be grateful to the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) for, perhaps inadvertently, raising a major point.
In debating an earlier Clause the Solicitor-General said, when referring to oral agreements, that if a union said that it did not wish an agreement to be legally binding but an employer said that it wished it to be so, there would be no agreement and therefore the matter would not concern the Clause. My hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Dan Jones) asked that question and the Solicitor-General was clear in his reply.
If the two sides are unmindful of this provision and make an agreement and reduce it to writing— even if it is only a scrap of paper— so that they both have a note of it, then they are legally bound by the terms of that piece of paper; and the mere fact that the union says, "I never intended that it should be legally binding" would be overruled by the industrial court. Will that in fact be the result of this provision?
Since there will be so much resentment caused in industry when agreements of this kind are brought before the Industrial Court, we ought to have a good deal more certainty about the drafting of the Clause and about the way in which written agreements are to be interpreted. A written agreement, if this is to be necessary in future, ought to have some legal form. There ought to be some sort of indication upon it that it will be legally enforceable. It ought to give an indication to those who are making the agreement that it might bring them before the Industrial Court. It may be that one can imply certain matters as a result of Clause 1 (1,b), but there ought to be a warning to the people engaged in it, who may just be shop stewards and managers coming to an agreement about a dispute which has broken out on the shop floor, that they are taking a step which, in the new circumstances, is quite unusual and may lead them into consequences which they do not envisage. It seems to me that the whole matter has been left very much in the air.
Does the hon. Gentleman know of an example going into minutiae of that kind, an oral agreement having been made, with separate notes taken of it, the separate notes then being exchanged, but neither signed by the other side? I should have thought that a most unusual circumstance if it were then to be thought that it was a written agreement. Surely, something which is agreed has to have the word "agreed" somewhere.
With respect, no. The hon. Gentleman emphasises the point which I was making. The Committee is talking about an agreement as though it understood what the term "agreement" meant, it being some sort of document like a deed or conveyance— "This conveyance herewith says", and so on. It is no such thing. A legal agreement is any agreement between two parties, and a written agreement is any agreement between two parties which is in writing. The writing can be of any nature whatever.
It has to be agreed.
It has to be agreed, but that is by no means the end of the matter. If the hon. Gentleman and I make an agreement that he will pay me £50 tomorrow if I am right, and we put that down on a bit of paper, that is a written agreement. That is all that is required, and we do not need any formal document. But the Committee is here asked to say that we shall import into our industrial relations. in which most people are completely oblivious to the legal realities, and will be after the Bill is enacted, a concept which will cause a great deal of trouble. People are making agreements day in and day out, perhaps reducing them to writing for convenience, but they will hereafter be caught by these provisions and may be brought before the Industrial Court.
If I understand aright, my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General is saying that the words "whether written or oral" in subsection (3) are put in here only because it is a definition of "collective agreement" as one finds it elsewhere in the Bill, but that definition does not really apply to Clause 32 inasmuch that Clause opens with the words, Every collective agreement… made in writing". I suggest that, on Report, my hon. and learned Friend should take that definition away from Clause 32 and put it in Clause 148 with the other definitions, and leave it at that. It is most confusing to find in a Clause which does not apply to oral agreements a statement about oral agreements. It would make the understanding of the Bill for both trade unionists and Members of Parliament much easier if the definitions were put in the definition Clause and not in the middle of the text.
It was not our intention to prolong the proceedings on what appeared to be a technical point, but it is clear from what has been said so far that this question needs clarification before the Report stage. As I understand it, the reference to an oral agreement is supposedly a reference to an oral agreement made be- fore the Bill comes into force with the intention that it should be legally binding. I think that that is rather academic after the A.E.F. and Ford case, because it is unlikely even that a written agreement would be binding, let alone an oral agreement. But what has concerned some of my hon. Friends is the Solicitor-General's statement that written matter which is evidence of an agreement might be used to turn what otherwise would be an oral agreement into a written agreement.
After the coming into force of the Bill, an oral agreement made and evidenced in writing, perhaps in the minutes of a trade union or an employers' organisation, or in some way reduced to writing, could be adduced in evidence so that what appeared to be an oral agreement was eventually regarded as a written agreement. I think that the Solicitor-General may have made a slip of the tongue in speaking of the matter in that way. I have no wish to divide the Committee unnecessarily, and I had no intention of moving Amendment No. 662 in due course, but, unless the Solicitor-General gives an undertaking that he will clarify the matter on Report, I should be obliged to advise my hon. Friends to show their concern by voting in the Lobby. I hope that we may have the hon. and learned Gentleman's undertaking.
It may well be that, in answering the intervention by the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), I misled the Committee. What I was answering was a question about the extent to which an exchange of documents could be evidence of an oral agreement, and I was not considering whether such an exchange of documents would amount to a written agreement for the purposes of Clause 32(1) (a). As I see it, one can distinguish an oral agreement, an agreement evidenced in writing, which could be in any document recording it, an agreement evidenced in writing and signed by the parties to the agreement, and simply what we have here, that is, a written agreement. In the effective part of the Clause that is, subsection (1) (a), we are concerned with a written agreement. I do not suggest that it goes further than that. I hope that that meets the point made by the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose). In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell), I hesitate to give any commitment about the structure of the Bill, but it seems to me at first sight that the point which he raised about the location of this definition should be looked at again. We shall do that, and we shall at the same time satisfy ourselves that there is no unnecessary lack of clarity here, in the light of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) and the hon. Member for Blackley.
In the light of the observations made both as to the structure and as to the text, we shall look at the matter before Report. In the circumstances, I hope that my hon. Friend will not wish to press his Amendment.
I have no intention of pressing it to a vote, but I am still not happy about the form of the Clause. It appears that an oral agreement could be taken as a legally binding agreement. This could cause tremendous complications in industry if my reading of it be right. However, although I am not happy about that, and I hope that ray hon. and learned Friend will look at the question again before Report, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.0 p.m.
I beg to move Amendment No. 659, in page 23, line 13, at end, insert: '(made after the commencement of this Act)'.
I suggest that it may be for the convenience of the Committee to discuss at the same time the following four further Amendments:
No. 660, in page 23, line 22, after 'agreement', insert: 'made after the commencement of this Act'. No. 666, in Clause 34, page 24, line 20, after 'agreement', insert: 'made after the commencement of this Act'. No. 667, in Clause 34, page 24, line 26, after 'of', insert 'such'.
No. 668, in Clause 34, page 24, line 27, after 'agreement', insert: 'made after the commencement of this Act'.
In our last major debate concerning the enforceability of collec- tive agreements, we on this side, and I think some hon. Members opposite, emphasised that we are at one with the Donovan Commission in opposing enforceability.
Although we support the Donovan Report, and therefore reject these Clauses in their entirety, because they divert attention from the main problems facing industry on to merely a symptom of one of those problems, it is incumbent upon us to deal with the problem of extension of the rule to cover matters that may have been provided for before the passing of the Measure. That is why we have put down a series of Amendments to insert the words: made after the commencement of this Act". Although another Clause restricts the presumption of enforceability to contracts made in writing after the commencement of the Act, failure to insert those words in Clauses 32 and 34 would give rise to serious and legitimate fears on this side about the retroactive effect of these Clauses.
We accept that Clause 32(3) is purely a definition Clause in relation to agreements and arrangements and parties to collective agreements, but certain consequences follow from the failure of the Solicitor-General to restrict the application of the new law concerning collective agreements to those made after the passing of the Bill, and more particularly with regard to Clause 4. The effect will be that voluntarily agreed, binding agreements made before the Measure is passed — which we understand could even include oral agreements, although I regard that as rather academic— where parties have stated their intentions that the agreement should be binding and made enforceable under Clause 33, will now be subject to the provisions of Clause 34. This is so in the case of agreements made under Clause 33 irrespective of when the procedure agreement was made.
The provision may also lead, therefore, to new litigation to decide whether, because of these rules, agreements made before the commencement of the Measure are legally binding.
We should have thought that in making these provisions that at least was something that the Solicitor-General would wish to avoid. As a result, we might still be subjected to the kind of litigation we saw in the A.E.F. and Ford case about legal enforceability, because the agreements to which I have referred are subject to the policing provisions of Clause 34.
Let me put the matter more clearly in everyday terms, and take the position of a joint negotiating body which comes to an agreement that is made enforceable under Clause 33. When the procedure agreement was made setting up that form of procedure in industry there could have been no foreknowledge of the policing under Clause 34, because such agreements were made to negotiate terms and conditions and procedures at a time when they were not enforceable. But Clause 33 agreements are now not only enforceable but subject to the new concept of unfair industrial practice which is brought into Clause 34 and to the policing arrangements which are also in that Clause.
We on this side of the Committee do not accept Clause 34, and shall speak against it later. The Amendment to the Clause at least stresses that we are trying to cover agreements made after the Act and not the original procedure agreement. It is to demonstrate the iniquity of imposing on voluntarily constituted bodies a presumption of enforceability that they could never have foreseen when they were constituted, because they were constituted before the Act in entirely different circumstances, before enforceability was imposed upon them, and before the policing arrangements and the unfair practices concept were imposed upon them in relation to those concepts which were agreed before the Act as binding. There may still be a few such contracts. I think that there will be very few, although there may be more that are alleged to be binding, notwithstanding the Ford and A.E.F. decision and the generally held acceptance that collective agreements were not enforceable. There could have been no possibility at the time that those agreements were entered into that the Government would impose upon the parties to them, particularly the trade union side, the duty to police those agreements, and would impose upon them the unfair industrial practices concept, which is what subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 34 lead to.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) will deal with the implications of Clause 34 in full. It suffices here to quote the evidence given by the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society to the Donovan Commission to see what is being imposed upon agreements made before the Act voluntarily and by bodies constituted before the Act voluntarily in relation to agreements made before the Act. When asked what a union should do in the case of a breach, the hon. and learned Gentleman and his Friends in their evidence to the Commission said with regard to trade union officials, perhaps paraphrasing the words reasonably practicable in the Bill, that in the event of a breach by members they would have to sue their members. They said that the union funds would become liable, and that in turn the union would sue its members for those funds. So the trade union will be under an obligation to recover damages from its own members, which, presumably, it is to do by suing them. In paragraph 5779, the hon. and learned Gentleman went rather further, saying: I would think one of the things the union would have to show was that it was intended to suspend or expel them. Therefore, we have here a duty imposed post facto upon unions to police agreements made before the Act and agreements under Clause 33, even if that requires the expulsion of their members, suing their members, or imposing fines upon them. We can think of few ways of causing more industrial chaos.
The provision goes far beyond anything in any other country. In Great Britain unions achieved collective bargaining and voluntary enforceability, where this occurs, without legislation. This differentiates us from other countries, such as the United States, where the situation led to the Taft-Hartley Act, and from the corporate state of Mussolini. I say that advisedly, because the hon. and learned Gentleman should understand, if he does not already, that in the minds of many of us on this side, and certainly of many trade unionists, these provisions are associated with the concept of the corporate state and are regarded accordingly. The Solicitor-General would do well to try to understand that, as we go on discussing the enforceability both of collective bargaining and procedure agreements. The position was expressed very well by one United States authority who wrote that the entire policy of the Wagner Act … must depend for its success on the uncoerced action of each party through its own representatives to the end that agreements satisfactory to both may be reached. But since Taft-Hartley there has been a rapid growth of the law pertaining to the interpretation of labour contracts. Perhaps the best remark about this was made by Professor Kahn Freund, who summed up the situation as follows: There seems to be no country in which highly doctrinal distinctions between various types of strikes and picketing have been more minutely elaborated than in the United States, but it may be said that the number of days lost in strikes is much higher in the United States than in other comparable countries. What we have here basically is the post-facto imposition of enforceability. That is repugnant to all the ideas the House of Commons has held on the subject of retroactive legislation and it comes on top of a departure from our traditional concept of the freedom of contract. If we add to this the very strange concept of policing by the trade unions, and the injection of the other concept of unfair practices resulting from an action in breach of something that was never envisaged as unlawful when the agreement was entered into, or when the procedural machinery was entered into, in the case of Clause 33, it is understandable why there is so much concern on this side of the Committee.
The nature of collective bargains is not as many hon. Members opposite appear to think it is. It has not been quoted so much in the debate we have had today, but I refer the hon. and learned Gentleman to Professor Wellington's evidence to the Donovan Commission, dealing with the American experience. It is on page 1739. Professor Wellington said: A collective bargaining agreement, however, is one episode in a continuing, joint history of a firm and union. It is temporary calm in a restless, shifting relationship. Accordingly, to attempt to compel the employer or the union during contract time peacefully to yield on a deeply felt issue, particularly if it believes it never consented to yield, often will not resolve that issue. Rather it merely will delay ultimate resolution to a time when the parties are freed from governmental restraints. At that time— the time on contract negotiation— economic combat may be the means of decision. That is the risk in allowing such a situation here. To compel compliance by means never envisaged by the parties entering into the agreement before the passing of the Act, never envisaged by bodies constituted by the parties before this Bill was dreamed of, is to throw a sizeable spanner into the delicate machinery of collective bargaining. It is not a spanner which the hon. and learned Gentleman need throw. Appeals have been made from both sides concerning the general question of enforceability. Perhaps we might yet see him give way over this. Even if he is not prepared to give way over it, surely in all logic and justice agreements entered into before these provisions were envisaged, agreements arrived at by bodies set up before these matters were envisaged, cannot be brought within the ambit of the Act and put into the context of these policing provisions.
I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman, therefore, at least, in making some concession to the Committee, to reconsider the effect of the present wording of these Clauses, and to consider, if not now then on Report, ensuring that they will apply only to those matters which are dealt with after the commencement of the Act and only to those bodies set up after the commencement of the Act. To do otherwise is to impose upon them something they could never have envisaged at the time of the agreement.
The hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) has mounted a formidable speech in support of what is said to be a gently probing Amendment. I shall not match professor with professor across the Committee to answer questions because that does not seem to me to be called for at this stage.
The intention of Clauses 32, 33 and 34 is that there should be no attempt at any retrospective legal enforceability to anything. The only intention is that agreements which the parties, either in the past or in the future, intended to be legally binding should remain so or be so regarded. There is no reason for the hon. Gentleman's fears there. But I will look at the wording to ensure that we have it in line with that intention.
8.15 p.m.
The effective parts of Clause 32, as now acknowledged, are subsection (1) and (2), and in each of these cases it is plain that the presumption applies only to collective agreements made after the commencement of the Act and no problem arises there. Two of the Amendments relate to the definition of collective agreements in subsection (3). That in itself imposes no obligation and makes no change.
On Clause 33, the hon. Gentleman argued that we were imposing legal enforceability on decisions made by voluntary bodies when those voluntary bodies did not visualise those decisions being made enforceable. That is not the case. Clause 33 identifies the bodies to which it refers as being those … established … (whether … before or after the commencement of this Act) …". In other words, the body may have been set up before the Act but there is no question of enforceability attaching to it simply for that reason.
Subsection (2) reads: For the purposes of any proceedings of any such body after the commencement of this Act, it shall be conclusively presumed that the parties to the procedure agreement by which it was established… intended to authorise that body, in relation to matters falling within the scope of the purposes for which it was established, to make awards or decisions having effect as legally enforceable contracts made on behalf of the constituent parties.
