House of Commons
Tuesday, February 2, 1971
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair ]
BERKSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [Lords]
BRISTOL CORPORATION (GENERAL POWERS) BILL [Lords]
As amended, considered.
Bill to be read the Third time.
ALDRIDGE-BROWNHILLS URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL
Read a Second time and committed.
BRITISH TRANSPORT DOCKS BILL
CHICHESTER HARBOUR CONSERVANCY BILL
CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) (No. 2) BILL
Orders for Second Reading read.
Bills to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.
CO-OPERATIVE BANK BILL
Read a Second time and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
EAST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL (NEWHAVEN BRIDGE) BILL
Orders for Second Reading read.
Bills to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.
ETON RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL
Read a Second time and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
HARINGEY CORPORATION BILL
HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL
Orders for Second Reading read.
Bills to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.
HUMBER BRIDGE BILL
Read a Second time and committed.
KESTEVEN COUNTY COUNCIL BILL
LONDON TRANSPORT (No. 2) BILL
Orders for Second Reading read.
Bills to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.
MANCHESTER CORPORATION (LOTTERIES) BILL
Order for Second Reading read.
Bill to be read a Second time upon Tuesday, 2nd March.
OXFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (No. 2) BILL
STOCKPORT CORPORATION BILL
TORBAY CORPORATION (No. 2) BILL
Orders for Second Reading read.
Bills to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.
TRENT RIVER AUTHORITY (GENERAL POWERS) BILL
Read a Second time and committed.
PAISLEY CORPORATION (CART NAVIGATION) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL (By Order)
As amended, considered.
Bill to be read the Third time tomorrow.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
SOCIAL SERVICES
Blind Persons
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will now seek powers to introduce a positive allowance for blind people whose incomes are not sufficient to enable them to take full advantage of the tax allowance for the blind.
There are already a number of schemes which provide benefits for blind people with low incomes, and we have no plans at present for a special scheme on the lines my hon. Friend suggests. As he knows, the Government have the problems of disabled people generally very much in mind.
Whilst I thank my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him to bear in mind that the benefit of tax allowance for the blind is available only to the better off and that it is not possible for those who are really destitute to take advantage of it? Would he think again about making it a positive payment?
I am obliged to my hon. Friend. I can assure him that the attendance allowance which is to begin shortly is only the first of a series of measures which the Government are planning to help the disabled.
Would not the Minister agree that a very important principle is at stake because very poor blind people need more financial assistance than those who pay taxes? Would he not also agree that the same principle should apply to all disabled people?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for those points. I am sure that he will realise that most of them are matters for my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Smoking (Lung Cancer)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what steps he will take to secure accurate information on the extent of hazard to health in smoking cigars and pipe tobacco.
On the whole, evidence to date suggests that pipe and cigar smoking is far less harmful than cigarette smoking. I am considering whether further research is needed.
Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that members of the public have it definitely in their minds that cigar and pipe smoking are relatively safe, and that they would regard it as a great deception if, in due course, research proved that this was not the case? Will he bear in mind that it is urgently necessary to ascertain the truth?
The recent Report of the Royal College of Physicians came down categorically on the side of the view that cigar and pipe smoking is less dangerous than cigarette smoking.
When will the right hon. Gentleman announce what action he proposes to take on the Report of the Royal College of Physicians?
I have already announced that I am in discussion with the cigarette manufacturers.
My right hon. Friend has twice said "less dangerous" in the context of pipe tobacco and cigars. Does not he agree that the only safe course is to abandon tobacco altogether—and in that I bracket all tobacco products, including snuff? Has his attention been drawn to the provisions of the Tobacco and Snuff (Health Hazards) Bill, already before the House and due for Second Reading on 12th February?
As I read the Report of the Royal College of Physicians, I cannot answer "Yes" to the first part of my hon. Friend's question, since it thinks that there is little harm in pipe and cigar smoking. I must record that Swiss and German research shows that cigar and pipe smoking is as dangerous as cigarette smoking.
I am much obliged to my right hon. Friend.
The answer to the second part of my hon. Friend's question is "Yes".
Is my right hon. Friend aware that, while his Department spends vast sums warning people of the dangers of smoking, very many young people turn all too frequently to drugs, and that some attention should be paid to this urgent and sinister matter?
Although that does not follow from the Question, is it preoccupying the Ministers concerned in the Government, myself included.
Does the right hon. Gentleman regard the Report of the Royal College of Physicians as conclusive evidence in this very serious matter, or does he still have doubts about the evidence of the Report? Is he willing to make firm decisions on behalf of the Government on the evidence of the Report?
The answer to the last part of the hon. Lady's question is "Yes". But "conclusive" is a very definitive word in a world of constantly deepening research. Certainly the Government accept the Report as a highly valuable document to be treated extremely seriously.
Pneumoconiosis Medical Panels
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he is satisfied with the present administration of pneumoconiosis medical panels; and if he will make a statement.
I have no evidence of any general dissatisfaction with the present administration of pneumoconiosis medical panels, but the question of their organisation is one of the matters the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council is considering in its major review of pneumoconiosis.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that answer and recognise the extent to which he has inherited the present administration, but does he accept that there is gross dissatisfaction at the outcome of these pneumoconiosis panels? Will he undertake to look at the situation with what might be termed compassionate interest?
Certainly. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Council is looking at the problem at the moment, in view of the difficulties to which he has referred. He will also know that there is a central panel which can look at the more difficult cases. My information is that this arrangement is working satisfactorily.
Industrial Lung Diseases
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what non-departmental advice he receives regarding the pathology of lung disease.
Our medical advisers are in constant touch with leading authorities on industrial lung diseases, with which I assume this question is concerned. In the particular field of the pneumoconioses, the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council has been receiving both written and oral evidence from all sources, including a number of pathologists with a direct interest in the diseases.
While I thank the hon. Gentleman for another very helpful answer, is he prepared to look at the methods adopted in the pathology of lung diseases? I am thinking primarily of pneumoconiosis. Is he aware that some very experienced medical men have expressed doubts about the methods at present adopted? For example, they believe that before a proper diagnosis can be made the lung should be blown up, and I understand that this is not a general procedure. Will he look at the methods of diagnosis?
Yes. This is one of the reasons why the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council is assessing the situation at present. If the hon. Gentleman has any further specific points that he would like to put to me, I shall be glad to hear from him.
Hypothermia (Deaths)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what estimate he has made of the annual number of pensioners dying through hypothermia due to shortage of heating.
In 1969, the last year for which detailed figures are available, the deaths of 155 people of 65 years and over were attributed to excessive cold, hunger, thirst and neglect in which hypothermia was a contributory or underlying cause. Shortage of heating is not the only factor responsible for the onset of hypothermia; some of these deaths occurred in the warmer part of the year.
Is it not a fact that there are other contributory causes of hypothermia which create serious illness, if not deaths, among many thousands of pensioners? Is it not time for an increase in pensions so that old people can afford the fuel that they need to keep them warm at this time of the year?
The hon. Gentleman will know that the Supplementary Benefits Commission is empowered to make special provision for the supply of extra fuel for those in this category who are in need.
Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that heat is very much a question of psychology as well as degrees Centigrade, especially for old people? Will not he have a word with his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment and ask him to persuade local authorities to provide old people with alternative forms of heat so that if they want cheerful coal fires they can have them?
Local authorities have wide and flexible powers for people in this condition. We reminded them of their powers in a Circular which was sent to them in November of last year.
In a prosperous country like Britain, is not it disgusting that people should die of hunger and cold? Why does not the hon. Gentleman refer to the fact that in the last few months the prices of gas, electricity, coal and even paraffin, the cheapest fuel, have risen by between 10 and 15 per cent.? Why is it that his right hon. Friend has not been able to extend the arrangements for people with special heating needs, who are a tiny minority of those on supplementary benefit, to everyone on supplementary benefit, as we have asked him to do repeatedly?
In reply to the last part of the hon. Lady's question, she will know that the supplementary benefit levels are flexible at the margin. She must also bear in mind the wide-ranging and flexible powers of the Supplementary Benefits Commission and the local authority medical and social services to help those in this condition. I agree with her first observation. It is unacceptable and shocking that people in this country, prosperous as we are, can be found in this condition and die.
Directors of Social Services
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what advice he has given local authorities concerning the qualifications of candidates for posts of director of social services and the procedure that should be adopted in making appointments to such posts.
I am sending the hon. Member a copy of the Circular sent to local authorities on 10th August, paragraphs 12 to 14 of which deals with his point.
I trust that the right hon. Gentleman is clear that candidates who have administrative experience in local government should not be excluded from consideration for these posts.
The Circular was very carefully drawn. I would prefer the hon. Gentleman to study the paragraphs to which I have referred, and send me his questions afterwards.
If evidence is provided to show that some local authorities are deliberately trying to thwart the will of Parliament and not keeping to the spirit of the Act, will the right hon. Gentleman be prepared to investigate the boroughs concerned?
"Investigation" is a very strong word. I am, naturally, interested in the appointments. If the hon. Gentleman cares to send me particulars, I shall be interested to study them.
Has the Minister observed just how many local authorities have translated their existing chief welfare officer to director of social services? Does not this, in effect, produce a situation where the local authority is giving very much the same services at a much inflated salary? Will the right hon. Gentleman look into this matter?
I have not got the figures in mind. If the hon. Gentleman cares to put down a Question, I will look at it.
On a point of order Mr. Speaker. In order not to waste the time of the House, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise a point of order on Question No. 6 at 3.30 p.m.
Water Supplies (Fluoridation)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many local health authorities to the most convenient date, in England, empowered to bring in fluoridation of water supplies, have voted to do so, how many have refused to do so and how many are still undecided.
According to my information, 94 English local health authorities and authorities with delegated health functions have voted in favour of fluoridation, 85 are against, and five have not yet reached a decision. Two authorities have sufficient fluoride in the water supplies without fluoridation.
Do the right hon. Gentleman's proposals mean that individuals who have artificial teeth and individuals who have no teeth whatsoever will require to swallow this fluoride water, and to what purpose— [Interruption.] —especially for mixing with their whisky? Would it not be wiser if the right hon. Gentleman dealt with those affected, the children, and gave them, where the parents consented, the appropriate treatment by means of pellets?
That is quite a different question, but it remains a free country.
Will the right hon. Gentleman do something about the position in London? In view of the evidence which the hon. Gentleman's Department has had for more than 20 years about the usefulness of fluoridation of water to prevent dental caries, may I ask the hon. Gentleman to look into the position in London where we have 32 boroughs under one water authority and a minority can preclude the rest from having this useful idea?
It is very frustrating to those of us, including the Government, who believe that fluoride is a valuable preventive to dental decay. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will first persuade his hon. Friend and then crusade in the areas concerned.
Cannot the Government do something about this obscurantist agitation to prevent the use of a valuable additive at a very cheap price which could be of such enormous benefit? Why must the Government sit under it and allow this agitation to intimidate one local authority after another?
This Government, like the last Government, have not failed to make clear their view that fluoridation is a valuable and harmless preventive to dental decay.
Liquid Vitamin Drops
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if the new drop preparation containing vitamins A, D and C will be available free of charge to nursing and expectant mothers; what plans he has to inform them of availability; and if he will make a statement.
Like the orange juice and cod liver oil which they replace, these liquid vitamin drops will be supplied free for children in families in need and will be on sale to others. Posters are to be displayed in child health clinics, a million leaflets are to be distributed, and full details are to be included in the publicity to be given to the family income supplement and new welfare milk arrangements.
Is not this charging, taking back again and having exemptions like taking a sledge hammer to crush a peanut? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that last year we had a surplus of £327,000 on orange juice account alone? In view of that, is it not better to have the whole thing free so that people can have this desirable thing for their children?
The surplus to which the hon. Gentleman referred arose from the fact that the stockbuilding, which was customary whilst the scheme was in operation, was run down. The payments for the new vitamin drops will result in substantial economies to those who have to purchase them.
King George Hospital, Ilford (Casualty Department)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what action is being taken to improve conditions in the casualty department of the King George Hospital, Ilford.
An improvement scheme is planned by the North-East Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board to start in the financial year 1971–72.
As the load on this department is infinitely greater in proportion than the amount of resources which have been given to it within the area, could not some action be taken to increase the scope of the proposed improvements?
The proposed improvement will cost a substantial sum—in fact, £60,000. My hon. Friend knows that there are new accident and emergency departments provided in two places nearby which between them should account for the likely need.
Psychiatric Beds (London)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many beds in units specifically designed for the psychiatric treatment of adolescents are at present available in the areas of the South-East, South-West, North-West and North-East Regional Hospital Boards, respectively; when work is to start on the adolescent unit at Goodmayes Hospital; and how many beds are to be provided.
77, 48, 30 and none respectively; in the Spring; 28.
Is not this rather a poor record? What does the Minister propose to do about it?
The record, particularly in the North-East Metropolitan Region, promises to improve with the commencement, we hope before long, of the Goodmayes unit to provide 28 more beds, which would eliminate at any rate the total failure so far of that region to make any provision.
Does the Minister appreciate that the figures which he has just given are appalling? Does this not represent a general inadequacy of beds in these regions? When will the Minister take steps to ensure that the worse-off regions get a larger proportion of the resources available?
There is a general national shortage of beds for this category. My right hon. Friend has made special allocations, both of capital and revenue, to assist regional boards to plan further provision.
Elderly Persons (Hardship Cases)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will take steps to require local authorities to establish a service charged with the tasks of initiating local inquiries to identify cases of hardship, particularly among old people, and of bringing to the attention of each individual case the benefit to which they are entitled as of right.
There is a close and growing liaison between social security officers and local authority welfare staff for this purpose, and I am not satisfied that a new special service would be helpful.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the basic problem is to find very large numbers of those who are entitled to the support of the social services? Is it not, therefore, time to reverse the onus of responsibility, so that the authorities concerned have a positive duty to take the initiative in seeking out those who need such support instead of waiting for applications?
My hon. Friend will be aware that when the relevant section of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act—Section 1—is implemented shortly after 1st April this year this very positive duty will arise.
While recognising the need for confidentiality to some extent, may I ask whether the Minister is satisfied with the arrangements which might be made by local authorities or voluntary bodies in the distribution of publicity material at the point where persons claim retirement pension?
I do not think that we could ever be satisfied until there is 100 per cent. information. This is a very difficult object to achieve. However, the Alf Morris Act will certainly impose a duty of wider communication, and we have no doubt that this will bear fruit.
Is my hon. Friend aware that some good local authorities —notably Croydon—already operate such a service on an informal basis? If my hon. Friend requires advice or help, will he apply to Croydon?
Croydon has a remarkable system of collaboration and co-operation between the health and welfare authorities which sets a pattern, I believe, for the whole country.
May I ask the hon. Gentleman to have another look at this matter? As he knows, dependence on means-tested benefits turns entirely on the uptake of those means-tested benefits. Clearly, this is the way that the Government are going. Will the hon. Gentleman at least consider whether local authorities might be advised to make clear to persons with whom they came into contact the whole range of benefits to which they are entitled, not only the benefits about which they inquire, which is often the case now?
I take the hon. Lady's point, but she will remember that it is not only those who come into contact about whom we are concerned, it is those with whom local authorities have no prima facie need to have contact that we need to discover.
Disabled Persons (Vehicle Fuel)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will take steps to assist disabled tricycle owners, in view of the difficulties experienced by them in obtaining fuel for their vehicles.
I am not aware of difficulty in obtaining fuel for the invalid three-wheelers.
From now on the Minister will be aware, because I am going to tell him, that there is a serious shortage of this two-stroke oil and petrol mixture which invalids use in their invalid carriage—many of them to go to and from work. What they are experiencing now, particularly in Middlesex, is that garages find that it is not worth——
Order. The hon. Gentleman must not use a supplementary question to impart information; he must seek it.
I thought that I had, Mr. Speaker. With permission, may I now ask the Minister whether he is aware that this is a grave problem, particularly in Middlesex? People who use these tricycles to go to work, to return home from work, and for other reasons, are discovering that garages are not stocking this mixture. This is a very serious problem, and I should be grateful if the hon. Gentleman would examine it.
I shall certainly examine it. The indications are that petrol stations, stocking the two-stroke mixture have not, in any noticeable sense, been reduced in number. However, if the hon. Gentleman would like to send me details, particularly of his part of the world, I shall gladly look into them.
If there is to be a national shortage of fuel, as is forecast by some sections of the Press, will my hon. Friend take particular care to ensure that the disabled do not suffer from it? Second, will he discuss with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the possibility of raising the allowance for petrol for these vehicles for the disabled?
The second part of that question lies outside the scope of an immediate answer. The answer to the first part is that we would hope to make any provision that was possible to protect vulnerable sections of the population from emergencies such as this.
Will the hon. Gentleman be a little more helpful and tell the House when it is proposed to withdraw the one-seater tricycle and supply a two-seater car? Would not he agree that the present vehicle is not only anti-social but must, of necessity, mean that if a break-down occurs away from home a disabled person is left without any immediate help?
That goes rather wide of the Question. I know the hon. Gentleman's concern in this matter but he, in return, will know that one-seaters have certain advantages, in the sense that they provide space for taking in collapsible wheelchairs.
May I ask my hon. Friend whether he will add to his pleading to the Chancellor of the Exchequer a plea to increase the supply of mini-cars to the disabled?
The supply of mini-cars to the disabled forms part of the review of the whole invalid vehicle service which my right hon. Friend is carrying out, and the results will be announced to the House in due course.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that much the most helpful thing that he could do for many tricycle owners would be to give them four-wheeled vehicles? Would he agree with Graham Hill and others who have been in touch with me that this could be done at no greater cost per car? Finally, will the hon. Gentleman keep in the closest possible consultation with the Disabled Drivers Association, the Hœmophilia Society and other organisations concerned with this problem?
We keep closely in touch with all those associations. But the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the three-wheeler, with its peculiarly light steering, is an essential form of mobility for some categories of disabled people.
Dental Charges
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what assessment he has made of the effect of recent Government announcements about increased dental charges on the dental health of the nation.
The new system of dental charges will give a financial incentive to patients to look after their teeth —[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—and should, therefore, have a beneficial effect on dental health.
One could call that reply standing logic on its head. Does the right hon. Gentleman know of the opposition put forward by the British Dental Association, particularly in view of its experience when dental charges were introduced in the 'fifties, of the reduction in the level of treatment demanded by patients? Is he further aware that in 1948, before the National Health Service was introduced, about 11 per cent. of people under 30 in this country had no teeth of their own, and that since the introduction of the National Health Service this proportion has been reduced to 4.6 per cent.? Is not that a complete case against his own argument and his reply to me? Will the right hon. Gentleman therefore—[HON. MEMBERS: "Too long!"]—in view of the genuine and serious concern expressed by experts in this matter, look at the issue again and withdraw the proposed charges?
The hon. Lady is right that there is serious concern. She is right that in the 'fifties the imposition of a charge did lead first to a surge in treatment, and then to a dip, but a dip that was only temporary.
The House will be aware that under the new arrangements two-thirds of treatments will remain either free or be at a lower cost than they were under the Labour Government. The number of people exempt altogether from charges will rise. Between me and the British Dental Association there will be a comprehensive campaign to explain to people the advantages, the immunities and the probable costs under the new system.
Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind during his campaign that the most valuable contribution which he, personally, could make would be to step along to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and point out to him that the scale of charges and the excess treatment now required arise partially from the fact that, while toothbrushes are free of purchase tax, toothpaste and dentifice are purchase-taxed at 36⅔ per cent.?
I thought my hon. Friend was going to say that these taxes are higher than those on sweets, As a user of sweets, toothbrushes and dentifrice, I have to point out that I do not think that a change in purchase tax, even if my right hon. Friend agreed, would, bring about a reduction in dental caries.
Will the right hon. Gentleman sack the civil servant who gave him the original answer? If the right hon. Gentleman himself believes this, why does he not do the job properly and double the charges, and then we shall all have first-class dental health?
I drafted my reply with loving care—[HON. MEMBERS: "Resign!"]—because I believe, and I believe that the House will come to realise, that a system by which a regular attender at a dentist will bear far less cost than those who do not attend regularly will improve dental health.
Can my right hon. Friend say what proportion of children who qualify for free dental treatment take advantage of the facilities available to them, and what steps he will take to encourage greater use being made of free dental treatment?
All children are entitled and will remain entitled, to free dental treatment. I hope that one result of the system of charges proposed will be that dentists will reach out to provide even more treatment to children, which will remain free.
The right hon. Gentleman is sounding a little as though treatment is bound to be extraction, because his loving care has persuaded very few dentists. Does what he has said mean, first, that he is informing the House that he is going to reduce the age of exemption from 21 to 18, or keep it at 21, because his last reply implied that the situation would be the same?
Second, does the right hon. Gentleman deny that as a result of high demand there has been a consistent fall in the price of dental treatment, largely owing to the much more efficient use of dentists?
Third, can the right hon. Gentleman inform the House that a situation in which treatment for extractions is going to be very much cheaper than treatment of a conservative kind—I use the term technically—is one which will improve the dental health of this nation?
The Government propose to introduce legislation to reduce the age of exemption from 21 to 18, and there will be an opportunity to discuss the merits of that at the time. I am the first to pay tribute to the improvement in the dental health of the nation which the dental service, dentists and the skills of those who serve them have brought about.
The National Health Service.
Yes. The answer to the third point is that I think it will always be important for dentists to explain to patients the advantages of one sort of treatment against another. A few will refuse what is sensible, but most will accept it.
In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.
National Health Service (Parliamentary Commissioner)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will make a statement on the discussions he has had about the establishment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for the National Health Service.
I am still studying the comments made by the bodies that were consulted by the previous Administration on this proposal.
Would the right hon. Gentleman comment on the suspicion that only the top of the iceberg of any maladministration can be revealed due to the understandable but unjustified reluctance of doctors to bear witness against each other? Can he tell the House if and when he intends to appoint a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Health Service?
The hon. Gentleman is exaggerating, and I think he is being too hard on doctors, but there is an element of truth in what he says. I hope to be able to tell the House something—not on his last point, but on his question—soon.
Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that it might be possible to extend the very narrow capabilities of the present Parliamentary Commissioner to encompass health matters?
I will bear in mind what my hon. Friend says, but the first thing is to decide whether there is a case for some such official in connection with the Health Service.
Would the right hon. Gentleman recollect the assurance of my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) during discussion of the Bill, when he was Secretary of State, that he would bring in some proposal before the Bill got to the House of Lords to cover the concern which was felt about maladministration in the Health Service which did not involve clinical judgment, and that, since that time, the Select Committee has unanimously recommended that this area should be brought within the ambit of the Parliamentary Commissioner, although that proposal has never been discussed in the House?
Technically, I am not, of course, responsible for my predecessor's proposals but his intention was to consult the interests concerned. He did do so, and I am studying the results of that consultation.
Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that there is a need for completely impartial investigations into patients' complaints and that the present procedures by Health Service area authorities are regarded by many people as being not completely impartial?
It is because I have sympathy with that point of view that I told the hon. Lady's hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South, (Mr. Ashley) that I hoped to be able to tell the House something very shortly.
Hospital Emergency Generators
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he will initiate an inquiry into the circumstances in which hospital emergency generators have failed to operate instantaneously in the event of power cuts; and whether he will make a statement.
Reports on significant failures of mechanical and electrical plant are sent to my Department, and I am aware of a failure at one hospital on which the manufacturer's report is awaited. If further inquiries show that standby generators designed to take up the load instantaneously failed to do so I will consider whether additional technical guidance should be issued.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that reply. Would he not agree that, as this equipment is designed to deal with emergencies, it is by definition expected to deal with the unexpected, but that there are reasons to believe that. at the moment, it cannot fulfil this function? Will the hon. Gentleman speed action to allay public anxiety by having a full inquiry into the Health Service and hospitals as a whole?
The hon. Gentleman will know that in the older hospitals, where it is not possible to have dual circuitry conveying power both to essential and to non-esesntial services separately, there has to be some element of switching, taking up a slight amount of time, when a standby generator is brought into effect. However, we are carefully considering the routine engineers' reports to see whether further steps should be taken.
St. Cross Hospital, Rugby
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will now make a further statement about the proposed development of the Hospital of St. Cross, Rugby.
At a meeting with representatives of the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board on 28th January it was agreed that further consideration should be given by the Board to the provision of acute beds.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that we shall be meeting on the Adjournment tomorrow night and that I shall be expecting something rather more positive than that?
I look forward to that encounter.
Retirement Pensioners (Fuel Costs)
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he will take into account, in his forthcoming review of retirement pensions, recent increases in the cost of fuel.
Yes, Sir.
Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the considerable hardship which is being caused at present, particularly to old-age pensioners, by the increases in fuel prices? Is he satisfied that these are properly taken into account when assessing the amount of supplemental benefits?
The Government are certainly aware of this problem, and that is one of the reasons why the special allowances for extra heating needs are being increased.
District Nurses and Home Helps
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he will take steps to encourage and enable local authorities to alleviate the shortage of district nurses and home helps.
My right hon. Friend proposes to bring into operation on 1st April Section 13 of the Health Services and Public Health Act, 1968, which makes the provision of home helps by local authorities a duty. I know that local authorities fully recognise the need for expansion. So far as home nurses are concerned, while there may be difficulties in particular areas I am not aware of any general shortage.
I welcome the first part of that answer, but does not the hon. Gentleman feel that the second part is unsatisfactory, in view of the fact that a comparatively small expenditure on home nursing can provide a considerable saving in hospital expenses and, in addition, of course, provide comforts for old people, who much prefer to be in their own homes rather than in hospital?
I note what the hon. Gentleman says. He will recall that my right hon. Friend had made substantial extra allocations for health authorities for precisely this sort of provision, where it is needed, in the current financial year.
I warmly welcome the Minister's announcement. Is he aware that there are many people who need not be hospitalised if we tackle this problem as keenly as we could? Will he draw attention of local authorities to their new legislative powers in this field?
Yes, Sir.
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
asked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the economic matters discussed at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Singapore.
We had discussions on a number of international economic issues. Details are to be found in the Final Communiqué of the Conference which was circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT on 26th January.—[Vol. 810, c. 336.]
But, since the Prime Minister has been prepared to go so far as to jeopardise the very existence of the Commonwealth in order to sell arms to South Africa, surely some estimate of the value of these arms has been made by the Government. In the interests of more open government, will the right hon. Gentleman give these figures to the House?
These figures were not discussed at the Commonwealth Conference to which the hon. Gentleman is referring; neither was this matter discussed during the day-long discussion on economic matters of an international nature. The Heads of Government concentrated on other very important matters of aid, special drawing rights, investment, trade, development and the special Commonwealth programmes.
Did discussions take place on the problems of Commonwealth fruit exporters, particularly of those supplying bananas to this country?
Yes, Sir; this was one of the subjects which was raised in the general discussions in the economic debate, and it was also one which I had the opportunity of discussing outside the Conference with some of the Caribbean Prime Ministers.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether there was any discussion of the Basle Agreement? Is it not a fact that this comes up for renewal this year and that one of its most important aspects is that our sterling depositors voluntarily restrict themselves as to the percentage of their deposits which they convert into dollars? If that restraint is to be renewed, is it not a fact that unanimity will be required by all the sterling depositors? Is the right hon. Gentleman, finally, aware that the sale of arms to South Africa would gravely impair the chances of obtaining that unanimity, with a damaging effect on sterling, which would in turn damage and weaken our bargaining position in regard to the European Economic Community?
This, again, was not a matter discussed in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference. It was not raised by anyone there, because the Heads of Government knew that it was a matter to be negotiated by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman is, of course, correct to say that the agreement comes up for renegotiation this year, but it is also well known, I think, that the arrangements affect different Commonwealth countries in a variety of ways. It is entirely a matter for negotiation with them.
Did my right hon. Friend find a great welcome among Commonwealth countries for his speech to the United Nations last October, when he said that this country would do its best, as soon as possible, to achieve a 1 per cent. target of transfer of net resources to the developing countries?
Yes, Sir; I found a very warm welcome for that when I made the speech in the United Nations, but it was true that the speeches at the Commonwealth Conference in the economic day's debate re-echoed those sentiments. I also emphasised that if we were to reach the target of 1 per cent. by 1975, this would, of course, include not only governmental aid and technical assistance but also private investment. It is a matter for each individual country to decide whether or not it wants private investment, but if it does, I suggested that then the right climate should be created for it, in which investors could have confidence, and that by far the best form of private investment is that which is made in partnership with the people or the Government or the organisations of the country in which the money is being placed.
As immigration is basically an economic matter, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman to say whether the Government's new immigration Bill was discussed with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in view of the fact that the details of the Measure are being discussed with race relations interests in this country?
This was suggested as an item for the agenda, but the Heads of Government did not agree that immigration should be placed on the agenda for the Conference. It was not, therefore, raised at any of the Conference discussions. However, talks on the subject were held outside the Conference.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that his insistence on Britain's right to pursue its own policies and his refusal to be pushed around has given wide satisfaction in this country?
I think that this position is now recognised throughout the Commonwealth.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the 1 per cent. aid pledge to which he referred would carry a lot more conviction if the Government's official aid figures took us nearer the United Nations target for official aid, instead of towards the figure of 0.5 per cent., which is what his statistics indicate?
I think the right hon. Gentleman will find that it is rather more than that, In any event, it has always been clear, from the United Nations Development Decade reports, from the Pearson Report and from everything that has been said on this subject, that the 1 per cent. target can be reached only if there is a combination of private investment, whether by firms or by individuals, and Government assistance.
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (SPEECH)
asked the Prime Minister if the public speech made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Birmingham on 11th January on inflation represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
asked the Prime Minister if the public speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Birmingham Chamber of Commerce on 11th January, on economic policies, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer concerning inflation to the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce on Monday, 11th January, 1971, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
Yes, Sir.
So much for Government policy! Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that quite responsible organs of public opinion, including The Times, castigated that speech as being irresponsible and disappointing and, in particular, criticised the Chancellor of the Exchequer for his very foolish, offensive and offhand disregard of the T.U.C. proposals— [Interruption.] —for curbing inflation and the fact that he made no mention whatever of prices, a promise on which the right hon. Gentleman and the Tories were elected?