The rubric to Clause 33 reads: Presumptions relating to proceedings of voluntary negotiating bodies. Our complaint is that if the Government impose retrospective enforceability in the sense that one is making bodies which were originally voluntary bodies into something different, that is a mistake.
I see the point and I hope to meet it. Under subsection (3), it is only a decision or award made after the commencement of the Act, and which is recorded in writing and does not contain a provision designed to be enforeable, that is presumed to be binding. All that one is saying is that a body of this kind, set up whenever it was set up— I accept that— once the Act is in effect will prima facie be doing something with the intention that both sides shall be bound after the commencement of the Act. We are not attaching enforceability to any decision made by that body in the past, and the body will itself be able, when recording in writing a decision by or on behalf of that body, to say whether or not it intends it to be binding. So the effect is prospective and not retrospective.
I accept that there is no provision in Clause 34 saying that the unimpeachability of a legally questionable contract shall only apply to such a contract made after the commencement of the Act. The intention is simple. We want to protect a legally enforceable contract from being broken, whether or not it was made after the Act, because one starts from the fact that it has to be intended to be legally enforceable in the first place, and we do not want to make of no value, and immune from being disrupted, an agreement entered into before the Act with the full intention of both sides that it should be legally binding, simply by applying Clause 34 for the future and not to any pre-existing agreements.
I hope that that explanation makes plain what we are trying to do. Of course it is a different purport from Clause 35, about which we shall have different debates, but the intention is to make it plain, that it is only agreements now existing which were intended by the parties that made them to be binding, or agreements or decisions given after the commencement of the Act which are intended to be binding that will be affected in this way.
I see no reason in the light of what has been said in the debate to think that we have got it wrong. Of course we will look at the wording again to make sure. I hope that it is correct as I have explained— the intention being only to attach enforceability to future decisions or to agreements now intended to be binding. On that basis, and consistent with that policy, I hope that the Committee will resist the Amendments.
I was happy with the Solicitor-General's interpretation except when he mentioned agreements, now in existence, which were intended to be legally binding. I suggest that existing agreements cannot very well have been intended to be legally binding and that the advent of the Bill will be the first occasion from which agreements will become legally binding. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give a little more detail about existing agreements which, he says, were intended to be legally binding?
I do not want to go too far into detail, but at one point in the course of the last debate bat one the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) asserted that it was possible for binding agreements between unions and individual employers to be made now, and there is certainly room for reaching that conclusion, although it is much debated.
The Ford case illustrated that for the most part that is not the intention of the parties, but there are at least three collective agreements which I can think of in which the parties believe that they have secured enforceability before the passing of the Bill. The point is that if they believe that they have enforceable agreements and they are right in that belief, we do not want to disturb them.
There is one industry-wide agreement believed to be legally enforceable, and I can think of at least two others which are not industry wide. We want to leave these with their pre-existing character of legal respectability, or disrespectability according to one's point of view. For that reason, we should be reluctant to insert the suggested words. We do not want to make a dishonest woman of an honest agreement already at large and enforceable.
What the Solicitor-General has said does not go far enough. In an earlier debate I mentioned the difficulty which subsection (4) put on the word "party". One of the difficulties about this gloss is that it does not define "party", but simply says what is included and it does not include individual members of trade unions. As the Solicitor-General rightly pointed out in answer to my intervention it includes individual employers.
The effect of putting this gloss on "party" instead of defining in such a way as to make it clear whether or not it includes individual trade unions raises a difficulty with collective agreements which may be legally enforceable under the existing law. There may be two categories of contract which may be binding in that way. On the one hand, there is the contract, which may be called a collective agreement, when each indi- vidual member of the trade union has authorised the trade union to negotiate certain terms on his behalf, and the employer has gone through the same exercise with an association of employers. In such a case there would be no doubt that, provided that the two agents— the trade union on the one hand and the employers' association on the other— had acted within the scope of their authority they could reach an agreement which would be binding under the present law. The other category is when an indvidual contract of employment takes in and incorporates in the contract the terms of a collective agreement. In each case the key is whether the individual member of the trade union is or is not a party to such a contract.
This is where the ambiguity comes into it, and unless one is clear whether under Clause 32 such contracts should be comprised within the heading of collective agreements, one cannot make sure about Clause 34 and that the guarantee which the Solicitor-General has given about a review will be sufficient. If one is looking at this criterion objectively, the only protection one can give to ensure that previous contracts which may be binding agreements are not affected by Clause 34 is to put in the words suggested. This is a very important point which I strongly urge on the Solicitor-General, and not a debating point. I urge it strongly upon him even if he does not accept any of the other Amendments.
Of course I acknowledge that points are being put forward in the anxious concern to ensure that the Clauses are right within the philosophy, odious or magnificent, according to view, of the Bill, we shall consider the issue which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Murray) raised in the last debate and this about the scope of the word "party". For the reasons I have explained we think it right when we consider Clause 34(2) and the possible implications of its effect on pre-existing agreements, to consider it in the light of Amendment No. 668.
We do not wish to give effect to any retrospective legislation, to attach intentions other than those which the parties intended when they made the agreements either before or subsequent to the passing of the Bill. I hope that that meets the point, but we will consider the matter again and, if necessary, return to it on Report.
Will the Solicitor-General deal with the enforceability of agreements which have already been accepted as legally binding? Does not "enforceability" in subsection (4) constitute something different from and above that of "enforceability"? I understand that enforceable agreements are agreements enforceable as a matter of contract between firm or company and individual employee. These agreements, which were enforceable before the coming into operation of the Bill, are enforceable only in that sense and are not enforceable against the trade union as such.
These Clauses constitute a new form of enforceability, because action in the industrial courts may be taken. It is not merely a question of claiming compensation for breach of contract against an individual employee, but proceedings may be taken against a union by virtue of industrial action. As there is a new situation, surely this is a retroactive legislation introducing a new aspect and a new situation for existing agreements.
8.30 p.m.
Existing agreements are enforceable, in so far as they imply terms in an individual's contract of employment, by the individual against the employer and vice versa . One view is that there are no existing collective agreements which may be enforced against a trade union. A union may be able to enforce an existing collective agreement against an employer.
The view has also been expressed, and it is one I mentioned en passant, that there are some existing collective agreements which can even now be enforced against a trade union. There is one which is industry-wide and at least two others I know of where people believe they are enforceable against a union as distinct from being enforcable against individual employees.
This is the area of uncertainty, and all that we are saying is that if and insofar as an existing agreement is enforceable in that way against a union or by a union against an employer, then it ought to be enforceable hereafter by means of an unfair practice. Beyond that there is a change embodied in the principles of Clause 34 which makes it presumptively possible for many more agreements to be made by a union. The whole structure of the Bill means that a union can be made, in limited circumstances, to comply with an order. The point raised by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Aston (Mr. Julius Silverman) is almost as narrow as he puts it but not quite.
I hope that the Committee will feel that I have shown our willingness to look at these Clauses in the light of the Amendments so as to ensure that we fulfil our original intention; namely, legally binding effectiveness to those agreements intended to be binding before the Act and those intended to be binding after the Act but not beyond that. I hope that the Amendments will not be pressed but if they are I must ask my hon. Friends to reject them.
While I certainly do not understand the hon. and learned Gentleman refusing the other morning to exchange fig leaves with my right hon. Friend, I can certainly understand his reluctance today to refuse to match professor for professor. He would have to dredge very deeply in this country and across the Atlantic to find any professor to support his contention.
I could have mentioned about a dozen.
I have yet to meet the professors to whom the Solicitor-General refers. What he has not succeeded in doing is calming the fears on this side of the Committee about policing. Although it would be churlish not to appreciate his willingness to meet the point about the retroactive nature of the legislation, he really has failed to deal with the new context in which previously agreed enforceable agreements are to be dealt with. That context includes the new courts and the new concepts of fair practice and of policing agreements, making trade unions responsible for taking action against their own members in the disastrous way to which I have referred.
What we have come down to is that in those few agreements which may exist now—and the hon. and learned Gentleman referred to one covering a whole industry—it would be wrong to allow these new provisions to apply when they could not have envisaged at the time the agreement was entred into. We accept his willingness to look into that.
With regard to the other part of the Amendment, it is agreed and accepted on this side that it will apply only to those agreements made after the commencement of the Act. But it is made by procedural bodies set up not with the knowledge that the trade unions would have to police these agreements, that they might have to sue their members, fine them or suspend them, but at a time when that was not the case and could not have been foreseen. It is for that reason that the retroactive element comes in again, although it is conceded to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the new agreements as such will not be affected in that way.
Because the Solicitor-General is prepared to look at this again and because there will be a debate on Clause 34 which establishes this new concept, I will advise my hon. Friends not to vote on this Amendment but to await Clause 34 and, if necessary, to vote then to show our feeling that that Clause will inject a new bitterness and chaos into industrial relations, particularly in what I call intra-union relationships. For that reason I do not propose to press this matter to a vote at this stage, although it will certainly be dealt with by Amendments on report if the hon. and learned Gentleman has not by then taken whatever action is necessary to remove what is clearly retroactive legislation with regard to these two types of agreement.
Can my hon. Friend help me? I am thinking of a firm which is perhaps 95 per cent. organised but 5 per cent. of the employees are not with any trade union. Some of that 5 per cent. are in vital positions and they decide to strike. They are not parties to the union agreement. What happens in such a case?
This is a matter for Clause 34, but it should be mentioned in this context. One of the iniquities of Clause 34, which is to be made applicable to two types of agreement which could never have envisaged this situation, is that the agreement may well be broken by people who are not members of the union which negotiated the agreement. They may even be non-union members. It has been known for non-union members to be more militant than union members. Therefore, imposed upon the trade union will be the obligation to police, not its members, but the agreement encompassing people who are not perhaps members of the union in question or of any union.
My right hon. and hon. Friends will show, within the context of Clause 34, the rather dim view that they take of this new obligation being forced on trade unions which are doing their best, as was acknowledged in the research pamphlet published for the Donovan Commission, to ensure that procedures are complied with and which all the evidence shows are doing their best to achieve peace in industry.
Amendment negatived.
Question put, That the Clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 303, Noes 260.
Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33
PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO PROCEED INGS OF VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATING BODIES
I beg to move, Amendment No. 664, in page 23, line 45, leave out subsection (2).
Throughout the debates so far today the presumptions seem to have been that the agreements which we have been discussing are national agreements, the major agreements entered into by trade unionists negotiating nationally, and by employers negotiating likewise, and it seems to me that, as a consequence, Clause 32 has overshadowed this Clause which we are now considering. In spite of its standing in the shadows, however, it seems to me that this Clause is pregnant with sinister potential, and the words of the Solicitor-General in reply to a question put to him by my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) confirm this.
Subsection (1) applies the Clause to any body consisting of representatives of one or more trade unions or other organisations of workers and representatives of one or more employers … for the purpose of regulating the terms and conditions of employment … I might say that that is the exact description of, for example, a joint works committee in the engineering industry, or a site committee in the building industry. I could emunerate many other examples of local and plant bargaining bodies throughout the whole of industry.
Subsection (2) conclusively presumes that these local bargaining agencies shall be authorised to make legally binding agreements. Subsection (3) provides that any decision made by such a body and recorded in writing but without a written proviso that it shall not be legally binding shall be conclusively presumed to be a legally enforceable contract.
I thought that the provisions of Clause 32 were sufficiently iniquitous, but this Clause seems to be intended to place a minefield before every shop steward—and, indeed, many employers—and then sends them into it blindfold. After the Bill is enacted unions as such will approach the negotiating table not only with multiplied caution but also with a lawyer as a train bearer. The Clause carries its legal presumptions into every little nook and cranny of industry. Every day of the working week shop stewards and other shop-floor workers' representatives are engaged in negotiating local agreements, factory agreements, site agreements, local productivity bargains, and so on. The Clause provides that all these will be legally enforceable, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary. These are agreements and decisions that almost certainly will be arrived at without the benefit of any legal guidance for the workers. With equal certainty, such agreements will be arrived at in blind ignorance of the legal consequences, because I greatly doubt if one steward in a thousand will either read or understand the Bill when enacted, certainly not at 18s. a time.
Every time the works committee meets in the little firm down the road the minutes of that committee are likely to become legally enforceable documents—that is what the Bill says. We will help the Government to ensure that every shop steward is aware of the requirements of the Bill, but even if I am wrong about the awareness of shop stewards I greatly doubt if in future any shop steward can have any meaningful dialogue with management. If a steward has any sense he will become completely inhibited, at the very least. Indeed, if he has any sense he will not have any on-record dialogue. No minutes will be the order of the day.
Let me hypothesise the type of situation I have been in as a shop steward in a former incarnation. I do this on the assumption that what is here in black and white is the correct interpretation of the Clause. Let us suppose that at its monthly meeting in January the works committee—a joint committee composed of shop stewards and management, as provided for under the engineering procedure agreement—has a solemn but informal discussion about matters of mutual concern and comes to a sensible arrangement about a piecework price that has been in dispute. That is solemnly recorded in the minutes, which at the February meeting are confirmed as a true and correct record. By June the part to which the piecework price applies is worked on and the price is found to be unsuitable. That is an every year occurrence in thousands of factories. But presumably under the Clause, when enacted, the employer will be able to say "You entered into a solemn and legally binding agreement that that piecework price shall be x number of hours or x number of shillings."
What happens in that kind of situation? I know that had I been the shop steward who negotiated that sort of arrangement I would have been kicked out, but that is another matter. If this is true, what price local productivity bargaining in the future? As the right hon. Gentleman knows, my right hon. Friend and I had some responsibility at his Department in the last couple of years in helping to give productivity bargaining a big push forward. We believed that this was one of the many ways in which to make our industry more efficient and more competitive and at the same time would make an effective contribution to industrial relations by bringing workers more into the every day decisions of management and industry. But in future, because of the character of legally enforceable contracts, shop stewards must inevitably hesitate before even contemplating entering into productivity bargaining.
I would add that one of the realities of the workshop, of which Government seem to be unaware, is that things do not remain static in industry, least of all in the work force and in workers' representation. They are constantly changing. The circumstances and conditions continually change. Decisions made last month which were relevant then may be irrelevant and illogical this month because of changed circumstances and conditions. But under the Secretary of State's provisions if management has been able to get a decision which is recorded as solemnly entered into and which is favourable to management then despite any changed circumstances they will fight to adhere to it. I mentioned a short while ago piecework prices, which are an outstanding example of this problem. Are lists of piecework prices to be legally enforceable?
There is one other matter which seems to permeate the Bill—the idea that management and workers meet freely as equals. Every time I hear the words "collective agreement" something way down in me jumps up to scream out to tell the right hon. Gentleman that this flies in the face of the reality that I experienced year after year in industry. In fact they are anything but "agreements". They are invariably imposed by one side of industry on the other at the time of an imbalance between relative bargaining strengths. The workers' representative is always, or invariably, in the position not of a free equal bargaining agent, but of a supplicant. At best he is required to acquiesce in what are still essentially managerial decisions. My point is that to buttress this situation with the judicial machinery of the Bill will consolidate enormously the inequity which I have described.
Although I do not wish to trespass on the debate that we shall have on Clause 34, it is interesting to speculate that the obligations in Clause 34(2) place on the parties the policing of such agreements. I have said sufficient to show, I assume —I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will tell me if I have it wrong—that what is set out here in black and white is correct.