I do not accept those strictures on my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As he pointed out in that speech, he had had an opportunity for three weeks to make a careful study of the proposals put forward by the T.U.C. as to how this matter should be dealt with, and had in the end concluded that they did not represent a satisfactory way of dealing with the present inflation; and I entirely support him in that.
Is it not Government policy, while restraining wages, to encourage prices and profits to rise to provide the resources for industrial investment? Will the Prime Minister, therefore, confirm that it is contrary to Government policy to act directly on prices?
There is certainly no encouragement being given by this Government for prices to rise. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!") As far as the nationalised industries are concerned, we have been constraining prices as a matter of policy. As for our agricultural policy, that was clearly explained at the General Election— [Interruption.] It is perfectly all right for hon. Gentlemen opposite, in their nervousness, to giggle. It was a deliberate point of policy which would enable the Government to reduce taxation. Already, both in the direct field and in corporate taxation, those steps have been taken.
Mr. St. John-Stevas.
On a point of order. Are you aware, Mr. Speaker, that this Question is being answered with my Question No. 14?
I am aware of that. Any hon. Member who has a Question being answered with another is entitled to put a supplementary question. I will call the hon. Member in due course. In the meantime, it is as well to have supplementary questions coming from alternate sides of the House. Mr. St. John-Stevas.
Does not the prime responsibility for the present inflation fall on the head of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, who lost his nerve in the last days of the Labour Administration and, judging by his performance on "Panorama" last week, has not got it back since?
I find myself in agreement with my hon. Friend—but what concerns the country even more is the fact that the Labour Party still shows itself to be a firm ally of inflation as well as a supporter of industrial disorder.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his replies today will hardly be seen as a serious attempt to justify his election pledges? Will he endeavour to get a firm grip on the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
By the throat.
—and perhaps, at a stroke, suggest that he stands on his own two feet in these matters and does not seek to abdicate his responsibilities to courts of inquiry?
I had understood hon. Gentlemen opposite to be some of the firmest advocates in industrial relations of arbitration, courts of inquiry and so on. I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman is disputing that.
Would my right hon. Friend agree that prices would have been very much lower if the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) and his colleagues had shown more courage in standing up to inflationary wage demands a year ago?
That is, of course, absolutely right, but it was a deliberate policy of the Leader of the Opposition and the then Chancellor of the Exchequer to encourage roaring inflation in an attempt to make people feel better in their pockets and to win the General Election. What irritates hon Gentlemen opposite now so much is the fact that they lost.
If the right hon. Gentleman genuinely believes that, why did he claim two days before the election that he had all the magic wands necessary to deal with the situation—which, he says, he then understood—at a stroke? Why has he not done so?
To come to the more serious remark which the right hon. Gentleman made, if I understood him aright he said that it has not been the policy of the Government to encourage increases in prices. [Interruption.] I think the right hon. Gentleman said that. Does he then repudiate what his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the Press the day before he went to Cyprus for the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference, because that is what his statement would appear to mean. [Interruption.] Does he repudiate that? I am asking a question and I want an answer from the Prime Minister.
Recognising, if not agreeing with, the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has rejected the T.U.C. proposals, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he would not be wise at this stage to meet the T.U.C. and discuss these proposals? He will have to do it sooner or later. Would it not be a good thing to do it now?
There exists a forum at which such discussions take place and at which these matters have, in fact, been discussed. That is the N.E.D.C., and that organisation is the right place for Government Ministers, together with the T.U.C., representatives of the C.B.I., the nationalised industries and the independents, to have the fullest possible discussions about these matters. The Government have always been willing to do this. I have taken part in discussions on these matters, and I shall go on doing so.
Will the Prime Minister answer the question whether he is repudiating what the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the Press the day before he went to Cyprus?
I have known the right hon. Gentleman long enough now to know that I cannot take any words like that without examining them. When he gives me the quotation he wishes to refer to, I will answer it.
——
Order.
QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
On a point of order. I understand that the fact that today only two Questions to the Prime Minister were taken is matched by precedent. However, what is quite new today is the fact that each supplementary question put from this side as an oral question was matched by a supplementary question from the other side which was not part of the Question which had been asked. I ask you, Mr. Speaker, if this is a new precedent which you are introducing.
The hon. Gentleman is not quite correct. I called the hon. Member for—[HON. MEMBERS: "Islington."] No, I did not call the hon. Member for Islington. I first called the hon. Gentleman who asked the first Question and then the hon. Gentleman who asked the second Question—the hon. Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Barnett). This is a matter on which I am very much in the hands of the House. If three hon. Members from one side of the House have tabled Questions, does Mr. Speaker then call three hon. Gentlemen to ask supplementaries from the other side afterwards? This is a matter for the judgment of the Chair. If it is considered preferable that I call first the three hon. Gentlemen who have tabled the Questions and then call three hon. Gentlemen from the other side of the House, it may well be. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for putting his point of order, but this really is a matter for me.
On a point of order. Mr. Speaker, I think this is a new practice which you have probably unwittingly brought to the House. It was the custom, and has been for as long as I have been in the House, that everyone who had a Question which was being answered with the original had the opportunity first to put a supplementary and then Mr. Speaker decided on his own initiative whether he would give other hon. Members the opportunity to ask supplementaries. I hope the House will agree that that is a preferable practice. If hon. Members want to ask questions they should table them. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that you will look back at the practice of Mr. Speaker King and his predecessors and follow their practice, which was to call first all hon. Members who had tabled a Question.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his help. I was encouraged to embark upon perhaps new procedures. I absolutely agree that if an hon. Gentleman has tabled a Question I will certainly call him to ask a supplementary. The exact order in which I call hon. Members admits of a little experiment.
On a point of order. Mr. Speaker, did you notice that today Questions to the Prime Minister did not start until 16½ minutes past three o'clock and that at 29 minutes past three you called my name for Question No. 4 and then stopped it and it got lost in the hubbub?
It did not get lost in the hubbub. It got lost because the Leader of the Opposition rose to ask a further supplementary question.
On a point of order. In view of the interest shown in several parts of the House yesterday in the issue of General Baker's statement, and in view of the related question of the approach to the British Government on Laos, have you, Mr. Speaker, received any request from the Government's business managers for time for a statement on the constitutional issues that arise out of this question?
I do not think that that is a point of order at all.
Mr. Speaker, as in giving your Ruling you seemed to be feeling the pulse of the House on what indeed had been the convention and what would be preferred, I would confirm that the procedure you adopted was in accordance with convention and that, as long as the hon. Members who have tabled the Questions on the Order Paper eventually are called to ask their supplementaries, the order of calling for supplementaries has not been important. In terms of giving a view, I would think that it was right to try to call hon. Members alternatively from both sides of the House so that both sides are properly represented.
I am grateful to the hon. Baronet for his assistance. I am not sure that I would be very wise to take either the pulse of the House or its temperature at present.
Further to that point of order. As most of us in the House are less concerned about the calling of questions than with the fact that we do not seem to get any answers under this Administration, and as you, Mr. Speaker, have been perhaps forced into giving a number of impromptu Rulings, would it be right to suggest, in view of the important business still ahead of us today, that you further consider at your leisure what has been said with a view to your deciding whether you really are proposing a new precedent in this matter?
In particular, Mr. Speaker, would you consider one Ruling—or at any rate Obiter dictum —which seems to me to be different from what has happened in the past, in that you said that every hon. Gentleman who has a Question on the Order Paper is entitled to a supplementary? Is it not a fact, certainly from what little experience I have had in answering Questions, that the only supplementaries called are those to Questions which the Prime Minister or another Minister groups with the original Question? If everyone who has a Question on the Order Paper is entitled to an answer, as both the Prime Minister and I know, there can be a habit of hon. Members adding their names to those Questions long afterwards, and indeed right up to the day before Questions are answered, and this might lead to 11 or 12 supplementaries on the first Question.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his suggestion and I will certainly consider what has happened. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for reminding me of the practice of adding— "tacking" I believe it is called.
Further to that point of order.
Oh!
This is a special case. Mr. Speaker, you may not have observed that today we had a very small group of people with questions in a peculiar place—the near misses—and that I was one of them. If one or two people could have contained themselves for a number of seconds I would have been called. Does not that at least permit me to establish a claim to a preferential position on Thursday? As I cannot get down to the Table, would the Table note that and put me in the proper place for Thursday?
The answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is, "No".
LAOS
I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely, the reported invasion of Laos by South Vietnamese forces supported by United States air cover". I apologise, Mr. Speaker, for not giving notice before 12 o'clock as required by the Standing Order, but I have been seeking either confirmation or refutation of the earlier reports. There were earlier reports today from a Japanese news agency, which now appear to have been confirmed by other agencies. Therefore, I submit that the matter is now specific enough. Even if those reports were in doubt, the threats and clear intention would make the matter sufficient to warrant the attention of the House.
Second, I submit that the importance of a matter concerning war and peace does not require to be substantiated. It is clear that in this situation the British Government have a duty to make representations on behalf of this country, and a further special responsibility as a co-Chairman of the 1962 Geneva Convention, which is clearly being violated. I ask that the House should have the opportunity to question the Government and express its views on this extremely urgent matter.
May I conclude, Mr. Speaker, by reminding you that under the Standing Order you are invited, in considering the application, to have regard to whether the matter may be brought before the House in any other way. Having regard to the lack of response to the points raised yesterday and today by my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell), I urge you, in the absence of any Government initiative, to enable the House to discuss this vital, urgent and important matter.
The hon. Member for Paddington, North (Mr. Latham) asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter which he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely, the reported invasion of Laos by South Vietnamese forces supported by United States air cover. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for having given me notice that he would ask leave.
As the House knows, under Standing Order No. 9 I am directed to take account of the several factors set out in the Order but to give no reasons for my decision. I have given consideration to the representations the hon. Gentleman has made, but I have to rule that the hon. Gentleman's submission does not fall within the provisions of the Standing Order and, therefore, I cannot submit his application to the House.
LICENSING (ABOLITION OF STATE MANAGEMENT)
Mr. Secretary Maudling, supported by Mr. Secretary Campbell, Mr. Patrick Jenkin, and Mr. Mark Carlisle, presented a Bill to remove the restriction on the sale and supply, otherwise than by the Secretary of State, of intoxicating liquor in the Carlisle district or of exciseable liquor in the State management districts in Scotland; to provide for the disposal of property held by the Secretary of State for the purposes of Part V of the Licensing Act, 1964, or Part V of the Licensing (Scotland) Act, 1959, and for the repeal of those provisions: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 100.]
CONTROL OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
Mr. Leslie Huckfield, supported by Mr. Ian Mikardo, Mr. Brian Walden, Mr. Bruce Douglas-Mann, and Mr. Peter Archer, presented a Bill to establish a data bank tribunal and inspectorate; to provide for the licensing of data banks containing personal information; and to make other provisions to prevent the misuse of information stored in data banks: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 2nd April, and to be printed. [Bill 98.]
QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
[FOURTH ALLOTTED DAY]
Considered in Committee [Progress, 1st February].
[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]
Clause 34
BREACH OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
3.43 p.m.
Amendment No. 669 proposed [1st February] : In page 24, line 26, leave out subsection (2).— [Mr. Heffer.]
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 261, Noes 294.
On a point of order, Sir Robert. Would it be possible for the appropriate authorities to investigate the possibility of placing some kind of zebra crossing between St. Stephen's entrance and the Parliamentary offices on the other side of the road? It is almost impossible to get here in time for Divisions from the parliamentary offices at Abbey Gardens because of the weight of traffic on the road. Could this matter be investigated?
All that may well be so. but I cannot take the point as Chair- man of Ways and Means. However, the hon. Gentleman may try me another time as Deputy Speaker.
I beg to move Amendment No. 670, in page 24, line 41, leave out subsection (3).
In his speech yesterday, the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) told us with great conviction and sincerity that Clause 34(2) applied only to freely negotiated contracts. With the frenzied haste imposed by the guillotine. I cannot blame him for the fact that he obviously had not read beyond subsection (2) to subsection (3), with which this Amendment deals. It was apparent from yesterday's debate that, in regard to the words "reasonably practicable", the Secretary of State had not read the evidence submitted to the Donovan Commission by the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Association, which made it clear that it intended that shop stewards and trade union officials should fine or expel, or suspend, or sue their members in order to do what was "reasonably practical" in policing these agreements.
It is this that we find repugnant in the Clause and quite unenforceable within the context of a democratic society. Clause 34 (3) applies these policing powers, together with the concept of an unfair practice, to Clause 39, which contains the ultimate embodiment of the most astonishing departure from freedom of contract ever imposed by Statute upon our legal system. Whatever else the Government may have had a mandate to do, it was not this. It applies the abhorrent to the obnoxious and the result is the most remarkable intrusion upon free collective bargaining—perhaps the most remarkable intrusion on trade union law since the 1875 Act. It attempts to make trade unionists responsible for policing fictitious procedure agreements into which they never wished to enter in the first place.
It is inconceivable that anyone will wish to enforce the ultimate folly, which is the duty on an official of a union to discipline someone, purporting to do so on behalf of the union, who does not belong to the union, in respect of an agreement into which the union did not wish to enter. That is taking us into realms we have never known before. The N.I.R.C. is to impose procedures even where employers and employees may resist them, and by virtue of subsection (3) they become collective agreements for the purpose of the policing and unfair practices provision.
This is ample evidence that procedural agreements are not the stuff of which enforceable contracts are made in any event. Perhaps the most authoritative study on this subject was made by Mr. Marsh in his two research papers pro- duced for the Royal Commission. It is significant that not one hon. Member opposite yesterday quoted Mr. Marsh and the evidence which he gave and the conclusions he found with regard to procedures in British industry. If he had it would have destroyed the case. Only those who share the doctrinaire stubbornness of the Solicitor-General's arid legalism would dispute the conclusions found in practice by Mr. Marsh. He observed in relation both to the compulsory arbitration method and to the prosecution method of enforcement in the court the following which appears in paragraph 100 of his report: There is no room for dispute about the general failure of both these approaches. He referred to Order 1305, and we all remember that. He said that while it had its uses: … in extending the conventional notion, of arbitration, its enforcement in practice proved to be extremely difficult, in part because it was legally and from the more purely industrial relations point of view impracticable to apply legal sanctions through the court to large numbers of workers and in part because any legal victory was likely to be a pyrrhic one". The second approach was also unsuccessful, not only because trade union members were inclined to argue that non-enforcement of the employer's rights should be a condition of a return to work but also because individual employers were not prepared to face the consequence of worsening relations with their workers by insisting upon its rigid application. 4.0 p.m.
It is rather remarkable that the Solicitor-General is able to dismiss all of that evidence in bringing forward these provisions. Here the intervention is not in respect of an agreement but in respect of an imposed procedure. It is in respect of something that is not assented to by one party or the other or perhaps by both. It is not enforced by the normal means of enforcement but by this as yet unexplained "reasonably practicable" action on the part of trade union officials.
The right hon. Gentleman cannot get out of this. He has not told us what "reasonably practicable" means. Does it mean what his right hon. and learned Friends said when they gave evidence to the Donovan Commission or does it not, as he said yesterday? He cannot answer this because it is one of the many tangles which will have to be sorted out by the N.I.R.C. or the industrial tribunals.
Why does the hon. Gentleman pursue this point? That phrase is common form in almost every legal document today. It has a real meaning, it is understood by the courts and the layman signing a lease understands it.
The reason I pursue this is because in the context of industrial relations "reasonably practicable" could mean merely that the shop steward or trade union official exhorts his members not to come out on strike at a mass meeting but it could equally be decided that it meant, as the Inns of Court Unionist and Conservative Association thought it meant, that a union should sue or expel its members. This is a value judgment being left to a court of law and not being decided by us. It is an abdication of the responsibility of the right hon. Gentleman, vested in a court of law and something which is quite unacceptable in industrial relations.
Is it not a fact that in this instance every case will be different? It is not the same as a legal contract between two people because every case will be different. Who will judge these words?
The reasonable man on top of the Clapham omnibus, often quoted in law cases, does apply his mind to a whole host of different problems. The point is that ultimately the court has to decide what is reasonable. We do not feel that it is right, as Donovan did not feel it to be right, and all the evidence agrees with this view, that it should be left to a court of law without experience in this area to define what it is reasonable practicable for a trade union official to do in given circumstances.
This is our objection. The position is that the trade unions will suffer fines if they fail to police the very thing that they have refused to accept. They are not being fined for refusing to police what they have agreed to but for refusing to police what they have not accepted. If the Secretary of State, incredibly, asks trade unions to accept that responsibility by law, he is bringing into disrepute, not the trade unions as was hinted at last night, but unfortunately the law itself.
The argument applies even more strongly to works and domestic proce- dure. Yet we know, again from Marsh's studies, paragraph 103: … it is widely acknowledged that full-time trade union officials are seldom found to act unconstitutionally, and that current arrangements for keeping procedures intact are quite sufficient to impress upon them the need for constitutional behaviour. It was obvious from the conduct of hon. Gentlemen opposite yesterday that their vision of a shop steward or trade union official was a caricature based on the assumption that these were men who went around deliberately fomenting strikes, instead of, as the evidence shows, being men who day by day prevent strikes in industry.
Is the hon. Gentleman saying that because a person joins a union and is therefore bound by the rules of that union he should totally disregard those rules for the purposes of this Clause?
I do not think that the hon. Gentleman has followed the argument. If he and some of his hon. Friends would read the Bill they will find that this Clause applies subsection (2) to Clause 39. This is nothing to do with the rules of the trade union, this is policing something which the trade unions have never agreed to enter into and this is the objection. The argument must gain strength not only when it is applied to voluntary procedures but to enforced procedures. This is the point I am trying to make to the hon. Gentleman, even if I was a little uncharitable to him.
It is clear that the tones of these proposals carry the hallmark of pre-Donovanian thinking, although as far as I know the Government have never had the courage—certainly the Solicitor-General did not give his evidence to Donovan in that way—to say that procedure agreements could be enforced against the wishes of the parties. It is like trying to build some viable defence strategy on the assumption that the tank has not yet been invented. Dig his trenches and build his Maginot Line as he may, the Solicitor-General will fail to beat off the attack that must be mounted on this legal nonsense. I appeal to him to read paragraph 109 of that Report because it is so vital to understanding the problem. It says: Among practitioners of industrial relations in the workplace there exists a profound misgiving about the appropriateness or practical value of the application of legal sanctions in procedure. In the main, the advocates of such methods are to be found among those who are not immediately associated with workplace problems and among those who believe that there ought to exist quick and ready answers to the relatively few areas of industry in which unconstitutional action is endemic. In general, practitioners in the industrial field, while acknowledging that unconstitutional action is a problem, would tend to turn attention less to the development of new sanctions than to the task of improving the operation of conciliatory processes. The right hon. Gentleman should reflect that that applies not only to matters which may be agreed but to matters which have not been agreed. What we face is an order compelling unions to risk their funds to police recommendations, whether or not they or the employers want it. It is a remarkable proposal not merely in industrial relations but in ordinary human affairs. It may or may not be vicious in intent, but it certainly will be unworkable in practice and will be a sure recipe for industrial conflict.
Subsection (2) is based on the curious non sequitur that the trade unions are too powerful and therefore they should have more power to police their members. We all know, with the exception it would seem of the Government, that decentralised plant bargaining and customary procedures are the real problems to which we should be turning our attention. The exercise of the function to be imposed here will weaken the authority of trade union officials and will encourage breakaways just as do some of the other provisions of the Bill.
I conclude by referring the Solicitor-General to some more evidence. I ask him to look at the British Journal of Industrial Relations of last July the article of Fox and Flanders: First, it does not tally with the facts; second, it contains inherent contradictions; third, it rests on an inadequate and erroneous view of collective bargaining. It is because the Government are imposing the most incredible obligation that I have yet discovered in this shoddy and shabby Bill on to these fictitious agreements, that my right hon. and hon. Friends will be dividing on what I consider to be one of the most important matters of principle in the Bill.
The Opposition yesterday made heavy weather of Amendment No. 669, and some extraordinary arguments were advanced by the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman), which I suppose if they were valid then must be equally valid on Amendment No. 670. If my recollection is correct, he went so far as to say that it was only in Communist or Fascist states that one man could be held to be responsible for the misdeeds of another, and that such a concept was completely foreign to a democratic country such as ours. This is absolute bunk. Vicarious liability is a well-known concept in English law. Every day of the week employers are held responsible for the failings of their employees, both in the civil courts in actions for damages and in the criminal courts—
The hon. Gentleman is obviously not making a distinction between someone who acts as agent for another and someone who is totally irresponsible to the first person. In talking about vicarious responsibility he is talking about those who act as agent for the prime mover.
The hon. Member for Coventry, North has exposed the whole fallacy of his argument. He is now saying, that a trade union has no responsibility whatsoever for its membership. I simply do not accept that to be either common sense or indeed the legal position. There can be nothing wrong in principle in a trade union in certain circumstances being responsible for the misdeeds of its members, even though that is not what is said in the Clause.
4.15 p.m.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) seemed to think that it would be possible to decide whether a trade union had taken all reasonable and practicable steps to prevent the various activities set out in Clause 34(2) (a), (b) and (c). He advanced fanciful ideas of what the trade union leadership might have to do to meet their obligations, even suggesting at one stage that it might be necessary to bring in water cannon to force the membership back to work.
That is absolute nonsense. The truth is that every day of the week the courts have the task of deciding what is and what is not reasonable; and what is and what is not reasonably practicable. If courts of law can manage that task in the present day, why on earth should not properly constituted courts—different from ordinary courts of law because they will be composed of a High Court judge and two people with special knowledge and experience of industrial relations—be capable of coming to a conclusion on what is reasonable and what is reasonably practicable in all the circumstances?
The Amendment would have the effect of deleting subsection (3) of Clause 34. It is a necessary subsection if one accepts —and I admit that one is entitled to take the opposite view—that there can be special circumstances where power should be given to a body to impose a collective agreement. As can be seen from reading all the Clauses, this is intended as a reserve power to be used sparingly. The hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) in moving the Amendment did not point out that this power is surrounded by safeguard after safeguard.
First, the Industrial Court has to be satisfied that there is no procedural agreement in existence or that the procedural agreement which is in existence is so unsatisfactory and so unworkable as to cause serious industrial trouble. Secondly, the C.I.R. has to be satisfied that those same defects exist and that it is possible to do something about it. Thirdly, the C.I.R. has to make recommendations, after first promoting and assisting in discussions between both sides involved in the matter. It is only in default of agreement and after all those safeguards have been exercised that the Industrial Court can make an order.
In moving the Amendment, the hon. Member for Blackley should have been more careful to make it plain that the Bill does not provide for the imposition of an agreement against the wishes of the parties, unless and until three separate things have first happened. Those safeguards make it as plain as a pikestaff to anyone who has read the Bill that this is a reserve power which it is intended should be used only in the most exceptional circumstances. I cannot see how any hon. Gentleman opposite can look upon this as a tyrannical attack on the trade unions. There is no question here of imposing agreements as to terms and conditions of employment. We are here dealing with procedural agreements and not with agreements concerned with terms and conditions of employment.
Anyone who recognises the real problem that we are faced with in industry today should be looking for a way of tackling the problems which arise in those sections of industry where there are effective procedural agreements. The subsection is a sensible and moderate way of dealing with those comparatively rare cases where collective agreements either are non-existent or so defective that they are incapable of preventing strife. I urge hon. Gentlemen opposite to think again and to recognise that the proposal contained in subsection (3) is a sensible one.
I had not intended to take part in this discussion until I heard the speech by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington). It is not possible to talk about Clause 39 without referring to the Clause that leads up to it, namely, Clause 35(1) (a) and (b). Here we run into a swamp land where a degree of legality and stupidity will enter into British industrial relations.
I do not know a great deal about Parliament and I have listened with some interest to lawyers being referred to as "honourable and learned". However, I am now convinced that in our discussions on this Bill we should abandon that practice and refer to all trade unionists as "honourable and learned". What has come out of these debates is that the lawyers do not know very much about industrial relations and that trade unionists know a great deal about them. If the Government have their way the situation in British industry as a whole in certain units of employment, to use the wording in the Bill, will be such that, with the imposition of Clauses 35 to 40, we will be plunged into the courts and the coercive Commission will be in a position to dictate industrial policy to management and unions whether they like it or not.
In the process of the implementation of the Clauses a great deal of the time of management and unions will be absorbed in various applications and appearances before the courts and in arguments with the Commission in the consultative stages as well as in the period when the Commission formulates its proposals to be laid before the Industrial Relations Court. This will absorb a great deal of time which managements and trade unions should be devoting to the job of making industry more productive. Therefore, to some extent this will all be a waste of time.
Both the Industrial Relations Court and the Commission are given wide, sweeping, undemocratic and legally objectionable powers in the Bill, powers which will involve crucial decisions, but these bodies are not to be given any responsibility. They will decree and then go off and leave management and unions in a situation which they did not want in the first place, and they will have to wrestle with the problems set up for them by the Court and the Commission.
A situation could arise under Clause 35(1) (a) and (b) in which a collective agreement could be voluntarily agreed between men and management which, in the view of both management and workers, was a sound agreement. Perhaps the agreement might be aimed at flexibility. The management's attitude may be that no procedure agreement is perfect and cannot hope to take account of every eventuality since most industrial situations are often fluid. Management may agree with the trade unions that such a document should not be legally binding. The two sides may after negotiation reach an agreed position in which the management is happy with a non legally binding agreement. It may be a sensible management which does not get hysterical about an occasional unofficial strike. Therefore, if management and men are satisfied with such an agreement, they will have some degree of confidence in each other's integrity, they will have gone through the constitutional processes and will realise the weaknesses and strengths of both sides and will know where they stand. Yet it is into such a situation that the Secretary of State may decide to step.
An unofficial strike may blow up in an industry when the silly season is upon the country. The newspapers may be looking for a good story and could pick on that unofficial strike, give it headline treatment and start to beat the anti-trade union drum, as newspapers sometimes do. The Secretary of State may well make a bad error of judgment under the pressure that builds up in such a situa- tion and may decide to intervene in the conflict.
It could end before that happens.
The hon. Gentleman says that it could come to an end before that stage. In making that remark he destroys the basis of the Secretary of State's Bill because, the Secretary of State having intervened, Clause 39 envisages an agreement being imposed on both management and men which neither wanted in the first place.
Is the hon. Gentleman saying that in his view the Secretary of State should in no circumstances take power to refer a case to the C.I.R.?
No. I believe in the use of the C.I.R. as a persuasive organ, but we are talking about the C.I.R. in the context of the Bill. It will be an entirely different Commission once the Bill is passed—if ever it gets to that stage. A situation could arise from Clause 39 involving an agreement which has the effect of being legally enforceable as if it had been made between both parties. I find this quite absurd and unbelievable. Both sides may not want that situation and yet it is to be imposed upon them. They are the people who are on the spot and who will have to deal with the situation seven days a week on a 24-hour basis.
Does my hon. Friend not recall that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne said —and I agree with him—that it would be sensible and encouraging to discuss these proposals, arid though they might appear to be? Would my hon. Friend not agree that in the context of discussions under the Clause to allow both sides to examine the situation the fallacy of this legislation is revealed by the fact that the Secretary of State was not prepared to talk to the Trades Union Congress about the Bill before he presented it to Parliament?
The Secretary of State's statement that he would only discuss detail and not principle is something he will live to regret as this Committee stage continues. It may be that a procedure agreement will be imposed on the parties which neither wants. It may be that in the process of arguing in the light of the provisions from Clause 34 to 40 a great deal of suspicion and anger will be generated between management and men because both have been required, unwillingly, to submit themselves to the court, to cross-examination, and all the rest of it.
It may be that after a procedure agreement is imposed both parties may decide to ignore it. They will then both become liable for unfair industrial practices. We could hardly blame trade unions and managements for ignoring this law because they are entitled to have contempt for a very bad law indeed.
I suggest that the Conservative Party has no mandate for the introduction of this particular piece of policy. I should like to refer to what was said in "Fair Deal At Work"—and we are told that that document was in circulation long before the General Election—in regard to enforceability. The Conservative Party wanted to alter the Trade Union Act 1871 to put collective agreements on a par with any other type of contract—no more and no less. The document continues a little later: We believe it would be wrong to accord to collective agreements the quite exceptional status of a contract which must"— I emphasise the word "must"— be enforceable—regardless of the wishes of the parties. It says that it would be wrong to impose such a provision.
This was a pre-election tactic.
This is a valuable document and no doubt my hon. Friend will have good cause to refer to it later. Explaining why they are opposed to this exceptional way of imposing collective agreements it says: Such a situation would create new tensions and suspicions and put the conduct of industrial relations into a straitjacket. I can find no better answer against their point of view today. They go on to say: But this is something to be settled in the course of bargaining. That point of view contained in "Fair Deal at Work" was surely the point of view portrayed during the General Election. The Government have no mandate for this partciular proposition.
4.30 p.m.
This is probably one of the stupidest Bills we have ever had before the House and, by far, the Clauses to which I refer are the stupidest part of this stupid Bill, which has oscillated between the absurd and the dangerous.
I have followed the argument of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars) with attention and, I hope, understanding. He referred to the imposition of an agreement, under this group of Clauses, possibly against the will of both parties. In that context, will he deal with subsection (1) of Clause 39, which says: … any of the parties to the reference may apply to the Industrial Court for an order under this section. Does it not follow that the condition precedent to a Section 39 order is an application by one of the parties which the hon. Gentleman will see defined in Clause 37(2)?
As I understand it, the Secretary of State could be one of those parties—
indicated dissent.
We are entitled to a reply from the Secretary of State on that point.
Fair points have been made, and it is for the Government to answer them in considerable detail. I hope that we shall not be told that all they will do is produce a leaflet in due course.