9.0 p.m.
The proposal is impracticable to the point of absurdity. Furthermore, it will have a harmful effect on industrial relations at shop floor level, and it is inequitable in the extreme.
The right hon. Gentleman has been compelled to include this provision in the Bill because it follows logically from Clause 32. Clearly, the unions have already shown their distaste for the proposal that collective agreements shall be legally enforceable. They see as a way of evading its requirements entering into or allowing their members to enter into agreements other than those which were being referred to in the debate on Clause 32, namely, to resort to plant bargaining. The right hon. Gentleman has presumably been compelled to bring them within his legal net by the provisions of this Clause. In so doing he has let himself into what seems an absurdity. He is trying to build bricks of straw in Clause 32 on the foundations of sand which he has set out in Clause 33.
[Mr. BRYANT GODMAN IRVINE in the Chair]
Being a non-legal hon. Member, may I ask what the words "conclusively presumed" mean? We seem to go on from that peculiar expression to decide whether the body concerned is then authorised and so on.
On an earlier Amendment I said that one of the great virtues of workshop organisation is the speed with which otherwise very difficult disputes can be resolved. This is one of the most vital elements in industrial negotiation. If it is to be that the words "conclusively presumed" mean that unless the trade unions, who are one side of the works committee arrangements, say to the employers, "We are not authorising our side of the works committee to agree to matters which are then deemed to be legally binding", I take it that the Clause means that they will at law be deemed to have given them that power.
That would make a nonsense of a great deal of internal factory negotiating machinery, which would be a pity. Let me give some examples of the most important part of works committee work. If we have an organisation really functioning, meetings of the works committee are merely a clearance stage, more or less, for work which has already been done. In other words, on piecework agreements and so on, there could be a difference in one department between the workmen concerned and the rate fixer or the foreman, and unless an immediate decision is taken, that results in strike action. The chairman of the works committee would immediately call together a sort of existing sub-committee, the shop steward of the department, the foreman, and the superintendent of the aisle or the bigger department, and he would have the works committee man with him, and they would make a decision as to whether they would accept the suggested agreement between, say, the shop steward and the foreman. When the full works committee met a report would be made by the secretary or the chairman of the committee that on Monday morning, in a certain part of the factory, an agreement had been made between so-and-so and so-and-so, and that would be the end of the matter.
If we are now to have the situation that if a sub-committee makes a decision which permits men to go on working, and thereby obviates the danger of strike action, that decision is to be interpreted as meaning that it is a legally binding contract, the whole concept of how to run a huge factory on a works committee basis will be at stake, because trade unions—and I should have thought the employers, too—will almost be compelled to nominate a legal adviser to the works committee. Instead of there being a two-minute report of what took place in a certain part of a factory, those concerned will have to give chapter and verse for the agreement, or the suggested agreement, and the legal advisers on both sides will there and then have to decide whether what was supposed to be in the agreement is in fact legally contained in it.
If one realises that hundreds of these agreements are made every week, one appreciates that the proposed procedure will make a mockery of the whole working of the works committee. I said earlier, and I repeat, that if the kind of thing to which I have referred happens the result will be to increase the number of working days lost by industrial action by any multiple that one likes to think of.
I always resent the suggestion made by hon. Gentlemen opposite—and one hon. Gentleman referred to the motor car industry—that when there is a dispute it must necessarily be due to the bloody-mindedness of shop stewards, and so on. It was rightly pointed out by this side of the Committee that thousands of arrangements are made every working day which prevent disputes which would otherwise occur from taking place.
I hope that instead of this awfully stultified legalistic approach to these things the Government will try to look at the way in which industry ticks over. If they apply this subsection in the way that I have suggested it might be applied, they will do terrible damage to works committee negotiating machinery, much of which has been in existence for 30 or 40 years. They will put the clock back to long before the time when, in the general run of industry, works committee arrangements were made at all.
I have tried to show that it will be utterly impossible to function with speed if those concerned have to go through the whole gamut of the procedures to which I have referred. If the Solicitor-General tells me that I am wrong, I shall be happy to accept that, but until he does so I shall insist, with some knowledge of these things, that thousands of working hours which are saved now will be lost if sub-committees of works committees cannot function and make sensible arrangements with employers without these being deemed to be legally binding arrangements.
My right hon. Friend speaks with great knowledge of the procedure that we both know so well but he has been referring mainly to written agreements. Oral agreements are also to be considered legally binding. How does he view the situation of workers trying to get witnesses to substantiate the terms of an oral agreement, and the advantages enjoyed by employers over workers in that respect?
I am not confining myself only to written agreements. The majority of arrangements which I have instanced in a section or a department are never written. We know that there is a dispute, we get the machinery functioning, and we make a verbal arrangement. On the basis of that verbal arrangement work is resumed.
If the works committee meets every Monday afternoon, then, on the following Monday afternoon, the chairman and secretary merely report to the committee that there was a dispute in a certain section and that it was resolved by a meeting of whoever it was. That is the way that these things function now, as my hon. Friend knows.
I am not stipulating that there must be anything in writing. It could be in writing or verbally. I am suggesting that when whatever arrangement was made comes for ratification before the full works committee legal advisers, certainly on the trade union side and, I think, on the employer's side would the need to be present. The Employers' Federation would no doubt be very worried if, within one of the factories of a member of the federation, arrangements were made which were above agreements made by the federation.
I do not wish to go further into this matter. I hope that the Government will see that they really are starting something which, instead of creating new machinery, will render existing machinery unable to function in the way that it has functioned in the past. I hope that the Amendment will be accepted.
Clauses 32, 33 and 34 are in many ways the weakest part of the Bill. As I said on Second Reading, they lack practicality, because it seems to me that contracts of employment will be virtually unenforceable. I believe that the time lag between a contract being broken and the cause of the breaking coming before the court—whether an industrial or any other type of court—will be so great as to make a nonsense of the whole thing when we remember that the union and the employer have, so to speak, to live together.
As a lawyer perhaps I can help the right hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Frederick Lee). It seems to me that "conclusively presumed" means that in law the presumption cannot be rebutted. Whatever the evidence that the voluntary body never intended to enter into legally binding decisions, it is a presumption which cannot be rebutted. Is that what is intended?
Is it necessary to have this Clause? There must be great doubt about an award or decision of such a body when many such decisions are arrived at by informal negotiation. Is it intended to cover such matters by the provisions of the Clause?
There is a quaint provision in subsection (3): Any award or decision made by any such body … as so recorded, does not contain a provision which (however expressed) states that the award or decision is intended not to be legally enforceable. This will give shop stewards great scope to express the view that the award or decision is intended not to be legally enforceable and to use any expletives they like in venting their feelings. It can be argued from the Government's side that the trade unions have a "let out"—that if they do not intend it to be legally binding they simply state it in some form of words in the written agreement or decision. But what happens where there is an oral decision which is perhaps not recorded in the minutes? In many small shops steps are not taken to record such things. I suggest that the Government will get themselves into a frightful mess on this part of the Bill. I support the Government on many aspects of the Bill, but on legal enforceability it seems that they are getting into an absolute mire. Should these matters ever come before the courts we would have a lawyer's paradise. Coaches and horses could be driven through these provisions.
Is it really necessary for the Government to continue with such a wide-ranging Clause? Would it not be better to allow the normal day-to-day shop floor arrangements to continue unaffected by this part of the Bill?
9.15 p.m.
I will not delay the Committee because, having previously raised the question of the practice of piece-work activities in industry, I do not want to repeat myself. Piece-working in the engineering industry is rife. Having failed to get a satisfactory reply to an earlier question that I asked about the legal enforceability of agreements of this kind, I support what has been said by hon. Members on this side of the Committee on this issue.
My fear is that if the Bill becomes law and this provision applies throughout industry, one of the first results will be difficulty in obtaining shop stewards. Who would be prepared to get involved in a legal Clause of this character? Very few shop stewards would be so prepared, and I would not blame them.
I also fear that the promoters of the Bill have been so blinkered by a legal approach that they have completely overlooked the practical problems that are involved. These are so apparent to some of us that we wonder why the Government have overlooked them.
For example, consider the difficulties that arise when a new job arrives on the shop floor. Certain conditions are laid down. The manning must be worked out; how much skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled labour is required. An agreement may be reached. If there is gang working, there may be absenteeism. How is the right labour to be obtained and deployed at the right place and at the right time? These questions place a great strain on supervisors, particularly in engineering, and they are all matters that must be considered in this context.
How many disputes occur in industry as a result of the breaking of piece-rate agreements? The answer is very few, if any. These matters are handled, usually by general agreement, by the rate fixer. Why the Government have introduced a provision of this nature when there is ample evidence to show that the existing practice works very well I fail to understand.
I have previously said that the whole Bill is unimaginative and will never produce industrial peace. This Clause will cause disruption in areas where now there exists reasonable harmony. I therefore add my plea to the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw this part of the Bill.
I rise at this point not to curtail the discussion but because it might be useful if I answered some of the points that have been raised.
I emphasise again that it is not the intention here to legalise a range of activities and institutions which have hitherto not been covered by legal obligations. I have several times pointed out that the heart of the limits in this context appears in Clause 33(3). In the first place, it applies only to decisions taken after the commencement of the Bill. It applies only to such decisions duly recorded in writing which do not contain a provision excluding the idea of enforceability. It is, therefore, not something which will automatically attach, for example—I appreciate the concern which is felt about it—to day-to-day decisions which might be taken between foreman and shop steward as to how manning should be altered for a piece of work on a particular day. That is not a decision of a body of the kind with which we are here concerned which would be recorded in writing by or on behalf of that body. It would not, therefore, attract these provisions. The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) spoke of the possibility of a non-written agreement of that kind attracting these implications. It is clear that, if a decision is not recorded in writing on behalf of the joint body, then—if I may be forgiven the phrase—the concept does not reach first base in the context of the Clause.
But is not the Clause too widely drawn nevertheless? Let us suppose that an informal agreement is entered into and as a matter of procedure it is minuted, but the minute does not happen to follow the exclusion provision. It is, therefore, legally binding. According to the Solicitor-General, the Government do not intend that it should be legally binding, but under the Clause it would be if it were minuted.
I have said that there is no intention that it should be automatically, irretrievably, irrebuttably legally binding. I accept the point as the hon. and learned Gentleman puts it, that if a joint body of this kind arrives at a decision which is minuted, in other words, duly recorded in writing by or on behalf of that body", without a disclaimer clause it would have legal effect. I am not seeking to conceal anything, and I hope that the Committee will accept that I am being frank about it. What I am saying is that it is excludable, and it attaches only to those decisions taken in writing.
It is to be noticed that many decisions recorded in this way would be decisions to the advantage of those negotiating for the workpeople in the workplace.
Will the Solicitor-General point out how, under the Clause as it stands, such a minuted decision can be excludable?
Under the provisions of subsection (3) (b), as so recorded, does not contain a provision which … states that the award or decision is intended not to be legally enforceable". May I suggest ways in which these matters may well be dealt with in practice? A substantial body, perhaps even a national body such as a J.I.C., takes formal decisions on behalf of an industry. It may well be that such a body would be the body effectively making the collective agreement for the industry or for a substantial section of it. In our view, it is right that in that kind of setting there should be the initial presumption set out in Clause 32 attached to that kind of setting. It has been said that this is consistent—in other words, that it follows logically from Clause 32—and in a sense that is right, because agreements can be made either by the formal making of an agreement between two parties at arm's length in national, industry or plant negotiations, or by the conclusion of a collective agreement by the decision of such a joint body. They are creatures of the same kind, and it is right that the same sort of presumption should apply to them.
As regards the very informal works committee kind of decision at the bottom of the scale, many of the most informal decisions will not be recorded in writing, and this will not bite.
In the middle category, there may well be a number of works committees which have a degree of formality attached to them in which the parties might decide that in the ordinary course of events—it might appear at the beginning and end of every set of their minutes—they are not, so to speak, legally binding agreement manufacturers.
I have said that the works committee itself becomes merely a clearance house for work done by shop stewards, foremen and so on. Just as Ministers may attend only that Cabinet when their business is due for discussion, so the shop stewards who are not members of the full works committee will attend it when their business is for discussion. In that sense, the local arrangements about which I spoke are made as a section of the works committee. Therefore, they would be covered by the legally-binding status, I take it.
I am not gainsaying the point the right hon. Gentleman made in his speech. If a local decision is brought up to the works committee for confirmation or ratification in that way, then, dependent on the way in which the works committee has agreed to conduct its business, it may be regarded as legally binding. We would expect the works committee to say to itself at the outset of the new system, "Shall we be the kind of committee whose decisions are automatically regarded as binding under Section 33(3)?". It may well agree that it will not be making legally binding decisions, with exceptions on which it agrees. The only function of the provision is to require any such joint body to be clear with itself as to whether it is making a legally binding agreement in respect of its decisions generally or separately, starting off with the proposition—here I agree with the right hon. Gentleman—that the larger national, industry-wide ones we would expect to be those most likely to begin by maintaining the presumption.
Without wishing to debate the merits of this metaphysical argument in an intervention, may I ask the Solicitor-General a simple question? How does he suppose that all these erudite and subtle arguments, which may seem clear to him and some of his colleagues who are solicitors, barristers or senior wranglers, can ever be conveyed successfully to the man on the shop floor, the shop stewards, the people handling human beings at the point of contact? That is what worries us. Is it not strange when Britain has no written constitution, that the Government are here trying to institutionalise and formalise even the most remote contingencies that are not understood by ordinary people?
Our not having a written Constitution is a different debate that we might join in on some other occasion.
The provisions of the Bill, like those of any major legislation, will be embodied in explanatory pamphlets and documents in simple terms to make them quite intelligible when the Bill becomes an Act. [Interruption.] It does not lie very easily in the mouths of hon. Members opposite to repudiate the idea of explanatory documents about legislation. I do not want to weary the Committee with examples of this not unfamiliar technique.
The central proposition here is not difficult. It is that any joint body of the kind we have been discussing, from the greatest to the smallest, must decide at the outset of its first proceedings after the Bill becomes law what kind of decisions it will take. In many cases it will be a once-and-for-all decision; for example, that "The decisions recorded in writing here shall all contain a provision that they are not intended to be legally binding." At least that is some thing of which such bodies are put in mind. Those of a larger or more formal kind dealing with larger matters and hammering out collective agreements in the true sense will take a different decision.
The effect of this kind of provision, if it impels people to say, "We do not want to attach legal force in this kind of way", may well be to encourage voluntary arbitration procedures for the resolution of disputes.
9.30 p.m.
In part, my hon. and learned Friend has already answered my query. With some experience of works councils, I understand the anxieties expressed by hon. Members opposite. I understand my hon. and learned Friend to say that it is the intention to issue some simple instructions which will give guidance to works councils and similar organisations. This, I take it, will make it clear that it will be possible for a works council to opt out of that legal obligation at the beginning of a period. The secretaries of many of these organisations are people without experience who may well forget this important wording when recording the decisions.
That is correct. The decision of the works council, or whatever it may be, could be recorded to the effect that awards or decisions made by the council are not intended to be legally enforceable.
If they are projected into the future?
If that is what is intended.
Surely it is not possible under the wording of the Bill. Surely one cannot make a sort of generalised disclaimer of that kind. Surely the whole point of making it a conclusive presumption that they can conclude legally binding agreements is in order to ensure that every agreement they make in writing will be legally binding unless it contains a disclaimer.
The conclusive presumption in subsection (2) is in respect of the authority of the joint committee, and the effect on a particular decision is contained in subsection (3), which says that decisions shall be conclusively presumed to be binding except where they contain a provision, however expressed … that the award or decision is intended not to he legally enforceable. That intention can be expressed in relation to awards or decisions of the committee. It can decide for itself, on the quality and the nature of the decision it has arrived at. The only intention of this is to put the balance in the direction of intention to make legally binding agreements at the level I have indicated —that the view of the committee or the council can be set out in that way.
If the only intention is as the hon. and learned Gentleman has described it, what is gained by making the presumption conclusive? Might there not be rebuttal?
The presumption is rebuttable in the way I have indicated.
This is inconsistent.
It is consistent. We are not suggesting that any decision is binding presumptively. A decision recorded in writing is prima facie enforceable, but that presumption is rebuttable by a further record saying that it is not intended to be binding. The balance is the same. It only becomes possibly binding if it is in writing, and if that is accompanied or preceded by a statement that it is not meant to be binding, the presumption is rebutted.
With the best will in the world, I believe, the hon. and learned Gentleman is straining our patience. Will he tell us what precise advantages he hopes to get from this Clause? At this moment, we have got legal arguments, and I believe that those arguments indicate clearly that this Clause is placing an intolerable burden on shop stewards.
The advantage I have tried to explain is really twofold. It is consistently a general presumption in relation to collective agreements of a substantial kind formally arrived at. Some of these can be arrived at through this kind of a joint body, some through the hammering out of a new agreement.
Then what benefit are the parties getting in addition to what they are getting now?
We start from the presumption that both parties intended to mean what they said and that what they said was effective to that purpose. The other presumption is that many decisions of councils and committees of this kind are arrived at quite frequently on behalf of a union or work people and can also clearly be regarded as binding as long as they are not rebutted and where this is clearly the intention unless the parties disagree.
I am sure that the Solicitor-General will be mortally offended if I say that he would not get my vote as district secretary after his explanation of the presumptions of the Clause.
I was intrigued by his promise that there will be an explanatory leaflet about the details of the Bill. He drew an analogy with publications explaining detailed legislation in similar Bills. Will he not distinguish between the leaflets which accompanied Bills on social security, industrial and factory and similar legislation and the leaflets which will accompany this Bill, when the people intended to be most affected, shop stewards and the workpeople in factories, will become subject to binding agreements on the basis of very informal documents and not even on the basis of the Bill which he has found it difficult to explain to the relatively sophisticated audience of Parliament?
I do not quite follow that. As I understand it, the hon. Gentleman is complaining that the explanatory document will not be clear enough. I repeat, much legislation passed by successive Governments, not only social security legislation but legislation on rents and on race relations, has been accompanied and supported by explanatory literature and explanatory leaflets. That is our intention with this Bill, save that we shall also have a code.
The intention of this provision is clear —that a decision taken by a body of this kind, a joint works committee or a joint industrial council, when recorded in writing will be presumed to bind the parties, unless they say that they do not intend so to be bound, and they can make that disclaimer in the ways which I have indicated.
I appreciate what the Solicitor-General has said about what the subsection is intended to do, but I strongly urge him to look again at the actual wording, for I do not think that there is any escape from the dilemma.
Subsection (3) begins: Any award or decision … if the award or decision"— There is no ambiguity and the reference is to "the" award or decision— (a) is duly recorded in writing"— This is still a reference to the award or decision— (b) as so recorded, does not contain a provision which (however expressed) states that the award or decision is intended not to be legally enforceable, shall be conclusively presumed … I do not think that the Solicitor-General intended to mislead, but his use of "presumption" was not legally accurate.
It is no use talking about presumptions which may be rebutted if they are preceded by paragraphs such as paragraph (b), which have an effect in an opposite way, because the plain effect of the language of paragraph (b) is that once an award or decision is so recorded, unless it contains a provision excluding legal enforceability, it will be legally enforceable. "Conclusively presumed" must mean what it says, that is, that there is no room for any kind of rebuttal.
For these reasons, it seems clear that the words "award or decision" govern the whole of paragraphs (a) and (b) and that there is no escape from this dilemma. If the Solicitor-General means what he says, may I implore him to look at these words again?
The hon. and learned Member for Leith has advanced a legitimate argument. I do not want in any sense to mislead the Committee or appear to be saying that something means other than it does. He suggested that it would not be sufficient to include a general disclaimer, because, as so recorded, such a disclaimer would have to be included each time. If that is the proper interpretation in the Clause, that is not the intention of the Government and I certainly undertake to make it plain that that is not the intention. It is an important point and I recognise that there is room for doubt.
Then accept our Amendment.
No, I would not be so conciliatory as that. There are limits to my accommodation, even at this hour. I appreciate the anxieties expressed by hon. Members. The intention is to go no farther than I have explained and we will see that it does not do so.
The Solicitor-General's strange retraction at this stage shows the kind of legal nonsense that we are getting into. He has now been bowled out completely by my hon. Friends on the wording of subsection (3). What he is doing in subsection (2) is starting us on the merry-go-round which ends in subsection (3). The situation which he has now told us he does not want to obtain under subsection (3) is the very situation that he intends to create in subsection (2). Otherwise why have it?
This is not only a practical nonsense, it is something deeply offensive in principle. What he is saying is something which was never indicated in the Consultative Document, and that must be made clear. The legal status of the collective agreement section of the Consultative Document gave an entirely different impression from the realities that have now emerged as a result of our examination of the Clause. It said that it was time that the legal status of the great collective agreements, negotiated at the top, sophisticated, level between both sides of industry be made binding. There was never any indication that what the Government were to do, as they are doing in this Clause, was to carry the conclusive presumption of legal enforceability right down the chain of collective bargaining in industry.
The Solicitor-General has admitted that any works council, not any medium-sized joint industrial council, but any works council negotiating any matter, if it puts its decisions in writing will be covered by this. He must have known he was doing that when he introduced subsection (2). When we pointed out to him what legal nonsense this is he turns round and says—it is rather like prescription charges, a person can buy himself cut by a manual lump sum—"Ah", he says, "there is nothing in subsection (3) that will prevent these bodies from deciding on a once-for-all disclaimer". If that is so why have this nonsense? Why bother?
The simple fact is that the Solicitor-General only thought that up when he was so effectively challenged by some of my hon. Friends and some of his own hon. Friends. It is the fastest piece of thinking on his feet that I have ever seen from the hon. and learned Gentleman who found himself in a first-rate legal and practical mess. Of course he will come along on Report with his Amendments. I do not claim to be a lawyer, but I hope that I have average common-sense. Anyone reading subsection (3) knows that the hon. and learned Gentleman's explanation will not hold water and that he has landed us with a Clause which got us into the kind of situation which even this legally obsessed Government could not justify.
9.45 p.m.
If the Solicitor-General is big enough to recognise that he is in that legal mess, he should be big enough to recognise that it is the result, first and foremost, o C subsection (2) from which subsection (3) flows. In terms of industrial relations and the Government's approach, it is an offensive principle to say what the Solicitor-General is saying in subsection (2), namely, that there shall be no outlet for anyone, however humble or however far down the negotiating chain he may be, from his legal net. That is what subsection (2) says. It detracts from the good relationship between employer and unions who between them have decided that they do not want anything to do with this nonsense about making agreements legally enforceable. They have decided that at the top level.
Earlier the Solicitor-General said, "What are we worrying about? Any two parties who decide that a collective agreement shall not be legally enforceable have only to put in a disclaimer". But that is not what subsection (2) provides, because it limits the parties' freedom to decide that they do not wish, when delegating power down the line, to delegate the power to make any agreement legally enforceable.
Why should not the parties have the right to say that they do not intend to authorise someone further down the line to make a legally enforceable agreement? Why should they not have that freedom? I thought that we were talking about a voluntary system of collective bargaining and how we shall merely underpin it as certain key points by the minimal legal requirements. It is a monstrous principle involved in subsection (2) which says there can be no outlet, even by agreement between both sides at the top, from the conclusive presumption that somebody not authorised by his superiors on either side of the negotiating table can make legally enforceable contracts and that it shall be conclusively presumed that they had intended to give authorisation? Who intended to authorise?—the people delegating to them or the Government?
I beg right hon. and hon. Members opposite to realise the kind of society into which we shall drift if these legal maniacs are not restrained by the common sense of Members of the House of Commons. The Government strike a theoretical pose, as they have done in Clause 32, that collective agreements should be legally enforceable just like any other contract. The moment they use those words—" as any other contract"—they give the whole game away because they say that they should be legally enforceable only if the parties want it; and then everybody says, "Thank you very much for nothing", because the parties do not want it. But the Government have struck a great theoretical pose, telling the country, "This will transform industrial relations". They have been telling them that for years, so they have to make a bit of a meal of it.
Having struck that theoretical pose, it is said—and the Solicitor-General said it—"The real collective bargaining decision is taken lower down the line, so we must stop up that one." What the parties at the top may do is say, "We do not want any nonsense about legally enforceable agreements", and the real decision goes down the line.
What does the Solicitor-General have to do to try to retrieve some of the damaged credibility of the Government on this part of the Bill? He has to follow them all the way down the line, trotting after them and saying, "You cannot escape, but we are going to make it a conclusive presumption in subsection (2) that whatever anybody intended to authorise or not, we will say that they intended to do something which they themselves may say they never intended." That is the situation.
From that flows the nonsense of subsection (3). Having made that conclusive presumption in subsection (2), it follows that every agreement in writing by any of these humbler bodies down the line shall be a legally enforceable contract unless, as so recorded —this is what is said—it contains a disclaimer in every case. We all know that this will make a total nonsense of industrial relations.
Therefore, we suggest that the Solicitor-General should go back and look at the wording of subsection (3). I am ready to lay any odds that it will be proved that what he gave to the Committee a few minutes ago was totally misleading legal advice, whether deliberately or not. He will be told by his draftsmen that he has placed upon subsection (3) an interpretation which the wording will not sustain. I suggest, therefore, that the hon. and learned Gentleman will come back on Report with an Amendment to subsection (3). I repeat, however, that that will still be meaningless—we have just been landed with a lot of legal farrago about this—unless he also takes back subsection (2).
The Solicitor-General has the nerve to come to us and say that it will all be all right on the night because the Government will issue an explanatory leaflet. I would love to see the explanatory leaflet which is issued about subsections (2) and (3). It would have been better had the Government issued that simple layman's explanatory leaflet before they introduced the Bill—that was what we asked them to do—telling us how these Clauses would work before the House of Commons had the duty of voting on them. It is too late to explain a mess when it has been put on the Statute Book. Are we to spend the next five years on amending Clauses because the Government have not had the decency to give us a layman's explanation of what is intended?
The Consultative Document was no substitute. It only made legal obscurities more obscure. Everyone knows that the legal experts are still arguing about what the different Clauses mean. We are arguing even more about the Bill in the limited time that is allowed to us. The reason why we have the guillotine is that the Government dare not dare submit the wording of the Bill to the scrutiny of the House. [Interruption.] Oh, yes. Hon. Members opposite have kept on making the same shocked discoveries as we have done. They are legislating on a serious matter on which their individual reputations as Members of the House of Commons depend. If they let this go through, they cannot hide behind the Front Bench because they know what they are doing.
Therefore, I ask the Solicitor-General in all seriousness to tell us that he will take back subsection (2) for reconsideration. if not, we shall have to divide the Committee.
The Solicitor-General ought to give us a little more explanation than he gave earlier, at least to try to clarify the information which he gave. He has had time to try to get these two points together between what he first said that he believed the Clause and the subsection to mean and the later occasion in the debate when he accepted the interpretation placed upon the Clause and the subsection by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle). I am certainly at a loss to know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman intends that the new revised version will have the meaning which he attributed to it or the meaning given to it by my right hon. Friend. It would certainly help me if the Solicitor-General would answer me on certain specific cases. I am not talking of the general application of the Clause and the general difficulties. I want to put to him a series of cases in particular, specific examples of a sort we have had from the engineering industry, for instance. I would ask him to consider agreements made between the National Union of Mineworkers and the National Coal Board. I hope I may have the hon. and learned Gentleman's attention.
There are face agreements between chargehands—30 to 50, perhaps—at the coal face and the mine manager, written agreements about prices and conditions. They will be, I take it, legally binding contracts unless they are stamped saying that they are not to be taken as legally binding or enforceable. That is one case. Then there is the agreement between a number of faces within one coal mine—an area agreement, a district agreement—a written agreement. I take it that unless those price list agreements are stamped, in one at least of the clauses of the agreements, saying that nothing in them is to be taken as legally binding and enforceable, they are binding. That kind of agreement is referred to a branch committee and the minutes of the branch committee confirm acceptance by the whole branch. Will the minutes also have to be stamped and sealed?
Then we come to an area agreement affecting one coal seam worked by several pits. Will an exemption clause have to be rubber-stamped on such an agreement? The rubber stamp industry must be something of an investment these days; it is probably the greatest growth industry in the country. Will area minutes have to contain exemption clauses? We come to national agreements between different parts of the coalfield. Will agreements in each of those four different instances have to be stamped saying they are not binding? Will each price list have to have an exemption clause saying it is not binding? Will there have to be notice to the mine manager that charge hands are not empowered by the branch to make any legally binding agreement?
Having seen the mental gymnastics indulged in by the Solicitor-General to save himself from legal embarrassment, can we not draw the conclusion that the coal industry, with the rest of industry, will, if this Clause is passed, and the rest of the Bill, face tremendous difficulties?
Yes, very great difficulties, arid unnecessary difficulties. All I am asking is that the hon. and learned Gentleman should at least try to tell the Committee what he intends, whether it is in the Bill or not. He has had some time to think about this. I am sorry to see someone originally from Merseyside in such difficulties, but it is not my duty to help him out.
Can anyone in a colliery or a factory or any place where they make agreements of this kind have disclaimers placed upon him to the effect that he is not authorised to make any agreement which is legally binding on anybody? Can a branch or district or area of a union? Can a union nationally write into its constitution that it will not empower its executive or anybody else to make any legally binding contract with anybody? Would this kind of overall disclaimer say, whether at the bottom or right at the beginning, that it is impossible for anyone to make a legally binding agreement for it?
These are concrete, practical examples of the difficulties. I think some explanation is due from the Solicitor-General about this kind of difficulty, because if from this comparatively small Clause all these considerations can arise with all these doubts and difficulties I wonder how many there are in all the other Clauses which have been passed and not debated, and I wonder whether we were right to pass them.
The Question is—
Answer.
On a point of order. Is it not in order for the Solicitor-General to give us a reply to the very many questions which have been put to him by people with practical experience?
I see that the hon. and learned Gentleman is seeking to rise to give a reply.
10.0 p.m.
I was not in any sense seeking to escape from my responsibilities to answer the questions I have been asked.
Not too keen to rise, anyhow.
I had not realised that the hon. Gentleman had so swiftly reached the end of his questions. I shall not try to answer them all in detail. I will deal with them in a general sense. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman asked me the questions for the benefit of the Committee. I wish to meet both points by giving the answer in principle for the benefit of the Committee. Then if there is anything left I will write to the hon. Gentleman afterwards. The agreements the hon. Gentleman mentioned appeared to change character as he went up the scale. For example, the face agreement would be made between the management and representatives of the union in respect of that face and would probably be an agreement hammered out for that purpose. Under Clause 32 such an agreement would be binding unless disclaimed.