Many of the arguments just used by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars) apply to Clauses 35–39 which we are coming to. It would probably be for the convenience of the Committee if I do not go into all those in detail now. May I just get one or two brief points on the record while they are fresh in the Committee's mind? The hon. Gentleman is quite incorrect in saying that the Secretary of State would have power to go to the court to have an order made binding. Under the Bill, the Secretary of State has power to start off the thing by going to the court, but he does not have power to complete it by going to the courts to have the order enforced. Only one of the parties can do that. That is an important point, and a very big difference from what the hon. Gentleman and hon. Members who supported him were saying.
We must remember that we are dealing with what is a very exceptional procedure. It is something which I shall want to go into at greater length when we reach the full debate on these Clauses. We still maintain absolutely what we said in "Fair Deal at Work" about it being wrong to accord collective agreements the quite exceptional status of a contract which must be enforceable without the consent of the parties. As a general rule, we stand by that absolutely and we have maintained that in the Bill. What I admit we have added since "Fair Deal at Work" is that some emergency procedure is needed to deal with exceptionally stubborn cases which are damaging the national interest and the company concerned. That is a controversial matter which we shall have to discuss. But it is important that the Committee should bear in mind that we are dealing in this area with exceptional cases.
We should realise that this applies both to managements and to unions. We are hearing, for example, in the engineering industry today, how apparently the A.E.U. have for many, many years now been unsuccessfully pressing the employers' federation to enter into negotiations to modernise what, we are told, is a 50-years out-of-date procedure agreement. Perhaps the A.E.U. might have been glad to have been able to stick some pins into the employers' federation to get on with the job, if that version of the situation is correct.
Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that until the Bill was introduced agreement had been reached to alter the York Agreement and that it was the introduction of the Bill that made the employers perform a volte-face?
If it was the introduction of the Bill which made the employers perform a volte face and get on with what we are told they have been refusing to get on with for 50 years, it has done some good. Here we have a situation in which the unions have for many years, we are told, been wanting to get a new procedure agreement negotiated and have not been able to get the employers to address their minds to it. The procedure which they are so objecting to would enable the union, in that case, to ensure that the employers got on with the job.
Mr. Joseph Ashton (Bassetlaw) rose ——
I am not giving way. There will be plenty of time to get on with this later. We are coming on to a long debate on this section, and I have promised the hon. Gentleman and others that I shall not be shy of dealing with their points.
The right hon. Gentleman has made a provocative point.
The hon. Gentleman said that I have made a provocative point. With respect, the hon. Gentleman and others made provocative points in referring to the section, and I am justified in briefly replying to them. I will reply later at greater length, and we shall have the full argument.
It is said that the sort of agreement we are dealing with in subsection (3) of Clause 34 imports an entirely novel situation into British law, in that we are dealing with an imposed agreement. I ask hon. Members opposite what they think of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959. That is an Act under which terms and conditions can be imposed on employers who have not had any party in the agreement. It is the same principle, in that case being imposed on employers only, and in this area capable of being imposed on both employers and unions. It is not right to argue that this process of imposing an agreement on people is new in principle, even in industrial relations law.
Many of the arguments about the way in which subsection (3) is brought into this Clause, and the unfair industrial practice angle of it, made by the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) were largely made last night by his hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and were dealt with last night. I will only deal with them briefly now. The hon. Gentleman once again repeated the charge that his hon. Friend made last night, that one of the wickednesses we were imposing here was that we were seeking to make unions act as policemen over their members. That may or may not be, but, whoever else claims that, it really cannot be the party opposite, because that is their policy, enunciated by their Leader when he was Prime Minister.
It is not our policy, though.
When the Leader of the Opposition tells the House and the country that he eats the words that he uttered in this House on 19th June, 1969, perhaps we will believe it. I will not bother the Committee with the words used by the right hon. Gentleman when he was Prime Minister, which I quoted yesterday, except to recall that the right hon. Gentleman's justification for giving up the legislation that he was proposing in return for the T.U.C.'s solemn and binding agreement specifically interpreted that solemn and binding agreement as putting on the unions and the T.U.C. the duty to police their members and, if necessary, to use their rule books, including fines and suspensions, in the process of policing. To the best of the country's knowledge, that is still the official policy of the party opposite. It has never been retracted.
The policing of a voluntary organisation which says that it accepts responsibility for running its own affairs, which is what everyone has said that we want the trade unions to do, is entirely different from coming along with a law and putting an obligation on people against which they are protesting and then saying, "What is more, we will fine you if you do not police our law to which you object." The right hon. Gentleman cannot pretend that the two are the same.
Clearly the right hon. Lady has not yet taken on board the principles of the Bill. As she has just described it, it is a complete travesty of what the Bill says. In this connection, all that we ask is that union officials shall use their best endeavours or take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that their members keep to the terms of en-forcible collective agreements. That is very different from fining union officials for not succeeding in getting their members to maintain laws imposed upon them.
We are discussing collective agreements and the duty of union officials which, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton, said yesterday, union officials are most of the time doing. What we want them to do is to take all reasonable steps. The suggestion that we expect them to fine and expel members of their unions is a lot of nonsense——
Why?
4.45 p.m.
Surely the point is that we face a situation where, I agree, union officials are doing this all the time. But, precisely because the Bill does not define what is "reasonably practicable", eventually a judge will have to decide. His decision will become the precedent. On that basis, it may be quite different from what the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting.
It is true that a judge may have to decide in the last resort. Incidentally he will be assisted by assessors with specialised knowledge and experience of industry. It will not be decided by an ordinary court.
It will be a biased court.
This is what judges are doing every day of their lives. This is what courts do in cases of claims for negligence against employers, for example——
It is loaded against the trade union movement.
The hon. Gentleman should grow up——
But it is.
It is not loaded against the trade union movement.
It is. The right hon. Gentleman knows as well as anyone that, if the Bill is forced through, the T.U.C. will not co-operate, and he will not get independent trade union assessors. That is why I say that such a court will be loaded against the trade union movement.
4.45 p.m.
We must wait and see. We are setting up special industrial tribunals and courts, and we seek to obtain the services on each of them of two independent people who are experienced in the affairs of industry to sit with the judge. If we invite trade unionists to serve on such tribunals and they deliberately refuse, I believe that the country will know what to make of that. If through that obstinate and, if it ever happens, irresponsible refusal the courts were denied the detailed living experience of trade unionism and trade union procedures, it would be no one's fault but the trade unions' themselves.
The right hon. Gentleman wants the trade unions to be their own executioners.
Apparently some hon. Members opposite think that the rest of us, whether we be private citizens or company directors, in the last resort should be obliged to appear before a court so as to allow the court to judge whether what we did was reasonable in the circumstances, but that trade union officials should be exempted. They are saying that that is reasonable for everyone in the community except trade union officials. I do not believe that it is the wish of the majority of people that trade unionists and trade union officials should be set apart. I am sure that would not be fair, and I do not think that that is the general wish.
It is clear that very few cases will ever come to it, but we say that, in the last resort, a judge assisted by people expert in these matters should decide whether such steps as were reasonably practicable were taken to achieve the ends to which names were signed and promises were made. I refuse to believe that that is oppressive, tyrannical, or out of tune with the majority wish of the people, including the majority wish of trade unionists.
[Miss HARVIE ANDERSON in the Chair ]
I have listened to the right hon. Gentleman say on numerous occasions that so many Clauses are not likely to be needed or to be used that I wonder why we need the Bill at all. It is apparent that the Government intend to make little use of it.
I want to spend a few moments on these words "reasonably practicable". The right hon. Gentleman talked about the trade union movement "policing" its members—
On a point of order. I do not know whether this speech comes under the heading of tedious repetition, but this point was debated for hours yesterday evening and has occupied the whole of today's proceedings so far. Will my right hon. Friend be accused of not giving hon. Members sufficient time for other detailed matters to be discussed?
The Chair has not heard these points before. However, I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's concern and the Chair will guard against it.
I do not intend to waste the Committee's time but, in view of the Minister's remarks, I felt that I should say a few words about the phrase "reasonably practicable". After all, the point was raised by the right hon. Gentleman not by any of my right hon. and hon. Friends.
In my view, it is one thing for a democratic organisation like the trade union movement to discipline some of its members who may be acting wrongly or not in accordance with its rules. It is quite another thing to bring in the power of the law. I cannot see that any such comparison can be made.
The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) referred to the common law position of an employer who is responsible for the actions of his workers. Trade union officers have a great deal of experience of making employers face their responsibility for employees whose actions cause accidents and so on to other people at common law. An employer pays a salary or wages to a worker; therefore, he must carry responsibility in law for the actions of that employee. But it is very different with a trade union. The great mass of trade unionists receive no wages or salaries from their trade unions; they in fact pay money to keep them in existence. There cannot be any comparison in suggesting that there is a responsibility on a trade union in the way that there is a responsibility on an employer. I think that matter should be made clear.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
I will not give way. I do not want to waste the time of the Committee. That is why I do not give way. I believe that the Bill makes a mockery of the situation when it talks about procedural agreements and having to enforce them by an act of law. My considerable experience of the trade union movement is that a proper working procedural agreement cannot be obtained until confidence has been established on both sides of the fence. The trade union side must have confidence in the employers' side and, vice versa, the employers' side must have confidence in the trade union side. That is the way to establish a proper, sound procedural agreement. This is how procedural agreements have been established over the years.
The trade union movement, having pioneered for good procedural agreements over the years, has been responsible for avoiding many disputes. It should be clearly understood that the trade union movement has probably avoided far more strikes than it has ever created, because striking is virtually the last weapon to be used. All procedures are investigated and followed before that stage is reached.
I believe that proper procedural agreements can be established only by this rule of agreement between the parties. We will never get proper, decent working procedural agreements by bringing in the force of law and demanding that both sides must have a certain agreement whether they like it or not.
The speeches of my hon. Friends—particularly the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars)—show that we ought to be moving on to Clauses 34 to 39. Because of the interrelation of these Clauses, these matters have, quite rightly, been brought in.
I want to deal with some of the points which have been made by hon. Gentlemen opposite. First, the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington), who is not present, mentioned the analogy of vicarious responsibility—the responsibility of one man for another who is usually his employee.
A trade union organiser is not an agent or employee of fellow members of his trade union. His obligations to police an agreement should be no higher than those of, say, a bus driver to police the agreement made by a passenger authority. It really is not a good analogy to use vicarious liability to illustrate this point, more particularly as subsection (2) contains the words "purports to act". That would make a man responsible for somebody not only acting on behalf of the union but purporting to act on its behalf. That is a very strange concept into which I hope the Solicitor-General will look.
The hon. Gentleman suggested that the court would be different from other courts. It will not. There are many courts which sit with assessors who are not legally qualified. We shall have a High Court judge—we know the tradition of the courts with regard to trade union cases—sitting with a representative of the employers and an academic who is likely to be biased towards the employer, because others are plainly not going to co-operate with legislation with which they cannot possibly agree.
The hon. Gentleman has referred to assessors. As the hon. Gentleman knows, but as all hon. Members may not know, an assessor is not a member of a court; he is merely a technical adviser. In this Bill the other persons will be full members of the court on the precise analogy which I gave yesterday of the Restrictive Trade Practices Court which has worked so well.
I think that we all accept that. There are three distinct types of tribunal. There is the industrial tribunal which has a representative from both sides of industry. That is entirely acceptable because of the class of case with which it has to deal. But the injection of legalism into industrial relations via a High Court judge with these two members of the court—I accept the right hon. and learned Gentleman's point—is not acceptable, first, because it will sabotage the Commission on Industrial Relations —it has already, in view of the resignations—and, secondly, because it will be weighted two-to-one at least, if not three-to-nil, against the employee.
Is the hon. Gentleman really saying—it is a serious matter if he is—that a High Court judge is so prejudiced that he cannot take an impartial view of a case coming before him? The hon. Gentleman should weigh his words before saying that from that Box.
I weighed my words very carefully. I made speech in the middle of the night, which unfortunately lasted 45 minutes, when we dealt with the court. If the right hon. Gentleman refers to that speech he will find that I said that judges are fair men trained in a particular discipline, but that they are ill suited to deal with problems in industry, just as the Marsh quotation showed and just as the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne showed in his speech. It was a perfectly logical and fair speech in a vacuum, away from the shop floor and away from any real knowledge of what happens in industry. On that occasion I quoted Lord Wright's famous speech—and although wrongly reported in HANSARD, I said "not a radical judge"—in relation to Lord Scrutton to the effect that the judges, because of their particular position in society, fair as they may be, are more likely to understand the problems of employers and the class of people with which they mix than those of employees. This is an accepted point.
Does not the hon. Gentleman understand that it is possible for there to be honest people in this world? Does the hon. Gentleman not also understand that if a judge, for instance, feels that he may be accused of being partial to one side, the very thing which he will not do is to come down against the workers' side in this argument. The hon. Gentleman has just claimed that the bias will be three-to-nil against the workers. That is an astonishing claim. I have never heard such rubbish in my life.
The hon. Gentleman really must try to follow what I said. I did not say that there was any question of partiality or of dishonesty. I should claim that our judicial system and judiciary, for all that has been said, gives me cause for pride.
5.0 p.m.
What I am saying is that the class of people from whom the higher judiciary is drawn, let alone the Bar itself, is such that that might be the case, and I refer the hon. Gentleman to the quotation from a judge of the High Court who said that he found it difficult to place himself in the position of the working man because his knowledge and his associations were such that he was dealing with somebody from a different class.
Nobody was more eloquent about this than my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, All Saints (Mr. Brian Walden) because, honourable as Members opposite may be, and honest as they may be, and kindly though the Minister is, with all the good will in the world, hon. Gentlemen opposite do not understand the practical points which are understood by my hon. Friends the Members for South Ayrshire and Salford, West (Mr. Orme) because of their day-to-day experience on the shop floor, and they descend into the arid vacuum of legalism, as the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) did.
One would think that Taft Vale had never happened, that Osborne had never happened, that Rookes v. Barnard had never happened, that Stratford v. Lindley had never happened, and that all these things are inventions by this side of the Committee.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite should look at the history of the intrusion of the courts into industrial relations and see how, on several occasions, it has been left to the legislature to correct the inadequacies of the judiciary, not because of malice or unfairness, but because of the lack of understanding of the real problems.
I now want to deal with the Secretary of State's reference to the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act. There is no policing of that Act in this way, and the analogy used by the right hon. Gentleman was unfair. That Act deals with something that is initially agreed. We are dealing in this subsection with something that is not agreed by the parties, and the employers would want it anyway.
The essence of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act provisions is surely that an employer who is not in any sense a party to a collective agreement can be brought before an industrial court and required to observe the terms of that agreement which had been arrived at by the unions and other employers in the industry. That employer can have the terms of the agreement imposed on him without his having been consulted or involved in the negotiations about it. It can be policed against him by unilateral arbitration. The terms of the agreement can he applied to him by unilateral determination of the terms and conditions which he must observe.
That is a clear example, as the Donovan Commission acknowledged, of the imposition of an agreement in a case by case process in a situation to which the person concerned may never have been a party.
The Solicitor-General is confusing the words "enforce" and "police". We are talking about policing by trade union officials, or trade union members. The point at issue is not whether trade union officials should act as policemen, but whether policemen should carry guns. The point is whether they should be vested with powers which the Solicitor-General suggested they should have in his evidence to Donovan, a view which apparently is rejected by his colleague sitting next to him, who presumably holds a different view. Whichever view is held, it will ultimately be for the court to decide, and it is not within the realms of possibility for the Front Bench opposite to answer this question about what "reasonably practicable" means. Nor can we accept that we should give this provision carte blanche.
The Minister should not say that it is nonsense when my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) or I refer to expulsion or to sanctions, such as suing members. He has only to turn up the evidence given by the Solicitor-General to the Donovan Commission. He was asked: How would you suggest the unions should go about it? Sue its members? Counsel for the Unionist and Conservative Inns of Court Association said, yes: Sue its members, yes. What do you say about the men themselves? I would think one of the things the union would have to say was that it was intending to suspend or expel them", and the evidence goes on in that vein.
I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends today to say that we shall not apply what we found to be an obnoxious provision under subsection (2) to an even more obnoxious provision under Clause 39. We shall not compound the damage which these two Clauses will do to industrial relations in this country.
I just want to come in on the last point about policing a trade union organisation. If someone joins the Labour Party, as hon. Gentlemen opposite obviously have, or the Conservative Party, or a local tennis club, he is given a set of rules in return for the payment of a sum of money, and he is bound by those rules to observe them. If he disobeys them, he must expect to be hauled before the executive committee—and unions have such committees—and asked to account for his actions.
I do not see why right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are claiming a special position for the trade unions in this respect, because in a voluntary organisation—and cricket clubs, tennis clubs and trade unions are voluntary organisations—one pays a sum of money and gets a book of rules in return. If someone breaks the rules, he must not grumble about being disciplined, and if one talks about policing, the elected officers of the union must do the job.
Their job must be to haul these people before the appropriate body and deal with them, otherwise we shall not get any discipline in the trade unions. We shall not get that discipline unless we give the trade union leadership the responsibility to act responsibly. I do not dissent from this part of the Bill. I hope that trade union leaders will set a good example to the rank and file of their unions and see that agreements made on behalf of their members are honoured in full.
I am particularly concerned to comment on some trends of the debate, because it is my view that most of the trade unionists whom I represent do not make their fear of a biased court the main reason for their opposition to the Clause.
I accept some of the argumentation of the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith), who is not here at the moment, but who has been present for most of the time, and I am not complaining about his absence now. I think that where we started going wrong was when the right hon. and learned Gentleman was trying to change the whole trend of our law on industrial relations while making it appear that we were doing nothing very important. I know that everything that has flowed from then is profoundly objected to by the trade unions.
Long before there is any question of the attitude of a High Court judge, or that of the other members of the court, what worries the trade unions is the way in which decisions concerning the management of the unions by their members, with the help of the officers whom they had elected, will come to be a matter for decisions by the court. Their objection is to the phrase about "acting reasonably" or with "reasonable practicability" or whatever it is. They say that there is no value in attempting to enforce discipline, or in calling for reasonableness on the part of a trade union official—local, national or regional —or a shop steward, or branch secretary as a result of a legal decision in a court.
That is the crux of the matter. Let me give the Committee a single example. It may be that a manager who has insufficient experience, having held the appointment for only a short time in a department—not a general manager—finds himself in conflict with someone who does not act as he, the manager, wants him to act. The local trade union officials must make a quick decision and that decision may not be the right one in the eyes of the national officials. Anyone familiar with industry will know that this is typical. None the less, 58 of the 60 men in that section would be determined to do what they decided to do at that moment, which may be at two o'clock in the morning, because there is a good deal of shift work in my area.
What trade unionists deeply oppose is making subsequent efforts by union officers have anything to do, however remotely, with the courts. They argue, I think rightly—this is far more important an argument than a long discussion of who will sit on a court—that the worst possible aid to any union officers is the pressure of a remote decision by a court of law.
Who would be the umpire if it is not a properly con- stituted court with all the authority of an impartial group?
When the hon. Gentleman disagrees, he usually at least follows the argument. I am talking past him. The trade unions are saying something different. They say that it is nonsensical to bring the courts into that situation.
It is no good quoting people. The Secretary of State substitutes quotation for argument and he cannot be surprised if some of us think that he and the Leader of the Opposition are both wrong. The Secretary of State must produce arguments for his Bill. We cannot part with the Clause because it governs many things which are to come later. This is a crucial debate.
I take the point that the Committee is interested in arguments in support of the proposed content of the Bill, but would the hon. Gentleman not acknowledge that the fact that his right hon. Friend and others of his party for some period at least agreed with some of the substantive provisions of the Bill is an argument of which the Committee and the country are entitled to take account?
The hon. and learned Gentleman has helped my argument. What I object to is that this sort of general political statement was quite justified on Second Reading and perhaps once at the start of the Committee stage, when it was right for the Secretary of State to say that the Leader of the Opposition wanted to do something of the same kind. But he should not waste time with quotations when his job is to produce arguments— [Interruption.] Hon. Members may shout, but in the end the Secretary of State's argument will not be tested by the cheers or jeers of either side but by the solid opinion of people at work every day.
It is their opinion that I am quoting. They take the view that it is nonsensical to introduce a court of law into a union's internal relations, with all the difficult problems that its officers face, even in the last resort. The Amendment is even more far-reaching. This is a crucial debate. It foreshadows an obligation in the same terms, which is legally binding, under Clause 39. One cannot argue on a later Amendment or Clause that one thought that it could be discussed under another heading.
5.15 p.m.
The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East, gave us a wrong lead yesterday when he made it appear that this tremendous change in the direction of our law was a simple difference in wording. That is incorrect. If this comes into force and is not quickly amended or repealed, the task of our most responsible trade union officers will be made much more difficult. The unions are therefore deeply opposed on this ground.
They also fear that, in those shops and factories where union organisation is not so strong, a legal threat will be made a substitute for good management, which British industry most needs. What is wrong is the shifting of emphasis to legal enforcement, however remote, and away from the urgent need for improved management and trade union organisation. Although I oppose the most important provision dealing with penal clauses, one of the most beneficial results of the argument by this side, on which no reasonable contribution was made by hon. Members opposite, was that the T.U.C. and the Leader of the Opposition both agreed that there is need for improved management, but also improved union organisation. That is an achievement which no jeering can hide. So let us have done with these political points and with the dangerous provisions of this Clause. My hon. Friends are right to oppose them and I hope the party will vote against them.
I regret that the validity of the judicial process has been questioned so often recently. Although I can understand some people outside the Committee questioning the value of a court's judgment in this kind of material, I should have hoped that the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Paul B. Rose) would not be one of them. As a member of the legal profession, he must concede that, in this country at any rate, the courts have
repeatedly shown themselves capable of judging matters of which they did not necessarily have very intimate knowledge before.
Should one argue that the courts must never consider the plight of, for example, small shopkeepers because the judges have never been small shopkeepers? The courts have shown themselves to be admirably adjusted to achieve justice, based on the facts and expert advice. They acquire expertise in new matters quickly. Whatever other arguments hon. Gentlemen opposite adduce, I trust that they will not press this one too hard.
In an earlier discussion both sides of the Committee accepted the basis of a legally enforceable contract. We took the view that it would be little use our accepting the importance of such a contract if the principals to it did not accept responsibility for it. We now consider that the wording of this provision is a natural corollary of that view.
In discussing the question of the order of the court, hon. Gentlemen opposite appear to think that this will embrace a whole range of cases but it will not. It is limited to the procedural aspects, and some of the most damaging problems in recent years have been in this sphere, many of them relating to petty points. Hon. Geneltmen opposite accuse us of over-estimating the importance of the enforceability of contracts. I suggest that they have underestimated the difficult job we have industrially to meet the problems which we face in overseas markets.
It is against this background that I hope that, in the long run, hon. Gentlemen opposite will take a more balanced view of the importance of this part of the Bill. Most of these arrangements will still be achieved by negotiation and agreement. Only in a small number of cases will this final part of the provision be invoked.
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 261, Noes 303.
Question put, That the Clause stand Part of the Bill:—
Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
APPLICATION TO INDUSTRIAL COURT RELATING TO PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
I beg to move Amendment No. 672, in page 25, line 8, after 'may', insert: 'after consultation with the parties'.
Order. It might be for the convenience of the Committee if we were to discuss with it Amendment No. 672, in line 8, leave out 'Industrial Court' and insert: 'Commission on Industrial Relations'. No. 674, in line 17, leave out from 'action' to end of line 18.
No. 675, in line 30, leave out 'Industrial Court' and insert 'Commission'.
and No. 676, in line 38, leave out from first 'the' to end of subsection and insert: 'Commission should put to the representative bodies in the industry proposals for reform and seek to obtain their implementation by voluntary agreement'.
We now come to the Clause which proposes remedial action where procedure agreements are either non-existent or defective. The way in which it is interwoven with the subsequent Clauses compels the debate to spill over. I shall confine myself to the Clause, but it is inevitable, because we are discussing yet another of what the Secretary of State referred to as the pillars that support this edifice of his, that the debate will tend to widen, and it will be difficult to confine it strictly to the narrow confines of the Clause.
I would be the first to agree about the need to take remedial action in the kind of situation about which the Clause hypothesises, but I reject the remedy prescribed by the right hon. Gentleman. The Amendments change the Clause radically, fundamentally and in a way that I think makes irrelevant and redundant the subsequent Clauses to which I have just referred. We propose them so that the Clause will conform more closely to the realities of industry, so that what is purely an industrial relations matter is disentangled from the odious judicial machinery that the Bill seeks to establish, and so that the Commission on Industrial Relations is saved from the perversion and prostitution to which the Government's proposals are subjecting that body.
Where are the Ministers?
The Secretary of State told me that he had to leave the Chamber for a short period because of a crucial meeting. I am sure that we all understand that, even if we equally understand that his very pressing problems are mainly of his own creation.
Where is the Solicitor-General?
I have had no such apology from the hon. and learned Gentleman. I am sorry— [Interruption.] —I am not supposed to be able to see him. Having acknowledged the marginal presence of the Solicitor-General, I shall return to the Clause.
Rightly, it brings together two of the major elements in my right hon. Friend's drive, when at the Department of Employment and Productivity—now the Department of Employment, productivity having been dropped by the Government —for a major reform of industrial relations. The reform or creation of procedures and the establishment of the C.I.R. were linked in her White Paper. I think that getting them launched in the way which is now showing positive results is amongst her achievements—achieve- ments which have received recognition almost everywhere except among hon. Members opposite, achievements wholly for the good of industrial relations but which are now placed in jeopardy by the proposals we are now discussing.
The right hon. Gentleman is fond of referring to "In Place of Strife". I hope that he has studied with great care the parts of that White Paper that deal with the importance of procedures and the rôle of the C.I.R. I regret that the Bill shows little sign that he has done so. The same strictures might equally apply to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington), who seemed to think that part of our attitude towards the Bill was one that did not go with the recognition of the need to establish remedy procedures. We went into this in considerable detail and set up all the signposts in "In Place of Strife". I refer to that White Paper not to quote it but to draw attention to the totally different approach it reflected on these two points, because there is a fundamental difference of philosophy between us on the whole broad question of the reform of industrial relations.
Whereas the Government concentrate on treating and suppressing the symptoms, we sought in our White Paper to identify the underlying causes of the problems and to remove or mitigate them at least. I hope that the Committee will study carefully paragraphs 19 to 35, because there my right hon. Friend did what the Government have not done. She highlighted the precise nature of the defects. She showed what reforms were necessary in detail and how they could be brought about, where necessary with the aid of the C.I.R. She also laid down criteria that agreements ought to aim at meeting, seeking above all to establish the procedures as speedy, effective and equitable.
In an earlier debate, I referred to the International Harvester agreement, partly because I am familiar with it through its association with my constituency, but also because in many ways it was a model of what we were hoping to achieve. I do not apologise for referring to it again, because it is an exemplar not only of what we were trying to achieve but showing what can be achieved in future, given the opportunities for the C.I.R. to go on its course unfettered in the way the Government propose. In a leader on 17th September, the Financial Times, referring to the report by the C.I.R., on the agreement, said: Yesterday's report by the Commission on Industrial Relations about ways of improving institutions and procedures at International Harvester is interesting not only in itself but as an example of the function which the Donovan Commission had principally in mind when it recommended that a CIR should be established. It was one of the great strengths of the way in which my right hon. Friend created the C.I.R. that she followed the pattern and path set and prescribed by the Royal Commission. It is interesting to note that those comments by the Financial Times were written on the occasion of the report, because the major achievement of the C.I.R. was not the identification of the problems—which it did—but the way in which it followed this through and brought in an agreement which has been hailed as one of the most comprehensive plant procedure agreements we have.
In an earlier debate, when I referred to the International Harvester agreement, I hope I made it clear that it was achieved only because from start to finish everything was done on a voluntary basis. I can say, from my own close if not intimate knowledge of the situation and of the personalities involved, that, had the provisions of this Bill been in operation, the agreement would not and could not have come into existence. It could not have done so in the order and ambience which the Bill seeks to create.
Unfettered, the C.I.R. would have gone on to add more battle honours to its banner. I have chosen the past tense deliberately because I believe that already the Bill has started to wield its evil influence. The distinguished team my right hon. Friend brought together to create the C.I.R.—men with profound understanding of what they were about, based on a long experience of problems in industrial relations—has already started to break up. Mr. Allen and Mr. Paynter have gone. Mr. Paynter was the man who brought the International Harvester agreement into existence. For many years he fitted precisely into the category so readily condemned by hon. Members opposite—that of "industrial militant". But on the basis of his profound experience, as a father he brought into existence this tremendously important and constructive agreement, and having done so immediately resigned because of the introduction of the Consultative Document and all that is associated with it in this Bill.
Can the hon. Gentleman seriously suggest that there is anything in these proposals which could inhibit or prevent persons of good will on both sides of industry working in future for good and helpful agreements?
[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair ]
I promise the Committee that I will be brief but, despite my brevity, I hope to make it clear that indeed I do believe that there are provisions in the Bill with that effect. Why does the hon. Gentleman think that Mr. Allen and Mr. Paynter resigned? Such men do not do such things lightly.
At the time of publication of the Consultative Document, there was a report in The Guardian that the C.I.R. had considered the Consultative Document and had concluded that its proposals would not be constructive either to the Commission's work or to the improvement of industrial relations. Not only the members of the Commission but the staff are affected. The staff are already being demoralised and are departing. The White Paper said that the C.I.R. would be a completely independent body. We believe that the right hon. Gentleman, in this Clause, is seeking to make it a tool of his Industrial Court.
We said the C.I.R. should be: a disseminator of good practice and a focus of reform by example. 6.0 p.m.
The right hon. Gentleman instead makes it an instrument for the implementation of the odious and pernicious provisions of his Bill. In doing so he degrades the C.I.R. We created it in an atmosphere of voluntarism, confident that its personalities would succeed by winning confidence and co-operation on both sides of industry. The right hon. Gentleman makes it a part of his machinery for ramming down the throats of industry what both sides have already rejected—no doubt he thinks of this as the industrial relations counterpart of forced feeding. We believe that attempted solutions imposed on industry in the teeth of opposition from both sides start without the remotest chance of success. What people will not do voluntarily they are hardly likely to do well or effectively when subjected to coercion or sanction—except possibly when they are in the Army. There are too many people who seem to think of the lads in the workshops in terms of a platoon in the Army.