Likewise with an area or district face agreement arrived at in such a way. If any such agreement was reached at a joint committee, which I think is unlikely —because it is not there that that kind of agreement is hammered out—there would be need for a disclaimer in respect of it.
The minutes of the branch committee or the lodge committee would be the union committee approving or disapproving that which its representatives had negotiated and would have no effect, because that would not be part of the agreement: it would be part of the internal working of the union.
It was at this point that I was not sure where the hon. Gentleman was going. He talked about area minutes and national agreements. If the area minutes are of the union, likewise they are of no consequence. If the area minutes are of an area joint industrial council or committee, the disclaimer would have to be applied.
That takes it as far by way of illustration as I can go in response to the points that the hon. Gentleman put to me. The intention within that framework is that there should be this power to make the general disclaimer for a joint council or joint committee type of exercise and the need to make a separate disclaimer for an agreement negotiated between union and management at a given level. That is the intention. I commend that intention and the Clause as it stands to the Committee and invite the Committee to reject the Amendment.
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 264, Noes 304.
[Mr. J. P. W. MALLALIEU in the chair ]
Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
I have no intention of keeping the Committee for very long, but during the debate on the previous Amend- ment we were given an extremely confused explanation by the Minister. Had I been sitting in the Gallery, and had I not had this Clause before me, I should not have had the faintest idea precisely what the Government were talking about, and I am certain that when the Solicitor-General looks at his three contradictory explanations in HANSARD he will be somewhat ashamed of the incredibly silly situation which the Government have got into this evening.
10.15 p.m.
My hon. Friend has told the Committee that if he had been sitting in a certain position in the precincts of the Chamber he would have had no idea what Ministers were talking about. The difficulty in which my hon. Friend finds himself is precisely the difficulty in which Her Majesty's Ministers find themselves. They do not know, either. They do not know what they are talking about. If they did, they would not talk such rubbish.
I think that the point is well made by my hon. Friend.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that subsection (2) was different from subsection (3), and that one did not follow from the other. If one examines the wording of the two subsections, one sees that one follows logically from the other, and I therefore put it to the Committee that we must have a better explanation of this issue from the hon. and learned Gentleman.
We are opposed to this whole principle, and I should like the Committee to consider exactly what is involved. There could be a joint committee in the mining industry—or the building industry, or the engineering industry, it matters not—or perhaps a welfare committee, a safety committee or a consultative committee. The right hon. Gentleman said that all these committees would need to have a disclaimer. What an utterly ridiculous situation to be in! But that is precisely what the Clause means. We consider that this is ridiculous, and that it should be opposed in principle, quite apart from the fact that it should be opposed because of the utterly confused situation which the Minister has got himself into in subsections (2) and (3).
The reference to "any body" not only means the type of committee to which I have referred, a welfare committee, a consultative committee, a safety committee, and so on, but, as we interpret it, can mean that if a trade union which is part of a national joint industrial council has an agreement at a lower level—for instance, one made by the shop stewards committee—this will be presumed to be authorised by the trade union side.
A works committee.
A works committee agreement could be covered by the Clause. The Minister may say that that is not so. The right hon. and learned Gentleman may argue that the Clause has been misinterpreted, but it reads as though that could be the position. In those circumstances—I have no intention of making a lengthy speech because this matter has been well debated in our previous discussions—we are convinced that the Clause should be taken out of the Bill. We ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman to take it out of the Bill. If he refuses, we shall express our view by voting against the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
The Clause retains and deserves to retain its place in the Bill, because it is plain that substantial and important collective agreements are arrived at in certain cases by substantial national joint bodies. The Government's view is clear: that those bodies in that kind of negotiation should be subject to the same alteration in bias, so that normally the parties in such negotiations are regarded, unless they provide to the contrary, as intending to set up obligations by which they intend to be bound. That is the primary objective of the Clause.
The Clause has no application to the example given by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer)—namely, a shop stewards committee. That would be a self-contained committee consisting of representatives of trade unions to the exclusion of others— [Interruption.] I thought that the hon. Gentleman was asserting it by reference to a shop stewards committee. The Clause applies presumptively to a joint works committee, but, as I explained earlier, that works committee is capable of making disclaimers in the pattern visualised in subsection (3).
Certainly it is not intended to place any difficulty in the way of such disclaimers being made. It is not intended to catch every small, humble, albeit important, body of that kind so that it cannot make its own decisions about the extent to which it will be bound. Given the importance of the intention to apply this presumption to the large national body hammering out the important national agreement, my right hon. Friend and I will certainly look at this again to see whether there is any possibility of it extending too far, too widely, or too obstrusively. The central intention, as part of the general alteration in the bias, is one which I must ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to support.
It seems to me that the Government are in an extraordinary mess on this Clause. If the Government's intention is as was stated by the right hon. and learned Gentleman—I accept that it is—then the Clause does not carry out that intention. If the intention is to catch the important voluntary body which enters into national agreements, it is far too widely drawn because it catches everybody. If an agreement is recorded in writing and there is no disclaimer—which has to be specific, not general—then the most informal agreement, if minuted, has the effect of being a legally binding contract.
I concede that it is an extraordinarily difficult exercise to make collective bargaining legally enforceable. But, as I have said before, I consider Clauses 32 to 34 as the weakest parts of the Bill. The Government are in an extraordinary difficulty. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman amends the Clause to carry out his intention he is in danger of achieving nothing because, if a general disclaimer is allowed, every trade union will insist on a general disclaimer whenever there is a negotiation. Therefore, the whole thing will be lacking in legal effect. The Government must think a great deal more about this and the surrounding Clauses. This part of the Bill has had more attention from the Press than almost any other; yet it is the least effective. I shall certainly vote against the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
I am content at this stage to leave the refinements of the legal argument to those who are best qualified to argue them.
I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) said, primarily because I was astonished to hear a Law Officer of the Crown try to persuade the Committee to accept an intention when he was endeavouring to explain what is likely to become the law of the land.
This point has been debated on hundreds of occasions and it is clear that one cannot express an intention in legislation. If or when this part of the Bill becomes law, it will be up to the professionals to endeavour to gain the ear of some arbitrator or magistrate in an effort to get the point decided. For this reason alone we are entitled to protest over the Solicitor-General getting the Committee into such a terrible tangle.
However, the most important aspect of the Clause arises if one considers the matter philosophically and not in the way in which the legal maniacs consider it, to borrow a phrase from my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle). [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend used that phrase and it will be found in tomorrow's OFFICIAL REPORT. It was a strong expression, but I have never been against the use of strong expressions in Parliament. We are usually opposed to mealy-mouthed statements, especially those which try to substitute intentions for realities in a Measure which may be destructive of many of our social patterns of behaviour.
I am glad to see the Prime Minister on the Front Bench opposite. I do not often catch his ear, apart from the occasional Question time. He has expressed his philosophy about these matters in public. He believes in this provision, which is part of a Measure to give legal enforceability to contracts, to bring them within the general sphere of contract law and make them legally enforceable in the courts.
We are told by no less a luminary than the Solicitor-General that there can be a disclaimer. Certainly there can be a disclaimer at the top end of the eschelon; and lower down the hon. and learned Gentleman considers that there can be a disclaimer, too. Considering his legal distinction, he is entitled to speak with authority, but suppose at the top, middle and lower echelons there are disclaimers, right down to the shop floor level? Where will be the legal enforceability of contracts then? What will happen to what the Government now pronounce so loudly should that happen?
If we have a situation which mechanically transfers power away from the leaders of industry, be they trade union or industrial leaders representing great and small companies alike, and if that power is transferred to the bottom eschelon, where it is difficult to deal with, will that not be entirely against the social needs of the nation? Order in industry is always being called for and we are constantly told that the leadership should lead. Here the Government are deliberately, by this type of legislation, which is construed on a narrow legalistic basis, doing the opposite. They are encouraging a situation in which leadership will be on the shop floor and not where it ought to be, and where I should prefer it to be.
That is a serious matter. [Interruption.] Of course it is. Does it not worry hon. Members opposite? There are many hon. Members opposite closely connected with industry, who come here with a special knowledge of industry. I am told by some of the younger hon. Gentlemen who have recently joined us—I have not the pleasure of knowing them personally yet, and I hope to make their acquaintance later on—that they are consumed with good will and a desire to bring a better and more harmonious atmosphere into industry.
This Clause is not the way to do it. We shall enmesh ourselves in a net of legal jargon, a seine net of legal jargon, a net with a small mesh which catches not only the large fish but the small stuff as well. I am sure that hon. Members opposite never expected or intended that.
I do not like to hear the Government trying to sell me a piece of bogus legisla
tion on the basis of proclaimed good intentions. Intentions cannot be construed when matters come before the courts.
10.30 p.m.
The Solicitor-General agreed to write to me in a few days giving his explanation of what the Clause means. I hope soon to receive that letter, which will, no doubt, start, "Without prejudice. Nothing in this letter is to be taken as legally binding as regards the explanation hereunder", and so on. But in the meantime we are to go through the Lobbies.
What concerns me at this point is the procedure which has meant that the matter has to be dealt with in this way. Because the Bill is being taken on the Floor of the House, the Solicitor-General is unable to say, on a Measure of this size and complexity, "There is the possibility of some doubt here. We shall withdraw the words as they stand now, and we shall come back with a considered view at a later stage". At some point, on every Bill in a Standing Committee, the Government make concessions of that kind. If we were in Standing Committee instead of on the Floor, the hon. and learned Gentleman would, no doubt, accept the points which have been made. However, because of the place where our business is being conducted, and, perhaps, because of the stubborness and stupidity of the Government, he is not able to do that.
Question put, That the Clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 304, Noes 267.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
BREACH OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
10.45 p.m.
I beg to move Amendment No. 669, in page 24, line 26, leave out subsection (2).
The Clause and this subsection take us back to the concept of an unfair industrial practice. We are here dealing with a breach of a collective agreement which is legally enforceable and which has been accepted as such by both parties. In itself, the Clause is sufficient reason for the trade unions not to agree to an enforceable collective agreement. Why should they? For them to do would mean they could immediately be caught by subsection (2).
It is provided: …it shall be an unfair industrial practice for any party to the agreement not to take all such steps as are reasonably practicable for the purposes of. … What is the exact meaning of "reasonably practicable"? Has a union official taken all reasonably practicable steps if he has made a speech? Will it be reasonably practicable for a union to have sent a circular to all its members?
In the event of the workers going on unofficial strike in breach of the agreement, will it be regarded as reasonably practicable only if the trade union official acts as a picket in reverse and stands at the door of the factory, plant, mine, or building site and puts his arm across the door and stops the workers from corning out? Does it mean that he would have to use a water cannon to drive them back? Does not that show how silly this proposal is?
Would not the hon. Member agree that whatever else they might mean the words mean that the officials could not get away with doing nothing?
That is the whole point; there must be a precise interpretation.
I have suggested a number of alternative interpretations. One lawyer might say that merely making a speech at a mass meeting of workers to say that the union's national executive advised them not to go on strike would be reasonably practicable. Another might say that that was not enough, that more should have been dome. It might be said that while a trade union official did not have to go to the length of using water cannon to drive the workers back, he should do more than make a speech on a building site to urge workers not to break a collective agreement.
The words might mean that the union would have to threaten to expel members. The Government speak of responsible trade unionism, but there may be fissures in a union precisely because of the operation of the Clause. Is that what the Secretary of State wants? That could be the result of this policy.
My hon. Friend has mentioned "responsibility". He will remember that we spent five hours discussing what that word meant and got a great deal of ridicule from the right hon. Gentleman for nit-picking. These two words will take much more definition. At the end of the day, however, their meaning will be decided not by the trade unions and the employers in negotiation, but by a High Court judge in an industrial court.
Of course, that is the whole point. It will be decided in the last analysis by a High Court judge. Why should a High Court judge decide it? Why should a trade union official have his policies determined not by his membership but by a High Court judge? That is what is being proposed. I mentioned the idea of internal discipline. Perhaps workers could be brought before a disciplinary committee. I do not know whether any hon. Gentleman has any idea of how a disciplinary committee works in a trade union. I will tell them.
The member who is charged has the right to bring before that committee all of his witnesses and in these circumstances I can see the trade union official picking out a few members and saying "Right, these chaps must be brought before a disciplinary committee so that we can say that we have taken all reasonably practicable steps. "The workers involved say "All right, we will bring our witnesses." If it is a building site with 2,000 workers they bring them all to the committee. If hon. Members do not think that has happened I can assure them that it has. It is this sort of thing that will lead to internal fissures, internal dissent within the union, and ultimately could lead to the position when workers break away, under another part of the Bill, and decide to opt for other organisations.
Hon. Gentlemen have not thought this out. It has been said throughout that the lawyers will have a field day. They will certainly have a field day when they have a case of this kind before them, with the sort of discussion that will take place around the words "reasonably practicable" for the purposes of subsections (a), (b) and (c). What do these subsections say? Subsection (a) says: of preventing persons acting or purporting to act on behalf of that party from taking any action in breach of the collective agreement or of that part of the agreement, as the case may be; Not only "preventing persons acting" but "purporting to act". The story gets worse as we go along. It becomes incredible.
Guilt by association.
Indeed. It is cloud-cuckoo-land. I have never heard anything like it. Then subsection (b) says: where the party in question is an organisation, of preventing members of the organisation from taking any such action … Subsection (c) says: …that the action is not continued and that further action as mentioned in those paragraphs does not occur. Not only have they to stop the action continuing, they have to ensure that it does not happen again. It is absolutely incredible. I honestly feel that hon. Gentlemen have not read their document. We have read it carefully and the more it is read the more absurd it becomes.
The hon. Gentleman has just said that union officials, or whoever is concerned, have to make sure that no disruptive action takes place. It does not say that, it says that they have to give every indication—presumably— [Laughter.] The sense of the thing is that they must be able to give an indication that they have done their best to make sure that this action did not take place with their authority. Assuming that there is a legally binding contract, is the hon. Gentleman saying that trade union officials should not do their best to make sure that it is not broken?
There are two parts to what the hon. Gentleman says. What he says has absolutely no relation to the Clause. I read the wording of the Clause. I did not say what I thought was in the Clause: I read the Clause. Obviously the hon. Gentleman had not read the Clause until one of his hon. Friends went out of his way to thrust a copy of it in his hand while he was on his feet.
The hon. Gentleman also wondered whether I was saying that the trade union officials should not use their powers of persuasion to keep a collective agreement. I never said anything of the sort. Trade union officials are doing that every day. If the hon. Gentleman does not know that, then he knows nothing about the trade union movement. On probably every building site, when workers take unofficial action, a trade union official explains to them that they are acting contrary to the agreement and to the trade union rules. That happens all the time, and, therefore, it is totally unnecessary to follow it up by saying that if a trade union official does not do it then his organisation, not him personally, can be caught by the provisions about unfair industrial practices.
The Government are trying to put trade union officials in a super-human position. They are almost making them God. God would not be very successful in solving some unofficial disputes for the simple reason that they arise from very poor procedure agreements because the agreements machinery is not good enough. The Donovan Report emphasises time and again that the answer to unofficial strikes is not to have things like unfair industrial practices based on the enforceability of agreements; the need is to have better procedure agreements machinery.