I quoted the opening words of a Financial Times editorial. Let me conclude by quoting the final words of the same piece when it said: In so far as the Government's proposals are controversial however, the C.I.R. may well prefer not to be associated with them too closely. Its job is essentially one of persuasion and to do it effectively it must obtain and keep the confidence of both sides of industry. It is hardly likely today, in the atmosphere that has been created and with the new burdens and obligations which the Government are placing upon it that it will be able to do that job. The Financial Times ended by saying: The C.I.R. is too young and operates in too delicate a field to be loaded with new functions. Let me add to that the pertinent remarks of Mr. John Gretton in New Society on 26th November last. Hon. Members will note that I said New Society and not New Statesman. This is what Mr. Gretton said, and it is a perceptive remark: It is to the credit of Robert Carr that he has decided to keep the C.I.R., and even to expand its functions. It would be even more to his credit were he to realise how irrelevant this report in particular"— that was the report on Hoover— shows how much of the proposed Industrial Relations Bill to be. That is absolutely right and I could not have put it better myself.
I had better make it clear before we go any further that with this Amendment we are debating Amendment No. 673 with which we are taking 674, 675 and 676, all of which are on two sheets in front of hon. Members.
I have a great deal of sympathy with some of the comments made by the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) but I have no sympathy with the way in which he made them. He is rather out of date. I tabled Amendment No. 720, which was not selected, the effect of which was to leave out from this Clause any reference to the Industrial Court. This would be an advantage and ought to be done. I am still of that opinion and the reason I say that the hon. Gentleman is out of date is that he will no doubt have noticed that my right hon. Friend has tabled Amendment No. 711 which goes some way towards doing what I sought to do. If my right hon. Friend had not tabled that Amendment my speech might have been different. I would assume that that Amendment will be accepted.
This Clause is one of the most important in the Bill. Other Clauses may or may not be operated, they are permissive. We may or may not have agreements legally binding, we may or may not have final sanctions brought in in any given circumstance when the Bill becomes law. The legal sanctions in the Bill are standoff in any case but there is nothing standoff about this Clause. This Clause and the next two deal with the heart of our industrial relations, conciliation. Even if we bring the law into industrial relations it is necessary to conciliate throughout and the hope is to solve problems through conciliation. We have said nothing contrary to that.
Oh.
We have said all along that conciliation is the basis——
You do not believe it.
Of course I do, otherwise I would not be standing up saying it. I was prepared to take a very strong line on this Clause if it had not been modified. Conciliation should be used before sanctions or the industrial court.
The hon. Member for Doncaster said that we had not been very complimentary to the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) and the C.I.R. This is not true. We have always said that it was basically good, with a potential for good. If we have criticised it it has been because it has not done enough, it has not been used sufficiently, not been operated widely enough by the right hon. Lady when she was in office. If she complains that we are bedevilling the issue with this Bill then she certainly bedevilled the issue and the working of the C.I.R. with the proposals in "In Place of Strife".
[Mr. J. C. JENNINGS in the Chair ] The C.I.R. can go a long way towards bringing together the two sides of industry in procedure agreements and in difficulties arising through disputes over wages and so on. It is important that the Industrial Court does not get involved until all else has failed. It is important to try every possible method, both conciliation by the Ministry and the Minister and the effective expertise of the C.I.R. until a situation is reached when it can be said, "We have gone thus far, we cannot get any further. There is no possibility of agreement because someone is being unduly difficult, awkward or destructive." It is because there are such people that we bring this Bill forward and that the Industrial Court is given the right to impose penalties.
To suggest that the C.I.R. would be affected if the Industrial Court is taken out at an early stage when conciliation is taking place seems entirely wrong. Providing conciliation procedures go forward before the Industrial Court is brought in, we shall be writing into the Bill the good industrial relations practice which has been accepted over many years by unions and by the best employers and which, until it recently became bedevilled by all kinds of other activities, used to be the purview of the Minister of Labour. The Clause will give the C.I.R. an opportunity to expand its work and go further than it was permitted to go by the right hon. Lady when she set it up. It will develop within the context of the Bill to the advantage of industry as a whole.
Clause 36 (2) (a) says— the Commission shall— (a) transmit the proposals to the Industrial Court, and". As a consequence of my right hon. Friend's Amendment No. 711, it will be necessary to amend that paragraph. My right hon. Friend will either have to change "shall" to "may" or substitute "or" for "and" after "the Industrial Court". He may also have to make a matching Amendment in Clause 37.
I believe that the C.I.R., despite the precipitate resignations which have occurred, can develop to the advantage of good industrial relations. If the C.I.R. is successful, the Clauses which seek to bring in sanctions will not be necessary. One thing which should be obvious from our debates is that my party would be delighted if, as the result of the Bill, industry was so well ordered that it was not necessary to implement the sanctions. If the C.I.R. does that, we shall all applaud it.
The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) said that he believed that the Bill was intended to deal with the tiny irascible minority who caused strikes. It is a shame that he was not in the Committee when my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, All Saints (Mr. Brian Walden) demolished that argument and called the Bill nothing more than a Trotskyist's charter. His argument was so irrefragable that it was not challenged either by the Solicitor-General or by the Secretary of State.
It is not sufficiently realised by the Secretary of State and the Solicitor-General that, whilst there is outright opposition on the trade union side to the Bill and to these Clauses, grave and serious apprehension is being voiced by the C.B.I. and by notable figures on the management side of industry about how the Clauses can function. To follow this to its logical conclusion, everyone will be submitting a complaint to somewhere or other and spending time arguing about it instead of getting on with production. The Government are in danger of becoming the most serious impediment to production since the war as the result of this remarkable Bill.
When, with the best will in the world, we tried to point out that sometimes even judges do not wholly understand what goes on in industry and that this is a specialised subject, the Secretary of State and the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) gave vent to expressions of horror. One would think that our judges are all-knowing, that they know about every mortal thing. When judges retire and write books about one another, it is very revealing. If hon. Gentlemen opposite want to get an inkling of how learned judges can misguide the courts they should go to the Library and get a book written by Mr. Du Cann on the art of advocacy, from which they will see that even the most brilliant advocate can come unstuck before a judge who does not know what the issues are about.
Does not my hon. Friend agree that the memoirs of judges who retire at a normal age are very interesting but that it is also very interesting when judges retire well before retiring age and secure lucrative employment with industry, in view of the effect that it might have on their attitude to the job?
It is very interesting to listen to this story about memoirs. Although I have allowed the debate to run wide, that is a little too wide.
Hear, hear.
It is all right for hon. Members to cheer your rebuke, Mr. Jennings, but they did not make a noise when the argument was initiated by no less person than the Secretary of State when you were not in the Chamber.
I was not then in the Chair. My attitude might have been quite different.
I do not ask the hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Molloy) to admit that judges are all-knowing, but would he not be prepared to concede that in this country at any rate they are impartial?
In accordance with your Ruling, Mr. Jennings, I will not be drawn too far into that, but I certainly do not accept that they are all perfect. My point is that even in the normal course of their work eminent Q.C.s and judges have criticised one another for not knowing enough about the case in question, and this could happen here. Their impartiality is impaired by their ignorance.
In this debate we are negotiating on behalf of the British trade union movement. The blunt truth is that the Government have taken a stand on behalf of the employers. They have set out by saying to trade unionists, "Sit round the table, let us negotiate and have no rash industrial action", but when we try to negotiate on the Bill on behalf of working men, the response of the Government is to bring down the chopper and to have no negotiation and no discussion. Instead we have to go through the lobbies all night, with no right to speak, simply taking the opportunity to register our votes. This sort of atmosphere can do the country no good and the Government have no right to introduce such a measure in a democratic system.
I hope that hon. Members opposite will concede that we on this side of the Committee have a right to oppose this measure. Indeed some hon. Gentlemen have put down Amendments. The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford has even said that if a certain form of words are not laid down he will make a more hostile speech on another occasion. If he looks at these Clauses closely, he may be persuaded to come and join us on this side of the House because that is his proper place.
Certain sections of knowledgeable management have made known their apprehension about Clause 35 and the provisions with which he dealt last night. The hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) made the serious accusation that certain trade unions were keen to whip up small minorities to cause industrial unrest and to have unofficial disputes. When challenged to provide evidence, he produced the HANSARD proceedings of a Committee and quoted what had been said on the same lines by an hon. Member on this side of the Committee. If this is the way Members of Parliament are to submit evidence, it is not difficult to understand that trade unionists outside will say that people who advance such arguments are not worthy of being listened to.
My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) spoke about the action of informers who would whisper to the bosses in the initiation of complicated negotiations. This is a practice we have never experienced in Britain, except in a few exceptional minority cases. I find it particularly loathsome that this sort of behaviour is now to be given official status.
I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he has considered the possibility of grave difficulties in the structure of the Civil Service in regard to the effects of Clause 35 on the Whitley Council. The Whitley Council machinery is somewhat complicated and was introduced by a famous Speaker of the House of Commons. It has worked remarkably well, particularly in the Civil Service. I feel that had it been adopted more seriously and widely, it could have made a great contribution to industry. We all know that some of the Civil Service trade unions, such as the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, the Society of Civil Servants, the Civil and Public Services Association, and the Civil Service Union are all different unions working for the same employer, namely, the State, as applied to different Departments, whether they be the Home Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or wherever it may be.
In such a hierarchy of the Whitley Council it is possible for a chief executive officer to be the chairman of the Official Side in meeting representatives of the Civil Service Union and the Civil and Public Services Association. It may be that that officer at a later stage, as a member of a union, is involved in negotiations a step further up the hierarchy. Many voluntary officers of these civil service unions are apprehensive whether they could be charged under these provisions if any actions were viewed as part of the disciplinary code.
I will put the hon. Gentleman out of his rather complicated worries. He seems to forget that the procedure can be put into operation only if there is either absence of a procedure agreement or if the procedure agreement obviously is seriously defective. I should not have thought that either of these conditions would apply within the Whitley Council system.
It is all very well for the Secretary of State to make clever remarks about this complicated system. [Interruption.] I agree that it is complicated, but I am asking that the Minister should look at the matter again. I believe he will find that there is something in what I have said which is worthy of examination and which needs to be cleared up. We are trying to be helpful. The Minister appears sometimes to get an idea in his head that something is wrong and it sticks there. This happened on a previous Clause when we were discussing contracts between management and unions when in every case the pejorative accent was put on the unions. The Secretary of State reminds me of the three university professors who had a few nights out. On one night they drank gin and water, on another brandy and water, and on the third night whisky and water. They came to the conclusion that water was inebriat- ing. I feel that the right hon. Gentleman is in a similar situation.
I am asking the right hon. Gentleman to listen to the arguments submitted to him by the Civil Service in regard to the provisions of this Clause and I hope that he will give them the attention which they deserve. The provisions of this Bill will, of course, apply within the British Civil Service, and it will be a serious matter involving the whole structure of the National Whitley Council and the Civil Service trade unions. I hope that the Secretary of State will examine some of the points I have made to see that he is not in danger of creating a situation that he might regret in the near future.
Several Hon. Members rose ——
6.30 p.m.
I realise that a number of hon. Members opposite wish to intervene, but it may be convenient for me to speak at this point. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will have an opportunity to deal with arguments deployed later if he considers it right to do so.
The hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) suggested that this was an illustration of the philosophic, fundamental difference underlying the approach of the two parties. I accept that there is a difference from Clause 35 onwards, but I want to make one thing clear. We on this side of the Committee subscribe to all that the hon. Gentleman said about the importance of encouraging the voluntary resolution of disputes and the importance of the rôle of the C.I.R. My right hon. Friend has said time and again that we want improved and effective voluntary procedures to take effect. It is set out in the consultative document. We value and recognise the rôle which the C.I.R. has played and will play in future. The hon. Member for Doncaster was intimately concerned with this matter and understands it. We shall discuss later the rôle which the Commission can play in relation to recognition questions.
Clause 106 provides for general references to the Commission of the kind which the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) made and which my right hon. Friend has made since. We recognise and endorse the Commission's rôle and the rôle of the voluntary improvement of procedures. There are many places in the Bill where this is underlined.
My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) drew attention to Amendments Nos. 711, 712 and 713 standing in the name of my right hon. Friend. Their object is to make it clear that the Commission shall be approached through the court subject to the condition that every attempt has been made to promote agreement between the parties and by my right hon. Friend offering advice and assistance to the parties—in other words, to prevent people from believing that they can rush through the court to the C.I.R. and back to the court as a short cut to solving their problems. It is essential for the Committee to appreciate the way in which the matter operates.
Amendment No. 672 proposes to insert in line 8 on page 25 of the Bill "after consultation with the parties". I cannot advise the Committee to accept it as it stands, but in so far as it conveys the thought which goes beyond what is in the Amendments to be moved by my right hon. Friend—in other words, in so far as it conveys the thought that even the Secretary of State may not invoke these procedures for reference through the court to the C.I.R. without having attempted to consult the parties and to advise and conciliate on the same lines as are suggested in Amendment 711—that is a thought to which we willingly subscribe. We cannot accept the Amendment as it stands.
Why not?
Because it is not properly tailored to the needs. I assure the Committee that we wish to embody this thought and we shall try to embody, it alongside or perhaps as part of Amendment No. 711. This emphasises the intention of my right hon. Friend to make clear that the Commission is not to be regarded as the tool of the court.
There is a difficult balance which we have tried to work out correctly and effectively. On the one hand, it can be said that the Commission is the tool of the court. On the other hand, it can be said—and I echo the criticisms which we have heard—that the court is a rubber stamp for the Commission. Neither is true. The court must be satisfied that certain tests and criteria have been fulfilled as a matter of fact as a result of an inquiry judicially conducted. That is the court's function. If those gateways are passed through and if those tests are satisfied, the industrially sophisticated, consultant, advisory, expert, conciliatory rôle, whether in recognition cases or in an endeavour to produce a working procedure agreement, is in the hands of the Commission.
There is that clear distinction between two very important functions and it would do a disservice to each body—the court and the Commission—to seek to dress up one of them as a kind of serving man or tool of the other. They have important constitutionally distinct functions to perform, and we have tried to produce that result.
Does the Solicitor-General believe that the C.I.R. will attract people of sufficient distinction to work in the capacity outlined with the Industrial Court virtually breathing down its neck? Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman wish to go on record as saying that?
I do not wish to go on record as saying that the Industrial Court will be breathing down its neck. For that reason, among others, the Amendment in the name of my right hon. Friend has been tabled—to emphasise that these two creatures, the Commission and the court, have different functions and operate independently of each other, with the Commission bringing the special expertise which it is already developing and which it will develop further as the provisions take effect, to bear on essentially industrial questions.
It would have been easy for us to have plucked solutions from other countries where the industrial and judicial functions are blurred into one agency, but we have not done that. We have recognised the value of the rôle suggested for the Commission by the Donovan Report and acknowledged by the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn. This is a special kind of agency—to bring the minds of men together in the conciliatory procedural bargaining process. The court is distinct, to be given tests and facts to be found before the Commission comes into play. We may not have got it right, but I hope that the Committee acknowleges that we have made a genuine attempt to separate the functions and to leave the rôle of the Commission unimpaired and capable of functioning properly.
Has the C.I.R. indicated to the Government that it welcomes even this association it is given with legal enforceability, or has it informed them that it feels that this statutory backing to its actions will weaken its effectiveness?
Perhaps the right hon. Lady will allow me to leave it to my right hon. Friend to deal with that matter. I should like my right hon. Friend to deal with the consequences of some of the points made by the hon. Member for Doncaster. I shall explain the machinery as we have tried to put it before the country and the Committee. I submit that the rôle of the Commission has been plainly defined and that our Amendments are of importance in defining it.
Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I would rather not. I do not want to take up a great deal of time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Give way."] The Committee cannot complain that I am normally unwilling to give way. Certain questions have been put to me and I have endeavoured to deal with them.
I propose to move on to the next stage of the argument. Having established this view which we took of the importance of the Commission, we nevertheless come on to the provisions which we regard as important in Clause 35, which would be removed by the Amendments which we are discussing now, namely those which lay the way to selective enforceability of procedures where they are nonexistent or defective. When we put it in the Bill and before the Committee, we took account of the argument which the Donovan Commission laid out in paragraphs which have been referred to already. It is important that this should be understood. This is not an idea conjured out of the air or some whim following on the original production of "Fair Deal at Work". In paragraph 510 of the Donovan Commission Report, the Commission indicates: … how in our opinion the legal enforcement of procedure agreements may, if the need arises, be made to fit into a system of collective bargaining reformed in accordance with our recommendations. The Report continues in paragraph 511: If legal sanctions have to be applied this will have to be done ad hoc." They commend the "case by case" approach analogous to that adopted under the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959, and so on. The Report suggests that: Before applying to the Industrial Court …"— I am not saying that Clause 35 and so on is precisely modelled on this, but there are many common elements which are important— … for an order the Secretary of State would have to consult both sides of the industry concerned and the Industrial Relations Commission. Then the Secretary of State would have to be satisfied as to certain matters.
In paragraph 515 the report continues: The Industrial Court would have to hear the two sides of industry, the employer and the shop stewards or other representatives of those employed in the enterprise or establishment. If it found that the conditions listed in the previous paragraph were fulfilled, it would by order, declare the procedure agreement to be legally binding on the employer and on all those employed by him in the enterprise or establishment to which the order applies. This is the foundation of the case, which we recognise, that in certain circles where difficulties persist, there is justification for allowing an agency to try to bring the parties together, and, in the last resort, for making a procedure agreement binding on both sides in the unit.
6.45 p.m.
Ought not the Solicitor-General, in fairness to the Committee, to quote the parts of the passage which he has omitted? I am not suggesting that he is trying to mislead the Committee. I understand his anxiety to be brief in order to make progress. But we ought to point out that in paragraph 511 the Royal Commission said: In both cases we hope and expect that the work of the Industrial Relations Commission will make the use of legal sanctions unnecessary, that is, that the persuasive influence of the Industrial Relations Commission will suffice to produce the necessary improvements. In both cases we envisage the use of legal enforcement machinery only as an emergency device…
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because that is exactly the philosophy underlying the approach here set out. If one looks at the first sentence which the hon. Member quotes and then at Clause 37(3) of the Bill, one will find in Clause 37(3): The Commission shall thereupon promote and assist discussion between the parties to the reference with a view to obtaining their agreement on new or revised provisions… Subsection (4) goes on to say: If, at any time after the Commission have made a determination under subsection (1) of this section, the Commission are satisfied that the purposes for which the reference was made have been or will be adequately fulfilled without continuing the proceedings on that reference, the Commission shall make a report to that effect to the Industrial Court… We have here precisely this concept. Let the Commission, once the situation has been referred to them, act to try to bring the parties together. If it can bring them together, then no longer need it go through the enforcement procedure. It is only in a situation where the criteria set out in Clause 35 are fulfilled that this question arises—that the unit suffers from the defects in or absence of a procedure agreement, or recourse to industrial action … contrary to the terms…of that agreement or the development or maintenance of orderly industrial relations in that unit has been seriously impeded, or there have been substantial and repeated losses of working time in that unit. It is a narrow set of gateways through which the parties applying here have to march. There may be some employers up and clown the land who think that they have been given a ready answer to the difficulties with trouble-makers. This is not their charter. It is designed to help in the case where real strife has persisted and where conciliation has failed to produce the solution, and where these narrow conditions can be established. We have not responded to the blandishments of some people in industry to make this extensive or industry-wide and to make enforceability attach automatically.
The hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Molloy) suggested that there were some employers who were concerned about what we were doing. But there are many employers who say that we have not gone far enough. We have resisted their blandishments. There will be no automatic attachment of enforceability to widespread, nationwide, industry-wide agreements. What we have is a procedure designed to move from case to case, where the case for its use is plainly established. It is a procedure within the framework of which the Commission on Industrial Relations can continue to play a part.
The right hon. Gentleman was praying in aid the appropriate paragraph of Donovan. But surely the point about the Donovan recommendations was that the disputes procedure would have to be agreed between the employer and the trade unions, and that it must have been broken on several occasions. What the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting in this set of Clauses is the imposition of a procedure when a procedure is completely non-existent. That goes a great way from what Donovan suggests.
I hope that I have not misled the Committee by saying that this is completely parallel. But there is a clear foundation. What we have to establish—not far from Donovan—is that it is either through the inadequacy or non-existence of disputes procedures that there has been trouble. That is the kind of situation for which the 28 day conciliation pause was suggested in "In Place of Strife", which acknowledged that the absence of procedure, or inadequate procedure, or failure to regard procedure can be a cause for intervention.
The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that the provision in "In Place of Strife" had nothing to do with the work of the C.I.R. What he totally fails to mention every time he trots out this piece of past history is that the first order on the conciliation pause was to be on the employer to restore the status quo. If this Government were to introduce something of that kind, they would find that they would make much more impact on the situation in industry.
The conciliation pause was to be used either where the strikes were unconstitutional, that is, in breach of procedure, or when no procedure existed or for other reasons. What we propose is broadly the same pattern of situations, with this distinction. The right hon. Lady's proposal was a more narrow, more short-term fire-fighting exercise. I accept that. We propose that issues like the status quo would be one of those which the C.I.R. would consider between the parties when trying to produce an agreement on this procedure. It would not impose something unjust, unfair or harsh on either side if it produced an agreement which it would hope the parties would accept and it would do its best to be just.
I do not want there to be any misunderstanding. I hope that the Committee will appreciate the central propositions, first, that we value the voluntary system and the C.I.R. and, second, that this Clause is a carefully designed procedure to deal with emergency situations. It is on that basis that I commend it and urge the Committee to reject the Amendment.
On the last point dealt with by the hon. and learned Gentleman, perhaps I might return to Donovan. After all, it was his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State yesterday who criticised hon. Members on this side of the Committee for praying Donovan in aid.
The Solicitor-General has just taken a hypothetical situation posed by but not accepted by Donovan in its findings on collective bargaining. The hon. and learned Gentleman has misquoted the Report and used it as the basis for introducing Clause 35. However, paragraph 509 of Donovan says: … the threat of legal penalties can create a counter-motive that may influence men's minds and acts, and the use of such penalties may command the support of many of the other workers. Everyone knows that Donovan can be quoted both ways. We accept that. However, in our view the final recommendations on collective bargaining cannot be accepted.
The hon. and learned Gentleman has quoted "In Place of Strife". Perhaps I might remind him that those of us who were not in favour of "In Place of Strife" use exactly the same argument against him. It is impossible to set up a voluntary system backed by sanctions, because it is no longer voluntary. That is one of the fundamental points of difference between us. Either a system is voluntary or it is compulsory, and the Secretary of State cannot have it both ways. The right hon. Gentleman is saying that he wants a voluntary system, that he wants to see collective agreements arrived at voluntarily He goes on to say that, if they cannot be arrived at voluntarily, they will be referred to the C.I.R. which has powers to refer them to the Industrial Court which, at the end of the day, can impose a collective agreement. If that happens, the agreement can no longer be described as "collective".
I am interested in the hon. Gentleman's argument. He is saying that it is impossible to have a voluntary system which is backed by a system of law with sanctions. Whenever any of my hon. Friends says, I believe wrongly, that there is no framework of law at the moment, the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends immediately deny it. I agree that there is a framework of law at the moment. We believe that it is antiquated and inadequate, but it is there. There are already sanctions in the background, but we have a voluntary system. The present situation disproves the hon. Gentleman's argument.
I accept that the trade unions are not above or beyond the law. They are within the law. If they violate the law as it exists at the moment, they can be brought before the courts in just the same way as they can go to law themselves if they want an outside opinion.
This Clause brings the law directly into collective bargaining. To some extent, the law exists, but the Clause is directly imposing it on procedure agreements and on the machinery operating in industry where no law has existed before.
It is a difference of philosophy, but it is a fundamental difference between the two sides of the Committee. The Government take the other point of view, and we shall have to leave it there for the moment. We see that there is real disagreement and that there are two points of view. Clause 35 says: The Secretary of State, or any other party to whom this section applies, may make an application to the Industrial Court … In the preceding debate, the right hon. Gentleman said that by "referring" he was not imposing an agreement but only exercising his right to say that a case could go to the Industrial Court. However, it is a distinction without a difference—
Nonsense.
The right hon. Gentleman says, "Nonsense" but, if he does the referring, he has the backing and support of the Government and his Department and, in consequence, any reference by him must carry considerable weight. He says that, at the end of the day, the Industrial Court could reject it. However, I object to the Secretary of State having the right at all, because, in effect, he is brought directly into industrial relations and the sensitive areas where the Government have no right to be.
Clauses 34 to 39 deal with collective bargaining and negotiations between employers and trade unions. The difference between the two sides is fundamental. We say that this is a matter for those bodies. They have to resolve their difficulties. If there are voluntary organisations like the C.I.R., they can look at a situation and make voluntary recommendations, but they should have no penal sanctions. It is our argument that these matters are purely for the bodies concerned. They are not for outside judicial authorities or for the Government.
That brings me to my next point, which concerns procedure agreements. In the last debate, the Secretary of State referred to the engineering agreement and said that this Bill would have been of assistance in the past to the trade unions which were anxious to reform the York Memorandum, which he said was outdated having been created in 1922.
We in this House talk about the York Memorandum as if there had been a battle to amend it for the last 50 years. It was imposed on the unions at the time of the national lock-out. The unions objected to it strongly, but they worked under it. They have wanted it changed. It is only in the current climate, where the argument has been that many dis- putes have been the result of bad agreements, that other people, who until recently had never heard of the York Memorandum and did not know what it was about, have been saying that it should be reformed. The trade unions recognised this, but whenever they negotiated with employers in the past they had all their work cut out to improve the wages and conditions of the workers whom they represent. There has been a long period of delaying tactics.
At the end of the day, without Clauses 34 to 39, an agreement has been reached in all but signature between the Engineering Employers Federation and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. Much of the argument has been about status quo and the problem of mutuality within the industry which, as the right hon. Gentleman will know, is a vital point in the view of the trade unions. However, we have reached the stage where the whole procedure is to be streamlined. The long traipse to York is to be discontinued. There will be more immediate and local negotiations and, except on major points, national officials will no longer be involved. All that has been agreed round the table after a great deal of argument between the two sides. The irony of the situation is not that Clause 35 would have helped. The Bill is preventing it being implemented now because the employers want to write into it the legally enforceable point.
7.0 p.m.
I thought that the unions were trying to insist that the reverse clause should be written in, which is rather different. It is also totally unnecessary, because, as has been made clear, the Bill is not retrospective. Therefore, the unions could sign that agreement straight away without anything like that in it because, until the Bill becomes an Act, the presumption in Clause 32 does not apply.
I see the force of the right hon. Gentleman's argument. It sounds extremely logical and easily acceptable to both sides of industry. But the Bill is bedevilling industrial relations. Trade unions are not prepared to sign anything at the moment because they are worried about the Bill's implications. They see every word being put under a legal microscope. The right hon. Gentleman cannot sidestep this issue. It is absolutely vital. The engineering industry agreement is a classic example in this argument.
I do not wish to interrupt unduly, but the hon. Gentleman's argument is standing on its head. If what the hon. Gentleman says is true, surely the unions should be trying to put their signatures to as many agreements as possible before the Bill is brought into being.
The trade unions, having learned their lesson—they have had their fingers burned a little recently—are extremely cautious. We cannot blame them. The Bill has made them cautious. They are not prepared to be put in a position which could mean this agreement at some later date being referred to the Commission which could insist on this point going in. It is not as simple as the right hon. Gentleman makes out. It is causing a great deal of trouble in the engineering industry and the right hon. Gentleman should recognise it.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the trade union side is attempting to get an escape clause written into the new agreement but that the employers refuse to have it, because, if the trade union side signs an agreement without an escape clause, when the Bill becomes law the Employers' Federation can take them to the court under Clauses 35 to 40?
No.
The Minister says "No". But the uncertainty within the industry is such that the unions will not allow their situation to be jeopardised.
My hon. Friend says that the Minister says "No". In fact there are three legal opinions opposite and each gives a different opinion. If three legal gentlemen give different opinions, what about the poor chap on the shop floor?
My hon. Friend has underlined the anxiety within industry which I am trying to express.
The right hon. Gentleman dealt rather harshly with me when I intervened earlier. The Minister does not usually call hon. Members names to that extent. Still, my shoulders are broad enough to take it. I think that the right hon. Gentleman should take serious cognisance of the composition of the C.I.R. and the industrial court. We have had the resignations of Mr. Paynter and Mr. Allen. Who knows how long Mr. Woodcock will be able to maintain the situation. Is the Secretary of State going to stuff this body, as it were— [Interruption.] —I will use that word again—stuff this body with supporters of the Government's policy and who will obviously give the impression that it is not independent? It is bad enough that it should have legal sanctions, but to balance it in favour of the Government makes it absolutely unacceptable to the trade union movement. From where is the right hon. Gentleman to get people of standing and quality in the trade union movement to sit on this body or to man the Industrial Court?
The side note to Clause 35 is, Application to Industrial Court relating to procedural provisions. It is not fully recognised that the trade union movement has no bias against the law; it just does not trust it. People say that the trade union movement is beyond the law. That is not so. It has a great deal of experience of going to law and feeling that it has not had fair judgments. It therefore feels that the last person to adjudicate on matters concerned with industrial relations is a high court judge or legal luminary. We do not say that such a person bends the law or is not honest; it is just that his nature and background do not qualify him to understand work people. If I did not reflect this view I should not be honest with the Committee or with the people I represent. This feeling exists.