If right hon. and hon. Members opposite were genuinely concerned about solving the problems in industry, they would be concerning themselves with precisely the sort of proposals which the Donovan Report made about unofficial disputes. But they are not. Earlier today, we were told that the unions were not being asked to act as policemen and that there were no disciplinary measures in the Bill. What are these but disciplinary measures and urging the trade unions to be policemen? This has to be spelt out in detail.
[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]
11.0 p.m.
If for some unfortunate reason a trade union official cannot prove that he has taken every reasonably practicable step, an award will be made against the trade union. Hon. Members opposite are right in saying that nothing would happen to a full-time trade union official. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the shop steward?"] He is left in the open. What was meant strictly was a full-time paid union official.
It does not say so.
No, but I think that that is the intention, unless right hon. and hon. Members opposite are prepared to apply it also to shop stewards. If that is the case, shop stewards do not have much to worry about in a personal sense; but I very much doubt that that is what the Government have in mind.
Whether it is a shop steward or a full-time official, however, suppose that it is proved that he has not taken all reasonably practicable steps. What will happen to him? He will not be fined, but the trade union can be fined-at least, it will be ordered to pay compensation up to £100,000, if its membership is 100,000 or more. What happens if the union says, "We are not paying?"
What will happen, perhaps, is what happened in Australia when a union official refused to pay. It was discovered that it was not the first occasion that the unions had refused to pay the so-called compensation or fine in Australia. It had happened many times. On that occasion, however, the Government decided to move, and the trade union official was put in gaol. Next day, there was a general strike in the locality. All the trade unionists went on strike. Is that what the Government want? Is that what is behind the Clause? The whole thing is an absurdity.
Will my hon. Friend note the interesting sequel to the Australian story that, in the end, virtually the whole of Australia was brought out on dispute? Is my hon. Friend aware that, in Australia, no case has been taken by the employers and the Government to the industrial court since that case nearly two years ago?
If I was not aware, I am sure that my hon. Friend was only too keen to bring me up to date on the situation, and I am pleased that he has done so. My view is that if these provisions come into operation, it will happen here. But it would happen only once. It would not happen twice.
If I may put the hon. Member at rest from his fevered imagination, I ask him to look at Clause 90(5), where he will see that we make special provision to ensure that a trade union official is not imprisoned in the sort of circumstances he is envisaging.
I will continue with the point, because I knew that that was what the Minister would say. I had pointed out that the Government were making great play of the fact that no trade union official would go to gaol. Then, however, I asked what would happen if a union refused to pay the compensation. How does the Minister propose to deal with that situation?
Let us remember that the maximum compensation, for the largest union, is a fraction of what such a union would commonly expect to pay in strike pay in a week. So let us get the maximum fine in perspective. I do not believe that a union in this country would refuse to meet a court order. [Interruption.] If it did, the courts have methods by restraint of goods and funds of obtaining satisfaction.
The right hon. Gentleman has not really answered the point I am making. He has merely said that there are ways and means, but he is not prepared to give me a direct answer about what would happen. I tell the right hon. Gentleman this, that the first time a trade union official's goods are restrained, or a trade union's premises are, perhaps, taken over—or whatever fever-imagined thing it is the right hon. Gentleman has in mind happens—as soon as that is done, we shall have one of the biggest industrial crises on our hands we have ever had in this country.
Is the hon. Gentleman saying then, that a trade union alone in this country should be put in a position of complete exemption from any sort of penalty from the courts for refusing to obey a court order? If so, I would like him to say it loud and clear for the country to hear.
Hear, hear. Answer.
I will answer when that rabble over there give me a chance. Let me tell the right hon. Gentleman this, that under the law as it stands at the present moment no trade union which has ever had any action taken against it has refused to comply. That is perfectly true. What the right hon. Gentleman is doing now is to introduce an entirely new concept, a concept which the trade union movement does not want. It is not that trade unions wish to be outside the law, but they do not wish to have a special law imposed upon them because they are prepared to take action to fight for better wages and conditions, and it is a special law which the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are trying to impose by this Bill. [HoN. MEMBERS: "Answer."] I have answered the point. I have no intention of responding every time there is a baying from some of the wolves on that side of the Committee. I am going to conclude my remarks—
Hear, Hear.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the potential penalty he is talking about here could arise only if a trade union broke a legally enforceable agreement into which it had voluntarily entered? Is he, therefore, really saying that if a trade union breaks a legally binding agreement, which it itself has admitted to be such, it should be exempt from all penalties?
What the right hon Gentleman seems to forget is that trade unions have different strengths. Some trade unions will be in a very powerful position, and when they meet the employers the first point on the agenda, before they discuss wages and conditions, will be, "Whatever we agree as the agreement, this will not be legally enforceable." Unless that is provided in the first place, there will be no agreement. But there are some trade unions who are not in exactly that position—
The farm workers.
Exactly. The farm workers, who may have to fight hard to get an improvement in their wages and conditions; then, at the very end of the discussions, the question arises whether it should be legally enforceable. What, then, do the farm workers do, after, perhaps, getting an increase in their wages, perhaps only a minor increase, but still an advance, and a little better conditions? Do they then say, "On this issue we will call all our members out on strike"? That is not realistic, and hon. Gentleman know it. If they had not realised it yet, I now tell them that that is precisely the answer. Of course, hon. Gentlemen opposite will not accept anything from us as being logical, except the more intelligent ones among them. I am very pleased that it is not all hon. Gentlement opposite who bay like wolves. It is just a minority who in any case would not accept anything that came from this side, no matter how logical and intelligent.
The Secretary of State says that the unions can pay compensation. What the Bill proposes, to stop them from paying compensation, is that they should sue their members, that they should expel them, threaten them with expulsion, bring them before disciplinary committees, take all forms of action, and having done that perhaps they will be saved from paying compensation. The trade union movement will not accept this. If the Clause, particularly subsection (2), goes through, all that hon. Members opposite are building up for themselves is a great deal of industrial trouble and they will be very sorry that this provision ever came before Parliament.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) referred at the end of his speech to logic. I and many of my colleagues see nothing logical about an existing law which permits a trade union to make a two-year agreement today and come out on strike next week to alter it.
We have reached the point in the Bill at which the parties to an agreement must use their best endeavours to see that it is kept. We have dealt with the binding agreement, to get away from the point where an agreement can be made today and broken next week. We have sought, by the principle of the binding agreement, to improve the content of the agreement and reduce the misunderstandings and uncertainties about it and improve communication on its content. We come now to keeping the agreement once it has been made.
In this all that we seek to do is to raise the standards of the minority—a small minority—to those which are accepted by the great majority of good trade unions. I do not believe that any hon. Member opposite seeks, and certainly few trade union officials or leaders seek, to condone the making of agreements and the breaking of them. We are talking specifically about agreements and not about something which has been imposed.
In my trade union membership I go back to the time when I was a member of the Transport and General Workers' Union. I remember Ernest Bevin, one of my heroes. [Interruption.] But O! for the touch of a vanish'd hand, And the sound of a voice that is still! When Ernest Bevin drove a bargain, he drove a damned tough bargain. But when somebody had an agreement with Ernest Bevin, he could be certain that his word was his bond, that his union would keep it and that he would see it did. I regret so bitterly that that is not the situation today.
11.15 p.m.
If the hon. Gentleman looks at subsection (3) he will see reference to Clause 39, a Clause which imports the astonishing concept of non-agreements which are enforceable as agreements. What he does not understand is that we do not object to trade union officials doing their job. We object to the assumption that they should do their job by expelling, fining or suspending their members. This was contained in the evidence given by the right hon. and learned Gentleman on behalf of the Conservative and Unionist Inns of Court Society.
I am glad I stunned the hon. Gentleman to his feet on this issue, but we are not discussing Clause 39 and if I were to proceed to do so I would be out of order. We are discussing the Clause that is now before the Committee. I am making the case that it used to be the tradition in the trade union movement that it took substantial steps to secure the agreement and support of its members to what had been entered into as an agreement.
I remember as a young member of the Transport and General Workers' Union attending a summer school at which the docks section of that union lammed into an audience of members of the union, in a hard-hitting manner and with a force of language that would have astonished many members of the public, for not honouring agreements made by the union on their behalf. This was a clear case of the union showing that it had a conscience and believed the best endeavours should be used to secure compliance with an agreement—
Agreements are broken every day.
The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) says that agreements are broken every day. The crucial question is: where do the unions stand? Do they condone the situation and just sit on the fence, or do they get off the fence and actively campaign to honour an agreement into which their members have entered? There are often unofficial strikes which are part of a recognised method of negotiation. There are many cases where officials may say publicly that they do not agree with unofficial action, but privately and in reality they are in support of it.
If any Member of this Committee makes statements of that kind, he ought, in fairness to the trade union movement, to substantiate it by evidence. If he does not, he has no right to make such statements.
It is perhaps a fair charge that is laid against me and I must consider it carefully because I do not wish to mislead the Committee. I am quoting from the Committee stage of the Trade Disputes Bill, and the words of the hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr.Hamling), who is a member of the Labour Party, a member of the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union and a member of the National Union of Teachers. His words were: Would the hon. Member not agree that, in many cases, an unofficial strike is a recognised method of negotiation, and that, secondly, also in many cases, although the officials may say publicly that they do not agree with the unofficial action, privately and in reality, they approve of it heartily."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A. 25th March, 1965; col. 135.]
This will not do. At the beginning of his speech the hon. Gentleman said that he would give examples of where a union one week made an agreement for two years and broke it a week later. Tell us which unions. Give us the examples. The hon. Gentleman knows, as does everyone in the Committee, that thousands of agreements are honoured day by day and year by year. The hon. Gentleman must give us the examples. He might wish to quote the doctors recently, but let us have more trade union examples.
I was asked first to justify the case I have made, and I have done that. [HON. MEMBERS: "0h!"] Secondly, I am asked to give chapter and verse for a number of cases where trade unions have not used their best endeavours to secure compliance with agreements. Ninety-five per cent. of strikes in this country are unofficial.
Give us examples.
Ninety-five per cent. of strikes are unofficial and unconstitutional. The examples are so multitudinous that one can pick almost any dispute one likes and find that it falls into the category which I have described.
The hon. Member for Salford, West has said that day by day and month by month many thousands of agreements are honoured. That was where I started my remarks. I said that the Bill seeks to raise the standard in the case of the minority to the best standard entrenched in the behaviour of the majority. That is what the Bill seeks to do throughout. I support every work of the Bill in this context. It is the right way to set about it.
I break slightly with convention, for I shall quote not from the Donovan Report, "In Place of Strife" or "Fair Deal at Work" but from a report of an industrial journalist who visited the United States just after publication of the Donovan Report. This is what he wrote at the conclusion of his visit: They have just bought off strikes by 55,000 seamen and 21,000 non-medical hospital workers in this city. That was new York. And a one-day walkout by 840 local railroad track workers has ended by order of the Teamsters Union hierarchy. I arrived here via: Detroit, where the local newspapers have been closed by a strike for nine months and the building industry is idle. San Francisco, where the teamsters have stopped the airport buses. Pittsburgh, where a big local hotel has just reopened after a months-long staff strike and where, most serious of all, talks are under way to try and avert a nationwide steel strike at the end of the month. All this may be small consolation to Britain. —But it helps to put our problems in some perspective in relation to a world which is all too ready to brand us strike happy while turning a blind eye to the facts and figures. That was written in 1966. Modesty prevents me naming the author. This article has not been publicly revealed before, because it was not printed at the time. I will not go into the reasons.
The article goes on to deal with legally binding agreements. It points out that in the United States, which is regarded as the land of the legally enforceable agreement, although law suits are sometimes brought, they practically never reach trial. It takes so long to get through the cluttered courts that the issue is settled meanwhile and the action is dropped to avoid further damage to industrial relations. This is an invariable pattern. Even State laws of the kind restricting government employees are ignored with impunity. In Ohio, public employees are automatically sacked if they strike. But the fast growing State, County and Municipal Employees Union backed 34 strikes in Ohio last year and only once failed to win agreements which included reinstatement of the strikers. Almost everyone in government, management and unions regard legal restraints as virtually unworkable—a view taken by the Donovan Commission. It was all summed up by Mr. Robert Moore, who bosses the Federal Mediation Service. He said: 'It is not to do with the law. It is the attitude. People here really believe that once an agreement is signed it is binding.' This is an attitude we sorely need to adopt in British industry today. But we need too the kind of comprehensive agreements which are as commonplace in America as they are rare at home. Do the Government think that they will change workers' attitudes, which they seek to do in the Bill, simply by providing another crutch for managements to lean on? I believe that the Secretary of State and, perhaps more especially, the Solicitor-General, have made entirely the wrong diagnosis. We do not want a crutch to cure what I regard largely as industrial growing pains, which are inevitable with change—I will prove that point subsequently—we need the kind of medicine which the Donovan Commission recommended and which the Government have largely thrown away.
I should like to illustrate my point by referring to the New York teachers. There was a rash of strikes in New York by the teachers. A law was passed to prevent the teachers striking, but that resulted in more strikes, not fewer. The law was then toughened by the introduction of cash penalties and gaol for the strikers, so there were even more strikes.
I suppose that the action of the teachers' leaders in that instance would certainly have been regarded by the right hon. Gentleman as unfair industrial practice, which is the subject of the Clause. The union leaders, who, it would be fair to assume, did not take reasonably practicable steps to stop this trouble, became martyrs. There is no mistake that they certainly got out of it jobs for life. But none of this helped towards a settlement, it did not help to produce better productivity or higher wages, and it certainly did not help the kids in the New York schools.
The Secretary of State recently gave what many hon. Members felt was a curious definition of industrial democracy. It is certainly not the law which prevents unofficial strikes in the United States of America; it is a system which has a good deal more to do with industrial democracy. There is no doubt that in America union members are much more involved in the decision-taking process—voting on collective agreements clause by clause. Communications in the major industries are, I think, better than in this country both between management and union and between union and workers—incidentally, they do not suffer from shop floor guillotines—and there were encouraging signs of this kind of thing beginning to happen and an appreciable improvement taking place in this country.
11.30 p.m.
Many industries were working to that end, and the T.U.C. was encouraging them. There was a great deal of worth-while reform on an industry-by-industry basis in line with the Donovan recommendations, and it seems to me that so much of this—in fact, practically all of it—has gone on ice because of the Government's legislative proposals. One of the real tragedies of the whole situation is that genuine progress in industrial relations reform has been stifled —one might even say sabotaged—as a result of the Bill. The scene has become embittered throughout, and one has only to look at the Commission on Industrial Relations which, after all, was a body destined to play a major rôle in the voluntary reform of industrial relations—
Order. I think that the hon. Member is straying rather wide of the Amendment to delete the subsection. Many hon. Members would like to address the Committee before Twelve o'clock, and I think, therefore, that the hon. Member should come to the terms of the Amendment exactly.
rose —
Mr. Crowder.
rose —
I beg the hon. Member's pardon. As he did not rise immediately I sat down, I took it that he had concluded his speech. If he has not done so, he may continue.
If I have strayed slightly wide of the Amendment, it is probably because, although I have attempted to speak on a couple of occasions, I have complied with the request of the Whips and the Front Bench to speed up the proceedings, so perhaps I could crave a little licence now.