If we are to have a high court judge as the chairman of the Industrial Court and possibly a legal authority, a professor, as one of the two assessors, and the Minister cannot get a trade union leader or trade union man of some standing and responsibility as the second assessor, because the trade union movement does not nominate or accept someone for that position, it will not be satisfactory to say, "We shall bring in academics for this position." The Minister will face a difficult situation. The credibility of what he is trying to do will be destroyed, because he will not be seen to do justice. It is important, as the right hon. Gentleman will recognize, that in British law not only must justice be done, but it must be seen to be done. It certainly will not be seen to be done in this situation.
Those are the important points which I wish to put forward. Others of my hon. Friends will want to make further points. I think that Clauses 34 to 39 are central to the argument. It is bad enough that the principle should be spelt out in Clause 34, but to go on and find that Clauses 35 to 39 are aimed against the trade union movement by introducing the legal enforceability of agreements by the Industrial Court and by the C.I.R. is something which will not be accepted by the trade union movement. The right hon. Gentleman must realise and face that situation.
I concede one point made by the hon. Member for Salford, West(Mr. Orme), and that is that whenever any new legislation is going through the House people involved in negotiations and talks about arrangements which may be affected by that legislation to some extent slow up to see what the possible outcome may be. If that is happening because this Bill is going through the House, I should have thought that the job of this Committee and of Parliament was to get this Measure on to the Statute Book pretty quickly, so that all concerned know where they stand and can make their arrangements in the full knowledge of the law.
Mr. Moyle rose ——
I shall give way later with pleasure, but I have only just started.
The hon. Member for Salford, West has endeared himself to the Committee by the tenacious way in which he has put his case during our discussions on the Bill. The hon. Gentleman is in a favoured position. He is sitting pretty. He is in the position of having disagreed completely right from the start with what his right hon. Friends and his Government were doing. The hon. Gentleman can therefore disagree with this Government, just as he disagreed with his own, and say, "Whatever they did, you cannot tag that on to me. I contracted out of it". Thus, when we are defending the Bill we cannot say a lot to the hon. Gentleman, because he has been consistent, and we know where he stands. But because the hon. Gentleman is in that position, it does not mean that we do not have a duty to point out that, I do not want to use the word hypocrisy, I do not feel like that now——
Try it.
Not before dinner. We have a duty to point out to the Front Bench opposite, with the possible exception of the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) who has been put on it to give it some respectability—
As legal adviser.
The managers have worked hard to get a decent average on that Front Bench, but the right hon. Lady and her right hon Friend the ex-Prime Minister were committed so completely that the chances against that are pretty high, despite the balancing appearance of the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and the hon. Member for Blackley.
There is no doubt that the extravagant language which has been used, bearing in mind what hon. Gentlemen opposite intended to do and tried hard to do, is most unsatisfactory. The real purpose of my intervening at this stage— [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) has only just come in.
I have been here all day.
The hon. Gentleman has been out for a long time. Perhaps I may ask the hon. Gentleman to be quiet for a few minutes, now that he is here.
My real objection to the debate on this Amendment arises from the extravagant words which have been used. I think that they have been criminally extravagant. The hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) is usually one of the most delightful and amenable of debaters— [Interruption.] —The hon. Gentleman is never delightful, and he certainly is never amenable, so he is excluded from that remark, but the hon. Member for Doncaster—
7.15 p.m.
Order. I wish that we could get rid of some of the badinage, good natured as it is, and get back to the wording of the Amendment.
You are absolutely right, Mr. Jenkins.
Jennings.
In order to put the record straight, may I change that to Mr. Jennings?
Thank you. We do not want any confusion of identity.
I can understand the embarrassment.
The extravagant language which has been used is detrimental to what we all hope to achieve at the end of the day. The hon. Member for Doncaster referred to the "odious judicial procedure". I do not think that even he meant that. The judicial procedures outlined here may not be liked by some hon. Gentlemen opposite, but I do not think that the procedures deserve the term "odious".
Nor do I believe that hon. Gentlemen opposite ought to use such terms as the C.I.R. "being a tool of the court". My point is that by using that kind of emotive, extravagant language hon. Gentlemen opposite interfere with what we are doing in the Clause, and all I ask is that in discussing the Clause and the Amendment to it we consider also the Amendment put in by my right hon. Friend, Amendment No. 711.
What we are discussing in this Clause makes it quite clear that conciliation procedures are expected to be used right to the end. There is no question of having the matter decided to start with by the High Court judge who understands the feelings of the workers, or by one who does not. The whole purpose of the Clause, as shown by the Amendment added to it, is that nothing shall go to the court until every effort has been made to conciliate and get to the point where there is a voluntary agreement.
There will be no short cut to the court. It will come to the Secretary of State, who in turn will put it to the C.I.R. Every effort will be made to see that it is a voluntary agreement, because everybody concedes that an agreement based upon a voluntary decision is bound to be stronger and more lasting than one that is forced upon people, even if only to a limited degree.
The idea of the sanction of the court is very much a long-stop. I envisage it being used but very rarely, and I believe that if we discuss the Clause and the Amendment without emphasising that the court procedure will be used but rarely, and that the whole emphasis will be on conciliation, we shall be failing in our duty to present the words in the way in which they ought to be presented if we really want to get the desired results.
I am grateful to you, Mr. Jennings, for calling me to speak.
The noble Baronet the Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls)—I hope that I have not got my adjectives confused—cannot understand the extravagant language being used about the Clause. It is this same lack of understanding which runs through the whole Bill. I say that because to me the Clauses in this group represent the most heinous part of the whole Bill and, considering how I regard the Bill as a whole, that must mean that they are very bad, indeed. The long-run effect of putting into operation the procedures contained in the Bill will be that a working man could have conditions of employment imposed upon him——
Some working men —the under-privileged.
Order. These little conversations are very pleasant, but they are not in order.
Thank you, Mr. Jennings. No only are they not in order, but they are not particularly relevant. As I was saying, a person may have conditions of work imposed on him, and he will have had no opportunity, either as an individual, or as a member of an organisation——
Will my hon. Friend give way?
No. My hon. Friend must let me finish what I want to say, and then I shall give way. That person may be one of a group of workers not registered as a trade union for the purpose of the Bill. In those circumstances, he need not at any time be given a hearing under the procedures outlined in the Bill.
I apologise to my hon. Friend, and to you, Mr. Jennings, for making a remark from a sedentary position. My hon. Friend said that workers would be penalised. He knows that this will apply only to some workers. It will not apply to company directors, to highly paid civil servants, and to many others. These provisions will apply to the poor type of worker, to the organised worker, but not to the selected few whom the Tories represent. They will not be affected by the Bill.
If a director is a member of A.S.S.E.T., he could be affected by the Clause.
I make the point because it is of fundamental importance and relates to the whole principle underlying what we are discussing in these Clauses. A person can he forced to work under circumstances over which he has no control, other than giving his notice. It has been said that the Bill owes a lot to America. There was in force in America a statute which provided that if a slave escaped from the territory in which he was a slave and crossed into another State, even a free State, it was the duty of that State, if it apprehended the slave, to send him back to the State from whence he came and put him to work under conditions of employment which he had never negotiated. I suspect that the Solicitor-General while in Amercia has picked up some aspects of the Fugitive Slaves Act and introduced them into the procedure laid down in the Bill, because this is a most heinous principle.
When questioned earlier in the last debate about the Clause, the Secretary of State said that a reference would be made only when it was in the national interest or in the interest of the company concerned to do so. What does he mean by the national interest, and by the interest of the company concerned? What comprises the national interest? What comprises the interest of the company concerned?
If that is to be the approach to this Clause, it means that a dispute about what is called a procedure agreement can go on for a long time but, because it is not important, because it is just a matter of the national interest, nothing is done about it. The Secretary of State can decide in this situation what is or is not important and can refer it to. the Industrial Court. It is not a question of equity.
Again, the Secretary of State can make these applications off his own bat. The hon. Member for Peterborough suggested that before the parties go to the Industrial Court, there would be a long procedure of conciliation. He should read his own party's Amendment, which is merely a window-dressing operation. It says that, when they go to the court, they must inform the Secretary of State, who will then bring them together. But having given notice: nothing in the preceding paragraph shall prevent the party giving the notice from making an application under this section at any time after the notice has been given. That is two remedies being brought into existence.
We know about the remedy of the fine, whereby an employer or a union can get from the court a penalty extracted from the union or employer and punish the union or employer. It was argued that employers would not use this procedure because it would sour industrial relations in the plant. But under this procedure, all an employer has to do, either directly or with the Secretary of State's consent, is say to the Industrial Court that he is having difficulty. Once the Industrial Court comes into operation and goes through the procedures, it is contempt of court if what is being introduced is not honoured: it is no longer merely a dispute between the employer and employee. The employer can then say that he referred it to the Commission but that it is now the court and not he himself that is enforcing it.
So the main objection of many employers to the Bill is that the job which they wanted the State to do was not being done, and was being forced upon them, can be done through this Clause.
I do not think that the hon. Gentleman has quoted Amendment No. 711 correctly. It is true that they can put in their claim, but the first part says: The Industrial Court shall not entertain an application …", although it has been put in, until it has been put to the Secretary of State, and the C.I.R. and the conciliation that I mentioned have been used.
The Amendment says: the Secretary of State shall offer such advice and assistance to the parties giving the notice —the employer or the trade union, since he would scarcely advise himself, although he might well on occasion do so— and to such other parties as appear to him to be directly concerned, as he may consider appropriate with a view to promoting agreement"——
Order. The hon. Member should be a little careful. Although it is in order to refer to the next Amendment, No. 711, we are digressing too much. Reference is all right, because I know that this is tied up with the debate, but let us get away from explanations of and long quotations from other Amendments and back to the original Amendments.
With the greatest respect, the burden of the Solicitor-General's case when defining these provisions and arguing against the Amendments was on the reference to this Amendment——
Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman very skilfully addressed himself to the Amendments which we were discussing. There are ways and means of getting around rules of order and referring to Amendment No. 711, without directly quoting from it. I have recognised that these Amendments and No. 711 are tied up, but we cannot at the moment discuss No. 711 because we are on No. 672. Let us go ahead.
With the greatest respect to you, Mr. Jennings, I was not quoting the whole Amendment, only part of it to illustrate the point——
Order. It is not a question of whether the part is greater than the whole or vice versa . We are discussing Amendment No. 672 and that is what I have ruled we shall discuss. A passing reference to No. 711 is in order, but not a long discussion.
As a passing reference to No. 711, I beg to suggest that the hon. Baronet's interpretation of it is not the same as mine. This shows another of the difficulties in the Bill and on this occasion perhaps I may be right——
Then honour is satisfied all around.
But somehow the umpire always has the advantage.
We were talking about the parties who may apply to the Industrial Court, and there is a severe limitation. For example, there is a limitation: an employer may do it, or a trade union which an employer recognises, or a union which is party to a procedure agreement. But what happens about a union which, first, is not recognised by the employer, second, is not party to the procedure agreement, or, third, is in that sort of limbo of organised sections of workers not yet qualified or semi-qualified to be unions for the purposes of the Bill? This, again, is quite unsatisfactory.
A "unit of employment" is defined as an undertaking or part of an undertaking, and in the definition Clause in page 103, I see that "undertaking" includes a business and, in relation to any body of persons (whether corporate or unincorporate) whose activities would not, apart from this provision, be regarded as constituting an undertaking, includes the aggregate of those activities; which I interpret as meaning that a unit of employment is an undertaking, and an undertaking is an undertaking. I should be grateful for some further elucidation on that.
The whole of the procedures under the Bill and particularly under this Part of it goes to the root of our objection to the Measure, for we believe that to bring in the big stick either as a long stop or as an emergency procedure, with all the connotations that that has, will be particularly distasteful.
[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair ]
7.30 p.m.
I shall be mercifully brief, for there is only one point of importance I wish to raise at this stage.
I believe that this whole element of having adequate procedure methods is the key to our industrial relations, and while know that the C.I.R. can ultimately investigate, at the instigation of the Secretary of State or one of the parties concerned, it seems that this discretion will inevitably be used rarely, for certainly its impartiality will be questioned if it is initiated either, as is proposed, by the Government, or by one of the parties concerned, without the general consent of the other.
This is not to suggest that these reserve powers should not be retained, but rather that they should be used infrequently to keep their credibility. Indeed, it is likely that the smaller unit will escape any investigation, precisely for that reason. These small component suppliers, particularly in the engineering industry, can be crucial and can result in the lay-off of many thousands of workers.
This is why I suggest that the C.I.R. regional supervisory boards, which could investigate at their own instigation in a given area the effectiveness of the existing procedure and conciliation machinery, would be invaluable, as I pointed out in my maiden speech, for they would concern themselves only where either the existing procedures were non-existent or were not being properly used. Where these were confirmed to be inadequate, they could recommend to both sides how best to put their house in order, and if that advice was ignored, the matter could be referred to the Industrial Court, as mentioned in the Bill.
The fact that it would be a routine investigation would lend credibility to their impartiality in that they would not have been called in by the Secretary of State, the employer or the union. Obviously it is essential that the Bill has as much impact as possible in the short term as well as in the long term. This would be a step in that direction and I therefore commend it to my right hon. Friend.
I wish to bring the Committee down to earth and to consider the practicalities of the Amendment, particularly as I do not believe that they were taken into account when this part of the Bill was drafted.
My union is the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians' Association. The allied technicians'part of the union is open-ended in that those two words cover a multitude of jobs. Indeed, considering the multifarious activities which are represented by the members of my union, this association must be unique.
I do not believe that either side of the industry which my association covers wants this part of the Bill, particularly in view of the "Voluntary non-agreements", as they are called, that exist. We have so many classes of worker that an incredible number of small difficulties could arise if this part of the Bill became law in its present form. For example, some firms could recognise "electronic duplicators' mates", while others do not. Some firms pay a minimum rate of £32 10s. a week while others will not pay them that sum. It all depends on how strong the union representation is in the firm concerned.
The present state of affairs in this industry creates advantages and disadvantages for both sides. For example, while a job may not be recognised by one employer, it may be recognised by another. In the present set-up, one does not have to go through all the procedures that one would have to go through under this Measure when there is a dispute. Indeed, my union is not particularly unhappy if an employer says, "I will not recognise a rate-fixer as being eligible to join your union". The union simply says, "We will have a strike as from Monday" without there being the necessity to go through local, central and London conferences. As a result, the dispute is quickly settled.
The Committee might be interested to learn that the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians' Association does not have unofficial strikes. This is one union which can be relied on not to go in for that sort of thing. Perhaps the reason is because we give strike pay of £27 10s. a week. Any employer knows that when we go on strike we mean business. It is not long before the parties are round the table negotiating. I wish that other unions would take note of these facts. One does not need procedure agreements when talking about matters like recognition when one is paying £27 10s. a week strike pay, because disputes are settled quickly, usually within a couple of days. There are no long drawn out disputes and perhaps this is a point which should be considered further. Equally, often the employer does not want to recognise certain jobs because of changes that occur in the industry. A technician may be called a cost-control engineer one day and become a budgetary analysis man the next. Indeed, it would be hard for any employer to put a name to many of the jobs that his employees do, particularly when a technician with a Higher National qualification can have more than one string to his bow, as it were. He may be an estimator this month and a planner the next.
The employer is not anxious, therefore, to adopt a procedure which is legal, so frequently may he be changing the terms of the procedure. A draughtsman, electronics engineer, control man or value analysis operative may be something totally different within a matter of weeks or months. Indeed, some may have had pay increases, which would make it necessary for the employer to go through the whole procedure again.
If these difficulties are multiplied by the number of firms and technicians in the industry, one begins to see the sort of problem that one runs into with thousands of different recognition points; and this happens with a comparatively small union with about 100,000 members.
Once the courts are brought into this, further complications arise. One firm will say that a stress engineer should be recognised and given the minimum wage of £32 10s. Other firms will say that the agreement should not apply to stress engineers because in their firm they serve only six months training and receive not more than £18 10s. because they are no more than qualified clerks. One can easily imagine the chaos that could arise.
When we have no procedure and a quick one-day strike, with the chaps on full pay, the dispute is settled without delay, though it never reaches the headlines. For this reason I repeat that my union does not have unofficial strikes.
My fear is that once the courts are brought into this, we will find firms in one part of the country saying that only 13 grades in a certain category will be recognised, compared with other firms in other parts of the country recognising ten or 16 grades. Complete chaos could result, whereas under the present free and easy set up everything works perfectly well.
I do not want to interrupt the powerful recruiting effort the hon. Gentleman is conducting on behalf of his union. I am sure that his hon. Friends have been impressed by his remarks. Is he aware that if the interests concerned are happy with the present arrangements, there will be nothing to prevent the employers and the union side from continuing them?
That may be so, but under this part of the Bill the court comes into it and a non-recognition provision could affect some workers. My fear is that the Secretary of State might bring in the legal provisions when nothing of the sort is necessary. This constant reference in the Bill to the framework of law is too open-ended.
I urge the hon. Gentleman to consider this in another context, from the point of view of abortion. This is legal in this country. Doctors cannot be forced to perform abortions, even though abortions are within the framework of the law. If it is sought to apply such a parallel and to say that the law can force unions to do certain things, men will say that they cannot.
The same principle applies with regard to the registration of procedures. Thousands of different procedures are laid down with regard to different types of negotiation, all of which would never be used except as a long stop. The trouble starts when the long stop is invoked. When someone asks, "Who turned the handle at Girlings? Did the rate fixer have it down in writing?", one begins to come into the legal jungle which neither the C.I.R. nor the law courts will be able to settle. The ultimate reaction of the man on the shop floor will be, "To hell with this. There is only one way to get action from these people and that is to down tools". The men will still down tools and disputes will not be prevented.
These are some of the practical difficulties which are solved every day without strikes, without recourse to the courts, and without reaching the headlines; and union men do not want to see them become the subject of court disputes.
I have not intervened in the debates on the Bill for about three days. The debate on this narrow Amendment has again inflamed the prejudices of many hon. Members opposite. I always think that the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) speaks from the heart and I listen carefully to what he says. It is the inconsistencies in his argument that make me realise that he speaks from the heart. The hon. Member accepts that the law is in industrial relations. All he does not want is to have the law made into a frame. This is extraordinary.
The other prejudice which hon. Members opposite consistently trot out is that my hon. Friends and I have no knowledge of industrial relations, no knowledge of business, no knowledge of procedures, and no knowledge of negotiations. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Tom King) is probably more actively concerned with the modern trade unionist and has more understanding of these matters than any hon. Member opposite, because my hon. Friend is continually in touch with trade unionists; whereas on the benches opposite there are many extinct volcanoes who from the bottom of the caverns are still producing the same old tape recordings that they were using 10, 20 and 30 years ago.
7.45 p.m.
What I am about to say might be considered to be controversial. I believe—this is what is so important in weighing the value of the arguments advanced by hon. Members opposite—that the ordinary trade unionist in the factory has his views more realistically and credibly expressed by the Institute of Directors than by the T.U.C.
I said that my words might be considered to be controversial, but what the modern trade unionist in the factory is interested in are his wages, his conditions, his holidays, his motor car, his home, and his fringe benefits. He is no longer interested in the old shibboleths which so many hon. Members continue to pour out in his name. Nor is he afraid of the courts, in my view. On the whole, he is more afraid of the kangaroo courts. My impression is that the majority of ordinary trade unionists are longing to have protection from many of their unofficial leaders who do not represent their point of view.
I believe that during this debate hon. Members opposite are doing everything they can to stir up bad relations between employer and employee. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton) said that he is not here to improve the Bill; he is not interested in improving it; he is merely here to oppose. The hon. Gentleman is not using the time of the Committee by putting the knowledge which I believe he has to seeking to improve the Bill, by advancing arguments on later Clauses which might improve the Bill and make it more acceptable in his eyes for trade unionists. He is merely opposing it blindly. He said he did not care about improving it.
On a point of order. Sir Robert, just before you took the Chair the then Chairman, Mr. Jennings, ruled my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) out of order for making a passing yet constructive reference in the discussion on Amendment No. 711. So far the hon. Member for Harrow, West (Mr. John Page) has made absolutely no reference to any Clause or Amendment. Is he in order?
I think that there is substance in that point of order. The hon. Member for Harrow, West (Mr. John Page) must not be quite so general in his terms, If he comes a little closer to the Amendment he will be more effective and achieve his purpose.
I regret to say that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Mr. Carter) interrupted me in the middle of my peroration. I was arguing that the Opposition support the Amendment because they say that trade unionists are afraid of the new Industrial Courts. I have said that I do not think that hon. Members opposite represent the opinion of trade unionists. I believe that ordinary people are willing and hopeful that their cases, if they should ever reach the courts, will be heard impartially by a British court set up by my right hon. Friend.
Someone once said that in any great drama there is an element of farce. We have just had it. The hon. Member for Harrow, West (Mr. John Page) is the best argument I know for introducing the television cameras into the Chamber. The public would then see the irresponsible approach of some hon. Members to what is a fundamentally serious subject for millions of trade unionists. I want to deal specifically with the Clause and the Amendment because the question of procedure agreements is possibly the most important question for trade unionists. It is even more important than wage negotiations, because trade union officials cannot negotiate for increased wages or better conditions unless they have a good procedure agreement. Therefore, we must examine the Bill very closely, in so far as it affects the establishment of good procedure agreements within industry.
A good procedure agreement is much more difficult to negotiate than a good wage agreement, because there are two opposing points of view. The trade union wants a procedure agreement that will enable it to bring its grievance to the attention of management as quickly as possible, but management wants a protracted procedure agreement so that it can stall on problems for as long as possible.
Those of my hon. Friends who are in the engineering industry know that on many occasions we have been to Broadway House to talk to the Engineering Employers' Federation representatives. I have been among the negotiators. We might have a wage application. We are told at the end of presenting our case, "We shall give very careful consideration to your application. We shall let our constituent associations and individual member firms know of the case, and we shall resume our negotiations when we have their views." Weeks and weeks go by, and nothing happens. There was once a one-day token strike of nearly three million engineering workers in protest against the long delays, which are quite deliberate, because if the application is for an increase of 10s. a week for three million engineering workers, every week that the employers can stall negotiations they save £1½ million.
As a result of such ridiculous procedure agreements, trade unions are obtaining a settlement of their claims and immediately putting in a new application, because they say, "Months and perhaps years will pass before we reach the point where we can negotiate and have a decision on our application." That was what happened under the York Memorandum. It lays down an elaborate procedure, which I have had to follow as a trade union official. The agreement says that if there is a dispute in a factory every endeavour must be made to settle it on the spot, on the factory floor. If that is not possible, the next step is to hold a works conference with local trade union officials, and if there is failure to agree there is a local conference at which shorthand notes are taken and the district committee officials are present. If agreements still cannot be reached, there is a national conference at York or in London to discuss the matter, and months elapse before comparatively simple issues are decided.
And then it can be referred back to the factory floor.
My hon. Friend is correct. Is it any wonder that if something happened in a factory, such as a shop steward being unfairly dismissed or someone being victimised, the men will say, "To hell with this. We are going out until that shop steward is retained in the firm's employment."? They take that attitude because they know that it would take months to go through the procedure.
Many trade union officials—I have done it myself—look with a blind eye on this sort of thing. There have been occasions when some of my shop stewards have been unjustly dismissed and I have told my members that they must stay at work and allow me to take up the matter under the procedure agreement. Week passes week and conference passes conference. The matter comes back to the shop floor, and nothing happens. Meanwhile, the man affected obtains another job. Therefore, when such a thing happens a second time at a factory and I am telephoned to be told, "All our members have walked out, because we cannot get satisfaction", I reply, "I, as an official, must apply the agreement, but I know what I would do if I were in your position." And a wink is as good as a nod to a blind horse. As a result, many unofficial strikes take place because the procedure agreements are obsolete, because grievances cannot be discussed within as short a time as possible.
Therefore, a good procedure agreement is essential to a trade union. What are the obstacles that the Clause places in the path of securing such agreements? As I have said, the negotiations are bound to be protracted, because the employers want a long-drawn-out agreement. It suits their book to stall demands for wage increases or for improvements in working conditions. As a consequence, a period will be approached when there is failure to agree and then one or other of the parties can refer the matter to the Secretary of State or to the Commission. It is in those circumstances that the Commission can impose a procedure agreement on the parties without their agreement. That raises a new principle in English law, that organisations can be parties to agreements with which they do not agree.
Mr. R. Carr rose ——
Is the right hon. Gentleman denying that under the procedure in the Clause organisations can be parties to agreements with which they disagree?
I was only going to point out, as has been pointed out before, that so can employers under the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959, which I believe the hon Gentleman supports.
But here we have an entirely new situation, and the right hon. Gentleman is contradicting the policy of his own party. During the election campaign the Tories said, "We believe that voluntary contracts should be enforced by law". Many people said that it was quite reasonable to enter into contracts and hope that they would be honoured, but the Tories never said during the election that irrespective of the views of one side in a dispute an agreement would be imposed, even though one side disagreed. As a result, we are having procedure agreements forced on to reluctant trade unionists in factories.
How does the right hon. Gentleman think that will work? Does he think that the trade unions will work through a procedure agreement with which they disagree? The provision will stimulate them to take unofficial action, because they will say, "This agreement has been imposed on us. Therefore, we have no regard for it. We have no reverence for an agreement imposed by law, and so we shall take matters into our own hands".
There is other action, apart from strike action, that they can take. I was very interested to read a recent book on the strike at Pilkington by two Liverpool university lecturers, Lane and Roberts. who said: What does our study suggest? It suggests in the first place that none of the proposals in current circulation would have made any difference to the Pilkington strike. They add: If it were possible to use the law to intimidate the potential striker then we could expect his attention to be drawn to other methods of protest, for the strike is only one weapon in the arsenal: there remain the work-to-rule, the overtime ban, the go-slow, the sit-down strike, the sit-in or factory occupation, and sabotage. Would those who would like to legislate against the unofficial striker really like to encourage the alternatives? This might well happen in a situation where a procedure agreement has been imposed from outside and where it has no respect whatever from the workers who have to work to that agreement. Might not they take action that at the moment they are restrained from taking by their present voluntarily agreed procedure agreement?
8.0 p.m.
If a voluntary agreement is possible, it will be reached. The hon. Gentleman is now talking about the long-stop position, as we have called it—that of finally having an imposed agreement. What is the alternative? What is to be done in future? It is no good saying that this would not have worked in the Pilkington dispute. What could possibly have worked in that?
The claim is constantly being made that this is a long-stop. The attitude is, "It may be unfair but only a few people will suffer." It is like saying, "We must have hanging but only a few people will be hanged, which will be unfortunate." The situation is quite plain to the trade unionists in the shop. They say that they are prepared to negotiate with management a procedure agreement that is mutually agreed. Probably neither trade unionists nor management will get everything each wants. Compromise will have to be reached on procedure as well as on wages. In the last analysis, if it is to work it must be mutually agreed.
The point I am making, which has escaped the attention of the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Tom King), is that if an agreement is not mutually agreed, it will not work, whether one goes to the Commission or whether one is legally bound to enforce it. The point is that the workers will not enforce it and therefore it is a waste of time. In this situation it is farcical that Parliament should be wasting its time in suggesting legal remedies which will not be carried out in the workshop.
I speak from a life time of experience as a shop steward among work people. I know their psychology. They are fundamentally honest. They know that if they can reach a compromise with the employers they will do it. We have been told that traders in the olden days could shake each other's hands, that an Englishman's word was his bond, that once an agreement as reached it was respected, and so on, but that unhappily does not happen these days. One only has to read the financial columns about the City to understand that business men would apparently rather stab each other in the back. Nevertheless, these agreements are still, in the vast majority of cases, honoured in the workshop. Thousands of voluntary agreements are reached every day between shop stewards and employers. Nothing is written down. The employers say, "We will give so much for this job". We accept their word and they accept ours. It is a mutual agreement. It is done all the time.
There are, of course, rare instances when one side or the other breaks a verbal contract. Hon. Members opposite should be pleased at the number of agreements we have reached, not astounded by the very few cases where agreements break down. This is the central theme of a procedure agreement. There must be mutual agreement. The pattern which the right hon. Gentleman is setting is the path that will lead to disruption in industry because the trade unions will not regard the imposition of a law for which they have no respect as an inducement to them to obey it.
This sort of thing has happened before. A few years ago, the law was that street betting was illegal. However, millions of people placed their bets at street corners with bookmakers. Parliament in the end had to say, "Everyone is breaking the law. We shall have to change it and make bookmaking legal". The Government are creating now a situation where thousands of people in factories will have no regard for a law imposed on them in the interests of the employers and against their interests.
I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider very carefully where he is going. He has betrayed the pledge he made to the country that this would not be introduced. He has reneged on the promise he made during the election in that we are to get the element of compulsion which was not included in the Conservative Party election manifesto. It is no good his claiming that the Government have a mandate to carry this thing out. There was no mention of it in his party's policy at the election. I warn him that if the Bill is carried and this procedure is adopted in the factories, it will make it increasingly difficult to reach procedure agreements. As such agreements are central to the stability of industry and to good industrial relations, it is essential that the Clause be deleted.
I have listened to all of this debate. There is, of course, recognition on this side of the enormous wealth of practical experience among hon. Members opposite which naturally, in the very nature of things, is lacking to a degree on this side of the Committee. Particularly of course, one is enormously influenced by the sort of speech we have just heard from the hon. Member for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher). I have been influenced, in spite of myself, by speeches which have been made by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), particularly since he was given his new position. It is also impossible not to have been influenced by the speeches which have been made by the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and others of his ilk.
A lot of trade union Members, and even a lot of hon. Members who are not in the House at the moment who are paid trade unionists as well—there is nothing wrong with that—are putting a view. The view that has just been put by the hon. Member for Darlington is a view with which most of us would agree to this extent—that he knows what he is talking about through experience. But although he knows what he is talking about through experience, particularly about procedure agreements, it appears that he gives no thought at all to the fact that my right hon. Friend has spent—a point on which the Opposition must agree, if on nothing else—many years in working out how the situation of employment can be improved.
We now have a situation where so many hon. Members opposite are damning outright anything said by the Government on the question of industry. Why? Why do not the Opposition think about this? It is a fact that no one can deny that the vast majority of the people in this country want to see the problems of industry solved—and if anyone thinks there is no problem, let him look at Ford's at the moment. The Ford dispute appears to be nothing short of disgraceful. My right hon. Friend is putting the Bill forward in the most reasonable fashion. We all believe that he will accept an Amendment to Clause 35 which will meet the case, from an Opposition point of view. This is what they are arguing for and yet they do not have one iota of confidence in the Minister and disregard the fact that he will move that Amendment.
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman but he must deal with the group of Amendments we are discussing.
I am on the right group of Amendments—I think I am—I am referring to Amendment 711 which has already been discussed.—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] It has been referred to by the Minister and it is important in relation to this Clause. It is also true that the Solicitor-General will meet the Opposition on another point. Of course the hon. Member for Darlington knows that there are problems. Everything he said showed that while there are a large number of procedure agreements reached during the course of a year, there are unfortunately a number which are wrongly framed. This Clause is based upon the improvement of procedure agreements.
indicated dissent.
The hon. Gentleman shakes his head but it says: Remedial action where procedure agreement non-existent or defective If that is not expressing a will to have procedure agreements where they do not exist or to improve faulty procedure agreements, I do not know what is.
The hon. Gentleman was referring to Amendment 711. This is adding another stage to the procedure which has to be gone through to acquire a procedure agreement and the end result will be more delays, more frustration on the shop floor and probably more strikes.
Order. Before the hon. Gentleman resumes his speech we must be quite clear about Amendment 711. Maybe the Minister has referred to it, but I am sure that it was in passing. We have not reached it yet. We must try to keep to the Amendments we are discussing, which mainly concern consultation with the parties.
I accept your Ruling at once, Sir Robert, but, with the greatest respect, I have sat through the whole of this debate, in so far as it is possible without having a cup of tea from time to time. I have not intervened once, but I have heard hundreds of speeches which have been Second Reading speeches on Amendment after Amendment. I would ask for just a little bit of latitude.
My fundamental point is: why cannot the Opposition listen to the appeals and try to co-operate in some way with the Government in making this a better Bill instead of bitching all the time and making the sort of unreasonable speeches that we have had from the Opposition Front Bench time and again? I appeal to hon. Members such as the hon. Member for Darlington and other trade union members to try to help, because the vast majority of people are determined that this Bill shall take proper and good shape.
8.15 p.m.
The hon. Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell) has just given vent to an hysterical outburst which adds nothing to industrial relations. It is not in issue that both parties are concerned with what is a major industrial problem. What is in dispute in discussing the Amendment is the right way to solve that particular kind of problem. The question is whether we use an industrial relations court to solve the problem or whether we use the device of the C.I.R. which was set up by my right hon. Friend. I do not join in the criticism of the judiciary made by some of my hon. Friends. The difference is that it is right for a judge to give judgments in cases involving claims for damages in industrial accidents but it is wrong to ask a judge in effect to legislate for the relations between an employer and a union.
The Secretary of State must have in mind some particular industrial situation. So much of the discussion about this kind of Clause is far too abstract. He must have in mind some kind of industrial situation to which he intends the Clause to apply and I hope that he will give the Committee one or two examples. Does he intend it to apply to the sort of situation that occurred at Girlings or the British Steel Corporation or Lucas? Is this Clause directed at the situation when there is a continuous outbreak of strikes or irregular industrial action?
It is not a one-strike situation at which it is aimed, it is meant to deal with the sort of situation which arose at Girlings where there was a series of irregular actions and where people said something ought to be done. The difference of opinion over such a situation is whether that matter should be referred to the C.I.R., which was our solution, to try to achieve a settlement—the sort of thing done by my right hon. Friend on the Harvester agreement—or whether it should go to the courts.
Let us take the Girling situation, because this must be the kind of situation that the right hon. Gentleman has in mind. What will he do? He has a choice. If he accepts the Opposition Amendment he can refer the problem to the C.I.R. In fact he can do that under a later part of the Bill. He has, alternatively, the choice of referring it to the court. He appears before the court, with the trade union or unions and the employer. There is argument to the effect that there is a situation where strikes keep breaking out because of difficulties over procedure. The court may be convinced that that is the case so it refers the matter to the C.I.R.
The Commission—and this is the criticism of this provision—is then inextricably bound up in the way in which the court works. First the Commission has to formulate the legally enforceable contract and therefore it must have a lawyer, it must have a judicial view in try- ing to draw up such a contract. Secondly the Commission, when it has formulated this contract, must get drawn into court proceedings when the matter is argued afterwards by trade union and employer. The argument against using this kind of procedure is that it devalues the good work which can be performed by the C.I.R. in many other situations and leaves people ambivalent about the attitude of the Commission.
Let us continue with the example of Girling. The Secretary of State has argued before the court, the matter has been referred to the C.I.R. The Commission might, in the interests of better procedures, suggest something that runs contrary to the earlier provisions of the Bill. What will the Secretary of State do if the Commission suggests that the enforceable agreement should be on the basis of 100 per cent. unionism, and that the disputes have occurred because there is multi-unionism? What if the Commission suggests that the trouble has arisen because people are entitled to join any trade union they choose? What if the recommendations of the Commission run against the principles which are set out almost as a religious formula at the beginning of the Bill?
Let us assume that an agreement which does not run contrary to the general principles comes back to the court. At that point, I think I am right in saying—although the Bill is not clear—that only the trade union or the employer can apply to the court within six months to enforce the agreement which has been drawn up by the C.I.R., the Secretary of State not being a party to the proceedings. That is only under Clause 35 and not under Clauses 38 and 39. So something like six months will have gone by.
Does the Secretary of State think that Girling or a similar firm will then apply to the court to make a procedure agreement legally binding on the trade union involved? Even if the firm did that, about a year would have gone by, and what is there at the end of it? The sanction is that the employer then has to sue the trade union for damages in order to enforce it. That is what has happened at the end of the day. About a year has been wasted and the only sanction at the end is that the employer has to be involved in legal proceedings against the trade union. This happens only by definition. It happens that the employer will have to sue the trade union only where there has already been a long history of industrial disruption or strife. Is the Secretary of State suggesting that the solution in those difficult cases is to allow the employer to sue the trade union? Will that really improve the Girling situation, or similar situations?
The Secretary of State should re-read carefully the suggestions made by Donovan on this. Donovan suggested first that this kind of action should be subject to parliamentary control, and secondly, that the enforcement of legal sanctions should take place—and I do not even accept Donovan on this—only where it was likely to cause a diminution in the number of stoppages.
The Opposition are suggesting that in these difficult situations with which every Secretary of State for Employment has to concern himself and which deeply concern the country, this judicial process, this process of the enforcement of damages, is not the right way to do it, and that the suggestions contained in my right hon. Friend's Bill, which the Secretary of State has copied in later Clauses of his Bill, are the most sensible and sane way to deal with difficult and sometimes almost intractable situations. Bringing the law into it will only make matters worse.
8.30 p.m.
I will come to some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) in the course of my remarks. May I say first to the Committee that, in considering this Clause and these Amendments, we must remember a number of things which go to form the essential background. First, we have to remember the national interest. Many hon. Members have been discussing what it is right for the employers, trade unionism, trade union officials or trade unions as corporate bodies to put up with, but someone has to ask, what is it right for the public to put up with? There are certain circumstances where we have an over-riding duty even above the particular parties in industrial relations. There has been a tendency through these debates—not only on this Clause, but it has been particularly apparent in this debate—to imagine that somehow industrial relations and those who take part in them on both sides are so esoteric, so different, so specialised and so unlike anything else that happens in life that they have to be put all on one side and nobody else must ever have a look in, let alone a "say in". This has to be borne in mind.
The right hon. Lady realised this, and she felt at one stage that she must propose conciliation pauses. We, in somewhat different though not all that dissimilar circumstances, propose this remedy. I am sure that the right hon. Lady and I could agree at least that we were proposing, reluctantly, measures to deal with emergency situations—not measures for the normal regular conduct of industrial relations, but emergency procedures which might need to be imposed because of a difficult situation causing damage not only to a particular company but to the community at large.
Emergency procedures are always difficult; there are always objections to them. It is always doubtful how well or otherwise they will operate, but there are different points of view. First the Labour Government and now the Conservative Government are saying to the country that we need to have available emergency procedures to deal with some awkward situations which are causing loss not only to a particular company and a group of workers in that company but to the community at large.
That brings me straight into the second point which we must remember, namely, that these are emergency procedures only to be used in rare circumstances where there is the absence of a procedure agreement or where a procedure agreement although in existence is clearly defective. When this procedure is to be used, it can be initiated by the Secretary of State, or one of the parties, in which case the court has to be satisfied either of the absence of a procedure agreement or that it is defective, that that absence or defectiveness is holding back the development or maintenance of orderly industrial relations in the plant concerned, or that there have been substantial and repeated losses of working time in that unit.
In other words, it will not just be brought in, and the court will not allow it to be used if it is an isolated instance. Therefore, first of all, there are barriers to make sure that this can be used only, I will not say in an emergency as a statutory concept, but rather in the sense of in emergency circumstances.
The right hon. Gentleman has mentioned two examples of what will happen when Clause 35 is in operation. He did not mention examples under paragraph (b) where a procedure agreement is in existence and industrial action follows. There the paradox is complete when there is already an existing agreement and one is trying to foist another agreement on the people concerned. In that connection paragraph (b) as it stands does not have a principal verb. It is difficult when reading it to discover who may have recourse to what. The paragraph as it stands is fundamentally defective.
I will look at the syntax or grammar, or whatever it is I ought to look at, but it is a long time since I had lessons in English grammar. In regard to the substance of the hon. and learned Member's point, I am sorry if I omitted anything, but if I have, I accept the responsibility.
The point I was trying to make is that first of all the Secretary of State or any party has to go to the court and to convince it either that there is no procedure agreement or that, although there is a procedure agreement, there has been industrial action. That is the first gateway through which anybody wishing to use the procedure has to pass.
The second gateway is that, before anything further can happen, the Secretary of State then has to satisfy the court that the absence of that procedure agreement is impeding the development or maintenance of orderly industrial relations in that unit, or that there have been substantial and repeated losses of working time in that unit. This applies to the second condition as much as to the first. In other words, where there is a procedure agreement and there has been industrial action, it would have to be shown that there had been substantial and repeated losses of working time as a result of that industrial action. This is a narrow set of gates through which anybody who wishes to use the procedure has to pass.
Although the analysis might be sound, is the Minister satisfied that it is better to go to the court to seek a solution rather than to trust the T.U.C.?
I will come to that in a moment.
The point is worthy of a reply.
Let me reply to the point in my argument in the way I should like to follow. In these emergency cases there will be a big effort to promote a voluntary solution. There have already been long and sustained efforts to obtain voluntary solutions in the normal course of industrial working before this process happens at all. It will only be in cases in which the normal system is not working and in which there are conditions such as those which I have described that this will come into being. But even when this comes into operation, there will still be efforts to promote voluntary action before we get to any question of imposing a compulsory agreement.
The Committee must remember that I have down an Amendment which we shall discuss in greater detail a little later—I realise that I must only refer to it in passing—by which, before any of the parties other than the Secretary of State can even begin to operate this provision, they must come to the Secretary of State and report it to him to give him an opportunity at conciliation by voluntary methods before the parties go to the court. There is that provision to be borne in mind. But even supposing that the parties have gone to the court and either have not used my conciliation or my conciliation has not been successful, and that the court accepts that the tight conditions which I have described exist and the matter goes to the C.I.R., under Clause 37(3) and (4) the Commission is still specifically charged to try to bring the parties to voluntary agreement.
It is only when all that has been done, when all these efforts have been made to bring the parties to voluntary agreement, that the C.I.R. can report to the court an agreement which, in their opinion, can if necessary be legally enforced and, if the Committee likes, imposed on the parties. Then one of the parties can apply to the court to have such an agreement registered and made legally binding. Some hon. Members thought that this involved a distinction without a difference. I do not so regard it. It is necessary in the national interest that a Secretary of State should have the right to initiate this whole procedure causing this further inquiry, but it is not right that the Secretary of State himself should ever have the right to impose an agreement on parties by his own direct action. If anybody wishes to do that, it must be one of the parties.
This is in line with the resistance which I have always shown—and this is at least one thing about which I can agree with the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn. To put it crudely, I will not have the Secretary of State doing the employers' or anybody else's dirty work. If they wish to have it they must take the responsibility of asking for it and not expect somebody else to do it for them.
It has been said by hon. Members opposite that all this is a waste of time and that a year might have gone by. A year will have gone by presumably only when several previous years have been spent attempting, through all the normal channels, but, alas, failing to achieve the desired situation. What we propose will not replace the normal procedure. It will operate only when the normal procedures have, alas, failed and the situation is serious.
Another point which I hope the Committee will try impartially to remember is that the procedure certainly need not be one-sided. People discuss this as if it were specifically an anti-union instrument. The hon. Member for Darlington(Mr. Ted Fletcher) nods in agreement. I was interested in his speech. He spoke from personal experience of the effect which the absence of a procedure agreement or which a bad procedure agreement could have on a trade union and its members and all the employees in a works and of the difficulty which trade unions sometimes had in getting employers to turn bad procedures into good procedures. He said that it was the absence of a good procedure or the fact that an employer obstinately refused to improve a bad procedure which drove men to go on strike in desperation, or, because they knew that it would take a year to decide the matter, forced them to put in a new claim the day after the previous settlement.
The hon. Gentleman said that those things often flowed from a bad procedure agreement which the trade unions could not get an employer to change. In those circumstances, let the trade union use the procedure we propose. Let it put pressure on the employer, as this procedure would allow, if, after persistent voluntary effort, it has failed to get the employer to mend his ways and to make a better procedure agreement. That course will be open to the union. This procedure could be of value to both sides.
That is the background against which we must consider the Clause. I admit that this proposal was not contained in "Fair Deal at Work" and that we have added it since the Election. I make no secret of that; I cannot do so. We added it after very careful consideration of all the circumstances. But I emphasise that it is an emergency procedure. The general rule to be applied is precisely that laid down in "Fair Deal at Work". This procedure is entirely for emergency use.
Hon. Members opposite—and I will repeat this point only once more—cannot say that this is an entirely novel legal principle in law, let alone in industrial relations law, because the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959, can and does impose unilaterally on an employer terms and conditions which he had no part in negotiating. He had no part in making the agreement. Somebody else wanted it to be made.
I agree with the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, but one cannot deny that it imposes on a party unilaterally terms and conditions in an agreement in which he had no part.
[Sir ALFRED BROUGHTON in the Chair ]
I am very interested to hear what the right hon. Gentleman is saying about the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959. Would he also agree in principle with the National Arbitration Tribunal Order, 1950, for example, which imposed that sort of term on all employers and which the British Employers Federation moved to have repealed, and which his Government—I think that he was a member at the time —repealed?
I remember that condition, although I think that I had just left the Government when that happened. I am not making a point of that. That Order, while it worked, did a great deal of good. But it depended on both sides of industry going along with it, because when either side of industry seriously objected to it, it was not sustained. It was replaced by the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959, and absence of that Order was one of the reasons which made that Act necessary. Whether it is a parallel or not, in any direct sense, the 1959 Act to which I am referring is another example of an Act of Parliament which imposes an agreement on parties who have not participated in reaching that agreement. Therefore, the principle is not a new one.
The right hon. Gentleman is being unfair to the Committee. Surely there is a fundamental difference between, on the one hand, the provision of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, which seeks to extend to recalcitrant employers that which has been voluntarily and freely negotiated and agreed in the first place, and, on the other hand, the provision of the Bill, which seeks to impose on both employers and unions alike that to which they are not prepared to agree.
Whatever else one may say, that difference did not commend itself to the Donovan Commission in the procedure which my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General mentioned, although as he made clear, it is not directly comparable or a pattern for that which we are introducing in this group of Clauses. Nevertheless, it is related to them. But the method of enforcement we are speaking of is the same as in Donovan, which drew the parallel of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959 in the paragraphs to which my hon. and learned Friend referred. I am not resting on that comparison, but on the merits of the case we put forward. There is that other example, so it is not true to say that this is a unique case of an Act which imposes terms and conditions on someone who is not party to an agreement.
The right hon. Gentleman went through the whole of the procedures in which one can attempt to enforce sanctions against either a trade union or an employer. Having gone through all the procedures, and assuming that the Industrial Court gives a decision against the trade union, presumably the employer then has to sue the union for compensation in the event of the union not applying the decision of the Industrial Court. Am I correct in that respect?
That is not a question to which there is a simple "Yes" or "No". First, the concept of the Industrial Court finding against the union is a false one. All that the court would be asked to do would be to confirm the terms of agreements prepared not by the employers but by the C.I.R. That would not be finding against the union. Second, supposing that the court confirmed a legally binding agreement, the hon. Gentleman asks whether the employer would have to sue the union. Of course not. It would be up to the employer to decide whether he thought, in all the circumstances, that it would be beneficial to do so. The very fact that we do not always decide to use our legal, civil rights does not mean that their existence is without influence or benefit. It is not always necessary to go to court to make the law of value. Hon. Gentlemen opposite to seem to forget that.
In any case, there is another remedy open to the employer or the union—for it could be a case in which the employer was not fulfilling the conditions. It is to go to court and to ask for an order that the party not doing what it should, in fact should do so in future. That is another possibility. But the number of cases which go to court will be very few and far between. For one thing, to make it worth suing, the employer would have to be able to prove to the court that he had suffered substantial damage, and so on. This talk of suing is not tremendously important. Certainly it is not important in the minds of those who support the Bill.
Against that background, I make my remarks about these Amendments. No. 672 wishes to include early in the Clause that the Secretary of State should act only "after consultation with the parties." As my hon. and learned Friend said, we cannot accept that wording. But we are not out of sympathy with the idea, and I believe that the Government Amendment on the Notice Paper to some extent meets that limited point in that we say that the parties cannot go to the court without having first come to the Secretary of State.
Perhaps this would be a convenient moment for me to reply to the right hon. Lady's question about the position of the C.I.R. The Commission as such, of course, has not pronounced on the Bill one way or the other. In view of its position, it would be most improper if it did. However, I have had what I regard as fruitful and valuable discussions with Mr. Woodcock and his colleagues on the role that the C.I.R. will play under Clauses 35 to 50.
One of the results of those discussions has been Amendments Nos. 711 and 714 which emphasise the view we share with the Commission that the use of the enforceable powers should be a last resort where efforts to resolve problems by conciliation and, where appropriate, by voluntary references to the Commission have failed—but only as a last resort. I believe that the approach in Clauses 35 to 50, as modified by these Amendments, commends itself to the Commission as achieving a reasonable balance between voluntary reform and special statutory provisions for dealing with these difficult problems after, but only after, voluntary methods have clearly failed. I think that the Amendments have gone a long way to meet the points that the Commission wished to make on this part of the Bill and have been welcomed by it.
Amendments Nos. 673, 675 and, effectively, 676 all wish to substitute "Commission" for "court". There is not a great deal that I can add to what my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General said. As he explained, this is a deliberate separation. We believed that it was right to have this filter before getting to the C.I.R. Normally, the filter is the Secretary of State. I hope that that traditional voluntary reference will continue to play a substantial part in the work of the Commission. The more the better. The more the references to the C.I.R. which come about in that way the better I shall be pleased, because that is the best way to work it.
Where we might have emergency situations to deal with—we must prepare for having them—there must be some slightly more obtrusive right to go to the C.I.R. If they were to go direct, the C.I.R. might not only have an uncomfortable amount of work to do other than its main task of investigation, inquiry and persuasion, a lot of unnecessary sifting work, but it might get involved in what could become highly controversial points about deciding whether such and such a case merits this treatment.
We genuinely believe that the C.I.R. is better insulated from what could be the uncomfortable task of deciding whether a particular case did or did not merit, in the national interest, the treatment which we have described. Therefore, the C.I.R., in all its work, would be involved in the persuasive and investigatory processes which it is designed, and has shown its ability, to carry out.
Finally, I turn to Amendment No. 674, the purpose of which is to leave out "irregular action". We cannot agree with this. We believe that "irregular action", as defined in the Bill, can be as damaging as a strike. If we are to be able to look at anything, we ought also to be able to look at "irregular action".
Therefore, we cannot accept these Amendments, although we are in considerable sympathy with the thought behind Amendment No. 672. I hope our Amendments show that. I therefore ask the Committee to reject the Amendments, but to think about them against the background of the need for and the merits of the Clause which I have outlined.
It would be out of order for me to reply to the comments made by the right hon. Gentleman about Amendments Nos. 711 and 712, because they are the subject of a separate debate and have not been called by the Chair as part of the group of Amendments under discussion. For reasons which my hon. Friends will be deploying later, we frankly think that the Amendments to which the right hon. Gentleman attaches so much importance really do not make the slightest difference to the principle with which we are concerned. Paragraph (b) of Amendment No. 711 certainly goes out of its way to reinforce the validity of the principle behind Clause 35 which we are challenging.
It is necessary at this stage to point out that the right hon. Gentleman does not seem to have grasped the key point of the group of Amendments which we have been discussing. The right hon. Gentle. man referred to all except the vital Amendment No. 676. I do not want to sound discourteous, but when the right hon. Gentleman says that he is in sympathy with Amendment No. 672, in page 25, line 8, after 'may', insert: 'after consultation with the parties', I say "Thank you for nothing". Frankly, the parties will not be frightfully excited if they are consulted about when and how a procedure agreement is to be imposed upon them.
What we are seeking is embodied in Amendment No. 676. We are not only wishing to substitute the C.I.R. for the industrial court at an earlier point; we are saying that the C.I.R., having examined the defective procedure situation, should then proceed to try to find a remedy. The crucial words are, the Commission should put to the representative bodies in the industry proposals for reform and seek to obtain their implementation by voluntary agreement. This is the great divide between us on this Clause.
I am sorry if I did not refer to the Amendment in detail, but I thought that the right hon. Lady had taken the point that Clause 37(3) charges the Commission to do just what she is talking about.
We are in a difficulty in discussing this complex Bill, because everybody has to get his cross-references right. One almost needs a computer to do it. The trouble with Clause 37 is that the right hon. Gentleman's attempt to get a voluntary agreement is merely an interim stage, and that at the back of it lies the threat of the ultimate sanction of Clause 39 if a voluntary agreement is not reached, and the Clause which we are debating now is the launching pad for this whole succession of Amendments embodying what we think is one of the most obnoxious provisions in an obnoxious Bill.
In saying that, I want to assure the right hon. Gentleman that he has no monopoly of concern for the national interest. We get a little tired of these sermons interjected into the middle of what is really a pretty tyrannical piece of legislation. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that the workers about whom we are talking are part of the nation. They are 25 million people worth of it. These are the people about whom we are talking.
The right hon Gentleman may say that the country is behind the Government, and that trade unionists want these reforms carried through, but what he is forgetting is that we are not talking about a great monolithic piece of stone which can be moved about in favour of one thing, or against another. I shall tell the right hon. Gentleman what the country, or at least these 25 million people who are part of it, think. They think that if it is their grievance, and their dispute, they are in the right, and that any action they take is justified, but if it is the other chap's grievance and dispute which is inconveniencing them, then the Government ought to be doing something about this industrial anarchy. This is human nature.
When we talk about serving the national interest, ought not we to stop and analyse it a bit? I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that our definition of the national interest is that it lies in achieving greater human fulfilment in industry as the only basis for industrial peace. One cannot build industrial peace by creating a sense of outrage. That is something that I learned, and it is something which I believe the right hon. Gentleman will learn in the course of time.
Nor is it possible to achieve human fulfilment in industry by imposing on people laws which they feel are intrinsically unjust, and I say to the right hon. Gentleman quite seriously that Clause 35, and the complex of Clauses that goes with it, are doing just that, because they are compelling people to observe agreements which they have not made.
It used to be a central Conservative principle that it was intolerable to interfere with people's freedom in that way, and the right hon. Gentleman has quoted the Contracts of Employment Act. He did not quote it in aid in "Fair Deal at Work" where, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars) said, the Government stated categorically that it would be wrong in principle to accord to collective agreements the quite exceptional status of a contract which must be enforceable regardless of the wishes of the parties. We say that there is a major point of principle here which we will fight with all our strength, because it is a gross invasion of individual human rights and liberty.
9.0 p.m.
This is the fictitious agreements part of the Bill, dealing with the procedure for imposing a so-called agreement by law on parties who have not agreed to it, and culminating in the fantastic phraseology of Clause 39, which says that, when all these procedures have been followed and all these gateways have been passed, in the end, the provisions drawn up as a result of this procedure shall have effect as a legally enforceable contract as if a contract consisting of those provisions had been made between those parties.
But it has not been made: that is the simple point of principle. Right hon. Gentlemen are distorting the law of contact when they say that an agreement should have the force of contract as if it were a contract when it is nothing of the kind. I believe that it is a very bad principle to embody in our law that, as the Duchess in "Alice in Wonderland" said, words in this law shall mean what the Government say they mean. So they say that there is a contract here, and the law must be mobilised behind what they say.
Then, to add insult to injury, the unions are told that they have a legal obligation to police agreements that they never made. Clause 34 imposes more stringent obligations on people who are not parties to a contract than the ordinary law of contract imposes on people who are. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman had the honesty to admit that this is not the policy on which the Government fought the election, so it is a policy on which they have no mandate. Indeed, this principle is the very opposite of that on which the election was fought, and on which the whole of their industrial relations policy was to be built.
If, only a short while ago, it was still wrong to accord to agreements this exceptional status, why is it right now, a few months after we and the electorate were told that the Government's policy was embodied in "Fair Deal at Work"?
Of course, some people, like the hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls), can swallow anything. He said that we were using extravagant language when we said that the judicial procedure embodied in these Clauses was odious. But I wonder whether even he did not feel the slightest twinge of concern when he heard the right hon. Gentleman say, as he said in an earlier part of our debate, that the Government were not really going back on their election policy, because there were three gateways which had to be gone through before the non-agreement could be imposed as if it had been agreed.
The right hon. Gentleman dismissed this, saying that it was only a little one, an exceptional one, an emergency one. We are all told on this side that we are being extravagant if we say that it is an obnoxious principle to which we will never subscribe, but would we not all have a different view if a contract were to be imposed on one of us? There is a practical parallel. Consider what would happen if the Minister wanted to buy my house and I did not want to sell. Suppose the Government had passed a law saying that I could be compelled to sell against my will because the right hon. Gentleman desperately needed a home. The Minister might then say that his latest Measure was justified, because he would have to go to the Industrial Court and satisfy it that he was without a house and that the lack of a house was leading to matrimonial disputes in his family.
The right hon. Gentleman might go on to argue that if that court was satisfied, it could refer the matter to an expert body of estate agents to recommend whether the right hon. Gentleman's need was serious and whether my house was the most suitable for his purpose. He might then argue that if that expert body was satisfied on all those points, it could call the two of us together to see if we could agree on the sale; and, failing that, the right hon. Gentleman could go to the court and get an order.
The right hon. Lady has been describing almost exactly the procedure that has existed for many years under the compulsory purchase provisions. I was concerned at one stage in a case in the Borough of Brent in which people who had had homes built to their own design and had purchased them with their own money—these were quite new houses—had to go through exactly the procedure which she has described because their homes were being expropriated to provide homes for other people. The right hon. Lady has given a good illustration of the way in which society intervenes for the better of the community as a whole.
I am glad that we have got that clear because the hon. and learned Gentleman is now saying that compulsory provisions are being put into the heart of what has been called a voluntary system of industrial relations reform. We now have his admission that what he and his colleagues have called "the disease of British industrial relations" requires, in their view, the equivalent of compulsory powers in a slum clearance situation.
This is their definition of the industrial relations scene. I am glad that I brought the hon. and learned Gentleman to his feet to define his stand on this, because that attitude is totally incompatible with all the fine words that we have heard from the Government on this issue. We have been told how the Government want to get voluntary reform through the C.I.R. and how they are anxious to retain this provision only as a kind of reserve power.
The fact, of course, is that this is an additional tyrannical dimension which has been wheeled in only at the last minute. Hon. Gentlemen opposite have made great play with what was to be achieved by making collective agreements legally enforceable with the consent of both sides. It is now obvious that this is an irrelevant piece of legislation that will not work and that, instead, compulsory powers are now being wheeled in.
Although we have been told that this will be an emergency procedure to be used as a reserve power, the Minister can give no such guarantee because he is taking away from the control of Parliament the use of this power and putting it into the hands of the independent courts. This is another of the great divides between us, for we believe that he should be responsible to the House of Commons for the powers he takes.
We have had from the Minister the usual tape recording to show how, in his view, this is all justified by "In Place of Strife". It is time that the Minister ceased hiding behind a woman's skirts and had the courage of his Bill. The truth is that in relation to all these matters, "In Place of Strife" said the exact opposite, and I suggest that we settle this, at any rate on this issue, by examining a few quotations. On page 14 we have the rôle of the C.I.R., and paragraph 37 states: Its contacts with trade unions, employers' associations and individual firms will be regular and continuous. It will need to gain their confidence and co-operation while remaining an independent and candid critic. It would be handicapped if at the same time it had juridical authority …". As to the attitude on the legal enforceability of collective agreements, paragraph 43 of "In Place of Strife" says this: There are those who argue that one of the main causes of unofficial strikes is the fact that collective agreements in this country are not legally enforceable contracts … This would not only be ineffectual; it could prove a deterrent … 44. There are those who go even further and would make all collective agreements legally binding whatever the wishes of the parties. Here again the Government believes such a step would hinder, not help … Paragraph 89 of the document contains these words: …some … would like to see the Government, or an independent agency such as the C.I.R., with statutory powers. taking from employers the responsibility for negotiating good procedure agreements, by imposing them if necessary on both sides and then ensuring that they are enforced. For reasons given in paragraphs 37 and 45 the Government rejects this approach. Therefore, it is impossible for right hon. Gentlemen to call "In Place of Strife" in aid of this, just as it is impossible for them to call on Donovan, whose whole theme was that we must concentrate first on the reform of voluntary procedure. Give the C.I.R. a chance— by heavens, it has been in existence for only a few months—and do nothing—this was Donovan's theme—to hinder that voluntary development.