Voluntarism is not a single principle, but is something that has many constituent parts. I am convinced that in the area of collective bargaining and procedure agreements the courts have no worthwhile part to play, and that they do not have the flexibility to deal with the ever-changing situation within industry, and it is an ever-changing situation, almost on a day-to-day basis. Nor do I believe that sensible employers who value their good relations with their work-people, and would wish to see them restored as quickly as possible, even in times of dispute, would risk resorting to law.
Despite all that has been said by this side of the Committee, the Government are persisting with these irrelevant Clauses in an extremely irrelevant Bill. They will not stop strikes in the short terms or in the long term, but will simply serve to inflame further an already inflamed situation.
I shall not detain the Committee for more than a few moments, but I think that it might be helpful if at this stage I make a few comments on the Amendment.
The hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. John D. Grant) should remember that in 1966, about which some industrial journalist made some comment, the position was very different from what it is today. Last year there were nearly three times as many unofficial and unconstitutional strikes as there were in 1966, and I think that the escalation of the problem during that time is something which the Committee and the country must take into account.
Is it not a fact that "Fair Deal at Work" made this proposal before 1966?
It was published in April, 1968, but I agree that it was based on a previous proposal. We felt, and I have made no secret of this, either inside or outside Parliament, that there was no doubt that in the early 'sixties there began an escalation in the trend of the number of unofficial, unconstitutional strikes of such severity that, in our view, different measures were needed from those which we had felt were right during the 'fifties.
In his speech on the Second Reading of this Measure, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister drew attention to this and explained that he had changed his mind, that what he had felt was appropriate in the 'fifties at one level of strike activity was different from what he had felt was necessary 10 years later when the level of strike activity had changed enormously and was still on an upward trend.
Circumstances change. They also change what is necessary to deal with a problem. We are, therefore, really dealing with a clear problem that has escalated all through the 'sixties and particularly in the last two or three years. If that were not so the Labour Government would never have proposed the measures which they proposed. They would not have done that had they not realised that something was happening in industry which could not be allowed to go on without some action being taken.
The right hon. Gentleman says that his policy is occasioned by the fact that there has been an escalation of particular kinds of strikes in the last few years. In the event of a de-escalation, would he voluntarily repeal this legislation?
I am sure that if we were to do so we would then get a re-escalation.
With respect, I urge the Committee to come down to earth, away from the heights of imagination to which it was elevated by the remarks of the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr.Heffer). Perhaps I should remind hon. Members that this question of enforceability and potential sanctions in relation to actions for breaking binding agreements applies as much to managements as to unions. It is interesting to note that in other countries where there are comparable laws, while the number of cases brought to the courts for breach of collective contracts is very small, of that small number more are brought by unions against employers than are brought by employers against unions.
Thus, experience in other countries is that, in so far as the process of law is used in respect of legally binding agreements, it is found to be used more by unions to protect themselves than by employers. [Interruption.] In other words, experience in other countries—I cannot be certain that we will follow it, but it is so universal that it is likely that we shall—is that, in so far as the law is used in this sphere, it is a union-protecting rather than an employer-protecting device.
Would the right hon. Gentleman care to say whether in those other countries an agreement is legally binding on a presumption in law such as he is proposing for this country?
These are highly technical matters, and the position, of course, varies from one country to another. However, by and large it is true to say that both parties in other industrial countries enter into collective agreements believing, I suggest rightly, that they are contracts which are legally binding on each and believing that if they are broken there is a legal remedy should they wish to take advantage of it. To the extent that either party takes advantage of it in other countries, there is a greater tendency for unions to use this protection than employers, and this is a factor which the Committee should bear in mind.
Having set the scene in that way, I must bring the Committee back to what we are talking about under this Clause. [HON. MEMBERS: "We know."] It would be difficult to understand that from the passion shown by the hon. Member for Walton. We are here talking about agreements which have been recognised by both parties as being legally binding contracts.
Will the Secretary of State give way?
I am afraid not; I have my eye on the clock.
rose —
Yes, I give way to the Front Bench.
We must clear this point up. We are not talking only about agreements which have been accepted by both sides. We are talking also about an imposed agreement under Clause 39, where an order has been put into effect.
I take the point, so may I regard my remarks for the moment as being addressed only to Clause 34 (1) and (2)? I shall deal with subsection (3) separately in a moment. As regards subsections (1) and (2), we are dealing only with agreements which have been recognised voluntarily by both parties as being legally binding on each of them.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
No, I will not. In these circumstances, we are saying that it is an unfair industrial practice for either the employer or the trade union not to take all reasonably practicable steps—
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
No.
It is a very important point.
I am sure it is, but I must be allowed to get on. I remind the Committee that we are talking here about agreements which both employer and union have agreed to be legally binding on both of them, and all we are saying in this Clause is that it would be an unfair industrial practice if either the employer or the union failed to take all reasonably practicable steps to see that they honoured the agreement which they themselves freely entered into and said should be legally binding on them. That is what we are saying here, and I believe that it is fair and reasonable.
The hon. Member for Walton said—I think he gave his case away when he said it—that this is what union officials are doing the whole time. It may be a bit of an exaggeration to say "the whole time", for if they were doing it the whole time a lot of our troubles would not be here, but I believe that this is what the majority of union officials are doing most of the time.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) said, what we are seeking to do here is to deal with the minority who are sometimes failing to live up to the general practice of the majority. We are doing no more and no less than that. I believe that this is a proposition which should commend itself to the Committee. I am sure that it commends itself not just to the majority of the country but to the great majority of working men and women on the shop floor and in offices, who are as tired as anybody else of the activities of the minority—I stress "minority"—of union representatives who do not spend their time using their best endeavours to see that the agreements which they entered into on behalf of their members are kept. We say that it should be regarded as an unfair practice not to do so.
I hesitate to interrupt, but I am one of the very few full-time union officials in the House. How will the Bill assist a union like mine, the Post Office Engineering Union, which has lost only one day in a national stoppage in 70 years because, unlike our American counterparts who have long and vindictive strikes, we can conclude a settlement knowing that it can be reopened one year later, and because of that we can recommend to our members acceptance of a settlement even when we may have doubts about it for the future? Can the right hon. Gentleman say—[H0N. MEMBERS: "Speech!"] This is a serious point, and the Secretary of State knows it. Can he explain how this provision will help officials like myself in strike-free industries to keep our members in work when we cannot get a satisfactory settlement, and any settlement reached will be legally enforceable?
11.45 p.m.
It seems to me that the hon. Gentleman, his union and his industry are setting an example that we should like to see followed more widely.
The Bill is making it more difficult for us.
I refuse to believe that there is anything in the Bill or the Clause that would make it in any way more difficult for the hon. Gentleman as a full-time official of his union, or for his union or employer, to continue in the good practices we are talking about. They are, clearly, doing the sort of things we should like to see done throughout industry.
It is clear to anyone who has any knowledge of this subject, living with it and seeing what happens in other countries, that recourse to the machinery of the law will be exceptionally rare. Because it is rare does not mean that the statement of the law is without value, because most people have a look at what the rules are, and most people most of the time, provided that the rules seem fairly decent, reasonable and fair, make some attempt to keep them. That is the influence that we chiefly seek and that we believe will bring the chief benefit.
All we are saying in the Clause is that we expect management and unions to take all reasonably practicable steps to honour the agreements that they themselves had said are legally binding. It will be for the court to decide in any case that comes before it what reasonably practicable steps are in the circumstances of the case. The courts are well used to taking that sort of decision. It is the most imaginative nonsense to suggest that to satisfy the court that it has taken such steps a union will have to have gone in for wholesale dismissals of its membership, fines and so on. That is simply not the case. The courts are all day and every day making decisions about what is reasonable in particular circumstances, and that is what these special, sophisticated courts will be able to do in this case.
I promised to deal specially with subsection (3). I agree that in it we are dealing with contracts that are not, like those I have previously been talking about—
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
I am sorry. I will not. I have given way to the hon. Gentleman many times in recent days, and I must distribute my favours in this way a little more widely.
I accept that in subsection (3) we are dealing with a different and difficult sort of case, the substance of which we shall discuss on Clause 35 and the Clauses immediately following.
I beg the Committee to realise that before there is an imposed contract, if I may quite openly use those offensive words, the case will have been looked at by the C.I.R., which will have been charged with the special duty of seeking to obtain the voluntary agreement of the parties to the procedure agreement which was lacking in their case when the case first came to it. So, in our view, we shall be dealing here only with the very rare case where, after full investigation and persuasion by the C.I.R., the parties utterly refuse to make any reasonable agreement voluntarily, where there is a scandal of industrial relations which is an offence to the national interest, and where, in those rare circumstances, the court may have imposed a procedural agreement on the parties. Whore that has been imposed we believe, too, that it would be wrong to allow either party just to breach that agreement without any obligation or possibility of any liability. Here, too, in these rather rare cases we believe that it is right that it should be regarded in this country as an unfair practice for either management or unions to fail to take all reasonable steps to maintain a legally binding agreement.
The right hon. Gentleman has once again drawn attention to the alleged multiplication by three of strikes since 1966. In doing so, he has drawn attention to the deterioration in our industrial relations. If we examine the situation, it indicates not the need for legislation but rather that the deterioration has resulted directly from the introduction of the concept of penal sanctions in industrial relations. Because of that, because of the malaise, the anxiety, the sense of insecurity which has resulted from that concept, we have seen this enlargement in the number of strikes.
I want to concern myself particularly with the Clause itself. It is a sinister Clause in an extremely sinister Bill. It is an informer's charter. The essence of the Clause is not, as the right hon. Gentleman kept on saying, that those involved should take every necessary precaution in order that unfair practices should not be carried out; the essence of the Clause is that those involved in carrying out the practices recommended by the Bill as a whole should take such action as "reasonably practicable" in order to prevent — persons acting or purporting to act on behalf of that party from taking any action in breach of the collective agreement or that part of the agreement, as the case may be". This is not just a question of individuals being responsible for their own behaviour, which is a concept in law that we all accept. This is a different concept. This says that unless one as an individual or a trade union official as an individual in the union takes certain action in order to secure as far as is "reasonably practicable" that some other person shall conform with the law, one shall be held guilty and responsible under the Bill.
That is not only an iniquitous recommendation but very novel in the law. I have said that this is an informer's charter. I am certain that in the factories it will quickly be called the "nark's charter". It will mean that every worker may he held responsible or at least accountable to his union for the behaviour of others; he will be called upon to be an informer on his colleagues.
The hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) claimed to be a member of the Transport and General Workers' Union and even invoked the name of Ernest Bevin. But I remind him that Bevin's great theme was loyalty—and loyalty is the basis of the trade union movement. I cannot imagine that any trade unionist would willingly lay information against his fellow workers in order that his officials may be held harmless under the Bill. The recommendation is not only socially iniquitous, not only legally impracticable, but, indeed, when we come to the term "reasonably practicable", it puts us in the deepest waters.
Surely the term "reasonably practicable" is a value judgment. Who is to decide, and by what criteria, when a thing is not "reasonably practicable"? Is it requested of the trade union official that he should set up some sort of kangaroo court to sit in legal judgment on the workers in that union to decide whether they are engaged in some sort of unfair practice? Those who intend, when the Bill becomes an Act, to engage in what is called an "unfair practice" will not do so openly. They will certainly consort together to discuss their own grievances, and they will try to get together to remedy grievances about which they are concerned. In that situation, a trade union official may well be required by Clause 34(2)(a) to act as a spy—and I am not mincing words—on his fellow workers, if he does not engage in that kind of espionage, he may well be held guilty of an offence under the Clause.
If there is one hon. Member who professionally understands the meaning of words, it is the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman). He must be a party to many contracts. Has he one contract to which he is a party by which he is not expected to take reasonable action to see that the terms to which he has agreed are fulfilled?
I entirely agree with the hon. Member. In contracts which I or any other hon. Member have signed, one is responsible for one's own actions as an individual; but one is not responsible for anybody else, not even for people who may act within one's ambience. What the Clause proposes is completely novel—it is that those mentioned in the Clause should be responsible for their fellow workers.
Would not my hon. Friend agree that, although the Secretary of State has been making great play with his talk about the trade unions being inside the law, there has hardly been a tyranny in the history of mankind which has not been dependent on pimps and narks and informers and that most of them would have survived but for people who were prepared to break the law and challenge them?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend because he has reminded me that it is only under the tyrannies of the Communists and the Nazis that such legislation has existed in which people are not responsible for themselves but are responsible in a form of guilt by association for their fellow workers and their families and so on. Innocent though the right hon. Gentleman may make it out to be, the Clause is one of the most sinister of any Bill ever brought before the House.
The right hon. Gentleman suggested that my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) was trying to put the trade unions outside the law. What is happening is not that the trade unions are now outside the law, not that the right hon. Gentleman wants to bring them within the law as it exists in the normal concept of jurisprudence, but that he is creating a completely new kind of law by which individuals are no longer responsible for themselves but may be found guilty because of the behaviour of others.
This is an entirely new concept, and it is an iniquitous and pernicious concept. The Clause is contrary to the rights of the individual. This is a matter which goes far beyond the concept of industrial relations. It touches the heart of human rights, the rights of every individual.
When the right hon. Gentleman wonders why the workers are incensed and angry and indignant about the Bill, he should realise that they are incensed and angry and indignant about this attack on their human rights. I hope that we shall vote against it and do everything in our power to ensure that a Bill of this sort which imposes on a trade union official or even—
It being Twelve o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again, pursuant to the Order made on 25th January.
Committee report Progress; to sit again this day.
EXPENDITURE
Ordered, That Mr. Michael English, Mr. Gwynoro Jones and Mr. Neil Kinnock be discharged from the Expenditure Committee and that Mr. Robert Sheldon, Mr. Joel Barnett and Mr. Lewis Carter-Jones be added.— [Mr. Humphrey Atkins.]
UNEMPLOYMENT (SCOTLAND)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Mr. Monro.]
12.1 a.m.
It is my intention to indict the Tory Government as the guilty men responsible for the high unemployment in Scotland. I have no doubt, particularly watching the Under-Secretary, that they will squirm and twist and wriggle in an attempt to get off the hook, but this is a bad week for the Tory Party. We start with a debate on Scottish unemployment tonight, we deal with the Scottish situation on Wednesday and we have another motion on Scottish unemployment next Monday.
I am certain that in the process of the seven-day debate that will go on inside the House and outside it the Conservatives will be made to face up to their responsibilities for the disastrous level of unemployment in Scotland. I say in all seriousness to the Under-Secretary that in laying the blame at the door of the Tory Party I am not playing politics. The reason is simple. I know that as long as the Tories think that they can shrug the blame off on to someone else they will do nothing about it. It is only when they cannot escape from the consequences of their actions that they are likely to do something about it. The motive is no higher than that—merely to save their political skins.