In paragraph 501 of its Report the Donovan Commission said this: This is our central recommendation. We cannot recommend anything that may jeopardise its success. That is our stand tonight. We believe that these proposals are not only inquitous in principle but will be counterproductive and will put back the clock of voluntary reform.
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 264, Noes 307.
I beg to move Amendment No. 711, in page 25, line 28, at end insert: (2A) The Industrial Court shall not entertain an application made under this section by a party other than the Secretary of State unless that party, before making the application, has given notice to the Secretary of State of the proposal to make it; and, where such a notice has been given (a) the Secretary of State shall offer such advice and assistance to the party giving the notice, and to such other parties as appear to him to be directly concerned, as he may consider appropriate with a view to promoting agreement between them with respect to the matters to which the application would relate, and for that purpose may refer any question relating to those matters to the Commission for examination by them, but (b) nothing in the preceding paragraph shall prevent the party giving the notice from making an application under this section at any time after the notice has been given. It might be convenient, Sir Alfred, to consider at the same time the following Government Amendments:
No. 712, in page 25, line 29, at beginning insert: 'Subject to the last preceding subsection'. No. 713, in Clause 36, page 26, line 1, leave out '35' and insert '35(3)'.
If the Committee agrees.
We come to the Government Amendment which was foreshadowed in the previous debate. It was referred to obliquely by a number of hon. Members who kept skilfully in order, and also by my right hon. Friend. The right hon. Lady—and I was sorry to hear it—said that this Amendment contributed nothing to the Clause, as she saw it, in mitigation of its provisions.
I should like to stress what my right hon. Friend said when he referred to the whole of the provisions of Clause 35, that these are emergency procedures, to be used only in rare circumstances. That has to be borne in mind. We are strengthening the Clause by the introduction of the Amendment. My right hon. Friend referred to the value of the discussions he had with Mr. Woodcock, Chairman of the C.I.R. One of the results of those valuable discussions is this Amendment It is fair to say that the Commission was anxious that the recourse to statutory procedure should be a matter of last resort. All along that has been the Government's view about the Bill, despite some of the allegations made by hon. and right hon. Members opposite. This element of Clause 35 will be a valuable provision because it will ensure that any party who makes application will have, first of all, to approach the Secretary of State and thereby the process of conciliation will immediately come into operation. We have maintained that there is conciliation built into every part of the Bill because this is a Bill to improve industrial relations. We are prepared to admit that originally it was lacking from Clause 35, and we are happy to bring this Amendment forward.
Those hon. Members who over the years have had contact with the Department of Employment, the old Ministry of Labour, know that it has experts within it, as well as excellent manpower services and conciliation officers who always do what they can to resolve problems, often with a great degree of success. In this case, before there is recourse to law these conciliation officers can have a marked impact upon the cases before them.
I know that the right hon. Lady objected to this, but it is fair to emphasise paragraph (b) of the Amendment which maintains the right of the individual who is applying for access to the court, however strongly, however mistakenly, although he must give notification to the Secretary of State.
We think that this provision must be maintained. Every chance will have been given to voluntary means of resolving difficulties, even in the exceptionally persistent and serious trouble spots with which Clauses 35–40 are designed to deal. In all the circumstances, bearing in mind the consultations which we have had with the C.I.R., the worth while tributes which have been paid to the C.I.R. and the fact that we shall be doing a signal service by including this Amendment which strengthens those procedures that enable conciliation to take place, I ask the Committee, with a good deal of confidence, to support the Amendment.
9.30 p.m.
I reject the Amendment principally because it gives to the Secretary of State rather more selective powers. In the preceding debate the hon. Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell) said that the Opposition were making no effort to concede that the Government were trying to deal fairly and properly with industrial relations and the matter of pro- cedure. If the Government are prepared to be more all-embracing on procedure, why are they so selective in looking at those cases where procedure is found to be at fault? I reject the notion that the Secretary of State can be given powers by the House of Commons to decide whether to look at a particular area of procedure——
I do not want the hon. Gentleman to be misled. I was trying to say that, although many hon. Members on the Labour back benches have been constructive, by and large the Front Bench has condemned the Bill out of hand.
I do not separate myself from anything that my Front Bench has said or any of my hon. Friends. There is a fair degree of unanimity among us.
The car industry plays a major part in my constituency. About 25,000 of my constituents work in it. Procedure is the root cause of the vast majority of problems in the car industry, and if we had a better form of procedure there would be no need for the Bill. During the summer I spent a fortnight in the industry and everyone I met complained about the procedure.
We are looking at the problem in a negative way. We see procedure as being concerned simply with disputes, whereas it is really a two-way exercise. If management wants to introduce a new system of working, a change in the pattern of working or a variation in the labour force, the procedure should be there to enable the workpeople who are affected to be fully informed. Yesterday the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) ended his speech by saying that there was a tremendous amount of good will in industry and there was consultation and negotiation, but this is not so.
Just before Christmas Lord Stokes and the board of British Leyland summoned to Berkeley Square the shop stewards of the whole British Leyland combine. He told them that 5,000 workers were to be made redundant. There was no consultation, no effort to give the workers prior warning of the decisions the company had to take. Because of that sort of incident, we on this side of the Committee reject the notion that there can be any real sincerity and intention by the Government to deal adequately with the problems of procedure, joint consultation, negotiation, and so on, in industry.
How long after the meeting of Lord Stokes with the trade unions were the 5,000 men to leave the company's employment?
The first started to leave on 1st January.
What about the rest?
The rest have probably gone by now. As a matter of principle, it would not have made the decision any more palatable to the people involved if they had known that they were not going for six months. The principle with which we are concerned is the fact that there was no consultation.
The problem of procedure is all the more important when one considers that the manufacturing industry accounts for 85 per cent. of all disputes and that half of those 85 per cent. are attributable to causes other than disputes about wages. It is commonly believed on the Conservative benches, in the Press, and also in the country, that industrial disputes are principally about wages. This is not so. They relate to working conditions, job continuity and bad supervision, all of which constitute industrial difficulties which often lead to disputes. Procedure has to cope with a wide variety of problems, not just wages. Half the time procedure is concerned with human problems.
What does the Secretary of State propose to do to meet this situation? The Government intend to introduce the law. They have said it is merely a long-stop. People who are working day by day in industry will have at the back of their minds that any misadventure could land them and their colleagues in the court. I suggest that in dealing with human problems, the less recourse one has to the law and the big stick the better.
I regard this provision as insidious and a violent intrusion into the way in which we in Britain over the last 50 years have conducted our industrial life. There is the possibility under this Clause that a worker may be compelled to stay at his place of work. The Government may say that this is not so, and that this is still a long-stop. But if it is such a wild improbability, why have it in? The Government have conceded that the Bill may compel men to stand by their benches and work under orders.
If there is one thing plain about this Bill, in contrast to the proposals in "In Place of Strife"— [Interruption.] Hon. Members opposite must forgive me for pointing out the contrast, although they may be embarrassed or disquieted by it. Clause 114 expressly provides that no court can compel an employee to do any work or to attend at any place for the purpose of doing any work. It is a misconception to suggest that these provisions will, can or conceivably might oblige someone to stand by his bench and work. That is a misunderstanding.
Hon. Members on this side of the Committee have as much accumulated wisdom at their elbow as hon. Members opposite, but it is interesting that whenever we come to a critical point we are accused of misconception. It is not right for the Solicitor-General to refer to "In Place of Strife" because that was superseded by a Bill. If it is proposed that we should talk about what the Labour Government would have done, we should be talking about that Bill.
I do not intend to intervene often, and perhaps not again, during the debates on the Bill, but I want to refer to the problems in the car industry which is probably not typical of British industry but will be very typical of industry of the future. We are moving into an age of automation and mechanisation when it will be necessary for industries to work without stopping. I ask the Committee to consider the demands which will be placed on ordinary men and women. This is the age, not of the craftsman, but of the semi-skilled or unskilled man doing four or five operations 20 times an hour in assembling a motor car. The pace of life on an assembly line is extremely fast. We should consider in a human way the problems which arise from that situation and not treat men merely as parts of machinery. The procedures which govern the working conditions of men and women should have some relevance to the job that they are doing.
It is of vital importance that the procedure in the car industry should work quickly. To give some indication of the pattern of procedure obtaining in the car industry, I hold up for hon. Members to see an example of the procedure which must be gone through when a dispute arises. It is quite a lengthy process. It is often not possible to settle a dispute for six, nine or 12 months.
If the Government had wanted sincerely and earnestly to do something constructive about the problems of procedure, they would, in advance of the Bill, have had deep, profound and lengthy discussions with the C.B.I. and with employers.
The hon. Gentleman held up an example of a procedure agreement which might be a model agreement; I would not know whether it was without taking expert advice. But in this Clause we are dealing with defective or non-existent procedure agreements. It is for that reason that the Government are doing something about the matter.
In part I accept that, for the minority of cases which the Secretary of State will ever refer to the court. If the Government intend to take a sweeping look at procedure, why does the Secretary of State have to examine every case which comes before the court? That is why I level the charge of insincerity at the Government. Why do they have to examine them? If either an employee or an employer came to the Government with a case where it found that procedure was inadequate, why would the Government have to vet it? Would the Minister like to comment on that? He would not.
In the engineering industry we work to an agreement signed in 1922 when the trade unions were at their weakeest. With the introduction of the Bill, the chances of getting that altered in the immediate future are negligible. It will stop any further attempt to get to grips with problems arising from outdated procedural agreements.
That Clause is unacceptable principally because it gives rather sweeping powers to the Secretary of State. The problems associated with the introduction of the law have been adequately dealt with. I believe in voluntary negotiating agreements and relationships between workers and employers, and the Government have run well in the face of that principle. For that reason, I ask the Committee to reject the Amendment.
I am glad that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Mr. Carter) referred to the motor car industry and the engineering industry. I recognise that he has particular knowledge of the latter and no doubt a good deal of constituency experience of both of them. I should like to impress upon him that we on these benches, like no doubt most of his colleagues, are not doing any of these things in any sort of foolish manner or with a desire to hammer any particular side of industry.
I visited the Geneva motor show about a year ago and inquired about the delivery times of different cars. I was appalled to find out that whereas Volkswagen, Fiat and most of the Continental cars could be delivered in a matter of days, most British cars sometimes involved waiting times of weeks. This is the measure of the competitive challenge which faces our industry. I should be the last to attribute the delays to a single reason. I do not attribute them to labour relations or to any particular reason. In every respect, in our industrial management and efficiency, the modernisation of our plant, investment, and labour relations, we have to be better than the rest of the world.
Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that Volkswagen was established under the most ideal of conditions, that as employers they are far superior to any in this country, and that they have within their industry procedural agreements which are heaven-like in terms of the agreements in our motor industry?
I accept a good deal of what the hon. Gentleman says about Volkswagen. I only emphasise that, in all these different facets of our industrial production, we need to be as good as if not to excel our competitors, and labour relations is one of many facets.
The hon. Gentleman also referred to a case concerning British Leyland. I do not know the exact facts, and I do not question what he said, but I am sure that I speak for all of my right hon. and hon. Friends when I say that this side of the Committee would not uphold any management which gave inadequate notice of a change of policy of that kind. This Clause, together with the Government Amendment, will enable employees to make application in the prescribed manner to remedy such defects.
The proposed machinery is available for all parts of industry to amend and improve procedural deficiencies——
Not for the postmen.
I wish that the hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. Robert Edwards) would not introduce irrelevancies when I am dealing with the points raised by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Mr. Carter). The hon. Member for Bilston has referred to another service. In any industry or service, the Government's proposed machinery, if used properly, could improve existing procedural defects.
The hon. Member for Northfield, for some strange reason, said that he opposed the Government's Amendment. But if it is accepted, it can only improve the Government's proposed machinery. Earlier, Amendment No. 672 was moved from the benches opposite asking for the insertion of the words …after consultation with the parties".
They will get that.
My hon. Friend is right. The Government Amendment embodies the sort of consultation for which right hon. and hon. Members opposite ask. I can understand the hon. Gentleman's objection to the main Clause, but I cannot understand why he objects to the Amendment. Whatever objections he has to the Clause, the acceptance of the Amendment is bound to make it better and less objectionable to him.
Why is it necessary for the Secretary of State to be selective? If he is sincere in his intention to make procedural agreements and arrangements across the board in industry as near perfect as possible, why does he introduce this sieve?
If the hon. Gentleman looks at the wording of the Clause, he will see that it lays down merely that no application shall be entertained from either party other than the Secretary of State unless that party gives notice to the Secretary of State, who thereupon "shall"—he has the duty— … offer such advice and assistance to the party giving the notice, and to such other parties as appear to him to be directly concerned, as he may consider appropriate with a view to promoting agreement… In other words, we are back to the main objective of achieving agreement before resorting to the long-stop powers on which right hon. and hon. Members opposite have commented so adversely.
By giving another requirement for the Secretary of State to be consulted, the Amendment is laying a duty on my right hon. Friend which is liable, in the small number of cases likely to arise, to lessen the resort to the final long-stop powers.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell) said earlier, we have all admired the interventions of the hon. Members for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher), Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and others who have spoken with a great deal of personal knowledge about these matters. If they have any faults, it is that they seem to feel that, ultimately, there is very little wrong and that our labour relations will get better if we take no action. However, the history of the last 15 or 20 years has been that of a series of Ministers, from Sir Walter Monckton and Iain Macleod down to my right hon. Friend the present Secretary of State, trying to avoid legislation of this sort. We have all tried, in successive Parliaments, to achieve these things by blissful agreement, cajolery and persuasion. It is only after a long history of trying that we have, most reluctantly, against all our disposition in the past, felt compelled to introduce these long-stop provisions. In no way will they remove the need for decent, proper negotiation.
Concerning labour relations and procedural defects, I think that it would be a very foolish manager or employer who did not co-operate with his unions and employees to achieve good procedural agreements. I would not prophesy for such an employer or industrialist a great future. In this enlightened age we should be working together to achieve something better for our industry because it is faced with a tremendous challenge overseas. Our rivals are tremendously efficient and we shall not easily win.
I disagree with the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) on one point. Unfortunately there are some stupid employers, and we have very defective procedural arrangements.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Mr. Carter) spoke with considerable experience about the defectiveness of procedures in British industry in general and in the car industry in particular. However, I did not follow his argument that that should be a reason for speaking against the Amendment. Comparing the industrial relations history of British Leyland with that of the Leyland Motor Company, before amalgamation, one can see a vast difference. The hon. Gentleman may be correct in illustrating some of the complicated procedures which have been laid down and putting a good deal of the blame on procedures adopted by British Leyland. I do not know whether that is right.
I agree that recourse to law should be the last resort. I think that everybody would agree about that. It is a trite saying—we have heard it so often, from this side particularly—that we are all in favour of voluntary agreements. Who is not, if they can be achieved?
I have already spoken of what I think are the gross deficiencies of Clauses 32 to 34, but we are dealing with different Clauses now. The whole point seems to be to deal with the hard core of cases which are a disgrace to British industry. We get examples, year after year, of the difficulty of getting any kind of agreement adhered to. It may be because the procedures are bad or because management is stubborn and refuses to advance with the times. It may also be because of recalcitrant trade unionists. I do not know. However, it is a hard core minority, and we should all be doing less than our duty if we did not face the problem.
The hon. Member for Northfield, speaking against the Amendment, is saying that it puts too much power in the hands of the Secretary of State. I do not regard it in that light. There is much expertise in the Department; its officers have long experience of conciliation. I regard this proposal as an extra sieve put in before getting to the stage of resorting to the law and, in particular, to the C.I.R. Resort to the C.I.R., after the conciliation officers' services have been invoked, is probably the most promising part of the procedures. I think that the controversial part of the Bill, Clauses 32 to 34—the valid enforcing of collective agreements—will be the least effective. It is in the expertise that will be developed over the years, through the C.I.R., and so on, that the value of the Bill will eventually be seen.
10.0 p.m.
I think that the Clause must be read in conjunction with Clauses 36–39. Clause 39, which is the long-stop, and which has the eventual compulsory power, is necessary, because we must face the fact that there are a few industries, and the motor car industry, or part of it, may be one of them, in respect of which, in the end, there will have to be recourse to the C.I.R. and to the Industrial Court. This will have to be done to deal with the situation where stubborn managements and stubborn union representatives are facing each other, and the public interest can go to blazes. I agree that this will apply in only a small minority of cases, but the Committee would be doing less than its duty if it did not face this problem and deal with it somehow.
If I were dealing with the problem, 1 should prefer to tackle it in the way in which German industry did, with a works constitutional law. I should prefer to tackle it from the other end, not from the top. I should prefer to tackle it from the works end itself. That would be my approach. But I am in favour of the Clause, and of the Amendment, because the problem has to be tackled somehow, and it is far better to have this procedure than to continue with the situation as it is today.
[MISS HARVIE ANDERSON in the Chair ]
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Mr. Carter) referred to procedure being the biggest cause of disputes, but the Donovan Report makes it clear that about 50 per cent. of disputes are concerned with it, and 50 per cent. are concerned with matters directly in line with what the hon. Gentleman has been talking about. It seems to me that the Minister is taking power to apply the provisions of subsection (3) by reference to a substantial and repeated loss of working time in a particular unit. I should like to draw the Minister's attention to the possible need to redefine that phrase, because it seems to me that we are concerned not so much with a loss of working time, as with a loss of production, and I personally should have liked to have seen the phrase "production" used there.
One has to recognise that if one puts a limitation on the power to use the Clause it will be possible for a group of men deliberately to fall outside the limitations imposed by ensuring that by means of a go-slow or work to rule they achieve the same effect but do not bring themselves within the provisions of the Clause.
The other thing which struck me was the hon. Gentleman's view that men will have at the back of their minds the fact that their behaviour might lead them to an action in court. The hon. Gentleman said that as though it is a major disaster that people should find themselves in that situation.
It is.
I am a motorist and, like most hon. Members, I am frequently in a hurry. When that happens, I am tempted to exceed the speed limit and to drive at 60 miles an hour when it would appear safe to do so, but I have at the back of my mind the thought that if I drive at that speed I may find myself faced with an action in court. What influences my decision not to drive at 60 miles an hour in a 30-mile-an-hour limit area is not the fact that I shall be dragged into the court, but the fact that I may face an action in court, and I am sure that other hon. Members find themselves in a similar position.
The hon. Member for Northfield has put his finger on something that is important. That is exactly and precisely what ought to be at the back of people's minds. They ought to remember that if they continually flout the accepted standards there will be some pressure on them to comply with those standards. I therefore believe that it is important to have this Clause in the Bill.
Mr. Carter rose ——
I should like to try to complete a brief intervention without having to give way two or three times.
My point was even more forcefully illustrated when the hon. Member spoke of British industry, particularly the motor industry, of which he has an expert knowledge, moving increasingly into a period of non-stop production. If that is so, it will be even more important to have the right procedures. Where there has been a complete breakdown in the procedures and a continual series of stoppages damaging to the point at which this Clause will operate, it must be right that something is done for the benefit not just of those involved in the disputes but for the far larger number of people, in the motor industry particularly, who cannot work although they are not involved in the dispute.
This kind of situation leads to good trade unionists being sent home. In the case of Vauxhall, 10 men, I think, went on strike and 5,700 were sent home. and another 4,000 put on short time. There was the case of British Leyland, in which five flow-control operators were on strike and 8,000 men were sent home.
It is in the interests of the trade unionists and the workers far more often that there should be effective procedures, so I support the Clause and the addition of the Amendment to ensure an added check that the Clause does not come into operation without all alternatives having been explored.
I put it to my right hon. Friends that there may be a misunderstanding in the Committee. Clarification would be helpful. Hon. Members opposite—the hon. Member for Northfield, I think—may be under the same impression as I was when I first read the Clause. I want to be certain that I am right now. The Clause refers to imposing "provisions". "Provisions", to me and to many hon. Members, implies something more than procedures. The word implies an ability to enforce a rate of pay or a set of working conditions related to a rate of pay, and does not simply mean procedures.
If it means only procedures, may I suggest that many hon. Members will feel much happier with this part of the Bill if the Minister can give us that assurance.
On that point, Clause 35 has in the side notes a reference to "procedural provisions". The word "provisions" appears in fact in Clause 36, which we have not yet reached. But I entirely take my hon. Friend's point that this could lead some people to think that "provisions", particularly in Clause 39, might mean substantive provisions. The intention is that the power of the court should relate only to procedural provisions as recommended by the C.I.R. I think that is right, but in the light of this point, we will look at the matter to make sure that it is set clear beyond doubt.
I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. Both I and, I think—from the nods of approval which I saw—some hon. Members opposite, are grateful for the clarification. It would be enormously helpful if the drafting could be altered on Report. Although it may be clear to members of the legal profession, certainly, to those of us who are not and to trade unionists who seek to interpret the Bill it would be a great help to have that clarification. It is clear to me that the hon. Member for Northfield was under a misapprehension in the case which he put.
In this and the previous discussion we have had an extensive review of the whole question of the enforcement of procedure agreements under certain conditions. Before coming to the specific points which were raised by the Under-Secretary, I have some general remarks to make on this subject.
The hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower), like most of his hon. Friends, does not appreciate the deep anxiety that is felt on this side of the Committee about the introduction of law into industrial relations. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, All Saints (Mr. Brian Walden) recently pointed out that my hon. Friends and trade unionists throughout the country feel a sense of deep offence at what the Government are doing. I will not labour this point, except to emphasise the revulsion which we feel at the introduction of law into this sphere of industrial relations.
Mr. David Mitchell rose ——
I will not give way. I wish to make progress.
Some hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to believe that procedure agreements can, by themselves, solve all the problems of industry. I wish that were true. I am all in favour of improving procedure agreements, but there are special circumstances in each industry which arise from time to time which even the best procedure agreement cannot solve.
Consider the docks. A special type of dirty cargo might arrive and it is possible for such a cargo not to be covered by any agreement. A trade union official will endeavour to negotiate an agreement with the employers, but no agreement may be reached and the workers may refuse to continue working until one is reached. It would not matter in these circumstances what procedure agreement existed urging a continuation of work; work would not be resumed until the matter was settled. This goes to show that in industry we are dealing with human relationships, and this must be borne in mind because it goes to the heart of industrial relations.
We are intrigued by what the Government have called their "long and valuable discussions" with Mr. George Woodcock and other members of the C.I.R. It is as a result of those discussions that this Amendment has been tabled. This must mean that Mr. Woodcock and his colleagues showed a great deal of anxiety about this part of the Bill, obviously because of the introduction of law affecting the whole position of the C.I.R. Obviously they objected to that. After all, they would probably not have taken their jobs had matters been arranged as they will be under the Bill.
10.15 p.m.
As the discussions have been mentioned, I express my regret that we could not have had a transcript of the discussions so that we could know what was said, why the discussions took place, and why ultimately an Amendment was tabled. It seems clear that this is a compromise Amendment arising from the discussions. The fact that members of the Commission felt they had to accept a compromise Amendment does not mean that we must do so.
The Under-Secretary made it clear that paragraph (b) was necessary to give people the right still to make an application to the Industrial Court at any time after notice had been given; he said that that right must continue. If that right must continue, it destroys the hon. Gentleman's whole previous argument.
The Amendment says: The Industrial Court shall not entertain an application made under this section by a party other than the Secretary of State unless that party, before making the application, has given notice to the Secretary of State of the proposal to make it … If notice is given, the Secretary of State can invoke his conciliation machinery.
Paragraph (b) says: nothing in the preceding paragraph shall prevent the party giving the notice from making an application under this section at any time after the notice has been given. It does not matter what efforts are being made by the Department, the party can still go to the court. Therefore, nothing is being given.
We cannot accept the Amendment. It does not make any real improvement. It has been tabled merely to placate some of the members of the C.I.R. who expressed genuine concern. It does not placate us. It does not solve the problem. I therefore ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote against it.
We have had a valuable debate. I welcome the comments made by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) in another of his very effective speeches in these proceedings. It is pleasing to hear such good sense coming from the benches opposite, although we appreciate the feelings of other hon. Gentlemen who speak with equal sincerity.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer) spoke about the discussions with the C.I.R. Obviously the discussions my right hon. Friend has had must be confidential, as would be discussions held by any Minister in any Government, because it would be intolerable if such discussions were published: nobody would have detailed discussions with a Minister unless there were that understanding. We welcome the advice of and opportunity for consultation with any organisation, including the C.I.R.
My hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) asked me whether in subsection (3) (b) the word "production" should be substituted for "working time". "Unit" need not be a production unit. It could be a service unit, which would probably not be covered. However, my hon. Friend may have a point here. Without any commitment, we will examine the point.
What do the Government mean by "notice"? Is it 24 hours, 48 hours, two months, three months or what?
I imagine that it is sufficient time to notify what is going on. I would have thought that was reasonably clear.
The debate underlines that the Amendment is needed. If it is made, it will impose an important condition, that conciliation processes should be first attempted as a condition of any reference to the C.I.R. This is important in view of all the parties that will be affected by the provisions of the Bill. Therefore, I recommend to hon. Members, even hon. Members opposite who are not in favour of the Bill as a whole, that the Amendment is a useful provision, bearing in hope that they will find it in their hearts not to vote against it.
Far be it from me to hold up the Divison on the Amendment, but one or two points that have arisen in the debate should be studied.
We have been asked why we oppose an Amendment which looks quite reasonable. We know that legislation like this operates in many countries and does not stop industrial disputes there; in all those countries they have more industrial disputes than we have. I remember a case in Southern Ireland only last year when a shop steward was sacked and the convenor of the shop stewards told the management, "You cannot sack Bill Jones". The management replied that he was sacked, and the convenor said, "We have a strike in this factory". He was dragged before the courts under legislation of this kind and was fined £40. In fact he went to prison instead, but his employers paid the fine because they said, "We cannot do without this man, because no work is being done in the factory". That is what will happen all over this country if the Government try to impose legislation of this kind.
Why are we opposed to the Bill and the Amendment? Because we do not believe in the Government's sincerity. They do not believe in consultation. What are they doing about the postal strike if they believe in consultation?
What about agreements?
We have had a postal strike for 14 days and no one is trying to end it. That is why we doubt the Government's sincerity.
The hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower), for example, talked about the Government's wanting to help the trade unions. He told us that he went to an international motor show in Geneva and found that the delivery of British cars was late, while the marvellous German workers in Volkswagen were providing delivery on the spot. What the hon. Gentleman did not say was that the German car workers get £60 a week,
twice as much as the British car workers, and they control the factory, because they have co-determination. If we want proper delivery we must give the motor car workers some participation in the industry.
Those are the relevant points in a debate like this. We do not believe in the Government's sincerity. We think that they are trying to undermine the unions to keep down the real incomes of the British people.
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 311, Noes 264.
Further Amendment made: No. 712, in page 25, line 29, at beginning insert: Subject to the last preceding subsection".— [Mr. Dudley Smith.]
Amendment No. 676 proposed: In page 25, line 38, leave out from first 'the' to end of subsection and insert:
"Commission should put to the representative bodies in the industry proposals for reform and seek to obtain their implementation by voluntary agreement".— [Mrs. Castle.]
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 263, Noes 311.
I beg to move Amendment No. 716, in page 25, lin 44, at end add: 'or a number of undertakings all of which are members of one employers' association, or part of those undertakings'. In moving my Amendment, I do not detract a word from my support for the Bill presented by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, and I support not only the principles of the Bill but the objectives which my right hon. Friend is determined to achieve.
Our present industrial relations legislation is more related to the conditions of the Tolpuddle Martyrs than many people would have us believe. It is natural and logical that the legislative proposals in the Bill should be seen by many people, and certainly by hon. Members opposite, as at best novel and at worst revolutionary, but I suggest to my right hon. Friend that he should not, and would not wish to, throw overboard such industrial relations practices as are relevant and seen to operate successfully in the context of collective bargaining.
As a relatively new Member of the House, I feel it incumbent on me to comment on the kind of observations made by hon. Members opposite in the context of their experience of industrial relations and to say that I and my hon. Friends take the strongest possible exception to the way they have assumed with arrogance that they and they alone have any experience in industrial relations. This is not a true reflection, and they know it.
It is essential that I should, briefly and with sincere modesty, present my credentials for moving this Amendment. I do so on the basis of a lifetime spent in the industry I continue to serve. I have served in the cotton and man-made textile industry from the shop floor where I learnt my technical skills and practical knowledge of contact with men and women and served as chairman of the local employers' association. I have served and still serve at national level as chairman or president of the employers' association covering my industry. I say this, I repeat, with modesty, by way of pointing out the arrogance which is coming from the other side of the Committee and which is totally irrelevant and will be ignored on these benches.
I also wish to place on record, because I am sure my trade union friends—and I choose that word advisedly—will appreciate it, that my industry's record in industrial relations has for generations been the envy of bigger and more important industries in this country. It is one of which the employers' and trade union representatives for the industry responsible for negotiations, are justifiably proud. The keynote of the basis of our success in industrial relations and the total absence of strikes in our industry for many years—and that is relevant to Clause 35—is that we have continued and feel bound to continue the practices of central negotiation which apply throughout all member firms covered by our association and also cover the whole membership of the trade unions with which we negotiate. I am certain that that is a major contributory factor to the peace in my section of industry.
The coming into operation of the Industrial Relations Bill is no ground, as can be seen, either by responsible trade union leaders, with whom I am in the closest contact, or by employers in my industry, for fear, panic, or, indeed, strike or major dissention. But I suggest that it is essential that procedures for dealing with problems should preferably be effective and simple to operate— [Interruptionj— I know that words along those lines, "simple to operate and to understand", have been voiced not only from this side, but from the other side of the Committee.
Clause 35 deals with action to be taken where procedural agreements prove defective. I do not consider that my industry has any evidence of procedural agreements being non-existent.
Then why is the hon. Gentleman moving the Amendment?
I note that all references to negotiations in Clause 35 relate to "the undertaking". About 120,000 men and women are employed in my industry, and procedural agreements are negotiated by the Textile Employers' Association. It therefore seems illogical and highly undesirable that the same employers should not be in a position to call in aid the remedial procedures outlined in the Clause.
The hon. Gentleman has used the word "undertaking". In the last debate I asked the hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend what "undertaking" meant. As the hon. Gentleman is now referring to and developing an argument on "undertaking", perhaps he will tell us what he means by it and perhaps his right hon. Friend will tell him whether he is right or wrong?
I certainly will, in the course of what I propose to say in moving the Amendment. If I fail to do so, the hon. Gentleman will be at liberty to come back to me and ask me to comment specifically if he considers it an omission with intent or indeed a failure on my part for one reason or another.
If my hon. Friend will refer his interrogator to the interpretation Clause, Clause 148, he will see that that gives the definition of "undertaking".
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for intervening on my behalf. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will take note of it.
The Secretary of State clearly and, I suggest, logically is anxious to find and use a form of wording for the Clause which he regards, and hopes will be seen, as universally applicable to all industries in Britain. The term "undertaking", I presume, is therefore appropriate within the context of the Clause and will fulfil the requirements of my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General when he seeks to use a word of universal applicability.
The cotton and man-made fibre textile processing industry, the wool industry, and the pottery industry are three examples of British industry, not inconsiderable in size compared with most British industry, which have certain characteristics which single them out from the general run of industry. They are made up of small units. They are small units technically, and in terms of numbers, employing between 150 and 300 men and women in each of these independent separate units. They also have in common the fact that they are large in number. There are a large number of these small units, or undertakings, whichever choice of words is appropriate under the circumstances, throughout the whole of any one section of the industry. They are small firms by commercial standards. The units, or, as I prefer to call them, and as the Bill refers to them in my context, undertakings, have the characteristic of homogeneity in the respect that technically they are alike. They have the same structure of machinery and system of processing. They have the same staffing, the same system of wages, payments and bonuses. They have the same system for the employment and deployment of all persons employed on the premises, and they have the same trade union representation at national level.
11.0 p.m.
They have a fifth characteristic which we feel is relevant to the Amendment. If difficulties or problems arise at one of these plants or undertakings, invariably in practice that is reflected, as it were, at plants through the length and breadth of the industry as a whole at that section of the staffing or the structure of the organisation. Under those conditions, I suggest that some co-ordination is surely desirable to remedy these defects.
Why is the hon. Gentleman so worried about plant bargaining taking place in the industry about which he is talking? This is happening in industry at the moment. Is the hon. Gentleman afraid that if plant bargaining was allowed this would lead to higher wages than those being paid collectively at the moment?
If I may reply obliquely to the hon. Gentleman, I suggest that that is not relevant to the Amendment, for the good reason that the procedural agreements which are in existence are effective in operation and are welcomed by the trade unions and employers' associations alike, and it is for that reason that I am asking the Committee to accept the Amendment in the terms in which it is couched.
The hon. Gentleman has made a speech during which he has proved conclusively that his right hon. Friend is wrong in bringing forward trade union legislation. He has proved that in the textile and fibre industry no such legislation has ever been necessary. Will the hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend take note of what he has said?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that comment. I am sure that he must have ignored the opening remarks of my speech, which made it abundantly clear that I wholeheartedly support the principles and the objectives of the Bill, and in so doing I assure the Committee that there is more widespread support for this Measure amongst employers and trade union members than hon. Gentlemen opposite would have the Committee believe.
I can illustrate my point by saying that in the weaving section of the industry there are 350 separate undertakings or units, all with identical qualities or characteristics. At each mill there are overlookers, twisters and drawers. For the benefit of the right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition, I should point out that they have no connection with the travel agency to which he referred the other day. All these mills have reachersin. There are also about 150 spinning mills in operation. All have strippers and grinders—who have no relevance to the West End of London but are of tremendous technical and industrial importance in the North-West. All are in craft unions, and are responsible men.
Under the Clause any remedial action required to be taken in connection with procedures—and that has no connection with stripping or grinding—would, in practice, have to be taken by as many as 200 or 200 separate employers. I strongly suggest that the making of such references would inundate the Secretary of State and the Industrial Relations Court, and would certainly swamp the Commission in Industrial Relations. I submit that the Amendment is the only practicable way in which we can deal with the special situation to which I have referred—special in the sense that all three industries enjoy the characteristics of homogeneity.
In terms of subsection (4) the Amendment would be permissive and not mandatory for the Secretary of State and the Industrial Relations Court. It would be highly undesirable if such an Amendment were allowed to open a gate through which the whole of British industry could pass.
I submit that there are four main reasons to justify the acceptance of the Amendment. First, the Bill aims to promote and facilitate collective bar- gaining, and I assure the Committee that the Amendment would enable the employers' associations, in close collaboration with their trade union opposite numbers, to promote effective collective bargaining. Second, the Amendment would leave absolute discretion, in terms of further references, in the hands of the Secretary of State and, through him, the Industrial Relations Court. They would not go as of right through the Industrial Relations Court to the Commission.
Third, the Amendment will not impose a procedure on an unwilling group of employers or unionists in the industries to which I refer. Fourth, the Amendment will strengthen, not weaken, the existing long-standing prudent proceedings for efficient collective negotiations and would deal with defects in the application of centrally-negotiated agreements which must continue for the benefit of the trade unions, the employers' associations and union members.
I hope that the Solicitor-General will at least give further thought to this. I know that he has already given considerable thought to it, but I hope that, on reflection, he will be prepared to try to find some means of achieving this object, to the advantage of three identifiably important sections of industry, without prejudicing the effectiveness of Clause 35.
The Solicitor-General rose ——
On a point of order. Would it be possible for you, Sir Robert, with your authority, to arrange that the speech to which we have just listened be transmitted direct to the Cheadle and Gatley Courier and the Textile Weekly Gazette, without being processed through HANSARD?
The hon. Gentleman is as good a Parliamentarian as any in the House, and knows quite well that that is not a point of order.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mr. Norman-ton) has underlined the value and importance of industry-wide agreements, unenforceable but honoured and respected as they are. But he has not made out a case for enforcing these— [Laughter.] I am glad that I have the support of hon. Members opposite. The provisions of this Clause are designed to be used in special cases according to exacting criteria and in situations where voluntary agreements have broken down. They cannot and need not be extended to wider ranges than the particular units we are suggesting they apply to.
It cannot be accepted by the Committee that something which is designed to apply by reference to specific and exacting criteria should be applied across the whole breadth of an employers' association, in particular if the situation is such as my hon. Friend describes, where a voluntary system is working well. If a situation were to develop in any industry where the provisions of Clause 35 have not been invoked, it could be extended thereafter if it proved necessary. But I cannot commend the Amendment to the Committee.
11.15 p.m.
I congratulate the Solicitor-General on refusing to accept the Amendment and I rise simply to correct a point which the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mr. Norman-ton) made on at least two occasions during his remarks.
Nobody would challenge the credentials of the hon. Gentleman to speak on behalf of the employers' organisation in the textile industry. On the other hand, I want to know why he thinks he can speak on behalf of trade unionists in this industry. I am sure that he would not wish to mislead the Committee, certainly not knowingly. I will, therefore, quote two passages from the submissions made by the National Union of Textile and Allied Workers about the Bill. The hon. Member for Normanton gave the impression that many responsible trade unionists in this industry supported not only his Amendment but also the Bill in its entirety. At the end of its submissions, this union commented: The general feeling of this trade union is that this attempt to resolve the problems of industry by legislation would be harmful in general but particularly to this union. In other words, not only does it object to the Bill in general, but it objects also because of the harm it would do to the union in particular. It went on: We do not see the present Bill as suitable to meet the problem, and very much regret the need to spend so much time of too many people on this abortive approach to the very wide problems of industrial relations. No condemnation of mine could refute more accurately the statements which the hon. Member for Normanton made, no doubt unwittingly, but which may have mislead the Committee.
This short intervention will not be popular with hon. Gentlemen opposite— [Interruption.] but I am not concerned with them, and if they will be quiet and listen for a moment they will realise why, including the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle).
The contribution of the hon. Member for Oldham, East (Mr. Lamond) was entirely proper, because he gave an answer to a case which had been made out by my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mr. Normanton). I have no complaint with that. However, I have real complaint—and I could not sit silently without commenting on it—with the superior, arrogant and intolerant way in which hon. Gentlemen opposite received my hon. Friend's speech. [Interruption.]
My hon. Friend came here to put a case [HON. MEMBERS: "Sit down."]—I said that my intervention would not be popular with hon. Gentlemen opposite—and he went to a great deal of trouble to see that it was put in a proper form. But the whole demeanour of hon. Gentlemen opposite was that my hon. Friend was intruding. But, feeling as my hon. Friend does about this, he was entitled to put his case, and he did so. The superior arrogance of hon. Gentlemen opposite is no compliment to Parliament.
I, too, will be brief, mainly because the guillotine is about to fall. It annoys us when hon. Gentlemen opposite who have not taken part in our proceedings for several days finally come here, as the guillotine is about to fall, and spend our valuable time moving Amendments which the Government reject.
If the imputation is that I have come here just for the purpose of moving this Amendment, that is inaccurate, as hon. Members who have been here throughout the Committee stage on the Bill will confirm. What the hon. Gentleman said is a slander and is far from the truth. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] I make it clear that this is a matter which I have sought and will continue to seek to present to the Committee within the context of the Bill. I have on several other occasions tabled Amendments which have not been called. It ill behoves any hon. Member opposite to make that kind of comment.
Whilst expressing considerable disappointment at the response of my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General
in reply to my Amendment, in view of discussions which have obviously built up I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Is it your pleasure that the Amendment be withdrawn?
No.
Amendment negatived.
Question put, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 311, Noes 264.
Clause 35, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
PROVISION FOR EXTENDING SCOPE OF REFERENCE UNDER SECTION 35
11.30 p.m.
Amendment made: No. 713, in page 26, line 1, leave out '35' and insert '35(3)'.— [Mr. R. Carr.]
The next Amendment is No. 678, in page 26, line 13, at end insert: 'with agreement of the parties'. standing in the name of the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle), the name of the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and the names of other hon. Members.
In view of the time factor and the fact that we are operating under a guillotine, I wish to say—under protest—"Not moved".
The next Amendment is No. 693, in page 26, line 20, at end insert: 'and to every trade union which the Commission shall consider to have members likely to be affected by them'. standing in the name of the hon. Member for Kensington, North (Mr. Douglas-Mann), together with the following Amendments also in his name:
No. 695, in page 26, line 24, after 'person', insert 'or trade union'. No. 699, in Clause 44, page 32, line 18, at end insert: 'and to every trade union which the Commission shall consider to have members likely to be so affected'. No. 701, in page 32, line 27, after 'person', insert 'or trade union'.
No. 702, in Clause 45, page 33, line 18, at end insert: (d) to every person and trade union which had been a party to the application or which had given notice under section 44(4) of this Act.
Under protest, not moved.
The next Amendment is No. 694, in page 26, line 21, leave out 'two weeks' and insert 'six weeks' standing in the name of the hon. Member for Kensington, North (Mr. Douglas-Mann).
Again under protest, not moved.
Question put, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 309, Noes 264.
Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
ACTION BY COMMISSION FOR PROMOTING SETTLEMENT OF QUESTION REFERRED UNDER S. 35
11.45 p.m.
I beg to move, Amendment No. 684, in page 27, line 31, leave out from 'provisions' to end of subsection.
It will be for the convenience of the Committee to take also Amendment No. 685, in page 27, line 40, leave out from 'effect' to end of subsection and insert 'to the Secretary of State'.
The Amendment follows logically from our earlier Amendments and from our presentation of the rôle of the C.I.R. in relation to defective or non-existent procedures. We have set out our case cogently and clearly for the rejection of the concept of legally enforceable collective agreements. We have also demonstrated to the Committee how damaging it is to the rôle and standing of the C.I.R. to require it actively to engage in the legal apparatus which the Government are setting up. We therefore now reject the obligation which is being imposed on the C.I.R. to promote, albeit in exceptional cases, legally enforceable collective agreements.
The right hon. Gentleman said in earlier debates that subsection (3) adequately met the point of our Amendment No. 676, which said that the C.I.R. should obtain implementation of reform by voluntary agreement. I have examined the right hon. Gentleman's claim, and he has a most curious idea of what constitutes a voluntary agreement. The subsection says that the Commission shall seek to promote agreements— so formulated as to be capable of having effect as a legally enforceable contract. Surely, a voluntary, free unrestricted agreement, to which the Government have so frequently paid lip service, means that the parties unaided, without coercive Governmental or extra-governmental pressure, should determine whether the agreement should be legally enforceable.
Under the common law, even if a case is pending, if both sides voluntarily agree to a settlement the judge will automatically agree that there is no need to proceed. Is my hon. Friend suggesting the same thing here?
Yes. If the right hon. Gentleman means that above all he wants people on both sides of industry voluntarily of their own will to enter into agreements, what is the purpose of the provisions in the Bill to coerce them into agreements?
I do not want to conclude without refering to the intemperate, if not hysterical, outburst of the hon. Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell) when he worked himself into a lather about what he saw as the destructive rôle of my right hon. Friend, my hon. Friends on the Front Bench and myself. If in our earlier debates I spoke with some vigour and in a rough manner, I think the Committee will accept that this is characteristic of me—
On a point of order. Sir Robert, may I ask you to request the Serjeant at Arms to get those hon. Gentlemen who are holding an unofficial meeting of strike-breakers at the end of the Chamber to conduct their proceedings outside the Chamber, because I want to listen to my hon. Friend?
Order. I hope that hon. Members will keep as quiet as possible.
I was referring to the intemperate remarks of the hon. Members for Yarmouth. After a difficult period in which my right hon. Friend the Mem- ber for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) tried to establish achievements of which she and I are justly proud, I am entitled to speak with some vigour when the Conservative Government seek to destroy those achievements. When the hon. Gentleman accuses people of being destructive, let me say to him: "Physician heal thyself". Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are the people who are being destructive and we are entitled to protest against their actions. We are the defenders of order and the status quo and are entitled to express ourselves vigorously about what we believe in.
I believed then, and believe now, that the C.I.R. as established by my right hon. Friend, with its rôle outlined in our White Paper, is a powerful force for good in industrial relations, and I suggest that our proposed reforms and procedures are the right way to proceed. It is because I am so concerned about industrial relations, as someone who has been involved from both inside and outside Parliament for the whole of my adult life, that I am entitled to express concern about the state of industrial relations. I am concerned about the people whose lives will be regulated by these provisions and I am concerned about the national interest. When the Government do things that run counter to all the good we have done, we are compelled to protest with all the vigour of which we are capable, and we shall continue to protest.
These two Amendments follow precisely on the earlier Amendments and the objections are on the same lines. The Committee might find it helpful to read subsections (3) and (4) together. It is true that in subsection (3) the Commission is directed to promote and assist discussions between the parties to the reference with a view to obtaining their agreement in a form which would be suitable for legal enforcement.
One advantage of an agreement that is suitable for legal enforcement, even if it is never made legally binding, is that it should be precise and clear. Precision and clarity are sometimes lacking in some agreements in industry today and they are good things in themselves.
Subsection (4) says If, at any time after the Commission have made a determination under subsection (1) of this section, the Commission are satisfied that the purposes for which the reference was made have been or will be adequately fulfilled without continuing the proceedings on that reference, the Commission shall make a report to that effect.… In other words, we are telling the Commission that, if it is encouraging the parties to the point at which they are able to make a voluntary agreement without further assistance, it should discharge the reference and leave the parties to agree in the normal, voluntary way.
Taking the two subsections together, plus the others, it remains true that we reserve for the most exceptional case the possibility of imposing legal enforcement, and we are giving the maximum encouragement—indeed, the maximum requirernent—for efforts to be made to achieve settlements by voluntary means.
I ask the Committee to reject the Amendment.
The right hon. Gentleman must be clear about two matters. The first is that we are against the imposition of legally enforceable contracts as such. The second is that we are against the imposition of legally enforceable contracts, even as a last resort, in the national interest or in the case of an emergency.
I find it hard to imagine how the two can go together and last for the sort of procedural time that the right hon. Gentleman referred to in our last debate. In industry, any national emergency lasting 18 months would be far easier to solve by bringing in Scamp or someone like him.
The right hon. Gentleman said that, if the Commission succeeded in bringing the parties together and they appeared to be coming to some sort of agreement acceptable to the Commission, it could hen apply to the industrial court to have the reference discharged. However, the only type of agreement that we are considering is a written one. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman is saying that a written agreement will be arrived at either by compelling the parties under the direction of the Commission or, as he prefers to call it, by the encouragement of the Commission, or an agreement will be imposed by compelling the Industrial Court to enforce it. Which- ever way the right hon. Gentleman goes about the procedures that he proposes, a written legally binding agreement will be imposed through the action either of the Commission or of the court.
That is the sole purpose of the Clause, and we are against it. For that reason, we support the Amendment, which proposes the deletion of all reference to the legally enforceable character of the contract.
Our second Amendment is equally important. It has long been our contention that the right hon. Gentleman is trying to foist on to the Industrial Court the responsibility for making policy decisions which should be his. As we have seen in the electricity power workers' dispute, the right hon. Gentleman is afraid to make up his mind and show his hand. The responsibility for making policy decisions is the Government's, and the right hon. Gentleman is trying to foist it on to outside bodies.
We want to make the Secretary of State accept the responsibility which is properly his. He should be the guardian of good industrial relations. He should try to act in this capacity, rather than as a person who claims that he is not intervening and then applies all sorts of pressures from the outside.
We say that if, in fact——
It being Twelve o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again, pursuant to Order [25th January].
Committee report Progress; to sit again this day.
ANIMALS BILL [Lords]
Order for Second Reading read.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 60A (Second Reading Committees) , That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Question agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Bill committed to a Standing Committee pursuant to Standing Order No. 40 (Committal of Bills.)
WEDDING PHOTOGRAPHS (FRAUDULENT PRACTICES)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Weatherill.]
12.1 a.m.
I wish to raise a very human issue which is attracting much attention in Bristol. This is because of the efforts of the local newspaper, the Bristol Evening Post , the offices of which famous paper are in my constituency, in exposing what I can only describe as a heartless fraud or a cheat on a section of the public. This section is from time to time fairly numerous: those who are marrying, their relatives and their friends. I believe that the investigations of the Bristol Evening Post in this regard are in the best tradition of Bristol local journalism, as I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South (Mr. Michael Cocks) will agree.
I am grateful for the evidence freely placed at my disposal by the Bristol Evening Post . What I am about to describe occurs in Bristol, as I shall show, but from all reports, I do not think that it is unknown elsewhere in the country. In Bristol, as elsewhere, an increasing number of weddings—a social tendency, I think—take place in register offices and such weddings are possibly a little less formal than church weddings in their organisation and in their arrangements for photography. The latter are not always made far in advance of the date of the wedding, if at all.
Therefore, it is generally, but not exclusively, register office weddings which attract the attention of those photographers—I do not wish to use too strong a word, but I think this is fair in the circumstances—who tout for orders either in advance or on the day. If they are given permission to take photographs, it is always on the attractive understanding that no money will be paid until proofs are submitted.
As is well known, many people, under pressure of salesmanship enter arrangements with these available photographers in presumably the same way as at one time, before legislation was brought in to deal with abuse, unsuspecting housewives and others entered hire-purchase agreements which they bitterly regretted afterwards.
If the Minister quotes, as he quite fairly might, the old legal saying, "Let the buyer beware", I agree. But I should point out that the law, despite this old view that it is for the buyer to protect himself, has had to step in to protect purchasers of goods on the deferred payments system. Since then there has been a further growth of consumer protection legislation—particularly the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968, to which I shall return later.
The practice about which I am complaining, which has caused so much distress, is operated in the following way. After attending the wedding ceremony, the photographer rushes immediate proofs to the reception. The proofs are circulated among the guests, and, in the cordial atmosphere of the wedding reception, orders are easily obtained from the bride and groom, their parents, relatives and friends. As the prints at this stage look good, the would-be purchasers part with their money fairly easily, and the finished photographs are verbally promised for delivery usually, in the cases which I have studied, within two weeks to two months. It is from this time onwards that the troubles begin.
There is in existence of the offices of the Bristol Evening Post a large file of about 120 letters, to which I have had access, complaining of lack of delivery of photographs despite telephone calls, letters, visits, and every kind of pressure, including, at times, quite understandably, a great deal of abuse. But every kind of excuse is proffered for non-delivery. It is never said that the photographs will not arrive in the end; it is said to be due to staff illness, technical difficulties, loss of records—even burglary.
The mental distress caused, particularly to the bride and groom and their respective families, is intense. Photographs taken at the wedding and afterwards at the reception are in a special category, because they capture moments which cannot return. They portray a unique episode in the lives of the bride and groom and their families. Such a time cannot come again. I have heard stories of brides being dressed again in their wedding gowns and going through a photographed re-enactment of the wedding ceremony so that they may have some record, because the original photographs have not arrived.
What remedy is open to the victims of this fraud? The criminal law is of no help. Complaint in these cases to the Bristol police has brought the response that, though there may be some element of deceit—a moral fraud—fraud, in the legal sense, cannot be charged as there has been no refusal to deliver the photographs, only an outrageous delay. In short, there is no proof of intent to defraud, as the lawyers would say. That is the difficulty in the way of the police, or so I am told.
The police give an answer to those who come to the police station and complain similar to that which the Minister gave to me in a Written Answer on 14th December, which I shall now read. When I asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will introduce legislation to make it an offence for photographers of weddings and the associated bridal receptions not to deliver the photographs within a specified period of time unless fees are paid by the would-be purchaser in advance are returned in full", the hon. Gentleman gave the answer which I understand the police in different words give in these circumstances: No, such a case is best left to the civil law of contract."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1970; Vol. 808, c. 229 .] I appreciate that on an Adjournment debate it is not for me to suggest new legislation, and I shall not do so, but the difficulty about a civil action is that it is no remedy in these circumstances, because the goods in question which have not been supplied are intensely personal, and my constituents who have complained about this—and others, too—tell me that they do not want revenge, they do not want damages, all they want are their pictures.
The public who have been injured in this respect naturally turn to the consumer protection legislation which is now getting very well known in the country, and in particular to the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968. I am therefore glad that the hon. Gentleman is to reply on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry, because he may be able to tell me what guidance is given to local inspectors about the application of Section 14 of that Act, which is the relevant Section, if any Section at all can apply to a case of this kind.
That Section relates to false or misleading statements as to services, and so on, as distinct from goods, and I think that it might have application in this instance, but I am not sure. The local weights and measures inspector regretted his inability to use Section 14 of the Act, and therefore I should be glad of an opinion from the hon. Gentleman.
There is a further remedy which is open to the public, and that is to deal with photographers of repute and here I think the trade itself could assist. The great majority of commercial photographers—I want no misunderstanding about this—are undoubtedly highly respectable people and do an excellent job. This is the case in Bristol, as elsewhere. In order to protect reputable people, particularly those in Bristol as I am dealing with Bristol cases, I propose to name the firms about whom complaints have been made in the correspondence that I have seen.
I would not normally do this, because I think that the protection which we have in this House because of Parliamentary privilege has to be used with moderation, but in order not to cast any slur on the good name of respectable firms, and also because the names were given in the Bristol Evening Post on 3rd November last year, so that if those who have been criticised in this respect want a remedy in the courts it is clearly available to them there, and I tell the House that the firms in question are Shannon Studios, Modern Brides, and West of England Studios. These names cropped up continually in the correspondence I have seen.
I think that the commercial photography trade could help to organise against the small minority of cheats within its ranks, and I have today had delivered to me—by hand, because of the postal strike—a letter from a body which, though I might have heard of it before, I confess that I have not had any dealings with, and that is the Institute of Incorporated Photographers. This body was apparently founded in 1901, and it has more than 4,000 members.
In the course of its letter it says: Members of the public using the services of Incorporated Photographers are assured of a professional service within that code of conduct and have the right of complaint to this Institute in any case of dispute between client and photographer, as this Institute has powers of arbitration. I am glad to know that, but what is required in addition is, perhaps, a published register of photographers of repute, established under the supervision of the trade itself.
If this were given wide publicity in addition to the protection, up to a point, which legislation might give, the public —which nowadays depends so much on the good photographer as part of its life —would be tremendously assisted.
12.15 a.m.
The hon. Member for Bristol, Central (Mr. Palmer) has performed a useful service in airing this matter tonight. The presence of five hon. Members representing Bristol constituencies shows the interest that the House has in the rather unusual and unfortunate practice to which the hon. Gentleman has drawn attention. As I understand it, what happens is that a photographer turns up uninvited at a wedding, takes some photographs, brings the proofs fairly quickly to the reception, and takes money against orders for the delivery of the finished prints—after which very little is heard of him; indeed, his speed in producing the proofs is matched only by his dilatoriness in producing the prints.
It is not for me to say whether these cases fall within the law or outside it; I have not the evidence, and it would be wrong for me to try to anticipate what the courts might say. The most useful thing that I can do is to try to indicate the exact state of the law in relation to this matter and form an opinion whether the law is adequate for dealing with this sort of abuse. The House would probably agree—translating the hon. Member's words into Latin—that the caveat emptor principle still stands, because these people were not asked to the wedding to take photographs.
In some cases the bride and bridegroom, or the relatives or parents, are approached in advance, so that the photographer comes under an arrangement.
I am glad to have that from the hon. Member. But it would clearly be wiser not to accept photographs from uninvited photographers, especially at such an important occasion as one's wedding.
Section 14 of the Trade Descriptions Act deals, among other things, with false statements as to the provision of a service or facility, or the time at which a service or facility is provided. To be caught by this Section such a statement must be false to a material degree, and the person must have made it recklessly, or knowing it to be false. Local weights and measures authorities are under a duty to enforce the Trade Descriptions Act, and have all the powers necessary to investigate suspected offences that are brought to their notice.
Although the powers under Section 14 have not been tested in the higher courts, there has been a case in which a photographer has been brought before a magistrates' court and convicted because he indicated that his pictures would be mailed in 7-21 days and they were not so mailed. He failed to send them within the time limit.
The hon. Gentleman asked me for guidance about the relevance of Section 14 and what I have said shows that one crucial point is whether a time was offered within which the photographs would be delivered; if that time were not met, the photographer might be liable—although it is not for me to interpret the application of the Act in any particular case, but for the court. The hon. Gentleman was a little pessimistic in his interpretation of the extent to which the criminal law applies to cases like this. There are provisions which may in certain circumstances bite on this sort of problem.
Section 15 of the Theft Act, 1967, makes it an offence for a person by any deception dishonestly to obtain property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving him of it. If someone took money with no intention of providing whatever it was paid for—photographs, for example—that person might fall foul of this provision, and it would be for the police to prosecute.
Further, the criminal law can properly deal with a case in which someone tries to attract custom by offering what he knows he cannot provide or by offering something without having taken reasonable steps to ensure that it can be provided when the due time comes. But very properly, it does not imperil the man who offers something, reasonably expecting to be able to provide it but eventually finding that he cannot do so because something beyond his control has intervened.
For instance, suppose that someone contracts to mow my lawn on Saturday morning, but his lawnmower breaks down on a Friday night or he has appendicitis or it pours with rain on Saturday morning; he cannot fulfil his contract for perfectly understandable reasons and it would be wrong to make a criminal out of him.
That describes the possible application of the criminal law—
Where, as my hon. Friend said, there is a great deal of evidence touching on a number of firms over a longer period, suggesting that this is not an accident for which the man, the photographer, is not responsible, can this collection of events be brought to bear to influence the police in drawing their own conclusions about the intent of the photographer not to supply prints?
The proof of the pudding would be if, after a certain period, the prints continue not to be supplied. The postponement of delivery indefinitely creates an offence, but as no time limit was offered, apparently, according to the hon. Member, it is difficult to pin it under the Trade Descriptions Act, and the criminal proceedings which I have discussed would be applicable if delivery were delayed for a very long time.
But these are not matters to which I can give an answer directly, because they obviously depend on whether the police, the prosecuting authority in such a matter, feel that the law has been broken. All that I can do is try to describe the law in the hope that it will be of some help to the hon. Gentleman and his constituents.
Therefore, in some cases, the breach of an undertaking may have been so deliberate and foreseeable that the criminal law can properly be brought to bear. I think that the criminal law is already adequately framed for such cases. In other cases, what is involved is no more than a simple breach of contract, for which only the remedies of the civil law are appropriate.
From what the hon. Gentleman said, this may well be the case in many of the instances which he has quoted. If a letter is sent from a Solicitor it has been known to evoke a response. There is this further channel of redress of using the civil law to get the photographs or the money back. I cannot judge, in the fashion of a court, on which side of the line the difficulties which the hon. Gentleman has mentioned lie. If there were reason to suspect a breach of the Theft Act or the Trade Descriptions Act, I am sure that the police or the local weights and measures authority would go into this very carefully and do their best. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman said that they had been consulted. It is up to them to decide what they should do in this case.
I doubt, however, whether there is any meaningful way in which the law can be changed. The law is comprehensive, both the civil and criminal law, as it is under the Trade Descripton Act. I do not quite see how this issue could be dealt with by fresh legislation. Nor do I think it necessary.
On the other hand, if the people of Bristol know that those who have ordered photographs from a speculative photographer have often had a good deal of difficulty in getting them delivered within a reasonable time, then if Bristolians have anything like the native wit and caution for which I give them credit, they will be very hesitant about placing such orders in future.
The hon. Gentleman having aired the matter tonight, I am sure that the local Press will take up what he said. This in itself will do a great deal to warn people of the dangers of this practice. Perhaps this will allow competition from the reputable—and I am sure that many of them in Bristol are reputable—photographers to take the business which has so far been provided unsatisfactorily by the people the hon. Gentleman mentioned. I hope that this will be so, and it may be that publicity of that sort, which the hon. Gentleman is seeking to achieve tonight, will do more good than trying to bend the law to fit into every sort of situation, including that which he described tonight.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes past Twelve o'clock.