The question of who is to blame for Scottish unemployment has been raised before. The Conservative Government say that it is the fault of the Labour Government. We have even had the Secretary of State for Scotland making that claim. He has justified this charge by claiming to have forecast the unemployment problem. I have here a quote nom the Daily Express, and I am certain hon. Members opposite will not question the authority of the Tory Party's Pravda. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Springburn (Mr. Buchanan), who is Secretary of the Scottish Labour Group, the right hon. Gentleman is reported in the Daily Express as follows: He reminded Mr. Buchanan that the Tories had forecast the current unemployment situation in the month before taking office. If the Tory Party and the Secretary of State forecast that situation before June that leads one to ask about the efficacy of their contingency plans. Why after three months in office, after forecasting before June, the problem of Scottish unemployment did the Under-Secretary of State for Development say in October, in his constituency "Alas, nothing can be done this year about unemployment."? Why did the Tory Party not tell the people during the General Election "Alas, we cannot do anything about unemployment his year."? They did not say that in the election. The opposite was the case. I will not weary the House by talking about the question of cutting prices "at a stroke", but no one has noticed that the Prime Minister's famous "at a stroke" speech on 16th June included rising production and falling unemployment.
If the Tories had been in office for only three weeks when the Under-Secretary said that nothing could be done about employment, he would have had a fair point and probably he could have been forgiven for his "alas" statement. But. coming three months after the Tories took office, his statement that nothing could be done meant that nothing would be done. There is a world of difference between those two statements.
Surely the first thing which the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary should have done when they went to St. Andrew's House was to check whether their forecasts were accurate. Surely that was a high priority on their internal administration agenda. If it was a high priority and if their forecasts were accurate, as they claim they were, there must have been a conscious choice in the early days—and I use the word "days" advisedly—of this Administration to do absolutely nothing and to throw in their hand about solving the problem of this year's unemployment.
I do not think that the Tories' claims to be innocent victims of circumstances hold water. Nor does the assertion that the present situation is an unavoidable consequence of the 1970 Labour Budget. [Interruption.] There is no point in the Under-Secretary shaking his head because I have heard Tory spokesmen argue that our budget judgment in April is responsible for the current unemployment.
The problem of unemployment arises because of low growth in the economy and for other reasons. Probably the switch from our investment grant system has something to do with it.
What about the 1966 White Paper?
There is no point in the hon. Gentleman interjecting. I am sick to death of him in this Chamber and in Committee upstairs.
Order. The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars) has been here long enough to know that what he just said is out of order.
I accept your stricture, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I regard it as most unfair for the hon. Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Mr. MacArthur) to interject from a sedentary position almost every time I am on my feet in this Chamber or in Committee upstairs.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
The hon. Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Mr. MacArthur) knows that if the hon. Gentleman does not give way he must resume his seat.
The reason why I will not give way is very simple. If the Tories want to raise the problem of unemployment in Scotland on the Adjournment they should make an application just like the rest of us.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
No. I am talking about an important subject, I am not here to bandy words with the hon. Gentleman.
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Will not the hon. Gentleman give us an opportunity to intervene from a standing position on a matter of great importance?
That is not a point of order. However, the House will remember that I drew attention to the fact that, although the remarks of the hon. Gentleman for South Ayrshire were perhaps intended to be directed at the hon. Member for Perth and East Perthshire, they were directed to the Chair.
I apologise for my flash of temper, but this is a very important subject.
The problem of unemployment arises because the Conservatives have reduced the rate of growth target of 3.5 per cent.
Tell us about the White Paper.
That means that unemployment figures have been recalculated upwards.
Eighty-two thousand lost jobs.
If the hon. Member continues to interject, I shall not listen.
I refer the Under-Secretary to my right hon. Friend's Budget Statement, on 14th April, 1970, as reported at column 1230, where he pointed out—
Eighty-two thousand lost jobs.
—that the central reason for his policy in accelerating growth towards the target figure of 3.5 per cent. was the need to reduce unemployment. Three months after my right hon. Friend's Budget judgment, we were into the month of July. It must have been fairly clear at that time that a certain stimulus was required in the economy if we were to reach 3.5 per cent.
To overcome 82,000 lost jobs.
If the Under-Secretary and his hon. Friend who is heckling behind him want to check up, I advise them to read the statement by the late lain Macleod in his first speech in the House as Chancellor of the Exchequer—
Eighty-two thousand lost jobs.
—that stimulus was required to get 3.5 per cent. When no action was taken, this meant slower growth and made higher unemployment inevitable.
I believe that it was a deliberate choice by the Conservative Government, because they abandoned the prices and incomes policy via the National Board for Prices and Incomes and opted for the traditional Tory wages policy of intimidating the workpeople and the trade union movement with high unemployment.
Nonsense.
I know that the Secretary of State for Scotland can take only a share of the blame for the Government's United Kingdom economic policies, which have consequential effects upon Scotland. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer must bear the main burden of the blame. Even within the restrictions of the policy laid down by the Cabinet, however, it is my contention that the Secretary of State could have acted to ensure that the rise in unemployment did not reach the present disastrous levels. A method was open to the Secretary of State and to the Government, and that was to increase public expenditure on that favourite Tory word "infrastructure", which was used constantly in their election manifesto.
It is legitimate to argue that public expenditure is a way of reducing unemployment because the Secretary of State recognised this and brought forward £1¾ million for winter work relief for unemployment. He recognised the principle of the point that I am trying to make. What he did not seem to recognise was that £1¾ million was derisory in relation to the needs of the time. What we required was public expenditure on infrastructure on a massive scale—on housing, roads, schools, hospitals, nursery schools, clearing up dereliction and the building of old folks' homes, for example. But a choice of that nature poses extremely grave problems for the Conservative Party because they have an ideological aversion to public expenditure.
What took place was a choice between Tory Party dogma and the needs of the people, and the needs of the people came last and Tory Party dogma came first. Public expenditure was not introduced on the necessary scale and our unemployment went up.
Hypocritical nonsense.
It was indeed. I can think of no better comment upon the Tory Government than that comment from the hon. Member.
Eighty-two thousand lost jobs.
Because of those decisions, the present winter has been one of humiliation for 115,000 people in Scotland.
I suggest to the Under-Secretary that even now something could still be done to absorb certain sections of unemployed people. If he released money to hospital boards of management, for example—all of them—with certain plans pigeon-holed for a number of years, for fairly minor schemes which they could undertake quickly, he would absorb many unemployed people in the building and construction industry.
Selective employment tax.
I hope that if S.E.T. is abandoned we shall not get value-added tax in its place.
This winter is a very worrying one, but I am also concerned about the probability of rising unemployment next winter. I may say, without being controversial, that the Chancellor, with that stupid 6d. cut off the standard rate of tax, has preempted his Budget this year, and there is not a great deal of room for manoeuvre left to him. One can predict the sort of situation we shall be in after this year's Budget, that growth—if we get growth at all—will not be sufficient to stimulate a sufficient reduction in unemployment. There is clear evidence of it now. So we have legitimate fears about next winter. This one is bad, but next winter could be worse.
I say to the Under-Secretary that it is essential that the Government act now. I further suggest that it is impossible to get away from the point which I made earlier about the need to inject massive amounts of money in public expenditure. I think that the Government will find that inescapable.
I remember writing to the Secretary of State on 5th October. I remember that very well because it was at the end of the Labour Party's annual conference. I made the proposition to him that he should undertake a public works programme amounting to £20 million, with £5 million for schools and nursery schools and £4 million for hospitals, and when one looks at the condition of our mental hospitals there would be a great deal of benefit not only to the unemployed but to the patients in those hospitals if we invested that amount of money in them —and also to the staff, as some of my hon. Friends are saying, and they are right. Then there should be £6 million for local authority road works and £5 million for clearing dereliction.
If that sort of programme is introduced, if it is introduced for next winter, then we shall take up the slack in both skilled and unskilled labour now unemployed. I would do the right hon. Gentleman an injustice if I said I had no answer from him, but I cannot remember getting an answer from him, probably because the points I made were unanswerable.
I want to come to the end of what I have to say.
Now talk about the White Paper and 82,000 lost jobs.
I want to be more generous in giving time to the Under-Secretary than some of his hon. Friends have been generous to me in this debate.
There are imperative economic reasons for reducing unemployment, but the social reasons override every other possible reason. Many people think that unemployment today is not the same problem as it was in the 'thirties. Certainly it is not the same problem in magnitude. We have about 700,000 unemployed in Britain now, compared with perhaps 3 million in the 'twenties and 'thirties. But to the individual who is unemployed today the problem is pretty much the same. Certainly cash aids and unemployment benefit are better, though they are still inadequate, but the sense of isolation and hopelessness is, to some extent, worse than it was.
In the days of mass unemployment one was unemployed together with all one's friends. Now a man can be unemployed and be the only one in his street who is unemployed. His sense of isolation is greater than it ever was before. I speak from experience. I have never been unemployed, but I have been the situation next to it, running around with a redundancy notice in my pay packet.
It happened to me about four weeks before a Christmas. I remember very vividly the horrible feeling which a man gets when his ability to earn his living is suddenly taken from him. I shall always remember walking up my street and being the only man in the street with a redundancy notice in his pocket. I went home and listened to the children innocently talking about what they were likely to get for Christmas. My wife and I were at our wits end wondering how to meet the bill for the Christmas presents. I was lucky. I was in a good trade union and did not become redundant.
That is the sort of situation which is facing 115,000 people in Scotland. Becoming unemployed does something to a man. It also does something to a woman, because women are taking their part increasingly in industry. It is perhaps irrational, but it is nevertheless the case that an unemployed man feels a loss of dignity, a degree of self-humiliation. When he applies for jobs but does not get them, when he applies for jobs that perhaps are not there, he gets the feeling that somehow or other he is industrially unclean. It is a social crime to put people through the mental anguish of unemployment.
The 115,000 unemployed people in Scotland have committed no offence against society. They are honourable and decent citizens with the very laudable, if modest, ambition of simply wanting work. As the Tory election manifesto was called "The Better Tomorrow", and as we have had 226 tomorrows since 19th June, it is clearly the Government's responsibility. They have the power and the ability. It is their responsibility to provide those people with the work that they urgently need.
12.21 a.m.
Once again, as is the normal practice with this Opposition, I have been asked to reply to an adjournment debate and have been given absolutely no time in which to do so. Even allowing the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars) the maximum time for interruptions, there is nothing like enough time for me to answer the debate in the time I have been left. I make that quite clear before I embark on my speech.
The hon. Gentleman disappointed me greatly tonight. I thought that he had a much greater grasp of the real ways of economics and of the ways in which the country is run than he has shown tonight. He has produced a whole string of slogans and extraordinary statements, none of which hang together. If his claim is to be believed that he was not playing at politics tonight, I look forward to the time when he does.
The hon. Gentleman misquoted something I said: he alleged that in October I said that no one could do anything about unemployment in the following year. What I said—correctly—was that, alas, no one could do anything this winter about unemployment, and nobody could in September and October of last year, and everybody knows that quite well.
A marvellous piece of information that the hon. Gentleman gave us was that unemployment arises because of low growth in the economy. Did not the hon. Gentleman, both in and out of Parliament, support for five years a Government which achieved the lowest growth that we have had for many years and which stagnated the economy for five years? The hon. Gentleman expects us to believe that until 18th June last everything was marvellous and nothing needed doing, that the budget judgment of his right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) in April was perfect until 18th June and that suddenly on 19th June it all needed changing.
The hon. Gentleman complained that the Tory Government had abandoned the prices and incomes policy, whereas his own party was the one that abandoned it, having introduced it in the first place. The Labour Government introduced a wage freeze, and then abandoned that, too.
The hon. Gentleman ended with the most remarkable thing of all. He complained that nothing had been done for mental hospitals under the Tory Government, whereas the fact is that the Tory Government in the short time they have been in office have already provided extra funds for putting right the things that are wrong with mental hospitals.
Clearly, we are very concerned about the rising unemployment rate. No Government could be anything but concerned about the situation. We do not underestimate the position. Having listened to my hon. Friends week after week for three, even four, years, putting Questions again and again to the Labour Government about the loss of jobs in Scotland and every time being laughed out of court, being scorned for raising the matter, being assured by the previous Secretary of State that everything in the garden was lovely, it is a bitter victory to be proved right now. Here we are left with everything that was forecast, everything we complained about, and more. Now we are expected to listen to the sort of speech the hon. Gentleman has made, and it is not worthy of him.
Let me give some facts. Every month after September, 1969, and up to June, 1970, the total of unemployed in Scotland was higher than it was in the corresponding month a year previously. At first the increase was relatively small, no more than 500, but the gap rapidly widened to an increase of over 6,000 by the beginning of 1970 and to 10,000 by May and June, 1970, and by July, 1970, it was 12,500. So we were not only on an upward trend, but on a rapidly accelerating upward trend.
Every Government find themselves with a legacy from their predecessors—the Labour Government did and we did. The legacy left to the previous Government when they took office in 1964 is shown in the unemployment figures for the first half of 1965—under 80,000 and falling by the early summer to around 60,000. What we inherited was a summer rate of over 80,000 and the deep-rooted rising trend to which I have already referred. Indeed the July, 1970, level was the highest level, with one exception, since the war. That was the legacy left to us by the Labour Government.
There is a contrast, too, and a very marked one, in the growth of employment opportunities between 1959 and 1964 and between 1964 and 1969. In the earlier period there was overall a net increase of 44,000 employees in employment in Scotland; under the Labour Government from 1964 to 1969 there was, as the hon. Gentleman knows, a net loss of jobs of 30,000. The hon. Gentleman may have noticed an answer to a Question by my lion Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Mr. MacArthur) on 10th December last, which shows that the net loss of employment between March, 1966, and March, 1970, was no fewer than 82,000 in Scotland. Those are the figures.
rose —
No, I am not giving way; I have not time. The hon. Gentleman cannot complain about those figures. They are taken from HANSARD, and they are absolutely right. By the end of 1969 the Scottish economy was stagnating, although the hon. Member for Greenock (Dr. Dickson Mabon) was describing Scotland's economy as "Scotland's rapidly strengthening position." I would emphasise that I am quoting from HANSARD of 10th December, 1969; Vol. 793, c. 520. That was the time when the jobless figures were going up in the way I have described to the House.
rose
No.
The index of industrial production for Scotland showed an increase of less than 1½ per cent between the second quarter of 1969 and the second quarter of 1970. Redundancies had begun to climb in many industries that can easily be named—
Would the hon. Gentleman give way?
No.
The Scottish economy has been afflicted by the same malaise which the policies of the previous Administration had imposed on the economy as a whole. Wage costs were forced rapidly upwards at an accelerating rate.
On a point of order. The hon. Gentleman began his speech by complaining of the fact he had not been given time to answer the debate. In the course of some seven minutes—and he has now one minute left—
The hon. Gentleman must know that that is not a point of order, nor is it helping the timing of this debate.
As I understand it, it is the—
Filibuster.
I am reminded of a debate some two years ago when we sought to ask the then Secretary of State about loss of jobs in Scotland when the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) put up a filibuster for something like 2½ hours to prevent these facts from being known. That was a disgraceful thing to do, and the same thing is being done tonight. It is a deliberate attempt to stop me from making my points.
You are a Parliamentary cheat.
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. Gentleman to accuse a right hon. Gentleman of a subterfuge in relation to filibustering and ought not that right hon. Gentleman to have an opportunity to reply?
Come off it!
I deny it entirely.
Order. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen must know that such interventions cannot help this debate. Mr. Younger.
It may have been a piece of private enterprise by the hon. Member for Fife, West. All I can say is that it was done without the right hon. Gentleman's approval—
The Question having been proposed after Twelve o'clock on Monday evening and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order and the Order of 25th January.
Adjourned at twenty-nine minutes to One o'clock.